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MAY 7, 1943Pages 1 - 22, Incl.JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFOUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIAReference: (a) J.C.S. 272
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1Notes by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information, in accordance with a request of the Joint Staff Planners. The Plan has not been reviewed by the Joint Staff Planners.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat,

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIA

Report by the Joint War Plans Committee

1. An outline plan for the seizure of SARDINIA is contained in Enclosure "A".

a. The concept of the operation (see Chart, Appendix "A" - Enclosure "A") is briefly stated below.

b. To conduct an air offensive from NORTH AFRICA and SICILY in order to reduce Sardinian fixed defenses and air bases, to neutralize air forces in ITALY and CORSICA, and to interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies by air and sea from ITALY proper to SARDINIA. Simultaneously to conduct intensive submarine operations against sea routes between SARDINIA and ITALY.

c. To gain beachheads on the west and southwest coasts of the island, under limited fighter protection from escort carriers and - at extreme range - from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Simultaneously to carry out diversionary landings with commando groups on other coastal points, and parachute attacks on airfields and vital communications inland.

d. To capture landing fields in the ORISTANO-VILLACIDRO-PORTOFINO area, and to establish shore based support aviation elements.

e. To advance overland to capture CAGLIARI and the surrounding area, and to land follow-up forces at the port of CAGLIARI.

f. To secure CAGLIARI from a counterattack from the eastward by an advance force along TORPOLL-LACONI-ORISTANO.

g. To subdivide the remainder of the island to the following extent:

(1) Advance to the line ORISTANO-NUORO-MACOMER-BOHA
SASSARI.

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(2) Occupation of the PORTO TORRES-SASSARI-ALGHERO area.

(3) Occupation of the MADDALENA-TERRANOVA area.

a. To consolidate the Island against counterattack by sea or air.

b. To occupy CORSICA, or to neutralize the offensive capability of CORSICA by air and sea action, and commando raids. (Appendix "B")

3. Major forces required.

a. Ground:

4 Infantry Divisions
2 Armored Combat Teams
2 Parachute Regiments.

b. Air:

7 Fighter Groups
5 Bomb Groups.

c. Naval:

3 BB
3 CV
5 ACV
10 CA & CL
44 DD
15 SS

4. Availability.

All forces and shipping required should be available in the area after HUSKY.

5. Advisability of the operation.

Since SICILY is the primary strategic prize of the area, the gain resulting from the subsequent occupation of SARDINIA is not commensurate with the cost of the operation and the maintenance of a permanent garrison, unless future operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged.

SECRETENCLOSURE "A"OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF SARDINIA5. Assumptions.

a. The UNITED NATIONS occupy the whole of the North African littoral.

b. SICILY has been occupied and all major resistance thereon has ended. The main units of the Italian fleet are restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Anti-submarine operations in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN are being actively prosecuted by the UNITED NATIONS.

c. SPAIN and PORTUGAL remain neutral. A German invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is unlikely.

d. French forces in NORTH AFRICA are actively collaborating with the UNITED NATIONS, and are assisting in the defense of the African littoral.

e. The bulk of the German Ground and Air Force is contained on the Russian front.

f. PANTELLERIA has been taken as a subsidiary operation to the SICILY offensive, and UNITED NATIONS convoys have been resumed through the MEDITERRANEAN.

g. TURKEY remains neutral, and there is no indication of a German invasion of TURKEY.

h. There are no indications of a German invasion of the BRITISH ISLES.

i. Operations in the PACIFIC continue as now directed.

7. Mission of the operation.

To seize and hold SARDINIA.

8. Concepts of the operation (Appendix "A")

a. To conduct an air offensive from NORTH AFRICA and SICILY in order to reduce Sardinian fixed defenses and air bases, to neutralize air forces in ITALY and CORSICA, and to interrupt movements of reinforcements and supplies by air.

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and sea from ITALY proper to SARDINIA. Simultaneously to conduct intensive submarine operations against sea routes between SARDINIA and ITALY.

b. To gain beachheads on the west and southwest coasts of the Island, under limited fighter protection from escort carriers and - at extreme range - from bases in NORTH AFRICA. Simultaneously to carry out diversionary landings with commando troops on other coastal points, and parachute attacks on airfields and vital communications inland.

c. To capture landing fields in the ORISTANO-VILLACIDRO-IGLESIAS area, and to establish shore based support aviation thereon.

d. To advance overland to capture CAGLIARI and the surrounding airdromes, and to land follow-up forces at the port of CAGLIARI.

e. To secure CAGLIARI from a counterattack from the northeast by an advance to the line TORTOLI-LACONI-ORISTANO.

f. To reduce the remainder of the Island in the following order:

(1) Advance to the line GROSEI-NUORO-MACOMER-BOSA
MARIINA.

(2) Occupation of the PORTO TORRES-SASSARI-ALGHERO area.

(3) Occupation of the MADDALENA-TERRANOVA area.

g. To consolidate the Island against counterattack by sea or air.

h. To occupy CORTICA, or to neutralize the offensive capability of CORTICA by air and sea action, and commando raids. (Appendix "A")

SECRET9. Geographic Estimate. (Appendix "C" - omitted*)

a. The terrain is generally mountainous with the exception of the CAMPIDANO PLAIN running northwest from CAGLIARI. The Island is but lightly wooded, and there are no major river obstacles. (Appendices "D" & "E" - omitted*)

b. The coast provides only a limited number of landing beaches, of which the most extensive are near CAGLIARI; in the GULF OF ORISTANO at the northwest end of the CAMPIDANO PLAIN; in the GULF OF ASINARA in the northwest of the Island, and in the vicinity of SAN ANTIOCO. Surf conditions may be severe at all beaches except those in the GULF OF ORISTANO, and usually there is an awkward subsidiary obstacle immediately behind the beaches in the form of salt lakes and lagoons. For detail of beaches, see Appendix "F" - omitted*.

c. Once an invasion force has secured a footing inland, there are no major natural obstacles; the few extensive landing beaches are, however, well protected by minefields and fixed defenses, so that the assault is likely to be an expensive operation in personnel and materiel.

d. There are no climatic limitations on the date of any operations, except that prevailing easterly winds are likely to make surf conditions on the east coast impossibly severe between March and October.

e. SARDINIA possesses valuable economic resources in agricultural produce and minerals. (Appendix "E" - omitted*) The most important of the latter is zinc, the supply of which is of vital importance to ITALY.

10. Military Estimate. (Appendix "G" - omitted*, except Annex "A" to Appendix "G")a. Ground Forces.

(1) The last intelligence estimate (May 3, 1943) of forces (all Italian) in SARDINIA was:

* Additional material "omitted" are available in the office of the Director.

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Two Infantry Divisions (Each of two Inf. Regts. and one Blackshirt Legion)
 Two Coastal Divisions
 One Separate Infantry Battalion
 One Sardinian Cav. Regiment
 Twelve Bns. Fascist Militia, including three tank bns.
 Three Bersaglieri (cyclist) Bns.

(2) Fixed defenses include coast defense and anti-aircraft artillery at all main ports. Controlled minefields and anti-submarine nets exist at CAGLIARI and MADDALENA and possibly at other ports. For map see Appendix "J"*

(3) Capabilities for reinforcement of ground forces.

Reinforcement would normally be by sea from CORSICA, from ITALY (where there are now 12 Italian Infantry Divisions) or - for personnel with light equipment - by air transport. Subject to demand for troops for other theaters, particularly for ITALY proper, the garrison could probably be increased by one division from CORSICA in one week, and by 3 additional divisions from ITALY in about six weeks. Attempts at reinforcement by sea would be vulnerable to bombing of both the embarkation and debarkation ports.

(4) The effectiveness of Italian troops defending SARDINIA should be assessed higher than that of those in NORTH AFRICA in view of the fact that they will be fighting for their own homeland.

B. AIR FORCES.

(1) The most recent estimate (May 3, 1943) of AXIS air strength in the MEDITERRANEAN area is: German 1164; Italian 1425; total 2589 planes. It is probable that, due to losses in the battles of TUNISIA and SICILY, AXIS air forces presently available to oppose our landings may be reduced by 500 to 1000 aircraft.

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(2) Capabilities for operation of air forces.

There are certainly nine and possibly as many as eighteen airfields in SARDINIA; only three of these are known to be equipped as airdromes. There are four airfields on CORSICA, and facilities are practically unlimited in ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE.

g. Naval forces.

The Italian Navy totals at present (May 3, 1943) 159 vessels (7-BB, 3-CA, 10-CL, 1-CVS, 71-DD, 67-SS). Of this, the effective strength is 120 vessels (6-BB, 2-CA, 5-CL, 1-CVS, 53-DD, 53-SS). The effective strength in smaller vessels will have been considerably reduced in the battle for SICILY. (Major units are assumed to have been restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN). Some MAS's (fast MTB's) are known to be in Sardinian waters.

g. Probable AXIS strength to be encountered.

Ground (all Italian): Garrison: 2 Inf Divs.
2 Coastal Divs.
Reinforcements: 1 Inf Div in 1 week
1-2 Inf Divs in 6 weeks

Air: 1500 - 2000 aircraft of all types

Navy: Some submarines, destroyers and lighter surface craft, with the possibility of some cruisers.

ii. Political estimate.

a. SARDINIA contains a population of about one million, whose standard of living is comparatively low.

b. There is a possibility of enlisting local support in aid of an invasion by making use of a popular patriot, Emilio Lussu, now thought to be in Lisbon.

c. There are no known political factors that will appreciably affect operations.

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12. Forces required for the operation. (Minimum) (Appendix "H" omitted)

a. Ground forces.

4 Infantry Divisions	59,032
3 Amphibiously trained (1 as floating reserve)	
1 Follow-up	
2 Armored Combat Teams	13,815
1 Amphibiously trained	
1 Follow-up	
2 Parachute Regiments	3,768
6 Commandos	4,800
Supporting units	61,918
Total Ground Forces:	143,333

NOTE: If the garrison of SARDINIA is appreciably reinforced, the above estimates of the forces required must be increased. If one German division were added to the present Sardinian garrison, it is estimated that two additional divisions would be required in the assaulting force. However, substantial reinforcement of SARDINIA is not believed likely, because since SICILY has been occupied by the UNITED NATIONS, ITALY proper would be very vulnerable, and its defense would absorb all available AXIS ground reserves.

b. Air Forces.

4 Fighter Groups (SE)	4,892
3 Fighter Groups (TF)	3,051
1 Light Bomber Group	1,247
3 Medium Bomber Groups	4,668
2 Heavy Bomber Groups	3,338
1 Observation Group	1,150
4 Transport Groups	5,848
Supporting units	4,227
Total Air Combat Personnel	28,421

These air forces are required for operations directly supporting the SARDINIA offensive. Strategic air force missions in the area (antisubmarine, photographic, strategic long-range bombing, and defensive fighter operations) will be performed by UNITED NATIONS air forces in NORTH AFRICA, SICILY, MALTA and the MIDDLE EAST.

SECRETg. Services of supply.

Total Army Service Troops .	41,970
Total Air Service Troops	<u>29,153</u>
Total Service Troops	71,123

h. Naval forces. (Estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in French North Africa).

3 BB	} - with trained reserve of 140 replacement fighter aircraft and crews.
3 CV	
6 ACV	
10 CA and CL	
4 AA ships	
20 DC fleet type	
24 DD A/S escort	
50 PC A/S escort	
8 DMS	
15 SS	
3 HQ ships	
18 AM	
20 ML	

i. Availability.

Ground forces will be available from forces not involved in HUSKY. Air forces will be available in the MEDITERRANEAN. The naval forces now committed to HUSKY are assumed to be also available for this operation. In general they exceed the forces as set forth by General Eisenhower.

iii. Supply.

Assuming a monthly maintenance factor of 1.3 ship tons per man, and 20 personal replacement, maintenance of the Sardinian force will require:

2 transport sailings per month
20 cargo ship sailings per month

iv. Training. (Appendix "I" - omitted)v. Requirements.

The assault force (including a floating reserve) will require:

20000 TPT
30000 AFA
10000 AKA
10000 LST
10000 LCT

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or any equivalent combination.

The follow-up force will require additionally:

45 LST
13 LCI
60 LCT
16 AK

or any equivalent combination.

b. Availability.

HUSKY requires shipping to lift eight assault divisions whereas this operation requires the lift of three and one half assault divisions. Therefore, assuming losses in HUSKY do not exceed 50%, there will be adequate shipping in the area for this operation. A small amount of replacement shipping becomes available meanwhile.

The shipping combination shown above is one based on craft to be in place for HUSKY.

Due to the necessity for repairing landing craft after HUSKY, and for amphibious training and rehearsal, it is considered that the earliest possible target date for this operation is 10 weeks subsequent to the initiation of HUSKY.

15. Installations influencing the operation. (Appendix "J")

a. SARDINIA.

Installations in SARDINIA appear to be adequate with the possible exception of the ports, whose total theoretical capacity is insufficient for the initial phases of the operation. There are four usable ports (CAGLIARI being by far the most important), all well connected to the main rail and road nets. (Appendix "K" omitted). The railroad net, although not extensive, runs through the center of the island and connects the principal towns. (Appendix "L" omitted). The road net is very good, with three main north and south roads all connected with CAGLIARI; and three east and west roads, one at each end and one in the center of the island. (Appendix "M" omitted). There are certainly nine, and possibly as many as eighteen

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airfields, with three of major importance (Appendix "N" omitted), the Allied use of which would extend effective bomber operations to extreme SOUTHERN GERMANY and the DALMATIAN COAST (Appendix "Q"). There are adequate telephone and telegraph lines, and a few low power radio stations (Appendix "O" - omitted).

b. SICILY.

Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for the force occupying SICILY, it is estimated that a maximum of 30,000 troops (one division plus supporting arms) could be mounted from Sicilian ports (Appendix "K" - omitted). However, due to the inevitable dislocation of facilities in SICILY immediately following its occupation, the comparative proximity of Sicilian ports to AXIS air bases in ITALY, and the greater distance from SICILY to the west coast of SARDINIA, it is considered undesirable to mount any part of the Sardinian expedition from SICILY.

Should it be decided to use one or more of the experienced divisions which have taken part in the capture of SICILY, it would be preferable to transfer those units back to NORTH AFRICA, and to mount the whole expedition from there. Such return movements could be combined with the necessary amphibious training or rehearsal.

1. NORTH AFRICA.

Allowing for the minimum maintenance requirements for the permanent garrison in NORTH AFRICA, and assuming that all troops east of TUNISIA are maintained from the MIDDLE EAST, there is sufficient port capacity to mount the whole Sardinian expedition from North African ports, providing that SARAGHIANA and other ATLANTIC ports are used (Appendix "K" - omitted).

10. Availability of the contemplated operation.

ii. Advantages:

(1) The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land

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and air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN area.

(2) If not already accomplished by the seizure of SICILY, the operation will probably result:

(a) In ITALY withdrawing all of its forces from RUSSIA and the BALKANS for the defense of ITALY proper;
or

(b) In GERMANY being forced to divert substantial strength to ITALY to augment the Italian defenses.

Either course will cause a drain on the available German reserves.

(3) Italian morale will be further lowered and ITALY may conceivably sue for a separate peace; encouragement will be given to Balkan countries to resist AXIS occupation. The resultant unrest and insurrection will require an increase in the garrisons in the area.

(4) The UNITED NATIONS will obtain centrally-placed air bases suitable for bombing ITALY, particularly the northern industrial area, and the industrial area of SOUTHERN GERMANY.

(5) The lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN will be further improved with resultant decreases in shipping losses.

(6) Provides an essential protective base for future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE; and thereby forces GERMANY to reinforce her northern MEDITERRANEAN defenses to counter the threat.

Disadvantages.

(1) This operation will require the maintenance of a large static garrison in SARDINIA; contrarily, if the operation were not undertaken, the AXIS garrison of SARDINIA would be immobilized by the mere threat of attack.

(2) The operation would only slightly improve the Allied position over that which obtains after NORTH AFRICA and SICILY have been consolidated, and in so doing absorb e

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disproportionate amount of Allied resources for the results obtained.

(3) The operation further disperses Allied effort at the expense of the build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM for a cross-channel operation.

(4) The operation will be expensive in personnel, equipment, and shipping due to the probably enemy concentration on the limited port facilities and landing beaches available.

(5) The operation involves a commitment either to:

(a) Neutralize CORSICA by air action, and accept some degree of interference with the use of SARDINIA as an offensive air base; or

(b) To undertake further amphibious operations to occupy CORSICA, and thus obtain full and free use of SARDINIA as an air base.

g. Conclusion.

Since SICILY is the primary strategic prize of the area, the gain resulting from the subsequent occupation of SARDINIA is not commensurate with the cost of the operation and the commitment of a permanent garrison, unless future operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged.

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Follow-up

Diversionary Raids

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
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SECRET - SECURITY

SARDINIA

SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP

Scale 1:500,000

APPENDIX "B"CORSICAPART I - APPRECIATION OF A CORSICAN OPERATIONPROBLEM

17. To determine what action should be taken against CORSICA in connection with the capture of SARDINIA.

DISCUSSION

18. With the fall of both SARDINIA and SICILY, GERMANY faces one of two conditions:

a. ITALY is weakened, but still an active power. The threat to ITALY proper is acute. GERMANY cannot permit withdrawal of Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA. GERMANY, therefore, must bolster the defenses of the Italian mainland. The flow, if any, of troops would, therefore, be from CORSICA to ITALY. This condition is the more probable.

b. ITALY is to all intents and purposes out of the war. Italian forces in the BALKANS and RUSSIA have lost all value for use other than defense of ITALY proper. GERMANY has been forced to replace these troops with those of other AXIS countries. GERMANY cannot then spare the troops required to defend ITALY effectively, and at most expects to fight a delaying action up the Italian Peninsula. However, the Allied threat to GERMANY is not across the ALPS from ITALY, but through SOUTHERN FRANCE. This threat can be most economically neutralized by the basing of the largest possible air force on CORSICA, and the garrisoning of the island with the minimum number of ground troops to effectively defend the island as an air base. This action is relatively cheap in expense against an Allied entry to the continent via Southern France. It is estimated that the probable force GERMANY could provide in this case in CORSICA is one division and 100 - 150 aircraft.

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19. The positive value of CORSICA to the UNITED NATIONS is small once SICILY and SARDINIA have been occupied, unless further amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY are envisaged. In this case seizure of CORSICA would, of course, be essential in order to protect the lines of communication.

20. The negative value of CORSICA resulting from denial to ITALY could be considerable, however, if full use is to be made of SARDINIA as an advanced air base for a heavy bombing offensive of the industrial areas in NORTHERN ITALY. Neutralization by air from SARDINIA of Italian airfields in CORSICA is no more likely to be permanently successful than AXIS efforts to neutralize MALTA from SICILY, and the only sound alternative is denial of airfields by occupation of CORSICA. Four hundred and eighty AXIS aircraft based on CORSICA (estimated capacity of potential airdromes) would require the bulk of UNITED NATIONS air forces on SARDINIA to be defensive, but could not prevent the use of SARDINIA for forward airdromes, nor to a limited extent for an offensive bomber base. The probable maximum of 150 German aircraft would not seriously interfere with Allied use of SARDINIA.

21. Possession of CORSICA will have no appreciable effect on the security of the West-East MEDITERRANEAN SEA route, once SICILY and SARDINIA are in our hands.

22. Failure of the UNITED NATIONS to occupy CORSICA will reveal to GERMANY that no surface action against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY is to be initiated; conversely, occupation of CORSICA will immediately force GERMANY to strengthen her NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN defenses.

CONCLUSIONS

23. The immediate strategic value of CORSICA to the UNITED NATIONS lies in the denial of its use by the AXIS to interfere

Appendix "B"

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with use of SARDINIA as an air base for bomber offensive against NORTHERN ITALY, and in creating an immediate threat against SOUTHERN FRANCE and NORTHERN ITALY.

24. Limited use of SARDINIA as an Allied air base cannot be prevented by AXIS troops on CORSICA.

25. The probable size of the AXIS garrison on CORSICA would not permit serious interference with Allied use of SARDINIA as an air base.

26. Seizure of CORSICA is warranted only if GERMANY intends to reinforce CORSICA heavily in air forces, and then only if unhindered use of SARDINIA is deemed essential to the UNITED NATIONS. CORSICA must be occupied prior to an amphibious operation against SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.

27. Seizure of CORSICA should not be attempted as a preliminary or simultaneous operation to the capture of SARDINIA, as it will divert considerable strength from the main objective and adequate temporary neutralization can be achieved more cheaply by air action alone.

28. Any assault on CORSICA should be made as soon after the fall of Sardinia as possible, before any further reinforcement of the garrison.

29. The Commander of the SARDINIAN expedition should be prepared to occupy CORSICA immediately subsequent to the termination of the Sardinian operation, utilizing the same forces and shipping used against SARDINIA. This operation should be initiated only if it becomes evident that CORSICA is to be appreciably reinforced, and only if at that time full use of SARDINIA as an air base is deemed essential or if future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE are contemplated.

Appendix "B"

SECRETPART II - OUTLINE PLAN30. Assumptions.

a. The UNITED NATIONS occupy the whole of the North African littoral.

b. SICILY has been occupied and all major resistance thereon has ended. The main units of the Italian fleet are restricted to the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. Anti-submarine operations in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN are being actively prosecuted by the UNITED NATIONS.

c. SPAIN and PORTUGAL remain neutral. A German invasion of the IBERIAN PENINSULA is unlikely.

d. French forces in NORTH AFRICA are actively collaborating with the UNITED NATIONS, and are assisting in the defense of the African littoral.

e. The bulk of the German Ground and Air Force is contained on the Russian front.

f. PANTELLERIA has been taken as a subsidiary operation to the SICILY offensive, and UNITED NATIONS convoys have been resumed through the MEDITERRANEAN.

g. Turkey remains neutral, and there is no indication of a German invasion of TURKEY.

h. There are no indications of a German invasion of the BRITISH ISLANDS.

i. Operations in the PACIFIC continue as now directed.

j. SARDINIA has been occupied by the UNITED NATIONS.

11. Purpose of the operation: To seize and hold CORSICA.

12. Concept of the operation (Map - Annex "A").

a. By air action from SARDINIA, to reduce the fixed defenses and air facilities of CORSICA, interdict movement of reinforcements and supplies to and within the island, and destroy the ports, roads and railroads of the island.

Appendix "B"

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d. To seize vital inland communications and important facilities near AJACCIO with parachute troops.

e. To conduct amphibious and land operations in the following sequence:

Phase I: To land forces in the GOLFE DE SAGONE under air cover from SARDINIA in order to seize the port and airfield at AJACCIO.

Phase II: To land follow-up forces at AJACCIO, and establish land-based aviation on the airfield.

To advance overland to the east coast.

To land forces south of BASTIA, under air cover from AJACCIO.

To advance upon and seize BASTIA.

Phase III: To occupy the remainder of the island.

f. To consolidate the island against counterattack by air or sea.

31. Geographic Setting.

a. CORSICA is a rugged and poorly developed island, possessing few good harbors and limited communications. The terrain is unsuitable for operation of armored forces. The island is 115 miles north to south, 50 miles east to west.

b. From BASTIA, extending south for sixty miles, there is a narrow coastal plain, fringed by beach and interrupted by lagoons and marshes. Elsewhere the coast is rocky, although very small beaches exist in most of the coves and around the entire coast.

c. The local population, though not particularly pro-Allied nations, are definitely anti-Italian, and provide fruitful ground for subversive activities to support an assault.

d. AJACCIO and BASTIA are the only towns of importance.

Appendix "B"

SECRET34. Military estimate (Map - Annex "B").

a. There are now (May 3, 1943) one corps of two Italian divisions on CORSICA, which with supporting troops total 46,000 men. It is believed, however, that one of these divisions will be transferred to SARDINIA when that island is attacked. The Italians obtained intact the original French fixed defenses, and very likely have strengthened them. Reinforcement of the garrison would be limited by the port capacities (2500 D.W. Tons per day) to about one division each 10 days. Total garrison of the island would be limited by maintenance considerations alone to four divisions, only two of which could be mobile.

b. The air strength available to defend SARDINIA (estimated at 1500 aircraft, all types) will have been reduced considerably by air action, attendant on the seizure of SARDINIA. Reinforcements by GERMANY from WESTERN EUROPE or RUSSIA is believed unlikely.

c. It is estimated that a maximum of 250 aircraft could be based on existing airbases in CORSICA with a minimum amount of improvement, and that facilities for a maximum of 400 aircraft could be constructed on the island.

35. Forces required.a. Ground:

1 MCT, assault loaded, with supporting arms.....	40,000
1 MCT, convoy loaded, with supporting arms.....	20,000
Service troops (estimated).....	<u>30,000</u>
	90,000

b. Air and Naval:

There will be sufficient air and naval forces available for the Sardinian operation to fulfill the requirements of a subsequent Corsican operation. The assignment of missions directly supporting the CORSICA assault to portions of the air and naval forces available will be done by the theater commander.

Appendix "B"

SECRET36. Supply.

Assuming a monthly maintenance factor of 1.3 ship tons per man, and 3% personnel replacements, maintenance of the Corsican force will require 13 cargo ship sailings per month.

37. Shipping.

a. Requirements:

Assault loaded: 4 RCT

16 APA) or any equivalent
5 AKA)

Convoy loaded: 2 RCT plus supporting units

35 convoy loaded transports) or any equivalent
50 convoy loaded cargo vessels)

b. Shipping requirements are approximately 40% of those for the Sardinia operation. Therefore, shipping will be available if losses in SARDINIA do not exceed 50%.

38. Installations affecting the operation.

a. There are now believed to be four airfields of sufficient size for limited military use on CORSICA. Additional construction would be very difficult due to the rugged nature of the terrain, except on the BASTIA coastal plain. Probably 17 additional airports could be constructed, with a saturation point of about 480 aircraft on the island.

b. Roads and railroads are inadequate and are susceptible to seizure by sabotage against bridges and tunnels. A considerable network of rough farm and logging roads and donkey trails could be used by lightly equipped forces, but are not suitable for heavy vehicular movements.

c. The only ports of consequence are at AJACCIO and BASTIA, each with a capacity of 800 D.W. tons per day. Minor ports, including lighters for cargo discharge, principally PORTO VERDE and PORTIFACCIO, raise the total port capacity of the island to 1800 D.W. tons per day.

Appendix "B"

SECRET39. Advisability of the operation.a. Advantages.

The operation continues the engagement of AXIS land and air forces in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN.

Provides an essential protective base for future amphibious operations against SOUTHERN FRANCE, and thereby forces GERMANY to reinforce her NORTHERN MEDITERRANEAN defenses to counter the threat.

Denies to the AXIS a base for aerial interference with UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA.

b. Disadvantages.

The ability of the AXIS to utilize CORSICA as a base to hinder UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA can be sufficiently neutralized by aerial operations. Occupation of the island is not required, therefore, for this purpose.

Garrison requirements to secure the island are extremely heavy compared with the benefits accruing from the occupation. Conversely, the AXIS will be relieved of the necessity of maintaining a large garrison on the island.

c. Conclusions.

The operation is warranted only if:

It becomes evident that, through reinforcement, the AXIS GARRISON strength will be sufficient to interfere seriously with UNITED NATIONS use of SARDINIA; or

The UNITED NATIONS expect to eventually assault amphibiously SOUTHERN FRANCE or NORTHERN ITALY.

Appendix "B"

ANNEX 'A' TO APPENDIX 'A'


SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET - SECURITY

L I G U R I A N

M E D I T E R R A N E A N

T Y R R H E N I A N
S E A



GROUND ACTION

- Phase I
- Phase II
- Phase III
- ☀ Parachute Attack



SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET - SECURITY

CORSICA
SPECIAL OPERATION MAP

Scale: 1:50,000

Map of Corsica showing military positions and ground action phases. The map includes a legend for ground action phases and a scale bar.

Scale: 1:50,000

Map of Corsica showing military positions and ground action phases. The map includes a legend for ground action phases and a scale bar.

SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET - SECURITY

Net Present Hostile Strength

Cap. 30 A/C

300 DWT

5-5.4°
2-3.0°

Cap. 60 A/C
10 A/C

Cap. 60 A/C
20 A/C


TYRRHENIAN
SEA

SECRET - SECURITY

3-5.4°
4-5.4°
4-4.7°
4-3.7°
4-3.0°
10-10° AA

3-6.4°
4-5.4°
2-3.0°
4-3.0° AA

Cap. 40 A/C



SECRET - SECURITY

CORSICA
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MAP

Scale: 1:500,000

Projection: UTM

Zone: 32N

Grid: UTM

Map Date: 1972

Map No: 100280001-3

Classification: SECRET - SECURITY

Legend:

- Coastline
- Major Roads
- Minor Roads
- Railroads
- Ports
- Islands
- Mountains
- Water
- Vegetation
- Population
- Administrative Boundaries



3"
 Dry over 6"
 Dry under 6"
 Dry AA over 3"


IN AREA (effective):

GERMAN:
 456 L.R. Bomb
 72 Bomb - Rac
 156 Dive Bomb
 432 Ftr
 24 Army Co-op
 24 Coastal

ITALIAN:
 230 Rac - Bomb
 130 Torp Bomb
 680 Ftr
 165 Army Co-op
 430 Coastal
 6 BB
 2 CA
 5 CL
 1 AVP
 55 DD
 53 SS

SECURITY

Green Principal Beaches
 Red Gun Batteries for Coast Defense
 Black Capacities of Principal Ports



8 over 6"
 26 under 6"

RED
 1 over 6"
 8 under 6"


SEP
 1 over 6"
 7 under 6"

RED
 14 over 6"
 20 under 6"

SARDINIA
 SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP

SECRET - SECURITY

DISTANCES - SARDINIA




SECRET - SECURITY

SECRET

ANNEX "Q"

DISTANCES - SARDEGNA



JCS - 268/1

OSS organization, India

Filed India 11,252

ROSS

organization

ASOE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ~~SECRET~~
WASHINGTON

CCS #196
JCS # 261/1
NOE
14 May 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES: ✓
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
DIVISION, WAR DEPT. GEN. STAFF:
AIDE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET.

Subject: O.S.S. Organization in India.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 261/1 (Copy No. 41).

1. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners on Pages 5 and 7 of the Enclosure.
2. It is requested that the necessary action be taken to effect implementation of this decision.
3. The British Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the content of Paragraph 10 of the Enclosure.

Forrest M. Royal
FORREST M. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

T. Planning Group
S.I.
S.O.

For signature & return



SECRET

SECRETCOPY NO. 41267-5
(J.C.S. 261/1)May 6, 1943Pages 4-7 (incl.)267
(1) C.O.S. 196
(2) J.C.S. 261
(3) J.P.S. 161/D
(4) J.P.S. 161/1JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFO.S.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIAReference: (a) C.C.S. 196
(b) J.C.S. 261Report by the Joint Staff PlannersTHE PROBLEM

1. To make recommendations concerning the establishment of an O.S.S. liaison group in New Delhi, India, to collaborate with the British S.I.S. and S.O.S., and to consider the position of all O.S.S. representatives in India and Burma in order to insure that the maximum degree of coordination will be obtained.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The U. S. representative at New Delhi (Mr. Phillips) has asked permission of the Viceroy to establish in New Delhi a small branch of O.S.S. for the purpose of liaison with the British S.I.S. and S.O.S. Reference (a) indicates that the British Chiefs of Staff welcome any measures designed to improve the liaison on S.I.S. and S.O.S. matters. The Director of Strategic Services concurs. General Gailwell has made a request to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, for the establishment of a joint intelligence center in the Asiatic Theater. He suggests that it is undesirable to send an O.S.S. liaison mission to his area at this time.

3. In connection with the above, the British Chiefs of Staff request reconsideration of the position of all O.S.S. representatives operating in and from India and indicate their opposition

SECRET

to the establishment of any new O.S.S. organization undertaking S.I.S. or S.O.E. operations in or from India. The establishment of the liaison group in New Delhi as proposed by Mr. Phillips would appear to be for the purpose of improving coordination of S.O. and S.I. activities rather than the establishing of a new operating group and, as such, is welcomed by the British Chiefs of Staff. The British consider that the O.S.S. mission should be linked with the Observer Group under Colonel Osmun.

4. To review:

a. An observer group of four officers headed by Colonel Osmun has been operating in India for some time as G-2 observers under the command of General Stilwell and under the direction of the Military Intelligence Service, War Department. Colonel Osmun's group submits reports directly to M.I.S. and copies of his reports are sent to General Stilwell.

b. The Office of Strategic Services is now conducting S.O. operations in Burma under the command of the Commander, U. S. Forces in India, China, and Burma (General Stilwell). These operations were initiated in May, 1942, under Colonel Eiffler, A.S.S. It was initially contemplated that Colonel Eiffler's mission would base in China and operate into Burma from China. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory and Colonel Eiffler's group was transferred to, and based in Assam. This group is conducting, with considerable success, S.O. operations in Burma in cooperation with the British S.O.E. These S.O. operations have been carried on in Burma in accordance with an agreement approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and summarized in J.C.S. 86/1 which states in part:

"That Burma, Siam, Indo-China and Sumatra should be regarded as a no-man's land which could be worked into an convenient by the British S.O.E. mission in India, the American S.O. mission in China and I.S.O. in Australia."

SECRET

Colonel Eiffler is working directly under the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the India-China-Burma Theater in cooperation with Chinese troops under General Stilwell's direction. It is General Stilwell's desire that no change be made in the present arrangement.

5. No agreement can be found which limits secret intelligence operations anywhere. It is considered that both countries would be best served by intelligence organizations operating independently but with a free and complete interchange of information. Without an independent intelligence organization operating in areas in which U. S. Forces are to be employed, strategic intelligence as well as combat intelligence would undoubtedly be curtailed. It should also be pointed out that if Great Britain has complete control of all intelligence in this area, operations may be adversely affected. The Office of Strategic Services does not carry on intelligence operations in India and does not propose to do so. They do, however, carry on counter-intelligence work at the request of and in close collaboration with the British S.I.S. It would seem to be highly desirable that intelligence operations in Burma should be carried on independently of the British S.I.S., but in close collaboration with them and on the basis of free and complete interchange of intelligence. Of necessity, such activities must be based in, and operate from India. Part of the duties of the joint intelligence center proposed by General Stilwell should be the coordination of all secret intelligence with the British S.I.S.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. That no liaison group be established by the O.S.S. in New Delhi at this time.

SECRET

7. That the O.S.S. mission under Colonel Eiffler remain under the direction of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, India-China-Burma.

8. That intelligence operations be carried on from India into Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, the Malay States and Sumatra independently of the British but on a basis of close collaboration and a free interchange of information.

9. That no intelligence or counter-intelligence be undertaken in India.

10. That the British Chiefs of Staff be informed that the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, India-China-Burma, proposes to establish a joint intelligence center in the Asiatic Theater which will accomplish the functions of the liaison mission proposed by Mr. Phillips and that Colonel Eiffler's O.S.S. mission is under the command of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, India-China-Burma, and will have the same relationship with the British theater commander as the other U. S. forces in this area.



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NO. OF PAGES: 10	ATTACHMENTS:		

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12.							

This sheet, together with the subject document, should be returned as soon as possible.

TOP SECRET

The attached memorandum
 should be up-graded from Secret
 to Top Secret due to the fact that
 it refers to JCS Directive
 RFA/W/D.


 PAUL F. TAYLOR
 Captain, AUS
 Acting CSI Top Secret
 Control Officer

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON

13,768
/ CS 256/2/D

29 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

SUBJECT: Cover and Deception Planning

REF: JCS Memorandum to OSS dtd 29 Feb 1944,
subject as above, enclosing copy #69 of
JCS 256/2/D.

ENCL: Memorandum for Holders of JCS 256/2/D,
dated 29 May 1946, copy #69.

The enclosure is forwarded herewith
for your information and guidance.

R. U. Ryan
RALPH U. RYAN,
Captain, USN (Ret.),
Assistant Secretary.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
13 FEB 1944

COPY NO. 69

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR HOLDERS OF J.C.S. 256/2/D, DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1944

Note by the Secretaries

J.C.S. 256/2/D, dated 2 February 1944, is hereby upgraded from "SECRET" to "TOP SECRET".

A. J. McFARLAND,
R. D. GRAVES, JR.,
Joint Secretariat.

*Even this will
if you can do @ f.6.3*

603 258/27D and files relating to it

SECRET

Distribution Sheet - 16 March 1964

- 1 Dr. Lovell
- 2 Secretariat
- 3 (MO)
 - MA Proder
 - Scribner
 - Sheparison

V. J. [Signature]

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Please Return



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

X Cover
X Planning
X Deception

TO: General Donovan
FROM: Brian Fitzell
SUBJECT: JCS 256//D

DATE: 1 March 1944

TOP SECRET

Attached is a copy of JCS directive entitled "Cover and Deception Planning" which I obtained from Colonel Gridley yesterday.

VPB

Although the document does not explicitly so state, it is Colonel Gridley's firm belief that the cover and deception plans referred to in the directive have to do with combat and battle matters, rather than with the camouflage and deception which is necessary for implementation of OSS projects.

In other words, this directive does not touch on cover and deception in the OSS field, but does seem to prohibit OSS from engaging in combat deception unless such engagement be at the request of the Theater Commander or Joint Security Control (for plans outside of a military theater of operations).

Dr. Lovell's earlier conference with Colonel Gridley confirms the views stated above.

VPB

E.J.P., Jr.
E.J.P., Jr.

DIRECTOR
From Files of the ~~Secretariat~~
Please Return

TOP SECRET

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
X. Donovan

DATE: 26 February 1944

TO : Lt. Col. O.C. Doering

FROM : Stanley P. Levell

SUBJECT: Conversation With Col. C.J. Gridley, JCS, 23 February 1944

37 421
24 FEB 25 PM 5 25

TOP SECRET


As a result of General Donovan's cable from New Delhi (#77, 1 Dec 1943) active investigation in camouflage and sonic and visual deception has been conducted by this office.

This involved the work done by U.S. Corps of Engineers, Army Air Force, U.S. Navy, COMINT, Signal Corps and other Services. We were advised that this matter was being handled by Colonel Gulbranson, Joint Security Control, who directed my attention to JCS Secret Directive No. 266/2/D. Through the kindness of your office, Colonel Gridley agreed to show me this directive. This he did the evening of 23 February 1944.

It clearly puts all deception, both sonic and visual, into the hands of Joint Security Control. I asked Colonel Gridley where we should draw the line. He stated that camouflage and deception such as articles for SI operators, microfilm containers, luggage with secret compartments and the like, was entirely pertinent to OSS, but that combat and battle camouflage was definitely not within our scope.

It would appear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct us to produce camouflage items for SI and SO only, and to abstain from sonic and visual deception otherwise.

Will you kindly furnish me with a ruling on this point?



Stanley P. Levell, Director
Research and Development

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SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


TOP SECRET

29 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: J.C.S. 266/R/D

Copy No. 59 of J.C.S. 266/R/D, Directive
Cover and Deception Planning, is furnished herewith
for your information and files.


CECIL J. ORDWAY
Colonel, G.S.C.
Assistant Secretary.

Incl 1
JCS paper
dtd 2 Feb 44



TOP SECRET

CW

~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

20 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
Subject: J.C.S. 1002/3

Copy No. 10 of J.C.S. 1002/3, containing
Cover and Description Plans, is distributed herewith
for your information and files.

WALTER D. WHEELER
Major General, USA
The Joint Chiefs of Staff

WHEELER
AS JCS. 10

RECEIVED FEB 20 1944



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~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. _____

3 February 1944

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CORRIGENDUM

TO

J.C.S. 256/2/D

COVER AND DECEPTION PLANNING

Note by the Secretaries

At the request of Joint Security Control the holder of each copy of J.C.S. 256/2/D is requested to substitute the attached page for the present page 5 and to destroy the latter by burning.

Handwritten initials/signature

P. B. ROYAL,
A. J. McFARLAND,
Joint Secretariat.

Struck
From Files of the Secretariat
Please Return

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

x Deception
x Planing

~~SECRET~~
269-6
(J.C.S. 256/2/D)
2 February 1944
Pages 4-5, incl.

COPY NO. 69
269
JCS 256 Series
JPS 157/D
OCS 281 Series

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE

COVER AND DECEPTION PLANNING

References: a. J.C.S. 256/1/D
b. J.C.S. 144th Mtg., Item 3

Note by the Secretaries

The Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to Cover and Deception Planning, as set forth in J.C.S. 256/1/D and amended in J.C.S. 144th Meeting, Item 3, is attached.

This directive supersedes all directives and terms of reference previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. B. ROYAL,
A. J. McFARLAND,
Joint Secretariat.

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRETENCLOSURE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE

COVER AND DECEPTION PLANNING

The responsibility for cover and deception planning will be as indicated below:

a. Deception policy:

Prepared by the Joint Staff Planners and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for areas of United States strategic responsibility.

b. Cover and deception plans:

(1) Prepared by the theater commander for those cover and deception measures which are to be undertaken within his theater in connection with a coming military operation.

(2) Prepared by the Joint Staff Planners for cover and deception measures that are to be executed outside of a theater of operations in order to further military operations within such theater. These plans must be integrated with the cover and deception plans of the theater commander conducting the military operation and both the plans prepared by the Joint Staff Planners and those prepared by the theater commander must be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Implementation of cover and deception plans:

(1) Within a theater of operations by the theater commander.

(2) Outside a theater of operations by Joint Security Control.

d. General: It is further directed.

(1) That the Joint Staff Planners coordinate and integrate approved U.S. deception policies with the policies through the medium of the Combined Staff Planners.

(2) That plans for cover and deception measures to be executed outside a theater of combined U.S.-U.K. operations, be coordinated with the British through the Combined Staff Planners.

(3) That Joint Security Control coordinate and integrate the implementation of cover and deception plans to be executed outside a theater of combined U.S.-U.K. operations with the British Control Section.

(4) Joint Security Control will recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff measures to coordinate the activities of all agencies engaged in:

(a) The development of devices and equipment for the implementation of deception.

(b) The development of deception methods and techniques.

(c) (i) The selection and training of staff officers in deception planning; (ii) the selection and training of appropriate personnel in the employment of deception methods, devices, and equipment, and in the execution of deception operations.


(d) Priorities and allocation of deception personnel and material to theaters.

(e) Preparation and promulgation of deception information to theater commanders and other responsible officers.

(f) Inter-allied affairs concerning deception.

(5) Joint Security Control will be the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the deception matters listed in paragraphs 4 above at the combined level.

(Revised 1 February 1954)



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

JCS 247 - 11082
* Field Photo Search
* Pres. Military 9907-A
* Navy Dept.
March 10, 1959
* JCS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIDE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET:

Subject: Naval personnel requirements of
the Office of Strategic Services.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 247 (Copy No. 18).

1. The Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners, contained on page 19 of the enclosure.
2. It is requested that appropriate action be taken to effect implementation of J.C.S. 247.

FREDERICK B. ROZAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

FOR THE
SECRETARY, JCS
Enclosure: J.C.S. (Copy No. 33 of JCS 247)

DECLASSIFICATION COPY

SECRET

COPY NO. 23

214-5
(J.C.S. 247)

214

March 26, 1943

- (1) J.P.S. 134/D
- (2) J.P.S. 134/1
- (3) J.P.S. 134/2
- (4) J.P.S. 134/3

Pages 1-17 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

JCS 247 11,082

NAVAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

- x FIGHT PLAN BR.*
- x Pers. Military-9707-A*
- x Navy Dept.*
- x JSP*

Note by the Secretaries

1. Enclosures "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" were referred to the Joint Staff Planners for study and recommendation.
2. Enclosure "F", a report by the Joint Staff Planners, is presented for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. A list of enclosures is attached to this cover sheet for convenient reference.

J. R. DEANE,
 F. B. ROYAL,
 Joint Secretariat.

SECRET

- Enclosure "A" - Letter from the Director of Strategic Services, to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated February 19, 1943.
- Appendix to Enclosure "A" - Letter from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Director of Strategic Services, dated February 16, 1943.
- Enclosure "B" - Memorandum from the Director of Strategic Services, to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated February 5, 1943.
- Appendix to Enclosure "B" - Memorandum from the Director of Strategic Services, to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated January 6, 1943.
- Enclosure "C" - Memorandum from the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated February 12, 1943.
- Enclosure "D" - Memorandum from Admiral Badger to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, dated February 25, 1943.
- Enclosure "E" - Memorandum from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Joint Staff Planners, March 1, 1943.
- Enclosure "F" - Report by Joint Staff Planners.

SECRETENCLOSURE "A"

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 19, 1943

Brigadier General John R. Doane
 Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
 Public Health Building
 Washington, D. C.

My dear General Doane:

I respectfully request reconsideration of the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1) in disapproving the allotment of officers and men for field photographic purposes and (2) in transferring our Field Photographic Branch to the Bureau of Aeronautics.

This request is made because your letter (Appendix) indicates that their action was taken under a misapprehension as to the facts.

It is not planned to utilize this personnel with landing operations or other naval activities in combatant zones. The activities of this Photographic Unit are not a duplication of the photographic services of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. They are entirely different in character and purpose and cover a field not occupied by the armed services or by any other governmental bureau. The transfer of this personnel would destroy the operation now concerned with special and secret tasks performed for the Army and Navy.

This unit was set up by order of the President on the 24th day of October, 1941. "Field Photographic" is a misnomer for the Branch as now constituted. The focal point of its operations is the technical personnel and complete studio and laboratory equipment in the headquarters section in Washington.

* * *

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These facilities are essential to the major activities of this Office:

I. Film reports of the Presentation Division of R. & A. which are processed by Field Photographic. These reports have been requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Army and the Navy. Five have already been presented:

1. The United States Army - a four-reel secret report on the organization and development of the Army, prepared at the request of the Chief of Staff and presented to the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees among others.

2. The United States Army - a four-reel version of the above report for release by the Signal Corps to all Army personnel.

3. U. S. Wartime Manpower - a three-reel restricted report on the problems of wartime supply and demand for manpower, prepared for the Services of Supply.

4. Loran - a two-reel secret report on the feasibility of a new system of long range navigation prepared for the Joint New Weapons Committee.

5. U. S. Army Manpower - a three-reel secret report on the manpower requirements of the Army, prepared for G-3.

These reports, and six others now in preparation, are produced by the Presentation Division of the Research and Analysis Branch with the assistance of the technical personnel and the special report laboratory facilities of Field Photographic. In the series of reports on new weapons, of which "Loran" is the first, these films have been of vital importance in covering demonstrations and important findings.

SECRET

II. Psychological warfare films. These films are a unique instrument in the carrying out of psychological warfare and are produced solely by the Field Photographic Branch. The first, "Mexico at War", was prepared at the request of C.I.A.A. and the Mexican government for release throughout South America and Mexico. Arrangements are now being made for similar films on Brazil and China.

In addition to the above work, Field Photographic in the second half of 1942 processed over half a million feet of film for the Bureau of Aeronautics and nearly as much more for various parts of the Army. Camera, sound, and electrical crews, the sound stage, the editing department, and optical work are also in constant demand by the services.

The major activities of Field Photographic, as well as those other services it performs for the Army and Navy, seem to me directly in line with the task assigned to us by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our effectiveness will be seriously impaired if this unit is taken from us.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Donovan
Director

SECRETAPPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

February 16, 1945

Colonel William J. Donovan,
 Director of Strategic Services,
 25th and B Streets, N. W.,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

The Chiefs of Staff have approved your proposed complement of Navy and Marine Corps personnel allotment of the Office of Strategic Services except for the 45 Naval officers, 6 Marine Corps officers, 170 Navy enlisted men, and 12 Marine Corps enlisted men which you have set up as field photographic personnel. The allotment of officers and men for field photographic purposes is disapproved.

At the present time in the Office of Strategic Services there are 21 Navy and 1 Marine Corps officers and 225 enlisted Navy personnel assigned to field photographic duties. So far as can be anticipated the work of these field photographic personnel will not be behind the enemy's lines. It is planned to utilize them, as in the recent past, in connection with landing operations and other naval activities in combatant zones. However, the Army and the Navy and Marine Corps maintain separate photographic services to cover all such operations and it would seem that the field photographic activities of the Office of Strategic Services are an unnecessary duplication.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that the field photographic personnel in the Office of Strategic Services be transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics, U. S. Navy, and that whenever such photographic units in the field are needed by the Office of Strategic Services for special purposes not covered by routine assignments of Army, Navy, or Marine Corps photographers, such needs be filled by requisitioning Army, Navy, or Marine Corps photographic units for temporary duty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ JOHN R. DEANE,
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
 Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE "B"OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

February 5, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services

To: Secretary, Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff

Subject: Naval Personnel Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services

Enclosure: Proposed Complement of Naval and Marine Corps Personnel - Office of Strategic Services (Not enclosed on account of size).

1. Attention is respectfully invited to memorandum of this Office dated January 6, 1943, subject "Military Personnel Requirements of the OSS", a copy of which is attached (Appendix).

2. The principles outlined in the first six paragraphs of that memorandum apply equally in support of a request for Naval personnel to augment the civilian and Army personnel required to carry out the functions of the Office of Strategic Services.

3. The accompanying chart (not furnished), with designation of proposed duties, has been prepared with due regard to minimum requirements, and following the provisions of SECNAV OPNAV-10 directing that the number of Naval officers should be limited as much as possible to "those duties which require them either directly or indirectly to perform Naval functions".

4. The proposed complement is requested to replace all other complements now established. Present complements are as follows:

1st Fleet Headquarters - 42 Naval officers
(Approved for Navy OPNAV-10, of March 15, 1943)

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(b) For training purposes only - 3 Naval officers and 30 enlisted men (Navy) and 3 Marine officers and 14 enlisted men (USMC) (VCNO ltr OP-12-sw serial 035512 of May 3, 1942)

(c) Overall complement - 406 enlisted men (Navy) (Supers ltr Pers-611-MCB of September 12, 1942)

5. There are currently serving in the Office of Strategic Services 50 Naval officers and 8 Marine Corps officers; 126 Naval enlisted men and 4 Marine Corps enlisted men.

6. The proposed duties for the requested personnel may be divided into categories as follows:

Foreign assignments	-----254
Assignments outside Washington	-----42
Assignments in Washington	-----101
Rotating (local and foreign)	-----209

Thus the percentage of those actually to be stationed in the local office will vary between 16% and 30%. It is estimated that when operations have become stabilized at the expected level, the percentage of those in the local office will be maintained at approximately 20%.

7. It is requested that a Naval Command be established for the administration of Naval and Marine Corps personnel attached to the Office of Strategic Services. It is believed that such a plan would result in greater efficiency of operation and greatly increased flexibility. Allowance for such has been incorporated into the proposed complement.

/s/ William J. Donovan
Director

SECRETAPPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "B"

January 6, 1943

To: Secretary, Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff
 From: Director of Strategic Services
 Subject: Military Personnel Requirements of the OSS.

1. The OSS has been assigned by JCS 155/4/D specific responsibilities in the planning and conduct of psychological warfare and for intelligence activities. In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the JFWC, dated October 11, 1942 (JFWC 37/2/D) a study was prescribed to effect "at least a partial militarization of the Office of Strategic Services."

2. The personnel of the OSS is responsible for a wide range of activities, many of which demand highly specialized knowledge or training. Specialists now in the organization and individuals among rare categories in civil life should be made available to the organization if it is to perform its mission. This personnel can be made available and retained in many instances only if military status can be accorded.

3. It should be noted that the OSS operates for and with the armed forces at home and abroad. Its personnel in considerable strength is subject to duty in the active theaters of war. Many of its operatives are engaged in individual activities involving great hazards. The personnel requirements of the OSS should be viewed in the same light as those of the armed forces.

4. Considering the nature of this organization, a considerable degree of militarization is essential to its effective operation. The hierarchy of authority and responsibility can best be maintained by the militarization of key personnel.

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Impairment of the organization through resignation, transfer, and particularly the draft, can likewise be prevented only by partial militarization. Other reasons dictating militarization are: to obtain extreme secrecy of activities demanding strict security measures; to afford financial security and the good name of official status for personnel engaged in hazardous tasks; to permit personnel to operate in areas under military control and transmit information through military channels.

5. No special military status is provided by the armed forces of the United States as protection for personnel engaged in varied secret operations as is done by foreign governments. In Great Britain the personnel employed in special operations and secret intelligence is covered by military status upon the request of those services with few formalities and a minimum of delay. If the services of an individual are required, waivers to ordinary bars to his commissioning are automatic. At present the British have commissioned grades estimated in excess of three thousand engaged in the secret activities comparable to those conducted by the OSS.

6. Two steps are necessary to solve the personnel problems of the OSS:

(A) The approval of an adequate over-all table of attainments and procurement objectives to cover the immediate and anticipated needs of the organization.

(B) Recognition of the special status of the OSS, as having been designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by authorizing some flexibility specifically to this organization in obtaining commissions for its personnel. At present the rigid restrictions in effect in the Secretary's Personnel Board make it difficult to obtain commissions for certain types of personnel in rare categories peculiar to OSS needs. This

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Efficiency can be eliminated only by waiving some of the restrictions.

This study omits considerations of Naval personnel since the Navy has already made available a quota of grades and ratings in keeping with JFPC 37/2/D which directed that the number of Naval officers should be limited as much as possible to those duties which require them either directly or indirectly to perform Naval functions."

3. The recommendations:

(a) (1) That the Army grades, below the grade of general officer, as shown on the attached Table of Organization (Tab. A)* be allotted to the OSS and that all previous allotments, which have been included in the Table, be rescinded.

(2) That the OSS be authorized to submit requests for procurement objectives as required for title to title in order to fill vacancies by specialists now in the OSS or which may be obtained for civil life.

(3) In order to facilitate the commissioning of personnel for the Office of Strategic Services, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the appropriate authorities that by reason of the duties and responsibilities of the Office of Strategic Services liberal waivers be made to the usual, when necessary, to personnel endorsed for commissioning by the Director, OSS, as being in a temporary capacity to OSS requirements and essential to the operational needs.

WILLIAM J. DEAN
Director

* Presumably identical to "Annex A" to J.C.S. 135/4/D.

SECRETENCLOSURE "C"

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
Washington

February 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIAT, JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Naval Personnel Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

Enclosure: Booklet - Proposed Complement of Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Allotment of the Office of Strategic Services. (Not enclosed on account of size).

1. The booklet showing the proposed complement of Navy and Marine Corps personnel for the Office of Strategic Services indicates reasonable requirements except with the respect to field photographic personnel where a proposed complement of 45 Navy officers and 6 Marine Corps officers plus 170 Navy enlisted men and 12 Marine Corps enlisted men is shown.

2. At the present time in the Office of Strategic Services there are 21 Navy and 1 Marine Corps officers and 126 enlisted Navy personnel assigned to field photographic duties. So far as can be anticipated the work of these field photographic personnel will not be behind the enemy's lines. It is planned to utilize them, as in the recent past, in connection with landing operations and other naval activities in combatant zones. However, the Army and the Navy and Marine Corps maintain separate photographic services to cover all such operations and it would seem that the field photographic activities of the Office of Strategic Services are an unnecessary duplication.

3. It is recommended that the proposed complement of Navy and Marine Corps personnel for the Office of Strategic Services shown in the attached booklet be approved with the exception noted above and, in the interest of economy and proper organization, it is further recommended that the field

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photographic personnel in the Office of Strategic Services be transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics and thereafter when photographic units in the field are needed by the Office of Strategic Services for special purposes not covered by routine assignments of Army, Navy, or Marine Corps photographers that such needs be filled by requisitioning Army, Navy or Marine Corps photographic units for temporary duty.

/s/ P. J. HORNE /s/ J. T. McNARNEY /s/ GEO. F. STRATEMEYER
Vice Admiral, USN Lieutenant General, USA Major General, USA

SECRETENCLOSURE "D"NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTONOp-130/104
Ser. 016412

February 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:

Subject: Naval Personnel Requirements of the Office of Strategic Services.

Reference: (a) Colonel Donovan's ltr. of Feb. 19, 1943 with enclosure.*

1. Referring to the enclosure of reference (a) above, the following comment is submitted:-

(a) Paragraph 2. In the interest of brevity and to avoid the disputatious issue of propaganda films, the memorandum for the Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated February 12, 1943, referred only to such activities of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services as are properly described by that title. In mind were the films produced by that Branch such as "Battle of Midway," an eight-reel production entitled "December Seventh" not yet released, the presence in the recent "TORCH" operations of 28 photographers from the London field office of the Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, and the maintenance of another field office in Hollywood. These activities appeared to be the ones of permanent interest to the Army and Navy.

(b) Paragraphs 3 & 4. However, it is noted that Colonel Donovan states that he does not plan to utilize the Field Photographic Branch personnel in combat zones but instead he states that "the focal point of its operation is the technical personnel and complete studio and laboratory equipment of the Headquarters Section in Washington." It will be seen that the scope of work to be carried on in

* This document is published as Enclosure "A" and Appendix to Enclosure "A" respectively, to J.P.S. 130/B.

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the future is not that envisaged as the principal function of the Field Photographic Branch when its present complement of Naval personnel was authorized. There is no evidence to support Colonel Donovan's statement that the transfer of this personnel to the Bureau of Aeronautics would "destroy the operations of his office now concerned with special and secret tasks performed for the Army and the Navy." On the contrary, the complete and elaborate facilities in the Navy's new Photographic Science Laboratory at Anacostia will permit the production of better films than could be produced in the smaller, improvised laboratory in Washington now used by the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. This new Navy laboratory will be manned by Navy personnel and it will be constantly engaged in the production of training films and other productions for the Navy where secrecy and security are on the same plane as that required for the productions in the Office of Strategic Services.

(c) Paragraph 2. None of the five productions listed are of a nature that requires a separate service and a separate laboratory for production. Any or all of them could have been produced by either the Army or Navy, incidentally, nearly all of the personnel now assigned to Field Photographic Branch in the Office of Strategic Services are now listed in the Navy, yet only two of the five productions listed (#1 - U. S. Wartime Manpower, and #4 - ~~... describing a new system of long-range navigation~~) are of direct interest to the Navy.

(d) Paragraph 3. The other six films now in production are as follows:

(1) German Air Power - 2 reels - aerial reconnaissance.

(2) German Manpower - 2 reels - script completed.

S E C R E T

- (5) Stolly - 2 reels in color - in production.
- (4) Organization of U. S. Navy - 3 reels - script in preparation.
- (5) "Dukwa" - report for Joint New Weapons Committee.
- (6) "Wensel" - report for Joint New Weapons Committee.

Items #1, 2 and 3 are editorial jobs such as turned out by "March of Time" and other commercial producers. The same films could be made by either the Army or the Navy. Number 4 could be produced by the Bureau of Aeronautics; similar productions have been made showing the organization of two of the Bureaus of the Navy Department. Numbers 5 and 6 could be produced by either the Army or Navy. Navy training films produced by the Bureau of Aeronautics cover such highly secret subjects as radar, fire control, torpedoes, bombs, and the latest devices and developments in aviation.

(a) Paragraph 7. "Psychological Warfare" films are a new departure, but they are probably about the same as propaganda films sponsored or produced by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and the Office of War Information. Pictures such as "Mexico at War" and "Salute to Mexico" already produced by the Office of Strategic Services and similar projected productions about Brazil and China appear to be more properly the responsibility of either Mr. Rockefeller or Mr. Homer Davis than of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Paragraph 8. It is true that the film laboratory of the Office of Strategic Services has been used by the Navy and other Departments of the Government and it is likewise true that the Field Photographic Branch has at all times evidenced good cooperation. However, it should be noted that the 400,000 feet of film processed during the

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second half of 1942 for the Bureau of Aeronautics represents less than 2% of the Navy's film production and probably less than 2% of the Army's production. During the past 7 months the Photographic Division of the Bureau of Aeronautics has completed some 200 motion pictures and some 400 more are now in production. During this same period 573 slide films were completed and 1157 more are now in production. For the foregoing approximately 47,000,000 feet of film were processed by the Navy. At the present time the Navy has a production unit with Navy personnel at the Eastman Kodak Co. plant at Rochester capable of turning out 300,000 feet of negative and release prints per week. The new Photographic Science Laboratory at Anacostia will have a capacity of 3,000,000 feet of negatives and release prints per week. It will have some 600 officers and men assigned to it. So notwithstanding any use the Navy may have made in the past of the laboratory facilities of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services there will be no need of such assistance in the future.

2. In order to get the whole picture as to the activities of the Field Photographic Branch it should be noted that in addition to the film productions listed above the following have also been produced.

- (a) The U.S. B-24 Kearns.
- (b) Aerial survey of Martinique.
- (c) Aerial survey of Guadelupe.
- (d) Aerial survey of Wake Island.
- (e) Sound interviews at Honolulu with Admiral Nimitz, Captain Berry, and the Army Bomber Pilots after the Battle of Midway.
- (f) The reels of pictures of a Navy Tank Force in the Coral Sea.
- (g) The reel "Torpedo Squadron Eight".
- (h) 4,000 feet of training film.

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3. The budget for the current year for the Field Photographic Branch is slightly less than \$1,500,000 and the anticipated budget for the next fiscal year will be slightly more than \$1,500,000. The film laboratory in Washington and the photographic equipment for the camera crews represent a cost of approximately \$100,000.

4. The basic question involved is whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to have a separate organization comprising some 50 officers and 200 men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and spending about \$1,500,000 a year for the production of motion pictures which Colonel Donovan says are now to be used principally in the presentation of reports from the Research and Analysis Branch. The educational and entertainment value of the productions so far made for the Joint Chiefs of Staff can only be evaluated by those who have seen the pictures, but there is no reason to believe that similar pictures can not be made in the future by either the Navy or Army or by the Navy personnel now assigned to the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services if they were re-assigned to the Bureau of Aeronautics and thereafter made available to Colonel Donovan when, as, and if needed for special projects approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. It is submitted that Colonel Donovan's justification in his letter to General Deane does not strengthen his case. The recommendation of this office for the transfer to the Bureau of Aeronautics of all Navy personnel now assigned to the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services is reaffirmed.

/s/ Oscar C. Badger
OSCAR C. BADGER.

SECRETENCLOSURE "E"THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS:

Subject: Personnel for Field Photographic Branch of the U.S.S.

On February 20th the Joint Staff Planners were directed to consider a letter from Colonel Donovan asking reconsideration of a decision made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) That the allotment of Navy personnel for the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services be disapproved, and

(2) That the personnel of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services be transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department.

It is desired that the Joint Staff Planners only consider and submit recommendations with reference to Item (1) mentioned in the paragraph above. Item 2 will not be considered.

/s/ JOHN R. DRAMM,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE "F"NAVAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF
THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICESREPORT BY THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERSSTATEMENT OF PROBLEM

1. The Joint Staff Planners were directed to consider a request from the Director of Strategic Services for reconsideration of the decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the allotment of Navy personnel for the field photographic branch of the Office of Strategic Services be disapproved, and to submit recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DISCUSSION

2. The complement of naval personnel requested by the Director of Strategic Services in his letter of February 5, 1943 included a complement for the Field Photographic Branch which had been previously approved by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

This approved complement of 45 naval officers, 6 Marine Corps officers, 170 Navy enlisted men, and 12 Marine Corps enlisted men has been filled to the extent of 21 Navy officers, 1 Marine Corps officer, and 126 Navy enlisted men assigned to field photographic duty. Representatives of the Field Photographic Branch state that the indications are proceeding slowly with selection standards they have set.

3. The reason for the naval designation of the Field Photographic Branch had its beginning in the establishment of a small Reserve Photographic unit in Hollywood in 1932 at the insistence of Admiral Behofield, then Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. This unit performed tasks for the Fleet and later for the President, and when the Office of Strategic Services was

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established this unit was called to service in September 1941 under Colonel Donovan. As presently constituted, this unit has a fine esprit de corps and it is the opinion of its leader that removal of the naval designation would result in a less efficient working organization due to the limited control that can be exercised over personnel in a civilian status and to the higher salaries that would be required to be paid such civilians.


4. Investigation of the activities of the Field Photographic Branch indicates that, in addition to their work of presentations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are doing highly secret work for the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations branches of the Office of Strategic Services. This type of work is expected to constitute the greater portion of their endeavor in the future and will be the reason for maintaining photographic crews in the field.

5. It is apparent that much of the presentation work done in the past and now in production for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could have been done by the photographic branches of Army Signal Corps, Bureau of Aeronautics and Army Air Corps. In view of the ability of these photographic services, it is believed that the burden of presentation of purely military nature should be removed from the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and assigned to the appropriate Army or Navy unit. This should make it possible to fix the allowance of Naval personnel at the approximate figure now indicated.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That the allotment of Navy personnel for the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services be approved except that the commissioned personnel be limited to 25 Naval officers and 2 Marine Corps officers and that enlisted personnel be 140.

(b) That further expansion of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services beyond the foregoing allotment be not made.



V.I.W. Pacific Theater

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF;
AIDE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, J.E. FLECK;
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

Subject: Special Military Plan for U.S.
Imperialist Warfare Operations
Against the Japanese within the
Pacific Theater.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 205 (Copy No. 23).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners as contained in J.C.S. 205, paragraphs 23 to 31, inclusive.
2. It is requested that the Army transmit a copy of this plan to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma, and India, for use as a basis for operations.
3. It is requested that the Office of Strategic Services transmit a copy of this plan to the Chief of U.S. Operations, China Theater, for use as a basis for operations.

John D. Ryan
John D. Ryan,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Staff Secretary.

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SECRETCOPY NO. 24213-3
(F.C.S. 245)213March 24, 1943(1) J.P.S. 133
(2) J.P.S. 133/1Pages 1-21, incl.JCS # 245 11/103
x FE 4 x PG-9
x PW x JAPAN
x Military PlanJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFSPECIAL MILITARY PLAN FOR U. S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE WITHIN THE ASIATIC THEATERNote by the Secretaries

Enclosure "A", containing the above listed plan, and Enclosure "B", additions to the plan recommended by the Director of Strategic Services, were referred to the Joint Staff Planners for study and appropriate recommendation.

The Joint Staff Planners have amended the plan in certain particulars and recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the amended plan as set out in Enclosure "C".

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

Distribution:

Gen. Marshall	Copy No. 1
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12-15, to Secretariat

SECRETENCLOSURE "A"SPECIAL MILITARY PLAN FOR U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE WITHIN THE ASIATIC THEATERSTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To conduct, in close cooperation with the Chinese and other Allies, psychological warfare against the Japanese within the Asiatic Theater, in furtherance of actual or planned military operations.

DISCUSSION

2. (a) Official U. S. National Policy. The United States is pledged to lend all possible assistance to China and to assist our other allies in this theater.

(b) Over-all Strategic Factors. The continued resistance of China, the opening of a "Burma Road", the securing of Chinese air bases within range of Japan, and the attitude of India are primary factors for the defeat of Japan.

(c) Physical Factors. For some time, and in close cooperation with our allies, OSS personnel has been conducting psychological warfare in China and Burma. Inadequate transport has prevented attainment of the desired results. Some 600 tons of special equipment essential to OSS operations are now at Calcutta; some 300 tons of additional equipment are now enroute to Calcutta by sea. This material is sorely needed in China. It cannot be delivered unless transport is made available. The entire undertaking is threatened and will fail eventually unless necessary transport is provided promptly.

SECRET(d) Psychological Warfare Factors.

(1) So long as our major military effort is to be made in the European Theater, psychological warfare offers the most effective means available for lending assistance to China. The Chinese are most unhappy over our limited assistance. Successful full-scale psychological warfare may alleviate this attitude.

(2) The OSS contribution in China will be one of coordination, providing instruction for the Chinese and providing technical personnel and equipment.

(3) Japan has penetrated so deeply in China, has so widely and thinly spread her forces, that on all sides the Japanese are vastly outnumbered by hostile Chinese. The Japanese invasion of China has been cruel. Chinese hatred is bitter. All the implements of psychological warfare, especially sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activities, will find the world's richest field in China.

(4) Close liaison with the Chinese may lead to the securing of vital information of our common enemy.

(e) Possible Contingencies. That the Burmese join Japan; that the Indians revolt against Great Britain; that India joins with Japan; that Chinese resistance collapses; that Japan attacks Siberia.

CONCLUSIONS

1. (a) That pending American offensive operations in the Asiatic Theater, psychological warfare of necessity must there play the major role.

(b) That within the Asiatic Theater, and especially in China, psychological warfare will achieve maximum results with the minimum expenditure of means.

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(c) That an effective psychological warfare effort in China is essential.

(d) That the psychological warfare program for China will fail if transportation for supplies is not provided promptly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Approve the foregoing special military plan for U. S. psychological warfare operations against Japan within the Asiatic Theater.

(2) Charge the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India, with the responsibility for prosecuting U. S. psychological warfare operations in that theater, and direct that all OSS personnel and activities in that theater be placed under his control.

(3) Forward the Plan and Appendix A, as approved, to the War and Navy Departments, to the Office of Strategic Services, and to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in China, Burma and India, for use as a basis for operations.

(4) Take such action as may be necessary to insure the prompt movement of essential psychological warfare supplies into China.

James Grafton Rogers
Chairman, OSS Planning Group

Enclosure: Appendix Estimate