

ITALY
CORSICA-SARDINIA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: The Secretariat
Attention: Mr. Robert Thrum
FROM: Earl Brennan
SUBJECT: Cavaliers of Liberty

DATE: May 25, 1944

Consequent to your telephone conversation yesterday with Lt. Orlando I forward herewith for your information and for appropriate action a copy of a report which we have received from Mr. Vincent Scamporino, my chief deputy in Italy, relative to the Soldier-Volunteer Movement. I refer you in particular to the second paragraph of this report in which it is indicated that the Cavaliers of Liberty have been dissolved.

ND

*returned to
Mr. Brennan*

E.B.
E.B.

Attachment as described above

*File
EJP
RT*

Not: This is relevant in respect of the General's cable to Algiers ordering me and do this movement, since it looked political rather than military. Since it has been dissolved in view of the fall of Rome, the committee, though I insist, are academic on the particular issue. RT

MS

SICILY TO DAY

The Italian island of Sicily, the Allied invasion of Sicily was not only a military operation, but also a political one. Our aim was to liberate Sicily from the German occupation and to establish a democratic government. Our aim was to liberate Sicily from the German occupation and to establish a democratic government. Our aim was to liberate Sicily from the German occupation and to establish a democratic government.

From the outset, two aims were in our mind. First, Sicily was the first overthrow of Fascism. Secondly, the rubber methods of the German occupation had severely drained the economic resources of the already impoverished island. Fascism had hit Sicily particularly hard. The island paid dearly for the privilege of being governed from Rome. While the peasantry lived on the most meagre diet, large quantities of grain and fruit were compulsorily exported to the mainland. With Italy's entry into the war, the hardships were increased. Throughout the summer of 1943, there was no bread, no "pasta" - the main food in Sicily - and no meat. Then from July 10, the restraint of the German troops in the rear utterly collapsed and they indulged in mass robbery and violence. Whole villages were systematically looted of food, clothing, bedding, jewellery and other valuables, while in the towns shops were sacked as the army fell back. From that date the Sicilians suffered their bitterest humiliation and terror.

The Sicilians were eager for change. But against this must be reckoned the effects of our intensive pre-invasion bombing of the large population centres, and of anti-Allies propaganda. Sicily was by no means sure that she wanted the British or American variety of change. Add to this the "hate thy enemy" theme, which, complete with lavish illustrations, had been plugged over the air. Add the fact that Rome radio and the press, especially from the time of our landings, told the country that the British would inflict every known violence and brutality. No wonder then that when our troops entered the southern towns of Noto, Vizzini, Ramacca, etc., during the first days of the invasion, they were sometimes met by a silent and uncertain people very different from those who greeted Tunis, Sousse and Sfax.

It was during these days that we achieved our first political success. The army advanced rapidly and with complete order. In their contacts with the civilians, the men were good-humoured, kind and helpful. In a fortnight, three years of propaganda was nullified. The news spread rapidly. On July 10, far to the north, the people of Messina trembled when they heard the fascist tolling of the bells which announced the invasion. A fortnight later they were watching the sea and the road eagerly for the approach of the Allies. If they had not forgotten the almost total destruction of their city, they were prepared to forgive. Those who have seen the extent of the damage and disruption of life in this town, will agree that we won a really big political victory, and laid a firm basis for complete winning over the Sicilians. Why then, do so many Sicilians now look at us with questioning and doubtful eyes?

When Amgot issued the first ration of white American flour, to the small shopkeeper, in the village of Galati St. Anna, the proprietor kept the white flour, and issued to the unsuspecting villagers a very inferior coarse brown German substitute. And here was no power to prevent it, nor to punish. So operated Amgot. The right hand provided and the left hand deprived. The official price of flour is a few lire a kilo, and the ration is two grammes a day per head. When

occupation of Sicily began from a British soldier in 1943, and he recent return to this country.

Amgot issued flour at 10 lire a kilo, the best moment a ration issued it at 15. The people bought at this price, and nothing was done about it. A week later the price went up to 20 lire a kilo, and still no steps were taken on a large scale. Later the price became 60-70 lire.

In the summer - until about September in Sicily - it is difficult to starve. There is an abundance of fruit and a fair amount of vegetable. Near the coast there is fish. By October all food was scarce. You could buy ice-cream and pastries at 40 each (a Sicilian must work a whole day to buy three pastries). But there was no fruit apart from lemons, no vegetables, no canned food, no fish in the interior, little meat and little flour. Nobody is starving in Sicily, but serious malnutrition is the rule. Above all, the people have stopped asking troops when we're going to bring food. Instead there have been food demonstrations in towns like Messina. The cruellest indictment of our failure to foresee and prepare for the food shortage is the startling appearance of casual prostitution by women whose husbands are in the Italian army. "Liberated" women have offered their bodies for a tin of bully beef.

Amgot has not been successful in reconstituting even the minimum social services. The schools did not open until December 1, ten weeks after fighting ceased. One wonders, in view of other evidence, how the teachers are being selected. Further north at all, or only the scantiest provision was made to link up towns with their surrounding villages. Thus there was little distribution of whatever local produce was available. The roads were crowded with ox-carts and donkey carts as well as pedestrians, seriously hampering military traffic. Medical services are still of the most haphazard nature. Many local doctors went to Italy with the Germans; others moved out of battle zones and have not returned. None of those left is obliged to visit a sick person if he does not wish to.

Underlying - and sometimes overlying - every other problem of social reorganization in occupied enemy territory is the problem of Fascism. Much of what happened in Sicily will be paralleled in other countries. Sicily has been, and still is, the first real testing ground. The lesson is clear; it is not, as in Africa, complicated by an Arab question, nor by the peculiarities of French politics.

In Sicily Fascism had the great advantage of being already organized. The Party and the groups were there - shaken, fractured perhaps, but still there. Anti-Fascism had to be organized. Yet the first detailed proclamation of the Allies posted in every village and town, declared the Fascist Party to be illegal and dissolved, and also declared all other political organizations to be equally illegal. Thus by virtually banning unaided action by the people the most valuable weapon for attacking not only the political roots of Fascist influence and teaching, but all forms of re-organizing, was lost to us. Amgot officials and Field Security men wandered about in the dark with hopelessly incomplete lists, waiting to catch a criminal, when an authorized village council could have infinitely simplified their work.

It may be coincidence, but the highest native civil authority in Messina is the mayor, Micali, well known to the people of his city for his Fascist activities. Micali is recognised by one and all as the arch-villain in the administrative plot, but up to a few weeks ago was, and I suppose still is, Amgot's chief adviser on local affairs. In the same town it is accepted as unchangeable that the majority of the interpreters employed by Amgot are not only just ex-Fascist Party members, but are ardent Fascist sympathisers. Several "squadristi" - foundation members of the Party - are known by the people to have returned to the city to develop illegal activity.

The people must be given knowledge, and the


The New York Times and Morning Post, February 5, 1945
power to use all Fascist specialists in general information, but merely knowledge. What we have done in Sicily to counter false information is negligible. Most Sicilians still believe that the Germans nearly destroyed London in 1941, captured Moscow in 1941, and are subjected to the most atrocious in Russia and in British prisons of the camps. They have no idea of the true state of Sicily.

How can we give power to the people? We give them a significant amount of government. The stated Amgot mission operation is to collaborate where possible with existing local authority. In the cases where this means a Fascist authority, they have decided where collaboration is possible. They decided to collaborate with Micali, the Fascist mayor of Messina?

In any village or town, only the people are in a position to determine whether or not the existing local authority is to be trusted, and only they are capable quickly of indicating which man is reliable. If free, secret, local elections had been the first act of Amgot, if the people could have chosen their own representatives, we should long ago have won over Sicily, and presented an irrefutable example to the rest of Europe. Not until the end of October did we guarantee political freedom, encouraging, isolated, come from the Three Power Conference in Moscow. It has not yet been implemented.

Amgot has set itself a difficult task: by August will the Allies be judged. The example of Sicily shows that the crux of the problem of defeating Fascism and substituting the benefits of democracy lies in the necessity for sharing power with the people. The very essence of democratic government is that it is by the people. The very concept of Amgot indicates a false view of that democratic government can be imposed from outside. We need the fullest help of all the people in occupied Europe. Unless we radically change our ways, we shall never have it.

Sicilians feel themselves at the mercy of small officials who cannot understand their language, and who appear to have the solution of their difficulties. They are groping about in the post-battle chaos. We have done nothing to give them a lead, nothing to make them see that the democracy preached by the Allies is a road for them.



SICILY TO-DAY

The Sicilians were eager for change. But against this must be reckoned the effects of our intensive pre-invasion bombing of the large population centres, and of anti-Allies propaganda. Sicily was by no means sure that she wanted the British or American variety of change. Add to this the "hate thy enemy" theme, which, complete with lavish illustrations, had been plugged over the air. Add the fact that Rome radio and the press, especially from the time of our landings, told the country that the British would inflict every known violence and bestiality. No wonder then that when our troops entered the southern towns of Noto, Vizzini, Ramacca, etc., during the first days of the invasion, they were sometimes met by a silent and uncertain people very different from those who greeted us in Tunis, Sousse and Sfax.

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Amgot issued flour at 4 lire a kilo, the black market price, it was 10 lire. The people bought at this price, and nothing was done about it. A week later the price went up to 10 lire a kilo, and still no steps were taken in a large scale. Later the price became 15-20 lire. In the summer—about September in Sicily—it is difficult to stirve. There is an abundance of fruit and a fair amount of vegetable. Near the coast there is fish. By October all food was scarce. You could buy ice-cream and whole pastries at 50 lire (a Sicilian must work a whole day to buy three pastries). But there was no fat apart from lemons, no vegetables, no canned food, no fish in the interior, little meat and little sugar. Nobody is starving in Sicily, but serious malnutrition is the rule. Above all, the people have stopped hiding troops when we are going to bring food. Instead there have been food demonstrations in towns like Messina. The cruellest indictment of our failure to foresee and prepare for the food shortage is the startling appearance of casual prostitution by women whose husbands are in the Italian army. "Liberated" women have offered their bodies for a tin of bully beef.

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It may be coincidence, but the highest native civil authority in Messina is the mayor, Nucoli, well known to the people of his city for his Fascist activities. Nucoli is recognised by one and all as the arch-villain in the administrative plot, but up to a few weeks ago was, and I suppose still is, Amgot's chief adviser on local affairs. In the same town it is accepted as unchangeable that the majority of the interpreters employed by Amgot are not only just ex-Fascist Party members, but are ardent Fascist sympathisers. Several "squadristi"—foundation members of the Party—are known by the people to have returned to the city to develop illegal activity.

The people must be given knowledge, and the

The New Statesman and Nation, February 5, 1945
 power to use it. Fascism specialises in information, but rarely knowledge. What we have done in Sicily to counter false information is negligible. Most Sicilians still believe that Germans utterly destroyed Leningrad, that captured Moscow in 1941, and are subjected to the vilest atrocities in Russia and in British prison-of-war camps. They have no idea of the fate of Sicily.

How can we give power to the people? How can we give them a rightful share in government? The stated aim of our operation is to collaborate where possible with existing local authority. In nine cases out of ten this means a Fascist authority. How then decided where collaboration is possible? We decided to collaborate with Nucoli, the mayor of Messina.

In any village or town, only the people in a position to determine whether or not the local authority is to be trusted, and only the people capable quickly of indicating which authority is reliable. If free, secret, local elections were the first act of Amgot, if the people were to choose their own representatives, and if we had won over Sicily, and if we had a precedent example to the rest of occupied Europe. Not until the end of October, 1944, was a guarantee of political freedom in Sicily belatedly, come from the three big powers in Moscow. It has not yet been in force.

Amgot has set itself a difficult task. It will be judged. The example of Sicily shows that the basis of the problem of Fascism and substituting the rule of law and democracy lies in the necessity for showing the people. The very essence of our government is that it is by the people. The concept of Amgot indicates a form of democratic government that is not to be outside. We need the fullest help of the people in occupied Europe. Unless we do this in our ways, we shall never have a chance.

Sicilians feel themselves a people of small officials, who cannot understand the language, and who appear to have no solution of their difficulties. They are in a state of the post-battle chaos. We have tried to give them a lead, nothing more, but that the democracy preached by the Allies is a road for them.

Major Project 10/6/43
Elson
Major Project
Companions, Vincent
Transportation

February 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. LEANE

We have received the following information from Colonel Eddy in Algiers. I thought you would like to have this:

✓
"1. AFHQ has requested me to ask whether groups for infiltration can be provided immediately by OSS as follows: (a) Italians, including 16 W/T operators, up to 40 in number; (b) Sardinians and Sicilians, up to 20 for each group, and both of these groups should have 8 men who are trained in W/T operations. There are very few reliable candidates in this area. What part of this need will you be able to meet and how soon can we expect shipment? The personnel which you send should preferably have contacts who will be ready to receive them and must have a recent knowledge of the territory. It is urgent that we receive a quick reply.

Cable #84

"2. It is further suggested by AFHQ that in the event that military operations are started against Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, larger groups of Sicilians, Italians and Sardinians could be brought to North Africa who could well be used on or after D day, even though they would not have the necessary qualifications for prior infiltration. The need for Sardinians in large part can probably be filled by recruiting here although they are quite scarce.

William J. Donovan
Director

MR. [REDACTED]

MARCH 8 1943

WILLIAM A. KIMMEL

GROUP 6000-88

Pursuant to meetings which we have had with Colonel Jones, OSS, we are advised that they expect to have transportation space available for Group 6000-88, known as the Earl Group, consisting of 15 people, on or about March 15th.

I emphasize the fact that it becomes an obligation to have these people ready to depart when transportation is provided. This applies to passports, travel orders, induction of men into service, equipment, and all other details essential to their accepting this space when provided. Any developments which would lead to our cancelling this allotment would seriously jeopardize OSS transportation requirements in the future.

W. A. K.

cc: Colonel Donovan
Colonel Burton
Mr. Kirk

SECRET

SECRET

March 4, 1943

To: Mr. Mygatt
From: Mr. Brennan
Subject: Members of Earl's Party

Referring to the conversation you had this morning with Dr. Jones and Lieutenant Cagiati, the following is a list of members of Earl's Party:

Mr. Vincent Scaaporino, Leader of Group
Lieutenant Frank Terallo, U.S.A., Asst. Leader
Lieutenant Sebastian Passanesi, U.S.M.C.R.,
Assistant Leader

Mr. Luigi DiMaggio, Private U.S.A.
Louis Fiorella, " "
Louis S. Timpanaro, " "
Antonio Camboni, " "
Egidio Clemente, " "
Gaspere Salerno, " "
Nato DeAngeles, " "
Giovanni DeMontis, " "
Michael Moroni, " "
John Ballato, " "
Peppino Puleo, " "
Vincent Pavia, " "

E. B.

SECRET

To have a group now on hand consisting of the leader of the group, two Lieutenants as assistant leaders, and twelve privates.

In order to assist AFHQ, we would like to send Vincent Scamporrino, the leader of the group, at the earliest possible date.

I understand that Colonel Jones has been given the list of names privately and I will not send them with this letter.

Therefore, if immediate passage could be arranged for Mr. Scamporrino to move at once, and then continue to move the others by ship at the earliest possible date, I would greatly appreciate it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Handwritten notes:
1. [unclear] [unclear]
2. [unclear] [unclear]
3. [unclear] [unclear]
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50. [unclear] [unclear]

SECRET

March 3, 1943

Col. Ray T. Maddocks,
Room 3788,
Pentagon Building,
Arlington, Va.

Through: Brigadier General John R. Deane

Dear Colonel Maddocks:

We have received a message from Colonel Hady stating that AFHQ has requested him to ask us whether groups for infiltration could be provided as follows:

- (a) Italians, including radio operators, up to 40 in number;
- (b) Sardinians and Sicilians, up to 20 for each group.

He said there were very few reliable candidates in that area. He stated also that AFHQ suggested that in the event military operations should be started against that area larger groups could be brought to North Africa for later use.

In response to that request we stated that we already had 13 Sicilians with a leader ready to go all trained in SI work. They have asked us as follows:

"At the earliest possible moment send the group of thirteen Sicilians to our SO school here for final training."

They have stated that it is most important to them that we should get these men off, and we have advised them that we will be able to arrange for forty more at an early date.

CABLES RELATING TO SUBJECT:

TO RUDY: 2/10-231, 2/11-38, 2/12-27, 2/12-29
2/18-46.

FROM RUDY: 2/10-16, 2/6-70, 2/13-79, 2/14-22
2/14-23, 2/23-84, 3/1-109

William Donovan 10/1/43
Earle
John R. Deane
~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1943

Colonel Ray T. Maddocks
Joint U.S. Strategic Committee
38-188 Postagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Through Brigadier General John R. Deane

My dear Colonel Maddocks:

✓ We have just been advised by Eddy that on March 3rd the Theatre Command cabled ACFAR priority passage for Earle groups of thirteen men (groups I discussed with you Sunday) to be sent in UGF-7, urgent.

Sincerely,

Cable 138-241

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

(OSS) Italian Project 10,665

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

SECRET
OFFICE OF A CDL
11 Maddocks
Date Initials

OPD 540 (3-9-43)

11 March 1943

Copy to Kirkland

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Subject: Earle's Group.

Reference is made to your letter of March 9, 1943, in regard to Colonel Eddy's communication re Earle's Group. As soon as the message from General Eisenhower was received in the Operations Division (March 5, 1943), an officer from the Strategy and Policy Group personally contacted Mr. Kirk of your organization to obtain a list of the members of this Group.

On March 6, arrangements were completed to secure the necessary orders and transportation priorities. After several changes, all matters relating to orders and transportation were straightened out on March 10.

In order to facilitate the issuance of orders, it is suggested that serial numbers of military personnel be included in requests for orders and transportation.

Ray T. Maddocks

RAY T. MADDOCKS,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief, Strategy & Policy Group.



SECRET

March 13, 1952

SECRET

TO: Lieutenant Frank J. Terrell

FROM: Colonel Hanson

SUBJECT: Order to Duty Overseas

1. You will proceed by air to Algeria and thence to other parts of North Africa as will be deemed essential by the Director of the Italian Section, II of the Office of Strategic Services, North Africa for the following purpose:

To carry out such activities as may be assigned to you in connection with your duties on behalf of the Office.

2. You will perform such travel in connection with the duties assigned to you as may be directed by air or by such other means as may be deemed expedient.

3. Travel beyond such limits as may be authorized. For travel by air you will be reimbursed.

4. On arrival in Algeria you will report to the Head of the Italian Section.

Earl Browder
Italian Section, OSI

1. An arrival in Mexico, you are to report to the Director
of the Latin Section of the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

Very truly yours,
William J. Donovan

SECRET

March 11, 1948

TO: Captain Robert L. Patterson, Marine Corps Reserve
FROM: Colonel Bennett
SUBJECT: Orders to Temporary Shore Duty Beyond the Zone

1. You will proceed on temporary shore duty to Algeria, and thence to other points in North Africa as will be deemed essential by the Director Head of the Italian Section, SI of the Office of Strategic Services in North Africa for the following purpose:

To carry out such activities as may promote the fulfillment of your duties on behalf of the Office of Strategic Services. On the completion of this temporary shore duty beyond the zone, you will return to Washington, D. C., and resume your regular duties.

2. You will perform such travel as may be required in connection with the duties assigned to you. You will perform the travel directed by air or by such other mode of transportation as may be deemed expedient.

3. Travel herein enjoined is necessary in the public service. For travel by air, and for all travel abroad directed under these orders, and while abroad away from your designated post of duty, Washington, D. C., you will be allowed a per diem of \$5.00.

4. The per diem allowances authorized and travel expenses involved in connection with these orders will be paid by the Office of Strategic Services.

10.565

SECRET
March 19, 1945
X. Tanaka

TO: Privates Luigi Bizzaglio, Louis S. Tripanaro, Giuseppe
Beltramo, Mario Paganelli, Giovanni Belmonte, John Mallico,
Pasquale Russo, Vincenzo Maria and Louis F. Fiorella
FROM: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: Order to Duty Overseas

1. You will proceed to Algiers and thence to other points in
North Africa as will be deemed essential by the Directing Head of
the Italian Section, SI of the Office of Strategic Services in
North Africa for the following purpose:

To carry out such activities as may promote the fulfill-
ment of your duties on behalf of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. You will perform such travel as may be required in con-
nection with the duties assigned to you. You will perform the travel
directed by air or by such other modes of transportation as may be
deemed expedient.

3. Travel herein enjoined is necessary in the public service.
For travel by air you will be allowed a per diem of \$6.00.

4. On arrival in Algiers, you are to report to the Directing
Head of the Italian Section of SI of the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

Earl Browder
Italian Section, SI

-2-

<u>Commissioned</u>		<u>Enlisted</u>		<u>Date by which required</u>
<u>Staff</u>	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Agents</u>	
3	1	10	60	Immediately
11	5	20	80	May 30, 1943
7	3		60	June 30, 1943
(1) 5		(1) 15		June 30, 1943

(1) Per use in Washington, London, Cairo and Istanbul in connection with operations from North Africa.

The allotment of 35 officers and 245 enlisted men is to be tentatively broken down as follows:

Commissioned Personnel

1 colonel or lieutenant colonel
 6 lieutenant colonels or majors
 8 captains
 10 first lieutenants
 10 second lieutenants or warrant officers

Enlisted Personnel

5 first sergeants or master sergeants
 10 technical sergeants
 12 staff sergeants or technicians, third grade
 22 sergeants or technicians, fourth grade
 35 corporals or technicians, fifth grade
 20 privates first class
 141 privates

SECRET

Italian Project 10,665 B

Personnel Military Requirements

March 25, 1943.

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Shapiro

Lieutenant Cagiati

Allotment for Italian Section, North Africa Expedition

Confirming our conversation of this morning, the following points are submitted:

1. It would appear that the Italian Section is charged with the bulk of recruiting staff personnel and agents, for SI and SO operations into Italy (including Sicily and Sardinia) in connection with NAM-1.

2. This Section is proceeding as rapidly as possible in the recruiting of agents and necessary staff personnel in this country.

3. It has been decided that practically all agents and staff personnel recruited in the United States should be enlisted or commissioned before departure, to provide effective cover and to facilitate transportation.

4. It would appear that no provision has been made in any of the allotments, either for OSM in general or in the special allotment for NAM-1, for the large number of agents already engaged, or to be engaged, in the future; and that provision for staff personnel is not sufficient for the projected operations. } Personnel Military 10,953

5. The staff personnel will naturally take care of additional agents to be recruited overseas.

6. It is requested that the following allotment of commissioned and enlisted personnel be put at the immediate disposal of the Italian Section:

- 4 officers
- 70 enlisted men

Our estimated requirements are shown in the attached table.

S/ Alessandro Cagiati
Second Lieutenant, Inf.

Handwritten:
11/19/43
K. Direction
x leader

April 6, 1943

Col. Edward G. Burton

I. D. Shapiro

North Africa Mission - Operational Nuclei for Italian
Action

Yesterday afternoon after the meeting in Colonel Donovan's office, Mr. Freeman and Lt. Capisti expressed to me their concern over the fact that no decision had been reached on the question of whether or not all OSS action in Italy and the Islands, including operational nuclei, would be under one head in the Theatre; and if so, who is to be that head. They stated that they felt it would be impossible to go much further with the program without such a decision. They fear the danger that a man might be chosen toward whom their operatives could not give complete loyalty and confidence, and which they believe would definitely result in a breakdown of the work during the infiltration stage.

I stated that I believed they were entitled to an answer on this question which is causing them such anxiety, and promised to endeavor to provoke a rapid decision. I pointed out, however, that in my opinion their chief business is the infiltration phase of the general objective; the secondary phases and particularly the operational nuclei work is of the most immediate concern of SO and Colonel Huntington personally.

I requested that through Mr. Shepardson they put in my hands a memorandum expressing their views, and that I would request Colonel Huntington to do likewise, and that whatever serious differences result could be settled by Colonel Donovan having in hand two clear cut expressions of views.

If the memoranda of Mr. Shepardson and the memorandum of Colonel Huntington are sent to me, I will transmit them both to you, together with any comments or suggestions that I can make.

I. D. S.

cc: Colonel Donovan
Lt. Col. Huntington
Mr. Shepardson
Mr. Freeman
Secretariat

*Reference to 10-65-3
Requirements
P.S. M...*

April 9, 1946

Subject: Transfer to the Office of Strategic Services of officers and enlisted men who speak Italian.

Re: Commanding General, Army Ground Force

1. The Office of Strategic Services desires to obtain for transfer to it of approximately thirty officers of the rank of Captain or below, and two hundred enlisted men of various grades, all of whom are able to speak Italian or one of the Italian dialects, and who have had as much infantry training as possible.

2. These men are to be formed into small groups of specialists in the nature of combat teams and dispatched as soon as possible to the North African Theatre of Operations. General Eisenhower has cables requesting the early dispatch of these men and has arranged priority of transportation for them.

3. It is requested that the Commanding Generals of the Second and Third Armies be informed of these requirements and that arrangements be made by them for a staff of interviewers from the Office of Strategic Services to proceed to units under their command for the purpose of interviewing men who have the required qualifications.

4. Major Russell B. Livermore, A.C., of this office, will be the officer in charge of these interviewers.

5. An allotment has been granted to the Office of Strategic Services by the War Department for the requisitioning of these men.

*By
Russell Livermore*


William J. Donovan
Director, Strategic Services

SECRET

-3-

The almost insurmountable difficulties with which SO has been confronted with respect to the recruitment of Italian personnel in response to Colonel Eddy's continued requests have to date resulted in our inability to procure one man. It is apparent that this delay is caused by reasons beyond our control.

I feel it is important that you be in possession of this information, as this Branch is greatly discouraged by its inability to secure the results for which it has striven so desperately for the past 3 months. Despite the fact that Colonel Eddy's cables indicate his urgent need that these men be available for transportation not later than August 15th, we, as previously stated, have not been able to procure one individual who may be subjected to training.



R. Davis Ashliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Chief, SO

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enlisted men were finally approved for transfer, but as of the present writing none have as yet reported for duty.

During this interval, arrangements were being made with the Officer Procurement Service of the War Department, and a meeting was scheduled to be held in Chicago on June 17th in order to set in motion the recruiting by that organization of additional Army prospects. Due to the extensive time required to inaugurate the functioning of such a complicated procedure, it was found necessary to again request the War Department to speed the procurement process by allowing the temporary transfer for interviews in Washington of a special group of Italians previously refused.

On June 23rd, we again submitted a request to Headquarters for the transfer on temporary duty in Washington of 3 officers and 33 enlisted men. The War Department allowed the transfer of the officers, and on July 3rd refused the transfer of the enlisted men.

During the second week in June, a recruiting party visited Camp Forrest, Tennessee, for the purpose of interviewing 218 Italians whose names had been procured through the Adjutant General's Office as prospects. 18 men were selected from this group, the Commanding Officer's approval for their release was secured verbally, and on June 24th the official request for the transfer of these men was made. About July 1, when no action was forthcoming, and as a result of our inquiries here, we were advised it was necessary to procure the Commanding Officer's release. This was done by telegram and immediate approval received.

Again as a result of our continued inquiry, we were advised on July 14th that the War Department had made no request for the transfer of these men until July 13th and 14th, and as a result none of the men have as yet reported for duty.

In addition to the foregoing, approximately ²⁰ requests have been made to the War Department, commencing on June 25th, for the transfer of selected personnel. However, for one reason or another, we have been unable to effect the transfer of these men to Washington. Part of this delay has been caused by a change in the War Department procedure, requiring the procurement of the Commanding Officer's consent to the release of personnel prior to the request for transfer being made. In this connection, it is interesting to note that we were advised of this fact by the War Department as being applicable to all future requests for transfers. We have, however, just learned that for a period of approximately 2 weeks preceding this change in procedure, the applications which were being held by the War Department, having previously been filed by us, are now subject to the changed procedure so that it became necessary for them to be returned to us in order that the new procedure might be applied.

SECRET

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.*Italian Project (OS 100,665 C)
Name I.
JCS #170
Personnel
SO.*

17 July 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton

FROM: H. Davis Halliwell

SUBJECT: SO Recruitments of Italian Personnel for JCS 170

SO first became aware of a requirement for Italian personnel to the North African Theater on April 13th, in accordance with a cable from Colonel Eddy, Number 55. Steps were immediately taken looking towards the selection of individuals considered as possibilities for such a project, to be subjected to a preliminary screening in the field prior to an interview in Washington.

By the end of April, several hundred names had been located but a complication arose with respect to the screening owing to the extremely scattered locations of the prospects. It was then decided that the selection of personnel by this method would not produce results as quickly as was necessary, and it was determined about the 20th of May to organize a recruiting expedition to the Airborne Infantry camps where men had been carefully chosen and given parachute training. A recruiting party was organized and left Washington on May 30th to visit Camp Mackall, Fort Bragg, and Fort Benning during a period of about 10 days. This party screened the best bi-linguists of Italian nationality and other desired language groups.

On June 16th, a request for the transfer of these selections was made by SO. As of today, none of the officers and men have reported for duty, and repeated requests to expedite these transfers have not been successful.

In order to interview the prospects who were scattered in various Army camps throughout the country, the War Department was requested on June 8th to transfer to Washington 15 officers and 45 enlisted men. This request was refused on the basis that it was too large a number. A second request was immediately made for a total of 25 officers and men on June 11th inasmuch as we were advised that the War Department would permit the transfer of men in that amount. As a result of prolonged negotiation, 4 officers and 3

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To:



G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(12678)

SECRET

- 25 March 1943 - Cable #199 states urgency of need for dispatch of men who are to operate in advanced territory.
- 26 March 1943 - Cable #200 states that AFHQ urgently desires dispatch of Italians recruited by Brennan or SO. We are requested to continue recruiting.
- 29 March 1943 - Cable #2994 from Gen. Eisenhower states that the North Africa Theater urgently desires Italians recruited by OSS and that transportation priority should be provided as they become available.

Ans.
A.W.S.

SECRET

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton

DATE: 22 July, 1943

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: SO Recruitment of Italian Personnel for JOS 170.

With reference to Comdr. Halliwell's memorandum to you, dated 11 July 1943, in which he states that SO first became aware of a requirement for Italian personnel in the North African Theater of April 15th, we are sending you herewith for your information excerpts from incoming cables sent by Colonel Eddy's headquarters prior to that date, requesting that we recruit Sicilian and Italian speaking personnel for use in Italy and the adjacent islands.

As early as 2 February 1943 Colonel Eddy wired General Donovan and Comdr. Halliwell in Cable #57 as follows:

"3. Groups of ten men plus officers should be recruited for shipment to be used in auxiliary operations in Italy, Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily. As trained officers for this service are needed, the groups will be split here and we will add officers and local recruits."

Subsequent requests were made on:

- 6 February 1943 - Cable #70, inquiring as to the status of Earle's group and requesting that Italian speaking troops be organized into companies and trained specially for use as a spearhead in special operations just prior to or upon D Day, if this had not already been done.
- 8 February 1943 - Cable #87 states that our additions will be welcome to Italians recruited for SO and SI operations. A need is stated for Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian auxiliary operation groups.
- 4 March 1943 - Cable #123 requesting immediate dispatch of Earle group in order to fulfill our commitments and priority request by AFHQ.
- 8 March 1943 - Cable #142 states need of operatives for Italian territory.

SECRET

Car. D. ...

PROCLAMA

IN NOME DEL GOVERNO DEGLI STATI UNITI D'AMERICA

1. Tutto il personale militare delle Isole deve con questo arrend. armi e considerarsi prigionieri di guerra.
2. Tutti gli armamenti delle ISOLE, militari e civili, devono essere immediatamente consegnati a noi.
3. Il sopraddetto include le armi in possesso dei Carabinieri e della Milizia. Verranno rilasciate le armi ai Carabinieri che dimetteranno di essere fedeli di altro quelli custodi dalle loro civili.
4. Tutti i prigionieri politici delle Isole verranno immediatamente rilasciati.
5. La Milizia sarà con questo considerata in custodia militare.
6. Tutte le comunicazioni con il Continente Italiano viene a cessare e tutti i mezzi di comunicazione passano sotto il nostro controllo.
7. Tutti i documenti, militari e civili, sono con questo acquisite. E ogni tentativo, da questo momento, di distruggere o nascondere qualsiasi documento, sia militare che civile, sarà considerato un atto ostile e l'autore verrà trattato con severità e comminato.
8. Gli inalienabili diritti di religione, di libertà politica di pensiero, di diritti di proprietà personale e la santità della persona saranno in questo momento guardati e rispettati.
9. Queste Isole sono con questo proclama dichiarate liberate dall'injustizia ed infamia del regime fascista e la popolazione può arroccarsi della protezione degli Stati Uniti d'America.

Per ordine di
GENERAL WINSTON CHURCHILL,
 Comandante Supremo delle Forze Alleate.
 Per, Capitano T. J. ...
 Tenente ... North

*Distributed at ... S. Stefano.
 Prepared by Exp. Det. 4-5 ... Field.
 P.S.*

Ben Danovitch.

Al valorosi compagni sardi

Oggi è il giorno del riscatto. I valorosi compagni d'armi in Italia e nel Balcani combattono contro la tirannia Tedesca. In tutte le città d'Italia, la popolazione civile si muove come una contro gli oppressori di tutto ciò che rappresenta la migliore cultura umana.

E voi, o valorosi Sardi che avete sofferto tanto - che cosa fate per il riscatto della vostra bella isola?

Le truppe Tedesche che si trovano in Sardegna sono pochi in numero, ma forte nei loro obbiettivi. C'è bisogno di unire in un'azione ben coordinata dai vostri capi, e di un azione unanime.

Alzate in aria la bandiera della libertà, o bravi compagni Sardi. Aiutate i vostri compagni che lottano le dure battaglie e che spargono il loro sangue in tutta l'Italia, i Balcani e le isole dell'Egeo. Vostro, con poco aiuto, sarà il compito di riconquistare la vostra perduta libertà. Vigliacco quel Sardo che si rifiuta di combattere. L'Italia ora combatterà a fianco delle grandi democrazie ed è il vostro dovere di aiutare.

Usate i seguenti metodi per ostacolare i Tedeschi:

1. Impedite il movimento delle loro truppe
2. Tagliate le loro linee di comunicazione
3. Rifiutate del vitto all'Podloto Unno.
4. Formate dei gruppi di resistenza con capi provati.
5. Propagate la causa nostra che è anche quella delle Nazioni Unite.
6. Lavorate di notte facendo del sabotaggio.

L'aiuto vi verrà in buon tempo, ma per ora rimane a voi ad iniziare il lavoro per la liberazione della nostra Sardegna - la stessa Sardegna che ospita la sacra salma del nostro immortale Garibaldi sulla sua isola di Caprera.

COMITATO D'AZIONE ITALIANO
 Emilio Lussu, Presidente d'Azione

- 100) VASSA, FRANCESCA
- 101) VASSA, ADRIANO
- 102) VASSA, ANTONIO
- 103) VASSA, OTTO
- 104) VASSA, MARIO
- 105) VASSA, GIUSEPPE

- MARINATO
- AVIENE BOBETO MARGONISTA
- MARINATO
- AVIENE BOBETO MARGONISTA
- AVIENE BOBETO MARGONISTA
- BOBETO CAPO SEGNALE

Prisoners taken at Lipari by Exp. DEI 13-5.

Ann. D. 107/10

ELENCO DEI MARIUCCI DI LIPARI

-1-1-1-

1*)	ALAMINNO, NELLO	CANNONIERE A.
2*)	CATALANO, ROSSARIO	MARO'
3*)	MONTELLI, MESSALE	MARESCIALE 1° CLASSE NOC. FORNO
4*)	CANELLO, ARSIZIO	SOTTO CAPO SEGNALETORE
5*)	DI NICO, GIRO	RADIO TELEGRAFISTA
6*)	DI PIETRA, ANTONIO - VINCENZO	RADIO TELEGRAFISTA
7*)	ROSSI, VALENTINO	SOTTO CAPO 1° MARESCIALE
8*)	ROMANILLO, GIOVANNI	2° CAPO RADIO TELEGRAFISTA
9*)	CANNICILIO, GIOVANNI	MARESCIALE 3° CLASSE MARINA
10*)	COZZANO, ALFIO	MAR. 1° CLASSE MARINA
11*)	ABENEA, VINCENZO	MARESCIALE 3° CLASSE MARINA
12*)	LETRIGO, PAOLO	2° CAPO NOCCHIERO
13*)	TELLA, VITTORIO	FUOCISTA
14*)	LO SCUDICIA, DOMENICO	RADIO TELEGRAFISTA
15*)	D'ONOFRIO, PASQUALI	CANNONIERE A.
16*)	COLANINNO, MARIO	MARO'
17*)	CRUCETTI, ANTONINO	CANNONIERE
18*)	GIOVENCO, FRANCESCO	SOLEATO
19*)	LO CASTRO, ANTONIO	MARO'
20*)	LEOTTA, DOMENICO	SERGEANTE FORNICO
21*)	MENINI, VINCENZO	MOTORISTA - MARINA
22*)	TOMASINI, DANTE	MOTORISTA - MARINA
23*)	PAISIO, MARIETTO	MARO'
24*)	BARUPI, GIUSEPPE	AVVIERO MARESCIALE
25*)	PURCELLI, GIUSEPPE	SOTTO CAPO SEGNALETORE TELETRA
26*)	TORNARENE, GIACOMO	CANNONIERE
27*)	ANGULO, SALVATORE	RADIO TELEGRAFISTA
28*)	TAVANI, MARIO	MARINAIO
29*)	MOCKE, PAOLO	SEGNALETORE
30*)	ANGULO, FERDINANDO	MARINAIO

Four Lewis Machineguns
 Two high frequency radio sets
 Four cases of small arms ammunition
 A quantity of small arms

The half-burned code books were turned over to Lt. Manikoff of the P.T. Base who undertook to turn them over to C.N.I. The radios were also turned over to the P.T. Base.

7. It may be of interest to know that all the New men from O.S.S. were trained strictly on the gathering of intelligence, but on this occasion they were armed with an odd variety of weapons including German and Italian. The group carried equipment as follows:

One Thompson .45 cal. submachinegun
 Two Schneiser Machine Pistols
 Four Handgrenades
 Daggers
 Two Italian automatic rifles.

8. A total of 48 prisoners were brought from the Archipelago, including one officer, the commandant of the Port of Iperu, and four petty officers in charge of insular communications. These officers were exhaustively questioned upon return by the operations officer. Several of these have proved very useful since their capture and have been used on operations. Taken away from the island were several volunteers who have also proved their usefulness to our detachment by participating in very hazardous operations.

9. This insular operation has shown how well something of this sort can be handled as a combined operation. This method has also proved valuable for future operations (Witness Ventotene.) A good part of the operation was based on definite bluff, which was well carried out by the persons participating.

Handwritten signature

- S e c r e t -

The members of the "surrender party" were then to align themselves with the two other shore parties.

b. Second Phase: The second and third boats were to land the following parties which had specific objectives and targets assigned to them: Second Landing Party - Lt. North, Pvt. Fiorilla and Pvt. Freglia. The specific objectives of these groups were the taking over of the radio station and the capture of the naval code books in the station. The third landing party was made up of Pvt. John Ballato, Pvt. Barney Tumbiolo and Pvt. Egidio Clemente. This group was assigned the task of gathering all available documents on the island, of arresting all Fascists and leaders and of taking care of any pertinent civilian affairs. With this group was also landed a Captain Canby from ANGO.

c. Third Phase: Work on Lipari being completed one of the PT's with O.S.S. personnel aboard was to execute a dash to Stromboli where another radio station was known to exist. Lt. North and Pvt. De Angeles were assigned to this mission. Objective was to capture other code books and destroy all the island's communications with the mainland.

4. At 09:30 after a final conference with Admiral Davison, commander of the fleet in Sicilian waters, the flotilla cleared the harbor of Palermo. This was on August 17th. At 12:30 of the same day the first phase of the operation had been brilliantly executed and the Lipari Archipelago had surrendered officially to Captain Tarallo of our Detachment. All parts of the first ^{PHASE} were carried out according to plan. The signal for the second phase ^{was} given and the second and third parties were immediately landed. The second party started to wind its way up the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ hill on which the radio station was located. Here, they captured half burned volumes of the Italian Navy secret code and other documents of equal importance. All phases of this operation were also carried out according to plan. The third party took charge of Civil affairs and of securing general intelligence.

5. At 15:00 hours the third ^{PHASE} of the operation was successfully carried out and the Island of Stromboli was in our possession. This surrender was also arranged by De Angeles, who was the official spokesman on the final third phase. The code books on Stromboli were found completely burned and the radio station was destroyed by the Italian sailors themselves. Many prisoners were taken in Stromboli including all sailors in the radio station.

6. The following equipment and ~~ammunition~~ were brought back to Palermo upon completion of the operation:

- Secret -

SECRET**EXPERIMENTAL DETACHMENT G-3
Attached to G-2, 7th Army**

September 10, 1943

TO: General W. Donovan and Col. W. Hady**FROM: Experimental Detachment G-3, 7 Army****SUBJECT: Lipari Operations.**

1. Based upon information secured from captured Italian merchant marine sailors whose schooner had been sunk near Stromboli, the operations officer of this detachment prepared a special operation for the capture of Lipari Archipelago. After twenty-four hours of intensive briefing and preparations the following group was selected to carry out the operation:

Captain Frank J. Tarallo - Commander
 Lt. (j.g.) Henry R. North - Second in charge
 Corporal Henry Treglia
 Private Nate De Angeles
 " Louis Nicolla
 " Peter Durante
 " John Ballato
 " Egidio Clemente
 " Barney Tambiolo

2. The operation was planned as a combined O.S.C. and U.S. Navy venture. By special arrangement with Lt. Com. Barnes three P.T. Boats under the command of Lt. (S.G.) Du Bose were assigned to land the men on the island of Lipari. These boats were to also cover landing operations. The P.T. Boats, under the joint agreement were also to provide 15 armed seamen.

3. The operation was planned in three phases as follows:

a. First Phase: The flotilla leader with Captain Tarallo, Pvt. De Angeles and Pvt. Durante aboard, was to make a bold entry under flag of truce into the harbor of Lipari. Captain Tarallo and the two enlisted men were to go ashore and demand the unconditional surrender of the Archipelago. Once the surrender was arranged they were to take charge of intra-island communications and warn the various garrisons of the occurring events, and that resistance was useless as Lipari itself had been taken by a large Allied force. The taking over of communications did not include the Island Radio Station under Italian Navy Control. All military and naval personnel was to consider itself prisoners of war. This accomplished they were to signal the second and third boats into the harbor.

- Secret -

6. Through every contact and through enlisting the aid of
close friends, our groups will suggest in numbers, by sea or
air, that if it is at all possible, we (OS) should attempt
to create a situation whereby all German elements on the island
will be forced to surrender.

7. For these operations we must use all available resources.
More than ten paratroopers have already been recruited in Sicily.
Others are at present in Algiers and to these will be added
other elements of the Italian Section. Aid in equipping all
these men must be given immediately by all branches of N. B.
C-1 and complete cooperation must be the order of the day.

8. A first pamphlet has already been written and printed
by Lt. Corvo. A copy of this pamphlet, translated, is attached.
Orders will follow in short order. Arrangements to have some
of these pamphlets dropped by our Air Force are underway.

Luigi Corvo

SECRET

10. General Banerjee and Col. Eddy

11. Operations L. D. 0-3 - 7th Army

1. Further Maitub operations have been planned and personnel recruited. These operations will be carried out in a very short time. All personnel will be moved to Zuma, which is to be the base of operations. All these operations will be carried out along the west coast of the island.

2. The first operation which will be carried out by Detachment 10, Italian section, will take place at Punta Mieve north-west of the town of Iglesias. The terrain here is suitable for penetration as it is very mountainous and offers good cover. At this point a strong contingent of CG's may also be landed as their operation will be rendered easy by various existing conditions. Objectives of Detachment 10 will be as follows:

- a. Organization of resistance by Italian Army Units.
- b. Organization of resistance by civilian population in all towns and cities as well as the country.
- c. Cutting of enemy communication lines.
- d. Widespread psychological warfare.
- e. Encouragement of widespread sabotage.
- f. Redemption of the island.

3. The area of operation of this first group will be enlarged daily and will include Cagliari and the southern part of the west coast. Particular targets will be all airdromes in the south, for the elimination of these airdromes as potential sources of attack will mean the end of German control of the island. Most of the German units on the island are either part of the Luftwaffe or are serving the Luftwaffe.

4. The second group of Special Detachment 10 will land at lat. 5°28', long. 39°39'. This area is near the peninsula jutting into the Gulf of Oristano. It is also mountainous and places the parties landed within easy reach of the important highway and RR running north from Cagliari to Oristano, to Macomer, to Sassari.

5. These two groups will coordinate their action with the original Maitub party and will direct their immediate attention to reaching the west coast and the fortified naval points of Tarremea, Pausania (Olbia) and La Maddalena.

- S E C R E T -

Team No. 1 will be infiltrated through our lines as soon as possible after sunset. It will be their duty to cut enemy communication lines, disrupt traffic, create commutations, collect all available intelligence on enemy units in their area and keep up with Italian soldiers, especially engineers, to order to show up transportation systems used by the Germans. This team will cooperate in the general dis-embarkment of Salerno and on the road to Castelluccio di Stabia and Naples. Its members will be augmented by local civilians who are known to the personnel of the team. One man in this group will be placed in a central position at all times and all intelligence gathered will be turned over to him. He will in turn see to it that it reaches Pvt. Malone who will transmit to us and also make the same information available to advanced G. P., 5th Army.

The second team will also use the same methods of operations and has been assigned to the area north of Avellino. A central position will be picked out for the radio man and for HQ., so that it is readily available to both teams.

The third team will be used for specific missions which may be desirable to divisional CP's. This team will be held in reserve and will be used exclusively for the above mentioned tasks.

Acting Sgt. De Angeles who is an old hand at infiltration has also been instructed to use other civilians whom he will recruit on the spot through old connections. He is well acquainted with the terrain and we expect that a special team will soon make its way to Rome.

The practice of cooperating with advanced Divisional CP's will be continued as will also that of handing in primary reports to the Advanced CP of the operating Army.

7th Detachment, Italian Destroyer, Salerno

Re: General, Salerno and Coll. Body.

FROM: Operations, N. M. C-3, 7th Army

September 14, 1943

1. On September 7th at 14:20 hours, a special detachment from this organization made up of ten specially recruited individuals cleared the harbor of Salerno aboard two MTD's. Their destination was the Italian mainland in the region just east of Terracina. This Detachment had been especially trained with the large type of rubber raft which is most convenient in these waters. All practice runs were held under actual landing conditions, including the lowering of the boats about three hundred yards from shore from American MTD's. These exercises were held for five consecutive days in all types of weather and on stretches of the Sicilian coast ranging from perpendicular cliffs to sandy beaches. None of the individuals who participated knew how to swim and no lifelines were issued to them.

2. Upon arrival off the coast at Terracina, the crews of MTD's prepared to lower the boats. However, just as they were in the process of doing so, a German ship quietly slipped in between the two MTD's. The enemy ship, believing the two boats to be friendly, commenced to signal them. For ten minutes one of the boats was able to simulate answers, then seeing that further signaling would lead to complications, the leading boat maneuvered into position and shot a torpedo directly at the German boat. The enemy craft immediately blew up, proving by the various explosions to be an ammunition ship. This unexpected action forced our boats to call off the landing party. German shore batteries immediately commenced to fire and the boats had to move out.

3. On Tuesday, September 14 at 19:00 hours, an augmented 7th Detachment, made up of 16 civilians and two of our enlisted men who have on more than one occasion proved themselves, boarded an Italian destroyer. This ship is due at Salerno on the 15th. The 7th Detachment is made up of three combat intelligence teams who will do both G. I. and S. O. work. The whole group is under the direction of Acting Sgt. Mate De Angeles and the radio operator is Pvt. Harry Calore. The teams are divided as follows:

1. "Darby" - 6 men
2. "Avellino" - 5 men
3. "Avenger" - 4 men

- SECRET -

St. Louis, Missouri, 1965
Satchel
X 7
Sodapaper
X 8 Day Cal W.

II. AN ~~EXCELLENT~~ report. I assume this document was
attached to Headquarters 7th Army where reports of these activities
have already been made. This is an outstanding example of what OAS
can do which no other exclusively military organization, specifically
in the lower echelons, can attempt. Every second of available time
should be used to train more people for the jobs that wait ahead
and in adjacent areas.

SECRET
Mag...
...
...
...

87
E. G.

SEVENTH INFANTRY COMPANY
HP. PROV.
APO 618
U.S. ARMY
STATION "P".

12, 9, 48
Financial arrangements
Native recruits
Italy
Secur. papers

27 September, 1948

FROM: Vincent J. Scamporino
TO: Col. William L. Rehn
SUBJECT: Financial arrangements, native recruits, (Italy).

The following financial arrangements covering native recruits employed in our services are submitted for your approval.

1. In the event of death, the next of kin or named beneficiary will be paid the sum of 200,000 Liras, (\$2,000.00) and in addition thereto the sum of 20,000 Liras (\$200.00) for each child of the decedent.
2. In the event of a total disabling injury, the same sum will be paid as above.
3. In the event of an injury partially disabling the recruit, he will be paid a lump sum to be determined on the extent of his disability but in no event shall it exceed the sum of 200,000 Liras.
4. It is recommended that in special cases additional allowances be provided, such allowances to be determined by the circumstances of each case. This is to be left to the discretion of the person under whose charge the recruits have been placed.

Vincent J. Scamporino

November 8, 1943

TO: General Donovan
 FROM: Col. W. L. Rehn

Reference is made to my memorandum dated July 31, 1943, copy of which is attached. When I was in Algiers I discussed this matter with Mr. Scamperino and Major Williams. I found that, as I expected, Major Williams had been paying the \$10 per diem to the Italians, effective with the date they arrived in Algiers. I pointed out to Mr. Scamperino that a per diem is paid to cover subsistence and lodging and that since these men were inducted in the Army there was no need to pay such per diem. Mr. Scamperino agreed with me on this point and suggested that we allow them to keep the amounts that had been paid but stop such payments as of October 1, 1943. Mr. Scamperino advised that in his opinion the morale of these men would not be effected by the discontinuance of these payments inasmuch as these over-payments were due to a misunderstanding. This seemed to me to be a reasonable suggestion and I accordingly approved such procedure.

Five of the men in question had requested that their per diem of \$10 be paid to their wives or other dependents in this country, beginning August 1, 1943. In my absence these payments were not made, as it was thought arrangements were being made to increase the salary of these men to make up for the per diem. So that each man shall receive equal treatment I have made the payments to the dependents of the five men requested for the months of August and September, 1943.

I trust that this arrangement will meet with your approval and shall appreciate advice from you to this effect.

July 10, 1943

SECRET

TO: General Donovan
 FROM: Lieut. Colonel King

When Carl Brennan first started recruiting, it was agreed with Colonel Bruce to pay his men \$3900 a year salary and \$10. per diem. As you know, the English had failed in obtaining men to enter Italy and it was not easy to find men in this country because of the particular requirements and the extra hazardous work. In getting this per diem no one knew at that time where the men would be located in North Africa, how they would be taken care of later on, nor that they would be placed in the Army.

It has now developed that these men expect their \$10. per diem despite the fact that they have been taken care of in respect to quarters and mess by the Army or C.S.S. Technically, they are not entitled to the per diem today. However, inasmuch as morale is so important (you would agree I am sure it would be extremely bad policy to alter the financial arrangements of these men at this time) I believe we must pay each of these men a total of \$7500. per year. The best way to do this is to handle it in the way of a salary without per diem. This applies to 27 men in all. Proper steps have been taken to forestall a misunderstanding of this nature in the future.

If you agree with the above, I would appreciate your approval by initialing this copy.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

December 6, 1963

TO: Colonel Burton
FROM: Colonel [redacted]
SUBJECT: Per diem for men from Italian Desk

On July 31st I wrote General Donovan a memorandum on the above subject, copy of which I attach. When I was in Algiers I discussed this subject with Beauporino and as I thought reached an agreement which I so stated in another memorandum of November 3rd.

It now transpires that Earl Brennan is embarrassed by my memorandum of November 3rd inasmuch as Beauporino did not think that he was in a position to decide this matter. It would seem to me therefore that the only way to settle this matter is to go back to my original memorandum of July 31st and establish these men from the time their per diem of \$10.00 was discontinued, on an annual salary of \$7500.00 per year.

Attachment.

P.S. I understand that my memorandum of July 31st to General Donovan had been discussed by the Executive Committee which was ready to approve my recommendation.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

TO: Lt. Charles A. Bone

FROM: Earl Brennan

SUBJECT: Compensation for Agents

DATE: 28 December 1943

In accordance with our telephone conversation this morning I wish to present our point of view concerning the proper adjustment in salary for our agents, a list of which you have on hand, in order to provide the proper compensation for them in place of a per diem.

The majority of the men on the list which we have given you were recruited from civilian life for the work which they are now doing. There was no idea at the time they were recruited that they would be militarized but subsequently it was determined that they would be militarized for purposes of cover and transportation. The others were men already in military service who volunteered for the dangerous missions which they have to perform. There can be no question as to the danger of the missions which these men have voluntarily undertaken in view of the fact that we have suffered some casualties. Under arrangements authorized by Col. David Bruce at the time when he was Chief of SI, we made an agreement with these agents that they would be paid an annual salary of \$3600 a year plus a \$10 per diem. Subsequently in recognition of work successfully accomplished and of increased responsibilities, the salary was increased to \$3900 with the sanction of Col. Nehm and Mr. Sheperdson.

Since we are now unable to carry out our agreement with these men as to the \$10 per diem, I consider it absolutely essential that this per diem be replaced by a salary payment in a similar amount, namely \$3600 per year. I consider this essential for two reasons; first, and by far the most important, is the fact that we had entered into a solemn agreement with these men as to their compensation at the time when they were recruited. If it should turn out that we are unwilling or unable to carry out our part of the agreement, it is inevitable that the men's morale will suffer and that their work in the field may no longer be of the superior quality which has made it so remarkable up to the present time. Second, there is the fact that most of these men come from Italo-American families and were in most cases members of large Italo-American circles or organizations. The repercussions which might result if we failed to maintain our agreements with these men would be of major proportions and would be felt even in the highest quarters.


 E.B.

SECRET**COPY**

Algiers, October 25, 1943

Dear Earl:

I have just received your letter plus enclosure on the question covering per diem allowances of the men. I am being placed in some sort of a compromising position chiefly because I did not understand that this was a matter that I could and should decide.

In the first place, it was not my understanding that I had made any agreement either with Major Williams or Col. Rehm. On the contrary, the matter was presented to me more as an ultimatum than as something subject to compromise. Col. Rehm as I recall, stated that such payments could not be continued, that it was in the best interests of the organization that they be terminated at once and that he would have to order such termination. I do not see how I was in a position to have arrived at any agreement under such circumstances.

I did agree with Col. Rehm in principle, namely that a person being supplied with food and lodging should not be unjustly enriched by being paid in addition thereto a per diem. I believe and I so stated that a per diem is paid to recompense the individual for his living expenses and that for that reason, I had never claimed any in my own individual case. However, I also mentioned and stressed that fact that these men had signed an agreement and that I could not offhand state the effect of such action on their contracts. That is as to whether or not it constituted a breach thereof.

I also stated that in my opinion, there would be possibly some difficulty with the men when they were informed of this. I asked therefore, that Col. Rehm forward to me a memorandum in which he was to state that orders were to terminate payment of all per diems. I left Algiers the following day and did not see Col. Rehm's memo until my return here last week. The men have not as yet been informed. In my previous letter to you, I have covered other aspects of the same subject. It is not a question of engaging in any tussle within our organization but I must emphasize that I have agreed in principle but I definitely have not entered into a so-called agreement on this subject.

In conclusion, and were I to judge the case not on equitable basis but upon interpretation of the contract, I would say that these men are entitled to a per diem less the cost to the organization of their board and lodging. It is no defense, if we have made a bad bargain.

I do not want to pass the buck on to you nor do I want to appear as negating any statements which I may have made but were it a matter which I could have decided, I definitely would have referred the matter to you as my superior.

I trust therefore that you will do what you may consider necessary. I am, of course more concerned about the men who would never under our draft laws seen service and who volunteered not for the pay but for purely patriotic and idealistic reasons. Many of them would have earned as much had they remained at home, but that is neither here nor there. I so stated to Col. Rehm.

I hope that this explains all to you and I do hope you can adjust the same on whatever basis you think fair.

I am rushing out again. A separate report follows.

Sincerely,
/s/ Vincent

SECRET

be paid to the family, plus \$500. for each child. We now have three deaths on our hands that I desire to take care of at once, and one individual who has been badly wounded.

As soon as I have received your reply I will be in a position to dispatch these financial matters.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Vincent

COPY

October 23, 1943

SECRET

To: Earl Brennan
 From: Vincent Scamporrino

Dear Earl:

The decision made by Colonel Rehm regarding allowances for the men has caused me a great deal of embarrassment. Although, in principle I agree with Colonel Rehm it has been extremely difficult to convince the men. Unquestionably morale has been somewhat effected. Many of these boys were promised, in good faith, commissions and opportunities to advance which I am sorry to state we cannot deliver.

Although I am not in a position at this time to report the complete results of the decision of Colonel Rehm I do however anticipate some trouble. I am particularly concerned about those men who would never have seen service in our Armed forces, either because of a physical handicap or from being over the age limit. These men were inducted and are, insofar as Army personnel here is concerned, enlisted men. I personally consider this most unfair and, although while the men are with us they are treated with equal respect, yet to those not within our organization they are privates and are therefore barred from entering officers' clubs and are subjected to many regulations covering G.I. personnel. Furthermore, most of these men have signed contracts and I am in doubt as to whether or not we are correct in the stand which is being taken.

I frankly do not know how to solve the problem. I do know that I am prohibited from paying anyone a per diem and under such circumstances I hardly expect to get full cooperation from these men. I personally place the same interpretation on the per diem as Colonel Rehm but I have failed to convince the men. My interpretation mainly is that insofar as board and lodging is being provided the per diem should not be paid. I do not believe that he is to unjustly enrich himself through the payment of a per diem. I do not know whether you agree with me on this point or not. My only query is whether we are justified in making a change at this time.

I personally have not put in a claim at any time for per diem allowance nor have I received any, feeling, rightly so in my own opinion, that I was not entitled to it as long as I was being provided with food and lodging. Some people argue that the Navy permits the payment of a per diem so why should not the Army receive the same. Furthermore, the deductions which are made for food and lodging are very small, thus leaving the individual with a substantial sum each day for other purposes.

In order that I may get this entire matter clarified as quickly as possible will you please take this point up again with Colonel Rehm and forward to me also a complete statement of (a) the men dispatched to the field, and (b) their financial arrangements. I need this for proper guidance as to payments. Will you also ask Colonel Rehm if he has approved my recommendations for the amount of money to be paid to men recruited here in the event of their deaths. I had recommended that the sum of \$2,000.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET




TO: Major Duncan C. Lee
 FROM: Earl Brennan
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 18 January 1944

I transmit herewith by hand copies of reports dated October 23 and October 25, 1943, sent to me by Mr. Vincent Scamporino, my chief deputy in the field, of which I spoke to you during our conversation earlier today.

E.D.
 E.D.

Attachments:
 copies of reports as described



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

TO: Major Duncan G. Lee
FROM: Earl Brownson
SUBJECT:



DATE: 18 January 1944

I transmit herewith by hand copies of reports dated October 23 and October 25, 1943, sent to me by Mr. Vincent Scamporino, my chief deputy in the field, of which I spoke to you during our conversation earlier today.

EWB.
18.14.

Attachments:
copies of reports as described

SECRET

- 2 -

Shortly after this, however, Colonel Rehm visited Algiers and while he was there, made arrangements whereby the per diem was to be discontinued after October 1, 1943, since it seemed to him that the men were being unjustly enriched by continuing to receive the per diem at the same time that they were receiving quarters and subsistence from the Army. According to Colonel Rehm, the discontinuance was agreed to by Mr. Scamperino, although Mr. Scamperino reported later to Mr. Brennan that the matter was presented to him more or less in the form of an ultimatum.

5. Upon the return of Colonel Rehm to the United States, he discussed the matter with Mr. Brennan who disagreed with the relation worked out. He believes that the per diem of \$10.00 should be continued, although Mr. Brennan agrees that it might be advisable to treat it as salary. In addition, Mr. Scamperino, in two letters from him addressed to Mr. Brennan, has stated that he would like to see a solution whereby the men would continue to receive the \$10.00, since otherwise their morale would be affected. As a result of all this, Colonel Rehm has now altered his position and proposes that the men continue to receive a per diem of \$10.00, but that it be treated as part of their salaries.

6. One consideration which should be borne in mind is the recommendation, adopted by the Executive Committee of OSS, at its meeting held 3 March 1943, that undercover agents, whether commissioned or enlisted, should be paid allowances up to but not exceeding \$5,000 per annum, including Army or Navy pay. It should be pointed out, however, that this determination was made after the arrangements were worked out with these men; there is no evidence that the determination of the Executive Committee was intended to disturb or affect arrangements existing at the time.

7. A memorandum from Mr. Brennan, in explanation of his position on the matter, and two letters from Mr. Scamperino recommending the continuance of the per diem, are attached. The reasons set forth in Mr. Brennan's memorandum seem to be quite persuasive, particularly for the preservation among Mr. Brennan's men of the morale for which his groups have been noted.

8. As a result of Colonel Rehm's recommendation in Algiers, the per diem was discontinued as of October 1, 1943. Under all the circumstances of the case, the Secretariat believes that you should approve Colonel Rehm's proposal that the per diem be continued, but as salary, and that payment should be retroactive to October 1, 1943.

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane
Lieut. (jg) USNR

SECRET

12, 979
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 21 January 1944

TO: Colonel Burton

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: Per Diem for Men from Italian Desk

1. The attached memorandum from Colonel Rehm to you raises certain questions concerning civilian agents retained by Mr. Earl Brennan for Italian activities. The Secretariat has attempted to make a full investigation, and believes that the following are the facts of the matter.

2. Some thirty men, Italians by birth or descent, were retained by Mr. Brennan during the period from September 1942, to January 1943, for SI activity in Italy. The salary aspect of the undertaking, which Mr. Brennan cleared through Colonel Bruce, was that the men in question would be paid \$3900 a year as salary and \$10.00 per diem. According to Mr. Brennan, the per diem was offered as an extra inducement to the men in order that they might not only defray the cost of their food and housing, but also have something extra left over from the \$10.00 allowed. It was not contemplated that food and subsistence would be furnished to the men since the negotiations with most of them took place prior to the invasion of North Africa; it was therefore contemplated that the men would be initially stationed at Cairo where, under the circumstances existing at that time, they would be required to find their own food and quarters.

3. The invasion of North Africa changed matters, however, so far as plans for the men were concerned. The most important alteration was that they were inducted into the Army, at the suggestion of General Donovan; this was done by the men voluntarily and was effected in order to regularize their position in North Africa after it had become a theater of war. As a result of this action, the men, upon their arrival in North Africa, were furnished mess and quarters by the Army. Nevertheless they evidently expected that they would continue to receive the \$10.00 per diem since all of the parties to the negotiations had regarded the per diem as an additional inducement for employment with OSS and was not made conditional upon subsistence and quarters being otherwise unavailable.

4. On July 31, 1943, Colonel Rehm addressed a memorandum to General Donovan, a copy of which is attached, outlining this situation and proposing that for morale purposes the \$10.00 per diem be continued even though the men were receiving quarters and mess, but recommending that the whole matter be treated as a matter of salary, making a total of \$7500 per year. This would be composed of \$3900 basic salary, plus \$10.00 per diem for 360 days.

SECRET

TO: [Illegible]

Approved and signed for your
copy of the report to Mr. [Illegible]
of General [Illegible]
[Illegible] and Mr. [Illegible]
[Illegible] and [Illegible]
[Illegible] with [Illegible]

[Illegible]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten text]

(14)

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Whitney Shephardson

DATE: 29 January 1944

FROM: Acting Director

SUBJECT: Compensation for Men from Italian Desk, SI

1. I have approved the joint recommendation of Mr. Brennan and Colonel Rehm, in which the Secretariat has concurred, that the compensation arrangement concluded with the 29 original recruits of Mr. Brennan should be continued for as long as they remain in our employ, and have also approved payment to them of any arrearages owing to them under this arrangement. This approval is subject, however, to the so-called \$10 per diem being regarded and paid as additional compensation without deduction for subsistence or quarters now furnished by the Army, which I understand is the way in which this per diem was always regarded by the men, themselves. Payment is, therefore, authorized of compensation at the rate of \$7500 per annum out of unvouchered funds.

2. I am disturbed, however, by the fact that this group is receiving compensation which is out of line with payments made to our other agents, and in excess of the aggregate \$5000 limit which has been recommended by the Executive Committee and approved by the Director. For this reason, I should like to have you investigate closely the present value of these men to OSS and the results they are producing. I am, of course, aware that during and preceding the invasions of Sicily and Italy this group has performed extremely well. I am not satisfied, however, that at the present time, with the development of the Italian campaign, circumstances might not have changed so as to diminish the present importance of their activities. If their value to us at this time is not commensurately higher than other groups of agents who are less favorably treated, then I feel we should take steps, as soon as possible, to terminate their employment with us. We certainly do not wish to affect unfavorably the morale of other agents who may be taking similarly patriotic and dangerous risks.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

cc General John Magruder
Colonel W. Lane Rehm
Mr. Earl Brennan

SECRET

1/31

Col Bryton

You may want to consider # 2 in light of Gen. Donovan's cable concerning the dispatch of Col Goodfellow to NATO to interview all personnel.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

SECRET

Mr. William H. ...

...

...

I have approved the joint recommendation of Mr. ... and ... in which the ... was approved, that the ... should be continued for as long as they remain in our employ, and have also approved payment to them of ... compensation without limitation for subsistence or quarters ... by the Army, which I understand is the way in which this ... was always regarded by the ... Payment in ... of compensation at the rate of \$7000 per ... out of unexpended funds.

G. Edward ...
Acting Director.

cc General ...
Colonel ...
Mr. Carl ...

RECEIVED
32/118

SECRET

[The main body of the document contains several large, dense blocks of text that are almost entirely illegible due to extreme noise and heavy blacking out. The text appears to be organized into paragraphs, but the individual words and sentences cannot be discerned.]

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SECRET

Mr. William H. [unclear]

10/1/44

Very respectfully,
[unclear]

The enclosed memorandum from Colonel
[unclear] is to review the information on this subject
from Colonel [unclear] dated 1 February 1944, and from
the memorandum dated 7 February 1944.

Director, G-2
Major, A-1
[unclear]

cc General John [unclear]
Colonel W. [unclear]
[unclear]

SECRET

W. F. Cassidy, Col.

- 2 -

29 March 1944

person not continue his assignment to GSS. Furthermore, it is not desirable either to him or to us that he continue his military status and be assigned to other duties by the Army. There is an obligation on the part of GSS to see that he is discharged from the Army. On the suggestion of Mr. Charles S. Cheston, I refer to your branch the problem of arranging for his honorable discharge. While this case is a specific problem, the matter should also be regarded as a general problem for which the correct procedure should be established, since it is anticipated that there will be a number of similar cases in the future.

For your further information on this matter, I wish to advise that the above indicated man is 37 years of age. His date of birth was 17 April 1907. He is married, was living with his wife until the time of his entrance on duty with us, and has three children. His draft board is Local Board No. 543, 640 Dewey Avenue, Rochester, New York. His order number was No. 461.

/s/ L.B.

Embassy Rome G.I.
Mr. P. Solbi 100,
Mr. 4700 - G.I.

Mr. P. Connolly, Col., P. A.,
Chief, Personnel Procurement Section

29 March 1944

Dear Sir:

Statement of Recruited Man

1. In accordance with the personnel needs of the Italian Section, SI, in the early part of 1943, special arrangements were made by this section with the office of Assistant Secretary of War John McLean and with G-1 for the militarization of a number of civilians who had volunteered to carry out on behalf of this organization certain overseas assignments for which they had special qualifications. Militarization of these men was desirable and necessary in order to facilitate their transportation overseas and in order to give them the security of military cover in the war zone in which they would operate.

2. It was agreed among the parties concerned that at a later date certain conditions might arise which would make it desirable to discharge some of the men involved. This should be done in case of physical disabilities which might render them unfit for our work although they might not be serious enough to justify medical discharge from the Army; in case of psychological unfitness for continuation of the assignment; in the event a man's withdrawal should become advisable as a security precaution; or upon completion of the specific assignment for which a man was recruited. Under such conditions it was agreed that there would be a moral obligation on the part of the Army to give honorable discharges to the men so involved. Matters of procedure for discharge were not discussed.

3. Under the arrangements indicated in Paragraph 2, Pvt. Albert Buhrle, 33744425, was inducted into the Army on 2 July 1943. Induction was purely voluntary on his part. His draft classification up to the time of induction, was 3-A. He departed for overseas duty 20 August 1943. During the course of his work overseas he developed physical disabilities which make it impossible for him to continue to take part in our activities. He was hospitalized there and was subsequently returned to this country for further hospitalization, reaching England General Hospital, Atlantic City, New Jersey, about 20 December 1943. He was released from the hospital 23 January 1944 and sent to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, for reassignment to "duties within the continental limits of U.S. not involving prolonged marches or exertion." Since we were responsible for his militarization we have had him transferred back to our office in Washington.

4. It is no longer desirable that this man remain on our

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Mr. [redacted] before doing anything further, I would like to have your instructions as to whether or not you want me to take the matter up again with Mr. [redacted] or whether you want to do so yourself. In the event that you have no recollection about a definite agreement regarding the release factor, it pleases me that we are in a position to bring for reconsideration of this case. Mr. Brennan feels that we have a very strong moral obligation to the men involved and, of course, we would not want to do them an injustice, but it seems quite likely that the men of draft age would have been drafted by now in any event. For those over draft age, I believe we can make a special case, if you desire to do so.

[Signature]
 M. F. CONNELLY,
 Colonel, P.M.C.

Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch

cc: Mr. Brennan

WFC:jc

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

General William J. Donovan

9 May 1944

Colonel Mark Connally

Disposition of Enlisted Men Returning from the Sicilian Operation, AI

As you know, there are 25 enlisted men who were recruited last summer for the AI Italian operation and these men will have to be disposed of upon their return to the United States. Mr. Connally of AI was of the opinion that arrangements had been made between you and the Assistant Secretary of War, John Hopley, to militarize this personnel and at a later date if certain conditions prevailed, that they would be discharged. In your absence, I took the matter up with Col. who indicated that they could do nothing in the way of discharging the men unless they had a directive from the Secretary of War's office to that effect. I then talked to Mr. Hopley who did not recall any agreement to the effect that the men would be released. He did remember the discussion about bringing them into the service. He told me that he would see what could be done about it, although there was nothing in writing in his office and the same situation existed in the Secretariat of War.

Yesterday, an officer on General White's staff called me to discuss it and it seems as though Mr. Hopley got the impression that these men were officers. When I explained that they were enlisted men, Col. again stated that it would be impossible to release them without a special directive from the Secretary of

CONFIDENTIAL

● **CONFIDENTIAL** ●

War's office. Before doing anything further, I would like to have your instructions as to whether or not you want me to take the matter up again with Mr. McCloy or whether you want to do so yourself. In the event that you have no recollection about a definite agreement regarding the release factor, it seems to me that we are in a rather weak position in asking for reconsideration of this case. Mr. Brennan feels that we have a very strong moral obligation to the men involved and, of course, we would not want to do them an injustice, but it seems quite likely that the men of draft age would have been drafted by now in any event. For those over draft age, I believe we can make a special case, if you desire to do so.

[Signature]
M. F. CONNELLY,
 Colonel, F.A.,

Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch

cc: Mr. Brennan

KFC:js

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTRA-OFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan

DATE: 5 May 1944

FROM: Colonel E. F. Connelly

SUBJECT: Disposition of Enlisted Men Returning from the Sicilian Operation, SI

As you know, there are 23 enlisted men who were recruited last summer for the SI Italian operation and these men will have to be disposed of upon their return to the United States. Mr. Brennan of SI was of the opinion that arrangements had been made between you and the Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy, to militarize this personnel and at a later date if certain conditions prevailed, that they would be discharged. In your absence, I took the matter up with G-1 who indicated that they could do nothing in the way of discharging the men unless they had a directive from the Secretary of War's office to that effect. I then talked to Mr. McCloy who did not recall any agreement to the effect that the men would be released. He did remember the discussion about bringing them into the service. He told me that he would see what could be done about it, although there was nothing in writing in his office and the same situation existed in the Secretariat of OSS.

Yesterday, an officer on General White's staff called me to discuss it and it seems as though Mr. McCloy got the impression that these men were officers. When I explained that they were enlisted men, G-1 again stated that it would be impossible to release them without a special directive from the Secretary of

CONFIDENTIAL

My little man
 in Elly was by
 phone - and
 I assumed that
 when the man was
 out there - James
 accompanied would plan
 about the job of the business.
 about plan that - we

1 August 1966

General Board

Colonel General

Disposition of Retired Officers

In order to work out the disposition of Retired Officers a meeting of the Board was held. Mr. [Name] represented Security in the absence of Mr. [Name] and Mr. [Name]. Mr. [Name] designated Lt. [Name], Captain [Name] represented the General Council. Also present were Lt. Colonel Paul [Name], RFB, and Mr. [Name] and Mr. [Name] of [Name], also Lt. [Name] of [Name].

I outlined the program as I envisioned it as follows:

- (1) That at this meeting Mr. [Name] and Mr. [Name] would present the committee the entire background of the case.
- (2) That the Bureau (OS) would outline all pertinent data relative to each individual of case.
- (3) That Mr. [Name]'s report read at this morning's meeting would be made available to the committee.
- (4) That I would appoint an Officer from RFB to work with an Officer from the General Council's office for the preparation of reports for each Retiree.

The preparation of this would be to have all essential data prepared in order to facilitate the Board would not have to accumulate data by reviewing its meetings. This essential data would include among other things the recommendations of the Woodrow Commission, as well as the work of the [Name] committee. The Board would schedule the stage for each of the [Name] men to be interviewed. These men will be heard individually and Mr. [Name] and Mr. [Name] will be available for consultation. I explained to the group that I felt the possibility of covering these men from the Army will into three stages first:

- (1) The outstanding request for severance of those men who are [Name]
- (2) The request to the War Department to return to identify [Name] men who were [Name] in [Name] them to [Name] old [Name] for reclassification.
- (3) Description of the wishes of those under [Name] so that [Name] they want to stay
 - (a) In OSB if there is a useful spot.
 - (b) If there is no use for them in OSB if they are willing to be referred back to the Army.

Of the twenty-five to be interviewed, 19 are over 40 years of age, 10 are probably subject to discharge because of physical disability, 11 are in [Name] cases on the physical and age side. It can be returned to the Army if [Name] use for them, since they were removed from the Army and [Name] they [Name] be special financial arrangements [Name] all have the [Name]. It is necessary to say that the approach of the Board will not be an equitable and [Name] to [Name] to each case so that [Name] will have OSB with a friendly feeling [Name].

L. J. [Name]
Col [Name]

COPY

SECRET

220.8 (8 Sep 44)

3d Ind.

RJP/eg

Director of Strategic Services, 21 Sep 44.

TO: OO, Hq. & Hq. Det., OSS, 24th & F Sts. N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

For appropriate action and retention in files.

For the Director of Strategic Services

/s/
/t/ E. J. PUTZELL, Jr.
E. J. Putzell, Jr.
Lieut. (j.g.) USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

4b Incls.
n/c

A TRUE COPY:

Carl V. Cash
CARL V. CASH
2nd Lt., AO.

SECRET

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4. These men while ideally suited for the particular task for which they were recruited have no further usefulness in OSS at this time, nor is it contemplated that there will be any change in this condition. It is also extremely doubtful if they will be of any material value to the Army.

5. Immediate ruling of G-1 is respectfully requested.

/s/ CHARLES S. CHESTON
/w/ CHARLES S. CHESTON
Acting Director

Incls. 46.

ADPE-A-WDCAP 220.8 (8 Sept 44)

1st Ind.

LF/4128

WD, AGO, Washington 25, D.C., 14 September 1944.

Through: Commanding General, Military District of Washington.

To : Commanding Officer, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. The request contained in paragraph 1, basic communication, is approved.

2. Future cases of enlisted men who were voluntarily inducted by the Office of Strategic Services for the performance of a specific job where they were promised immediate discharge after completion of the assigned mission, will be processed in a like manner without reference to G-1, WDOS.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ M. G. RICHESON
Adjutant General.

46 Incls.
n/s

SPWPD 220.8 (8 Sep 44)

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, Room 5-D-518, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C., 15 September 1944.

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services, Room 107, North Building, 26th and "K" Streets, N. W., Washington 19, D. C.

/s/ C.J.S.

46 Incls.
n/s

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 September 1944

FROM: Request for Honorable Discharge for 46 Enlisted Men.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
Room 5B 534, Pentagon Building,
Washington, D. C.

File

1. The War Department is herewith requested to approve the honorable discharge, for the convenience of the Government, of 46 enlisted men now assigned to OSS. A brief description of each case is attached herewith as Exhibits 1 to 46 and action is respectfully requested either collectively or individually.

2. The reason for this request is as follows:

a. In the earlier part of 1943 OSS was requested to recruit a large number of individuals for special secret activities in the then contemplated Sicilian, Sardinian and Italian campaign. The type of individuals to be recruited constituted a scarce and difficult category. It was necessary to recruit men who were completely familiar with the territory involved, who spoke the language fluently and who were willing to volunteer for an extremely hazardous task.

b. None of the Enlisted men included in this memorandum were at the time in the Army.

c. At the request of OSS these men voluntarily offered themselves for induction and were inducted in the Army of the United States on dates in accordance with Exhibits attached. This was necessary to secure transportation and to provide adequate security in operations. These men were shipped overseas for the carrying out of their assigned tasks and were returned to the United States their mission having been completed.

d. At the time of induction the War Department informally agreed that upon the completion of this mission that these men would be discharged from the Army and definite promises to this effect were made by those who recruited these men. To keep faith with these men who volunteered for a hazardous mission their honorable discharges are requested. They will return to their homes, register with their Local Draft Boards and be subject to any action that these Boards may desire to take.

3. It should be further pointed out that the recruiting of these men was at the urgent request of AFHQ who wanted a very much larger group of men than was possible to recruit. It also should be pointed out that at the Quebec Conference, OSS was charged specifically with handling affairs in Sardinia in order to permit the Army proper to by-pass that particular territory.

SECRET

SECRET

27 October 1944

The Director

1. It is recommended that the men and women who are being discharged as of the day of discharge or return to the Army as the case may be, and termination is to be placed to the discretion of each man or woman, be discharged as follows:
2. The Executive Director recommends that upon termination of the employment of the men of this group, the usual period of notice given for termination of general employment contracts be dispensed with, inasmuch as the men will receive 3000 discharge pay from the Army upon being honorably discharged. This sum should be considered as sufficient termination pay.
3. It is recommended that a complete and final settlement of all outstanding obligations be made with Cpl. Tampara, Cpl. Hancock, Pfc. Bellows, Pfc. Lee and S/ Sgt Milner in accordance with the individual promises made to them as set forth above.
4. It is recommended that the men recruited from the Army be transferred to the Army for regular duty if they cannot be utilized within OSW.
5. It is recommended that Pfc. Felix N. Martini be transferred to the Army for regular duty.

St. Col. Paul Roberts, OAC
Acting Chairman

[Signature]
Member

APPROVED this _____ day of _____ 1944.

[Signature]
Director

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

The Director

27 October 1944

In addition the Memorandum, dated 2 October 1944, stated that Pvt. Franco Nicotri (now being processed for discharge by the Army in accordance with the recommendations approved by the Director on September 1944) was promised a \$7 per diem allowance while in the field.

It will be the responsibility of the Italian Section, C.I. to prepare a financial settlement in accordance with agreements made with each of the men and as set forth hereinafter. In making such financial settlements, the non-traveling officer will be assisted by Special Funds Branch.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The OSS Personnel Board, having had presented to it and having considered the facts in each case, including all contractual arrangements made between the men and authorized representatives of this agency, makes the following recommendations which are necessary and equitable in its judgment to discharge the obligations of this organization of the men concerned:

1. It is recommended that a complete and final settlement of all OSS financial obligations with Pvt. Joseph Muraddu, Cpl. Gaetano Cicale, Pvt. Felix D. Martini, Cpl. Vincent Favala and Pvt. Franco Nicotri be promptly effected in accordance with the following conditions:

a. For the entire period from the day of entrance on OSS duty to the day of termination of the present existing OSS contract, each man shall be paid the salary, plus the per diem allowance while overseas, both as agreed upon with him and as set forth above. From such payments there will be deducted the following items and no other:

- (1) Army base pay calculated on the basis of the rank of the individual when assigned to this mission by OSS;
- (2) The sum of two dollars (\$2) per day while overseas, this sum representing the estimated value of rations and quarters furnished by OSS or the Army; PROVIDED, however, that no such sum shall be deducted for period during which an individual was in enemy hands or in enemy-occupied territory or otherwise was not furnished rations and quarters at the expense of the Government.

SECRET

* per diem allowance only -g. involved in this case.

SECRET

27 October 1944

of the same amount as that for Army Sergeants Sicala and Martini was promised by the Italian Section, S.I. The same amount was promised by the Board of 1944. The other two will be placed within \$25 by the Board of 1944. The same amount was promised by the Italian Section, S.I. The same amount was promised by the Board of 1944.

Under his present service, Pvt. Martini had dealings with the Board of 1944 which prior reports were made to the Director. In the request of the Security Officer that he be returned to the Army and this Board concurs, subject to the findings and approval of the Director's office.

The compensation promised by representatives of the Italian Section, S.I. to these men has been set forth in Memoranda of 25 August 1944 (revised 20 September 1944), 6 October 1944, 17 October 1944 and 25 October 1944, addressed to this Board by the Italian Section, S.I. The compensation promised is set forth below:

Pvt. Joseph Maradda was promised \$325 per month, less his Army pay, plus a \$10 per diem allowance while overseas.

Cpl. Gaferio Cicala was promised \$325 per month, less his Army pay, plus a \$10 per diem allowance while overseas.

Pvt. Felix E. Martini was promised \$325 per month, less his Army pay, plus a \$7 per diem allowance while overseas.

Cpl. Vincent Pavia was promised \$325 per month, less his Army pay, plus a \$10 per diem allowance while overseas.

Cpl. Frank G. Zamparo was promised \$150 per month less his Army pay while in the Theater.

Cpl. Frank Mancuso, Pfc. Louis F. Bellotto and Pvt. Joseph Moo were promised the difference between their Army pay and a Staff Sergeant's pay while overseas.

S/Sgt. Joseph L. Hilger was promised an increase in pay, but no definite amount was ever settled on. He should be paid the difference between his Army pay and a First Sergeant's pay for the period he was overseas.

In reaction as to the promises made to Cpl. Guy A. Giaraldi has not been furnished. The Italian Section, S.I. is securing such information by cable.

*Subject to confirmation by cable as to \$7 or \$10 per diem.

SECRET

SECRET10-66
27 October 1944
to [unclear] [unclear]
to [unclear]

TO : The Director

FROM : The OSS Personnel Board

SUBJECT: Second Supplemental Report and Recommendation of the OSS Personnel Board regarding the Termination of the Services of Certain Enlisted Men now Assigned to the Italian Section of P.I. Branch.

In accordance with the provisions of General Order No. 9, Rev. Supp. 23, the OSS Personnel Board met on the following dates and proceeded to consider the disposition of the men listed below who had recently returned from overseas duty:

25 September 1944

Cpl. Bruno G. Zamparo

12 October 1944

Cpl. Gaferio Cicala
Pvt. Felix E. Martini
Cpl. Frank Mancuso
Cpl. Guy A. Giaraldi
Pfc. Louis F. Bellotte
Cpl. Vincent Pavia

24 October 1944

S/Sgt. Joseph L. Hilger
Pvt. Joseph Mureddu

25 October 1944

Pvt. Joseph Nee

The men, listed above, were all engaged by the Italian Section, P.I. for extra hazardous duty in connection with the Italian campaign. Pvt. Joseph Mureddu was recruited as a civilian and volunteered for induction in the Army at the request of OSS. His honorable discharge from the Army was recommended to and approved by the Acting Director on 8 September 1944. The remainder of the men, listed above, were recruited from the Army.

SECRET

JPWC Subcommittee

September 15, 1942

Excerpt:

JEDBURCHS

Because of some difference of opinion among the U.S. Staff in London as to the method of using these groups, COLONEL POWAN recommended that the proposal be withdrawn until further

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Directed the Secretary to withdraw this proposal from its present status with the Joint Staff Planners.

SECRET**ENCLOSURE****MEMORANDUM****PROPOSAL**

1. The Military executive of the British Secret Operations Executive has proposed to the Office of Strategic Services the organization and training of a number of teams of "organizers" to operate in France. For reasons of security these teams have been referred to as JEDBURGHS.

2. Role

(a) A total of 70 teams will be required who will be dropped to make contact with French local authorities or existing S.O.E. organizations in France in order to distribute arms, to start off the action of the patriots, and to arrange by radio the dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and equipment. It is probable that these teams will be required to organize the patriots to interfere as far as possible with all means of communication which the Germans are likely to be employing in certain areas.

(b) 50% of the teams will be composed of British personnel and 50% of U. S. personnel. All teams will operate in either British or U. S. uniform.

3. Composition

Each team will consist of one officer, one N.C.O. assistant and one radio operator, with set. The officer and N.C.O. will require a sufficient knowledge of French to enable them to instruct the patriots. They will never be required to attempt to deceive the Germans as to their real nationality, and will therefore not require to be absolutely fluent in the language.

4. Enrolment and Training

(a) The training of 50% of the teams will be completed by 1st December, 1942 and the training of the remainder by the 1st April, 1943. The whole of the first flight (35 teams) will have to be found from British sources since the O.S.S. is not confident that it will be able to recruit the necessary personnel so that training may commence on the 1st September.

(b) Training will be organized so that the essential knowledge can be imparted in the first two months; additional instruction which will be of value to personnel can be given as further time is available. This will mean that if training of British personnel starts on the 1st September they will be available after the 1st November in case they are required to operate at short notice.

(c) The U. S. authorities will recruit personnel for their quota as soon as possible and commence basic training in the U. S. A. The present proposal is that the U. S. teams will then carry out a month's final training in U. K.

5. Equipment.

The suggested scale of equipment for each team is as follows:-

Sten guns	-	72
Sten gun		
ammunition	-	32,400 rounds (450 rds. per gun)
Pistols	-	72
Pistol ammunition	-	1,360 rounds
Hand grenades	-	315
P.E.	-	30 lbs.
Connected equipment	-	30 lbs.

RECOMMENDATION

6. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee recommends the approval of this project with the following conditions:

A. That the employment of JEDBURTS, as proposed, be contingent upon approval of the Theater Commander concerned.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

August 24, 1942

JEDBURGHs

GENERAL WEDEMAYER pointed out that the operations of the JEDBURGHs should be subject to control of the Theater Commander concerned.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that since joint action and joint training with the British are involved, the project should go to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

THE COMMITTEE:

1. Approved this project amended to indicate that the Jedburghs should be employed subject to control of the Theater Commander concerned.
2. Directed the Secretary to transmit the amended proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending approval.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

Jedburgh's
Taylor

2012

August 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Edmond Taylor
Subject: JEDBURGH'S

After reading the very interesting Jedburgh project, it occurs to me that we could greatly strengthen our position as a psychological warfare organization and also make the projects themselves still more attractive by giving them, whenever possible, a definite psychological warfare slant.

In the case of the Jedburgh project, for example, these groups could probably engage in a few simple propaganda activities, mainly publicizing their own operations as an example and they could be instructed as to types of information which they could transmit for exploitation by radio propaganda in support of their own operations. If this extension of their activity were contemplated, some provision for a little training along these lines should be included in the recommendations.

I think it is always useful to have some reference to the psychological as an additional phase of P.O. work in projects like the Jedburgh project from the very start because it serves to build up our main contention that we are a psychological warfare organization and are not only interested in the type of "secret military" activity behind enemy lines which too many commanders may feel is a general "warrior" activity. We feel - and must be handled exclusively by them.

It is always a hard job difficult to translate this point of view into action.

the different branches of the organization have not yet got used to working together as a psychological warfare team, and each still thinks only in terms of its own specialty. In other words, we do not always practice ourselves the doctrines which we preach to the O.W.I. and at the Psychological Warfare Committee.

My suggestion would be, whenever it can be done without compromising security or slowing things down too much, that projects like the Tedburgh project originated by S.A.G. or S.A.D. and intended for submission to the Psychological Warfare Committee should be ~~submitted~~ supported by the O.S.C. Supporting Committee. John Wiley will nearly always have some idea for the political exploitation of any action, and I frequently can contribute some suggestion for propaganda support.

MOST SECRET.

MOST SECRET
LOMN/252

21st July, 1942

Dear Colonel,

Attached is a copy of a memorandum which I wrote after our meeting yesterday.

I am also forwarding a copy of some notes on training which I have received from Colonel Munn.

To save confusion and explanations, we suggest that we always refer to these teams by their code name, JEDBURGHs.

I thought you might like to have the above for reference.

Yours truly,
W. L. Gant

Colonel G.P. Guenther,
Office of Strategic Services.

MOST SECRET~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 7

JEDBURGHS

As a result of recent meetings with G.S.A. (Plans) and Colonel Guenther and Colonel Sheetz, additional information is now available with regard to the role, composition and training of JEDBURGHS.

1. Role

(a) A total of 70 teams will be required who will be dropped to make contact with local authorities or existing S.O.E. organisations in order to distribute arms, start off the action of the patriots, and to arrange by W/T the dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and equipment. It is probable that these teams will be required to organise the patriots so as to be able to interfere as far as possible with all means of communication which the Germans are likely to be employing in certain areas.

(b) 50% of the teams will be composed of British personnel and 50% of U.S. personnel. All teams will operate in either British or U.S. uniform.

2. Composition

Each team will consist of one officer, one M.C.O. assistant and one W/T operator, with set. The officer and M.C.O. will require a sufficient knowledge of French to enable them to instruct the patriots, but will never be required to attempt to deceive the Germans as to their real nationality, and will therefore not require to be absolutely fluent in the language. A working knowledge of French would be of use to the W/T operator, but will not be essential.

3. Enrolment and Training

(a) The training of 50% of the teams will be completed by the 1st December, and the training of the remainder by the 1st April. The whole of the first flight (35 teams) will have to be found from British sources since the U.S. are not confident that they will be able to recruit the necessary personnel so that training may commence on the 1st September.

(b) Training should be organised so that the essential knowledge can be imparted in the first two months and additional instruction which will be of value to personnel can then be given as further time is available. This will mean that if training of British personnel starts on the 1st September they will be available after the 1st November in case they are required to operate at short notice. It is always possible that these British personnel trained for the first flight may not be required until after the 1st April, so the question of their employment during the intervening period must be considered.

(c)/

MOST SECRET**PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS FOR TRAINING**

1. I have been considering this problem again in the light of our recent conversation with Colonel Guenther, and have come to the following conclusions:-

- (a) The training will take about two months, assuming that the students are men with some military knowledge.
- (b) If necessary this training can be extended by one more month.
- (c) If the operation is delayed beyond this period, it will not be possible for the Training Section to give the students further suitable occupation. Consideration must therefore be given to the best method of employing them until required for operations. This might include attachment for further training to formations, more particularly to the Airborne Division.

(d) The syllabus of training should be:-

(1) For all members of each party

- (i) Parachute descents.
- (ii) Reception committee work as at present carried out at S.T.S.51, but omitting the disposal of containers.

(2) W/T Operators

- (i) Wireless training, to be arranged by the Chief Signals Officer.
- (ii) Training in Close Combat and Weapon Training, to be given at the Wireless School by instructors lent by the Training Section.

(3) Officers and Assistants

- (i) P.O. and Close Combat.
- (ii) Weapon and Grenade Training (Gren. Pistol, Rifle, grenade)
- (iii) Map Reading (including use of foreign maps)
- (iv) Demolitions. (Only using those materials which will be supplied)
- (v) Airdrops, especially movement by night and movement of parties.
- (vi) Reception Committee work, as done at Training and Holding Schools, including selection of drop-in points.
- (vii) Equipment and organization of patrol teams.
- (viii) Tactics and employment of small groups with particular reference to the tasks required:-

Covering drop-in points.
 Mine clearance
 Denial communications to the enemy.
 Prevention demolition of main bridges, etc.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 33

COPY NO. 1

AUGUST 21, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

JEDBURGHs

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a proposal of the O.S.S., consists of two memoranda on the organization and training of "Jedburghs."

The Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee has considered this proposal and recommends its approval by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

In the manner indicated above

A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

*Subject to the content of the
three memoranda enclosed*

A B O R TE N C L O S U R EJ E D B U R C H S

As a result of recent meetings with G.H.Q. (Plans) and Colonel Guenther and Colonel Sheets, additional information is now available with regard to the role, composition and training of JEDBURCHS.

1. Role

(a) A total of 70 teams will be required who will be dropped to make contact with local authorities or existing S.O.I. organizations in order to distribute arms, start off the action of the patriots, and to arrange by W/T the dropping points and reception committees for the receipt of further arms and equipment. It is probable that these teams will be required to organize the patriots so as to be able to interfere as far as possible with all means of communication which the Germans are likely to be employing in certain areas.

(b) 50% of the teams will be composed of British personnel and 50% of U. S. personnel. All teams will operate in either British or U. S. uniform.

2. Composition

Each team will consist of one officer, one N.C.O. assistant and one W/T operator, with nat. The officer and N.C.O. will require a sufficient knowledge of French to enable them to instruct the patriots, but will never be required to attempt to deceive the Germans as to their real nationality, and will therefore not require to be absolutely fluent in the language. A working knowledge of French would be of use to the W/T operator, but will not be essential.

SECRET3. Enrolment and Training

(a) The training of 50% of the teams will be completed by 1st December, and the training of the remainder by the 1st April. The whole of the first flight (25 teams) will have to be found from British sources since the U. S. are not confident that they will be able to recruit the necessary personnel so that training may commence on the 1st September.

(b) Training should be organised so that the essential knowledge can be imparted in the first two months, and additional instruction which will be of value to personnel can then be given as further time is available. This will mean that if training of British personnel starts on the 1st September they will be available after the 1st November in case they are required to operate at short notice. It is always possible that these British personnel trained for the first flight may not be required until after the 1st April, so the question of their employment during the intervening period must be considered.

(c) The U. S. authorities ~~have agreed~~ ^{should} to recruit personnel for their quota as soon as possible and to commence basic training in the U.S.A. The present proposal is that the U. S. teams should then carry out a month's final training in this country.

4. Equipment

The suggested scale of equipment for each team is as follows:-

Sten guns	-	72	
Sten gun ammunition	-	32,400 rounds	{450 rds. (per gun)}
Pistols	-	72	
Pistol ammunition	-	1,350 rounds	
Hand grenades	-	315	
P.E.	-	30 lbs.	
Connected equipment	-	30 lbs.	

The above figures are only a rough guide and will be confirmed after the return of Brigadier Gubbins.

S E C R E T**PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS FOR 'JEDBURGH'
TRAINING**

1. I have been considering this problem again in the light of our recent conversation with Colonel Guenther, and have come to the following conclusions:-

(a) The training will take about two months, assuming that the students are men with some military knowledge.

(b) If necessary this training can be extended by one more month.

(c) If the operation is delayed beyond this period, it will not be possible for the Training Section to give the students further suitable occupation. Consideration must therefore be given as to the best method of employing them until required for operations. This might include attachment for further training to formations, more particularly to the Airborne Division.

(d) The syllabus of training should be:-

(1) For all members of each party

(1) Parachute descents.

(11) Reception committee work as at present carried out at S.T.S.51, but omitting the disposal of containers.

(2) W/T Operators

(1) Wireless training, to be arranged by the Chief Signals Officer.

(11) Training in Close Combat and Weapon Training, to be given at the Wireless School by instructors lent by the Training Section.

S E C R E T(3) Officers and Assistants

- (1) P.T. and Close Combat.
- (ii) Weapon and Grenade Training (Sten, Pistol, Mills Grenade)
- (iii) Map Reading (Including use of foreign maps)
- (iv) Demolitions. (Only using those materials which will be supplied)
- (v) Fieldcraft, especially movement by night and movement of parties.
- (vi) Reception Committee work, as done at Finishing and Holding Schools, including selection of dropping points.
- (vii) Equipment and Organisation of Patriot Groups.
- (viii) Tactics and employment of small groups with particular reference to the tasks required:-
 - Covering dropping points.
 - Killing Germans.
 - Denoing communications to the enemy.
 - Preventing demolition of main bridges, etc.
- (ix) Conditions of civil organisation in the country concerned, with special reference to the recruitment of patriots, obtaining help from local authorities, enemy forces and locations, etc.

SECRET

2. If, as was suggested, the U. S. authorities carry out a portion of the training of their parties before the students arrive in this country, I think that they should do the following, leaving the remainder to be done in this country to ensure uniformity:-

(a) Parachute Training.

(b) W/T training (after consultation with S.O.E.

Chief Signals Officer as to how much can be done before arrival in this country.

(c) Close Combat.

(d) Weapon and Grenade training.

(e) Map Reading.

(f) Fieldcraft.

(g) Demolitions.

3. I am now drawing up a first tentative programme of training and will submit it for approval shortly.

(60/10)

SECRET

J.P.W.O. 42/5

COPY NO. 1

December 4, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS --
1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

Ref. - J.P.W.O. 42/1/2d Draft
J.P.W.O. 42/4

Note by the Secretary

1. In accordance with the request of the Joint Staff Planners, the Office of Strategic Services has submitted a statement regarding the use of the items included in the O.S.S. 1942 Catalogue of Materiel. In addition, it has presented a list of the requirements as to items and quantities of materials to meet British requests. Both documents are circulated herewith as a supplement to the Catalogue.

2. Review and comments of the Services of Supply, War Department, and of the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department will be obtained on the Catalogue and this supplement.

A. H. ONTHANK
Secretary

Presented by Summary to Procurement & Materiel

S E C R E T

J.P.W.O. 42/5

SUPPLEMENT TO

O.S.S. 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

- (1) Statement of the Director of Strategic Services re use of items by the Office of Strategic Services
- (2) List of items and quantities to supply British requirements.

S E C R E T

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 1, 1942

To: Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
From: William J. Donovan, Director, OSS
Subject: OSS Catalog - 1942.

The quantities listed in the OSS 1942 catalog were originally intended to cover OSS needs and, in some cases, anticipated requirements of the British and other foreign governments up to December 31, 1942. However, because of the delay in approval of the catalog and, therefore, in the procurement of these items, these quantities are now needed for the exclusive use of OSS.

We have received an urgent cabled request from the British (copy attached) that of the 300,000 sets of incendiary pencils contained in the attached list, 100,000 sets be shipped by January 1, 1943. These could be supplied from the amount listed in the catalog and later replaced from the additional quantities ordered for the British.

Attached is a list of special items and quantities of each which we have been requested to supply to the British, together with the approximate quantities of materials necessary for their manufacture.

The 1942 catalog was originally submitted to the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee at its meeting of September 8, 1942; submitted in revised form to the same committee on October 2, 1942; and approved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and by the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department, on October 17, 1942.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

COPY

Copy of Message received from Captain Benson
10/12/42.

1. LONDON HAS CABLED ASKING FOR THE URGENT DELIVERY OF 500,000 PENCIL DELAYS WITH WHITE - REPEAT WHITE - AMPOULES. THIS DELIVERY TO BE EX OUR REQUIREMENT OF 1,500,000.
2. WILL WATTS HILL BE GOOD ENOUGH TO ISSUE AN EXECUTIVE ORDER TO FREETH ENABLING HIM TO INSTRUCT THE MANUFACTURERS TO SWITCH TO THE MANUFACTURE OF WHITE AMPOULES AND GET THE PENCIL DELAYS ASSEMBLED AND SHIPPED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.
3. THESE PENCIL DELAYS ARE REQUIRED FOR AN OPERATION WHICH HAS JUST BEEN APPROVED BY OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF.

SECRET

ITEMS AND QUANTITIES REQUESTED BY BRITISH

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Lampets, Type VI	5,000
Universal Switch	175,000
Pocket Time Incendiary	500,000
Fighting Knives	1,000
Spring Cashes	1,000
Detonator Magazines	10,000
Adhesive Tape (3/4 x 15 yd. rolls)	10,000
Large Magnets	5,000
Spools Trip Wire - 25 yds.	10,000
Smatchets	10,000
Pencil Sets (5 pencils per set)	300,000
Pull Switches	125,000
Booby Trap Wire, spools	60,000
Olams	5,000
K Tablets	10,000
Fog Signals	100,000

The above items will use the following materials in the approximate amounts set forth below:

Brass Strip	38,692 lbs.
Brass Rod	60,764 "
Brass Tubing	29,872 "
Lead	14,458 "
Cadmium	440 "
Copper Tubing	6,690 "
Copper Anodes	266 "
Electrolytic Copper	200 "
Copper	1,800 "
Brass	12,775 "
Spring Steel	11,635 "
Cold Rolled Steel	34,630 "
Strip Steel	4,500 "
Steel	16,050 "
Mild Steel	12,400 "
Steel Tube	285 "
Phenolic Resin	1,700 "
Rubber	3,475 "
Die-Casting Metals	35,066 "
Pulminate of Mercury	6,200 "
Musie Wire	7,800 "
Alnico No. 2	2,500 "
Carver Steel No. 1	10,500 "
Phenolic Bakelite	2,500 "
Brass Screws	16 2/3 lbs.

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Morphine	20 lbs.
Nickel	5,400 "
Aluminum	3,000 "
Aluminum Powder	10,000 "
Barium Nitrate	30,000 "
Cellulose Acetate	3,100 "
Cellulose Nitrate	47,000 "
High Grade Leather	600 sq. yds.
Cobalt	3,750 lbs.

W.D.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.O. 42/4

COPY NO. 1

November 6, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL
(Ref. - J.P.W.O. 42/1/2a Draft)

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosure presents a memorandum from the Secretary of the Joint U. S. Staff Planners, dated November 6, 1942, which states the action taken by that Committee with reference to this subject at its meeting on November 4, 1942.

A. H. ONTANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE

November 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR - Secretary, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

Subject: 1942 Catalogue of Material for O.S.S.

References: (a) J.P.S. 35/10.
(b) J.P.S. 44th Meeting, Item 5.

1. In connection with the above subject, attention is invited to the following extract of Item 5, minutes of the Joint U.S. Staff Planners, 44th Meeting, held November 4, 1942:

* * * * *

"B. 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIAL FOR O.S.S.
(J.P.S. 35/10)

"After discussion,

"THE COMMITTEE:-

"Agreed to return the Catalogue to the J.P.W.C. with the following requests:

- "(a) That the items in the Catalogue be re-examined for the purpose of determining if any items for foreign nations are included and, if so, to delete such items;
- "(b) That the Catalogue be then submitted informally to the Services of Supply, War Department General Staff, and the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department, for review;
- "(c) That the Catalogue, together with the views of the above agencies thereon, be returned to the Joint U.S. Staff Planners;
- "(d) That any items to be procured for the account of any foreign nation be submitted through the International Division."

* * * * *

A. J. McFARLAND,

Secretary,

Joint U.S. Staff Planners.

JPWC Subcommittee

October 28, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF recounted the results of his discussion with Admiral Cooke and Captain Conolly, USN, concerning the Joint Staff Planners' disapproval of the recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee on this proposal, and the action of the latter in referring the matter to a Subcommittee for the purpose of reexamining the situation.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE

Took note that new recommendations to coordinate all factors of the situation will be made by the special Subcommittee of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

SECRETTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE**

October 28, 1948

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARIES JOINT STAFF PLANNERS:

Subject: Office of Strategic Services -
Communications Services.

1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is considering action upon the "1948 Catalogue of Material for the Office of Strategic Services," which includes a requisition to complete two radio stations, one in New York and one in California. It also includes requisitions for material to establish communications facilities in the Far East, West Africa, Middle East and Near East and for equipment for its operatives who will be stationed in many parts of the world.

2. The Committee has also been ordered by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army to initiate a study and to submit recommendations to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff which will clearly define the functions of the several branches of the O.S.S., including all subsidiary activities.

3. It is noted that the Joint U. S. Communications Board has submitted recommendations to the Joint Staff Planners pertaining to the establishment by the O.S.S. of various communications systems, to control by theater commanders and to the operation of the radio stations mentioned above.

4. Because of the directive to the O.S.S. (J.C.S. 67/5) which requires that all plans or projects to be undertaken by it be submitted through the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and because of that Committee's present interests in considering the subjects mentioned above, it is respectfully suggested that the Joint Staff Planners refer the recommendations by the Joint Communications Board contained in J.P.S. 38/16 to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for comment and recommendation.

Distribution:
Col. Donovan
Lt. Col. Onthank
Gen. Beane
Col. McDowell
GDS Records

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. Minutes
Excerpts

October 26, 1942

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942
CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

Without discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Deferred action on this proposal as being contingent on the action pertaining to procurement of O.S.S. special devices.

J.P.W.C. Minutes
Excerpts

October 26, 1942

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reviewed the previous action of this Committee and the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners that the proposal be disapproved. He outlined the effect of this disapproval in foregoing any control over procurement by foreign Governments of the special devices developed by O.S.S. In consequence, he had discussed this situation with Admiral Cooke and Captain Connolly and they had agreed that the paper should be resubmitted to this Committee for reconsideration on the basis of eliminating certain objectionable features.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER stated that he was in agreement with Admiral Cooke and recommended that a Subcommittee to consist of Captain Grosskopf, Commander Vanderbilt, of O.S.S., Lt. Col. F. S. Besson, C.E., and a representative of S.O.S. be appointed to examine the situation and clarify it in a report to this Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to appoint a subcommittee for this purpose as suggested by General Wedemeyer.

SECRET**SECRET****J.P.W.G. 48th Meeting**COPY NO. 1**SUBCOMMITTEE OF
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE****Minutes of Meeting held in Room 224,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on Friday, October 20, 1949, at 1100.****PRESENT**

Lt. Col. G. G. Blakeney

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USA

Major J. K. Woolnough

Lt. Col. Chas. Moran

Dr. J. G. Rogers

1. **O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS**
(Ref. - J.P.W.G. 48)

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF brought to the attention of the Subcommittee the action taken by the Joint Staff Planners in recommending disapproval of this proposal. He said that the Joint Staff Planners evidently believed that procurement of these devices for other agencies than O.S.S. should be done through usual channels instead of setting up O.S.S. as an additional procurement agency.

DR. ROGERS pointed out that the British S.O.E. does not procure such items through the Army or Navy. Many of these devices which O.S.S. is having manufactured were developed originally by the British and have been improved by the O.S.S. or are obtainable in this country more cheaply. It is normal therefore for the British and other foreign governments to attempt to procure from one central source.

General discussion of the ensuing situation regarding procurement of special devices brought out the following points:

- (a) No obstacle has been placed in the way of O.S.S. procuring such items for itself.
- (b) Refusal to permit O.S.S. to act as a procuring agency for foreign governments deprives these governments of a source for such devices; it is particularly restrictive on the governments which do not have their own manufacturing facilities any more.
- (c) The proposed control of foreign government requests for such devices, viz., approval of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, would be removed, and no control by any organization would exist.
- (d) Under these circumstances it would be possible for the O.S.S., were it so minded, to turn over parts of its own supplies of these devices to foreign governments on whatever payment basis, secret or otherwise, it desired.

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(e) If it is later required that O.S.S. procure these secret materials through the Army Services of Supply or the Navy Office of Procurement and Materials, it will result in a number of severe difficulties, including inability of O.S.S. to use unvouchered funds; destruction or impairment of the security that has been built up in the procurement of these devices; loss of time and direct dealing with sources of supply; and much more red-tape and paper work.

(f) It was noted that the British S.O.M. is not required to procure through military channels. It was also believed that foreign countries will not cease requisitioning on the O.S.S., since it controls the only supply of certain of these special devices, which are greatly needed for operations of Patriot groups throughout the world. If, therefore, the O.S.S. receives such requests under the lack of any control by J.F.W.C., it will be obliged to send the requisitions through the Army, and the Army will probably ask O.S.S. to procure larger amounts for the purpose of turning them over to the foreign governments. Nothing will be saved, time will be lost and there will be no control which is near the picture.

(g) It was also noted that the plan suggested by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee had been initially recommended by, and had the approval of, the Lend-Lease Administration and the Bureau of the Budget.

DR. ROGERS also gave an explanation of the background of O.S.S. plans and operations.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- (a) Directed the Secretary to furnish a resume' of the situation regarding procurement by O.S.S. of special devices for itself and for foreign governments.
- (b) Requested Captain Grosskopf to discuss the matter further with Admiral Cooke and Captain Conolly, USN, to ascertain if the proposal could be reconsidered by the Joint Staff Planners on the basis of the information in the above resume'

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

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JFPC Subcommittee
Excerpts

October 21, 1942

MILITARY PERSONNEL FOR O.S.S. EMERGENCY ALLOTMENT

LT. COL. BLAKENEY reported that the message from General FitzGerald in West Africa had recommended against adding two more officers to the O.S.S. mission in that area, and that General Strong had approved this recommendation.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Took note that the proposal of the O.S.S. for this emergency allotment of commissioned officers for the Army had been approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee but that submittal had been deferred pending a decision regarding the two officers for West Africa.

S E C R E TJ.P.S. 35/15OCTOBER 20, 1948COPY NO. 20JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERSLIST OF O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

Previous references: (a) J.P.S. 35/14.
 (b) J.P.S. 41st Mtg., Item 5.

Note by the Secretary

1. In response to reference (b), the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has submitted to the Joint U.S. Staff Planners the enclosed list of the O.S.S. special items referred to in reference (a).

2. The Office of Strategic Services states its policy with reference to the distribution of these special items as follows:

"It is our practice to handle for foreign governments or other government agencies only those items which cannot be procured through regular channels, such as the Army, the Navy, etc., nor do we handle for them standard items which can be procured by them direct, except in cases where such standard items, as for example adhesive tape, trap or trip wire, might be packaged and shipped as a part of some other special item."

A.J. McFARLAND,
 Secretary.

SECRET**ENCLOSURE****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

October 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. Rogers
From: William H. Vanderbilt
Subject: O.S.S. Special Items

In accordance with your request of the 16th, I am listing below special items being, or to be, acquired directly by O.S.S. All these items are for the use of O.S.S. Special Activities and we have already been requested to supply substantial quantities of them to the British, Chinese, Poles, and other Allied governments. We have received a request from the United States Engineer Corps of the Army for a large quantity of Pencil Sets (time delay devices). It is our practice to handle for foreign governments or other government agencies only those items which cannot be procured through regular channels such as the Army, the Navy, etc., nor do we handle for them standard items which can be procured by them direct except in cases where such standard items, as for example adhesive tape, trap or trip wire, might be packaged and shipped as a part of some other special item.

PENCIL SETS (Time Delay Firing Device)

Description: The pencil is constructed of a soft copper sleeve containing an ampule of corrosive liquid and through which a steel wire is passed. The chemical constituents of the corrosive liquid determine the time delay period. This steel wire holds a firing pin against a spring. The device operates

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when the soft copper sleeve is crushed with the fingers, breaking the ampule. The corrosive liquid attacks the retaining wire, breaking it and permitting the firing pin to go forward and fire a primer cap. The device has a safety pin which must be removed before it will fire.

Purpose: This time delay firing device or time pencil is used to initiate an explosive charge where an interval of time is required between the placing of the charge and the explosion. It is used for the demolition of structures of all kinds, including, but not limited to, buildings, bridges, power lines, water works and machinery. It is an integral part of several other devices. The pencils are manufactured with six different color markings. Each color indicates a different period of time by which the explosion may be delayed. The pencils are packed in waterproof metal boxes, each of which contains five pencils of similar delay periods. They are issued to an operator in complete sets, one set of each time period. Due to possibility of failures, safe practice dictates the use of at least two pencils for each explosive charge. Several explosive charges may be required for demolition of a structure of any size.

Method of Use: The device is used by inserting either a safety fuse or a blasting cap onto the spring snout. In the latter case it will be necessary to insert the blasting cap directly into a charge of explosive or tape a piece of primacord to the blasting cap and, in turn, carry the cord to the explosive charge. The operator, to initiate the explosion, merely squeezes the copper tube. The main charge will subsequently explode at the expiration of the chosen time delay period.

PULL SWITCHES (Pull Firing Device)

Description: This device is constructed of a small brass sleeve in which a firing pin is held against a spring by a pin which, when withdrawn, releases the firing pin permitting it

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to go forward and explode a primer cap set in the end of the sleeve. The sleeve is fitted with a spring snout. The device contains a safety pin which must be removed before the device can be fired.

Purpose: This device is used to initiate a charge of high explosive when a wire attached to the device is deliberately or accidentally pulled. It forms a convenient means of permitting an operator to bring about an explosion when he is some yards away. Its essential purpose is, however, as a booby trap.

Method of Use: When used as a booby trap, a length of small dimension wire or string is attached to the activating pin. The wire or string is then stretched across the path of on-coming personnel or vehicles. The device is held in place by affixing it to a tree, fence, post or other convenient rigid anchor.

When a member of enemy personnel or an enemy vehicle reaches the wire, and in walking or moving forward, puts a pressure of more than seven pounds on the wire, the pin is withdrawn and the explosion occurs.

The device is also effective in the demolition of buildings, bridges and other structures where the operator attaches a long wire to the pull pin and after fixing the charge and device to such structure, removes himself to a distance and carrying the wire with him, pulls the wire at such time as he is ready to initiate the explosive.

UNIVERSAL SWITCHES (Combined Pressure and Release Timing Device)

Description: The universal switch is constructed of a die cast housing with a hinged lid. The lid compresses two concentric springs which, when at rest, hold the lid in such a position as to hold a firing pin against a spring. By the arrangement of setting pins the device may be so fixed as to release the firing pin against a primer cap when pressure is applied to the lid or when pressure is removed from the lid.

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Purpose: This device is used to initiate an explosive charge either by the application of pressure to its upper surface or the removal of an already fixed pressure from its upper surface. The device is in effect a self-contained booby trap not necessitating the tripping of a wire, as is the case with the pull switch. With the use of tripping it may be used as a pull switch.

As a pressure switch it is effective against enemy personnel or vehicles and it also may be used as a booby trap in offices, homes, theatres, or other places.

Method of Use: The device, when used as a pressure switch, may be spread in the path of oncoming enemy personnel or vehicles. The operator, in so using the device, attaches a charge of high explosive to the switch by any appropriate method. As a booby trap, it may be inserted under a chair, bed or the like, and arranged so as to explode a charge of high explosives when weight is added to such chair or bed.

As a release switch, it is principally effective as a booby trap. As such trap, it is inserted in a door jamb so as to fire when the door is opened, or in a desk drawer so as to fire when the door is opened, or it may also be placed under a packing case, or the wheel of a vehicle, and in such instances will fire when the case or suitcase is removed or the vehicle moved.

LIMPETS

Description: The limpet consists of a bakelite case in the base of which are inserted light, high power magnets. The case contains a high explosive charge. Two time delay devices are inserted in the explosive charge.

Purpose: The limpet is a device containing a charge of high explosive which is detonated by a self-contained time delay mechanism of either a corrosion chamber or clockwork design. The device is designed to be affixed to the hull of an enemy vessel

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by self-contained magnets. The charge of explosive which the device contains is sufficiently great to blow a hole with a radius of two to four feet in the steel plate of any but the most heavily armored vessels. The device can also be used effectively against heavy tanks.

The device is designed to withstand the water pressure which will be applied to it when the vessel is in motion. It, however, contains a mechanism which initiates the charge if the limpet is, perchance, washed off the vessel by the action of the water. This mechanism is so arranged that the device will be as effective when so detonated as it will be when detonated by operation of the time delay device.

Method of Use: This limpet is affixed to the underwater plates of an enemy vessel by an operator carrying the device strapped to his body, and swimming to the vessel when it is in port. The operator removes the device from the carrying plate, places it upon the ship's side under water, preferably as close to the stern as is possible so that the explosion will damage the steering and propelling apparatus. The operator then sets the time delay mechanism and returns to the shore. The time delays, furnished with the limpet, are of varying lengths, or if a clock-work delay is used, it may be set for any particular time in the future.

POCKET RELAYS (Pocket Time Incendiary)

Description: The pocket incendiary consists of two incendiary flares and a corrosion chamber delay mechanism encased in a cellulose nitrate housing. In the base of the housing is inserted a cellulose acetate screw plug with a match head on a short stem.

S E C R E T

The delay mechanism consists of a soft copper sleeve containing an ampule of corrosive liquid through which is passed a steel wire. The chemical constituents of the corrosive liquid determines the time delay period. This steel wire holds back a wooden dowel coated with match-striking compound against a spring. The device is operated by crushing the copper tube with the end plug which is first removed.

Purpose: This device is essentially an incendiary for starting fires at a predetermined future time. It is effective for initiating conflagration of warehouses, factories, vessels, coal mines, etc.

Method of Use: The device is activated by unscrewing the match plug and inserting the head end into a slot on the side of the housing and crushing the ampule of chemical solution which is contained in the copper sleeve. The safety cover is then removed from the match and the plug containing the match is again screwed into the housing. The device is then placed in a concealed position among the material it is desired to ignite. After the delay period, the action previously described takes place and a fire is started.

M.L. (MEDIUM) FLARES (Instantaneous Incendiary)

Description: This incendiary is constructed of a paper cylinder with a paper cap. The cylinder is packed with an incendiary compound. Its chemical formula is secret. Inserted in the top of the cylinder is a large match head; affixed to the paper cap is a metal striking board. The cylinder and cap is wrapped in paper.

Purpose: This device is to be used to initiate a fire where no time delay permitting the operator's escape is required.

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Method of Use: To ignite the incendiary the operator strips off the paper wrapping, removes the paper cap, strikes the match head on the match striking head and throws or places the lighted incendiary into or against readily ignitable material.

FUSE IGNITERS (Pull Wire Fuse Igniters)

Description: The fuse igniter consists of a paper tube in which is inserted a brass clamp, a small brass cup filled with match compound, and a wiggle wire covered with match striking compound. Five devices are packed in a waterproof cellophane bag.

Purpose: The fuse igniter is a device which is designed as a substitute for matches. It is used in the lighting of safety fuses. It is superior to matches for two principal reasons: (1) There is no visible illumination; (2) It will light fuse in a high wind or in the rain.

Method of Use: This device is used by inserting safety fuse in the paper tube into the brass clamp. The wiggle wire is then pulled through the cup of match compound which causes a fire in the paper tube, which lights the safety fuse.

FIGHTING KNIVES AND SHEATHS

Description: The blade is constructed from a high grade steel and is diamond shaped from the hilt to the point. The smaller section of the blade extends the length of the handle and is threaded on the handle end. The hilt, handle and knob are constructed from separate pieces of brass. These three parts, respectively, are assembled onto the blade. The knob is threaded and is screwed onto the handle and form one unit with the blade. The knife is carried in a special sheath designed so it may be carried in numerous positions, depending upon the personal taste of the user.

S E C R E T

Purpose: The Fighting Knife is, as the name implies, a close combat weapon. It may either supplement firearms or be used as a weapon which is carried by an operator as his sole means of defense.

SPRING COSH (Spring "Billy")

Description: The "Billy" is constructed of two concentric heavy springs which extend as a telescope when it is used. When carried, the two springs are encased in a tubular steel handle with leather covering, to which is attached a thong. At the end of the smaller spring, there is a heavy metal knob, which is the striking piece.

Purpose: The Spring "Billy" is a close-combat weapon. Its use is very similar to that to which any club would be put. The "Billy", however, is so constructed that it may be readily concealed on the person. The "Billy" has an advantage in that it embodies a certain element of surprise. As it is swung, held in the hand, two of its sections extend, emerging from the short tube. This, in turn, offers an extended club whereby a farther reach may be obtained. The two spring sections of the "Billy" are sufficiently long so that when it is used above the head, the tip of it may extend beyond the rim of a steel helmet and strike the opponent in the neck or face.

DETONATOR MAGAZINE (Cap Magazine)

Description: The Cap Magazine consists of a tubular plastic barrel with sixteen cylinders for sixteen caps. The top and bottom covers are held on by a light spring assembly permitting their easy rotation. As they are rotated, each cylinder is opened in turn.

Purpose: The cap magazine is a container for blasting caps. Blasting caps are carried in this packet so as to prevent their being crushed and to keep them separated; thus preventing a premature explosion. The magazine has a capacity of 16 caps.

SECRET

Unlike the standard container for blasting caps, this device permits the easy removal of one cap at a time. Two magazines usually contain a sufficient quantity of caps for an operator to complete a demolition setup.

Method of Use: The magazine is loaded with eleven caps from one end and five from the other. When a cap is required for use, either end may be rotated until the lug of that end centers with a corresponding cylinder. Thus, the two holes, the one in the barrel and the one in the cap, may be aligned and one cap extricated. This procedure may be used for extracting all of the caps contained therein.

LARGE MAGNETS

Description: These magnets are specially constructed of Alnico #2.

Purpose: These magnets may be used either singly or in numbers for attaching charges of plastic explosive to iron surfaces. They are also used for constructing flexible limpets. In the former case they serve as an excellent tamping agent as well as a device for holding the magnet to the object to which the demolition charge is attached. In the latter case they serve merely as a holding agent. Magnets greatly facilitate the placing of charges on surfaces that are either too large for adhesive tape to be employed, or where the time element is a factor. A charge may be readily and most effectively placed on a stool base by employing magnets.

INCENDIARY CAPSULES (Capsule "H")

Description: The incendiary is a gelatin containing a potassium chlorate and sugar mixture and a small lead pellet.

Purpose: Incendiary capsules are used for the field concoction of incendiary containers. They are used principally to make modified molotov cocktails. These cocktails are merely gasoline bombs which are used for delayed incendiary devices.

S E C R E TCIGARETTES (Pairs of Powders - Incendiary Packets)

Description: The incendiary packet contains a small box of powdered sugar, a small box of potassium chlorate, and a small box containing ten paper incased ampules of sulphuric acid. These three small boxes are placed in a container and the container sealed with waterproof adhesive tape to prevent the contents from becoming moist. A fire is started by permitting sulphuric acid to come into contact with the sugar and chlorate. The time delay is determined by the number of wrappings of paper around the ampule.

Purpose: The purpose of the incendiary packet is to equip an operator with all the necessary materials for chemically initiating a vigorous fire at some predetermined future time.

Method of Use: The operator mixes a quantity of sugar and chlorate together placed in any type of inflammable container that is desired. One or more paper covered sulphuric acid ampules are then crushed and inserted in the pile of mixed powders. The acid attacks the paper cover of the ampule and, in a known time, destroys it, whereupon it comes in contact with the chlorate and sugar mixture and thus starts a fire. A piece of clothing or other cloth may be saturated with a water solution of chlorate and sugar, allowed to dry, and when dry may be wrapped around several crushed ampules. At a known future time the acid will eat through the paper and come into contact with the sugar chlorate mixture in the clothing, which will ignite the whole.

CLAMS

Description: The clam consists of a bakelite case in the base of which are four high-power magnets. An explosive charge is contained inside the case and two time pencils are inserted therein through holes in the case.

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Purpose: The device contains a charge of high explosive detonated by the operation of two time pencils. This device is effective for the demolition of automobiles, trucks, small tanks, small boats and similar vehicles.

Method of Use: The operator places the device surreptitiously upon any exposed steel surface of a vehicle such as the gas tank, underside of a mudguard, under the hood or in some similar position. The device, due to its magnetic power, adheres to the vehicle even when driven at high rates of speed over extremely rough country. At a time in the future, which time is determined by the time delay of the pencils inserted therein, the device explodes. The charge contained in the device is sufficiently high to completely demolish an automobile, and to render useless a heavy truck or tank and to sink a small boat by blowing a hole in the side. The device, after it is attached by the operator to a steel or iron surface, is caused to explode by the squeezing of the copper tubes of the time pencils. The device, being self-contained, needs no detonators or fuses in connection with its use.

BLASTING CAPS (Detonators)

Description: At least two chemical compositions are employed in the manufacture of all blasting caps. In a special cap developed for O.S.S. for initiating plastic explosive, a base charge of detonating explosive is primed by a lead azide cone. These two compositions are compressed into a thin aluminum cup shell two inches in length.

Purpose: The purpose of blasting caps is to initiate or fire high explosive charges. It must be kept in mind that to explode a high explosive charge it is necessary to build up, step by step, an explosive wave of sufficient intensity to detonate the explosive used in the main charge. Different explosives require blasting caps which produce waves of varying intensity.

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Plastic explosive, which is used extensively for O.S.S. operations, is a very insensitive material. Therefore, a cap having a high initiating capacity is essential.

The material in blasting caps requires only heat to initiate the explosive material contained therein. This heat may be obtained from either an ignited powder train contained in a safety or instantaneous fuse, or by the flame emitting from a primer cap which functions on the same principle as the cap in a cartridge.

Method of Use: Blasting caps may be inserted into spring snouts which are contained on the majority of firing devices used by the O.S.S. Used thus, the caps may be placed directly into the explosive charge, as in the case of a pencil delay, or a piece of Primacord may be taped to the cap and extended to the explosive charge. Secondly, a safety fuse may be inserted into a spring snout on one end and into a blasting cap on the other. The cap, in turn, would then be inserted into an explosive charge. In this latter case the fuse would be initiated by the primer cap located in the firing device and the flame would be propagated via the powder train in the fuse to the blasting cap.

EXPLOSIVE CONTAINER BAG (Jefoten Bags)

Description: The bag will be constructed of non-critical synthetic rubber substitutes, such as vinylite resins or the like. The cloth used to make the bag is dark on one side and white on the other and the bag itself is reversible.

Purpose: These bags are made of a rubber substitute material in three sizes and serve the purpose of permitting a charge to be set up away from the scene of the action and conveniently carried thereto. The three sizes will hold, respectively, 10, 5, and 3 pounds of high explosive. The material from which the bag is to be fabricated is waterproof, permitting it to be carried through water without injuring the contained mechanisms and explosive.

SECRETMETAL CONTAINERS

Purpose: These will contain the pairs of powders and cigarettes described earlier in this memorandum.

KNIFE

Description: The knife is made with a high tempered, high carbon steel blade with a bakelite-molded handle. The pommel is made of a light metal. The knife is contained in a leather covered wood sheath which sheath is fitted with a leather strap which serves the purpose of holding the knife in the sheath when in the upside-down position. The bakelite handle may be carved to fit the user's hand.

Purpose: This knife is a personal combat weapon. It is designed as a killing weapon for use upon enemy personnel. The blade, which is single-edged, is extremely sharp and of a high quality steel which, when properly used, will readily penetrate thin sheets of metal such as the usual steel helmet.

PLASTIC EXPLOSIVES (P.E.)

Description: The method of manufacture of PE and the formula are secret.

Purpose: Plastic Explosive is the principal explosive material used in these operations. The explosive is a new formula and is particularly well adapted to our use. It is powerful, being at least 1-1/2 times stronger than trinitrotoluol (T.N.T.) and is superior to the other usual demolition explosives, such as dynamite, gelignite, nitro cellulose, and so forth. The material is of the physical consistency of putty and is capable of being molded by hand into any desired shape. The material, as presently manufactured, is of a light yellow color resembling putty but may be, with ease, manufactured in any color. Plastic Explosive, although highly powerful, resists to a great extent accidental explosion. It will not detonate when dropped; it may be burned with safety and does not explode when a bullet is fired into it at close range. It may, however, be readily exploded with the use of

SECRET

a special lead azide primed aluminum shell detonator or primacord and when so primed explodes with great violence. A peculiarity of this explosive, which makes it particularly well adapted to demolition use, is that it has a cutting effect on steel plate and will, if properly used, destroy steel plate of considerable thickness as effectively as a blow torch. The explosive is used with all firing devices and will be packed in the limpets, clams and road switches.

FOG SIGNALS (Track-Contact Firing Device)

Description: The device consists of a truncated pyramid, riveted to a lead strap. There is inserted in the top of the pyramid two or four primers. The detonation of these primers occurring when the wheels of the train pass over the device, is transmitted by an internal channel to a spring snout in which is inserted a detonator attached to a length of instantaneous fuse, which in turn brings the detonation to the main charge and causes the explosion.

Purpose: This device is used to initiate a charge of high explosive and operates by the wheels of the first truck of the locomotive passing over it. The device is effective for the demolition of locomotives and trains as well as railroad tracks and other right-of-way structures. The device itself is designed to avoid detection by the engineer of an oncoming train. This result is achieved by making the device of die cast material, which is the same color as steel rails and which reflects light to the same degree.

Method of Use: The operator in using this device fixes it upon the track by bending the ends of the lead strap over the track, thereby holding the device in place with the spring snout on the outside of the track so that the flange of the railroad wheel will not sever the fuse. In the spring snout there is then inserted the detonator or fuse. The charge is placed on the track in such a position so that its explosion will cause most damage to the locomotive passing over it.

C O R R U P T

Research and development is constantly being carried on in close cooperation with the National Defense Research Council and the National Inventors' Council and it is probable that from time to time new special items will be developed which will be of use to O.S.S., other U. S. government agencies, and Allied governments.

The Field Photographic Division of O.S.S. is at present testing a new type camera which is not regularly manufactured.

The Communications Branch will require the following items of special equipment:

Ultra high-frequency pocket radio sets

100-watt telephone, telegraph transmitters

"Packages" containing three units - transmitting unit, receiving unit, and power supply unit, weight 20 lbs. per package.

/s/ William H. Vanderbilt

JPWC Subcommittee

~~October~~
November 21, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942 Catalogue of Materiel

DR. ROGERS presented a memorandum from the Office of Strategic Services which requested that the 1942 Catalogue already submitted be revised in the numbers of certain devices required and in the estimates of raw material necessary for them. This request has been necessitated by reason of recent urgent British requirements for an operation which had been approved by the British Chiefs of Staff.

It was reported that the Office of Procurement and Material, Office Secretary of the Navy, had given verbal approval to this Catalogue on the basis that it reported the requirements and not a requisition, and further on the condition that the Navy Procurement Bureaus would be entitled to make representation of their competitive needs for critical items at any future time when the O.S.S. submitted requisitions for those items.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- (a) Directed the Secretary to circulate the request of the O.S.S. for additional supply of special devices in connection with requirements previously stated in the 1942 Catalogue.
- (b) Took note that the approval of the Navy Department of the 1942 Catalogue, as a basis for requirements of O.S.S. will be submitted in writing.

JFPC Minutes

October 19, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIAL

COLONEL DONOVAN stated that the recommendation of the Subcommittee was agreeable to the O.S.S., inasmuch as it desires only the right to present its case in comparison with other demands, on the basis of the strategical situation and needs. He felt it unnecessary to include the stipulation that the O.S.S. allocation of priorities be on an equal footing with the Army and the Navy.

There was general discussion on the request of the British for supplies of special devices which are being procured by the O.S.S.

THE COMMITTEE:

- (A) Agreed to accept the recommendations of the Subcommittee with the following changes:
- (1) To omit the statement that the allocation of the priorities of the O.S.S. be on an equal footing with the Army and Navy.
 - (2) The approval of the Supply Division, War Department General Staff and the Office of Procurement and Material of the Navy Department be obtained on the increased amounts of supplies and materials involved in the British request.

JPWC Subcommittee

October 16, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. Requirements for Munitions - Procurement
Authority for O.S.S. Special Items

Without discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- (a) Took note of the request of the Joint U.S. Staff Planners to furnish a list of the special items referred to in the subject paper.
- (b) Requested the Office of Strategic Services to furnish the report required, including the title of each device, a description of each and a short explanation of its use.

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**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

October 16, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUBCOMMITTEE:

1. There is quoted below, for your information, a memorandum from the Secretary of the Joint United States Staff Planners.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

* * * * *

October 16, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR - Secretary, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

Subject: O.S.S. Requirements for Munitions - Procurement Authority for O.S.S. Special Items (J.P.S. 35/14).

1. Your attention is invited to Item 5, Minutes of the Joint U. S. Staff Planners, 41st Meeting, which is as follows:

* * * * *

"5. O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS.
(J.P.S. 35/14)

"After discussion,

"THE COMMITTEE:-

"Directed the Secretaries to request the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to supplement the paper with a list of the special items referred to in order to indicate clearly the specific items to be procured through the Office of Strategic Services."

* * * * *

/s/ R. L. Vittrup
R.L. VITTRUP,

Secretary,

Joint U.S. Staff Planners.

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WJD

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 42/3

COPY NO. 1

October 29, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL DEVICES

Note by the Secretary

1. The enclosure presents the report of the Special Subcommittee appointed at the Committee's 32d Meeting, October 26, 1942 to reexamine and recommend on this subject.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

S E C R E TE N C L O S U R E

October 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
COMMITTEE:Subject: Procurement Authority for O.S.S.
Special Devices.

1. The Special Subcommittee appointed by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee at its meeting on October 26, 1942, for the purpose of reconsidering the Committee's recommendations on designating the Office of Strategic Services as the procurement authority for the special devices it develops, met on Wednesday, October 28, 1942. From the discussion of this subject, the following points were made clear:

(a) The Services of Supply, U. S. Army, opposed the previous recommendation of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee only because the use of Lend-Lease facilities for payment to O.S.S. for items procured by foreign governments would have tended to destroy the necessary security in those transactions.

(b) If proper security arrangements could be made, the Services of Supply would have no objection to the use of Lend-Lease funds for the procurement of these items by foreign governments.

(c) The Services of Supply have no objection to the O.S.S. acting as a procurement agent to provide these special devices for other U. S. Government services.

(d) No complications were foreseen through O.S.S. acting as a procurement agency. The development and procurement of its special devices would be facilitated by direct procurement and security would be maintained better.

(e) The Office of the Chief of Engineers expects to utilize a number of types of the special devices developed by O.S.S., and anticipates no difficulty in using the O.S.S. as its procurement source for these articles.

S E C R E T

(f) It is not anticipated that the number of special devices developed by O.S.S. will be large. Many standard items are used as parts of the special devices, e.g., adhesive tape, and these are procured through the Services of Supply whenever practicable. Existing Government purchasing agencies are utilized by the O.S.S. to the fullest extent consistent with security and the time element involved.

(g) It would be preferable to give the U. S. Army and Navy, as well as foreign governments the option of procuring these special devices through the O.S.S. or from outside sources.

(1) If foreign governments prefer not to utilize the services of O.S.S. as a procurement agency for these items it will be necessary for them to clear their requirements through the International Supply Committee of the Services of Supply. Control over such requisitions can be maintained by normal liaison between that Committee and the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

(h) It is highly desirable for the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to control the requisitions of foreign governments for such devices as are procured through O.S.S., by reviewing each such requisition.

2. Accordingly, the Special Subcommittee recommends that the recommendations contained in P.P.W.C. 42 be changed to read as follows:

(a) That the Office of Strategic Services be a procuring agency for "special devices", and upon which all agencies, both foreign and U. S. may requisition.

S E C R E T

(b) When the procurement facilities of O.S.S. are utilized, reimbursement shall be made to it by the requisitioning agency or the requisitioning foreign government.

(c) That prior approval of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee be obtained by the Office of Strategic Services for each foreign government requisition upon it.

Capt. H. L. Grosskopf, USN
(Chairman)

Cdr. W. H. Vanderbilt, USN

Lt. Col. F. S. Bossen, U.S.A.

Lt. Col. P. W. Smith, U.S.A.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

S E C R E TJ.P.W.C. 42/2COPY NO. 1October 17, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEO.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
SUPPLEMENTARY REQUEST TO 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIELNote by the Secretary

1. By memorandum of October 16, 1942, the Office of Strategic Services has requested that its requirements for certain special devices listed on pages two and three of the 1942 Catalogue of Materiel (J.P.W.C. 42/1) be revised in the amounts indicated in the enclosure.

2. The reason for this request is contained in a letter from the British Security Coordination to the office of Strategic Services, dated October 13, 1942, which states the quantities of such special devices desired by the British for their S.O. operations in England and abroad. This letter also cites a message received by the British from London requesting urgent delivery of 500,000 "pencil delays" for an operation which has been approved by the British Chiefs of Staff. These items are included in the total British requirement, which is quoted as "Appendix A" to the enclosure.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREAMENDMENTS TO O.S.S. 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

	<u>Catalog</u>	<u>British Request</u>	<u>O.S.S. Needs</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Increase Necessary</u>
Pencil Sets	290,000	300,000	100,000	700,000	410,000
Pencil Sets (U.S. Engineers' request)			300,000		
Pull Switches	150,000	125,000	100,000	225,000	75,000
Booby Trap Wire	25,000	60,000	30,000	90,000	65,000
Clams	20,000	50,000	30,000	80,000	60,000
K Tablets	2,500	10,000	2,500	12,500	10,000
Fog Signals	25,000	100,000	---	100,000	75,000

Estimates of Raw Materials and Costs

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u>	<u>Amount</u>
410,000 sets Pencils	\$1,272,000	
Cadmium Balls for Plating		585 lbs.
Long Copper tubing .302 i.d. x .005 wall		5,850 "
Soft Brass Strip 1/8 x .018		15,210 "
Brass Rod 4/16"		47,385 "
Brass Rod 9/32"		11,700 "
Brass Rod 3/16"		13,600 "
Hard Brass strip .031		29,542 "
Seamless brass tubing		22,250 "
Lead Washers .040		4,100 "
Copper Anodes for plating		355 "
Cold Rolled Steel for cans		44,840 "
Spring Steel for Springs		6,500 "
High carbon strip steel for snouts		5,000 "
Brass Strip for Caps		5,800 "
Fulminate of Mercury		820 "
Music Wire .014		650 "
Rolls of Utilitape		3,000 Rolls
75,000 Pull Switches	\$25,000	
Spring Steel		235 lbs.
Brass Tube .317 o.d.		1,200 "
Cold Rolled Steel Rod .120		600 "
High Carbon Strip Steel for snouts		250 "
Brass Strip for Caps		200 "
65,000 Rolls Trap Wire (50 yds.)	\$13,850	
Music Wire .014		5,200 lbs.

S E C R E T

<u>Item</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u>	<u>Amount</u>
60,000 Glams	\$180,000	
Alnico No. 2		30,000 lbs
Bakelite		30,000 "
Brass Screws		200 "
10,000 K Tablets	\$4,500	
Morphine		Approx. 20 "
75,000 Fog Signals	\$15,000	
Die-Casting Materials		4,700 lbs
High Carbon Strip Steel for snouts		250 "
Brass Strip for Caps		260 "
Lead Strip 1" x .040		7,000 "

S E C R E TAPPENDIX ABRITISH REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL DEVICES

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
Pencil Time Fuses	1,500,000
Limpets, Type 6	5,000
Fog Signals	100,000
Pull Switches	125,000
Pressure Switches	100,000*
Release Switches	75,000*
Pocket Time Incendiaries	500,000
Fighting Knives	1,000
Spring Cosh	1,000
Detonator Magazines	10,000
Adhesive Tape 3/4s x 15 yd. reels	10,000
Large Magnets	5,000
Trap Wire 50 yd. spools	60,000
Trip Wire 25 yd. spools	10,000
K. Tablets	10,000
Clams	50,000
Smatchots	10,000

* The American "Universal" Switch may be substituted in these cases. Research and testing is in process.

(Source - Letter from British Security Coordination to Office of Strategic Services, October 17, 1941.)

S E C R E TJ.P.W.C. 42/1/2d DraftCOPY NO. 1October 17, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEO.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS
1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIELNote by the Secretary

1. The 1942 Catalogue of Materiel required by the Office of Strategic Services for the balance of the Calendar Year 1942 (previously distributed) has been submitted by the O.S.S. at the request of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. That Board has given a preliminary approval to this Catalogue as to form and classes of items, and will assign priorities only after approval of the requirements in the Catalogue by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Catalogue has been submitted also to the Supply Division, War Department General Staff, and to the Office of Procurement and Materiel, Navy Department. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, stated in a memorandum dated October 9, 1942,

"2. The Supply Division, War Department General Staff, in conjunction with the procurement agencies of the Services of Supply, has reviewed the list of items in the subject Catalogue and has found that all items included therein can be procured with a negligible detrimental effect on the present Army Supply Program."

The Office of Procurement and Materiel, Navy Department, stated in a memorandum dated October 16, 1942,

"The Catalogue of Requirements for the balance of 1942 has been examined. The Navy Department has no objection to the submission as "Requirements" of the materials listed therein."

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3. The J.P.W.S.C. recommends approval of the 1942 Catalogue of Material for Office of Strategic Services as "requirements", i.e., as an authorization to present their requirements to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for consideration by that Board in the allocation of priorities on an equal footing with the Army and Navy, in so far as the supply of critical materials or of manufacturing facilities are concerned.

4. The Subcommittee also recommends that the amendments to certain items of the Catalogue, listed in J.P.W.C. 42/2, be authorized.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

JPWC Subcommittee

October 16, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT
AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

Without discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- (a) Took note of the request of the Joint U.S. Staff Planners to furnish a list of the special items referred to in the subject paper.
- (b) Requested the Office of Strategic Services to furnish the report required, including the title of each device, a description of each and a short explanation of its use.

JPWC Subcommittee

October 16, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942 CATALOGUE OF MATERIEL

DR. ROGERS presented a memorandum from the Office of Strategic Services which requested that the 1942 Catalogue already submitted be revised in the numbers of certain devices required and in the estimates of raw material necessary for them. This request has been necessitated by reason of recent urgent British requirements for an operation which had been approved by the British Chiefs of Staff.

It was reported that the Office of Procurement and Material, Office Secretary of the Navy, had given verbal approval to this Catalogue on the basis that it reported the requirements and not a requisition, and further on the condition that the Navy Procurement Bureaus would be entitled to make representation of their competitive needs for critical items at any future time when the O.S.S. submitted requisitions for those items.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- (a) Directed the Secretary to circulate the request of the O.S.S. for additional supply of special devices in connection with requirements previously stated in the 1942 Catalogue.
- (b) Took note that the approval of the Navy Department of the 1942 Catalogue, as a basis for requirements of O.S.S., will be submitted in writing.

JPWC Minutes

October 12, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

In connection with procurement by foreign governments of O.S.S. special items which have been developed by it, COLONEL DONOVAN stated that this procedure had been suggested by the Lend Lease organization, and that the Bureau of the Budget had agreed to work out reimbursement to O.S.S. on the basis of individual cases. In effect, this would constitute the moneys appropriated to O.S.S. for such supplies as a revolving fund for procurement of these devices for both United States and foreign government agencies.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER questioned whether there would be adequate coordination in the war effort if equipment were procured for the Army and Navy by several agencies. He pointed out that it is essential to establish the precedent of the best possible integrated procurement procedure for the Army and Navy. COLONEL DONOVAN replied that the policy being recommended is in accordance with that principle since one procurement source is being used to provide these devices for the Army, the Navy, O.S.S. and foreign governments; also, since no Army and Navy agencies now produce these items, there is no duplication of procurement and no competition among procuring agencies. GENERAL WEDEMEYER indicated that his objections were removed provided that coordinated procurement, which is integrated with Army and Navy requirements, is actually obtained by this procedure.

After directing certain changes in the recommendations,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to recommend approval of this proposal to the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff through the Joint U.S. Staff Planners.

JFPC Minutes

October 12, 1942

Excerpts

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS - 1942 Catalogue of Materiel

CAPTAIN CROSSKOPF withdrew the Navy approval of this Catalogue subject to further consideration by the Procurement Bureaus of the Navy Department.

GENERAL WEDEMAYER questioned the need for radio stations in New York and California. COLONEL DONOVAN explained that these stations had been purchased by the C.O.I. for three main uses:

- (a) For monitoring short-wave broadcasts as supplementary to similar Army and Navy operations.
- (b) For use later as transmission stations in connection with S.O. and SI. Activities.
- (c) For intercept stations on a small scale.

The stations would be administered by the O.S.S. but would be used also by the Army and the Navy. This project had received the approval of the Joint Intelligence Committee but has not yet been approved by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

COLONEL DONOVAN further stated that he realized that there is great shortage of some types of equipment which are included in this catalogue. He pointed out, however, that the Catalogue is merely general authorization for priorities and that it must be followed by actual requisitions for the equipment needed.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Deferred action until the Navy Department has indicated its opinions.
- (b) Directed that the paper supporting the Catalogue be revised to indicate that it is only an authorization and is not an approved requisition.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 48/1

COPY NO. 1

October 30, 1948

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEO.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS
1948 CATALOGUE OF MATERIALNote by the Secretary

1. The attached 1948 Catalogue of material required by the Office of Strategic Services for the balance of the calendar year 1948 has been submitted by the O.S.S. at the request of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. That Board has given a preliminary approval to this Catalogue as to form and classes of items, and will assign priorities only after approval of the requirements in the Catalogue by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Catalogue has been submitted also to the Supply Division, War Department General Staff and to the Office of Procurement and Material, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Both offices have reviewed the list of items in the Catalogue and have found that the procurement of the items listed by O.S.S. will have no serious effect on the present supply program for the Army or the Navy.

3. The catalogue is submitted, therefore, with recommendation of the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee that it be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purposes for which it has been submitted.

A. P. Orlin,
Secretary.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 42

COPY NO. 1

October 7, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS -
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O.S.S. SPECIAL ITEMS

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure presents a determination of policy regarding procurement of O.S.S. special items which is recommended for approval by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREBACKGROUND

1. The Supply Division, Office of Chief of Engineers, War Department, in a memorandum dated September 22, 1942, addressed to the Office of Strategic Services, refers to a conference between members of both organizations, as follows:

"At this conference it was agreed that since the Office of Strategic Services had established a source of supply for delay type firing devices, the requirements of the Corps of Engineers for the subject devices would be more readily satisfied if the procurement were coordinated by requisitioning the devices from the Office of Strategic Services."

2. The devices required by the Corps of Engineers are identical with those being produced for the Office of Strategic Services, with slight exceptions. Both devices are being produced by the same manufacturer who is using about half of his facilities for each order.

3. The Supply Division, Office of Chief of Engineers has requested that the above verbal agreements regarding the joint production of these devices for both organizations be formally accepted.

4. The Office of Strategic Services, in a memorandum to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee dated September 30, 1942, has pointed out that similar requests for O.S.S. special items have been received from the British, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs and the Dutch. Future requests are anticipated from the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy for such devices.

5. The Office of Strategic Services has requested, therefore, that a policy be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Office of Strategic Services to act as a procurement

SECRET

agency for both United States agencies and foreign governments for these O.S.S. special items which it develops. The Office of Strategic Services requests this policy in order that it may

"(a) properly make provisions in our catalogue of requirements;

"(b) take advantage of a better price level for larger purchases;

"(c) arrange the necessary priorities;

"(d) arrange for the financing through Lend-Lease in case of foreign government requests or method of payments by other branches of the Army or Navy."

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee recommends

(a) That the Office of Strategic Services be the procuring agency upon which all using agencies shall requisition for all O.S.S. special items.

(b) That United States agencies and foreign government agencies requisition on Office of Strategic Services for their supplies of these items.

(c) That direct reimbursement be made to the O.S.S. by United States Government agencies, and that reimbursement be made by foreign governments to the O.S.S. through the instrumentality of Lend-Lease.

(d) That prior approval of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee be obtained by Office of Strategic Services for each foreign government requisition for these supplies.

SECRETOctober 7, 1942

COPY NO. _____

delay type firing device

SECRET**ENCLOSURE**BACKGROUND

1. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department, in a memorandum dated September 22, 1942, addressed to the Office of Strategic Services referred to a conference between members of both organizations as follows:

"At this conference it was agreed that since the Office of Strategic Services had established a source of supply for delay type firing devices, the requirements of the Corps of Engineers for the subject devices would be more readily satisfied if the procurement were coordinated by requisitioning the devices from the Office of Strategic Services."

2. The devices required by the Corps of Engineers are identical with those being produced for the Office of Strategic Services, with slight exceptions. Both devices are being produced by the same manufacturer who is using about half of his facilities for each order.

3. The Corps of Engineers has requested that the above verbal agreements regarding the joint production for these devices for both organizations be formally accepted.

4. The Office of Strategic Services, in a memorandum to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee dated Sept. 30, 1942, has pointed out that similar requests for specially designed items for strategic services have been received from the British, the Chinese, the Yugoslaves and the Dutch. Future requests are anticipated from the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy for such devices.

SECRET

5. The Office of Strategic Services has requested, therefore, that a policy be established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Office of Strategic Services acting as a procurement agency for both United States agencies and foreign governments for the specially designed items for strategic services which it develops. The Office of Strategic Services requests this policy in order that it may

- a. properly make provisions in our catalogue of requirements
- b. take advantage of a better price level for larger purchases
- c. arrange the necessary priorities
- d. arrange for the financing through Lend-Lease in case of foreign government requests or method of payments by other branches of the Army or Navy."

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee recommends
- (a) That the Office of Strategic Services be the procuring agency for all specially designed items for strategic services which it has developed.
 - (b) That United States agencies and foreign government agencies requisition on Office of Strategic Services for their supplies of these items.
 - (c) That direct reimbursement be made to the O.S.S. by United States Government agencies, and that reimbursement be made by foreign governments to the O.S.S. through the instrumentality of Lend-Lease.
 - (d) That prior approval of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee be obtained by Office of Strategic Services for all foreign government requisitions of these supplies.

A. H. Onthank

Secretary

JPWC Subcommittee

October 7, 1942

Excerpts

O. S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS
PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR O. S. S. /SPECIAL ITEMS

The 2d Draft of the Memorandum was discussed and several changes made.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Directed the Secretary to incorporate the indicated changes and to refer this paper to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee with recommendation that it be approved.

JJWC SUBCOMMITTEE
Excerpts

October 7, 1942

O.S.S. REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNITIONS

It was reported that the sixty-four tons of brass and five and one-half tons of copper included in the O.S.S. requirements would be approximately the equivalent of four million rounds of .30 caliber ammunition.

CAPTAIN HALL of the Army and Navy Munitions Board stated that the preliminary approval which had been given by the Priorities Division, A. & N.M.B. to the O.S.S. catalogue pertained (1) to the form of the catalogue, (2) the manner in which the materials were listed; it did not carry agreement with the requirements as stated. These, he said, would have to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after which the catalogue should be returned to the Board for assignment of priorities.

COLONEL HASS, G-4, recommended strongly that the catalogue be sent to the Requirements Division of the S.O.S., through G-4, for comment as to what items are critical because of demands of the Army. He pointed out that some of the items listed are critical and not available and some are available but if approved would have to be taken away from allotments to combat troops.

DR. ROGERS and CAPTAIN DOERING stated the U.S.S. point of view, that almost any item in the catalogue is valuable in military operations and would have conflicting claims upon it. If the O.S.S. is to operate, its claims should be given full consideration in any such conflicts. The amounts of materiel required are usually very small and would probably have little effect upon Army requirements. In addition, the Lend Lease organization has indicated that it must have an estimate in the immediate future for the amount of materiel needed in 1943 and any delay in approving this catalogue might have serious results.

COLONEL GOODFELLOW and LT. COL. HUNTINGTON explained that this catalogue relates to the six months requirements which had been worked out in conjunction with the British, and represents a minimum needed for operations projected over that period. The present stockpiles in the field are not only insufficient for both present and future operations but are already depleted, due to the fact that the O.S.S. has been permitted to draw on the British for all supplies needed in training activities.

In answer to a question, LT. COL. BLAKENEY expressed his belief that when the O.S.S. requests non-critical items for training which have not been included in the catalogue it will not be necessary to submit a list of such items to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for approval.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- (a) Directed the Secretary to refer the O.S.S. 1942 catalogue of material requirements to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff, with a request that comment be made on comparison of the strategic necessities for the items listed.
- (b) Requested Lt. Cdr. Moran to refer the catalogue to the proper Navy office for similar comments.
- (c) Requested the O.S.S. to review the catalogue with the purpose of making any possible shifts in the procurement of critical items.
- (d) Agreed that the catalogue should be approved for all items on which the War Department and the Navy Department do not report conflicts with the strategic necessities, and that the latter items should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a decision, including recommendations by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

SECRET**SECRET**
OCTOBER 2, 1942COPY NO. 1**(COPY)****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**
Washington, D. C.

October 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM:**To: Psychological Warfare Committee of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.****From: Director, Office of Strategic Services.****Subject: Catalogue of 1942 Requirements.**

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum from William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services, to your Committee, Subject: Procurement Authority for Special Gadgets.

2. Also attached hereto are eight (8) copies of the 1942 Catalogue of the Office of Strategic Services, for your approval.

3. As set forth in the attached letter from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, dated September 28, 1942, the Catalogue was given their preliminary approval on Sept. 21, 1942 and they requested that it be resubmitted at the earliest possible date.

ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD
Washington, D. C.

September 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
"QUE" Building
25th & E Streets, N.W.**Attention: William J. Donovan, Director****Subject: Priorities, Office of Strategic Services.**

1. On July 7, 1942, Mr. C. W. Horn, Technical Adviser for the Office of Strategic Services, conferred with members of the ANMB regarding the assignment of preference ratings to contracts and purchase orders for special equipment and supplies required in connection with services performed under the jurisdiction of the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. At that time, Mr. Horn was advised that high preference ratings particularly ratings higher than A-1-a, could be authorized for assignment to Office of Strategic Services contracts and purchase orders only after receipt by the ANMB of a statement indicating the types and amounts of the items to be procured, together with evidence of the military urgency applying to such items. On several occasions since the first discussion of this matter with Mr. Horn, the Priorities Officer of the Office of Strategic Services, Lt. J. H. Rosenbaum, has been requested to furnish this Division a catalog, approved by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the items to which ratings in the AA category are to be assigned.

2. On September 11, 1942, at a meeting attended by the Priorities Officer of the Office of Strategic Services and by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was recommended

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by the Executive Officer of this Division that the catalog referred to above, covering requirements for the balance of the year 1948, be presented for informal review by the ANMB prior to obtaining written approval of such catalog by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The catalog was received by this Division on September 21 and was given preliminary approval on the same day and returned to the Office of Strategic Services Priorities Officer with the request that it be resubmitted in final form at the earliest possible date.

3. At the September 11 meeting it was agreed that pending receipt of the approved catalog from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Division would receive and process individual applications for ratings in the AA category. This agreement was made with the understanding that only a few applications would be submitted and that the approved catalog would be presented to the ANMB without delay. Since that time, however, this Division has received more than 30 such applications and it is understood that the catalog has not as yet been presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

4. The temporary procedure heretofore followed in assigning ratings higher than A-1-a to contracts and purchase orders of the Office of Strategic Services cannot be continued indefinitely. All items to which such ratings are applied must be charged against a total amount approved for procurement within a specified time. The same procedure applies to all procurement services of the Army and Navy and of agencies coming under the priorities jurisdiction of the ANMB and must be complied with.

/s/ F. R. DENTON
Colonel, A.U.S.
Army Chief, Priorities and Allocations Division

SECRET**SECRET****OCTOBER 3, 1948**COPY NO. 1

(COPY)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

September 30, 1948

MEMORANDUM

To: Psychological Warfare Committee of the Joint
United States Chiefs of Staff

From: William J. Donovan

Subject: Procurement Authority for Special Gadgets

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, asking that the Office of Strategic Services be the procurement agency for Delay Type Firing Devices, which OSS has ordered manufactured.

2. Requests for other "specialties" used in OSS Secret Operations have been made by the British, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs, and the Dutch.

3. It is necessary to establish a policy for OSS in this matter so that we can

- a. properly make provisions in our catalogue of requirements
- b. take advantage of a better price level for larger purchases
- c. arrange the necessary priorities
- d. arrange for the financing through Lend-Lease in case of foreign government requests or method of payments by other branches of the Army or Navy.

/s/ William J. Donovan
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

* * * * *

21st St. & Va. Ave., N.W.

(COPY)

EM:jmg
5970

WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of Chief of Engineers
Washington

Rm 2116 War Dept Bldg.,
Refer to File No. 471.6(SF-298)SPESD

September 22, 1948.

Subject: Delay Type Firing Devices. 11861

To: Office of Strategic Services,
Supply Section
630 Fifth Avenue,
New York City, N. Y.
Attention: Captain S.G. Lucas.

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1. Reference is made to conference regarding procurement of delay firing devices previously held in this office which was attended by Captain S. S. Luce and Mr. E. A. Coleman, Sr., of the Supply Section, and Major F. C. Randall and Mr. R. Hayes of this office. At this conference it was agreed that since the Office of Strategic Services had established a source of supply for delay type firing devices, the requirements of the Corps of Engineers for the subject devices would be more readily satisfied if the procurement were coordinated by requisitioning the devices from the Office of Strategic Services.

2. This office has advised the Requirements Branch, Supply Division, C.E.S., to issue a requisition to the Office of Strategic Services for the delay devices required by the Corps of Engineers. These devices will be in the same time lengths as those being procured for the Office of Strategic Services and will be the same devices with the exception that the bases are to be the same as the bases on the Corps of Engineers standard pressure and pull type firing devices. Since the A.C. Gilbert Company is the manufacturer for the standard Corps of Engineers pressure and pull firing devices, as well as the delay devices, being procured by the Office of Strategic Services, the different base require. will present no difficulty.

3. As stated by Captain Luce, the devices requisitioned by the Corps of Engineers are to be manufactured simultaneously with those being procured by the Office of Strategic Services with half the production facilities of the A. C. Gilbert Company being used for the manufacture of devices for the Corps of Engineers.

4. It is requested that the above verbal agreements regarding the joint production of delay firing device for the Office of Strategic Services and the Corps of Engineers be formally concurred in.

For the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ F. S. Besson, Jr.
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Engineering & Development Branch
Supply Division.

*Copy of memo
Filed Ammunition
8931*

Lt. J. H. Rosenbaum, Priorities Officer
Colonel William H. Donovan

Sept. 28, 1942

Ammunition for 9-mm. Guns.

1. I understand that there has been recommended the assignment to the Office of Strategic Services of 5,000 9-mm. Marlin type guns.

2. It is suggested that a formal request be made to the Munitions Assignment Board for the assignment to the Office of Strategic Services of 500 rounds of ammunition per gun at one time. Informal discussion with the Munitions Assignment Board indicates that this request, if formally made, will meet with approval and with the assignment of the requested ammunition in a lump amount instead of over a period of months.

3. The present request for 250,000 rounds per month would give only 60 rounds of ammunition per gun and would take ten months until the necessary ammunition of 500 rounds per gun could be accumulated.

4. Through the weighing of the guns and ammunition, it appears that 500 rounds of ammunition per gun can be handled successfully.

SECRET**DRAFT****I.P.W.C. 32**

COPY NO. _____

September 15, 1942

**SUBCOMMITTEE OF
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE**

MUNITIONS FOR OFFICES OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

The enclosure is brought to the attention of the Subcommittee for its consideration at the request of the Operations Division, W.D.G.S.

A. H. Onthank

Secretary.

ENCLOSURE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 8, 1942

From: Lt. J. H. Rosenbaum

To : Chief of Staff

Attention: Logistics Group
Operations Division

Subject: Carbines and Revolvers for Office of Strategic Services.

1. The Office of Strategic Services was designated to perform certain duties under the jurisdiction of the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff, by virtue of a military order dated June 15, 1942.

2. By memorandum of August 4, 1942, the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff advised the Priorities Division, Army and Navy Munitions Board relative to the Office of Strategic Services -

"The operations of this Office are of a secret nature and may be of the highest military urgency."

3. This Office desires ten (10) 30-caliber carbines for use in operations overseas and twenty (20) 32-caliber revolvers for use in operations overseas. The above are needed as soon as possible.

4. Kindly address any communications on this matter to Lt. J. H. Rosenbaum, 2207 "Que" Building, 25th and Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.

- 1 -

SECRET

John Edgar
S E C R E T**J.P.W.C. 22****July 14, 1942***Huber*
**From the Files of the Director
Please Return**

COPY NO.

1**JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE****O.S.S. PLAN FOR ORGANIZATION OF UNDERCOVER
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN THE FAR EAST
"DRAGON PROJECT"****Note by the Secretary**

The enclosure is a revised proposal on this subject. The original plan was sent to the Joint Intelligence Committee and by them sent with comments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was published as J.I.C.S. 66. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at their 21st Meeting, June 23, 1942, referred the proposal to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee "for comment and recommendation to be submitted through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The J.P.W.C. Subcommittee has considered this revised "Dragon Plan" and transmits it to the senior committee with the recommendation that, because the project was originally examined by the J.I.C., and because the subject is outside of the jurisdiction of the J.P.W.C., the proposal be forwarded to the J.I.C. for consideration and report to the Joint Staff Planners.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE"DRAGON PROJECT"

It is proposed that the Office of Strategic Services should establish in China with the knowledge and consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell an undercover intelligence system to operate in China, in Japan, and in Japanese occupied territories, making available to General Stilwell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington the results of their operations.

Attached is a copy of a general directive which it is proposed to give to the head of our organization in China, should this project meet with your approval.

* * * * *

Head of the Office of Strategic Services
Organization in China

1942

Subject: General Instructions

1. You are directed to proceed to Chungking, China, by the earliest available transportation to establish an undercover organization to obtain, evaluate and furnish information of military interest concerning Japan and Japanese-occupied territory, and to make this information available to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and through him to the Office of Strategic Services.

2. You will take with you, or arrange to have follow you at the earliest practicable moment, those of the American personnel for the Office of Strategic Services organization in China who have been selected in this country; and will arrange to have those already in China report to you upon your arrival.

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3. On arrival in Chungking you will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China. You will secure the initial approval and subsequent coordination of the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, and the acquiescence of the Generalissimo, which should be obtained through the Commanding General.

4. You will follow general directives given you by the Office of Strategic Services for carrying out your task. In following the general directives of the Office of Strategic Services, however, you will bear in mind that orders from the Commanding General will, of course, take precedence.

5. You are designated the head of the Office of Strategic Services organization in China. You will make your headquarters in Chungking or wherever the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may designate.

6. The American personnel accompanying you, or which is to follow immediately thereafter, or which will report to you in China, will be assigned as supervisors with headquarters in other key cities in free China. These supervisors will organize and direct the work of the regional or local agents, under your general direction.

7. Local agents will be selected by you from among Chinese or others in whom you have confidence. While complete discretion is left in your hands for the selection of such agents, you will be expected to use every means possible and reasonable for protecting their identity, their persons, and the information which they may gather.

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8. Sources of Information -- The occupied areas in China offer great opportunities for securing information of military value concerning the Japanese. These areas contain thousands of Japanese civilians in addition to the Japanese military personnel. Constant streams of civilians and military personnel proceed to and from Japan. Many of these Japanese are corruptible. Japanese militarists in China have long been powerful in their home government and often are well informed concerning its plans. Inevitably the Japanese in China are in contact with the Chinese population.

9. Another great reservoir of information concerning occupied China, other territory under Japanese occupation and Japan itself, is to be found in printed matter available within the lines of occupation -- newspapers, magazines, proclamations, the Japanese official gazette (some copies of which probably find their way into occupied China), and other means of publicity and propaganda.

10. Types of Information to be Sought -- Information concerning maritime activities in Chinese ports and along the China coast: Vessels in port; types of cargo which they are loading and discharging; the speed with which the stevedoring is handled; the types of material on docks and in storehouses; the extent to which the capacity of docks and other storage space is being used; and so forth.

11. Information concerning the movements of enemy naval vessels in and out of ports and up and down the coast.

12. Information concerning the enemy forces of occupation: Troop movements; quality of troops; the military organizations represented; and so forth.

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13. Similar information concerning enemy air forces; aircraft; production plants, air fields; and so forth.

14. Economic information of a military value, such as the extent to which given industrial plants are in operation; the quantity and the quality of their products; labor problems; the establishment of new industrial enterprises or the expansion of old ones; financial operations and situations.

15. It is to be hoped that eventually military information can be secured from the Japanese Empire itself.

16. Communications -- You will establish a system of communications to make possible the proper transmission of information from its source to the local or regional representatives and thence to Chungking. In your discretion you will use and are authorized to purchase shortwave transmitting and receiving radio sets. You are authorized, in your discretion, to employ couriers. You will be expected to endeavor to arrange with the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, for such mail facilities and plane service to supplement the above as may be considered necessary by you for the efficient carrying out of your task, and as the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, may find it practicable to provide.

17. You have been provided with an Office of Strategic Services code which you will use wherever practicable for transmitting cable messages from Chungking or wherever your headquarters may be to the Office of Strategic Services in Washington. Before messages are coded you will furnish complete and accurate paraphrases thereof to the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in China, or, if he so desires, the complete message. The Commanding General has been instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transmit your messages through military channels.

SECRET

18. You will use your discretion as to the ways in which -- whether by code or otherwise -- messages between yourself and your supervisors, between supervisors, and between agents and supervisors shall be sent.

19. Every effort must be made to see to it that codes do not fall into the hands of the enemy. In the event of danger of their doing so, codes and all messages made up thereof should be burned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy 2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

MUHAMMAD BIN-ABD-AL-KARIM

Near Eastern Section

Situation Report No. 7

CONFIDENTIAL**MUHAMMAD BIN-'ABD-AL-KARIM**

Note: The correct name of the person usually called 'Abd-al-Karim (Abd-el-Krim) is Si Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi. His father's name was 'Abd-al-Karim, but when the father died, it apparently became customary to call Muhammad by his father's name, 'Abd-al-Karim, in order to distinguish him from his brother M'hammad. In this discussion all three will be called by their correct names in order to avoid confusion.

Si Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi was born in Ajdir, Spanish Morocco, about 1883, as the son of the old chief 'Abd-al-Karim of the Beni-Urialgel. Muhammad considers his family to be of Arab origin, direct descendants of the U'ad Si Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim, originally from Yanbu' in the Hijaz, who emigrated to Morocco about 900 and occupied the country between the Bay of Alhucemas and Targist.

Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim's early career might be cited as a good example of that of the contemporary young Moroccan intellectual. He studied in Melilla as a youth and in 1907 obtained a post as Arab Secretary in the Bureau of Native Affairs. He studied law and became a qadi; in 1914 he was appointed Chief Qadi in the Zone of Melilla. In 1915 he received an important post in the Arab School founded by General Jordana and was in addition writer on a local journal, the Telegrama del Rif.

Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim's nationalism was inherited from his father and reinforced by his studies in Fez, the center of the Moroccan nationalist movement. In the days before World War I the Rif was a no-man's land controlled by neither France nor Spain. It was the dream of Muhammad's father to unite this mountainous Berber country and rule it himself as an independent state. In 1912 the German Mannesmann family started negotiations with the elder 'Abd-al-Karim to exploit the Rif iron deposits. Spain intervened, however, and the old qadi saw his dreams of wealth and the economic development of the Rif disappear. This was the basis of his interest in Germany and his antipathy toward Spain.

The elder 'Abd-al-Karim directed the education of his two sons so that they should be able to carry out his plans after his death. The young Muhammad, later to become leader of the Rif rebellion, was entrusted with a "political mission" while he was a student at Fez. In his memoirs, Muhammad gives the purpose of this mission as an attempt to enlist the support of the Makhzan in destroying the bu-Ham'rah tribe and setting up the elder 'Abd-al-Karim as ruler of the Rif under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Morocco. Nothing came of the attempt, however. Si M'hammad, the younger brother of the leader of the Rif revolt, was sent by his father to Malaga and Madrid to study mining engineering so that he might oversee the economic development of his country.

I. J. Roger-Mathieu, Mémoires d'Abd-el-Krim (Paris, 1927)

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CONFIDENTIAL

Young Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim's first difficulties with France occurred in 1915. He had always been violently anti-French, which of course, was pleasant to the Spanish régime in Morocco. However, this anti-French campaign had been, since the end of 1914, accompanied by dealings with a certain Francisco Farle, a Spaniard of German origin. Farle seems to have offered to supply him with all necessary arms and money if he would make trouble for France. But Muhammad wanted to arm against Spain also; unfortunately for him, the Spanish authorities discovered the existence of these negotiations and he was thrown into prison. He was eleven months in captivity and then rejoined his tribe for one year. Later he returned to Melilla and was restored as Chief Qadi, in which position he remained for two years.

During the course of the war, Muhammad visited Madrid, where he rendered various services to the German Embassy. His activities in this direction finally alarmed the Spanish authorities, so that they asked him to leave Spain.

The final break between the elder 'Abd-al-Karim and Spain came in 1919. His attempts to negotiate with a Spanish syndicate for the exploitation of the Rif were wrecked by General Silvestre. It became clear to 'Abd-al-Karim that Spain meant to establish a protectorate over Morocco and exploit the Rif resources for herself. When Muhammad realized that the final break between Spain and his father had come, he left the Spanish-Zone never to return as a peaceful citizen.

The elder 'Abd-al-Karim died in 1920, leaving his two sons to carry on the fight for the independence of the Rif. War broke out with Spain on April 11, 1920. In 1921 Muhammad conceived the idea of the Rif republic, and on February 1, 1922, he was proclaimed Amir of the Rif and the war became a ihad.

In May 1926, the war was over and Muhammad was exiled to Réunion, where he has remained ever since.

Muhammad's defeat marked his disappearance from the field of Moroccan politics except as a potential French tool. On August 25, 1936 the Paris paper Le Matin reported an unconfirmed rumor that he had escaped from Réunion.¹ That this was clearly a trial balloon sent up to test the political reaction in French and Spanish quarters is certain from the fact that soon after, reports emanating from France circulated in Morocco to the effect that Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim was to be released from Réunion. The French had in fact conceived the idea of bringing him back to French Morocco and with the help of the Madrid government smuggle him into the Spanish Zone to stir up the Rif Berbers against the Franco régime. The scheme, however, fell through, when it was realized that the defeated Muhammad no longer had the respect of the Rif and that his working for a foreign power would destroy any prestige he might have in the eyes of the Berbers and Arabs.

The idea of bringing Muhammad back to Morocco to be used to stir up trouble in Spanish Morocco was revived either by General Noguès or his advisors

1. See also New York Times, August 25, 1936.

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CONFIDENTIAL

in October, 1940. However, Franco got wind of the project and protested strongly to Paris, whereupon the matter was dropped.¹ However, under French encouragement, the reorganized Nationalist party in the Spanish Zone, after consultation and agreement with the Nationalist Party in the French Zone in 1941, proclaimed Muhammad as leader of the party.²

In spite of all this, Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim is still in Réunion.

On at least one occasion it is known that Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim expressed great admiration for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. From Muhammad's attempts to promote the exploitation of the Rif's natural resources, his attempts to stop inter-tribal warfare and his ready adaptation of modern military methods, including aviation, it is clear that he was no medieval reactionary. His aim was to build up a Rif republic using such modern techniques as were suitable, but at the same time keeping the control entirely in his hands. That he had not the political capacity for the job is apparent. His only hope was in playing France off against Spain, and when that failed he lost.

In 1925 Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim's name was mentioned by "prominent Egyptians" as a candidate for the caliphate because of his "victorious battle against European nations"³, but nothing ever came of the proposition since the whole idea of reviving the caliphate was abandoned.

Conclusion

From the study of the past history of Muhammad bin-'Abd-al-Karim the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. As the logical corollary of his primarily Rifian nationalism, he is anti-Spanish first, anti-French second, and anti-European on any score. He probably in the long run would not turn out to be more friendly to the Free French than to Vichy. Sooner or later his presence would cause trouble with Spain and would turn Spain toward Germany for support.
2. He has been out of touch with Morocco for about fifteen years. There is no assurance that he any longer understands the situation there or that he has any following.
3. He was defeated by Franco. This would lower him in the eyes of Berbers and Arabs.
4. He would lose any appeal he might have if it were suspected, as would be almost certain, that he was acting in the interests of a foreign power.
5. He has an old friendship with German interests dating from 1912. In the past, it was always Germans who wanted to help him, while Spain and France blocked him. It is doubtful whether he would be able to distinguish between pre-1932 Germany and the Third Reich. It is possible, however, that Germany's friendship with Spain might serve to discredit the former in his eyes. It

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1. Memorandum from H. S. Gould, U. S. Consul at Casablanca, Oct. 21, 1940.
 2. H. Earle Russell, Consulate General at Casablanca, letter to S. D. of June 18, 1941.
 3. New York Times. February 19, 1925, p. 11.

- 2 -

should be not forgotten that the Moroccan nationalists are now united, and as one of the chief protagonists of the movement, Mohammed bin-'Abd-al-Karim would almost inevitably be drawn into the Moroccan camp.

6. There are other men in Morocco who are stronger than he. It can be assumed as fairly certain that, if Mohammed bin-'Abd-al-Karim appeared on the scene there would be a struggle for power between him and the Ghazi of Marrakech, for example.

7. He owes a good deal of his success to his brother, Si Mohammed. Mohammed would have to be brought in line, too, if things were to function properly.

8. He has rivals in the Rif today. As long ago as 1925¹ it was reported that Si Mohammed had been, the Rif prime minister, was aspiring to his chief's position. Mohammed bin-'Abd-al-Karim's arch-foe for the supremacy in the Rif in 1925² was the Qz'id Hamu Haziqo of the Hamisa tribe, who joined the French. There is danger that Mohammed bin-'Abd-al-Karim's efforts might degenerate into a struggle among Qz'id for supremacy in the Rif instead of for Moroccan independence. Even at the height of his power he found it difficult to hold his tribes together.

1. New York Times, April 21, 1926, p. 4.
2. New York Times, May 8, 1925, p. 6.

EXCERPT FROM
JFK SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 22, 1963

ABD-AL-KARIM

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that conversations have been held with various individuals as to the feasibility and method of rescuing ABD-AL-KARIM. There was difference of opinion, for example, as to whether he should be brought to the UNITED STATES or to GIBRALTAR, and there was also some question as to whether he would espouse the United Nations or the Axis cause.

For the latter reason COLONEL DONOVAN believed it desirable to obtain some indication of his location before taking any steps to bring him away from REUNION.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Took note that this subject is still under discussion.

MOST SECRET

August 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILBY:

The question of taking Abd-el-Krim from his exile on Reunion Island for the purpose of starting native uprisings in the Riff raises many questions which should be taken into consideration before any decision in the matter is reached.

1. The political sympathies and antagonisms of Abd-el-Krim should be well understood. Information from sources believed to be reliable in quite recent weeks indicates that at the present time he is strongly pro-Axis. It would be very dangerous to release a strong Axis sympathizer from his exile and put him back into a position of influence among his own people in a part of the world where it is vital that Allied sympathies be increased rather than lessened.

2. It is reported by several observers, one of whom has been recently in Spanish Morocco, that Abd-el-Krim has lost his influence among his tribesmen, that this is because of his defeat in 1925, that no matter how glorious his fight for survival may have been, the fact that the French finally got the better of him destroys his prestige in the eyes of his followers. It would not serve the desired purpose to bring back to a position of leadership a man who, because of his record, is in no position to assume leadership.

MOST SECRET

- 2 -

3. An Arab seldom forgets a broken promise. Abd-el-Krim fought successfully against the Spaniards and is reported to have counted heavily on British support against the French. This support was not forthcoming and Abd-el-Krim may well feel that he was deserted at the most critical moment by the British. It would seem unlikely that on any terms he would now willingly cooperate with the British in starting uprisings, even against the French by whom he was once defeated, and certainly there is no reason for his cooperating against the Germans, against whom he has no grievance.

4. Even if Abd-el-Krim could regain his prestige and cooperate effectively with the United Nations in driving the Axis and Vichy French out of North Africa, his cooperation would have to be won, presumably, by some very considerable bribe, possibly even the immediate establishment of a Moslem State under his suzerainty. In any case, his demands might well be excessive, and more excessive in proportion if he thought his services valuable. The political consequences of promises that would have to be made might well outweigh any advantage from any attempted uprising.

5. If Abd-el-Krim were to undertake any activities in North Africa they could hardly be looked upon with equanimity by the Spanish people. The continued neutrality of Spain in the present conflict is a matter of grave concern to the Allied

MOST SECRET - 3 -

Nations and might well be jeopardized by any collaboration between a one-time bitter enemy and the United Nations. The inter-relationship between Spain and Spanish Morocco is one of the few political-economic questions outside Spain proper that has a deep emotional significance to Spain as a whole. It is possible even that collaboration with Abd-el-Krim might arouse profound resentment not only in Spain but throughout Latin America.

6. Any attempt to use Abd-el-Krim in North Africa would probably have disastrous consequences on the morale of the Jewish people and their sympathizers. At present a delicate balance is maintained in Palestine, though there is increasing pressure for a Jewish Army in spite of persistent objection from Arabic leaders. Jewish sympathizers extend beyond the ethnic group of the Jewish people so that adherents of Zionism and supporters of the agitation for a Jewish army are now found among many prominent non-Jews in the United States. These form an influential group in our own citizen body which would feel outraged at the denial of their just demands, as they conceive them, while opportunities such as they seek are being voluntarily given to their bitterest enemies. This implies the danger of a serious break in morale, not only among the most ardent supporters of the war effort abroad, but also within the United States itself.

7. In view of the fact that there is already some suggestion that the British in particular are trying to hold their Arabic peoples in line by a mild policy of appeasement, a gesture toward

MOST SECRET - 4 -

Abd-el-Krim for such open and vigorous collaboration might well be interpreted as a crowning act of appeasement toward the Arabic-speaking world which would bring dismay to democratic peoples who would undoubtedly be told by the divisionist press in the United States that British diplomacy has made no advance since the days of Munich.

If the question should arise of making use in North Africa of Abd-el-Krim or of any other native leader like, for example, the youthful Muhammed ibn-'Allā al Fāsi in exile in Algeria, it would be highly desirable first to get a complete report on the advantages and disadvantages from Colonel Z. Peckoff, who is now in South Africa and who could speak authoritatively from the point of view of the ~~Free~~ French ~~(and General de Gaulle.)~~

*Free
the*

B. D. Meritt

S E C R E T

J.P.W.O. 25

COPY NO. 1

August 1, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

ABD-AL-KARIM

Note by the Secretary.

The enclosure is a study presented by the Office of Strategic Services as a background for discussion of certain proposals pertaining to FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURESubject: 'Abd-al-Karim of the Rif

After the loss of Cuba and the Philippine Islands, which was explained on the ground of distance from the seat of government, the military party in Spain sought a closer field of colonization. Morocco seemed the ideal spot. It was close to the mainland. The powerful clerical party favored it, too, in the hope of spreading the Gospel among the infidels. This, they said, was a testament of Ferdinand and Isabella. Furthermore the French were at that time planning such an expansion, and it seemed wise for both to cooperate and divide the African territory into zones of influence. Naturally the native inhabitants were not consulted, and when the Spaniards arrived, there was no evidence of jubilation. In fact resistance was almost spontaneous. A serious outbreak in 1909 taxed all the resources of the colonizers.

No sooner had order been established in the tradition of Cortex than the Great War broke out. German agents, it is said, seized the opportunity to spread discontent among the inhabitants, first against the neighboring French and then against the Spaniards. The soil was a fertile one for such propaganda, since the Moroccans were not much enamored with either the French or the Spaniards. In the first place the natives were almost to a man Moslems who resented non-Moslem rule. In the second place neither the French nor the Spanish rule was in any way benevolent. In the third place the native population was for the most part Berber, a proud race which often times was inhospitable even to the Arab Moslem element among them. These Berbers belong to the white Hamites of the Mediterranean, although they have intermingled freely with the negroid races of Africa. Finally, Berber and Arab alike, all Moslems, were determined to resist any foreign penetration. For these reasons German propaganda was not wholly unsuccessful, at least in stirring trouble.

S E C R E T

After the War the Spanish government was anxious to punish the tribal chiefs who have given comfort to the enemy. Among the suspects were the chief of the Banu-Urriaghel, 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khattabi, and his two sons. Shortly, however, 'Abd-al-Karim the elder died, and his son Muhammad was elected in his stead as chief of the Banu-Urriaghel -- and for punishment by the Spaniards.

Muhammad ibn-al-Karim (better known to the world as Abdul Karim) was then at Melilla, serving in the Bureau of Native Affairs, and editing a paper besides. He was proficient in Arabic, the literary and religious language of Morocco and the entire North African provinces. The spoken tongue, it should be remembered, is a polyglot of Berber dialects.

While at Melilla, the new chief was jailed at the order of General Sivestre, but was able to flee in 1920, and join his tribe. Meanwhile the Spaniards were pursuing their plans of punishing disloyal tribes, buying those whose loyalty was dubious, and fighting the out and out hostile. They came head on with the Banu-Urriaghel and with the new chief, 'Abd-al-Karim. Muhammad ibn-'Abd-al-Karim (this is his real name) gave the tribe a new and enlightened leadership, and the Spaniards a humiliating defeat. In 1921 he seized Anual, and General Silvestre and his staff who had rushed to defend the place were either killed or committed suicide.

With this initial success, other discontented tribes began to flock to 'Abd-al-Karim, and the movement took on the color of a holy war against the foreign invaders. Tribe after tribe jumped on the band wagon, and finally (1924) the confederation of the so-called Jibalah (Mountain) tribes, the most important single group, joined the ranks.

S E C R E T

By 1925 practically the whole Rif was under the rule of 'Abd-al-Karim. The French decided to capitalize on Spanish defeat and 'Abd-al-Karim's occupation in the west and the north. As they started to push on, 'Abd-al-Karim turned south and gave battle, since he saw that, if left unchecked, French penetration would overrun the whole territory. At first he was successful, and almost captured Fez. The French then dispatched an army of over 160,000 under the leadership of Petain. Six years of war against the Spaniards had exhausted the Rif soldiers. They were no match for the regulars of France. 'Abd-al-Karim expected aid from Britain, but no such aid was obtained. In May 1926 he surrendered, and was immediately sent as an exile to the Island of Reunion off Madagascar.

During the Spanish Civil War, there was talk of freeing 'Abd-al-Karim in order to check the partisans of General Franco, but the Blum government hesitated too long, and the leader of the Rif remained an exile.

Now that the Islands of Madagascar and Reunion are under the control of the United Nations, the question of 'Abd-al-Karim's fate looms important. Will he be of use to the war effort, or will his release be like that of a Jinnee out of a magic bottle?

It must be remembered that 'Abd-al-Karim's fight was, in the first place, against the Spaniards. His release and support by the United Nations will serve as a good check against further Spanish philandering with the Axis. In the second place it was France and French troops under Petain that finally defeated 'Abd-al-Karim. His release and support by the United Nations will also be useful against Vichy and its present rulers.

SECRET

No other North African leader except 'Abd-al-Karim can at present unite all the tribes in the service of the United Nations. His release and support will demonstrate to the peoples of North Africa, as nothing else can, that the days of the old imperialism are gone for ever; that the United Nations are indeed waging this war for the ideals of democracy; that nationalism in the so-called "subject peoples" will no longer be punished, but will be nurtured and guided along useful and peaceful lines. These intangibles will be the dominant factor in weaning away the entire North African regions from the control of Vichy with its Petain and Laval, and from Franco, whose dubious neutrality has been one of the most disturbing elements in the whole Mediterranean situation.

Already al-Sanusī has pledged his support to the United Nations against Italian excesses in Libya and Tripolitania. Al-Sanusī represents the religious aspect of North African nationalism; Muhammad ibn-'Abd-al-Karim its secular and enlightened leadership. Under the tutelage of the United Nations, and more especially that of the United States, these two can make the Mediterranean safe for the Allies. Equally important is the influence which such a move will have throughout the Moslem world. From India to the Atlantic Allah will be praised, and the Allies will receive the plaudits and the support of the "faithful".

JPWC Excerpts
Minutes

November 30, 1942

COORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

GENERAL STRONG stated that one factor had been overlooked in this proposal, viz, the close religious connection between Brazil and Portugal, which could possibly be used to advantage.

ADMIRAL TRAIN explained the new organization which had been set up in Brazil by the Navy Department, whereby all personnel are made responsible to Vice Admiral Ingram. He pointed out that Admiral Ingram should be consulted before action is taken on this proposal.

GENERAL STRONG said that the State Department also should be approached in advance of any formal action, as it might tend to place the proposed functions with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Colonel Donovan suggested that this paper might be approved in principle and the details worked out with the State Department prior to any final decision. He pointed out that there is a good precedent for such collaboration with the State Department in the consideration of the Plan for Portugal which has been before the Advisory Committee.

THE COMMITTEE:

Took note that Colonel Donovan will:

- (a) Refer this proposal to the Advisory Committee for discussion of details of operation;
- (b) Report to this committee at its next meeting on the attitude of the State Department

JPWC MINUTES
EXCERPTS

October 5, 1942

COORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

LT. COLONEL BLAKENEY reported that General Strong had requested that this proposal be suspended pending certain decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer consideration of this proposal until the Joint Chiefs of Staff had indicated U.S. policies in BRAZIL.

JFWE
Excerpts

September 28, 1942

COORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

ADMIRAL TRAIN stated that ADMIRAL BEAUREGARD, who had recently returned to BRAZIL, had talked to COLONEL DONOVAN about this project and that he had indicated his opinion that Brazilians would not look favorably upon psychological warfare activities, since they would be likely to favor more direct methods. ADMIRAL TRAIN also suggested that if this project were approved the liaison representative in BRAZIL should work under the direction of ADMIRAL BEAUREGARD. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed with the latter idea.

GENERAL KRONER stated that GENERAL KRONER stated that GENERAL STRONG requested that no action be taken on this subject until certain pending questions have been decided.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer action on this proposal until its next meeting.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 38

SEPTEMBER 26, 1942

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

COORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure has been considered by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee and is recommended by it for approval.

A. H. Onthank

Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURECOORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SITUATION

1. The declaration of war by Brazil calls for re-orientation of U. S. psychological warfare efforts in order to coordinate our activities with those of Brazil and, through use of Brazilian facilities, to turn from defensive to offensive operations from Latin America.
2. Brazil's ties are to Portugal, our chief gateway to continental Europe. She also has close connections with the Spanish and French. Due to the large Italian and German colonies in Brazil which have preserved their homeland loyalties and cultures, the Brazilian Government is familiar with the use of, as well as with the defense against, subversive and repressive measures. Properly trained Brazilian agents would probably be the ideal operatives for Portugal, Spain, the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese West Africa, French West Africa, Timor and other Portuguese, Spanish and French speaking places.
3. Present U. S. activities in Brazil, other than those of the armed services chiefly at airports, include F.B.I.'s surveillance of Axis operations, G.N.I. and G-2 in the military intelligence field, the State Department's usual diplomatic and general intelligence work, and the furtherance of the "good neighbor policy" by the C.I.A.A.

PROPOSAL

4. To take advantage of Brazil's potentialities for psychological warfare in Europe, Africa and Asia it is proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through one of its supporting agencies, establish direct liaison in Rio de Janeiro with whatever Brazilian authorities are or may be responsible for conducting psychological warfare against Axis areas.

SECRET

The objectives would be:

a. To promote the development of a Brazilian psychological warfare branch which would operate solely in Axis areas;

b. To assist Brazilian authorities in that branch by advice on technical problems of organization, training and equipment;

c. To coordinate U.S. and Brazilian plans for psychological warfare operations in Axis areas and to maintain liaison between Brazilian and U.S. authorities responsible for execution of such plans.

5. In order to give him the necessary official standing and at the same time to provide cover for his real work, the person designated to coordinate psychological warfare activities of Brazil with the corresponding activities of the United States should be attached to the office of the Military or Naval Attache as an Assistant. He should have the following qualifications:

a. Suitable language qualifications. (Portuguese and French).

b. A thorough familiarity with conditions in the Iberian peninsula and in West and North Africa.

c. A thorough knowledge of psychological warfare including overseas propaganda and special operations, and familiarity with organizing, training and operating such services.

RECOMMENDATION

6. To invite the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Director, Office of Naval Intelligence to assign to the Military or Naval Attache in Brazil an assistant, either military or civilian, with appropriate qualifications, instructed to establish liaison with the Brazilian authorities conducting psychological warfare overseas and to coordinate the efforts of such authorities with the corresponding activities of the United States.

JPWC Subcommittee
Excerpts

September 25, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

After considering the form in which this proposal should be submitted to the Senior Committee, and after making several changes,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Directed that the proposal, as amended, be submitted for approval to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee at its next meeting.

SECRETCOPY NO. 1**September 24, 1942.****AD DRAFT****COORDINATION OF U.S. AND BRAZILIAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE****SITUATION**

1. The participation of Brazil in the war opens new and important possibilities for psychological warfare operations from Brazil to vital strategic areas - i.e. Europe and other Axis areas - because:

a. Brazil has sufficient resources to create an effective psychological warfare organization.

b. Brazil's close cultural ties with Portugal, Spain and France give her an asset for psychological warfare operations in these countries and their island possessions and colonies in North and West Africa which can be powerfully exploited.

c. Brazilian agents can penetrate into French, Portuguese and Spanish territories in Africa or Europe which cannot be reached by American or British agents.

2. Entry of Brazil into the war necessitates partial reorientation of American psychological warfare because:

a. Hitherto our psychological warfare activities in Latin America have been defensive, aimed at combating enemy influence in the several Latin American Republics.

b. Now Brazil - largest of the Latin American Republics - is capable of using offensive psychological warfare, to attack the common enemy outside of the western hemisphere.

c. Brazilian psychological warfare against the Axis, to be fully effective, must be coordinated with our own operations in this field as well as with those of the British and other allies.

CAPABILITIES OF BRAZIL

3. The Republic has forty million people, one-third of the population of South America. No other South American

- 1 - **SECRET**

SECRET

nation, except Argentina, has more than a fraction of Brazil's commerce or strength. It is the only nation in South America speaking Portuguese and its ties are to Portugal. Lisbon is our chief gateway to Continental Europe. The Portuguese are Iberian and almost as closely connected with Spain as Spain is with some of its own racial elements. Brazilian ties with France are nearly as strong.

4. Brazil has an area as large as the Continental United States, with a coastline impossible to patrol or control. Its ports, especially Rio, Santos, Rio Grande do Sul, Recife, are touched by the largest part of South Atlantic traffic wherever bound and Brazil's own domestic intercourse is largely coastal. It is suggested as a likely bridgehead for enemy attack on the United States by airplane stepping-stones reaching to the North (its northwest uplands being 1000 miles from the Panama Canal) or for invasion of South America if the events of the war open possibilities of Axis attacks upon South America, now remote. Brazil has large Italian and German populations, including some towns almost purely German or Italian, which preserve their homeland culture and loyalties, particularly along the south coast. The secession of the southern areas of Brazil, influenced by German and Italian populations and by political sympathies with Argentina, has been sometimes considered a contingency.

5. Brazil is under a dictator with a Department of Press and Propaganda, with five divisions:

- a. "Educational activities" through school and patriotic propaganda,
- b. Movies and theatre,
- c. "Tourism," advertising Brazil abroad,
- d. Radio, with supervisors in stations and some internal and external shortwave programs.

SECRET

2. Press running many government papers and punishing private press.

The government is familiar with the use of, as well as with defense against, such underground, subversive and repressive measures, and is likely to be as much concerned with traffic of this character as with military participation in the war.

A small army and large federal and state police forces preserve the dictatorship. There is every reason to believe that Brazil, if aided by us, could create a useful psychological warfare organization conducting both propaganda and subversive operations effectively in Europe and Africa. Properly trained Brazilian agents would probably be the ideal operatives for Portugal, Spain, the Azores and Cape Verde island; Portuguese West Africa and French West Africa.

U. S. A. IN BRAZIL

6. American government activities in Brazil, other than armed services in uniform which are chiefly at airports, include:

- a. F.B.I. operating in Brazil and throughout South America with type of personnel familiar in the U.S.A., watching chiefly Axis penetration aimed at us.
- b. G-2 and O.N.I., concerned primarily with gathering military intelligence.
- c. The State Department, through the Embassy, dealing with friendly policies but also covering its usual field of general intelligence. Associated with it are the "Good Neighbor" agents of C.I.A.A.

CONCLUSION

7. Brazil has large capabilities arising from its geographic situation, its national strength, its ties with Portugal, Spain and France, its political traditions and the

SECRET

existence of a dictatorship, for the development of secret operations overseas especially in Europe and Africa. These are not now being developed by any American agency and none are equipped to use these capabilities or coordinate them with our own. Her belligerency opens an opportunity.

DESIRABLE U. S. ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL

8. In addition to the American activities listed in the previous section it is now important that the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, through one of its supporting agencies, should establish direct liaison in Rio de Janeiro with whatever Brazilian authorities are or may be responsible for conducting psychological warfare in Europe and other Axis areas.

9. The duties of the officer effecting this liaison would be:

a. To promote the development of a Brazilian overseas psychological warfare branch confined to use of Brazilian capabilities in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Oceanic Islands in coordination with the other United Nations.

b. To assist the Brazilian authorities in charge of such a branch by advice on technical problems of organization and training, by studying their needs and recommending to the proper American authorities whatever further measures of assistance in regard to instruction, equipment, etc. may be necessary.

c. To discuss with the Brazilian authorities plans for coordinated psychological warfare operations in Europe and other Axis areas and to maintain liaison between the Brazilian psychological warfare authorities and the American agencies responsible for the execution of various phases of such plans.

SECRET

9. To make reports on the progress of Brazilian psychological warfare and its coordination with our own.

10. In order to give him the necessary official standing and at the same time to provide cover for his real work, the officer designated to coordinate psychological warfare activities of Brazil with the corresponding activities of the United States should be attached to the office of the Military or Naval Attache as an Assistant.

g. Qualifications.

This liaison officer should have the following qualifications:

- (1) Suitable language qualifications.
(Portuguese and French)
- (2) A thorough familiarity with conditions in the Iberian peninsula and in West and North Africa.
- (3) A thorough knowledge of psychological warfare including overseas propaganda and special operations, and familiarity with organizing, training and operating such services.

RECOMMENDATION

11. To invite the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Director, Office of Naval Intelligence to assign to the Military or Naval Attache in Brazil an assistant, either military or civilian, with appropriate qualifications, instructed to establish liaison with the Brazilian psychological warfare authorities and to coordinate the efforts of such authorities with the corresponding activities of the United States.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extract

September 23, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

Dr. Rogers presented a second draft of the entire proposal which incorporated the changes requested by the Subcommittee. This was discussed in detail and further amendments made.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Directed the Secretary to redraft this memorandum to include the new changes and to present it at the Subcommittee's next meeting.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extract

September 22, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

DR. ROGERS presented an amendment for paragraph (a) of the duties of the officer to be sent to BRAZIL, indicating more clearly that the activities will emanate from BRAZIL and not be carried on within that country.

The first recommendation was changed to direct it to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Accepted the amendments suggested.
- b. Requested DR. ROGERS to draft a paragraph of conclusions.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extracts

September 18, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

LT. COL. BLAKENEY presented the draft of two paragraphs which were suggested as additions to the recommendations. These would,

- a. Provide that the American Intelligence Command, M.I.S., in conjunction with the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs be directed to submit joint plans for psychological warfare in Latin America to the J.P.W.C.;
- b. Designate the American Intelligence Command, M.I.S., as the agency to coordinate psychological warfare activities from the countries under its jurisdiction, directed at the enemy.

Discussion of the proposed additional recommendations brought out the fact that there might be some misunderstanding as to the purpose of the memorandum presented by the O.S.S. CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF stated that the Directive for operations from BRAZIL should make it plain that no psychological warfare activities are contemplated within BRAZIL but that this proposal intends only to use BRAZIL as a new outlet for psychological warfare aimed at enemy countries.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Requested MR. TAYLOR to have the O.S. S. proposal rewritten to emphasize the recommendation made by CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF.

- b. Directed the Secretary to address a letter to the Military Intelligence Service, G-2, requesting a report on psychological warfare activities emanating from countries in Latin America, and directed at theaters in which we have enemy operations; and stating further, that inasmuch as BRAZIL is a recent belligerent, and a study of its psychological warfare possibilities is being made by the J.P.W.C., it is requested that the report on activities in BRAZIL be expedited in advance of the report on other Latin American Countries.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extracts

September 16, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

LT. COL. BLAKENEY REPORTED THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THE proposals in the O.S.S. memorandum on this subject with COLONEL DUFF of M.I.S., who will head the American Intelligence Command. It appears that this Command may be planning to perform some of the functions proposed in the O.S.S. memorandum, and he pointed out that these activities should be brought officially to the attention of the J.P.W.C.

LT. CDR. MORAN read a memorandum which had been prepared by COLONEL THOMASON of O.N.I. which submitted detailed comments on the plan proposed by O.S.S.

After Discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Directed that the present proposal amended to omit paragraph 2 of the Recommendations, be submitted to the J.P.W.C. with recommendation for approval.
- b. Requested LT. COL. BLAKENEY to obtain a statement from the American Intelligence Command of its proposed activities in BRAZIL, to be submitted to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extracts

September 15, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

LT. COL. BLAKENEY reported that the Latin American Section has approved this plan in principle but that he lacks certain details of the plans that the Latin American Section may have in connection with this subject.

LT. CDR. MORAN stated that he has submitted this proposal to ADMIRAL TRAIN but has not yet received his comments.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Requested LT. COL. BLAKENEY and LT. CDR. MORAN to obtain further information and agreed to discuss the subject again at its meeting on September 16.

J.P.W.C. Subcommittee

Minutes of Meeting
Extracts

September 9, 1942

PLAN FOR BRAZIL

LT. COL. BLAKENEY stated that he had discussed this proposal with COLONEL HEARD of the Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, who favored it generally but thought he might have some suggestions for amendments and additions, as well as for the personnel involved.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed to defer action on this proposal until its next meeting, in order to give the Latin American Section, Military Intelligence Division, a chance to offer suggestions.

SECRETMEMORANDUMSITUATION

1. The participation of Brazil in the war opens up new and important possibilities for psychological warfare operations in a vital strategic area - i.e. Europe and Africa - because:

(a) Brazil has sufficient resources to create an effective psychological warfare organization.

(b) Brazil's close cultural ties with Portugal, Spain and France give her an asset for psychological warfare operations in these countries and their island possessions and colonies in North and West Africa which can be powerfully exploited.

(c) Brazilian agents can penetrate into French, Portuguese and Spanish territories in Africa or Europe which cannot be reached by American or British agents.

2. Entry of Brazil into the war necessitates partial re-orientation of American psychological warfare because:

(a) Hitherto our psychological warfare activities in Latin America have been aimed at combating enemy influence in the several Latin American Republics.

(b) Now Brazil - largest of the Latin American Republics - is capable of using psychological warfare herself to attack the common enemy outside of the western hemisphere.

(c) Brazilian psychological warfare against the Axis to be fully effective must be coordinated with our own operations

(3088)

-2-

in this field as well as with those of the British and other allies.

Capabilities of Brazil

The Republic has forty million people, one-third of the population of South America. No other South American nation, except Argentina, has more than a fraction of Brazil's commerce or strength. Brazil has large Italian and German populations, including some towns almost purely German or Italian, which preserve their homeland culture and loyalties, particularly along the south coast. It is the only nation in South America speaking Portuguese and its ties are to Portugal. Lisbon is our chief gateway to Continental Europe. The Portuguese are Iberian and almost as closely connected with Spain as Spain is with some of its own racial elements. Brazilian ties with France are nearly as strong.

Brazil has an area as large as the Continental United States, with a coastline impossible to patrol or control. Its ports, especially Rio, Santos, Rio Grande do Sul, Recife, are touched by the largest part of South Atlantic traffic wherever bound and Brazil's own domestic intercourse is largely coastal. It has been considered a likely bridgehead for enemy attack on the United States by airplane stepping-stones reaching to the north (its northwest uplands being 1000 miles from the Panama Canal) (3088)

-4-

subversive operations effectively in Europe and Africa. Properly trained Brazilian agents would probably be the ideal operatives for Portugal, Spain, the Azores and Cape Verde island; Portuguese West Africa and French West Africa.

U.S.A. in Brazil. American government activities in Brazil, other than armed services in uniform which are chiefly at airports, include:

- (a) F.B.I. operating here and throughout South America with type of personnel familiar in the U.S.A., watching chiefly Axis penetration aimed at us.
- (b) G-2 and O.N.I., concerned primarily with gathering military intelligence.
- (c) The State Department, through the Embassy, dealing with friendly policies but also covering its usual field of general intelligence. Associated with it are the "Good Neighbor" agents of C.I.A.A.

DESIRABLE U.S. ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL

In addition to the American activities listed in the previous section it is now important that the JFW through one of its supporting agencies should establish direct liaison in Rio de Janeiro with whatever Brazilian authorities are or may be

(3088)

-5-

responsible for conducting psychological warfare in Europe.

1. The duties of the officer effecting this liaison would be:

(a) To promote the development of a Brazilian overseas psychological warfare branch.

(b) To assist the Brazilian authorities in charge of such a branch by advice on technical problems of organization and training, by studying their needs and recommending to the proper American authorities whatever further measures of assistance in regard to instruction, equipment, etc. may be necessary.

(c) To discuss with the Brazilian authorities plans for coordinated psychological warfare operations in Europe and Africa and to maintain liaison between the Brazilian psychological warfare authorities and the American agencies responsible for the execution of various phases of such plans.

(d) To make reports to the JICG on the progress of Brazilian psychological warfare and its coordination with our own.

2. In order to give him the necessary official standing and at the same time provide cover for his real work, the psychological warfare liaison officer in Brazil should be attached to the office of the Military or Naval Attache as an Assistant Attache.

(3088)

-6-

3. The liaison officer should have the following qualifications:

- (a) Suitable language qualifications.
- (b) A primary qualification would be thorough familiarity with conditions in the Iberian peninsula and in West and North Africa.
- (c) Thorough knowledge of psychological warfare with special emphasis on S.O. tactics and familiarity with the problem of organizing, training and operating an S.O. service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the JCS authorize the sending to Rio de Janeiro of an Assistant Military or Naval Attaché instructed to establish liaison with the Brazilian psychological warfare authorities on the coordination of Brazilian and American psychological warfare efforts in Europe and Africa.

2. That the JFWD recommend to the JCS the designation as psychological warfare liaison officer in Brazil of an officer selected by the JFWD on the basis of special qualifications for this duty.

WJD

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 51/2

COPY NO. 1

November 10, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALY

Note by the Secretary

The J.P.W. Subcommittee recommends the following implementing action be taken on J.P.W.C. 51:-

(a) The attached letters to the Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the directive to the Office of Strategic Services be approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and dispatched to those agencies.

(b) That a copy of the enclosure to J.C.S. 139 be forwarded with a letter of transmittal to the Secretary of State for his information.

(c) That ^{the War Department be} ~~requested~~ ^{requested} to notify the Provost Marshal General of the favorable treatment desired towards Italian prisoners of war and to ^{request} ~~request~~ the Provost Marshal General to report all instances and such pictures as can be made available to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for incorporation in propaganda further implementing this desire.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

S E C R E TPROPOSED LETTERS TO THE DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION, AND TO THE
COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

November 10, 1942

Mr. Elmer Davis, Director
Office of War Information
Washington, D. C.

1. The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan for psychological warfare directed against Italy which was prepared in London by representatives of the Office of War Information and Office of Strategic Services in cooperation with the British Political Warfare Executive. This plan has also been approved by the British Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff. In order that the efforts of all interested Government agencies may be directed toward the same end, the parts of this general plan which are applicable to the propaganda portion of the program are hereby transmitted to you for your guidance:

(a) The purpose of Psychological Warfare as an offensive arm is to assist in "the destruction of the foundations of the German war machine" in order to make possible decisive action against the main enemy. Propaganda is one instrument of psychological warfare, and to be successful must work in conjunction with all other instruments of war which can contribute to the total offensive against morale.

(b) The object of psychological warfare directed against Italy is to give maximum assistance to the military efforts in eliminating Italy as an active partner in the Rome-Berlin axis and make her a liability to Germany. The following are the specific objectives:

SECRET

(1) To destroy the will to fight of the Italian armed forces on sea, on land, and in the air.

(2) To disrupt and paralyze the central and local civil administration.

(3) To create and sustain resistance to the Fascists and Germans and to convince the Italians of the certainty of victory by the United Nations.

(4) To foster among the Italian people respect for the honor and good faith of President Roosevelt and the leaders of the United Nations.

2. To accomplish these objectives the cooperation of the Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs is necessary, in order that the propaganda phase of the psychological warfare activities from the United States be coordinated with those of the European Theater Commander and the Political Warfare Executive.

3. The following methods of achievement are set forth for guidance:

(a) Exploit to the full (in propaganda) both to the Italian armed forces and to the civilian population, the Italian dislike of this war, which they feel is being waged in German rather than Italian interests (Germany will be the gainer, Italy the loser).

(b) Exploit the misfortunes of Italian arms. These misfortunes in all cases to be attributed to the failure of the Party to provide proper arms and equipment, and the refusal of Germany to supply either raw materials or finished weapons.

(c) Publicize good treatment of Italian prisoners in order to encourage large scale surrenders in the field and to counter the present hate campaign against the Anglo-Saxon races.

MEMORANDUM

- (d) Encourage passive resistance.
- (e) Exploit with gover confidence among the Italian forces and civilian population the successes gained in Africa as announced in military communiques.
- (f) Emphasize that the United Nations offensive is gathering momentum and that before long the day of reckoning will be at hand.
- (g) Emphasize that the victory of the United Nations is the best guarantee that Italy will be allowed to develop.
- (h) Emphasize that the United States has a long and honorable tradition of Liberty and Justice and desires to see these principles formally established in all countries, including Italy.

4. The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs has been furnished a similar letter.

5. For the information of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, reports of your action and progress are requested.

Sincerely yours

J. R. DEANE
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Secretary

S E C R E TPROPOSED DIRECTIVE TO THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICESJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 10, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:Subject: Joint American-British Plan of
Psychological Warfare for Italy

1. Forwarded to you for your information and necessary action is copy number ___ of J.C.S. 130 (Joint American British Plan of Psychological Warfare for Italy) which was approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff at their 40th Meeting.
2. Your attention is particularly invited to:
Section V., Objective A, paragraph (2)
Section V., Objective B, paragraphs (1), (2) and (3)
The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency to implement these portions of the Plan.
3. Appropriate parts of this plan have been referred to the Office of War Information and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs for implementation. A copy of the letter forwarded to these agencies is enclosed for your information.
4. You will report in writing the initial action taken by the O.S.S. in implementing this plan, and keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of progress in accordance with paragraph 7, J.C.S. 67/4.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff,

J. R. NEASE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SECRET

J.P.W.O. 51/1

November 6, 1942

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALY

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosure presents comments and recommendations on the basic proposal (J.C.S. 139) submitted by the Office of Strategic Services.

A. H. ONTHANK.
Secretary

Distribution:

Hon. W. J. Donovan -	Copy	No.	1
Gen. Strong	"	"	2
Adm. Train	"	"	3
Adm. Cooke	"	"	4
Gen. Handy	"	"	5
Lt. Col. Onthank	"	"	6
Gen. Wadsmeyer	"	"	7
Capt. Grosskopf	"	"	8
Gen. Deane	"	"	9
Cdr. McDowell	"	"	10

SECRETENCLOSURE

November 5, 1942

COMMENTS BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ON
"JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALY"
 (J.O.S. 139)

The Office of Strategic Services approves the plan. It asks, however, that in execution, the following comments be kept in mind:

1. "Introduction," page 1.

a. (1st and 2nd paragraphs.) Though the plan is an over-all plan for Psychological Warfare against Italy (1st paragraph), and recognizes that "propaganda is only one instrument of Psychological Warfare" (2nd paragraph), it throughout focuses only upon open propaganda.

Further consideration should be given to the use of other means of psychological warfare, i.e., black propaganda, subversive activity, espionage, combat propaganda, and economic, diplomatic and cultural pressures.

b. (4th paragraph). It is necessary to make explicit the fact that this Plan of agreement between American and British agents refers only to expedient tactics which govern their actions in psychological warfare. The agreement is not to be understood as a concurrence on high policy between the two governments. Such plans as this should be based upon the following understanding:

"The American agencies executing this Plan do not consider it in their competence to commit the United States Government to high policy. The agreement emphasizes the solidarity of the concurring agencies in utilizing the weapons of psychological warfare, which is conceived of as a joint effort to create, not a policy, but only conditions favorable to and expediting the war effort of the United Nations."

S E C R E T

2. The "Appreciation" on the basis of which the later courses of action embodied under "Objectives" and "Methods of Achievement" are determined, is not a full estimation of the Italian psychological situation. Rather than merely an estimate of a military strategic situation, it should have contained a brief statement, based on intelligence, of the current conditions of Italian attitudes and morale. Such an appreciation would have revealed at once the assumption implicit throughout the Plan that there exists an antipathy of the Italians to the Fascists. Such an assumption is speculative; reports on the matter are contradictory.

3. "Methods of Achievement. Objective A" page 3.

a. These "methods" (in 1,2,3,4) are simply emotional. There should be a reasoned appeal to self-interest. To this the Italians, an old and cynical people, will better respond.

b. "Method (1)", page 3. In "Italian dislike of the war," a prime emphasis should be on the long-standing, now reinforced, Italian dislike of the Germans.

c. "Method (2)", page 3. The fostering of hatred of Mussolini and the Fascist hierarchs should not be prosecuted in open propaganda. It is, in general, unsound for foreigners to attack top leaders. The media should be black propaganda and subversive work. To be effective, such an attack should be stepped up at the time Italy faces real disaster.

Concentrating divisive tactics only on the Fascist hierarchs is based on superficial estimation of the situation. The bonds between the Fascist hierarchs, the Army, the Monarchy, the Church, and other elements must be considered and utilized.

S E C R E T

d. "Method (3)", page 3. Rubbing in defeats should be fostered only in black propaganda and subversive work. Open propaganda should emphasize misfortunes of Italian arms as due only to German double crossing.

e. "Method (4)", page 3. Rather than on "good treatment of Italian prisoners," emphasis should be on the publicity to be given such treatment in the homeland and to the troops themselves.

4. "Objective C, Method (2)", page 4. Regarding attack on "Mussolini and his gang" as "tools" of Hitler, see comment 3 c. above.

5. "Objective D, Method (1)", page 4. Efforts to "demonstrate" to Italians what their own development "along traditional lines" would be as a result of a United Nations victory is psychologically unsound. It is (a) patronizing, (b) dangerous. "Traditional" will suggest to the Italian mind continuation of the monarchy, irredentism, etc. The theme should be that a United Nations victory is the best guarantee that Italians will again live in peace and prosperity, and be masters in their own house.

Recommendation:

1. That this Plan be approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

2. That the following caveat on government policy be appended to this plan by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and communicated to theatre commanders for their guidance hereafter:

"The American agencies executing this Plan do not consider it in their competence to commit the United States Government to high policy. The agreement emphasizes the solidarity of the concurring agencies in

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utilizing the weapons of psychological warfare, which is conceived of as a joint effort to create, not a policy, but only conditions favorable to and expediting the war effort of the United Nations."

3. That the above comments be attached to the Plan for guidance of the agencies involved, for consideration in its execution and in any later revisions.

w.j.o.

S E C R E TJ.P.W.C. 51November 4, 1942COPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEJOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALYNote by the Secretary

The Enclosure, J.C.S. 139, was approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff at their 40th Meeting on November 3, 1942. They directed that this plan "be referred to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for the necessary implementation of this plan and for the supervision of its execution in accordance with the provisions of J.C.S. 68."

A. E. ONTHANK,

Secretary.

Distribution:

Col. Donovan
Admiral Train
Capt. Grosskopf, USN

SECRETFOIA 139October 28, 1942COPY NO. 15JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFFJOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALYNote by the Secretaries

The enclosed plan, prepared in London by representatives of the O.W.I, and O.S.S., in cooperation with the British Political Warfare Executive, is presented for consideration of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. It has been approved by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff.

J. R. DEANE,

L. R. McDOWELL,

Joint Secretariat.

Distribution:

Gen. Marshall	Copy No. 1
Adm. King	Copy No. 2
Gen. Arnold	Copy No. 3
Gen. Wedemeyer	Copy No. 4
Exec. OPD, War Dept.	Copy No. 5-6
Adm. Cooke	Copy No. 7
Gen. Deane	Copy No. 8
Comdr. McDowell	Copy No. 9
Adm. Leahy	Copy No. 10
Gen. Strong	Copy No. 11
Capt. Dyer	Copy No. 12

SECRETWOLBURNI. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Psychological Warfare as an offensive arm is to assist in "the destruction of the foundations of the German war-machine", in order to make possible decisive action against the main enemy. The following Plan seeks to define the methods by which the morale, and consequently the actions, of the Italian armed forces and of the Italian people may be influenced in order to contribute to the end in view.

Propaganda is only one instrument of Psychological Warfare. To be successful it must work in conjunction with all other instruments of war which can contribute to the total offensive against morale.

This Plan is a general statement of action proposed; it does not attempt to cover the detailed application of propaganda, nor to show how the various media of propaganda will be employed.

Both this Plan and any subsequent Working Plans are conditioned on mutually agreed arrangements for intimate and constant co-operation between the American and British Agents responsible for planning and executing Psychological Warfare under the direction of the appropriate military authorities of the two Governments.

II. APPRECIATION

During the operations in "Toroh", the attitude of the Italian Fleet will be a matter of crucial importance. The Italian Fleet was constructed with a view to the possibility of its having to stand up to the French Fleet, and one of the reasons for its inactivity has probably been the fear of leaving Italy undefended in the face of a powerful French Navy, which might possibly join the United Nations. If the French Fleet rallies to Vichy and opposes the American-British operation,

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there is no reason to assume that the Italian Fleet will not fight alongside it. If, on the other hand, the French Fleet were to join the United Nations or remain inactive, there is good reason to think that the Italian Naval Staff will be loath to risk their own ships. German pressure to force them to do so would create resistance, or at best sullen co-operation, among the officers, which would seriously affect fighting efficiency.

III. OBJECT

To eliminate Italy as an active partner in the Rome-Berlin Axis, and to make her a liability to Germany.

We cannot at present avoid or prevent the complete occupation of Italy should the Germans so determine. Indeed, the more successful our fighting services are against Italy, whether in Libya, in "Torch", by naval action or by bombing, and the more effective our Psychological Warfare, the more likely such occupation becomes. Nor can we bring about this occupation at any given time. Indeed, a German occupation of Italy, if it happened as a result of Allied successes in the Mediterranean area, might take place in circumstances least calculated to arouse Italian opposition as the German forces would appear to be coming to Italy for the defense of that country against the United Nations. An occupation, if it is to serve our purposes, must be made to appear to the Italian people as a move designed solely or principally to effect the subjugation of their country to Germany. If it appeared merely as a normal military necessity, it would - at least in the initial stages, that is until too late -- set up little hostile reaction.

IV. OBJECTIVES

- A. To destroy the will to fight of the Italian armed forces on sea, on land and in the air.

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- B. To disrupt and paralyze the central and local civil administration.
- C. To create and sustain resistance to the Fascists and the Germans and to convince the Italians of the certainty of victory for the United Nations.
- D. To foster among the Italian people respect for the honor and good faith of President Roosevelt and the leaders of the United Nations.

V. METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT

Objective A "To destroy the will to fight of the Italian armed forces on sea, on land and in the air" will be achieved:-

(1) By exploiting to the full in propaganda, both to the Italian armed forces and to the civilian population, the Italian dislike of this war, which they feel is being waged in German rather than Italian interests. (Germany will be the gainer, Italy the loser.)

(2) By fostering hatred of Mussolini and the Fascist hierarchs, who will be exposed as the tools of Germany.

(3) By exploiting the misfortunes of Italian arms. These misfortunes will in all cases be attributed to the failure of the Party to provide proper arms and equipment, and the refusal of Germany to supply either raw materials or finished weapons.

(4) By good treatment of Italian prisoners in order to encourage large scale surrenders in the field and to counter the present hate-campaign aimed at the Anglo-Saxon races.

Objective B "To disrupt and paralyze the central and local civil administration" will be achieved:-

S E C R E T

(1) By encouraging passive resistance.

(2) By incitement to sabotage through covert propaganda. The objection to direct incitement to sabotage through open propaganda to Italy (an enemy country) is that in Italy the mass of the people is already unconsciously slowing down the war effort through apathy rather than through any positive or idealistic motive. A direct appeal to sabotage from an enemy source might bring this home to many of them and, by revulsion of feeling, stimulate them to greater efforts on their country's behalf.

(3) By the disruption of transport. (N.B. The achievement of this objective will be greatly facilitated by a considered policy of bombing Italian ports and railway centres, and by work already being carried out by S.O.E.)

Objective C "To create and sustain resistance to the Fascists and the Germans and to convince the Italians of the certainty of victory for the United Nations" will be achieved:-

(1) By exploiting with sober confidence the successes gained in TORCH and in the Western Desert to the Italian forces and civilian population.

(2) By convincing them that the United Nations' offensive is gathering momentum and that before long the day of reckoning will be at hand. "Now is the time to choose between the hated German dominator and his tools (Mussolini and his gang) on the one hand, and the American and British promises, which will certainly be fulfilled, on the other. Any doubts about the inevitability of the United Nations' victory can now be abandoned."

Objective D "To foster among the Italian people respect for the honor and good faith of President Roosevelt and the leaders of the United Nations" will be achieved:-

(1) By demonstrating that the victory of the United Nations is the best guarantee that Italy will be allowed to develop along her traditional lines.

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(2) By demonstrating that the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations have a long and honorable tradition of Liberty and Justice and only desire to see these principles formally established in all countries including Italy.

10/13/42

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Copy No. _____

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November 6, 1942

COMMENTS BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ON
"JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALY"

(JCS - 139)

November 5, 1942

COMMENTS BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES ON
 "JOINT AMERICAN-BRITISH PLAN
 OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR ITALY"
 (JCS - 139)

The Office of Strategic Services approves the plan. It asks, however, that in execution, the following comments be kept in mind:

1. "Introduction", page 1.

a. (1st and 2nd paragraphs.) Though the plan is an over-all plan for Psychological Warfare against Italy (1st paragraph), and recognizes that "propaganda is only one instrument of Psychological Warfare" (2nd paragraph). It throughout focuses only upon open propaganda.

Further consideration should be given to the use of other means of psychological warfare, i.e., black propaganda, subversive activity, espionage, combat propaganda, and economic, diplomatic and cultural pressures.

b. (4th paragraph). It is necessary to make explicit the fact that this Plan of agreement between American and British agents refers only to expedient tactics which govern their actions in psychological warfare. The agreement is not to be understood as a concurrence on high policy between the two governments. Such plans as this should be based upon the following understanding:

"The American agencies executing this Plan do not consider it in their competence to commit the United States Government to high policy. The agreement emphasizes the solidarity of the concurring agencies in utilizing the weapons of psychological warfare, which is conceived of as a joint effort to create, not a policy, but only conditions favorable to and expediting the war effort of the United Nations."

- 2 -

The "Appreciation" on the basis of which the later courses of action embodied under "Objectives" and "Methods of Achievement" are determined, is not a full estimation of the Italian psychological situation. Rather than merely an estimate of a military strategic situation, it should have contained a brief statement, based on intelligence, of the current conditions of Italian attitudes and morale. Such an appreciation would have revealed at once the assumption implicit throughout the Plan that there exists an antipathy of the Italians to the Fascists. Such an assumption is speculative; reports on the matter are contradictory.

3. "Methods of Achievement. Objective A" page 3.

a. These "methods" (in 1,2,3,4) are simply emotional. There should be a reasoned appeal to self-interest. To this the Italians, an old and cynical people, will better respond.

b. "Method (1)", page 3. In "Italian dislike of the war", a prime emphasis should be on the long-standing, now reinforced, Italian dislike of the Germans.

c. "Method (2)", page 3. The fostering of hatred of Mussolini and the Fascist hierarchs should not be prosecuted in open propaganda. It is, in general, unsound for foreigners to attack top leaders. The media should be black propaganda and subversive work. To be effective, such an attack should be stepped up at the time Italy faces real disaster.

Concentrating divisive tactics only on the Fascist hierarchs is based on superficial estimation of the situation. The bonds between the Fascist hierarchs, the Army, the Monarchy, the Church, and other elements must be considered and utilized.

d. "Method (3)", page 3. Rubbing in defeats should be fostered only in black propaganda and subversive work. Open propaganda should emphasize misfortunes of Italian arms as due only to German double crossing.

e. "Method (4)", page 3. Rather than on "good treatment of Italian prisoners", emphasis should be on the publicity to be given such treatment in the homeland and to the troops themselves.

4. "Objective C, Method (2)", page 4. Regarding attack on "Mussolini and his gang" as "Tools" of Hitler, see comment 3c. above.

5. "Objective D, Method (1)", page 4. Efforts to "demonstrate" to Italians what their own development "along traditional lines" would be as a result of a United Nations victory is psychologically unsound. It is (a) patronizing, (b) dangerous. "Traditional" will suggest to the Italian mind continuation of the monarchy, irredentism, etc. The theme should be that a United Nations victory is the best guarantee that Italians will again live in peace and prosperity, and be masters in their own house.

Recommendation:

1. That this Plan be approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.
2. That the following caveat on government policy be appended to this plan by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and communicated to theatre commanders for their guidance hereafter:

"The American agencies executing this Plan do not consider it in their competence to commit the United States Government to high policy. The agreement emphasizes the solidarity of the concurring agencies in utilizing the weapons of psychological warfare, which is conceived of as a joint effort to create, not a policy, but only conditions favorable to and expediting the war effort of the United Nations."

3. That the above comments be attached to the Plan for guidance of the agencies involved, for consideration in its execution and in any later revisions.

JPIN C-30-714/166

*Thai Project

FE-3

XJCS-91

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell
FROM: Major Doering
SUBJECT:

DATE: April 5, 1943

This is to authorize the making and sending to Colonel Onthank of 12 mimeographed copies of the memo dated September 11, 1942 addressed to the Director, OSS by the JCS, in regard to the Mission of Thai Nationals for the Far East (Reference JCS 91).

 O. G. D. Jr.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWO MINUTES

August 24, 1942

MISSION OF THAI NATIONALS FOR FAR EAST.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that all such groups going to various theaters of operations should be given directives detailing their specific missions, including the coordination necessary with military plans and the manner in which they would be subject to the orders of Theater Commanders. COLONEL DONOVAN agreed and stated that the Subcommittee would submit a standard form of directive to be used for these groups.

There was general discussion concerning the desirability of obtaining GENERAL STILLWELL'S APPROVAL of this mission prior to submittal of the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:

1. Approved this proposal, subject to obtaining the approval of GENERAL STILLWELL.
2. Directed the Secretary to forward the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending approval on the above condition.
3. Recommended that in the future the approval of the Theater Commander be obtained for the activities of such missions, prior to submitting recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EXCERPTS FROM
JFPC SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING

August 20, 1942

MISSION OF THAI NATIONALS FOR FAR EAST THEATER

COLONEL DONOVAN presented a proposal of LT. COL. KHARB KUNJARA, Military and Air Attache with the Legation of THAILAND in Washington, to send certain THAI Nationals, who have been or will be trained in the O.S.S. schools, to the Far East as a Mission to operate under the command of GENERAL STILWELL. The first group of thirteen, who were very carefully selected from THAI students who were in this country, will finish training on September 12 and an additional group of eighteen will commence training on September 5.

The THAI Legation has expressed its willingness "to defray all expenses incurred in the carrying out of this Mission". The THAI Nationals are willing to be inducted into the United States Army or to serve as members of a "Free THAI Army".

Accordingly the O.S.S. has recommended,

- a. Approve the sending to the Far East of a mission composed of THAI Nationals and a United States Army Liaison Officer to report to the head of the O.S.S. Far Eastern Mission to operate under his orders and under the general direction of the Theater Commander, GENERAL STILWELL.
- b. That the THAI Nationals making up this mission be inducted into the United States Army. That LT. COLONEL KUNJARA proceed with the first group and remain as Lt. Colonel in the "Free Thai Army."
- c. That the most generous offer of the THAI Legation to defray the expenses of this mission be declined.

After discussion,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- a. Agreed to recommend acceptance of this proposal with the following changes:
 - (1) That the THAI Nationals making up this Mission shall not be inducted into the United States Army but will become members of the "Free Thai Army".
 - (2) That the offer of the THAI Legation

- 2 -

to defray the expenses be accepted, but that the O.S.S. pay for all expenses of training the members of this Mission.

b. Directed the Secretary to prepare a paper including this proposal and the recommendation of the Subcommittee and forward it to the J.P.W.C. for consideration at its next meeting.

SECRET

J.P.W.O. 30

COPY NO. 17

AUGUST 20, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MISSION OF THAI NATIONALS FOR FAR EAST

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached proposal of the Office of Strategic Services is recommended for approval by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, with the following changes:-

(a) That the Thai Nationals composing this Mission be not inducted into the U. S. Army, but become members of the "Free Thai Army."

(b) That the offer of the Thai Legation to defray the expenses of the mission be accepted, but expenses of training the Thai Nationals in the U. S. be borne by the O. S. S.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.MEMORANDUM

August 18, 1942

To: United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
 From: Director of Strategic Services

Under date of March 25, 1942, Lt. Colonel Kharb Kunjara (copy of his record is attached, marked Appendix A), Military and Air Attache with the Legation of Thailand in Washington, addressed to the Chief of Foreign Liaison Section, Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington, D. C., a memorandum, the original of which had been handed to the Department of State on the same day by the Thai Minister, concerning a proposal to send certain Thai Nationals to the scene of operations in Burma with a view to assisting the United States military authorities in that area. (Copy of this proposal is attached, marked Appendix B)

The letter from Colonel Kunjara, together with the proposal, was forwarded to the Coordinator of Information on March 30 by Lt. Colonel Theodore Babbitt, Acting Foreign Liaison Officer, MTD.

During the months of April and May, 1942, Lt. Colonel Kunjara, with the consent and assistance of the Thai Minister, proceeded to locate and interview various Thai Nationals who were in this country as students, the purpose being to utilize them as a military force to assist in driving the Japanese from their country. After discussion with this office it was determined that these men could be most effectively used at the present time as individuals to be introduced into Thailand where they would attempt to organize groups looking to the eventual carrying on of guerilla warfare. For this purpose, thirteen Thai Nationals, in addition to Colonel Kunjara, were recruited by the Thai Legation. These were all selected from among the young men who had been sent

S E C R E T

to various universities in this country for the purpose of preparing themselves to become leaders of their nation at a future time. These men were carefully selected and checked as to security by the Thai Legation, independently checked and finally interviewed by our own security branch.

They commenced training as a group on June 13, 1942. On September 12 this group will have completed Preliminary, Basic, Advanced, Radio, Parachute, and Maritime School training. A United States Army officer having experience in the Far East has recently been assigned to this group as Liaison Officer.

An additional group of eighteen Thai Nationals is now under consideration by Lt. Colonel Kunjara and the Thai Legation and it is proposed to commence their training on September 5.

It is proposed that as these groups complete their training here they be sent out to the Far East to report to the head of our Far Eastern Mission already in the field who is operating under the general direction of the Theater Commander, General Stilwell. Under date of August 6, 1942, a memorandum was submitted to this office by the Thai Legation expressing the willingness of the Legation "to be allowed to defray all expenses incurred in the carrying out of this mission." (Copy of this memorandum is attached as Appendix C.)

(Colonel Kunjara has advised this office privately that the Thai Legation has available in this country approximately ten million dollars, two million in paper money and eight million in gold). The estimated cost of the Thai mission for a twelve-months' period is \$245,000.

Up to the present time the Thai Nationals are civilians. They are entirely willing to be inducted into the United States Army or to serve as members of a "Free Thai Army." Lt. Colonel Kunjara has taken a physical examination looking toward his possible commissioning in the United States Army. This examination he has failed to pass and it will therefore be impossible, at least for the present, to commission him in our Army.

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It is recommended that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff take the following action:

*Do not
insert
reference
to
return*

1. Approve the sending to the Far East of a mission composed of Thai Nationals and a United States Army Liaison Officer to report to the head of the OSS Far Eastern Mission to operate under his orders and under the general direction of the Theater Commander, General Stilwell.

2. That the Thai Nationals making up this mission be inducted into the United States Army. That Lt. Colonel Kunjara proceed with the first group and remain as Lt. Colonel in the "Free Thai Army".

3. That the most generous offer of the Thai Legation to defray the expenses of this mission be declined.

It is felt that paragraphs 2 and 3 above are necessary to insure complete control of this mission by United States military authorities.

Respectfully submitted,

William J. Donovan,
Director

SECRETAppendix A

RECORD OF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KHARE KUNJARA

Royal Thai Legation, Washington, D. C.

Born in Bangkok October 10, 1905.

1912-1920 - Royal Military College, Bangkok

1921-1922 - War School, Bangkok, Military College

1922-1924 - Private Tutor, England

1925-1926 - Royal Military Academy, Woolwich Military College

1927 - School of Artillery, Lark Hill, England, School of Arms

1928 - Gunnery Staff, Anti Aircraft School, Biggin Hill, England

1929 - School of Mechanisation, England

August 1929 to March 1931 - Thai Army, Section Commander,
1st Artillery Regiment

March 1931 - Thai Army, Gunnery Instructor

June 1933 to April 1934 - Thai Army, Company Commander Infantry

1934 to 1936 - Thai Army Officer H.Q. Anti Aircraft Defense

1937 - Thai Army Officer

1938 - Thai Army, Chief of Staff, Anti Aircraft Defense

1938-1939 - Thai Army, Course at Staff College, England

1939-1941 - Thai Army, Chief of Staff, Anti Aircraft Defense.
(During this period held special appointment as visiting
Officer to His Britannic Majesty's Forces in Malaya, Burma,
and India)

1941 - Thai Government, Military and Air Attache, Washington, D.C.

S E C R E T

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 370 Thailand 3-25-42

March 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Coordinator of Information.
SUBJECT: Thai Nationals as Observers in Burma.

Enclosed is a letter from the Thai Military and Air
Attache with its enclosure concerning a proposal to send Thai
Nationals to Burma for duty with the armed forces of the United
Nations. Your remarks and recommendations will be appreciated.

For the Chief of Military Intelligence Service:

/s/ Theodore Babbitt
THEODORE BABBITT,
Lieut. Colonel, Field Artillery,
Acting Foreign Liaison Officer.

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix B

No. 906/2485

MEMORANDUM

The Thai Legation has learned from Lieutenant Colonel Kharb Kunjara that the United States authorities contemplate sending the Free Thai young men, who are now undergoing the course of training in the army camp, to the Far East on a special mission in the near future.

The Legation wishes to express its satisfaction at this information, and to state its willingness to be allowed to defray all expenses incurred in the carrying out of this mission.

August 6th 1942.

The Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

Appendix C

THE ROYAL THAI LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 25, 1942.

Chief of Foreign Liaison Section,
Military Intelligence,
War Department.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, copy of a memorandum handed to the Department of State to-day by the Thai Minister.

The subject of the memorandum concerns a proposal to send certain Thai nationals to the scene of operations in Burma, with a view to assisting the United States high command in that region.

Yours truly,
/s/ K. Kunjara
Lt. Col. Kharb Kunjara,
Military and Air Attache,
Legation of Thailand.

SECRETMEMORANDUM

In view of the fact that the armed forces of the United Nations are operating in northern Burma, near the borders of Thailand, under the command of an American General, and that the opposing Japanese forces are apparently employing, probably under coercion, certain Thai troops or guides to assist them, the Thai Legation believes that valuable services could be rendered to the American command by Free Thai nationals sent to that region.

These services could take the form of preparing leaflets in Thai, guiding troops near the Thai border, exhorting by loud-speaker the few Thai troops cooperating with the Japanese and, generally, encouraging the reported reluctance of the Thais to assist the enemy.

Since it is the firm desire of the members of the Thai community in the United States to do all in their power to assist the United Nations in their conflict with Japan, it would be easy to find a number of Thais in this country who would be prepared, and anxious, to be sent to the scene of hostilities in Burma. Should the United States authorities give their concurrence, the Legation would be glad to supply the Department of State with the names of three or more Thai volunteers considered suitable for the mission indicated.

March 26, 1942.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

OS Mission 7690 D
M. H. East
Director
Copy to Colonel
Huntington, #16

JCS
JED

November 5, 1942.

SECRET

INFORMATION COPY

Lieut. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Colonel Hoskins:

Since sending you my letter yesterday, with reference to the proposed mission to Syria, the Office of Strategic Services has decided to send a representative to Cairo at once in order to coordinate all of the activities of the Office of Strategic Services in the Middle East with the British S.O.E. and the theater commander in accordance with agreements which were made and approved last June. Since your mission is to be under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services it will be necessary to amend the directive slightly and you are therefore requested to disregard my letter of November 4th for which the following is substituted.

You are informed that, by agreement with the British Chiefs of Staff, you are authorized to proceed to Cairo, Egypt, accompanied by one other member of your proposed mission, and report to the Commanding General, U.S.A. Forces in the Middle East for presentation by him to the theater commander. The objective of your trip is to investigate and make recommendations to the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff on the arrangements necessary to dispatch a United States Mission to Syria for the purpose of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize cells of resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion. You will be nominally under the control of the Theater Commander, but will keep the Commanding General, U.S.A. Forces in the Middle East, continually and completely informed of the progress of your activities, through the representative of the Office of Strategic Services in Cairo.

Since permission of the British Chiefs of Staff for you to proceed to Cairo on this task was predicated on certain restrictions to be placed on your activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to inform you of these limitations.

INFORMATION COPY

- 1 -

SECRET

SECRET

No U. S. mission will be set up in the Middle East until you have agreed with the representative of the Office of Strategic Services and the British S.O.E. in Cairo on the form and extent of the proposed mission and the scope and character of its activities.

When you have reached such an agreement, your mission will operate only under the direction of the representative of the British S.O.E. as communicated to you by the representative of the Office of Strategic Services in Cairo. No part of any agreement may make provision for distribution of food by the U. S. mission.

Because of the two limitations imposed above, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff direct that you make no commitments of any nature to the British, but that you submit your recommendations for such agreements as you feel necessary through the Office of Strategic Services to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for approval prior to undertaking any further action beyond discussions with the appropriate authorities. You are further directed not to discuss controversial subjects on which official government opinion has not been announced.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNATURE) NOV . 1942

J. R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary

Distribution:

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Colonel Donovan
General Hedemeyer
General Strong
Admiral Cook
General Handy
Admiral Train
State Dept. (Mr. Welles)
Colonel Cathart
Operations Div.
Capt. Chapman
Comdr. McDowell
Sec. General Staff

OS Records
Stayback

SECRET

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SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

*650 Mission 14,100
Near East
1 Syria Plan
1 Directive*

November 5, 1942

Memorandum to Colonel Donovan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

Subject: NE-1 - Hoskins

1. I had a very nice talk with General Deane at 11:00 o'clock and he agreed that the directive should be redrawn substantially in accordance with the changes noted on the attached copy of letter which is the document handed by you to me this morning.

2. General Deane preferred to have direction lodged in the representative of O.S.S. rather than through the S.O. representative in Cairo. As he pointed out, it will be a simple matter for either you or the O.S.S. representative in Cairo to direct that Hoskins report in all cases through the S.O. representative there when he is established.

3. General Deane said he would redistribute the new directive at once.

ECH
- Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS

JCS
TWA

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1942.

SECRET

Lieut. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Hoskins:

This letter is to inform you that, by agreement with the British Chiefs of Staff, you are authorized to proceed to Cairo, Egypt, accompanied by one other member of your proposed mission, and report to the Commanding General, U.S.A. Forces in the Middle East for presentation by him to the theater commander. The objective of your trip is to investigate and make recommendations to the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff on the arrangements necessary to dispatch a United States Mission to Syria for the purpose of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize cells of resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion. You will be nominally under the control of the Theater Commander, but will keep the Commanding General, U.S.A. Forces in the Middle East, continually and completely informed of the progress of your activities.

Since permission of the British Chiefs of Staff for you to proceed to Cairo on this task was predicated on certain restrictions to be placed on your activities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to inform you of these limitations.

through the Chief of the OSS Mission here

No U. S. mission will be set up in the Middle East until you have agreed with the head of the British S.O.E. in Cairo on the form and extent of the proposed mission and the scope and character of its activities.

When you have reached an agreement with the head of the British S.O.E. in Cairo, your mission will

be then ready

INFORMATION COPY

SECRET

SECRET

mean through 1st chieftain in case

operate only under his general direction and will take no action except with his approval. No part of any agreement may make provision for distribution of food by the U. S. mission.

Because of the two limitations imposed above, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff direct that you make no commitments of any nature to the British, but that you submit your recommendations for such agreements as you *through* feel necessary to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for approval prior to undertaking any further action beyond discussions with the appropriate authorities. You are further directed not to discuss controversial subjects on which official government opinion has not been announced.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

(SIGNED) NOV 4 1942

J. R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

not

Distribution:

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Colonel Donovan ✓
General Wedemeyer
General Strong
Admiral Cooke
General Handy
Admiral Train
State Dept. (Mr. Welles)
Colonel Onthank
Operations Div.
Capt. Chapman
Comdr. McDowell
Sec. General Staff
CGS Records
Stayback

SECRET

Handwritten notes:
12/10/42
[unclear]
[unclear]
[unclear]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Mission to Syria.

At their meeting on November 3d the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Hoskins and not to exceed one member of his mission should proceed at once to Cairo, Egypt, to confer with the British and American military commanders in the Middle East and with the head of the British S.O.E. in that area. The purpose of this conference will be to discuss the plan for Syria which is outlined in C.C.S. 107, as originally proposed by the Office of Strategic Services.

Colonel Hoskins will be given a directive by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff which will authorize him to make arrangements for performing all the functions of the mission which were suggested in the original plan with the exception of that part of the plan which provided for the shipment of food.

The Office of Strategic Services will be requested at once to arrange for the necessary transportation.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

Handwritten signature: W. A. ...
W. A. ...
[unclear]
[unclear]



SECRET

September 28, 1942

JFWC Minutes

Excerpts

PLAN FOR SYRIA

Colonel Donovan reported that the Under Secretary of State intends to discuss with GENERAL MARSHALL the letter which was sent to the State Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the message sent to MR. WINANT on this subject. From his own discussion with the British in London COLONEL DONOVAN believed that the British Chiefs of Staff consider this project to be desirable.

COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that the project may need to be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that GENERAL MAXWELL may have some guidance in the matter.

THE COMMITTEE:

Agreed to discuss the matter further upon the receipt of GENERAL MAXWELL'S recommendations

CLASSIFIED

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 7, 1942

SECRET

TO CENTRAL FAX UNIT (ALBANY, CALIF.)

FROM COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION (DONOVAN)

CLEAR TEXT
CODE OR CIPHER
ACKNOWLEDGE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DONOVAN

OUTGOING HEADING

UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS DEFERRED

TRANSMIT

Re your # 110 September 5, 1942. The Office of Strategic Services representative has in effect been being withdrawn. A new representative is to be deployed and at once and he will report to you shortly. He will give you all details of the project outlined in the report of September 21. Request that outgoing representative be conferred with you, you do not wish a detailed report on the project.

SECRET

OPERATOR'S RECORD

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Subject: Syrian Mission.

On September 2d the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff sent a radio to General Maxwell outlining the proposed O.S.S. Mission in Syria and requesting his comments and recommendations. The following is a paraphrase of a reply sent by General Maxwell, dated September 5th:

With reference to the project proposed in your No. 644, considerable study is necessary before making a final reply. This study should include an investigation of the activities of the O.S.S. representatives now operating in this theater independently of my headquarters.

I request that O.S.S. representatives now in this theater be instructed to inform me of their activities to date.

The British Headquarters already has a wide and similar coverage of this area. Full investigation may lead to a recommendation by me that O.S.S. activities be discontinued because of possible interference.

With reference to the use of the O.S.S. representative to advise on supply and economic problems, I feel that the Middle East Supply Center now has the matter well covered. The State Department is represented on this agency by Mr. Winant and my headquarters is also represented.


I urgently recommend that no action be taken until a complete study of the matter has been concluded.



SECRET

SECRET

I think the radio that you sent to General Maxwell last night will do much to answer his questions. A copy of this message has been sent to you. Inasmuch as there is to be some delay I am sending General Maxwell a copy of O.C.S. 107, which gives the proposed project in detail. I understand that you are sending a representative there in the immediate future and I believe he will be able to clear up any questions that General Maxwell may have in mind.


J. R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SECRET

- 2 -

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington

SECRET

September 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

Subject: Syrian Mission.

On September 2d the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff sent a radio to General Maxwell outlining the proposed O.S.S. Mission in Syria and requesting his comments and recommendations. The following is a paraphrase of a reply sent by General Maxwell, dated September 5th:

With reference to the project proposed in your No. 644, considerable study is necessary before making a final reply. This study should include an investigation of the activities of the O.S.S. representatives now operating in this theater independently of my headquarters.

I request that O.S.S. representatives now in this theater be instructed to inform me of their activities to date.

The British Headquarters already has a wide and similar coverage of this area. Full investigation may lead to a recommendation by me that O.S.S. activities be discontinued because of possible interference.

With reference to the use of the O.S.S. representative to advise on supply and economic problems, I feel that the Middle East Supply Center now has the matter well covered. The State Department is represented on this agency by Mr. Minant and my headquarters is also represented.

-2-

I urgently recommend that no action be taken until a complete study of the matter has been concluded.

I think the radio that you sent to General Maxwell last night will do much to answer his questions. A copy of this message has been sent to you. Inasmuch as there is to be some delay I am sending General Maxwell a copy of C.C.S. 107, which gives the proposed project in detail. I understand that you are sending a representative there in the immediate future and I believe he will be able to clear up any questions that General Maxwell may have in mind.

J. R. DEANE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Secretary.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

August 24, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN presented the recommendation of the Subcommittee that this proposal be approved. He pointed out that present conditions indicate the need of representatives in SYRIA immediately, and that if action is deferred until the State Department and the British Foreign Office reach an agreement on the proposed political statement regarding SYRIA, there might be considerable delay.

GENERAL STRONG suggested that since SYRIA is in a British theater of operations the authorization to send O.S.S. representatives should be subject to concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER pointed out that paragraph 2(c) should refer to a directive to the O.S.S. representative which would state their mission exactly, and would also comply with J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1 as regards direction and control by the Theater Commander.

He suggested that recommendations (g) and (f) be omitted since these matters are outside the sphere of control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

1. Agreed,
 - (a) That the authority to send O.S.S. representatives to SYRIA be predicated upon the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
 - (b) That the recommendations should provide that a directive be given to the O.S.S. representatives to be sent to SYRIA, which will clearly indicate their exact mission, and will be in conformity with J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1 as pertains to control by the Theater Commander; this directive to be approved by the JPWC.
 - (c) That reference to the OWI and State Dept. including Appendix A, be omitted.
2. Directed the Secretary to transmit this paper, with the amendments as suggested above, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action at their meeting on August 25.

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 31 ✓

COPY NO. 1

AUGUST 21, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PLAN FOR SYRIA

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a plan for psychological warfare in SYRIA, is transmitted by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee with recommendation that it be approved by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE1. DISCUSSION.

(a) The situation in the area of the Middle East Command has seriously deteriorated because of long-continued Axis successes, the efficacy of Axis propaganda, the conflict between Jewish and Arabic aspirations, the extent of Fifth Column activities, the acute lack of foodstuffs which is contributing to the instability of puppet governments, native hostility to the French (whether Vichy or Free), native distrust of the British and, finally, to the acute crisis in Syria and Lebanon in the relations between the British and the French military authorities. Steps to improve the position of the United Nations in the MIDDLE EAST and to win over native support are urgently necessary.

(b) It is proposed that U.S.S. send to the MIDDLE EAST to be based on BEIRUT, LEBANON, certain representatives to obtain and transmit information and to stimulate and organize cells of resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion. The primary effort would be to center this resistance under the leadership of graduates and students of the American colleges there located.

(c) SYRIA is faced with acute food shortages and the question of bread has assumed primary importance. Conditions throughout the area should be studied with a view to the importation of required foodstuffs and the stimulation and scientific improvement of planting, cultivation and harvesting. Work such as this would have an immediate objective as well as intermediate and long-range planning. The range of such activities would facilitate travel and contact through the area and would afford broad cover for the work of the representatives of U.S.S.

(d) Practical aid could well be a more effective antidote to Axis propaganda than political promises.

SECRET

(e) In order for the representatives of O.S.S. to carry on their work, it will be necessary to have funds in order to purchase demolition material, radios, medical equipment and supplies and to have at hand sums of money adequate to meet emergencies.

(f) The State Department has under contemplation two specific steps which it believes would help the critical situation in that area. These are (1) the issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the MIDDLE EAST, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, and (2) the initial implementation of such a declaration by the appointment of a diplomatic agent to LEBANON and SYRIA. The State Department is desirous of opening negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to obtaining its acceptance of the principles laid down in Appendix A as a basis for a common political policy in the MIDDLE EAST.

(g) O.W.I. is considering sending representatives to BEIRUT to be attached to the office of the diplomatic agent for the purpose of disseminating open propaganda.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) That O.S.S. be authorized to send representatives to SYRIA and LEBANON, to obtain and transmit information and to stimulate and organize cells of resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion;

(b) That the budget estimate of the O.S.S. in this connection be initially approved in the sum of \$250,000;

(c) That all officers and representatives of the O.S.S. operating in the theater of operations in the MIDDLE EAST comply with the provisions of J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1;

(d) That the O.S.S. representative in charge be directed to express no view on controversial political questions unless and until a governmental policy has been determined upon and laid down after consultation with our Allies;

Refer to J.C. in connection with this article receive response of J.C.

S E C R E T

✓ (e) That in the event that there should be any O.W.I. representatives in that area, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff request the Director of O.W.I. to instruct his representatives to coordinate their efforts with the representatives of O.S.S. and to conform to the same policy of avoidance of controversial issues as provided in (d) above.

(f) That the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare be requested to authorize the O.S.S. representative in charge in that area to act as chief of an economic mission for the shipment of foods of immediate need and to survey the supply requirements of that region.

✓ (g) That the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff request the State Department to discuss with the British Foreign Office a common political policy in the MIDDLE EAST.

SECRETAPPENDIX APROPOSED DECLARATION BY STATE DEPARTMENT

Questions have been asked as to the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this Government's attitude, which is as follows:

The war objectives of this Government as stated in the Atlantic Charter include the desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.

An elaboration is given in the basic statement of policy made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on July 25, 1942, as follows:

"We have always believed - and we believe today - that all peoples, without distinction of race, color or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.

"We have always sought - and we seek today - to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations.

"It has been our purpose in the past - and will remain our purpose in the future - to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy.

"This government is of course determined to the fulfillment of these objectives in the Near East and in other parts of the world.

B E R O R T

"The record shows that the Axis Powers have repeatedly and cynically dishonored their promises and engagements. Therefore it is inconceivable that any Near Eastern peoples place either faith or credence in them. The Axis aggressors threaten the maintenance and extension of freedom in the Near East; consequently, increased participation in the war effort by all Near Eastern peoples would be in their own interest and naturally would be welcomed by the United States Government."

August 14, 1942

~~AMERICAN EMBASSY~~

~~LONDON~~

APPENDIX A

~~SECRET~~ PROPOSED DECLARATION BY STATE DEPT.

~~The statement referred to in paragraph 4(a) above is~~
as follows:

~~These~~ Questions have been asked as to the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this Government's attitude, which is as follows:

The war objectives of this Government as stated in the Atlantic Charter include the ~~desire~~ desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, ~~and~~ and respect for ~~the~~ the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live ~~and~~

~~and~~
An elaboration is given in the basic statement of policy made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on July 23, 1942, as follows:

~~August 14, 1942~~

~~AMERICAN EMBASSY~~

APPENDIX A

~~LONDON~~

~~SECRET~~ PROPOSED DECLARATION BY STATE DEPT.

~~The statement referred to in paragraph 4(a) above is~~
as follows:

~~SECRET~~ Questions have been asked as to the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this Government's attitude, which is as follows:

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An elaboration is given in the basic statement of policy made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on July 23, 1942, as follows:

-2-

We have always believed - and we believe today - that all peoples, without distinction of race, color, or religion, who are prepared and willing to accept the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.

" We have always sought - and we seek today - to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations.

~~We have striven to meet squarely our own responsibility in this respect - in Cuba, in the Philippines, and wherever else it has devolved upon us.~~

" It has been our purpose in the past - and will remain our purpose in the future - to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy. ~~END OF PARAGRAPH~~

" This Government is of course dedicated to the fulfillment of these objectives in the Near East as in other parts of the world.

" The record shows that the Axis Powers have repeatedly and cynically dishonored their promises and engagements. Therefore it is inconceivable that any Near Eastern peoples

-3-

place either faith or credence in them. The Axis aggressors threaten the maintenance and extension of freedom in the Near East; consequently, increased participation in the war effort by all Near Eastern peoples would be in their own interest and naturally would be welcomed by the United States Government.)

End of Telegram

NS:HRH:BLG

Secret

TO: Col. Donovan.....

Here is a short digest of S.D. ^{UPC} _{MI} telegrams on Syria etc., which reflect the acutely disturbed state of things in that area.

SECRET

FROM: JOHN C. WILEY

August 7, 1942:
(Gwynn)

Hears that Spears will no longer intrude in domestic Syrian-Lebanese affairs; but Catroux is dissatisfied, insisting he will get out if Spears doesn't (which he privately thinks unlikely because of British pride). Both went to Damascus on the 6th about wheat. Lebanese Supply Director says he has no more wheat and none is en route. Army wheat may come to the rescue. The Lebanese Premier says without grain he'll resign; won't shoot into mobs of men merely hungry. He doesn't like the officials' viewpoint in Syria. In the latter, however, the situation is better; also as regards grain. General Collet brags that he himself heads up the Allies there and has made the English toe the mark. Tajjedine enjoys Collet's favor, but the people think he is just Collet's puppet. Tajjedine seemed surprised when Spears submitted a Minister's full-power credentials since neither we nor Egypt had recognized Syria as a sovereign state. Tears Holmes may supplant Wilson as Commanding Officer of 9th Army, possibly because of Holmes' actions in squabble between Spears and Catroux.

August 8, 1942:
(Hull to Cairo)

Winant says the British Foreign Secretary states British policy is just as publicly announced. Winant hasn't been able to make Churchill believe Spears unsuited for post.

August 10, 1942:
(Kirk)

Catroux believes military position so acute installation of democratic institutions in Syria and Lebanon should be postponed. De Gaulle, who once agreed, has changed. Casey, afraid of political repercussions if action is deferred, favors plan agreed on -- (1) Early August: announcement of democratic institutions and recognition of chief executives of both republics (British announcing approval); (2) September or October: proclamation of election dates; and (3) October or November: elections. On the question of recognition the British think we should support them and think the election announcement a good time to proclaim our recognition. They also think there should be a regular U. S. diplomatic mission to calm down the Spears-Catroux disagreement. Kirk concurs provided we send it with a Minister or Minister-Delegate; thinks it would strengthen our popularity in the Levant (especially if recognition came simultaneously with the election announcement); that it would express United Nations' cohesion. Thinks we should just state our general friendship to the Levant states and not get involved in any potentially embarrassing post-war commitments.

SECRET

- 2 -

August 12, 1942:
(Gwynn)

Thomas Holmes, new head of 9th Army, feels as he does on situation: (1) Spears should be replaced by someone more tactful; (2) The present situation re jails and prohibitions on public gatherings, etc. makes it silly to hold elections now; (3) The supply shortage has stirred anger against the United Nations; (4) Bread is the main concern; (5) The Trojan horse is more potent than the government.

August 12, 1942:
(Gwynn)

Wonders whether it is true that Casey has written Groux stating the elections should be held soon and that the U. S. agrees. Gwynn thinks that if the United Nations doesn't intervene, the elections will turn out badly for our side.

August 12, 1942:
(Gwynn)

The British have constructed airbases in the mandate. The de Gaulle chief of the air arm thinks them dangerous because they are unprotected and not staffed with planes. Our airforce has been invited to occupy them, in preference to the R.F. which expressed a desire to do so.

August 12, 1942:
(Gwynn)

De Gaulle voluntarily repeated his previous statement, to the effect that France's position in the Levant is far from critical and that France intends to remain there according to 1936 treaties and not in the mandatory capacity. De Gaulle intends to settle immediately, once and for all, France's position in the Levant and sees no alternative except the recall of General Gerra. Unless Spears is recalled, says all Franco-British collaboration would end, and says he authorized Churchill and Casey by making this statement in Cairo. He claims to have told Churchill that the latter's personal friend, the latter should not be indicted on the French in Syria. He appeared disgusted with British assurance that their intentions do not go beyond those publicly set forth, and claims the British have argued that events in Syria concern British security in adjacent Arab countries, to justify intervention in local government. He elections in Syria, De Gaulle said Casey and Churchill were insisting on it. He said, De Gaulle, and Casey told that it was some of their business. He wants no elections in 1942. Casey's charge (who had the talk with De Gaulle) told that the report that the British had elections in Syria, London, and not the other way around. De Gaulle wants to settle the present situation regardless of consequences.



SECRET

Aug 16, 1942: De Gaulle claims to have wired Churchill that the British are not respecting the agreement made with Lyttelton in the Mandate last July (1941) and the exchange of notes three months later; that the British are encroaching on the French position and the principle that only the League can alter the E. C. mandate. In fact he thinks British disinterestedness re the political situation is open to doubt. The Arabs, to the Axis' advantage, see this as evidence of Allied disagreement, and resentment is aroused in Mandate natives and among the French, especially in view of the aid being given the British. He appeals to Churchill to correct the situation. Later, in an interview requested by De Gaulle, he told Gwynn France will live up to its promise of eventual independence for the Mandate but says the Mandate may not be ready for it for some time. Only France reconstituted can cede territory and the Fighting French have no legal basis for so doing. Meanwhile the Mandate must continue and when the time arrives France will doubtless reach agreements which will maintain French privilege in the Mandate. However, he said the English are trying to supplant the French and are not living up to the July and October (1941) agreements he got them to sign. De Gaulle expects to stay in the Mandate until the trouble is straightened out. He wants Spears removed and the United Kingdom policy altered. He fears Churchill won't agree, and says that would force him to stop cooperating -- he'll see the matter through even if it means warfare. He then left for a week's trip to Syria. He feels Johnson hasn't been to see him on instructions from Spears. Gwynn says it's a bad situation. Both sides cannot be presented as the English won't talk. With the United States air force in Syria he thinks we'll be in a bad spot if an Anglo-French clash materializes.

SECRET

August 16, 1942: Joan Hellan, former Vichy envoy to Turkey, has pro-
(Gwynn) posed his stand and when De Gaulle returns from Syria it may be decided whether Hellan will head the Fighting French in the United States.

Farrell from
Baghdad:
Aug. 17, 1942

Reports on Axis propaganda that the British will be driven out of Egypt and Syria and that the Levant is due to the United States. The British and Axis are in open conflict on border between Iraq and Syria; that the United States is taking a policy of non-interference; that the United States has its eyes on Iraq and Syria and will take with India and that the United States is of English intervention and will not be a policy of non-interference.

*Syria
Lebanon
Food Situation*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Wilfred Malenbaum
TO: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: Syria and Lebanon

DATE: August 24, 1942

Attached is a brief summary (original and two copies) of the food situation in Syria and Lebanon, as requested by you on Saturday through Mr. Despres.

Wilfred Malenbaum

SECRET
AG Memo 43

SYRIA AND LEBANON
FOOD SITUATION

Grains play a large role in the diet of the population of Syria and Lebanon. Wheat, barley and rice are the most important foodgrains. Vegetables, particularly potatoes, feature large, as do fruits and vegetable oils. Meats are consumed, but not in large amounts (and primarily in the cities).

Most of the total consumption is provided domestically. Rice is the only significant grain import; meats are normally imported in the form of live animals (particularly sheep and cattle). Small quantities of dairy products, sugar, tea, and coffee are also imported. On the other hand, the region is normally an exporter of potatoes and other vegetables, oils, fruits, and some cereals. Only in years of adverse harvests must reliance be placed upon imports of wheat for consumption. Most of the foreign trade in foodstuffs is confined to countries bordering the Mediterranean; exports to Palestine and imports from France are predominant.

Currently, a shortage in wheat is indicated. Harvests have nonetheless been good -- above average in 1940, higher in 1941, and probably above average in 1942 (despite a poor growing season in some areas). However, there were imports (from Great Britain) in 1941. Some imported seeds were used for the current crop, and shortages are still reported.

In view of crop levels, it is not likely that wheat supplies are inadequate. Hoarding is rampant -- not only among the peasants, but also among dealers. This explains why shortages seem to be confined to cities, particularly Beirut (which always requires large wheat shipments from Syria).

The hoarding is due partly to political uncertainties, but mostly to the rapid rise in prices. Bread prices have increased more than thirty-fold in some cities. It can be expected that the food crisis would disappear if more normal prices were instituted (and could be enforced). The government has not yet been able to accomplish this objective, despite such efforts as the "Spears Plan".

SECRET
AK HMM 43**SYRIA AND LEBANON
FOOD SITUATION**

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WM:jb
8/24/42

2.1 p. 11
 SECRET
 AX Home 11

**SYRIA AND LEBANON
 FOOD SITUATION**

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WM:jb
 8/24/42



8/22/42

Col. Donovan

Here are 8 copies of
the proposed budget
along the lines we
discussed HBT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1942

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION

FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	
		\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>30,000</u>	
		\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	
		\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	
		\$117,500
Total		\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.
 August 24, 1942

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION
 FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:

35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	\$ 32,500

II. Operating Expenses:

1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>30,000</u>	\$ 75,000

III. Basic Supplies:

1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives, Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	\$ 25,000

IV. Unvouchered Funds

\$117,500

Total

\$117,500
\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1942

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION

FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	8,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>20,000</u>	\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	<u>\$117,500</u>
Total		\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1951

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION
FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 33 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>20,000</u>	\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds		
	<u>\$117,500</u>	<u>\$117,500</u>
Total		\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1948

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION
FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
25 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	\$ 22,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 25 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	8,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>20,000</u>	\$ 78,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>ARMY stores.</u>	\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	<u>\$117,500</u>
Total		\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1948

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION
FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>20,000</u>	\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	<u>\$117,500</u>
Total		\$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 24, 1948

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION

FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	
		\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>30,000</u>	
		\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives, Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>Army stores.</u>	
		\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	
Total		<u>\$117,500</u> \$250,000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 26, 1948

BUDGET OF O.S.S. NEAR EAST MISSION

FIRST THREE MONTHS

I. Travel of Mission to Near East:		
35 men total		
20 by air	\$ 25,000	
15 by water	<u>7,500</u>	
		\$ 32,500
II. Operating Expenses:		
1. Per Diem of 35 men, 90 days	\$ 20,000	
2. Office Rent, Equipment and Supplies	5,000	
3. Travel in Near East	4,000	
4. Transportation and Upkeep	5,000	
5. Medical Supplies	1,000	
6. Special Personnel Funds	10,000	
7. S.O., S.I., and P.W. Operations	<u>50,000</u>	
		\$ 75,000
III. Basic Supplies:		
1. Radio Equipment	\$ 10,000	
2. Medical and Food	15,000	
3. Arms, Ammunition, Explosives, Field Equipment and Vehicles	procurable and expendable from <u>ARMY stores.</u>	
		\$ 25,000
IV. Unvouchered Funds	<u>\$117,500</u>	
		<u>\$117,500</u>
Total		<u>\$250,000</u>

SECRET**BRAT****J. J. G. H.****AMEMB BEIRUT****1. RECOMMENDATION.**

The situation in the Near East has seriously deteriorated because of long-continued Axis successes, the efficiency of Axis propaganda, the conflict between Jewish and Arabic aspirations, the extent of Fifth Column activities, the acute lack of foodstuffs which is contributing to the instability of puppet governments, native hostility to the French (whether Vichy or Free), native distrust of the British and, finally, to the acute crisis in Syria and Lebanon in the relations between the British and the French military authorities. Steps to improve the position of the United Nations in the Near East and to win over native support are urgently necessary in view of the inadequate military forces in that area.

It is proposed that O. S. S. send to the Middle East to be based on Beirut, Lebanon, certain agents and representatives to establish a system of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion. The primary effort would be to organize resistance among the graduates and students of the American colleges because of the long tradition of these institutions arising from the American missionaries who have been there.

Syria is faced with acute food shortages and the question of bread has assumed primary importance. Conditions throughout the area should be studied with a view to the importation of required foodstuffs and the stimulation and scientific improvement of planting, cultivation and harvesting. Work such as this would have an immediate objective as well as intermediate and long-range planning. The range of such activities would facilitate travel and contact through the area and would afford broad cover for the work of the representatives of O. S. S.

Practical aid could well be a more effective antidote to Axis propaganda than political promises.

SECRET

In order for the representatives of U. S. S. to carry on their work, it will be necessary to have funds in order to purchase ammunition, medical, medical equipment and supplies and to have at hand sums of money adequate to meet emergencies.

The State Department has under contemplation two specific steps which it believes would help the critical situation in that area. These are (1) the issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, and (2) the initial implementation of such a declaration by the appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria. The State Department is desirous of opening negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to obtaining its acceptance of the principles laid down in Appendix A as a basis for a political common policy in the Middle East.

O. W. I. is considering sending representatives to Beirut to be attached to the office of the diplomatic agent.

2. **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

A. That U. S. S. be authorized to send agents to Syria and Lebanon,

(1) To establish a system of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion, and

(2) That the budget estimates of the U. S. S. in this connection be initially approved in the sum of \$250,000,

(3) That all officers, agents and representatives of the U. S. S. operating in the theater of operations in the Middle East comply with the provisions of J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1,

(4) That the U. S. S. representative in charge be directed to express no view on controversial political questions unless and until a governmental policy has been determined upon and laid down after consultation with our Allies, and

SECRET

(5) That in the event that there should be any U. V. I. representatives in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Director of U. V. I. to instruct his representatives to cooperate with the agents of U. S. S. and to conform to the same policy of avoidance of controversial issues as provided in (4) above.

4. That the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare be requested to authorize the U. S. S. representative in charge in that area to act as chief of an economic mission to arrange for the shipment of foods that are needed and to survey the supply requirements of that region.

5. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the proposal of the State Department of entering into negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to arriving at an understanding on political common policy in that area.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~J. P. V. G. II~~

~~APRIL 22, 1942~~

1. ~~DISCUSSION~~

Middle

The situation in the ~~NEAR~~ East has seriously deteriorated because of long-continued Axis successes, the efficiency of Axis propaganda, the conflict between Jewish and Arabic aspirations, the extent of Fifth Column activities, the acute lack of foodstuffs which is contributing to the instability of puppet governments, native hostility to the French (whether Vichy or Free), native distrust of the British and, finally, to the acute crisis in Syria and Lebanon in the relations between the British and the French military authorities. ~~Steps to improve the position of the United Nations in the Near East and to win over native support are urgently necessary & a review of the ~~present~~ military ~~forces~~ in that area.~~

It is proposed that U. S. S. send to the Middle East to be based on Beirut, Lebanon, certain agents and representatives to ~~establish a system of obtaining and transmitting~~ information and to stimulate and organize ^{cells of} resistance among the native populations ^{with} against Axis infiltration and invasion. The primary effort would be to ~~create~~ ^{develop} resistance among the ^{graduates} and students of the American colleges ^{because of the long tradition of those institutions arising from the American missionaries who have been there.}

Syria is faced with acute food shortages and the question of bread has assumed primary importance. Conditions throughout the area should be studied with a view to the importation of required foodstuffs and the stimulation and scientific improvement of planting, cultivation and harvesting. Work such as this would have an immediate objective as well as intermediate and long-range planning. The range of such activities would facilitate travel and contact through the area and would afford broad cover for the work of the representatives of U. S. S.

Practical aid could well be a more effective antidote to Axis propaganda than political promises.

SECRET

In order for the representatives of O. S. S. to carry on their work, it will be necessary to have funds in order to purchase demolition material, radios, medical equipment and supplies and to have at hand sums of money adequate to meet emergencies.

The State Department has under contemplation two specific steps which it believes would help the critical situation in that area. These are (1) the issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, and (2) the initial implementation of such a declaration by the appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria. The State Department is desirous of opening negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to obtaining its acceptance of the principles laid down in Appendix A as a basis for a political common policy in the Middle East.

O. W. I. is considering sending representatives to Beirut to be attached to the office of the diplomatic agent. *for*

the purpose of dissemination of propaganda.

2. **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

1. That O. S. S. be authorized to send ~~agents~~ ^{representatives} to Syria and Lebanon,

~~To establish a system of obtaining and transmitting~~ ^{TO} information and to stimulate and organize resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion,

2. That the budget estimates of the O. S. S. in this connection be initially approved in the sum of \$250,000,

(3) That all officers, ~~agents~~ and representatives of the O. S. S. operating in the theater of operations in the Middle East comply with the provisions of J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 85/1,

(4) That the O. S. S. representative in charge be directed to express no view on controversial political questions unless and until a governmental policy has been determined upon and laid down after consultation with our Allies, and

SECRET

(5) That in the event that there should be any O. W. I. representatives in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Director of O. W. I. to instruct his representatives to cooperate with the ^{representatives} agents of G. S. S. and to conform to the same policy of avoidance of controversial issues as provided in (4) above.

That the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare be requested to authorize the D. S. S. representative in charge in that area to act as chief of an economic mission to ~~arrange~~ ^{arrange} for the shipment of foods that are needed and to survey the supply requirements of that region.

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff ~~approve~~ ^{approve} the proposal of the State Department of ~~entering~~ ^{entering} into negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to arriving at an understanding on political common ^{policy} in ~~the area~~. *the many the*

SECRET1. DISCUSSION.

The situation in the Near East has seriously deteriorated because of long-continued Axis successes, the efficacy of Axis propoganda, the conflict between Jewish and Arabic aspirations, the extent of Fifth Coluan activities, the acute lack of foodstuffs which is contributing to the instability of puppet governments, native hostility to the French (whether Vichy or Free), native distrust of the British and, finally, to the acute crisis in Syria and Lebanon in the relations between the British and the French military authorities. Steps to improve the position of the United Nations in the Near East and to win over native support are urgently necessary in view of the inadequate military forces in that area.

It is proposed that O. S. S. send to the Middle East to be based on Beirut, Lebanon, certain agents and representatives to establish a system of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion. The primary effort would be to organize resistance among the graduates and students of the American colleges because of the long tradition of these institutions arising from the American missionaries who have been there.

Syria is faced with acute food shortages and the question of bread has assumed primary importance. Conditions throughout the area should be studied with a view to the im-

-2-

portation of required foodstuffs and the stimulation and scientific improvement of planting, cultivation and harvesting. Work such as this would have an immediate objective as well as intermediate and long-range planning. The range of such activities would facilitate travel and contact through the area and would afford broad cover for the work of the representatives of O. S. S.

Practical aid could well be a more effective antidote to Axis propaganda than political promises.

In order for the representatives of O. S. S. to carry on their work, it will be necessary to have funds in order to purchase demolition material, radios, medical equipment and supplies and to have at hand sums of money adequate to meet emergencies.

The State Department has under contemplation two specific steps which it believes would help the critical situation in that area. These are (1) the issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A, and (2) the initial implementation of such a declaration by the appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria. The State Department is desirous of opening negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to obtaining its acceptance of the principles laid down in Appendix A as a basis for a political common policy in the Middle East.

O. W. I. is considering sending representatives to Beirut to be attached to the office of the diplomatic agent.

-3-

2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. That O. S. S. be authorized to send agents to Syria and Lebanon,

(1) To establish a system of obtaining and transmitting information and to stimulate and organize resistance among the native populations against Axis infiltration and invasion, and

(2) That the budget estimates of the O. S. S. in this connection be initially approved in the sum of \$250,000,

(3) That all officers, agents and representatives of the O. S. S. operating in the theater of operations in the Middle East comply with the provisions of J.C.S. 67/3 and J.C.S. 83/1,

(4) That the O. S. S. representative in charge be directed to express no view on controversial political questions unless and until a governmental policy has been determined upon and laid down after consultation with our Allies, and

(5) That in the event that there should be any O. G. I. representatives in that area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Director of O. G. I. to instruct his representatives to cooperate with the agents of O. S. S. and to conform to the same policy of avoidance of controversial issues as provided in (4) above.

-4-

B. That the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare be requested to authorize the U. S. S. representative in charge in that area to act as chief of an economic mission to arrange for the shipment of foods that are needed and to survey the supply requirements of that region.

C. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the proposal of the State Department of entering into negotiations with the British Foreign Office with a view to arriving at an understanding on political common policy in that area.

EXCERPTS FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MEETING

August 18, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN read a message which the State Department proposes to send to its representatives which outlines the need for and the plans for a psychological warfare effort in the Near East. It also included a statement of the United States' position relative to independence for the ARAB NATIONS. He stated further that because this proposal of the State Department would need much discussion among both United States and British agencies, which would delay the formulation of a basis for propaganda activities in SYRIA, it would be preferable to send COLONEL HOSKINS, with certain assistants, as an economic Mission initially. Under cover of this objective, COLONEL HOSKINS could prepare for other activities.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF agreed with this proposal on the basis that the Arabs will undoubtedly be more amenable to United States propaganda if they are given economic assistance first. He suggested also that CAPTAIN CHEVIGNY of the FREE FRENCH speak to the J.P.W.C. concerning conditions in the Near East.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will present this proposal in writing for the meeting tomorrow.

August 14, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

PART II

The statement referred to in paragraph 4 (a) above is as follows:

QUOTE Questions have been asked as to the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the peoples of the Near East, with particular reference to their future. It is therefore desirable to make known this Government's attitude, which is as follows:

The war objectives of this Government as stated in the Atlantic Charter include the SUBQUOTE desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and respect for SUBQUOTE the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. SUBQUOTE.

An elaboration is given in the basic statement of policy made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 12/8/41, 1942, as follows:

SUBQUOTE We have always believed - and we believe today - that all peoples, without distinction of race, color, or religion, who are oppressed and... SUBQUOTE

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the responsibilities of liberty, are entitled to its enjoyment.

We have always sought - and we seek today - to encourage and aid all who aspire to freedom to establish their right to it by preparing themselves to assume its obligations.

We have striven to meet squarely our own responsibility in this respect - in Cuba, in the Philippines, and wherever else it has devolved upon us.

It has been our purpose in the past - and will remain our purpose in the future - to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy.

This Government is of course dedicated to the fulfillment of these objectives in the near East as in other parts of the world.

The record shows that the Axis Powers have repeatedly and cynically dishonored their promises and treaties. Therefore it is inconceivable that any course can be placed either with or without them. The military - sons threaten by interference and a hostile attitude in the near East; consequently, a greater effort in the war effort by all our people and by all nations their own interests and our own. It is the duty of our United States Government.

End of column.

Copy 2

SECRET

[Spears-Catroux troubles;
De Gaulle's views and telegram
to Churchill]

Beirut,

August 16, 1942.

OSS # 5784.

De Gaulle has just telegraphed the British premier as follows: His agreement in the Mandate with Lyttelton of July last year, and the exchange of notes three months later, are not respected by the British, who are encroaching on the French position and on the principle that only the League can alter the ~~mandate~~ mandate. So much so in fact that their disinterestedness is open to doubt in respect of the political situation of the Mandate. Such things make the Arabs think there is lack of Allied agreement, to the consequent advantage of the Axis.

These actions of the British arouse great resentment in the Mandate natives and in all Frenchmen, particularly in view of the help they are giving the British in the Middle East. De Gaulle ends the telegram by appealing to Churchill to have the abovementioned agreements lived up to, in order to present a united front to the enemy and the natives.

Interview of an hour between De Gaulle and me at his request:

France will live up to the promise of eventual independence in the mandate agreement, but it may be long before the Mandate is prepared for it.

Only a properly reconstituted France can cede territory; the

SECRET

- 2 - (Beirut, August 16, OSS # 5784)

Fighting French have no legal basis for doing so. Meanwhile the mandate must continue, but when that time arrives, France will no doubt conclude agreements like the previous ones in the 1930's, which maintain a situation of privilege for France.

The English, however, seemed bent on supplanting the French in the Mandate, so he got them to accept the two 1941 agreements (July and October), but they were not observing them. Matters were so bad that he had come here to remain until they could be straightened out, -- maybe a fortnight, but if required he would stay on a long while.

He feels that Spears must be removed and the policy of the United Kingdom here drastically altered at once. He fears Churchill may not acquiesce, which would force him (De Gaulle) to stop cooperating completely. De Gaulle said he would see the matter through even if it meant warfare: better be beaten than supinely submit.

Thus ended the interview, which appeared to have been carefully prepared. He has departed on a week's trip in Syria, after which he will return here pending developments. He thinks Spears has told Holmes not to contact him since Holmes has made no effort to do so.

It looks bad. Unfortunately the English won't talk like the French, so it is hard to give their side, but my telegram, OSS # 5742, gives the basis of their views reasonably well. I haven't mentioned the above to the English in the Mandate; I shall see De Gaulle no doubt again. The U.S. airforce soon to be located at Rayak will put us in a pretty quandary if an Anglo-French clash should materialize.

HVVF
August 19, 1942

Gwynn.

August 14, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

PART I

The following plan has been discussed with the President and has his general approval:

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have for some time been giving special consideration to the situation in the Near East and have discussed with the State Department the serious consequences for the United Nations if this area were lost. They feel that every possible effort, both political and military, must be made to hold this vital area.

2. The United States still holds a unique position in the Near East and American prestige and influence is still high. This results from a realization by the people of the area that the United States has no territorial or vested political interests there. Furthermore, since actions speak louder than words, this widespread goodwill toward the United States has become what might be described as a deep-seated conviction on the part of the peoples in this area, due mainly to a century of American missionary, educational and philanthropic efforts that have never been tarnished by any material motives or interests. No other member of the United Nations is in such a position.

-2-

3. Although unfortunately large American military forces are not now available for the adequate protection of the Near East, there are weapons in the field of American political action and propaganda that we feel in a position to contribute to help hold this area until additional military force becomes available.

4. In the political field, in an effort to help this critical situation, the State Department has under contemplation two specific steps as follows:

- a. The issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is included as Part II of this telegram.
- b. The initial implementation of such a declaration by the appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria.

5. A further step is also contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the Near East remains primarily a British theater of military responsibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an American division, part military part civilian, which, because of its status in the United States, is able to hold its own, and they have in mind sending to the Near East as soon as possible such an American Division.

6. As necessary defensive measures, the United States will start building up its military in the Near East. The U.S. can continue to supply construction materials and equipment in case of a general emergency in the Near East.

Arrangements already agreed upon in London in regard to U.O. operations, the S.O. section of this Mission will work in close cooperation with the British S.O.E. of the Middle East Command. It will be free to build its own local organizations but as regards actual operations, and so long as this area remains a British theater of military responsibility, the section will of necessity function only with the approval and under the general direction of the British.

1. The major and positive function of another section of such an American Mission will be to capitalize on the existing goodwill toward the United States and, as a result, to gain more active support of the peoples of the area for a United Nations victory. The main effects of this section of this Mission, which will be split into two parts, the S.O. and S.O.E. sections, will be in the field of political warfare and of propaganda. The S.O. section, on the one hand, the close collaboration will be maintained with the diplomatic representatives of the United States in the area, with the local representatives of the United States to do the ground work. Political warfare will be conducted through the various areas of the area, and the S.O.E. section, on the other hand, has a major function of the type of operations.

2. American propaganda through the area will be increased and the United States will be able to have a very active role in the area. The United States will be able to do a great deal of work in the area.

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In the shortest possible time and increased amount of American news for Arabic newspapers, an efficient photo newspaper service, pamphlets, padgets, etc. as are being offered in other parts of the world. In connection with all this work there must be kept in mind at all times the special importance of photographic material in view of the high percentage of illiteracy.

9. For effective coordination the activities of this Mission must of course be subject to the general control of the American theater commander. Full cooperation with all other American government agencies operative in this area is being arranged before the Mission leaves for the Near East.

10. A further problem that must be worked out before such a Mission leaves the United States is the relations with the British. To obtain effective results, the plan and purpose of this Mission must of necessity be agreed to in principle by the British military and political authorities in London; and their representatives in the Near East must be specifically so instructed before the Mission arrives there. The same clearance, so far as Lebanon is concerned, would also be obtained from the British French National Committee in London.

11. In its work in the Near East, this Mission must, at least, at least to the people of the Near East, be seen to

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operate as an independent American organization and not, as may be suspected, as a "front" for French and British post-war imperialism. Its principal arguments will be:

- a. The military power and potentialities of the United Nations.
- b. The inevitable fate of the peoples of the Near East in case of Axis victory -- political and economic enslavement as in all occupied countries.
- c. The self-interest of the Near East peoples and their better prospects for political and economic development as a result of a United Nations' victory.
- d. The assurance of the support of the United States for their aspirations to independence after the war if, in line with American foreign policy and the Atlantic Charter, these peoples actively assist in winning it.

12. Such an American Mission will naturally cover the same theater as the Middle East Command but its primary efforts will be aimed at the Arabic speaking world of the Near East -- Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans Jordan, Arabia, Iraq, and, because of physical location, Turkey and Iran.

Official headquarters will be with the British Middle East Command, wherever that may be. Operational headquarters probably will be established in Beyrouth, Lebanon, with subsidiary headquarters in each of the political areas listed above.

13. The proposed head of this Mission is LTJ. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, Army of the United States, for the past year and a half in the State Department and now on an indefinite leave of absence. Colonel Hoskins, who was with

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in Beyrouth of American missionary parents, speaks Arabic, French, German and Spanish. During the last war he was a Captain in the 5th Regiment Marines, 2nd U.S. Division, wounded and decorated. Since then he has been in the cotton goods business in the United States but has continued to travel widely in Southern Europe and the Near East. He is also Vice-President of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut.

14. To keep competition and duplication with existing British organizations to a minimum, this American mission will aim wherever possible at enlisting the support of students and graduates of American schools and colleges in the Near East as the backbone of its efforts. The students of these institutions are among the mental and physical elite of these countries and the older graduates are naturally political and business leaders in these areas.

15. It seems advisable that such an effort should be made, and the results can be substantial, especially if the Mission is going out with the full support of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, and if it is done with prior agreement as to its American character and activities by the British political and military authorities. The idea of sending such a Mission has been discussed in general terms with the President and on the same level.

16. Please discuss this project with the appropriate officials and endeavor to get their views on it.

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- (1) the two steps contemplated by the State Department, including the issuance of the proposed declaration of United States Government policy toward the Near East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a statement of this kind is most urgently needed from a military point of view, and this statement is in the opinion of this Department the minimum that can be effectively said. If the British suggest or prefer that such a statement be issued by our diplomatic representatives in the Near East rather than announced from Washington, you are authorized to accept such a compromise; for maximum effect, however, this statement should be issued in Washington by the President or the Secretary of State.
- (2) the sending of an American Mission that would be authorized to operate along the lines outlined above.

17. Please transmit a copy of this instruction to General Eisenhower and ask him to discuss this project with the Fighting French National Committee and to endeavor to get their concurrence also to the points in paragraph 16.

18. In view of the urgency of this matter, you are requested to obtain their approval and concurrence as soon as possible and to report their concurrence at the earliest possible moment.

Part two follows.

MOST SECRET

August 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

It is generally conceded that of the United Nations the prestige of the United States is higher in the Middle East than is that of either Great Britain or the Free French of General de Gaulle. The reasons for this are complex, but it may be stated briefly that the native population of Syria has not been happy under the mandate of France and that the British have had so many troubles in Palestine which they could not solve with satisfaction either to the Jews or to the Arabs that their prestige, too, has declined. On the other hand, the good opinion of the United States has rested primarily on a long tradition of beneficent and philanthropic works, and the United States has not suffered under the disadvantage of having any immediate political or military entanglement with the Eastern Mediterranean. Distance has given it a measure of protection.

It now seems to be a matter of military interest to increase in any way possible the prestige and influence of the United States in the Middle East, and it is appropriate to examine ways and means of doing this. One plan is to send a political and military mission to Syria. Whether this mission consists of one man or five or twenty-five, it is desirable to explore its advantages and disadvantages to American prestige in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the probable course of the war.

Informed Jewish and Arabic leaders in the United States are in agreement that some such mission is desirable. This seems to

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be the immediate and primary reaction, though it soon develops that from the Jewish point of view the desirability is maintained only so long as the mission does not collaborate too closely with the Arabs and that from the Arabic point of view the desirability lasts only if the mission is willing to renounce American support of Zionism. By being removed from the actual scene, the United States is now in the fortunate position of being counted a potential friend by everyone. One Arabic observer has commented that within twenty-four hours after the arrival of any mission, every Arab of influence, whether Christian or Moslem, would want to know what stand the United States will take on the question of supporting the Jews in Palestine. If no commitment is made, the United States will lose face and be in no better position vis-a-vis the Arabs than are the British. If Zionism is renounced, Jewish people not only in Palestine but all over the world would regard it as a most outright betrayal, and the political repercussions would be tremendous, not only in the Middle East but in the United States. If Zionism is supported, a possible good influence of the mission upon the Arabs of Syria will be nullified.

These are delicate questions, but perhaps less fundamental than some others. Syria is now nominally free, the head of the Syrian Government being Taj-al-Din al Hasani. This freedom was proclaimed by the British and grudgingly acquiesced in by the Free French after their occupation of Syria. There is, however, a Free French military control. Any American mission operating quite independently in Syria, making contacts directly with the Syrian

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government and with the subjects of Taj-al-Din, would run grave danger of coming into conflict with the Free French. Indeed, if the direct contacts with the Syrian people were to be effective enough to make them worthwhile, such conflict with the Free French would seem inevitable, unless, indeed, the American mission acted in a spirit of collaboration with the Free French. But any collaboration would spoil the effectiveness of the mission, because of the deep enmity between the Syrian people and the French authorities. It makes little difference to the Christian and Moslem Syrians whether the French are Vichy or Free. They would prefer to have as little as possible to do with both.

In any case, in such circumstances, there is little that the mission could offer the Syrians except to emphasize and re-emphasize the nominal promises already made to them by the French authorities, and these in the eyes of the Syrian people are only promises. There is, in addition, the danger that any misunderstanding between the American mission and the French authorities and any promise made by the American mission to the Syrians would be used by the Axis as propaganda to stir distrust of the United States with the French people in France. The President Roosevelt has repeatedly assured the French people that the United States recognizes and intends to guarantee the integrity of the French empire at the end of the war, and it would be possible for the Germans and the collaborators to point to the activity of the mission as an admission that the assurances of the President are not to be taken.

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The immediate interest of the United States is to preserve the Eastern Mediterranean in this war to the United Nations. Inasmuch as prestige in the eyes of the Arabic-speaking peoples is most effectively enhanced by a display of force close at hand, the most effective way of attaining this purpose would be to send men and armor in sufficient quantity to defend Syria and to impress the Arabs with the fact that Syria will be successfully defended from any attack by the Axis. One reason why the propaganda which comes from the Grand Mufti is effective is because there is no present aid from the United States to prove to the people by example that the Mufti's propaganda is not true. The most effective counter-propaganda to the Grand Mufti would be to let the Arabs see a display of American military aid instead of words and promises. The Axis partners and the Grand Mufti can make just as many promises as we can, and they are constantly doing so. What is needed to enhance our prestige is not more promises but a show of force.

This analysis of the problem suggests, therefore, that if a mission is to be sent to Syria it should be not political or military, but purely technical or economic in nature to avoid the many pitfalls of a small military and political mission. A visit of technical enrichment and educational facilities might increase long-term investment, the prestige which the United States is already enjoying in the Middle East because of its humanitarian activities in the past. Such a mission might include the study of the agronomy to hydro-electric power. A technical mission could also

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now because of the shortage of food in Syria and because of the lack of shipping, but politics should be kept out. There should be nothing like the investigation of the King-Crane commission at the end of the last war and there should be no political post-war planning for the end of this war. The mission should act as a fact-finding body, perhaps in preparation for military occupation, but should not indulge in politics.

Most desirable would be an ultimate military occupying force capable of defending the country with arms and equipment against any Axis attack. Such a military force, so far as one can now foresee, ought to act in harmony with the French military garrison. If powerful enough, it would probably escape the stigma of collaborating with the French while at the same time, because of its own show of power, it could win and hold the active support of the now recalcitrant Arabic natives.

B. D. Meritt

August 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

A columnist in the Jewish Daily Courier of July 20th, 1942, a Mr. Ben Lewis, attacks the recent conference on Near Eastern problems which was held at the University of Chicago. "Zionist leaders in America," he writes, "may as well be aware of the fact that there is danger ahead for their post-war plans with regard to Palestine. I wonder how many of them know what actually took place at the recent round-table conference on Near Eastern problems, which was held at Chicago University. I wonder whether...the Zionist leaders are aware of the fact that ninety-nine percent of the papers read at this conference by non-Jewish experts were not exactly in favor of a Jewish Palestine. And I wonder whether Zionist leaders in America are especially aware of the fact that this conference was attended by a number of important officials of the State Department in charge of the division dealing with Palestine. What makes the matter still worse is the fact -- not known to many -- that all the experts who participated in the round-table discussions have organized themselves into a Council on Near Eastern Affairs. Thus, a permanent body of professors, scientists and politicians, all far from friendly to the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, has quietly come into existence in America. The role which the newly created Council may play in influencing post-war plans with regard to Palestine should not be underestimated, since the State Department seems to have taken the Chicago round-table discussions rather seriously. The

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first practical step of the new body will be to publish the papers read at the Chicago parley, which in itself would have a neutralizing effect -- to put it mildly -- on many leading Americans whom the American Palestine Committee is trying to win into its ranks. Could it be true that American oil interests are behind the entire Chicago scheme?"

MOST SECRET

August 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILEY:

Jews of North Africa
(Tunis, Algeria, French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, Tangiers)

1. Population Statistics:

Published figures for the Jewish population of North Africa are avowedly unreliable, particularly in respect of Jews of European nationality, these being for the most part reported in the official census as French citizens or nationals of other European countries. In 1931 the French Government gave semi-official assistance to a census of North African Jews under Jewish communal auspices which produced the following results:

Tunis	56,248
Algeria	110,127
French Morocco	<u>117,603</u>
Total	283,978

The French Statistical Annual for 1938 gives the following figures:

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Tunis	59,485
Algeria	73,967
French Morocco	<u>161,312</u>
Total	294,764

The difference between the 1931 and 1938 figures for Algeria is to be accounted for by the fact that the Statistical Annual data do not include the so-called Mzab Jews. The increase in the Jewish population of French Morocco reflects a westward trend on the part of Jews from Tripoli and Tunis attracted to French Morocco by the greater stability of the French regime there and the prospects of better civil and economic status. This movement continued until the introduction of the Vichy anti-Jewish laws into North Africa. It is today conservatively estimated that there are 220,000 Jews in French Morocco. No official figures are available for Spanish Morocco but the following estimates are reasonable:

Tangiers	12,000
Spanish Morocco	<u>20,000</u>
Total	32,000

Taking present day estimates for the Jewish population

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of North Africa, the following summary results:

Tunis	65,000
Algeria	115,000
French Morocco	220,000
Tangiers	12,000
Spanish Morocco	<u>20,000</u>
Total	432,000

In Tunis Jews constitute about 2.5% of the total population, in Algeria less than 2%, in French Morocco about 3.5%, and in Tangiers and Spanish Morocco about 3%. Exclusive of Jews, the European populations of these areas are approximately 9% of the total in Tunis, 13% in Algeria, 3% in French Morocco, and 7% in Tangiers and Spanish Morocco. The percentage of the population which is Mohammedan in these areas is thus: Tunis, 88.5%; Algeria, 85%; French Morocco 93.5%; Tangiers and Spanish Morocco 90%.

2. Distribution of the Jewish Population:

In 1931 84% of the Jewish population of French North Africa lived in 73 towns and villages in Tunis, in 257 towns and villages of Algeria, and in 75 towns of Morocco. Chief present day centers are Casablanca

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with 40,000 Jews out of a total population of 200,000; 26,000 in the city of Tunis (other principal Jewish centers in Tunis: Sfax, Mehdia, Susa, Bizerta, Gerba.). In Spanish Morocco the chief centers of Jewish population other than Tangiers are Tetuan (Jewish population 7,500), Alcarzaquivir, Larache, Ceuta, and Melilla.

In the Riff, the majority of the Jews live on the Guelaya peninsula, the second largest area of Jewish settlement being the territory of the Beni-Amil tribe. The only Jewish cemetery of the Riff is located at Snada in the territory of the Beni-Itt Elft tribe. Jews from all parts of the Riff journey there when interments take place. The town is strategically located, having served as the take-off point for Spanish military operations in the Riff.

Attached to this memorandum are photostatic copies of maps prepared in connection with the 1931 census above referred to. Number 1 shows the number of Jews then living in each North African city,

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town, or village; Number 2 indicates the percentage which Jews formed in each town of the total population. There is little evidence of substantial movements of Jewish population in North Africa since that date.

3. Composition of the Jewish Population:

Generally speaking five groups of Jews may be distinguished in North Africa.

- a. The Berbers or desert Jews, whose roots in the territory go back to the days of the Carthaginians and the Phoenicians, and whose religious customs show large admixtures of Mohammedan influence. These are usually in the hinterland of the North African territories and have little contact with the Jews of the cities and the seacoast.
- b. The "ghetto Jews", so called because most of them still live in the "Mellaha" or Jewish quarters. These Jews stem from the collapse of the Jewish centers of Babylon and North-east Africa following the rise of Mohammedanism

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in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries. They are by far the most numerous of the five groups (thus, in French Morocco it is estimated that of a total Jewish population of 220,000 at least 150,000 are ghetto Jews), the poorest, and, after the Berbers, the most backward and least related to modern Jewish activities.

- c. The Sephardic Jews, whose first arrival dates from the Spanish expulsion of 1492 but who came in more significant numbers, chiefly from Italy, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They have largely become Europeanized, live outside the ghetto, speak Spanish and French (with some Arabic), and engage in trade and industry.
- d. European Jews, who are the aristocracy of North African Jewry, having come to North Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as nationals of other countries.
- e. Refugees from Hitlerian Europe who came to

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North Africa after 1933. No exact figure is available but it is probable that their number today is about fifteen thousand. (This is in addition to the Jewish population figures above cited.)

4. Economic Status of the Jewish Population:

The recent introduction of the Vichy anti-Jewish laws into French North Africa and the repressive measures adopted in Spanish North Africa since Franco's coming to power make it difficult to form an accurate estimate of the economic position of North African Jewry. For purposes of this discussion, however, it seems relevant to indicate the occupational distribution of the Jews as it was revealed by the 1931 census. Of 59,882 reported Jewish wage-earners in North Africa, 23,945 were tradespeople and trades-employees; 21,662 were artisans and skilled trade or factory workers; 5,586 were unskilled or day laborers; 3,931 were members of the professions (this group has been entirely ousted by the Vichy laws). In descending order of importance are listed public and government

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services and transportation (likewise affected by Vichy decrees), and agricultural occupations and landholders. 946 persons were employed in a variety of miscellaneous occupations not included in the foregoing list. (A photostatic copy of two detailed occupational schedules compiled in connection with the 1931 census are attached to this memorandum.)

5. Civil and Political Status of the Jewish Population:

This may be summarized by saying that all of the Vichy decree laws affecting Jews in occupied France have been applied to French North Africa. Citizenship granted to Algerian Jews in 1870 has been revoked. In Morocco all Jews who took up residence outside the ghetto after September 1, 1939 have been ordered to return to the Mellah. Restrictions have been placed on property holding by Jews, school attendance has been limited to a figure of from two to ten percent of the student population, professionals, government employees, and certain classes of merchants have been barred. In Spanish North Africa there have been continuing and increasing repressive

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measures against Jews on the part of the Franco regime. Jews are reported to receive smaller rations and to be discriminated against in the distribution of available supplies. Nevertheless the fragmentary reports which have been coming out of North Africa suggest that these restrictions are not being evenly or vigorously applied. The Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed, is reported friendly to the Jews and, as nominal ruler of the non-European Jews, resistive to French pressure for the enforcement of anti-Jewish measures. Reported to be similarly motivated is Pasha Glaoui of Marrakech, chief of the Berbers. Ghetto laws have not been enforced, reputedly in part because of French fear that in the event of possible subsequent bombardment, a Jewish quarter would deliberately be spared. But the very existence of the laws has been a potent factor in stimulating Arab hostility and in encouraging private discrimination. There can be no doubt that the status and position and consequently the internal influence of the Jewish communities of North Africa

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has been seriously impaired since the Franco-German armistice.

6. Relations Between Jews and Mohammedans:

Despite the centuries old hostility between Jews and Mohammedans, which has repeatedly expressed itself in violent outbreaks, even in the present century, the picture of Jewish-Mohammedan relationships is by no means exclusively negative. Although Moslem law, which governs these relationships in Spanish Morocco, Tunisia, and to some extent in Morocco, definitely assigns an inferior position to the Jews, they are recognized as having specific rights and a definite place in the social structure and participate in governing councils in e.g. Meknes, Fez, and Tetouan. Until the Vichy restrictions, dealing in agricultural produce, hides, and real estate with the Mohammedans were almost exclusively in Jewish hands and they enjoyed the confidence of the Mohammedans in these fields. The Banque Hassan of Tangiers, headed by a Portuguese Jewish family of that name has large interests in Tangiers and Morocco. J. R.

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Benezeraf, leading tea merchant of Casablanca, is well regarded in Mohammedan circles.

Axis anti-Jewish propaganda has made substantial headway among Mohammedan youth but the older generation is chary of it and recognizes the possibility that an anti-Semitism which today is directed against the Jews may tomorrow be extended to the equally Semitic Arabs. Active anti-Semitism is directed primarily at the European Jew and the wealthy and socially prominent Sephardic Jew. The bulk of the Sephardic, "ghetto", and Berber Jews live apart from their Mohammedan neighbors but at peace with them, sharing in the general poverty of North African life.

7. Jewish Organizational and Communal Relationships:

The Berber and "ghetto" Jews constitute separate worlds from the Sephardic and European Jews with whom they have little contact, save through philanthropic activity conducted by the latter for the former. Contact with the younger generation of "ghetto" Jews can be established through the representatives of the Alliance Israelite Universelle,

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the schools of which are attended by some three thousand of these youth.

The Sephardic Jews are intensely religious and have little connection with regular Jewish organizations abroad. Though they are concerned with Jewish activities in Palestine, this concern is religious rather than Zionist. Contact with this group should be established through the Agudath Knesseth (Central Organization of) Sephardim in Jerusalem.

Contact with the European Jews of North Africa can be established through the small but closely related group of Moroccan Jews recently arrived in this country. Jacques Pinto of 360 Central Park West, New York City, is undertaking to organize this group for purposes of assistance to Moroccan Jews and may be useful for establishing Moroccan contacts here or abroad. The Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme which was active in North Africa until the advent of Vichy could provide useful contacts of friendly Mohammedans as well as Jews. Among the persons identified with their activities there

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figure prominently the names of Sheik El-Okbi of Algiers, Lucien Sabbah of Constantine, Marcel Gozland, former president of the Ligue's Tunisian Federation, and Ben Ali Boukert, former city councilman of Algiers. Vichy decrees dissolving most Jewish organizations in North Africa and severely restricting the activities of those remaining constitute a limiting factor on the organizational approach to the Jews of North Africa but individual members of related former organizations will be useful. Regard should be had for the varying Arabic dialects spoken in Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco but this may be in part overcome, especially in those contacts initiated from Jerusalem, by the use of Hebrew.

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Summary and Conclusions:

The traditional centuries old discrimination from which Jews have suffered in North Africa, the inferior position they have always occupied vis-a-vis the Mohammedans, the limitations recently imposed upon them by Vichy decree and the efficacy of Axis anti-Semitic propaganda combine to restrict severely the utility of North African Jewry for certain aspects of a program of psychological warfare. A further handicap is the separation which exists among the various groups of Jews, those groups which are most numerous, and best distributed throughout the area and enjoy relatively the best relationships to their Mohammedan neighbors being precisely those which have least contact with the outside world.

Nevertheless, their stake in the present war is such as to make them logically useful for other phases of a psychological warfare program. Contacts may be made with individuals and groups through the Central Sephardic organization in Jerusalem, individual Moroccan Jews who have recently come to this country, and representatives of the Alliance Israelite Universelle and the Ligue Internationale

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MOST SECRET

Contre Racisme et l'Antisemitisme. Through this last organization contacts can be made with friendly Moham-medans. Once these are established, the facts of Jewish distribution throughout practically all the populated places of North Africa and representation in the major occupational fields can be turned to account.

M. W. Beckelman

M. W. Beckelman

August 14, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON.

PART I

The following plan has been discussed with the President and has his general approval:

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have for some time been giving special consideration to the situation in the Near East and have discussed with the State Department the serious consequences for the United Nations if this area were lost. They feel that every possible effort, both political and military, must be made to hold this vital area.

2. The United States still holds a unique position in the Near East and American prestige and influence is still high. This results from a realization by the people of the area that the United States has no territorial or vested political interests there. Furthermore, since actions speak louder than words, this widespread goodwill toward the United States has become what might be described as a deep-seated conviction on the part of the peoples in this area, due mainly to a century of American missionary, edu-

-2-

ational and philanthropic efforts that have never been tarnished by any material motives or interests. No other member of the United Nations is in such a position.

3. Although ~~unfortunately~~ large American military forces are not now available for the adequate protection of the Near East, There are weapons in the field of American political action and propaganda that we ~~feel~~^{are} in a position to contribute to help hold this area until ~~additional military forces become available~~.

4. In the political field, in an effort to help this critical situation, the State Department has under contemplation two specific steps as follows:

- a. The issuance of a declaration of United States Government policy in regard to the Near East, a copy of which is included as art 21 of this telegram.
- b. The ~~initial implementation of such a policy~~^{is the} appointment of a diplomatic agent to Lebanon and Syria.

5. A further step is also contemplated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the Near East remains primarily a British theater of military responsibility, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^{it has been reported} believe that an American mission, art

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military part civilian, might, because of the standing of the United States, be able to help hold this area, and they have in mind sending to the Near East as soon as possible such an American Mission.

6. As necessary defensive measures, ^{in its present} two sections of this Mission ^{will} start setting up immediately upon arrival in the Near East S.I. and S.O. organizations respectively, that can continue to supply information and to harass the enemy in case this area is overrun by the Axis. In line with arrangements already agreed upon in London in regard to S.I. operations, the S.I. section of this Mission will work in close cooperation with the British S.I. of the Middle East Command. It will be free to build its own local organizations but as regards actual operations, and so long as this area remains a British theater of military responsibility, the section will of necessity function only with the approval and under the general direction of the British.

7. The major and positive function of another section of such an American Mission will be to capitalize on the existing goodwill toward the United States and, as a result

to gain more active support of the peoples of this area for a United Nations' victory. The main efforts of this section of this Mission, which will be quite distinct from the S.I. and S.O. sections, will be in the field of political warfare and of propaganda. This will require, on the one hand, the closest collaboration with the American consular and diplomatic representatives in this area, and, on the other hand, with the local representatives of CNI who will ^{have the opportunity} actually ~~do~~ the propaganda work. Personal contact with influential leaders in the various areas of the Near East will, from the start, be a major function of the head of this Mission.

8. American propaganda throughout the Near East ~~will~~ ^{will} be increased enormously and quickly in both volume and effectiveness over what has been done to date. It has already been discussed with C.I. that there should be made available in the shortest possible time an ~~an~~ ^{an} increased amount of American news for Arabic newspapers, an efficient photo newspaper service, ^{in quantity} pamphlets, ^{handbills} radio-casts, etc. as are being offered in other parts of the world. In connection with all this work there ~~must be kept in mind at all times the special importance of~~

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~~photos remain unclassified in view of the high percentage of~~
~~misinformation.~~

9. For effective coordination the activities of this Mission ~~must~~^{will} of course be subject to the general control of the American theater commander. Full cooperation with all other American Government agencies operative in this area ~~is being~~^{will be} arranged before the Mission leaves for the Near East.

10. A further problem that must be worked out before such a Mission leaves the United States is its relations with the British. To obtain effective results, the plan and purpose of this Mission must of necessity be agreed to in principle by the British military and political authorities in London; and their representatives in the Near East must be specifically so instructed before the Mission starts there. The same clearance, so far as Lebanon is concerned, needs also to be obtained from the French National Committee in London.

11. In its work in the Near East, the Mission must, at least to the people of the

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operate as an independent American organization and not, as may be suspected, as a "front" for French and British ~~post-war imperialis~~. Its principal arguments will be:

- a. The military power and potentialities of the United Nations
- b. The inevitable fate of the peoples of the Near East in case of Axis victory -- political and economic enslavement as in all occupied countries.
- c. The self-interest of the Near East peoples and their better prospects for political and economic development as a result of a United Nations' victory.
- d. The assurance of the support of the United States for their aspirations to independence after the war if, in line with American foreign policy and the Atlantic Charter, these peoples actively assist ~~us~~ in winning it.

12. ~~Such an American mission will naturally cover the same theater as the Middle East Command at its primary~~ efforts will be aimed at the Arabic speaking world of the Near East -- ^{of this mission} Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Arabia, Iraq, and, because of physical location, Turkey and Iran.

Official headquarters will be with the British Middle East Command, ~~whereas that may be~~ ^{Beirut} ~~Beirut~~ headquarters probably will be established in ~~Beirut~~ ^{Beirut}, Lebanon, with subsidiary headquarters in each of the political areas listed

above.

13. The proposed head of this Mission is Lt. Colonel Harold S. Hopkins, Army of the United States, for the past year and a half in the State Department and now on an indefinite leave of absence ^{and consulted with writer.} Colonel Hopkins, who was born in ~~Georgia~~ ^{Georgia} of American missionary parents, speaks Arabic, French, German and Spanish. During the last war he was a Captain in the 5th Regiment Marines, 2nd U.S. Division, wounded and decorated. Since then he has been in the cotton goods business in the United States but has continued to travel widely in Southern Europe and the Near East. He is also vice-president of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut.

14. To keep competition and duplication with existing British organizations to a minimum, this American Mission will aim wherever possible at enlisting the support of students and graduates of American schools and colleges in the Near East as the backbone of its efforts. The students of these institutions are a goodly percentage of the social elite of these countries and the older graduates are not only political and business leaders in these areas.

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15. It seems advisable that such an effort should be made, and the results can be substantial, especially as this mission is going out ^{with} the full support of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, and it is hoped with prior agreement as to its American character and activities by the British political and military authorities.

~~The above mentioned project has been discussed in general terms with the President with his approval.~~

16. Please discuss this project with the proper British officials and endeavor to get their concurrence in

- (1) The two steps contemplated by the late Department, including the issuance of the proposed declaration of United States Government policy toward the four Axis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a statement of this kind is most urgently needed from a military point of view, and this statement is in the opinion of this Department the statement that can be effectively said. If the British do not prefer that such a statement be issued by our diplomatic representatives in the near past rather than announced from Washington, you are authorized to issue such a statement for that effect, however, this statement should be issued in Washington to the President of the Secretary of State.
- (2) The Secretary of War should consider that would be authorized to operate along the lines outlined above.

Engelmann

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17. Please transmit a copy of this instruction to General ~~Lebanon~~ and ask him to discuss this project with the Fighting French National Committee and to endeavor to get their concurrence also to the points in paragraph 16.

18. In view of the urgency of this matter, you are requested to obtain ~~their~~ ^{*British and French*} approval and cable us their concurrence at the earliest possible moment.

Part. 1000 1/1/11

NR:NBH:NR

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

August 17, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that he had asked the State Department to formulate the U. S. comprehensive policy for that area, and that this statement will be sent to this Committee at an early date.

He proposed that if it is found impossible to arrive at once at an agreement among the various interested parties on the propaganda basis to be used in SYRIA, it would be desirable to send COLONEL HOSKINS immediately to that area as the head of an Economic Mission. He would have assistants with experience in agriculture and in Lend-Lease administration and would be directed to ascertain what economic aid could be given to the population. Under this cover it would be possible for him to initiate conversations on other activities.

In this connection, COLONEL DONOVAN proposed that the HON. DAVID BOWES-LYON, Deputy Director of the British Political Warfare Executive, attend a meeting of this Committee for discussion of propaganda objectives in SYRIA, for the purpose of having his assistance in formulating a directive on this subject to the O.W.I.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will submit a written report on these proposals.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMMEL
 TO: COLONEL DONOVAN
 SUBJECT:

DATE: AUGUST 19 1942

At Mr. Berle's request I this morning had a meeting to discuss several matters with him. He stated that the State Department had received from you a request for an outline of basic policy which could be used as a guide in formulating our plans for the Near East. Mr. Berle stated that he would comply with this request as soon as possible. The subject is now being discussed and conclusions should be reached shortly. They are endeavoring to establish one comprehensive policy to include all of the countries in the Near East area. They prefer to establish this all inclusive blanket policy so as not to create the confusion with respect to the various countries. When this blanket policy has been established, they will then interpret it to apply to each country. This will be sent to you at the earliest possible date.

W. A. K.
 W. A. K.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 11, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN reported that the Senior Committee at its meeting on August 10 had agreed that a directive should be drawn up for O.W.I. operations in this area.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Took note that the O.S.S. will submit a draft directive for O.W.I. operations in SYRIA.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

August 10, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN outlined in detail the plan under which COLONEL HOSKINS is to operate in conjunction with the State Department diplomatic representative in SYRIA. He stated further that he had conferred with representatives of G-2 and O.N.I. for the purpose of discussing a directive to be given to the O.W.I. representatives who will accompany this Mission to Syria.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note that no action will be taken on the plan for SYRIA until it has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thereafter has been submitted to British representatives in Washington.

EXCERPT FROM
JFPC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 31, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN requested MR. MOWRER to report on the instructions which have been given by O.W.I. to its three representatives for their operations in SYRIA, as well as for conforming to the orders of the British Theater Commander. MR. MOWRER agreed to obtain this information and submit it to this Subcommittee at its meeting next Tuesday.

COLONEL HOSKINS supplemented his previous report by pointing out:

1. That the loss of the NEAR EAST will involve the oil supply of IRAN and IRAQ;
2. That even if the NEAR EAST is held, action must be taken to counteract the increasing pro-Axis feeling of the Mohammedans.

COLONEL DONOVAN requested COLONEL HOSKINS to attend next Tuesday's meeting. He has also arranged for COL. B.F. FELLERS to attend that meeting.

EXCERPT FROM
JFWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

July 29, 1942

PLAN FOR SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN introduced MR. GEORGE WADSWORTH of the State Department, who gave a detailed statement of the background of the present situation. After occupation of LEBANON and SYRIA, the British and Free French set up a President for each country who appointed their own Ministries for the administration of those areas. Difficulties have arisen because the British assigned GENERAL SPEARS with a special mission and the belief has grown that he intends to push the Free French out of the picture. The Moslem Arabs, whose chief purpose is to gain independence and possibly to unite all Arab speaking countries, profoundly distrust the British because they believe that previous statements of policy indicating a willingness to grant independence to the Arabs have always been implemented in favor of the Jews.

On the contrary, until recently the Arabs have had complete faith in the United States because of the unselfish educational, medical and philanthropic work that has been done by Americans in the Near East, as well as because it appears that the United States has no political axe to grind and no territory ambitions. In the last five years, however, a small amount of distrust of the United States has appeared because of a feeling that American policy is also dictated by Zionist Jews; this belief has been strengthened by German propaganda.

The State Department has agreed that MR. WADSWORTH is to go out to BEIRUT as a diplomatic representative of the United States in place of the Consul who has been stationed there. He will have a staff of a Military Attache, an Economic Attache and others, including three men from the O.W.I. to direct overt propaganda. He proposes to open a suboffice in DAMASCUS for freer access to the Arabs.

It is further proposed that a group of about twenty-five officers and civilians headed by LT. COL. H. B. HOSKINS be established in SYRIA for two general purposes:

- a. To establish an intelligence organization.
- b. To organize resistance groups of Syrians and Arabs in the event of a German invasion. These groups would also exert counter efforts against the Axis fifth column that is now understood to be very strong in Syria.

-2-

Since this area is in the British zone of operations the Mission may only be established with the approval of the British and the Free French. It is planned to have it work in accordance with an agreement which the O.S.S. has already made tentatively with the British Subversive Operations Executive to the effect that the Mission's S. O. activities would be in cooperation with the British military and S.O.F. objectives and operations would only be with their approval.

The State Department has already proposed to the President that he issue a statement in the near future emphasizing the application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Near East, to the end that the Arab speaking world will be given independent sovereignty.

COLONEL DONOVAN pointed out that, on the assumption that the Middle East will be lost, it seems necessary to take immediate steps to organize groups which will continue to believe in the U. S. and will continue to fight and harass the Germans.

After COLONEL HOSKINS, MR. WADSWORTH and MR. WILSON left the meeting the discussion revolved around the question of whether it is desirable to have a group of inciters and resisters in the Near East in case of its loss to the Germans, and secondly, what should be the basis on which the U. S. appeal is made to the Arabs for their adherence and loyalty. CAPTAIN REDFIELD stated that such a group should certainly be established for intelligence purposes. It was the general feeling of the Subcommittee that the organization of groups for subversive operations would do no harm and might well be of positive military value.

The question still remained as to whether U. S. military and civilian representatives could disseminate propaganda based on a promise that the U. S. would do its utmost to promote an independent Arab State. The attitude of the O.W.I. on this question appeared to be most important.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Agreed:

1. That COLONEL DONOVAN should ask MR. SHERWOOD and other O.W.I. representatives what propaganda objectives they propose to take in Syria.
2. That the proposal should be discussed with British and Free French representatives before a decision as to establishment of resistance groups can be made.

No. 1

S E C R E T

SUBCOMMITTEE OF
JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE
Verbatim Report, July 29, 1942, 1100.

PRESENT

Hon. W. J. Donovan	Hon. Geo. Wadsworth
Lt. Col. V. H. Connor	Mr. J. A. Wilson
Lt. Col. C. C. Blakeney	Lt. Col. A. B. Hoskins
Captain H. J. Redfield, USN	
Lt. Cmdr. F. J. Courtney	
Mr. Edmund Taylor	

SECRETARIAT

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank.

Reporter: Sgt. Foster.

(The meeting was already in progress, and Mr. Wadsworth was speaking when the report was started)

MR. WADSWORTH: The Free French had been trying to run the country, maintaining the prestige of the French. The British under this Liaison Mission, and this particular Spears, had been building up a parallel administration throughout the country to such a degree that our consul, who reports from Beirut says that Catroux' policies are to oust the Free French from the government and to take over. Obviously, this isn't an open British policy, but he is afraid that if Spears is successful, it will be accepted as it is and welcomed by the British Government.

We have felt that that was no way for allies to work in a country which is in that position, so we made representations in London asking our ambassador there to take it up with Halifax. He told the Secretary of State why Churchill sent Spears out there, and that it was time to get rid of Spears and start a new setup there where we can all work together. That is where the State Department stands. In that connection we want to do two things from a diplomatic point of view to help. One is to implement a statement of last November that we made following that occupation, that we sympathize, and that we have always held since the beginning of the mandate theory, that they should obtain their full sovereignty. We want to implement that by appointing someone else as diplomatic agent to Syria and Lebanon. A diplomatic agent is sent to a country which is semi-independent. We had them in Bulgaria when Bulgaria was a semi-autonomous province. We had a

minister in Morocco until the establishment of the French Protectorate.

COLONEL DONOVAN: What is his authority; letters of credence from the President which he presents the same way as a minister does?

MR. WADSWORTH: He is the lowest form of a diplomatic representative of his government, and he deals on a factual basis with the authorities existent, exercising the effect of his authority. General Wilson exercised his authority in the defense of the country. The Free French exercised it. You have two governments exercising it. Our policy has been, and we presented it to London -- and we are taking it up with Cairo to see if we can't elaborate some sort of a plan whereby gradually these puppet governments will take over the exercise of more of the functions of the sovereign governments.

If two new delegations are sent out there, we are going to have much more of a staff than has been there, a consul general protecting American interests. What we want to add to that staff is several attaches. The idea is to have a military attache as a professional observer. Certainly they are going to send an economic attache. I gathered that we are taking over the supply of the Near East, not only military supplies, but also basic supplies necessary for the civilian population. We are sending a food controller out to Persia. The Persian Government has asked us for him. Mr. Winant's brother has probably gone to the Middle East supply center in Cairo, which has a job of getting from its representatives in the different provinces in the Near East the basic needs for basic commodities and seeing that they are ordered and shipping; space

is furnished for these supplies. My theory is that it is going to take on more and more of that control thing, and working through the U.K.O.C. and the U.S., we will get the stuff out there on the basis of reports from our own people. Therefore, we need quite a man for that. The facilities will be available to all the different branches of the government.

Next is the O.W.I. We have letters from Sherwood saying he wants to send three men there -- a special attache that would be called a cultural attache in South America. They don't like the word "cultural" in the Middle East. He is going to be a special attache to do the direct newspaper, cinema, photographs, propaganda, and things of that sort. We are going to send out match boxes with a statement translated into French that the President says to the Free French, "We are not forgetting you."

The idea is that they want to do direct open propaganda work.

Grit (?) is the first person asked for the job. I gather he has had newspaper, editorial, movie, and some propaganda experience in this country. He is especially recommended by Elmer Davis for the job. Attached to him, as an outer angle, is this man Brown, five years archeological work, and last head of the Yale Mission. He is one of our very best and thoroughly sound archeologists that we have had out there. Since he came back he has been a professor at Yale. Between these two then they will make a good team.

The two countries are under mandate from Beirut. It is the seat of the High Commissioner. It is the seat of the Free French. It is the seat of the Spears Liaison Mission. It is the seat of the Wheat Control Board, which is functioning as the Middle East supply center to get

supplies to the country. But it is a port. It is Syrian, Lebanon; it is largely Christian. What we want to do is get to the Arabs of the country, who are in the interior. We don't have much difficulty in appealing to the average Christian and Lebanon with our line of propaganda. What we want to do is build up a relationship based on trust with outstanding people in the rest of the country, notably the Moslems. Therefore, the theory is that I shall have a legation in Beirut to the Lebanese, and Damascus to Syria, and there I shall have a secretary consul in my staff. It is my thought that there is where this mission ought to function, primarily on the Moslem area. We are going to erect buildings for all this. People will organize what they have to do and what the mission should be.

COLONEL DONOVAN: I wonder if you could tell us what the facilities of propaganda are in Syria, newspapers, printing shops, radios, and so on.

MR. WADSWORTH: There is the Free French radio which we could use in cooperation with them. There are two radio centers in Palestine. There is not only the Palestine broadcasting but that new Middle East broadcasting station they put up. From the point of view of getting out radio propaganda in Arabia, cooperation with the British and French will be very simple and they are delighted to have us. I was reading last month several reports from Jerusalem where they welcome propaganda which we have given them there.

There is an American mission press in Beirut which is first class. There is lithographing stuff. They can do excellent sheets of photographs in Palestine and they have all the modern Jewish technique. There is the Palestine Post. It is a bang-up modern newspaper sheet. Generally speaking, this mission work is in Syria, but with the Arabs of that

western area.

Today they are beginning again to talk of a United Syria after the war. The Arabs have argued for twenty-five years that it was a damn bad business to split Syria, including Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and so forth. After this war they want to see all of their country, north, south, east, and west, reunited under some form of federation. The Arabs are talking unity. They are saying "Iqalam Inglessi", which means a oneness. That is what they are getting at.

There are many interpretations of how that unity is going to be brought about as there are Arab leaders. They never can agree themselves on what kind of unity they want, but each is in favor of it if they would rule. Emir Abdullah of Transjordan would like to see it, if it were under his control. The Alaouite area in the North would like to rule it all also, and Iraq would be glad to have had it all one as long as their king would be king. Trans-Jordan would work for it, no end for control of Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Syria, with the capital at Damascus. Syria-Lebanon wanted to unite in some sort of federal union.

What most people seem to see coming now in all this, the trend of the unity movement, is that with the end of the war you will have something in the nature of a United States of Syria. You will have the different areas. There will be an Alaouite area in the North; there will be the Christians; there will be an inner land in Syria, primarily Moslem; there will be Palestine, the bottled Arab country. There will be Trans-Jordan, which will develop its own special province, and a coastal area for the Jews in Palestine. Over there the most barren well-graded country in the world is not Jew country; it is Arab country. It will be a

thing in the nature of a United States of Syria, a senator from each one, a representative, will be set up. The holy places themselves of Jerusalem and Bethlehem will be set aside. They are the bone of contention. They will be removed and put under administration control. The Syria he wants to work with is not all Arab; it is mostly Moslem. It has been no end in being supplied Axis propaganda. We believe, and have reports substantiated from all sources we have that are first-class, a fifth column is organized there already, and that, generally speaking, all those who are not fifth columnists and prepared to jump any minute they are told, are on the fence politically and tending to go down on the other side, taking the Axis side.

What we want to get are some of those people sitting on the fence now, some of those notably trained in the schools and universities in the Near East who are democratically-minded, and who would like to see us win this war. We want to get them organized ourselves to this mission in the Near East and they can help us in psychological warfare with these people. We have to sell America to these people. The basic proposition is you can fight a war better in the country where the people are with you than when they are against you, even though they are not doing anything against you.

Basically, our position in the Near East is still 90% good, ourselves, America, as distinguished from the British. Before the last war when I first went out there the Arabs would swear by the word of an Englishman. Today if two Arabs meet in the bazaars at Jerusalem and one is telling a big story, the other one will say, "What, are y u talking

English?" The difference is between day and night. They do not trust British declarations of policy any more. They do not trust the Free French declarations of policy, because the French have been trying to hang on to that country, hang on to the mandatory regime in spite of the fact they have declared the independence of those two countries.

There is only one of our United Nations they really trust, and that is the United States. I say 90% instead of 100% because they are beginning to distrust us about 10%. The reason for that is this: First of all, all through the last century we built up out there a magnificent background of missionary and philanthropic work. There were hospitals, missions, building up this great organization in Beirut; the other universities at Cairo, Constantinople.

That educational system has given us today thousands of men in the Near East in responsible positions who know what our work is and that Americans come there for centuries and give them the best America has to offer to any foreign people. There was also the Near East relief in the last war, \$100,000,000. Our trade out there is good. We had the automobile people, the typewriter people, the furniture and machinery business. We have good trade out there, no shyster trade. All of this plus the important factor that we have had no political axe to grind in the Middle East, that we have had no political or territorial ambitions -- and they know it -- has made us in the Near East in the last twenty-five years a great power.

Today we are a great power, a great power not only because of what we did, but because of the example that they find in us and in our democratic institutions, from what they adhere to themselves. They want independence. They

don't believe they are going to get it without a fly in the ointment. There have been first-class statements of policy from London, but they have seen them for twenty-five years. Each one of those statements of policy, implemented and interpreted from London, have always been interpreted and implemented, as the Arabs see it, in favor of the Jews. The Arabs have been very much convinced that they are right because the local British officials themselves did not like the interpretation of London that these general statements of policy were given.

Briefly, without over-simplifying it, there has grown up this feeling, not only in Palestine, but generally throughout the Middle East, British policy, the policy of the British Government, the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, has been dictated by the influential Jews in England, whose major theme has been the realization of Zionist aims; that is, the setup in Palestine of a Jewish State. Political Zionism means the setting up in Palestine of a Jewish State. Zionism is defined as Jewish nationalism.

The Arabs have felt the power of this nationalism, these people with a different culture coming into their country. With their political aims, the establishment of a Jewish State over all Palestine, has knocked the wind out of the Arabs no end. They have seen and come to the conclusion right in a moment that British policy has been dictated by influential leaders of that group. Little by little in the last five years there has been a feeling that our policy, too, the American policy, with respect to them has also been dictated by Zionist leaders in the United States.

I saw the beginnings of that, and I saw the first -- and this wasn't Axis propaganda -- time that Mr. Roosevelt

was called "Mr. Rosenfeld," in the Arab press. The first was semi-humorous with rather nasty cracks that began to gather as to our policy out there. I saw the Grand Mufti and others and they sort of laughed it off. They didn't think it was good policy with their own people. But a thing like that starts, and it has been played up in a great big way by the Germans all over the world.

They believe that our government policy is beginning to be influenced in favor of political Zionism, that is the settlement of a Jewish State, and they will never take it. We have to get out a statement with respect to the Near East, a simple statement that the principles of the Atlantic Charter apply, that those paragraphs in Mr. Hull's speech last week on liberty, and that our purpose in the past and now is that we shall use the full measure of our import to support the freedom for people who by their acts show they are capable of self-rule.

I don't know where all this political background is going, but what can this mission do? We say in the Near East, and with the Arabs more than any place I have ever worked, "You don't get anywhere unless you have personal relationship." There is no such thing as honesty as an abstract quality.

I have got a relationship with you where we can trust each other 100%, but somebody else cannot trust you or me. A rug dealer I have known and dealt with for years is an honest rug dealer with me. He is not an honest rug dealer. If I sent you there, he wouldn't take all your eye teeth, but he would take most of them. He has that chance; he has that opportunity.

He is going out there with the right kind of people to work with and for. His job is to sell America personally to those people and to the picked people to build up something that I call in the nature of a counter-fifth column, a fifth column not only of our own that will find out what that fifth column of the Axis is there for and counter it, but we will have a group of men who have these democratic ideas instilled in them from our great background of prestige that we have had, men who can say, "This statement means what it says. I have talked to the Secretary; I have talked to all of them. The President sent me out here. He says to tell you what it says, that at the end of this war you people are going to be independent, irrespective of what you think the British are going to put over or the Free French." If he can do that and sell that idea and base it on a conviction that we are going to win this war, and if you will remove the threat -- it is not a nice word -- the immediate threat of the Rommel attack on Egypt, you can get some of those fellows after that to come out overtly and work for you and with you.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Mr. Wilson, have you anything you want to add to that?

MR. WILSON: No, I think he has covered that very thoroughly.

The general situation is that on top you have occupying powers in all these countries, whether they are British or Free French. We are leaving out Arabia for a moment. At the bottom you have nationalism which is opposed to the occupation. In between you may have a puppet government which is not really a factor in the picture. It is puppet

under the occupying power. It is necessary to put something else in between. The only thing which we can put is some American force which is still trusted. It may not be within another six months because our position is slightly deteriorating. Mr. Wadsworth said ninety percent trusted. We used to be one hundred percent trusted. We can put that American force in between the nationalists who want their independence and are opposed to the occupying force, characteristically British, and the others. I think he said that. I just wanted to underline it. I think the important thing is Colonel Hoskins' statement.

COLONEL CONNOR: How are you going to convince them that you have the power to give them these things that you promise them in the face of the British and French occupation?

MR. WILSON: That is a very difficult problem because we are bound politically and militarily with the British and Free French. We say we are in favor of their independence, and they say, "Can you get it for us?" There is a question. I don't know what the answer is going to be on that.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Of course, Colonel, the great difficulty in answering our question is the conflict that may come between the British and the Free French on the one hand, and ourselves on the other. I think that is one of the things that has got to be worked out before there is any movement in there. We have to come to some arrangement with them, just as we have to deal with O.V.I.

COLONEL CONNOR: That is what I was thinking. Unless you have an agreement with the British and the French, and they are going to cooperate with us, you are going to have

three types of propaganda and confusion there.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Yes. It seemed best, therefore, to try to lay this whole thing before the Committee and then get some direction as to the approach with the British and Free French.

COLONEL HOSKINS: I can shorten my statement because of the background Mr. Wadsworth has given. I can leave with you copies of this memorandum with some of the basic points.

The importance of holding the Near East is something that you are just as familiar with as any one, so there is no necessity of emphasizing it. I was impressed yesterday when I was over in the War Department with the increasing seriousness of the point of view taken by the Army people in case this area is lost to the United Nations. So some effort, even if it seems at a late hour and almost too late, still seems to be worth doing if there is any possibility of its being of some use.

Even though the Near East is at present a British theater of occupation, of military occupations, and even though we don't have here in the United States sufficient troops perhaps at the moment to be able to send out much military support, we feel that there is a job that can be done in that area still along the lines outlined by Mr. Wadsworth, and it does go back to this one basic factor, the prestige and influence which the United States has in that area, gradually deteriorating, as outlined to you, but nevertheless still very strong. The background is that we have had no territorial or vested economic interests out there to tarnish the work of the missions of educational and

and philanthropic groups who over a period of years have not concentrated on proselyting, sometimes, as you think of military work, but education, philanthropic work. We were not dealing with help then, and it was not put on that basis.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Excuse me. I should have said that Colonel Hoskins was born in Syria. He comes of a family which has been there a hundred years now, I think. He is vice-president of the American university out there. Colonel Hospitala himself was in the 5th Marines in the last war, and was wounded, and he still has a strong acquaintance out there with many of the leaders today.

COLONEL HOSKINS: Since the last war I have been in business out there. I have been vice-president of the Cannon Mills in New York, cotton goods. I have traveled out there. I am not vice-president of the university; I am vice-president of the board of trustees.

The method that has been suggested is that a group or mission should go out to work in this area in support of the political phases of this thing that have been outlined by Mr. Wadsworth. From the start I think you realize that to be fully effective such a mission -- and we will come to the difficulties that will result from it -- must with the prior agreement of the British, and necessarily the Free French, be known and operated as an American organization. In other words, to take advantage of the prestige and strength we have, our mission and operations must be definitely American and not apparently tied to a British kite to such an extent that they no longer trust our mission any more than they do the British or French.

At the same time such a mission must be operated in

accordance with agreements already arrived at with the S.O.E. in London; Colonel Donovan and Colonel Goodfellow were in London. It was agreed then that a mission should be sent out by O.S.S. to the British Middle East Command, and in harmony with the general procedure of necessity, this mission would have to operate under the general direction of the British military, and in cooperation with them.

As regards actual operations, actual work aside from the building of local organizations, which we would be free to do, would, as long as this remained a British theater of military operations, naturally function under them and only with their approval. That would relate primarily to the S. O. operations, that is to the setting up of sabotage and guerilla organizations in case the whole Near East area were lost. The aim then, of course, would be to have an organization already set up before that occurs that could continue to harrass the enemy until that area could be recon. It would also contemplate setting up an S. I. organization for information, strategic information in that area, both to work together under one head.

The third would be as Mr. Wadsworth outlined, persist in countering the efforts of the Axis to infiltrate and organize those areas for later military occupation. Those are the three specific and definite jobs tied in to the functions, as I understand it, to the objectives of the O.S.S.

The fourth function is one that comes into the phases of psychological warfare, working in the closest cooperation with the consular and diplomatic officials in that area to get more active assistance, military, economic, and moral, from the peoples of this area for our war effort. This phase of the thing is one, I take it, that this Committee is primarily interested in. Obviously, its work will depend on whether we hold the area militarily or not. On the

assumption we do hold the area militarily, active propaganda on the one hand, and personal contact with local leaders and key people of all of that area, on the other hand, can, we believe, assist materially in holding that area against the penetration of the Axis. The suggested area of operations then would be what used to be Syria. It would be the Arab-speaking world at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Iran for geographical reasons, and Saudi Arabia. Such a mission would make its headquarters probably with the British Middle East Command, wherever that might be. A second headquarters is suggested for Beirut, where with Mr. Wadsworth's organization, the Americans in Beirut, and the organizations we have there, would make the place most popular, and subsidiary headquarters in the various political areas. The suggested organization of such a mission would initially require twenty-five men, including military and civilian members. In order to keep the competition and duplication of existing British organizations in this same area to a minimum, it is suggested that this American group aim preliminarily at enlisting the support of students and graduates of American schools and colleges in the Near East as the backbone for all our work, for sabotage and guerilla work on the one hand in case that area were lost, and for all forms of more active war work, on the other hand, in case we hold it. The students of those institutions are the physical elite of that area. The older graduates are naturally the key leaders all through that whole Near Middle East, including Egypt and as far east as India.

The possibility of gaining their support, as Mr. Wadsworth has indicated, to a great extent does center -- we must have some time; we are going out there at a late date --

but we have got a nucleus to go to and work with almost immediately in these students and graduates, and Bayard Dodge, who is the President of the American University in Beirut; a great friend of Mr. Vadasworth and myself. I have worked closely on the board of trustees for the past ten years; so I am fairly familiar with the organization and its problems; and I think with that background and the background of my family; -- my aunt who was the first and only woman ever allowed to practice medicine in the Turkish Empire before the war; she used to travel over that Arab area east of Damascus, and was able to go work and get in and know the people to a degree which no man ever at that time had been allowed to do -- I think those are the sort of connections that we can and must capitalize on while they are still good:

Despite the fact that such a mission would be coming at such a late date; it does seem if it were definitely worth the effort; and the amount of American personnel, the amount of supplies and funds required, we could go over this morning. The results of such a group might be substantial; particularly if it had the approval of the Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. I think it has that from the State Department. Also, if we may work out before we go the basic things that may absolutely prevent us from being successful -- first, is within our own setup, the relationship of this setup and how it will operate with such an organization as the Office of War Information, so that the propaganda story that is told, the psychological warfare story that is told, will be correlated and the same. You can't tell one story in Saudi Arabia, another in Iraq, another in Palestine, and have the darn thing held together.

The second thing is to have a clear understanding with the War Department or with the American general in that area, who may or may not -- I don't know -- be interested or familiar with the possibilities of psychological warfare in the Arab world, and the necessity for it.

Third, to have as clear an understanding as possible with our British and French allies as to what we are doing and why we are doing it. Obviously, there are possibilities of conflict with the policies which some, at least, of the French and the British, hold as regards Syria and the Near East. On the other hand, if we can get that cleared, if we can make them understand, hear, and sell the same story out there, that we are not opposing the British and the French, we are doing something which ought to have their support to help us win the war, that this work is needed, and that the independence, the assurance of independence for those areas after the war is a necessity for holding that against losing it to the Axis -- if we can get those things cleared here before we go, then I think we can do a job out there.

I have copies of this and specifically the personnel, the tons of articles, ammunition, and explosives, the transportation that is required, and the secret funds which will be needed, at least to a certain extent, in doing a job in that area. It is not an idea of going in and doing a wholesale bribery job, but there are uses to which secret funds can be put in working with these key people in these different areas that we ought to have.

I think one final thing is that if we are going to function at this late date, we must be able to take with us the basic supplies that we need, ammunition, arms explosives we must have on the ground out there, transportation

supplied from those areas, so we can go to work immediately when we get there, and not be held up for weeks and months after that. If we can get that, we can move pretty fast. We have part of our organization already set up, and if the approval is here for the plan as a whole, I think we ought to be able to begin, at least some of us get off, within the next ten days or two weeks.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Are there any questions that any of you gentlemen want to ask?

COLONEL BLAKENEY: How much of a military personnel is incorporated in this mission?

COLONEL DONOVAN: The only idea is to have it not strictly in the sense military, but to have the people and leaders working with these people and organize their resistance, having them there to set up a proper kind of an organization.

COLONEL BLAKENEY: I got the impression from what Colonel Hoskins said that it would be military.

COLONEL DONOVAN: Not all the men in uniforms, no.

COLONEL BLAKENEY: The reason I ask, is it the proper answer to send out a person in uniform on a mission which is not at all primarily of a military nature? What I am getting at is that in the main the function of this mission is the establishment of a subversive organization in the event the Middle East falls to the Axis, the establishment of a subversive intelligence organization in any event, and the distribution of military and economic and political propaganda. If such is the case, and it counts in its membership a military function, does it lose part of its basic reasonability?

COLONEL DONOVAN: I think it would depend on the things they were to do, but I will let Colonel Hoskins answer that

question if he cares to.

COLONEL HOSKINS: If you are going into a Neutral country, of course it would have to be. But the S. O. organization, the corresponding organization of the British, is military, and the leader of the British S. O. operation in the Middle East Command is an officer on the staff of the commanding general of the Middle East Area.

COLONEL DONOVAN: All through that area particularly, subversive work is done under the direction of the officers in uniform.

COLONEL BLAKENBY: As a matter of fact, I feel it is important that on the staff of the commander the actual head of such a unit should be, but not the active head in the area.

COLONEL DONOVAN: It does not mean he would be in uniform in the area. He could be an officer.

MR. WILSON: I think it has a psychological importance in the Near East.

COLONEL DONOVAN: I know that an officer has a much greater effect. I noticed that myself all through that area in dealing with that problem. It is a power, and it is important.

MR. WADSWORTH: It is a theater of operations, and military authorities are in direct control everywhere.

COLONEL DONOVAN: For instance, Mr. Wilson; if he would go out there, probably he would be viewed with suspicion and wouldn't get anywhere at all.

The uniform would speak for the power of the United States to these people. I think this mission will certainly affectuate the work normally done that most of us are trying to do.

COLONEL BLAKENEY: I realize the military thought. The only thing that reaches the Arab mind is power. The only other thing that reaches them is money.

MR. WADSWORTH: And something in the way of assurance that these national organizations of his are going to be realized.

COLONEL HOSKINS: Yes, power, money, and independence. Those three are the ones.

MR. WADSWORTH: Yes, independence; he wants it. It is the bread of life. He must have it. They talk it everywhere, independence.

CAPTAIN REDFIELD: How do the British feel about that?

MR. WADSWORTH: They are apparently in favor of it for Syria and Lebanon. They are very hesitant about making any pronouncement about Palestine.

COLONEL DONOVAN: I think that the first point is whatever arrangements we can make with the British as to the line to follow. Then, having determined that, we have to see what line the Free French are prepared to follow. Those two questions are at the very threshold. This is involving mostly what shall be done in the way of speaking to these people, the means that we take of proclaiming our idea. Apart from that, I think there is another function, and that is the assumption that the Middle East would go. Then it is a serious problem for us to put out any kind of assistance of any sort we can. Certainly during this period now where we just got to watch that, we ought to do something more than wait. That is to get people of influence in there who could arouse these people to the ultimate winning of the war. I think that is the thing that has to

be brought in on the Arab, or he won't go anywhere. If he would accept what he sees before him, why he wouldn't want us to be in. If he is willing to see beyond and recognize our potential ability will mean the winning of the war, then he may go with us. In that period we have to get organized within the country, right in the hills or wherever it is necessary. That, I assume is the real reason that you are prepared to come in here and make this fight, because you believe people will go to the hills with you.

COLONEL HOSKINS: That is right.

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EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

July 27, 1942

AID TO SYRIA

COLONEL DONOVAN brought up the question of formation of groups of resistance in SYRIA and SAUDI ARABIA. The O.S.S. has arranged with MR. HOSKIES to visit SYRIA to initiate such activities; and even though this area is under British control, he believes that the project is practicable. He stated, however, that the State Department has authorized O.W.I. to send two men to SYRIA to work with the consul there, and he questioned the purpose of sending these two O.W.I. representatives.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Requested COLONEL DONOVAN to discuss this matter with the State Department and with the O.W.I. and to report back his findings to this Committee at its next meeting.