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COPY FOR COL. DONOVAN'S FILES

Mr. Frederic Dolbeare

Jan. 23, 1943

Hugh R. Wilson

"Paul"

Replying to your memorandum of January 19, I quote herewith a memorandum left on my desk by David King:

"I spoke to B. about our friend D. last night. Apparently everything is arranged. D. will proceed to North Africa on or about the 15th of February and report to Giraud. I asked B. to arrange it so that D. could also keep in contact with Bill Eddy as I have a shrewd suspicion he may be useful to us over there. B. said he would so arrange it."

Regarding money we should meet his necessities generously. Try and work this out in a way satisfactory to him.


In regard to his code you might ask him whether he wants to risk taking this with him or whether he would like us to transmit it to Eddy.

Please instruct him when he presents himself to Eddy to say that he is "Paul".

If he departs before we have time to get a letter to Eddy we must send a cable stating that Paul has been working for us and that a full account of his activities will follow by mail.

When this has all been worked out between you and Paul send me a notice of your arrangements and I will draft a letter to Eddy for the Colonel's signature.

I am inclined to send our copy of the material to Eddy in order that he can be certain that he is playing safe.



SECRET

Hugh R. Wilson

HRW:MHO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The French General Staff in peace times contains a section known as the Second Bureau, which is the information section. A subdivision of that section is known as the "Research Section." The "Research Section" carries out all clandestine activities, in other words, operates a secret service.

At the outbreak of war the "Research Section" becomes the Fifth Bureau and is commanded by a Staff Officer. It operates in war time completely separated from the Second Bureau, the latter continuing its functions of collection of information through attaches and other legitimate means.

With the collapse of France in 1940 the personnel of the Fifth Bureau severed itself from the Army and set up a secret service of its own under the former commander of the Fifth Bureau. This commander has expressed the sentiment that as far as he and his men are concerned the war is not over and will not be over until the last German has left French territory.

There ^{was} ~~is~~ in Washington a representative of this

SECRET

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hidden Fifth Bureau. He is a French professional Army officer, a man of character and integrity, who will obey implicitly the orders of his former and present commander.

This representative was established in Washington and, under direct instructions from his chief in France, established connection with the American Army, specifically G-2. From time to time this representative furnished information to Colonel Donovan's representative, which was in turn passed on to G-2 and officers of the latter establishment have often expressed their appreciation of the information furnished. I append herewith a copy of a report as an example of the type of material furnished.

On the breach of relations with Vichy the military personnel of the French Embassy was interned at Hershey and the Frenchman in question accompanied his colleagues in this internment. It had been the intention of the OSS eventually to bring about the release of the Frenchman, to endeavor to reestablish his contact with France, and to utilize his services either in the United States or in North Africa to maintain this contact. Parenthetically, it is believed that if this contact could be reestablished it would be much more unique and valuable now than it was before the occupation of the whole of France.

SECRET

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However, it was discovered at the State Department that the President had interested himself in the matter and had ordered adversely in the case of the Frenchman in question.

After talking with Colonel Donovan, Mr. Hugh Wilson then called on Admiral Leahy to explain the situation. Admiral Leahy requested to know more specifically whether an order had been issued from the White House and in what form. Mr. Wilson investigated again in the State Department and was informed that a letter had been written by the President to Mr. Sumner Welles instructing that this Frenchman should be returned to Vichy and Admiral Leahy was so informed.

Subsequently, Admiral Leahy informed Mr. Wilson that he was still endeavoring to find out the reason for this order but so far without success.

COPY

8 Oct. 42

DEPLOIEMENT AVIATION ALLEMAND
DEBUT JUIN

Note -- Il n'y a eu pour ainsi dire pas de changements depuis cette date.

FRONT OCCIDENTAL

A) COMMANDEMENT

Le Mar. SPERRLE commande la III^e Flotte aérienne et dispose de:

9^e corps aérien à COMPIEGNE

un groupement de chasse

un commandement des opérations en ATLANTIQUE

" " " " du Secteur Sud de la Mer du NORD

En outre il existerait un 12^e corps aérien indépendant et groupant toutes les formations de chasse de nuit.

B) DEPLOIEMENT AERIEN

Les groupes: 3/KG 26, 2/KG 56, 100 (ne sont peut être plus sur le front occidental?)

Les groupes 2/KG 77 (à RENNES?), 3/KG 77 (BEAUVAIS?) venant tous les deux de la Méditerranée.

Le groupe 2/KG 40 (peut-être parti pour Extrême Nord?)

Le " 3/KG 40 comportant 3 escadrilles dont deux en France

SECRET

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(la 8^e à BORDEAUX, la 9^e à ORLEANS-BRICY)

Le groupe de destruction 210 a quitté TOURS pour le front Oriental.

L'Escadre de bombardement No. 2 (KG₂) est en France et Belgique.

Le 1^{er} groupe en Belgique ou Hollande

Le 2^e - vers GAND

Le 3^e - en France ou Belgique

En résumé sur le front occidental: 11,500 appareils { 7 Gr. de
Bombard
10 à 12 de
Chasse
3 Chasse de
Nuit

UNITES D'ERGANZUNG

5 Groupes en France: 4/KG₄ - AVORD

30^e - BRIETIGNY

40^e - ORLEANS-BRICY

55 - OISON

77 - BOURGIES (peut être parti pour Belgique)

LAPONIE et NORVEGE du NORD

v Flotte: G^{al}. STUMPF

MEDITERRANEE

Les effectifs paraissent devenus identiques à ceux de l'hiver dernier soit environs 650 appareils.

STU

-3-

Avens identifiés:

Groupe de Bombardement:	1/26
"	1/54
"	606
"	806
Groupe de Destruction:	3/26
Group Bomb ^t en piqué	1/2
"	2/2
Group de Chasse de	
Nuit	1/2
Escadrilles de recon-	
naissances lointaines	1/122
	2/122
	2/123
	3/O.B.D.L

Translation & notes to
'Pearl' — originals in
1948 to Mrs. Becker,

German Battle Order.

July - August.

I Panzer Division.

The 7th should have left the middle of August and is probably in Russia.

The 5th is at Rennes

The 10th is at Amiens and may have been divided.

II. Infantry Divisions.

A.O.K. No XV

712th at Gand since the end of February.

304th at Bruges.

? at Bergues. More precise information will be given in the next 4 days.

340th (at Ostende) in the process of being motorized.

106th at Boulogne.

321th Montreuil.

302nd at Dieppe.

332nd at Le Havre.

711th at Lisieux,

716th at Caen.

320th at Cotentin.

319th at Coutances.

A.O.K. No VII

709th at Lamballe.

17th at Loudeac in the process of being motorized.

325th at Brest.

333th at Auray

SECRET

A.O.K. No I.

327th at La Rochelle,

708th at Royan

15th at Lisbonne on the point of leaving.

715th at les Landes and may have been divided.

III S.S. Divisions.

"Das Reich" at Le Mans.

"Adolphe Hitler" is between Le Mans and Versailles.

These two divisions arrived from the Russian front about the middle of July.

IV Miscellaneous.

The 337th Division is probably in the region of Dinan.

A division is probably being formed between Nevers and Dijon.

A Parachute Division is at Avranches and is one the point of departure.

The "Goering" regiment is at Loudeac.

Middle of August.

The constitution of these newly formed German divisions and perhaps even of all the divisions on the Russian front, has been changed.

These divisions now have only two Infantry regiments. The Artillery regiments on the contrary will be increased.

The 340th Division is at Ostende.

(2 regiments of infantry
artillery next word illegible)

SECRET

July 8

Numerous items of reliable information indicate:

1. Defense construction is being pushed on the coast and in great depth toward the interior of the occupied zone.
2. Defense organization appears as follows:
 - a. Defense organizations are in progress the length of the coast from Belgium as far as Brittany to defend at least all points having landing facilities.
 - b. A second line from supporting points is being established in back of the first at a varying distance of from 20 to 70 kilometers. This line is skirted by: Mt. St. Michel, Mts. d'Arree, Domfront, Lisieux, Neu-Chatel-en-Bray, Roulers, Gand, Terneuzen.
 - c. Other isolated construction projects in evidence are at: Vitre, Laval, Mamers, Chemin des Dames; They could outline a third position which, through Poix Terres, would form a defensive triangle. The points of this triangle would be at: Maubeuge, Namur, Charleville.
 - d. In back of this position construction is in progress particularly on the Maginot line; Work fortifications facing West and also Northwest, and preparation to destroy construction as far as Belfort, Besancon, and ---?

SECRET

July 4

We have learned, although it has not been confirmed, that in mid-June concrete shelters five meters deep were under construction on the edge of the sea between Boulogne and Wimereux.

In general, it seems to us that measures for defense and evacuation are being especially pushed in the coastal zone from the Scheldt to the Seine while in the zones to the Northwest and West the organization of the shore defense seems still limited to the defense of the most vulnerable points.

We are waiting for precise information and cannot confirm the foregoing paragraph.

SECRET

May 1

We do not know of any depot of combat gas
or stocks of gas bombs in the coastal region
from Brest to Belgium. We will inform you
soon of the positions of gasoline depots
which we may know of.

Paul

SECRET

April 19th.

(Noted in WBI)

BATTLE ORDER - beginning of April.

15th ARMY -- The following divisions are grouped in 3 army corps:
 The 37th O. A. at Tourcoing, the 32nd O.A. at Rouen, the 80th at Caen.
 304th at Bruges, 306th near Courtrai, -Brussels, Nth at Bergues.
 340th at Ardres, 331st at Montreuil, 302nd at Dieppe, 336th at Le
 Havre, 332nd around Rouen, Yvetot, Etretat (This division seems
 intended to replace the 336th), 333rd at Caen, 320th (uncertain) at
 Valogne, 711th at Coutances, 319th at Dinard, 718th near St. Quentin.
 (The 337th and 308th divisions have left).

2th ARMY --

333rd near Lorient - Nantes, 308th near St. Nazaire, 327th at Niort -
 La Rochelle, 708th at Bordeaux - Rochefort, 718th at les Landes .
 (the 8th and the lightly armoured (legere) 29th left at the end of
 February or the beginning of March). A new armoured or motorized
 division arrived recently near Rennes and camp Coelquidon. It
 seems that it is not completely organized, but is in the process
 of being made up.

1st ARMY :

337th at Bourges, 211th (uncertain) at Auxerre, 71st (on the point
 of leaving). The 23rd armoured division is described as having
 left Paris towards the end of March.

IN ADDITION - 2 divisions at Erata

At Metz - the 148th.

At Nancy - the 182nd.

SECRET

TURKEY

The government and national wish to conserve their neutrality and conciliate England and Germany.

The country has been unpleasantly impressed by recent English reverses and by the delay necessary to the United States before action could be taken effectively in Europe.

The government also fears an alliance with Russia and England because of the situation of the Straits.

A good observer in Turkey maintains that if German pressure is applied by firm military aviation measures and also takes place at the time of a successful German offensive in the Caucasus, the government would bow to Germany, using the pretext of the Turkish people's desire for peace.

At present it seems that the Turks have somewhat diminished their security measures with the hope of augmenting the eastern and southern frontiers. (This last sentence is difficult to read and therefore should be checked.)

SECRET

July 3

We have reliable information indicating that -- The coastal artillery and the D. C. A. of the west zone of France are in the course of reorganization. The whole coastal defense is to be taken over by the Navy which would have control of the coastal artillery and the D. C. A.

The batteries of the D. C. A., batteries of 7,5 and 8,8 c/ms., which are stationed along the coasts would be organized in four groups; these, beside their normal duty of anti-aircraft fire, will also assist in the defense against attacks from the sea.

Paul

SECRET

✓
SECRET

May 9

General G, having reached the age limit within the past year goes into retirement. At present he will establish himself with his family in the neighborhood of Lyon.

He desires no publicity. He wishes to be forgotten as a private citizen.

Paul

The least publicity given him at present, the better.

SECRET

J.C.S. 7070
x Communications
x French Embassy
x Exchange
Cinquieme Bureau

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942.

SECRET

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

With reference to your letter of November 10th concerning a contact with the head of the Cinquieme Bureau and my reply of November 11th, which was subsequently withdrawn, the following information is furnished.

Continued contact with France is considered desirable. However, it is not believed wise to allow any officer of the French Embassy to send coded messages from this country which have not been censored. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 has been directed to obtain the cipher code mentioned and deliver it to you. It is desired that this code be retained by you, and that arrangements be made that will permit any message this officer desires to send to be encoded by you prior to transmittal. Subject to the above restriction, I believe that you should handle this matter as your judgment dictates.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

J. R. Deane
J. R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

*Discussed with
Strong. Will explain
orally. DRW*



SECRET

J. C. S. 9070

- Communications
- Exchange
- French Embassy
- Cinquieme Bureau

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

NOVEMBER 12, 1942

November 11, 1942

William J. Donovan
Office of Director
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General John R. Deane
The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Deane:

In accordance with your telephone request this afternoon I am returning your letter to me of November 11, concerning the exchange of communications with the head of the Cinquieme Bureau.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

L. C. S. 7070
x Communication
x Exchange
x Personal Embass
x Cinquieme Bureau

November 10, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane,
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Public Health Building,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

This office has for several months carried on an exchange of communications with the head of the Cinquieme Bureau which operates separately in France in war-time and at other times is called the Research Section of the Deuxieme Bureau.

The officer--a member of the French Embassy in this country--who has been working with us, has inquired whether it was our wish to continue this service. (It should be said that he is a high-class man, that we do not pay him for this work, and that he has assumed it as his patriotic duty). As a result of the African operations he has been completely cut off from telegraphic communications, and if we desire to continue the exchange, the following steps are necessary:

1. He must regain possession of his cipher codes which are in the Embassy Chancery, now blocked off from all access by agents of the F.B.I.
2. Our assistance is necessary to arrange that a telegram from him be forwarded through our representative in Lisbon or in Madrid to the French Military Attache in Lisbon or Madrid,

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Brigadier-General Deane:

November 10, 1942

who will in turn send it on to the Deuxieme Bureau. In this telegram he will inquire whether his chief desires and is able to continue the exchange of messages, and in the event of an affirmative, whether he desires to arrange for the exchange of telegrams via Switzerland.

3. Since a reply will come via Switzerland, we will have to advise Dulles, our man in Switzerland, that an emissary from the Chief of the Cinquieme Bureau will approach him bringing a cipher message, and we must caution Dulles to take proper security measures in transmitting the quoted message through the Legation in Bern.

I suggest that if it is desired to proceed with this plan it might be possible to arrange with the F.B.I. to escort him to the Chancery at night, quietly, so that neither the public nor other members of his Embassy need be aware of the action taken. It must be remembered that neither the Ambassador nor any member of his staff has any knowledge of these activities. And, finally, if we want to accomplish these arrangements, the quicker the better, since there is reason, of course, to believe that the Germans will be increasingly active in the unoccupied area of France.

If you agree with this procedure, I would appreciate your advising me so that we can act.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Wm. J. Donovan
FROM: Frederic R. Dolbeare
SUBJECT: Continuance of Communications with
Deuxieme Bureau of French General Staff

On behalf of G-2 this office has for several months carried on an exchange of communications with the head of the Cinquieme Bureau which operates separately in France in war-time and at other times is called the Research Section of the Deuxieme Bureau. ~~The results have been very satisfactory to G-2.~~ Reference is made to a memorandum to you dated about October 22, relative to increasing the flow of communications by operation of a secret radio station in this country.

Miss
The Frenchman in this country who has been ~~working with us~~ *working with us* serving his chief on the one hand and ourselves on the other, is, as you know, a member of the French Embassy.

has He spoke with me yesterday afternoon and inquired whether it was our wish to continue this exchange, ~~impossible.~~ *This would be desirable.*

Knowing your attitude to this whole matter, I answered him in the affirmative. *(As a result of the new operation)* Under present conditions he has been

*This he is a member of the staff
This we have been discussing*

Colonel Donovan

-2-

November 10, 1942

completely cut off from telegraphic communications, and if we desire to continue the exchange, the following steps are necessary:

1. He must regain possession of his cipher codes which are in the Embassy Chancery, now blocked off from all access by agents of the F.B.I.
2. Our assistance is necessary to arrange that a telegram from him be forwarded through our representative in Lisbon or in Madrid to the French Military Attache in Lisbon or Madrid, who will in turn send it on to the Deuxieme Bureau. In this telegram he will inquire whether his chief desires and is able to continue the exchange of messages, and in the event of an affirmative, whether he desires to arrange for the exchange of telegrams via Switzerland.
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*See memo
in folder*

I suggest that if it is desired to proceed with this plan it might be possible to arrange with the F.B.I. to escort him to the Chancery at night, quietly, so that neither the public nor other members of his Embassy need be aware of the action taken. It must be remembered that neither the Ambassador nor any member of his staff has any knowledge of these activities. And, finally, if we want to accomplish these arrangements, the quicker the better, since there is reason, of course, to believe that the Germans will be increasingly active in the unoccupied area of France.

F.P.D.
F.P.D.

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1942

The Situation:

The French General Staff in peace times contains a section known as the Second Bureau, which is the information section. A subdivision of that section is known as the "Research Section." The "Research Section" carries out all clandestine activities, in other words, operates a secret service.

At the outbreak of war the "Research Section" becomes the Fifth Bureau and is commanded by a Staff Officer. It operates in war time completely separated from the Second Bureau, the latter continuing its functions of collection of information through attaches and other legitimate means.

With the collapse of France in 1940 the personnel of the Fifth Bureau severed itself from the Army and set up a secret service of its own under the former commander of the Fifth Bureau. This commander has expressed the sentiment that as far as he and his men are concerned the war is not over and will not be over until the last German has left French territory.

There is in Washington a representative of this

SECRET

-2-

hidden Fifth Bureau. He is a French professional Army officer, a man of character and integrity, who will obey implicitly the orders of his former and present commander.

This representative is established in Washington and, under direct instructions from his chief in France, established connection with the American Army, specifically G-2. (Such connection was established and carried out under Colonel Donovan's direction and is still in active operation.)

The Frenchman in Washington has explained that his Chief feels that the exchange must be a two-way traffic, that he must have a justification for the flow if it is discovered. He adds that he would never, of course, expect information as to strategic plans but desires to obtain from time to time approximate information as to production, methods of modern war, et cetera. This desire should be met as far as it is possible without jeopardizing our security.

The Problem:

Unfortunately, for reasons which cannot be remedied, the flow of communication is small both to and from France and Washington. The communication is carried on in as

SECRET

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great a flow as the present means will permit. Technical difficulties, plus the danger of security to the Frenchmen both in France and here, render it imperative that if the flow be increased it must be by other than the present means of communication.

There are obvious advantages in providing the facilities to increase the flow. Not only could we obtain more specific information as to German operations in occupied France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, but it is possible and has indeed been suggested by the representative here that information of a much broader character could be worked up by the men in France. Further, we are faced with the daily possibility of a rupture with Vichy. It therefore seems not only advantageous but urgent and indispensable that a means of communication be set up by which this information can continue to reach us even if relations are severed.

The Chief in France recognizes the precarious nature of the business that he is carrying on. Hence, he is scrupulous that all means of communication for his system shall be "French." He wants to be able to offer the defense for himself and his officers that he has employed French channels and has not been in correspondence with foreign governments. He feels that it is probable that

SECRET

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other officers in the General Staff suspect his activities and wink at them but that nevertheless some episode or some pressure may at any minute bring about the arrest of himself or his men and he must have his record clear.

A representative of the O.S.S. has discussed the technical problem involved with the Frenchman here and a proposal has been formulated to solve this communication difficulty in such a way as to give (a) reasonable assurance of a relatively continuous flow of traffic of communication and (b) the element of security that seems necessary to the leader in France.

The Proposal:

It is proposed:

1. That the O.S.S. acquire a small sender (described in memorandum herewith attached);
2. That the O.S.S. recruit a Frenchman in whom it has confidence, a radio operator if possible, if not, such Frenchman to be trained as radio operator;
3. That the Frenchman in Washington pay for this installation so that it becomes "French."
4. That this station receives messages in the Frenchman's code always through an intermediary to the end that the Frenchman operating the radio will feel that

SECRET


-5-

he is serving the United States Government both in sending messages to France and receiving messages from an American station in France;

5. It is obvious that such a station could not be carried on without raising immediate question, especially by F.B.I., O.N.I., and the Signal Corps of the Army. It is proposed to give sufficient explanation to each one of these organizations to reassure them as to the purpose of the sending and receiving;

6. While the O.S.S. has confidence in the integrity and purpose of the Frenchmen here and abroad, nevertheless it would seem advisable to make assurance doubly sure in a matter of this importance. It is therefore proposed that filmsies of the ciphers used on this station, both incoming and outgoing, should be furnished to Army and/or Navy cryptographers to the end that an endeavor may be made to check the nature of the messages.

SECRET



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Log 8
16.841

Office Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director

DATE: 10 May, 1946

FROM : Acting Top Secret Control Officer

SUBJECT: BERNE CABLE #10000 (In 12800) dated 11 May, 1946.

1. Subject cable was received in the OSS Message Center at 0820 on 12 May, 1946. It was processed by the following individuals: Edwin Sautman, 0820 to 0805; R. J. Leaven, 0800 to 0630 (paraphraser); A. W. Bullaway, 1200 to 1202; Philip Leason, 1202 to 1300 (paraphraser); Richard Seldman, 1230 to 1215 (clocker). (Major Calfield later saw this cable from 1225 to 1235 on 17 May.)

2. 4 copies of the cable were made and distributed as follows:

- 1) To the Director, and it was seen by the Director, Mr. Leaton and Lt. Thron;
- 2) To the Secretariat, and it was seen by Mrs. Jenks, Lt. Thron and Lt. Tulzell;
- 3) To the Secretariat, and it was seen by Mrs. Jenks, Mr. Leaton and Mr. Bullaway;
- 4) To Col. Fiddell for general reference, where it was seen by General Anderson, Major Sherman, Hon. Mr. G. J. Arnold, Mr. Leason, Lt. Thron and Mr. Tulzell.

It is assumed that these persons are all to be advised of those persons who have seen the cable on 12 May, 1946.

3. In accordance with a report received from Mr. Leason on 13 May 1946, the returned a special message to the effect that copies, which were typed by Mr. Leason, were distributed to the office of the Director as follows:

- 1) and 2). The original cable (1st and 2nd copies)
- 3) and 4). The Secretariat copy (1st and 2nd copies)
- 5) and 6). The copy of cable (1st and 2nd copies)
- 7). The copy of cable (1st and 2nd copies)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

All of the foregoing were sent by officer courier on 12 May, 1951 and receipts, properly signed, are in the possession of the Officer Courier Room.

#13. Mr. Carlisle J. O'Donnell, for routing in the Director's files. These were delivered by a courier in person on 12 May, at approximately 1100. These copies are all properly in the Director's files and have been so retained since their delivery to Mr. O'Donnell.

14. Mr. General William G. Tolson, Assistant Secretary of State (carbon)

#15. Lt. Col. J. E. Keenan, O-3 representative on the Joint Intelligence Staff. (We are advised by Col. Keenan that the memorandum was seen by Capt. Johnston, USA; Capt. Jones, USA; Col. Fontaine, USA; Mr. Paul Cotton, State Department.

16. Mr. William L. Tucker. He follows the personnel in A. Saw the memorandum; Lt. Raymond Fontaine, USA; Lt. Col. J. E. Keenan, USA; Mr. James Douglas, USA; Mr. J. J. Tamm, USA; Mr. Louis J. By and Mr. Tucker. (on 12 May.)

The copies that were distributed by officer courier on 12 May and duly executed receipts are in the Courier Room.

17. Mr. Robert H. Lee, Chief of the Division of Identification and Intelligence, USA; Mr. Central Intelligence.

18. Mr. Lee, in the extra copies of the memorandum on Identification and Intelligence, USA; Mr. Central Intelligence.

4. In review of this matter, I find the conditions of the personnel who saw the document and the details as to conformity with proper top secret procedure, etc., as outlined.

William L. Tucker
Acting Chief
Secret Control Officer

~~TOP SECRET~~

Japanese Legion #32
2 memos -
2 Jones -
[Signature]

Honolulu, T.H.
May 26, 1942

From: Harold Jones
To: Murry Brophy
Subject: General Emmon's proposal for Japanese Legion

I prepared a very careful memo for the Colonel on this subject. He took it up with the General Staff to see what had happened to Emmon's proposal. The General Staff said, "We are not in favor of Foreign Legions."

Donovan said to lay off the proposition. However, I had already talked to Harold Smith, Ed Kemp and Howard Marsh. The matter was to be talked over with the President and I imagine has been directly submitted to him. As you know, I have wired Marsh and should get an answer before I leave. Due to the fact that the Ross does not want us to monkey with this matter further, I wouldn't do anything without first talking it up with him and giving him the substance of this memo.

[Signature]

James would like to see the [unclear]
General Staff also to the [unclear]
(M.B.)

THE MILITARY ATTACHE
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 27th, 1941.

Dear Bill,

Herewith the questionnaires which you asked Field to make out before he left on Japan and Manchukuo. He apologises for their being a bit sketchy but he had no records to consult and has tried to limit the questionnaire to what the individuals described by you were likely to be able to produce. As he says, it never pays to overload such people.

Yours sincerely,

Russ

Colonel W. C. Donovan,
1847 - 18th Street,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JAPAN

It is believed that there is considerable misgiving in certain quarters in Japan about the eventual results of the expansionist policy, and of the Axis partnership.

Is this really so - if so, is the feeling shared by the ordinary man in the street?

It is unlikely that there is at the moment any organised opposition to the Government's policy, but if such an opposition were to arise at a later date, from what group or groups would it come? Can you make any forecast of what their main 'talking points' would be?

We are always interested in estimates of the economic position in Japan - e.g., data on the general state of business, especially internal business, the raw material position, (especially in oil) and the effect of Allied restrictions on Japanese life. Presumably the tendency in official propaganda is to blame shortages on to Allied restrictions. Is this so and, if so, is the argument generally accepted? How best, in your opinion, could such statements be combated?

Military

It is not desired to burden you with specialist Military questions, but you may be able to acquire information on the following valuable points:

- (a) The effect of service expansion on the man-power situation. Do manufacturers complain of shortage of labour - if so, in what districts and in what industries?
- (b) Do shippers complain of lack of shipping facilities? If so, by what lines, and what routes are affected? An estimate of the tonnage allocated for carrying on normal business would be most valuable.

(c)

- 2 -

- (c) Any unusual concentration of shipping at any point in Japan, or elsewhere, should be reported at once. It is most necessary to give, also, an estimate of the reliability of the report.
- (d) You cannot be expected to identify Japanese army formations, nor would it be desirable for you to attempt it. If you have ever had any acquaintances among senior Japanese officers - say from Lieutenant-Colonel upwards - it would be valuable to renew contact with them and report where they are now and, if possible, what their appointment is. Similarly with any other officers you may happen to meet. In all these cases the full name and rank of the officer is necessary to establish an identification - e.g., "Lieut.-Colonel Tanaka, Eiichi, met at Osaka, believed to be commanding an infantry regiment in that area, " not "Met an officer named Tanaka in Osaka."

You will be aware that the easiest and most natural way of acquiring this information, in Japan, is by exchange of cards!

August 26th, 1941.

SECRET

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MANCHUKUO

1. You may be aware of the normal distribution of Japanese troops in the areas in which you have been working. Report any marked increases or decreases in strength. If there are any new troops in the area, where did they come from? When did they arrive?
2. Report any signs of future arrivals in the areas you cover. This can often be estimated by demands for more accommodation, or preparations for new camps and barracks.
3. You will probably not be able to identify Japanese army formations - and an inaccurate identification is worse than none at all. It will be better to report the name and rank of any senior Japanese officer you may encounter, where he is stationed and, if possible, what his command or appointment may be. The full name is necessary in all cases.
4. Report any instances of Russian or Chinese subversive activities - propaganda or sabotage. In what areas are such activities prevalent and what effect do they have on (a) the Japanese, (b) the Chinese in Manchukuo?
- b. Road and railway information is always valuable, especially about new roads and railway projects in the direction of the Russian border.

If possible, concentrate on such information in the following areas:

- (a) Northern Korea
- (b) The Suifenhø area
- (c) round Heihø (opposite Blagoveshensk).

August 26th, 1941.

TOP SECRET
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

14,465
Japanese
position

16 April 1944 Pac./c/SLU

MEMORANDUM TO: General Donovan.

File
1. Japanese Position:

a. General. For the Pacific War Japan possessed a balanced air, land, and sea force. Against light opposition she quickly advanced to INDIA, to the N.E.I., and was finally stopped in the Solomons and New Guinea. Today, however, Japan's air, land, and sea forces are no longer balanced.

b. Air. (1) From an effective striking force the strength of the enemy air arm has dwindled until it had to assume the defensive. In this theater, even though air combat has been greatly restricted, the enemy has been unable to replace aircraft losses. In the BISMARCKS his air has practically ceased to exist. In NEW GUINEA few aircraft are stationed east of HUMBOLDT BAY.

✓ (2) During the last four months estimated enemy air strength in this theater has decreased 30%. For March the enemy allocated 200 aircraft replacements to the Southeast Asiatic Theater, 135 to this Theater, 356 to the Central Pacific Area. These allocations probably are the maximum possible within the month. During April, action of our Pacific Forces against enemy air has been devastating. There is reason to believe, therefore, that the enemy air position in this Theater will continue to deteriorate. Aggressive air action in preparation for and during the HOLLANDIA Operation will either destroy the enemy air force which engages us or force its withdrawal.

(3) Estimated Enemy Air Strength 14 April 1944.

New Britain	16
New Ireland	12
Solomons	2
Northwest Area	
(Remainder of SWPA Theater)	621
TOTAL	651

c. Land. (1) In actual ground combat the enemy is as formidable as ever. But in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCKS and Eastern NEW GUINEA his troops have a high sick rate; they are immobilized and inadequately supplied. Their positions are untenable and can now be by-passed with safety.

(2) As of 15 April 1944, the 1st, 20th, and 51st Divisions, totaling 50,000 troops, were in the WENAK-MADANG area; at AITAPE 3,000, one-third of which were L of C troops; in the HOLLANDIA-WARDE area 20,000 of which at least 50% were L of C; in the MAHOKWARI-NOEMFOOR area 10,000 of which one-fifth were

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L of C; in Western VOGELKOP 2,500 of which more than half were L of C; in HALMAHERA 10,000 troops, of which half were L of C.

(3) At present the 36th, 14th, and 3rd Divisions are believed to be moving into this theater. By the 22nd of April the bulk of the 36th will probably be east of GEELVINK BAY in the HUMBOLDT BAY-WAKDE area. Some of it may have moved on into the forward area between WIEWAK and MADANG. The bulk of the 14th will probably be in the VOGELKOP and the bulk of the 3rd in HALMAHERA.

(4) By 1 July the 14th and elements of the 3rd will probably be in the VOGELKOP. By 1 September elements of the 14th Division and elements of the 3rd will probably be in Western VOGELKOP. On 1 November elements of the 3rd Division and probably the bulk of a new division will be in HALMAHERA.

(5) The pattern of enemy defensive measures is emerging. In the past SWPA forces have limited advances to those which could be covered by fighters. In NEW GUINEA the enemy has now set up defenses to meet such an attack. He expects us to strike HANSA BAY which is almost exactly 180 miles from our forward air bases. He has disposed his strength so as best to meet such an attack. He is now shifting his weight so as to leave a sacrifice outpost of 5,500 at MADANG; he is strengthening the ALTAPE area. HOLLANDIA is the base for these forward forces. Supplies move from HOLLANDIA by barge. No strong air forces are stationed permanently forward of HOLLANDIA.

(6) West from HOLLANDIA the enemy is preparing another defensive entity. His forward elements are in the WAKDE area. His strength is being built up from WAKDE to MANOKKARI, inclusive. The base for these forward elements is probably HALMAHERA. In other words, the area MADANG-WIEWAK is to the base HOLLANDIA as the area WIEWAK-MANOKKARI is to the base HALMAHERA.

d. There is no evidence as yet to indicate that the enemy expects our next attack at HOLLANDIA. We have not yet used carriers in this theater.

e. Sea Forces. Losses in light surface naval craft and the misuse of submarines seriously impair the effectiveness of the enemy fleet. A strong fleet was in at Singapore; heavy units are moving into Southern Philippines.

f. Shipping. Enemy shipping losses are progressively increasing. Losses of more than one-third of the losses is being replaced by new construction. The sinkings have been so extensive that at no place along the entire outer perimeter is the enemy supply

TOP SECRET

satisfactory. Since shipping is barely adequate to meet minimum requirements at present, it is doubtful if the enemy could move and supply large bodies of troops.

g. Intent. Reliable intelligence indicates that the enemy expects attacks at HANSA BAY, MADANG, RABAU, KAVIENG, and possibly TIMOR. By desperate fanatical ground resistance to our expected attacks he intends to achieve maximum delay. He must gain time to build ships, expand industry, amass raw materials and prepare defenses. The enemy has plenty of troops and to gain time he will not hesitate to sacrifice them.

h. The Pacific Fleet may be available to provide amphibious lift and escort for two divisions from this theater for a short period, possibly during August. If the Fleet action in the MARIANAS gains momentum, this help will be available earlier than August.

2. Conclusions:

- a. That in ground combat the enemy remains formidable.
- b. That enemy air and naval means available for this Theater are on the wane.
- c. That the enemy supply position is precarious.
- d. That our progress after HOLLANDIA will depend entirely upon the means available.

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TOP SECRET

DATE

8-14-44

Col. Buxton

You may be interested in the attached, together with Mr. Bradley's comments thereupon.

Genl. Donovan and Mr. Cheston may also be interested.

*To answer his
for the comments
a return D*

N. F. Allman
1245 Que

EXL

acc no.

32141

Japan 14789

x Allman

S.P.

August 5, 1944

Following memorandum is by one of the closest observers of the Chinese scene. This copy of it has been obtained outside the usual channels and from another agency, therefore, there should be no distribution outside of OSS. It is most important that secrecy regarding it be carefully observed. The original document was dated June 24, Chungking.

N. F. Allman

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**THE SITUATION IN CHINA AND SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING AMERICAN POLICY**

SECRET

I. The situation in China is rapidly becoming critical.

A. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful.

Japan has had the choice of two alternatives.

1. It could beat China to its knees. But this would have required large scale military operations and a large and continuing army occupation. And there was the danger that it might have driven the Kuomintang to carry out a real mobilization of the people, thus making possible effective resistance and perhaps rendering the Japanese task as long and costly as it has been in North China.

2. Or Japan could maintain just enough pressure on China to cause slow strangulation. Based on the astute use of puppets, the understanding of the continuing struggle for power within China (including the Kuomintang-Communist conflict), and the knowledge that Chiang expects to have the war won for him outside of China by his Allies, this policy had the advantage that as long as the Kuomintang leaders saw a chance for survival they would not take the steps necessary to energize an effective war. It would thus remove any active or immediate threat to Japan's flank, and permit consolidation and gradual extension of the important Japanese-held bases in China. Finally, it would permit the accomplishment of these aims at a relatively small cost.

Japan chose the second alternative, accepting the gamble that the Kuomintang would behave exactly as it has. Like many other Japanese gambles, it has so far proved to have been nicely calculated. China is dying a lingering death by slow strangulation. China does not now constitute any threat to Japan. And China cannot if the present situation continues, successfully resist a determined Japanese drive to seize our offensive bases in East China.

B. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past ten years.

China faces economic collapse. This causing disintegration of the army and the government's administrative apparatus. It is one of the chief causes of growing political unrest. The Generalissimo is losing the support of a China which, by unity in the face of violent aggression, found a new and unexpected strength during the first two years of the war with Japan. Internal weaknesses are becoming accentuated and there is taking place a reversal of the process of unification.

1. Morale is low and discouragement widespread. There is general feeling of hopelessness.

2. The authority of the Central Government is weakening in the areas away from the larger cities. Government mandates and measures of central control are ignored and remain ineffective. It is becoming difficult for the Government to collect enough food for its huge army and bureaucracy.

3. The governmental and military structure is being paralyzed and controlled from

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top to bottom by corruption, unprecedented in scale and openness.

4. The intellectual and salaried classes, who have suffered the most heavily from inflation, are in danger of liquidation. The academic groups suffer not only the attrition and demoralization of economic stress, the weight of years of political control and repression is robbing them of the intellectual vigor and leadership they once had.
5. Peasant resentment of the abuses of conscription, tax collection and other arbitrary impositions has been widespread and is growing. The danger is ever-increasing that past sporadic outbreaks of banditry and agrarian unrest may increase in scale and find political motivation.
6. The provincial groups are making common cause with one another and with other dissident groups, and are actively consolidating their positions. Their continuing strength in the face of the growing weakness of the Central Government is forcing new measures of political appeasement in their favor.
7. Unrest within the Kuomintang armies is increasing, as shown in one important instance by the "Young Generals conspiracy" late in 1943. On a higher plane the war zone commanders are building up their own spheres of influence and are thus creating a "new warlordism".
8. The break between the Kuomintang and the Communists not only shows no signs of being closed, but grows more critical with the passage of time: the inevitability of civil war is now generally accepted.
9. The Kuomintang is losing the respect and support of the people by its selfish policies and its refusal to heed progressive criticism. It seems unable to revivify itself with fresh blood, and its unchanging leadership shows a growing ossification and loss of a sense of reality. To combat the dissensions and cliquism within the Party, which grow more rather than less acute, the leadership is turning toward the reactionary and unpopular Chen brothers clique.
10. The Generalissimo shows a similar loss of realistic flexibility and a hardening of narrowly conservative views. His growing megalomania and his unfortunate attempts to be "sage" as well as leader -- shown, for instance by "China's Destiny" and his book on economics -- have forfeited the respect of many intellectuals, who enjoy in China a position of unique influence. Criticism of his dictatorship is becoming more outspoken.

These symptoms of deterioration and internal stress have been increased by the defeat in Honan and will be further accelerated if, as seems likely, the Japanese succeed in partially or wholly depriving the Central Government of East China south of the Yangtze.

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In the face of the grave crisis with which it is confronted, the Kuomintang is ceasing to be the unifying and progressive force in Chinese society, the role in which it made its greatest contribution to modern China.

0. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative, on the contrary, its policies are precipitating the crisis.

Some war-weariness in China must be expected. But the policies of the Kuomintang under the impact of hyper-inflation and in the presence of obvious signs of internal and external weakness must be described as bankrupt. This truth is emphasized by the failure of the Kuomintang to come to grips with the situation during the recently concluded plenary session of the Central Executive Committee.

1. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. The result is the enthronement of reaction.

The Kuomintang continues to ignore the great political drive within the country for democratic reform. The writings of the Generalissimo and the Party press show that they have no real understanding of that term. Constitutionalism remains an empty promise for which the only "preparation" is a half-hearted attempt to establish an unpopular and undemocratic system of local self-government based on collective responsibility and given odium by Japanese utilization in Manchuria and other areas under their control.

Questions basic to the future of democracy such as the form of the Constitution and the composition and election of the National Congress remain the dictation of the Kuomintang. There is no progress toward the fundamental conditions of freedom of expression and recognition of non-Kuomintang groups. Even the educational and political advantages of giving power and democratic character to the existing but impotent Peoples Political Council are ignored.

On the contrary, the trend is still in the other direction. Through such means as compulsory political training for government posts, emphasis on the political nature of the Army, thought control, and increasing identification of the Party and Government, the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for "Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer" -- even though such a policy in China is inevitably doomed to failure.

The Kuomintang shows no intention of relaxing the authoritarian controls on which its present power depends. Far from discarding or reducing the paraphernalia of a police state -- the multiple and omnipresent secret police organizations, the Gendarmerie, and so forth -- it continues to strengthen them as its last resort for internal security. (For the reinforcement of the most important of these German-inspired and Gestapo-like organizations we must, unfortunately bear some responsibility.

Obsessed by the growing and potential threat of the Communists, who it fears may attract the popular support its own nature makes impossible, the Kuomintang, despite the pretext -- to meet foreign and Chinese criticism -- of conducting negotiations with the Communists, continues to adhere to policies and plans which can only result in civil war. In so doing it shows itself

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blind to the facts; that its internal political and military situation is so weak that success without outside assistance is most problematic; that such a civil war would hasten the process of disintegration and the spread of chaos; that it would prevent the prosecution of any effective war against Japan; and that the only parties to benefit would be Japan immediately and Russia eventually. Preparations for this civil war include an alliance with the present Chinese puppets which augurs ill for future unity and democracy in China.

2. On the economic front the Kuomintang is unwilling to take any effective steps to check inflation which would injure the landlord-capitalist class.

It is directly responsible for the increase of official corruption which is one of the main obstacles to any rational attempt to ameliorate the financial situation. It does nothing to stop large-scale profiteering, hoarding and speculation -- all of which are carried on by people either powerful in the Party or with intimate political connections.

It fails to carry out effective mobilization of resources. Such measures of war-time control as it has promulgated have remained a dead letter or have intensified the problems they were supposedly designed to remedy--as for instance ill-advised and poorly executed attempts at price regulation.

It passively allows both industrial and the more important handicraft production to run down, as they of course must when it is more profitable for speculators to hold raw materials than to have them go through the normal productive process.

It fails to carry out rationing except in a very limited way, or to regulate the manufacture and trade in luxury goods, many of which come from areas under Japanese control. It shows little concern that these imports are largely paid for with strategic commodities of value to the enemy.

It fails to make an effective attempt to reduce the budgetary deficit and increase revenue by tapping such resources as excess profits and incomes of landlords and merchants. It allows its tax-collecting apparatus to hog down in corruption and inefficiency -- to the point that possibly not more than one-third of revenues collected reach the government. It continues to spend huge government funds on an idle and useless Party bureaucracy.

At best, it passively watches inflation gather momentum without even attempting palliative measures available to it, such as the aggressive sale of gold and foreign currency.

It refuses to attack the fundamental economic problems of China such as the growing concentration of land holdings, extortionate rents and ruinous interest rates, and the impact of inflation.

3. On the external front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progressive estrangement of its allies.

By persistence in tactics of bargaining, bluff and blackmail--most inappropriate to its circumstances--and its continuing failure to deal openly and frankly

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and to extend whole-hearted cooperation--which its own interests demand--the Kuomintang is alienating China's most important ally, the United States. It has already alienated its other major potential ally, Soviet Russia, toward which its attitude is an irrational and short-sighted as it is toward the Communists. The latest example of this is the irresponsible circulation of the report that Soviet Russia and Japan have signed a secret military agreement permitting Japanese troop withdrawals from Manchuria.

It is allowing this situation to develop at a time when its survival is dependent as never before upon foreign support. But the Kuomintang is endangering not only itself by its rash foreign policy; there are indications that it is anxious to create friction between the United States and Great Britain and Russia. When speedy victory--and any victory at all--demands maximizing of agreements and the minimizing of frictions, such maneuvers amount to sabotage of the war effort of the United Nations.

4. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation.

Its most important present contribution is to allow us--at our own and fantastic cost--to build and use air bases in China.

It delayed, perhaps too long for success, to allow forces designated for the purpose and trained and equipped by us to take the offensive in West Yunnan, even though needed to support the American-Chinese campaign in North Burma, the purpose of which is to open a "life-line" into China and facilitate the eventual landing on the China coast. It agreed to this action only after long months of obstruction.

It fails to make effective use of American equipment given to it, as it also failed with earlier Russian supplies. Equipment brought into China has often not been transported to the fighting fronts. In other cases it has been known to have been hoarded or diverted to non-military purposes. China has displayed a "dog-in-the-manger" attitude in regard to equipment consigned to China and deteriorating in India for lack of transportation. It has concealed and refused to make available to our forces hoards of supplies such as gasoline known to exist in China, even when the emergency was great and China's own interests directly served.

It has consistently refused to consolidate and efficiently administer transportation. In the past this resulted in great losses of supplies in the Japanese capture of Burma and West Yunnan; now it is crippling Chinese internal transportation on which military activity must depend.

It has allowed military cooperation to be tied up with irrelevant financial demands which can only be described as a form of blackmail. It has been these excessive demands in spite of the fact that American expenditures in China (against which there are almost no balancing Chinese payments) continually add to the large Chinese "nest egg" of foreign exchange, which cannot be used in China at present and thus constitutes in effect a "kitty" being hoarded for post-war use.

It has failed to implement military requisitioning laws to assist us in obtaining supplies in China and has left us at the mercy of conscienceless profiteers.

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some of whom have been known to have official connections. It has permitted the imposition on us of fantastic prices, made more so by a wholly unrealistic exchange rate, for articles in some cases originally supplied to China through American credits. It seemingly has ignored the fact that the more supplies

In its own war effort a pernicious and corrupt conscription system which works to ensure the selection and retention of the unfit--since the ablest and strongest can either evade conscription, buy their way out, or desert. It starves and maltreats most of its troops to the degree that their military effectiveness is greatly impaired and military service is regarded in the minds of the people as a sentence of death. At the same time it refuses to follow the suggestion that the army should be reduced to the size that could be adequately fed, medically cared for, trained and armed. It bases this refusal on mercenary political considerations--the concentration on the continuing struggle for power in China, and the ultimate measurement of power in terms of armies.

For the same reason it refuses to mobilize its soldiers and people for the only kind of war which China is in a position to wage effectively-- a people's guerrilla war. Perhaps our entry into the war has simplified the problems of the Kuomintang. As afraid of the forces within the country its own people--as it is of the Japanese, it now seeks to avoid conflict with the Japanese in order to concentrate on the perpetuation of its own power.

The condition to which it has permitted its armies to deteriorate is shown most recently by the defeat in Honan, which is due not only to lack of heavy armament but also to poor morale and miserable condition of the soldiers, absence of support by the people--who have been consistently mistreated, lack of leadership, and prevalent corruption among the officers through such practices as trade with the occupied areas.

If we accept the obvious indications that the present Kuomintang leadership does not want to fight the Japanese any more than it can help, we must go further and recognize that it may even seek to prevent China from becoming the battleground for large scale campaigns against the Japanese land forces. This helps to explain the Kuomintang's continued dealings with the Japanese and puppets. Thus the Kuomintang may hope to avert determined Japanese attack, maintain its own position and power, save the East China homes of practically all of its officials, and preserve its old economic-industrial base in the coastal cities.

If this analysis is valid it reveals on the part of the Kuomintang leadership--which means the Generalissimo--a cynical disregard of the added cost of the inevitable prolongation of the war in American lives and resources.

D. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the Party.

In view of the above it becomes pertinent to ask why the Kuomintang has lost its power of leadership; why it neither wishes actively to wage war against Japan itself nor to cooperate whole-heartedly with the American Army in China; and why it has ceased to be capable of unifying the country.

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The answer to all these questions is to be found in the present composition and nature of the Party. Politically, a classical and definitive American description becomes ever more true; the Kuomintang is a congeries of conservative political cliques interested primarily in the preservation of their own power against all outsiders and in jockeying for position among themselves. Economically, the Kuomintang rests on the narrow base of the rural gentry-landlords, the militarists, the higher ranks of the government bureaucracy, and merchant-bankers having intimate connections with the government bureaucrats. This base has actually contracted during the war. The Kuomintang no longer commands, as it once did, the unequivocal support of China's industrialists, who as a group have been much weakened economically, and hence politically, by the Japanese seizure of the coastal cities.

The relation of this description of the Kuomintang to the questions propounded above is clear.

The Kuomintang has lost its leadership because it has lost touch with and is not longer representative of a nation which, through the practical experience of the war, is becoming both more politically conscious and more aware of the Party's selfish shortcomings.

It cannot fight an effective war because this is impossible without greater reliance upon and support by the people. There must be a release of the national energy such as occurred during the early period of the war. Under present conditions, this can be brought about only by reform of the Party and greater political democracy. What form this democracy takes is not as important as the genuine adoption of a democratic philosophy and attitude; the threat of foreign invasion is no longer enough to stimulate the Chinese people and only real reform can now regain their enthusiasm. But the growth of democracy, though basic to China's continuing war effort, would, to the mind of the Kuomintang's present leaders, imperil the foundations of the Party's power because it would mean that the conservative cliques would have to give up their closely guarded monopoly. Rather than do this, they prefer to see the war remain in its present state of passive inertia. They are thus sacrificing China's national interests to their own selfish ends.

For similar reasons, the Kuomintang is unwilling to give whole-hearted cooperation to the American Army's effort in China. Full cooperation necessarily requires the broad Chinese military effort which the Kuomintang is unable to carry out or make possible. In addition, the Kuomintang fears that large scale, widespread and direct contact by Americans with the Chinese war effort will expose its own inactivity and, by example and personal contacts, be a liberalizing influence.

The Kuomintang cannot unify the country because it derives its support from the economically and socially backward agrarian social groups. These groups are incapable of bringing about China's industrialization, although they pay this objective elaborate lip service. They are also committed to the maintenance of an order which by its very nature fosters particularism and resists modern centralization. Countless examples can be given to show the line-up of the party with the groups that oppose modernization and industrialization--such as connections with Szechwan warlords and militarists. The Kuomintang sees no objection to maintaining the economic interests of some

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of its component groups in occupied China or in preserving trade with occupied China, the criterion of which is not the national interest but its profitability to the engaging groups. This explains why Free China's imports from occupied China consist largely of luxuries, against exports of food and strategic raw materials. It is therefore not surprising that there are many links, both political and economic, between the Kuomintang and the puppet regime.

E. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure; if that failure results in a collapse of China it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our longterm interests in the Far East.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the Kuomintang under its present leadership has neither the ability nor desire to undertake a program which could energize the war and check the process of internal disintegration. Its preoccupation with the maintenance and consolidation of its power must result, to the contrary, in acceleration rather than retardation of the rate of this disintegration. Unless it widens its base and changes its character it must be expected to continue its present policies. It will not of its own volition take steps to bring about this broadening and reform. The opposite will be the case; precisely because it has lost popular support, it is redoubling its efforts to maintain and monopolize control.

The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain to fail because they run counter to strong forces within the country and are forcing China into ruin. Since these policies are not favorable to us, nor of assistance in the prosecution of an effective war by China, their failure would not of itself be disastrous to American interests. For many reasons mentioned above we might welcome the fall of the Kuomintang if it could immediately be followed by a progressive government able to unify the country and help us fight Japan.

But the danger is that the present drifting and deterioration under the Kuomintang may end in a collapse. The result would be the creation in China of a vacuum. This would eliminate any possibility in the near future of utilizing China's potential military strength. Because the Japanese and their puppets might be able to occupy this vacuum--at much less cost than by a major military campaign--it might also become impossible for us to exploit China's flank position and to continue operating from Chinese bases. The war would thus be prolonged and made more difficult.

Such a collapse would also initiate a period of internal chaos in China which would defer the emergence of a strong and stable government -- an indispensable pre-condition for stability and order in the Far East.

China, which might be a minor asset to us now, would become a major liability.

F. There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse.

These groups, all increasingly dissatisfied with the Government and the

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Party responsible for it, include:

The patriotic younger Army officers,
the small merchants,
large sections of the lower ranks of the Government bureaucracy,
most of the foreign-returned students
the intelligentsia, including professors, students and the professional classes,
the liberal elements of the Kuomintang, who make up a sizable minority under the leadership of such men as SUN Fo,
the minor parties and groups, some of which like the National Salvationists enjoy great prestige,
the Chinese Communist party, and
the inarticulate but increasingly restless rural population.

The collective numbers and influence of these groups could be tremendous. A Kuomintang official recently admitted that resentment against the present Kuomintang government is so widespread that if there were free, universal elections 80% of the votes might be cast against it. But most of these groups are nebulous and unorganized.

feeling -- like the farmers -- perhaps only a blind dislike of conditions as they are. They represent different classes and varying political beliefs -- where they have any at all. They are tending, however, to draw together in the consciousness of their common interest in the change of the status quo. This awakening and fusion is, of course, opposed by the Kuomintang with every means at its disposal.

The danger, as conditions grow worse, is that some of these groups may act independently and blindly. The effect may be to make confusion worse. Such might be the case in a military putsch -- a possibility that cannot be disregarded. The result might be something analogous to the Siam incident of 1936. But the greater delicacy and precariousness of the present situation would lend itself more easily to exploitation by the most reactionary elements of the Kuomintang, the Japanese or the puppets. Another possibility is the outbreak, on a much larger scale than heretofore, of unorganized and disruptive farmers revolts. A disturbing phenomenon is the apparent attempt now being made by some of the minority parties to effect a marriage of convenience with the provincial warlords, among the most reactionary and unscrupulous figures in Chinese politics and hardly crusaders for a new democracy.

The hopeful sign is that all of these groups are agreed that the basic problem in China today is political reform towards democracy. This point requires emphasis. It is only through political reform that the restoration of the will to fight, the unification of the country, the elimination of provincial warlordism, the solution of the Communist problem, the institution of economic policies which can avoid collapse, and the emergency of a government actually supported by the people can be achieved. Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic and political.

It is clear beyond doubt that China's hope for internal peace and effective unity -- certainly in the immediate future (which for the sake of the war must be our prior consideration) and probably in the long-term as well --

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lies neither with the present Kuomintang nor with the Communists, but in a democratic combination of the liberal elements within the country, including those within the Kuomintang, and the probably large section of the Communists who would be willing, by their own statements and past actions, to collaborate in the resurrection of a united front.

Given the known interest and attitudes of the Chinese people, we can be sure that measures to accomplish the solution of these problems will be undertaken in earnest by a broadly-based government. Such a government -- and only such a government -- will galvanize China out of its military inertia by restoring national morale through such means as the reduction of the evils of conscription and stopping the maltreatment and starvation of the troops. Such a government -- and only such a government -- will automatically end the paralyzing internal dissension and political unrest. Such a government -- and only such a government -- will undertake the economic measures necessary to increase production, establish effective price controls, mobilize national resources, and end corruption, hoarding, speculation and profiteering.

It is of course unrealistic to assume that such a broadly-based democratic government can be established at one stroke, or that it can immediately achieve the accomplishment of these broad objectives. But progress will be made as, and only as, the government moves toward democracy.

II. In the light of this developing crisis what should be the American attitude toward China?

It is impossible to predict exactly how far the present disintegration in China can continue without spectacular change in the internal situation and drastic effect on the war against Japan. But we must face the question whether we can afford passively to stand by and allow the process to continue to an almost certainly disastrous collapse, or whether we wish to do what we legitimately and practically can to arrest it. We need to formulate a realistic policy toward China.

A. The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support.

We must realize that when the process of disintegration gets out of hand it will be to us that the Kuomintang will turn for financial, political, and military salvation. The awareness of this dependence is the obvious and correct explanation of the Kuomintang's hyper-sensitivity to American opinion and criticism. The Kuomintang -- and particularly the Generalissimo -- know that we are the only disinterested, yet powerful, ally to whom China can turn.

The appeal will be made to us on many grounds beside the obvious, well-worn, but still effective one of pure sentiment. They have said in the past and will say in the future that they could long ago have made peace with Japan -- on what are falsely stated would have been favorable terms. They have claimed and will claim again that their resistance and refusal to compromise with Japan saved Russia, Great Britain and ourselves -- ignoring the truth that our own refusal to compromise with Japan to China's disadvantage brought on Pearl Harbor and our involvement before we were ready. They

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have complained and will continue to complain that they have received less support in the form of materials than any other major ally -- forgetting that they have done less fighting, have not used the materials given, and would not have had the ability to use what they asked for. Finally, they have tried and will continue to try to lay the blame on us for their difficulties -- distorting the effect of American Army expenditures in China and ignoring the fact that these expenditures are only a minor factor in the whole sorry picture of the mismanagement of the Chinese economy.

But however far-fetched these appeals, our flat refusal of them might have several embarrassing effects.

1. We would probably see China enter a period of internal chaos. Our war effort in this theater would be disrupted, instability in the Far East prolonged, and possible Russian intervention attracted.
2. We would be blamed by large sections of both Chinese and American public opinion for "abandoning" China after having been responsible for its collapse. (In a measure we would have brought such blame upon ourselves because we have tended to allow ourselves to become identified not merely with China but also with the Kuomintang and its policies. Henceforth it may be the better part of valor to avoid too close identification with the Kuomintang.)
3. By an apparent abandonment of China in its hour of need, we would lose international prestige, especially in the Far East.

On the other hand, if we come to the rescue of the Kuomintang on its own terms we would be buttressing -- but only temporarily -- a decadent regime, which by its existing

It is clear, therefore, that it is to our advantage to avoid a situation arising in which we would be presented with a Hobson's choice between two such unpalatable alternatives.

B. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence.

Circumstances are rapidly developing so that the Generalissimo will have to ask for the continuance and increase of our support. Weak as he is, he is in no position -- and the weaker he becomes the less he will be able -- to turn down or render nugatory any coordinated and positive policy we may adopt toward China. The cards are all in our favor. Our influence, intelligently used, can be tremendous.

C. There are three general alternatives open to us.

1. We may give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether.
2. We may continue to give support to the Generalissimo, when and as he asks for it.
3. We may formulate a coordinate and positive policy toward China and take the necessary steps for its implementation.

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SECRETD. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China.

The United States, if it so desired and if it had a coherent policy, could play an important and perhaps decisive role in:

1. Stimulating China to an active part in the war in the Far East, thus hastening the defeat of Japan.
2. Staving off economic collapse in China and bringing about basic political and economic reforms, thus enabling China to carry on the war and enhancing the chances of its orderly post war recovery.
3. Enabling China to emerge from the war as a major and stabilizing factor in post-war East Asia.
4. Winning a permanent and valuable ally in a progressive, independent and democratic China.

E. We should adopt the third alternative -- a coordinated and positive policy. This is clear from an examination of the background of the present situation in China and the proper objectives of our policy there.

The first alternative must be rejected on immediate military grounds -- but also for obvious long-range considerations. It would deprive us of valuable air bases and position on Japan's flank. Its adoption would prolong the war. We cannot afford to wash our hands of China.

The results of the second alternative -- which, insofar as we have a China Policy, has been the one we have been and are pursuing -- speak for themselves. The substantial financial assistance we have given China has been frittered away with negligible if any effect in slowing inflation and retarding economic collapse. The military help we have given has certainly not been used to increase China's war effort against Japan. Our political support has been used for the Kuomintang's own selfish purposes and to bolster

The third, therefore, is the only real alternative left to us. Granted the rejection of the first alternative, there is no longer a question of helping and advising China. China itself must request this help and advice. The only question is whether we give this help within a framework which makes sense, or whether we continue to give it in our present disjointed and absent-minded manner. In the past it has sometimes seemed that our right hand did not know what the left was doing. To continue without a coherent and coordinated policy will be dissipating our effort without either China or ourselves deriving any appreciable benefit. It can only continue to create new problems, in addition to those already troubling us, without any compensating advantages beyond those of indolent short-term expediency. But most important is the possibility that this haphazard giving, this serving of short-term expediency, may not be enough to save the situation: even with it, China may continue toward collapse.

F. This positive policy should be political.

The problem confronting us is whether we are to continue as in the past

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to ignore political considerations of direct military significance or whether we are to take a leaf out of the Japanese book and invoke even stronger existing political forces in China to achieve our military and long-term political objectives.

We must seek to contribute toward the reversal of the present movement toward collapse and to the rousing of China from its military inactivity. This can be brought about only by an accelerated movement toward democratic political reform within China. Our part must be that of a catalytic agent in this process of China's democratization. It can be carried out by the careful exertion of our influence, which has so far not been consciously and systematically used.

III. The implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects, is practical and can be carried out by many means.

A. Diplomatic finesse will be required in the execution of this policy in such a way as not to offend the strong current of genuine nationalism (as distinguished from the Chauvinism of the Kuomintang) which characterizes almost all sections of the Chinese people. There must be a sensitivity to the situation in China and the political changes there so that there can be an appropriate and immediate stiffening or softening of the measures which we undertake. This tact and sensitivity will be required not only of the top policy directing agency but of all other agencies actually implementing that policy and concerned in direct relations with China.

B. There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China.

The present lack of effective cooperation between the various Government agencies -- State, War and some of the newer autonomous organizations -- detracts from the efficient functioning of each, and weakens American influence when it is most needed.

It must be recognized--and it will be even more the case under the policy proposed--that all our dealings with and all our activities in China have political implication. Coordination is absolutely essential for the achievement of unity of policy and synchronization of action. Its attainment will require intelligent and forceful direction both in Washington and in Chungking.

The logical person to coordinate activities in Chungking is obviously, because of the broad issues involved, the Ambassador. Similarly the corresponding person in Washington might be the Chief of the China Section of the State Department, who would watch the whole field for the President or a responsible Cabinet member. Positive action, of course, would depend on constant and close consultation, both in Washington and in the field, between the representatives of the State, War, Navy and Treasury Departments and the other agencies operating in China.

C. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing.

Some measures will be simple and immediately useful. Others should be deferred until primary steps have been taken. Still others will be more

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forceful or direct and their use will depend on the Kuomintang's recalcitrance to change its ways. We must avoid over-playing or underplaying our hand.

D. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following:

1. Negative:

(a) Stop our present "mollycoddling" of China by: restricting Lend-Lease, cutting down training of Chinese military cadets, discontinuing training of the Chinese Army, taking a firmer stand in the financial negotiations, or stopping the shipment of gold. Any or all of these restrictive measures can be reversed as the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang become more cooperative in carrying on military operations, using equipment and training supplied, being reasonable on financial questions, or allowing us freedom in such military requirements as establishing contact with the Communist areas.

(b) Stop building up the Generalissimo's and the Kuomintang's prestige internationally and in the United States. Such "Face" serves only to bolster the regime internally and to harden it in its present policies. Our inclusion of China as one of the "Big Four" served a useful purpose in the early stage of the war and as a counter to Japanese racial propaganda but has now lost its justifications.

We make fools of ourselves by such actions as the attention given to the meaningless utterances of CHU Hsueh-fan as a spokesman of Chinese labor and the prominence accorded to China in the International Labor Office Conference. Our tendency toward overlavish praise is regarded by the Chinese as a sign of either stupidity or weakness.

Abandonment of glib generalities for hard-headed realism in our attitude toward China will be quickly understood—without the resentment that would probably be felt against the British. We can make it clear that praise will be given when praise is due.

(c) Stop making unconditional and grandiose promises of help along such lines as UNRRA, post-war economic aid, and political support. We can make it clear without having to be very explicit that we stand ready to help China when China shows itself deserving. This ties into the more positive phase of publicity and propaganda to the effect, for instance, that American post-war economic aid will not be extended to build up monopolistic enterprise or support the landlord-gentry class but in the interests of a democratic people.

(d) Discontinue our present active collaboration with Chinese secret police organizations, which support the forces of reaction and stand for the opposite of our American democratic aims and ideals. This collaboration, which results in the effective strengthening of a Gestapo-like organization, is becoming increasingly known in China. It confuses and disillusion Chinese liberals, who look to us as their hope, and it weakens our position with the Kuomintang leaders in pressing for democratic reform.

2. Positive:

(a) High Government officials in conversations with Chinese leaders in Washington and in China can make known our interest in democracy and unity in China and our dissatisfaction with present Kuomintang military, financial and other policies. Such suggestions will bear great weight if they come from the President and advantage can be taken of opportunities such as the

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visits of Vice President Wallace to China and J.H. King to the United States. A progressive stage can be questions or statements by members of Congress regarding affairs in China.

(b) We should take up the repeated--but usually insincere--requests of the Kuomintang for advice. If advisors are asked for, we should see that they are provided, that good men are selected, and that they get all possible aid and support from us. While the Kuomintang will be reluctant to accept the advice we may give, its mere reiteration will have some effect.

(c) We should seek to extend our influence on Chinese opinion by every practical means available.

The Office of War Information should go beyond its present function of reporting American war news to pointing up the values of democracy as a permanent political system and as an aid in the waging of war against totalitarianism. We should attempt to increase the dissemination in China, by radio or other more direct means, of constructive American criticism. This should include recognition and implied encouragement to liberal and progressive forces within China. Care should be taken to keep this criticism on a helpful, constructive and objective plane and to avoid derogatory attacks which may injure Chinese nationalistic sensitivities. To do this work, there may have to be some expansion of the O.W.I. in China and of our propaganda directed toward this country.

A second line is the active expansion of our cultural relations program. The present diversion--by Kuomintang wishes--to technical subjects should be rectified and greater emphasis laid on social sciences, cultural, and practical political subjects such as American government administration. We should increase our aid and support to intellectuals in China by the many means already explored, such as aid to research in China, translation of articles, and opportunities for study or lecturing in the United States.

Other, more indirect lines, are the expansion of our American Foreign Service representation in China to new localities (since each office is in some measure a center of American influence and contact with Chinese liberals and returned students from the United States) and the careful indoctrination of the American Army personnel in China to create, by example and their attitude toward Chinese, favorable impressions of America and the things that America stands for. Where contact between American and Chinese military personnel has been close, as in Burma, the result has apparently been a democratizing influence.

(d) We should assist the education of public opinion in the United States toward a realistic but constructively sympathetic attitude toward China. The most obvious means would be making background information available, in an unofficial way, to responsible political commentators, writers and research workers. Without action on our part, their writings will become known to Chinese Government circles and from them to other politically minded groups. We should, however, coordinate this with the activity described in the section above to promote dissemination in China.

(e) We should maintain friendly relations with the liberal elements in the Kuomintang, the minor parties, and the Communists. This can--and should for its maximum effect--be done in an open above-board manner. The recognition which it implies will be quickly understood by the Chinese.

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Further steps in this direction could be publicity to liberals, such as distinguished intellectuals. When possible they may be included in consideration for special honors or awards, given recognition by being asked to participate in international commissions or other bodies, and invited to travel or lecture in the United States. Every effective action of this type would be in an invitation to Madame Sun Yat-sen from the White House.

We should select men of known liberal views to represent us in OWI, cultural relations, and other lines of work in China.

(f) We should continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists. This includes contact with the Communist representatives in Chungking, publicity on the blockade and the situation between the two parties, and continued pressure for the dispatch of observers to North China. At the same time we should stress the importance of North China militarily--for intelligence regarding Japanese battle order, Japanese air strength, whether reporting bombing data and damage assessment, and air crew evasion and rescue work. We should consider the eventual advance of active operations against the Japanese to North China and the question of assistance to or cooperation with Communist and guerrilla forces. If our reasonable requests based on urgent military grounds do not receive a favorable response, we should send our military observers anyway.

(g) We should consider the training and equipping of Provincial or other armies in China in cases where we can be satisfied that they will fight the Japanese.

(h) We should continue to press--and if necessary insist--on getting American observers to the actual fighting fronts. We should urge, and when possible assist, the improvement of the condition of the Chinese soldier, especially his treatment, clothing, feeding, and medical care.

(i) We should publicize statements by responsible government officials indicating our interest in Chinese unity and our attitude toward such questions as the use of American lend-lease supplies by the Kuomintang in a civil war. It is interesting, for instance, that Under-Secretary Welles' letter to Browder regarding American interest in Chinese unity was considered so important by the Kuomintang that publication in China was prohibited.

This program, is, of course, far from complete. Other measures will occur to the policy agency and will suggest themselves as the situation in China develops.

1. Most of these measures can be applied progressively.

This is true, for instance, of the various negative actions suggested, and of the conversations, statements, and other lines of endeavor to influence public opinion in China. A planned activity of encouragement and attention to liberals, Minor Party leaders, and the Communists can advance.

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F. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner.

What is needed chiefly is an integration, systematic motivation and planned expansion of activities in which we are already, perhaps in some cases unconsciously, engaged. We do, for instance, try to maintain contact with a liberal group; we have expressed the desire to send observers to the Communist area; we have a weak cultural relations program; and the OWI has made some attempts to propagandize American democratic ideals.

G. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs.

It must be admitted that some of the measures proposed would involve taking more than normal interest in the affairs of another sovereign nation. But they do not go so far as to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. If we choose to make lend-lease conditional on a better war effort by China, it is also China's freedom to refuse to accept it on these conditions. We do not go nearly as far as imperialistic countries have often done in the past. We obviously do not, for instance, suggest active assistance or subsidizing of rival parties to the Kuomintang -- as the Russians did in the case of the Communists.

Furthermore, the Chinese Government would find it difficult to object. The Chinese have abused their freedom to propagandize in the United States by the statements and writings of such men as Lin Yu-tang. They have also, and through Lin Yu-tang, who carries an official passport as a representative of the Chinese Government, engaged in "cultural relations" work. They have freely criticized American policies and American leaders. And they have attempted to dabble in American politics -- through Madame Chiang, Luce, Wilkie, and Republican congressmen. They have had and will continue to have freedom to try to influence public opinion in the United States in the same way that we will try to do it in China.

TO: Judge N. F. Allman August 9, 1944

FROM: Hugh W. Bradley

SUBJECT: Comments on Memorandum on China

I.
 A. Situation in China rapidly becoming critical

Writer fails to mention that the East being what it is, home of compromise, the Japanese expected, prior to outbreak of Pacific War, that some form of compromise agreement between Chungking, Nanking and Japan would finally be reached. Definite steps in this direction had been taken, comprising formation of a third Chinese party. As long ago as spring of 1941 I was approached in Macao by a former official of the Salt Gabelle who informed me in above sense and said that various high officials not then definitely committed to either Chungking or Nanking were about to "come out" - from temporary private life. These officials were to announce such a third party, invite higher personages of the rival regimes to step aside, and make suitable oriental provision for high honorable posts for both Chiang Kai Shek and Wang Ching Wei. The object of the visit to myself was to sound me out as to my willingness to accept appointment from such third party as I.C. of Customs for South Central, South and South East China. In other words, southern rather than northern Chinese influence was indicated.

B. Generally concur. Writer, however, seemingly overlooks, or is unaware, that the writ of Central Government - and of General Chiang Kai Shek - has always been weak in southern areas. For example, a special proclamation of General Chiang, enjoining compliance with Central Government Customs rules on imports was valueless unless supported by a corresponding proclamation of the local general.

Can specially support statements regarding Generalissimo's leanings toward Chen brothers, termed "reactionary and unpopular." It is to be remembered, however, that Generalissimo's knowledge of English is practically "nil" and his acquaintance with foreign countries a minus quantity. The same holds true in cases of many of his personal friends of long standing. Also, many Chinese of both older and younger schools are definitely opposed to different manifestations of "modern" (European-American) life, e.g. semi-European dress, mixed parties involving drinking, eccentric dances, etc.. I have been personally told by a private secretary of a Provincial Governor (the secretary was a returned student from America) that, after the war, a sound knowledge of Chinese and careful use of Chinese clothes would be much more valuable in official life than a seeming veneer of western education.

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I.
 C. Concur in toto.

Throughout China, and in all Government schools, communistic literature is widely read. I have heard Chinese officers - at parties where wine was a motivating force - denounce the Kung predominance and hint at drastic remedial measures as soon as the war was over.

Conscription laws in China are largely a farce. It is still the poor farmer or coolie who is caught in the drag-net.

F. Concur.

II.

It is pertinent to point out that China has definitely become a U. S. "baby". The British have never been entirely carried away by Chinese propaganda and are generally sceptical of Chinese ability to maintain internal unity after the war. They have been irked by the flood of advice as to how to deal with India in particular and Asiatics in general. They will not throw sand in any machinery we may see fit to employ to solve the China problem as a whole. Neither will they be quick to acknowledge that such machinery is effective. Their policy will be "wait and see." Meanwhile they will devote attention to what, for them, are more urgent matters.

The Russians are under no Chinese illusions whatsoever. Their Asiatic experience covers more than a thousand years and many Russians in high position are Asiatic or semi-Asiatic. They are well acquainted with the Eastern law that applies from coolies up to Governments: "beat or be beaten." Temporarily, they may be in a frame of mind to allow words and theories to have a brief inning. But if China does fall into confusion it is very likely that Russia has its own plans of direct action to meet that situation.

Hugh K. Bradley

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DATE 8-15-44

TO: _____

I believe that Col Burtok, Mr. Cheston, and General Donovan may be interested in the attached.

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SECRETAMERICAN PROPAGANDA AND POLICY IN UNOCCUPIED CHINA

Judging from evidence in the public sources of information in provincial China--the basis of judgement for most of the interested Chinese in unoccupied territory--American attitude and policy towards China remain as follows: our attitude is one of great and unquestioning admiration because of the seven years of resistance, and our policy is summed up in the promise that because of past performance America is going to give China everything she needs, not only to drive out the Japanese but to build herself into a major postwar power.

With the attitude and policy I have no quarrel. The seven years' resistance is indeed admirable and the strengthening of China must be a basic point in any practical and decent American plan for an early Japanese defeat and a successful peace in the Orient.

I would like to submit, however, that the way in which our attitude and policy are now being presented to the Chinese public is not only unhelpful to our aims, but is actually detrimental, both to ourselves and to China.

The present Chinese attitude to the war is a mixture of passive--spectator's--interest in the war outside China, plus great boredom with--and indifference to--the war inside China. This attitude was evident even before the Pacific war, with more and more attention and energy draining away from the unwanted local war, turning back toward private and special interests. After the Pacific War began, the assumption arose that because of the years of single-handed war, China could now sit back and passively wait for victory and its benefits; interests and energies turned farther away from China's own war. Recently, since the news for the Allies has become so much better and the increase of American strength in China has been generally realized, confidence in a victory won without our aid is the predominant idea in Chinese war-opinion.

That our role had become that of a spectator is an actual choice because a spectator to the war is not a participant. The fact that the country must almost certainly lose the war makes it a serious handicap to her Allies. The difficulties the American Army has already had with private and special interests who attempt to exploit and sabotage the effort to build up American strength in China are only a foretaste of what can occur if the attitude is allowed to continue.

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Present American propaganda policies of unqualified praise and unqualified promises for China not only allow, but have been an important factor in building up, Chinese complacency with its attendant disadvantages. By overemphasis on our own strength and goodwill, we are working directly counter to what must be our primary aim in China--the development of the country into a useful partner against Japan and a responsible ally after the war.

Not only are we cutting down the amount of practical cooperation we can get for the war, but we are harming China by contributing to the impression that China need not trouble too much over her military, economic and political weaknesses, because her difficulties will all be solved by what she gets from us after the war. We are also fostering a type of chauvinistic national conceit, and a confident expectation of unearned postwar benefits, which can make China a difficult neighbor in the postwar period.

I do not know why we adopted such a policy but suppose it was in the belief that China needed great encouragement if she was to continue the war, also assuagement because of previous American aid to Japan. It is not necessary to continue it for either reason. The Chinese are thoroughly convinced that the Allies will win and only a major Japanese offensive in China or economic collapse could force them off the bandwagon--both those eventualities are pretty well out of propaganda's field of remedy. Our main problem now is how to help make the most effective use of China for the common aim of our two countries.

To that end, I would like to suggest three ways in which our propaganda be modified or stiffened, or just made to stick closer to the facts.

1.) Frank definition of America's aim in the war in the Orient

Until we have some specific statement about post-war aims to clarify future intentions, we should make it plain that we are fighting out here, not primarily to "help China", but to defeat Japan. This is the first step in putting Sino-American relations on a realistic basis of mutual self-interest, the first step in clearing the air of vague talk about international admiration and future amity and in getting down to specific discussion about present-day cooperation.

Our present mealy-mouthedness on this subject can be--and is--used against us by the enemy since

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it is obvious that if we were willing to go to war to "help China", we would have been fighting years before Pearl Harbor. There is very little the enemy propagandists can do with the flat statement that we are fighting to defeat Japan, particularly as the physical evidence of our intention accumulates. Admittedly this makes a negative political line for us, but I do not see how the present unexpressed state of our post-war intentions allows us any other accurate one.

2.) Franker and fuller treatment of American policy in waging the war in the Orient, particularly of policy affecting China

I base this suggestion on the assumption that American policy must veer away from that of pampering China, or special groups in China, as soon as increased American military activity in this country makes increased practical cooperation more urgent.

The recent agreement whereby the American Army was allowed to stop paying for its purchases in gold at the official exchange rate seems to have been a step in this direction, and the complete silence in the Chinese-language press concerning it is an example of the kind of news treatment it would be desirable to avoid. I know nothing of the details or background of this agreement but cannot imagine how a well-planned coverage of the news that the American army in China had finally been put on a more sensible financial basis could be anything but good news for both China and America. It would certainly have provided a good means of indicating to the Chinese public that there will be more to winning this war than actual combat, that the cooperation expected of China will take many forms.

From what I have learned of the opinions of American civil and military officials in China, a good deal of consideration is now being given, at least in official circles, to the handicaps the military, economic, and political situations in China offer to offset her geographic advantage as the most convenient route for the attack on Japan. In contrast, our propaganda gives no inkling that anything is contemplated except a landing in China, to "help China", and drive the Japanese all out of the country. Mention of some of these things would have a salutary effect on the current complacency. I think confidence in our victory is certainly

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great enough to prevent any bad effect resulting from such news.

3.) Fuller and more carefully-presented coverage of American military activity in this theatre

This requires not only a changed policy, but a new type of material since there is nothing at present which could be called an American coverage of the subject for China. The only news available are the official communiques which are incomplete, delayed and poorly-presented, and occasional stories from the foreign correspondents, written for the home audience. Some of the American news in China and a good deal of it from Burma is put out as "Allied activity" by Central News, the Kuemintang agency, whose policy in presentation is not to our best interest since it tends to increase rather than modify complacence about China's prospects during and after the war.

A full coverage of American activity in this theatre, presenting the background as well as the high-lights, the difficulties as well as the achievements, offers an excellent means whereby we can attack that complacence, and possibly even reactivate real interest in the local aspect of the war. It can at least present to the Chinese public a clearer picture of what kind of a war this is, what it will take to win it, and what China's part in it should be.

May 24, 1944.

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109 TO STEVENS. INFORMATION: HEPNER.

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GILBERT'S OTHER QUESTION.

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TOD: 1643 17 AUGUST 45

WJD

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INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 15 AUGUST 45

FROM	MAWOI, CHUNGKING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRIORITY <input type="checkbox"/> ROUTINE <input type="checkbox"/> DEFERRED
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	
DISTRIBUTION		

IN 21643

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

FIELD SECTION

*Presently
26.01.1
10.20 ✓*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87403-2

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SECRET

SECRET

#2417. CHUNGKING-WASHINGTON.
#5997. CHUNGKING-KUJUNG, N.C.

STEVEN TO 109 AND WILSON; INFORMATION: HEPNER.

RODNEY GILBERT REQUESTS I SEND YOU THE FOLLOWING:
 *HOLLINGTON TONG HAS LEARNED FROM GEVETH-13D1MOS (SIC) CHOLF
 SECRETARY THAT K.C. WU APPOINTMENT MINISTRY INFORMATION CERTAIN
 AND IMMINEANT ALSO THAT WU WILL CHANGE VICE MINISTER. HOLLINGTON
 TONG THEREFORE PREPARING GET OUT SO SCHOOL JOURNALISM SHORTLY UNDER
 UNKNOWN PROBABLY UNFRIENDLY CONTROL. OTHER CONDITIONS BEING
 ADVERSE, I THEREFORE UIGE THAT SCHOOL BE GIVEN QUIETUS BEFORE WU'S
 APPOINTMENT PUBLISHED SO THAT WITHDRAWAL SUPPORT OBVIOUSLY NOT
 ON PERSONAL GROUNDS. I REQUEST YOU INFORM ACKERMAN DIRECTING HIM
 AUTHORIZE ME, BEFORE AUGUST 19 TO ANNOUNCE 'UNDEFINITE SUSPENSION'
 SCHOOL ON GROUNDS WAR'S END, AND INEVITABLE SHIFTS GOVERNMENT AND
 POPULATION. PLEASE BE SURE THIS IS TAKEN CARE OF PROMPTLY AS IT IS
 ESSENTIAL WE HAVE WORD BY 19TH. NEW SUBJECT: RE GILBERT HIMSELF.
 WILSON WILL REMEMBER GILBERT SPOKE TO HIM ABOUT HIS WIFE AND
 DAUGHTER GETTING TO SWITZERLAND. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE, GILBERT
 WILLING TO STAY ON HERE UP TO 6 MONTHS TO DO WORK FOR OSS IF OSS
 NEEDS HIM, OTHERWISE HE WILL RETURN HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE NEXT
 MONTH. PLEASE ADVISE.

Coolley handling

TOR: 0848 15 AUGUST 45

COPY

SECRET

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10,302

OSS Form 64 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 2 AUGUST 1945

REC'D

1239 2 AUG 45

TO SEE BELOW

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DEFERRED
BOOK MESSAGE
2 STATIONS

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

FIELD SECTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SHEPARDSON, LMG RUDER.

J. W. ... School of

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-47888-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

- #21627. CHAFX, KUNMING. (OUT 19013)
- #17817. MAWOL, CHUNGKING. (OUT 19014)

ED WILSON FROM SHEPARDSON AND COOLEY.

SECRET

MESSAGE RECEIVED BY ACKERMAN FROM TONO PROTESTS TRANSFER OF SCHOOL, CITING COMMITMENTS MADE BY LATTER BASED ON ASSURANCES BY FORMER. GILBERT PROPOSES TO DISCUSS WITH 109. WE AND ACKERMAN AWAIT WORD FROM YOU.

IF ARRANGEMENTS ARRIVED AT BY YOU ON SUBJECT OF SCHOOL PERMIT, ACKERMAN REQUESTS YOU CONSIDER GIVING ROBERT A RIDE HOME WITH YOU.

SECRET

TOD: 1636 2 AUG. 45

FILE COPY

WHS;JC JC
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 18 JULY 1945

FROM MAW01, CHUNGKING

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 1949

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

Journalism 10322 ✓ 7. Section

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37813-2

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SECRET

~~SECRET~~

#2097 CHUNGKING-WASHINGTON,

#1117 CHUNGKING-KUNMING.

HEPPNER TO 109.

AT A CONFERENCE TODAY GENERAL OLMSTEAD SAID THAT IT WAS THE THEATER'S HOPE AND DESIRE THAT WE DO NOT CONTINUE WITH THE JOURNALISM SCHOOL PROJECT NOR RETURN TO THE CHINA THEATER THE 3 INDIVIDUALS NOW ENROUTE TO THE STATES.

AWs - have Ed Wilson follow up on this. We want to recover funds if W.D. approved cancellation

TOR: 0857 18 JULY 1945

SECRET

SECRET

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WILL THE FOLLOWING
PLEASE SIGN BELOW

GENERAL DONOVAN

✓ MR. CHESTON

✓ COLONEL BUXTON ✓

✓ LT. PUTCELL ✓

✓ LT. THRUN

✓ MR. SULLOWAY -

Col. Doring

SECRET

ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATION

Originator _____ 10,302
Date _____
Addressee _____
Date Rec'd _____

Subject _____

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
		Rec'd	Pwd'd		
Chas R. Chatham		6/29	6/29	[Signature]	
				P	
				PC	
				S	

1151051

FORM 100 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 28 JUNE 45

FROM

CHAFX, KUNMING

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 17157

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

SI

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, MAGRUDER, FIELD SECTION.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87488-9

SECRET

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#14607. KUNMING TO WASHINGTON.
8897. KUNMING TO CHUNGKING.

SECRET

HEPPNER TO KNOLLENBERG. INFORMATION: WHITTAKER.

VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN YOUR #17359 (OUT 15048). THE PROBLEMS WHICH PRESENT THEMSELVES ARE THE FOLLOWING: SINCE BAKER AND HIS ONLY COMPETENT ASSISTANTS HAVE BEEN PROMISED US VACATIONS, GILBERT IS LEFT ALONE AND HE WILL BE ABSENT MORE OFTEN THAN NOT. TO USE STEVENS TO ASSIST WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN BLOWING COVER.

IT MAY BE THAT THE THING TO DO IS APPROACH TONG, FRANKLY REQUESTING THAT HE SEND REPORTERS INTO THE FIELD FOR PURPOSES YOU DESIRE. HE MAY OBJECT BECAUSE HE FEARS CROSSING UP TAI LI OR BECAUSE THESE STUDENTS ARE SECRETLY TRAINED AND EARMARKED FOR KUOMINTANG PROPAGANDA AFTER AMERICAN LANDINGS.

IF YOU AGREE, I THINK BEST THING WOULD BE TO AWAIT IMMINEENT ARRIVAL OF 109 WHO COULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH TONG PERSONALLY.

SECRET

TOR: 1010

28 JUNE 45

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FILE COPY

WILL THE FOLLOWING
PLEASE SIGN BELOW

GENERAL DONOVAN

MR. CHESTON

COLONEL BUXTON

LT. PUTZELL ✓

LT. THRUN ✓

MR. SULLOWAY

Col. Darling

OSR FORM NO. 4000
(REV. 1/4/45)

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE: 21		ACCESSION NO.:	out 15041
ADDRESSED TO: <i>Personnel</i>		ACCESSION DATE: <i>June 25</i>	
DOCUMENT DATE: <i>June 24, 1945</i>		OFFICE OR BRANCH: <i>Branch</i>	
DOCUMENT NO.: <i>97359</i>	COPY NO.: <i>3</i>	LOGGED BY: <i>James J. [unclear]</i>	
NO. OF PAGES: <i>1</i>	ATTACHMENTS: <i>none</i>		

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the space provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____, Courier Receipt No. _____
(branch or office)

	REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
		SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE	TIME
1.	TSCO	<i>R. [unclear]</i>	6/26	9:00	<i>SP</i>	6/26	8:15
2.		<i>Charles G. Chaston</i>	6/26	14:30	<i>CC</i>	6/26	17:30
3.		<i>RT</i>	6/26	17:20	<i>RT</i>	6/27	14:30
4.		<i>[unclear]</i>	6/27	15:40	<i>[unclear]</i>	6/27	15:50
5.		<i>[unclear]</i>	6/27	16:45	<i>[unclear]</i>	6/27	File
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							
11.	TSCO						

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Office Courier to the next TSCO listed on the salmon routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____, Courier Receipt No. _____
(branch or office)

(41467)

TOP SECRET

Form 68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 24 JUNE 1945

REC'D

1438 24 JUNE 45

TO SEE BELOW

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

BOOK MESSAGE
2 STATIONS

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

31(1-2)

DIRECTOR(3-4) MAGRUDER(5)
FIELD SECTION(6)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87488-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

TOP SECRET

#17359: TO CHAFX, KUNMING. (OUT-150,6)
#13759: TO MAWOL, CHUNGKING. (OUT-150,7)

TOP SECRET

KNOLLENBERG TO WHITAKER AND HEPNER ONLY.

WE WISH TO INCREASE INTELLIGENCE FLOW FROM CORNET. BELIEVE THIS COULD BE DONE BY USING CHUNGKING REPORTER AS COVER. STUDENT OR GRADUATE REPORTERS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO TURN IN STORIES AND DOCUMENTS. AS WITH ANY PAPER, MUCH MORE RECEIVED THAN PUBLISHED. RESIDUE SHOULD PROVIDE MUCH VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE. 2 MAIN SOURCES WOULD BE FROM INTERVIEWS IN CHUNGKING OF PERSONS COMING THERE AND FROM REPORTERS IN FIELD. IN ADDITION TO PATRIOTIC URGE, SUGGEST SMALL SCHOLARSHIPS TO INDUCE STUDENTS TO GO INTO FIELD. BUDGET FOR 1945-46 PROVIDES \$5,000 FOR SCHOLARSHIPS. TONG EXPECTED TO USE THIS TO SEND STUDENTS TO STATES BUT UNDERSTAND GENERALISSIMO FROZEN SUCH. BEFORE HE CHANGES HIS MIND AND AS ALTERNATIVE TO SAVE TONG'S FACE, SUGGEST THIS MONEY BE USED FOR FIELD SCHOLARSHIPS. EAGER STUDENTS REMAIN AND WORK IN CHINA.

ACKERMAN WILLING TO MAKE THE \$5,000 AVAILABLE THROUGH US TO BAKER OR OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNEL PROVIDED MONEY USED FOR FIELD SCHOLARSHIPS. WILL ALSO PAY TONG \$5,000 IN JUNE INSTEAD OF JULY, AS ORIGINALLY PROMISED, FOR FIRST INSTALLMENT SCHOOL EXPENSES. ACKERMAN HAS ACTUALLY DEPOSITED \$10,000 WITH US WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU WHEN REQUESTED.

ACKERMAN FEELS GILBERT ONLY MAN IN CHINA ABLE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT ABOVE DESCRIBED INTELLIGENCE FLOW. FEELS THAT GILBERT HAS SUCH CONFIDENCE IN YOU THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO INDUCE HIM TO DO JOB. BELIEVE THIS WORK WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH GILBERT'S

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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TOP SECRET

FORM 89A

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO:

DATE 24 JUNE 45

TOP SECRET

TRANSMIT

TOP SECRET

NO WORK. MANN APPRISED OF PROPOSITION AND SUGGESTS STEVENS ALSO MIGHT HELP WITH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.

GIVE US YOUR COMMENTS OR PROCEED WITH PROPOSITION AND ADVISE.

FROM WILSON: ABOVE APPROVED BY 109 WHO PROBABLY THOUGHT IT HAD BEEN SENT BEFORE HE CABLED IN ANSWER YOUR #7257*. 109 NOW IN EUROPE. KNOELLEBERG MESSAGE DELAYED FOR CLEARANCE ALL INTERESTED PARTIES. 109 ADVISED ME THAT HE HAD MADE FULL DIS- CLOSURE TO WEDEMEYER OF SCHOOL AND ITS CONNECTION WITH OSS. \$60,000 FOR NEXT SCHOOL YEAR ALREADY PAID AND WILL NOT COME OUT YOUR NEW BUDGET. HOWEVER, THIS CONTEMPLATES ARMY TRANS- PORTATION FOR 3 MEN. COULDN'T THEY COME TO STATES BY AIR AND RETURN BY SEA, STARTING IN TIME TO BE IN CHINA FOR FALL TERM? IF SO, ORDERS SHOULD SO PROVIDE.

*KUNMING-WASHINGTON #13887 (IN-16594)

TOO:1057 24 JUNE 45

INITIALS: OGD EGW

TOP SECRET

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COPY # 1

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Tel. # 17-35-9 for
Kunsming
to Mrs Jenks

088
Form 60 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 21 JUNE 45

FROM CHAFX, KUNMING

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 16594

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(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

See memo to Sec of State

10,802

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57888-9

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SECRET

#13227. KUNMING-WASHINGTON.
#7197. KUNMING-CHUNGKING.

HEPPNER TO 109.

SECRET

SUBJECT IS GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM CHUNGKING. GENERAL WEDMEYER HAS STATED HE WILL AUTHORIZE AIR TRANSPORT TO US FOR 3 MEN CONCERNED BUT DUE TO OVERHEAVY COMMITMENTS CANNOT AND WILL NOT AUTHORIZE A ROUND TRIP BY AIR. WITHOUT MEANING TO BE PRESUMPTIOUS, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THIS FURNISHES A SPLENDID OUT FOR THE WHOLE PROJECT WHICH FROM MY OWN OBSERVATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS OF OTHERS INTERESTED HAS PRODUCED NOTHING TANGIBLE FOR OSS OR THE US WAR EFFORT. WHETHER IT HAS HAD ANY INTANGIBLE EFFECTS ON SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO STATE. (AGAIN WITHOUT MEANING TO BE PRESUMPTIOUS I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT I AM VERY CONCERNED OVER THE CHINA THEATER BUDGET FOR COMING YEAR AND HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING SOME SLEEPLESS NIGHTS WORRYING ABOUT WHETHER WE CAN CARRY OUT THE PROGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN SET FOR US FOR COMING YEAR.) NONE OF FOREGOING APPLIES TO RODNEY GILBERT WHO IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB ON BAMBOO PROJECT. WHEN YOU READ THE REPORT OF ITS RESULTS I KNOW YOU WILL BE DELIGHTED. FINALLY, IN RETURNING THESE 3 MEN WE COULD WITH DIFFICULTY HAVE THEM TRANSPORTED FREE AS ADJUNTS OF ARMY PROVIDING WE MAKE A FULLER DISCLOSURE AND JUSTIFICATION TO THEATER HEADQUARTERS. DO YOU THINK THIS DESIRABLE OR WOULD YOU RATHER PAY THE COST OF THEIR TRANSPORT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE STRINGENCY OF OUR FINANCES BETWEEN NOW AND END OF FISCAL YEAR.

TOR: 1352

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Form 48 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

1209 18 JUNE 1945

DATE

18 JUNE 1945

REC'D

TO

SEE BELOW

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

BOOK MESSAGE
2 STATIONS

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

General School
10/30/45

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27808-1

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SECRET

SECRET

#13067. MAWOT; CHUNGKING (OUT 1444)
#18667. CHAFX, KUNMING (OUT 1445)

109 TO HEPPNER ONLY.

WILL YOU PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO WEDEMEYER PERSONALLY: WHEN I WAS IN CHUNGKING I TALKED WITH RICHARD BAKER, ANTHONY DRALLE AND FLOYD D. ROGERS WHO ARE LOCATED AT THE CHUNGKING PRESS SCHOOL. I BELIEVE THAT THE WORK THEY ARE DOING IS SIGNIFICANT AND A DISTINCT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR EFFORT. I BELIEVE THAT AS IT PROCEEDS IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AND I AM STRONGLY CONVINCED THAT IT CAN BE MORE PRECISELY DIRECTED TOWARD THE COMMON GOOD. WHEN I TALKED WITH THESE MEN WE EXCHANGED THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD RETURN HERE AT THE END OF THE TERM JUNE 30 AND THEN RETURN TO THE THEATER ON SEPTEMBER 15. I WOULD OF COURSE ADVISE YOU OF THE PROGRESS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM HERE. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I DISCUSSED THIS PROJECT WITH YOU ON MY LAST VISIT BUT IT IS TOO MUCH TO HOPE THAT YOU CHARGED YOUR MEMORY WITH MY STATEMENT THAT I HAD TOLD THESE MEN THEY COULD COME HOME FOR A REST IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR THAT REASON I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT TRANSPORTATION IS BUT I THINK THIS STEP WOULD BE WELL WORTH TAKING AND WOULD JUSTIFY THE SPACE GIVEN. SINCE IT WOULD NOT ONLY ENABLE THESE MEN TO RECOVERATE BUT WOULD COMPLETELY REVITALIZE THE EFFORTS OF THE SCHOOL.

TOD: 1405 18 JUNE 1945

WJD/EGW

SECRET

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10,302A

General Baker, Richmond T
X. Baker, Richmond T

7 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : General Donovan
FROM : Commander B. W. Antell, PFB
SUBJECT: Mrs. Marjorie Coleman Baker

1. Mrs. Baker's appointment has been processed up to the point of requesting her to report for duty. This appointment was in terms of a secretarial position in Chungking in which she was interested. In view of the current freeze on the sending of women to China, she was informed on 6 June that her case would be referred to your office for advice. It was suggested to her that she might enter on duty in Washington to wait further developments. This seemed inadvisable since she has a good position in New York City. Her husband is expected to leave China for the United States late in June and is expected to return to China in the autumn.

2. Please advise.

B. W. Antell
Lieut. Commander, USNR
Personnel Procurement Branch

Form 66 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 6 APRIL 1945 REC'D 1114 7 APR 45

TO SEE BELOW

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

BOOK MESSAGE
2 STATIONS

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

Jaworski, School # 10,302
DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37801-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#5627. MAW01, CHUNGKING (OUT: 8296)

#9247. CHAFX, KUNMING (OUT: 8297)

HEPPNER FROM 109. REFERENCE YOUR #1447 (IN: 9258).

RE YOUR 1447 THE TERMS OUTLINED BY ACKERMAN ARE THOSE TO WHICH I AGREED. PLEASE ASSURE ALL CONCERNED THAT THEY WILL BE CARRIED OUT.

TOD: 1225 7 APRIL 1945

WJD

SECRET

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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201 million

753 South

answered

Next -

*he should reply
to this at once.*

*Whitney Stephenson
should be informed.*

*In substance -
this is what I need to
to and from communit.*

*Letter
referred
to for
information
to be
provided
of
reference
to
answers.*

*Mr. Parker should
be taken care of as
provided and her
letter upheld to be
I love. S. D. J*

ORR Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

Journalism School

DATE 4 APRIL 45

FROM MAWOT, CHUNGKING

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 9258

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57989-9

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

Journalism School
SECRET SECRET

#1447. DEAN ACKERMAN TO 109.

AFTER CONFERENCE WITH GILBERT, I WISH TO SUBMIT FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE AND CONFIRMATION, BEFORE I LEAVE APRIL 10, SO I CAN MAKE COMMITMENTS HERE AND AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

REGRET GILBERT'S WITHDRAWAL, BUT AM SATISFIED HE WILL REMAIN AS UNSALARIED DEAN-COUNSELOR. OUR PROFESSORS WILLING REMAIN 3RD YEAR AND COLUMBIA DESIRES CONTINUE ITS RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPERVISION UNTIL JUNE 30 NEXT YEAR, SUBJECT TO ANOTHER RENEWAL IF YOU WISH.

FOR NEW YEAR WE WILL REQUIRE \$60,000 PAYABLE TREASURER, COLUMBIA. OF THIS SUM \$25,000 WILL BE FOR SALARIES FOR 11 PROFESSORS. RECOMMEND TONG RECEIVE \$25,000 PAYABLE AS FOLLOWS: \$5,000 DEPOSITED IN NEW YORK FOR SCHOLARSHIPS FOR GRADUATES OF CHUNGKING SCHOOL AND \$20,000 IN CURRENCY PAYABLE TO GILBERT IN 4 INSTALLMENTS AUGUST 1ST, NOVEMBER 1ST, FEBRUARY 1ST AND APRIL 1ST. BALANCE WILL COVER NEW YORK ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES OF \$6,000 AND CHUNGKING EXPENSES OF \$4,000.

I WILL RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT BUTLER BE APPOINTED (SIC) ASSISTANT DEAN AND ACADEMIC PROMOTIONS TO ASSOCIATE PROFESSORSHIPS FOR BAKER, DRAILLE, ROGERS. BAKER WILL BECOME ADMINISTRATIVE HEAD. I UNDERSTAND YOU WILL PROVIDE AIR TRANSPORTATION AT YOUR EXPENSE FROM HERE TO NEW YORK AND RETURN FOR BAKER, DRAILLE, ROGERS BEGINNING ABOUT JULY 1ST AND ENDING ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15TH.

IF YOU APPROVE, PLEASE ADVISE YOUR SUBORDINATES SO THAT COLUMBIA WILL BE PROTECTED IN OUR COMMITMENTS.

RECEIVED AS DEAN COUNSELOR
RECEIVED AS SCHOLARSHIPS

TOR: 0008 4 APR 45 FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR DISSEMINATE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

156 FORM 2102

FROM

May Lee

SECRET

Needell
Rush

ROUTING AND RECORDS SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
<i>May Lee</i>	<i>4780</i>			<i>DL</i>	<i>100 - 1000</i>
<i>Ac Bon</i>	<i>SAPR 8</i>			<i>MMB</i>	
<i>G. Brown</i>				<i>RT</i>	<i>By Council</i>
<i>W. L. Wilson</i>				<i>FW</i>	<i>See letter - sent to</i>
<i>1st Col</i>					<i>Gilbert's letter will</i>
<i>4/10</i> <i>Little MD</i>		<i>4/10</i>	<i>4/10</i>	<i>SPC</i>	<i>be returned to</i>
<i>Mrs</i> <i>O'Donnell</i>					


Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20040) =

SECRET

11/19/49
To:

Major Lee



CONFIDENTIAL

10.302.
Journalists
x China.
x Columbia Univ.

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATER

A.P.O. 879
17 March 45

SUBJECT : School of Journalism.

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

1. I send you herewith a letter dated March 11th from Mr. Rodney Gilbert discussing the present situation with reference to the School of Journalism, and the progress that is being made on the Bamboo plan - now known as the Denver plan. Gilbert is anxious that you be kept currently advised of the circumstances surrounding both operations.

Handled
of 27 -
4/1/45

2. Also enclosed is a letter to Mrs. Richard Baker which is to be mailed to her. In it Baker refers to the staff meeting with you and more particularly to the matter of a furlough home this summer and your assurances that if Mrs. Baker was found qualified and passed our security, aptitude, and evaluation tests, we could (and would) use her in the Far East - preliminarily in Kandy or Northern India and eventually here.

3. It appears from Baker's letter that he understood our personnel people would get in touch with her, but nothing has happened so that he is now suggesting she approach O.S.S. and I have recommended that on her arrival in Washington she get in touch with Miss Haight who I know will expedite matters.

4. One more point - Mrs. Baker may wish to reply to her husband's letter via our pouch. Baker has cautioned her not to discuss the matters discussed herein in her ordinary letters via A.P.O. I assume that arrangements can be made and Mrs. Baker advised how any reply she may wish to make in this instance may be made through us.



For Colonel HEPNER:

Bob Thum
Will you take
Care of Mrs. Baker
the present situation
CONFIDENTIAL

Harley O. Stevens
HARLEY O. STEVENS
Major, AUS
D. and
ps

Chungking, March 11, 1945

Major General William J. Lenovan, USA,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear General,

I am sure that I do not need to remind you of the discussions we had here in Chungking of our little School of Journalism and its prospects for a third year. It is not to refresh your memory of these discussions that I am writing therefore. Since you were here I have had letters from Dear Carl Ackerman of Columbia University which have raised a question in my mind about his attitude towards the School. As you probably know, he is due here towards the end of this month. I am inclined to think that I may have to wire you about the future financing of the School, after I have talked with him. I am writing therefore to give you some idea in advance of the problem which I believe may arise.

I remember telling you that, before your arrival here, I had had several letters from Ackerman in which he said that it had been so difficult to get pledges of support for a third year of the school after June of this year. I understood from you that he had not seen you personally this past winter; but I think it is possibly true that your subordinates, with whom he dealt, were not encouraging. Certainly the inquiry that William Christian had about the worth of the School was couched in such terms that it seemed to be prejudged and condemned. More recent letters from Ackerman give me reason to believe, however, that he made no particular effort to see you personally, and did not try very hard to "sell" the School at OSS headquarters, for the simple reason that he is tired of it. He only goes upon the amount of his spare time that he has to give to correspondence about this School and its accounts. He tells me that he finds it increasingly tedious to have to go to Washington to get piecemeal appropriations for the School from a reluctant "sponsor". And he says that, in his opinion, it has now been given a good enough start and should be turned over to the Chinese.

If this is the case, it is an arrangement that he proposes to give us when he gets here, he will have to help us to liquidate the American end of the School (without which it would promptly lose its character and its usefulness) and the members of the faculty home at the end of the term and wash his hands of it. I should perhaps tell you in confidence that Carl Ackerman has a reputation for starting new projects with great enthusiasm, boosting them along at high speed for a little time, wearying of them and scuttling them.

If he comes here with the idea that he is going to scuttle this School, I shall have to tell you that you have inquired into it and have found it worth while, that you have promised support for a third year, that you have made tentative arrangements for the retention of three of the veteran faculty members for another school term after a US vacation, and that the School is not there for liquidation, whether he gets out from under or not. I have no idea how he will take that; but there is a possibility that he will say that it is entirely... I... will... through... Billy Christian... I... shall... arrange to have the "sponsor's"... the State Department... OSS agents, that... letter. Will...

Department's cultural relations in China, is an old and intimate friend of mine and knows all about the school and its operations. His representative here in the Embassy, J. Hall Paxton, is also in close touch and friendly with all of us. A shift of control from Columbia to the State Department would not, therefore, put us into the hands of strangers. I say "us" because, while I shall not be part of the School organization next year, it will be under my nose and I know that Hollington Tong will continue to use me as an intermediary with the faculty. You will therefore understand what has happened here, if I wire you towards the end of this month or early in April that Carl Ackerman is getting out from under, that it is incumbent upon you to have the "sponsor" channel his support through an agency other than Columbia University -- presumably Willys Peck's office in the State Department.

One other matter: You will remember that Richard T. Baker, who was responsible for the organization of the School, who really runs it, and would continue to run it a third year, spoke to you about getting his wife out to India (and possibly to China later) as an OSS employee. You said that you would have your personnel department get in touch with her in New York. Baker has heard nothing from his wife about such an approach and has so far written her nothing about getting in touch with the OSS. He is now writing her through your organization, however, (by courtesy of Major Harley Stevens here), to tell her of the tentative arrangements made. Now it is my personal opinion that arrangements had better be kept in tentative form until we know what Carl Ackerman ~~plans~~ to do, for the following reasons. Our idea when we talked with you was that Mrs. Baker should be sent to India pretty shortly to work there for OSS and that Baker would spend his summer vacation in India (July and August). If it happens that the School is to be turned over to the State Department, however, it would seem to me that Baker ought to return to the US at the end of June to get to know Willys Peck and his staff, and that ~~thereafter~~ he and Mrs. Baker should then have their vacation together in the USA and together settle their affairs there before her ~~departure~~ departure for India. It would do no harm meanwhile to make preliminary arrangements. It is therefore my suggestion that Mrs. Baker should go to Washington, call on your personnel chief and, if possible, see you for a few moments. I am a great believer in having employees know the boss; and, although Mrs. Baker is an exceptionally level-headed woman, I am quite sure that brief contact with your justly renowned charm will help her to make up her mind about this Far Eastern adventure. She could then return to New York, go through the "processing" of which you spoke and be ready to move as circumstances dictated.

Finally: My own plans here for floating propaganda into occupied China are maturing. The wheels you started turning have run smoothly. The High Chinese and American authorities have given the plan their formal approval and I am told that I shall shortly be equipped with credentials. I had satisfactory talks with Colonel Little before he started for home and I am getting some material prepared. My preliminary arrangements are still slow because I have all kinds of school chores to get out of the way before I start active operations and because my Chinese helpers will be fully employed until the end of ~~the~~ this month. Also A Komura's visit at the end of this month will hold up operations. I hope nevertheless to start an experiment before the end of the month, by floating about a thousand of my tubes containing propaganda material down the Yangtze from Chungking and by checking on their reception at points as far down as ~~Chongking~~ Chongking. We shall be set to move at high speed early in April anyway. I understand that you are coming to see us again this spring and it would be a tremendous satisfaction to me to report to you personally that my literature had all had a few outraged squawks from the Japanese.

With sincere personal regards, I beg to remain

Yours very truly

Rodney Gilbert
Rodney Gilbert

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATER

A.P.O. 87
17 March 45

SUBJECT : School of Journalism.

TO : The Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

1. I send you herewith a letter dated March 11th from Mr. Rodney Gilbert discussing the present situation with reference to the School of Journalism, and the progress that is being made on the Bamboo plan - now known as the Denver plan. Gilbert is anxious that you be kept currently advised of the circumstances surrounding both operations.
2. Also enclosed in a letter to Mrs. Richard Baker which is to be mailed to her. In it Baker refers to the staff meeting with you and more particularly to the matter of a further home this summer and your assurance that if Mrs. Baker was found qualified and passed our security, aptitude, and evaluation tests, we could (and would) use her in the Far East - preliminarily in Kandy or Northern India and eventually here.
3. It appears from Baker's letter that he understood our personnel people would get in touch with her, but nothing has happened so that he is now suggesting she approach O.S.S. and I have recommended that on her arrival in Washington she get in touch with Miss Knight who I know will expedite matters.
4. One more point - Mrs. Baker may wish to reply to her husband's letter via our pouch. Baker has cautioned her not to discuss the matters discussed herein in her ordinary letters via A.P.O. I assume that arrangements can be made and Mrs. Baker advised how any reply she may wish to make in this instance may be made through us.

For Colonel NEFFNER:

HARLEY G. STEVENS

Major, AUS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ONINA, THAMPAA.P.O. 879
17 March 49

SUBJECT : School of Journalism.

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Washington, D.C.

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For Colonel HEPPNER:

HARLEY O. SCHEVENS

Major, AUS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATERA.P.O. 879
17 March 45

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For Colonel NEPPER:

HARLEY G. STEVENS

Major, ADE

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

1 February 1945

10302.
 Journalism, Sch
 x China
 x Churman
 x Tang
 x Columbia

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Robert Thrua
 FROM : 2nd Lt. Thomas J. Davis, Jr.
 SUBJECT : Journalists at Chungking

During the course of our travels several matters came up which require action in Washington. Most of these I was not able to write down at the time, and although I mentioned them to you, I hardly would expect even your retentive mind to be able to hold on to all of them. I am therefore going to give you brief notes for your convenience.

a. State Department Sponsorship

In talking with the people at the School of Journalism in Chungking, General Donovan stated several times that (1) the school would be continued at least another year and (2) he would urge the State Department to adopt the School.

I am ignorant of the details of present sponsorship (ostensible) though I know, of course, by whom it is actually supported. (I believe it is under the aegis of Columbia University School of Journalism). One point raised by the teachers but not presented so that General Donovan appeared to advert to it, is that the State Department Cultural Relations Division is somewhat moribund (as the teachers in School of Journalism see the facts), and control by that Division might have had results. Probably special status for the school should be guaranteed by State.

b. Leave in U.S. for Three Teachers

General Donovan said that he would arrange for 3 teachers to have leave in the U.S. They have been out here over a year, expected originally to go back to the U.S. after one year, are willing to stay on another year if they get this leave, which should begin in June (approx) and continue through to October--to be coterminous with

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- 2 -

the school vacation period. The three involved are Richard T. Baker, Anthony F. J. Dralle, Floyd D. Rodgers, Jr. I discovered just before I left that there is a 4th instructor--why he is not to receive similar treatment I did not have time to ascertain. This should be looked into for two reasons (1) fair play, (2) the 4th is I think the son of the dean of the Columbia School of Journalism.

c. Job in OSS India for Wife of one of Teachers

One of the teachers (Baker) asked whether 109 could arrange for his wife to have a job in India. Apparently she has had an excellent background in sociology, ~~WBK~~ at Cornell and social work in New York, and would be a real asset to OSS. 109 said he would endeavor to place her in our India or Ceylon Detachments. Her name and address are listed in the notes I gave you of our conference with the journalists. These notes are on 3 pages torn from my pocket notebook. P.S. Her address is Mrs. Richard T. Baker, 421 West 21st St., N. Y. She has been in India once.

d. Intelligence possibilities of the School

At 109's suggestion, I lunched with Rodgers and Baker and ran through some of their unpolished notes from their student reporters. Some of the material was of interest to us per se--though nothing startling--and a good deal of it indicated that the students could unwillingly dig up stuff of real value to us if properly and subtly directed. There are real difficulties in working out a procedure which would keep the students and others from learning of our connection, but probably they would be worked out.

I turned the material over to Halliwell and briefed him on the necessity for proceeding with maximum caution and security. I will check with him when I return. In the meantime, you can use the notes I gave you (attached) if you need evidence to support 109's claim that the project has intelligence potentialities.

SECRET

SECRETTom Davis' Notes Of Talk With Young JournalistsJournalism

Get Gauss's report in favor of it.

- a) Reaction of statements to censorship.
- b) Paper considered by SHOUSE as best paper in China; read avidly by American Embassy.
- c) Improvement of journalism in Chungking.

Point-

Want air passage, home for summer vacation
30th June to Sept. 1st or Oct. 1st.

Point-

Send 10 students to U.S. as promised by
Hollington Long.

Point-

Check into unprinted material.

Political Future of China

-Trend among people is toward pro-Allied feeling and toward liberalism. May be different in high KUOMINTANG circles.

-People basically democratic. Classes are not fixed so far as any individual is concerned. People pretty well informed, capable.

-Communists here are Agrarian reformers. Students are left of KUOMINTANG and right of Communists.

-Papers published all over China. Langjoe for instance, "tea-house gossips", professional story tellers. Students traveling back to home town.

Point-

Have the teachers put on paper their political and sociological conclusions.

SECRET

SECRET

Point-

Radio broadcast by Floyd Wright, boy from TOUNKI near Shanghai came in and said Chinese in his area listen to it. Eight stations carry it. School has radio course.

8th Route Army (18th Group Army) moved into North Howan province. Checked with representative of Communist Government near Chungking, who said true, running all over Howan. Bands within few miles of Hankow.

Point-

Physical conditions bad--housing, food, medical care--can we help? Students welfare is in hands of Ministry of Education. Universities at (1) Changtu, (2) Shan Ping bah, Nat. university of Nanking also Pekin man, (3) Chungking University, (4) at Kunming is merited great--4 big old universities including Pekow University (the Harvard of China). Courses include: technical emphasis, dis arts, chemistry, aerodynamics, but Chinese like lit. and econ. Encourage technical students to go abroad.

In school of journalism several radio engineers, 3 or 4 soldiers who fought the Japs (one expert on Jap torture methods) 4 women students (better than the men) theory is that male child in China is spoiled, whereas woman has learned to get along. Timid but go more strenuously into government offices for interviews than male students. Also shame men into working harder.

Students belong to upper class, "aristocracy of Education."

SECRET

Form 68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 24 January 1945

FROM OIAXX, KUNMING

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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<input type="checkbox"/>	ROUTINE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DEFERRED

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China X
SECRET

#4974. Shepardson and Chaston from 109.

Cornet, Christian and I held a conference and investigated the matter. I find that besides the good will that the organization has established that I cannot agree at all that it has no real worth as a part of a war agency nor, in particular, as a part of an intelligence organization. The most troublesome part has been that the material assembled by these young journalists was not made procurable. This condition has been remedied and arrangements have been made for this to be sent to us. Guidance can now be given to better it. I have decided to keep this in effect for a period of 12 months and plans are being worked out accordingly. In addition Rogers, Baker and Dralle are to return late in the fall after a few months vacation. In accordance with his wishes, arrangements are being made for Cornet to be assigned for a certain job with HQ.

FILE COPY

SECRET

TON: 1658 24 Jan 45

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: TO JANUARY 1948 REC'D TIME TO JAN 1948 OUT 592

TO: TEGSI, NEW DELHI PRECEDENCE

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONFIRMATION: SHEPARDSON

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MADRAS.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

(CORRECTED COPY)

SECRET
Chin X

PRISBY, SONOVAN ONLY FROM SHEPARDSON.

IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIAL CHUNGKING PROJECT FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED:

1. CORNET HAS WRITTEN SAYING THAT PROJECT HAS NOT AND CANNOT POSSIBLY MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION TO WAR EFFORT AND HE IS THEREFORE DETERMINED TO QUIT.

2. AT OUR REQUEST CHRISTIAN HAS INVESTIGATED AND REPORTED HE AGREES WITH CORNET.

3. U. S. EMBASSY CHUNGKING REPORTS GREAT IMPORTANCE OF ENTERPRISE FOR U.S. PRESTIGE, GOOD WILL AND HAS ASKED CORNET TO URGE SPONSOR TO CONTINUE.

4. OUR CONTACT NEW YORK CITY HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE FOR ADDITIONAL YEAR BUT THAT YOU INTEND MAKE YOUR OWN DISCREET INVESTIGATION ON THE SPOT AND CONSULT CORNET.

5. YOUR DECISION BY LAST WEEK END FEBRUARY IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED SO THAT IN EITHER EVENT NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE BY WAGON FIRST.

YDD: ROST 10 JANUARY 48

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SECRET

INITIALS: THORP WHO JMW VB

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: JANUARY 10, 1945 REC'D 1036 TO JAN 45 QLT 894
 TO: TEHRAN, NEW DELHI PRECEDENCE
 FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET
 CONFIRMATION SHEPARDSON
 INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACGRUDER.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#23197. DONOVAN ONLY FROM SHEPARDSON.

SECRET

IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIAL CHUNGKING PROJECT FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED:

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FILE COPY**SECRET**

TOD: 2231 10 JAN 45 INITIALS: THMCB WMS JDW VB

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OSS Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 30, 1944

FROM

CG, USAF, CHINA THEATER, CHUNGKING

TO WAR DEPARTMENT: CG, REAR HONGKONG HQS, CHINA THEATER, KU MING

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

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China

SECRETIVE X

#CFB 30161. Signed Wedemeyer. From Oxford to Ulio for Turner McRaine, OSS.

With reference to your letter of December 11th concerning the Cornet mission, I am of the opinion that it possesses no genuine worth either now or later as a job for a war agency. I concur in Cornet's feeling that it is useful solely from the cultural standpoint. Barring any unforeseen development, Cornet will go back to the United States before June. With the exception of a report to the State Department representative here, I cannot locate any communications to other agencies before Cornet arrived.

ACTION: OSS
CIN-29482, 24:33 z, Dec. 30, 1944

TO: 1/1/45 10:35 AM

E COPY

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan DATE: October 21, 1944
 FROM: C. J. Lennihan, Jr.
 SUBJECT: C. J. L. dr.

9946A
 1 Cong. H-
 Acher...
 School of Journalism

SECRET

I recently told you that Mr. Ackerman would need \$35,000, beyond the \$125,000 advanced him to date, to carry his operation through June 30, 1945. The details of expenditure of this \$35,000, seemed reasonable to me and I took it that you agreed. This morning Mr. Ackerman asked me for \$50,000 instead of this \$35,000. He wants the additional \$15,000 for remittance to Chungking as the expenses out there have been heavier than anticipated, due to the difficult exchange situation, and our Chinese friends are having trouble, as the money appropriated by them for their share of this operation, is proving insufficient. I have given Mr. Ackerman his \$50,000 today, feeling you would approve - and I will add that the \$35,000 of the \$50,000, will be spread over the same contemplated expenditures - administrative and operational - as shown on the memorandum calling for \$35,000.

I should advise you that last year Mr. Ackerman sent \$25,000 to our Chinese friends which, from such records as have reached me from Chungking, has been used for general expenses of operating the hostel - but I am assured that the money will be spent on American personnel only. The original authorization which you approved, did not contemplate any of our money being used for operation of the hostel but I think you will agree with my feeling that we can and should properly bear some of this expense in view of the fact that the appropriation set up by our Chinese friends for their share of the enterprise, has proven quite insufficient, due to circumstances beyond their control and which could not have been foreseen by them or by Mr. Ackerman - chiefly variations of exchange.

As you know, I am presently preparing a report on this operation for your consideration - and I hope approval. This will cover three main points (1) Any expenditures which were not specifically authorized by you originally, will be detailed and will be accompanied by my recommendations for your approval. I feel sure you will approve because they make sense but I think it better to have a clear record of

SECRET

General Donovan

- 2 -

October 21, 1944

any such departures and to record your approval, retroactively. (2) Judge Allman has already completed for me a review of results obtained in the Field to date, together with his prediction as to what should be produced in the Field through the year June 30, 1945 - July 1, 1946, if you subsequently decide to finance this operation through that period. I am also having Mr. ~~Stewart~~ prepare a specific budget for the 1945-6 period but have cautioned him that you cannot give definite consideration at this time for this future period. I am satisfied we will cause Mr. ~~Stewart~~ no embarrassment if your decision on the 45-6 period is arrived at by shall we say April-May at which time I will bring the matter to your attention. (3) Mr. Tripp, who is Mr. Miller's Lieutenant, should have for me toward the end of next week his audit of Mr. ~~Stewart~~'s financial records and reports, from the beginning of this operation up to a recent date. I will then see to it that these records fit the pattern which has been established in my office - and of course I do not anticipate finding any irregularities, though there will probably be need for amplification or better descriptions of some of Mr. ~~Stewart~~'s expenditures.

I have discussed all the foregoing with Ensign Donovan, feeling our program will be better protected, as he and I are working increasingly together on these matters - and incidentally, that young man's head is screwed on straight.

I am going to the hospital Monday and I am assured by the doctors that I can go right on my job commencing the end of next week so there should be no delay in bringing this item and others forward promptly and I shall keep you posted by memo.

C.J.L.

Tong, Hollington 99464

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

Originator Carl W. Askew
Date October 7, 1953
Addressee To Whom It May Concern
Date Rec'd _____

Subject Confidential Report on Chinese School

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
Col. Duxton	Admin.				
Gen. Magruder	121 Central				
Mr. Scribner	2108 Q				
Mr. Shepardson	212 Q				
Secretariat	Admin.				

Mrs. O'Donnell

1151051

Tong, Hollington 9946 A

x Chinese
x School of Journalism
x Ackerman, Carl.

File

Columbia University
in the City of New York

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

October 4, 1943

Dear General Donovan

These "To Whom" copies
of messages from Chung King will
be mailed by me personally. No
answer is expected.

The reports are encouraging.
I have underlined the important
items.

Sincerely

Carl W. Ackerman

Columbia University
in the City of New York

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM

OFFICE OF THE DEAN

October 2, 1943

To Whom It May Concern:

We have received the following two radio messages from Dr. Hollington K. Tong from Chungking, China:

(1) Dated Chungking, September 25, 1943:

"I received word yesterday from Mr. O. H. Lowe, director of our Calcutta office, that a group of four Columbia professors arrived in India on September 22 from the United States. They are: Dr. H. L. Cross, Mr. Richard T. Baker, Mr. Floyd D. Rodgers, Jr. and Mr. Anthony Dralle. Arrangements are being made by Mr. Lowe to have three of them fly to Chungking soon. Mr. Dralle is down with dengue fever and will join his colleagues later. Mr. Lowe advises me that the new arrivals have brought with them a large number of books, sample newspapers and other reading matter which will be of interest and value to students of Journalism.

"Through entrance examinations held in Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming and Kvelin, more than thirty students have been admitted to the Journalism training school of which Dr. Cross and his colleagues will be in charge. About two hundred applicants sat for the examination.

"The training school is scheduled to begin in Chungking on October 10th. Owing to rather rigid selection I am confident that the chosen students will not disappoint their mentors. Judging from some of the examination papers I have seen, I should not be surprised if some of the students become prominent journalists later on. Another fact worth noting is that a few applicants have given up lucrative positions to join the school."

(2) Undated cable, Chungking:

"Cross Baker arrived safe well. Enthusiastic plans and progress. School opening October 10th. Address Press Hostel. Rodgers Dralle in Calcutta awaiting plane."

Carl V. Siskerman

Return to Mr. Putzall

Noted by WIS.

7-2-43



CPB

Tong, Hollington -9446 A

X Chinese
X School of Journalism

Columbia University
in the City of New York X Ackerman, Carl

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

September 20, 1943

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

We received today the following letter from the
Department of State:

"The Department has received a telegram dated
September 16, 1943, reporting the safe arrival at
Colombo, Ceylon, of Cross, Dralle, Rodgers, and Baker.
They were leaving by rail for Calcutta en route to
Chungking."

Faithfully yours,

Carl W. Ackerman

Dean

CWA: AR

Columbia University
in the City of New York
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

September 20, 1943

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

While we are awaiting the arrival of our staff in China, we have received the following message from Dr. Hollington K. Tong, dated Chungking, September 11, 1943:

"I have put up two buildings to serve as classrooms for students of journalism. Up to this writing I have not heard directly from the Columbia professors regarding their whereabouts.

"An entrance examination was given in Chungking yesterday to some eighty-five applicants who aspire to receive advanced training in journalism. Among the candidates are a few who now hold remunerative posts in banks and other private business concerns."

Faithfully yours,

Carl W. Rickman

Dean

CWA: AR

To: Commander Holland
 For information
 of
 return
 D.
 Noted 3/20/42
 (3300) Director's Office

Tong, Holliston 9856 A
x Chinese
x School of Journalism
x Ackerman, Carl

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 17, 1943

16229

PERSONAL
SECRET

16229
16229
16229

Dear Colonel Donovan:

The attached telegram refers to an air mail letter which was approved by Mr. Tong and which has been sent to Chungking for the approval of General Chiang Kai-Shek. The phrase "to my own chief" refers to Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia. The signature "Earlham" is the name of the school in Indiana which Carl Ackerman and I attended, and signifies Ackerman. Also attached is a copy of Mr. Ackerman's letter to Mr. Tong.

Respectfully yours,

Bonner F. Fellors
Bonner F. Fellors
Brigadier General
U. S. Army

Enclosures (2)

Col Donovan:
These enclosures are for your file
and I have no copies.
B.F.

CLASS OF SERVICE
 This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless the deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

WESTERN UNION

SYMBOLS	
DL	Day Letter
NT	Overnight Telegram
LC	Deferred Cable
NLT	Night Letter
Ch	Reduction

A. N. WILLIAMS
 PRESIDENT

NEWSOME GARLTON
 CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. B. WILLEVER
 FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination.

H41NG 39 NL

NEWYORK NY FEB 16 1943

BRIG GEN BONNER FELLERS

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHDC

AIR MAIL LETTER WAS APPROVED BY MAN TO WHOM ADDRESSED NOW BEING SENT TO GENERAL ABROAD IF APPROVED BY HIM I WILL SEND IT TO MY CHIEF. ABSOLUTELY NO ONE KNOWS IDENTITY OF DONOR WILL ADVISE YOU OF DEVELOPMENTS

EARLHAM

348A

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

February 16, 1943

Mr. Hollington Kong Tong
Vice Minister of Information
Republic of China
Room 4221
1950 Sixth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Tong:

The text of the letter I am prepared to send to President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University reads as follows:

"Mr. Hollington Kong Tong, '135, Vice Minister of Information of the Chinese Republic, has invited our School to sponsor the establishment of a Graduate School of Journalism in Chungking, China. This would be a separate educational unit under our patronage as indicated herewith.

"A friend, who insists upon anonymity, will deposit a sum of \$30,000, annually with the Treasurer of Columbia University for the duration of the war and possibly thereafter. To this sum, the Republic of China will contribute maintenance, travel, equipment and facilities, which will equal or exceed the cost of our cooperation, so that the new school will be adequately financed. The gift is contingent upon my personal selection of teachers from among our graduates.

"Mr. Tong, a distinguished journalist and alumnus, is now in New York City and has collaborated with me in the preparation of the plan herein proposed and respectfully submitted for your consideration.

- 2 -

- Mr. Hollington Kong Tong -

- February 16, 1945 -

"The name shall be the Graduate School of Journalism of the Republic of China. The curricula, the requirements for admission, graduation and the degree or diploma to be awarded shall rest with the Faculty of Journalism of the new school in order that there may be complete autonomy and respect for the laws and educational traditions of China.

"In conjunction with this project a group of Chinese students now in the United States will be assigned to the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University by the China Institute, or the Ministry of Information to prepare themselves as teachers of journalism so that after the war the Graduate School of Journalism in China may be a self-perpetuating, autonomous educational institution. A beginning in this direction has already been made, as there are at present three Chinese students now registered in our School preparing themselves for the teaching and practice of their profession in their own country.

"Mr. Tong advises that there will be a minimum of fifty students in the school at the beginning and that the number may be increased to one hundred. All students will be graduates of Chinese colleges and universities and will be able to read and write the English language, so that all instruction will be in English.

"For the present the teaching staff will be as follows:

"Director and Professor of Journalism and teacher of the history, philosophy and principles of journalism.

"Assistant Professors of Journalism:

- "a. To teach news writing, editing, interviewing, and newspaper and magazine feature writing
- "b. To teach radio writing and broadcasting

- 3 -

- Mr. Hollington Kung Tong -

- February 16, 1945 -

"c. To teach news photos, photography, and research methods

"d. Assistant to the Director

"BUDGET ESTIMATE

"Director of School, twelve months' salary	\$ 7,500
"Assistant Professors a,b,c - \$5,000 each	15,000
"Assistant to the Director	4,000
"Administrative expenses, such as traveling of men to be interviewed, correspondence, emergency fund, secretarial and office expenses in New York	<u>3,500</u>
TOTAL	\$30,000

"All living and traveling expenses from New York City to China and in China will be paid by the Republic of China. The contract of employment shall be subject to the approval of Mr. Tong and Professor Harold L. Cross, a member of the New York Bar and of the Faculty of Journalism.

"Appointments will be made jointly by Mr. Tong and by me. Salaries will be paid by the Treasurer of Columbia University out of the special fund which will be deposited for this purpose.

"The new school of journalism, as soon as the faculty can be transported, will begin to instruct Chinese journalists to prepare them during the war period for services to the government in Chinese embassies and legations throughout the world, to the ministers of state, the commanding generals in the field, and also prepare men to establish, publish and edit daily newspapers in the provinces. As rapidly as the conquered areas are freed from the invader, newspapers will be established

- 4 -

- Mr. Hollington Kong Tong -

- February 16, 1945 ..

and Mr. Tong advises us that it will be the policy of the government to permit the establishment of newspapers as independent enterprises as they are in the United States.

"As Mr. Tong and I are eager to go forward with this plan, we seek your counsel, the cooperation and assistance of the University and the opportunity of being of service to our respective countries during the war and to the profession of journalism now and in the future."

This concludes the text of the proposed letter to President Butler. If this meets with your approval, please draft an appropriate letter to accompany this communication to the President of Columbia University.

Cordially, your friend,

OWA:JP


INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

Originator Carl W. Ackerman
 Date October 7, 1943
 Addressee To Whom It May Concern
 Date Rec'd _____

Subject Confidential Report on Chinese



To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Rec'd	Initials	Comments
Indicate action desired or taken					
Col. Buxton	Admin			ACB	
Gen. Magruder	121 Central			AM	
Mr. Scribner	2108			MS	
Mr. Shepardson	212			MS	
Secretariat	Admin			MS	

Σ 8 8

(11919)

To: Ned Putzell

Please circulate
this to Col. Buxton and the
Deputy Directors.

WJD

Director's Office

(3300)

Mailed personally, by Carl W. Ackerman Oct 7, 1943 9946A

*Tong, Hollington
x Chinese
x Ackerman, Carl*

Columbia University
in the City of New York

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM

OFFICE OF THE DEAN

October 7, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON CHINESE SCHOOL

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dr. Hollington K. Tong sent the following radio letter October 2, 1943 to his New York office:

"Professor H. L. Cross, Mr. Richard Baker and Mr. Floyd Rodgers, Jr., of the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, have arrived in Chungking. The fourth one, Mr. Anthony Dralle, is ill in India and will not arrive until the latter part of next week.

"The School of Journalism is scheduled to commence on October 10th. Thirty two students out of more than 200 applicants have been chosen. The entrance examinations were rigid and a serious attempt was made to pick the best students in Chungking, Chengtu, Kunning and Kweilin. In the opinion of Professor Cross, to whom I have shown the examination papers, the admitted students seem all well versed in English. He is now busily engaged in drawing up a curriculum for the students and also planning their extracurricular activities.

"Utilizing the time available Professor Cross and his colleagues are calling on the American Embassy, meeting the local American community and in short making a study of the local situation. In a conversation with me yesterday Professor Cross said that he and his colleagues are not only going to teach but also to collect material and do writing. He referred to a list of things our Overseas Offices needed and added that he and the

- 2 -

other teachers would constantly bear the Overseas needs in mind when they attempt turning out anything. Mr. Baker, who was also present at the conversation, said that he would begin right away while his impressions were still fresh.

"As to the simultaneous issuance of an announcement in the United States and China concerning the School, I have informed Professor Cross that a little delay is necessary. Mr. Chen Tien Fang, Vice Chancellor of the Central Political Institute, and myself have met and decided to petition the Generalissimo, concurrently Chancellor of the Institute, recommending that the School be made a postgraduate division of the Institute. The joint announcement may be made when the recommendation is formally approved. Vice Chancellor Chen and myself have already agreed that Professor Cross be made the Dean of the Postgraduate School of Journalism. I was recently asked by the Generalissimo to head that School but I declined the offer owing to the fact that I could not be away from my office several days in the week. The burden of directing the Postgraduate School will fall upon the shoulders of Professor Cross as Dean. I hope that Dr. G. L. Hsia will communicate the foregoing information to Dean Carl Ackerman so that he will understand the reason of postponing the announcement."

Carl Ackerman
Dean

Jones, Harry M. D-776
x Ref. a. e. l. e. m. g. W. E.

13 April 1944

Mr. W. E. Sprackling,
Vice President,
Anaconda Wire & Cable Company,
25 Broadway,
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Sprackling:

General Donovan is not in Washington at the present time and is therefore not available to consider your letter of 5 April 1944 relating to Mr. Harry M. Jones.

We have reviewed the file and find that Mr. Jones was evidently interviewed by Commander Vanderbilt of this office in March of 1943, but there was at that time no position in which Mr. Jones' abilities could be used. We should like to suggest that if Mr. Jones is still interested that he send directly to the Personnel Procurement Branch of this office a statement of his education and business experience and full consideration will be given to it.

We are certain that General Donovan would regret not being able personally to reply to you.

Sincerely yours,

C. A. Bane,
Lieut. (jg) USNR,
Asst. Chief, Secretariat.

Bane: rlc

Letter Harry M. 101 196
W. Sprackling

ANACONDA WIRE & CABLE COMPANY
25 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

W. E. SPRACKLING,
VICE PRESIDENT

April 5 1944

Dear General:

Early last year I wrote you in behalf of my good friend Harry M. Jones who is interested in becoming connected with the U.S.S. My letter is probably in your file, therefore, I will not reiterate what I then wrote.

My purpose in writing you now is to advise that Mr. Jones is still extremely interested and inasmuch as he will be in Washington before long, he has asked me to intercede in his behalf toward the end that he might have an interview with you. I realize how very busy you are but anything you could do for Mr. Jones will be a big favor to me.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

W. E. Sprackling

Brig. General W.J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Service
Washington, D. C.

Jones, Harry M. 10-24-43
X Spangenberg, W. E.

ANACONDA WIRE & CABLE COMPANY



100

TWENTY-FIVE BROADWAY
NEW YORK

OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

March 2, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Co-ordinator of Information,
25th and M. Streets, N. E.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel:-

I have taken the liberty of giving Mr. Harry M. Jones of Pittsburgh, Pa. a letter of introduction to you.

Mr. Jones was a classmate of mine in College and is interested in finding out if he can be of any service to his country in the work which comes under your supervision. I would appreciate it greatly if you would give him an audience.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

W. E. Spangenberg
W. E. Spangenberg,
Vice President.

Handwritten notes:
100
10-24-43
10-24-43

10

Date 31 August 1943

To: Colonel Biscorn

The attached letter from J. (Robert) Rubin to General Donovan dated August 27, 1943, concerning Lt. Robert G. Johnson, is submitted for the preparation of a draft of reply for the Director's signature at your early convenience.

E. J. P. Jr.

E. J. P., Jr.

Jorgan
13 Command

under line

SEC. REF. 28 AUG

Office of the Secretariat

possible 30 August
k for S...

(9139)

Johnson, R.G. - 12,375
~~X Navy Dept. Personnel~~

4 September 1943

Mr. J. Robert Rubin,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,
Culver City, California.

Dear Bob:

I have your letter of 27 August 1943 telling of Lt. Robert G. Johnson, USN, and of your high opinion of him.

Lt. Johnson is being considered for service with one of our branches. I have not as yet been able to see him personally but hope to do so soon. At the present time our allotment of Naval Officers is full so that I cannot request his transfer to this organization. However, an additional allotment is under consideration and I am hopeful that favorable action will be forthcoming shortly.

Thank you for sending me your opinion of Lt. Johnson. As you know, I am always interested in hearing of good men.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director.

*Johnson, R.G. - 12371
Navy Dept Personnel*



August 27, 1943

General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

My dear Bill:

I understand that Lieutenant Robert G. Johnson has filed an application for service with your unit. He has asked me to communicate with you concerning him, which I gladly do.

First, I would like to recall him to your mind. During '41 when we were attending football games, he occupied the box next to us at the professional games. I think you will remember him and his wife who was formerly Mrs. Snowden.

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant Johnson joined the air force of the Navy, and after preliminary training was dispatched to Alaska where he remained for some time. He has now returned east and is at the Hotel Statler in Washington, awaiting new orders.

Lieutenant Johnson is an earnest, hard-working man, with a variety of experiences in executive work, and is keenly desirous of engaging in the activities which your organization is doing. Can you send for him at the Hotel Statler and talk with him? You could then determine for yourself whether or not he would fit into your organization.

Any courtesies that you can show Lieutenant Johnson will be greatly appreciated.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Yours,

J. Robert Rubin

Jrk:mn
Via Air Mail.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Johnson 14, 549
v O'Neill, Richard

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General William Donovan

DATE: 28 April 1944

FROM : Weston Howland *WH*

SUBJECT:

The attached letter from Dick O'Neill is self-explanatory as is the letter which he calls to my attention. I believe you will enjoy reading it.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

680 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK (20) N.Y.

April 21, 1944

Dear Chief:

As a result of several things we discussed about this war some time ago, I thought you would enjoy the enclosed letter from a nephew of mine, George O. Johnson, Jr., to his Dad.

This boy was an expert on aviation. He can fly every type of plane from a FIGHTER to a SUPER-FORTRESS. He has a complete education in aeronautical engineering and for this reason was assigned to the job of testing new ships and training pilots.

He had written to his father saying that for reasons of his own, he was transferring to the Bomber Command, which would mean actually bombing Germany. His father with no thought of having his son in a "bullet-proof" job, wrote to him suggesting that he remain as an instructor, pointing out that by reason of his own training he would be more valuable for the armed war effort. The boy's reply answered all questions and arguments.

I think it is a classic and could be used as a pep-talk for any unit in the armed service.

Sincerely,

Dick Orfield

Encl.

Mr. Weston Howland
OSIS Washington.

C O P Y

Johnson George 14, 344
x C. Hull, Richard

March 14, 1944

Dear Dad:

What I have done has upset you - I expected you to be anxious but not as much as you apparently are. However, I don't think it wise for me to attempt to allay your apprehension - it is well founded.

Why did I do it? Let me tell you about Brownie. I met him when I first arrived here. He was a very likable chap so we struck up a solid friendship. In the evenings, after supper, we'd sit in front of the fireplace in the lounge and over a drink would talk about flying, our crazy college days, girls and other trivia. Then Brownie invariably talked about his wife and baby girl. Only occasionally would he talk about the raids he'd been on.

One day he went out on a mission over Germany from which he didn't come back.

It came as a shock. But I sat up and took notice of what was going on. I saw a lot of Brownies around me.

They all advised me as you did: "Stay where you are", "Don't be crazy", "You're well off and don't know it." This from boys I drank with, gambled with and gambled with. From boys who went West on the east bound trip. A lot of them were married and had children.

It wasn't fair - not by a damned sight! I was cheating them - I had no right to a soft job. I've had it easy all my life because you made it that way. And while decent men with live responsibilities are dying all over the world, I, with 21 carefree years behind me, am given a non-combatant assignment!!!

I am your son and you love me as only a father can - but you can't deny the truth of it.

There's too much meaning in life and death for me to continue a selfish course. Let the bleeding hearts and politicians, the strikers and the flag wavers tell us what we're fighting for. You can read selfishness in every word. But look at a formation of Fortresses as they return from a mission where planes should be, there is emptiness; that emptiness speaks eloquently of what we're fighting for - and for the greatest.

March 14th, 1944

Page Two

sacrifice a man can make for his country. And, if God wills that I make that sacrifice, so be it. I will have justified my existence.

BUT - do you think I'm worried about what MIGHT happen? I'd be a nervous wreck if I did. And so you will be if you do. You were a soldier in uniform in 1917 - be a soldier in mufti in 1944.

Head up - chin in - chest out.

Love

Pat

37 235
THOMAS M. JOHNSON
420 WEST 116TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

Nov. 22, 1944 ✓

Dear Bill:

I am writing a syndicate series-
550 newspapers- about Generals who were
commissioned straight from civil life for
this war. This excludes any who were members
of the Organized Reserves, Guard, etc.
I hope it includes you and if it does will
you let me know and I'll gladly say so.
I think I know the story well enough so that
you needn't trouble with details.

My congratulations on your
second star!

Sincerely,

T.M.J.

15,735
THOMAS M. JOHNSON
480 WEST 116TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

Johnson, Thomas M.

March 18, 1945

Dear Bill:

You'll just hope this finds you in Washington. I'm writing a short piece for Reader's Digest about my last dinner of World War I in Buzancy with headquarters mess of the 42nd Division. It was rather dramatic, and also I'm making it (I hope) bear a message: never trust the Germans.

Now, were you there? I am hazy as to who was. I've checked with a good many: Hughes, Rumbaugh, Wolf, Meany, and others, and only Damon Runyon who was with me, recalls anything. If you were there, perhaps you'll tell me what you can recall of the scene, the dramatic personae and the dialogue. Especially anything you said. And can you suggest anyone who may have been there? I'll be grateful for assistance but don't trouble if you are busy.

Enclosed appeared in The Sun after I had suggested they do something on the Remagen-60th idea.

Sincerely,

Tom.

151 735
THE NEW YORK SUN

YANKS IN THE RHINELAND IN WORLD WAR I



American officers of the 165th Infantry leaving Remagen twenty-six years ago, left to right: Major George Lawrence, Capt. Harold Allen, Capt. Thomas Kenney, Lieut.-Col. Alexander E. Anderson, Father Francis Duffy, Lieut. Col. Timothy J. Moynahan, Col. William J. Donovan, Capt. John J. Mangan and Capt. Jack Hurley.

165TH PULLED OUT OF REMAGEN IN '19

Twenty six years ago next month the 165th infantry, New York's own fighting Irish, pulled out of Remagen after six months with the Army of Occupation in the Rhineland that gave Remagen that was the springboard for the American troops who are fighting on the east bank of the

river today. Aboard the last train were Col. William (Wild Bill) Donovan and his staff, including Major Gen. John J. Mangan, then a captain. A photograph was taken of Col. Donovan's staff as the train pulled out, and Gen. Mangan, now an official of the National War Labor Board, has kept it as one of his choicest mementoes of world war I service. Four of the nine officers in the picture are dead, including Major Gen. Alexander E. Anderson (then a lieutenant-colonel), who died of a heart attack in 1942 while commanding the Eighty-sixth Divi-

ston, and Father Francis J. Duffy, the chaplain. Col. Donovan, now the head of the Office of Strategic Services, sped across France to Great Britain, the same port they arrived through to join the A. E. F. Later that month the regiment arrived in New York for a tumultuous welcome as New York's own regiment.

First Settlement in New World
Santo Domingo was the first permanent settlement in the New World.

Jordan, Max - 12, 444

x Hake
✓ (1) H Broadcasting Co

1 (2) John

3 September 1943

Mr. John F. Royal,
National Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
RCA Building,
New York City.

✓ Dear John:

I have your letter of August 31st. I am taking it up with the British and will let you know what they say.

I am leaving within a few days. It might well be that I would be back in London around the time you say.. I would like to see you both.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Jordan, Max - 12444
P. L. L. L.

X (Mad) (P. L. L. L. Co.)

✓ Royal, 2001

3 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. William Stephenson

FROM: General Donovan

✓ Here's a copy of a letter from John Royal. I
give it to you just as it was sent to me. What do you
think?

Jordan may 12, 444
x w...
x h...
x Royal.

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.



A RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA SERVICE

RCA BUILDING · RADIO CITY

NEW YORK, N. Y.



JOHN F. ROYAL
VICE PRESIDENT
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
TELEVISION-NEW DEVELOPMENTS

August 31 1943

Brigadier General William J Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington D C

My dear Friend:

Now that things are shaping up so well in Italy, we have been anxious to send Max Jordan there as our representative. If there is any one place in the world he could be valuable - not only to ourselves, but to the cause, it would be in Italy. I have reason to believe that if we sent him over, we might still have difficulty in getting him through Trinidad or Bermuda, because of the attitude of the British, which we have discussed in the past. I know you are well acquainted with this situation, and would like your advice on the procedure. It was intimated to us that the British would not take such a firm stand unless it was sympathetically received by our people, and when Jordan requested his passport through the State Department, there was no hesitancy in giving it to him. We did not mention the previous "incident" to the State Department officials.

In the past Jordan, perhaps, was a little gullible, but his intentions were right, and he had been very helpful in other ways at that time, to which our American representatives can testify. He speaks Italian like a native, and has close contacts in the Vatican.

We did not wish to make an issue of it in the past, and do not wish to do so now, but the matter might get out of our hands, because several newspaper men have asked us when Jordan returns to Europe.

Would appreciate any help you can give us in this matter.

Niles Trammell and I are figuring on going to London around the first week in October. Are you, by chance, going to be there?

With cordial good wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

John F. Royal
John F. Royal

Johnson, Edw 2478
To Mr. McKee

January 20, 1942

Mr. Joseph V. McKee
Attorney and Counselor at Law
14 Wall Street
New York City

Dear Joe:

I took up with Edgar Hoover the
matter of Edward F. Johnson, Jr.

Here is a copy of Mr. Hoover's
letter to me. I hope the boy makes out
all right in his re-examination.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Murphy:Foy

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

January 16, 1942

*Ed Johnson for 2478
He has 5 cards.
h. l. l. c.*

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
23rd and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

By reference from Mr. E. A. Tamm of this Bureau, I have your letter with which you transmitted a letter from Honorable Joseph V. McKee in behalf of Mr. Edward F. Johnson, who is an applicant for appointment to the position of Special Agent in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I regret to advise that Mr. Johnson failed to attain satisfactory ratings in the tests afforded him in October, 1940. However, in view of your interest and the interest of Mr. McKee in this young man, arrangements are being made for him to be afforded a reexamination in the near future. You may be assured his case will be given careful consideration in the event it is possible to utilize his services at some future date.

Mr. McKee's letter is being returned herewith for your files.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

DEC 29 1941

JOSEPH V. MCKEE

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW

Edward Johnson, Jr. 2475
Herbert Todd
Joseph McKee

Johnson

14 WALL STREET, NEW YORK CITY

December 26, 1941

Dear Bill:

Can you help me in the following matter?

Through J. Herbert Todd of Todd Shipyards, I am deeply interested in Mr. Edward F. Johnson, Jr. who is the son of Mr. E. J. Johnson, Manager of the Prince Line Department of Furness, Withy & Company, Ltd. The young man is twenty-seven years old, a graduate of John Marshall College and John Marshall College of Law. He was admitted to practice in the State of New Jersey in 1940.

Mr. Johnson is anxious to get a position as an investigator with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and I am wondering if you can consistently help place him with that Bureau.

He is of exemplary character and competent to do a job requiring tact, industry and ability.

I shall be deeply appreciative of any assistance you may possibly be able to render in the matter.

With best personal wishes, I am

Very truly yours,

Joseph McKee

M:h

Honorable William J. Donovan,
Washington, D. C.

Johnson
Ladd
McKee - 2478

December 30, 1941

Dear Joe:

I have your letter and I will
be glad to do all I can with the FBI.
Of course, the main fact to be stressed
is that the boy is endorsed by you.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. Joseph V. McKee
Attorney and Counselor at Law
14 Wall Street
New York City

cc - Mr. Tamm,
FBI

Murphy:Foy

*Edw.
Johnson - 2 4 7 8
Herbert Toms
Joseph McKee*

December 30, 1941

Mr. Edward A. Tamm
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Tamm:

I am sending the enclosed
letter from a former Mayor of New York,
Joseph V. McKee, together with a copy of
my reply.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure
Murphy:Foy

*Jarowschewicz KR. 3741
✓ Rel. Freedom in Russia
* L. E. H. Smith*

SECRET

File

February 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

I return herewith your memorandum and the letter from Mr. L. E. H. Smith. Mr. Jarowschewicz sounds like very bad news indeed. He and his group are reliably reported to be conducting anti-Roman Catholic propaganda among the Poles and anti-Orthodox among the Russians. I can't imagine a better way to antagonize the Poles at this moment than to give him any encouragement at all.

As for his convictions on the subject of religious freedom in Russia and his proposed activities in distributing Bibles there, a comment seems superfluous. My hunch is that Mr. Smith is too enthusiastic a joiner of movements.

John C. Wiley
John C. Wiley.

*Not for
2-2-42*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 31, 1942

Memorandum for Mr. Wiley:

Here is a letter from L. E. H. Smith in Buffalo, who has been identified with a good many movements. I do not know whether or not his idea has any merit. Would you take a look at it and let me know your reaction.

WJA
WJD

*Jarow Bohavicz, STU
(Religious freedom in Russia)*

INTERDENOMINATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL
INTER-RACIAL

NEW YORK STATE *Smith* CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR UNION



Affiliated with The International Society of Christian Endeavor
STATE HEADQUARTERS: 1010 PRUDENTIAL BUILDING, BUFFALO

January 29, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information for the President
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

There is a matter which has come to my attention which I think has tremendous possibilities. Mr. K. A. Jarow Bohavicz, who is the president of the Union of Churches of Christ in Poland, is in this country due to persecution which he received at the hands of the Germans in the performance of his duties. He is an emotional type and has a very harrowing tale to tell, but he has interested some very wealthy and influential people in his cause.

He already has had a seven minute audience with the President, but probably was not able to properly present himself in such a time. My purpose in writing to you is that in public utterances, which are always to large audiences in various sections of the country, he is insistent that the President was correct in saying that there is religious freedom in Russia. To a luncheon of responsible people in Pittsburgh last week, he proposed that he be made one of a commission of three to go to Russia and procure statements and information from the Evangelical churches of Russia, which statements would substantiate the President. He would need no funds. The American Bible Society has set aside \$25,000. to his account to be used in distributing Bibles in Russia. A portion of this money could be diverted toward this mission. Some wealthy people have also added to his funds. There are potentialities in this prospect aside from his immediate objective.

He has an office in New York City and committees in various other cities. I think this would be worth your while to present to the President. So much do I believe in this that I would have no hesitancy in being associated with Jarow Bohavicz. If you care to investigate him further, it will not be hard to do. If you deem it advisable, I will come to Washington and confer with you over this matter.

Every article about you in the news papers magazines takes me back to old times.

Your friend,
L. E. H. Smith
L. E. H. Smith

LEHS:RMH

Jewish Trade Council Dinner - 5770
x [unclear]

April 18, 1942.

To Allen W. Dulles

From George K. Bowden

Re: Jewish Trade Council Dinner

Adolph Held, President of the Amalgamated Bank, New York City, and Chairman of the Jewish Labor Committee, gave a dinner at the Brevoort Hotel April 18, 1942, for the benefit of this office. Bowden and McDonough attended. The dinner lasted from 6:00 o'clock P.M. to 10:30 o'clock P.M. Most of the time was taken up with speeches made by guests. Held politely excused the representatives of the Coordinator's office from speaking.

All the guests offered to cooperate fully with the Coordinator as a source of information on a voluntary basis. The guests included the following (Bibliography furnished by Held):

Alberto Cianca. Former editor of "El Mondo" in Rome; one of the leaders of the "Justicia e Libertad" - democratic and anti-Fascist organization in Paris and now in the U.S.

Jean Rollin. Well known French journalist; worked for Havas until the fall of France. Resigned from his position because of the new politics of this agency after Petain came to power. Now working for Reuter's News Agency. Associated here with "France Speaks."

Raphael Abramovitch. Member of the executive of the Socialist International. Editor in chief of the Russian Socialist magazine "Socialist Courier". Chairman of the delegation of the Russian Social-Democratic Party.

Jules Deutsch. Former War-Minister in Austria. Well known Austrian socialist labor leader. General of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.

Emanuel Novogrodsky. General Secretary of the Jewish Socialist Party in Poland (Bund) and representative of the Jewish socialist underground movement in Poland.

Friedrich Stampfer. For many years the editor-in-chief of the central organ of the German Social-Democratic Party in Berlin, "Forward". One of the famous leaders of the social-democratic party of Germany.

Nicolai Avxentieff. Former minister of Russia in 1917. One of the most important leaders of the Russian social-revolutionary party.

Joseph Botton. One of the leaders of the Catholic Trade Union Movement in France. Escaped to England after the fall of France. Came to the United States to the conference of the International Labor Office with Mr. Henry Hauck, labor minister of the Free French Government in London. Now associated with "France Speaks."

Vanni Montana. Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party in New York. Assistant editor of "Justicia". Publicity director of the Italian-American Labor Council; educational director of Local 89, I.L.G.W. U.

Vladslaw Malinowski. One of the leaders of the Polish Socialist Movement in Warsaw; representative of the Central Committee of the Polish socialist party and the underground movement in Poland.

Nathan Chanin. Member of the Executive of the Jewish Labor Committee.

Isiah Minkoff. Member of the Executive of the Jewish Labor Committee.

Jacob Pat. Member of the Executive of the Jewish Labor Committee.

Benjamin Tabachinsky. Member of the Executive of the Jewish Labor Committee.

It will be noted that the guests were selected with the view to obtaining representatives from the various parts of Europe.

The dinner was given under the auspices of the Jewish Labor Committee. Most of the speakers were not Jewish. The speakers were, however, for the most part trade unionists.

The subject matter of the speeches comes within the field of the F. I. S., rather than our division. Generally there were criticisms of the Coordinator's shortwave broadcasting. The speakers and a summary of their remarks follow:

Vladslaw Malinowski. He is a young intellectual, the vigorous type. He spoke clearly, in English.

Poland has a mass of underground movements. Many of these are organized locally. There is liaison between the groups. The groups publish local newspapers. The speaker produced a copy which he said was typical of the get-up. The specimen was of hand bill size containing 10 or 12 pages of printed matter. The underground movement needs financial support. The support of the United States government would be appreciated.

Most of the Polish underground movements are conducted by laborers. The organization of these movements was based in large part upon the remnants of the old trade labor groups in Poland.

Short wave broadcasting from America could be helpful in encouraging and strengthening the underground movements. Broadcasts should be made at no regular schedule. If made at regular times the Germans could more easily detect the listeners. These labor groups engaged in underground movements have radio sets. The broadcasts are a source of information to these Poles. Recipients of the broadcasts circulate the news by means of newspapers and orally. The broadcasts should be in Polish. The listeners would in large part be laboring men. The subject matter of the broadcasts should be made attractive to laborers.

Preferably, broadcasts should be made by Poles identified with the labor movement. The broadcasts should not be for cultural entertainment. They should supply news useful to strengthen the labor movement and its opposition to Nazi control.

Emanuel Novogrodsky. General Secretary of the Jewish Socialist Party in Poland.

He speaks in fluent English. He described the horrible condition of the Poles in Russia. To Poles food is the problem. Starvation is their fear. Broadcasts to Polish Jews should be in Yiddish and hold out to them hopes of food.

Raphael Abramovitch. Editor-in-chief of the Russian Socialist magazine "Socialist Courier".

He is aged. He looks and speaks as though he has carried the weight of the world on his shoulders for a long time. His English is especially clear. He spoke extemporaneously. Mr. Held's intention had been that the Russian situation be covered by Nicolai Avxentieff, former Kerensky Minister, but he had to leave before his time for speaking arrived to address another meeting. Abramovitch stated that the Russian Socialist Democratic Party had declared an armistice with Stalin for the duration of the war because Hitler, not Stalin, was the real menace. The Russian Socialist Democrats were supporting the Soviets in their war.

Abramovitch argued for cooperation between all Leftists in the fight against Hitler.

The Russian army, just prior to the war, numbered four million. The percentage of the followers of Stalin in the army was perhaps 80%. With the army enlarged the percentage fell rapidly and now perhaps less than 50% of the soldiers are by political creed followers of Stalin. Russia is a long way from presenting a united front in its fight against Hitler. Nor has internal political

discord ceased. There are today in Greater Russia fifteen million people in concentration camps. Recently two prominent Socialists who last year were released from prison by the Russians have again been imprisoned.

The Soviets favored a peace with Germany last November. The generals, however, because of pride opposed the peace and were in favor of carrying on the war to the end, however bitter that might be. Stalin supported his generals instead of his political leaders. Abramovitch thought that now there would be no separate and premature peace. Abramovitch complained of the English propaganda in respect of Soviet Russia. He termed this "an apology for Russian Totalitarianism". He thought we should still continue our opposition to such forms of government. This criticism of Russia should, however, be constructive and should not interfere with the effective prosecution of the war.

Jules Deutsch, Austrian Socialist and former War Minister in Austria. Deutsch speaks English with caution but with clarity. His enunciation is distinctly foreign. His speech was by far the most thought provoking of any delivered during the evening. He endorsed the short wave broadcasts from America as a very effective means of warfare. In Austria there are many listeners to American broadcasts.

The subject of the broadcasts should be determined by who are the listeners. There are two classes of listeners; trade unionists and soldiers. The broadcasts should be designed to be of interest to labor and the military. Broadcasting is an effective means of strengthening the trade union movement. This movement is the source of strength against the Nazis.

Radio speakers should preferably be natives of the country to whom the broadcast is addressed. Deutsch favored speakers with political knowledge and experience in preference to scholars.

Care should be used in selecting political propa-

ganda. He criticized any broadcasting from America favoring the return of the Hapsburgs. This is very undesirable to Austrian labor and would do much to weaken the movement amongst laborers for the overthrow of the Nazi regime.

Austrian broadcasts should not preach pan-Germanism. Deutsch opposed a set schedule for American broadcasts because this would imperil listeners and reduce the volume of listeners.

Friedrich Stampfer, Editor-in-chief of the German Social-Democratic Party's publication "Forward". He, too, is old and shows the wear and tear physically of his opposition to Nazis. He spoke in German. Held translated.

When Hitler took over there were six million Social-Democrats in Germany. Driven from Germany, the party established headquarters in Prague. When the war broke out the headquarters were changed to London where they now remain.

Stampfer last year attended party councils in London.

Stampfer praised the English handling of French broadcasts. These broadcasts were by Frenchmen to Frenchmen. He considered colorless the British broadcasts to Germany. These were mainly by British to Germans. They were composed in English and translated into German. They were artificial and innocuous. He recommended that C.C.I. broadcast in German to Germans by Germans. He recommended that German labor leaders now in exile in this country be used for this purpose. He stated that there were available here twenty German political refugees, former members of the German National Assembly. He was sure these men would cooperate in these broadcasts.

Jean Rollin. He is a young, vigorous journalist on the staff of "France Speaks" and a correspondent

for Reuter's.

The ascension of Laval would strengthen in France the opposition to the Nazis. Now there is a much better chance of bringing about cooperation between the various groups opposing the Germans and Italians. This country should immediately address its broadcasts to French sailors. The Germans have done effective work in creating amongst these sailors anti-British feeling. The German propaganda has not been effective as to the United States. Hence, American propaganda will be more effective than British amongst the sailors.

Rollin criticized the absence of political broadcasts by the C.O.I. He strongly urged that scholars and socialites be taken off the air and that French refugees formerly connected with the trade movement in France be permitted to broadcast in French to French masses.

Vanni Montana. He is personable. He is a vigorous and fluent speaker.

Montana criticized the Italian broadcasts under the auspices of the C.O.I. He was disappointed that the C.O.I. did not employ Sidney Frafelt. Tomkins' employment was a bad mistake. He criticized the Short Wave Agency and its staff. He said that Italian broadcasts were being composed in English and translated into Italian. These broadcasts should be composed in Italian. If necessary, they could be translated into English. Adventurers and pro-Fascists were being employed by C.O.I. rather than anti-Fascists. No labor representation had been given. He urged the use of the radio as an effective means of propaganda in Italy, provided Italians with labor backgrounds be permitted to broadcast script composed in Italian and designed to interest Italian labor. He asked that the C.O.I. cooperate with and make use of talent facilities of the Italian Labor Council, the Massini Society, the Italian Socialist Party. Montana stated that Mussolini was never popular in Italy. In the last real election in Italy Mussolini obtained only thirty-five out of the five hundred seats in

the National Assembly and of these thirty-five, twenty-five were gained only through political trades.

Antonini. Vice-President of the Italian Labor Council in New York, prominent Italian leader. (He appeared in the absence of Alberto Gianca who, because of another engagement, was unable to attend the dinner). Antonini is quite Americanized. He is a vigorous, forceful speaker.

He recommended an active broadcasting campaign from the United States. To Italians America is a great country. There is a warmth of feeling, particularly in southern Italy and Sicily for the United States. Many Italians' lives have been enriched by their annual Christmas checks from relatives residing in the United States. Christmas this last year was the first that the checks did not come. This has had a profound effect upon Italians benefiting from American support.

He accused the C.O.I. of appointing pro-Fascist speakers on their radio broadcasts. He recommended the use of Italian labor leaders to broadcast to members of the trade unions in Italy.

In propaganda to Italy the C.O.I. should appreciate that Italy is an occupied country and that the feeling against the Germans is bitter, particularly in southern Italy. He stated that the feeling is so bitter in Sicily that it was necessary to move to the northern part of Italy thousands of Sicilians to permit German operations with safety in Sicily.

Summary: Laborers in Axis dominated European cities have access to short wave reception sets. Soldiers have access to these sets. Both classes listen to broadcasts. Information obtained in broadcasts is printed in newspapers by trade unions and circulated by hand amongst the members. Broadcasts from America should be designed to appeal to labor and to strengthen the trade union movements. Natives of the countries to whom

the broadcasts are addressed should be used as radio speakers. Cultural programs should be omitted. Socialites and scholars should not be encouraged. Natives with labor backgrounds should be used for speaking.

The above were the recommendations of each speaker at the dinner.

G. K. B.