

FRANCE
MATERIEL

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 12, 1942

COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRANCE

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reported that the Navy Department considers this project to be in the British sphere of operations, and therefore believes that the Free French should request the six P. T. boats from the Admiralty.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Took note that COLONEL DONOVAN would discuss this project with representatives of the British Admiralty.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 11, 1942

COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRANCE

COLONEL DONOVAN introduced MR. W. A. ROSEBOROUGH, who stated the details of a proposal to furnish the Free French with certain materials in return for their cooperation in setting up and developing communications with FRANCE, both occupied and unoccupied. He recommended two projects:

1. Establishment of a radio network of one station in BELGIUM and three stations in FRANCE, to remain latent until combat operations begin.
2. Establishment of an operational base at GIBRALTAR for the purpose of maintaining underground communications with SOUTHWESTERN FRANCE and NORTH AFRICA; this would also serve as a base for subversive activities.

As a quid pro quo the Free French services want (1) about 50 radio sets, most of which O.S.S. can furnish; (2) five or six vedettes or PT boats capable of operating in the English Channel under adverse weather conditions or of covering the considerable distances involved in the GIBRALTAR plan; (3) some small planes. The last request is not regarded as feasible.

Following MR. ROSEBOROUGH'S departure, CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF raised doubt as to the availability of any U. S. PT boats for this project and suggested that the British might better be able to spare six boats of this type.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

- a. Agreed that the plan had merit and should be further investigated as to feasibility of providing the material desired by the Free French;
- b. Requested CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF to ascertain if the Navy could make six PT boats available for this project.

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YOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICESINTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE:

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Problem of Supplying Material for the Development
of our Activities in France.

1. Our efforts to date for the development of our Intelligence activities in France have been directed to sending agents in the Unoccupied Zone under plausible private cover. It has become rather clear that the Vichy Government is not likely to grant entry visas to any American citizen going to France for private or business reasons. Should we succeed in placing men in France, it is obvious that the effectiveness of their operations will depend upon the presence of a Chief Agent in Vichy.

2. In view of the difficulties encountered so far in reference to obtaining visas, and considering also that our relations with the Vichy regime may eventually deteriorate to the point of diplomatic rupture, we must envisage other means of establishing and maintaining communications with France, both Occupied and Unoccupied, through clandestine and underground channels. The possibility of setting up and developing such communications with the cooperation of the Free French Special Services and other underground groups has been closely examined and we have made contacts with representatives of the Free French Services in this country and with other persons connected with underground resistance activities in France.

3. Two detailed projects have been prepared involving the following:

a. Setting up a Radio Network in several sectors in France and Belgium for the transmission of strategic information at the time a landing is made on the continent. The essential feature of this project is that the Network would remain dormant until combat operations actually begin. This would insure obtaining rapidly essential military information at the most critical moment.

b. Setting up an operational base at Gibraltar for the purpose of maintaining underground communications with Southwestern France and North Africa.

4. For these projects to be carried out it is essential for us to be in a bargaining position so that we can offer a quid pro quo to the Free French Services or any other group with whom we may decide to collaborate. This involves the possibility on our part of supplying certain material either to facilitate the activities of the Free French Services, if we decide to work with them, or to set up independent activities with any other group or organization. The material which we must be in a position to provide in either case involves the following:

a. Approximately 50 radio sets capable of meeting the requirements of clandestine operations. This problem has been examined with the assistance of radio

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technicians and we are reasonably sure of having this material from a special allotment within a relatively short time.

b. Making available to those who will cooperate with us both at the England base or at Gibraltar, a total of five or six vedettes capable of operating in the Channel under adverse weather conditions, or of covering the considerable distances involved in the Gibraltar plan.

c. The problem of having available small planes for the transportation of personnel has also been raised, but it is felt that this problem will have to be examined more carefully before any request is presented.

5. One of our representatives is to leave shortly for London to examine the possibilities of carrying out these various projects, arrangements have been made for him to discuss these projects with the representatives of the Free French Services and other groups in London. In order for these conversations to lead to concrete results, it is most important that this representative be prepared to discuss the problem of material with the assurance that we can carry out our part of any arrangement concluded.

Colonel Donovan

Problem of Supplying Material for the Development of our Activities in France.

1. Our efforts to date for the development of our intelligence activities in France have been directed to landing agents in the Unoccupied Zone under plausible private cover. It has become rather clear that the Vichy Government is not likely to grant entry visas to any American citizen going to France for private or business reasons. Should we succeed in placing men in France, it is obvious that the effectiveness of their operations will depend upon the presence of a Chief Agent in Vichy.

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b. Setting up an operational base at Gibraltar for the purpose of maintaining underground communications with Southwestern France and North Africa.

- 3 -

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a. Approximately 50 radio sets capable of meeting the requirements of clandestine operations. This problem has been examined with the assistance of radio technicians and we are reasonably sure of having this material from a special allotment within a relatively short time.

b. Making available to those who will cooperate with us both at the England base or at Gibraltar, a total of five or six vedettes capable of operating in the Channel under adverse weather conditions, or of covering the considerable distances involved in the Gibraltar plan.

c. The problem of having available small planes for the transportation of personnel has also been raised, but it is felt that this problem will have to be examined more carefully before any request is presented.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 6, 1942

FROM: David Bruce
 TO: Colonel Donovan

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 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

You will remember that last week at a conference which you attended, we discussed a French Project and a Gibraltar Project with General Kroner and Captain Pickhardt. In both projects were involved the supply by us of two Corvettes or Vedettes or naval craft of similar character.

I was advised yesterday by O.N.I. that the matter of supply of such craft should be taken up, in connection with the projects, by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee and, if approved by it, should be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The present situation is that, in our discussions with various French Intelligence Services, it is necessary for us to be in a bargaining position so that we can give them a quid pro quo in return for the strategic and assistance that they will furnish us. In the two instances outlined by these projects, particularly the latter, what is particularly want is this assistance to the war effort.

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If the Joint Chiefs of Staff would decide that the Navy would furnish us with such vessels, the practicable way to carry the projects forward, as far as this little far is concerned, would very likely be to have our naval representative in London undertake to furnish the boats there. Possibly they could be lent by the British with the promise of replacement later to the United States Navy.

As Mr. Roseborough is going to London August 1st, and expects to be in London about a week later, it would be highly desirable, if you do not mind, that the J.C.S. talk with the J.P.S.C. and the J.C.S. and have a decision reached as quickly as possible, so that Mr. Roseborough will be in a position to make an offer to the French.

In addition to the two projects, there are two more in the same folder concerning the project, that should be considered.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ROUTING AND RECORD BUREAU

Document No.
 Date Rec'd RA

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. <i>Dir</i>	<i>1212</i>	<i>8/5</i>		<i>MS</i>	
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 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
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 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Leon Destert

DATE: August 5, 1942

TO: Major David K. Bruce

SUBJECT: Extent of collaboration with the Free French

The projects submitted for the development of activities in France independently of any diplomatic agent in Vichy, emphasize the importance of establishing close and practical collaboration with the Free French Special Services. This plan should be construed as tentative until the representative of the Western European Section has had an opportunity to examine in London the feasibility and soundness of this contemplated collaboration.

On the basis of information received from various sources it appears that the Free French Special Services have not always proved as reliable and as effective as the circumstances require. In examining the various possibilities for carrying out these projects and setting up these communication networks, it was thought that we should first examine the possibility of close collaboration with the Free French Special Services. However, if these Services do not work effectively or their discretion cannot be trusted, we must be prepared to carry out our projects through other connections with underground organizations. We are now in a position to establish contact with various resistance groups independently of the Free French Special Services. Furthermore, we have learned that in London we may be able to make connections with former members of the French Intelligence Services who are not directly connected with the Free French Special Services.

Should we decide after examining the situation that it would be best to proceed without tying up with the Free French Special Services, we would have even greater need of the material mentioned in the projects for the transportation of personnel and the establishment of communications, and might also need the assistance of Navy personnel. The necessity for a prompt decision on the question of policy in reference to the material needed for implementing these projects would not, therefore, be affected by a later decision not to carry them out in collaboration with the Free French Special Services. No matter whom we work with in the realization of these projects we will have to be assured of the material needed to carry them out.

W.K.B.

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SECRET
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: August 5, 1942

FROM: Leon Dostert
 TO: Major David K. Bruce
 SUBJECT: French File

The file on France delivered to you this morning includes the following documents:

- 1) Report of Progress on Various Projects.
- 2) Memo from L. D. to Mr. Hugh Wilson on the establishment and maintenance of communications with France in the event of a break with Vichy.
- 3) French Project No. 4 (Radio Network)
- 4) Gibraltar Project No. 1 (Operational Base for Southwestern Europe - North Africa)

The first of these documents presents a picture of our French activities and includes an outline of our plans for the future. The memorandum to Mr. Wilson outlines the steps contemplated to insure that communications with France would be maintained in case of a diplomatic breach between our Government and the Vichy regime. French Project No. 4 presents the details of a plan for setting up a radio network which would remain dormant until landing operations begin on the continent. Gibraltar Project No. 1 provides for the establishment of an operational base at Gibraltar for the development and maintenance of communications with Southwestern Europe through the Mediterranean and North Africa.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTER-OFFICE MEMO

FROM: Leon Destort

DATE: July 22, 1942

TO: Mr. Hugh Wilson

SUBJECT: Collaboration with Free French Special Services and Establishment and Maintenance of Communications with France in the Event of a Diplomatic Break with Vichy.

I. Our present efforts are mainly directed to the organization and development of information activities in France through the Unoccupied Zone. These activities must rely for their direction and for communications upon the presence in Vichy of a Chief Agent attached to our Embassy's staff. Should our relations with the Petain-Laval regime deteriorate to the point of a diplomatic breach, the removal of our Chief Agent would not only impair the operations of our intelligence organization, but would leave us without established means of communication with France.

II. The following plan in the form of various specific projects is now being prepared to insure the maintenance of communications with France in the event of a break with Vichy:

A. Development of closer collaboration with the Free French Special Services in London (with secondary liaison here in Washington) on a mutually profitable basis. This subject has already been discussed in detail with one of their representatives here and the collaboration contemplated would involve on their part:

1. Making available to us on a day-to-day basis any information obtained by their Services in which we may be interested. While such arrangements and procedure have long since existed between the British Services and the Free French, it is felt that closer collaboration between our services and theirs would definitely present additional advantages.

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2. Use of their own facilities by them to obtain for us any specific information in which we may be particularly interested.

3. Assisting us in recruiting and transporting some of the personnel needed to carry out our independent activities in France.

4. Possibility for some of our agents and contacts in France to have indirect access (through a cut-out) to their own means of communication.

5. An understanding that additional information gathered as a result of the development of their activities through our assistance is to be made available to us.

On our part, to obtain the assistance outlined above, we must be prepared to offer the French some concrete aid. This involves the following:

1. Share with them insofar as we may deem it suitable, information gathered through our own activities in France.

2. Affording them the use of two or three vedettes to be based in England, capable of crossing the Channel under adverse weather conditions. These boats would be used for the transportation of personnel to and from the French Coast.

3. Making available to the French Services some of the smaller radio sets from our own OSS allotment.

4. It was also suggested that at some future date it would be of great material assistance to have available one or two small planes for the transportation of personnel to and from the Occupied Zone.

This last suggestion, of course, involves a number of practical and technical difficulties which would have to be carefully examined on the spot before any sort of commitment is made.

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B. Setting up an operational base at Gibraltar to maintain contact with the French Mediterranean Coast, and to serve as a base for eventual connections with North Africa. (See Gibraltar Project).

This involves close cooperation with a French underground organization which is now functioning chiefly in the Unoccupied Zone, but which has ramifications into the Occupied Areas. From recent conversations with the head of this underground organization, it has become clear that if we were in a position to offer material assistance, particularly the possibility of utilizing two or three vedettes for communication between Gibraltar and the French Coast, we can be assured that, in return, this underground organization would assist us in maintaining communications and contacts in France.

It appears that a Joint Committee for this organization is to be set up in London with British and Free French participation. It is our understanding that our participation in this Committee would be welcome, but our representative would have to be authorized to make commitments with reference to the material aid indicated.

C. Setting up a radio network in Belgium and in three French Sectors (North, Central, South) which would begin operations only after a permanent landing is effected by our forces. This network, according to present plans, would relay information directly to our Armed Forces (see French Project No. 4). The assistance of the French Special Services is indispensable for recruiting and transporting several radio operators needed for the development of this network.

III. This three-fold plan would assure the maintenance of communications with France independently of our diplomatic mission in Vichy. Moreover, if the present situation in regard to visas remains unchanged, this plan would enable us to initiate activities in France regardless of the visa obstacle. For its execution, it is essential that steps be taken to assure that the material indicated above can be obtained. To enter into conversations with the French Services with a view

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to developing our collaboration with them would do more harm than good unless we are really in a position to give concrete assurances of material aid. To engage negotiations on any other basis might well eliminate the possibility of developing close cooperation with them now or at a later date.

IV. It appears that Major Bruce recently had a conversation with Colonel Fiske concerning the best procedure to be followed to solve this type of difficulty. We understand that it was the latter's opinion that the approach might be made through the Joint Intelligence Committee. This Committee would apparently be in a position to take steps to facilitate the execution of these projects, and could address itself to the proper persons in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order that necessary directives will be forthcoming. It might be desirable to discuss this question more fully and with specific reference to these projects with Colonel Fiske.

V. In addition to the three-fold plan outlined above, the following possibilities for maintaining communications with France independently of Vichy should be examined with a view to defining the means of their execution:

- A. A tie-up between our Swiss activities and contacts in France to establish communications and relay French information via Switzerland.
- B. Development of means of communication with Southwestern France through our Basque contacts.
- C. Setting up means of communications between the Spanish East Coast (with headquarters at Barcelona), and agents located on the French Mediterranean littoral.

Inquiries have been forwarded to New York to determine whether more specific details can be obtained in reference to "B" and "C" above.

L. D.

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July 22, 1942

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YFRANCEREPORT OF PROGRESS ON VARIOUS PROJECTSA. UNOCCUPIED ZONE

The last progress report on French Projects submitted late in June emphasized the difficulties encountered in appointing a Chief Agent for France under official cover, as a member of our Embassy staff in Vichy, and the obstacles we had met in sending agents to Unoccupied France under unofficial cover through the refusal of the French Authorities to grant visas to such persons. Since that time we have endeavored to overcome both of these obstacles and to carry forward various projects. The following is a brief outline of our plans for France:

1. The problem of appointing a Chief Agent under official cover is on the point of being solved and latest reports indicate that the A.N.A., who is to assume the direction of our activities in the Unoccupied Zone, will shortly obtain the necessary visas to proceed to Lisbon. There he will meet with a representative of this branch who is to acquaint him thoroughly with our contemplated program and plans in France. It is expected that this meeting will take place in Lisbon about the middle of August and that shortly thereafter our operations in France will develop along more concrete lines.

2. The problem of obtaining visas from the Vichy authorities for agents proceeding under unofficial cover remains unsolved. One agent, for whom a definitely plausible and legitimate

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cover had been devised, has failed to obtain his visa after more than two months of effort. Although the visa has not been formally refused, the policy of prolonged delay resorted to by the French authorities makes it unlikely that we shall succeed in getting this man to France.

3. We have been in contact with a Frenchman who came to this country in December 1940 for business reasons and who is anxious to return to France at an early date. His security has been most carefully checked and it is felt that we could employ him with a minimum of risk. The Department of State has so far refused to grant him an Exit Permit because members of his family are now in Paris and one of his sons is a war prisoner in Germany. However, the Department has indicated that the Exit Permit will be granted if we make formal request for it. In view of this man's likely usefulness to us and considering that the risk involved is only slight, it has been decided to present a formal request to the State Department in order that this Exit Permit may be obtained. This prospect, formerly Director of a large Franco-American Shipping concern, is in a position to return to the Occupied Zone and to come back to Vichy later. He would thus be able to consult with some of his associates who for the past two years have been working in the principal ports along the French Atlantic Coast. These conversations would enable him to gather valuable information. Moreover, he may be able to obtain the services of a former French Army officer who would accept certain assignments in connection with our activities. (Detailed project on this case will be submitted this week.)

4. Through the New York office, we have contacted a member of an organization engaged in relief work among internees in various camps of the Unoccupied Zone. This man has already

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France. He appears to be most reliable and definitely capable of assisting in our activities within certain limits. He has contacts of his own over there and we would facilitate his work by giving him the names of other people who could assist him. His wife will accompany him and she is to be stationed in Lisbon, where she could be of some assistance to us. Moreover, this man may be able to find a place in his organization for a young physician who has had experience in France and who could be trained for more active participation in our activities. The passports have already been issued and no difficulties are anticipated in securing all necessary visas. (Detailed project on this case to be submitted in a few days.)

5. We have in training now a man who was in France until several months ago at the head of an important American concern. He has applied for a passport and the Department of State has so far raised no objection. This man has connections in France who may be able to intercede effectively in case he encounters difficulties in securing his French Visa, although it may well be that the Vichy authorities will once more resort to the policy of endless delay and postponement. This man has been active in underground work in the past and his connections and calibre are such as to warrant the expectation of real usefulness.

6. A project involving sending a man to France under the auspices of a well-known Cultural Association is now being developed. This will call for a grant of approximately \$10,000 to this Association for assistance to French intellectual workers through the faculties of various French universities. This mission would place our agent in a

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position to contact a number of persons in French intellectual circles and it is expected that through them valuable information can be gathered. The plan has been accepted in principle by the head of the Cultural Association referred to above and the candidate we presented for the mission has also been approved. We should be in a position to present a detailed project on this case within a week or two.

7. For the last several weeks we have been pursuing our plan to place a certain sum of money at the disposal of an outstanding labor leader in France for assistance to resisting elements among labor organizations. The transfer of funds presents real difficulties, but several possibilities are now being examined and it is expected that this project will be carried out shortly. The assistance thus granted should lead to effective cooperation between resistance groups and our own services.

8. In the course of the last several weeks, we have obtained from various sources the names of a number of people who can be counted upon as reliable contacts and sub-agents in France. These individuals have either participated in intelligence activities in the past, or are emphatically vouched for by reliable persons on this side. We now have the names of some forty individuals situated in various localities who can be approached by our agents with reasonable security.

B. PROJECT TO SUPPLEMENT THE ABOVE PROGRAM AND
TO ASSURE COMMUNICATIONS WITH FRANCE IN THE
EVENT OF A BREACH WITH VICHY.

The program summarized above has been conceived and drawn on

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the assumption that a Chief Agent would assume the direction of our activities under official cover in Vichy. The effectiveness of the several projects mentioned depends, of course, upon communication facilities, and these can only be assured through the assignment of an agent in charge of Vichy through whom the information secured will be transmitted. It is felt that we should likewise consider several projects to supplement this program. With this objective in mind, the following plans have been drawn up. The projects outlined below are also calculated to assure the maintenance of communications with France in the event of a diplomatic breach between this Government and the Vichy regime. It is of the utmost importance that this problem be envisaged at this time so that steps may be taken to give us reasonable certitude that the flow of information from France shall not suddenly cease at the very time when it will be most needed. This program involves the following projects:

1. Getting up an operational base at Gibraltar which, through the medium of a network developed by an underground French organization, would enable us to maintain contact with France through the Mediterranean Coast, and to establish some connections with North Africa in the event of a withdrawal of our mission there. The detailed project has been submitted and it is hoped that it will continue to receive serious consideration leading to effective steps for its realization.

2. Organizing a radio network in Belgium and in three separate zones in France to remain dormant until a landing is effected by our Forces on the continent. The project as drawn emphasizes the fact that the setting up of this network can only be effectively carried out from London, and with the close cooperation of the Free French

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Services there, particularly in recruiting part of the personnel needed. This in turn will call for assistance on our part to the French Special Services in the form of materiel such as vedettes (details on the type wanted are now on hand), radio receiving and transmitting sets, and possibly the use of several Stinson B-10's. While the difficulties involved in getting this materiel are fully realized, it is hoped that no effort will be spared to secure it so that our own projects can be carried out.

3. Effective liaison with the head of the Free French Military Mission in Washington has been developed and we can be reasonably assured that a mutually useful collaboration between ourselves and the French Special Services can be achieved on a working and practical level. This would enable us to have more complete access to the data gathered by the French, who already have a rather effective network in operation. Moreover, any additional information which our materiel assistance would enable them to gather would be made readily available to us. We cannot hope to pursue conversations with these Services toward fruitful conclusions either here or in London unless we are in a position to engage in more than verbal and platonic negotiations. For that reason, unless we are to resign ourselves to the prospect of having no intelligence network in operation in France at the time when it will be most urgently needed, we should seek as early as possible to bring up this question before members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Joint Intelligence Committee, in order that proper steps may be taken if these projects are deemed useful and feasible.

4. We are also examining the possibilities of securing.

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some means of communication with France, independently of the Vichy tie-up, through Switzerland, the Eastern Pyrenees and Catalonia, and the Western Pyrenees and Basque contacts. It is expected that present exploratory conversations will enable us at an early date to devise some plan which can be submitted in the form of definite projects.

L. D.

July 27, 1942

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FRANCE

French Project No. 4

RADIO PROJECT

Distribution:

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SECRETFRANCERADIO PROJECTI. BACKGROUND

While our immediate efforts should be, and are being, directed toward the early development of active intelligence operations in Unoccupied France, with possible ramifications into the Occupied Zone, we should also consider at this time the advisability of taking immediate steps for the establishment of a Supplementary Radio Intelligence Network.

Once a permanent landing is effected and combat operations begin in Western Europe, we may well anticipate that any active intelligence organization which will have been set up in the meantime, will find its operations and facilities for communications greatly impaired. It is very likely that the beginning of land operations will make it most difficult for our own agents and our local sub-agents to continue their operations effectively.

The intelligence organization which we are now seeking to develop must rely in large part for directives and communications upon the presence in Vichy of a Chief Agent attached to our diplomatic mission. The American agents which we are now seeking to send to the Unoccupied Zone may well find themselves obliged to leave in the event of landing by our Armed Forces on the Continent. Finally, it is anticipated that many of the local sub-agents recruited largely from resistance and labor groups will

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find it most difficult, if not actually impossible, to continue their activities when military operations begin. In short, any active information network which we may succeed in setting up in the immediate future is likely to find its operations largely, if not entirely, stopped at the very time when information will be most urgently needed.

II. OBJECTIVES

The present project involves the organization of a Radio Network which would cover Belgium and Northern, Central and Southern France. The essential feature of this project is that once the operators have been recruited, trained and located in various communication centers in these areas, they would remain dormant until landing operations begin.

The information to be gathered and transmitted by these agents would be combat and traffic information. The transmission would presumably be made directly to a Receiving Center set up with the Armed Forces and would, therefore, become immediately available to the Headquarters Staff. This Network would thus make it possible for our forces to obtain rapidly up-to-date information on troops and materiel movement in the areas back of the lines of operations.

III. GEOGRAPHIC SETUP

Each sector is to comprise a Regional Center which would be in direct communication with the Receiving Unit set up with the Armed Forces. In each Sector a number of Local Operators would be distributed in important railway junctions. These operators

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would communicate with their respective Regional Centers. Each Regional Network would be organized and function as a separate unit so that if one of them is detected by the enemy, the entire structure of the general network would not be jeopardized.

The following are tentative lists of local points which would transmit to their respective Regional Centers:

Sector A - Ghent (Alternative Termonde)

Antwerp
Hasselt
Liege
Namur
Libramont
Charleroi
Ath

Sector B - Amiens (Alternative Beauvais)

Lille
Mezieres
Conflans
Laon
Chalons sur Marne
Dijon
Paris

Sector C - Rennes (Alternative LeMans)

Chartres
Orleans
LeMans
Nevers
Tours
Poitiers

Sector D - Bordeaux (Alternative Perigueux)

Niort
Lyon
Brive
Avignon
Montauban
Toulouse

(See accompanying maps)

SECRET**IV. WAYS AND MEANS**

The realization of this project involves two distinct phases:

A - Organization; and B - Operation.

A. Organization**1. Staff**

While the general plan can be drawn up here at Headquarters for approval, it is felt that the actual realization can be best carried out from London, possibly in conjunction with the projected base in Gibraltar. This would involve sending to London two men who would devote themselves exclusively to this project. One of them would be in charge of the organization and recruiting, and the other would take care of equipment, technical problems and training. These men would have to establish satisfactory liaison with the proper units of our Armed Forces there. It is indispensable for the accomplishment of their task that all essential directives be transmitted to our Military Headquarters in England. These men should be commissioned to facilitate their contact and work with our Armed Forces, and with the British and Free French Special Services.

B. Recruiting and Training

a. The problem of recruiting presents two distinct operations: (1) the recruiting of operators to be in charge of the four Regional Sectors; and (2) the recruiting of the Local Operators within each separate Sector.

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(1) Regional Operators - The Regional Operators will have to receive their training in London. From preliminary contacts and conversations with representatives of the Free French Services, it seems that their collaboration could be counted upon for recruiting these Regional Operators. These men would be thoroughly trained by our own technician and they would be sent back to their operating base with all necessary instructions and equipment for the proper accomplishment of their tasks, (such equipment might be sent separately). Their training will have to be conducted in liaison with the Military Unit which will be set up with our Armed Forces for the reception for this Network's traffic.

(2) Local Operators - The Local Operators would be recruited in their respective Regions. They would receive limited training which could be given to them by the Regional Operators themselves. Through our contacts with labor representatives in this country, we have been able to arrange a tentative plan for the recruiting of Local Operators. A contact man affiliated with these labor organizations has considerable facilities for travel and connections with artisan groups in both the Unoccupied and Occupied Zones. This man would recruit the Local Operators and arrange to send them to some point within each district where they would receive their training and instructions from the Regional Operator.

3. Equipment

The setting up of this network would call for the following equipment:

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a. Two strong and highly selective sets for the Army Unit to be set up as the Receiving Station, and which would accompany the landing forces. (Equipment now with our Armed Forces could be utilized for the Receiving Unit.)

b. Approximately 10 sets of considerable power and selectivity to operate at the Regional Centers.

c. Approximately 60 smaller sets to be used by the Local Operators.

B. Operation

After the Network has been established, it will not engage in active or regular transmission until our forces land on the Continent. However, each Sector Operator will check briefly at prearranged regular periods with his Local Operators, and the Central Receiving Unit would in turn make regular checks with each of the four Regional Centers at prearranged periods to assure that the Network is in constant readiness for transmissions.

It is assumed that during the earlier phases of the combat operations, the Local and Regional Operators would transmit in code. Arrangements would be made for transmission in clear upon a given signal should the operations warrant it. Each Local Operator should presumably arrange to find one or two assistants whose duties would be to observe and report on the rail and road traffic going through their particular locality. The Local Operator would transmit for very brief intervals to his Regional Center point. It would be the duty of each Regional Center operator to integrate and condense the information received from his Local Operators. Each Sector Operator would then transmit at

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specified intervals each day the resume of the information collected. The Receiving Center would then make this information immediately available to the General Staff.

V. ESTIMATED BUDGET

A. Non-Recurring Items	
Radio Equipment	\$12,000
Training	6,000
Organization and Recruiting	5,000
Transportation	3,000
Maintenance and Contingencies	5,000
B. Permanent Items, Salaries and Allowance of Personnel in Charge (Approximate) \$1200 per month.	

C. It is obvious that the setting up of this Network will call for collaboration with the Free French Services. On the basis of recent conversations with qualified representatives of these Services in this country, it is clear that we will find them ready to assist us in every possible way.

The assistance to be obtained from the French Services for the realization of this project is part of the broad problem of our collaboration with them. The advantages of this collaboration must, of course, be mutual and we should be prepared to offer some reciprocal assistance.

For the operation of their own Network, and particularly with reference to the problem of transportation of agents and communications, the French Services have in the past been handicapped by lack of equipment and facilities. Before engaging negotiations on this project on a practical basis with them, it

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should be ascertained whether we are not in a position to give them the help that they expect of us. This would probably involve making available to them the services of two or three vedettes capable of operating in the Channel under adverse weather conditions and also the possibility of supplying the French Services with radio sets. These vedettes might conceivably be obtained from the British on a trading arrangement for other Lend-Lease material, or by replacing at a later date any boat which the British might now make available to us.

The radio sets required for the operation of this Network, as well as those that might be given to the French Services for their own operations, would be obtained from the OSS Priority Quota.

VI. PROCEDURE

In its present form, this project is only an outline designed to trace the main objectives and define the essential problems involved in setting up this Network. Obviously, many practical details of organization and operation will have to be settled after consultation with Army services and other representatives in London, taking cognizance of actual experience.

Considering the difficulties which the setting up of such a Network would encounter, the realization of this project is bound to take considerable time. If the plan as now outlined meets with approval, its realization within a reasonable time will require that:

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1. The man in charge of organization proceed to London with a minimum of delay.

2. The technical assistant in charge of equipment and training be sent over as soon as preliminary steps have been taken for the recruiting of a Regional Operator.

3. Early arrangements be made to provide the equipment necessary for training and operations as soon as feasible, as well as other material to be provided an assistance to collaborating French Services.

L.D.

July 14, 1948

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COPY

ESTABLISHMENT OF OPERATIONAL BASE FOR
SOUTHWESTERN EUROPE AND FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

North Africa Project No I
PROJECT NO.

COPY

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PROJECT NO.

Establishment of Operational Base for
Southwestern Europe and French North Africa

I. OBJECTIVES:

(a) To establish and maintain effective contact with active resistance groups in France and French North Africa. (See French Projects I to III, inclusive.)

(b) To provide for the effective coordination of the action taken by the Intelligence and Secret Operations Sections; and

(c) To facilitate the rapid transmission of messages from representatives and agents to headquarters and between representatives and agents in the field; by the establishment of an operational base in Gibraltar.

II. BACKGROUND AND COMMENT:

The experience acquired from our operations hitherto emphasizes the necessity of establishing operational bases along the lines suggested in my memorandum of April 16, 1942, to which reference is made.

Three primary essentials to the early success of our operations in the Axis occupied or dominated countries are:

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(a) Close contact with and effective use of the groups and organizations which are, actually or potentially, engaged in active resistance to the Axis.

(b) Effective coordination of the action taken by our own Intelligence and Secret Operations Sections, in cooperation with these groups and organizations.

(c) Rapid and secure communication of messages and transportation of men and materials.

1. We have neither the trained agents nor any great reservoir of dependable potential agents susceptible of being trained, within a reasonable time, sufficiently to enable them to maintain a cover and do effective under-cover work in the continental European countries or in North Africa. On the other hand, in virtually all these countries there are not only innumerable individuals, but well organized groups and organizations which ask nothing more than that we establish and maintain contact with them and give them the relatively modest means which they require to accomplish our ends. This applies equally in connection with our intelligence work and in connection with our subversive operations. Our principal effort in Southwestern Europe should, therefore, be directed toward the establishment and maintenance of such contact and the furnishing of such means.

In the case of France this has been done by the English, primarily through the dropping of men, equipment and material

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COORDINATOR OF RESEARCH

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by airplanes over the occupied territories. Such means are not open to us until, at least, we have established air bases in England and Ireland, and it is suggested that even when such bases are established, this method of operation should be left primarily to the English.

Various projects have been elaborated for the use of overland routes through Portugal and Spain. These routes are, however, carefully guarded and present great danger and difficulty where any extensive utilization is involved.

It has been suggested by the leader of one of the French resistance groups that the most effective means of contact between his and similar organizations and ourselves would be by the use of small surface craft which would depend upon their speed and maneuverability, rather than upon camouflage or submersion for protection. (See my memorandum to Colonel Buxton of June 17, 1942).

Such craft should, if possible, have a range sufficient to enable them to reach the French Mediterranean coast and return to Gibraltar. (The distance from Gibraltar to Marseille is 690 miles.) They should be capable of maintaining, in reasonable weather, a cruising speed of from 20 to 25 knots, with a maximum speed substantially greater. Boats of the "P.T." or "E" types could presumably be converted for this use by the removal of the torpedo tubes and, possibly, one of their three engines, to increase carrying and fuel

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capacity. If the operations prove successful, craft of similar speed but greater tonnage might be desirable but it should be possible to initiate the operations with boats of the type suggested after a minimum conversion.

If the required range could not be provided for in this type of boat, caches of fuel and provisions could be made on the French coast or on adjacent islands, and upon the uninhabited islands of the Columbretes group, which lie between the Spanish mainland and the Balearic Islands. (See page 147, Volume 1 of H. O. 151 - Brit. Adm. Chart 1458).

Points of contact along the French coast between Marseille and Cannes could be established. The French resistance group, the leader of which is referred to above, has "organized" this coast for this purpose. (The peninsula between LaCroix and St. Tropez - Capes Lardier and Camurat - would be ideal. The coast for some distance inland is uninhabited except for one isolated farm house. When I last visited this region in May 1940, it was wholly unfortified and unpatrolled despite the imminence of the expected Italian attack. The virtually uninhabited Ile du Levant of the Hyeres group might also be used). Men and materials landed at these coastal points could be transported over the underground railway of the resistance groups even, we are assured, into the Occupied Zone. Frenchmen, who because of their activities must leave France, or who desire to join the Free French Forces could be

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removed from France. Radio contact between our craft and portable sets on the coast could be maintained at predetermined hours. The French groups and organizations, properly directed and given the means, could furnish us secret intelligence and carry out subversive operations far more effectively than could be done by any network we could hope to set up with agents introduced from the outside. Similar operations could be worked along the African Coast and a network of small radio stations set up in the interior which could communicate either with our craft or with the base at Gibraltar.

2. While the strict separation of the activities of those actually engaged in the field in the collection of secret intelligence from that of those carrying out subversive operations is undoubtedly desirable, it is felt to be essential that the coordination of these activities be as close as possible in order to prevent confusion and "crossed wires". This is particularly true where, as in the territory under consideration, those charged with the direction of the two activities must rely primarily upon the same cover and address themselves to the same groups. It is virtually impossible to prevent confusion and misunderstanding unless the point of coordination is placed as near as feasible to the point of operations. This can best be done at an advanced operational base commanded by one man charged with the direction of both activities but assisted by specialists in each field. The commandant of such a base should be of sufficient caliber and enjoy sufficient authority to carry out the directives received from headquarters.

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3. Perhaps the greatest handicap under which we have hitherto worked has been our virtually total dependance upon the State Department, both for cover for our representatives and our communications. This has meant that our representatives and agents have been under the primary control of the State Department and that both they and the contents of their messages have been known to a relatively large circle within this Department, both here and abroad. The risk to their security and that of their informers and sub-agents is obvious. It has seldom been possible to complete an exchange of cables with our agents in less than a week, even when the officials of the Department have been disposed to cooperate to the limit rendered possible by their administrative regulations, which has not always been the case.

The effective value of secret information secured in the field varies in almost direct proportion to the speed and secrecy with which it can be transmitted to the point which it is to be acted upon. In many cases the transmission of information which might be of great value results in far more harm than good if it is transmitted by insecure means or, in transmission, becomes known to persons capable of even unconscious indiscretion.

On the other hand, information obtained in one area may be of great value to agents in other regions if received by them promptly. It may be of little value if received only after the lapse of the time required to transmit a message from the point of

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origin to headquarters and to retransmit the information from headquarters to others in the field. This situation could be greatly improved by the establishment of an operational base at Gibraltar which would be in direct radio communication with Washington as well as in touch with the agents in the field.

III. PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED:

The base personnel should consist of:

- (a) One Chief representative charged with the direction of both Intelligence and Subversive Operations.
- (b) Two assistants.
- (c) One or more representatives of the French groups.
- (d) Two code clerks.
- (e) One radio operator and one competent radio technician capable of instructing French operators in their own language. (Such a technician could no doubt be recruited in France or from the Free French Forces, brought to the base and, after he had familiarized himself with our equipment, he could be entrusted with the training of operators recruited in France and brought to the base).
- (f) The Naval personnel necessary to operate and maintain the speed boats - presumably two officers and from eight to ten men.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

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(g) The crew of the flying boat or amphibian airplane which it would be desirable to have attached to the base for special missions and emergency work.

Note: If deemed desirable, this Naval personnel could, no doubt, rapidly be replaced by French personnel either recruited in France or drawn from the Free French Forces.

The basic material required would be:

- (a) One or, if possible, two boats of the type described above.
- (b) A small long-range flying boat or amphibian airplane.
- (c) Fuel and supplies, maintenance tools and parts for the above.
- (d) Several short-wave medium-range radio transmitting and receiving sets with repair and maintenance tools and parts.
- (e) The material required for the operations of the French group could be determined as these operations progressed - presumably small printing presses, paper and ink and propaganda material, would be followed by radio sets, sabotage equipment and material, small automatic arms and ammunition, etc.

Note: The operations conducted from the base should, in so far as France and French North Africa are concerned, be closely coordinated through a committee set up in London. (A committee has recently been formed and consists of representatives of Bl-6, FOK, deGaulle and the French Resistance organizations. An American member should be added to this committee or a separate committee formed.)

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IV. COSTS:

It is impossible at this stage to give any useful estimate of the costs of this project. They will depend very largely upon the extent of the aid, both in personnel and material, afforded by the Navy. Such aid and the close cooperation of the Navy would be essential to the success of the project in the relatively near future.

* * * * *

W. A. R.

June 22, 1942

It is respectfully suggested that the possibility of placing this project into effect be considered as promptly as feasible and that, if deemed advisable, an opportunity be granted for an oral exposition of the results it is hoped to obtain from it.

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
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
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June 22, 1942


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





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French National Railways system, showing (shaded) the territories in German occu




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


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RAILROADS OF BELGIUM

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- Standard Gauge Single Track
- Standard Gauge Electric
- Meter Gauge Light
- Meter Gauge Electric
- Standard Gauge Light





DRAWN AND COMPILED IN GEOGRAPHY DIVISION, C.O.