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personnel and transportation, in liaison with the Dispatching Officer or Army or Navy Liaison Officer. The Planning Officer, with the approval of the Chief of Mission, the Executive Officer and Operations Officer, may appoint such area Operations Officers as seem necessary or desirable to assist in the preparation and execution of operations in a designated geographic territory.

AREA INTELL. REPRESENTATIVES

The Intelligence Officer may be represented in areas or territories outside of London by one or more Area Representatives who shall be responsible to him for the collection, compilation and reporting of information available in the area or territory where such Area Representative is located.

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GEOGRAPHIC AREA REPRESENTATIVE:

The Geographic Representative shall, under the general direction of the Section Chief, be responsible for organizing and preparing the territory under his jurisdiction for subversive and psychological warfare operations. His duties shall include:

a. All work of origination and planning, whether initiated by the Geographic Representative or pursuant to orders from higher authority.

b. All contacts with Agents, including recruiting and handling.

c. All daily contacts with representatives of foreign agencies.

d. In general, all matters pertaining to the area for which he is responsible, including liaison and support of organizations.

[illegible]:

The [illegible] Officer shall be responsible to the Operations Officer, in liaison with the appropriate Air Force and or appropriate authorities, for all matters of transportation, including the loading of containers and packages and the [illegible] of material and personnel.

[illegible]:

The Logistic Officer shall, with the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Executive Officer, be appointed by and be responsible to the Operations Officer, for the preparation [illegible] operational plans. All proposals for [illegible] shall be submitted to him for coordination [illegible] and equipment, logistic and billeting of

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or desirable for the proper preparation, planning and execution of subversive operations and/or activities undertaken or contemplated by Auxiliary Operations Groups.

OPERATIONS OFFICER:

The Operations Officer shall, under the direction of the Executive Officer, be responsible to the Executive Officer for the preparation, planning and execution of all subversive, psychological warfare or other operations of a military nature, including responsibility for the coordination, planning and execution of all attacks upon targets, coup de main projects, and planning and coordination of activities of Auxiliary Operations Groups.

CHIEF OF SECTION:

The Chief of Section shall be responsible to the Executive Officer for all activities in the area under his jurisdiction except that all operations of a military nature shall be approved, coordinated and directed by the Operations Officer. The Chief of Section shall supervise and integrate the work of the Geographic Representatives within his Section. In particular, he shall be entrusted with the following functions:

a. He shall approve and be responsible for the coordination of all matters of major policy within his Section and shall handle all matters of policy affecting relations with foreign governments.

b. He shall appoint all Geographic Representatives within his Section with the approval of the Chief of Mission and the Executive Officer.

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Armed Forces.

COUNTER ESPIONAGE OFFICER:

The Counter Espionage Officer shall be responsible to the Intelligence Officer for the conduct of all counterespionage activities which come within the jurisdiction of the Mission.

ANALYSIS OFFICER:

The Analysis Officer shall be responsible to the Intelligence Officer for the collection and analysis of such information and the preparation of such basic material and studies as may be necessary or required for military or subversive or psychological warfare operations.

REPORTS OFFICER:

The Reports Officer shall be responsible to the Intelligence Officer for the compilation and dissemination to appropriate branches and officers within the OSS and to appropriate agencies of the Armed Forces of information and intelligence necessary for the prosecution of subversive and psychological warfare activities or required for military operations.

LIAISON WITH OPERATIONS:

The officer in Charge of Liaison with Operations shall be responsible, upon the request of the Operations Officer, the Planning Officer, Chiefs of Section or Geographic Desk Representatives, for assembling from all available sources information, maps, charts, illustrations and visual presentations necessary

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ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND SECRETARIAT:

Shall be responsible for providing a channel through which all proposals for action from officers of the Mission may be submitted to the Executive Officer and through which all executive decisions may be disseminated to appropriate branches and officers of the Mission and shall also perform such work of a special character as the Chief of Mission or Executive Officer may determine.

PLANNING GROUP:

The Planning Group shall consist of the Executive Officer, the Intelligence Officer, the Operations Officer and the Chiefs of Sections and such other officers as may be appointed to it or invited to sit with it, from time to time, by the Chief of Mission. The Planning Group shall advise the Executive Officer on matters of general policy in connection with the development and coordination of the planning and execution of Secret Intelligence and subversive and psychological warfare activities in the territories in which such activities are contemplated or carried on under the control and supervision of the OSS Mission, ETOUSA.

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER:

The Intelligence Officer shall, under the direction of the Executive Officer, be responsible for the collection, compilation and analysis of information and intelligence necessary for the prosecution of subversive and psychological warfare; for the dissemination of such information of military or naval significance as may have been collected, to appropriate agencies of the

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# APPENDIX ONE

## OSS FIELD HEADQUARTERS

## DUTIES AND AUTHORITIES OF OFFICERS

### CHIEF OF MISSION:

The Chief of Mission shall be responsible to the Director OSS in Washington for all activities of the Mission and shall approve any and all appointments to offices or positions within the Mission.

### EXECUTIVE OFFICER:

The Executive Officer shall be under the control of the Chief of Mission but subject to the direction and supervision of the Chief of Intelligence, OSS, with respect to all matters relating to Intelligence and to the Chief of Operations, OSS, for the execution of all military and special operations. He shall also be responsible to the Chief of Mission for the proper integration of all intelligence and operational activities of the Mission including: subversive and psychological warfare operations; the organization and operation of Secret Intelligence activities; the collection, compilation and analysis of information necessary or valuable for the prosecution of subversive or psychological warfare operations or of incidental military or naval significance, and the dissemination of such information and intelligence to interested branches within the OSS and to appropriate agencies of the armed forces.

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


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


Note (1) Membership to consist of Executive Officer; Chief Operations Officer; Chief Intelligence Officer, and Chiefs of Sections

Note (2) For functions, duties and authorities of officers, see Appendix One attached.

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(March 21, 1943 continued)

Threw some cold water on my face at 5:00 A.M., had a cup of coffee and managed to live through the next four hours. We landed at 8:53 - seven minutes short of our 15 hours ETA. New York was beautiful to behold on this snappy morning which is traditionally our first day of spring. Customs and immigration and then home. What a perfect climax to a trip I would not have missed for worlds but which I trust will not again be necessary!



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## Notes of E.C.H., Jr.

(March 20, 1943, continued)

Thunderstorms, tropical storms and bursts of sunshine followed along in quick succession until finally, at 7:35 we were down at Trinidad. We were ushered, by a Pan American hostess, through the soggy morning haze into a waiting room where fruit juice and coffee was to be had. Rather sporting and decidedly thoughtful of a rival line. Then to the Queens Park Hotel. A shower, shave and good breakfast.

Several of our party went into Port au Spain which, on this particular Saturday, looked and smelled like any other British West Indian town. In fact it reminded me very much of Kingston, Jamaica.

Back to the Hotel for an abominable lunch, another shower - it was very hot and muggy - and then off to the Seaplane Base at 4:00 P.M. New York time after a half-hour delay.

The unpleasant spectacle of a second Lieutenant of Ordnance and two privates, all with too much rum aboard, fraternizing without restraint. Part of an exceedingly sloppy and undisciplined looking outfit (numbering 35,000 to 50,000 men) stationed about Trinidad. It was more of the same sort of thing I had seen in North Africa (including the 3rd Division, I believe, at Port Lyaute). Of what are our Commanders of Troops thinking? And - except for heat conditioning - why ground troops to any number in Trinidad? Think of the diversion of shipping required to transport and maintain them.

Having reached the Air Base at about 4:10 we proceeded to hang about (as is always the case) until 5:45 when we went aboard. After a lot of taxiing we were off at 6:07 P.M. (New York time) No one was sorry to say good-bye to Trinidad.

We are told that we have a 15hour flight ahead. Too bad we have so late a start. This is my night to sit through it all and a short one would have suited nicely.

### March 21, 1943

It was a long night without doubt. Strange how interminable the hours seem as you near home. Millions of American men and boys are learning now - if they have not known before - what home and family and friends and their own great country mean.



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(March 18, 1943 continued)

the ship's Canteen. These Navy boys live right. Nothing is missing - candy, cigarettes - even a soap box. And quarters de luxe.

Walked through the town and then had a good mess at 6:00 P.M.

We left the ship at 7:30 P.M. and were off at 7:55.

This will be a good night to continue with my report.

March 19, 1943

Landed at Bathurst Sea Plane Base at about 8:10 London time. The usual delays due to lack of preparation, so that we did not leave the Base until 9:30. We were taken 8 miles to a BOAC Camp where we had the usual atrocious British breakfast. Bathed and shaved just prior to the time the water was turned off. A walk on the beach and a good lunch at Naon (1:00 P.M. for us). It was a very good lunch, indeed.

We quit the BOAC camp at 1:30 (2:30 our time) and went immediately to the plane. We took an extra load of gas which made a long run necessary. At 4:12 P.M. (London time) we were off, however.

It looks like a tedious 20 hours journey. That would put us in Trinidad at about 7:00 A.M. New York time. Let us hope so as the plane is small and overcrowded at best. In any event, it should be my turn to sleep tonight.

March 20, 1943

It was, indeed, a long night. We were buffetted about by head winds for several hours and then descended to a lower level where the heat became too great to permit of sleep. I was up, therefore, at about 3:30 New York time or 8:30 London time. The next four hours were long ones broken only by the unbelievable picturesqueness of the moon as it settled, glowing like a huge jack-o-lantern at Haloween, behind a bank of thunderheads. To this was added a West Indian sunrise sketched on the brightening horizon in lemon and orange background - a fitting reminder of the breakfast of citrus which, we hoped, awaited us.



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## Notes of E.C.H., Jr.

### March 17, 1943

Up at 7:30 A.M. after a grand sleep. Breakfasted on eggs and bacon and then worked on my report to the Colonel.

Our crew arrived, but we were not told whether or not we are to leave.

The Czech Finance Minister is with us and I had an interesting talk with him about Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and France. He came out of France, incidentally, in 1940 and has followed the situation there, apparently, very closely. He believes pretty much in the De Gaullist claims. He believes, too, that Germany must collapse prior to Christmas 1944 barring substantial German successes or large allied reverses. Perhaps he is right. He admits, however, that any internal collapse must be predicated on Allied successes on the Continent. No move toward an invasion can be made this year, he feels, but early in 1944 we must be ready. And we cannot fail. If we do, the people of Germany can then be converted to a policy of further resistance. Perhaps the Minister is right. At this stage of the War who can tell.

A ride into Limerick to purchase some lace from the sisters at the Convent of the Good Shepherd . The Estate of the Earl of Dunraven - an inspection of the ancient castle and Abbey - a good dinner and off to Foynes at 9:45 where we were inspected and put aboard the American Export Clipper at 11:20 P.M. Off at 11:55. We drew lots for bearths - either tonight or tomorrow night. My turn comes tonight - worse luck.

### March 18, 1943

The lunch was good but I did not sleep too well or too long. After all my practice I really do better sitting up.

After alternately freezing and roasting I finally climbed out at about 7:30 London (and African) time. We were moving along over a cloud bank and the sun was well above the horizpn. Finally at 8:55 Port Lyauti with its scuttled French vessels lying in the harbor and estuary. A Naval medical inspection and then to the "Biscayne" - a U.S. sea plane tender. We were treated to a royal breakfast, hot shower and shave. We changed back into uniform and took off the white beards. On further inspection most of us proved to be poorly disguised Army and Navy Officers.

A walk about town - two oranges for lunch and then a little work on my report in the African sunshine. After lunch we visited



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## Notes of E.C.H., Jr.

(March 15, 1943 continued)

No one feels much like moving too rapidly. The aspect of nature is that of one awakening, with great effort from deep sleep.

Dined with some of my boys. They see big things ahead and are, I conceive, somewhat stupified by what they understand to be their job. I think they know what is needed and have the inspiration which the task requires. They will have to stand on their own for a time. I am already too long delayed.

## March 16, 1943

Had two or three calls after getting to bed last evening - the last from Dave Bruce about midnight. He was just in from Ireland where everything, he said, turned out alright. Dave was optimistic about what our boys in London could accomplish. I asked him to "follow up" strenuously on air transport requirements.

Being fearful of not receiving an early call I was up at 5:30 A.M. Rang for hot water which I finally received together with some bread. This, with powdered coffee, was my breakfast.

Finished packing and called a taxi. The morning was chilly and ice lay in the gutters and depressions as we drove to Paddington Station. The setting was lovely - a nice setting for my final look at London town.

We were off for Bristol at 8:15 A.M. where we arrived a little before 11:00. Then to the Airport and two hours of British customs. I was way overweight but talked the boys into letting me carry everything.

We had tea as two loads of PAA and American Export passengers took off for Limerick and the Shannon Airport. Three of us were left to go in the baggage plane - a Sterling bomber. We left at 1:40 P.M. and passed a miserable, cold two and one half hours in the ship's dark waist. Then more customs and on to Limerick and Adare. Here, we found that we must stay the night although the PAA passengers were allowed to go.

The day was gorgeous and Manning Jacob and I took a long walk before dinner. I also dismounted my carbine which had been causing consternation among customs officials all day.

A good dinner and then a plunge into an icy bed at 9:15 P.M. Thank goodness for a bed - warmer which helped materially.



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(March 15, 1943 continued)

under which we will service Southern and Southwestern France and SOE the remainder of France and Western Europe. Any established lines of communication would remain and new lines established by us would be "tied into" these.

The General wondered if this meant that our operations were to be run from North Africa under "Giraud" influence. We said only in part would North Africa have any concern in the matter. Our operations would be, in the main, directed from London.

We stated that SOE would probably wish to have "Observers" with our own at headquarters and in "key" points in the territories to be serviced by SOE. The General saw no objection to this.

We left at about 12:50 P.M. The General is returning to France this evening. Back to the office to clean up some last minute details.

George Brewer was excited about a cable from the Colonel on the Norwegian proposals of SOE (specific targets) recently made to us. Louis Franck, it seems, told the Colonel that OSS London had turned down two proposals. Louis has evidently been led astray. The record here shows that the British themselves abandoned one target (and properly - it was a fish plant producing only 60 tons a year). The other was the molybdenum mine which was proposed to Washington and concerning which there is here no record of a reply to the cable pointing out the danger, viz: almost certain capture. The personnel proposed from Washington was absurd and, in any event, such a task could only be undertaken after weeks of arduous training. We were not and are not ready for it yet.

George said that Arthur Nichols was a bit cool toward him this morning. He told George that SOE was completely upset. They were obviously going to be compelled to give up the Jedburgh idea and follow our plan of Auxiliary Operations Groups. They were so upset that Nichols did not see how they could continue to train our officers.

I told George not to worry. More and more, I thought, We would have to proceed under our own steam. SOE may be upset because we are dealing with the French - but, after all, we are keeping them advised. They may also be in a turmoil because they are beginning to realize the value of Operations Groups about which we have been thinking for months. The irony of it all is that the British Military authorities will give SOE the authority to go ahead whereas Washington will hold us up indefinitely not only on authority but on equipment and transportation. We may have some ideas but the British get on with the job.

Took a walk and finished my packing. I had almost forgotten how beautiful London can be. Spring is really here. Crocuses are out - and the crowds too. The weather is balmy.



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March 15, 1943

Up early to work on notes of yesterday.

At 10:00 A.M. I was called and told I would leave American Export tomorrow. Good news, if true. There is much to be done at home.

Paul Van der Stricht telephoned to say he wanted to make an appointment with the mysterious Mr. Chevalier (a French General - De Gaulle's Chief of Staff in Paris and a former Corps Commander - who is here for a few days). The conference would be a continuation of our meeting with Col. Billiot.

We kept the appointment at a little before 12:00 noon at the Hotel Rembrandt. The General is a pleasing, clean cut, bald headed little Frenchman. He was accompanied by M. Binet, Col. Billiot and a Naval Lt. Commander. He showed us a map of France indicating 12 Divisions which represent the De Gaulle organization there. Headquarters are now at Lyon but are being moved to Paris. There were 7 organizations (secret) working in France but they have agreed to consolidate their work.

We heard, again, the story that only De Gaulle represents "France Resistant". The General was more calm and unpretentious in his claims than some of his confreres but insisted, nevertheless, that theirs was the only group in France on whom we could count for expert and organized assistance. His chart showed "effectives" of 126,000, but he said this represented only one half of those actually available.

The General made it clear that German measures (labor conscription etc) were rapidly taking the younger men from France. His associates said that not only was this true, but France, they felt, would not have the spirit to endure another winter. Invasion could only safely be put off 4 to 6 months. Later on he indicated that if we could launch upon a program of storing arms (they want sub-machine guns principally) and could demonstrate that we were actually planning invasion, in this case the people could be held together for a longer period.

We spoke, again, of our plan to put "observers" with the "Free French" - Americans who could pass as natives. They welcome the idea. They will also take, later, other American Officers who cannot pass as natives but who may live in France, clandestinely, for short periods.

We pointed out that we would have to discuss our plans with SOE with which we work closely. We may effect an arrangement



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March 14, 1943.

Rather late out of bed and then to Church where I was compelled to listen to a sermon - something I usually abhor and this was no exception.

Lunched with Frank Canfield who wanted to discuss the advisability of proceeding with a Frenchman brought in by Pacotte - who has been working with SOE in Southern France. I advised him to talk frankly with SOE. This man knows Americans and wants to work with them. He is operating in territory in which we will probably have the largest military interest and which, perhaps, we may arrange to service. Will they let us "take him on". We cannot, of course, make an arrangement with him until we receive air transport aid. We are not in a position, today, to put him back into France where he wants to go in two weeks. But his organization would be useful in supplementing our own there and the one on which Paul Vanderstricht is working. With the Free French (through our Officer-Observers) we would then be building four separate organizations - none too many considering the increased liquidation which is sure to come.

Frank suggested that we might have to provide compensation for some of his people through Switzerland. This, I said, could be done through Allen Dulles. Start slowly - 15 organizers and 5 W/T operators - the latter to be brought out through Spain, trained and redelivered. We want to look at his performance and have our own people check on it before going too far.

Frank left at three and then Bross and Strombolt came by. We went for a walk - almost two hours of fast going up the embankment - past the Abbey and back again.

Then dinner at the Connaught - a walk home and to an early bed.



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disappointing notice that my plane would be delayed until Monday, too bad. I'm ready to go now, although this day was one I should not have wanted to miss.

A long walk, dinner and to bed.



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of American Service, of the areas which seem most logically assignable to OSS -- to wit: Norway (or Scandinavia) and Southern and Southwestern France. This would leave the rest of France, the Lowlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., to be serviced by the British -- a difficult undertaking at best.

The facilities we would require in making our contribution would not be enormous. We do not ask that special ships be diverted, but we would require [illegible] trained in Map Navigation and "pin point" landings. We operate solely during the moon period and then only when weather conditions permit. A relatively few Liberators -- any number at the outset -- would do the trick. We have some, I know, fitted with "Radar". If these were removed (as could easily be done) they would probably be suitable for our operations except for "flame dampening" equipment.

General Andrews then said "The flame dampeners we have, and the Radar equipped ships have all been sent down below (meaning N.A.)." I replied: "Surely you will be getting others. We might even make out, for the moment, with paratroop carriers". "That", I said, "is our problem in a nutshell", and I added that I hoped the General might go out on the trip Colonel Bruce had arranged for the General, General Eakers and General Barker, so that he could have a first hand view of how the job is really done. The General promised to go.

At this point I decided I had probably not only talked too much, but had about covered the ground anyway, and the meeting was, therefore, ended. It was difficult to tell whether or not the General had been at all impressed. He is on the diffident side, Colonel Barth had said not a word during the entire time, so there was no way of judging his feelings. The Admiral was obviously interested and repeated that he would help find the Officer-Observers we needed. Toward the end he even indicated that, if I begged hard enough, I might have young Williams.

Both General Andrews and Admiral Stark urged me to see General Marshall and the Admiral told me to be sure to call on Admiral King. Just what I could say to the two Chiefs I cannot imagine.

As I went out Admiral Stark said he would bring Lieut. Williams in to meet us. He might have friends who would be useful -- so, he thought, might Commander Kittredge. I stayed to meet Williams and then suggested that he and Kittredge join me for lunch, thanked the Admiral again and left. As I was going he said, "Well, I suppose I'll get soft as I always do and let you have him (meaning Williams)".

I stopped by the office, picked up Paul Van der Stricht and then met Williams and Kittredge for lunch. Young Williams is keen to be one of our officer-observers. He could pass as a Frenchman without the slightest difficulty. We discussed possibilities among French-speaking Americans. Paul Van der Stricht mentioned Henry Hyde, who could surely "fill the bill" and Commander Kittredge promised a list of names. I told Williams I'd be after him later.

During the afternoon I completed my letter to the Colonel. Then a



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within France should be handled by competent officers who are put into France by the British and ourselves as "observers".

Our OSS arrangements presupposes that the Theatre Command will wish to follow some such program. We plan to build our own present organization and to add at least one independent French organization. We will build principally in the South and Southeast with outlets into Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. We have in training, and will soon induct into North Central France, a group of two organizers and one W/T operator who will build toward the South to contact our groups there. We consider South and Southwest France as more likely American invasion territory than Northern France.

We will also, preliminarily, try to attach to the De Gaulle organization, at a limited number of selected points, American officers who will tie us to this organization and will be our official "observers". They, but not the De Gaullist Groups to which they are attached, will have contact (through cut-outs) with our own organization in Southern France so that they may have a "way out" if anything untoward happens.

A second group of American Officer "observers" will, we hope, be found and inducted at a later date at points which are designated by the Theatre Commander through his Planning Staff. They will be attached to De Gaullist and other groups and will work with our other "Observers" in preparing resistance units and instructing them, in a general way, in the assignments which will be given them on "D-Day". They could, in effect, be representatives of the Staff who can report on conditions as they find them and confirm (or deny) information passed along by the French.

Just prior to D-Day we would attempt to infiltrate, at spots selected by the U.S. Staff, our A.O. Groups which would be received by the Observers (and the organizations to which they will be attached) and will act as rallying points and instruction centers for any available resistance units.

I pointed out that it was not going to be easy to find even a half dozen officers capable of acting as observers. These officers must be American by nativity (for political reasons a naturalized Frenchman would not do) and must be able to "pass as Frenchmen".

I ended this particular discussion by saying that I was sorry not to be able to feel that we could trust ourselves to the French without reservation. I have lived among them and like them. On the other hand I had been asked a direct question affecting American interests and felt bound to answer frankly.

Both Admiral Stark and General Andrews said the plan was sound. Admiral Stark said he might help us find some of the officers. He mentioned Lieut Williams -- his aide -- but then said he "would not let him go". He did promise a list of possibilities, however.

I pointed out that, to do the job I had just been describing, we would need some serious aid in the way of air transportation. British SOE is now receiving assistance from the Air Ministry in the form of two squadrons of Halifaxes, specially equipped and manned by specially trained crews. They have been generous in their help to OSS and the so-called "Secret Armies" and "Resistance Groups" of Western Europe. But their facilities are insufficient for the job which must be done. We have recently discussed the possibility



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only been able to save and store something like 150 tons of war material. The task of inducting supplies by plane and of organizing, equipping and instructing an army in occupied France has been considered on anything but a basis of careful selection. Certain strategic points should be chosen and we should build our supplemental organizations at these points. If we have, at immediate time, the assistance of a relatively few thousand patriots we will be fortunate.

h. I would never "trust" the French in the sense of confiding too much in any group. The French are, and will probably continue to be, terribly factional. It is the nature of the Frenchman to be so. A large proportion of them have a great love of country but, fundamentally, they have no burning interests other than their own. They admire the British and appreciate their aid. But there is no tender affection for England or the Empire. With respect to us their feelings are probably kindlier. We, they know, have no lasting selfish interests in Europe which must be served and preserved at all costs. But even concerning us, in all frankness, there are now some doubts. Our action in North Africa has left the French people amazed and fearful. They see, in what has occurred there, a pattern for other controlled areas. Martial law they would have understood (and this, I added, was certainly the obvious solution), but cooperation with an existing and hostile regime is what we have given them. This, we as Americans, was deemed necessary by reason of the fact that -- martial law not having been invoked -- it was essential to preserve a government through which we could work. We, as soldiers, should not criticize, and I do not intend criticism, but the fact remains that the French people are undoubtedly distrustful of our policies. This was obvious among all classes in Algeria, and is confirmed by all reports from France. President Roosevelt, in spite of all that has happened, still undoubtedly remains personally highly popular and there [illegible], even now, I am sure, a great regard for the American people as such.

General Andrews interrupted to say that on the Continent martial law would, undoubtedly, be enforced. I said that this would certainly be advisable and helpful.

g. Concerning reliance on De Gaulle's Staff, and close cooperation in invasion planning, my thoughts were as follows:

It was certainly going to be highly advisable to consult with and use De Gaulle's officers, and to work with the Free French on general plans. They have, undoubtedly, some able officers (like Col. [illegible], for example) whose advice will be valuable and who are not as interested in politics as their leader, or who, perhaps, are more astute politicians. There are other able French officers, too, whose services we should not be precluded from using.

Detailed planning should be done by our own and British officers and the results and the making of final arrangements



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equipped, well led soldiers.

We are now in the process of rectifying this situation by organizing [illegible] Groups which have been especially requested by A.F.H.Q. for Italy and [illegible] Italy and which will be useful in every theatre. We propose [illegible], for example, to organize Norwegian and French Groups of language-[illegible] Americans who [illegible] be employed on the Scandinavian Peninsula and [illegible] France. In anticipation of their use we are building, at the same time, [illegible] 21-40 organizations in these countries. Our DZ organizers will take contact with local "Resistance Groups", will prepare lines of communication, [illegible] houses, etc., and will "receive" the A.O.Groups.

[illegible] went on to explain the purpose of Auxiliary Operations and said, [illegible] in preparing the way for their use in France, we were contacting existing [illegible] organizations in addition to building our own. For example, we [illegible] discussing with the De Gaullists the possibility of sending into [illegible] (at specific points) with De Gaullist units, American officers who [illegible] act as our organizers and contacts with the French, and would, at the [illegible], be capable observers for General Andrews own Staff.

[illegible] the General and Admiral Stark said, in effect, that the plan [illegible] "like a good idea". They then proceeded to ask me three questions:

1. What do I think of the claims of the De Gaullists respecting their position in France (Admiral Stark);

2. How far should we "trust" the French (General Andrews); and

3. Should we rely on De Gaulle's Staff as he wishes us to (Admiral Stark -- really a "follow up" of the General's question).

My answers were pretty frank and probably very presumptuous. They were [illegible] as follows:

a. The De Gaullists, as is indicated from all information we have [illegible] in North Africa, are probably correct in saying that they have the largest organized following in France with which we can deal. They are not, in any sense of the word, the only organization and OSS is, at the moment, dealing with other groups and, at the same time, building its own net work. There are, of course, [illegible] Communists, about whom we do not know and will probably never know too much.

[illegible] Finally, after the Germans seized the Free Zone a good many of [illegible] supporters (and some "Vichy French") ran to cover to the [illegible]. They were, to some extent, undoubtedly received and [illegible]. Others ran to Laval and have become outright collaborationists.

[illegible] groups, since the elimination of Free France, have suffered [illegible]. The De Gaullists admit liquidation and increasing difficulty. [illegible] Gaullists (as recently asserted by certain of their [illegible] just out of France) claim 125,000 adherents capable [illegible] military service. They also claim that they represent the hopes [illegible] centers of activity of most loyal Frenchmen. These [illegible] are probably substantially correct. On the other hand, it [illegible] would, as a practical matter, be possible to arm, organize or [illegible] anything like 125,000 men behind the enemy's lines as aids [illegible] invasion. The De Gaullists themselves, for example, have



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March 11, 1943

Up at 6.00 a.m. to work on some operational memoranda for the days here in London. We went active now and plenty of it.

Finally managed to breakfast at 7.10 which the British consider a barbarous hour even in War time.

Finished my memorandum and left it with Mr. Robinson at 71 Grosvenor Street, on the way to Admiral Stark's office, where I arrived at two minutes before eleven.

Admiral Stark saw me immediately and first, whether or not I had seen General Andrews. I said I had not as I had been dealing mainly with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Barth. The Admiral then proceeded to bring in the General and Col. Barth and we talked together for an hour and five minutes. As luck would have it, they allowed me to do most of the talking.

The meeting was most informal and, as we sat down I told General Andrews that I had sought him out in Cairo to deliver Colonel Donovan's respects and ask his permission to permit OSS to undertake operations there. I had found General Bradley instead and had received courteous and complete cooperation from him. I had followed the General here and had sought the authority in this Theatre, which we had obtained. I thanked him for this on behalf of the Colonel.

Admiral Stark said: "Tell us about your trip". He meant, of course: "How are things going in North Africa?", but it looked like an opportunity to talk about OSS. I therefore interpreted and answered his question literally.

The burden of my story was that I had visited the various Theatres in an attempt to help put our various OSS missions in a position to work more closely with the local Military Commands. At the same time, I had undertaken to study, in Tunisia, the possibilities of OSS aid to Combat Groups, both before and after combat lines are drawn.

Certain things have become very evident as a result of actual operations to date. First, the North African invasion, in connection with which Bill Donovan had renewed the vision and determination to build an organization which could really contribute to the success of the program, demonstrated, clearly, the need for highly organized clandestine organizations behind enemy lines in areas where military action is likely to occur. It is an undisputed fact that OSS had built a substantial network in North Africa over a year ago and that the claims of penetration and other preparatory work -- made by Colonel Donovan last summer when he and I came to England -- were fulfilled completely. No one could, or would, I thought, deny that the work done had saved much precious time and many lives.

Second: Battle lines having been drawn, our OSS units were continuing to serve the combat forces at the front. They are able still to penetrate enemy positions and are carrying on special jobs of sabotage, ambushing and patrolling. Their work, frankly, is disappointing, however, and for two reasons:

a. Our net-work in Tunisia -- prior to Axis seizure of the Area -- was not as strong as it should have been and has been largely dissipated; and

b. The work of our OSS units at the front is being carried on by units which were "improvised" on the spot. The men are trained saboteurs and SO operatives. They are not disciplined, specially



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underground - A "stand-by" plant, as it were. All of this must be made available to our North African Groups.

Our main effort must be in the South and Southwest of France. Here, when a division of territory is made, is likely to be the sphere of U.S. influence as, perhaps, may Norway. British forces are more than likely to proceed against Central Western Europe. In Norway and Southwestern France there may only be large scale diversions. The main attacks will be elsewhere. We have time in which to prepare. I see no possibility of any sizeable military moves in these areas in 1943. Against Italy; through Turkey and Greece with diversions in Yugoslavia are possible this year - depending on the speed in Tunisia. I do not believe, however, that the Tunisian campaign can be settled at as early a date as many people evidently believe. April is optimistic - May a real possibility. Bizerte, remember, could be defended for some time.

One thing everyone in OSS - ETO should bear in mind is that, while the war can be lost in other areas, any "knock out" blow against Germany is likely to be given in the West. If our people here are patient they will see action.

Lunched at the Officers Mess and then wrote Dave a memo on Air Force cooperation and a note to C.D. on the same subject and thanking him for all his help.

Discovered that this morning's raid was more substantial than I had thought.

Wrote the Colonel an interim report. Cabled him about Lundbeck and also cabled Lundbeck to return. He is talking too freely although without authority. This shows the danger of sending out even semi-intelligent people (and most are not intellectual cellAssi) without long and careful training directed to the specific end in view.

Quit the office at 6:00 P.M. and walked an hour. (I am getting "soft".) Then dined alone, went to bed and completed a stupid piece of detective fiction.

Admiral Stark's Aid (St.Williams) called just as I returned from the office to say the Admiral wanted to see me at 11:00 A.M. tomorrow. What is up, I wonder?



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March 12, 1943.

Breakfasted at 7:10 A.M. Packed and worked on my memo of Unit Requirements for AOGroups. At 7:30 an alert sounded but I heard nothing further.

At office at 9:15 to prepare operational instructions for this office on France, Spain and Belgium. Copy to Roseborough as the French-Spanish operations must be "tied in".

Then a letter and cable to the Colonel. Want to put everything in his hands so that OSS may carry on in the field whether or not I arrive in Washington. I feel that, from this point, anyone with energy and imagination and the ability to hold and stimulate our field forces can do the job that now must be done. Whoever undertakes the task will be given wide powers to direct operations and the personnel concerned with them. Such person will, I hope, not be diverted from his objective (which, if reached, will make a real contribution to the War Effort and a "place in the Sun" for OSS) by becoming involved in overall planning - which should be carried on in Washington between our people and nominees of JCS - or "morale" subversion except on the action side, or R & A work (intelligence surveying and reporting). These other things should be in a cubical by themselves - except intelligence collecting which, under the JCS directive, is intended to service the action side of our work.

May OSS come down out of the ether and concentrate on the single job which everyone wants to do and which we alone - in the American service - are just beginning to learn, viz: the task of building organizations behind enemy lines. For the first time we have been invited, in all Theatres, to undertake this work.

Conferred, before lunch, with Canfield and Vanderstricht on work with the French Groups and they showed me a memorandum from Robin Brooke (SOE Regional Director, Western European Section - Paul Vanderstricht's opposite number) which indicated that Brooke does not subscribe - at least wholeheartedly - to any independence of operation in France. This is a shortsighted policy, does not conform to Charles Hambro's point of view and will have to be altered. I can see that young Mr. Brooke and I are going to have mild difficulties about the time of my next visit here. Paul and Frank went on to say that both "Free" and "Anti-Free" French were seeking us out. They say, frankly, they prefer dealing with us than with the British (although they are not unfriendly toward nor ungrateful for the aid of our Allies). The reason is obvious. We have and will have no "axes to grind" in Europe when the smoke of battle clears away. We can do a good job for the cause if allowed, now, to deal freely with all possible resistance groups in France.

At this time Dresser came in and I read the boys a lecture on policy and possibilities in this Theatre and included a little "pep" talk as well. We will, eventually, be allowed to build a small organization on the continent. We must concentrate on Southern and S.W. France with only connecting links (which our three men about to go in can form) to the center and North. The French organization and the Spanish - Portuguese underground group with which we are currently negotiating must be "linked up" (through out-outs) to form a chain of communications and safe house from the Swiss border to Biarritz. Our own service (from Madrid through Gregory Thomas) must be built from the Spanish border to supplement, but independently, the work of the



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interesting to note, however, that he did not consider military operations in North Norway of great validity. I asked whether any operation in Norway held real strategic possibilities - other than to further our warfare against the submarine and for the purpose of diversion. He agreed that the answer was probably "no strategic value - but a real solution to submarine difficulties along the Northern route and, therefore, worthy of exploitation". No frontal attack of Norway will be possible. The coast defenses must be hurdled and attacked from the rear. Our AO Groups and local groups would be most useful in this kind of an attack and, with plane assistance, might hold important areas for some time.

Col. Cen thought that the infiltration of any but Norwegians would be impossible although perhaps a few Norwegian speaking Americans might be put into the country (with native groups to help protect them) as "observers" and to give us direct contact. He will consider the matter.

After lunch I went to Col. Waite's office to see about the Theatre Command approval of my requests for OSS. The matter was before the Commanding General.

I then called on General Barker and Col. Barth (who was busy although I left word). General Barker was cordial, gave me some letters and wanted to be remembered to General Wiedemeyer. In response to a direct question he said we should "by all means build in Norway. It has great nuisance and diversion value if nothing else".

Back to the office to struggle with Brewer and Bross on organization Chart for OSS, London, and with Dave Bruce on a letter to SOS in answer to a report from a British Committee now working on the matter of supplying secret armies. We were pretty well left out of consideration.

Sumner Waite called to say the request to the Theatre Commander had been approved as well as the Norwegian Undertaking. I met him at Brewer's apartment and found that approval had been given except that we are to "function under G-2" rather than G-3 and that our requested TO is to be set up only under our own allotment. (I had thought we could pick up something additional by getting the TO activated here). We now have a complete, broad charter here though it would be better to function under G-3 as in the other Theatres. It really does not matter. Waite played that little trick and now, it appears, he is to be booted back to Washington.

Dined at the mess and then back to the Hotel to prepare some memoranda.

At least I have fully completed the job for OSS - 100%. For the first time we have a real charter in every Theatre. We are known and aid has been promised. What a job. Not for anything would I endure it all again. And our intellectuals still sit in Washington placidly thinking they know how to put (or perhaps they don't even think about this little matter) Agents behind enemy lines.



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The reply of our visitors was that they could and would aid. They will gladly continue the discussion. They count on an organization of 125,000 (which I said was many times larger than could ever be employed behind enemy lines on an invasion program) and have stored at least 180 tons of arms and ammunition. They need supplies which can be brought in by air. Given submachine guns and ammunition they can, even now, do great damage. It must be borne in mind, however, that their forces will act only under the command of French officers and only upon the order of DeGaulle. Joint units of their troops and our own advance forces (paratroops and others) might be formed - but not "mixed brigades".

I said that I was unprepared to discuss details now. We would confer again - establish principles - and then begin work on the minutiae.

Our meeting adjourned at 11:20 P.M.

March 11, 1943.

Breakfasted at 7:15 A.M. and worked on notes for the AO Group until a little before 10:00 A.M. Then to office and to call on Sir Charles Hambro at 64 Baker Street.

I reviewed with C.D. (and Major , his aid) my talk with Tony Keswick about Capt. Lund. Also our talks of the previous evening and said that Capt. Vanderstricht would report to C.D.'s people in more detail. I thought there could be no harm in multiplying contacts. Neither did C.D.

I told Sir Charles, also, of the man (Happy) who is going into Sweden and of Hilmer, already there, who has, unfortunately, contacted some of Hahnsteen's people. This, I thought, was through the N A rather than direct. I'm afraid the N A is not too discreet. (Perhaps Hilmer isn't either). I told C.D. I was seeing Col. Oen (Hahnsteen's Chief of Staff) at lunch and would explain the matter to him.

Sir Charles referred to Auxilliary operations and said that the present manuevers had aroused great interest in this idea. "These Groups", he said, "offer a great opportunity for OSS". He had a report on the subject to the British Chiefs of Staff, a copy of which or excerpts from which he promised me.

We talked a bit about Cairo and I said that it looked as if Tony were in the process of helping us out with Glenconnor.

Before leaving I again urged C.D. to come to Washington and bring Hahnsteen.

Hushed back for a lunch appointment with Oen and George Brewer. We discussed AO Groups and Oen promised to send over Norwegian officers for attachment to such Groups. He foresaw their extensive use. It was



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of the populace - the effect on the people of our African policy and the extremity of control measures now being undertaken by the "Boschs". Two of the gentlemen have been out only a fortnight. One of them (X) is De Gaulle's Chief representative in France.

It is evident that the de Gaulleists are sunk, spiritually, by what has occurred in North Africa. They are not bitter but they are surely sorely disappointed. They allege that, after the German seizure of the "Free Zone", Giraud's organization, his Lieutenants and the "Armistice Army" completely vanished. The French token forces were "booted out" by the Germans. The Chiefs ran to cover - seeking shelter in the DeGaulle organization or "going over" to Laval and the Axis.

The French people, themselves, were stunned at our policy of collaboration with the former Vichyites of Morocco and Algeria. They see, in the action taken in Africa, a pattern of post-war conduct. President Roosevelt is still popular and there is faith in the American people but the policies of our State Department are feared.

In spite of all this the French people await the day of battle. France, they feel, can only be reborn in the sweat and blood of a conflict against a common foe.

As for the organization represented by the gentlemen present, it is the only group which represents, now, active and planned resistance. Despite the hardships of increased control it continues to function. It is and will be the only rallying point for patriotic groups when the Day of Vengeance arrives.

We dined - discussing mundane topics, principally the influence of communism and its potentialities as related to the aftermath of war - and then returned to my apartment and our discussion.

I told the Colonel that he and his organization must, if they are to play a role of importance in the coming conflict, be prepared to cooperate intimately with our armed forces. Our American Staff (and the British) would eventually want confirmation from representatives of their own of the military possibilities included in the assistance which they declare is available within their organization. This involves preparation. Not only must Staff work be coordinated but we must have prior contact, within the country, with their forces and leaders - certainly at vital points. To translate this requirement into action involves, at this stage of our preparatory work, contact on the part of representatives of OSS with nationalist forces within France. From a practical point of view this means the induction of Agents of our own who will live, in part at least, under the protection of the French organization within the country. Once adequate contact and communications are established these Agents can be followed by from four to six officers who - adequate Staff planning having been completed - can observe and report on what they, themselves, find and can direct, on the spot, the formulation of a limited program of cooperation and "behind the lines" conflict as may be in keeping with Staff planning. Any aid given our organisation (OSS) in preparing for all this will be appreciated. Capt. Vanderstrickt will gladly particularize at further conferences.



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March 10, 1943.

Again worked on my data for the AO Groups. Called C.D. who is away until tomorrow. Finally caught Tony Keswick and made a luncheon appointment with him. Wanted to discuss Cairo.

George Brewer brought in Capt. Lund (SOE) a Norwegian Engineer who lived for 17 years in China. He wants to go back there - ostensibly to show the Chinese how to make "gadgets" from local products but actually to work on "targets" (aluminum plant in Korea; a metallurgical coal mine, etc.). I told Lund I'd have to speak to SOE and then consult Washington. This means Major (or Colonel) Hsiao.

Sumner Waite called to say he did not have all necessary papers for submission to the Chief of Staff. I convinced him he did have.

Lunched with Tony Keswick. He had received a letter from Glenconnor with all our correspondence (which I've not received from my own office). Glenconnor had answered my letter. His answer still indicated that he wanted to dominate our operations. This gave me another opportunity to plead for what I know is proper - the right to build our own organizations behind enemy lines in collaboration, however, with SOE. Tony (and C.D. too) agree that this is the only way we will get the recognition we need from our own forces and the consequent aid which we both badly want. Tony said C.D. would write a note telling Glenconnor to "let matters work themselves out" on the spot and give us independence.

We then discussed Lund. He is an excellent chap and a fine engineer but has always had difficulties in working with others. In addition he is not either American or British and the Chinese (for obvious reasons of security) want us to send them only our own Nationals. Since the Navy has already sent out a "gadget maker" we cannot risk a conflict. I will rule Capt. Lund out.

Keswick spoke of our proposed AO Groups which he says he calls "Huntington's Groups" and said that the current manouvers had convinced them more than ever (and the British Staff too) of their usefulness. I can see SOE will now want to share in a big way.

Read again and prepared a memo for Dave Bruce on the SOE memo relating to supplies for Patriot Armies.

Prepared a summary for my TO for the AO Groups.

Walked back to the Savoy, had a hair cut and arranged for a private dinner with Vanderstrecht, Brewer, Lt. Kittridge and four visiting firemen, allegedly de Gaulleists, from France (three of them) and may offer an opportunity for us to make a worthwhile connection on the Continent. Brewer dug them up through Kittridge.

My guests arrived from 7:30 P.M. on - Col. Billot, M X (Mercier, deGaulle leader in France), M Y (Crillon), M Z (Bornoy), Commander Kittridge, P. V de S and G.E.B.Jr. Another distinguished visitor failed us. He was at Manouvers - a deGaulleist General.

We had a most interesting discussion of France - the present disposition



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March 9, 1943.

Out of bed early to work on a TO for the AO Groups. Not an easy job.

A call from Col. Waite with whom I made a luncheon appointment. Trust he will think my proposals to General Andrews alright.

To the Office to give Mrs. Robinson my TO; thence to Passport Bureau. It now seems (according to Major Girard of ATC) that I am leaving American Export about the 11th. Nice way to spend my birthday.

Met Sumner Waite for lunch at Claridges. What a talkative fellow. He read the NA and Mid East approvals and then my proposed letter to Gen. Andrews. He took violent exception to the fact that we wanted to be under G-3 rather than G-2 (himself) and thought we should certainly be under the Command of someone! I told him that the personal preference of all of us would be to work under him but I thought we should follow the plan adopted in the other Theatres. In any event, I said, "the J.C.S. in its basic directive makes Bill Donovan directly responsible to them and it follows, therefore, that his representative here (Dave Bruce) must be directly responsible to the Theatre Commander". He was unconvinced but I told him that the Chief of Staff had not objected and told him not to "upset the apple cart" as I wanted to get home.

We discussed the African campaign and then went back to Sumner's office (he and I are now on that kind of basis) to make sure he had all the papers for Col. Barth. A raid warning blew so I left. I hope Sumner behaves.

Worked some more on AO Groups and talked with Pacotte about recruiting for French units.

Dave Bruce and George Brewer came in to discuss an SOE memo on supplies for patriot (national) groups. It left us out in the cold. It had been sent over by our own SOS. We are certainly in a sweet position as we are not even giving SOE supplies promised a year ago. Wanting information I wired Dave Halliwell.

I then called General Sir Marshall Cornwall about an appointment with Hahnsteen. He was to have made one but has not.

It was then 6:00 P.M. - so, an hour's walk, dinner, alone, and then home to read, carefully, the supply memorandum!

I'll have an egg in the morning - thanks to Louis Huot.

To bed at 9:30 and to read a bit.



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March 8, 1943.

Awoke at 7:20 after a good sleep despite a raid which I barely heard. A good rest is undoubtedly the real preventative of bombing jitters.

At 11:00 A.M. David Bruce and I called on Col. Barth - General Andrews' Chief of Staff. He was most pleasant and agreeable and listened attentively to my story of what OSS was doing here and elsewhere and of what we wanted - authority to act based on our N.A. and Mid East formulae and specific approval of our Norwegian undertaking. I told him we would also need a TO for OSS activated here. He read all the documents - including my proposed requests. There were no objections, he said, as I had covered our relationships with G-2 and G-3 (with which he was particularly concerned). The TO might be a problem - a minor one - as the JCS was not being kind to this Theatre. I said that attitude would change as operations progressed and that, in any case, our organizational needs would not be noticed in his overall allotment.

NOTE: I have tried this in all Theatres as it increases OSS' overall allotment. We have nothing to lose in trying to accomplish this.

I told Col. Barth I wanted to rush back to Washington and asked if he would permit me to clear the details of our requests with Col. Waite with whom I had worked before.

NOTE: This is necessary as I do not want Waite to throw any sand in the gear box - something he could easily do unless properly directed.

This was all arranged and Col. Barth then told us to come in any time. He really does not seem too busy. He is young for a Chief of Staff (40) but looks keen. He asked me to buy a hassock for him in Marakech which I promised to do. Anything for good will!

Back to the office and called Waite who is on maneuvers. He will call me in the morning.

Talked with Brewer, Bross and Vanderstricht on Belgian and French operations. We must be building.

Worked on a memorandum to the Chief covering Auxilliary Operations.

Called Pulsifer Longfellow and Gizard about transportation. I can't get out so must send word to Jack McCloy. Must go Pan-Amer. Too bad. My priority is no good.

Dined with Brewer and Bross. To bed at 10:30.



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[illegible] in [illegible]. The Colonel also cabled about the [illegible] letter and [illegible] clearance--both of which I will [illegible].

[illegible] request, at 7:00 [illegible] two hours. I told George, [illegible] and asked him to bear in [illegible] of operations with collaboration.

[illegible] talk on communications. [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] we will be able to [illegible].

[illegible] to bed [illegible].



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be handled, normally, through the SOE central station but we should be ready to pick up if SOE begins to give their own people priority, or if, at any time, territory is divided between the British and ourselves.

Louis thought we could work something out but said he was "fed up" and wanted to get into operations. Graveson is an excellent man, he added, well able to do any job.

I told Louis that since Graveson is not here and since we now have operational groups in France and more going in, I would try to clear an improvised arrangement with the Colonel, who, after all, is interested in results--action not applesauce. If he, Louis, will see this through I'll try in Washington to get him released to operations.

It was a bargain.

Dined alone and wrote these notes. To bed at 10:00 PM Perhaps my first real sleep in three months except that I leave early in the morning on manoeuvres.

## March 6, 1943

Out at 8:45 for a trip to Audley End, on the way to Cambridge, where SOE has set up a headquarters for sabotage and Jeddburgh group practice with the invading army in connection with current manoeuvres. The Polish (SOE) Finishing School was being used as Hqrs. Col. Rawlinson was in charge with Major H. 11 2nd in Command. Six sabotage groups had been sent in prior to manoeuvres and six Jeddburgh teams had been prepared for infiltration behind enemy lines with a view to contacting local resistance groups.

Captains Canfield and Lloyd were staying at Headquarters and actually assisting the British. Captain Manning Jacob and I went for the day.

We found a well ordered situations map and operations room. We also noted the "Boykin" (SO) group locations and that three of the six groups had been uncovered as a result of CE work carried on by CE squads without the aid of the local police or D-Effing; the other groups had "stuck" and were sending back good information-- the only information, in fact, being received by the invading forces covering current troop movements.

Two Jeddburgh teams had been "put in" the night before (the 5th) for use against assigned targets on the night of the 6th. They had made contact with local resistance groups. They were moved by truck (simulated air transport) from behind the enemy's lines. A rather different job than that which would confront the teams in actual conflict.



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are considered only an adjunct of SOE, the answer will always be "Let the British do it".

CD answered that he had heard nothing from Cairo and had supposed all was well. Christopher Glencconner, he added, had too great a penchant for detail. Tony Keswick agreed with this. CD thought he would send off a cable asking how things were coming.

CD raised the question about the sub-committee which controlled operations in the Mid East. I answered that we would, of course, conform to their procedure.

CD then stated that "this formality was unnecessary" and that he would send a cable.

David Bruce said that what we really needed were supplies (through activation of the OSS catalogue and a manufacturing program) transport and a good operation to give us prestige.

We then discussed operations and the Auxilliary Operations Groups for a moment. I said I would like to see General Hanstoen for a moment and General Cornwall volunteered to make an appointment for me for Monday. At this point I told Sir Charles that the Colonel had asked me to invite both himself and Hahnsteen over as guests of OSS. CD would like to come.

The meeting ended at about 3:00 PM. It had been well worth the effort.

Gave the proposed letter to General Andrews to David for correction and then went to the Savoy to meet Guepin and Vander Stricht at 4:00 PM. Went over plans for Guepin. Dave called to say MI-5 wanted to know about Guepin. Told Van der Stricht to arrange this.

At 5:30 PM, Louis Huot came in to discuss Communications. He said that Col. Osonne had told him today that SOE must go ahead with the Northern Station unless we are ready to proceed at once. Louis was in an awful stew as Gravesen is not here and Louis feels that he is without authority. I told Louis that I was not surprised and that I had written the Colonel when the deal was first made that it was the chance of a lifetime for OSS but that I knew we would "fall flat on our face" and that nothing would happen. Now it has transpired just as predicted. I told Louis, however, that we just could not fail. Operations require communications. Therefore, let's improvise as we have at Algiers and Cairo. We'll give the Colonel what he wants and what OSS needs in spite of Lowman who is a grand fellow but a total loss when it comes to the communications requirements of Secret Operations. Louis said we might be able to use temporary huts and SOE operators and find enough equipment to make a start. He thought he could get some poles. I, therefore, suggested that we plan the Northern SOE station for operation, at the outset, by British operators but with American supervision and cipher clerks and our own ciphers. The small, secret station must be all-American from the outset and must be able to pick up traffic from our stations at Algiers and Cairo and also from an organization we hoped to build in France. French contacts could



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other (as SO might in Italy or SOE in France), neither party was not to be barred from any so-called "sphere of influence" of the other. It was to the interest of everyone to get as many operatives behind enemy lines as possible in order to compensate for the ravages of liquidation and similar hazards. Our facilities would, of course, be pooled. SOE, for instance, had two training officers and we four, but, while groups should be separately trained and handled, courses should be so arranged that the services of all officers would be available to each of us. We are, as a matter of fact, furnishing parachute facilities at the moment, and, we hope, may assist with plane transportation. CD replied that he knew about the parachute trainind arrangements which were most helpful. I went on to say that, as a practical matter, cooperation was being worked out on the spot without the necessity for written agreements. Our memoranda had, in effect, been put aside and our people in the field were cooperating voluntarily. Recruiting, for example, was being done more or less jointly on a "that one for you and this one for me" basis. CD stated that formal agreements were a nuisance anyway and that willing collaboration was much more effective. "We spend too much time preparing papers anyway" he said.

TONY KESWICK THEN ASKED ME ABOUT CAIRO. I replied that the Cairo negotiations were a disappointment to me. General Brereton had given us complete authority and promised cooperation though. I, on the other hand, had left London hoping that we had an understanding which would give SO and OSS some apparent independent standing. I had seen Boalbee of SIS who had said that the arrangements with Turner McBaine on the Intelligence side were entirely satisfactory. My talks with Glenconnor were pleasant enou too, but he had wanted to particularize our relationships. As a result, he had prepared a memorandum, received by me during the afternoon of the day preceding my early morning departure, in which SO had been constituted a mere appendage of SOE. He was to control all operations of SO even to dealings with our own Air Force and even with respect to intelligence matters. I had hastily replied in a letter (of which Amoss was to have sent me a copy but failed to do so) stating that I could, in the first place, negotiate only for SO; that certainly I could not speak for our Air Force nor prescribe the method pursuant to which their cooperation would be given; that I presumed our Air Force and the RAF could work out their own system of cooperation; and that SOE dominance such as he was indicating was surely inimical to our best joint interests as it would foreclose independent contacts with foreign groups which we might otherwise exploit.

I went on to say to CD that I thought the same status should prevail in Cairo as in Algiers. The people on the spot could work out a reasonable modus vivendi. Gus Guenther and Amoss were agreeable chaps and certainly no one could have been more cordial than Glenconnor was to us.

I ventured the thought that it was, perhaps, Col. Keble who had prepared the memorandum. I had not had an opportunity to talk to him at length and disclose to him the need, discussed many times by CD and me, for helping OSS appear more formidable, perhaps, than it really is— at least to outsiders, especially our own services from whom we want assistance.

David Bruce emphasizes the need of establishing an independent American Service if we are to receive aid from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. If we



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The boys told me that D'Oench was coming over to be Maddox's assistant and Crossewell was also coming. What nonsense! To waste D'Oench's time as an office boy to run about and gather information from our good friends. And how the Germans will shudder when they hear that Crossewell is to head OSS work in U.K.!

This reminds me that David Bruce asked me to do something about Pacatte and Schlangen. He admitted that he had been "egged on" by Brennan into getting them here. Pacatte, however, is a complete nuisance and Schlangen wants a desk job. He did not have the courage to volunteer for a proposed "Norwegian Raid." He now wants to go to Cairo. I told Dave I was well fed up with this business of having my judgment on personnel thrown in the ash can at Washington, and then, in the last analysis, finding this personnel back in my lap. Nevertheless, I will talk to these lads and see what I can do. Someday, I hope, someone will be given the authority over operational personnel which General Cubbins has in SOE. He hires and fires as circumstances may require. People perform or get out— just as three top men are now being sent home full speed from North Africa. Cubbins is too ruthless and his people fear him. The same results can be accomplished with tact but the power must be there and if Magruder is made Deputy Director in Charge of Operations every person in the field, on the operations side, under and including the Executive Officer, should be under his control. Naturally he would act through the local OSS Chief and/or Executive Officer, but he must be able to act. This, again, will never be accepted in Washington.

To bed after midnight and dog tired. I've not made up for lost sleep yet.

March 5, 1943

Walked to the Office after a late breakfast.

Further talks with Cross and Van der Straight on Table of Organization and Chart.

Prepared a draft of letter to General Andrews covering OSS activities in Theatre as promised David Bruce yesterday.

Met Charles Hambro, General Sir Marshall Cornwall and Tony Keswick with David Bruce at his apartment for lunch. We discussed the War and my African visit in general terms. Also the arrangements made in North Africa between SO and SOE. I stated that General Cubbins had found the memorandum prepared in London much too long for his liking. He had prepared a short one of four paragraphs as a substitute. On this we had agreed. Subsequently, following my return from Cairo we had met at the Club de Pins (Cubbins, Munn, David Keswick, Bruce and one or two others from SOE, and Eddy, Roseborough, Potter and Huntington from SO). We had, in effect, decided that independence of operations could be maintained without sacrificing cooperation in the higher echelon. While there might be territories where one of us could work more advantageously than the



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With David Bruce, I met General Barker (G-3) and General Gardee at the latter's apartment for lunch. An excellent meal and a good opportunity to talk OSS operations and air transport needs. Barker will see us again and says he will help us with Andrews. He suggested that we confer with his assistant--Col. Barth.

After lunch, David Bruce and I discussed, once more, the question of organization. He is highly in favor of a plan such as that worked out in North Africa which, I told him frankly, had been worked out on paper by two SI men (Roseborough and Shapiro) but was actually suggested by an SO man (Hill, Jr.). Since it effectively eliminates SI and SO and creates an OSS operational group and since I, myself, had suggested Roseborough as Executive Officer, I had no compunctions about persuading the gentlemen in question to adopt the plan. Dave said it was all right with him and was the only sound basis on which to proceed in the field. From the Colonel's remarks over the telephone Monday night, it seemed to be acceptable to him too. Dave did not believe any change in the Washington set up would be brought about since there were too many vested interests --strongly entrenched in OSS--to be served. I told Dave that I understood, of course, that there would be resistance but that I was sure the Colonel could by-pass any preliminary strong points. After all, I have no personal interest to serve. My only concern is to have OSS make a place for itself in the winning of the war-- something it has never even begun to do to date-- and that I could make a drastic reorganization easy for the Colonel by resigning as Chief of SO which I have already suggested. Dave said I was talking damned nonsense and that the Colonel would "give me hell" if I even mentioned a resignation.-- So much for that. We will see what happens on my return.

In any event, we agreed on a "set-up" for our MTO Headquarters.

I dined with Bruce, Manning Jacob (Gil Winant's assistant) Van der Stright, Dulot and Canfield. We went over the proposed London Headquarters plan. Van der Stright and Canfield would like the Section Chiefs to function in an isolated and a tonomous department with no control except from the Head of OSS at London. I said that our sole objective was operational--preparations for "the day." This means that every proposal must in general terms, be known to the Executive Officer and his Chief Operations Officer. They--an military men-- might not understand the political nuances involved in the making of undercover contacts-- (and even in recruiting) but they must be in a position to relate original plans to military requirements and available facilities. The Executive Officer, (acting through his Chief of Operations) must be in a position to exercise "veto" power with respect to activities of an operational nature. In addition the Army, Navy, and Air Force would deal, on operations, not with five or six section Chiefs, but with one Operations Officer on whom they could pin responsibility. OSS at home may be a haven of refuge for high pseudo intellectuals but in the field it must be and act like a military organization. This involves a "chain of Command, authority and responsibility". Canfield--an usual-- argued the point and said that he was "way down the line" but we finally parted friends. I did not want to hurt the boy's feelings, but he belongs, of course, "way down the line".



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Miss Cowles' observations on the North African front were interesting. British troops well disciplined and thoroughly organized. Our troops giving the appearance of laxity and sloppy leadership. She said that a fellow newspaper man had reported the American Forces as a fraternity rather than an Army. It was "How about moving over there somewhere, Bill?" rather than "Captain Jones, your command will take position Southwest of X-roads-7.5— H.2 at 4" "As Orn, prepared to move in the direction of Hill 220. Your objective——. Your boundaries---etc." This confirms my own impressions.

March 3, 1943

The ride in was a ghastly affair and I arrived tired and unkempt to find myself without a room at Claridges. Finally at 10:00 AM I was taken in at the Savoy. Here I bathed and shaved. Then to the office. Saw David Bruce and talked trip and organization with him. Later more of the same with Bross. It was interesting to note that Dave's attitude on field operations conformed to everything I had found in Africa and the Mid East. He, too, has become operational minded. He was delighted with the African organization chart, and wants the same thing here. I told him I'd just seen a cable from the Colonel which I would answer in the morning which indicated that the whole field plan was to be kicked out of the window. Whitney Shepardson, who is a delightful fellow and very good at wheedling information from local British, French, and Polish sources, evidently has visions of a great and independent intelligence system. He will, therefore, oppose any move calculated to consolidate OSS operations. How he intends to build such a system is beyond my own conception since he has no experience-business or combat— on which to draw. The war would be years old before OSS— on its own— could build an organization behind enemy lines. Good operatives are to be had and Army, Air Force and Navy assistance is to be obtained, only on the basis of action. Intelligence will come but only as an incident to a real combat objective.

Dave believes me tired and unduly pessimistic but I know my Washington intellectuals. Only the Colonel— among those left— has the instincts of a fighter and will appreciate the needs of our outposts— and the Colonel will be immersed in other things when I return.

Returned to the Savoy to work with Johnny Bross on a Table of Organization for our London office. A raid came about 10:30 PM. I seem to be a first class conductor for these events. Three bombs whistled down near enough to be heard, but nothing much was visible as the sky was heavily overcast.

To bed at 11:00 PM.

March 4, 1943

There was a second raid in the early morning. The alert was but a faint disturbance to me and then I slept peacefully and soundly through whatever else occurred.



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my tired boots.

March 1, 1943

No air raids, but a poor sleep just the same.

Off at 10:00 for Oran where we stopped an hour and forty-two minutes later, for two hours to slush about the ever-present mud and lunch at an atrocious mess. We were told that passage to Gib would be out of the question— fog and storms. Our pilot agreed to give it "a half-hearted try", however, and we were off at 1:55. The weather was the worst I've seen in a long time and our pilot proved to be more courageous than any of his passengers. We were ready and willing to turn back, but he kept along—riding the waves—withno ceiling, little visibility and a bad compass—until, suddenly, there before us—cloaked with mist—lay "The Rock". We arrived at about 3:45 P.M. and went directly to the Rock Hotel under the direction of Major Eaton and Lt. Ghomert of ATC. Later on Captain Huot learned that some B-24's were taking off in the morning and by dint of much wrangling with Major Eaton and a great display of rank on my part, we managed to be assigned tentative places.

Diped with Lt. Col. Kelley (Oran) of USAAF— a nice chap, and turned in at 10:15 PM on the basis of a 3:45 AM call.

March 2, 1943

We were actually up at 3:15 AM. The morning was cold, windy, and rainy. We packed, had what was called breakfast (including tea which at that hour could, for my part, equally well be castor oil or dishwater) and after some bickering with the rather dull Major Eaton over a matter of parachutes (which Huot and I did not possess) we were away at 6:30 AM.

The journey was a nightmare of cold. We flew through a gale at 10,000 feet. I donned flying suit and everything else in sight but still found myself such with cold. We were in the center gun pits and at 9:00 AM, the ports were flung open to permit of machine gun practice. The temperature dropped another 10 degrees as we all took some practice shots. Then interminable hours above the clouds: at last the descent. More open ports. Several unidentified planes which veered away as we laid our guns on them (this B-24 carried 10 fifty calibre Brownings). Finally St. Ilry airport at about 2:45. Here we received the usual discourteous and disorganized attention of our Air Force officials and, finally, after two hours, were allowed to go into Newquay to search for food. This we found in a very bad "Pub". A tiresome wait for the 8:00 PM local to London broken by a call to Fisher Howe and Johnny Bross. A supper— a poor one— at the Manor House. A local train to Parr where I found sleeping accomodations which, with reluctant chivalry, I gave to Miss Virginia Cooles. She assists Gil Winant and might, some day, be helpful to us.



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accommodations and personnel are lacking. I pointed out that Horrigan, Crosby, Harris and one or two other officers could carry on training, and that by the time the course was completed more personnel would be there.

Arthur Roseborough said that OSS had no adequate personnel to send and thought our best policy would be to put ourselves entirely in SOE's hands— training, operations, communications, etc. Better this than nothing.

I said that we now had a definite understanding with SOE which would enable us to proceed independently but on a cooperative basis; that SOE only had two training officers whereas we had four people who could temporarily be used in this capacity; that I saw no objection to combining training provided our groups and those of SOE were kept separate; that in any event communications and operations must be separately maintained with coordination at the top only. We do not need to play "second fiddle" nor take a defeatist" attitude. We are now, after all, beginning to establish our own lines of contact within enemy territories. We are also contributing, currently, to the training program and to facilities— especially with respect to parachute work which is entirely U.S. except for one officer instructor.

The meeting ended on a more affirmative and combatant note than had been in evidence when we started.

At dinner time, I talked with Horrigan about training and Captain Rossmiller about his impressions of SO work on the Southern front; Rossmiller and Carl Coon, too, both feel as I have felt that the Southern effort of OSS (actually it is SOE) is a waste of time, energy and manpower and is a source of annoyance to the second corps.

Stopped off to say goodbye to Bill Eddy. One of the grandest fellows ever. I wonder how he has tolerated me. I came without authority to make operational suggestions yet he has listened to me patiently. We have campaigned together and understand each other. I wanted, on this trip, to get close to Bill— as I have to Gus Guenther, and everyone else in the field who has to do with operations.

Incidentally, I was struck by one remark of Roseborough's. He was strictly an SI man, but in talking of the lads now in Corsica and France, he said: "It is impossible to get good men like that for SI work. They will give us intelligence but only if their principle objective lies on the side of action." This has, of course, always been so. The Chief knows it—otherwise Dave Bruce would not now be in London. Intelligence Officers—properly supervised— to gather and correllate information which we and others gather—Yes. But two operating branches— SI and SO— ridiculous. Almost as ridiculous as training and communications sections which are not directly controlled by operations. This, in truth, is confusion worse confounded.

I was told that I should leave in the morning via Gib. So— back to the famed Alatti to pack. It will be good to shake the mud of Africa from



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(b) American and British forces driving from the Kasserine Pass and the Pass just South (to cut off German units retiring on Ferriana from Thala) towards Sfax; and

(3) A movement from Souk el Khemis and Beja on Matur, Tunis and Bizerte. In this sector a strong tank force, with mobile support, could even now find reasonably easy going through the valleys of the treeless waste which lies before Matur.

I did not tell Jack McCloy that our American operations seemed to me, in contrast to the British, ill organized, undisciplined and directed by officers of not too notable efficiency. Only in materiel and its handling do we excel. There is not the snap, the sureness and the military efficiency among our forces which is so evident with the British.

We stopped for a good lunch at the new OSS Mess and I then had a session with Roseborough, Downes, Potter, and Lawrence.

Roseborough was in one of his more pessimistic moods and complained, again, of the handicaps which confronted him in dealing with the French because of the political blunders of our Government; of lack of personnel and equipment--saying that he had no confidence that our requirements would ever be fulfilled by Washington; of the fact that Lt. Smith, the Communications Officer, did not seem to realize that communications are to serve operations and that instead, Smith wanted to run a separate little show of his own; and that even if Smith did wish to cooperate, Lowman, who has no idea of what is wanted or needed in the field, will never permit of it. In short, Roseborough said, he was about ready to quit but would stay for six weeks longer. I tried to give Roseborough some encouragement pointing out that we were actually making progress. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY WE HAVE PEOPLE WITHIN ENEMY TERRITORY WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONTACT. We cannot do everything in a few short weeks and I am going home with the conviction that I can "sell" our Chief on the requirements of the field.

After this meeting, we all adjourned to Bill Eddy's apartment. Arthur Roseborough talked in less bitter terms but covered much the same ground he had gone over with me. Donald Downes, too, complained that he had been made a recruiting officer without real portfolio in that he did not know what Col. Eddy had in mind as OSS objectives. Eddy said, again, that Tunisia was first; Italy and the Italian Isles second, and Corsica and France last. Spain was, for the moment, to be left alone. He said, also, that radio operators were needed for the Southern Tunisian group and wanted the boys we had sent over with Downes. I intervened to say that I thought this would be a waste of talent just as keeping training officers schooled (like Gage and Crosby) there-- rather than officers schooled in tactics and operations-- was not only like waste but dangerous practice as had been indicated by the Gage-Felsen liquidation.

We then discussed immediate plans and decided on the commencement of training of OSS groups for Italy, Sicily, etc. within a week even though



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At last the dawn and a clear sky in the west. There was no traffic. We rolled into Constantine (78 miles distance) at 8:25.

Gus Guenther (who had already obtained for us a jeep, 20 carbines, and 6 tommyguns) wanted to stop at the ordinance depot for more equipment. We, therefore, dug up a bit of breakfast at the depot and Gus then demanded a jeep, a 1/2 ton truck and more carbines. We received 22 carbines, 4 Tommies and a jeep. Gus is unbelievable when it comes to acquiring equipment.

The cavalcade was off for Algiers at 12:45 PM. Huot and Eddy in the Command car and Guenther and Huntington in the jeep. Gus and I were frozen after our 350 mile trip with no lunch and Algiers, where we arrived at 6:15 PM, looked good to us.

We had a cold snack and then turned in at 10:20.

February 28, 1943

Two raids last night, but I was too tired to pay much attention. I am told that several bombs were dropped. However, after the first alert I slept and so heard nothing.

Breadfasted at Bill Eddy's; worked with Potter on a Table of Organization; and then lunched sumptuously at the new OSS Mess which Warwick Potter had organized.

In the interim Jack McCloy, Asst. Sec. of War, came in and chatted a few moments. He asked about our impressions of the front and I gave him mine in brief. He also suggested that I fly back with him to the states--arriving about March 15th. Since I could not get back earlier by boat I will certainly accept. It will give, me a chance to talk to Jack further about aid for OSS. I emphasized, this morning, that we can do a real job for our Combat forces given a little help. He was much interested. He talked incidentally, about P.W. and said this strife was still going, full tilt, in Washington.

The impressions I obtained of the front, incidentally, given only hastily to Jack McCloy, are about as follows:

(1) Most of the effort at the actual front is, at the moment, British. Even at Thala we found the Grenadier Guards (motorized) leading the spearhead of the advance on Feb. 24 which resulted in the retreat, two days later, of the Germans from the Kasserine Pass.

Note: The 1st Division (US) was apparently pulled out of the lines about the 26th and the 9th Division substituted.

(2) The activity in and near Thala and the movement of heavy equipment there and around Souk el Khemis, in the North, indicated preparations for a three way attack:

(a) By the 8th Army Northward



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at 8:00 AM— a look at the Arab Camp and a talk with Major Torrence and Colonel Young (who had arrived late the previous evening.)

My conversations with Torrence and Connor gave me much the same impressions of SO activities in a combat area as those I had received in the South. A little mine laying at great risque and with little benefit from the point of view of military requirements. Hawkins grenades may destroy a wheel or immobilize and occasional vehicle but work of this sort cannot be considered of military importance.

One thing had been done in this sector which was not true in the South. A planned effort had been made by SOE to carry on CE work--especially against the Arabs. This had been and still was important since the Arabs have been disclosing every slightest movement to the Germans. The "bush telegraph" works well and quickly. All of this CE work had now ceased, however, as the Army had taken it over.

The day was spent in travel—Souk el Khamis, Souk Ahras and Guelma. We lunched again on a mountain top and arrived in Guelma at 5:20 PM in the pouring rain. Our inspection trip had ended. It had been worthwhile for me since it gave living current confirmation to what I had felt must be the fact:

(A) That SO and SI work must be well planned in advance and will be most effective when carried on behind enemy lines before combat is joined; and

(B) That the effort, once battle lines are drawn, must be made by well organized and highly trained specialists groups who can act, not only as sabotage units but also as highly skilled advance Patrols and ambush groups. They must be highly mobile and thoroughly equipped for raiding party and patrol work.

Our visit to 2nd Corps Headquarters in the Southern Sector had convinced Guenther, Huot and me that our unorganized, irregular sabotage parties were not needed or wanted. Col. Merritt (of G-3) had given us no time at all. His assistant, Lt. Col. Honicutt, had listened to the suggested operations (random suggestions made by Col. Young, Major Sage and myself) with obvious disinterest and had said "Yes" to every inquiry from us as to the advisability of any given operation. Col. Dixon (G-2) had actually told Gus Guenther that he "wished to hell they (our group) were out from under fast".

We dined late—fell into bedding-roll at 10:00 PM. Our morning start will be early-- 5:00 A.M.

February 27, 1943

We were up at 5:15— no water— no wash-- no shave. One car was late so that it was 6:20 before we finally left Guelma. The morning was cold and raw. Rain was still coming down.



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We stopped at 12:50 P.M., after passing the Tunisian border, for a roadside lunch. A fire was built and we had a good mess of "B" rations--Guenther, Huot, the driver (Henri) and I--who were going on ahead in a borrowed French car. General Gubbins, Colonel Young and Bill Eddy had proceeded by way of Sauk Ahras to visit First Army Headquarters.

The day was beautiful and the mountainous country picturesque beyond expression. No one who has not traveled through Algeria and Tunisia can imagine the ruggedness or distances which are encountered there.

Our trip was fairly rapid and we reached SOE northern headquarters near Souk-el-Kemis about 4:20 P.M. From La Calle we had been well in the combat zone and had been on guard against road straffing which is common in this area. Many flights were seen but they were all allied planes.

At northern Headquarters, DJEBEL HALLOUF (Pig Hill), we met Majors Torrence and Crosby who suggested that we visit their outpost No. Two (near Sidi Nazir) before dark. We set off at once, through Beja, on the road to Matur. We travelled some 35 miles reaching a point probably not more than 40-50 miles from Tunis itself. It was near the apex of a long salient reaching far into the German positions. The last British outpost was just ahead. On our left was no man's land-- 200 yards away-- on our left a valley, stretching a mile or two toward hostile lines, containing some 25 pounders and AA batteries. Nothing was visible anywhere but out there on the treeless plain and barren hills were patrols and ambushes--mines, machine gun nests and anti-aircraft. The only actual sign of conflict at the moment was a burning hurricane, encountered on our trip up, which had fallen just a few moments before our arrival. Signs of earlier activity in the form of dangling wires and charred remnants of lorries were everywhere along the road.

The advance post headquarters were located at an abandoned railroad station. The men there seemed contented, in fine spirits and well fed. We talked with Captain Connor, who was in command, and started on our return trip just as dusk was falling. The hour for straffing had passed It was beginning to rain. We drove slowly through increasing darkness to Beja where we stopped to look in on Captain Burgoyne--just badly wounded--and thence to Headquarters and a grand field dinner at 9:00 PM.

Just as we sat down for our meal a message arrived from Guelma saying that Jerry Sage and Sgt. Milton Felsen had been captured and the latter badly wounded. They had been ambushed while on the reconaissance patrol we had discussed two nights ago. Too bad, but not surprising. What experience had they on which to base an operation? For these boys the war had been a short one.

We slept on the floor--five in a tiny room-- but we were tired enough to enjoy it all.

February 26, 1943

We were all up at 7:30 AM--15 people using one water tap. Breakfast



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[illegible] case [illegible] supplied to [illegible] a meal from a [illegible] air. Our boys were good to us and [illegible] hold [illegible]ns.

[illegible] our [illegible] planes flew over- [illegible] the ground and [illegible] terrifying [illegible] without [illegible] a trail of [illegible] side-ise, but did [illegible] covered [illegible] deep buried around the [illegible] closed.

[illegible] its or a [illegible] cold. [illegible] alone [illegible] and as I [illegible] were on a [illegible] officers [illegible] more [illegible] interested [illegible] noticed

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[illegible] ed.

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with Harry Blank since Eddy had discharged him yesterday. Dennes has taken the position that Blank has been abused. This is decidedly none of Dennes business and a piece of rank insubordination. Blank is said, on all sides, to be too talkative and not overly trustworthy. He was Eddy's man and it is emphatically his affair.

Went to the Aletti Hotel after lunch to arrange my affairs for tomorrow morning.

Met at Club des Pins with General Gubbins, Munn, Keswick, Bruce and Godfrey. The General wanted to discuss division of work and organization. It was decided that, in general, we would recruit Italian and other local groups on some sort of cooperative basis to prevent duplication and interference. OSS would probably be predominate in Italy but SOE should not be barred. I pointed out that we would like the same rights with respect to France, for example, where SOE is likely to have the largest interest. This was because of Roseborough's particular contacts in this direction. This was agreed upon in principle.

Organization problems were discussed. The General outlined SOE's program here and his proposed staff. I stated that we would submit our chart which would indicate that we would have "opposite numbers" for each of their people and sections.

I promised to have Lt.Herrigan see Major Bruce about training. Our training staff, I pointed out, would be larger than that of SOE.

We went back to the immediate problem of recruiting and it was decided that Dennes, Perkins and Crawshaw (SOE) should work out the details of this program.

To dinner with Potter and Lawrence. Gave them last minute instructions.

Thence to bed.

NOTE: My notes for the next week will be sketchy. I will try to fill them in on my return home with comments made from such data as I can keep.



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AO Groups, perhaps, begins. SI-30 work must be done in advance. In any event - irrespective of the time involved (one week) - I am going to have a first hand view.

Dined with Downes and then went with him to his apartment where I prepared a "Proposal" for Italy and the adjacent Islands. Roseborough, Potter and Lawrence came in. Roseborough agreed on my memorandum except for one change - Recruiting is to be done in "N.A." - not in Algeria alone. It would have been so simple for Roseborough to have done this job himself instead of displaying his well known temperament. The memorandum took exactly 20 minutes of my time. A copy will be filed with these notes.

In bed at 10:30 P.M.

February 20, 1943.

Up before 7:00 - breakfasted - worked a bit and then to Eddy's apartment.

Carl Coon was with Col. Eddy and I had a report on the American disaster in Tunis. Our information has evidently been bad at the front. G-2 is British in AFHQ but has not furnished our combat forces with real intelligence. We lost 100 Grants and Shermans against enemy 72 ton tanks. We had no artillery. When one looks at our military personnel at headquarters there can be no doubt of incompetence there. The same thing is apparently true at the front.

Talked with Bill Eddy about Roseborough and Downes. Told him I thought they would "get down to business" but warned him they were both prima donnas and would require handling. Properly supervised they had great capabilities. If he cannot handle them wire Col. Donovan that they should be "called back for a conference". I let Bill know that he would never have difficulty with the rest of the contingent who are all solidly with him.

We arranged a meeting with General Gubbins for four o'clock at Club du Pin. I want to insist with the General on some independence of action for OSS both here and in Cairo. I shall make the same point with Charles Hambro in London.

Arthur Roseborough came in and I said I would like to put in military form the projects we had discussed last evening. He gave me a typed copy which had just been finished by Wayne Nelson. There were no changes from my original draft. I rewrote the proposal and it will be the rewritten copy which will be attached to these notes.

Inspected "Villa Sennotti" and one other Villa we hope to have for operations. Lunched at the very poor officers mess and told Potter and Lawrence to meet me for dinner and some final instructions.

Found Bill Eddy had been upset over Donald Downes having fraternized



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I pointed out to Downes and Roseborough that OSS was a combat and not a policy making organization. We must work within the framework of directives given us by our commanding officers. We cannot be political crusaders but must use impartially any tools which are available for our work. Our objective is a simple one - service to our armed forces by building organizations behind enemy lines.

Both Roseborough and Downes charged that Bill Eddy is interested only in Tunisia - not in future building. Why should we be barred from Spain and France, for example, where the interest of Downes and Roseborough lies. Any such policy will undermine the contacts and nullify promises already made by Downes.

I answered that we had best get down out of the ether and deal with realities. I saw no reason why Downes should relinquish his Spanish contacts nor why Roseborough should give up his plans for French groups. Certain Spanish units might even now be recruited and used in Tunisia. They would then be prepared if conditions later warranted their use in Spain. In the same way a number of French Nationals might be recruited for induction through London. Later, I was sure, if we had performed first in Italy (or had shown signs of performing) we would be permitted to send groups to France through the South. We must cut our own pattern to conform to military requirements. They, as intelligent students of strategy, must know that some move is being planned for the Balkan Corridor - perhaps through Turkey (Churchill's trip was not taken for no purpose) - perhaps through Crete and Greece - perhaps with diversions here and against the Macedonian Coast. In such event a movement against Italy would be necessary so that the Allied left flank would not be too exposed. Why not conform to military exigencies and render service where it is wanted.

I went on to say that I would undertake to present a plan (through Bill Eddy) to G-3 which would involve the use of Italian groups and some of Downes' Spaniards. This would take care of Downes committments to the Spanish leader and would give us trained units for use in Spain and Spanish Morocco if necessary.

We then went to lunch - talked a bit more on the general subject - then sought out Bill Eddy who agreed, in principle, to the plan. Bill was firm on the point of "sticking to our directive".

Later I saw Perkins (who had been told by Bill Phillips that he would be "Chief of the Italian Section" in London) and informed him that he would have to work here in whatever capacity Col. Eddy and Arthur Roseborough decided to use him. He would probably be attached to the Italian Section but the head of this section would be selected by Roseborough and the Colonel later. Perkins attitude was good. He only wants to "get busy". I told him he would probably go out with Downes on a recruiting job at once.

Col. Anstruther (SOE) was here and I arranged for a trip to the front with Bill Eddy. I want to see what is going on - so does Bill. I have the feeling that our groups are being used only as "sappers" (booby traps, etc.) and that after lines are drawn in close combat the opportunity for SO work pretty much ceases. I want confirmation of my own strong belief that this is the place where SO work ends and the task of our



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is not only not an authority but a prejudiced observer. There is only needed the exercise of common sense, careful training of the groups and well planned operations.

I said to Downes that I thought he could turn his trip to useful account but that he was inclined to be "all over the lot". He deals in generalities whereas we need here detailed plans. I pointed out that the Italian Officer he had found in one of the Camps (once a Foreign Legion member and anti-Fascist at heart) would be a useful person with whom to begin. Why not sit down in the morning on a definite project which we would then discuss with Col. Eddy.

The evening ended as I moved from the Oasis to the Aletti.

Feb. 19, 1943.

My sleep was good. There was a thunderstorm but no raid. The weather is bad.

We have evidently taken a beating in Tunisia. The Germans, I imagine, anticipated an Allied drive which was rumored in Cairo several days before I left. There is much too much conversation everywhere. The British indulge in a good deal of stuff Security practices but they obviously miss a good deal of the essence of Security in that they "confide" in bosom friends too freely. This tendency was also noticeable in London.

Had a miserable breakfast of bread and bad French coffee and then to Eddy's apartment, where I had another breakfast.

Roseborough had arrived the night before from Casablanca. He was filled with discouragement. Said we could do no recruiting as our American political policies had antagonized the French on whom we must rely for recruits. The same feeling permeates other national groups who see, in the American policy here, a pattern of post war policy which will bring no benefit to the idealogies for which they are struggling. Arthur was in the frame of mind where he was about ready to "throw in the sponge".

I suggested to Roseborough that he talk with Downes about the latter's recent recruiting trip and said I would join them at noon. This I did. I heard a good deal more of the same from both Downes and Roseborough. They said that the President, Eisenhower and Murphy were making it impossible to work in this territory and that Col.Eddy's position (that our activities should be limited to Italy and the Italian Isles as directed by G-3) was so confining as to render OSS work here ineffective.



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within itself, of performing both intelligence and combat assignments. If we had such a "set up" our communications and supply problems could be coordinated with operational needs and many of our present discouraging obstacles removed. Only along this road will OSS receive or deserve the recognition of Allied combat groups.

Since Downes was in low spirits after our talk about Washington's report on "Spanish Recruiting" (which could not, by reason of the time element involved - since Vanderstricht reported the same thing from London Jan. 30th and Downes trip began on Feb. 4th) I decided to have dinner with him and get him in a more useful frame of mind.

NOTE: It now appears that Springs and Paulson (SOE) took a trip some time ago and worked among Spanish Groups to a certain extent - Paulson being particularly interested. This may be the source of all complaints.

At dinner time (Downes, Potter, Lawrence and I being present) Downes complained that there was no one here who understood or sympathized with the attitude of the various underground groups (Spanish and Italian principally) from whom we must get our recruits (locally, at least) and through whom we might expect aid within Italy or the Italian Islands or elsewhere. It was all very well for Eddy, Downes went on to say, to object to "playing politics" or indulging in social reform here in a combat zone. Eddy, however, had done this very thing with the "Rightists" and "Monarchists" and we would now have to sympathize with "Leftists" and Communists if we were to have assistance from those who could really give it to us. This includes Labor organizations and some people on our staff who understand Labor Union movements on the Continent. It would also require here someone who is familiar and can deal with political factions within Italy and the other countries in which we wish to operate. We cannot flounder as we are here with the French who are doublecrossing everyone and cannot be trusted. They are, for example, still keeping imprisoned all anti-Axis groups (Communists,et al.) who had been imprisoned prior to the invasion of North Africa.

I replied to Downes that the province of OSS was not to deal with groups, parties or factions for the purpose of aiding or abetting them or in such manner as to involve us in internecine quarrels. It is our job to use every tool which comes to hand to accomplish our great and moving objective in the field, viz: The building of combat organizations behind enemy lines. We must, of course, be sagacious in dealing with the various groups. If, for example, we select a Greek Communist leader as a recruiting Agent we must let him choose his groups and with his we must work out the operational objectives of these groups. We should try to attach American language speaking operatives to all such groups but only if they are free of prejudices. We cannot and should not force misfits and antagonists on those who are aiding us. These groups should be kept apart (under the direction of the leader) and should not be exposed to other groups working in the same territory. To carry out such a program does not require the direction of an American who is reputed to be an authority on political movements within a given country and who, generally, as a matter of fact,



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Feb. 17,1943, cont'd.

We were told by the French that there was ice in the passes to Algiers but we decided to try nevertheless. We had a fine trip coming in at the Blida Airport - thence into Algiers where we landed at 5:30 P.M. Algiers time.

We brought cold weather and I bedded down in the Oasis Hotel in a clammy room. Dined with Potter and Laurence and retired at 10:30 P.M.

There had been no air raid in Algiers since I left but at 4:00 A.M. we had an alarm. Three bombs were dropped in town at about 5:00 A.M. - two near the Hotel and an incendiary fell within thirty feet of my room. The smoke was suffocating and my night's sleep was ended. Our French friends put out the fire at about 7:00 A.M.

February 18, 1943.

Breakfasted on hot water and bread and then signed in at the A.C.O.'s office and Bill Eddy's apartment.

Talked with Bill, Huot, Guenther, Potter and Downs. Roseborough is off at Casablanca and very little organization progress has been made since my departure as no one is here to make decisions. Shapiro has gone home. Potter is acting as Administrative Officer, Operations Officer, Transportation, Billeting and Supply Officer. He is also helping Lieut. Smith establish communications. He has obtained all living quarters, food and transportation without which the entire crowd here would have frozen or starved.

Downs was down in the dumps and was in Eddy's bad graces because of complaints from Washington about recruiting among Spaniards. As a matter of fact Downs' visit to concentration areas was too recent to be the cause of the complaints. He recruited no one for Spain but did find Italian contacts and a few Spaniards for Western Sardinia. I told him - with Eddy's consent - to get those groups, AFHQ wants them at once. We can add to them any recruits received from the States.

I am more convinced than ever that a strong operational hand is needed in Washington. We have SI, SO, Labor, Psychological experts, etc. all competing to come out here and in this, as in every other Combat Theatre, the military authorities want one thing - operatives and communications behind enemy lines. Personnel sent to our field headquarters must be used as seems best to the Chief in the field. Their prior use cannot be irrevocably determined by several different Branch Heads in Washington - especially when most of those Heads have not the faintest conception of what is required by Task Force Commanders. As has always been the case in OSS we are directed by numerous individuals bent on carrying out pet plans - not by a strong operational chief who is able to build and coordinate a single striking force capable,



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Feb. 16, 1943.

We were awake at 5:15 and crowded as we were - three in a room with one bath (Guenther, Huot and I) managed to bathe, shave and prepare for breakfast before six. Breakfast was slow - 6:30 before it came. We finished by 7:00 when Col. Zymanski arrived with a truck for our luggage. On board by 7:10 with farewells to Shepards. We reached the airfield at 7:30 as per schedule and then hung about until 10:45, when we pushed off in DC 3 No 13.

So good-bye to Cairo with its mixture of humanity, smells and noises. Where the Westerner can feel at home but never be a part of the Eastern background which prevails. A demoralizing atmosphere and no place in which to fight the War. But a Mission for us there is essential - much will be doing from that base in the months to come - and our people must relish the job.

Off across the desert with an overload -- a look, again, at the battle fields, a lunch of C Ration N(cold beans and meat - very bad) and a stop at Bengazi (about 4:00 P.M.). An inspection of derelict Axis planes - a brief moment of relaxation, and then on again to Tripoli and Castle Benito Airport. It was then quite dark (7:30 P.M. Cairo time), and we had no end of trouble locating the field. There were, of course, no lights. Finally we found ourselves and came in.

A Mess of more canned rations - no water - nothing hot. Some broken cots on which we spread our bedding rolls - a short walk - a skirmish with British sentries - a gorgeous moon rimmed with promised rain - and then a deep and restful sleep.

Feb. 17, 1943.

We found water outside our door - enough for a quick shave and a breakfast of cold porridge without sugar and the usual tea. Repacked and then to the field at 9:30 A.M. Some delay while we plotted our course to avoid somewhat the combat zone and then away at 10:15.

Our pilot gave us a view of Tripoli (N.E. of the airfield) - a gorgeous white town which sparkled in the morning sunlight and then south across the desert toward Misda.

We "flew the contours" at about 100 feet - sometimes much less - across the southern Tunisian front. Two mobile British patrols were sighted - no planes. It was an exciting ride which lasted until 2:30 P.M. (Cairo time - 1:30 Algerian time) when we came suddenly over some low hills on to an oasis and little Arab town on the edge of which was a French airport. This proved to be Lagourat where in peace time there is an infantry garrison but at which now are two French squadrons.

We were well received by the French officers who had seen no outsiders for two months. They took us to their mess and wined and dined us for two hours. Since we had not eaten well for almost two days the lunch was most welcome.



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February 15, 1943.

Col. Hoskins reported in and we saw him for a few moments at 9:30 A.M. and again for lunch where Guenther, Hoskins, Amoss, Leets, White, Edwards, Huot and myself gathered.

Col. Guenther brought a copy of the cable from General Brereton to the J.C.S. giving us authority to go ahead. The cable was exactly as I had drawn it and is highly satisfactory. I hope Washington thinks so although to date there have been no words of encouragement or thanks. The latter does not matter but it would be interesting to know what the folks back home are thinking of results. One thing is certain, viz: no one without considerable training and experience in negotiation could have made a dent in the solid wall of indifference to and lack of knowledge of OSS. which I have encountered everywhere. I've felt like "calling it off" many times since I know the opportunity we now have will never be understood or exploited by our Washington confreres. They move at high altitudes where deep thought replaces action while our niche in the Hall of Fame - if it is to be carved at all - must be chiseled out of performance in the field.

Col. Guenther and I saw Hoskins again in the afternoon. He said he would make his report through Col. Krom and would then go home. He thought he should go via London as "Minister Casey considers this advisable". Col. Guenther stated that Hoskins last orders were to return to the States at once and that clearly this meant "directly". Hoskins still indicated that he would go to London. Guenther then asked whether Hoskins was representing OSS or some other department. He replied that he was with OSS though "really on loan from the State Dept." - A long loan since he is in the Army for the duration.

Hoskins said that the Colonel had cabled his pleasure at Hoskins survey and that he would no doubt return on a P.W.Mission. He, it was indicated, would head an independent mission among the Arabs.

Hoskins also said that he had been well received by the British everywhere. As a matter of fact Glenconnor had indicated the night before that, so far as SOE was concerned, "doors had been opened" only because of their regard for OSS and not because they looked with favor on Hoskins or his Mission.

Col. Guenther told Hoskins to submit a copy of his directive and report and that he would then make a survey of his own and report to Col. Donovan. This seemed to upset Hoskins usual equilibrium and assurance.

Col. Guenther does not care much for Hoskins and stated that he would be "very disappointed if Hoskins were sent out here for any purpose".

About 6:30 P.M. the note from Glenconnor (promised last night) on SOE-OSS cooperation arrived. It was a blatant attempt to make OSS operations of all kinds subject to SOE control. I answered the letter and Amoss will mail it sending copies of both documents to me in London.

To bed at midnight after packing for tomorrow's journey to Algiers.



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As a result of too much lunch we were all "loggy" and napped until 5:30 P.M. when we again took up organization questions.

At 8:00 P.M. we went to Glenconnor's for dinner. Coll Keble and a Lt.Col.Butler (SOE propaganda) were there. After dinner I told Glenconnor that we had cleared with General Brereton and that he was going to cable approval (to our J.C.S.) of our Mission here. This he was going to do without regard to the British and therefore we would have to arrange "clearance" with British authority on an informal basis rather than formally, as discussed at our first meeting.

NOTE: Glenconnor is hell bent on having an "agreement" and this seemed the best method of laying a foundation for saying that an agreement is not necessary.

Glenconnor pulled out a proposed memo to his "Sub-Committee" which functions under Minister Casey. The memo provided, in effect, that OSS should submit its requests for approval to the British C.inC. through the Sub-Committee and that it should likewise so submit its agreement with SOE.

I told Glenconnor that, in view of the action taken by General Brereton to which I had just referred (1) any request on the part of OSS to the British for approval would be a reflection on the General; and (2) the procedure suggested would probably involve a reference back to our own J.C.S. of any agreement between us with an attendant delay of at least thirty and probably nearer ninety days.

I suggested to Glenconnor that we consider the memo written in London as the basis of our understanding leaving all details to be worked out by our operations departments. He insisted on something, however, and will prepare it tomorrow A.M. (I showed him the short statement agreed to by Gubbins and me at Algiers in preparation of a proposal on my part to make any document a short one).

Glenconnor wanted a copy of Brereton's cable which he will get tomorrow.

I asked Glenconnor about Lts.Helvig and Benson who are wanted by us and by him. Said we could use them and that we were short of personnel but that I would like them to have more training. This was agreed to.

Concerning Mandel (the third man of Low's) Keble took a poor view as have Benson and Helvig.

Home and to bed at 12:30.



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February 14, 1943.

Col. Guenther and I went at 9:45 A.M. to call on General Brereton. He saw him at 10:20 A.M. with General Strohm and Col. Krom.

The General said he had been over our papers and had prepared a cable which would answer our needs. The cable stated in effect:

That the O.S.S. representative had been interviewed; that the Theatre Command would consider favorably his proposals; that the Theatre Commandant was prepared to submit recommendations to the J.C.S. on behalf of O.S.S.; and that until adequate instructions had been received by the Theatre Commander from the War Dept. "O.S.S. activities within the Theatre were to be limited to the exercise of planning functions only".

I was completely floored since it was obvious that the General had missed the entire point and that another ninety days would pass before anything could be activated. A long discussion of our proposed activities ensued and of our relations with the British.

In the end I persuaded the General to send the cable I had proposed from him to the J.C.S. with the addition of a phrase asking the War Department to send to the Theatre Commander confirmation copies of Directives 155 and 166 (which have evidently never been sent out here). This was so worded as not to detract from the approval set forth in my cable.

To say that I had passed through a bad 30 minutes would be putting it mildly.

General Brereton then asked what help we needed and I outlined our requirements for communications and air transport. He said "We will give you every possible aid".

Brereton, incidentally, did not think British consent was needed and struck out Paragraph Eighth of my cable as originally drawn. This suits me but I will still have to clear with the British.

After this meeting we talked with Col. Krom. He made it clear that operational activities of O.S.S. could not be broken down by them into two parts - SI and SO. It is clear that they consider here (just as in Algiers) that our operations are directed to one end and cannot be broken down so far as their dealings with us are concerned. We will have to shape our field organization accordingly whether the folks back home like it or not.

Talked with Benson and Helvig - two Air Corps officers formerly in Captain Law's employ and now wanted by SOE. We need them in O.S.S. and I will arrange this with Glenconnor. I had Col. Amoss meet them. They would like to take a "refresher" course with SOE and could then be used as training officers and perhaps as group leaders.

Col. Guenther, Col. Amoss, Capt. Huot and I lunched with Capt. White and Capt. Edwards at their apartment. It was an excellent meal. Then we discussed organization and a cable to Washington setting forth what had been accomplished with General Brereton and what was now required in the way of personnel and help.



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February 13, 1943.

At office at 9:30 A.M. to examine cables.

Visited Lord Glenconnor's office with Guenther and Amoss at 11 A.M.

SOE occupies an entire apartment building in town not far from U.S. Headquarters. Their communications establishment is a large plant near Mena. Their schools are in Palestine.

Lord Glenconnor and Col. Keble received us. Our talk was very general. They wanted to discuss an agreement. I avoided this and took the position that Glenconnor's memo of our conversations in London had been taken by me to mean that we had an understanding. I do not want to be bound too tightly.

I then showed Glenconnor and Keble copies of my proposals to the Commanding General and called particular attention to my statement that we had made satisfactory arrangements with our British counterparts (meaning SOE and SIS). I said it would be helpful if they could speak of our requests to the British Chief of Staff. This Col. Keble promised to do.

We discussed operations in Syria and I said this was a matter to be covered in the Hoskins report which would certainly soon be submitted to the U.S. and British authorities. Glenconnor said as everyone has said in the same or substantially similar terms: "Yes, Col. Hoskins has given us some little concern as we have not known exactly what he wanted or intended".

Glenconnor invited us all to dinner Sunday evening and we then left to go to the Minister's House - Mr. Kirk - for lunch. A grand luncheon and Kirk is a superb and unctious host. Col. Krom and Col. Kroe of U.S.Hqrs. were there; Mr. Allen of American Red Cross; Mr. Hare, Kirk's assistant; a Captain Dobilt of British Hqrs. and the 8th Army; and one or two others besides Guenther, Amoss, Leete, Huot, and myself.

After lunch we visited Cairo's Bazaar. A litter of filth and fake jewelry. I felt the need of a hot bath on getting out of the place.

Dinner with Cols. Sibley, McClenahan and Manard.

Sibley did not come to dinner but called to "beg off" because of a headache. Our other guests stayed much too long - until curfew. We watched the dancing in Shepard's Restaurant. The War seemed a long distance away. We could as well have been at the Waldorf or St. Regis.



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Roseborough (with all his temperamental difficulties), Shapiro, L'Orenchi, Hoover and Huber there is no one in this organization who would be given standing room on the action side. John Hughes would be splendid for operational work. He should have been made SI Chief if the fiction of two branches is to be preserved - but Whitney Shepardson has no experience or background which would qualify him for the job.

It is clear that, at this stage, OSS in Washington must have a Director of Operations under whom will serve an Operations Officer (formerly SO Chief) and and Intelligence Officer who can use some of the SI personnel in collecting, cataloguing and evaluating information. Under the Intelligence Officer, or separately, should function CE work.

Our Geographic Desks should become Territorial Sections. In Washington they should have a Section Chief, who knows something of the country, a Recruiting Officer, a Supply Officer, a Geographic Desk Representative, an Operations Officer and a Contact Officer (through whom contact with the field is maintained).

We need to move fast if we are to play any part in the War. If Churchill's visit means anything, its import is that there will be a drive through the Balkans - via Turkey, perhaps, and perhaps, also via Yugoslavia. Our men must be there ahead of time and so must our communications. Italy (and surely Tunisia) may have to be settled first so that the left flank and rear are protected. This will give us five or six months from now.

We can be ready with manpower if we organize now at home and in the field to do the job. Our communications will be the weak spot. Short of getting mobile equipment to the field at once, we have no hope. Sea transportation to the Mid East is out of the question.

The same reasoning applies to England and operations from there - particularly into Norway. The Germans themselves obviously consider Norway vulnerable.

The tempo of the War has changed. We are on the offensive - but we are not ready to participate and will not be unless the direction of effort is changed.

Perhaps you wonder why I write this nonsense - especially at such an hour.



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February 12, 1943

Up at 7:00 A.M. after a bad night. Egyptian food, noise and odor was too much. Breakfasted and then had proposals to Commanding General, USAFIME, rewritten.

Got transportation for Louis Huot and looked at buildings which might be useful as headquarters. Nothing is available but large villas at excessive prices. The British have all else.

Talked to Leete about our cars. He hangs on to the Dodge station wagon which certainly might be offered to Colonel Guenther. This chap is a complete loss and I wonder what in the world he has been doing out here. OSS in the field makes a pathetic spectacle.

Colonel Amoss arrived about lunch time. He has had a bad trip. After lunch I took Amoss to meet McClenahan and Manard. Also delivered my requests to McClenahan.

Tried to reach Lord Glenconner of SOE several times. Finally connected and arranged to meet him with Colonel Guenther at 11:00 tomorrow.

Found Captain Huot at the Hotel. He was a bit blue. We had asked him to beg, borrow or steal radio equipment from the Signal Corps or the RAF. Ours, as was to be expected, is wholly inadequate. It might handle two or three agents but there are no poles here for antennae and none to be found. Furthermore, a couple of sergeants cannot do a complete construction job and, without a competent officer who can deal with Army officials, no help will be obtained from the Signal Corps. With a reasonable crew and an officer steadily on the job here we might fabricate a station. We will, again, be too late. My guess is, as I have repeatedly stated and written, that there will be a Balkan drive - perhaps, now, through Turkey. With no communications system our contribution will be negligible. Any communications planning should have foreseen this. The story is that of Algiers and London, and it's thoroughly disgusting.

Took a short walk and then met Guenther, Amoss and Huot for dinner. We discussed, to some extent, a proposed organization for this Theatre. I still see only one reasonable solution in the field, viz. a consolidation of operational effort. OSS is too short of manpower to warrant any continuation of two "operations" efforts. Any operational job will have to be performed by military people or civilians who have a flair for action and an understanding of what is required to make our efforts in the field useful to our combat forces. There is little such personnel in SI whose people are largely intellectuals (if anything) who may be good at evaluation and survey work but who, up to the moment, have not built a single organization behind enemy lines. Except for



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General Donovan March 30, 1943

a military job - one that I would like and understand and I wonder if this should not be my assignment. This would still keep me in operations where I honestly think I belong. In Norway and France, for instance, I happen to have made the personal contacts within the countries themselves and with the people in control which count for so much and should not be lost to OSS.

2. I have not stressed in the report the desirability of moving OSS operational headquarters nearer the field. Both Gubbins and Hambro have begged me repeatedly to spend more time in England or North Africa and Sir Charles almost wrote you on the subject a few days ago. They do not want me, personally, particularly - simply someone who can discuss "overall" operations occasionally. Full time there for anyone directing our operations is impossible because of the very fact that the seat of our power is here. Intermittent service there, however, is almost imperative and perhaps an Operational Headquarters, with an assistant of some kind in charge - to maintain general supervision of operations in all Theatres (other than the Far East) - should be established at an early date.

3. In the final analysis, of course, I will work cheerfully where and at whatever you wish just as long as I can keep this association.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 30, 1943

Subject: Supplement to Report of E.C.H., Jr. on European Trip Ending March 21, 1943.

To: General William J. Donovan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

1. In connection with my report and its suggestions may I be heard on one or two matters of personal interest which I did not think were properly included in the report itself:

a. My own preference would be to stay as Chief of Operations under a competent Deputy of yours through whom could be "tied together" the various functions I have outlined.

b. On the other hand Dave Halliwell has done such a splendid job that I would like to see him receive the recognition his fine performance deserves by having him "stepped up" to Chief of Operations. As I have often told you my idea of a good organization job is one as a result of which the organizer finds himself no longer needed.

c. There is the further consideration, which must not be overlooked, viz: The organization of the Auxiliary Operations Groups is a big and technical undertaking. It is

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We went office and training camp hunting after lunch. Not much luck. OWI has the best buildings pre-empted.

At five o'clock I went to McClanahan with my letter to Brereton and a proposed cable from him to the J.C.S. Col. McClanahan thought everything was all right but I will make a few changes just the same. McClanahan asked me to write a forwording letter for General Brereton to the C-in-C (General Alexander) who would certainly have to consent to our activation here.

Back to the Hotel where I ordered dinner in my room and went to work.

Capt. Huot came in and said that my arrangements for communications had worked out well. McClanahan had "gone the limit" with the Chief Signals Officer and we were to get complete facilities even to having a receiving station built for us on the desert. Huot was furious about the fact that a lot of radio equipment had been allowed to lie idle here for a long time- uncrated. He complained, too, because two radio men had been permitted to "kick about" Cairo for weeks (until we came) with no instructions and nothing to do. This last I know to be true as I have talked to the boys myself and it is disgraceful. The fact is, as I knew in London, that there would be no radio service here but for the action we have now taken. Larry Lowman is even now cabling about Schneider and one other man (suggesting they go to Algiers) who have never yet arrived in Cairo. The whole situation on communications is ridiculous and I'd bet money that nothing has yet happened in London. Huot said he was awfully sick of his communications job which, he said, could be quickly completed in London if the aid requested were given him. He wants to stay with OSS but wishes more action. He wanted a job in operations. He would be useful here as he is a good linguist. I told him I would see what could be done at home.

I prepared my letters for General Brereton and General Alexander.

No sign of Amoss as yet.



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February 11, 1943

Redrafted proposed letter to General Brereton.

At 11:20 A.M. Colonel Guenther and I called on Colonel Krom (G-2 and A-2) with Lt. Colonel McClanahan (Ass't. G-2).

Colonel Krom welcomed us most graciously and immediately asked what Colonel Hoskins was supposed to be doing. He had not heard from him nor received any report. I said that Hoskins had been sent to Syria on a Survey Mission and was expected in town any day. He is now in Turkey (where, incidentally, he was definitely told not to go). Colonel Krom said he certainly wanted to see Hoskins as he had some very definite ideas on the subject of "fooling 'round in that territory".

Colonel Krom took us in to General Strohm - Chief of Staff of the Air Force. The General was courteous but required a lot of information on what OSS and its activities and aims are. My explanation was not too lucid and the General interrupted continually so that his understanding of our purposes is probably still vague. He suggested that we call Sunday A.M. to see General Brereton.

On returning to the office I sent Captain Huot to see McClanahan to whom I had talked about communications.

I found at the office one Mr. Williams - an American Syrian who had been through Baker's School and had then been sent to Syria. He thought a Mr. Lord had sent him but I concluded it must have been Gordon Lord. He said he had cabled Washington his whereabouts but had been left hanging about Cairo for a month with no instructions. He said there was nothing of importance to be gotten from Syria - no combat intelligence, of course - and no other worthwhile job to be done now in view of the changed military situation and the complete control of the British. He wanted to be put on a new job or sent back to Washington. I suggested that he talk with Amore, who is due today. Poor Williams is not half of fire. He looks like a fat Syrian rug-dealer and I wonder how [illegible] would have made this investment.

I didn't see the three lost boys who had been hired - eight [illegible] - by my predecessor from the British and who drove trucks for several months on OSS pay of $320.00 per month. They are now in the Army on their own volition. Not bad boys but not worth that salary as chauffeurs. We will try to find something for them to do out Tray [illegible].

Guenther and I lunched with Leete. A nice lunch and an affable host. I wonder again. I wonder so much as I see some of our new cinders in the field.



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Feb. 10, 1943.

Up at 7:00 a.m. to work on letter of request - breakfast and more of the same thing.

At 11:00 A.M. went to the office to meet Commander Leete and Col. Guenther for a visit to the I.R.L.D. (SIS) crowd. Captain Boalbee is in charge, a Navy Captain; Col. Teague is his second in command (25 years in this area); and Commander Bremmler is third.

This was a social call. I said we were grateful to them for the assistance given our people and asked whether the existing arrangements between SIS and SI were satisfactory. Captain Boalbee said:"Very - we exchange information fully and your people maintain an office here." I said I wanted to be sure as it would be necessary for me to give assurances to this effect to our Commanding General.

Captain Boalbee said there was only one thing that gave him concern, towit: the duplication of information work here and in London. Both places were sending material back to Washington. I told him that I would speak to our London office about this.

Lunched and went to the Pyramids and the Mena House. No one works in Cairo between 1:00 and 5:00 P.M. so it seemed a good time to go. Captain Huot and Captain White were along. I explained to the latter, at his request, our general plans for this Area. He said they sounded fine but he was "fed up" with the place and did not want to stay. He would like to go back home. I told him any such move would make a spectacle of both of us since he had, less than two months ago, been so anxious to come out as to be a nuisance at home. I suggested that we have another talk on the subject.

At 5:00 P.M. Col. Guenther and I called on Col. McClanahan and Col. Sibley. They took us in to General Crawford who does most of the Theatre Command work for General Brereton. He approved the plans we had agreed upon for presenting our requests.

Col. Guenther and I then called upon Mr. Kirk, U.S.Minister, who was most cordial. He said that he was glad O.S.S. was going to operate on a military basis as the antics of O.S.S. representatives he had seen

The Minister invited us to lunch with him on Saturday and we then left him.

Col. Guenther, Captain Huot and I dined together. Huot said that White had told him that Amoss was a fake, had never served in the last War and was only a Y.M.C.A. secretary. This, I imagine, came from Hoskins.

We all read the Hoskins report which seemed to us an attempt to make something out of nothing. The British and our own people here have not seen the report I feel certain. It is practically an admission that what Colonel Donovan and I had decided in Washington is true - There is a very small job for us in Syria and the British do not want us there.



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Lt. Col. Manard, (G-3) and Lt. Col. McClanahan (G-2). I then spent two hours with Col. Sibley, Manard, and McClanahan explaining OSS, its objectives, our arrangements in other theatres, our understanding with SOE and our desires in the Mid East. These gentlemen were hazy on all these problems although they had heard of Lt. Col. Hoskins and said, frankly, that he had seemed to them both a puzzle and a problem. He had been very secretive about his plans and movements.

I told Col. Sibley that we wanted to set up an organization, have proper cover, and such aid as we could be given. I also told him of our communications requirements. They were interested (McClanahan in particular) and promised every aid. Sibley asked that I prepare a letter of request a proposed directive for Theatre Command and C in C approval and a form of letter and cable to be sent the U. S. JCS. These papers will be presented to General Brereton through General Crawford.

Col. McClanahan was, by far, the keenest and most interested of the three officers present at the meeting, but all of them will give us every assistance I am convinced. McClanahan's point of view on cooperation with the British was enlightening. He stated that he was glad to know that we were cooperating with SOE and was equally pleased that it was on a basis which gave us independence. I told C Col. McClanahan that our relations with SIS were not so intimate as with SOE but that our liaison was everywhere friendly and complete.

We discussed "cover". Col. McClanahan stated that G-3 would be better than SOS. I suggested Experimental Detachment G-3 as at Algiers. This was agreed upon.

I asked before the meeting ended, if I could get them all together with Col. Guenther and Col. Amoss. They said they desired to do so at our convenience.

I lunched alone and then began work, in cramped quarters, on my letter of request and accompanying documents. I want to settle this matter as expeditiously and thoroughly as possible. Then I will have to persuade Gus Guenther to a sensible and workable "set up" for OSS. He has not, I am sure, given the matter any deep consideration as yet.

Had a talk with George White about the trip he and Hoskins made. SOE was cordial but uncommunicative. In Syria they are quiescent. The personnel is not too high grade. Their training center near Jerusalem is not good. Col. Keble, SOE Chief of Staff, is not up to SOE standards in London.



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## February 7, 1943

We were awakened at 6:30— I'm not clear whether this was Algerian time or G.M. time. In any event, it was early. I reckoned it to be 5:30 Algerian time, which it actually proved to be.

Since water is scarce at Marble Arch, we had no choice except to throwmon our clothes and walk to the mess tent— some hundred yards away. A mess of hot cereal with no sugar— some poor coffee and then away at 6:55 Algiers time.

The day was beautiful and the trip most interesting. We flew over the battle fields of El Agheila and Bengasi— later Tobruk and El Alamein. The entire coastal area of Lybia and Cyranaica was in fact one vast Champs des Battailles. Ammunition dumps, gun positions, fox holes, bomb craters were visible everywhere. The ground was noticeably free of debris, however. The salvage sections had done a good job— an occasional tank or plane, a few ammunition crates, and gasoline tins and the countless thousands of tracks left by the mobile units— these were the last remaining witnesses of battles that had ebbed and flowed across the desert sands. The pattern of movement was clearly visible. It was as if number-less figure skaters, using double runners, had cut fine patterns on discolored ice— now somewhat obliterated by the action of the elements.

At 11:30 AM, we flew over Alexandria. A beautiful sprawling part—completely isolated from the mainland except to the southeast. And then to Cairo, up the green valley of the Nile, when we arrived at 12:30 PM. It was 2:30 before trans-portation was available. Thence, in search of a billett, which, after endless delay, we found at Sheppards.

A good dinner and to bed at 10:00 PM.

## February 8, 1943

We were up at 7:00 AM— checked in at the ADC office— went to Commander Lent's office and found he was away. Then to Kilometre 13 for supplies and equip-ment and back to town.

This was a day of no accomplishment.

Tomorrow we begin.

We met Col. Zymanski (Asst. MA) and Major Moore (another Asst. MA) for dinner, and then went to Casino Baida which is a low grade Montmartre tourist night club with Egyptian flavor. Zymanski and Moore can be helpful but the evening was not too well spent.

## February 9, 1943

After a poor breakfast, we all went to OSS/FUSE Headquarters. Col. Guenther met Capt. Edwards and the non-coms (Morris and Mitchell) and went to work on the lists. Capt. Hunt went to see Mr. Kirk (U.S. Minister) and I called on Lt. Col. Bixby, Chief of Staff. I was cordially received and turned over to



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February 6, 1943

Woke at 4:30 as I had no alarm. Dressed and brewed some of last night's coffee which I found in Bill's kitchen. This, with an orange, was my breakfast. Finished packing and was ready to go when Louis Huot called by with Henry Leger, and Joseph. We drove to the Aliette for Gus Guenther. Had his room 218 called and then went up myself to awaken him. He was dead to the world-- had met his friend Bob McClure the night before and I guess the boys had been up somewhat late. I told Gus to hurry (it was then 7:10) and that Louis and I would try to hold the plane. Henry Leger would bring him out. As things turned out Gus arrived at 7:55 AM and we took off at 8:05 after Louis and I had first been put in the wrong plane.

The morning was gorgeous and no lovelier sight could have been presented to us than the mountains to the east toward which we headed into the rising sun. We flew easterly, then southeasterly and finally toward the northeast--through Tanggourt, Gadames, and Misdah to Tripoli-- or rather to the nearby airport, Castle Benito.

The desert was a rare sight--for a time the white desert with its sand dunes so regularly placed as to look like drops of meringue spotted there by design. Then the brown desert-- sand and clay-- where the whorls disappear and evidence of recurrent sandstorms is found in long lines of drifts.

We saw numerous Arab villages and swooped low over Tanggourt and Gadames where there were French air stations. The villages marked the oases each with its mud houses, a mosque, some tents, and untethered camels on the outskirts. All with the inevitable date palm-- nothing else.

We arrived at Castle Benito at about 1:45 and pushed off for Marble Arch at 2:20 where we arrived at 4:30-- all Algerian time.

Our view of Tripoli was excellent-- a beautiful white town and a fine harbor-- not too large. There was a good deal of shipping in the harbor at the time.

More desert-- and now a few signs of the fighting. We passed many British depots and convoy stations and two large red cross field hospitals. Finally-- Marble Arch (there is one)-- a tented camp in the desert.

We were assigned a tent and told that mess had just been finished but that if we hurried, we might still get something.

Having only eaten a cold egg, some Vienna sausage, and an orange, since breakfast, we were all hungry. Gus, in fact, had not eaten much and was hungrier than any of us. This, I must say, had been a bad day for poor Gus. The crew, too, was not in good shape--the Captain was ill, the co-pilot had a toothache and all were tired.

We ended on crackers, bully beef and grape juice-- not bad we thought. And then to bed, in borrowed sleeping bags, just as a new sickle moon and evening stars appeared above the horizon. It was only 7:30 but on the desert, which was growing cold, bed seemed the safest place.



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no support in London, and I'll wager that we will never fulfill the contract we have made there. For this reason, five extra days in Cairo would mean nothing in the way of loss to London and everything in the way of planning at Cairo. Our folks back home will not accept the cold fact that combat (field) necessities are paramount nor do they adhere to the philosophy that the man in the field are "right". When they prove themselves incompetent, they should be replaced— until that time, they should be supported. Our energies should be directed away from— not into— Washington.

February 5, 1943

After a good breakfast with eggs, following exercise and a cold bath (as it is all but twice a week) Hughes, Shapiro, Potter, Roseborough, and I discussed organization with Bill Eddy. He was agreeable to the proposal made which segregated administration and operations but pointed out that, unless personnel is forthcoming from Washington, we will have to be satisfied with few and minor operations. We should do whatever we can with the personnel at hand.

When I asked Colonel Eddy about Joe Raichle and what he would like to do, he said that Joe would stay while the present station was being moved and wanted then to go back to the Navy. He thinks that Lt. Smith should, in the meantime, proceed with the new station as rapidly as possible.

Louis Huot stayed over to go to Cairo and I'll take the rap on this with Larry Lowman and the Colonel although it is Gus who insists most strongly. I agree with Gus (as does everyone here) or I would not permit of it. Louis will be delayed only four or five days and there is nothing to do in London in any event, until the personnel, engineers, and equipment arrive. I'll bet we "blow" that opportunity completely.

Went to Partridge's office to pick up the cable of the Theatre Commander to JCS on No. 170. It was the same as last night's. Gus Guenther was with me. He knew Partridge and I wanted someone to see Partridge hand on the cable copy.

We were informed that we should be at Maison Blanche for the Cairo plane at 7:45 AM— not 8:00 as originally stated. I had sandwiches etc for three prepared. Then, late in the afternoon, John Hughes, Warwick Potter, and I went to Warwick's billett where we cooked our own meal. Compared to the mess at the St. George, it seemed like a meal at restaurant De la Rue. I had a chance to talk with John a little bit about field organization and the work to be done at home in supplementation. We should do away, in Washington, with our SI-SO fiction and get down to business. Sections—for the Far East, Cairo, NA and UK Sections having a section chief; Geographic Desk man (expert), Operations Officer and Supply officer — a recruiting officer, too, if needs be— and an intelligence officer. Nothing else will really work.

John and I returned to Bill Eddy's apartment at about 8:40— a few minutes later the alert sounded but nothing happened. I said goodbye to Bill, Arthur, Jerry, John, and Joe Raichle, and thanked them all. Told them I'd be in Algiers again only if it seemed the easiest and quickest way home.



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point was then dropped but the question of operational understandings between SOE-SO-SIS and SI was then raised. It was said that care must be taken to avoid duplication. Bill Eddy again came to the front by saying that he did not assume this would mean that we should not have as many intelligence operatives as possible covering the field so long as they were so handled that the various groups would not "blow" each other. Mockley-Feryman, himself, answered that "we want all possible agents". Whiteley then said that cooperation would be needed and asked Munn to try to arrange, among the parties themselves, a weekley meeting. This was distinctly not an order. It seemed to be a suggestion based on the necessity, seen by Whiteley, for sharing transportation and other facilities which, General Gubbins, said had been done in England.

Brigadier Sugden said some operational directives would be needed at once covering the various territories referred to in the directive.

General Gubbins said that he thought SO-SOE operations in this theatre would be rather limited until invasion time due to transportation difficulties. Whitely asked my ideas and I replied that such a view was disappointing to me since in this area we, with our large language speaking groups at home, could make a real contribution. I spoke of our proposed AO Groups for Norway and said that Sicily and the other Islands and Italy itself offered similar opportunities. Whitely seemed enthusiastic and said "By all means". We mentioned transportation and discussed the necessity for special aircraft and crews.

The meeting closed.

Brigadier Whitely stayed for a moment with General Gubbins and spoke again of the AO Groups. I outlined our ideas. He said "Send at once as many as you can get." I then asked him how he intended to implement the action today and suggested that he cable JCS approving No. 170 since, after all, my letter was, in effect, a paraphrase. He said "Very good" and we went into Partridge's room where he directed him to prepare a cable and give me a copy. Partridge wanted to write a cable with some exceptions. When he finished, however, it read:

AGWAR (SECRET ROUTINE) Your JCS 170 to OSS approved in principle Eisenhower. To JCS through JSP.

I said I would pick up a copy in the morning. I wanted to see what was really sent. Then I reported to John Hughes, Arthur Roseborough and Jerry Shapiro. I don't really feel so elated. Perhaps I'm getting tired and perhaps I have the feeling that our home office will never devote itself to field service anyway. Like every one else at home, we are easily diverted. A fine dinner at the Mess of all Messes and a quiet sleep may change my point of view.

I discovered today that General Hughes is now permanently here from London. Since the Scandinavian undertaking has never yet been approved that blows the whole show in that Theatre and I suppose everything will have to be renegotiated. It has turned out exactly as I had feared when, on December 23rd, last, I asked for the immediate submission of that very project. Perhaps that is why I feel a bit on the sour side tonight. It may also be due to the fact that I've told Louis Huot to go on back to London in accordance with the obvious desires of Washington. He has been a real help here and would be of inestimable value in Cairo. He has had



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We all dined at Potter's quarters— thence to bed at 10:30.

February 4, 1943

An air-raid alarm sounded last night at 3:00 AM. Lasted an hour but nothing happened in Algiers.

After breakfast, John Hughes, Arthur Roseborough and I discussed Sugden's proposed meeting. I said that I did not think it would be wise for me to take anyone else along since we might then be committing ourselves on SI as well as SO. I should act as a patrol and if we were not satisfied with results we could then go direct to General Smith. I offered to let one of them go in my place. They thought my plan the advisable one to follow, however, so it was decided that I should go alone and "play dumb" with respect to SI if needs be.

The AGO's office called to say I might proceed to Cairo in the morning. I asked them to include Gus Guenther which they will do. We must be at the airport at 8:00 a.m. with food and bedding roll. I would like to finish here today and be allowed to leave in peace.

Gus Guenther arrived. We arranged to go on Saturday AM.

At 4:30 PM I went to the War Room for my conference. It was presided over by Brigadier Whiteley (Asst. Chief of Staff). Brigadier Mockler-Feryman (G-2), Brigadier Sugden, another British officer, General Gubbins, and Col. Munn (SOE), Col. Partridge, General Rooks, Bill Eddy and I were present. Neither Partridge nor Rooks ever said a word until Whiteley told Rooks to make a note of the fact that the Air Corps must be contacted when he answered "Yes, sir," nor until he asked Partridge (who acted as secretary) whether he had taken a certain note to which he nodded assent.

Whiteley said he supposed I was representing SO to which I said "Yes". He took up my letter paragraph by paragraph and stipulated only with respect to 2 and 3 that operations be with Theatre Command consent. Since JCS 155 provides for this, I said nothing other than that I assumed we need not do anything with respect to existing organizations in any area to which he replied "no, of course not— keep them by all means." Communications, facilities, personnel, and supply were approved without question.

We then began a discussion of SI. I was about to object but thought I might see how things went and object at the end if all was not well. No question was raised about SI work as such except that it was ruled out vis a vis the French in this territory (NA). Mockley-Feryman and Whiteley talked about CE work and were going to make a fuss but Bill Eddy made a grand speech about his organization in Morrocco and pointed out that CE or CI work was part and parcel of the normal intelligence duties of his men. The matter was dropped although there was talk of the necessity of cooperation as between the various organizations working in a given area. About this time, too, the general question of collaboration as between SI and SIS was raised. I was afraid an agreement would be suggested and said that I knew that Col. Dransford and our SI people were in close touch with each other and thought they would be able to work out their own modus vivendi. The specific



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We returned at 5:45 PM and John Hughes and I attempted to tackle Joe Raichle about his administrative job, but there were too many people about. The meeting was adjourned until morning.

Dinner was anything but a delight. Wrote the Colonel, omitting all remarks about the military and political situation here. I am disappointed in the calibre of military representative I find. A good many of the heads of important sections at AFHQ would not be given standing room in a mediocre business office. This must handicap General Eisenhower. Let us hope that his combat officers are of better grade. Our military, too, is suffering from too much involvement in the intrigues of French politics which they do not understand and our participation in which is controlled by the President and his representatives rather than by AFHQ. In addition, we are dominated in many places by the British whose views are much longer term than our own and whose relations to local nationals are a handicap to us.

To bed— no raid.

February 3, 1943

After breakfast, I studied the organization chart prepared by Jerry Shapiro. It is in good shape and except for one or two minor points meets all requirements. I then talked with Ken Pendar who wants to go to the Near East. Bob Murphy, will I hope, release him. He can use archeological cover and would be excellent in Turkey which he knows. Bill Eddy says he is an excellent chap.

Lunched at Col. Eddy's apartment with General Cubbins, General Rooks (G-3) Col. Partridge (G-2), Brigadier Sugden (British G-3 and Rooks' No. 2), Col. Munn, Arthur Rosseborough, John Hughes, Warwick Potter, Capt. Frank Holcomb (Eddy's second at Tangier). Nothing of importance was discussed except that Sugden stated that he was arranging a meeting tomorrow to discuss my letter. Obviously the British are moving in on us— through the efforts of Crawford of British SIS. They certainly do try to dominate everything and succeed. Sugden obviously runs G-3, and the actual head of G-2 is a British officer anyway. This is in no sense an American Theatre and we in OSS may as well realize it. The meeting tomorrow will be an attempt to commit me to a scheme to refer all SI-SO operations to Sugden. I will take the position that I came here under a JCS directive to settle SO affairs only and to settle them within the framework of such directive. I will also say— if required— that I cannot discuss SI matters since this Branch is represented by other representatives who are here. All I need and want is authority from the Theatre Commander similar in form to that granted SOE on December 14th last.

After lunch, we discussed communications with Louis Huot. There were present Rosseborough, Hughes, Shapiro, Huot, and Huntington. Huot's memorandum was to the point. His investigation and our own clearly indicates that Raichle does not possess the knowledge or experience to set up and run a communications system. On the other hand, he has told me that he will not take an Administrative job and Bill Eddy clearly wants to keep him in charge of communications work here. This might work if Smith were willing to accept Raichle's command and if another good officer could be sent out from Washington.



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All agreed. It was also decided that an Intelligence Officer (under Operations) should handle all intelligence and CE work. If G-2 insisted (as Hastings has) on doing CE work or in having OSS furnish operatives for intelligence work in the field of "Psychological Warfare" (whatever this involves) let us then give them this to operate under Hastings's direction, but let us build our own organization and operate it until we are stopped.

John Hughes was most helpful throughout. He grasps essentials, and cuts through red-tape. He is a keen analyst and a grand negotiator.

We had a home cooked meal at Donald Downes', consisting of eggs, cocoa, and toastcoa. Much better than the mess. And thence to bed.

February 2, 1943

John Hughes and I were able to present to Bill Eddy at breakfast the question of organization. I outlined the necessities and asked about Joe Reichle as Administrative. Bill seemed agreeable to the plan and suggested that we talk to Joe.

Arthur Roseborough then came in and said he had dined with Col. Crawford of SIS last evening. Crawford obviously wants to swing our operational control to G-2 (British). I said I would see Partridge and get him to veto this.

I managed to catch Col. Partridge for a moment and told him that I hoped to be able to show him, in the morning, a copy of our arrangements for SOE and SO. In this case, I said, there would seem to be no need for a meeting. He replied, "I agree."

At lunch time, we went to Matafou for lunch with SOE. It was better done than an mess at the St. George. After lunch, we discussed our operational arrangements. Everything went well until Col. Eddy said he would not act as Chairman of the Policy Committee with a deciding vote. He thought the Committee all right, but only wished to act as an advisory member. If there was any dispute, this was to be referred to G-3. I said this could not be for the reason that G-3 would not take the responsibility and even if they were to do so I would not think it desirable to have them control our operations to this extent. My suggestion was that the Committee be formed with two members from each side, and Col. Eddy as advisory member as he had suggested. If there is no accord or policy, nothing will be done. My thought was that what we could not do in SO we would do as SI-- an immoral approach, perhaps, but another way of getting what we want, and I am here, I take it, in the interest of OSS.

I managed to keep the conversation away from SI so there are no restrictions in this direction.

General Robbins was hell-bent on stating that our relations should be the same as those of the Allies at AFHQ. This would mean British control, and I ruled it out.

SOE wanted us to move our operational work beside theirs at Club dePin. I steered away from this on the grounds of housing difficulties saying that we would keep our training contingent there and a few officers. These last, I thought, we could use when we wished. I want to preserve some independence.



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own Department and now OWI is sending Sherwood out while the JCS directive says you are to handle it." I replied that if he was thinking of propaganda, this is the field of OWI--, if subversive action, this is the province of OSS. For my part, I was here for the purpose of discussing only Operations, SI, and SO. Colonel Partridge seemed satisfied and asked me to dedraft the letter setting forth the details.

I returned to Col. Eddy's apartment to meet General Gubbins, Colonel Eddy, and Col. Munn. We talked about getting down to business-- i.e. an arrangement between SOE and SO. He asked whether we should go to the Chief of Staff together, perhaps. My answer was that I wanted to clear our position here with our own authorities before talking with him and that once this was settled, our arrangements, I thought, were our own internal affair. We agreed to meet at Matafou for lunch tomorrow to discuss the matter.

After this meeting, I re-wrote the letter to General Smith including, verbatim, the essentials of JCS #170, plus a request for transportation and communications. This I submitted, after lunch, to Col. Partridge, who said it seemed satisfactory. He asked whether or not it should be discussed with G-2 (which here is wholly British) SOE and the Chief of Staff. I replied that it seemed to me that it was a matter for SOE and ourselves to work out our own arrangements to avoid duplication which we were about to do, but that I would "sit in" on such a meeting if it were insisted upon. My guess is that General Gubbins ran from our meeting to his British friends in G-2 and suggested that this procedure be followed.

John Hughes and I next had a meeting with Arthur Roseborough and Jerry Shapiro on organization. I told the crowd again of how we had devised a combined operational arrangement in London and outlined the theory of a "setup" under which with Bill Eddy as OSS Chief, we could have:

(1) An administrative Organization under which would be Special Services, of Finance, Supply, Personnel, Documentation, Housing, etc. and,

(2) An Operations Department headed by an Executive Officer who would have overall supervision of the Sections hereinafter described and who would be assisted by a Chief Operations Officer responsible for the planning and execution of operations and the furnishing of military advice (through Area Operations Officers) to the various Section Chiefs. The Section Chiefs would be men best qualified (through knowledge of particular areas and the people, politics, and local conditions) to direct the activities of the section. He could be either a civilian or military man. He would be assisted by a Geographic Desk Representative or Representatives (another "expert",) and an Area Operations Officer who would do operational planning and execution. The Training Officer and Dispatching Officer would work under the Chief Operations Officers, Section Chiefs would direct recruiting.

In general, the above met with the approval of all. I suggested that Arthur Roseborough be the Executive Officer, and Warwick Potter the Chief Operations Officer. To enable us to deal with SOE, BIS, and other outsiders, we would keep Arthur as head of SI and Warwick (temporarily at least) as head of SO. A table of organization would be set up for military personnel which could be under the direction of the Personnel Officer as Commander of troops. This military personnel would then be attached to departments as required.



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a few general topics on the way home, such as, locations, etc. John thinks soundly, and is a great help to everyone.

January 31, 1943

At 10:30 AM, I called on General W. B. Smith, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. He put me off until 11:15.

I told General Smith that the recommendations made by the Joint Planners to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS No. 170, of December 21, 1942 represented an acceptable directive for OSS in North Africa except that the number of our personnel must be increased, and except that we require very close liaison with G-1 and G-2 and proper authority to deal with the Air Corps, Navy, and SOS.

General Smith said that we could have any personnel we want, and that the other matters were details of arrangement only. He stated that he was familiar with JCS 170 and saw no reason for not approving it. He suggested that I submit a request through G-3 and sent me to Brigadier General Rooks to arrange this. General Rooks had not the foggiest idea of OSS or its functions, but did know Col. Eddy. He turned me over to Col. Partridge to whom I told the story. He was friendly and knew more of our objectives than did General Rooks. He wanted to see No. 170 (which I left) and suggested that I prepare a letter for him to pass upon tomorrow morning.

Lunched with Bob Murphy (Director of Civil Affairs), Bill Eddy, Julius Holmes, Col. Gaylord, Culbertson, and two others were there. We talked only of this and that. Bob lamented the fact that the British plan of pushing to Tunisia had been vetoed by the American Chiefs. He expects this to be cleaned up by March, however.

After lunch, I prepared a letter for General Smith. John Hughes thought it all right. Bill Eddy also agreed but objected, as he always does, to asking for authority to work into Europe since, he says, we have a job to do here, and when this is finished can look elsewhere. I wheedled him into giving his consent to the letter. He would not join in my requests but agreed only to carry out orders so long as he is representing OSS. (He inserted the words "at present" before "Chief of OSS, Western Mediterranean"). He certainly disapproved of planning. This is evident in the casual way in which tonight's mission to Corsica was handled. Louis Quot was horror-stricken. The boys here will have a time getting the colonel to help them train and infiltrate men in advance of military operations and there is no one here strong enough to insist. I have crossed him where I had to and while he has not liked it he will not, I hope, take offence.

February 1, 1943

Went to see Colonel Partridge of G-3 at 10:30. He read my proposed requests to the Theatre Commander which had been drawn on the basis of references to JCS170. He objected, and thought the contents of #170, including the requirements schedule, should be set forth in full. He also asked how we intended to operate— I supposed he meant CI-CO but he said "No, I mean with respect to all this stuff about psychological warfare— what do you intend to do about that. Here we have our



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joint training camp— Eddy, Potter and I. Eddy spoke again of getting instructors and others over for use by the British in Tunisia. He has no interest in plans which look ahead of this. I will make no committments until I've seen General Smith.

Col. Munn, Col. Eddy, and I drove 12 miles East of Algiers to Club des Pins which is a development lying along the shore— some 27 houses of various types scattered through the dunes and pines. A beautiful spot "preempted" by the British SOE in which they may give us 4 or 5 houses for our training work. They have, as usual, acted while we have talked. It is the same throughout the American operations in this area. The British move rapidly and in force. They are organized and show the benefits learned in three years of war.

The site we saw will do for a beginning, but we must look about for a place in which to establish our own show and our own communications. We returned to town to lunch with Col. Eddy. Here we arranged for a group to go to the 1st Army to work with our 2nd Corps. This will please Eddy. They will do some instructing there until we are ready for a training program back here at Algiers. The groups which are sent up are, I find, handled by G-3. Since we have no adequate communications set up, no attempt is made to service the men who are infiltrated and they are lost to us. Not too much credit goes to OSS under this arrangement. With mobile equipment, we could move up with the combat forces (as SOE actually is doing) handle and direct our men, and be responsible for producing the results desired by G-3.

After lunch, Roseborough said that we were getting nowhere— N.A. is just like Washington in this respect— and he thought I should go with him in search of a suitable Operational Headquarters. Since he appeared disgruntled, I went with him although what is needed is just what Warwick Potter is doing— scouring the country methodically with the aid of two local Frenchmen. Potter, I should record, has evidently arranged in his quiet way, to provide automobiles and obtain quarters for everyone. The best of these, I observe, have been set aside by Roseborough for his own use. Arthur is brilliant but as temperamental here as at home.

The afternoon was spent in driving (Roseborough at the wheel) at 50 miles an hour in and out of nearby towns. We stopped only three times, and our pace was too rapid to permit seeing much.

Captain Huot talked to me further, prior to dinner, about communications. We had found our second Corsican party going out without an adequate cipher— as inadequate as the one the present party is using. I asked him to give me a report in writing on the entire communications problem in N.A. It is obviously one that needs serious study by an expert, as I had assumed in London, would be the case.

Huot and I also discussed the security and handling of the party about to go to Corsica. They are wandering about aimlessly with none to direct them and stay with them until their departure. The French family, which they live with, knows and talks about their mission freely.

Had dinner at the mess at the St. George's— visited the quarters of Roseborough and Chapin, and walked back with John Hughes, to Col. Eddy's flat. We discussed



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Eddy then said he wanted to send the entire group arriving under Jerry Sage direct to Tunisia, as this is our principal job in this theatre-- not organizing for future operations which are not yet planned. I replied that our men coming out had been selected and trained for special jobs in particular places and could not be diverted out of hand. We could, however, divert a few people and I would examine the list at once with this in mind. We could also get some more people out from the States for work in Tunisia and could bring Rucker and his party down if we could get orders for them. Col. Eddy did not like this point of view and said, "Well, I'll work on Tunisia and you people work on future planning". He added that we could get orders for all useful people.

Col. John Munn called and I met him by appointment at Raichle's apartment. He wanted to tell me that General Gubbins hoped I would not see the Chief of Staff without him. I said I'd already seen General Smith and was to see him again Sunday, but I was sure no action would be taken which would interfere with our internal or inter-organization arrangements.

Louis Huot wanted to discuss Communications, so at 6:30 PM, we moved to the St. George's Hotel to undertake this--: Roseborough, Shapiro, Huot, and I. Captain Huot said there was no security of communications-- the W/T operators are French , and Raichle's secretary and cipher clerk is a French girl who has access to our strip. Raichle's office is open to every passerby. Roseborough and Shapiro confirmed this. It is obvious, too, that Raichle knows little or nothing of the technicalities of Communications and he is "punch drunk" from continuous cipher work. I told Huot to get Raichle aside and persuade him that there was a bigger job here (possibly as Eddy's assistant) than merely coding and decoding messages. With this done, we will persuade Eddy to let Lt. Smith begin to set up a communications system. Here, as in London, we will need something more elaborate than Washington has yet visualized.

We dined together and I talked with Sage, Rossmiller and Crosby who have just arrived. We all went to Downes' and Potter's quarters and John Hughes and I then walked two miles down the hill to the apartment and bed.

## January 30, 1943

I slept fitfully until about midnight when the Air Raid warning was sounded. At 12:30 AM, the "Jerries" began coming over. They were coming in from the West and making the circuit. I only heard and saw about four bombs although some others may have dropped. At the end of the show, the AA caught an enemy plane which burst into flame so quickly as to give the appearance of a flare. It moved along across the bay as the searchlights followed it, flames streaming far behind like a comet's tail-- then slowly settled to the water where it hung momentarily to plunge, finally, beneath the surface engulfed in last defiant glow.

Go back to bed and little sleep indeed, until seven thirty, when I arose to a cold plunge and good breakfast.

Col. Eddy was already in the dining room and we were joined immediately by John Hughes. We made arrangements to go with Col. Munn to the site of the proposed



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programs and raiding parties— alone or in conjunction with combined operations.

The above, I told the group, envisioned both SI and SO operations. This is what our military friends conceive as our function in life. We should not permit ourselves to be sidetracked. We must build an autonomous organization— in collaboration with, but not under the domination of the British.

John Hughes, Arthur Roseborough and Jerry Shapiro all said that their thinking had been along the same line. I told them that it would be necessary to try, jointly, to convert Bill Eddy to our ideas. I also outlined our operational plan for London which would give a joint SI-SO operational organization viz, a Section Chief (who could be a military man or civilian), an Area Operations Officer, to advise on military plans and procedure and to execute such plans; and a Geographic Desk Representative (an authority on the Geography, language, politics, and social conditions of the concerned area). This everyone thought, would work.

I lunched with Miss Taylor and Harris and then called on General Smith at 2:30 PM.

General Smith was most cordial but said he was very busy and could see me only for a moment. I replied that I had asked to see him only to pay my respects and to ascertain when I might talk to him for a few moments about our mission here. I asked whether he had seen the new directive to OSS which he had before him. He said Yes. I then told him about calling on General Hughes, and of my requests to the General. He said, "Fine— we can do the same thing for you here." He asked whether I was going to discuss propaganda with him, and I answered "No, only operations". He said in reply "Good, I wish Bill would forget that. If he would 'lay off' it would all come back in his lap. OWI is a source of trouble to all of us. They are even sending Sherwood out here. Perhaps it is a good thing— We will be able to control him better." At this point, I told the General I was sorry to have to bother him but we needed his action in order to get on with our operational job. He replied "I'm glad to do it. I wish the other bureaus were as little trouble as OSS". "Come on in Sunday at 10:30 AM and we will talk it out." He added, "How is Bill?".

I told General Smith the Colonel was well, and as incorrigable as ever. He laughed and asked if John Hughes was here. Said he had a letter about him from General Marshall. I said that John was here and asked if I might bring him along Sunday. He said "No, let's talk alone first. I will get hold of him later." He then told me that he would give us every assistance, but made one condition. We must get our operational headquarters out of Algiers. I said we would do this, but would need a small cipher and administration office in town. He said "O.K., but move everyone else outside. Even headquarters is going to move."

After leaving the General, I returned to the apartment for a meeting with Eddy, Hughes, Roseborough, Shapiro, Downes and Potter. Eddy wanted to discuss quarters, training operations, etc. We agreed on an operational headquarters outside Algiers, and a cipher and administration office (and small flat) in town. Eddy was convinced, against his will, that SI and SO training might be combined, but he thought SOE would object. I told him that SI was as friendly with SOE and as acceptable (in London anyway) as SO. Arthur Roseborough confirmed this.



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later on, Arthur Roseborough, Jerry Shapiro, and John Hughes all said things which led me to believe that my suspicion about Bill had been correct. John said "He is a very tired man". To me, he appears willing to "let the British do it"---. We will see. Tomorrow we begin on NAM.

January 29, 1943

My rest at Bill Eddy's apartment was somewhat spasmodic. The bed was a new type with a bisecting gully to which I was not accustomed. Then when I had fallen asleep, a raid began (5:30 AM) which lasted for an hour. The raiders came over singly at 5 to 10 minute intervals. Since the AA fire was spasmodic, and undirected, they were able to dive bomb almost at will with good effect. It was a beautiful sight, nevertheless, in the bright moonlight, which was thrown back almost as brightly, from the whitestucoed walls of the city.

John Hughes, Bill Eddy, and I breakfasted together. We discussed yesterday's telegram on "Morsi (meaning morale) Subversion" with which Col. Eddy declared he would have "no truck". G-2 here is now controlling Psychological Warfare and Eddy thinks our forte lies in other directions. He said, again, that we should build up an OI and SO organization, as he did not want to be "bogged down" with administrative detail. He wants to press the Tunisian show and thinks future planning should wait on this. He thought I should try to see the Chief of Staff, Major General W. B. Smith. This I shall try to do at once.

General Gubbins called at 8:15 to get me to go to the First Army with him. This, I think, is with a view to "selling" me something. I put him off.

At 10:30 AM, I went to AFHQ to make an appointment with General Smith. He will see me at 2:30.

Thereafter I met with Arthur Roseborough, John Hughes, Jerry Shapiro, Donald Lowes, and Warwick Potter. We discussed a modus operandi vis a vis SOE, Col. Eddy, and our own forces. John Hughes pointed out again that Col. Eddy was interested only in a program for the immediate campaign and had stated that other operations must be different. He confirmed my own feeling that the Colonel is unwilling to take on administrative responsibilities of whatsoever nature and that his work here was on a "hit or miss", unorganized basis.

I suggested to the crowd that I outline to them the presentation and arrangements we had made in London and read excerpts of my letter to General Hughes. I told them that my approach to General Hughes had been purely on the basis of operations as I had found that he, as every other military man with whom I had talked, had asked why OSS now considered that it was, in anywise, interested in subversive action except in the field of Actual Subversive Operations, and intelligence which is supplemental to operations. I had told General Hughes, I said, that my sole concern and authority was limited to operations; that, within this field, we were prepared, in concert with SOE, to build organizations of information and communication behind enemy lines; to contact and support resistance groups; and to take action when this is deemed necessary in aid of overall strategic plans. In the meantime, in addition to the building of organizations, contacts, and communications, we could and would provide groups which may be used on "one shot"



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at 8:55 with Lt. Col. Crawford, a French lady friend of his, and a Squadron Leader, Richardo. Major Crosby (SOE) came up just before train time and said "hello". He was going our way.

We went via Newport and Cardiff-- a slow trip to the tip of Wales.

I sized Col. Crawford up as having to do with intelligence and probably SIS because of a suitcase radio set he was carrying which looked like one of Gambia Perry's best. (On arriving at Algiers, I learned he was the head SIS man there.) His attractive girlfriend was not his wife since she once asked him if he had ever been to Switzerland. Doubtful business for an intelligence officer. She rode all day to Pemberton Dock and then back again that night-- just for the ride with him. The French woman know how to "lay it on".

We reached Pemberton Dock with no lunch save a doubtful sandwich of spam and some still more doubtful tea. It was just 5:00 PM.

Pemberton Dock is an RAF Naval Air base-- impressive and well-run. We were told we should leave via a Sunderland flying boat at 8:30 pm. We dined on British rations of more spam and tea and rode in a barge six miles to our ship. She was big-- almost as large as a Clipper-- and cumbersome. We were packed into a tiny cabin and set off at 10:50 PM.

The trip was uneventful and I slept (fairly well) on the floor. We breakfasted on more spam and tea and a few beans and greasy potatoes arriving at Gibraltar at about noontime. After some delay, we reached the Rock Hotel where Captain Huet and I were given my old room (No. 13). We ate a dozen oranges and tangerines, had lunch, and basked in the sunshine. Later we saw the ATC officer and were told we would leave at 8:00 AM for Algiers.

Dined, watched the dancing, and then slept well until 6:00 AM.

January 20, 1943

Breakfasted on coffee and oranges at the hotel and on eggs at the British mess. We left in a DC-3 at 8:05 AM and arrived in Oran at 10:00 AM where we wasted an hour. Then on to Algiers which we reached at 12:30 PM. Transportation was slow, but we finally reached town (on a French bus after our Command Car had blown a tire) and were billeted at the Hotel Feminine. After lunch, I reached John Hughes at Bill Eddy's flat and he and Donald Downes came down and moved Louis Huet and me to Bill Eddy's apartment (which he was temporarily taken over from Fred Cole,) and Louis Huto in with Joe Raichle and others.

It had been a beautiful day and the North African coast was a gorgeous sight. We flew over a mountain chain from Oran to Algiers-- rolling mountains for the most part, interspersed with valleys filled with citrus and truck gardens. Near Algiers, the mountains break away to an open plane, dotted with glimmering white houses set off, for the most part, by countless rows of orange trees.

I found Potter, Rosebrough, Shapiro, Nelson, Leger, and Harris, as well as Bill Eddy, and John Hughes. My talk with Eddy was brief but I could see that he was resisting the responsibilities of an increasing organization.



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Amoss asked whether Glenconnor would be satisfied to have Xenos detailed to Cairo by the Greek Government so that his former Greek Army intelligence organization in Greece might be revived. Glenconnor promised to consider the matter.

Amoss also asked about Col. Duke and requested that he be reconsidered by Glenconnor. Duke's standing has been effected, in the eyes of the British, by his association with Fellers who did not get along too well with General Maxwell, the then theater Commander (UK). Glenconnor said the real objection was based on Duke's association with a bogus Turkish "Princess" and his ownership, with her, of a notorious night club in Cairo. Amoss stated that Duke admitted his relations with the Princess (who is still there) but denied any interest in the Cafe. Glenconnor said that the matter would be examined into on the spot when we arrived. I do not favor Duke under the circumstances; while I am not the guardian of the morals of members of my own Branch, One can use people who are discreet, at least, and do not parade their questionable philanderings before the public eye. Women and discretion do not go hand in hand.

Our lunch was late, and when I reached the office, I found that at least two of us might be off on Tuesday morning on an RAF plane. Col. Quenther had too much luggage for the British so it was agreed that Captain Huet and I should go.

Col. Szymanski came in to see Col. Quenther. He had just arrived from his point of departure--his flight having been cancelled. He said he would try again in the morning. Szymanski, in answer to my direct question, said that he thought we should discuss his transfer to OSS after we arrive in Cairo. Had his transfer taken place when he was in Washington, he would have been delighted but, since we had delayed and a new assignment had been given him, he would like to consider the matter later.

I talked with George Brewer for about three hours-- going over some last minute instructions. George was in a stew about Dier, who is in trouble again. The trip in made with the "dropping" squadron was not made with SOE knowledge or consent, but through the Air Ministry. SOE is furious since the party was theirs, and Dier was the only person a member of it who has met SOE personalities. Had he been captured, he could and would (as does anyone under pressure) have divulged names. For this very good security reason, no SOE personnel is ever allowed on these missions. Here, again, Dier made the arrangements directly with the Air Ministry, rather than through Canfield, who, he knew, had charge of all schedules. I directed Brewer to have an investigation made and report to me in London.

Dined and did my packing preparatory to being at Paddington station at 8:00 AM.

## January 26, 1943

Up at 6:00 AM-- finished packing. Frank Canfield and Louis Huet passed by Claridges for me at a little before 8:00 AM. On arriving at Paddington, we were told to buy tickets for the 8:55 train to Pamberton Dock. This we did-- there were cars reserved for a RAF party for this destination, and we climbed aboard promptly



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Thereafter, I met VanderStricht, Canfield, Bross and Brewer, to discuss VanderStricht's position. He wants to be part and parcel of SO— he thinks SI, at best, should be used only to supplement SO work and that, actually, under the OSS directive, there is no excuse for the existence of SI. He thought Dave Bruce would object. I answered that I agreed with his logic, but was not going to take any position on the matter. I said I was sure David Bruce would give SO his enthusiastic support. Dave likes action, and is a realist. He can represent me anytime. As I told these boys, we are in the enviable position of having the only assignment in OSS which is ever going to meet with the approval and support of the Army and Navy, viz: the placing of men, materials, and working organizations. Let us stick to this job and not be side-tracked or befuddled by repeated reorganizations, orders or changes in terminology. Only in this way can we perform. The essential task which all of us present, at least, believe is the one which has been allotted to OSS.

VanderStricht and I discussed French recruiting in N.A. This is SO territory, but SOE is doing all the recruiting, and is sending a stream of prospects here for induction into France. We actually should be doing this. I agree. The organization in N.A. will have to take a longer term and broader view of their functions.

I told VanderStricht that we would be handicapped in one respect, namely: SOE can enlist and commission any recruit who "signs up". We cannot, and our doubt is that our so-called allotment has been made flexible enough for this. I have written memoranda about the matter ad infinitum without result. Our original allotment request was made with this in mind. Noone has seemed to understand what is involved, however, and our allotment has been regarded at OSS headquarters as something devised for our exclusive use in Washington. I have tried to overcome this difficulty by devising the plan of including "replacement personnel" in each "Project". This is only a makeshift, however, and will scarcely meet our requirements.

We had dinner with Colonel Amoss with whom I discussed, later, some of his ideas for the Balkans.

January 25, 1943

Spent the morning on a letter to RDH and on memoranda assigning various officers to their posts. At a little after 12:30, Lord Glenconnor, Colonel Amoss, and Colonel Guenther came to lunch in accordance with requests of Guenther and Amoss.

We discussed in more detail than at anytime previously the joint handling in Cairo of our Greek and Yugoslav projects. All agreed that a continuation of the Greek (Canalopolus) Committee would be advisable but that nothing of this sort will be possible in Yugoslavia. Glenconnor conceives that we will wish to "run our own show" in Cairo and will evidently encourage and abet this. We must be careful not to let either Greeks or Yugoslavs use one of us to obtain favors from the other.

Both Guenther and Amoss seemed entirely satisfied with Glenconnor's position on this matter.



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feint against the mainland.

In my original organization set-up, I did not, perhaps, provide for enough NCO's. Perhaps with each platoon, there should be one Tech. Sgt., particularly qualified to teach demolition work. He would receive special training in England at their Industrial Sabotage School.

All officers and NCO's must be specialists in, and able to teach, some particular subject. Our men must be as familiar with German (and other) 9m.m. arms as with our own.

The above will be put into memorandum form later in the day.

Knocked off work at 11:10 a.m. and went to a Church of England service in a little church on North Andley Street. No harm was done and the few peaceful moments of philosophical quiet were welcome even though the sermon did not hold my undivided attention.

Lunched with Col. Waite and Col. Guenther. We discussed our air transport problems and Col. Waite agreed that General Candee's branch "Air-Ground Operations" could most logically service our requirements. He said that he had already taken steps to see that the matter is referred to General Candee. He could not understand why it should take so long a time for us to receive JCS authority on the "Norwegian Undertaking". I said I was expecting an answer momentarily. Our organization is, unfortunately, subjected to more procedural formality, including a good deal of our own making, than would seem necessary, but since it exists we must make the best of things.

After Waite had left, Col. Guenther and I discussed Cairo and Major Beir. I told him of the letter from Lord Allerton and Col. Guenther wondered whether Beir would not now be harrassed, wherever he is sent, by his difficulties with SOE here. Col. Guenther does not want to be handicapped in Cairo by any misunderstandings with our British friends. The political situation in Cairo is difficult enough without the imposition of distrust of any officers sent out there for SO. I agreed, but pointed out that Major Rucker was destined for N.A. and Beir certainly was not wanted here. If he oversteps the bounds at Cairo he should be sent home. Col. Guenther suggested finding something for him to do at home.

I asked Col. Guenther about Szymanski saying that a cable had just arrived from Col. Solbert (through General Kroner) who is Biddle's MA here, that Szymanski preferred his present post. I pointed out to Col. Guenther that we had lunched with Szymanski on the day he left for Cairo. He quit us at a little after 2:00 pm at Claridges to catch a 3:00 pm train. He could not easily have seen Solbert after leaving us and indicated that he was going directo the train. We had discussed his transfer to us. I said we had asked for it. He gave every indication of wanting to come to OSS and said toward the end of the conversation: "Well, if they won't let me go, we will find a way of working together anyhow." Col. Guenther remembered this as clearly as I.

Played a little squash raquets at Evan's house. He and Kahler were hosts to Fisher Howe, George Brewer and me. My first exercise in thirty days.



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NOTES OF E.C.H., Jr.
January 24, 1943

Major Brewer reported on his discussion with Major Wilson (SOE liaison with Norwegian Groups). Major Wilson confirmed what General Hansteen had intimated at our last meeting, to wit:

1. More than two groups of 25 Norwegian speaking Americans will be needed— at least four and conceivably five or six;

2. They are needed at once;

3. The general plan of organization outlined in my letter to General Gubbins (January 12th) seems entirely proper;

4. Radio operators are needed in abundance as rapidly as possible;

5. The Norwegian Government will furnish Norwegian officer liaison with each unit, but the command will be American;

6. Lt. Stromholt will be our chief liaison officer, and will work with and be attached to our London mission;

7. The three Norwegians being held in the States (Dag, Einar, and one other) are to be sent to England at once to receive special training and then to be fitted into the first groups;

8. The groups should each have the fundamentals of military drill and discipline and then three weeks of preliminary and para-military training and ten days of advanced training.

Note: (1) Weapons training, unarmed combat and Field craft to be included. Preliminary radio instruction should be given and the better operators should be sent to Communications school for more work (including cipher). They can join their units in England later.

Note: (2) If radio operators can be found early enough in the recruiting program, they might be started on this work at once but they must have the other training as they are potential operatives in Norway for SO.

I discussed the above program with Major Brewer and Lt. Morrigan. The latter said he had left contacts and addresses with RDH which would lead to Norwegian-speaking groups. Our real aim should be to get enlisted (Norwegian speaking) men from the Army, but Bill Morrigan's cut-outs can be another source of supply.

My guess is that Sicilian (and mixed Italian), Serbian, (and possibly Albanian) and Greek groups should be next in order. Some day, perhaps, we can contribute French speaking units. In order of use, the Italian speaking groups will probably be needed first— we should, in fact, have those units as well as individual operatives, in Africa now. The fact remains, however, that the Norwegians are asking for aid, and we must respond quickly. I doubt that any Norwegian program, if one is devised, can be put on a military basis prior to next fall when it might be coordinated with a



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I hope some day, we can learn in Washington that continuous pressure is necessary. We must improvise. The needs of the field must be met without regard to the stuffy formality of our own and other Headquarters.

Had cocktails for Colonel Hills (of A.T.C.) whom I met at Accra, and some of my SO group.

Dinner, and to bed.



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NOTES OF E.C.H. Jr.
January 23, 1943

Had a long talk with 395 about his proposed mission. During the discussion he told me that an official of the Barking - Berkley Brewery (which had been hit in Sunday's raid) had said that some 20 - 30 small bombs had fallen in the area. Three bombs exploded and caused fires in the Brewery. The others were "duds". One of the duds was marked "1942". Sixteen out of seventeen counted were of the year "1942".

Called Colonel Waite and asked him about having our Air Transport request referred to General Candee. He said he would do his best and will lunch with me tomorrow (Sunday) to discuss the matter further.

Major Fair came in to see me and I showed him the letter from Lord Allerton (not Atherton) respecting his trip to the Air Dispatching station. He admitted that he had no right or business to take the girl driver into the operations room, but said the room was not marked and he had only taken the young lady in for shelter from rain and cold. He had made his own arrangements to go to the station. I told him this was the first case in which complaint had been made by the British about one of our officers; that he had no business fraternizing with women drivers while on duty, and whether on duty or not and no right to usher a woman into an Air Headquarters when entry is forbidden all outsiders. This was an unforgivable lack of judgment, and the only thing a lot could now be said on the subject is that he must profit by the experience. His difficulty arose, I thought, because he is too fond of showing about under his own steam. The criticism about this procedure, and indications from several sources are that he has not made himself popular by employing this technique. Our contacts are through us -- not direct with the Air Ministry -- and we must proceed through this channel even though results are slower and the attendant delays annoying. I and we are here and able to do this in a fashion we, largely, because of the aid of 395 and we must be careful to interfere with the good relationships which have been established.

I told Major Fair that Brewer is in command of 30 Detachment here and that he, in turn, had placed Captain Field in charge of the instructional programs for 30 officers. Major Fair said adhere to this program.

I talked with Captain Hunt and Colonel Gunther about various operations problems here, Cairo and North Africa. This revolves from the cable of 21 January which arrived this morning, that our CSS Communications Capt. in Washington [illegible] the time of what is required if Captain Hunt's [illegible] cable with OSS are to be complied with. My best guess is that OSS will fall far short of performance in this direction. It is the old story of too little and too late.



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NOTES OF E.C.H. Jr.

The lunch was somewhat extended. I then arranged, through Gus Guenther, to have General Candee for dinner in order to talk Air Force cooperation. Invited Colonel Guenther and Major Brewer.

Thereafter, I listened to further complaints about Bair, this time from Major Rucker. Major Rucker asked that his training be kept separate from that of Bair as he was embarassed handicapped by the association. It was obvious to Rucker that he was not receiving nearly as much information from the British with Bair present as he had received when here alone last summer. He added that he did not blame the British, but he does not want to learn less merely because his associate has made himself obnoxious. I said I'd see what could be done. Except for the letter of Lord Atherton and the cook and bull story to Brewer about difficulties between SOE and the Air Ministry, I know of nothing specific. Certainly Bair is certainly disliked by all who know him, and I dislike sending him to Cairo if the same situation is to prevail there. I will talk with him tomorrow.

Went to Baker Street to see Major Rhee, General Dubbins' aide, at the latter's request. He wanted to talk about "Massingham" which I did. Discussed SOE's Tunisia operations and said that their man on one of the Islands had not yet reported. They are putting men in everywhere.

After leaving Major Rhee, I called on Sir Charles at no. 64 and said goodbye to him and Tony Keswick. Spoke to CD again about a trip to the States on which subject I wrote the Colonel today.

George Brewer and I talked with Lieutenant Frederick Cromwell about coming with us. He would like to do so. He is now with the 6th Air Force, 1st Bomber Wing. His Chief is Lt. Colonel W.S. (Jack) Pumpreys, whom I know well. Jack would also be a good man to get.

General Candee, Colonel Guenther, Major Brewer and I had dinner and talked until midnight. General Candee said his ground force operations would logically dovetail with our requirements provided, always, he can get additional transport planes. He would assign definite crews to our work, which he seems to understand and appreciate, as he recognizes that our operations are highly specialized. He would welcome learning from the British. He said he would not object if I asked Colonel Bliss to request General Harbon to refer our Air Transport requirements to him. It was a worth-while evening.



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NOTES OF E.O.H. Jr.
January 22, 1943

Another day of waiting which I decided to put to some reasonable use. There is just no transportation available. Even General Gubbins is still held up by the British.

I was not satisfied to leave without another shot at General Hughes, though I did not want to offend Colonel Waite to whom my letter had been referred for recommendation. It seemed possible to see the General on the excuse that I would like to discuss one matter of policy, on which I wanted a ruling before leaving, viz: Once a general project is approved will he require approval of detailed operations carried out within the framework of the project. This question Waite and I had discussed only briefly. I, therefore, called Hughes who said, as I thought he might, that he wanted Waite present. Colonel Waite was at the General's office at 11:00 a.m., and I posed the question of detailed operations to which he answered "No such approval will be required. The matter after approval is purely one of internal operations". He added that he would "like to be kept advised". I said, " This can be done through our liaison with G-3 which I hope you will establish for us". He then asked, as I had hoped he might, how we were getting on. I answered, " I think Colonel Waite and I are in the clear except with respect to our formal project on Norway". On this, I suggested (as I had to Waite) that Theatre approval be immediately given, subject to receipt of JCS and British Joint Staff consent for which we had already asked. The General then turned to Colonel Waite (who at this point could have had the approval for us) and said "Is this all satisfactory to you?". Waite answered "All except the Norwegian project on which I think we need JCS approval before we can act" -- the General (who had his pen over the paper ready to give an O.K. and had in fact initialed my letter of request) said "Of course" and struck out his initials. I did not press the point further, but said I hoped to have both approvals shortly. At least I know he will sign if I can get a cable from Washington. SOE says they will have British JCS approval tomorrow.

After leaving General Hughes office, I wired Washington for the second time about the matter.

At lunch yesterday I had lunch with Colonel F.W. Lee, Asst Asst Sec TS, Colonel Amoss and Major Brewer. Colonel Lee knew not [illegible] of OSS or its purposes, nor did he know of SO or [illegible] gave him an outline of our organization, and told him of what we are trying to do for SO here. He appeared, after a time, to be interested and agreed that liaison with them would be most helpful. He promised to talk to General Barker (G-3 TTO) and tell Jerry Brewer to see him at any time.

I wanted Miss Amoss to "sit in" on the meeting as I am sure we will be confronted with the same type of sales job in Cairo.



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NOTES OF E.O.H. Jr.
January 11, 1943

Major Brewer asked me to talk with an Air Force representative who is interested in a training program for his bomb crews designed to make them useful and to furnish a background in event of capture and escape. The Air Force Major proved to be an old friend of mine, Joe Mellen, who had been a flyer (and was captured) in the last war, and who is in charge of potential POW training. I told friend Joe that we would be willing to help, but that, in return, we would want access to lines of communications with prison groups, so that our own agents in enemy controlled or enemy country might be able to contact such groups at or near invasion time with the idea of enlisting their aid with local resistance units. Mellen thought this was a grand idea, and admitted that this potential use of these groups was probably more important than conniving to aid their escape which would bring small results and might uncover our own men.

We lunched with Colonel Masterson and his Balkan contingent - Colonel Amos, Brewer et al. An interesting and instructive meeting. Colonel Hannock will be in Cairo, and seems to know his territory well.

Called Gus Guenther to let him know that I'd just learned that his friend General Candee was head of Air Ground Force operations of the 9th Air Force (Parachute troops - pick-up operations etc.). He is obviously our man. Gus evidently did not know the general's job, although they have been sharing an apartment. We'll see him at once.

A letter came in from Wing Commander Eaton's Section (Air Ministry representative) signed by Lord Atherton about young Major Hair. He has all the racial characteristics. He had already told George Brewer that he had learned from the Air Ministry that the SOE crowd was not well considered by the Air Force which did not like the manner in which SOE operations are conducted. Since SOE has nothing to do with Air operations this sounded fantastic to me. The next day, George Brewer saw Comdr. Eaton, who went out of his way to tell George that we must model the Sub-Air Force arrangement on Cairo with SOE if possible. Hair is considered a nuisance by our own people without any exception, and is not wanted by SOE. I will write PDM about him and will see the young man tomorrow.

Brewer, Van Der Bright, Canfield and I discussed an SOE agreement covering internal operational arrangements between us and SO.

Called Colonel W.L. Lee, who is General Barker's aide in [illegible]. Just see him with respect to liaison with the Reserve Division. Will see him tomorrow at 10:15 p.m. at Claridge (he will ring, phone 20 Grosvenor, Extension 98).



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Col. Guenther and I made an appointment to see Col. Szymanski at lunch. I would still like to have him with us in Cairo-- and he would like to join us.

At 12:45 the Boche staged a daylight air raid. So far it is not serious. We will go to lunch.

Col. Szymanski still indicates that he would like to be with us. In any event, he will give us every help in the Mid-East.

Col. Waite called me over to discuss my letter to General Hughes. We got off to a fair start since he asked me if I had not gone to Colgate and then said he had played at Maine in 1911 and had followed our teams closely-- why I don't know. Waite says that he is in the clear except as to our "Norwegian Undertaking" of Dec. 23, 1942, on which we should have our own and British Joint Chiefs' approval before asking for Theatre Command consent. I pointed out that Theatre Command consent subject to the other would accomplish the same purpose and expedite matters. Frankly, I dislike the other method which may get us in trouble from the point of view of procedure. The higher echelon could logically require Theatre Command action as a prerequisite. Col. Waite stuck to his guns so I've cabled Washington and telephoned SOE for aid with the British Chiefs.

After having seen Waite - who, incidentally, is most agreeable but scared to death of General Hughes - Col. Conrad took me to see Colonel Lee of G-3, with whom I talked about planning liaison. I arranged to carry on with him when I return.

At 5:30 they told me we would not leave until Friday. I hope I can continue to be philosophical.

Took Major Watney of SOE to dinner and talked a bit of planning. Had him meet Elias Alsos as I would like the latter to study SOE procedure as long as he is here where it can be done.

More alerts and a little firing. The Germans must have been hurt in Berlin.



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January 19, 1943

Arranged to lunch with Colonel Waite to whom General Hughes has given the job of passing on our requests. There will also be present Col. Genther, Col. Conrad (whom I wish to steal from Waite) and Major Brewer.

Fisher Howe came to see me and said that an O.W.I. crowd had arrived to take a propaganda course under the joint direction of P.E.W. and S.O.E. Mr. Hackett of the S.O.E. propaganda school had called to ask what we wanted to do about the matter and seemed disturbed at the thought that O.W.I. personnel was being imposed on S.O.E. I told Fisher that the Colonel and I had discussed this matter when the subject first arose and that I had written a memorandum suggesting that O.W.I., in undertaking to study this type of propaganda (subversive) methods was poaching on ground allotted to OSS. I still believe this and so told Fisher. I also told him that I thought we should inform Hackett that these people werehere without our consent or permission and, so far as I knew, without the official knowledge of our Washington office. Fisher then said that Murray Brophy had made the arrangements. This transcends my comprehension so I will "bow out of the picture". Perhaps I have misread the President's directive of June 13th last.

Col. Waite did not come for lunch but Col. Conrad was there and said he had also been working on our request to General Hughes. He said they were recommending approval and action.

After lunch, Col. Amoss and I met Lord Glenconnor and Col. Masterson. The meeting seemed advisable so that Glenconnor and Ulius might get to know each other before reaching Cairo. Some general discussion of possible operations into the Balkans was had.

January 20, 1943

We are still delayed. It is always manana por la manana.

Passed the morning discussing operations with Major Brewer and in writing the Colonel and RDH.

This morning's "Express" had two interesting articles--one on Sweden and the other on the question of a settlement with Japan prior to reaching a conclusion with Germany. This last is a problem which I raised with the Colonel last summer, and I am glad that someone has at last posed the problem publicly. The Japanese war is a long way from this part of the world and we could easily be left alone on the field of battle with a hardy antagonist.



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have Ulius Amoss meet C.D. and Gubbins and see, first hand, how these matters are handled. Both C.D. and Hanstoen believed Navy aid both essential and feasible. W.O.E.'s 25 fishing smacks are now operating weekly from the Shetlands and faster craft will serve a very useful purpose. We probably should, in addition, purchase fishing boats for our own use. I did not discuss this but will do it later.

General Gubbins told us that he had transportation to North Africa via B.O.A.C. We, seemingly, can get nothing. This means that I will have to return to London and then push off to Cairo - leaving on this trip about the 31st. The transportation problem is upsetting all my plans and will subject me to no end of a beating.

Both C.D. and General Hanstoen indicated they would like to make a trip to the U.S. I wonder if we should not invite them to return with me.

Another raid which was evidently abortive.



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Prepared and sent off some cables after lunch touching on Norway and the re-organization. Suggested a "Table of Organization" for all O.S.S. missions. It is impossible to provide security of records and ease of movement of personnel without this. In addition a T/O permits of supplementing personnel from the local theatre - an essential factor in a growing organization.

Talked with Wynne Rutherford (Frank Polk's son-in-law) now in the Marine Corps and suggested he see R.D.H. He might be useful in Combined Operations work with our A.C. Groups. He was with me in the 17th Regiment and is made of good stuff although slow in his thinking.

Dined at Scott's with George Brewer and finished just as an alert was sounding. This was about 8:00 P.M. George and I walked back to Claridge's enjoying the show as we went. London's air defense is undoubtedly magnificent. The rocket barrages are almost as impressive as those at "Gib" and, of course, are in greater quantity. The Boche were kept pretty well to the west. They seemed to be following the course of the Thames somewhat. There was not too much light, the moon being obscured, for the most part, by a blanket of light clouds. It was, at best a poor reprisal for the R.A.F. show over Berlin. The raid ended at about 9:00 P.M.

January 18, 1943

At 5:00 in the morning air-raid warnings were again sounded. The Germans were retaliating, I suppose, for further raids on Berlin. The show was a replica of the earlier raid although more bombers seem to be involved. Again the Huns were kept to the west -- the whistling of the bombs was scarcely audible. It was, once more, a hastily planned and poorly executed reprisal. Unless they can do better we will have further proof of a growing impotence in the air.

Up at 7:00 A.M. and examined, again, into chances of leaving which seemed good. Did some necessary shopping and put my photostated papers in order. Then had a long talk with Ulius Amoss about the Mid East.

George Brewer and I lunched, by appointment, with Admiral Kirk. Since he is in command here (as well as Naval Attache) I wanted him to hear more of our requirements. The story told General Hughes was repeated. Specifically I said we needed fast, Navy manned seacraft (PT boats, perhaps) to work Northern Norway from the best available base - Iceland, Scotland or the Shetlands. Also to assist S.O.E. in their work toward the continent. He was interested and wants to help but said the boats must come from home - there is nothing here - and bases will have to be obtained from the British. This latter should be easy. If the Norwegian program is approved, therefore, we must strike the Navy in Washington for at least four (better six) boats for England and Iceland, Scotland or the Shetlands. As I pointed out to Admiral Kirk, we have been assigned a definite area to service. It is a vital area and should be served by the American forces just as communications will, under the plan, be controlled by us. The Navy will have a large responsibility in any invasion program and the handling of our personnel on raiding parties, one shot operations and for the induction of operatives and materials will be excellent training and experience. The Admiral asked for a copy of the documents sent General Hughes and promised to assist us.

After lunch I went over our various memoranda with Col. Amoss and discussed the Cairo paper. He seemed satisfied with the proposal. He and I then went to meet Brigadier General Larson and the Greek Minister of Defense. He, Col. Guenther, George Brewer, Fran Canfield and I then dined with Sir Charles Hambro, General Gubbins and General Wanstean. I wanted to discuss the Norwegian situation further and also wished to



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At 10:00 A.M. left with C.D., Lord Glenconner and Col. Nichols (who is working with Col. Osanne in S.O.E. communications with especial reference to communications security measures, Col. Nichols having had a long experience on the C.D. side of this work with the British Army).

We visited Station 53 which is the actual communications center. They are now handling about 800 messages per month (total in and out) and in October it was 1090. They are working 95 Field Operators on about 30 sets (four of which - their best - are American made H.C.A.'s or Halicrafters) which means 3 operators per machine and leads to all kinds of difficulty. They evidently badly need there second station and our third.

The spot picked for our station, incidentally, seems a good one. This is an opportunity for us to make a real contribution and derive the benefit which will flow to us from control of Northern European traffic. We will need a large establishment as S.O.E. is employing 200 men and women at their present station and will increase this to 261. We must move at once. By using prefabricated huts we could be ready by the end of March and our operators (if experienced people) could be trained in S.O.E. technique by that time (so I am told). We will need our own mess and housing facilities.

Col. Pollock is in charge of the station and all training and he is assisted by Major Elliot, commandant at the communications center, and an excellent staff of officers and NCO's.

We also visited Stations 54 and 52. Both are training centers - the former for agents and the latter for Home Station Operators.

S.O.E. has just ordered for N.A. and Cairo a fleet of mobile stations. They are movable home stations and there is no doubt but that we should immediately purchase and ship similar equipment. We should have three to six mobile sets in England, three in N.A. and three in Cairo fully equipped with generators, etc. We will be way behind the parade unless this is attended to at once.

While at Station 53 I met Capt. Hunt's man Williams (Warrant Officer from U.S.N.). He confirmed the time schedule on our station (53-C) given by the British provided we can have assistance from our own Engineers. The second and secret station will be more easily and quickly constructed.

I had considerable discussion with Col. Nichols on D-Effing methods. Most of this I had heard before from Col. Osanne of S.O.E. and Col. Gambia Perry of S.I.S. Nichols, however, has practical ideas which will bear studying derived from years of C.F. work in this field.

We were ploughing about in the rain and mud all day. The result was I went directly to bed on arrival in London at a little after 7:00 P.M.

January 17, 1943

Slept until 8:00 o'clock, had a late breakfast and then went to Church - none of which did me any great harm. My throat is better and I think I may live through Claridge's campaign.

Discussed with Major Brewer the instructional program for our S.O. officers and then met him and then for lunch and further discussion. Fisher Howe was included.



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side -- but will do as a place of beginning. The precis was full of a lot of nonsense about what I thought the "American High Command's" (a phrase I am not accustomed to use) ideas are respecting Norway -- something, naturally, about which I haven't the foggiest notion -- so I suggested that G.D. simply write the letter without reference to the precis and that he state in the letter that Hanstoen is in accord. This, I told Major Beaver, I would then send along to General Hughes. Major Beaver agreed to have this done right away.

I called George Bowden and asked him to dine with me. I'd like to give him the story so that he can tell the Colonel what I'm doing or trying to do. Besides, I'd like George's opinion. He has a keen analytical mind and will see pitfalls which I'm missing.

George and I spent the evening going over both his and my own ventures. We seem to be thinking alike on where the emphasis should be put. He discussed North Africa and the Italian situation and suggested the use of our own men to handle Italian affairs -- and from Africa. There is a large Sicilian population in and about Chicago and West -- in George Bowden's office there -- may be useful to us in any recruiting program among these groups.

January 15, 1943

Passed the morning in cleaning up on material to be sent the Colonel, N.B.H. and General Hughes.

Talked with Bross, Herrigan, Rucker and Stromholt.

Called General Hanstoen and told him we would like Stromholt whom he said we could have. I also suggested that one Norwegian officer be assigned to each of our A.O. Groups. He thought this a good idea and agreed.

George Brewer and I called on Admiral Kirk and discussed with him communications to Norway. He was most agreeable and said he would see that anything of ours was handled on a "High Command" basis. I told him of my talk with General Hughes and said we would, perhaps, like to see him again on the subject of N.O. activities in this Theatre.

After lunch I dictated operational instructions for Major Brewer covering our Swedish contingent - i.e., B & C and C & L. Wrote G.D. in answer to his note in London. Talked with Col. Gunther about going direct to Cairo due to the delays we are encountering.

G.D. called and wants me for a trip with him and Glencenner tomorrow which I shall take.

Dined with my boys and discussed their operations here - their training for those who are going elsewhere and their relations with S.O.E.

Johnny Bross handed me a letter from my best girl which helped no end. And to bed.

January 16, 1943

Went to the office at 8:00 A.M. to prepare duplicates of the papers submitted General Hughes for Admiral Kirk, George Brewer and to take to N.A.



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that I supposed Ambassador Phillips would report to Colonel Donovan on India and the Colonel to C.D.

He also talked about Australia. Sir Charles has offered the services of S.O.E. there and thinks we should collaborate. I told him that nothing much could be done in this Theatre, probably, unless Jim Hayden is able to convince General MacArthur that our services are worthy of consideration.

Our proposed London arrangement was discussed at some length. C.D. wanted to change my revision of General Gubbins' memorandum. He put the changes on the ground of security for S.O.E. and more independence for S.O. Wants officers to be attached for duty to S.O.E. rather than considered as integral part of the S.O.E. section. Actually, by this means, our officers will be prevented from knowing the details of S.O.E. operations. The real reason may be a desire on S.O.E.'s part to retain control, at invasion time, even of those areas assigned to U.S. Command -- at least they would like to have a voice in these areas as well as their own. I was scarcely in a position to argue. We will have to build a high-powered organization of our own -- learning as much and as fast from S.O.E. as possible and keeping ourselves in touch with E.T.O. Staff Planning. In this way we may, after all, be able to run our own show on D-Day.

Dined with George Brewer, with Mr. Kessler (Managing Director of Dutch Shell), talked post-war economy and the use of Quepin. Mr. K. will give us the answer on this tomorrow.

January 14, 1943

Spent the morning having the London memorandum rewritten and revising the letter to General Hughes so as to include communications (as desired by Capt. Hunt). Also went to the A.U. Office (priorities) to plead for transportation. We are the step-children of the Army beyond a doubt.

Bill Eddy cabled asking us to come along quickly; also complaining that S.I.S. was "milling about" in North Africa. I replied saying we were coming as rapidly as lack of priority would permit and advising that we would do what we could about S.I.S., that my own belief is that nothing should transpire in that area except under his direction as provided in the S.O.E. proposal which I am bringing for his approval.

A cable from Larry Lyman indicates no need for Hunt to go to N.A. or Cairo. Larry does not understand the situation. Communications are inextricably bound up in our negotiations with S.O.E. and the Theatre Commander. Louis Hunt has negotiated here in this fashion with S.O.E., Colonel Perry (S.I.S.) and the Signal Corps. I doubt that Raichle could even begin to do the job and I am sure that Lieutenant Smith (who is a technician purely) will be of much help. I will so wire Larry. Without communications we will be lost.

Again changed London memorandum calling Tony Kewick about it and then forwarded an original and two copies to C.D. Also sent C.D. a copy of the letter to General Hughes.

Major Beaver of S.O.E. called to say he was on his way to General Panteon's office to get his approval to the Norwegian program and would call at 5:15 P.M. He came around at that time with a letter from C.D. to which was attached two copies of General Marshall-Cornwall's proofs of the conversation C.D., he and I had had with General Panteon. The letter was all right -- a little on the S.O.E.-S.O. "joint operation"



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Chief of E.T.O.-S.O.E. was in General Hughes's room so they all listened. I don't know how effective the explanation was but they all listened without comment. I spoke, particularly, of the need for liaison with the E.T.O. Planning Group and of assistance from S.O.S. on supplies and the Navy and Air Force on transportation, and asked how we could go about securing all of this. General Hughes said, "Through this Command."

I outlined our arrangements with R.O.B. and our proposals for operations -- especially into Norway where the assistance of our armed services will be needed. I then asked if it would not be well for me to submit a letter covering the matters discussed and requesting approval of proposed programs of operation. General Hughes said "Yes". A copy of my letter is attached. It covers, substantially, my presentation of this morning. It may or may not be in exact accord with the Colonel's interpretation of the directive and future operations, but I am where I have to improvise a bit as I go along. The fact is that no one in authority seems to have the faintest notion of the functions or authority of O.S.S. Certainly they have not considered working with us -- taking us into the family so to speak -- or giving us assistance. The result is I seem to be doing or trying to do a "selling job" primarily. I suppose we'll be confronted with the same thing in North Africa, (to a lesser degree perhaps), and in Cairo.

After leaving the three Generals we called on Colonel Waite -- Assistant G-2. He was most agreeable. We talked directive again and he said he had Louis Huot's communications proposal up for consideration. I asked him about getting Conrad away from him and he said "No -- get someone from Washington". He wanted to know what the province of his local Psychological Warfare Committee was in view of the directive. I told him I thought it should continue to function but that certainly we should have adequate representation there, as we should in other Theatres -- so as to coordinate the work of the local committee with Psychological Warfare Programs devised in Washington. He said he would welcome such an arrangement.

Colonel Waite also wanted to know about the meaning of the word "control" as applied, in the directive, to the relationship between the Theatre Commander and O.S.S. Does this mean that officers in the O.S.S. Mission in London are under the command of the Theatre Commander. I answered that I did not know, technically speaking. That this was the intent but for all practical purposes it would seem to be the same. I could see definite advantages to O.S.S. in having its local Missions under the command of the Theatre Commander. This would fix in him some responsibility to give us the assistance and facilities of liaison we so badly need.

Returned to lunch with Tony Keswick and Brewer and to discuss the London arrangement.

After lunch -- and all afternoon -- I worked on my letter to General Hughes and various cables.

To dinner with Capt. Vennon, Asst N/A. (Admiral Kirk, N.A., was ill today so could not see him.)

January 18, 1945

Revised letter of explanation requested by General Hughes and prepared a memorandum for General Hughes on the A.O. Groups.

After lunch I kept an appointment with Sir Charles Hambro who wished to discuss the London arrangement, India, China and Miller. I told C.D. that Miller should now be in close touch with his men at New Delhi; that I had little to say on China and



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At this point I asked whether some of the more intelligent might not be usable as members of S.O. groups with his own men. The General did not answer but C.D. said "things might work out that way".

I also asked the General whether or not he could use Norwegian-American radio operators, of whom we have a good many (I hope we can find them). He said "by all means -- any number". They can be infiltrated with our own men and will be perfectly safe.

We had now reached a satisfactory stopping point. By finding Norwegian-American radio operators and training them well in S.O. work in addition to radio, we will build and control our own Norwegian system. I, therefore, suggested that we reduce our discussion to writing as I would like something on which to base a request to General Eisenhower and our own J.C.S. for permission to proceed. It was then agreed that General Cornwall would draft the "Minutes" of the meeting.

Note (1): If General Eisenhower approves we should ask the J.C.S. to authorize our Norwegian Project. We can then begin a recruiting and training program stressing radio experience. We will, at the same time, have to generate some interest in the Army, Navy and Air Force. Submarines and Catalinas are especially required and Iceland, the General said, would do as a base for either type of operation.

Note (2): Consideration should be given to the same idea for Italy and the Italian Islands. Later on Col. Amoss will want the same thing at Cairo for the Greeks and Yugoslavs. The groups in general should be smaller than indicated above -- to wit -- 2 officers, 1 Sgt., 2 Cpls. and 10 P.F.C.'s.

Sir Charles and I talked a moment about my counter-proposals on North Africa and he said they were entirely agreeable. I said I wanted to make some changes in the London arrangement suggested by the General. These, Sir Charles thought, would be acceptable.

After leaving General Hanneken I called on Mr. Kessler to discuss M.F.A.C.G. Kessler seemed agreeable to the general idea but said he could not visualize any excuse for a long stay. He also said he would have to discuss the matter with one or two associates whose discretion, he said, he would vouch. I told him I would like to bring Major Brewer around so that in event I left the matter could be carried on. Mr. K. said he would like to "think things over" and asked me to bring Brewer to dinner Wednesday evening at 8:00 P.M. at his apartment, 49 Grosvenor Square.

Once more to dinner and to bed.

January 12, 1943

The days go by pretty rapidly. I'll never finish this job and I suppose I'll not know how badly I've done for months to come -- certainly not until I can sit down quietly somewhere and really determine whether or not I've just been "fanning the breeze".

At 10:00 A.M. I went with Colonel Guenther and Major Brewer to see Brigadier General Hughes, Chief of Staff of Major General Martin, now Theatre Commander. General Hughes was interested in the O.F.S. directive and then decided (after I had outlined its terms) that General Martin should listen to the story. Major General Lee,



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After lunch I wrote a counter-proposal to the General's suggestions. Copies of the original memorandum and my own will be attached to these notes. What, in effect, I have tried to do late recognize that this is "home base" for S.O.E. They are well established here with their own and our forces. For this reason I am of the belief that we must adopt a policy of partial integration, at least, in order to benefit from their prestige and experience and obtain full use of their facilities. At the same time we have, I hope, preserved reasonable individuality -- especially with respect to the areas indicated in my counter-proposal. When we have grown stronger we may be able to fabricate paramount interests elsewhere. Righnow we are by no means "weaned" and scarcely in a position to be "taken off the bottle".

At 3:20 Sir Charles picked me up, by appointment, for a meeting with Lt. General Hanstoen, head of the Norwegian Forces -- Army, Navy and Air. General Cornwall -- C.O.'s Scandinavian expert (former M/A) -- was present.

Hanstoen is about 47 years old and looks 10 years younger. An easy person with whom to talk. Sir Charles stated that we had been discussing the possibility of S.O. participation in Norway and then "threw the ball to me".

I told General Hanstoen that we, as Americans, had a natural and live interest in Scandinavia due to the quality of our Scandinavian-American population. Especially, at the moment, Norway is of especial interest everywhere due to admiration and respect for its people with their resistance had engendered. To us in S.O. it is of further interest because of its strategic possibilities. For all of these reasons it offers to S.O. an opportunity to furnish manpower and services for which latter we are and will be dependent, in part at least, on our own Armed Forces. I thought it would be good psychology, if the General agreed, to assign to S.O. a definite area of responsibility. In this way our Army, Navy and Air Force could be made to give us, from patriotic motives if for no other reason, the assistance which all of us -- S.O., S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government -- so badly need. We could then operate from Iceland or Northern Scotland as circumstances may dictate. Our operations must, of course, be related to and integrated with those of S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government. We wish to be considered as a part of the family group. Under the existing arrangement manpower, we have been given to understand, is being furnished by the Norwegian Government and services and facilities by S.O.E., the Commandos and Combined Operations. We would expect to follow the same general plan of operation.

I went on to point out to the General, however, that our situation was somewhat different from that of S.O.E. in that we had a very considerable Norwegian, Swedish and Danish speaking population on which we could draw and which, as a matter of fact, ought to be used. We could probably, in fact, draft sizeable contingents of American speaking Norwegians from our own Army.

The General explained that the policy of his Government was to use, as agents within the country, only members of the Norwegian Army. On the other hand, American-Norwegians could be used in groups on "One Time" or "Coup de Main" projects or with Combined Operations. Such Americans should be organized into military units and then sent here for further training and for use against Special Targets just as the Norwegians held by S.O.E. are now being used. He suggested the immediate organization and training of two groups of 20 each. They should be adequately officered (I would say groups of 25 -- a captain, a 1st Lt., a 2nd Lt., two Sgts., four corporals and 18 P.F.C.'s) trained in the U.S. (including Combined Operations, S.O. and parachute work) and then sent to England.



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Since copies of the two memoranda on N.A. are to be attached to these notes, no attempt will be made here to summarize them.

Fisher Howe came in to see me. He is a capable lad who wants more action. He talked about our Guerrilla Units. I told him I had spoken to General Gubbins about this and intended to do some thinking on the subject as I strongly believe we can make a direct contribution here. My thought is that small language-speaking groups can be drawn from the Army; each group should number from 10 to 20 men, a Captain and one or two Lieutenants. While the groups will eventually be scattered, there should be some unity of command -- a full Colonel or at least a Lt. Colonel with combat training. The C.O. would need a Chief of Staff and a good Executive Officer. Even though commissioned in the Navy, Fisher Howe might qualify as the Executive Officer who would carry the load of organization. The Guerrilla Units would be trained in S.O. and Combined Operations work and then sent to our various O.S.S. Field Bases foruse as coup de main and special target groups or on Commando operations until at or near D-Day when they would be attached to or detailed to operate in conjunction with the various Invasion Units. Young Mr. Howe seems to like the idea. I pointed out to him, of course, that he would have to make sure that David is not left in the hole here.

To dinner and to bed.

January 11, 1943

I went to 83 Baker Street at 10:00 A.M. to meet General Gubbins with the idea of discussing the London arrangements for S.O. and S.O.E. There were present Major Brewer and myself, the General, Major Nichols, Major Brooke and three others of the General's staff. He works with large groups of assistants it seems.

General Gubbins first indicated his acceptance of my counter-proposal on North Africa so that is settled subject to approval on the spot.

We then tackled London. The General handed me a memorandum on the subject which I said I would like to examine later. A quick glance indicated that I have talked too much about "integration". That magic word, however, appeals to S.O.E. and has been my "entrance ticket".

We outlined, in some detail, the positions to be filled by S.O. officers. This conforms to my instructions of yesterday to George Brewer.

The General was emphatic on one point, viz.: The new Home Station (63-C) to be operated by O.S.S. must be considered solely as an S.O.-S.O.E. station and must be under the control of Major Brewer, the S.O. Operations Officer. Any other arrangement would lead to confusion. I told the General that I was sure Captain Huot understood this since Colonel Berry had agreed to a secret station for other O.S.S. traffic.

The meeting ended at about 11:30 and I then called Tony Keswick to ask about the memorandum on Cairo. This, he said, would be in my hands shortly.

On returning to the office I met Louis Huot and told him of the General's remarks. Huot said there would be no difficulty. I asked him to work out the details of a proper arrangement with Major Brewer.

I then lunched with Bair in order to outline to him the work on which I believe he should concentrate.



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to fight is the creation of definite "Spheres of Influence" (especially where it seems we can "make a showing"). In the absence of this the areas must be "free" for operational purposes with coordination only through the Policy Committee. I hope I can persuade Bill Eddy to this view as it seems the only method pursuant to which we can grow, gradually, to the point where our armed forces will recognize us as an integrated organization worthy of assistance and consideration.

I suggested to Lord Glenconnor that we prepare a draft of memorandum setting forth the ideas expressed at this meeting with the thought that this memorandum might be used as the basis of our requests to General Andrews and the C. in C. in the Mid East. He agreed subject to consultation in Cairo (before preparation of any final document) with his C. of S. and the Sub-Committee above mentioned. He will prepare a first draft of the arrangement.

Col. Guenther, in answer to my question, stated that the discussion had been highly satisfactory to him. On the way home I suggested to Col. Guenther that Col. Greenwell might be the man to bring on as our Chief Operations Officer and liaison representative to work with him. He thought this would be a splendid arrangement.

Note: I have already written R.D.H. on this subject though, at the time, I had not thought of Greenwell forCairo. He should, if he accepts, be sent through England for Operational and S.O. training -- or he might get a look at S.O. training at Washington and pass through England for three weeks of operational work.

We left Berkeley Court at about 5:00 P.M. I said good-bye to Commander Heiberg and then adjourned to Fisher Howe's flat for a party given by him for us and a number of the S.O.E. Group. Here were present from S.O.E.: General Gubbins, Col. Nash, Col. Wilkinson, Col. Ozanne, Col. Pollock, Col. Estney, Major Leonard, Major Tracy, Robin Brook (Gubbins' political advisor), Capt. Hewitt, and the two Keswicks. Capt. Mann and Capt. Van Markle, whom I wanted to meet, could not come.

Dinner at 8:30 P.M. and then to bed.

January 10, 1943

This was Sunday and I spent it in rewriting General Gubbins' proposal of North Africa and in preparing instructions for George Brewer on operations here in London. I talked with the General, incidentally, at about 11:00 A.M. (with Brewer and Canfield as witnesses) and told him I would like to alter his proposal so as to provide for the establishment of "Areas of Responsibility" and to cover the future appointment of our own Chief OperationsOfficer. I also told the General that I thought, for the purpose of expediting Theatre Command and J.C.S. approval, our memorandum should include some reference to the existing J.C.S. directives. The General did not think this would be objectionable.

The memorandum was rewritten and taken to General Gubbins by Major Brewer as my reconnaissance officer. The General read the memorandum without comment and then made an appointment to see me in the morning (with Major Brewer and Major Nichols, Chief of Staff) on the London "set up".



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(4) Geographic Desks (Country Sections) should function independently;

(5) Coordination should be arranged through:

(a) A Policy Committee composed of Lord Glenconnor and his Chief of Staff and the O.S.S. representative (Col. Guenther) and the Chief of S.O. (Col. Amoss);

(b) Centering operational direction in the S.O.E. Chief of Staff (who is, in effect, S.O.E. Chief Operations Officer);

(6) Special Services, such as supply, transportation, research, documentation, communications, training, etc., would be "pooled" in so far as practicable.

The foregoing suggestions of Lord Glenconnor followed, it will be seen, the outline of my discussions of yesterday with the General and Tony Keswick. (Our friends work rapidly). It will also be seen that the Cairo S.O.E. "set up" follows the organizational plan we adopted for S.O. in Washington rather than that of S.O.E., London. The difference is that S.O.E. Cairo uses its Country Sections as Operations Divisions, i.e., origination, recruiting and planning entities. The Directors who head the Divisions are, in effect, the equivalent of our "Area Operations Officers" and the Chief of Staff is the equivalent of our "Chief Operations Officer". Their "Secretariat" to the C. of S. performs some of the duties of our "Planning Officer". Lord Glenconnor agreed that this was so. Their organization in Cairo was revised last August and represents latest S.O.E. thoughts on a workable structure. This would indicate that we have not gone far wrong in our thinking.

I told Glenconnor that his suggestions accorded withour ideas except that:

(a) Our Desks on Iraq, Iran and other British-dominated areas would not be as extensive as theirs. This area would be served by the so-called "Hoskins Mission" but the scope of this Mission would be definitely limited to areas where American influence could be capitalized. We do not wish to impose ourselves on the British in their own territory norbecome a nuisance. The extent of Hoskins' activities can be determined in Cairo.

(b) While I would be delighted, at the outset, to use the services of S.O.E.'s Chief of Staff as Chief Operations Officer for both S.O.E. and S.O., it might transpire that we will be able to obtain a high ranking and experienced Regular Army officer to handle S.O. operations. In this case it would be necessary to look to the Policy Committee, alone, for coordination with Lord Glenconnorhaving the "casting" vote just as it is intended Eddy shall have this power in North Africa. Lord Glenconnor and Tony Keswick both stated that a separation of operational control under such an arrangement would not seem to be objectionable. I added that the same situation would probably ultimately prevail in North Africa once we were in hopes of having a Regular Army colonel assigned there as Chief Operations Officer and as liaison representative with the Theatre Command on all operations. Until such a man arrived I would be delighted to have Col. Munn appointed as Chief Operations Officer for S.O. (as well as S.O.E.). Potter could act as Executive Officer of S.O. and for the moment there would be no Chief of S.O. Mission.

Note: If S.O.E. controls all operational direction the Mission is obviously theirs. I am trying to provide for a set up under which we can, at first, have British aid on all operations and later, as our personnel acquires experience, become entirely independent. Theother point for which I want



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Chief of Mission

Chief of Staff
(Chief of Operations)

Naval Operations

Secretariat of C. of S.

Propaganda

Finance and Administration

Director
Division of Special Services

Director

Director

Training | Transportation | Supply | Communications | Printing

Country Sections
Director
Persia and Iraq

Country Sections
Balkans and Islands and S.E. Europe.

Country Sections
Arab World

Documentation is done by S.O.E. and S.I.S. in combination.

S.O.E. in the Mid East functions under the C. in C. of course. The C. in C. has appointed Glenconnor's Chief of Staff (Chief Operations Officer) who is a Brigadier. This facilitates matters.

The operations of S.O.E. are supervised by the Defense Committee of the Mid-East which was originally established by the War Ministry. Actually, there is a sub-committee (on which S.O.E., the Foreign office and the Armed services are represented) which handles the details. For operations into Greece a further committee -- the Canalopolus Committee -- has been organized. Glenconnor's Chief of Staff is the representative here.

Transportation derives in part from a squadron of eight Halifaxes and in part from fishing boats owned and operated by S.O.E. The Navy has given some slight assistance and has actually assigned two small boats and crews to S.O.E. for operational work.

Training is done in Palestine.

S.O.E. has its own network of communications with a new War Station in Cairo.

I asked Lord Glenconnor whether or not he had given any thought to our proposed O.S.S. Mission and its functions. He replied that he had. His ideas are as follows:

(1) The O.S.S. Mission in Cairo under Col. Guenther shall contemplate branches for S.I. and Subversive Warfare -- the latter organized as we shall see fit but including, presumably, Special Operations, morale subversion and Propaganda (written and audible);

(2) Special Operations should be organized under Col. Amoss along the lines of the S.O.E. Cairo organization;

(3) Col. Guenther should be appointed to the Sub-Committee of the Middle East Defense Committee and Col. Amoss should be appointed to the Canalopolus Committee;



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(B) Facilities, again, would be pooled insofar as possible.

The General was polite but probably somewhat astounded at my presumption. He said he would like to consider my suggestions and "prepare a memo" (a great game with S.O.E. since I will probably have to write a counter-memo and so on ad infinitum). One thing, the General said, must be understood. In all these countries S.O.E. operates only through the various Provisional Governments by whom all "manpower" is furnished. We must adhere to all rules of procedure established with such Governments. One of the most important of these is that information respecting operations shall be disseminated only through channels agreed upon by S.O.E. and such Governments and only in the form so agreed. I said that I would answer for our representatives on this score.

I asked the General if he had considered the organization of language speaking "guerrilla" groups for use on or near "D Day" saying that I thought we could make a real contribution in this direction. He said "No" but that it should be discussed by us at once. The DEBARKER were his only conception to date.

The meeting adjourned to reconvene at lunch tomorrow.

I met Perkins by appointment. He is interested in going to N.A. to handle Italian matters and can get an assistant. He is well qualified and experienced. Since S.O. does not seem to be able to work with the desk in Washington we must build an organization of our own.

In the evening Brewer, Lawrence and I had dinner with Heiberg and discussed at great length the Stockholm arrangements. I outlined my Norwegian proposal to the General. Heiberg said it sounded reasonable and that he was sure, given air transportation from Sweden to London, he could furnish us with recruits who would be satisfactory to Hansteen and could arrange "reception committees" if necessary. He approved of the selection of the area from Trondheim north. Obviously, in the south, the Germans will most easily counter invasion efforts.

Commander Heiberg said he had arranged with Admiral Kirk for communications with us here in London and suggested that we speak to the Admiral. Since George Brewer knows Kirk well, this will be easy.

January 9, 1943

Sir Charles Hambro insisted on transferring our luncheon arrangement to the Paddington Hotel. Col. Guenther, Major Brewer and I met with G.D., Lord Glenconner, General Gubbins, Col. Pierson, Harry Sporborg, Tony and John Keswick. It was a pleasant lunch meeting at which we discussed only generalities. Toward the end the General handed me a draft memorandum on North Africa and said he would produce one on London this evening. I suggested to the General that I read it and give him my comments on Monday. I could see at first glance that it would not do.

Lord Glenconner, Col. Guenther, Major Brewer, Col. Pierson, Tony Keswick and I then adjourned to Berkeley Court to discuss Cairo. Glenconner is a pleasing chap who gave us a succinct picture of his organization and operations. S.O.E. in the Mid East is set up about as follows:



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I said we were particularly concerned with Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Albania where, because of commitments already made as a result of British Foreign Policy, we would be severely handicapped if our associationwith S.O.E. appeared to be too close.

It was left that we would talk about Cairo at lunch with Glen Connor tomorrow.

C. We next discussed arrangements here in London. I told the General that we recognized that it would take many months for us to build an organization comparable in size and experience to his own. It is necessary, however, that we give the appearance here, as elsewhere, of being able to "walk by ourselves". Actually I expected and hoped he would "lead us by the hand".

So far as France and the Low Countries are concerned, S.O.E. has covered there pretty thoroughly. S.O.E. should continue to direct these operations, melding our groups with theirs. In Scandinavia, Finland and Germany, however, we wish to play a real role. Our "set up" in Sweden is already good and growing each month, and our people in Switzerland have established contact with a friend of mine which, I am sure, will open a line of communications into Berlin. A similar line, I hope, will be opened from Stockholm within 30 days. We will, thus, be able to "check" the accuracy of reports and gauge loyalties and effectiveness. In Stockholm we have connections with the same "Home Front" with which he is dealing here through General Hansteen. We recognize that Hansteen must control Norwegian operations but we would like to "service" a definite portion of the country -- that part from Trondheim north which is accessible from Iceland or Scotland. Unless we have an assigned responsibility of this sort our Navy, Air Force and S.O.S. will say: "Let the British continue to do the job."

With respect to an operational arrangement in London, I proposed:

(1) That we "penetrate" the important Operations Sections of S.O.E. This would require about 15 officers and I will get them. About half are now available.

(2) Our Geographic Desk work would be limited to liaison with and representation on their Western European Section.

(3) We would wish to build a strong and independent Desk of our own (with S.O.E. liaison) for Scandinavia, Finland and Germany.

(4) Scandinavian operations would be conducted in cooperation with General Hansteen, with whom we must now confer.

(5) We would be prepared to take a floor in Berkeley Court as suggested by Sir Charles, where operational and Geographic Desk work could be conducted and where we could be in "close touch" with his organization.

(6) S.O. administration would continue on at 71, Grosvenor Street.

(7) For the moment Major George Brewer would carry on for S.O. I want him as S.O. Operations Officer, however, and will replace him by a higher ranking officer (as Chief of S.O. in London) when the right man can be found. Meanwhile if David Bruce comes to London as O.S.S. Chief he can and will represent us fully and ably.



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(1) The two missions should be set up independently -- an O.S.S. mission with its S.I. and P.W. branches under Eddy.
(2) An S.O. mission under Potter as Executive Officer.

Note: I would like to get a Regular Army colonel as Chief of S.O. Perhaps Bob Strong at Accra (he is in command there) who is a classmate of General Eisenhower can be obtained.

(3) I would appoint Munn, for the time being, as Chief Operations Officer for S.O. and the General would make a similar appointment for S.O.E.

(4) Contiguous territory would be divided into "Sphere of Influence" and operations would be conducted by S.O.E. or S.O. personnel (dependent on the area) irrespective of whether the operatives or groups employed were of S.O.E. or S.O. origin.

(5) Assigned areas might be as follows: S.O.E. France and the Low Countries; S.O. North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and the Italian Islands.

(6) Country Sections or Geographic Desks would be built up to correspond to Spheres of Influence and would be operated by the predominate interest with liaison and representation on the part of the other interest.

(7) Training, Transportation, Communication and Supply would be pooled as nearly as possible.

(8) A "Policy Committee" composed of Eddy, the S.O.E. and the S.O. Chiefs (Potter for the moment representing S.O.) would govern all matters of general policy (precedence of supply, operations, etc.) with Eddy having the deciding vote.

(9) Liaison would be primarily with Eddy and for operational purposes could be delegated by him to Munn.

Note: Potter must be "taken along" by Munn to build and preserve contacts and Eddy must remain near Theatre Hdqrs and delegate work elsewhere. He is now flying about the country and there is complaint from the Theatre that he is not readily available (as Gubbins states).

The General said this sounded all right and he'd like to think it over and prepare a memorandum on the subject. He would like to add Col. David Keswick to the Policy Committee. I said I had no objection provided Bill Eddy had absolute veto power and the deciding vote. To this both he and Tony Keswick agreed. Today I will come back to this point and say I would like to add a representative on P.W. It could be Ed Taylor or someone nominated by Fred Oeschner. Propaganda in N.A. is very bad and British propaganda here directed at Italy is not too good. For example -- derision of Italian deserters gets us nowhere. Why not encourage the Italians to desert and leave derision to the Germans? O.W.I. is doing a sloppy job. We must have a voice in this and at once.

B. The General next wished to discuss Cairo. I said that perhaps Cairo could be set up as N.A. but somewhat in reverse with Glen Connor having the deciding vote, assigned territory, preponderant Geographic Desks related to assigned territory and "pooled" resources where circumstances permit. Tony Keswick thought this might work but that greater independence might be needed. I agreed, saying that the Balkan groups were so numerous and factional that complete segregation of operations might be necessary.



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January 8, 1943

As arranged by O.D. (Charles Hambro) yesterday I met with Tony Keswick and his brother, John, at about 11:00 a.m. It was necessary for me to outline, again, the program I had laid before O.D. last evening. Tony Keswick advised me that Sir Charles had presented our views to the General and himself. He said that the General's rec action was "Why not set up an O.S.S. show in N.A. and allow us to tag along". It was their thought, he indicated, that the Theatre Commander would not wish to deal with two groups.

My reactions to Keswick's statement were:

(1) This suggestion is made for the purpose of:

(a) Putting us in something of a "hole" from the point of view of responsibility for results in North Africa since they doubt (and I recognize) our ability to carry on a big show without the benefit of S.O.E. experience and guidance. In six or eight months our boys will be able to run things and our air force and navy (perhaps) will have learned the rudiments of cooperation. Meanwhile one must be realistic. We need S.O.E. assistance all along the line -- in operations, transportation, supply and communications. Bill Eddy could come close to directing a successful campaign from an African base but I suspect that his actual experience in the field of S.O. work has been more in the nature of moral and psychological suasion and subversion than in the planning of Special Operations;

(b) Paving the way for a reverse arrangement in Cairo and London. This would be unfortunate for both of us. In the Balkans and in certain spots on the Continent, nationalistic cooperation will come to us much more readily than to the British. Unless we maintain a semblance of independence only British contacts will be available to either of us. Our friends, I am sure, can be made to realize that, in many places, because of their recognized post-war ambitions, Englishmen will be under suspicion. To foreclose independent and original action on our part will be to render a great disservice to the main effort which, at the moment certainly, is to bring about the defeat of the enemy.

Actually, what I told Keswick was that the Theatre Commander would certainly recognize that two organizations, collaborating closely but exploiting their own particular fields of influence, could be more useful to him than one organization against which might be directed the hostility of groups outside those which could be dealt with in common. Furthermore, both of us need assistance from our respective armed services. This is much more likely to be worth while if sought independently rather than jointly. Operational unity can be effected by mechanical arrangements but administrative autonomy must be preserved if either of us is to attain maximum efficiency.

A. The General launched upon a discussion of North Africa. His proposal was that we set up an organization in which Bill Eddy, as head of O.S.S., would be sitting on top of S.O., S.I. and P.W. Col. Munn, as Chief of S.O.E., would also be under Eddy's general direction. Munn would act as Chief of Operations for both S.O.E. and S.O. Eddy would act as Liaison Officer in the Theatre on general matters and Munn would be in direct contact with Theatre "Operations" on all operational programs.

The General's suggestion gave us a part of what we desire but since "Operations" will be the foundation stone of O.S.S. prestige, I wanted to tighten our hold somewhat. My counter-suggestions were:



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operate under-[illegible] agents in [illegible] Europe, but we [illegible] that Scandanavia, Finland and [illegible] any [illegible] we considered "free" territory as I believed we could make [illegible] essential contributions there. At this point, I handed Sir Charles a copy of the [illegible] project. He glanced at it and said he thought we [illegible] it with General Donovan.

Sir Charles said he would arrange for meeting [illegible] with General Dobbins, so that something definite might be put on paper.

I left Sir Charles at 7:30 p.m. and went to the [illegible] for dinner with George Brewer and Colonel Tyman Conrad. The Colonel is a [illegible] in this theatre. A most likeable and intelligent man, who seemed interested in [illegible] of our activities. He offered to put us in touch with General Barclay of "Operations" and others who might, through close liaison, assist us in our work.



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Norway or elsewhere would be effectively closed. So Dr. Neiberg agreed with my view and stated unequivocally that the Norwegians preferred to work with Americans rather than the British.

It was left with Condr. Neiberg that we would meet tomorrow evening.

Col. Buenther entertained us at dinner at his apartment. We were in bed at a reasonable hour nonetheless.

January 7, 1943

Worked at 71 Grosvenor Street in the morning and early afternoon drafting a cable to R.D.H. and a letter as well as instructions for the training of our SO officers here.

At 5:30 p.m., I called on Sir Charles Hambro by appointment. I showed him the OSS directive and those concerning Cairo and North Africa. I told him that, in general, our ideas of close collaboration remained as we had presented them last fall, but that more than ever it had become necessary for SO to give the appearance, at least, of an organization able to function under its own steam. This was the reason, I stated, that the Colonel and I both felt so strongly about the way in which the North African Missions should be constituted -- two independent organizations closely coordinated at the top through the medium of a policy-making committee. It was, in part, the reason, too, why we had been unwilling to hurry our North African plans. Sir Charles interrupted to say that he regretted that misunderstanding. I told him there had been no misunderstanding, but that, pending receipt of the OSS directive, it seemed unwise for us to proceed too rapidly.

In reply to a question from Sir Charles, I said that it seemed reasonable in both the North African and Mid-East Theatres to divide the territory from an operational point of view so that direction of operations might be SOE or SO depending upon the area. France, for example, would logically be SOE; Italy might be SO etc. I admitted that our operational staff would not, for many months to come, be able to function as efficiently as that of SOE and said that even in SO territories, I was sure SOE guidance would be badly needed. As for liaison with the Armed Forces, this, I thought, could be either British or American, as the Area Commander himself might indicate or as circumstances might dictate. If, for example, Colonel Eddy were too occupied in North Africa, it might be advisable to use Colonel Munn on liaison with General Eisenhower's staff, since Colonel Munn would outrank any SO representative on the spot.

With respect to the London organization, I stated that we were ordering additional personnel to duty here with the idea of "penetrating" SOE in its vital departments. We should probably



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## NOTES OF [illegible], Jr.

7:10a.m. The pilot we found was inexperienced, and he and his navigator were thoroughly lost on leaving Gibraltar, and again on arrival at Lands End, where we intended landing at the field at Portreath. As a result our trip was a long one.

We arrived at Portreath at 4:30 p.m. here we had gas and motored to Redhuth where at 5:05 p.m. we caught a slow train for London due at 8:30 a.m. e were able to change at Plymouth at 11:15 p.m. to a faster train which put us in Paddington Station at 5:30 a.m., January 6, 1945.

## January 6, 1945

We were taken to Claridges (Col. Donovan, Major Lair, Capt. Lawrence and I) where Col. Donovan left us to go to his apartment. We bathed and then presented at the Officers Club on South Audley Street. We were back at the Hotel by 10 a.m. and there saw Major Brewer, Major Howe and Major Fowler. I gave Fisher the various directives to be typed, and then registered at the AGO, and did some necessary shopping.

After lunch, I discussed with George Brewer his activities at SOE and looked at their revised Reorganization Plan. At 5:00p.m. Commander Walter Helberg (Naval Attache at Stockholm) came in. He is on his way to Stockholm with Minister Trygve Johnson. We discussed at some length (Major Brewer and Capt. Lawrence being present) the Norwegian situation and the possibility of SO action there. Commander Helberg counselled against permitting British domination of our activities, but approved collaboration. He has not worked closely with the British nor with Lt. General Hahusteen, who is Head of the Norwegian Armed Forces with offices in London. Comdr. Helberg has preferred to work with the "Home Front" in Stockholm. He is of the opinion that we should try to effect a plan of collaboration with Sir Charles, discuss with Hahusteen and, with the consent of Sir Charles, discuss with Hambro and, with an initial reception committee for submarine or parachute landings. He can also furnish us with young Norwegians who might be acceptable to Hahusteen and who would be members of the "Front". These men could be trained and "reinducted" into Norway.

George Brewer expressed the opinion that the British are working with this identical "Home Front". George is convinced that, to avoid duplication and dangerous duplication, we can only work in this territory and elsewhere in Western Europe as a part of SOE. He sees no opportunity for independent SO action. I pointed out that this meant that nothing but a liaison organization would be needed by SO in England if this program were followed. It would be evident to all National Groups, I added, that SO was but an adjunct of SOE. In this case any "entree" which Americans, operating independently, might have in Sweden,



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simplest possible undertaking. Our own Air Force has been at station for one week. Perhaps I say all complete and perfect the field. I have not been too impressed with Air Force organization or discipline, however, although their engineering jobs have been superb. This last, however, has been true to date in those places which were originally organized and developed by Pan American Airways. It has been obvious throughout this trip that air transportation should have been left completely to our commercial organizations. It is now a mixed affair. Transportation is suffering and the airline organizations are not being held together. We will reap the lack of foresight in the days to come. I imagine that British tactics have been the exact opposite.

January 4, 1943

We put up at the Hotel Comunia at Marrakech. The two or three U.S. Air Corps officers at the station were most helpful. Also Major Gilley (from Accra) was with us and this helped.

It was decided that we would leave Marrakech for Gibraltar tomorrow (the 4th of January, 1943) by a C-47, and our baggage was accordingly shifted.

Messrs. Fowler and Culbert, we found, were at Marrakech, and we accordingly arranged to breakfast with them which we did after a reasonable rest. They said that our OSS situation in Africa was in a muddle. No one knew what they might do nor the extent of our authority. Bill Eddy is awaiting us at Algiers. OWI and the Army are apparently making a mess of propaganda. Our communications have been "cut back" but we can still talk between Casablanca and Algiers. I can see that our program with General Ike must include a definite plan of propaganda as well as for CE and SO.

We ultimately left Marrakech at about 1:10 p.m. and arrived in Gibraltar at 3:30 p.m. after a good ride with Captain Kane in a C-47. There were only two seats but we managed somehow.

We were well received at Gibraltar and were put up at the Rock Hotel for the night. We stopped in to see Mr. Cox of SOE and he gave us a car and driver so that we might see the Rock which we did from top to bottom.

January 5, 1943

We were called at 4:00 a.m. Colonel Guenther and I transferred to a B-17 (Fortress) piloted by St. Vick. We were off at



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met Colonel Peschkoff and discussed the French situation in Dakar and North Africa. He said that this was now bad. The leaders are still largely pro-German "Vichyites". If Giraud and DeGaulle can get together and rid themselves of some 15-20 of the group now in power, the entire situation will change. The rank and file of the people will respond if properly led.

We boarded our plane at 7:30 and took off 15 minutes later. After a good trip in our C-87 (converted B-24) we arrived at Bathurst in about 15 hours. The trip was good; the country uninteresting.

Bathurst is an R.F.C. Post badly built and badly run. The corrugated runways were of interest. Went into town - filled with blacks.

We dined at the officers mess, were "briefed" and tried to sleep on rope beds. Three blankets were blankets were not sufficient to keep us warm.

January 3, 1945

We were delighted to be called at 4:45 a.m. in the hope of quitting Bathurst. Walked through dust to a very poor mess and thence to the field. Our B-24 had broken down over night and Colonel Guenther and I transferred to a C-54 (DC-4) while Major Beir and Capt. Lawrence were stuck in a B-24 filled with boxes and other freight. Colonels Hills and Phillips were left behind to follow with our ship of yesterday which will pick us up in Marrakech.

We took off (after I had transferred my courier liability to Colonel Hills who was nice about it). At 7:45 a.m. for Marrakech in a C-54 (DC-4) a grand plane.

Arrived at Marrakech, French Morroco at 3:15 p.m. after a long but interesting trip over arid deserts and snow capped mountains which reminded me of our own Sierras. The mountains are igneous mass showing quite clearly the lava flow which formed them. They are overlaid, in spots, with sandstone which, toward the North has been lifted vertically by a huge fault, plainly discernable from the air, which extends northeast - southwest as far as the eye can see.

The airfield at Marrakech was built by the French. It is well plaped but not well built. Needless to say, it is sloppily run - typically French. There is no security at the Post and the field is swarming with civilians. Enemy sabotage would be the



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## Notes of H.C.H. Jr.
## January 1, 1943

Breakfasted at 6:30 a.m. Had a long walk with Major Bair and then back for lunch. Met Colonel Robert W. Strong (now Theatre Commander in General Fitz Gerald's absence). Colonel Strong was at the Military Academy with Ike Eisenhower and remembered our Army - Colgate game well -- especially the 1913 game which seems, also, to be well remembered by General Ike. Colonel Strong, Colonel Cox, Gus Guenther and I talked at length about OSS and I said that Ted Ryan had told us of his good relations with Colonel McCone (G-2 of the Theatre). I spoke of Dakar to Colonel Strong who said there would be no objection to our going to Dakar if McCone agreed.

Went to Accra after lunch to see Ted Ryan and suggest that he follow up the Dakar problem with McCone, stressing the fact that my talk with Colonel Strong was only casual. Suggested to Ryan to make the cable to Washington as strong as possible.

Returned to Camp at 4:30 p.m. to find that we are really due to leave in the morning at 6:00 a.m. via a "C-47" (converted B-24).

Cashed a traveller's check (at an exhorbitant commission rate) and then "relaxed" a bit. Tried to see Colonel Peashkoff.

At about dinner time, Dick Heppner came in on his way to India with Ambassador Phillips. After dinner we called on Ambassador Phillips and met there General Hines (whom I had seen in Washington at lunch with Colonel Donovan) and Colonel Collins of the Post.

Colonel Guenther and I also paid our respects to Mr. and Mrs. Packer who are on their way to Ankara where he is to be first Secretary of the Embassy.

Dick Heppner and Mr. Phillips both spoke about OSS in Lisbon and Madrid. Olivera and DiLuccia are very much the "wrong types" and are not wanted. Olivera apparently tells everyone about the people he is going to "bump off" and gets no information worthy of the name. What is needed is a man with reasonable "finesse". Those under him can be of the "thug" type if necessary.

Also talked with the Ambassador and Dick about Eifler. Mr. Phillips had heard that he was a problem to the British. I told the Ambassador Eifler was keen to do a job, was courgeous and loyal but needed guidance. Said we had wired him to report to British at New Delhi.

## January 2, 1943

Up at 4:00 a.m. to catch a plane from Accra to Bathurst. Breakfasted and went to field where we saw Mr. Phillips, General Hines, Dick Heppner and Mr. and Mrs. Packer off for Cairo. Also



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NOTES OF W.C. L. JR.

Here I met Harvey Stevenson and Archie - (both majors in the AC.) of the old 307th. We rested a little, had an early dinner and were off to Ascension Island at 7:30 p.m. with a new crew.

December 30, 1942

Natal, Brazil to Ascension Island where we landed at 6:15a. . Here is a field built on a volcanic rock some 7x5 miles. A marvel in engineering - done by our own men. Water is distilled and scarce. We breakfasted on hot cereal, canned sausage, prunes and bread and were off for Accra, Gold Coast, Africa, at 1:45 a.m. A long tedious trip. We finally arrived at 5:30 p.m. and were quartered, bathed and shaved by 7:00 p.m. This is a fine post. Food and quarters excellent.

December 31, 1942

Accra, Gold Coast, Africa (British). New Year's Eve. A delightful breeze. Cool under shelter. Very livable place indeed. We will wait here for transportation which is uncertain.

Had lunch and spent afternoon with Ted Ryan (131) going over situation with respect to West African group of enlisted men - Okie, Plants and Prichard. They are obviously dissatisfied. In this territory they are exposed and immobile. All agree (Lockwood confirmed this in Washington) that they are too young and inexperienced for work elsewhere. In no event, evidently, could they operate except under close direction. British SOE does not want them. As a result of all this, we have cabled Washington to recall these men, send them to troop duty and replace them. We have suggested Dakar as a place where men should be sent. The French (Air Force Officers just back from a tour confirm this) are receiving Americans without reserve. This is the time to build an organization in all these territories where CE work against enemy organizers is now most essential.

Saw Major Turkel (A-2) who knew Ted Ryan and about OSS. He (and Captain Hopper, his assistant) have been most friendly. So has Major Tom Early, who is stationed here. We have met Col. Cox (Camp Commander) and Colonel Collins (Chief Air Transport Command).

Warwick Potter and Jimmy Lawrence came in this afternoon from Fisherman's Lake (where they had no business) and we decided to route Potter and Downes at once to Oran and thence Algiers to do preliminary work. Gus Guentler, Howard Bair, Jimmy Lawrence and I will proceed to London when transportation is found.

Lt. Col. Hills (Air Transport Command London) and Colonel Thompson (Fort Knox) joined the party.



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NOTES OF R.C.H. Jr.
December 24, 1942

Washington D.C. - Left Airport 10:30 a.m. with Gus Guenther, Howard Reir and Donald Downes. Arrived Miami, Florida, 5:30 p.m. Engine trouble. Trip discontinued awaiting new plane. Put up at Venetian Hotel.

December 25, 1942

Miami, Florida - Christmas Day - Church of the Holy Trinity. Rested during afternoon. Flight scheduled for tomorrow. Lt. Col. Laudell and party and Lt. Col. Browne and Major Hate all joined us.

December 26, 1942

Miami, Florida - Scheduled to report at Airport at 10:30 at which time told ship would leave at 12:30. Strong head wind blowing.

December 27, 1942

Miami, Florida to Borinquen Field, Porto Rico. Left at 2:30 a.m.; arrived about 10:30 a.m. Two good meals. Slept an hour or two and awakened at 11:30 p.m. for 12:30 takeoff. More engine trouble.

December 28, 1942

Borinquen Field, P.R., at 1:30 a.m. to Georgetown, British Guinea, where we arrived at about 8:30 a.m. Heads winds all the way - no sleep. Very poor breakfast and then a "takeoff" at 10:30 a.m. for Balem, Brazil, where we arrived at 6:30 p.m. Here we bathed, shaved, had a good meal and slept for an hour. We were aroused at 11:30 p.m. for a 12:30 a.m. departure. Balem is a well organized post. It is interesting to note that the climate conditions at all spots other than Georgetown have been about parallel to those at Miami or even better. Living conditions are not bad. Georgetown is terrible. It is just off the Equator.

December 29, 1942

Balem, Brazil at 1:30 a.m. to Natal, Brazil, where we arrived at 7:30 (changed time), had a good breakfast and were quartered.

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NOTES OF E.G.H. Jr.

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the building of military organizations within enemy countries is a separate and distinct job which must have singleness of purpose, seasoned judgment, a smattering of diplomacy, unquestioned authority, and unity of command. It is on these principles and because they have been invoked that General Cubbins has done so fine a job in the field for SCE. It will be a harder task for us-- since we are starting late in the day-- but it can be done.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, AUS

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part of definite operational programs. Communications, on the other hand, serve other branches as well as operations though the bulk of the traffic will, eventually, be operational. It should be related to something. It could be integrated under either of the Lieutenants above mentioned.

V. That the Lieutenants, if appointed, be clothed with real authority to make the "wheels go round".

VI. That Territorial Sections be created, organized as suggested to conform to Theatres of Command.

Note: All the work done by the recent North African Committee (now being disbanded) could have been done by the "Section" which would remain--more or less permanently-- to "carry on" with the Mission which has been implemented.

VII. That an organization set up (in substantially the form of that attached hereto) be adopted for our various Field Missions.

VIII. That serious consideration be given to the establishment of our Operational Headquarters (for all but the Far Eastern Theatre) nearer the scene of action.

6. CONCLUSION:

This paper has concerned itself, chiefly, with operations. The reason is, perhaps, that my own interest lies in this direction. I have in all my thinking, however, been influenced by the conviction that here, without doubt, if we move quickly, surely and without hindrance, OSS can "do a job" which noone else (and few among us) knows how to do. This does not mean that our organization will not make other contributions in many different directions. I am convinced that this will be so. It only means that I know, from the bitter lessons of actual experience, that

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assume, by induction of civilians who would be useful and simultaneous requisition.

There are, I am told, a lot of cooks stirring the AOO broth. Since this was my own particular conception and since I alone sold the idea in the various Theatres and am, therefore, almost the only one cognizant of what is desired, I am sure I can make something of a contribution in this direction and perhaps save some unnecessary "milling about".

g. Resume of Suggestions respecting OSS Operations:

I. That an OSS "Operations Division" be created in which will be included all activities directly concerned in the building and handling-- in conjunction with the "Territorial Sections" abovementioned-- of "behind the lines" organizations. This Division would be directed by a Chief of Operations.

II. That an "Intelligence Division", directed by a Chief of Intelligence be authorized and that this Division operate along the lines heretofor pursued by SI.

III. That Intelligence activities of all kinds (including collection, reporting, analysis, etc.) be consolidated under a Lieutenant of the Director of OSS.

IV. That Operational activities (including the building of Primary OSS organizations in the field and the functioning of AO Groups as well as the operational facilities of Training and Communications) be integrated under another Lieutenant of the Director.

Note: Training is an operational function purely and simply. It should henceforth be conducted, largely, in the field as a

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then, because they find it is not the bed of roses they envisioned, are permitted, in effect, to order their own return.

In a similar way, control over promotions is required. We have been woefully guilty of a lack of discrimination in this respect. It will be some time before we live down the Bier incident, a part of the reason for which was that the boy has been carrying just too much rank for his years. I firmly believe in promotions upon the recommendation of immediate superiors but through channels. Perhaps most of our mistakes are behind us.

f. Auxilliary Operations.

This subject has been referred to in several places in the report. Since it is covered in a separate memorandum already in the hands of the Director, it will not be discussed here in any detail.

The Auxilliary Operations Groups should be part and parcel of OSS operations. They should function under a separate command, however, and should not be made the concern of the Chief of Operations, except as operational planning is channeled through and directives are passed along by the Operations Division both at headquarters and in the field. For command purposes, and to insure complete coordination of effort, the AOG Staff should be under the authority of your Deputy in charge of the operational end.

I have not yet had an opportunity to study the JCS approval covering "Guerrilla Nuclei". It is probably all right, and I assume, under it, we can work out some practical properly organized units. I have seen the AGO authority covering the North African allotment which includes "Guerrilla Nuclei". It is completely unworkable and absurd in one respect, viz; it allows no original procurement. We avoid this, I

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combat work-- especially in connection with a messy, disorganized show such as that SOE and ourselves (really SOE direction) in Tunisia, and I believe that the latitude given to the OSS Chiefs should be circumscribed by the imposition of an understanding to the effect that personnel earmarked for use in certain fields will be used within the framework of the categories into which they fall (ie, a supply man within the Administrative Branch, an Intelligence officer within that Division, a Training officer within that section, etc.). This would give the Chiefs of Departments and the Deputy Directors at least a reasonable veto-power over the specific employment of the individuals shipped out by them. In the absence of such a condition, it would be well nigh impossible for Washington to meet the overall requirements of the field. (Note: On this subject, see Colonel Eddy's cable 199 (OD16461) and our 103 (OD15941).

It is equally important, on the other hand, that requests from the field be given careful and impartial consideration. The spectacle of the Italian Desk, for example, expediting personnel of its own selection (which may, of course, be useful) to the exclusion, for what were evidently personal reasons, of Di Trabia, a man urgently requested by our people in North Africa, and one who has been thoroughly vetted and is well considered here, is too ridiculous for words.

There must be some place, too, in which more control can be had over the action of our representatives in the field. This is why, I believe, the limitation suggested above is essential. We cannot, unless we are to run the risk of justified censor from outside our organization permit of situations, such as that involving Captain White, in which officers, at their own insistent request, are sent to the field and

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reason, be consolidated, under the direction of able Section Chiefs so that it may conform to the requirements of the field. Then, there should be one integrated, well-directed group here at headquarters which will service the needs of a given theatre. We are, at the moment, "all over the lot" and are resorting to hit or miss improvisation in getting personnel into the field. It should be entirely unnecessary, for example, to be obliged to organize a "committee" for North Africa. This should be a function of the "Section". Its plan and recommendations could be prepared after consultation with the Chief of Intelligence, the Chief of Operations, and the Heads of other Divisions. The whole should then be approved for the Director of OSS by the Assistant Director and the Deputies. This last is, I think, essential since there will always be differences of opinion about personnel and other matters of detail which must be finally decided. On the selection of personnel, we cannot be too careful if we are to receive and maintain the confidence of our field organizations.

2. Field Personnel and its use should be more carefully controlled than has been the case.

I promised our OSS representatives two things: First, that only personnel approved by them would be sent to their Theatres; and, Second, that, while recommendations as to use would be made, all personnel may be utilized, in the field, where the Chief of OSS and his Executive and Administrative Officers deem advisable.

Although this last promise could involve us in difficulties, they should not be too serious to permit of handling. I disagree emphatically, for example, with Bill Eddy in the use of Training Officers (such as Sage, Harris, et al) and Training NCO's for highly specialized

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of the bare Intelligence and Operational activities abovementioned could flow through our Deputy (General Magruder, for example) so that he might give to you, from time to time, a complete and concise picture of the operation of these Divisions, which after all, though functionally separate, are mutually dependent.

The alternative to single direction of Intelligence and Operations is dual control in accordance with which Intelligence (including the collection of information, its analysis, its reporting, and its dissemination, as well as CE and CI activities) would function under one Lieutenant and Operations (including not only the building of "behind the lines" organizations and Auxilliary Operations Groups, but also the coordination of Training and Communications) under another. Supply and Procurement, and Research and Development, as well, of course, as Planning and the Administrative Services should be separate Divisions. Research and Analysis could, also, if necessary, be set apart. Psychological Warfare, which here at headquarters, is a planning function, should either be a separate division or attached to the Planning Group. The execution of programs of Psychological Warfare will, on the action side, become in part, a task of the Operations Division of OSS and in part a function of other Agencies and Branches of the Government.

e. The implications of the proposals herein set forth.

1. The suggestions which have been made presuppose some changes and some hurt feelings. There is ample room, under the plan, for all existing "Geographic Desk" personnel within the framework of the "Sections" which have been proposed. This work, however, should in all

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served by it. It would effect a saving in manpower and would be a satisfactory medium through which both Intelligence and Operations-- as they related to particular areas-- could be properly and readily coordinated.

d. Coordination and Control.

Such a "set up" back at Headquarters would facilitate the work of Field Headquarters and would conform, as closely as is possible, to organizational requirements in the field. Our OSS Chiefs in London, Algiers, and Cairo are expecting a direction from Washington respecting the type of organization under which they are to operate. In general, they expect that Administrative Services (Personnel, Housing, Supply, Security, Transportation, Finance, etc.) will be directed by an Administrative Officer responsible to the Chief of OSS. Intelligence, under an Intelligence Officer, Operations, under an Operations Officer, Analysis, CE work, and the activities of Territorial Sections, etc. would be coordinated under an Executive Officer. Our OSS Chiefs will be busy, full time, with liaison on the higher Echelons. They will require at least two able assistants to supervise, for the Chiefs, the detailed working of the various departments. Under any other system, we will have, in the field, what we are inclined to have at Headquarters-- numerous autonomous divisions, all working under the direction of Field Marshalls, each moving about in a separate secluded cubicle without regard to or interest in what is going on elsewhere in the organization.

The suggestions outlined above--both as they apply to Headquarters and the Field--presuppose, here in Washington, coordination and direction of the various activities by a proper Lieutenant or Lieutenants of the Director of OSS. It would be ideal, of course, if the supervision

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definite need for some closer union with training and communications.

9. A single "Basic Working Unit" which would service both Intelligence and Operations is possible.

The basic unit to which could be related and in which could be coordinated both intelligence and operations should be an entity corresponding somewhat to our present "Geographic Desks", but with some revisions and additions. In effect, they should be territorial "Sections" corresponding roughly, in area coverage, to the principal Theatres of Command, to wit: the European, African, Mid Eastern, and Far Eastern Theatres. At the head of each Section would be a Section Chief-- the man best qualified for the job, whether civilian or military man. He would be assisted by a Geographic Representative, or Representatives (experts on specific countries within the territories allotted to the Section) an Intelligence Officer, or officers (including an officer for analysis and reporting), one or more Area Operations Officers, a Supply or Procurement Officer (liaison with OSS Special Services), a Recruiting Officer, and a Planning Officer. There should also be , in each Section, a Correspondence Officer, who would supervise the handling and expediting of all communications.

The Section Chief, himself, would serve two masters-- the Chief of Intelligence (present Chief of SI) and the Chief of Operations (present Chief of SO). In practice, he would actually maintain contact on the Intelligence side through his Intelligence Officer, and on the Operations side through his Area Operations Officers.

The Section so described would be a complete but compact working unit. It would initiate and handle all matters relating to the territories

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on the question of whether or not this particular job— the job of operations— is to be integrated and controlled, or is to take the form of an open inter-branch competition as a result of which, there will be a scramble for men, equipment, and facilities. The latter would result in confusion at home and would never lead to the building of organizations in the field. What is worse— the organizations and contacts now established would be seriously jeopardized and perhaps, in due course, completely blown.

b. The separation of Intelligence and Operational functions is possible.

Thinking only in terms of that part of OSS which has been known as its SI and SO Branches, we have in our Headquarters organization the material from which to build, overnight, two excellent but totally different departments: the one an "Intelligence Division", within which the collection from whatever source, the analysis, the reporting, and the dissemination of items of intelligence of all kinds would be continued; and the other, an "Operations Division" which would be charged with the responsibility for the building and maintenance of our "behind the lines" organizations. Naturally, the two Divisions would, of necessity, work closely as they do now. Intelligence must service Operations and the operatives in the field must furnish information "in the raw" as it is acquired, incidentally, or in response to the demands of the Intelligence Division.

How much or how many of the existing departments of OSS should be placed in the Divisions which have been suggested, is a matter of detail. Whether, for example, Research and Analysis or CE belongs with Intelligence, I am not prepared to say. On the operations side, there is certainly

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5. OSS OPERATIONS

Whether we like it or not, ours is considered, primarily, an operating organization. This means that OSS is looked to by those we are serving for "action" and the results of action. Since "action" is pleasing not only to the Director of OSS, but also to the writer of these lines, and since the latter strongly believes that here, at least, OSS can make a unique and substantial contribution to the war effort, it has seemed advisable to give the subject separate treatment in this report. Any treatment of the matter involves a discussion, also, of "Organization" and the two points will, therefore, be covered under the same heading.

a. OSS operations cannot be simultaneously directed from several sources.

The execution of a considered plan and the action which takes place within its framework is, within the scope of the activities assigned to OSS, essentially a job of military action. A scheme of penetration is not an operation, but its implementation is— and to activate any such scheme except under experienced and integrated direction is not only dangerous, but simply will not produce results.

My own belief has always been,— and I felt this way before I became responsible for any part of operations— that operatives sent by this organization into enemy territory must be "OSS" representatives and not the particular property of either the so-called SI or SO Branch. Since neither of these branches has ever actually placed anyone in axis-held areas, there has not been much of a problem to date. Now, however, we are putting our own people, and building our own organizations and lines of communications behind enemy lines. We must, therefore, reach a decision

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III. Transportation.

The groundwork was laid in each Theatre for Air Force assistance. My notes (especially those of January 12, February 2, February 14, March 6, and March 13) give a reasonable picture of what was said and done in this direction. Suffice to say I was satisfied, when I left, that with some reasonable "follow up" from our own people on the spot we would, in time, receive complete and regular support from the Army and the Air Force. Our Navy is cooperative in spirit but its equipment in European waters is not such, at the moment, as to warrant any optimism respecting the assistance we are likely to get from this quarter. We should, here in Washington, try to purchase and ship to each Theatre at least three fast PT boats and for our Norwegian (and perhaps French) Operations must undertake to buy or have constructed some fishing vessels of the type now being used by SOE. This latter is a matter on which our Supply Division should be working overtime.

IV. Personnel.

This subject as well as the question of "Organization" will be discussed under the heading "Operations" which is to follow. A considerable personnel will be needed in the field. Whenever it arrives will be late. We appear, however, to be doing all possible to get our people out. The log jam of transportation seems to be our greatest stumbling block and there is not much to be done in this direction which is not already being done.

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Communications was given under article 3. OSS now has, or will have shortly, three main Stations (actually four since there will be two in U.K.) capable of communicating with field agents, with each other and with Washington (also Cairo could contact Chungking if desired). If we can establish a station in Washington we will, indeed, have "round the world" coverage. The OSS system is being built in the only way it could be built without serious opposition -- i.e. "from the field in" rather than "from Washington out". This was what I advocated last summer when the question was under discussion and I am sure, in spite of some headaches, that it has been the proper method of approach.

Our communications department does not yet know much about the essentials of "Secret Communications" but we are learning fast and I have no apprehensions in this direction.

II. Supplies.

We must leave no stone unturned to get a flow of supplies into the field. SOE feels that we have let them down completely and the beginning of "bad relationships" is at hand unless something happens soon.

In spite of SOE requirements our own needs must not be overlooked. We must, at once, begin building "stock piles" in all Theatres which we can use as "bait" with resistance groups with which we are working. This is one of the most important jobs yet to be done by OSS and it must be done at once.

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To the average mind "Psychological Warfare" is in some wise related to propaganda (which the Army does not understand). In addition, the various G-2 Sections look with misgiving on certain of the clauses dealing with intelligence. Performance in the field will go a long way toward overcoming existing feelings of apprehension.

Analysis and reporting give rise to no objections and, until I reached London on my last trip, I found by and large, no concern over OSS work - something which, up to now at least, G-2 has not been organized to handle.

III. OSS Operations will be welcomed.

There were certain fields of action with respect to which I found no opposition. The building of contacts and communications behind enemy lines and the furnishing of language speaking, specially trained Operational Groups everyone seems to accept as being our particular assignment. The fact is that Army men recognize our primary work of organization as a specialty in which they have no training or experience. Why they are willing to grant to us Auxiliary Operations in addition is more than I can understand but the fact remains that for the moment, at least, this question, too, is considered ours.

b. OSS relations with SOE.

A full discussion of this subject was included under article 5 above.

c. OSS facilities in the Field.

I. Communications.

This outline of what has occurred with respect to

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4. OBSERVATIONS

a. OSS relations with Theatre Commands:

I. OSS has not been well or favorably known to rep-resentatives of the Military in the several Theatres.

Two things stand out in my mind very clearly:

FIRST: The aims and purposes of OSS are known to very few members of the Armed Forces in the field. With the exception of General Smith I dealt with no officer who had the remotest idea of what we were trying to do and very few who had ever before heard of OSS except in the vaguest sort of way. This was upsetting but I concluded it was not unnatural since we had never had organizations in the field working with the military authorities there. We must bear in mind, however, that ours is a never ending "selling job". In due course we will have to be recognized.

SECOND: Many of those who knew us - and some of our staunchest friends (General Smith, for example) - have been led, by the very wording of our basic directive, into thinking that we are intent on engaging in such widely diversified activities that:

(A) We cannot be relied upon to carry through on limited but specific military assignments; or

(B) If permitted to continue our present course we will usurp functions properly belonging to others.

II. The term "Psychological Warfare", employed in the directive, and its somewhat obscure language throughout, have made us no friends.

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tended to Southern France and plans were laid to expand the organization being built in these places. Recruits were arriving, also, for radio training and for use in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. Other recruits were arriving for use in Tunisia. These latter will be good saboteurs who are not likely to contribute more on the battle front than have the existing groups.

Communications in North Africa were, as has been pointed out, on a "field set" basis. Steps were taken to build a permanent and satisfactory system under the direction of Lt. Smith who is a capable technician although not, probably, a good Chief of Communications. Joe Raiola could probably do the job of supervision but he wants active Navy duty as soon as he can be released.

In the Mid East there was no personnel on hand (other than Guenther, Amess, Loche, two communication Sergeants, one or two clerks and an administrative officer). A complete communications system was fabricated out of whole cloth, however, and Colonel Amess was asked to see what could be done, at once, on recruits for Crete, Greece, the Dodecanese Islands and Yugoslavia. This program involved the recruiting, locally, of organizers in cooperation with representatives of the Governments in Exile. It also included a plan for the recruiting and training of W.T. Operators some of whom, I hope, will be obtainable in the U.S.

II. A program was devised looking toward the authorization, recruiting and organization of Auxiliary Operations Groups. This subject will not be discussed here since it has been fully covered in my memorandum of March 6th, 1945.

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functioning under Colonel Eddy in North Africa. What was really done - and what was intended - was the building of OSS field units (around the meagre personnel in the process of being sent out while my trip was in progress) designed to conduct operations within enemy held territory.

d. Initiation of Operational Programs:

I. Plans for the development of preliminary organizations of contact and communication were laid in all Theatres.

In ETO three operatives destined for work on the Continent were placed in SOE schools and steps were taken to obtain additional recruits for operations in the same territory. Arrangements were also made to begin work on the proposed (SOE and SECRET) communications systems concerning which no definite word had arrived from Washington since my earlier departure from London. The groundwork for Norwegian operations was also laid. In addition valuable contacts were made with three French organizations and one Spanish organization through which a chain of "Safe Houses" and communications from Switzerland to Lisbon may be established. Negotiations were also commenced with SOE for the handling of all Belgian operations - theirs as well as ours - due to difficulties, recently arison, between SOE and the Belgian authorities.

In AFHQ so-called SO operations (really SOE directed with some OSS assistance) were continuing on the Tunisian front. These operations were discussed in my letter of March last. They have resulted in the unnecessary loss to OSS of an excellent training officer and a fine NCO without compensating contributions to the War Effort. Work with French Groups, well begun by Colonel Eddy, into Corsica was ex-

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Miscellaneous Comments:

It will be observed that, in connection with the negotiations referred to above, I spoke, throughout, only for the "Operations" side of OSS. In my dealings with SOE I consistently took the position (as my notes clearly indicate and is evident in all of the documents to which reference has been made) that I could not and would not speak for our Intelligence Branch. This was not, of course, the same position I took in my dealings with the various Theatre Commanders. In these negotiations I did my best to serve both Intelligence and Operations impartially and if I failed to obtain the desired breadth of authority for OSS it was only because I have forgotten how to prepare an all-inclusive charter.

The job, from this point, is one for the men in the field. They now have the power to act. They have communications everywhere and there is accessible to them, if they handle themselves diplomatically and reasonable, the experience and the facilities of SOE -- an organization which has proven itself in the fire of actual performance. We should do away with our own internal jealousies and disputes, organize ourselves at home and in the field in an efficient manner and get on with the business at hand which is the making of a contribution designed to bring the war to the quickest possible end.

c. Field Headquarters Organization Changes:

Actually no changes were made in the OSS organizations in the field. There had really been no substantial organization anywhere - at least no operational organization - other than the informal SO group

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I had no opportunity to discuss my letter with Lord Glenconnor as I left the morning it was delivered. It created a stir in London, however, as I knew it would and was the first subject discussed by Sir Charles and me upon my return. Sir Charles (in a meeting David Bruce and I had with him, Tony Keswick and General Sir Marshall - Cornwall on March 5th) was apologetic of Glenconnor's attitude and, in effect, volunteered to send him a letter which would make it clear that the independent status of OSS in Cairo must be preserved. Sir Charles thought that we, as SOE, would have to conform to the requirements of Mr. Casey's "Sub-Defense Committee" (which establishes broad operational policies for the entire area) and I agreed that this was essential since the Mid East Command was, and probably would remain, purely British. We should not, I insisted, be subjected to greater restrictions than SOE and proceedural protocol should be enforced against both of us impartially. Sir Charles agreed, without reservation, to what had been said. Later, on March 10th, Tony Keswick, SOE Chief of Missions, confirmed that a letter was being sent Lord Glenconnor which, he thought, would clarify the situation. His letter to me of March 18th (copies of which have previously been submitted) were intended to confirm the informality of the arrangements respecting the Mid East.

Again, my notes contain a full record of all conversations relating to the situation in Cairo.

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For the sake of the record I made, in the diary of my trip, a full account of the various conversations on which are based the understandings now in force in North Africa.

Cairo:

As has been pointed out above, it was originally agreed that SOE should "take the lead" in the Mid East in that Lord Glenconnor was to act as Chairman of a "Policy Committee" (designed to coordinate operations) much as it had been intended Colonel Eddy should act in North Africa. There was never at any time, in the position taken by me in London during the January meetings or at later conferences, any deviation from the insistence that the organizations in the Mid East should remain independent. The memorandum of January 9, 1943, prepared by Glenconnor in London clearly established this principle.

Notwithstanding the earlier discussions and Glenconnor's London memorandum, a new document was prepared by Glenconnor after our meeting in Cairo. This (a copy of which has been submitted with my interim reports) was entirely unacceptable and was rejected as presenting a dangerous and unworkable plan. The rejection took the form of a letter (copy of which was likewise submitted with my interim reports) in which "independence with coordination" was insisted upon. As a matter of practice we went ahead in Cairo without regard to Glenconnor, obtained wide and complete authority from our own Theatre Commander and even began, with the assistance of the Signal Corps, the construction of our own independent communications system.

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as I had expected they would and when I returned from Cairo I found that Gubbins (who knew as well as I that the Tunisian show was proving nothing but [illegible] (-che) had sacked several of his chief officers including Munn. This left a youngster (Dodds-Parker) in charge. He was, though a capable operations man, clearly no match for Eddy, Roseborough and Potter who were then beginning to find themselves and work as a team. General Gubbins, therefore, called a meeting to discuss "set up" and it was agreed: That we should operate independently but pool resources and facilities to the greatest possible extent. I told the General that we did not wish to restrict him in any way in the building of "behind the lines" organizations; that because of an increase in liquidation which would come as invasion time approached, I was convinced that both of us should strive to infiltrate asmany individuals and groups as possible. We wanted the same privilege in territories normally considered British "spheres of influence". Coordination and collaboration could be insured through the informal collaboration of our operational divisions. The General agreed to these principles. There can be no doubt as to what was understood and Bill Eddy, Arthur Roseborough and Warwick Potter can all substantiate our claims. As a matter of fact, no substantiation will be needed as both organizations were working harmoniously along the lines indicated when I left and, except for normal minor differences which may arise (and which Bill will always handle tactfully and well), the very pressure of operations will serve to keep both organizations on an even keel.

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Their thought was that OSS would dominate and direct operations from Algiers and SOE those from Cairo. The memoranda prepared in London during January last contemplated arrangements of the nature described. As a matter of fact the written documents never went as far in the direction of "Joint Enterprises" as Hambro and Gubbins at first desired. It was never my intention to permit of domination of the sort contemplated but, having in mind the early agreements between SOE and SO, I concluded that a process of education was necessary. Actually General Gubbins, himself, as his own "show" in North Africa grew in size, wanted independence with coordination at the top rather than a "Joint venture". Accordingly, on my first visit to Algiers we scrapped the elaborate document prepared in London and signed a paper of a few lines stating that we would carry on operations independently but would coordinate them through a "Policy Committee" and by the appointment of Colonel Munn as OperationsLiaison Officer with G-3 of the Theatre. He was forced into this arrangement by reason of the fact that Colonel Eddy (largely interested in the "Lonsay" groups in Tunisia) refused to accept the job of "Operations Arbiter" which I had arranged. This left Munn as the only person qualified to carry on liaison work with G-3 since he and Colonel Eddy had up to that moment been the only representatives of either organisation who had been dealing with G-3.

I was not much concerned since John Munn (a capable soldier, fine fellow and good friend of mine) is not a forceful or aggressive chap and could, therefore, be "handled" by Eddy or myself at a later date. As a practical matter things "worked themselves out"

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by all of their subordinates. This is notably true of Major Robin Brooke (Western Europe, London) and Lord Glenconner and Colonel Keble (Cairo). I am hopeful that we have softened Brooke somewhat and that he will, without the necessity of more pressure, accede to our desires to establish a small organization of our own in Central France to "tie up", indirectly, with his own and those we now have in the Southern and Southwestern portions of the same country. In Cairo, Glenconner would probably be alright if he were not influenced too much by Keble. The latter is keen but terribly pompous and "stuffy" and so considered by his own people. Sir Charles will, I am sure, see that we are independent in the Mid East.

London:

SOE wished, at first, to absorb our operations department. Hambro was quick to see that this would not work. We were able, even in the short period I was there, to demonstrate so much in the way of independent contacts that it was obvious that much of value will be lost to both organizations unless we are permitted to function separately. In addition it became clear that only by "dividing territory" would we receive air transport and other facilities. In the end, too, Sir Charles was worried, somewhat, about his own security and, therefore, was relieved to find an excuse to keep us from "penetrating" SOE. In practice our organizations are collaborating closely but working independently.

North Africa:

It was originally proposed by Sir Charles Hambro and General Gubbins at our conferences in London that North Africa be considered an American sphere of influence and the Mid East British.

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These have been covered in my letters to you of January 8, 1943 (discussion of general principles with Charles Hambro), and January 14, (London, Africa), and in my notes: January 7 and 9, and March 5, 1943 (general principles of collaboration); January 7 and 8 (Division of territory); January 7, 8, and 13 and March 5, 10, and 11 (London); January 7, 10, 11 and 13 and February 2, 4 and 20, 1943 (Africa); and January 7, 9 and 25, February 12, 13 and 14 and March 5 and 12, 1943 (Mid-East).

The arrangements between SOE and OSS (a considerable portion of which are now represented by tacit understandings and practices in the field rather than formal agreements) may be summarized as follows:

General:

Sir Charles Hambro and General Gubbins have agreed with us on the practical necessity for an independent operational status everywhere for our organization. Without this we would be an adjunct of SOE and as such would not only not receive the facilities and aid we need from our own military services but would be compelled, for political reasons, to confine our dealings with National groups to those who are now willing to "play with the British. This would result in no good to SOE or ourselves and would certainly not increase the joint contribution of our organizations to the War effort.

In all fairness I must say that the broad and generous approach of Sir Charles and the General is not shared

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A minor job of collecting information (largely from British SIS) was still being carried on. SO had never really had an organization in this Theatre and at the time of my visit did not have a single representative. Such a thing as communications was unknown.

c. OSS was nowhere considered an operating organization. In no Theatre, in fact, did I find (with the single exception of General Smith at AFHQ) that the combat officers, with whom OSS should normally have been dealing on operations, had the slightest conception of what OSS or its avowed or authorized purposes really were.

3. ACTION TAKEN:

a. Theatre Command Authorization of OSS Activities:

I. My letters of January 14, February 2, February 13, and March 12, 1943, and my notes as follows: (ETO) January 18, 19, 20, 22 and March 5,8, 9, 11 and 13; (AFHQ) January 29, and 31, and February 4; and (USAFIME) February 7, 11 and 14, have pretty well covered what was done in this direction. One point should be made clear: my dealings were for OSS operations as a whole, and not merely for what has been known as its "SO Branch". Where the position was taken that I spoke only for a particular Branch this was done for "trading" purposes. The principle negotiations at AFHQ, as well as my letter of February 14, 1943, to Lord Glenconner on the Mid East understanding indicate the extent to which I went in maintaining the fiction of separate operational "Branches" for OSS.

b. Arrangements with SOE:

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II. In Africa a rather loosely knit SO organization (which also carried on certain intelligence work) had been built up by Vice-Consul Robert Murphy and Colonel William A. Eddy prior to the invasion. These men and their organization had done a superb job and they had produced all they had promised. Unfortunately neither Bill Eddy nor OSS have "received the credit" which the accomplishments deserved. This may be the inevitable concomitant of the work of the character of that which OSS is delegated to perform. We must find some way, however, of driving home to our military chiefs the fact that OSS has served them, and can continue to do so, in a military way.

After the invasion the OSS organization in North Africa was pretty much liquidated. In many places the need for its existence had ceased. Colonel Eddy, however, who is a dogged and determined chap, had kept things going in Spanish Morocco; was cooperating with SOE on the Tunisian front; and was aiding French Groups in Corsica. His was distinctly a "one man show" although two or three of his old confreres were still with him.

In Africa, too, OSS had a semblance of communications. Under Mr. Raichle a really astounding though limited job had been done with most inadequate equipment. The little station in Algiers is still, so far as I know, in touch with Oran, Gibraltar, Madrid, Lisbon and Tangier, as well as Corsica and Southern France.

III. OSS in the Mid East had practically nothing.

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SECRET



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2. ITINERARY AND FINDINGS:

a. My trip took me to North Africa, thence to England; back to North Africa; from North Africa to the Mid East and back again to North Africa and the Tunisian front; to England once more on my return from Tunisia; and thence home via North and West Africa.

b. I saw what there was to be seen of most of our organizations in ETO, AFHQ and USAFIME.

I. In ETO the situation was not materially different than that which I had seen on my visit last summer and autumn, to wit: SO operations were nonexistent and those of SI consisted, largely, in the gathering of information from the British, Poles and French and from the various Agencies and Departments of our own Government. This is valuable work, of course, but is not the conduct of "Secret Intelligence" in any sense of the word. We have added, since last summer, a field photographic unit and some analysists and have laid the foundation for work which is classified as CE. OSS still had representatives (both SI and SO) in neutral countries and certain original information may still be coming from these sources. We possessed no communication facilities although the establishment of these had been the subject of discussion for some time. In short, our organization was in no sense of the word an "operational" one. We did not even possess, with one or two exceptions personnel which might be classified as "operational minded"

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 29, 1943

Subject: Report on European Trip - December 24, 1942, to March 21, 1943.

To: General William J. Donovan

From: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

1. OBJECTIVES

The purposes of the trip, as I conceived them, were:

a. The implementation of OSS activities in the European, African and Mid Eastern Theatres of Command through authorization obtained from the various Theatre Commanders;

b. The negotiation with SOE of more satisfactory arrangements than now exist for cooperative but independent operations in the field;

c. A study of organizational requirements in the various Theatres necessary to make OSS "Field Operations" possible; and

d. Where time and the facilities at hand permitted, the formulation of plans designed to bring OSS operations from the "project" to the "functional" stage, in other words to speed the actual building of "behind enemy lines" organizations.

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REPORT ON EUROPEAN TRIP

December 24, 1942 - March 21, 1943

HENRY G. HUNTINGTON, JR.

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SECRET

REPORT ON EUROPEAN TRIP

December 24, 1942 - March 21, 1943

ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON, JR.

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Satterlee 2301

Mr. Tuggett
Personal

HERBERT L. SATTERLEE
1 BEEKMAN PLACE
NEW YORK

December 22, 1941

Dear Colonel Bill:

Thank you for your letter of October 13th. Charlotte Kellogg and the Paderewski Testimonial Committee are getting along all right. We have got the hospital for the Poles running in Edinburgh, and thanks to Mrs. Kellogg's trips around the Country and the efforts in New York City of Mrs. Chauncey Waddell, (Charles E. Hughes' daughter), the money is coming in in a satisfactory way.

The apartments in this house are pretty well rented, (except Helen Woods' big place downstairs and Mrs. Willard's upstairs), and we are giving Saturday night parties for soldiers and sailors.

I am going to give a letter of introduction to you - my partner, Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. You may remember him in this building when he had the Study next to Mabel Ingalls, and used to play squash with you. Also you may have seen him in France in the A. E. F. He was in the 307th Field Artillery, 78th Division. He is now forty-eight years old and is in the Home Guard here in the 17th Regiment, which was the old 71st. He has spent a great deal of time abroad on business and gets along all right with French, Italian, and knows some German, and I think a bit of Spanish. At all events, he can do better service, in my opinion, in some other position than tramping the aqueduct or watching [illegible]okan Dam or the bridges, although those are very important duties [illegible] as you can send him somewhere when he presents the letter. [illegible] my partner for about seventeen years and I hate to lose him, [illegible] makes no difference.

With best wishes for the Holiday S[illegible]on.

Faithfully yours,

Herbert L. Satterlee

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
The Federal Trade Commission Building
Washington, D.C.

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December 31, 1942

Mr. Herbert L. Satterlee
2 Dunham Place
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Satterlee:

Of course, I remember Hilary G. Huntington, Jr. with great pleasure. Frankly, it is quite problematical whether or not I would have any suggestion for him. The administration of this organization is now quite complete as we have only a small executive staff and the rest of the people are specialists in limited fields.

On the other hand, if Mr. Huntington came to see us in Washington on such a poor chance of finding something to do, I would suggest that he make an appointment to see my assistant, Mr. Kenneth Wyatt, before he sees me, as Mr. Wyatt is thoroughly conversant with the needs of this program and might have other ideas.

I might suggest that Mr. Huntington should plan to spend several days in Washington, if necessary, because the successful way to find a niche here seems to spend some time going from Department to Department presenting letters and making contacts. You may be sure that if this organization can help a partner of yours to get into some useful work in the present emergency, it will do so.

Please note that my correct working address in Washington is now the Federal Trade Commission Building but 15th & E streets, N. W.

I send you my best wishes for a happy new year.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

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FORMERLY
SATTERLEE & CANFIELD
KELLOGG, EMERY & INNESS-BROWN

JAN 5 1942

Mr. Donovan

Satterlee 2301

B. H. INNESS BROWN
DAVID PAINE
COUNSEL

SATTERLEE & WARFIELD
49 WALL STREET
NEW YORK

Coordinator of Information
- LIAISON OFFICE -
Attn:
Action Taken:

January 3, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
25th and E Sts., N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Mr. Satterlee was good enough to show me your very kind note to him of December 26th. I did not have the temerity to write you directly as I was not sure you would remember me and our occasional games of squash rackets together.

It was terribly nice of you to suggest that I see Mr. Kenneth Mygatt and, following this suggestion, I have arranged to see him on Monday.

With renewed thanks and kindest personal regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

Edward C. Kennington

ECKjr:JT

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December 31, 1941

Private Hunter Liggett Military Academy

Kenneth Wynnt, Esq.,
Assistant to the Coordinator of Information,
Room 630, 18th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wynnt:

This will introduce to you Mr. Hilary C. Huntington Jr., whose name and address have for the purpose of identification. He has Colonel Donovan's kind letter to me of December 30th, and knows the substance of our conversation over the telephone today. We will be very glad to receive any ideas that you may be able to give him as to finding an appropriate billet in the Government service in which he can be of service to the United States Government.

With best wishes for a Healthy New Year and for victory over our enemies on land and sea in 1942, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

HERBERT L. SATTERLEE

Copy to Col. William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Room 630, 18th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Hilary C. Huntington, Jr.

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January 5, 1942

Gordon

**Gordon C. Huntington, Jr.**

My residence address is 18 East 51st St., New York City. My telephone number is Eldorado 5-1401. My office address is 49 Wall Street and the telephone number there is Hanover 2-4102. I am a lawyer and a member of the firm of Satterlee and Farfield, formerly Satterlee and Canfield. I have specialized almost entirely in corporate practice, including corporate finance and reorganizations.

I am 46 years old, a citizen of the United States born in Nashville, Tennessee. I graduated from Colgate University in 1914 with an A. B. degree and from Harvard Law School in 1917 with an L.L.B. degree. My military record is as follows:

First Massachusetts Field Artillery,
Battery A, Boston, 1914-1916.

Pittsburg R.O.T.C. summer of 1916

Captain, 307th Field Artillery,
78th Division, American Expeditionary
Forces, 1917-1919.

Major, 17th Regiment, New York Guard,
December 1940 to date.

Special qualifications:

I have lived and worked in Europe and besides having made sporadic voyages, spent about 2-1/2 years there on business with headquarters in Paris. I have traveled in most of the countries of Western Europe and have friends and acquaintances in France, Italy, Holland, and Belgium. My knowledge of foreign languages might be classified as follows. French, reasonably fluent and comparatively current. Spanish, not quite as fluent as the French for the reason that I have not spoken Spanish recently to any great extent. Italian, a fair understanding of Italian, which I read readily although my ability to converse is somewhat limited. German, although I have studied more of German than of any other language it has been many years since I have had any practice in conversation or reading. It would require from 6 weeks to 2 months of study for me to acquire a passable efficiency in this language.



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[redacted]

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

January 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., interviewed by Kenneth Mygatt on January 5 and introduced to Messrs. Kimbel and Bruce. He is a very high class type. He is a lawyer, a gentleman, has a fine appearance and mental capacity.

KM

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Huntington 2 3 1/2

WARDMAN PARK HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 6. 1942

Dear Colonel -

Needless to say I've been troubled no end wondering how you were getting on but did not know what to do about it until I saw Jimmy this morning. What a tough time you've had and what rotten luck that it had to be you though I'm sure that for anyone less rugged the results would have been far worse.

Jimmy says you are now throwing all flowers, candy etc out of the window. I wish, though, there were something I could do. Please let me know if there is anything anywhere which I can contribute. And don't let those permits upset you. I'm sure that there is no - I'll be out from a squad on patrol. Be well, Sleep -

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Charge to the account of

# WESTERN UNION

R. B. WHITE
PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

CHECK
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
TIME FILED

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

April 6, 1942

Mr. Ellery Huntington,
Wardman Park Hotel,
Washington, D. C.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR NOTE. WE ARE STILL IN THE RING.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

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May 9, 1942

SUBJECT: Physical Examination

TO: The Commanding Officer
General Dispensary
U. S. Army
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is requested that the following named officer be given a physical examination as indicated in connection with his reporting for active duty:

Ellery Spaulding Huntington, Jr. Lt. Colonel Full Check
(Name) (Rank) (Type of Physical Examination)

G. S. I.
(Assignment) May 9, 1942
(Date of Active Duty)

2. It is also requested that this officer be given the Mandatory Inoculations. His Certificate of Physical Condition (True Copy A.G.O. Form No. 63) is attached hereto.

William J. Donovan

Enclosure-1

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William J. Donovan

May 8, 1942

Lt. Colonel Hilary C. Huntington, Jr.
Assignment to Duty, May 8, 1942

1. In accordance with provisions of Executive Order No. 120 issued by the War Department under date of May 8, 1942, you are hereby assigned for duty with this organization as its Security Officer.

2. You will take charge of the Security Office of this organization and will proceed with the discharge of the duties of the Chief of such Office at once.

William J. Donovan

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February 13th, 1942.

Commanding General,
Walter Reed Hospital,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Please give the bearer, Major Ellery Channing Huntington Jr., a final type physical. We are asking that he be re-commissioned and assigned to active duty.

Very truly yours,

M. Preston Goodfellow
Lt. Col. General Staff, G-2

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February 26, 1942

The Honorable John J. McCloy
The Assistant Secretary of War
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

In accordance with your suggestion, I am sending the papers in the matter of Ellery Huntington. You know his record and his standing in his profession. We are anxious to have him if possible get the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, for the reason that he will be given a special assignment as security officer in our foreign service and there are officers in that unit of equal grade. If he is commissioned I would appreciate it very much if he could be assigned to the Coordinator of Information.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1943

Dear Bill:

I have your letter of February 26 about Ellery Huntington.

I have placed his papers and your letter in the hands of the Adjutant General who handles all appointments.

I will keep in touch with the Adjutant General and let you know what can be done.

Sincerely,

J.J.

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25 & E Streets, NW
Washington, D. C.

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April 30, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This office desires to have Mr. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army of the United States, and there is attached hereto an application on W.D.A.G.O. Form No. 170 and classification questionnaire on W.D.A.G.O. Form No. 178. This application has the approval of this office, and the appointment is recommended. There is also attached hereto a report of physical examination on W.D.A.G.O. Form No. 63.

It is desired to use the services of Mr. Huntington as Chief Security officer for this organization. In connection with his duties in this capacity, his services will be employed in certain technical and confidential work relating to the program of special operations now being conducted by this office under authority of a directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under date of February [illegible], 1942. It is our belief that Mr. Huntington possesses special qualifications and experience, which fit him for the duty for which his services are requested.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

Enclosures

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr:fkm

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connection with the conduct of the activities, including certain activities now being developed under authority of directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in letter dated February 25, 1942.

2. The applicant possesses unusual qualifications for the proposed duty.

3. Upon being appointed, the officer should be assigned to the Coordinator of Information, Washington, D.C. He should be ordered to report at the date of appointment.

4. The appointment of this applicant to the Army and Service branch shown in the attached application is urgently recommended.

5. This appointment should be charged against the procurement objective set forth in letter dated February , 1942, J.C. 320.2 (1-27-42) O.S.S. addressed to the Coordinator of Information.

William J. Donovan

Enclosures:
Application
Questionnaire
Oath
Certificate of Selective Service Status
Order of Discharge

* Donovan to Jeffers

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April 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

1. With regard to the attached application for appointment as a commissioned officer in the Army of the United States submitted by Mr. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., and in compliance with current War Department instructions, the following data pertaining to this applicant is furnished:

a. Applicant is not subject to induction under the Selective Training and Service Act.

b. Applicant possesses special training and experience for assignment to important duty of a confidential nature with the office of the Coordinator of Information.

c. The duty proposed for the applicant cannot be adequately performed in a civilian capacity.

d. Former commissioned service: Captain, 301st Field Artillery, 76th Division A.E.F. from August 1917 to March 1919; Major, New York Guard, from December 1941 to April 9, 1942.

e. Immediately available for active duty.

f. Waiver of the 14-day notice for active duty and certified copy of order of discharge from New York Guard are attached.

g. United States citizenship of the applicant has been verified as being by birth in this country.

h. The duty proposed for this individual is that of acting as Chief Security Officer for this organization and of supervising certain technical and confidential work of importance to this organization.

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April 30, 1942

Colonel H. N. Sumner
Room 1029 M Bldg.
War Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Sumner:

I am enclosing herewith a letter (and copy) addressed to the Secretary of War and a memorandum (in quadruplicate) to the Adjutant General requesting the appointment of Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., under the procurement objective referred to in the memorandum to the Adjutant General.

This request is in substitution of a prior similar request made under date of February 16, 1942.

Attached to the prior request were the physical examination papers (in triplicate) of Mr. Huntington on W.D.A.G.O. Form No. 69. It is my understanding that you will be able to obtain the additional necessary copies of these papers through the Commanding Officer of Walter Reed Hospital. The examination was taken about February 18, 1942.

Since the services of Mr. Huntington, in the capacity for which we are requesting him, are urgently needed anything which could be done to expedite his appointment and assignment to us will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

Re: Confrey

Huntington, Jeffrey

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AG 200.3 (9-4-42)

June 4, 1943

Designation as Acting Quartermasters.

TO: The Coordinator of Information,

Washington, D. C.

SUBJ: Lieutenant Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. (0-409476) A. U. S.

You and the following-named officers are designated as Acting Quartermasters for the purpose of issuing meal transportation requests as may be necessary for travel on official business in compliance with orders issued you and the officers named:

Captain George E. Brewer, Jr. (0-903213) A. W. S.
First Lieutenant James E. Lawrence (0-861100) A. W. S.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. H. Daly

Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
OFFICE, THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
CU, WASHINGTON, D. C. INFO, WASHINGTON, D. C.
FINANCE OFFICER, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.
THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.
CR. TUCUL, ROOM 1506.

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[illegible]

[illegible] 6, 1945.

[illegible] Coordinator of Information,

Washington, D. C.

[illegible] Chief Albert C. Huntington, Jr. ([illegible]) [illegible]

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that you proceed at such time and in such manner and frequency as may be necessary to any point within a radius of 50 miles of Washington, D. C., during the period from June 6, 1945, to June 30, 1945, both dates inclusive, [illegible] duty for the purpose of performing official [illegible] in connection with your duties in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and upon completion of each tour of duty, i.e., return to your proper station.

2. In lieu of subsistence a flat per diem of $6.00 is [illegible] while traveling on official business and while away [illegible] designated post of duty. (Public Law 301, 77th Congress, [illegible] April 21, 1941). TD 14 P-08 A 0429-45.

[illegible] officer making payment in connection [illegible] travel performed will submit a copy of voucher, showing the amount paid, [illegible] in which paid, voucher number and [illegible] of this order. The copy of the voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to the Adjutant General's [illegible] Fiscal Section, stating the enclosed copy [illegible] is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement to the Coordinator of Information.

H. L. [illegible]

Adjutant General.

[illegible] COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.

[illegible], MAY 1505.

[illegible] 1505.

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i. The applicant possesses special qualifications for the proposed duty.

j. Upon being appointed, the officer should be assigned to the Coordinator of Information, Washington, D.C. He should be ordered to report on the date of appointment.

k. The appointment of this applicant to the rank and service branch shown in the attached application is urgently recommended.

l. This appointment should be charged against the procurement, objective set forth in letter dated February 2, 1942, G.O. [illegible] (1 27 42) G.P.-A. addressed to the Coordinator of Information.

William J. Donovan

Enclosures:
Application
Questionnaire
Cover
Certificate of Selective Service status
Order of discharge

Huntington Gilpg

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Huntington, 23016
x War
x Service Comm.

April 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

1. With regard to the attached application for appointment as a commissioned officer in the Army of the United States submitted by Mr. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., and in compliance with current War Department instructions, the following data pertaining to this applicant is furnished:

a. Applicant is not subject to induction under the Selective Training and Service Act.

b. Applicant possesses special training and experience for assignment to important duty of a particular nature with the office of the Coordinator of Information.

c. The duty proposed for the applicant cannot be adequately performed in a civilian capacity.

d. Former commissioned service: Captain, 307th Field Artillery, 78th Division A.E.F. from August 1917 to March 1919; Major, New York Guard, from December 1941 to April 9, 1942.

e. Immediately available for active duty.

f. Waiver of the 14-day notice for active duty and certified copy of order of discharge from New York Guard are attached.

g. United States citizenship of the applicant has been verified as being by birth in this country.

h. The duty proposed for this individual is that of acting as Chief Security Officer for this organization and of supervising certain technical and confidential work of importance to this organization in connection with the conduct of its activities, including certain activities now being developed under authority of directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in letter dated February [illegible], 1942.

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Huntington 2 3016
A War
X Services Command

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

[redacted]

# INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Lieutenant Lawrence J.F.

DATE July 6, 1942.

TO: Mr. Murphy

SUBJECT:

At Colonel Huntington's request, I am attaching a copy of Colonel Donovan's memorandum of April thritieth, addressed to The Adjutant General and recommending the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Huntington.

Under date of April sixteenth, Colonel Donovan wrote a memorandum to The Adjutant General with respect to the appointment of the undersigned which was identical with the attached memorandum except as to details, prior service, etc. Specifically under paragraph "L" in both memoranda it was indicated that the appointments should be charged against the procurement objective of February 2, 1942.

James F. Lawrence
1st Lt., AUS
Security Office

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[illegible] - Hartinger, Ellery G.
[illegible]

Orders.

[illegible]

Headquarters Army Ground Forces, A. G. O.
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that you proceed on or about August [illegible], 1945, from Washington, D. C., to New York, New York, thence to Toronto, Canada, on temporary duty in connection with the activities of the Office of Strategic Services and upon completion of this temporary duty return to your proper station.

2. In lieu of subsistence a flat per diem of $6.00 is authorized for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States in accordance with existing law and regulations. [illegible]

3. The finance officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number and station of disbursement. The copy of the voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to the Adjutant General's Office, Attention Travel Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of claiming reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

W. O. McNeil

Adjutant General,
Officers Branch, Adj. Genl's Dept.

DISTRIBUTION:
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

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Huntington, Ellery 2501 B
War Dept. Pers.
Service Command

February 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

From: William J. Donovan.

To: Major Richard H. Oliver.

Will you please put the name of Lieutenant Colonel Ellery Huntington on the list of those to be considered for promotions. I should like to have this taken up at the next meeting of the Committee. Ellery has been serving as head of Special Operations and has done a superb job. He has served more than six months in his present grade and I strongly recommend his promotion, both because it is deserved on merit and also because the additional rank is necessary for his job.

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In reply
refer to: 201-Huntington, Ellery C. Jr.

Washington, D. C.
March 6, 1943

SUBJECT: Promotion

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of Circular No. 161, War Department, 1942, as amended, it is recommended that the officer named below be promoted to the grade as indicated:

| GRADE | NAME | ARM OR SERVICE | ASN | DATE OF RANK OR EFFECTIVE DATE | REGULAR ARMY OR RESERVE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lt. Colonel | Ellery C. Huntington, Jr. | [illegible] | 0469476 | 30 May 42 | [illegible] |

2. During the past eight (8) months Lt. Colonel Huntington has by actual outstanding performance of duty demonstrated his fitness for promotion to the next higher grade and his capacity for its responsibilities. During this period he has been detailed as Chief of one of the Branches of the Office of Strategic Services, and has proved himself to be efficient and has demonstrated his fitness for this position in every respect. He has a keen sense of responsibility. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

3. A position vacancy exists in this organization. By filling this promotion and by the promotion of others previously recommended, the total number of authorized grades of this organization will not be exceeded.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

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[redacted]

[illegible]/[illegible]
March 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel William J. Donovan.

1. Attached is recommendation for promotion for Lt. Colonel Hilary C. Huntington. This recommendation was approved by the Service Personnel Committee in accordance with your request made two weeks ago. It was, however, delayed in view of the fact that there was no appropriate vacancy in OSS for the grade recommended. An additional allotment of 1 Colonel was requested of the War Department and was approved by the War Department on March 1, 1943.

2. This recommendation is therefore now being submitted for signature.

R. M. CLOWES
Major, G.S.C.
Adjutant

1 incl.

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[redacted]

March 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Colonel William J. Donovan,

1. Attached is recommendation for promotion for Lt. Colonel Ellery C. Huntington. This recommendation was approved by the Service Personnel Committee in accordance with your request made two weeks ago. It was, however, delayed in view of the fact that there was no appropriate vacancy in SO for the grade recommended. An additional allotment of 1 Colonel was requested of the War Department and was approved by the War Department on March 1, 1943.

2. This recommendation is therefore now being submitted for signature.

H. H. CLIVER
Major, C.A.C.
Adjutant

1 Incl.

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[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2028, BUILDING "O"
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 12, 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO Colonel William J. Donovan

This is to inform you that Lieut. Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., has been promoted to the grade of Colonel, per par 15, Special Order 69, War Department, March 10, 1943. Promotion is effective the date of this order.

John E. Myzza
JOHN E. MYZZA
2nd Lieut., Air Corps
Personnel Officer

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OSS

6. Colonel Huntington was commissioned within this organization from civilian life on 8 May 1942, in order to coordinate and direct the activities of the Security Office at the inception of the Security Office. Having initiated all procedures necessary for the successful administration of the Security Office, [redacted] Colonel Huntington was relieved from that assignment in order to undertake an intelligence assignment for this organization, the accomplishment of which necessitated his performance of duty in the North African, Mediterranean, and European Theaters of Operations. These assignments have now been completed.

7. A copy of the original memorandum to The Adjutant General, recommending this officer's appointment is enclosed (Incl #3). Since this officer has now completed the missions for which his recommendation for original appointment in the Army of the United States was processed, it is recommended that he be relieved from active duty.

For and in the absence of the Director:

CHARLES S. CHESTON
Acting Director

3 Incls:
Incl 1 - Copy of O's 66-1
Incl 2 - Statement of Leave
Incl 3 - Copy of memo to TAG



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201-Huntington, Ellery C. Jr., (A) 1st Ind. 2301

[redacted], Washington, D.C., 24 January 1946

TO: The Adjutant General, ATTN: Officers' Branch, Assignment Section, Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

2. [redacted] will remain available to this organization for consultation on [redacted] which will [redacted] in the future. There is no military assignment appropriate to his grade within this organization to which he can be assigned, nor is there one in prospect. [redacted] affordability [redacted] by virtue of his business affiliations [redacted] will exceed his value on any military assignment.

3. In compliance with par. 8 e of War Department Circular No. 495, the following information is furnished:

a. Subject officer is qualified by training and experience for duty assignments involving security measures and for intelligence assignments peculiar to OSS, which assignments have been completed.

b. A surplus exists in the jurisdiction of this command of officers of his grade who are qualified to fill this specific duty assignment.

c. Colonel Huntington is entitled to separation under honorable conditions.

d. No disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 are pending or appropriate in this case.

e. No hospital disposition board or Army retiring board proceedings are pending or believed to be appropriate.

f. Colonel Huntington became surplus on 15 January 1945, the approximate date it was determined that no future assignments were anticipated in which his services could be utilized.

g. Complete and up-to-date copy of officer's qualification card is enclosed (Incl #1).

4. Colonel Huntington has been directed to undergo a terminal type physical examination, the results of which will be forwarded as soon as available.

5. Officer's statement of leave is enclosed (Incl #2).



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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] been completed.

[illegible]

For and in the absence of the Director:

3 Incls
Incl 1: [illegible]
Incl 2: Statement of [illegible]
Incl 3: Cy of [illegible]

CHARLES [illegible]
Acting Dir [illegible]

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[illegible]

TO: [illegible]

1. [illegible] assigned, [illegible] present.

2. [illegible] Colonel [illegible] on any military assignment.

3. In compliance with par. 8 c of War Department Circular No. [illegible], the following information is furnished:

a. Subject officer is qualified by training and experience for duty assignments involving security measures and for intelligence assignments peculiar to OSS which assignments have been completed.

b. A surplus exists in the jurisdiction of this command of officers of his grade who are qualified to fill this specific duty assignment.

c. Colonel Huntington is entitled to separation under honorable conditions.

d. No disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR [illegible] are pending or appropriate in this case.

e. No hospital disposition board or Army retiring board proceedings are pending or believed to be appropriate.

f. Colonel Huntington became surplus on 18 January 1945, the approximate date it was determined that no future assignments were anticipated in which his services could be utilized.

g. Complete and up-to-date copy of officer's qualification card is inclosed (Incl #1).



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Col. Huntington, Ellery W., Jr. (A), [illegible]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, Personnel Board, Room 101, North Building,
20th & E Sts., Washington, D. C. 1 February 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, [illegible]
F Street, NW, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Mr. John E. O'Gara, Room 251 Administration Building, O.S.S.

Approval Recommended.

For the Chairman, Personnel Board:

E. H. DRIVER, JR.
Captain, GSC
Secretary, Personnel Board

1 Incl.
n/c

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[illegible]

TO: [illegible] Personnel Board

[illegible]

Basis: [illegible] the [illegible] Personnel Board for [illegible] is [illegible].

For the Chief, [illegible].

1 Incl.
N/C

[illegible]
1st Lt., AUS

[illegible]-Washington, Silas S., Jr. (O) 2nd Ind.
OFFICE OF [illegible] SERVICES, Personnel Board, Room 160, North Building, 20th & H Sts., Washington, D. C. 1 February 1948.

TO: Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, [illegible] 7 Street, NW, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Mr. John H. O'Gara, Room 221 Administration Building, O.S.S.

Approval Recommended.

For the Chairman, Personnel Board:

H. W. [illegible], JR.
Captain, [illegible]
Secretary, Personnel Board

1 Incl.
N/C

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HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICER'S PERSONNEL SECTION
Room 21, 2324 F Street N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Huntington, Hilary C.

26 Feb 45

210.3

SUBJECT: Transfer of Officer

TO : Directors Office.

1. Lt. Col. Hilary C. Huntington Jr. asgd to Directors Office, USA trfd out of this orgn per F 4 80 [redacted] 43 HD, 19 Feb 45 actually departed fr this orgn 22 Feb 45... .

2 Request that the above named officer be dropped fr all records on file at your office.

For the Commanding Officer:

C. M. Crosby

C. M. CROSBY,
1st Lt., AUS,
Asst. Adjutant.

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April 24, 1942

Mr. David H. Milton
The Equity Corporation
50 Pine Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Milton:

In order that your Company may be informed with regard to the status of Mr. Hilary Huntington, this is to advise that the work he is doing is essentially war work in its nature. As a matter of fact, we have requested the War Department to commission him as an officer, which we expect will be done in the very near future. The type of work in which he is engaged is such that it should be carried on by a commissioned officer. I thought you should have this information for your records.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

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# THE EQUITY CORPORATION

ONE EXCHANGE PLACE, JERSEY CITY, N. J.

April 27th, 1942.

Mr. William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Thank you for writing me on April 24th regarding the status of Ellery Huntington. The auditors wanted this record to show that Ellery was in the Government service. I am sorry to have had to trouble you for this information. Ellery seems to be enjoying his work, and especially working with you.

We are all missing you at 1 Beekman Place and are trying to keep the four walls together for the duration. Hope you will be with us again when the storm blows over.

Sincerely,

David M. Milton

DMM:BCG

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SECRET

August [illegible], 1942.

SUBJECT: Orders

To: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Lieut.-Colonel Hilary C. Huntington, Jr., Serial No. [illegible], A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will be chargeable to funds pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services.

3. Travel by air to and from the United Kingdom will be arranged by the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

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[redacted]

August [illegible], 1943

SUBJECT: Orders

To: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Lieut.-Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., Serial No. [illegible] A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will be chargeable to funds pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services.

3. Travel by air to and from the United Kingdom will be arranged by the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

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August 30, 1952

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Gandfellow
Colonel Huntington
Major Bruce
Mr. Hugh Wilson

From: W. J. R.

In accordance with the recommendation of Major Bruce in his cable No. 37 of August 27, I have prepared the following cable to be sent to both Mollaine and Lee with a view to discussing proper organization in that area.

"UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF MAJOR BRUCE YOU ARE DIRECTED TO RETURN HOME AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE IN ORDER TO REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN YOUR AREA. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHAT ASSISTANCE WE CAN GIVE FOR TRANSPORTATION."

I have also sent a message to Leete informing him that he will be in charge during their absence.

Being unable to reach you by phone this evening, these cables were dispatched.

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AG 210.31
(8-21-42)OA

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SECRET

JHD/dbs/ed/1515
Dr 2740-3021

September 1, 1942.

SECRET

7. Attention is invited to Sec II, Cir 220, WD 1941, regarding the preparation and distribution of extract copies.

Incls. (Pay Guide & Instr.Memo)

Distribution:
Officer (4)
Officers' Records Section, AGO

Adjutant General.

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SECRET

The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.

AG 210.31
(9-2-42)OA

September 1, 1942.

Subject: Orders.

To : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Auth: [illegible]
Initials: [illegible]
Date: [illegible]

To : Officers Involved.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that each of the following-named officers, ADS, proceed at the proper time on temporary duty, from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to London, England, and to such other places in the British Isles as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out instructions of the Director, Strategic Services, and upon completion of this temporary duty, return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Kilsey C. Huntington, Jr, 0467476

Captain George T. Brewer, Jr., 0903823

2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, army or naval transport, and rail is directed. TD by air from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to destination and return, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission.

3. In lieu of subsistence, a flat per diem of $6.00 is authorized while traveling by military or commercial aircraft, and for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. A baggage allowance of seventy-seven (77) pounds while traveling by military or commercial aircraft is authorized.

4. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such other places, in such order and as often as may be necessary to carry out this mission. The duties to be performed in connection with this mission being exceptional, may require more than seventy-two (72) hours at different places for their performance, therefore, a delay for any period required at any place where necessary is authorized.

5. Travel is chargeable to FD 14 P 434-02,03 & 0425-03.

6. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number, and citation of this order, by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

March 12, 1943

Dear Colonel:

This will serve to bring you up to date for the 11th time:

1. Theater General Approval of Our Activities:

a. E.T.O.: This has been covered in letter form, as has the "Norwegian Undertaking". I have cabled this morning advising you. Like Algiers and Cairo, the charter is, I think, pretty broad. The fact that primary liaison is through G-2 rather than G-3 is inept but inconsequential. The reference to our paragraph 3b was made because of the reference to enclosed documents. In other words, Colonel Waite (G-2), who drew the endorsement, advised me this morning that he intended to approve our communications clause on the condition that we would act within the provisions of our letter arrangements with B.C.S and Col. Perry. Again, this is immaterial.

A proposed Field Note "set-up" for OSS-ETO is enclosed. Patterned on Algiers and Cairo it will work operationally and satisfies Dave here, as it does Bill Eddy and Gus. It effectively eliminates MI and SO but preserves operations and the gathering, surveying, analyzing, etc., of information (an intelligence job and not the operational side) in separate cubicles. Some changes, I still think, ought to go along with this in Washington. I will argue this point later.

b. Joint Arrangements: These papers you have received. We have a broad charter there and I think I left the boys in Algiers with a program.

c. Mid East: By this time you have a copy of my paraphrase of General Eisenhower's cable and perhaps my letter with a copy of the main cable. Nothing such will happen in the Mid East until more personnel arrives there. I have some ideas on this. For one thing I want to steal an officer from another department where he does not fit and to remain. I think I can show you that he will be useful to O.S. in operations as part of the Cairo show. Time

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Colonel Wm. J. Donovan from Lieut-Colonel E. C. Huntington, Jr.

is not being altogether lost in the mid East, as Dixie Amos and I discussed one or two very specific programs before we left, viz., Greek recruiting locally, and the laying of groundwork for a Mission with Mihailovitch.

Ground Communications:

A. I took something of a chance with your patience on insisting on having Huot with me in Cairo and Algiers. I had the hunch, however, that we would need to improvise, on the spot, in order to take advantage of "quick openings". This proved to be the case and, in Cairo, where our own equipment has been delayed, the Signal Corps is actually now putting up two stations, masts, etc., and giving us equipment. In Algiers we had the same situation but now have seven houses, seven masts (aerials as can be) and stolen and borrowed equipment.

Here in England I found, on my return, that nothing had happened. Graveson and his material had not arrived and SOE informed us that they would not wait longer. Only a few days before Lowman had cabled (in answer to one from here weeks ago suggesting improvisation) authorizing us to go ahead with a "haywire" arrangement. I had already told Major Huot to get pre-fabricated huts, local labor, local draughtsmen and borrowed supplies and proceed with the SOE and the clandestine station. Larry Lowman's cable would indicate that he approves. In any event it is of vital operational concern. We have groups on the Continent and more going, and we want to service Norway. We must be prepared. For operators we will temporarily use SOE girls at the SOE station with our own ciphers and supervision. The small station will not need much personnel. It should be all-American.

Shortly after I had again "stuck my neck out" (as I always seem to be doing) Graveson arrived. He seems clean-cut and able and he O.K'd the progress.

All of this is by way of explaining that I took the action I did by reason of the fact that I was sure I knew the conditions in the field. In all of these things I have only two interests to serve: yours and those of OSS. These, to me, are two different things and I try, always, to keep both in mind.

Third: Operations:

A. Field Operations: Definite plans, looking toward operational accomplishments, are under way in each theatre. The enclosed copies of memos to Dave, George Brewer and Paul Van der Stricht, and the copy of my letter to G.E. will give you some idea of what the suggestions are respecting ETO. My letters to Bill and Dan (copies enclosed) contain further thoughts.

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D. Auxiliary Operations: This is a sizeable undertaking in itself. The enclosed papers will give you some idea of how my thoughts have been developing. Speed is required. Here is an undertaking -- wanted in every Theatre -- which, I believe, is "down our alley".

Fourth: Field Organizations:

You should have copies of the Algiers and Caire Charts. The enclosed cover OSS-MTO (London). It is substantially like the others.

As I have said above (and as I said in my effusion of Feb. 2 from Algiers) I think our Field Organizations are basically operational (combat) in nature. SI and SO can and should be eliminated. Your Deputy Director of Operations (which I still think should be John Magruder) would consolidate all this work. He would have an Intelligence Officer and Operations Officer under him. I recognize that R & A might offer a problem but this branch might function under "Planning" except as R & A men are assigned to Field Hqrs when they should operate under the Intelligence Officer. Training and Communications should surely fall under the supervision of the Deputy Director.

I realize that, in your recent cable, you reject my suggestion of John and are intimating that I could handle the job. I never quarrel with you and seldom disagree, but, for the kind of position I am visualizing, General Magruder would be highly acceptable to everyone. He has the contacts and capacity and I am sure that I could not hope to "fill the bill". No use making any change if it is not a good one. May I argue this with you -- and don't think I'm not deeply touched by your confidence -- as I was about the promotion for which I thank you although there are many others more deserving I'm afraid.

Fifth: Personal Notes:

My notes - covering my last stay here in London and my latest African visit are enclosed. I would never let anyone else read them and I have, in all cases, sent them along to you so that you might have the intimate by-play of my own reactions. I scrawl them each night or early morning and they picture moods as well as thoughts. Please read them with this in mind. Upon my return the Notes will be gathered together in memorandum form with a covering report similar to the one I made last fall.

Since accidents occur to planes I am sending this letter along

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with all available material so that you will have my planning date and so that someone at Washington can carry on. If I myself, arrive, this can be taken as my final interim report.

It will be grand to be with you again.

Yours,

Quillen H. Huntington, Jr.

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**[illegible], [illegible] 23, 1943**

By at 5:30, dressed and packed for the field—helmet, tin hat, side arms, canteen and haversack. Donned my British battle dress which I found most comfortable. I wonder many times why our troops are not as comfortably clad.

Left the Hotel Aletti about 6:15, with Guenther and Eliot, for Bill Riley's apartment where we had a good breakfast. Then off at 7:00 in a Command Car and Jeep—the two Colonels, Riley and Guenther in the Command Car with a driver, and Eliot and two in the Jeep, Eliot driving.

The day was lovely; and the mountain passes out of Algiers snow capped as they were, made a gorgeous setting for the verdant valleys through which we passed. Our road lay through SETIF and Constantine to Guelma (near Bona). From the green lowlands we emerged upon a wide plateau—devoid of trees—resembling the wastelands of Oklahoma, although somewhat more rugged.

We made poor time, passing countless convoys on route to the front, and although (1:00 P.M.) were still 70 miles from SETIF. We ate well, thanks to Bill's lunch, to the gaze of scores of [illegible], black-eyed Arabs. Then to SETIF where we arrived about 2:30. We refueled and continued on to Constantine, 76 miles away, stopping for a short 10 miles to the West. Constantine is a beautiful old city, but we did not linger as it was another 78 miles to Guelma and the hour was late (4:30 P.M.).

From Constantine we climbed over tortuous roads, past more convoys, to the summit of the pass which leads to Guelma. Here we met [illegible] and fog. Our dim-out lights were very dim and we drove slowly—[illegible] to twenty miles an hour—down the last few miles. We arrived finally, at 9:00 o'clock, found Chez Bourger (our rendezvous with Colonel Anstruther) and were fed. Then to our Billets—a French House which at this hour (10:30 P.M.) was tightly closed. We broke down the door and, finding beds, unrolled our bedding-rolls and went to sleep. There was no water and the facilities were meagre but we slept [illegible].

Sleep proved good. We had drove 330 miles over narrow, winding roads and the open Jeep had proved very cold—colder, perhaps, than ordinarily since I had been upset all day and had been down, been doubly chilly as a result of surveying at the shoulders, almost naked Arabs wandering about the countryside in the bitter wind or huddled in their cotton rags beside the muddy roadways.

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[illegible] FEBRUARY 27, 1945

A good sleep although I was tight. Bill and I had been reminiscing and had lived through the discomforts of Bruxelles and at the front with equal relish.

We were out a little after seven. Water and facilities were available--neither in abundance--but we managed a shave and pretended we were clean.

We breakfasted at the [illegible] mess at about 8:00 A.M.--[illegible], eggs, coffee--also spam.

After Breakfast I met Colonel Jim Young just in from the Southern forward area. It was good to see him. He reviewed for us the action of the 17th to date (TEN) which I have outlined elsewhere.

I conversed, at great length with Young and Colonel Anstruther. Two things were clear: First: That SO operations, based on infiltration, have not been possible since combat lines were drawn; and Second, that Colonel Young, in the South and Major Terrance in the North, are merely improvising with detachments which are unequipped, disorganized replicas of the Auxiliary Operations Groups about which I have been writing and cabling vigorously.

Colonel Young's groups are cutting lines of communication, laying mines, doing ambushing--this is not SO work, (which must be done in advance) but AO work (which is done at and after D-Day).

From my talk with Anstruther and Young, it is evident that the problems of supply, transportation and communications must be solved in advance. Units must come to combat zones fully equipped--and with arrangements for replacements.

The Communications problem is probably the most important of all those which are involved in operations of the kind under discussion. Since Captain Hunt is here (and brought for this purpose) I put him on the job of ascertaining the best possible Wireless system and materiel for the handling of combat detachments like our AO groups. I, therefore, sent him on the road at once and he went willingly.

A good lunch and then a visit, with Colonel Anstruther, to the training area. Crude but sufficient. Coming back our car broke down. Colonel Anstruther and I walked back a mile into town leaving

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Bill Eddy to guard the way. It was a veritable [illegible] surrounded by high hills—[illegible] lovely green valley where even now, about (this is the green [illegible] country of Algeria) is beginning to sprout.

And so ends dinner time.

Colonel Auchinleck gave us a report, made by May about the 23rd. of January 1943, on operations of Lessay. It was obvious from this that he and BOX consider this Mission directly their [illegible] OSS a bare participant. The British First Army and our 2nd Corps have been sold this idea. Yet the operatives have been recruited by us and several of our officers have been training. We can never, under such a scheme of things, build a position for OSS. Bill Eddy will not take operational responsibility.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1943

We pulled off from Guelma at 10:30 A.M. Our route lay via Ain Beida, Clairefontaine, La Meskiana to Tebessa and La Kouif (2nd C. Adv. Hq.). Here we found our Southern SO Group about 6:00 P.M. and prepared to bivouac for the night.

Spent one half hour at G.H.Q. looking at operations. Decided on a plan for Sage and his party. The enemy are now falling back toward Kasserine. There is a chance that a move toward the Southern flank may be made. Our sabotage groups should get there first. This was my suggestion as no one seemed to have a better idea. In fact, the original plan was to proceed from Thala, which would have led into the battle area where no sabotage work would be practicable.

The SO Combat Group will consist of 5 Spaniards, 4 U.S. Sargents, 1 British Driver, 2 W/T operators (1 Wireless set at Camp), 1 British officer, 1 American officer.

Note: No portable W/T set for advanced Party.

There will be left at La Kouif SO Hqrs. about 1 Signals officer, 1 U. S. officer and 12 men.

The drive during the day was most interesting. From Ain Beida to La Kouif we passed through a great alluvial plain replete with dark brown and winter wheat in which sheep, goats and cattle grazed at will. The roads were packed with convoys and the sky filled with Ju87s, Spits and Hurricanes which flew in a steady stream toward the eastern hills and returned, in scattered units, when their missions were fulfilled.

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While at Tebessa we stopped to beg a meal from a bunch of (American) Negro [illegible] Our boys were good to us and we ceased on hot field rations.

As we finished our meal three Marauders flew overhead. Suddenly one dived quickly toward the ground and skimmed along some few feet from the earth at terrifying speed. He hit and [illegible] in a "belly landing" without brakes or [illegible] full speed. There was a trail of smoke but no flame. The plane turned sideways, but did not nose over. The pilot jumped out--his co-pilot hovered around a moment and were off. A Jeep hurried toward the damaged plane. The incident was closed.

We slept on floors of abandoned huts or in French cottages and in trucks. The night was clear and cold. We slumbered to the noise of trucks and tanks moving along the Thala road. One thing was clear in my mind as I dropped off to sleep. Our operations in this sector were on a "Boy Scout" basis. A few young training officers and some Spanish ragamuffins. Neither G-3 nor G-2 were much interested in them. I wondered whether or not Bill Hedy had noticed this.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1943

We awoke at 5:45 A.M.--just as dawn was breaking--after a freezing night. A dash of cold water, then hot coffee. Bedding-rolls were packed, the Command car loaded. A mess of eggs and we were off at 6:15 for Thala and the advance Post of the 13th Armored Rgt. We passed Haidra and its Roman ruins and rolled into Thala at 10:15 A.M. Here we met Colonels May and Haines of the 1b Command moving up. The Thala road had been cleared in part the day before and we drove down some 7 1/2 miles to the head of a column of tanks manned by Grenadier Guards. Sappers were working two miles before us but their work had not been perfect. A Bren-gun carrier was demolished in our faces--the second within a few moments. Its driver was alive but immobile. He was immediately carried off in an ambulance. The British take care of their men.

The Guards, completely mechanized, were moving ahead at the rate of about 7 miles an hour against the German rear guard. German and British tanks littered the road and nearby fields. We peered into one black sig to stare into the shriveled face (features as clear as those of a mummy) of its charred German driver. Tank crews do not escape direct hits.

And so at 1:00 P.M. we were again at Tebessa where we lunched with our Aer-Ack boys again and then pushed on.

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The road was clear. We came at Tanlan at 5:30 P.M. [illegible] a cold high and a drink. I felt better. I wanted to talk to General [illegible] (who had come up for a conference) and Bill [illegible]. Certain things seemed to look dark as the result of my talk.

(A) At our meeting at 2nd Corps Headquarters neither G-3 (Col. Merritt and Lieut-Col. [illegible]) nor G-2 (Col. [illegible]) appeared the slightest bit interested in what our groups were doing. Col. Gunther reported that Dixon had said, in effect, that we were a nuisance;

(B) The efforts of our Southern group have been confined entirely to the mining of roads behind enemy lines; and

(C) The Group itself is composed of some three or four officers--intelligent but highly inexperienced; three good American Sergeants; and a motely array of French and Spanish speaking adventurers, trained in demolition work, but disorganized and exceedingly undisciplined from a military point of view.

There was a rather large party (over 30 when all were assembled) which was utilizing transportation, eating a lot of food and adding responsibilities of safety and securities to the other worries of 2nd Corps Staff Officers. They were not, as organized, doing a useful job.

This visit confirmed, beyond a doubt:

1. That SO work cannot be successfully carried on after conflict is joined;

2. That combat operational groups (AO Groups) must be specially trained, highly intelligent, well equipped and thoroughly organized; and

3. That such AO Groups can make a contribution at and after the time when combat is joined:

(a) In the organization of local resistance, intelligence and OM units;

(b) In carrying out specified missions such as raids, sabotage, etc.

[illegible], FEBRUARY 23, 1941

Off from Sousse at 5:30 A.M. Our destination Souk-el-Kemis via Kairouan, Le Kef, Le Sallo and Souk Ahras.

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We stopped at 12:30 P.M., after passing the Tunisian border, for a roadside lunch. A fire was built and we had a good meal of "3" rations--Scottie, Bert, the driver (Mari) and I--who were going on ahead in a borrowed French car. General Gribbins, Colonel Young and Bill Eddy had proceeded by way of Bone Annaba to visit First Army Headquarters.

The day was beautiful and the mountainous country picturesque beyond expression. No one who has not travelled through Algeria and Tunisia can imagine the ruggedness or difficulty which are encountered there.

Our trip was fairly rapid and we reached XXX northern headquarters near Souk-el-Kemis about 4:20 P.M. From La Calle we had been well in the combat zone and had been on guard against raid strafing which is common in this area. Many flights were seen but they were all allied planes.

At northern headquarters, BIRGEL MALOUF (Fig XXII), we met Majors Torrence and Gronby who suggested that we visit their outpost No. Two (near Bidi Nasir) before dark. We set off at once, through Beja, on the road to Mateur. We travelled some 15 miles reaching a point probably not more than 40--50 miles from Tunis itself. It was near the apex of a long salient reaching far into the German positions. The last British outpost was just ahead. On our left was Ne Zan's land--200 yards away--on our left a valley, stretching a mile or two toward hostile lines, containing some 25 pounders and AA batteries. Nothing was visible anywhere but out there on the treeless plain and barren hills were patrols and minefields--mines, machine gun nests and anti-aircraft. The only actual sign of conflict at the moment was a burning house, encountered on our trip up, which had fallen just a few moments before our arrival. Signs of earlier activity in the form of dangling wires and charred remnants of lorries were everywhere along the road.

The advance post headquarters were located at an abandoned railroad station. The men there seemed contented, in fine spirits and well fed. We talked with Captain Cooney, who was in command, and started on our return trip just as dusk was falling. The hour for strafing had passed. It was beginning to rain. We drove slowly through increasing darkness to Beja where we stopped to look in on Captain Burgoyne--just badly wounded--and thence to headquarters and a grand field dinner at 8:00 P.M.

Just as we sat down for our meal a message arrived from Gafsa saying that Jerry Sage and Sgt. Milton Folsom had been

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[illegible] wounded. They had been ambushed while on the road between [illegible] and [illegible] on [illegible]. Too bad, [illegible] Last experience had shown us adequate time on operations [illegible] this boys the war had been a short one.

We slept on the floor--five in a site reconnaissance we were tired enough to enjoy it all.

## [illegible], February 19, 1961

We were all up at 7:30 A.M.--15 people using one water tap. Breakfast at 8:00 A.M.--then back at the Arab Camp and a talk with Major Terrence and Colonel Young (who had arrived late the previous evening).

My conversations with Terrence and Conner gave us some [illegible] an appreciation of SO activities in a combat area as these I had observed in the South. A little mine laying at great range and with little benefit from the point of view of military requirements. Hawking grenades may destroy a wheel or immobilize an mechanical vehicle but work of this sort cannot be considered of military importance.

One thing had been done in this sector which was not true in the South. A planned effort had been made by SOG to carry on PW work--especially against the Arabs. This had been and still is important since the Arabs have been disclosing every slightest movement to the Germans. The "Arab telegraph" works well and quickly. All of this PW work had now ceased, however, as the Army had taken it over.

The day was spent in travel--back at Khamis, Bisha Abha and return. We lunched again on a mountain top and arrived in Qasim at 5:30 P.M. in the pouring rain. Our inspection trip had ended. It had been worth while for me since it gave living, current confirmation to what I had felt must be the fact:

(a) That SO and SF work must be well planned in advance and will be most effective when carried on behind enemy lines before combat is joined; and

(b) That the effort, once battle lines are drawn, must be made by well organized and highly trained specialized groups who are not, not only as saboteurs units but also as highly skilled guerrilla fighters and scouts groups. They must be highly mobile and thoroughly equipped for raiding party and patrol work.

Our visit to 2nd Corps Headquarters in the Southern Sector had reviewed frontier. Just and so that our unorganized, irregular

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[illegible] parties were not needed or wanted. Col. Harris (G-3) had given us no [illegible] at all. The assistant, Lt. Col. [illegible] listened to the suggested operations (random suggestions made by Col. Tracy, Major [illegible] and myself) with obvious disinterest and then said "Yes" to every inquiry put to him as to the feasibility of any given operation. Col. Dixon (G-2) had actually told Gus Guenther that he "wished to hell they (our group) were out from under foot."

We dined late—fell into bedding-roll at 10:00 P.M. Our morning start will be early—8:00 A.M.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1943

We were up at 5:15—no water—no wash—no shave. One car was late so that it was 6:30 before we finally left Guelma. The morning was cold and raw. Rain was still coming down.

At last the dawn and a clear sky in the west. There was no traffic. We rolled into Constantine (78 miles distance) at 8:25.

Gus Guenther (who had already obtained for us a jeep, 30 carbines and 6 2-wheelers) wanted to stop at the equipment depot for more equipment. We, therefore, dug up a bit of breakfast at the depot and Gus then demanded a jeep, a 1/2 ton truck and more carbines. He received 22 carbines, 4 trailers and a jeep. Gus is unbelievable when it comes to acquiring equipment.

The caravan was off for Algiers at 12:15 P.M. Hunt and Eddy in the Command car and Guenther and Huntington in the jeep. Gus and I were frozen after our 150 mile trip with no lunch and Algiers, where we arrived at 8:15 P.M., looked good to us.

We had a cold snack and then turned in at 10:20.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1943

Two raids last night, but I was too tired to pay much attention. I am told that several bombs were dropped. However, after the first alert I slept and we heard nothing.

Breakfasted at Hôtel Régina, worked with Potter on a Table of Organization; and then lunched sumptuously at the new OSS Mess which Derrick Potter had organized.

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In the Kasserine Jack McCloy, Scott, Mack of Ike, came in for a short - few minutes. He asked about our impressions of the front and I gave him mine in brief. He also suggested that I talk with him to the photographs about noon Sat. Since I could not get back earlier by boat I will certainly accept. It will give us a chance to talk to Jack further about all for me. I understand this morning, that we can do a real job for our Allied forces, a little help. He was much interested. He talked [illegible] about P.W. and said this strife was still going full [illegible] in Washington.

The impressions I obtained of the front, incidentally, given only hastily to Jack McCloy, are about as follows:

(1) Most of the effort at the actual front is, at the moment, British. Even at Thala we found the Grenadier Guards (attached) leading the spearhead of the advance on Feb. 21 which resulted in the retreat, two days later, of the Germans from the Kasserine Pass.

Note: The 1st Division (US) was apparently pulled out of the lines about the 16th and the 34th Division substituted.

(2) The activity in and near Thala and the movement of heavy equipment there and around Souk el Khemis in the North, indicated preparations for a three way attack:

(a) By the 8th Army Northward;
(b) American and British forces driving from the Kasserine Pass and the Pass just South (to cut off German units retiring on Fernana from Thala) toward Sbeitla; and

(3) A movement from Souk el Khemis and Beja on Mateur, Tunis and Bizerte. In this sector a strong tank force, with mobile support, could even now find reasonably easy going through the valleys of the treeless waste which lies before Mateur.

I did not tell Jack McCloy that our American operations seemed to me, in contrast to the British, ill organized, undisciplined and directed by officers of not too notable efficiency. Only in material and its handling is we equal. There is not the esprit, the surness and the military efficiency among our forces which is so evident with the British.

We stopped for a good lunch at the new CSS Mess and I then had a session with Eisenhower, Rosson, Potter and Lawrence.

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Roosborough was in one of his more pessimistic moods and complained, again, of the handicaps which confronted him in dealing with the French because of the political [illegible] and [illegible] of lack of personnel and equipment. He [illegible] confidence that our requirements would [illegible] in spite of the fact that Mr. Roth, the Commander-in-Chief, had not seen to realize that commitments are to [illegible] and that instead, Roth wanted to run a separate little show of his own; and that even if Roth did wish to commitment [illegible] has no idea of what is wanted or needed in the field, [illegible] permit of it. In short, Roosborough said he was about ready to quit but would stay for six weeks longer. I tried to give him a little encouragement pointing out that we were actually making progress. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY WE HAVE MORE WITHIN SOME PERSONNEL WHO WERE HERE AND IN COMMAND. I expect to [illegible] everything in a few short weeks and I am going home with the conviction that I can "sell" our Chief on the requirements of the field.

After this meeting we all adjourned to Bill Eddy's apartment. Arthur Roosborough talked in less bitter terms but covered much the same ground he had gone over with us. Donald Downes, too, complained that he had been made a recruiting officer without real qualifications in that he did not know what Col. Eddy had in mind as the objectives. Eddy said, again, that Tunisia was first; Italy and the Italian Isles second and Corsica and France last. Spain was, for the moment, to be left alone. He said, also, that radio operators were needed for the Southern Tunisian group and wanted the boys we had sent over with Downes. I intervened to say that I thought this would be a waste of talent just as keeping training officers (like Sage and Crosby) there--rather than officers schooled in tactics and operations--was not only like work but dangerous practice as has been indicated by the Sage-Nelson liquidation.

We then discussed immediate plans and decided on the commencement of training of OSS groups for Italy, Sicily, etc. within a week even though accommodations and personnel are lacking. I pointed out that Griffith, Crosby, Harris and one or two other officers could carry on training and that by the time the course was completed more personnel would be here.

Arthur Roosborough said that OSS had no adequate personnel to send and thought our best policy would be to put ourselves entirely in OSS's hands--training, operations, communications, etc. Better this than nothing.

I said that we now had a definite understanding with OSS which would enable us to proceed independently but on a cooperative basis; that OSS only had two training officers whereas we had four

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people who could temporarily be used in this capacity. [illegible] no objection to continuing training getting our groups and units of OSS were kept separate; that in any event communications and supply lines must be separately maintained with coordination at the top only. We do not need to play "second fiddle" nor take a "cut-rating" attitude. We are now, after all, beginning to develop which our own lines of contact within enemy territories. We are also contributing, currently, to the training program due to facilities--especially with respect to parachute work which is entirely U.S. except for one officer instructor.

The meeting ended on a more affirmative and confident note than had been in evidence when it started.

At dinner time I talked with Morrison about training and Captain McCallum about his impressions of SO work on the Southern front; McCallum and Carl Coon, too, both feel as I have felt that the Southern effort of OSS (actually it is SOE) is a waste of time, energy and man-power and is a source of annoyance to the second corps.

Stopped off to say goodbye to Bill Eddy. One of the grandest fellows ever. I wonder how he has tolerated me. I came without authority to make operational suggestions yet he has listened to me patiently. We have campaigned together and understand each other. I wanted, on this trip, to get close to Bill--as I have to Gus Guenther, and everyone else in the field who has to do with operations.

Incidentally I was struck by one remark of Roseborough's. He was strictly an SI man, but in talking of the lads now in Corsica and France he said: "It is impossible to get good men like that for SI work. They will give us intelligence but only if their principle objective lies on the side of action." This has, of course, always been so. The Chief knows it--otherwise Dave Bruce would not now be in London. Intelligence officers--properly supervised--to gather and correlate information which we and others gather--Yes. But two operating branches--SI and SO--ridiculous. Almost as ridiculous as training and communications sections which are not directly controlled by operations. This, in truth, is confusion worse confounded.

I was told that I should leave in the morning via Gib. Have been to the fraud Aletti to pack. It will be good to shake the sand of Africa from my tired boots.

[illegible]

No air raids, but a poor sleep just the same.

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Off at 10:00 for Gander where we stopped at [illegible] minutes later, for two hours to [illegible] lunch at an atrocious mess. We were told that [illegible] be out of the question—fog and storms. [illegible] it "a half-hearted try", however, and we were off at 1:30. The weather was the worst I've seen for a long time and our pilot proved to be more courageous than any of his passengers. We were ready and willing to turn back, but he kept [illegible] no ceiling, little visibility and a bad [illegible] there before us—climbed with [illegible] "the Rock". We [illegible] about 3:45 P.M. and went directly to the [illegible] tion of Major Eaton and Lt. Shoemart of A.P.C. Later on [illegible] learned that some B-24's were taking off in the morning and by dint of much wrangling with Major Eaton and a great display of [illegible] my part, we managed to be assigned tentative places.

Dined with Lt. Col. Kelley (Gran) of U.S.A.A.F. [illegible] and turned in at 10:15 P.M. on the heels of a 3:45 A.M. call.

TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 1943

We were actually up at 3:15 A.M. The morning was cold, windy and rainy. We packed, had what was called breakfast (including tea which at that hour could, for my part, equally well be castor oil or dishwater) and after some bickering with the rather dull Major Eaton over a matter of parachutes (which Knot and I did not possess) we were away at 6:30 A.M.

The journey was a nightmare of cold. We flew through a gale at 10,000 feet. I donned flying suit and everything else in sight but still found myself numb with cold. We were in the center gun pits and at 7:00 A.M. the ports were flung open to permit of machine gun practice. The temperature dropped another 10 degrees as we all took some practice shots. Then interminable hours above the clouds; at last the descent. More open ports. Several unidentified planes which veered away as we laid our guns on them (this B-24 carried 10 fifty calibre Brownings). Finally St. Ivy airport at about 2:45. Here we received the usual discourteous and disorganized attention of our Air Force officials and, finally, after two hours, were allowed to go into Newquay to search for food. This we found in a very bad "Pub". A tiresome wait for the 8:00 P.M. local to London broken by a call to Fisher Rowe and Johnny Bruce. A supper—a poor one— at the Manor House. A local train to Parr where I found sleeping accommodations which, with reluctant chivalry, I gave to Miss Virginia Cowles. She assists Gil Winant and might, some day, be helpful to us.

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Max Gordon's observations on the South African front were interesting. British troops well disciplined and thoroughly disorganized. Our troops giving the appearance of laxity and disorganization. He said that a fellow newspaper man had referred to the American Forces as a frequently rather than an army. It was "Roo about moving over there Sunshine Bill" rather than "Captain Jones, your command will take position Southwest of Kasserine, E.E at 4a to Gen. proceed to move in the direction of Kill Jim. Your objective---. Your boundaries---etc". This confirms my own impressions.

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1943

The ride in was a ghastly affair and I arrived at Claridges tired and unkept to find myself without a room at Claridges. Finally at 10:00 A.M. I was taken in at the Savoy. There I bathed and shaved. Then to the office. Saw David Bruce and talked trip and organization with him. Later more of the same with Bruce. It was interesting to note that Dave's attitude on field operations conformed to everything I had found in Africa and the Mid East. He, too, has become operational minded. He was delighted with the African organization chart and wants the same thing here. I told him I'd just seen a cable from the Colonel which I would answer in the morning which indicated that the whole field plan was to be tossed out of the window. Whitney Shepardson, who is a delightful fellow and very good at wheedling information from local British, French and Polish sources, evidently has visions of a great and independent intelligence system. He will, therefore, oppose any move calculated to consolidate OSS operations. How he intends to build such a system is beyond my own conception since he has no experience--business or combat--on which to draw. The war would be years old before SI--on its own--would build an organization behind enemy lines. Good operatives are to be had and Army, Air Force and Navy assistance is to be obtained, only on the basis of action. Intelligence will come but only as an incident to a real combat objective.

Dave believed me tired and unduly pessimistic but I knew my Washington intelligensia. Only the Colonel--among those left--has the instincts of a fighter and will appreciate the needs of our interests--and the Colonel will be interred in other things when I return.

Returned to the Savoy to work with Johnny Bruce on a Table

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of Organization for our London Office. A raid came about 10:00 P.M. I seem to be a first class conductor for that process. Three bombs whistled down near enough to be heard but nothing more was visible as the sky was heavily overcast.

To bed at 12:00 P.M.

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1943

There was a second raid in the early morning. The alert was but a faint disturbance to me and then I slept peacefully and soundly through whatever else occurred.

With David Bruce, I met General Barker (G-3) and General Donovan at the latter's apartment for lunch. An excellent meal and a good opportunity to talk OSS operations and air transport needs. Barker will see us again and says he will help us with Andrews. He suggested that we confer with his assistant—Col. Barth.

After lunch David Bruce and I discussed, once more, the question of organization. He is highly in favor of a plan such as that worked out in North Africa which, I told him frankly, had been worked out on paper by two SI men (Roseborough and Shapiro) but was actually suggested by an SO man (E.O.H.Jr.). Since it effectively eliminates SI and SO and creates an OSS operational group and since I, myself, had suggested Roseborough as Executive Officer, I had no compunctions about persuading the gentlemen in question to adopt the plan. Dave said it was alright with him and was the only sound basis on which to proceed in the field. From the Colonel's remarks over the telephone Monday night it seemed to be acceptable to him too. Dave did not believe that any change in the Washington set up would be brought about since there were too many vested interests—strongly entrenched in OSS—to be served. I told Dave that I understood, of course, that there would be resistance but that I was sure the Colonel could bypass any preliminary [illegible] points. After all I have no personal interest to serve. My only concern is to have OSS make a place for itself in the winning of the war—something it has never even begun to do to date—and that I could make a drastic reorganization easier for the Colonel by resigning as Chief of SO which I have already suggested. Dave said I was talking nonsense and that the Colonel would "give me hell" if I even mentioned a resignation.—So much for that. We will see what happens on my return.

In any event we agreed on a "set up" for our SFO headquarters.

I dined with Bruce, Manning Jacob (Gil Fitzhugh's assistant), Tom Barr Stewart, Hunt and Canfield. We went over the proposed Lon-

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on Bridgeworks plan. The Air Ministry has finalized [illegible] the Section Chiefs in function in an involved [illegible] department with no central execut from the head of [illegible] I said that our main objective was operational-preparation [illegible] ng" day. This means that every personal must in general [illegible] be known to the Executive Officer and his Chief Operations Officer. They--as military men--might not understand the political [illegible] involved in the making of underground contacts (and even in [illegible] ing) but they must be in a position to relate or fuse plans to military requirements and available facilities. The Executive Officer (acting through his Chief of Operations) must be in a position to exercise "veto" power with respect to activities of an operational nature. In addition the Army, Navy and Air Force would deal, on operations, not with five or six section chiefs but with one Operations Officer on whom they could pin responsibility. OSS at home may be a haven of refuge for high powered intellectuals but in the field it must be and act like a military organization. This involves a "chain of Command, authority and responsibility". Canfield--as usual--argued the point and said that he was "way down the line" but we finally parted friends. I did not want to hurt the boy's feelings but he belongs, of course, "way down the line".

The boys told me that D'Cerwik was coming over to be Madder's assistant and Crosswell was also coming. What nonsense! To waste D'Cerwik's time as an office boy to run about and gather information from our good friends. And how the Germans will shudder when they hear that Crosswell is to head OSS work in U.K.!

This reminds me that David Bruce asked me to do something about Fuentes and Shlangen. He admitted that he had been "egged on" by Bruce into getting them here. Fuentes, however, is a complete nuisance and Schlangen wants a desk job. He did not have the courage to volunteer for a proposed "Norwegian Raid". He now wants to go to Cairo. I told Dave I was well fed up with this business of having my judgment on personnel thrown in the ash can at Washington and then, in the last analysis, finding this personnel back in my lap. Nevertheless, I will talk to these lads and see what I can do. Sooner, I hope, someone will be given the authority--over all national personnel which General Sublime has in OSS. He hires and fires as circumstances may require. People perform or get out--just as these top men are now being sent home full speed from North Africa. Sublime is too ruthless and his people fear him. The same results can be accomplished with tact but the power must be there and if Magruder is made Deputy Director in Charge of Operations every person in the field, on the operations side, under and including the Executive Officer, should be under his control. Naturally he would act through the local Chief and/or Executive Officer, but he must be able to act. This, again, will never be accepted in Washington.

We had after midnight and dog tired. I've not made up for lost sleep yet.

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FRIDAY, AUGUST 6, 1943

Walked to the Office after a late breakfast.

Further talks with Bruce and Van der Stricht on Table of Organization and Chart.

Prepared a draft of letter to General Andrews covering OSS activities MTO Theatre as promised David Bruce yesterday.

Met Charles Ambrose, General Sir Marshall Cornwall and Tony Keswick with David Bruce at his apartment for lunch. We discussed the War and my African visit in general terms. Also the arrangements made in North Africa between SO and SOE. I stated that General Gubbins had found the memorandum prepared in London much too long for his liking. He had prepared a short one of four paragraphs as a substitute. On this we had agreed. Subsequently, following my return from Cairo we had met at the Club de Pins (Gubbins, Mann, David Keswick, Bruce and one or two others from SOE and Eddy, Roseborough, Potter and Huntington from SO). We had, in effect, decided that independence of operations could be maintained without sacrificing cooperation in the higher echelons. While there might be territories where one of us could work more advantageously than the other (as SO might in Italy or SOE in France), neither party was not to be barred from any so-called "sphere of influence" of the other. It was to the interest of everyone to get as many operatives behind enemy lines as possible in order to compensate for the ravages of liquidation and similar hazards. Our facilities would, of course, be pooled. SOE, for instance, had two training officers and we four but, while groups should be separately trained and handled, courses should be so arranged that the services of all officers would be available to each of us. We are, as a matter of fact, furnishing parachute facilities at the moment and, we hope, may assist with plane transportation. CD replied that he knew about the parachute training arrangements which were most helpful. I went on to say that, as a practical matter, cooperation was being worked out on the spot without the necessity for written agreements. Our memoranda had, in effect, been put aside and our people in the field were cooperating voluntarily. Recruiting, for example, was being done more or less jointly on a "that one for you and this one for me" basis. CD stated that formal agreements were a nuisance anyway and that willing collaboration was much more effective. "We spend too much time [illegible] cooperation though," he said.

TONY KESWICK THEN ASKED ME ABOUT CAIRO. I replied that the Cairo negotiations were a disappointment to us. General Eisenhower had given us complete authority and promised cooperation though.

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[illegible]

I, on the other hand, had left [illegible] standing which would [illegible] opinion. I had [illegible] which with Turner [illegible] on the Intelligence side was [illegible] satisfactory. [illegible] talks with Eisenhower and Bedell Smith, [illegible] but he had wanted to particularize our relationship. [illegible] he had prepared a memorandum, received by us during the evening of the day preceding my early morning departure, in which OSS had [illegible] conditions a new arrangement of OSS. He was to control all officers of OSS when in dealings with our own Air Forces and even with respect to intelligence matters. I had hastily replied in a letter (of which Jones was to have kept me a copy but failed to do so) stating that I would, in the first place, negotiate only for OSS; that certainly I would not seek for our Air Force any preemptive the method pertinent to which their cooperation would be giving that I presumed our Air Force and the RAF could work with their own system of Cooperation and that OSS Assistance such as he was indicating was surely inimical to our best joint interests as it would foreclose independent contacts with foreign groups which we might otherwise exploit.

I went on to say to GD that I thought the same status should prevail in Caire as in Algiers. The people on the spot could work out a reasonable modus vivendi. Gus Guenther and Jones were agreeable chaps and certainly no one could have been more cordial than Glassmoor was to us.

I ventured the thought that it was, perhaps, Col. Keble who had prepared the memorandum. I had not had an opportunity to talk to him at length and disclose to him the need, discussed many times by GD and me, for helping OSS appear more formidable, perhaps, than it really is--at least to outsiders, especially our own services from whom we want assistance.

David Bruce emphasizes the need of establishing an independent American Service if we are to receive aid from the Army, Navy and Air Force. If we are considered only an adjunct of SOE the answer will always be "Let the British do it".

GD answered that he had heard nothing from Caire and had supposed all was well. Christopher Glassmoor, he added, had too great a penchant for detail. Tony Kubek agreed with this. GD thought he would send off a cable asking how things were coming.

GD raised the question about the sub-committee which controlled operations in the Mid East. I answered that we would, of course, conform to their procedure.

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SO then stated that "this formality was unnecessary" and that he would send a cable.

David Bruce said that what we really needed were supplies (through activation of the OSS catalogue and a manufacturing program), transport and a good [illegible] to give us prestige.

We then discussed operations and the Auxilliary Operations Groups for a moment. I said I would like to see General [illegible] for a moment and General Cornwall volunteered to make an appointment for me for Monday. At this point I told Sir Charles that the Colonel had asked me to invite both himself and [illegible] over as guests of OSS. SO would like to come.

The meeting ended at about 3:00 P.M. It had been well worth the effort.

Gave the proposed letter to General Andrews to David for correction and then went to the Savoy to meet Gulpin and Vander Stricht at 4:00 P.M. Went over plans for Gulpin. Have called to say SH-5 wanted to know about Gulpin. Told Van der Stricht to arrange this.

At 5:30 P.M. Louis Huot came in to discuss Communications. He said that Col. Oscoma had told him today that SOE must go ahead with the Northern Station unless we are ready to proceed at once. Louis was in an awful stew as Grayson is not here and Louis feels that he is without authority. I told Louis that I was not surprised and that I had written the Colonel when the deal was first made that it was the chance of a lifetime for OSS but that I knew we would "fall flat on our faces" and that nothing would happen. Now it has transpired just as predicted. I told Louis, however, that we just could not fail. Operations require communications. Therefore, let's improvise as we have at Algiers and Caire. We'll give the Colonel what he wants and what OSS needs in spite of Lowman who is a grand fellow but a total loss when it comes to the communications requirements of Secret Operations. Louis said we might be able to use temporary huts and SOE operators and find enough equipment to make a start. He thought he could get some poles. I, therefore, suggested that we plan the Northern SOE station for operation, at the outset, by British operators but with American supervision and cipher clerks and our own ciphers. The small, secret station must be all-American from the outset and must be able to pick up traffic from our stations at Algiers and Caire and also from an organization we hoped to build in France. French contacts could be handled, manually, through the SOE central station but we should be ready to pick up if SOE begins to give their own people priority, or if, at any time, territory is divided between the British and ourselves.

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Louis thought he could open something that had said he was "fed up" and wanted to get back to Washington. Anyone is an expendable man, he added, well able to do any job.

I told Louis that since Donovan is not here and since we now have operational groups in France and more going in, I would try to clear an improved arrangement with the Colonel when, after all, he interest's in reconnaissance not sabotage. If he, Louis, will see this through I'll try in Washington to get him released to operations.

It was a bargain.

Dined alone and wrote these notes. To bed at 10:00 P.M. Perhaps my first real sleep in three months except that I leave early in the morning on manoeuvres.

SATURDAY, MARCH 6, 1943

Out at 6:30 for a trip to Audley End, on the way to Cambridge, where SOE has set up a headquarters for sabotage and Jedburgh group practice with the invading army in connection with current manoeuvres. The British (SOE) Finishing School was being used as Hqrs. Colin Mackinnon was in charge with Major Hill 2nd in Command. Six sabotage groups had been sent in prior to manoeuvres and six Jedburgh teams had been prepared for infiltration behind enemy lines with a view to contacting local resistance groups.

General Canfield and Lieut. were staying at Headquarters and actually assisting the British. Capt. Manning Jacob and I went for the day.

We found a well arranged situation map and operations room. We also noted the "Berlin" (HQ) group locations and that three of the six groups had been uncovered as a result of GE work carried on by GE agents without the aid of the local police or D-Effing. The other groups had "stuck" and were doing good information-getting only a fortnight, in fact, being received by the invading forces covering current troop movements.

Two Jedburgh teams had been "put in" the night before (the 5th) for use against assigned targets on the night of the 6th. They had made contact with local resistance groups. They were moved by truck (or lorry or air transport) from behind the enemy's lines. A rather different job than that which would confront the teams in actual conflict.

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[illegible] lunch [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] (to [illegible]). As I recall, [illegible] (I [illegible]) [illegible] 700 rounds of ammunition, and hand grenades [illegible] [illegible] guns, [illegible] and pistols. They also carry two [illegible] [illegible] interesting to note that pistols will very soon be [illegible] [illegible] the 5th Army. I am [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The Jedburgh and SOE's promotion of auxiliary [illegible] groups. I do not believe they fill the bill. Their [illegible] are not sufficiently high and they are not [illegible] [illegible] to organize quickly, teach and then control the local [illegible], it is expected, can be gathered together at an [illegible] [illegible].

Discussed the various [illegible] of the Jedburgh units (French, Free French, Danes and Norwegians) and took one [illegible] look at operations after [illegible]. Back back to London at 4:30 P.M.

In any event it was a lovely ride.

Completed my notes, dined alone at the hotel and went to bed to read myself to sleep.

SUNDAY, MARCH 7, 1943

Up at 8:00 for a skimpy breakfast and then to work on a memorandum to the Colonel on the subject of Auxiliary Operations.

To Claridge's at 1:30 P.M. to tell a Mlle [illegible] going to Algiers (Dave Bruce says he is a [illegible] here in London and not too accessible to either British or Americans—something I already know), at the earliest moment had been receipt of [illegible] from Gen. Gammer. I hope the lad does not do us as much harm in the Mid East as he has here. I learned this again on his "pushy" temperament and think he will follow my admonitions. Thus far he has been a complete "pain in the neck" to me.

I met David Bruce, Sheppard Morgan, Bruce Magruder, Bill [illegible], Junius Morgan (who came after lunch) for lunch. We talked about this and that and I asked Magruder to look after a financial matter in Washington to be handled through the Commander.

A short walk and then back to the Savoy for more work and to begin a letter report to the Colonel. Dave showed me a cable

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Then [illegible] Louis said, [illegible] the [illegible]. He will [illegible] the [illegible] will [illegible]. It is possible that we will be able to [illegible] something.

Dinner with Major and Mrs. [illegible] and then to bed [illegible] midnight.

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


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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

a. [illegible]

b. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible]

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(Ltr, from Office of Strategic Services, United States Government, 5 March 1943, subj: O.S.S. Operations - E.T.O.)

AG 381 M 1st Ind CMB/ejd

Hq ETOUSA, 11 March 1943.

TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Department, Washington D.C.

1. Approved subject to the provisions of Paragraph 3 b. basic letter.

2. Attention is invited to Paragraph 6, Directive, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (No. 155/4/D, dated 23 December). In this connection the A.C. of S., G-2, is designated as the representative of the Theater Commander and as such O.S.S. in this Theater will function under the direction of this office. The A.C. of S., G-2 will establish the necessary liaison for all O.S.S. operational projects with the G-3 Section.

3. Attention is further invited to Paragraph 2 a. basic letter. It is understood that the T.O. mentioned therein will be based on the T.O., Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, O.S.S., Annex A., J.C.S. Directive No. 155/4/D, 23 December. An examination of this T.O. shows that it provides the necessary personnel and enumerates the grades and ratings for O.S.S. Branch Offices.

For the Commanding General:

C.H. BARTH
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

Handed Lt. Col. Ellery C. Huntington Jr., by Colonel Duane White in the presence of Colonel Bruce, Major Brewer and Captain Brown at Major Brewer's apartment 6.10 p.m. March 11, 1943.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.,

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(Ltr, OSS, U.S. Government, 8 March 1943, subject: O.S.S. Operations N.T.C. - Norwegian Undertaking)

AG 381 MOS 1st Ind. CHB/aps

HQ ETOUSA - 11 March 1943.

TO: Officer in charge, Office of Strategic Services, London.

Approved.

For the Commanding General:

CH. HARTH,
Colonel, GSC
Chief of Staff.

Handed Lt. Col. Ellery C. Huntington Jr., by Colonel Sumner Waite in the presence of Colonel Bruce, Major Brewer and Captain Bross at Major Brewer's appartment 6.10 p.m. March 11, 1943 (with statement for cable being sent).

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. There is attached herein copy of memorandum of [redacted] which is being circulated, or has been circulated, by British [redacted] the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. A photostatic or duplicate copy of the "Proposed Intelligence Venture Interpretation" is being referred to in the [redacted] has already been submitted to the Joint Chiefs, [redacted] copies or photostatic copies of Letters, dated January [redacted] respectively, outlining the plan of operation (copies were [redacted] representatives of the Foreign Governments in [redacted] mentioned in such memorandum.

3. On the basis of the foregoing it is requested that the Theatre Commanders:

a. Give consent to such "Proposed Intelligence Venture Interpretation" subject to receipt of approval to such "Interpretation" (as requested in the memorandum aforesaid, or even date) of the British Chiefs of Staff, which approval may be communicated to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Theatre Commanders, S.E.A., either directly or through [redacted] and

b. Guide such consent to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Hilary P. Huntington, Jr.,
Lieutenant, USN,
Special Representative,
Director, Office of
Strategic Services.

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be obtained, of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and the British Chiefs of Staff.

6. It is recognized, therefore, that the Chiefs of Staff will give their approval to the American plan and in particular agree to the establishment of the proposed O.S.S. base in Zealand.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

1. O.S.S. has submitted or is about to submit a proposal (dated December 23, 1942) entitled "Proposed Psychological Warfare Undertaking in Norway" providing, among other things, for the conduct of S.O. activities in that country.

2. In furtherance of this "Undertaking" O.S.S. (of which S.O. is the section corresponding to S.O.E.) have prepared a plan for operations in Norway. In discussion with N.O.R.A., O.S.S. have agreed that S.O. work will normally be conducted north of parallel of 62°. This plan has been approved by representatives of the Norwegian Govt. in exile as well as by S.O.E. and O.S.S.

3. The objectives as stated by O.S.S. are:-

(a) To carry on psychological and subversive warfare activities in Norway.

(b) To train operatives to accomplish the foregoing objectives.

(c) To obtain information in Norway necessary to accomplish the foregoing objectives where such information is not available from other sources.

4. In order to achieve these objectives O.S.S. will require facilities to train their personnel and to operate from this country. This has been arranged direct between N.O.R.A. and O.S.S. O.S.S., however, hope eventually to establish a base of their own in Iceland or perhaps in the British Isles from which they feel operations to Northern Norway might more conveniently be carried out.

5. The Minutes Committee in the U.S. European Theatre of Operations is being asked to give consent to the O.S.S. plan subject to the [illegible]

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[redacted]

Dear Tony

Many thanks for your letter of the 14th March, and the copies of the future correspondence which were enclosed.

I am sure our people on the spot will be able to get on together without difficulty. As I have on other occasions said yourself, we have recognised our own shortcomings where they have been, but it has been that it is to the benefit of both of us that we maintain some responsible guidance of being able to get more very similar our own point.

It would be very difficult indeed for us to attempt to express to you my thanks for the great patience and consideration which has throughout the entire organisation has shown to all of us.

I shall be seeing you soon again I hope. In the meantime, au revoir, and best regards.

Faithfully,

(sgd.)

Hilary C. Huntington, Jr.,

H. J. Kenrick, Esq.,
44, Baker Street,
London, W.1.

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March 5th, 1953

Dear Gene:

I wired to tell you how sorry I was to have missed you the morning we all left. I really wanted to [illegible] work it had seemed to me to have had the good morning [illegible] with you all of the time we had together. I was [illegible] wished it for everybody. Only of course I wished [illegible] all the best of luck. I hope the job will be well done. I am sure that you, Milan and Wade will get along [illegible] and I'll certainly get [illegible] relaxed to you. [illegible] improvise a Communications system here. Military has [illegible] since we left - in page from Washington saying, at will, [illegible] date, telling us to go ahead as we had suggested before we left.

I have mailed you about Job Challenge. He is a good lad and will be useful, at first in training and, later perhaps, as an operations officer.

They are ready to have George White come on duty. If he stays there longer he will never be home!

Tell Elma that I think Irene and Irmee are Number 1 objectives for operations and a [illegible] [illegible]. A mission to Mihailovich would certainly be available - with training officers and communications. I will work with his desk in hope on Auxiliary Operations Group (Greek and Serb).

I know that you mind and want and will send you good personnel. Vella Lada - Kosovski (pronounced "Kosovsky" which he wrote) and Fuyter are both good on operations and planning. Mier is about ready and has had good training. He can function in S.A. work as well as handle discussions and air operations, but he will have to be directed. He antagonizes people by being

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[redacted]

[redacted] Sputnik. This would be [redacted]

Great luck and my best to your good self, [redacted], Dorothy

White and Jim Lucas.

I am off, I hope, in two days.

Sincerely,

Hilary C. [redacted] Jr.

Pole (2): I talked with G.H. about interchange of [redacted]. He agrees and will [redacted] to make [redacted] people think we are worth [redacted].

Pole (1): The enclosed on Auxiliary Surveillance Group [redacted] be submitted to our [redacted] Council [redacted].

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Dear Bill:

This is for you, Arthur, Harold, Donald, Jimmy and the rest of your crew.

First of all, I want begin to tell you how much I enjoyed having even so brief a time with you. I would not have [illegible] for anything, the opportunity of being (too [illegible]) with you. Bill, so that I could leave for you, [illegible] could get, first hand, some picture of real life in Algiers, the experience of my stay there and of our [illegible] with me - vividly - for a long, long time. And I think I have been able to bring back some [illegible] problems and needs are, and can likely do so. I bring back the consoling knowledge that you will always have the [illegible] of those who are working under you and for you.

Here in DC we are setting up an organization similar to that we developed in Algiers and Italy. We are asking the Theater Commander for most the same authority and we have set up a table of organization which he believes he will activate on the spot out of his own allotment. The Colonel, too, is a [illegible] with have been a [illegible] who could be appointed the Algiers chief and related operating philosophy in DC. He has done [illegible] that he approves preliminary consideration (which I suggested in a letter written Friday last from Algiers) and will not put General Eisenhower or Deputy Director [illegible] to land the job and wants me to do that. That he has accepted the principle is fine. I only have to convince him, now, that John Hagaman should be asked to undertake the job. This, I am sure, can be done. It will simplify the functioning of the facilities of supply, communication and transport, should other some perverse problems [illegible] in the kind of organization both have of which you believe in the Field have made.

Your organization is going to have the primary task of organizing behind enemy lines. There will be work and [illegible] - in point of time. Will Arthur get to become disengaged, the same applies to Donald. Will Arthur be, that equal has will even go to the place to which he is interested from this point - toward the North and Sweden - and there may be complete in the development. Through Paul Van our Switch - and using our [illegible] in the Field - these systems should be tied together. We also hope to have contacts from the Partisans and a system (dormant)

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[illegible]

[illegible]

In connection with [illegible]

I think I know at least [illegible]

My best to you and the boys.

Faithfully,

Hilary [illegible], Jr.

Enc. (1): The enclosed on A.G. [illegible] will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs through the Colonel.

Enc. (2): Saw the Chief of [illegible] (G.B.) and told him that [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

I very much appreciated our talk this [illegible].

Yours,

[illegible]

Lieut.-Colonel [illegible] C. [illegible],
Office of Strategic Services,
[illegible] Grosvenor Street,
[illegible]

[illegible]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

X 6/20/47

[redacted]

Dear Colonel Donovan,

Following upon our conversation of yesterday, I [illegible] FEE/DCE Subcommittee to approve the minutes of our meeting held [illegible] on 5.6.47, on the basis of a working arrangement between the S.O.E. and O.S.S. Mid East Missions.

In the meeting, I think that there are several points which require further clarification.

As I see it, the SOE/OSS Committee referred to in the minutes of our meeting of 5.6.47 will be responsible for coordinating the activities of S.O.E. Mid East and the S.O. Department of O.S.S. Mid East, within the limits of policy laid down by S.O.E. London. The policy directives received by the SOE/OSS Committee will not, however, be finally accepted until they have been approved by the Minister of State and Commander Mid East by submitting them to the FEE/DCE Sub-Committee of the Middle East Defence Committee.

Any new projects for any country initiated by yourself as the Head of the S.O. Department will be submitted to the SOE/OSS Committee. If approved, they will then be submitted to the FEE/DCE Sub-Committee and, after their concurrence has been obtained, the American S.O. Department will execute the operations involved, subject to the provisions of the next 2 paragraphs.

The Chief of Staff of S.O.E. Mid East will be appointed as Chief Operational Officer and will be responsible to the SOE/OSS Committee for all the operations of both Missions. The Head of the S.O. Department will report to the Chief Operational Officer on the progress of operations undertaken by his department and will be responsible to him for their execution.

The Country Section Heads of the S.O. Department will be responsible normally to the Head of their own Department but it will, I think, be necessary for the Chief Operational Officer to reserve the right to make them subject to the authority of the corresponding Country Section Heads of S.O.E. Mid East for any particular country or operation should he deem this necessary.

The form and extent of the S.O. Department will be decided by the SOE/OSS Committee. It is, however, agreed that it will have its headquarters at Cairo and that it will consist of the appropriate number of Sections for conducting subversive warfare in the countries within the Mission area. The S.O. Department will be entitled to main use of the Directorate of Auxiliary Services of S.O.E. Mid East for W.T., communications, training of agents, despatch of agents and special requirements of concealment articles and forged papers, etc., and will not set up their own War Stations for communication with agents in the field or with sub-centres in the Mission area without the approval of the SOE/OSS Committee.

Any American aircraft or aircraft used by the S.O. Department for special operations will come under the command of the R.A.F. Commander of the S.O.E. Squadron and S.O.E. Para-Naval Section respectively.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

24 Feb 43

My dear Lord Glenconner,

Colonel Donovan, Colonel Amen and I have just received your note of even date respecting making arrangements, arrived in your absence at our London meeting of 9 January, 1943, between S.O.E. and S.O. I am answering at Colonel Donovan's request, since the matters involved concern the branch of O.S.S. for which I am responsible.

The expression of complete cooperation contained in your letter, and expressed as well in London, are most kind and are accepted in the spirit in which they are made. There are one or two points which I would like to discuss, however, in the interest of clarification of our position. Chief among these is that I can, of course, speak only for our S.O. Branch - ours being a dual organization.

We will also, I believe, from our point of view, be compelled to recognize that our primary responsibility is to our Theatre Commander under our base directive from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would indicate that policy matters (referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4) [redacted] Such was the arrangement made in Algiers where each Mission reserved the right to refer policy matters to organization headquarters. Since the work of our own military and political units is so closely coordinated, I cannot believe that the policies under which we will operate are likely to be in conflict.

My only other point is one which I have many times discussed with CD and the General. If S.O. is to make any material contribution to our joint efforts it can only be because we are able to "establish" ourselves in the eyes of our own armed forces. We will otherwise face the charge from our Air Forces and Services of Supply that we are a Department of S.O.E. and must rely on S.O.E. facilities. For this reason I firmly believe, as I expressed myself in London, that our functions and our operations should be separately maintained. Coordination of operations through the Policy Committee which you suggest is entirely agreeable.

With respect to the use of facilities, I am sure, for the reasons outlined above, that contact with American services should be through S.O. just as I feel that any British facilities which are employed should be requested through S.O.E. I do not know how our Air Forces will wish to operate but I am sure we cannot undertake to bind it to any operational procedure which it does not [illegible]. I am equally sure that collaboration between the American and British Air Forces is of the closest.

The fourth paragraph on page 2 of your letter would seem to be fraught with some difficulty. S.O. has, for a considerable period of time, been dealing with foreign and Allied Governments and groups. To discontinue this would be impolitic if not dangerous. Does not the suggested Policy Committee furnish the only safeguard which is needed?

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

I regret that I did not have an opportunity to read this letter before it was delivered to you but time and the lack of [illegible] did not permit of this. Colonel Ames has been kind enough to offer to see that the note is placed in your hands.

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[redacted]

My dear Colonel Huntington,

[redacted]

[redacted] and the S.O. Department of S.O.E., [redacted] so indispensable to success.

I can see no reason why the U.S. Government should not receive [redacted] policy directives from [redacted] the U.S. [redacted] without the knowledge of [redacted] the S.O.E./O.S.S. Committee. [redacted] that such directives conflict with those which are received by S.O.E. [redacted] we would of course refer the matter to our respective headquarters for them to deal with.

Regarding your paragraph 4. I see your point. In the good [redacted] I think we must avoid anything which savours of [redacted] undertaken by the two Missions, or which might [redacted] occupied countries that we are backing one [redacted] your money on another. It is for this reason that I feel [redacted] operations should be undertaken jointly, even with mixed [redacted] that the aircraft, equipment etc. which we may each [redacted] the disposal of both Missions.

Regarding your paragraph 5. I did not mean to suggest that [redacted] contact with the AMERICAN Services should not be made through S.O. [redacted] I suggested was that S.O. would not apply, even for [redacted] ment including aircraft, etc., without the approval of the S.O.E./O.S.S. Committee.

Regarding your paragraph 6. I did not suggest that S.O. should [redacted] discussions dealing with Foreign Allied Governments [redacted] but that the S.O. Department should not conduct independent negotiations with them except with the knowledge and consent of the S.O.E./O.S.S. Committee. Here again I think this is important if we are to keep together and avoid pulling at cross purposes and adopting different lines.

I hope that this letter will reassure you on the points which you raise, and that taken in conjunction with my letter of 15th February, we are now in full agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Huntington,
U.S. LIAISON,
CAIRO

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March 5th, 1943

SUBJECT: [redacted]

TO: [redacted]

[redacted]

Guerilla Warfare, which has been a concomitant of almost every time immemorial, has been exploited, during the present war, on a larger scale and with more careful organization and planning than ever before. With certain modifications, guerilla units have, in fact, become part and parcel of the great armies of the world.

Organized irregular bodies are of particular interest to the United Nations in the current conflict since the enslaved nationals held prisoner as a result of Axis conquests are a continuous source of trouble to the enemy and could well be of incalculable assistance to the Allies - particularly when the moment for invasion comes.

One of the tasks of O.S.S., and its counterpart in the British Services, has been to contact and assist the various resistance groups and "secret armies" of Europe. Within enemy territory (or enemy controlled territory) contact must, in the first instance, be carefully made by individual operatives skilled in intelligence and the task of organization. Eventually, with reasonable good fortune, local organizations may be built. Into these may be inducted highly trained groups (either nationals or those who can pass for nationals) of saboteurs and subversionists who, alone or with the aid of friendly natives, will institute a campaign of action against the enemy.

The work of the original Agent organizer and that of the subsequent sabotage groups is fostered and encouraged, to the greatest possible extent, by material aid from without. It is hoped that such organizers and groups will not only be able to contact resistance leaders in the area in which they are working but that, with or without the aid of local nationals, they will receive and transmit intelligence, locate "safe houses" and, from time to time, carry out isolated programs of subversion and sabotage.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

The problem of organizing and activating, at or near [redacted] the resistance groups with which our organizers are in contact now [redacted] which U.S.S.R. and British U.S.S.R. have long been [redacted]. In the [redacted] to find a solution U.S.S.R. proposes [redacted] teams of three men (two officers and a W/T operator) [redacted] the language of the country in which they were to operate. Such teams would be the focal point for military group organization and morale.

The term idea was a step in the right direction but it did not go far enough. [redacted] the unit is not sufficiently large to operate alone in event [redacted] and this will often be the case since pin point landings in the dark of night are not easy.

Fifth, Without the parachute troop landings in North Africa in connection with the invasion there.

Sixth, no considerable number of natives could be quickly organized and [redacted] by so small a unit;

Seventh, there is no sizable military "cadre" into which local nationals [redacted] and through the medium of which they can be made [redacted] as a fighting force; and

Eighth, there is a lack of organized fire power which will be badly needed in [redacted] of the type visualized.

The thought that larger, highly trained, language-speaking groups might be so organized as to meet the requirements of our "Social Wing" came as a result of conversations had during last January with General [redacted], Chief of the Forces of the Norwegian Government in exile. General [redacted] complained of a growing scarcity of men who could be used in raiding parties and of a complete lack of W/T operators who are always so essential in work within enemy territory, and asked for recruits for this work. He also dis-

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present a willingness to consider the indication, [illegible] with his own Bermudian [illegible] group of a few [illegible] can [illegible] of course, live within the [illegible] attended by the native group to which they might be [illegible] group, be sent as teachers to which they might be [illegible] would be invaluable in [illegible] and [illegible] information submitted by General [illegible] with military planning the Allies must largely rely.

As a result of conference with General [illegible] O.S.S. Furnish several units - Auxiliary Operations Groups. It was proposed that General [illegible] would consist of from 15 to 25 highly [illegible] speaking Americans heavily armed and well [illegible] of which, in of importance in one or more previous [illegible] a generous sprinkling of [illegible] operators.

The primary function of the A.O. Groups will, of course, be to act just before and on D-Day as rallying points for local patriots. These will organize, train and equip. Among the native [illegible] military service. If enough of these are available they will be [illegible] into the heads unit of the A.O. Group (the squad) which will be [illegible] ingly. Since each member of the A.O. Group will speak the language of the country there need be no delay, no uncertainty, no hesitation [illegible] or instructions. If the actual incorporation of local recruits into the A.O. Groups proves impractical or impolitic they can, at least, be trained to work "in combination" under their own leadership.

The A.O. Groups will be skilled in sabotage, demolition work, small arms (our own and the enemy's), unarmed combat and field craft. They will also have had intelligence training and a course in combined operations. Each member will be of the "leader" type. They should all be non-commissioned officers or of the caliber of good N.C.O.'s.

Although A.O. Groups will be used principally as our zone invasion [illegible], there is no reason why these groups should be idle in the interim. General Donovan's original interest in the Groups was aroused by reason of the interim use he foresaw rather than by the thought of their employment in connection with an invasion program. They could - as groups - be kept reasonably active on "raiding parties" and "one shot targets" operations - alone or with commando or paratroop units. Many of them - including W/T operators - would be useful as members of ordinary A.O. groups, in connection with preliminary survey and organization work.

Auxiliary Operations Groups should be heavily armed. When employed on an invasion project they should carry with them extra arms, ammunition and equipment (including any uniforms for new recruits). They should be large enough, per se, so that they might with luck, carry out a mission even without the aid of local sympathizers. They should be effective - but self-contained and powerful.

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] of our Army units in the Tonkin [illegible] impossible, by the [illegible] of operations on the [illegible] O.S.S. groups are working in the [illegible] Army [illegible] groups are already [illegible] in truth, [illegible] two [illegible] For units of the character described [illegible] groups which have been employed [illegible] from many nations who possess neither the [illegible] the work [illegible] of [illegible]. These nations are largely of the [illegible] type. Everyone are not [illegible] to be useful to an [illegible] organization but these talents are largely wasted in the assignments which have been given them. In spite of their limitations they have, however, made some valuable contributions - both on the information and action side - to the work of our [illegible]. They have demonstrated, beyond question, that the best for auxiliary operations, will be a small one.

The impressions gathered in Tonkin lead to one more conclusion. It would be foolhardy - and [illegible] not "[illegible]" to underrate the organization and capabilities of Anti Europe unless O.S.S. is properly equipped to proceed with a program of organization, training and equipment calculated to produce detachments capable of fulfilling completely their assigned missions. The units must be a part of our small regular [illegible], since they is of the [illegible], should be drawn from selected groups who have already received a course of basic training. As pointed out above, they must be highly intelligent and well disciplined. They should be trained in organization work, in intelligence, [illegible], [illegible] operations, sabotage, field craft and scouting. They should be [illegible] and many of them must be skilled in communications. They should be lightly but severally equipped. They must be highly mobile, self-contained units with an abundance of fire power and striking force. Above all, they must be heavily [illegible] and well led. They will need something of the same qualifications and equipment as had General Montgomery's desert bands who served him so well in the African campaign.

In order to implement the program herein suggested provision will have to be made at once for a Table of Organization, for recruiting from outside units and for proper equipment and supplies. Training will offer no great

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I would your further opinion in the matter.

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[redacted]

| [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] | [redacted] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. GROUP COMMAND | [redacted] | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | [redacted] | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | [redacted] | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | PLANNING OFF. | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | ADJT. ADM. OFF. | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| " " " | ADM. S & T OFF. | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | ADM. MAN. OFF. | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " " | CLERICAL ADMIN. | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| TOTALS | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
| AREA COMMAND | AREA COMMANDER | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
| " " | [redacted] | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | PLANNING OFF. | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | ADM. ADM. | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| " " | OTHER CLERICAL & MANAGERIAL | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| TOTALS | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 |
| [redacted] - CLERICAL UNIT | [redacted] COMMANDER | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | [redacted] | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | ADJUTANT | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | S. & T. OFF. | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | COMM. OFF. | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| " " | ADM. ADJT. | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| " " | S. & T. ADJT. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | COMM. ADJT. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | CLERICAL ADMIN. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | OTHER CLERICAL & MANAGERIAL | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | T.T OPERATORS [redacted] | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [illegible] | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SCALE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PLATOON S.M. SECOND [illegible] | PLATOON [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | [illegible] | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SCALE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SQUAD [illegible] SMALL [illegible] | SQUAD LEADER | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | W.T. OPERATOR | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| " " | SQUAD MEMBERS | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SCALE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

I = Requirements for two sections

II = Two sections or four Platoons.

III = Four Platoons or eight Squads.

Upon Expansion (through induction of personnel)

SCALE:-

(1) Each Squad number would become a Squad L[illegible] personnel) added to his squad. This would [illegible] addition of 6 men to each existing [illegible] Squads each.

(2) The foregoing would lead to a requirement [illegible] total of 6 Platoons consisting of 6 Squad [illegible] leader (5 total) each or 30 men per Platoon.

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(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

[redacted]

(A Platoon 2 Squads each)
[redacted]

(B Platoon 4 Squads each)
[redacted]

| | Officers | N.C.O.s | Enlisted Men or Members | Total | Officers | N.C.O.s | Enlisted Men or Members | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [redacted] | 2 | 2 | 4 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 18 |
| Total | 2 | 2 | 4 | 22 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 18 |
| [redacted] | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Rt | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 2nd Rt | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 3rd | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| 4th | - | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Total | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| [redacted] | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Platoon | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Squad | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 2nd Squad | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 3rd Squad | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 4th Squad | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 2nd Platoon | | | | | | | | |
| 1st Squad | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 2nd Squad | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 3rd Squad | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 4th Squad | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
| 3rd Platoon & Squads | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| 4th Platoon & Squads | - | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| U.S. Operators | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Total | 0 | 8 | 36 | 44 | 0 | 4 | 80 | 84 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 5 | 12 | 40 | 47 | 5 | 25 | 84 | 114 |

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(7)

[redacted]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| [illegible] | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| [illegible] | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| [illegible] | ... | 1 - [illegible] |

[illegible]: [illegible]

[illegible]

1 SQUAD

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Platoon Leader | ... | 1 - 2nd Lieut. |
| Second in Command | ... | 1 - Sergeant. |

[illegible] (Note (1).)

1 [illegible]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Section Commanding Officer | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| Note (2) | Operational Assistant (Planning) | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | Medical Officer | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | Administrative Assistant | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | Communications Assistant | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | Supply, Transp. & [illegible] Supervisor | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | [illegible] | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | [illegible] | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | W/T Operator | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | Messengers & Cipher Clerks | ... | 3 - [illegible] |

(Note (1)): Section Hqrs located at or near operational Hqrs of Combat Team.

(Note (2)): Section Hqrs held under Command First Lieut. (Planning Officer) equipped with [illegible] [illegible], "Transceiver" set and [illegible].

[illegible] (Note (1))

1 (or more) [illegible]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | [illegible] | ... | 1 - Major |
| | [illegible] Officer | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| Note (2) | [illegible] | ... | 1 - 1st Lieut. |
| | Supply & Transportation Officer | ... | 1 - 1st Lieut. |
| | [illegible] Officer | ... | 1 - 1st Lieut. |
| | Administrative Assistant | ... | 1 - [illegible] Sergeant. |
| | Supply & Transp. Assistant | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | [illegible] Assistant | ... | 1 - [illegible] |
| | [illegible] | ... | [illegible] |
| | [illegible] | ... | [illegible] |
| | W/T Operators | ... | [illegible] |
| | Cooks | ... | [illegible] |

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

18 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. Guenther and Lt. Col. Amoss.

Subject: Operations -- Arrangements with SOE.

1. I am leaving with various miscellaneous papers which I am handing Col. Amoss (mostly operational matters) a copy of the SOE-OSS record of our London meeting. Glencoener may want a further agreement.

2. My idea is to avoid any tight agreements. We can work with SOE's operational Department (Col. Noble) on projects but unless we are careful they will want to dominate each project. They should know our general intentions and the areas in which we will be operating. Our groups and communications systems can "tie in" through "cut outs". They should not work together for obvious security reasons except as we want (or they want) to attach operatives to special groups.

3. I should think that both of you should try to get on the "Sub Committee" of SOE organized by the Minister and that the membership of the SOE-OSS operational "Policy Committee" might be the OSS Executive Officer and Chief Operations Officer since the work here would be detail which would be a time consumer for Col. Guenther.

4. Here, as in other Theatres, I have tried to negotiate the deal so as to give SI activities wide latitude. We can, therefore, always build so-called SI organizations (respecting which SOE can have no voice) where we are too restricted on SO work. All of our men should, in any event, I am sure, be both SI and SO trained just as a matter of course. You can be sure I will pressed on this theory in Washington.

HENRY C. HUNTINGTON, Jr.,
Lt. Col., AUS.

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**S E C R E T**

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**
**U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

15 February 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Gunther and Lt. Col. Amoss.

**O.S.S. Mission, Mid East.**

**ORGANIZATION MEMORANDUM**

1. There are attached hereto letter of request from the undersigned to the Theater Commander, together with relative documents, and a copy of the cable of the Theater Commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff approving the activation of an O.S.S. Mission, TRAPEZE.

2. We have, as you are aware, cabled Colonel Donovan and Halliwell respecting the requirements of this Mission for personnel and material.

3. It is my understanding that the following personnel is, or should be, available for this Mission, to wit:

a. Operations Officers: Major Paynter - Planning Officer; Major Maciaraki - Area Operations Officer for Yugoslavia; Lt. (jg) John Shaheen who speaks Arabic and French but would be useful as an Area Operations Officer for almost any territory; Major Livermore who will organize and supervise the training of Auxilliary Operations Groups; Major Bair - Dispatching Officer;

b. Area Section Chiefs, Geographic Desk Representatives and possible additional Operations Officers: McFarland, Turkey; Sperling, Turkey; Caskey, Turkey; Brewer, Turkey; and two women operatives whose names are known to Col. Amoss. Young, Daniel, Oliver and Hyatt - Greece. Vucinich - Serbia. Beeler - Bulgaria. Stevens - Rumania and Serbia;

c. Provision should be made for four Training Officers and about eight non-commissioned officer instructors. I will attempt to arrange for these in Washington;

d. Communications: I will have a memorandum from Captain Huet on this and will try to expedite communications facilities and personnel from Washington; and



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Organization Memorandum from Col. Huntington to Colonel Ames
Col. Ames - 18 February 1943

c. Operatives and Operational Groups. I should think it would be well for Col. Ames to telegraph his Desk Representative in Washington for personnel for use in various territories and for the enlistment of wireless operators.

The above personnel will, I judge, be used in places for which they are best fitted. For example, although Major Macdonald is trained as an Operations Officer, he might well be an excellent Section Chief for Yugoslavia to whom would be assigned someone as Geographic Desk Representative and possibly someone as Operations Officer. By the same token, Young, Daniel, Oliver or Hunt might be the Greek Section Chief, or a new Greek Section Chief might be found and one of the others could be trained as an Operations Officer provided they are commissioned. Incidentally, operational training can be given any of these officers at Algiers, where they could be sent even after arriving here in Cairo.

4. With respect to the organization of the Mission itself, I will try to get Washington to agree to the chart which we discussed yesterday. Since you will be short of personnel for a while, it will be necessary for officers to hold several positions. We are, I suppose, obliged for the moment to preserve the fiction of an SI and an SO branch unless I can have the organization chart agreed to by Colonel Donovan. In this event McBaine would be, under the chart, Intelligence Officer and Chief of SI and Col. Ames would be Executive Officer and Chief of SO. I will do my best to have Captain Hunt released to this Mission so that he could be made Operations Officer and I will also attempt to obtain appropriate rank for him. If he were Chief Operations Officer, communications should most certainly be placed under his jurisdiction and should not be set up as a separate department, although on the chart it is in any event under the jurisdiction of the Executive Officer.

5. When I return to Washington I will urge the sending of necessary administrative personnel.

6. Will you review my answers to cables 100, 106, 107, 110, 113, 115, 116 and 117.

7. I have every confidence in this mission, and you can be sure that I will be doing my best for you back in Washington.

Incls.

ELLERY C. HUNTINGTON, Jr.,
Lt. Col., AUS.



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Supplement to Organization Memorandum of 15 Feb. 1943 from Col. [illegible] to Col. Guenther and Col. Ashes.

8. Miscellaneous Personnel for Cairo Mission:

a. Lts. Selvig and Ronson. The transfer of these men from the Air Force to OSS has been requested. They have had SOE training and can go to Palestine on the 15th of February for a Refresher Course and Parachute work. The British want to use them in Serbia. As I told Lord Glenconner last evening, however, we are short of manpower and would like to keep them but would appreciate it if they could take the course as planned. We could use them as Training Officers or with our own Serbian Mission. Why deliver them to the British?

b. There was originally a third man (Lt. Kendall) with the other two. His transfer has also been requested but neither Selvig, Ronson nor Kehle think much of him. If obtained he might be used in an administrative capacity. Col. McClenahan has a memo about the transfer of all three.

c. A cable asking for Capt. Flues has been sent. McClenahan might help here, too. Flues would be useful in getting Italians and possibly Germans for induction as "escapees" through Italy. A carefully evolved escape plan might work and perhaps one of them could be taught a code and they might take in a field set for communications so that the reception of other parties could be arranged. They could even escape into Albania and logically work their way into Italy and Germany. They might be able to establish contact with Dulles in Switzerland if other communications fail. There are plenty of Italians and Germans crossing the Swiss border. The possibilities for good work by Flues are enormous.

9. Reports. Periodic reports of accomplishments will help me in Washington.

E. C. N. Jr.



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[illegible]

[illegible] ARMY

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 1943.

[illegible]

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:

[illegible]
C/S
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

A. F. H. Q.
[illegible] 1943

[illegible] at 1:00 P.M. [illegible] 1943 [illegible]

[illegible]

[signature]

[illegible]

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[redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

To: [redacted]

1. In accordance with your requirements, request for [illegible] through G-2, [illegible], for approval [illegible]

2. The activities and objectives of OSS as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the "Summary of Plan" contained in and forming a part of the directive of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (No. 170) of December 18, 1942 (subject to control of the Theater Commander as contemplated in the directive of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (No. 155/4/D) of December 23, 1942), as follows:

"a. To [illegible] activities in North Africa from French West Africa to and including Libya, Malta and continental Europe, including the Iberian Peninsula and Balearic Islands to the eastern boundary of Italy, and the islands adjacent thereto.

"b. To [illegible] activities in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, France, and such other places as are required by the North African Theater Commander.

"c. Establishment of [illegible] headquarters, communication groups, and small numbers in the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Belgian Congo, Spanish Morocco, Rio de Oro and Tangier.

"d. Counter subversive activities in each of the areas named in paragraphs 2a & b and c above.

"e. Counter intelligence activities in each of the areas named in paragraphs 2a & b and c above, insofar as they affect [illegible] activities.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

3 high speed long range [illegible]

[illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] and equipment.

12 field phones, 6 or 8 power.

4 telescopes.

[illegible] .38 caliber pistols.

[illegible],000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible].

[illegible] Thompson sub-machine guns.

[illegible],000,000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible].

100 .45 caliber pistols.

[illegible] rounds of ammunition for [illegible].

18 [illegible] sub-machine guns.

[illegible],000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible].

12 M.L. (Inert) [illegible].

[illegible],000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible].

([illegible] supplies of equipment for [illegible] and repairing all above [illegible])

[illegible],000 hand grenades.

[illegible] hand [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] safety fuse.

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[illegible] spools primers.

[illegible] primers [illegible].

[illegible] pull [illegible].

[illegible] cable [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] cable rubber [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] cable adapter [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] standard [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] bombing [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] 3-cell flashlights.

[illegible] small flashlights batteries (for flashlights).

(3 note [illegible] batteries and 1 note [illegible] [illegible] for flashlights)

[illegible] empty bandages.

20 light [illegible].

[illegible] standard portable compasses.

[illegible] first-aid kits.

500 special medical supply packets.

[illegible] "K" rations.

Standard rations for 60 men for 6 months.

Standard rations for [illegible] men for 3 months.

[illegible] special field rations equivalent to parts of [illegible] rations.

Supplementary [illegible] rations equivalent to rations for [illegible] men for 6 months.

100 note portable [illegible] equipment.

Assorted maps of Europe and Africa, topographical, navigation, tactical, etc.

200 note [illegible] equipment.

[illegible] note field shoes, [illegible], socks, shirts.

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20 sets assorted charts showing weapons, displays, ships and aircraft of Allied and enemy nations.

4 sets each mobile kit weapons.

2 sound projects and systems, including signals and explosions.

4 portable screens.

2 35 mm. film slides and strip projectors.

2 film rewind and splicing outfits.

Signal Corps radio equipment for 20 students.

500 Coveralls.

500 Fatigue uniforms.

500 rubber helmets.

500 spine pads.

500 pairs heel pads.

500 pairs crash ankle bandages.

500 pairs "A" type parachute, large personnel.

50 dangling bags.

100 blankets.

500 Bunsen flames.

50 foot thermos.

500 parachutes - combinations, assorted.

50 dummy grenades for training.

5,000 house safety matches.

50 sets drawing boards, map making and reading equipment for training school.

Office equipment and supplies for headquarters (including radio station office and training school offices).

Standard field equipment and supplies for headquarters complement and training school complement of an approximate total of 50 men.

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1. [illegible]

14 [illegible]

6 [illegible]

6 [illegible]

1,000 [illegible]

1,000 [illegible]

1,000 [illegible]

1,000 [illegible]

150 [illegible]

400 [illegible]

3,000 tubes of [illegible]

100 [illegible]

1,000 [illegible]

50,000 ft. fine wire [illegible]

12 rubber field boats (completely equipped).

100 units [illegible]

1,000 units [illegible]

30,000 lbs. plastic explosives.

1,500 time pencils, assorted.

500 [illegible]

500 [illegible] 9 mm. sub-machine guns.

300 electric detonators.

1,000 non-electric blasting caps No. 8.

500 non-electric blasting caps No. 6.

500 electric blasting caps No. 8.

10 sets [illegible] equipment.

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[illegible] hand power hacksaws [illegible]

[illegible] (Black) [illegible] 20 [illegible]

300 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

4 [illegible] light [illegible] guns.

5,000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

4 [illegible] submachine guns

5,000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

4 [illegible] pistols.

600 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

4 .38 pistols (bulls)

4,000 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

4 larger pistols.

800 rounds of ammunition for [illegible]

Small quantities of assorted ammunition material for [illegible] purposes.

18 handle reamers.

500 flexible [illegible].

75 [illegible] rubber [illegible] [illegible]

12 [illegible].

12 welding helmets.

12 wall hooks.

12 [illegible] hooks.

20 pair assorted [illegible] gun [illegible].

[illegible] [illegible] tables.

[illegible] for one temporary [illegible] [illegible]

1 complete [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] equipment for testing [illegible].

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TRUE COPY OF PARAPHRASE CABLE

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING
(Paraphrase)

SECRET

AGWAR WASHINGTON DATE: FEBRUARY 15, 1943.

TO AMSME No._____ FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM: BRERETON.
THROUGH JOINT STAFF PLANNERS.

With regard to your Directive No. 166 on the Middle East Program. Conferences as listed below have been held with representatives and the Director of OSS:

1) A Headquarters to be established in Cairo by OSS. Other offices to be established elsewhere in the theater as needed. Authority to conduct activities as outlined in Paragraph 3 of Directive No. 166.

2) Language speaking auxiliary operations groups or guerrilla nuclei to be organized and dispatched to this theater. Groups should number 10 units and should be organized as deemed advisable by OSS. They should be qualified for use on raiding parties and against special targets in the Balkans and Greece.

3) Sufficient communications facilities to service 50 to 75 field sets and contact with other OSS Operational Offices to be established in theater of communication facilities.

4) The Operation of adequate training schools.

5) During the current year, 350 commissioned, enlisted, and civilian personnel to be transferred to the theater for administrative training, supply, and communications work.

6) Supplies, equipment and replacements which are available and reasonably necessary to conduct the above-outlined activities to be drawn or acquired as expenditures are made and shipped here.

The total supplies and equipment may include fixed and mobile radio material and may be equivalent to those listed in Appendix 1 of your OSS Directive No. 170.

(7) Air and Sea transportation facilities which are reasonably available will be furnished. Cover will be provided here as an experimental detachment of G-3.

(8) Confirmation copies of Directive No. 155/4 D and Directive No. 166/1 D which were submitted by OSS representatives are desired. So far, no copies of these have been received from the War Department.

BRERETON.

AIRFORCE - A-2 - WHC/kl. RWC. SECRET.

Carbon copy of paraphrase cable handed to Col. Guenther at 1145 hours, 15 February 1943, in presence of Capt. Huot.

G. B. Guenther,
Colonel, GSC,
Director of Strategic Services,
Middle East.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

AIR MAIL.

January 14, 1943.

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
"J" Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel:

You should have received in the letter I am sending through Colonel Corridon copies of my notes of the 8th and 9th inst. and of my letter of the 10th to General Gubbins covering the arrangements for North Africa which have, of course, been made subject to Bill Eddy's approval. Incidentally, my letter of the 7th to you inadvertently referred in the postscript to "my notes of yesterday" when as a matter of fact the reference was intended to be to my notes of January 8th.

The following inclosures accompany this letter:

1. My notes up to date, that is, for the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th, which will give you some idea of what I have been trying to do. Copies are being sent to Dave Kallivell.

2. Copy of a memorandum made by Lord Glenconner on our conversations respecting Cairo. Except for the fact that I stressed in my conversations with Lord Glenconner the necessity for having our own Operations Officer, the notes are substantially correct and represent, I think, a starting point from which an agreement can be reached in Cairo.

3. Copy of a letter I am sending to General Hughes, who is General Keyes's Chief of Staff, the latter being in command of N.A.C. in General Eisenhower's absence. My meeting with General Hughes was somewhat inadvertent but probably timely, provided I have covered the matters referred to in the letter in a manner satisfactory to you. Since General Keyes, General Lee and General Hughes were all present, it seemed a good opportunity to present our problems and to ask for assistance. I do not know that I have summarized the directive and our intentions exactly as you would like to have had it done, but I have at least covered some of the points.

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Colonel William J. Donovan from Lt. Col. E. C. Huntington, Jr., Jan. 14, 1943

4. Copy of letter to Dave Ellitwell, today's date, in which I have gone to some length on the question of Norway, the organization of Auxiliary Operations Groups, and other matters. This is covered in more detail in my memorandum to General Gubbins of Jan. 12th, copy of which is inclosed.

5. Copy of memorandum of agreement relating to the "London Arrangements" as revised by C.D. and me last evening which, as you will see, differs materially from General Gubbins' original memo, copy of which is inclosed. This arrangement is not exactly as I would have wanted it, but I think it will do. C.D. evidently had two points in mind:
First: He wanted to protect against too great "spread" of information, and
Second: (I suspect) his organization wanted to keep us a little on the outside respecting the detail of S.O.E. plans so that even if, on D-Day, S.O. takes over certain areas we will still be dependent on S.O.E. and they will, therefore, have a voice in our assigned territory as well as their own. We can effect that by building a strong organization here and by working closely with the Planning Group of the N.T.O. Staff.

6. We have not yet heard from General Ramstedt and S.O.E. on the question of our arrangements for Norway. I expect, however, to have some word on this today. The matter will be covered in my notes and I will also inclose herewith a copy of any memorandum of understanding which is reached with General Ramstedt.

7. Your cable No. 12650 of the 13th has just come to hand. I think our arrangements with respect to North Africa will meet the requirements. They provides that Bill Eddy shall be the Directing Head. I think no doubt is left respecting this. I have already cabled Bill the substance of the agreement and have stated that it is, of course, subject to revision by him. A copy of C.D.'s approval of N.A. is inclosed.

My work here is practically ended for the moment. My departure has been delayed by reason of lack of transportation, but I have had plenty to do in trying to arrange for operations from London and North Africa and in paving the way for negotiations in Cairo. I will stay in North Africa for as brief a period as possible but long enough to give Bill Eddy a hand in getting the organization started. I will do the same with respect to Cairo, stay again in North Africa, return here to give this operation some additional impetus, and will then come home unless you decide that I should follow some other program.

Regards.

Respectfully,

Kilroy C. Huntington, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, A.U.S.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. [redacted] McDonell,
Room [redacted], [redacted] Building,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear [redacted]:

I am inclosing herewith a copy of a letter just received by [redacted] on the subject of the progress of my negotiations here. I [redacted] send a copy of this letter to the Colonel, as I have [redacted] on some of the matters referred to here.

You will also find inclosed a copy of a [redacted] among other things, with what the S.O.E. and [redacted] chose to term "Auxiliary Operational Groups".

Here are some ideas. Since you are on the job running things, you may discuss it with you and [redacted]. The Executive at headquarters must make all final decisions.

First: Auxiliary Operational Groups.

You have seen from my letter to the Colonel that the situation is recycling Norway. Given any reasonable assistance from the Naval Air Force and Naval Commanders (Zeeland, however, would do if submarines and Catalinas are available), we will be enabled to make a showing in Norway. On the basis of intelligence we are being rewritten to Radio Operations (of which General Sunstrom will take any number) and Auxiliary Groups. If our Radio Operations are also located in S.O. reps and are discovered and intelligent, we will get [redacted] agents (Americans) into Norway by this means. In addition, Hawkish wants at least two groups (of 20 men) of Norwegian speaking Americans who would be trained for use primarily at or near "D-Day" but the, possibly, could be used with Commando, Raiding Operations and against special "any what targets" an S.O.E. group now being used. The make-up of the groups would be as indicated in the cable and in my memo of Jan. 17th to General Donovan.

The groups immediately desired by Hawkish would require our S.O. training (including at least 10 days advanced training) but, if arrangements could be made with the Marine Corps, a course in "Commando Operations". If we cannot get Norwegian speaking officers this may not be definitely, although it would certainly be preferable.



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Mr. E. Perle Mahoney from Lt. Col. [illegible]

The groups which I mained would be [illegible] Mission.

We should have a [illegible] — [illegible] Operations Building [illegible] Auxiliary Operations Group [illegible] would, of course, take [illegible] (though the Chief Operations [illegible] groups are to deal with [illegible] be responsible [illegible]

Kept your [illegible] and the Station Bureau [illegible] promoted a couple of good [illegible] to work in collaboration with the [illegible] presence of a good Brazilian [illegible] Find — with young Powell, perhaps, as [illegible]

I believe I will find the same A.O.A. [illegible] Italy, and perhaps, later, Yugoslavia and Greece. The [illegible] I think, be smaller — a total of 16 in each group — a [illegible] lieutenant, a sergeant, two [illegible] and two P.F.C.'s. The [illegible] corporal and five men each. In effect, one platoon. All on [illegible] the same.

There should be at least one Radio Operator in each group.

Robert Livermore and Richard [illegible] Jack Arell be used on this work. Jack should be assigned for England, Richard for Dark Africa and Lipscomb for Italy. The latter would, perhaps, begin work in Italy in Washington since the Italian Mission will be longest delayed. We will eventually need a good Senior Officer of the rank of Lt. Col. to head up the work in Washington, and Fillmer Ross, if convalescent, could be and wants to be his Executive Officer.

If Norwegian A.O. groups are to be maintained our three boys being added by us there might be trouble. They should be informed and should apply at once for citizenship.

Joseph [illegible] Situation.

With regard [illegible] this idea of the program as an Italian Desperado [illegible] and operational personnel. Besides, that is now standing as [illegible] here, will be all right as a No. 2 Operations Officer. He knows the language and the country but he is no [illegible] Schenck. It is too bad we cannot work with Lord Rothman but I would [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] send a good man here as previously indicated.

Fifth: I am discussing [illegible] with [illegible] tonight, I hope.

Sixth: My stay here has been delayed:
a. to enable me to [illegible] (in principle) and [illegible] and
b. because no transportation is available. We have no priorities in this theatre and any [illegible] seems to be able to outrank us. We will keep trying.

My best to all.

Sincerely,

[illegible], Jr.,
Lt. Col., A.U.S.

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Lt.Col. Hilary S.Huntington,Jr

Jan 18, 1960

[redacted]:

1. The news from Mr Dulles (the recently [illegible] on Harvey is here and very [illegible]. [illegible] conditional that by [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible] lower use of his [illegible] [illegible] we may have [illegible] [illegible] A.O. Gamma, [illegible] the other [illegible] the first Gamma.

2. I have just talked about [illegible] Italian affairs. [illegible] London [illegible] Jerry Shapiro. [illegible] also [illegible] [illegible] of him.

3. Copies of [illegible] and London are being [illegible] [illegible] I will try to [illegible] London [illegible] [illegible] London [illegible] [illegible].

4. I hope I can see Joyce tonight.

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[redacted]

Spent the morning having the London memorandum rewritten and rewriting the letter to General Hughes so as to include communications (as desired by Capt. [illegible]). Also went to the A.F. Office (priorities) to plead for transportation. We are the step-children of the Army beyond a doubt.

Bill Eddy called asking us to come along quickly, also complaining that S.I.S. was "bawling about" in North Africa. I replied saying we were coming as rapidly as lack of priority would permit and advising that we would do what we could about S.I.S., but my own belief is that nothing should transpire in that area except under his direction as provided in the S.O.E. proposal which I am bringing for his approval.

A cable from Larry Leeman indicates no need for that to go to N.A. or Cairo. Larry does not understand the situation. Communications are inextricably bound up in our negotiations with S.O.E. and the Theatre Commander. Louis Hart has negotiated huge in this fashion with S.O.E., Colonel Perry (S.I.S.) and the Signal Corps. I doubt that Eddie would even begin to do the job and I am sure that Lieutenant Smith (who is a technician purely) will be of much help. I will so wire Larry. Without communications we will be lost.

Again showed London memorandum calling Tony Keenick about it and then forwarded an original and two copies to O.D. Also sent O.D. a copy of the letter to General Hughes.

Major Beaver of S.O.E. called to say he was on his way to General Hanstean's office to get his approval to the Norwegian program and would call at 5:15 P.M. He came around at that time with a letter from O.D. to which was attached two copies of General Marshall-Cornwall's precis of the conversation O.D., he and I had had with General Hanstean. The letter was all right -- a little on the S.O.E.-S.O. "joint operation" side -- but will do as a place of beginning. The precis was full of a lot of nonsense about what I thought the "American High Command's" (a phrase I am not accustomed to use) ideas are respecting Norway -- something, naturally, about which I haven't the faintest notion -- so I suggested that O.D. simply write the letter without reference to the precis and that he state in the letter that Hanstean is in accord. This, I told Major Beaver, I would then send along to General Hughes. Major Beaver agreed to have this done right away.

I called George Boudin and asked him to dine with me. I'd like to give him the story so that he can tell the Colonel what I'm doing or trying to do. Besides, I'd like George's opinion. He has a keen analytical mind and will see pitfalls which I'm missing.

George and I spent the evening going over both his and my own ventures. We seem to be thinking along as where the emphasis should be made. We discussed North Africa and the Italian situation and suggested the use of our own men to handle Italian affairs -- and from Africa. There is a large Sicilian population in and about Chicago and West -- in George Bowen's office there -- may be useful to us in any recruiting program among these groups.

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[redacted]

Revised letter of explanation requested by General Donovan was prepared & memorandum for General Robbins on the subject.

After lunch I kept an appointment with Sir Charles Portal who wished to discuss the London arrangement, Italy, China and Malaya. I told him that Donovan would not be in close touch with his men at New Delhi; that I had talked to my [illegible], and that I suspected Ambassador Phillips would report to Colonel Bissell on China and the Colonel to O.S.S.

We also talked about Australia. Sir Charles has offered the services of [illegible] officers and thinks we should collaborate. I told him that nothing can work in this Theatre, probably, unless Joe Dugan is able to convince General MacArthur that our services are worthy of consideration.

Our proposed London arrangement was discussed at some length. O.S.S. agreed to change or revision of General Robbins' memorandum. We put the change on the ground of security for S.O.E. and more independence for S.O. Staff officers to be detached for duty to S.O.E. rather than constituted an integral part of the S.O.E. mission. Actually, by this means, our officers will be prevented from handling the details of S.O.E. operations. The real reason may be a desire on S.O.E.'s part to retain authority at invasion time, even if these areas assigned to U. S. Command — at least they would like to have a voice in these areas as well as their own. I was secretly in a position to object. We will have to build a high-powered organization of our own — learning as we work and as fast from S.O.E. as possible and keeping ourselves in touch with S.H.A.E. Staff Planning. It [illegible] to say, after all, to find we are now where we today.

Dined with George Brown, with Mr. Kessler (Managing Director of Dutch Shell), talked post-war economy and the use of Dugan. Mr. K. will give us the answer on this tomorrow.

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[redacted]

The days go by pretty rapidly. I'll never finish this job and I suppose I'll not know how badly I've done for months to come -- certainly not until I can sit down quietly somewhere and really determine whether or not I've just been "running the house".

At 10:00 A.M. I went with Colonel Guenther and Major Brewer to see Brigadier General Hughes, Chief of Staff of Major General Hartle, new Theatre Commander. General Hughes was interested in the O.S.S. directive and then decided (after I had outlined its terms) that General Hartle should listen to the story. Major General Lee, Chief of R.P.O.-S.O.S. was in General Hartle's room so they all listened. I don't know how effective the explanation was but they all listened without comment. I spoke, particularly, of the need for liaison with the R.P.O. Planning Group and of assistance from S.O.S. on supplies and the Navy and Air Force on transportation, and asked how we could go about securing all of this. General Hughes said, "through this Command."

I outlined our arrangements with S.O.E. and our proposals for operations -- especially into Norway where the assistance of our armed services will be needed. I then asked if it would not be well for me to submit a letter covering the matters discussed and requesting approval of proposed programs of operation. General Hughes said "Yes". A copy of my letter is attached. It covers, substantially, my presentation of this morning. It may or may not be in exact accord with the Colonel's interpretation of the directive and future operations, but I am where I have to improvise a bit as I go along. The fact is that no one in authority seems to have the faggiest notion of the functions or authority of O.S.S. Certainly they have not considered working with us -- taking us into the family so to speak -- or giving us assistance. The result is I seem to be doing or trying to do a "selling job" primarily. I suppose we'll be confronted with the same thing in North Africa, (to a lesser degree perhaps), and in Cairo.

After leaving the three Generals we called on Colonel Waite -- Assistant G-2. He was most agreeable. We talked directive again and he said he had Louis Mott's communications proposal up for consideration. I asked him about getting General Donovan from him and he said "Go -- get someone from Washington". He wanted to know what the province of his local Psychological Warfare Committee was in view of the directive. I told him I thought it should continue to function but that certainly we should have adequate representation there, as we should in other Theatres -- so as to coordinate the work of the local committee with Psychological Warfare Programs devised in Washington. He said he would welcome such an arrangement.

Colonel Waite also wanted to know about the meaning of the word "control" as applied, in the directive, to the relationship between the Theatre Commander and O.S.S. Does this mean that officers in the O.S.S. Mission in London are under the control of the Theatre Commander. I answered that I did not know, technically speaking, that this was the intent but for all practical purposes it would seem to be the case. I could see definite advantages to O.S.S. in having its local Missions under the command of the Theatre Commander. This would fix in him some responsibility to give us the assistance and facilities of liaison we so badly need.

Returned to lunch with Tony Kovrick and Brewer and to discuss the London arrangement.

After lunch -- and all afternoon -- I worked on my letter to General Hughes and various cables.

We dined with Capt. Vaughan, [redacted] Kirk, U.S.N., was ill today so [redacted]

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[redacted]

I went to 38 Baker Street at 10:00 A.M. to meet General Gubbins with the idea of discussing the London arrangements for S.O. and S.O.E. There were present Major Brewer and myself, the General, Major Nichols, Major Brooke and three others of the General's staff. He works with large groups of assistants it seems.

General Gubbins first indicated his acceptance of my counter-proposal on North Africa so that is settled subject to approval on the spot.

We then tackled London. The General handed me a memorandum on the subject which I said I would like to examine later. A quick glance indicated that I have talked too much about "integration". That magic word, however, appeals to S.O.E. and has been my "entrance ticket".

We outlined, in some detail, the positions to be filled by S.O. officers. This conformed to my instructions of yesterday to George Brewer.

The General was emphatic on one point, viz.: The new Home Station (SS-6) to be operated by O.S.S. must be considered solely as an S.O.-S.O.E. station and must be under the control of Major Brewer, the S.O. Operations Officer. Any other arrangement would lead to confusion. I told the General that I was sure Captain Hunt understood this since Colonel Perry had agreed to a secret station for other O.S.S. traffic.

The meeting ended at about 11:30 and I then called Tony Keswick to ask about the memorandum on Cairo. This, he said, would be in my hands shortly.

On returning to the office I met Louis Hunt and told him of the General's remarks. Hunt said there would be no difficulty. I asked him to work out the details of a proper arrangement with Major Brewer.

I then lunched with Reir in order to outline to him the work on which I believe he should concentrate.

After lunch I wrote a counter-proposal to the General's suggestions. Copies of the original memorandum and my own will be attached to these notes. What, in effect, I have tried to do is to recognize that this is "home base" for S.O.E. They are well established here with their own and our forces. For this reason I am of the belief that we must adopt a policy of partial integration, at least, in order to benefit from their prestige and experience and obtain full use of their facilities. At the same time we have, I hope, preserved reasonable individuality — especially with respect to the areas indicated in my counter-proposal. When we have grown stronger we may be able to fabricate permanent interests elsewhere. Right now we are by no means "weaned" and scarcely in a position to be "taken off the bottle".

At 5:30 Sir Charles picked me up, by appointment, for a meeting with Lt. General Hanstean, head of the Norwegian Forces — Army, Navy and Air. General Cornwall — H.B.'s Scandinavian expert (former M/A) — was present.

Hanstean is about 47 years old and looks 10 years younger. An easy person with them to talk. Sir Charles stated that we had been discussing the possibility of S.O. participation in Norway and then "threw the ball to me".

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Notes of [illegible]

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I told General Eisenhower that we, as Americans, had a natural and live interest in Scandinavia due to the quality of our Scandinavian-American population. Especially, at the moment, Norway is of especial interest everywhere due to admiration and respect for its people which their resistance had engendered. To us in S.O. it is of further interest because of its strategic possibilities. For all of these reasons it offers to S.O. an opportunity to furnish manpower and services for which latter we are and will be dependent, in part at least, on our own Armed Forces. I thought it would be good psychology, if the General agreed, to assign to S.O. a definite area of responsibility. In this way our Army, Navy and Air Force could be made to give us, from patriotic motives if for no other reason, the assistance which all of us -- S.O., S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government -- so badly need. We could then operate from Iceland or Northern Scotland as circumstances may dictate. Our operations must, of course, be related to and integrated with those of S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government. We wish to be considered as a part of the family group. Under the existing arrangement manpower, we have been given to understand, is being furnished by the Norwegian Government and services and facilities by S.O.E., the Commandos and Combined Operations. We would expect to follow the same general plan of operation.

I went on to point out to the General, however, that our situation was somewhat different from that of S.O.E. in that we had a very considerable Norwegian, Swedish and Danish speaking population on which we could draw and which, as a matter of fact, ought to be used. We could probably, in fact, draft sizeable contingents of American speaking Norwegians from our own Army.

The General explained that the policy of his Government was to use, as remain within the country, only members of the Norwegian Army. On the other hand, Americans-Norwegians could be used in groups on "One Time" or "Coup de Main" projects or with Combined Operations. Such Americans should be organized into military units and then sent here for further training and for use against Special Targets just as the Norwegians held by S.O.E. are now being used. He suggested the immediate organization and training of two groups of 30 each. They should be adequately officered (I should say groups of 35 -- a captain, a 1st Lt., a 2nd Lt., two Sgts., four corporals and 16 P.F.C.'s) trained in the U.S. (including Combined Operations, S.O. and parachute work) and then sent to England.

At this point I asked whether some of the more intelligent might not be usable as members of S.O. groups with his own men. The General did not answer but O.D. said "things might work out this way".

I also asked the General whether or not he could use Norwegian-American radio operators, of them we have a good many (I hope we can find them). He said "by all means -- any number". They can be infiltrated with our own men and will be perfectly safe.

We had now reached a satisfactory stopping point. By finding Norwegian-American radio operators and training them well in S.O. work in addition to radio, we will build and control our own Norwegian system. I, therefore, suggested that we reduce our discussion to writing as I would like something on which to base a request to General Eisenhower and our own J.C.S. for permission to proceed. It was then agreed that General Cornwall would draft the "Minutes" of the meeting.



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Note (1): If General Eisenhower approves, we should ask the J.C.S. to authorize our Norwegian Project. We can then begin a recruiting and training program stressing radio experience. We will, at the same time, have to generate some interest in the Army, Navy and Air Force. Submarines and destroyers are especially required and Iceland, the General said, would be an a base for either type of operation.

Note (2): Consideration should be given to the same idea for Italy and the Italian Islands. Later on Gal. Amone will want the same thing at Suez for the Greeks and Yugoslavs. The groups in general should be smaller than indicated above -- to wit -- 2 officers, 1 Sgt., 2 Cpls. and 10 P.J.C.'s.

Sir Charles and I talked a moment about my counter-proposals on North Africa and he said they were entirely agreeable. I said I wanted to make some changes in the London arrangement suggested by the General. These, Sir Charles thought, would be acceptable.

After leaving General Eastman I called on Mr. Kessler to discuss M.F.A.&.C. Kessler seemed agreeable to the general idea but said he could not visualize any course for a long stay. He also said he would have to discuss the matter with one or two associates whose discretion, he said, he would vouch. I told him I would like to bring Major Brewer around so that in event I left the matter could be carried on. Mr. K. said he would like to "think things over" and asked me to bring Brewer to dinner Wednesday evening at 8:00 P.M. at his apartment, 40 Grosvenor Square.

Once more to dinner and to bed.

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January 12, 1945.

Memorandum: To Major General E. Rdf. Gubbins.

[redacted]

Dear General Gubbins:

Pursuing a suggestion made by General Eisenhower to S.H., General Grevemil and myself on Monday that small, language speaking units might be useful in Norway for use ultimately with Invasion Forces and, in the interim, in conjunction with Resistance Operations and Resistance groups and against "special" or "one shot" targets, it has occurred to me that S.O. could easily extend its activities in this field.

It would be possible to draw on our own armed forces for language speaking personnel. This personnel could be supplemented by induction into the Army from civil life of qualified individuals. From among American soldiers and our citizenry we could, I am convinced, provide groups as follows:

1. For areas overlooked from the British Isles, Norwegian and other Resistance groups as well as German and French units.

2. For North Africa, Italian (where groups would be organized according to dialect), French, Spanish and, if necessary, Arabic speaking units.

3. In the Mid East, Greek, Turkish, Albanian, Hungarian and perhaps Rumanian and Bulgarian groups.

The units I have described here have been authorized under the J.C.S. directive (155/4/D of Nov. 22, 1944) to O.S.S. as "guerrilla units". I do not believe that actual guerrilla organizations are intended but, rather, what I have chosen to call "auxiliary operations groups" which is, in fact, what they would be. The primary use of the A.O.Groups would be to supplement the work of S.O.E., S.O. and the Invasion forces at or near D-Day and, in the meantime, for the special purposes above mentioned.

The organization of the A.O.Groups would be about as follows:



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Major General C.McV.Saltzman from Lt.Col.R.G.Huntington, Jr., Jan. 18, 1943.

1. A typical unit of fifteen would envision a Captain, a 1st Lieutenant as second in command, a Sergeant, two Corporals and ten enlisted men (Privates First Class). There would be two squads of five men and a Corporal each. The Corporals would act as squad leaders, the Lieutenant and Sergeant as Section Chiefs and the Captain as Group Commander. In each squad there would be at least one Radio Operator, a machine gun crew and two men armed with submachine guns. Those not armed with sub-machine guns would carry carbines. All would receive S.O. and Combined Operations training.

2. For the Norwegian Units there would be a complement totaling twenty-five, including: A Captain, a 1st Lieutenant, a 2nd Lieutenant, two Sergeants, four Corporals and sixteen P.F.C.'s. The squads would be composed of four men and a squad leader. Two squads would form a single section under a lieutenant and sergeant. The Captain would again be the Group Commander. To each of these groups should be attached a Norwegian officer, as Liaison Officer and Advisor.

The A.O.Groups would receive about twelve weeks of training in the United States and would then be sent out to join O.S.S. Missions from which they would be assigned to duty. All Groups operating in any given theatre would be under the command of a Major or Lieutenant Colonel (skilled in S.O. and Combined Operations work — there being too much now available) who would, in effect, be the Area A.O.S. Commander. He would, in turn, function under the direction of the S.O. Chief Operations Officer in that area. For command and organization purposes there would be an A.O.S. Chief in Washington who would be held responsible by me for all A.O.S. activities.

This is my version of auxiliary unit possibilities. I wonder whether or not you can see anything of value in the ideas presented.

Sincerely yours,

Lloyd G. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, A.U.S.



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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] of a proposal from the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, on behalf of S.H.A.P., relating to the building up of an additional wireless station.

2. By way of commenting on the explanations given to Admiral Burke, General Lee and yourself:

[illegible] The directive to S.H.A.P. would seem, in effect, to establish "subversive warfare" as an additional military service.

[illegible] The content of subversive warfare in furtherance of military plans is assigned to O.P.C. By definition this includes "special operations" involving the use of agents and groups trained in sabotage and subversive operations; espionage and counter-espionage in many simple or sophisticated forms; the aiding and abetting of resistance groups and "guerrilla" operations of military language speaking units around primarily to create harassing forces but originating, in the meantime, in exploitation of innocuous work and dedicated operations and on "non-start target" or any do-nothing projects. Subversive warfare, of course, contemplates, in addition to physical action, sabotage, psychological and political subversion through the direct medium of corruption and penetration and the more insidious methods of disruption, black propaganda and terror.

[illegible] On the intelligence side O.P.C. is entitled to contribute information and intelligence necessary for the planning and execution of the military program for psychological warfare. It is also directed (through the research and analysis section) to prepare "analysis and evidence of intelligence digests and such other data and visual presentation as may be requested". In connection with general intelligence activities, N.I.S., S.N.I. and O.P.C. are to provide "for the complete and free interchange of information, evaluated as to probability of error, required for the execution of their respective missions".

[illegible] In addition to the operational functions assigned to S.H.A.P. as indicated, S.H.A.P. is charged with the "planning, development, coordination and execution of the military





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[redacted]

[redacted]

2. As indicated above, intensive [redacted] operations are to be planned and directed [redacted]. The execution and planning of programs and separate operations, on the other hand (see chart on military program of psychological warfare, attached as indicated above), are the problems of S.O.S. [redacted]. In the field of propaganda, [redacted] propaganda is, under the Resolution [redacted] of June 23, 1948, assigned to S.O.S. "Black" or "[redacted]" propaganda remains a function of S.O.S.

3. Finally, all Psychological Warfare Operations within organized theaters of war are subject to direct control by the Commander concerned. The Commander shall be informed of all plans or proposals to be carried out within the theater of war, and their general character, and no directive or agents of S.O.S. shall engage in any activity which has not been approved by the Commander concerned[1].

4. The documents referred to in paragraphs 1 a, b, c and d above, have been prepared with a view to formulating [redacted] of the special operations branch (S.O.) which are based on logic. The disagreements with S.O.S. have been caused by the interest of [redacted] and to avoid dangerous duplication of effort. With respect to operations in Norway, as here, as will be observed, contact is [redacted] only with S.O.S. but, [redacted] limited. Paragraphs 2 a and b refer to [redacted] relating to the establishment of communications system which are essential to field operations. These documents have already been submitted, by [redacted] of this office, through channels, for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.





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[redacted]

[redacted]

Dear Colonel,

I am writing to confirm the decisions reached at my meeting held at [redacted] on the 11th January with Major Halvorsen to discuss S.O.E. activities in Norway. General Eisenhower has now set out the result of our conference:

1) The S.O. Section of S.H.A.E. will provide one [redacted] two groups of 16 to 18 Norwegian officers who have [redacted] members of the American Army and will be [redacted] training in the United States. [redacted] Plans for training where the composition of the Norwegian [redacted] Chief in the hands of the Norwegian Independent Company.

2) All S.O. personnel for operations in Norway will act under the control of the Norwegian Collaboration Committee.

3) S.O. will set up a Norwegian unit in London. This unit will be responsible to the Norwegian Collaboration Committee for the administration and discipline of all American personnel employed in Norwegian operations. It will also be the channel through which the Norwegian Collaboration Committee will communicate with the American Service Departments. A representative of the American Unit in London will be attached to the Norwegian Collaboration Committee for the purpose of assisting in the planning of all operations undertaken by S.O. personnel whether in collaboration with British and Norwegian personnel or not.

4) All supplies and training facilities available to the Norwegian Collaboration Committee and S.O. will be pooled to the benefit of both, but in particular S.O. will normally service operations which take place north of parallel [illegible].

Should any of the personnel recruited by S.O. in America prove to be suitable for agency work in Norway they will be transferred from the American guerilla units and specially trained in England under the control of the Norwegian Collaboration Committee and will thereafter be sent to Norway as joint S.O./S.O.E./Norwegian Government agents.

S.O. will present forthwith to recruit Norwegian speaking civilian operators in America over and above the requirement for guerilla units and will send them as soon as possible to England for training and absorption into the S.O./S.O.E./Norwegian network.

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) S.O.

Lt. Colonel Hilary G. Huntington,
75 Grosvenor Street,
W. 1.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Dear Colonel,

General Robins has shown me your memorandum to him of January 14th, 1948 with which you enclose a memorandum dated January 14th 1948 covering our mutual activities in and from North Africa.

I am writing to confirm that I am in agreement with its general terms and conditions. It may be that the [redacted] Robins have consulted our representatives on the spot and minor discrepancies there may be further additions or amendments on matters of detail.

I suggest therefore that before I communicate with the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office for their confirmation of our arrangement that you ask the General notify us from North Africa of General Eisenhower's final approval.

May I thank you once more for your co-operation in this matter which augurs well for the future of the joint effort.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ [redacted] C.D.

Lt. Colonel Riley C. Huntington, Jr.,
O.S.S.,
70 Grosvenor Street,
W. 1.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

The following are the principles proposed for the organization and execution of S.O.E.-S.O. activities in and from North Africa as related to the directive of United States Joint Chiefs of Staff No. 170 of December 18, 1942, and the plan for Special Operations thereto attached.

1. Present Situation.

a. O.S.S. has established a mission in North Africa, under the direction of Col. William A. Eddy, for work both in North Africa and areas in or adjacent to the Western Mediterranean. As a part of the activities of the O.S.S. mission, it is proposed to conduct, in the territory described, S.I. and S.O. operations and other aspects of subversive warfare under the authority of the directive to O.S.S. from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff No. 155/4/D of December 28, 1942.

b. An S.O. mission will be established at an appropriate base in North Africa under the direction of Lt. Commander Potter, Executive Officer and Acting Chief of this mission who will be responsible to and act under the authority of the Chief of the O.S.S. mission.

c. S.O.E. has established from London Headquarters an advanced operational base in North Africa (Kensingham), under the direction of a Chief of Mission (Col. Munn), for work solely into Europe. It will undertake no operational activity in North Africa except as requested by the Chief of the O.S.S. mission and A.F.H.Q.

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Its relations with A.F.H. are governed by the directive issued by A.F.H. dated December 15, 1942.

d. The Chief of the O.S.M. mission is to act as the Executive head of all S.O.M. action in and from North Africa.

2. Functional Organizations.

a. For purposes of operational responsibility and convenience, the territories to be served by S.O.M. and S.O. will be divided, as agreed between the Chiefs of the S.O.M. and S.O. missions with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S., into "Areas of Responsibility" in which S.O.M. or S.O., as the case may be, will have operational responsibility.

b. Geographic Desks or Country Sections will be predominantly S.O.M. or S.O. to conform to "Areas of Responsibility" with representation on the part of the other party. The personnel for such Desks will be arranged by mutual agreement between the Chiefs of the S.O.M. and S.O. mission with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S.

c. Operations will be directed for S.O.M. and S.O. by Chief Operations Officers who may be the Chiefs of Mission or different persons. Col. Munn will act as Chief Operations Officer for S.O.M. and, until such time as the services of an experienced Operations Officer for S.O. can be found, will be appointed as Chief Operations Officer for S.O.

d. In so far as may be practicable, joint facilities for transportation, communications, supplies, training, documentation, and other services necessary to meet operational requirements, will be established by mutual agreement between the Chiefs of the



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S.O.E. and S.O. missions with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S.

3. Conduct of Operations.

a. All S.O.E.-S.O. operations in and from the Theatre will be directed locally by a Policy Committee composed of the Chief of O.S.S. as chairman, the Chief of the S.O.E. mission, the Chief of S.O. and the regional director of S.O.E. The chairman shall have the casting or deciding vote on all matters. If O.S.S. shall appoint a representative to this area to direct its activities in other fields of psychological warfare assigned to O.S.S. under the directive above mentioned, such representative shall become a member of the Policy Committee. It shall be the task of the Policy Committee to formulate policy in the light of the principles established in this memorandum.

b. Subject to the control of the Theatre Commander as provided in the directive to O.S.S. above mentioned:

(1) The Chiefs of the O.S.S. and S.O. missions will receive their general directives from Washington Headquarters;

(2) The Chief of the S.O.E. mission will receive his general directives from London Headquarters and he and his staff remain for disciplinary and administrative purposes under London Headquarters; and

(3) The Chiefs of O.S.S. and S.O.E. shall each be permitted the right of reference to their respective headquarters.



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Special Operations [redacted] Mediterranean Area
Plan of Collaboration Between S.O.E. and S.O.

4. Implementation of Plan.

a. The Plan of collaboration and operation herein set forth shall be made effective when approved by or on behalf of the Theatre Commander.

Confirmed _____ day of January, 1943.

Chief of S.O.E. mission, North Africa.

Chief of S.O.E. mission, North Africa.

Chief of S.O. and representative of Director of O.S.S.

A.F.H.Q., January ____, 1943.

The foregoing plan of collaboration between S.O.E. and S.O. and the establishment of the missions for O.S.S., S.O.E. and S.O. therein contemplated, as well as the plan for Special Operations in the Western Mediterranean Area referred to in Directive No. 170, December 18, 1942, of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services, are hereby approved.

Ralph I. Mershow,
Lieutenant General, U.S.Army.

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[redacted]

A. [redacted]

1. S.O. does not desire to set up in London a totally separate operational base, as it considers any general duplication of S.O.E.'s established activities to be unfortunate. Further, there are certain countries of Europe, notably France, Holland and Belgium, where S.O. cannot, initially at least, assist S.O.E. except by furnishing a limited number of individual operatives. S.O. will, however, make every effort to recruit and make available for use, in all such areas, language specialists "guerrilla units" or "auxiliary operations groups" intended primarily to supplement the work of invasion forces and sabotage units and, in the interim, to be used in Commando and Combined Operations raids and on "one shot (night)" or "coup de main" projects.

2. There are, however, certain countries, notably Scandinavia, Italy, Spain and Portugal, in which S.O. feels able to make a major contribution, and therefore wishes to be strongly represented by suitable S.O. officers in this country and/or in North Africa.

3. S.O. wishes to put personnel into the field in Norway, under agreement with S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government. These operations would be planned and directed by S.O. Geographic Desk and Operations Officers in collaboration, however, with S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government. Substantially, such operations would be conducted by N.O. within the limits of the provisions of a certain "Proposed Psychological Warfare Undertaking in Norway" as certified by the Secretariat of O.S.S. December 23, 1942, subject, of course, to the terms of the arrangements between S.O.E., S.O. and the Norwegian Government now in the process of being reduced to writing. It is anticipated that the Area of Responsibility in Norway which would be assigned to S.O. for "servicing" would be the northern portion.





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4. S.O. will also, perhaps, wish to carry out operations in other occupied territories and in Germany. In such other occupied territories operations will be under the direction of, and in Germany in collaboration with, S.O.E.

5. S.O. will wish to establish its own War Station which, while independent in theory, would be under the general control of S.O.E. acting through the Chief Operations Officer of S.O.

B. Conduct of Operations from London.

1. S.O. shall maintain its own administrative offices with the O.S.S. Mission, London, but all operational matters shall be coordinated through S.O.E.

2. S.O. shall maintain, as required, its own Geographic Desks or Country Sections and proper Operations Officers for the conduct of operations as outlined above. S.O.E. will maintain liaison with such Desks which, in turn, shall maintain similar liaison with the corresponding S.O.E. sections.

3. S.O. personnel will be attached for duty, or for purposes of liaison, to the various sections of S.O.E. where such attachment will be of value and in those sections in which it is considered that S.O. has an interest or can render assistance.

4. From their position as officers attached to sections of S.O.E., officers of S.O. will inevitably have access to or obtain information through or from S.O.E. which otherwise would not be available to them. It is essential for the establishment of mutual confidence both between S.O. and S.O.E., and with the exiled Government concerned, that such information shall be treated as "privileged" and as being the property only of the Country Section and for the relevant foreign Government.

5. The actual position of S.O. officers in the various sections, and the work they will undertake will be the object of particular agreements, after discussion with regional heads concerned.



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6. All supply, operational and training facilities of S.O.E. are at the disposal of O.S.S. for any action undertaken from the United Kingdom.

7. The S.O. organization in the United Kingdom will conform to the security measures laid down by S.O.E.

For S.O.E.,

For O.S.S.,



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General Gubbins 1 pm
Jan 9. 43.

DRAFT

S.O.E. AND O.S.S. IN LONDON

1. O.S.S. does not desire to set up in London a separate operational base, as it considers any general duplication of S.O.E.'s established activities to be redundant. Further, there are certain countries of Europe, notably France, Holland and Belgium, where O.S.S. will not be in a position to assist S.O.E. to any degree.

2. There are, however, certain countries, notably Scandinavia, Italy, Spain and Portugal, in which O.S.S. feels able to make a major contribution, and therefore wishes to be strongly represented by suitable O.S.S. officers in this country and/or in North Africa.

3. O.S.S. also wishes to put personnel into the field in Norway, after agreement with S.O.E. and the Norwegian Government, and may also have a few men for work in other occupied countries. Such men would in theory be operated by O.S.S. personnel, but in fact would be under joint S.O.E./O.S.S. control. O.S.S. is particularly anxious that some ostensible part of Norway, say the northern part, is 'serviced' by O.S.S.

4. O.S.S. also wish to establish their own War Station, in theory independent to work to their own agents, but in practice as already agreed in collaboration with and under general control of S.O.E.

5. To sum up, O.S.S. is desirous, as far as operations from London are concerned, to work in integration with S.O.E., i.e. to put O.S.S. men in key positions in D/CE(O)'s Directorate where they will take up actual executive work. O.S.S. is not desirous of establishing an independent operational base in England.

Should/

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Should such a system be decided upon, the following general principles for conduct of work are put forward for agreement.

**Conduct of work**
**S.O.E./O.S.S. operations from London**

A. O.S.S. will not establish a separate mission in London but will operate from there in full collaboration with S.O.E. by integrating its personnel in the relevant Sections of S.O.E.

B. The personnel concerned will take up executive appointments in these Sections.

C. The Sections concerned will be those Country Sections where O.S.S. has an interest or wishes to render assistance, and in the air, planning and operations sections.

D. From their position within Country Sections officers of O.S.S. will inevitably have access or obtain information which otherwise would not be available to them.

It is essential for the establishment of mutual confidence both between O.S.S. and S.O.E., and with the emigré Government concerned, that such information is treated as 'privileged' and as being the property only of the Country Section and for the relevant foreign Government.

E. The actual position of the O.S.S. officers in the various sections, and the work they will undertake will be the object of particular agreements, after discussion with regional heads concerned.

F. Communications between O.S.S. officers working within S.O.E. and their own headquarters or missions abroad will be through S.O.E. channels.

G. All operational and training facilities of S.O.E. are at the disposal of O.S.S. for any action undertaken from the United Kingdom.

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[redacted] January, 1945

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CO-ORDINATION OF

S.O.E. AND THE AMERICAN S.O. MISSION

IN THE BALKANS AND MIDDLE EAST

PRESENT : Colonel Huntington
Colonel Guenther
Major Brewer
Mr. W. J. Keswick
Lt. Col. Pearson
Lord Glenconner

.....

1. LORD GLENCONNER gave an account of the organisation of S.O.E. Mid East and its relations with its own Head Office and the local British political and military authorities.

He explained that S.O.E. London is responsible for all questions of Policy but that the political directives received by the Mission are discussed with the British Minister of State and Commanders-in-Chief before they are finally accepted. The machinery for doing this is an S.O.E. Sub-Committee of the Middle East Defence Committee - which is presided over by the Minister of State and on which all three of the active Services are represented.

LORD GLENCONNER explained that S.O.E. Middle East is organised on a country basis and the Country Section heads are responsible for initiating projects within the limits of approved policy, which are then submitted - through him and his own Chief of Staff - to the S.O.E. Sub-Committee for approval. When approved, they are passed back to the Country Section heads, who are also responsible for the execution of the operations involved, subject to the supervision and control of their own Chief of Staff.

Co-ordination with other Government departments is therefore effected in London and with the local authorities on all questions of policy. Planning is also adjusted to the strategic requirements of the local Commanders-in-Chief, and the closest liaison has been established between S.O.E. Mid East and the operational staffs of the three Services in the sphere of operations themselves.

2. COLONEL HUNTINGTON asked if S.O.E. had any suggestions for making use of the personnel, materials and new contacts which the American Mission hoped to be able to provide.

LORD GLENCONNER replied that S.O.E. Mid East welcomed the set up of an American Mission for the reasons indicated by Colonel Huntington. He said that in

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his view such an American Mission should be organised on the same pattern as S.O.E. Mid East - i.e. that it should be divided into Country Sections responsible to the Head of the S.O. department of the O.S.S. Mission.

He was not in favour of allocating certain countries to S.O.E. Mid East and others to the American Mission, but that the American Mission should be a replica of the British Mission so far as the operational departments were concerned. Co-ordination of the activities of the two Missions could, he thought be effected by the Chief of Staff of S.O.E. Mid East, who could be given the title of Chief Operational Officer. He went on to say that he hoped that the American Mission would make use of the Services Directorate which had already been set up as a part of S.O.E. Mid East and that they would therefore look to the British for all communications within the Mission area, training, transport of agents, etc. and for non-Service stores, such as W/T sets, explosives, special devices, concealment articles, forged papers, etc.

LORD GLENCONNER went on to say that he would be in favour of setting up a Joint Committee consisting of himself and the Chief Operational Officer for the British side, and Colonel Guenther, Head of the O.S.S. Mission to the Middle East, and Colonel Amos, Head of the S.O. department, for the American side. This committee would direct the activities of both Missions. He also suggested that Colonel Guenther should be invited to be a member of the S.O.E. Sub-Committee referred to above and the Anglo-Greek Committee, which has been set up by the British Government in conjunction with the Greek Government for conducting all subversive activities in Greece.

COLONEL HUNTINGTON expressed agreement with these proposals in principle. He went on to say that in his view effective co-ordination of the activities of the two Missions in the spheres of policy, planning and execution of operations was essential for success. He added that it was equally essential that control should be vested in one party or the other. In view of the fact that the Balkans and Middle East is a British theatre of war, he suggested that this control should be in British hands. This would be partially effected by the appointment of the Chief Operational Officer, but he also thought that Lord Glenconner should be appointed as Chairman of the Joint Committee with casting vote.

He went on to say that at a later date he might wish to appoint a Chief

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Operational Officer of his own for the American Mission, in which case co-ordination and control would be effected by the British Chairman of the Joint Committee. Lord Glenconner undertook to consider this proposal but expressed the view that it might be a natural development.

With regard to Lord Glenconner's suggestion that the American Mission should make use of the Services Directorate of S.O.E. Mid East, Colonel Huntington said that he hoped his Mission would be able to make a substantial contribution in the form of explosives, arms and stores of a non-Service type. He said he also hoped that they would be able to provide their own aircraft, seacraft and military stores, etc., as he understood these already at the disposal of S.O.E. Mid East were barely sufficient for their own needs. Lord Glenconner welcomed this suggestion.

3. LORD GLENCONNER pointed out that the discussion must be regarded as provisional as it would be necessary for him to consult with the Minister of State and British Commanders-in-Chief on his return to Egypt. Colonel Huntington agreed that from his side also the proposals could not be regarded as binding as he would need to consult with General Andrews and report through him to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

4. IT WAS THEREFORE AGREED :

(a) to make a record of the conversation,

(b) to meet in Cairo at the end of the month with a view to drawing up a joint recommendation in greater detail for submission to the British and American local authorities.

...oOo...



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Herewith, the following documents -

1. Letter and accompanying document from Captain [illegible] to Colonel J. B. Cannon, under date of November 15, 1942.

2. Colonel Cannon's reply, answering the proposal outlined above.

3. A letter from Colonel Donald Jump, Controller of Special Communications, agreeing in the establishment of a small, independent O.S.S. radio station, one receiving station. This request was only partly [illegible] therefore no [illegible] document in this file.)

4. Letter from Captain [illegible] to Colonel Donald [illegible] the conditions outlined in his letter of January 6th, 1943.

January [illegible], 1943.

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COPY No. 5

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19th December, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan,

Please find herewith a short outline of our proposals. I believe this accurately represents the decisions that we have reached in the course of our conversations during the last few days. Please note that there is no attempt to outline here the precise modality of our collaboration. We shall work this out as we go along, and it is my feeling that any effort to be precise about it now would only lead to complications. Furthermore, there are too many unpredictable factors that we shall have to meet as best we can, as we go along. Linked as we are by absolute community of purpose and strong bias of good will, I feel certain we shall find a way to meet any situation that may arise.

On Saturday afternoon, Sir Charles received me in his office and I presented to him the letter from Colonel Donovan. At that time I reported to him that we had already reached a complete understanding regarding the implementation of our agreement, although nothing had as yet been set down in writing. I also told him that we would have a written version of our proposal ready within a day or two. The enclosed document is what I had in mind at the time. Sir Charles suggested that any proposal we might wish to make should be sent to you for your examination and comment. I presume that if it should prove acceptable, you will forward it to him with your recommendations. Should you feel any reservations about it, I should, of course, appreciate your calling them to my attention now, in order that we might go over them together and seek the necessary modifications.

Yours sincerely,

Louis Hart,
Capt., AUS.

Colonel C. M. Donovan, M.C.,
Baker Street,
London.

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It is proposed that the Communications Section of the Office of Strategic Services and S.O.E. should collaborate in England as follows:

1. O.S.S. will build, equip, staff and operate Station 53-C for communication with British, American, Norwegian or other Allied Agents in North Western Europe.

2. Station 53-C will form an integral part of the S.O.E. communications system, and as such will be under the control of S.O.E. Communications Section headed by Colonel Osborne.

3. O.S.S. will retain ownership of any materials and equipment supplied for Station 53-C.

4. The Chief Signals Officer of O.S.S. will be invited to participate in conferences affecting the management and operation of the station.

5. O.S.S. will make every effort to find sufficient personnel for Station 53-C and will, in any case, immediately supply a number of operators for training at Stations 54 and 52. S.O.E. will assist in the training of Signal Masters and other key members of the station's staff.

6. In the event of agreement being reached between O.S.S. and S.O.E. on the basis here outlined, the above proposals will be submitted to General Eisenhower for his approval and support.

December 15th, 1944.

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64, Baker Street,

W.1

9th January, 1943.

Dear Capt. Huot,

With reference to your letter of the 15th December, 1942, I am very pleased to say that agreement has now been reached in this matter, exactly on the lines set forth in the attachment to your letter.

I shall look forward to collaborating with you very closely as soon as possible, in order that all details, as already provisionally agreed between us, may be finalised.

Yours sincerely,

(G.D.OZANNE, Colonel)

Capt. Louis Huot,
71, Grosvenor Street,
W.1

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54, Broadway Buildings,

S.W.1.

G.7/ 4959

January 6th. 1943.

Dear Captain Hunt,

With reference to the request by Office of Strategic Services, U.S.A. Government, for agreement to erect and operate a wireless station in the United Kingdom, I would like to clarify the situation. It is the responsibility of Controller Special Communications to ensure that such a station shall not, through lack of co-ordination, cause interference with vital operational Service frequencies with consequent risk of serious disaster; it is further the responsibility of Controller Special Communications to have full information regarding all transmissions in the United Kingdom and particularly of transmissions of the nature contemplated by the Office of Strategic Services, both for Radio Security purposes and to protect the contemplated station from undesirable investigation.

I am glad to inform you that the principle of erecting such a station has been approved provided that the Office of Strategic Services will notify their agreement to the terms and conditions set out below:

1. (a) The station shall contain not more than four transmitters.

   (b) The transmitters shall have a maximum power not exceeding 500 watts, measured as R.F. energy available at the output terminals of the transmitter.

2. (a) The site of the station shall be agreed by Controller Special Communications.

   (b) The number and nature of the aerials erected on the site shall be agreed by Controller Special Communications.

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3. (a) Radiation shall not take place on any frequency until Controller Special Communications has given written approval for the use of that frequency.

(b) All call signs shall be notified to and agreed by Controller Special Communications before they are taken into use.

(c) All operating procedures shall be notified to and agreed by Controller Special Communications.

(d) All contact times and operating schedules shall be notified to and agreed by Controller Special Communications.

(e) All general locations, frequencies, procedures and times of operating of 'out stations' which are being worked shall be notified to Controller Special Communications.

(f) Controller Special Communications, or his representative, shall have access on request to the full station logs.

(g) Controller Special Communications, or his representative, shall have access to the station on request.

Yours sincerely,

Colonel,
Controller Special Communications.

Captain L. Huot,
72, Grosvenor Street,
W.1.

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COPY NO. 5

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January 9th, 1943

Dear Colonel Gambier Parry,

Thank you for your letter of January 6th, which reached me today. I am very pleased to learn that it has been possible for you to obtain a favourable decision in connection with our request for the right to operate a small transmitting and receiving station in England.

The terms and conditions on the basis of which this arrangement is possible have received the closest consideration and study. They would seem to cover points on which agreement had already been reached in verbal form, in a general way. I understand that it will be your responsibility, as Controller of Special Communications, to ensure that such a station shall in no way interfere with operations through emission on operational frequencies, hazards to aircraft through erection of poles near operational sites, etc. etc.; also that a very close liaison with your organization will be required in order that you may have full knowledge of our schedules, call signs, etc. None of these points should lead to any difficulty, and we do agree to them as outlined in your letter.

Thank you again for your kind offices in bringing about this agreement.

Yours sincerely,

Louis Hunt,
Capt. AUS.

Lieut. Col. R. Gambier Parry,
54 Broadway,
London, S.W.1.

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2. Control of Work.

(a) The affairs of O.S.S./S.O.E. will be directed locally by a Policy Committee composed of:-

S.E. 6000 (Chairman.)

Head of S.O.E.

Head of S.O.

Regional Director, S.O.E.

The Chairman will have a casting vote.

(b) The local head of S.O.E. will continue to receive his general directives from London Headquarters, and he and his staff will also remain for disciplinary and administrative purposes under London Headquarters, subject to local control by A.F.H. The local head of O.S.S. will continue to receive general directives from his own Headquarters.

(c) It is the task of the Policy Committee to formulate policy in the light of these directives.

4. For all action in connection with military operations, O.S.S./S.O.E. will be under the direct operational command of A.F.H.

5. The local heads of O.S.S. and S.O.E. each retain the right of reference to their respective Headquarters.

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O.S.S. and S.O.E. in North Africa.

The following are the principles for the organisation and execution of O.S.S./S.O.E. activities in and from North Africa.

1. Present Situation.

(a) O.S.S. is establishing a Mission in North Africa under GB.6000 for work both in North Africa and into Europe from that base.

(b) S.O.E. has established from London Headquarters an Advanced Operational Base in North Africa (Massingham) for work solely into Europe. It will undertake no operational activity in North Africa except as requested by GB.6000 and A.F.H. Its relations with A.F.H. are governed by the directive issued by A.F.H. dated the 15th December, 1943.

(c) GB.6000 is the executive head of all O.S.S./S.O.E. action in and from North Africa.

2. On Establishment of O.S.S. Mission.

(a) GB.6000 will remain as head of the joint O.S.S./S.O.E. operations as described above.

(b) The Head of S.O.E. (at present Colonel Munn) will be the Chief Operations Officer of O.S.S./S.O.E.

(c) O.S.S./S.O.E. will set up joint services for transportation, communications, supplies, training and any other services required, by mutual agreement between the heads of O.S.S. and of S.O.E. in North Africa.

(d) O.S.S. and S.O.E. will set up joint geographical desks by countries for work into Europe. The personnel of these desks, and the head of each, will be arranged by mutual agreement as in 2 (c) above.

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11 January 1943
Special Operations in Western Mediterranean Area
Plan of Collaboration between S.O.E. and S.O.

4. Implementation of Plan.

a. The plan of collaboration and operation herein set forth shall be made effective when approved by or on behalf of the theatre Commander.

Confirmed _____ day of January, 1943.

Chief of S.O.E. mission, North Africa.

Chief of S.O.E. mission, North Africa.

Chief of S.O. and representative of Director of O.S.S.

A.F.H.Q., January ____, 1943.

The foregoing plan of collaboration between S.O.E. and S.O. and the establishment of the missions for O.S.S., S.O.E. and S.O. therein contemplated, as well as the plan for Special Operations in the Western Mediterranean Area referred to in Directive No. 170, December 18, 1942, of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Office of Strategic Services, are hereby approved.

Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Lieutenant General, U.S.Army.



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11 January 1945
Special Operations in Eastern Mediterranean Area
Plan of Collaboration between S.O.E. and S.O.

S.O.E. and S.O. missions with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S.

2. Conduct of Operations.

a. All S.O.E.-S.O. operations in and from the theatre will be directed locally by a Policy Committee composed of the Chief of O.S.S. as chairman, the Chief of the S.O.E. mission, the Chief of S.O. and the regional director of S.O.E. The chairman shall have the casting or deciding vote on all matters. If O.S.S. shall appoint a representative to this area to direct its activities in other fields of psychological warfare assigned to O.S.S. under the directive above mentioned, such representative shall become a member of the Policy Committee. It shall be the task of the Policy Committee to formulate policy in the light of the principles established in this memorandum.

b. Subject to the control of the theatre Commander as provided in the directive to O.S.S. above mentioned:

(1) The Chiefs of the O.S.S. and S.O. missions will receive their general directives from Washington Headquarters;

(2) The Chief of the S.O.E. mission will receive his general directives from London Headquarters and he and his staff remain for disciplinary and administrative purposes under London Headquarters; and

(3) The Chiefs of O.S.S. and S.O.E. shall each be permitted the right of reference to their respective headquarters.



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Special Operations in Western Mediterranean Area
Plan of Collaboration Between S.O.E. and S.O.

Its relations with A.F.H.Q. are governed by the directive issued by A.F.H.Q. dated December 15, 1942.

b. The Chief of the O.S.S. mission is to act as the Executive head of all S.O.E. action in and from North Africa.

2. Operational Responsibilities.

a. For purposes of operational responsibility and convenience, the territories to be served by S.O.E. and S.O. will be divided, as agreed between the Chiefs of the S.O.E. and S.O. missions with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S., into "Areas of Responsibility" in which S.O.E. or S.O., as the case may be, will have operational responsibility.

b. Geographic Basis or Country Sections will be predominantly S.O.E. or S.O. to conform to "Areas of Responsibility" with representation on the part of the other party. The personnel for such Basis will be arranged by mutual agreement between the Chiefs of the S.O.E. and S.O. missions with the approval of the Chief of O.S.S.

c. Operations will be directed for S.O.E. and S.O. by Chief Operations Officers who may be the Chiefs of Mission or different persons. Col. Hazen will act as Chief Operations Officer for S.O.E. and, until such time as the services of an experienced Operations Officer for S.O. can be found, will be appointed as Chief Operations Officer for S.O.

d. In so far as may be practicable, joint facilities for transportation, communications, supplies, training, documentation, and other services necessary to meet operational requirements, will be established by mutual agreement between the Chiefs of the



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11 January 1943.

[redacted]

[redacted]

The following are the principles proposed for the organization and execution of S.O.E.-S.O. activities in and from North Africa as related to the directive of United States Joint Chiefs of Staff No. 170 of December 18, 1942, and the plan for Special Operations thereto attached.

1. [redacted]

a. O.S.S. has established a mission in North Africa, under the direction of Col. William A. Eddy, for work both in North Africa and areas in or adjacent to the Western Mediterranean. As a part of the activities of the O.S.S. mission, it is proposed to conduct, in the territory described, S.I. and S.O. operations and other aspects of subversive warfare under the authority of the directive to O.S.S. from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff No. 155/4/D of December 28, 1942.

b. An S.O. mission will be established at an appropriate base in North Africa under the direction of Lt. Commander Potter, Executive Officer and Acting Chief of this mission who will be responsible to and act under the authority of the Chief of the O.S.S. mission.

c. S.O.E. has established from London Headquarters an advanced operational base in North Africa (Kensington), under the direction of a Chief of Mission (Col. Hunn), for work solely into Europe. It will undertake no operational activity in North Africa except as requested by the Chief of the O.S.S. mission and A.F.H.Q.



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10 Jan. 1943

Memorandum to Major General S. McF. Griffin.

Subject: North African Mission, S.O.E. and S.O.

My dear General:

With respect to the draft of memorandum which you handed me yesterday I find nothing fundamental on which to comment other than the points mentioned in our telephone conversation of this morning. Concerning these points it would seem advisable to outline, subject to discussion with Bill Eddy and John Hunn, areas of operational responsibility and to relate Country Section or Geographic Desk requirements to such areas. Respecting actual operations themselves I would like, unless Colonel Eddy has other views, to follow your suggestion of appointing Colonel Hunn as Chief Operations Officer for S.O. so that he could, for the moment, act in this capacity for both of us. It is possible that, at a later date, an experienced regular officer will be assigned us for this work, in which event coordination would be derived through the proposed "Policy Committee".

I have taken the liberty of recording your memorandum slightly with a view to covering the points above mentioned and with the idea, also, of providing a document which can be related to our directive of North Africa from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (No. 170) of which you have a copy.

There is, needless to say, no magic in the language used.

Sincerely yours,

Elliott C. Huntington

Elliott C. Huntington, Jr.,
Lieut. Colonel, A. U. S.

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their own territory may become a nuisance. The extent of Mackiam' activities can be determined in Cairo.

(b) While I would be delighted, at the outset, to use the services of S.O.E.'s Chief of Staff as Chief Operations Officer for both S.O.E. and S.O., it might transpire that we will be able to obtain a high ranking and experienced Regular Army officer to handle S.O. operations. In this case it would be necessary to look to the Policy Committee, alone, for coordination with Lord Glenconner having the "veeting" veto just as it is intended Eddy shall have this power in North Africa. Lord Glenconner and Guy Kerwick both stated that a separation of operational control under such an arrangement would not seem to be objectionable. I added that the same situation would probably ultimately prevail in North Africa since we were in hopes of having a Regular Army colonel assigned there as Chief Operations Officer and as liaison representative with the Theatre Command on all operations. Until such a man arrived I would be delighted to have Col. Munn appointed as Chief Operations Officer for S.O. (as well as S.O.E.). Potter could act as Executive Officer of S.O. and for the moment there would be no Chief of S.O. Mission.

Note: If S.O.E. controls all operational direction the Mission is obviously theirs. I am trying to provide for a set up under which we can, at first, have British aid on all operations and later, as our personnel acquires experience, become entirely independent. The other point for which I want to fight is the creation of definite "Spheres of Influence" (especially where it seems we can "make a showing"). In the absence of this the areas must be "free" for operational purposes with coordination only through the Policy Committee. I hope I can persuade Bill Eddy to this view as it seems the only method pursuant to which we can grow, gradually, to the point where our armed forces will recognize us as an integrated organization worthy of assistance and consideration.

I suggested to Lord Glenconner that we prepare a draft of memorandum setting forth the ideas expressed at this meeting with the thought that this memorandum might be used as the basis of our requests to General Andrews and the G. in G. in the Mid East. He agreed subject to consultation in Cairo (before preparation of any final document) with his G. of S. and the Sub-Committee above mentioned. He will prepare a first draft of the arrangement.

Col. Gunther, in answer to my question, stated that the discussion had been highly satisfactory to him. On the way home I suggested to Col. Gunther that Col. Greenwell might be the man to bring on as our Chief Operations Officer and liaison representative to work with him. He thought this would be a splendid arrangement.

Note: I have already written R.D.E. on this subject though, at the time, I had not thought of Greenwell for Cairo. He should, if he accepts, be sent through England for Operational and S.O. training -- or he might get a look at S.O. training at Washington and pass through England for three weeks of operational work.

We left Berkeley Court at about 5:00 P.M. I said good-bye to Commander Keiberg and then adjourned to Fisher Howe's flat for a party given by him for us and a number of the S.O.E. group. Here were present from S.O.E.: General Gubbins, Col. Nash, Col. Wilkinson, Col. Gamme, Col. Pollock, Col. Bateman, Major Leonard, Major Tracy, Robin Brock (Gubbins' political adviser), Capt. Howell, and the two Keswicks. Capt. Munn and Capt. Van Mantle, whom I wanted to meet, could not come.

Dinner at 8:30 P.M. and back to bed.

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Training is done in Palestine.

S.O.E. has its own network of communications with a new War Station in Cairo.

I asked Lord Glenconner whether or not he had given any thought to our proposed O.S.S. Mission and its functions. He replied that he had. His ideas are as follows:

(1) The O.S.S. Mission in Cairo under Col. Guenther shall contemplate branches for S.I. and Subversive Warfare — the latter organized as we shall see fit but including, presumably, Special Operations, morale subversion and Propaganda (written and audible);

(2) Special Operations should be organized under Col. Amoss along the lines of the S.O.E. Cairo organization;

(3) Col. Guenther should be appointed to the Sub-Committee of the Middle East Defense Committee and Col. Amoss should be appointed to the Executive Committee;

(4) Geographic Desks (Country Sections) should function independently;

(5) Coordination should be arranged through:

(a) A Policy Committee composed of Lord Glenconner and his Chief of Staff and the O.S.S. representative (Col Guenther) and the Chief of S.O. (Col. Amoss);

(b) Centering operational direction in the S.O.E. Chief of Staff (who is, in effect, S.O.E. Chief Operations Officer);

(6) Special Services, such as supply, transportation, research, documentation, communications, training, etc., would be "pooled" in so far as practicable.

The foregoing suggestions of Lord Glenconner followed, it will be seen, the outline of my discussions of yesterday with the General and Tony Kewick. (Our friends work rapidly). It will also be seen that the Cairo S.O.E. "set up" follows the organizational plan we adopted for S.O. in Washington rather than that of S.O.E., London. The difference is that S.O.E. Cairo uses its Country Sections as Operations Divisions, i.e., origination, recruiting and planning entities. The Directors who head the Divisions are, in effect, the equivalent of our "Area Operations Officers" and the Chief of Staff is the equivalent of our "Chief Operations Officer". Their "Secretariat" is the G. of S. performs some of the duties of our "Planning Officer". Lord Glenconner agreed that this was so. Their organization in Cairo was revised last August and represents latest S.O.E. thought on a workable structure. This would indicate that we have not gone far wrong in our thinking.

I told Glenconner that his suggestions accorded with our ideas except that:

(a) Our Desks on Iraq, Iran and other British-dominated areas would not be as extensive as theirs. This area would be served by the so-called "Hopkins Mission" but the scope of this Mission would be definitely limited to areas where American influence could be capitalized. We do not wish to impose ourselves on the British in



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7/8

**Visit of S.O.E. Men**
**[redacted]**

Sir Charles Hambro assisted in transforming our business arrangement to the Washington Hotel. Col. Gardner, Major Brewer and I met with S.O., Lord Glenconner, General Gubbins, Col. Pyrson, Mary Rostron, Guy and John Kendrick. It was a pleasant lunch meeting at which we discussed only generalities. Turned the ball over handed me a draft memorandum on North Africa and said he would produce one on Greece this evening. I suggested to the General that I send it and give him my comments on Monday. I could see at first glance that it would not do.

Lord Glenconner, Col. Gardner, Major Brewer, Col. Pyrson, Guy Kendrick and I then adjourned to Berkeley Court to discuss Cairo. Glenconner is a charming man who gave us a constant picture of his organization and operations. S.O.E. in the Mid East is set up about as follows:




Documentation is done by S.O.E. and S.I.S. in combination.

S.O.E. in the Mid East functions under the G. in G. of course. The G. in G. has appointed Glenconner's Chief of Staff (Chief Operations Officer) who is a Brigadier, this facilitates matters.

The operations of S.O.E. are supervised by the Defence Committee of the Mid-East which was originally established by the War Ministry. Actually, there is a sub-committee (on which S.O.E., the Foreign Office and the armed services are represented) which handles the details. For operations into Greece a further committee -- the Balkan Committee -- has been organized. Glenconner's Chief of Staff is the representative here.

Transportation derives in part from a squadron of eight Italians and in part from fishing boats owned and operated by S.O.E. The Navy has given some slight assistance and has actually assigned two small boats and crews to S.O.E. for operational work.



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This was Sunday and I spent it in rewriting General Gubbins' proposal of March 1944 and in preparing instructions for George Brewer in connection here in London. I talked with the General, incidentally, at about 11:00 A.M. (with Brewer and Sam Field as witnesses) and told him I would like to alter his proposal so as to provide for the establishment of "Areas of Responsibility" and to cover the future appointment of our own Chief Operations Officer. I also told the General that I thought, for the purpose of expediting theatre Command and J.C.S. approval, our memorandum should include some reference to the existing J.C.S. directives. The General did not think this would be objectionable.

The memorandum was rewritten and taken to General Gubbins by Major Brewer as my reconnaissance officer. The General read the memorandum without comment and then made an appointment to see me in the morning (with Major Brewer and Major Khanna, Chief of Staff) on the London "set up".

Since copies of the two memoranda on N.A. are to be attached to these notes, no attempt will be made here to summarize them.

Fisher Howe came in to see me. He is a capable lad who wants more action. He talked about our Guerrilla Units. I told him I had spoken to General Gubbins about this and intended to do some thinking on the subject as I strongly believe we can make a direct contribution here. My thought is that small language-speaking groups can be drawn from the Army; each group should number from 10 to 20 men, a Captain and one or two Lieutenants. While the groups will eventually be scattered, there should be some unity of command — a full Colonel or at least a Lt. Colonel with combat training. The S.O. would need a Chief of Staff and a good Executive Officer. Even though commissioned in the Navy, Fisher Howe might qualify as the Executive Officer who would carry the load of organization. The Guerrilla Units would be trained in S.O. and Combined Operations work and then sent to our various O.S.S. Field Bases for use as soon as main and special target groups or on Commando operations until at or near D-Day when they would be attached to or detailed to operate in conjunction with the various Invasion Units. Young Mr. Howe seems to like the idea. I pointed out to him, of course, that he would have to make sure that David is not left in the hole here.

To dinner and to bed.

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h. Monthly reports of progress and a summary of activities (so far as conforms to S.O.E. practice) should be submitted to Washington.

i. Both London and Washington must be kept advised on all matters of policy affecting the theatre.

j. To facilitate our work with S.O.E. it might be advisable for S.O. to take a floor at Berkeley Court where our Operations can be housed. Our Scandinavian, Finnish and German Desk might be here (with S.O.E. liaison) and the space could be used as an Operations headquarters and for S.O.E. overflow. We must not impose too much on S.O.E. Captain Knot might with his Communications Office in the same place. Certainly one or two cipher clerks should be there. Our Supply and Training Officers might also have room there to facilitate liaison. Captain Knot should be urged to establish good and rapid communications for O.S.S. with Algiers and Cairo.

k. Administrative details should still be handled at 71, Grosvenor Street.

l. If we are to make any real contribution to operations we will need a flat where agents or groups can be interviewed and, perhaps, "held".

m. Our representatives should be able to recruit operatives for France in North Africa and send them to you in London for training and induction through S.O.E.

n. Our Scandinavian operations will have to be handled with the consent of General Eisenhower. I will prepare a memorandum on this subject when G.B. and I have seen the General.

o. The role of our organization here will not be an easy one to play. You must collaborate fully with our good friends. At the same time grow and mature as rapidly as possible. S.O.E. will "help" us for a time but at some point we must be fully prepared to "shift for ourselves". I would hope that we could be reasonably experienced by June fifteenth next.

Distribution:
See London - All Offices.

Elroy G. Huntington, Jr.,
Lieut. Colonel, A. U. S.



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**[illegible]**

[illegible](US) — Major Brown.
[illegible](US) — Major Kneeland.
[illegible](US) — Captain Spair.
[illegible](US) — Captain Sandfield.
[illegible](US) and [illegible](US) — Lt. [illegible].
[illegible](US) — Major [illegible].
[illegible](US) — [illegible] (under the [illegible] of [illegible]).

**[illegible] Region (Country Desks):**

Western Europe - Captain Van der Stricht.
Scandinavia, Finland and Germany - unfilled.
Poland - Captain Lloyd, who is to be supplemented unless transferred to S.O.

**Communications** - Captain Hart.

**Training** - Captain Dew (or a substitute).

**Supply** - unfilled.

**Transportation** - unfilled.

3. The following explanatory notes are for your guidance:

A. **Organization:**

(1) **Administration.**

(a) Until such time as a Chief of Mission is appointed, Major Brown will act as Chief Operations Officer and Executive Officer of S.O., London.

(b) Captain Rafferty, if his services are obtained, will act as Administrative Officer vice Captain Edwards who will accompany Colonel Gunther to Cairo.

(c) Clerical assistants (enlisted personnel) will be drawn from Washington or E.T.O. to replace existing WAC's who are to accompany Colonel Gunther.

(2) **Supply.**

(a) Washington should furnish London with a Supply Officer competent to handle both service and non-service requirements and with ability to carry on liaison with S.O.X. in connection with its requirements and our own (including liaison with Research and Development of S.O.X.).



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(2) Operations.

(a) The Head of the Geographic Book, Washington, should supply at least two good men on Scandinavia, Finland and Germany.

(b) S.O. Washington should supply an Area Operations Officer for the territories last mentioned. Major Fessel may be used as an Assistant Area Operations Officer concentrating on Norway.

4. Future Developments.

A. Guerrilla Units.

(1) At some point we will undertake the organization and preliminary training, in the U.S., of units for all areas.

(2) When training has been completed, language speaking Guerrilla Units will be sent to the various S.O. Missions for further training and for use.

(3) These Units will be intended, primarily, for use with or in cooperation with S.O. or S.O.E. Groups within occupied areas and Invasion Units employed in Invasion Operations at or near "D-Day". They might, in the interim, be included in raiding operations, over do main projects or Commando parties.

B. Invasion Operations.

(1) Prior to D-Day all areas will be divided between S.O.E. and S.O. to conform to Theatre Command.

(2) At or about D-Day our Operations Officers and Geographic Book representatives will "take over" in all U.S. Areas. Our training and operations must be directed toward this end.

(3) Where needed you may request from Washington Assistant Area Operations Officers and additional Geographic Book representatives.

5. Interim Operations:

A. Our policy will be to "penetrate" S.O.E., London, in the manner intended, acquiring all possible experience and familiarity with British Operations in anticipation of the day when operational responsibility will fall on S.O. with respect to assigned areas.



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12 Jan. 1945

From: Lt. Col. Riley C. Huntington, Jr.

To : Major George H. Beaver, Jr.

Subject: London S.O. Organization.

1. The following organizational program will be followed until further notice.

2. S.O. in London will be organized to conform to existing S.O.E. sections:

S.O.E. Operational Sections

E Section - Operations
- MEA Section - Administration and Review.
- ASA Section - Long Range Planning.
- MSA Section - Coup de Main Projects.
- DEEC Section - Sabotage Operations.
- MI Section - Building Parties.
- MD Section - Air Operations.

Country Sections
- M1 Section (Western Europe).
- M2 Section (Scandinavia, Finland and Germany).
- M3-MP Section (Secret Army in Poland).

I Section - Intelligence
- General Intelligence and Liaison (with other services).
- Compilations and Survey - (Liaison with Research and Analysis).

Communications

Training

Supply

Transportation

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(3) Facilities, again, would be pooled insofar as possible.

The General was polite but probably somewhat astonished at my presumption. He said he would like to consider my suggestions and "prepare a memo" (a great game with S.O.E. since I will probably have to write a counter-memo and so on ad infinitum). One thing, the General said, must be understood. In all these negotiations S.O.E. operates only through the various Provisional Governments by whom all "manpower" is furnished. We must adhere to all rules of procedure established with such Governments. One of the most important of these is that information respecting operations shall be disseminated only through channels agreed upon by S.O.E. and such Governments and only in the form so agreed. I said that I would answer for our representatives on this score.

I asked the General if he had considered the organization of language speaking "guerrilla" groups for use on or near "D Day" saying that I thought we could make a real contribution in this direction. He said "No" but that it should be discussed by us at once. The Jugoslavs were his only conception to date.

The meeting adjourned to reconvene at lunch tomorrow.

I saw Furlong by appointment. He is interested in going to N.A. to handle Italian matters and can get an assistant. He is well qualified and experienced. Since S.O. does not seem to be able to work with the Desk in Washington we must build an organization of our own.

In the evening Brewer, Lawrence and I had dinner with Heiberg and discussed at length the Stockholm arrangements. I outlined my Norwegian proposal to the General. Heiberg said it sounded reasonable and that he was sure, given air transportation from Sweden to London, he could furnish us with recruits who would be satisfactory to Sweden and could arrange "reception committees" if necessary. He approved of the selection of the area from Trondheim north. Obviously, in the south, the Germans will most easily counter invasion efforts.

Commander Heiberg said he had arranged with Admiral Kirk for communications with him in London and suggested that we speak to the Admiral. Since George Brewer knows Kirk well this will be easy.

.....

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[illegible] we were particularly concerned with Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Albania where, because of commitments already made as a result of British Foreign Policy, we would be terribly handicapped if our association with S.O.E. appeared to be too close. It was left that we would talk about Cairo at lunch with Glen Donner Corrrrr.

8. We will discuss arrangements here in London. I told the General that we recognized that it would take many months for us to build an organization comparable in size and experience to his own. It is necessary, however, that we give the impression here, as elsewhere, of being able to "walk by ourselves". Actually I expected and hoped he would "lead us by the hand".

So far as France and the Low Countries are concerned, S.O.E. has covered these pretty thoroughly. S.O.E. should continue to direct these operations, holding our groups with them. In Scandinavia, Finland and Germany, however, we wish to play a real role. Our "set up" in Sweden is already good and growing each month, and our people in Switzerland have established contact with a friend of mine which, I am sure, will open a line of communications into Berlin. A similar line, I hope, will be opened from Stockholm within 30 days. We will, thus, be able to "check" the accuracy of reports and gauge loyalties and effectiveness. In Stockholm we have connections with the new "Home Front" with which he is dealing here through General Ramstedt. He recognizes that Ramstedt must control Norwegian operations but we would like to "service" a definite portion of the country -- that part from Trondheim north which is accessible from Iceland or Scotland. Unless we have an assigned responsibility in this part our Navy, Air Force and S.O.E. will say: "Let the British continue to do the job."

With respect to an operational arrangement in London, I proposed:

(1) That we "penetrate" the important Operations Sections of S.O.E. This would require about 15 officers and I will get them. About half are now available.

(2) Our Geographic Desk work would be limited to liaison with and representation on their Western European Section.

(3) We would wish to build a strong and independent Desk of our own (with S.O.E. liaison) for Scandinavia, Finland and Germany.

(4) Scandinavian operations would be conducted in cooperation with General Ramstedt, with whom we must now confer.

(5) We would be prepared to take a floor in Berkeley Court as suggested by Sir Charles, where operational and Geographic Desk work could be conducted and where we would be in "close touch" with his organization.

(6) S.O. administration would continue on at 71, Grosvenor Street.

(7) For the moment Major George Brewer would carry on for S.O. I want him as I.C. Operations Officer, however, and will replace him by a higher ranking officer (an Chief of S.O. in London) when the right man can be found. Incidentally if David Bruce comes to London as O.S.S. Chief he can and will represent us fully and ably.



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Note: I would like to get a Regular Army colonel as Chief of S.O. Perhaps Bob Strong at Accra (he is in command there) who is a classmate of General Eisenhower can be obtained.

(3) I would appoint Munn, for the time being, as Chief Operations Officer for S.O. and the General would make a similar appointment for S.O.E.

(4) Contiguous territory would be divided into "Spheres of Influence" and operations would be conducted by S.O.E. or S.O. personnel (dependent on the area) irrespective of whether the operatives or groups employed were of S.O.E. or S.O. origin.

(5) Assigned areas might be as follows: S.O.E. France and the Low Countries; S.O. North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy and the Italian Islands.

(6) Country Sections or Geographic Desks would be built up to correspond to Spheres of Influence and would be operated by the predominate interest with liaison and representation on the part of the other interest.

(7) Training, Transportation, Communication and Supply would be pooled as nearly as possible.

(8) A "Policy Committee" composed of Eddy, the S.O.E. and the S.O. Chiefs (Potter for the moment representing S.O.) would govern all matters of general policy (precedence of supply, operations, etc.) with Eddy having the deciding vote.

(9) Liaison would be primarily with Eddy and for operational purposes could be delegated by him to Munn.

Note: Potter must be "taken along" by Munn to build and preserve contacts and Eddy must remain near Theatre Edgre and delegate work elsewhere. He is now flying about the country and there is complaint from the Theatre that he is not readily available (as Dubbins states).

The General said this sounded all right and he'd like to think it over and prepare a memorandum on the subject. He would like to add Col. David Keswick to the Policy Committee. I said I had no objection provided Bill Eddy had absolute veto power and the deciding vote. To this both he and Tony Keswick agreed. Today I will come back to this point and say I would like to add a representative on F.W. It could be Ed Taylor or someone nominated by Fred Oechsner. Propaganda in N.A. is very bad and British propaganda here directed at Italy is not too good. For example -- derision of Italian deserters gets us nowhere. Why not encourage the Italians to desert and leave derision to the Germans? O.W.I. is doing a sloppy job. We must have a voice in this and all else.

The General next wished to discuss Cairo. I said that perhaps Cairo could be set up as N.A. but somewhat in reverse with Glen Connor having the deciding vote, assigned territory, preponderant Geographic Desks related to assigned territory and "pooled" resources where circumstances permit. Tony Keswick thought this might work but that greater independence might be needed. I agreed, saying that the Balkan groups were so numerous and factional that complete segregation of operations might be necessary.



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**NOTES OF M. O. M. 21, FOR [illegible]**

As arranged by O.D. (Charles Hunter) yesterday I met with Tony Keswick and his brother, John, at about 11:00 a.m. It was necessary for me to explain, again, the proposals I had laid before O.D. last evening. Tony Keswick advised me that Sir Charles had presented our views to the General and himself. He said that the General's reaction was "Why not set up an O.S.S. over in N.A. and allow us to tag along". It was their thought, he indicated, that the Theatre Commander would not wish to deal with two groups.

My questions to Keswick's statement were:

(i) This suggestion is made for the purpose of:

(a) Taking us in something of a "hole" from the point of view of responsibility for results in North Africa since they doubt (and I recognize) our ability to carry on a big show without the benefit of S.O.E. experience and guidance. In six or eight months our boys will be able to run things and our air force and Navy (perhaps) will have learned the rudiments of cooperation. Meanwhile, one must be realistic. We need S.O.E. assistance all along the line -- in operations, transportation, supply and communications. Bill Eddy could come close to directing a successful campaign from an African base but I suspect that his actual experience in the field of S.O. work has been more in the nature of moral and psychological suasion and subversion than in the planning of Special Operations;

(b) Paving the way for a separate arrangement in Cairo and London. This would be unfortunate for both of us. In the Balkans and in certain spots on the Continent, nationalistic cooperation will come to us much more readily than to the British. Unless we maintain a semblance of independence only British contacts will be available to either of us. Our friends, I am sure, can be made to realize that, in many places, because of their recognized post-war ambitions, Englishmen will be under suspicion. To foreclose independent and original action on our part will be to render a great disservice to the main effort which, at the moment certainly, is to bring about the defeat of the enemy.

Actually, what I told Keswick was that the Theatre Commander would certainly recognize that two organizations, collaborating closely but exploiting their own particular fields of influence, could be more useful to him than one organization and which might be directed the hostility of groups outside those which could be [illegible] with in common. Furthermore, both of us need assistance from our respective [illegible] services. This is much more likely to be worth while if sought independently rather than jointly. Operational unity can be effected by mechanical arrangements but [illegible] autonomy must be preserved if either of us is to attain maximum efficiency.

Keswick was not in the frame of mind to be convinced and we adjourned to reconvene at [illegible] p.m. at General Gubbins' office.

The General launched upon a discussion of North Africa. His proposal was that [illegible] an organization in which Bill Eddy, as head of O.S.S., would be sitting on [illegible] S.O., [illegible] and P.W. Col. Munn, as Chief of S.O.E., would also be under Eddy's [illegible] direction. Munn would act as Chief of Operations for both S.O.E. and S.O. Eddy would act as Liaison Officer in the Theatre on general matters and Munn would be in direct contact with Theatre "Operations" on all operational programs.

The General's suggestion gave us a part of what we desire but since "Operations" will be the foundation stone of O.S.S. prestige, I wanted to tighten our hold somewhat.

My Counter-suggestions were:

(i) The two missions should be set up independently -- an O.S.S. mission with its I.T. and P.W. branches under Eddy.

(ii) An S.O. mission under Potter as Executive Officer.

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Col. William J. Donovan from Lt. Col. E. O. Huntington, Jr. 2 Jan 43
Page 3.

[illegible] to Cairo or North Africa as liaison officer. He would probably be better in Cairo with Our Team in North Africa, since he has evidently had some differences with officials of E.T.O. who are now in the African theater. In any event we will need two or three good regular army officers in this type of work.

[illegible] apparently functioning as O.S.S. representative on the [illegible] Warfare Committee run under Conrad's direction. [illegible] is that Hugh is not considered any bad of fire, and I am wondering whether Fred Oechsner should not have his representative here in [illegible] serve on this committee and otherwise represent us on [illegible] of psychological warfare. In this connection, I hope [illegible] in North Africa as we are apparently badly in need of [illegible] in this area.

Sir [illegible] will probably write you at some length urging that H.Q. [illegible] nearer the front. It is his idea that [illegible] be an auxiliary base for Special Operations [illegible] there only reasonable administrative and [illegible] service of supply. He believes that [illegible] be England. This idea you and I have discussed [illegible] a good deal of score, although in the [illegible] unquestionably be in Africa and should be [illegible] the scene of military operations is shifted. [illegible] idea, of course, but I have contrived to [illegible] both here and in North Africa to the exclusion of [illegible] the wish of Sir Charles, and also of [illegible] place or the other. I told Sir Charles [illegible] matters of like nature, I not only on the [illegible] may remember me after

Faithfully,

Elery

E. O. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Col., AUS.

Jan 4 '43

So you will be able to observe from the enclosed note of [illegible] I probably won't get exactly what I [illegible] in the way of an arrangement. I will carry [illegible] with [illegible] the [illegible] Sir Charles [illegible] me and I have the feeling [illegible] "throwing your [illegible]"

Elery

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[illegible] Dave [illegible]

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under which our respective organizations were coordinated at the top by a policy committee composed of representatives of S.O.E. and S.O., with Bill Donovan as chairman. For operational purposes, the Theater of Operations should be divided into S.O.E. and S.O. controlled areas, with certain territories designated perhaps as "free" territory. For example, S.O.E. owned and are already so extensive in France and the Low Countries as to [illegible] these areas as belonging to S.O.E. for operational purposes. We on the other hand are well qualified to service Italy and the Italian Islands, the Iberian Peninsula and Spanish Morocco. In Norway, too, and in Sweden and Finland, I thought we could initiate contacts and lines of communication which would be most valuable. These territories, therefore, would be, in a sense at least, free. With respect to the Mid East it would seem reasonable to have a similar "setup" with Glenn Conner [illegible] as chairman of the policy committee. In this area, too, the territory should be allotted and certain territory, particularly Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, should probably be designated as free.

I told Sir Charles that under any circumstances our operational [illegible] would be compelled to lean on his people at the outset for [illegible] that between our two organizations there need be no [illegible] the extent of our collaboration and cooperation.

[illegible] seem to resent the proposal and with respect to [illegible] reason why we should not undertake supplies to [illegible], especially in Northern Norway, so long as such operations [illegible] with the consent of General Renstrom, with whom he suggested [illegible] Monroe.

[illegible] Sir Charles that I should see Tony Keswick this [illegible] General Sutherland this afternoon. I conferred with Tony [illegible] and outlined to him the discussion I had had [illegible] Tony [illegible] had evidently had a meeting with the [illegible] Tony [illegible] morning and had stated to them the substance of [illegible]. My hope is that this afternoon I will [illegible] with the General. I recognize that I am [illegible] but I still hope to come out with a [illegible] memorandum, on the basis of which I can see Ike Eisenhower [illegible]. Tomorrow I will trouble Glenn Conner (who is [illegible]) and [illegible], I will report to you on this matter through [illegible], who will be leaving next week.

[illegible] Col. Conrad last evening. He is Assistant G-2 here, [illegible] I told him that we were interested in what we are [illegible] Chief of S.O., but [illegible] that we could [illegible]. I will talk to Eisenhower about him, however, when in Africa, [illegible] the [illegible] of asking Col. Greenwell are both displeased [illegible] Hallowell. If we could get Conrad for [illegible] it might be possible to persuade Greenwell

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

[illegible] January 1943

Lieut. Colonel Corridon

[illegible] William J. Donovan, Director,
[illegible] of Strategic Services,
[illegible],
[illegible]ngton, D.C.

[illegible]

I [illegible] to get down to work yesterday after a disappointing and [illegible] I would suggest, incidentally, that we use water transportation [illegible] air if we are required to send people via the [illegible], i.e., through Brazil, Accra, etc.

[illegible] a preliminary skirmish with Charles Hambro last evening which [illegible] with Tony Leswick this morning. At three o'clock I am to [illegible] with the Brigadier -- now Major General Gubbins.

Sir Charles [illegible] cordial but it is evident from all my conversations [illegible] would prefer that we play a supplemental role, not only [illegible] but probably also in North Africa. I sensed that this [illegible] when Sir Charles told me that Bill Eddy seemed [illegible] on the move in North Africa that it would probably be [illegible] Col. John Munn act as the liaison officer for both [illegible] I decided to give the offensive and [illegible] to Sir Charles the ideas previously discussed by [illegible] George Taylor, all of which are set forth in our [illegible] Dakar and Dist. I pointed out to Sir Charles that [illegible] any real contribution it must establish its position [illegible] services. On any other basis we would not only fail [illegible] transportation and other facilities but would probably be severely [illegible] the acquisition of supplies and equipment. This would be [illegible] disadvantageous both to S.O.E. and ourselves.

[illegible] that we all recognized that it would be a considerable [illegible] before our organization could hope to expand to [illegible] size of theirs and before we could possibly acquire the [illegible] which I deemed necessary for the proper conduct of [illegible]. On the other hand we should simulate, so far as the [illegible] services are concerned, functional independence. [illegible], therefore, to have in North Africa an arrangement

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To: Col. Bonesteel

Kindly see
check this as
the return of
the original.

Director's Office

(1300)

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O. C. D., Jr.

(Wilson)

Col. Quarrels —

I have read the attached —

Noted — JPS

JPS

JTW

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
## PLANNING GROUP

P.L.G.

## ROUTING SLIP

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10. | Dr. Jas. G. Rogers | ☑ | JGR |
| 1. | Maj. Gen. John P. Smith | ☑ | JPS |
| 2. | Brig. Gen. Ronner F. Fellers | ☑ | RFF |
| 3. | Capt. H. L. Groesbeck, USN | ☑ | HLG |
| 4. | Lt. Comdr. C. H. Coggins | ☑ | LHC |
| 5. | Mr. James C. Dunn | ☐ | |
| 6. | Mr. Hugh R. Wilson | ☑ | HRW |
| | Mr. Edmond Taylor | ☐ | |
| 7. | Mr. John Wiley | ☑ | JW |
| 8. | Mr. John T. Whitaker | ☑ | JTW |
| 9. | Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank | ☑ | AHO |
| 11. | Gen. Magruder | ☑ | JM |
| | | ☐ | |

Return to Dr. Rogers
c.c. Gen. [illegible] 7/21/43

(9120)

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**SECRET**
**OUTGOING CABLE**
**ORIGINAL**

File.....
Serial.....
Security.....

(Attach all Drafts and Notes)

January 22, 43

Dear Colonel:

While I'm still here on account of weather and transportation I am keeping busy and will have a full day to-day with Col Lee of G-3, General Candee of Air Force Ground Forces (Paratroop Carriers etc) and others. Perhaps Lee be off to-morrow.

The real object of this note is to say that both Charles Hambro and General Hanstein want to come to the States in the Spring. Sir Charles would come on General business — Hanstein to plead the Norwegian cause. Would it be proper for me to invite them to be the guests of OSS — in your name. We would then try to arrange transportation

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QUEX

January 22, 1943

Dear Colonel:

While I'm still here on account of weather and transportation I am keeping busy and will have a full day today with Col. Lee of G-3. General Dundee of Air Force Ground Forces (Paratroop Carriers, etc) and others. Perhaps I'll be off tomorrow.

The real object of this note is to say that both Charles Hambro and General Hansteen want to come to the States in the Spring. Sir Charles would come on general business. Hansteen to plead the Norwegian Cause. Would it be proper for me to invite them to be the guests of OSS, in your name. We would then try to arrange transportation, etc. here.

With Hansteen in Washington, General Wedemeyer and our own planning staff could get valuable information on Norway. He might wish to bring an aide or two. I still want to promote interest in Norway although the African campaign will immobilize a lot of men and material for some time and a Norwegian campaign would require a great number of aircraft carriers. Norway and the Balkans will be a lot cheaper bridgeheads, if Italy can be reduced, than Western Europe for some time to come.

I am meeting red tape and resistance but will keep on plugging. I will not come back until I see some results, much as I wish I were there right now.

My very best, Yours,

(Signed)
Ellery (Ellery Huntington)

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Huntington, Ellery 10,209
+ Report

COPY

January 22, 1943

Dear Colonel:

While I'm still here on account of weather and transportation I am keeping busy and will have a full day today with Col. Lee of G-3. General Oakley of Air Force Ground Forces (Paratroop Carriers, etc) and others. Perhaps I'll be off tomorrow.

The real object of this note is to say that both Charles Hambro and General Hansteen want to come to the States in the Spring. Sir Charles would come on general business. Hansteen to plead the Norwegian Cause. Would it be proper for me to invite them to be the guests of OSS, in your name. We would then try to arrange transportation, etc. here.

With Hansteen in Washington, General Wedemeyer and our own planning staff could get valuable information on Norway. He might wish to bring an aide or two. I still want to promote interest in Norway although the African campaign will immobilize a lot of men and material for some time and a Norwegian campaign would require a great number of aircraft carriers. Norway and the Balkans will be a lot cheaper bridgeheads, if Italy can be reduced, than Western Europe for some time to come.

I am meeting red tape and resistance but will keep on plugging. I will not come back until I see some results, much as I wish I were there right now.

My very best, Yours,

(Signed)
Ellery (Ellery Huntington)

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Notes of T.C.H.Jr.
February 12, 1943.

It is clear that, at this stage, OSS in Washington must have a Director of Operations under whom will serve an Operations Officer (present, SO Chief) and an Intelligence Officer who can use some of the SO personnel in collecting, cataloguing and evaluating information. Under the Intelligence Officer, or separately, should function CE work.

Our Geographic Desks should become Territorial Sections. In each case they should have a Section Chief, who knows something of the area, a Recruiting Officer, a Supply Officer, a Geographic Desk representative, an Operations Officer and a Contact Officer (through whom contact with the field is maintained).

We need to move fast if we are to play any part in the War. If Churchill's visit means anything, its import is that there will be a drive through the Balkans - via Turkey, perhaps, and perhaps, also, via Yugoslavia. Our men must be there ahead of time and so must our supplies. Italy (and surely Tunisia) may have to be settled before we can be sure the left flank and rear are protected. This will give us five or six months from now.

We can be ready with manpower if we organize now at home and in Africa to do the job. Our communications will be the sore spot. Unless we can get while equipment to the field at once, we have no hope. Transportation to the Mid East is out of the question.

The same reasoning applies to England and operations from there - particularly into Norway. The Germans themselves obviously consider it vulnerable.

The nature of the War has changed. We are on the offensive - but we are not ready to participate and will not be unless the direction of effort is changed.

I sometimes wonder why I write this nonsense - especially at such a time.

.....

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NOTES OF [illegible]
February 16, 1943.

[illegible]00 A.M. after a bad night. Egyptian food, noise and odor [illegible] breakfasted and then had proposals to Commanding General, [illegible] am.

[illegible] transportation for Louis Huot and looked at buildings which [illegible] as headquarters. Nothing is available but large villas [illegible] The British have all else.

[illegible] about our cars. He hangs on to the Dodge station [illegible] mighty might be offered to Col. Guenther. This chap is [illegible] and I wonder what in the world he has been doing out [illegible] makes a pathetic spectacle.

[illegible] arrived about lunch time. He has had a bad trip. After [illegible] to meet McClenahan and Menard. Also delivered my re-[illegible] mail.

[illegible] met Lord Glenconner of SOE several times. Finally con-[illegible] to meet him with Col. Guenther at 11:00 tomorrow.

[illegible] at the Hotel. He was a bit blue. We had asked him [illegible] usual radio equipment from the Signal Corps or the RAF. [illegible] expected, is wholly inadequate. It might handle two [illegible] but there are no poles here for antennae and none to be [illegible], a couple of sergeants cannot do a complete construc-[illegible] a competent officer who can deal with Army officials, [illegible] obtained from the Signal Corps. With a reasonable crew [illegible] on the job here we might fabricate a station. [illegible] late. My guess is, as I have repeatedly stated [illegible] there will be a Balkan drive - perhaps, now, through [illegible] communications system our contribution will be negligible. [illegible] should have foreseen this. The story is that [illegible], and it's thoroughly disgusting.

[illegible] and then met Guenther, Amos and Huot for dinner. [illegible] extent, a proposed organization for this theatre. [illegible] reasonable solution anywhere in the field, viz. a [illegible] of operational effort. OSS is too short of manpower to [illegible] of two "operations" efforts. Any operational [illegible] by military people or civilians who have a [illegible] understanding of what is required to make our [illegible] to our combat forces. There is little such [illegible] people are largely intellectuals (if anything) [illegible] evaluation and survey work but who, up to the moment, [illegible] single organization behind enemy lines. Except for [illegible] (temperamental difficulties), Shapiro, D'Ouch, [illegible] is no one in this organization who would be given [illegible] action side. John Hughes would be splendid for [illegible] he should have been made SI Chief if the fiction of two [illegible] prevailed, but Whitney Shepardson has no experience [illegible] qualify him for the job.



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At five o'clock I went to McClanahan with my letter to Brereton and a proposed cable from him to the J.C.S. Col. McClanahan thought everything was all right but I will make a few changes just the same. McClanahan asked me to write a forwarding letter for General Brereton to the C-in-C (General Alexander) who would certainly have [illegible] in our activation here.

[illegible] to the Hotel where I ordered dinner in my room and went [illegible].

[illegible]. Huot came in and said that my arrangements for communications had worked out well. McClanahan had "gone the limit" with the Chief Signals Officer and we were to get complete facilities including a receiving station built for us on the desert. Huot was furious about the fact that a lot of radio equipment had been [illegible] to the tune here for a long time - uncrated. He complained, [illegible] two radio men had been permitted to "kick about" Cairo [illegible] until we came) with no instructions and nothing to do. [illegible] I know to be true as I have talked to the boys myself and [illegible] disgraceful. The fact is, as I knew in London, that there [illegible] radio service here but for the action we have now taken. [illegible] man is even now cabling about Schneider and one other man [illegible] they go to Algiers) who have never yet arrived in Cairo. [illegible] situation on communications is ridiculous and I'd bet [illegible] nothing has yet happened in London. Huot said he was [illegible] sick of his communications job which, he said, could be [illegible] completed in London if the aid requested were given him. [illegible] to stay with OSS but wishes more action. He wanted a job [illegible] I would see what could be done at home.

[illegible] prepared my letters for General Brereton and General [illegible].

[illegible] of Amoss as yet.

.....



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Cat. Dec. [illegible]

**NOTES OF [illegible]**
**February [illegible], [illegible]**

Redrafted proposed letter to General Brereton.

At 1[illegible]:20 A.M. Col. Guenther and I called on Col. Krom (G-2) and with Lt. Col. McClanahan (Asst. G-2).

Col. Krom welcomed us most graciously and immediately asked what Hoskins was supposed to be doing. He had not heard from him nor received any report. I said that Hoskins had been sent to Syria on a [illegible] Mission and was expected in town any day. He is now in Turkey [illegible] incidentally, he was definitely told not to go). Col. Krom [illegible] certainly wanted to see Hoskins as he had some very definite [illegible] on the subject of "fooling 'round in that territory".

[illegible] Krom took us in to General Strohm - Chief of Staff of the [illegible] Force. The General was courteous but required a lot of instruction [illegible] and its activities and aims are. My explanation was not [illegible] and the General interrupted continuously so that his under- [illegible] our purposes is probably still vague. He suggested that [illegible] Sunday A.M. to see General Brereton.

[illegible] returning to the office I sent Capt. Huot to see McClanahan [illegible] had talked about communications.

[illegible] at the office one Mr. Williams - an American Syrian who [illegible] through Baker's School and had then been sent to Syria. He [illegible] Mr. Lord had sent him but I concluded it must have been [illegible] he had cabled Washington his whereabouts but [illegible] left hanging about Cairo for a month with no instructions. [illegible] there was nothing of importance to be gotten from Syria - [illegible] intelligence, of course - and no other worthwhile job to be [illegible] view of the changed military situation and the complete [illegible] of the British. He wanted to be put on a new job or sent [illegible] Washington. I suggested that he talk with Amoss, who is due [illegible] Williams is no ball of fire. He looks like a fat Syrian [illegible] and I wonder how OSS could have made this investment.

[illegible] saw the three boat boys who had been hired - sight unseen - [illegible] from the British and who drove trucks for several [illegible] salary of $[illegible].00 per month. They are now in the Army on [illegible] Not bad boys but not worth that salary as [illegible] We will try to find something for them to do at Army [illegible]

[illegible] lunched with Beetu. A nice lunch and an affable host - [illegible] again. I wonder so much as I see some of our stem-winders [illegible]

[illegible] office and training camp hunting after lunch. Not much [illegible] a great buildings pre-empted.



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1

Col Donovan

**NOTES OF E.C.R. Jr.**
**FEBRUARY [illegible]**

[illegible] a poor breakfast we all went to USAFIME Headquarters. [illegible] met Capt. Edwards and his non-coms (Morris and Mitchell) [illegible] to work on billeting. Capt. Huot went to see Mr. Kirk (U.S. [illegible]) and I called on Lt. Col. Sibley, Chief of Staff. I was cor- [illegible] and turned over to Lt. Col. Menard (G-5) and Lt. Col. [illegible] (G-2). I then spent two hours with Sibley, Menard and [illegible] explaining OSS, its objectives, our arrangements in other [illegible] our understanding with SOE and our desires in the Mid East. [illegible] gentlemen were hazy on all these problems although they had heard [illegible] Hoskins and said, frankly, that he had seemed to them both [illegible] and a problem. He had been very secretive about his plans and [illegible].

[illegible] Col. Sibley that we wanted to set up an organization, have [illegible] and such aid as we could be given. I also told him of [illegible] requirements. They were interested (McClanahan in [illegible]) and promised every aid. Sibley asked that I prepare a [illegible] request, a proposed directive for Theatre Command and C-in-C [illegible] and a form of letter and cable to be sent the U.S. JCS. [illegible] will be presented to General Brereton through General [illegible].

[illegible] McClanahan was, by far, the keenest and most interested of [illegible] officers present at the meeting, but all of them will give [illegible] assistance I am convinced. McClanahan's point of view on [illegible] with the British was enlightening. He stated that he was [illegible] that we were cooperating with SOE and was equally pleased [illegible] on a basis which gave us independence. I told Col. [illegible] that our relations with SIS were not so intimate as with [illegible] liaison was everywhere friendly and complete.

[illegible] "cover". Col. McClanahan stated that G-5 would be [illegible] SOE. I suggested Experimental Detachment G-5 as at [illegible] was agreed upon.

[illegible] before the meeting ended, if I could get them all together [illegible] and Col. Amons. They said they desired to do so at [illegible].

[illegible] alone and then began work, in cramped quarters, on my [illegible] and accompanying documents. I want to settle this [illegible] expeditiously and thoroughly as possible. Then I will have [illegible] to a sensible and workable "set up" for OSS. [illegible] I am sure, given the matter any deep consideration as yet.

[illegible] a talk with George White about the trip he and Hoskins made. [illegible] but unenumerative. In Syria they are quiescent. [illegible] not too high grade. Their training center near [illegible] not good. Col. Keble, SOE Chief of Staff, is not up to [illegible] in London.

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to write. Needless to say, I will be there as quickly as transportation can carry me.

Yours,

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.,
Lt. Col., AUS.

P.S.--I am concerned about the Hoskins report. He is not here but in Turkey. There is much about the situation which you ought to know. I hope (although it is none of my business since operations are not involved) that you will receive my report before granting him authority. Leete has just told me that Hoskins said to him that his authority is from a higher source than yourself. Amoss was present when this remark was made.

Read - not read.



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which I am asking in this theatre. You will observe that I have asked for everything we can possibly need. There is no guarantee as yet that we will receive all or any part of the approval or aid which has been requested. I am to see General Bradley at 10:30 tomorrow morning, Sunday, and in the meantime will try my best to have our British friends pave the way with the Commander-in-Chief.

Even if we get everything for which I have asked, I greatly fear that we will be too late. I found our communications project here in as bad state as it was in London and Algiers. We have in all of these places only a trifling amount of material on hand and nothing adequate to service field operations. Louis Huot has been of inestimable value and I regret to say that I am sorry that I still feel that having him here has been a wise decision. I see no way in which we can possibly ship to this territory, or even London or Algiers (although it is easier there), the wireless equipment we will require if we are to provide for adequate field service, and it is impossible to obtain equipment here. Our only hope, I believe, is to ship as many mobile units as possible by boat to Oran, or even Casablanca, with the idea that they will be brought to Algiers and this theatre under their own steam. These mobile units should each contain at least three or four transmitting and receiving units. Each unit can service two or three field agents. If, therefore, we are to have fifteen or twenty wireless operators in the field, we should have at least four of these units in Cairo. Additional stationary equipment (and plenty of it) can probably be shipped to Oran and brought to Algiers by truck, so that mobile units are not so essential there. I feel that we have been badly let down on the communications side and that there is no reason in the world why equipment should not be on hand in these areas.

My feelings about the type of organization we need in the field and at home for operational purposes has not only not changed since I wrote the letter which John Hughes has brought to you, but has been strengthened and confirmed.

I hope to leave here Tuesday morning and will stop in Algiers a day or two and then go to London to re-negotiate the program there. A re-negotiation will be essential, I am sure, because of the fact that the command has changed.

I wish I were at home now where I could talk to you personally about these matters concerning which it is so difficult



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Huntington file, 1920
file pnt.

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USAFIME,
Feb. 13, 1943.

AIR POUCH
DIRECT

Col. William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
"X" Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel:

I understand that a pouch is leaving this morning and I am therefore sending this along, even though the job here has hardly gotten under way.

The situation respecting command in this theatre is somewhat confused and I have had to talk with numerous officers, including General Strohm, General Brereton's Chief of Staff, who also is both G-2 and A-2, Col. McClenahan, Asst. G-2, Menard, G-3, Col. Sibley, Chief of Staff to General Brereton, who acts for General Brereton on theatre matters, and also with General Crawford. In addition to this, I have paid my respects on the Minister, Mr. Kirk. I have talked with the Sib people and expect to see Lord Glenconner at five o'clock this morning.

The notes which are enclosed, covering February 9th, 10, 11, 12, will give you some idea of what I have been up against in the problems with which we are confronted in this theatre. These notes, incidentally, were written for my own convenience and I see no reason for keeping my thoughts from my alter-ego, Dave Halliwell. In view of the shortage of time and lack of facilities, it has seemed best to send each of the notes as I have been able to have transcribed directly to you, so that you might have the details of our activities from day to day. They are for you and Dave only, as they are certainly not intended as a diplomatic presentation of whatever personal views I may hold on the various subjects which they cover.

My letters, incidentally, as well as my letters to you generally, I intend to send written by one person in whose discretion I have absolute confidence.

You will also find enclosed a memorandum to Col. McClenahan with accompanying documents which will indicate the things for



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would be welcome.

[illegible] I will let George Kramer and [illegible] [illegible] of the things we will discuss tonight.

I'm off, I hope, early in the morning for NY. Please let the Colonel see this.

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explanatory.

5. Operational Responsibility:

A memorandum is enclosed (originally prepared for the [illegible] here) which contemplates a "Section Chief" in substitution of what has been an Area Operations Officer. The Area Operations Officer now becomes Military Adviser (and the Geographic Desk representative—political and geographic advisers) to the Section Chief. It is Paul Vander Stricht's idea that in this way we may ultimately bring in XI Geographic Desk personnel and keep it under SO Operational control, which is essential. The idea appeals to me— and to all of us here— and I think the recommendations should be adopted by SO throughout.

As I go about talking to Theatre Commanders and lesser lights, I find they are looking to OSS for operations only. It is, in their opinion, our sole reason for existence. They will aid us and work with us in this field but never in intelligence, or in the various other fields, which they believe (rightly or wrongly) are covered by other organizations. This includes [illegible]. We do not, in OSS, quite recognize nor admit this fact as yet. In reality, we can make a real contribution on the operations side and those of us in SO must not be diverted.

I would not want much— ever— from the XI desks. Calvin Hoover, Jerry Shepard, Ulysses Amoss, Arthur Rasenbrough if he weren't so temperamental. Russell D'Oench. And their best— and very few indeed— assistants. There is nothing beyond that which we need or want other than two good men on the Far East and the Pacific Isles. And we can get ready cooperation from the lads I've mentioned.

6. A letter from you to me here (for my return step on the way home)

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tions in this theatre under the direction, however, of the Chief Operations Officer of this Mission, Major Brewer, since all operations must be coordinated.

E. Western Europe:

We can do more on the mainland than I had thought possible, and Paul Vander Stricht may be writing back for some recruiting work in the U.S. for France and the low countries. Through the Free French these recruits will be placed in the country and aided even though they have been out for a long time. Paul will write further on this.

F. Secretarial Work:

For security reasons, our own secretaries are needed in London and in Cairo. Presumably, also, in North Africa. There is no secretarial assistance available in Cairo I am told. That means a half-dozen there. Here in London three or four should do.

G. Movement Orders:

The enclosed disposition order to George Brewer is self-

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left some contacts for Norwegian recruiting. Get as many as possible from the Army and fill in the rest by inducting civilians.

G. Auxiliary Operations Groups:

The enclosed memo to George Brewer supplements my letter to General Gubbins of Jan 13th. A special allotment may be needed and should be requested from JCS. My original requests on the allotment and the use of the SSTU personnel covered this situation which I was then considering, but my cues were batted back and the allotment request emasculated. Now we will have to begin again. I am beginning to learn that all planning in a Bureaucracy must be on a "when the event arrives" basis. However, let's do our best.

I judge that Obolensky and Bielecki are not available. Very well--for the moment turn the job of getting the AO Groups started over to Livermore. Then, by the time the first groups are ready, we can have some more officers--perhaps Marine Corps trained for GA and the Mid East. Livermore could then accompany the Norwegian Group to England. He would be in charge of AO Group opera-

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in the OSS Secretariat's hands at that time, and I remember urging immediate action on it, as it was one of the most important things on my schedules. I am hopeful that it has been approved, and that the delay in answering my cable is not due to the fact that the project has just been lying quietly in some convenient pigeonhole. General Hughes wants to approve everything at once and this is by far the best procedure from our point of view.

B. Norwegian Program

Further talks with JOE and the Norwegians indicate that they want us to recruit, train and send over AO Groups (25 each) numbering four to six rather than two. We can play a real part in Norway, even if we don't control communications. On this latter, I am convinced--from reading the cables--that we will not produce. Louis Huot seems to have been left here without assistance and authority. We on the other hand, can get men into Norway (and W/T operators) if they can be found. If need be, we will communicate through SOE. Incidentally Bill Morrigan

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SECRET

Claridge's, Brook Street
London, England
January 25, 1943

Dear Dave:

This will go by pouch.

We are still here but, again, I have kept busy through today when I am meeting with Lord Glenconner, Guenther and Amos to discuss further details with respect to Cairo.

Work with our people in the field tends to clarify certain ideas and gives rise to new ones. I will try to outline some of my thoughts in this letter, will answer all recent cables and will cover certain points about which I have previously cabled or written:

London Mission:

A. Theatre Command Approval:

I have things arranged, I hope, for approval of all documents copies of which you have received. As I have cabled, it is necessary--before General Hughes will act--to have JCS approval of our Norwegian undertaking of Dec. 23rd. This was

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Huntington, Henry 10.302.B
x Halliwell, R.D
x Report.

# SECRET

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 13, 1943

Memorandum to Colonel Donovan

From: R. Davis Halliwell

Subject: Colonel Huntington's letter of January the 28th.

1. I have just received Colonel Huntington's personal letter to me dated January the 28th., but unsigned, presumably written the morning he left for North Africa.

2. As you observe, in the post-script he asks me to let you see this, and we have made a typewritten copy which will be easier reading.

R. Davis Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Deputy Chief, SO

RDH/pc

Attachment

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Huntington, E.C. 11,087

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

SECRET

x SO operations
x Thomas, Jupary.

March 30, 1943

Memorandum to General Donovan

From: Gilbert C. Huntington Jr.

Subject: [illegible] Stations - France and Iberian Peninsula - [illegible]

[illegible] several cables from Africa with [illegible] stations which are being contacted there.

[illegible] belief is that the principle contacts for [illegible] will be in Portugal, Madrid in [illegible] [illegible] in touch with each [illegible] [illegible] matter thoroughly [illegible] [illegible] of them at least [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

Gilbert C. Huntington Jr.
Lieut. [illegible]

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offers you an excellent Government career in exchange for it. Some who did decided by an accident of a particular background of experience in intelligence work.

3. It indicates to you, further, that I have not been the "Grand-Vizier", I would like to point out to you that neither the "Grands" of which you are a member nor any other "Grands" of this world perhaps be doing business within this or other Government Services today but I not even did have put themselves, at the General's request, in December 1944, Without General issuing to the contact office of all of the activities. The authorities granted upon for themselves.

4. As another evidence of the fact that I am by no means a "Grand" adherent, I wish to remind you that, although my early interest was in the operations side of OSS activities, I have devoted myself, for over a year, almost exclusively to matters of intelligence. Again, I did not particularly seek the assignments but undertook them, largely, because General Donovan believed he had a niche which I might fill.

II. It is in the light of all these things, therefore, that I find the implications contained in your memorandum so displeasing. Ignorance of the facts may serve as an excuse for many mistakes but it is certainly no justification for thoughtless innuendo or ill-tempered forwardness.

Elroy O. Huntington, Jr.
Colonel, Infantry

Copies to:
General Donovan
Colonel Wisner
Lt. Col. Rose

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[illegible]. I should like, now to comment specifically upon the third paragraph of your memorandum:

(a) This paragraph contains, I submit, both unjustified language and implications which are at the same time unnecessary and [illegible]. They were unnecessary for the reason that you well know [illegible] to recall me. You could have obtained, personally and informally, the facts I am compelled to set forth in this paper—compelled because I saw fit to submit a formal document (and one it were formal by [illegible] me with the Commanding General and the Commanding Officer) [illegible] necessitates a formal reply. They were unnecessary because without an investigation either of the correct facts surrounding [illegible] of the individuals mentioned or the historic facts [illegible] by association with OSS.

(b) [illegible] historic basis the charge of 'Communistic' (as you term [illegible] "[illegible]" of OSS, rather, justifiably, be made against me [illegible]

[illegible] came to this organization long before it was OSS. I joined—not to satisfy any personal ambition nor to promote the interests of any special department (for there were few then)—but simply because I had known [illegible] for a long time, and wanted to serve under, the man who [illegible] and is the Chief. I have done, from the beginning, [illegible] I could to assist him in what looked, originally, like an almost impossible task. My policy has been only to undertake and attempt to carry out his suggestions and commands— not to indulge in intra-mural [illegible].

In serving in this way, I have run the gauntlet of many [illegible] activities within the organization. I spent a good deal of time on the head of the "Branch" of which you are a member. I took over this duty from Colonel Quarfallow when he became a Deputy [illegible], and carried on with what had already been [illegible] by him. At this period OSS was undergoing [illegible] considerable expansion and a great deal of recruiting was to be done under my direction. You will find, on investigation, that most of the American personnel working with or being used by you was obtained at [illegible] time. This is particularly true when OSS was considered. It is somewhat anomalous, therefore, that you, who recruited and trained some of this personnel, should now be levelling at me a charge of "[illegible]".

The [illegible] instance, incidentally, in which I have [illegible] sought some one of your section, was the [illegible] of Lieut. [illegible], about whom I was very careful [illegible] remember, to speak to you. Furthermore, I

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

4 August 1944

TO: Lt. Col. Davis - OPOS

Subject: [illegible] OPERATIONS

Ref.: Memorandum of 31 July 1944, from Lt. Col. Davis

1. In reply to the aforesaid memorandum you are in error with respect to certain facts:

(a) I have never requested the assignment to me of 7 or any other number of operators placed in training by OPOS for the use you specify, or otherwise.

(b) I did, some time ago, as the result of conversations between General Donovan and the French Minister of War, and later between the Minister's representative and myself, request from the Commissariat de la Guerre French personnel qualified to do, and having a preference for, intelligence work with certain sections of OSS. Certain officers and other ranks have volunteered and have been assigned to OSS for said purposes. I have received one officer and three other ranks for an intelligence mission in which I am interested. The individuals were delivered to this Station by French Authorities. With the exception of the officer, the personnel has never been seen by me before arrival.

(c) It is my understanding, derived from conversations with French Officials consulted since the receipt of your memorandum:

1. That all assigned personnel consisted of individuals under the charge and direction of the Commissariat de la Guerre;

2. That there were no prior commitments to OPOS or any other organization with respect to such individuals;

3. That such individuals would not, in any event, have been committed to special assignments, not in line of duty, without the consent of such individuals; and

4. That all individuals, including the officer and three other ranks with me, assigned to intelligence sections of OSS, have volunteered for and consented to such assignment.

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