

LABOR

OSS FORM 4001a

Date 21 June 45To: General Donovan

The attached report submitted by Mr. Shaw of SI has been summarized for transmission to the President, in accordance with your request.

You might want to consider whether the intelligence it contains is worth the risk of State Department displeasure, though I have pinned the conclusions, as you will see, as "labor opinion".

Osborne Nichols
Osborne Nichols
Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1945

Miss Rose Conway
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Conway:

I believe the President will be interested
in the attached memorandum. Will you kindly see
that it reaches his desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

ON:ep

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Labor's Rebuff By UNCIO at San Francisco

This report is a consolidation of informed CIO, British, French, and Mexican labor opinion on the treatment accorded the World Trade Union Federation by UNCIO at San Francisco. Though critical of the State Department, these opinions are submitted to you because they throw valuable light on some of the problems which are bound to arise at your forthcoming meeting with Churchill and Stalin and because they have probably not been reported to you by any other source.

WTUF was formed in London in February to replace the nearly defunct International Federation of Trade Unions to which neither CIO nor the Russians belong. The AF of L refused to join WTUF, because CIO had been active in its formation. WTUF went to San Francisco to gain recognition and to draw up its own constitution.

The British long-range poli- at both UNCIO and WTUF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

was the aim: to obtain and hold the balance of power by pitting the U. S. against Russia. Its short-range policy was to make Russia appear obstructionist and thus persuade the British public to support the tough-with-Russia Conservative Party at the forthcoming general elections.

They attempted to accomplish both these aims by pushing to the forefront at UNCTO such issues as Poland, Austria, and Yugoslavia to force the U. S. into opposing Russian purportedly in order to rally the necessary two-thirds of the Senate.

The AF of L persuaded the State Department that WTUP was a Russian-dominated organization and talked the Department into helping the British rebuff WTUP efforts to obtain recognition from UNCTO. A strong WTUP meant close U. S. - Russian collaboration, which did not fit British balance-of-power position.

The extent to which the British were able to maneuver the State Department into doing their job is best illustrated by the events which followed the acceptance of WTUP's application for admission to the Social and Economic Council. The same night, after hearing of the Council's action, Stalinians arranged an emergency meeting of the Steering Committee of the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Plenary Session. With the aid of Rockefeller in the Latin-American field, he engineered enough votes to reverse the action of the Council, though Nien had been forced into making the principal speech demanding reversal. This did not aid American-Russian relations, since the Soviet Union had strongly urged representation for world labor.

The State Department went so far in its policy of exclusion as to try to bar all nongovernmental organizations from participating in the Social and Economic Council, despite the Council's obvious need for popular roots among organizations of workers, employers, and farmers. Their common displeasure with the State Department was strong enough to unite the CIO, AF of L, IRL, Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau and National Grange in opposition to this policy. As a result, the State Department was forced to back down and the final charter includes the bare "right" of nongovernmental organizations to participate.

The labor sources from which this information was obtained were of the opinion that the State Department, by cooperating with the British and AF of L anti-Russian policies, created issues which will **CONFIDENTIAL** into your lap at the coming meeting of the Big Three. They also felt that the role

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

of the State Department in playing off the AF of L against the CIO, using UNGIO as a bait, was an unwarranted interference by the State Department with domestic labor matters and one not tending either towards labor unity or labor enthusiasm for the ratification of the UNGIO charter.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: LABOR'S REBUTT BY UNCIO AT SAN FRANCISCO

This report is a consolidation of informed CIO, British, French, and Mexican labor opinion on the treatment accorded the World Trade Union Federation by UNCIO at San Francisco. Though critical of the State Department, these opinions are submitted to you because they throw valuable light on some of the problems which are bound to arise at your forthcoming meeting with Churchill and Stalin and because they have probably not been reported to you by any other source.

WTUF was formed in London in February to replace the nearly defunct International Federation of Trade Unions to which neither CIO nor the Russians belong. The AP of L refused to join WTUF, because CIO had been active in its formulation. WTUF went to San Francisco to gain recognition and to draw up its own constitution.

The British long-range policy at both UNCIO and WTUF was the same: to obtain and hold the balance of power by pitting the U. S. against Russia. Its short-range policy was to make Russia appear obstructionist and thus persuade the British public to support the tough-with-Russia Conservative Party at the forthcoming general elections.

They attempted to accomplish both these aims by pushing to the forefront at UNCIO such issues as Poland, Austria, and Jugoslavia to force the U. S. into opposing Russia, to mollify the necessary two-thirds of the Senate.

2

~~They were aided in both UNCIO and WTUP by the State Department.~~
~~The A.P. of L., and several other bodies, had~~
~~mounted a campaign to persuade the State Department~~
~~that WTUP was a Russian-dominated organiza-~~
 tion and talked the Department into helping the British rebuff
 WTUP efforts to obtain recognition from UNCIO. A strong WTUP
 meant close U. S.-Russian collaboration, which did not fit
 British balance-of-power politics. 3

The extent to which the British were able to maneuver the
 State Department into doing their job is best illustrated by the
 events which followed the acceptance of WTUP's application for
 admission to the Social and Economic Council. The same night,
 after hearing of the Council's action, Stettinius arranged an emergency meeting of the Steering Committee of the Plenary Session.
 With the aid of Rockefeller in the Latin-American field, he
 engineered enough votes to reverse the action of the Council,
 though Eden had been forced into making the principal speech
 demanding reversal. This did not aid American-Russian relations,
 since the Soviet Union had strongly urged representation for world
 labor.

~~Because of the British and American refusal of WTUP, the~~
~~Russians insisted that the International Labor Office be kept out~~
~~of the charter. The State Department had to go along with this~~
~~position in order to be consistent, leaving the ILO with a very~~
~~dubious status, resting solely on the Treaty of Versailles.~~

The State Department went so far in its policy of exclusion
 as to try to bar all nongovernmental organizations from participating
 in the Social and Economic Council, despite the Council's
 obvious need for popular roots among organizations of workers,

3

employers, and ~~X~~ farmers. The ⁱⁿcommon displeasure with the State Department was strong enough to unite the CIO, AP of L, NAM, Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau and National Grange in opposition to this policy. As a result, the State Department was forced to back down and the final charter includes the ~~same~~ *same* "right" of nongovernmental organizations to participate.

The labor sources from which this information was obtained were of the opinion that the State Department, by cooperating with the British and AP of L anti-Russian policies, created issues which will undoubtedly fall into your lap at the coming meeting of the Big Three. They also felt that the role of the State Department in playing off the AP of L against the CIO, using UNCIO as a bait, was an unwarranted interference by the State Department with domestic labor matters and one not tending either towards labor/~~any~~ unity or labor enthusiasm for the ratification of the UNCIO charter.

To:

AWB
AWB

Please ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~following~~
This is from
available to the
President.

OSS Form 3054
(3308)

Director's Office



Ned,

I wanted to
general to see
this before he left
and I should like to
see him for a moment
before he goes.

Incidentally, I think
you find this report
interesting - Charles.

Dave Shaw

I have to be in
New York on Monday.
I should like to see you
on Tuesday before you
leave.

David Shaw

16 June 1945

TO : The Director
FROM : David C. Shaw
SUBJECT : Attached Summary from San Francisco

1. The White House may desire to be apprised of the attached estimates from San Francisco. The matter is believed certain to turn up at the coming meeting of the Big Three.
2. The estimates derive from labor sources of several countries. The results will affect the American domestic labor situation.
3. Since this summary may be deemed critical of State Department policy, it is submitted only to the Director.

David C. Shaw
David C. Shaw

16,535
Labor

This report, a summary of our San Francisco work, is an analysis and synthesis from labor sources. It does not represent ultimate truth and doesn't pretend to. But it is an objective and honest report from the left.

World labor's relation to UNCIO was not settled at San Francisco. "Labor" will bounce into President Truman's lap, the same as the Latin-American question bounced and others will. Labor was not "successfully rebuffed" at San Francisco, nor "put in its place." Instead it will be a principal headache of the next Big Three meeting.

The State Department - and FBI, plus AFL - may be pleased with S.F. - both for the "damage done to the world labor people" and for the "labor gains" at S.F. - meaning some wordings for UNCIO charter accepted from labor consultant sources. President Truman would be ill-advised to accept such a view as final; or at least he may wish, later on, that he had been informed of another view.

What Did Not Happen at San Francisco

The German question was hardly present. Current popular doubts about whether UNCIO got down to business or to any reality are partly due to this disregard. Instead of the "problem of aggressors" San Francisco substituted a battle over Russia.

Take a lesser issue - punishing German war criminals - and note how impractical and bankrupt San Francisco was. You have to find the criminals first, identify them and docket their cases and set up a process for punishment, so far as those inside Germany are concerned, in connection with the German occupation organization. The cooperation of

Anti-Nazi Germany is inevitable, despite all past Allied blunders on that point. We shall have to face up to using the surviving kernel of socialists, communists, Catholics, etc. - whose common denominator was that they were "labor", and so the first victims of the Nazis. Months ago General Eisenhower's political adviser stated that "we would foster free democratic labor unions" under the occupation. That was words; but occupation authorities will soon have the practical problem of translating these words into specific action. San Francisco produced not even any words to underpin that approach to the German problem.

Labor organization, as a democratizing implement, either for Germany or among victorious Allies, got a snub at San Francisco; but there are international situations where snubs prove short-lived.

What Did Happen at San Francisco

Turning San Francisco into a battle over Russia, plus a setback for labor, certainly fitted into the policy of our government -- Britain. It fitted a long-range British policy and a short-range Churchill policy.

a) At the end of a coalition war Britain habitually reverts to balance of power. This implies reducing the powers between which Britain will balance. Which in 1946 means reducing U.S. and U.S.S.R. The traditional means is foresting disputes between the major partners while the balancing power remains in the background. The disputes which erupted at San Francisco - Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia - had been publicly agitated from within Britain as early as 1943. Two other dis-

puted countries - Italy and Greece - mention of which would have embarrassed the British at San Francisco, were never mentioned. What was thrust onto the stage embroiled U.S. and U.S.S.R. - with Britain out of sight, except as a hinted mediator - at some Big Three meeting,

b) The short-range policy turned on the British general election. Weeks beforehand it was estimated that San Francisco would coincide with V-E day, hence with dissolution of Parliament and Churchill having to fight an election against labor. For that campaign, any recognition or status accorded at San Francisco to labor, either British national or international labor, could be of no help to Churchill.

The extent to which the British were able to maneuver us into doing their job at San Francisco was best illustrated by the incident of the admission of the World Labor Federation into the all-important Social and Economic Council. The application for admission was heard on the merits and voted one day by the Council. That night, after Stettinius heard of the admission, he arranged for an extraordinary emergency meeting of the Steering Committee of the Plenary Session. He was also responsible, largely with Rockefeller's help in the Latin-American field, for engineering the votes reversing an action which would have accorded status to the World Labor Federation. At the emergency meeting, however, Eden was forced into making the principal speech before the Steering Committee demanding the reversal. Thus Stettinius aided Churchill's electioneering and increased the antagonisms of U.S. and U.S.S.R., since the latter urged representation for world labor. All of these facts are known to American Labor and to Russia.

Eden's action in enforcing a further refusal - of status for labor consultants within the British delegation - threw a bone of open contention into British labor, useful on the eve of the election campaign. It arrayed the British Labor Party (Attlee) against the trade unions (Citrine).

Usefulness to British Policy

The usefulness of this sort of thing to the British government was obvious. Its serviceableness to the White House is less obvious.

A further proposal, pressed by the British, concerning the I.L.O., had the effect of throwing a bone of contention among not only British but American labor organizations. The American delegation did not fully go along with the British move concerning the I.L.O. No clear reasons were given by the American delegation, but the indications were that this would be another issue to be referred to the White House.

Background of San Francisco Conference

To observers experienced in international conferences, it was somewhat amazing that the events of the first ten days of the conference were so little grasped here. The position which President Roosevelt had maintained as mediator, negotiator and virtual leader as between Britain and Russia, disappeared overnight in San Francisco and America became both a rubber-stamp and a spearhead on policies of opposition to Russia. These policies had been brewing in London for a year and a half. As each issue was hauled to the stage of San Francisco by

someone, each seemed to be looked on as a new, almost unheard-of and explosive issue created by the Russians. The Polish question had been whetted up in Britain a year and a half before San Francisco. British opinion-making sources were occupied with Poland in great detail in 1943 when American opinion gave it only passing attention. Even the "great news" of the arrest of the sixteen Polish underground leaders had been hotted up in the British Parliament a month before San Francisco opened. The effect of "revelations" at San Francisco was to put Russia in the dock as "double-crossing the Yalta agreements". Thus, a British "interpretation" of Yalta was promulgated as a gospel which the American State Department took upon itself to preach.

Austria was a preoccupation of British policy in 1943 and began to be agitated in the British press early in 1944. This was long before the Russian drive for Vienna had begun. The Austria issue also was no concern of American public opinion until the State Department suddenly rubber-stamped the British non-recognition of the Vienna provisional government. Yugoslavia was another issue long agitated from Britain, though this had some early echoes in the United States. But it was only at San Francisco that American opinion waked up to the fact that the Yugoslavian question might become a Trieste problem, like the Fiume problem which Lloyd George dumped into President Wilson's lap in 1919. Other Balkan problems, hangers-on of the above, and each an acute, long-standing issue in British policy, appeared at San Francisco, on what was made to seem to be American initiative. Always also each issue pointed straight at Russia.

Toward the end of May the old British-French conflict in Syria and Lebanon reappeared in the Middle East, and at San Francisco, this time arraying London and Washington against Paris. Nobody brought up the issues of Italy and Greece, which would have pointed at Britain, although the State Department was certainly conscious of President Roosevelt's efforts to modify British policy in those two countries.

The net result was that the antagonizing of U.S. and U.S.S.R. became a bit overdone and by the end of May it was plain that moves at the White House were being made to remove U.S. from the position of protagonist and back to the Rooseveltian role of mediator.

The Labor Background

Against the above background, it is not difficult to see why the San Francisco conference rebuffed the request of the WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) for a measure of recognition. WFTU, linking American and Russian labor, worked counter to maneuvers for setting American and Russia at loggerheads. The rebuff to world labor fitted both the British long-term and short-term policies. On the short-term it also fitted Canadian policy, since Prime Minister King was also facing an election which threatened to be in large part a contest with Canadian labor.

The final move, persisted in with great insistence by the British delegation, was to give specific recognition to the ILO. Had this been done, it would have enabled the British government, during the British election, to point to the ILO as "recognition for labor obtained by the British" and so to relieve the British government of the onus of an anti-labor attitude. In addition, recognition of the ILO, a

government body, could have been used to give the ILO an exclusive position, an added good reason for barring WFTU. This in addition to the advantage that the ILO, actually a ghost legally "in being", has been under British control and likely to remain so.

But the ILO move was also long headed in that it threw a bone of contention into American labor. Presenting the ILO issue whetted the antagonism between AFL, with ILO connections, and CIO, with virtually no recognition there. The British governmental insistence furthered disruption within WFTU and tended to bring the AFL onto the potentially British side, against the CIO.

No Use to the White House

Again the usefulness of the above San Francisco developments to the American domestic labor policy might be a bit difficult to see.

It was certainly no help in case the White House should attempt, as it has in years past, for political reasons, to mitigate the CIO-AFL rivalry. Particularly San Francisco was no help if the White House should decide to use some form of international labor organization, recognized by UNCIO, as a unifier, according equal place to AFL and CIO.

Finally, this issue at San Francisco threatened to put the State Department in the position of a dickener between CIO and AFL. That is, it turned the national foreign affairs into a make-weight between domestic labor organizations. This sort of thing would be even worse than the State Department policy as laid down privately a month before San Francisco; "Labor ought to be in it somewhere, but not at San Francisco, not until the UNCIO instrument is framed." (The attitude was reminiscent of State Department policy, as laid down by the same men in 1941 when

they advised government agencies to disregard a world labor conference, that of the ILO, the only organization in the field that was even pretending to function. President Roosevelt reversed that policy and requested that the final meeting of the ILO be held in the White House and be emphasized by a world broadcast by the President.) Today the White House may not prefer, ultimately, the consequences of UNCIO alienated from labor or pretending to placate labor with an ILO ghost.

"Postponement" and "reference to the next meeting of the Big Three" developed in a number of issues at San Francisco. The relationship of labor organizations, including international organizations, to UNCIO is almost certain to be present at the table of the Big Three, and perhaps above the salt.

Summary

While the above estimates, based on labor sources, are made from a purely American viewpoint, it should be noted that the sources include labor in other countries, especially Britain, France and Mexico.

To discount the estimates as "anti-British" (in the usual sense of the term) would be beside the mark. There were British observers at San Francisco who "took a dim view" of the British official manoeuvres listed above and criticized them as too useful to Eden's party in an election.

Finally note that in the U.S.A. it is the labor organizations, dealt with in these estimates, that our government is supposed to be looking to for mass support for adoption of an UNCIO charter.

Outstanding conclusions are:

a) In the international labor field San Francisco did

damage which will require to be redressed, just as the White House had to redress the balance regarding Poland, etc. To advise the White House to regard the international labor relation to UNCIO as "as a subtle Russian plot" would be to put the President in the hole at the Big Three meeting.

b) In the American domestic labor field the President would be ill-advised to permit any agency, including the State Department, to attempt to jockey between AFL and CIO, using the UNCIO labor question as a bait to either labor organization. Especially when such jockeying might be of obvious advantage to one foreign power. If that power's coming elections put the British labor Party in a position to be critical of any State Department interferences in labor problems, the White House might wish to be forewarned.

c) In its desire to rebuff World Labor, the State Department did two things which may have very serious results indeed. In the first place, by opposing the WFTU with the ILO, (as the British wanted), they have put the ILO in a position where its future is very precarious. The Russians, threatening to raise the roof if the ILO were named in the Charter, kept it out. Now its status is dubious, resting only in the Treaty of Versailles. If the British-engineered American position were not taken, it is not at all certain that the Russian objection to the ILO would have been so strenuous.

In the second place, the State Department, in order to keep the WFTU out of the picture of the UNCIO, went so far as to bar all non-governmental organizations from participation in the Social and Economic Council. This Council, mainly designed as one which would prevent

war by removing the Economic and Social causes of it, had to have, of course, a social and economic base in the representatives of Labor, Industry and Agriculture. To bar the organizations of workers, employers and farmers would have been to deprive the organization of any real "peoples' base" at all. This was so obvious that Jim Carey, CIO Consultant, was able to perform the miracle of uniting the CIO, AFL, the NAM, Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau, National Grange and other economic organizations in opposition to this policy of exclusion. The flux that bound these organizations together was, of course, a common displeasure with the State Department policy of excluding any but "governmental" organizations. With this sort of backing, of course, the final charter, as drawn, includes the participation of non-governmental organizations. But the tactics are not forgotten.

Delivered by hand by Gen. D on 14 May

CONFIDENTIAL*Labor*

13 May 1945

*W. L. L. L. L.***MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

The following report on World Federation of Trade Unions and UNCIO was prepared by one of our representatives:

The World Trade Union Federation is an outgrowth of a meeting held in London in February 1945 at the call of the British Trades Union Congress. Invitations were sent to the labor movements of all United Nations countries, including Russia. In the United States, the CIO accepted; the AF of L did not, saying it did not choose to participate with the Russians.

The British sought to consult to discover means to mobilize the working classes to aid the war effort, to secure peace, and most importantly, to set up rational methods whereby after the war the workers of the world would not be the means of destroying each other through "out-throat competition." The last purpose was the most important to the British who were, and still are, fearful

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

of the status of the British standard^{of} living in a postwar world.

But the CIO and the Russians had very different ideas about the London conference. Both groups, denied participation in world international labor organizations, wanted a clean slate, a new organization of world labor, revitalized by the war experience and definitely dedicated to political action on a world scale.

This conflict between the purposes of the meeting in London was obvious even before the meeting began. At the labor conference, the conflict became more acute. The British, with support of refugee European labor leaders in London, while participating in the meeting tried to block any moves to make the meeting other than consultative. But they found themselves in a difficult position. Having called the meeting, they could not be the cause of its failure. Hillman of the CIO, Toland of the Latin American workers, and Kuznetsov of the Russians brought out of the meeting the basis for a new organization. The British, fearing Russian domination because of the large number of Russian votes and those of what they considered Russian-influenced countries, tried to get a voting basis

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

which would give them a real leadership.

During the London conference, Yalta was announced. This gave tremendous impetus to the new World Labor Organization. As Yalta was the high point of Russian influence, so also was it the high point of desire for new world organization, political as well as labor. The new World Labor Organization, coming to the same conclusions as Yalta, was pictured as a popular base among the working people of the world for carrying out the decisions of Yalta.

From London, the Continuations Committee moved to Paris, the permanent seat of the new organization. Here the decisions of London were implemented. A new organization was set up. The constitution was to be drawn in Washington on April 12, 1945, and then the Committee was to proceed to San Francisco to represent world labor at the UNCIO.

In the Washington meetings the differences, apparently ironed out in London and Paris, began to appear. The British, not yet fully committed to the new organization and retaining their membership in the IFTU, were the clear balance of power. If they pulled out of the new WTUF, it would mean the end of the WTUF.

The British, working through Oldenbrook of the IFTU

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

and Schevenels, as well as Citrine, indicated that not only were they not overly interested in the new WTUF but also were inclined to stay out of the new WTUF unless they were able to achieve enough autonomy to keep the Russian influence at a minimum. At the conference itself Oldenbroek and Schevenels, in touch with the AF of L, attempted to "water down" the decisions of London and Paris. Citrine, anxious to protect the autonomy of the British TUC, fought to have the decisions of the WTUF of a non-binding nature. He got support from the CIO on this because of its desire for autonomy and the growing apprehension of some of its right-wing leaders for protection from "Russian-influenced" decisions.

The Washington Conference closed without really accomplishing anything. Skepticism and discouragement were the mood. The prospect for a strong organization was bad.

On the eve of the conference at San Francisco, certain things were clear:

- a) The strong organization proposed at London and Paris had been "watered down" in Washington.
- b) The "watering down" consisted largely in British and American agreement to take away the binding nature of the decisions of the congress of the new world organization and

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

substitute autonomy.

c) The British and certain American CIO leaders were worried over the strength Russia would be able to muster in the new organization and anti-Russian feeling was noticeable among both groups.

d) The British scheme to stabilize British wages, based on strong trade secretariats and the continuance of the ILO, became a real issue in the Washington conference.

e) The British, while participating in a new world organization, were making overtures to the AF of L and were far more interested in creating a world federation which would be acceptable to the AF of L than they were in creating a strong world trade union movement. If such a strong movement were created, because the representation would in one way or another be based on membership figures, the Russians with their large membership would dominate the new organization.

In both the labor and the political field, the real issue was Russia and Russian influence in the postwar world. At London the CIO was the bridge between the British and Russian workers; just as at Yalta, Roosevelt was the bridge between Churchill and Stalin. We had the balance of power, and we had it both in the labor and political field. But because of our

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL

disunity both in the labor and political field, we were robbed of the use of it. By the time of the Washington Labor Conference and UNCIO, the balance had shifted to the British.

Labor at San Francisco was barred from the UNCIO; it was actually physically isolated in Oakland. It was further isolated from the local labor movement of San Francisco Bay. Some of the AF of L leaders there, friendly to the WFTU, were prohibited from showing any support by strong AF of L pressure. The local CIO, dominated by Bridges, was barred by anti-Bridges elements in the CIO from contact with the WFTU delegates.

The isolation of labor from UNCIO has continued within the national delegations. British labor delegates profess that they have been rebuffed by their government in regard to the status they wanted for British labor delegates as advisers. The French delegates profess indignation at their foreign minister, Bidault, who has failed to appoint any labor advisor to the French UNCIO delegation.

In general the world labor delegates feel that the San Francisco UNCIO atmosphere is, if not hostile, at least frigid. They feel that the atmosphere here is not one of "peace" or of "the problem of aggressors" but instead of a battle about Russia. The labor delegates "will do nothing to

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

impede UNCIO" publicly but privately they think the UNCIO atmosphere is anti-Russia and anti-labor. Labor Conference delegates resent the idea that their demand for status, as an independent international body, should be tied up with Russia or that the labor voice, given such status, would be automatically the voice of Russia. Labor delegates profess being stupefied by "such naive questions" as "why should labor have separate and independent organization in connection with a world political organization?" They seem to think that, given the history of the last quarter of a century of such independent bodies as the ILO and of other forms of independent autonomous trade union international organization, that the UNCIO should take it for granted that such organizations are an accepted part of any world set-up.

The labor delegates' "indignation and disappointment" at the present situation should be taken with several grains of salt. First, they did not expect to do very much better than they have done and they are looking to the future. They had been told in London that they would not be seated. Their future is the September meeting in Paris. Some delegates expect to get on "without benefit of UNCIO" though their experience here so far is a handicap which some of them think will

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

not be bettered. 'Two countries' delegates are looking to the future based on hopes of election returns. The French labor delegates express gratification rather than enthusiasm over the current French municipal election results. In the French general elections to come they count on a sufficient left majority to "check the de Gaulle government and create a very different atmosphere in Paris in September from San Francisco now". British labor delegates here are on tenterhooks over the imminent end of the war and possible immediate general election. They profess to see coming a shift to the left in Britain in that election.

In short, the Labor Conference "disappointment" here is colored by expectations that political events in the west of Europe will look in labor's direction in the next six months and so will result in a different status for a world labor organization at future UNCIO sessions. Wishful thinking naturally enters into these labor estimates, just as wishful thinking enters into some governmental estimates that the British, French and other political developments will be "safe".

The most important hitch in the World Labor Conference, of course, grows out of the division in American labor. The AFL policy seems to be thoroughly set for blocking the World

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

Labor Conference at all costs. This is not too disappointing to the British labor delegates whose desire is for a world labor organization which they control. The AFL-CIO division has been so whetted by recent events that West Coast AFL leaders who criticized the AFL attitude previously now say privately that they were not open their mouths. They say they cannot sit on the same platform in this matter with CIO officials with whom they associate daily on governmental and other bodies.

The constitution of the new WFTU has just been announced. In essence, it shows:

a) The Russians, numerically strong enough to dominate all decisions, have willingly agreed to a voting scheme which will materially cut down their strength. Under the new scheme, England and the CIO can outvote the Soviet unions, even if they have only one-half the approximate membership. If the AFL came in, it and the CIO could almost match the Russian vote.

b) The Russians have compromised also on the question of the autonomy of the WFTU. While not as weak as the British wanted the organization to be, it does allow enough flexibility to preserve basic autonomy while preserving the semblance of

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

world organization.

c) On the question of Trade Secretariats, one of the most difficult of the conference, the new constitutional provision, while a compromise, is clearly not in favor of the position of the British and Oldenbrook.

Here are the results of Oakland:

1. UNCIO looked like a battle over Russia. The labor conference has achieved something that is the exact opposite. Notwithstanding the prevalence of anti-Russian feeling and the frigid atmosphere of UNCIO, the delegates went about their solid job of completing their constitution. This they were unable to do at Washington.

2. World labor, as represented by the WFTU, although disappointed by the isolation accorded them by UNCIO, will not fight it. But it will not be enthusiastic.

3. A new world organization has been formed and the dissolution of the IPTU is, as its Secretary has said, "almost a foregone conclusion."

In view of what happened in Washington, how can we explain the unanimity of agreement and the solid nature of the achievement in the Labor Conference as contrasted with the apparent lack of unity at UNCIO? The answers would seem to be:

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

CONFIDENTIAL

a) The British, who held the balance of power at Washington, lost it in Oakland. When the AFL refused to pay its dues to the IFTU Secretary, the British would have felt they had no place to go except to the new organization. For the IFTU without the AFL would have been a shell.

b) The Russians at Oakland, unlike the Russians at San Francisco, were not fighting a battle for prestige and were not picking up every small item to battle over. They apparently really wanted a WFTU and were willing to compromise to get it.

c) The recent elections in France and the prospect of elections in Britain, indicated the growing strength of labor and the consequent weakening of conservative forces in Europe.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President *The following is*
a report from one of the representatives
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS AND UNCTO

The World Trade Union Federation is an outgrowth of a meeting held in London in February 1946 at the call of the British Trades Union Congress. Invitations were sent to the labor movements of all United Nations countries, including Russia. In the U. S. the CIO accepted; the AF of L didn't, saying it didn't choose to participate with the Russians, who, it considered were not "free" trade unionists.

When the British TUC made the call for the conference first in the fall of 1943, there is little doubt that they had in mind, not a new World Labor Organization, but merely a general meeting of the representatives of United Nations Workers to discuss a number of items. In the main, the British sought to consult to discover means to mobilize the working classes to aid the war effort, to secure peace, and most importantly, to set up rational methods whereby, after the war, the workers of the world would not be the means of destroying each other through "out-throat competition". This last purpose was the most important to the British who were, and still are, fearful of the status of the British standard of living in a postwar world.

But the CIO and the Russians had very different ideas about the London conference. Both groups, denied participation in world international labor organizations, wanted a clean slate, a new organization of world labor, revitalized by the war experience and definitely dedicated to political action on a world scale.

This conflict between the purposes of the meeting in London was obvious even before the meeting began. At the labor conference, the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

conflict became more acute. The British, with the support of refugee European labor leaders in London, while participating in the meeting, tried to block any moves to make the meeting other than consultative. But they found themselves in a difficult position. Having called the meeting, they could not be the cause of its failure. Hillman of the CIO, Toledano of the Latin American workers, and Kuznetsov of the Russians brought out of the meeting the basis for a new organization. The British, fearing Russian domination because of the large number of Russian votes and those of what they considered Russian-influenced countries, tried to get a voting basis which would give them a real leadership. In a measure, due to the Russian willingness to compromise, they were successful. Other compromises had to be made to accomplish British participation. One of these was the naming of Walter Schevenels, Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, on Citrine's demand, to the Continuations Committee, the key committee empowered to set up the new organization to replace the IFTU. (The AF of L was a member of the IFTU).

During the London conference, Yalta was announced. This gave tremendous impetus to the new world Labor Organization. As Yalta was the high point of Russian influence, so also was it the high point of desire for new world organization, political as well as labor. The new world Labor Organization, coming to the same conclusions as Yalta, was pictured as a popular base, among the working people of the world, for carrying out the decisions of Yalta. In America, for example, the CIO-PAC was to popularize Yalta and the new principles of international organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

From London, the Continuations Committee moved to Paris, the permanent seat of the new organization. Here the decisions of London were implemented. A new organization was set up. The constitution was to be drawn in Washington on April 12, 1946, and then the Committee was to proceed to San Francisco to represent world labor at the UNCIO.

Between London and Washington things began to happen. In the labor field, as in the political field, the desire for "getting tough with Russia" began to grow. The spearhead was the AF of L in the United States. Left out of the new organization, the AF of L awoke to discover that participation in the new organization amounted to a ticket to San Francisco. Therefore, it set about to discredit the new organization as a "Communist" show and worked hard to keep the WTUP from representing world labor at the UNCIO. Although the AF of L had long advocated "labor's seat at the peace table", when confronted by the threat of something like this, it fought to deny such. Since it didn't and couldn't claim to represent world labor, it wanted to prevent the WTUP from representing world labor. It was successful.

As a result, except in a consultative capacity, along with the Rotary, Kiwanis and "do-good" organizations, labor has no seat at UNCIO.

In the Washington meetings the differences, apparently ironed out in London and Paris, began to appear. The British, not yet fully committed to the new organization and retaining their membership in the IPTU, were the clear balance of power. If they pulled out of the new WTUP, it would mean the end of the WTUP.

The British, working through Oldenbrook of the IIF and Schevenels, as well as Citrine, indicated that, not only were they not overly interested

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

in the new WTUF, but also were inclined to stay out of the new WTUF unless they were able to achieve enough autonomy to keep the Russian influence at a minimum. At the conference itself, Oldenbroek and Schevenels, in touch with the AF of L, attempted to "water down" the decisions of London and Paris. Oldenbroek, intent in achieving independence for his Trade Secretariat, argued for days, insisting that if he did not get the independence he sought, and did not receive a definitive answer to the difficult place of the Trade Secretariats in the new WTUF, he would pull out of the WTUF and seek to exert such influence as he could to scuttle the new organization. Citrine, anxious to protect the autonomy of the British TUC, fought to have the decisions of the WTUF of a non-binding nature. He got support from the CIO on this because of its desire for autonomy and the growing apprehension of some of its right-wing leaders for protection from "Russian-influenced" decisions.

The death of President Roosevelt was a powerful factor in the negotiations in Washington. To the British, the CIO was largely a creature of Roosevelt. With him gone, its influence was secondary to the AF of L in America. So bridges to the AF of L were built. Attempts were made to create the kind of a new organization acceptable to the AF of L. This meant weakening the kind of organization contemplated at London and Paris.

The Washington Conference closed without really accomplishing anything. Skepticism and discouragement were the mood. The prospect for a strong organization was bad.

Before coming to Washington, Schevenels, Secretary of the IFTU, had written Robert Watt of the AF of L telling him that the London

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

conference of the WTUF had not accomplished any practical work. He also said that "needless to say, as far as IFTU is concerned, no decision from outside can affect its future." He also wrote that since the AF of L had not paid its dues to the IFTU for 1944, he would like to have the AF of L keep the money in Washington until he arrived and to pay it to him in cash, which would save him the trouble of obtaining money from England necessary to meet his expenses in Washington and San Francisco.

Just before leaving Washington for San Francisco, Schevenels called on the AF of L to collect the 1944 dues. Bob Watt bawled Schevenels out and refused to pay the dues. He accused Schevenels of being disloyal to the IFTU in his participation in the conference which was devoted to the setting up of a dual world movement and wanted to know by what authority he, as secretary of the IFTU, was a member of the Administrative Committee of the new World Trade Union Congress.

On the eve of the conference at San Francisco, certain things were clear:

- a) The strong organization proposed at London and Paris had been "watered down" in Washington.
- b) The "watering down" consisted largely in British and American agreement to take away the binding nature of the decisions of the congress of the new world organization and substitute autonomy.
- c) The British and certain American CIO leaders were worried over the strength Russia would be able to muster in the new organization and anti-Russian feeling was noticeable among both groups.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

d) The British scheme to stabilize British wages, based on strong trade secretariats and the continuance of the ILO, became a real issue in the Washington conference.

e) The British, while participating in a new world organization, were making overtures to the AF of L and were far more interested in creating a world federation which would be acceptable to the AF of L than they were in creating a strong world trade union movement. If such a strong movement were created, because the representation would in one way or another be based on membership figures, the Russians with their large membership would dominate the new organization.

On the basis of what had happened in the Washington meetings an observer, promising his observations on an analogy between the WTUF and the UNCIO, could not only make some predictions about what would happen in the labor meeting in San Francisco; he could also make certain predictions about what would happen in UNCIO. This prophecy would run something like this:

In both the labor and the political field, the real issue was Russia and Russian influence in the postwar world. At London the CIO was the bridge between the British and Russian workers; just as at Yalta, Roosevelt was the bridge between Churchill and Stalin. We had the balance of power, and we had it both in the labor and political field. But, because of our disunity, both in the labor and political field, we were robbed of the use of it. By the time of the Washington Labor Conference and UNCIO, the balance had shifted to the British. // This had begun before Roosevelt's death. The real reason was our disunity over Russia, exposed most clearly after Yalta. In the labor field, the British, by pulling out of the new organization, could wreck it. In the political field, the threat of one-third of our Senate refusing to pass the Dumbarton Oaks

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

was comparable to the threat of the AF of L to isolate itself. Thus the British, in both fields, hoping to weaken Russian influence, could throw their weight against the type of an organization which would give the Russians a position commensurate with their strong population and geographical position, and this would be done under the guise of making it palatable to our Senate. Thus, the really effective figures at UNCIO would be Eden and Vandenberg. It could therefore be assumed that UNCIO would be a "watering down" of Yalta as Washington was a "watering down" of London in the labor field. In the labor field the British had shown that their real interest was not in any new world organization, but in strong cartel arrangements worked out through the "Industry Committees" of the ILO. These could be said to correspond, in the political field, to regional agreements, bilateral treaties and the preservation of the Empire Colonial policy.

Labor at San Francisco was barred from the UNCIO; it was actually physically isolated in Oakland. It was further isolated from the local labor movement of San Francisco Bay. Some of the AF of L leaders there, friendly to the WFTU, were prohibited from showing any support by strong AF of L pressure. The local CIO, dominated by Bridges, was barred by anti-Bridges elements in the CIO from contact with the WFTU delegates.

The isolation of labor from UNCIO has continued within the national delegations. British labor delegates profess that they have been rebuffed by their government in regard to the status they wanted for British labor delegates as advisors. The French delegates profess indignation at their foreign minister, Bidault, who has failed to appoint any labor adviser to the French UNCIO delegation; this after Bidault's

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

CONFIDENTIAL

previous promise to them to appoint such labor advisers. Murray and Hillman, advisers, say there has been but a single meeting of the American UNCIO advisers. Toledano of the CTAL has isolated himself in a private house and otherwise buries himself in the World Labor Conference meetings.

In general the World Labor delegates feel that the San Francisco UNCIO atmosphere is, if not hostile, at least frigid. They feel that the atmosphere here is not one of "peace" or of "the problem of aggressors" but instead of a battle about Russia. The labor delegates "will do nothing to impede UNCIO" publicly, but privately they think the UNCIO atmosphere is anti-Russia and anti-labor. // Labor delegates show some amazement, sugar-coated as amusement, at private feelers made to them such as "if you labor people were in this conference, how would you vote on the Polish government? on the Baltic states? on the Austrian government?, etc." In other words questions of power politics, centering on Russia. The private attitude of labor delegates is "we are not interested in saying anything about such questions; our interest is obtaining some status for having any kind of a say at all on anything". Labor Conference delegates resent the idea that their demand for status, as an independent international body, should be tied up with Russia or that the labor voice, given such status, would be automatically the voice of Russia. Labor delegates profess being stupified by "such naive questions" as "why should labor have separate and independent organization in connection with a world political organization?" They seem to think that, given the history of the last quarter of a century of such independent

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

CONFIDENTIAL

bodies as the ILO and of other forms of independent autonomous trade union international organization, that the UNCIO should take it for granted that such organisations are an accepted part of any world set-up.

The labor delegates' "indignation and disappointment" at the present situation should be taken with several grains of salt. First, they did not expect to do very much better than they have done and they are looking to the future. They had been told in London that they would not be seated. Their future is the September meeting in Paris. Some delegates expect to get on "without benefit of UNCIO" though their experience here so far is a handicap which some of them think will not be bettered. Two countries' delegates are looking to the future based on hopes of election returns. The French labor delegates express gratification rather than enthusiasm over the current French municipal election results. In the French general elections to come, they count on a sufficient left majority to "check the DeGaulle government and create a very different atmosphere in Paris in September from San Francisco now". British labor delegates here are on tenterhooks over the imminent end of the war and possible immediate general election. They profess to see coming a shift to the left in Britain in that election. British labor delegates Citrine and Edwards began electioneering yesterday with a public attack on the British UNCIO delegation's opposition to seating world labor delegates in UNCIO. Their attack was not only on Eden but on Labor's governmental delegates who went along with Eden.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

In short, the Labor Conference "disappointment" here is colored by expectations that political events in the west of Europe will look in labor's direction in the next six months and so will result in a different status for a world labor organization at future UNCIO sessions. Wishful thinking naturally enters into these labor estimates, just as wishful thinking enters into some governmental estimates that the British, French and other political developments will be "safe".

The most important hitch in the World Labor Conference, of course, grows out of the division in American labor. The AFL policy seems to be thoroughly set for blocking a World Labor Conference at all costs. This is not too disappointing to the British labor delegates whose desire is for a world labor organization which they control. The AFL-CIO division has been so whetted by recent events that West Coast AFL leaders who criticized the AFL attitude previously now say privately that they dare not open their mouths. They say they cannot sit on the same platform in this matter with CIO officials with whom they associate daily on governmental and other bodies. A proposal for a welcoming mass meeting, to be given by all local labor bodies for the world labor delegates, was quickly rejected by local AFL leaders who had previously advocated it. They say now "it would be futile".

If the UNCIO conference comes to be acclaimed as a success, little will be heard for some time from this international labor movement. If the UNCIO conference comes to have a different reputation, labor delegates will conceivably begin blaming the bad results on claims that "labor's voice was barred at San Francisco".

The constitution of the new WFTU has just been announced. In essence, it shows:

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

CONFIDENTIAL

a) The Russians, numerically strong enough to dominate all decisions, have willingly agreed to a voting scheme which will materially cut down their strength. Under the new scheme, England and the CIO can outvote the Soviet unions, even if they have only one-half the approximate membership. If the AFL came in, it and the CIO could almost match the Russian vote.

b) The Russians have compromised also on the question of the autonomy of the WFTU. While not as weak as the British wanted the organization to be, it does allow enough flexibility to preserve basic autonomy while preserving the semblance of world organization.

c) On the question of Trade Secretariats, one of the most difficult of the conference, the new constitutional provision, while a compromise, is clearly not in favor of the position of the British and Oldenbrook.

The Conference closed on May 3rd. The Constitution was announced at a public press conference on May 5. Some of the delegates will remain behind, but most have already left. All that remains now is the outcome of the request to Stettinius of the WFTU for participation in UNCIO as advisors and in the Economic and Social Council as more active participants.

Here are the results of Oakland:

1. UNCIO looked like a battle over Russia. The labor conference has achieved something that is the exact opposite. Notwithstanding the prevalence of anti-Russian feeling and the frigid atmosphere of UNCIO, the delegates went about their solid job of completing their constitution. This they were unable to do at Washington.

2. World labor, as represented by the WFTU, although

CONFIDENTIAL

- 12 -

disappointed by the isolation accorded them by UNCIO, will not fight it. But it will not be enthusiastic.

3. A new world organization has been formed and the dissolution of the IFTU is, as its Secretary has said, "almost a foregone conclusion."

In view of what happened in Washington, how can we explain the unanimity of agreement and the solid nature of the achievement in the Labor Conference as contrasted with the apparent lack of unity at UNCIO? The answers would seem to be:

a) The British, who held the balance of power at Washington, lost it in Oakland. When the AFL refused to pay its dues to the IFTU Secretary, the British would have felt they had no place to go except to the new organization. For the IFTU without the AFL would have been a shell.

b) The Russians at Oakland, unlike the Russians at San Francisco, were not fighting a battle for prestige and were not picking up every small item to battle over. They apparently really wanted a WFTU and were willing to compromise to get it.

c) The recent elections in France and the prospect of elections in Britain, indicated the growing strength of labor and the consequent weakening of conservative forces in Europe.

Now that the conference is over, it remains to be seen what next will happen. William Green, president of the AFL has just gone to San Francisco to present the AFL position to the UNCIO. What he will do is not fully known, but it is clear that he will plead against the use of forced German labor in Europe. He may also try

CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

to revive his association with Schevenels and Citrine in order to restore the IFTU. On the first point, he will run up against serious opposition, not only from the English, but from the majority of European delegations. Also he will face serious opposition at home. The strong reports of Rosenman and Monseignor Ryan's Catholic Welfare leaders are against him. So is logic. With all other types of reparations gone, and his unwillingness to come out against reparations, he can suggest nothing except an American-financed program which will be labelled "reparations". On the second point, the British may have gone too far already to revive the IFTU. If the IFTU cannot be revived, the AFL will then face isolation in world labor. This may result in the creation of a new AFL inspired "free" trade union international. If this happens, it will begin to develop in Germany where AFL Joe Keenan will be in charge of setting up German labor unions under General Clay. Whether this can be extended to other European countries is a serious question of doubt and whether it will be successful in Germany is also very doubtful.

- 13 -

CONFIDENTIAL

to revive his association with Schevenels and Citrine in order to restore the IFTU. On the first point, he will run up against serious opposition, not only from the English, but from the majority of European delegations. Also he will face serious opposition at home. The strong reports of Rosenman and Monseignor Ryan's Catholic Welfare leaders are against him. So is logic. With all other types of reparations gone, and his unwillingness to come out against reparations, he can suggest nothing except an American-financed program which will be labelled "reparations". On the second point, the British may have gone too far already to revive the IFTU. If the IFTU cannot be revived, the AFL will then face isolation in world labor. This may result in the creation of a new AFL inspired "free" trade union international. If this happens, it will begin to develop in Germany where AFL Joe Keenan will be in charge of setting up German labor unions under General Clay. Whether this can be extended to other European countries is a serious question of doubt and whether it will be successful in Germany is also very doubtful.

CONFIDENTIAL

To: General Donovan

You wished to relictate your
memorandum to the President based
upon these notes.

*no then
can be stated
in. I have will
Director's office up*

(3308)

1635
Labor
1945
11/10/45

San Francisco Conference
2 May 1945

Memorandum

Summary of Position of World Labor Conference in Relation to UNCIO

The World Labor Conference is accomplishing its primary purpose, behind closed doors, of drafting a constitution to be submitted to constituent bodies for ratification before the reconvened World Labor Conference in Paris in September.

Its secondary objective, i.e. "to obtain recognition as the spokesman of world labor" at the UNCIO, has obtained less success than the most pessimistic feared. Tonight at a public mass meeting the World Labor delegates will make public some sort of pronouncement, thus using the method of "public pressure".

Two methods were open to the labor conference from its beginning here. One was by public pressure, exerted through open sessions of the Labor Conference, press interviews, mass meetings, etc. The other method was of secret negotiation, primarily with the Big Three. The labor delegation obviously chose the latter which has now resulted in a rebuff from UNCIO. They are now proceeding belatedly to the first method and at the same time announce that they are winding up their sessions secretly and leaving.

The Labor Conference has experienced a succession of isolations. Physically they were isolated off in Oakland, meeting and living in inconspicuous hotels. Some of the foreign delegates, after the prominence given to their activities in the London and Paris meetings recently, look on their treatment here as an indignity. Next, the Conference found itself isolated from the local labor movement, which was not permitted to make arrangements for the Conference, nor have its heads been permitted inside the Conference. Local CIO organizations have been indignant at this situation and blame Carey, secretary of the CIO, and MacDonald, who, they say, "were determined to shut out Bridges at all costs". Third, the Conference was isolated from local AFL contacts, including AFL unions which have been openly cooperating with the CIO. This was done by direct instructions from Pres. Green of the AFL in Washington. The AFL opposition went further and included a check of State Department and UNCIO authorities aimed at rebuffing the Labor Conference demand for representation at UNCIO.

-2-

Dave Beck, AFL adviser here, flew to Washington to the AFL executive committee meeting, reportedly carrying the assurance that UNCLIO would not admit representatives of the Labor Conference.

Secret negotiations continued from Saturday to Monday. The upshot was rejection of the Labor Conference request, primarily by Britain and the U.S.

The isolation of labor from UNCLIO has continued within the national delegations. British labor delegates profess that they have been refused by their government in regard to the status they wanted for British labor delegates as advisers. The French delegates profess indignation at their foreign minister, Bidault, who has failed to appoint any labor advisor to the French UNCLIO delegation; this after Bidault's previous promise to them to appoint such labor advisers. Murray and Hillman, advisers, say there has been but a single meeting of the American UNCLIO advisers. Toledano of the CPAL has isolated himself in a private house and otherwise buries himself in the World Labor Conference meetings.

In general the World Labor delegates feel that the San Francisco UNCLIO atmosphere is, if not hostile, at least rigid. They feel that the atmosphere here is not one of "peace" or of "the problem of aggressors" but instead of a battle about Russia. The labor delegates "will do nothing to imbed UNCLIO" publicly, but privately they think the UNCLIO atmosphere is anti-Russia and anti-labor. Labor delegates show some amazement, sugar-coated as amusement, at private feelers made to them such as "if you labor people were in this conference, how would you vote on the Polish government? on the Baltic states? on the Austrian government?, etc." In other words questions of power politics, centering on Russia. The private attitude of labor delegates is "we are not interested in saying anything about such questions; our interest is obtaining some status for having any kind of a say at all on anything". Labor Conference delegates resent the idea that the UNCLIO and for status, as an independent international body, should be tied up with Russia or that the labor voice, given such status, would be automatically the voice of Russia. Labor delegates profess being stupified by "such naive questions" as why should labor have separate and independent organization in connection with a world political organization? They seem to think that, given the history of the last quarter of a century of such independent bodies as the ILO and of other forms of independent autonomous trade union international organization that the UNCLIO should take it for granted that such organizations are an accepted part of a world set-up.

-3-

The labor delegates' "indignation and disappointment" at the present situation should be taken with several grains of salt. First, they did not expect to do very much better than they have done and they are looking to the future. Their future is the September meeting in Paris. Some delegates expect to get on "without benefit of UNCIO", though their experience here so far is a handicap which some of them think will yet be bettered. Two countries' delegates are looking to the future based on hopes of election returns. The French labor delegates express gratification rather than enthusiasm over the current French municipal election results. In the French general elections to come, they count on a sufficient left majority to "check the De Gaulle government and create a very different atmosphere in Paris in September from San Francisco now". British labor delegates here are on tenterhooks over the imminent end of the war and possible immediate general election. They profess to see coming a shift to the left in Britain in that election. British labor delegates Citrine and Edwards began electioneering yesterday with a public attack on the British UNCIO delegation's opposition to seating world labor delegates in UNCIO. Their attack was not only on Eden but on labor's governmental delegates who went along with Eden.

In short, the Labor Conference "disappointment" here is colored by expectations that political events in the west of Europe will look in labor's direction in the next six months and so will result in a different status for a world labor organization at future UNCIO sessions. Wishful thinking naturally enters in to these labor estimates, just as wishful thinking enters in to some governmental estimates that the British, French and other political developments will be "safe".

The most important hitch in the World Labor Conference, of course, grows out of the division in American labor. The AFL policy seems to be thoroughly set for blocking the World Labor Conference at all costs. This is not too disappointing to the British labor delegates whose desire is for a world labor organization which they control. The AFL-CIO division was soon so whetted by recent events that West Coast AFL leaders who criticized the AFL attitude previously now say privately that they dare not open their mouths. They say they cannot sit on the same platform, in this matter, with CIO officials with whom they associate daily on governmental and other bodies. A proposal for a welcoming mass meeting, to be given by all local labor bodies for the world labor delegates, was quickly rejected by AFL leaders who had previously advocated it. They say now "it would be futile".

-4-

With tonight's public report by the world labor delegates some fur may possibly begin to fly, and a continuing debate. That is only a possibility. If the JWCIO conference comes to be acclaimed as a success, little will be heard for some time from this international labor movement. If the JWCIO conference comes to have a different reputation, labor delegates will conceivably begin blaming the bad results on claims that "labor's voice was barred at San Francisco".

OSS Form 2202

S E C R E T

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <i>Director</i>					<i>Here is a report on the way the picture looked at the beginning of the</i>
2.					<i>S. F. Conference. As the last part of the report</i>
3.					<i>indicates, there is an analogy which can be drawn from the labor</i>
4.					<i>picture. This might be added to by two items which have just been</i>
5.					<i>reported</i>
6.					<i>1. Yesterday Molotov moved the steering committee to admit the</i>
7.					<i>WTUF to an advisory status. He was howled down.</i>
8.					<i>2. The reports coming out of Greece show the effect created by the controversy at SF. Since</i>
9.					<i>this is largely a British-influenced press, some indication of the soundness of the</i>
10.					<i>prophecy or speculation can be seen. The Greek Report is attached.</i>
					<i>David C. Hall</i>

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

S E C R E T

The World Trade Union Conference at its February meeting in London formally expressed "its earnest desire and firm resolve to work together for the creation of a powerful, democratic World Trade Union Federation at the earliest practicable date." The task of drafting a constitution for this federation was assigned to a Continuations Committee of 41 members. This committee established an Administrative Committee of 13, which in turn created a sub-committee of seven members. After meeting in London, Paris, Washington, and now in Oakland, the labor leaders are encountering a number of obstacles which impede the achievement of the goal laid down by the London resolution. The net result of the committee deliberations to date fall far short of building the unified and powerful labor organization envisaged by many of the delegates to London. The following points, including decisions already made and issues which remain unsettled, reveal the distance still to be traveled before labor can unite as an effective force in international relations.

1. The WTUF will not send a formal delegation to the San Francisco conference in an effort to present the views of world labor. As a result, organized labor must still wait to be recognized as an independent factor in international relations.

2. According to present plans, national centers affiliated with the WTUF will not be obligated to carry out the decisions of the WTUF unless they specifically ratify these rulings.

3. There is no certainty that the International Trade Secretariats will become an integral part of the WTUF. On the contrary, Oldenbrook and Schevenels are demanding that the ITS shall remain independent and unregulated.

4. Certain groups want the ILO to figure prominently in post-war inter-

- 2 -

national labor circles, thereby reducing the prestige and the power of the WTUF.

5. The AF of L, its prestige perhaps strengthened by the death of President Roosevelt, remains aloof from the WTUF and instead looks to a post-war fight between the 'free unions' and the 'government-dominated unions' with the AF of L leading the former. As a result, it is possible that the scheduled meeting of the IFTU in September may mark the beginning of a new split in the international ranks of labor.

6. Finally, the "old guard" in international labor circles, such as Schevenels and Oldenbroek, have succeeded in occupying positions within the committees planning the WTUF. Thus far, they have played a strong dissenting role and have refused to share the aspirations of other delegates who look for the creation of a more effective organization than was the IFTU. Unless new and dynamic leadership emerges to build the WTUF, the old guard may successfully sabotage the present plans.

The ideal of organized labor the world over uniting in one group, acknowledging the same objectives, and agreeing to work together for their achievement, continues to be a distant goal. Labor remains divided within certain countries, and on the international level several organizations compete for the allegiance of the working class. Given the political role of organized labor in many countries, there is an inevitable clash between class loyalty and national loyalty with the result that any international labor organization must suffer an inherent weakness. Indeed the present collaboration of the organizations favoring the WTUF springs as much from the war-forged unity of the United Nations as from any feeling of group solidarity. Were it not for the war, it seems doubtful that the Russians and the CIO would today be meeting

- 3 -

with the British TUC. The war and the resultant agreement by the Allied powers has been a major factor in bringing together the various national labor groups. Similarly, the peace and its effect upon Allied collaboration will have a determining influence upon labor unity. A weakening of the relations between the Big Three will certainly affect the attitude of the CIO toward the Russians, and consequently produce repercussions within the projected WTUF. Similarly, a strengthening of Allied collaboration will harden the base upon which the present efforts toward world labor unity are being made. Therefore, the future of organized labor on the international level will depend not only upon the agreement which labor itself can reach, but also upon how successful the United Nations are in continuing their present collaboration. The future role of the WTUF will be shaped in large measure at San Francisco. It will be determined by labor leaders in their own meetings and by the results of the United Nations' conference itself.

LONDON

Meeting in London immediately after the adjournment of the World Trade Union Conference, the Continuations Committee with its 41 members proved too large to handle effectively the task of drafting a constitution for the World Trade Union Federation. As a result, the committee created an Administrative Committee of 13 members, including:

TUC:	Sir Walter Citrine Ebby Edwards
CIO:	Philip Murray Sidney Hillman R. J. Thomas (alternate)
USSR:	Vasily Kuznetsov Mikhail Tarasov

- 4 -

CTAL & Latin America:	Vincento Lombardo Toledano Angel Gofino
France:	Louis Saillant Benoit Franchot
China:	H. T. Liu
IFTU:	Walter Schevenels
ITS:	J. Oldenbreek

This Administrative Committee, also meeting in London, discussed general principles governing the formation of an international trade union organization, but left most questions unsettled. The committee made two concrete decisions.

1. It rejected a draft constitution presented by Schevenels, because - according to Tarasov - the proposal embodied the principles under which the IFTU had operated. This decision reflected the position taken at the conference by the Russians, French, and Latin Americans, all of whom were opposed to any reconstruction of the IFTU. The CIO had also proposed the creation of a new organization, distinct from the IFTU, but Hillman is reported to have expressed the opinion that it did not matter whether a new organization was attained through the reconstitution of the IFTU or through the establishment of a new body, so long as the organization was actually created.

2. To draft a constitution, the Administrative Committee appointed a sub-committee of seven persons. Originally, the group numbered five: Citrine, Hillman, Tarasov, Liu, and Saillant. At the suggestion of Citrine, Schevenels was added. In a countering move, the Soviet delegate successfully obtained membership for Lombardo Toledano. It is significant that Kuznetsov, whose fluency in English would have strengthened the Soviet membership, returned to Moscow instead of participating in the committee.

- 5 -

PARIS

Moving to Paris where the secretariat of the WTUC had been established, the sub-committee early in March met twice, once for a three-day session and again in a day-long meeting. The committee apparently completed a draft constitution to be submitted to the Administrative Committee at its meeting in Washington on 12 April and then to be circulated among the national trade union organizations for their approval before adoption at the Paris conference scheduled for September.

The most controversial questions to arise at the Paris meetings were whether decisions of the WTUF would be binding on affiliated unions, whether the international trade secretariats would be continued as independent entities, and how the general council should be selected. On these three points, the sub-committee tentatively decided:

1. Decisions of the WTUF or its General Council would be binding upon affiliated unions after two-thirds of the national organizations had endorsed the decisions.
 2. The international trade secretariats would be bound closely to the WTUF. The proposed arrangement called for the WTUF to set up industrial sections which would function as departments under the direction of the executive committee. These industrial sections could hold conferences for workers in a specific industry, but the executive committee would have to give prior permission and would have to approve all decisions taken at the conferences.
 3. The General Council would be elected by a world conference.
- with the rejection of the Schevenels plan and the adoption of these

- 5 -

resolutions, the sub-committee appeared moving toward the creation of a strong international trade union organization which would be more integrated and more powerful than past labor internationals. At the same time, however, the Paris discussions emphasized the opposition role which the veteran international leaders intended to play. Schevenels vigorously dissented to the three decisions of the sub-committee. He strongly insisted that the decisions of the WTUF should not be binding, that the trade secretariats should be allowed to affiliate with the IPTU, and that the General Council be constituted of representatives of the various trade union centers and then endorsed by a world congress. In essence, Schevenels argued for the creation of a trade union international which would resemble the IPTU in structure and in principles.

WASHINGTON

The Administrative Committee convened again in Washington on 12 April to receive the draft constitution prepared by the sub-committee and to plan the role to be played by the WTUF at the San Francisco conference. After several days of long-winded and pedantic discussions which were virtually monopolized by the veteran international labor officials, the committee made two basic decisions.

1. The WTUF would not send an official delegation in an attempt to represent the views of world labor at the conference. Instead the various labor leaders would be accredited to their respective national delegations as special consultants. However, the WTUF supporters would continue their meetings on the Coast, apart from the conference itself, and would regularly exchange views on the policies to be favored.

- 7 -

2. Decisions of the WTUF to take direct action would not be binding upon affiliated trade union centers, unless these national bodies had ratified the decision.

In contrast to the earlier proposals of the sub-committee, these two decisions taken by the Administrative Committee appear to weaken the structure of the proposed labor organization. However, the delegates can be largely absolved of the responsibility for the first decision which was virtually imposed upon them by outside factors. For the American Government, as host to the conference, could not have invited the WTUF to appear as the representative of world labor for fear of alienating the AF of L. In the face of such a political situation, the WTUF lost its first opportunity to win official recognition as the international spokesman for organized labor. Since the WTUF at present exists virtually only on paper, this failure to gain admission cannot be described as a serious defeat. Yet the present arrangements for the representation of labor underscores the obstacles which labor will have to overcome in the future before it can become an independent factor in international relations, operating exclusively through the various governments. The American Government has invited both the AF of L and the CIO to send two persons from each organization to serve as consultants to the American delegation. This decision places American organized labor on the same level with such groups as the National Lawyers Guild, General Federation of Women's Clubs, the National Council of Parents and Teachers, and the Kiwanis International, which are among the 42 organizations invited to send consultants.

However, labor leaders already are meeting on the sidelines, and plan to continue such parleys apart from the San Francisco conference.

- 8 -

Labor may make an effort to secure a place in the Social and Economic Council envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks plan. For the time being, however, the union representatives will not be able to present their views to the conference as the attitude of world labor. Instead the labor leaders must turn to their respective governments to present these views, not as the position of labor, but as the position of the government. For the present, the San Francisco conference remains an exclusive affair for governments only.

In making its second decision that rulings of the WTUF would be binding upon only those affiliated centers which ratified them, the Administrative Committee perhaps was acknowledging the fact that the ideal of world labor unity does not command the basic loyalty of the various national groups. Yet the decision went far in reducing the potential power of the WTUF as an international organ for both the economic protection of labor and the advancement of labor's political views.

Apparently the Russians championed the idea of a more disciplined body than the IFTU, and presumably the Soviet delegate was responsible for the sub-committee's proposal that a decision of the WTUF be binding upon all affiliates after it was ratified by two-thirds of the national centers. Schevenels strongly opposed this position on the sub-committee, and Oldenbrook continued the attack on the Administrative Committee. In addition, both the CIO and the British did not favor undertaking such obligations. James Carey flatly declared that the CIO would hold its own contracts more sacred than its constitution. Thus, if the WTUF ordered direct action, such as a strike, the CIO would stand by its contracts not to strike rather than to join in the international action.

- 9 -

In an attempt to meet the opposition of the Americans and the British and at the same time to make the WTUF more than a voluntary association, Tarasov suggested at Washington that in principle the decisions of the WTUF should be considered binding upon affiliated centers. However, a system of appeals should be set up by which individual national groups could request that they be released from the obligation to observe the decision. By rejecting the Soviet suggestion, the committee emphasized the unwillingness of national labor groups to relinquish their independence of action and to subordinate themselves to an international organization.

In addition to reaching these two decisions, the committee also devoted lengthy discussion to the relations of the WTUF with the international trade secretariats and the International Labor Office. On both topics, the committee failed to obtain agreement, and presumably will continue the discussions in San Francisco.

The place of the international trade secretariats in the proposed international labor system proved the most controversial both at the Paris sessions and the Washington meetings. The OIC and the Russians, on one hand, were willing for the secretariats to preserve their autonomy, but maintained that they be incorporated into the framework of the WTUF to increase the international unity of labor. At Paris, Schevenels strongly opposed this position and demanded instead that the trade secretariats be allowed to affiliate with the WTUF in the same manner as they affiliated with the IFTU. Such an arrangement would have permitted the secretariats to operate virtually exclusive of the WTUF. Rejecting Schevenels' proposal,

- 10 -

the sub-committee proposed the establishment of industrial sections which would function as departments within the WTUP. This would follow somewhat, the plan of organization within the CIO, where the principle of organization by industries is maintained within the larger framework of the CIO. These "industrial sections" would thus become an extension of such a principle on an international basis. With the approval of the General Council, these sections could hold conferences of the workers of a specific industry. All decisions, however, would be subject to the ultimate approval of the General Council. It is not clear whether this proposal means the complete incorporation of the existing secretariats into the WTUP or whether the industrial sections would be supplemental to the secretariats.

When the issue came up at Washington, Oldenbrook replaced Schevenels as the chief proponent of complete independence for the secretariats. He threatened to bolt the WTUP unless the new organization permitted the creation of autonomous and unregulated secretariats. In an open fight with Citrine, Oldenbrook threatened to have the British members of his International Transport Workers Federation bring pressure to bear upon the British Trade Union Congress to remain outside of the proposed organization, unless his demand for independent secretariats was granted.

Obviously Oldenbrook does not want to place his organization under the jurisdiction of the WTUP, but desires to maintain his own position free from any obligation to observe the decisions of the WTUP. At the same time, Oldenbrook is representing the position of Ernest Bevin, who looks to the trade secretariats, rather than to any general organization, for

- 11 -

assistance in achieving Britain's post-war economic aims. This relationship became clear during the discussion of the relation between the WTUF and the ILO.

The London conference in its formal resolutions did not mention the ILO, largely because the Russians requested the deletion of any reference to the Geneva organization. The Russians, as well as the CIO, declared that it would be embarrassing for them to have to vote on the question of whether the conference should cooperate with the ILO because neither group belonged to the organization. As a result, the relation of the WTUF to the ILO was left unsettled.

At Washington, however, Oldenbrook precipitated the issue by demanding that the preamble of the WTUF constitution specifically guarantee the cooperation of the projected organization with the ILO. Such a guarantee would have the effect of preserving the position of the ILO and of weakening the WTUF which would be forced to share the field of international labor with the Geneva agency. In making his proposal, Oldenbrook was advancing the views of Bevin who looks to the ILO to provide machinery for assisting Great Britain in her post-war economic tasks. Bevin wants to protect British markets through cartel agreements to be worked out by similar industries in different countries. Toward this end, the British Government at the Philadelphia meeting of the ILO successfully proposed the establishment of international committees in certain major industries. Acting on this resolution, the Governing Body of the ILO in January set up committees for the following industries, all of which figure prominently in British economy: inland transport, coal mining, iron and steel, metal trades, textiles, petroleum production and refining, and building, civil engineering, and public works. These committees will have tripartite membership with the

- 12 -

government, employers, and workers all represented. According to an ILO official, these committees in the beginning would serve to facilitate the exchange of information within a given industry. Later, however, they might develop into international joint industrial councils which would seek "to establish uniformity on a broad international basis."

Such committees - bringing government, employer, and labor together - obviously could serve as an effective basis for arranging international industrial agreements in accordance with British intentions. To increase the support of labor for such arrangements, the British would stand to gain more from existing trade secretariats, organized along industrial lines, than from a general labor organization. Consequently, Bevin and the British government appear more concerned with the ILO and the trade secretariats than with the WTUF. Bevin has long favored the establishment of industrial unions. In a significant speech before the World Trade Union Conference at London, he emphasized the value of bringing together workers in the same industry to "talk over not so much political troubles, but what do I get for this and what is my standard for that, and what advance have I made in this, that or the other direction?" His slighting of the political activities of labor and his warning later in the speech that "the working-classes have all to gain.... in combination and cooperative exchange of their products and their labor, and all to lose from fratricidal competition" appear to indicate his desire to see labor join in the cartell arrangements favored by certain British circles. The success of the British scheme depends in part upon the fate of the ILO. Without the Soviet Union as a member, the ILO is hampered as an effective international organization. Consequently, the future of the ILO will be influenced by the position taken

- 13 -

by Moscow. Although in the spring of 1945 the Governing Body of the ILO invited the Russians to return, and President Roosevelt personally urged Stalin to consider the invitation, the Soviet government has shown no intention to return to the Geneva organization. The Russians, if they again accept membership, will certainly wait until the connection between the ILO and the League of Nations is severed. The Soviet press has virtually established this condition as a sine qua non for Russian participation. In addition, the Russians have said that the ILO has never enjoyed much prestige and its work has had little effect, largely because the ILO does not possess sufficient authority. To strengthen the organization, the Russians have suggested that the number of labor representatives be increased to equal the total number of government and employer representatives. In addition, the Russians call for a broadening of the ILO executive body. The Russians offer their proposals as a means of strengthening the ILO as an international forum of labor, yet at the same time it is apparent that the Russians want to displace the IFTU from its dominant position within the Geneva organization.

The relation which the WTUP will have with the ILO can be determined only after the various governments themselves have decided the fate of the ILO. The dissatisfaction of the Russians with the present structure of the ILO and the failure of the CIO to become associated with the Geneva organization will have a delaying effect upon the formation of WTUP policy.

As the labor leaders moved on to San Francisco, therefore, they still faced most of the problems concerning the structure of the WTUP and its relation with other organizations in the international field of labor. They left Washington without taking any positive action toward

- 14 -

creating a strong labor federation. Their two basic decisions - not to send a delegation to San Francisco and not to make the decisions of the WTUF binding upon affiliated centers - were both negative. One reason for this lack of progress is the dominant role played by the old guard at the Washington meeting. Both Schevenels and Oldenbroek were more concerned with the preservation of their own positions than with the creation of a unified and powerful labor organization. From all available evidence, none of the other delegates, with the exception of the Russians, took a vigorous stand on behalf of the proposed organization. Beth Kusnetsev and Liu were absent from the Washington meeting, although both are members of the Administrative Committee. Kusnetsov joined the group in San Francisco, where perhaps a more affirmative leadership will come into play.

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

The picture of labor the world over moving toward one unified organization has been marred by the isolationist position of the AF of L which thus far has remained aloof from plans to establish the WTUF. The AF of L refused to attend the London conference for several reasons announced by William Green.

1. The AF of L considered the IPTU as the proper organization to convene the conference.
2. Because the CIO had been invited, the AF of L could not attend, for its presence would have been tantamount to recognizing the dualism of American labor.
3. The AF of L is opposed to the presence of unions which are not free, but are government-controlled. In short, the AF of L refuses to join

- 15 -

with the Russians in an international labor organization.

4. The AF of L felt that some of the delegates invited would not be in a position to speak authoritatively because their countries were still under German domination or were too recently liberated to establish an effective labor organization.

At London, the Russians, the CIO, and the British all made overtures to the AF of L in an effort to win its participation in the WTUF. Lately, however, the CIO appears to have changed its tack and instead has announced that plans for the WTUF will be pushed regardless of whether the AF of L decides to join. This apparent indifference toward the AF of L probably will have little effect for the time being, for the AF of L still holds some potentially strong cards.

Since little progress has been achieved thus far in establishing the WTUF, the AF of L can afford to remain outside of the projected organization for the present time to await developments. By joining the WTUF, the AF of L would be recognizing the CIO as a dual labor movement, forfeiting its place of leadership within the IFTU (although it would occupy a leading position within the WTUF), and injuring its position within the ILO. In addition, the AF of L would be forced to sit with the Russians after years of criticizing the Soviet labor movement. The AF of L, therefore, will not join the WTUF without a fight. As a result, the AF of L looks to the IFTU conference scheduled for September as the crucial test. Robert Watt has indicated the line the AF of L may take by describing the WTUF as merely a new Red International of Labor Unions. At the IFTU conference, the AF of L may attempt to rally "free unions" in a labor organization of the Right to oppose the WTUF which would be attacked as a tool of the

- 13 -

left, particularly of the Communists. Whether the AF of L will be able to split the international labor movement or whether the WTUF will be able successfully to weather the predicted storm will depend upon several developments.

1. The position of the AF of L will depend upon how well the Russians, the CIO, and the British can agree upon the structure of the WTUF. If the drafting committee can produce a potentially powerful organization, capable of attracting the allegiance of labor, the AF of L may be left a voice crying in the wilderness. However, the task of building an effective organization has been made difficult by the presence of the old guard on the drafting committee. The efforts of Schevenels and Oldenbrook thus far have been directed toward sabotaging the plans for the WTUF. If these leaders are not satisfied by the WTUF, they may bolt the organization and throw their weight to the AF of L. Although it may be wishful thinking, Watt predicts that the British will never join the WTUF. Without the British, the AF of L would have little major support for its fight against the WTUF. Therefore, the AF of L looks forward (a) to the weakening of present plans for the WTUF, (b) to the withdrawal of the old guard from the embryonic organization, and (c), most important, to the withdrawal of the British.

2. The position of the AF of L also will be affected by the nature of political relations among the United Nations. The AF of L will benefit if American-Soviet relations become embittered, for in such an event the CIO would be forced to move cautiously. On the other hand, the achievement of closer collaboration between Washington and Moscow would put the AF of L at a disadvantage in attacking the Soviet trade unions. Similarly, the

- 17 -

British T.U. will consider the effect of its leaving the WTUP upon Anglo-Soviet relations before joining with the AF of L.

Thus, while today a battle looms on the international labor front, the trend of events between now and September may so weaken the position of the AF of L that it will decide not to wage its contemplated fight. If the planners of the WTUP can create a powerful and unified organization, and if the United Nations strengthen their collaboration, then the AF of L will face the choice of joining the WTUP or of withdrawing from the international field, except for the ILO.

On the home front, the position of the AF of L remains strong. The death of President Roosevelt removed the close connection enjoyed by the CIO with the White House. The advent of President Truman brings to power the first choice of the AF of L for the vice-presidency, but not the initial choice of the CIO. The prospect of peace appears to present less problems for the AF of L, which is well rooted in diversified trades, than for the CIO, which is virtually concentrated in war industries. Finally, the AF of L still represents American labor in the ILO, which may become the chief competitor of the WTUP. For the old guard, the British, and the AF of L may find the ILO, rather than the IFTU, as the most effective means of combatting the labor organizations of the Left. It is significant that Oldenbrook was requested to serve as one of the observers of the ILO at the San Francisco conference.

Representatives of some 80,000,000 trade union members called for the world unity of labor at the London conference. Instead of obeying the call, however, organized labor appears to be preparing for a fight.

- 18 -

The challenge of the AP of L and the old guard places the groups supporting the VTUP in a difficult position. If they attempt to close their ranks by following the present policy of compromise and conciliation, they will bring forth a weak and ineffectual organization. If they adopt a strong and positive stand, they may alienate some of the groups which are now cooperating. For the time being, the CIO is following the middle of the road; the Russians appear to be willing to take a stronger stand, but hesitate to take advantage of their newly-acquired position; and the British, as the bridge between the new and old in international labor circles, appear to realize that they have a foot on each bank.

- 19 -

CONCLUSION - A SPECULATION

The question might well be asked whether the results achieved at Paris and Washington in the labor field cast any light on what results might be achieved at San Francisco in the political field. The aim of both London and Yalta was international unity, one in the labor field and one in the political field. Both resulted in broad expressions of unity which looked ahead to specific implementation to perfect peace and world brotherhood. As we have seen, the London declaration, as implemented in Paris, has already been watered down in Washington. Will Yalta be watered down in San Francisco? The answer to this may perhaps lie in a proper understanding of the basic forces which caused the "watering down" of London in Washington.

Of the "big three" groups in the WTOP, only one was completely committed to the new organization - Russia. England was not committed, and even now, can pull out, as Robert Watt of the AF of L feels it will. The AF of L has never been in, and will not come in. The Russians and the CIO both feel that international labor unity is possible without the AF of L. England is not sure, and the TUC does not want to "burn its bridges to its old friend the AF of L." Oldenbrook and Schevenels, under strong British pressure, immediately went into conference with the AF of L upon arrival in Washington, although both were delegates to a constitutional convention of an organization to which the AF of L is uncompromisingly opposed. As a matter of fact, Schevenels expensed in America as a delegate to the WTOP are being paid by the AF of L as dues to the IFTU. Oldenbrook's only affiliate in America is the AF of L Leason's union. He hopes to obtain

- 80 -

the affiliation of the anti-WTUF AP of L dominated Railway Brotherhoods and Tobin's powerful Teamsters.

Both the AP of L and the "old guard" believe that international labor unity is possible without the Russians. Nobody believes that such is possible without the British TUC. This leaves the British TUC in obvious control of the balance of power within the WTUF. If the TUC left the WTUF, it would dissolve. Therefore, the British are in the position of making demands which must be granted. These demands will be based upon the British determination to keep its control of the new movement and to have the structure of the new movement so constituted as to leave the door open for the AP of L. Because of great Russian strength and influence, any decisions of the WTUF which might be binding on the national centers, will, in the British view, be to Russian advantage. Already Citrine, who first sponsored the world conference, has expressed in Washington his deep concern over the Frankenstein he has created. This will push him more and more to the AP of L and Oldenbrook and Schoenhals. The object of all will be to prevent Russian influence through some arrangement which will match the power of the 27,000,000 Russian members and those they influence.

Thus the split in America between the AP of L and the CIO gives the British the real and effective voice in the WTUF structure. Though the balance of power should really lie in the Americans, our lack of a unified movement robs us of this position. The British, unified and cleverly led are aware of this and prepared to exploit it. Although Devin and Citrine have their own internal disputes, they are both

- 21 -

Englishmen and will present a united front against Russian influence. Both are pro-AP of L and both very sceptical about the inherent strength of the OIO. This scepticism has been heightened by the death of President Roosevelt. British strength can, therefore, be expected to be exerted in favor of the creation of a WTUF which will be acceptable to the AP of L. This means a world trade union movement which they and the AP of L can control and which will prevent Russian influence from spreading. This explains British insistence on the "non-binding" nature of the decisions of the WTUF.

If this analysis of the "watering-down" of London is correct, can an analogy be drawn in the political field to determine what might happen at San Francisco? The analogy is not easy. At first glance, there are some differences. Here England is definitely committed to a World Organization of power. On paper, America is committed, but we still have the spectre of a recalcitrant one-third of the Senate. Although Russia appears to have the possibility of retreat from such an organization, actually Russia cannot withdraw. As in the labor field, Russia's real interests lie in a powerful world organization. Her influence, her strength and her policies can only be perfected in a peaceful way through such an organization. Here, as in the labor field, strong organization for world unity is her salvation. Isolation for her would be futile.

To the British, a strong organization for world peace will imply increased Russian influence. Although Britain is clearly committed to a world organization (as she is in the labor field - either the IFTU or the WTUF), she still is not committed completely to specific implementations

- 22 -

of Dumbarton Oaks. Again America's threat of the one-third veto in the Senate, gives England the opportunity for backing specific proposals which will leave the door open to American Senatorial acceptance of the New World Organization. Though the term "watering down" is not as yet readily applicable to what San Francisco will do to Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, it might be worth while to bear the following points in mind in observing the San Francisco conference:

1) Do the representatives of the possible one-third of the American Senators (Vandenberg, et al) occupy a position similar to the AF of L?

2) Will the British support amendments and implementations which will tend to be satisfactory to these Senators? Are these amendments and implementations also designed to weaken Russian influence?

If the above questions are answered in the affirmative, then there will be a "watering down" of Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. The purpose of such watering down will be to weaken Russian influence and at the same time to weaken world organization. Thus Yalta, like London, was the high point not only of Russian influence, but of strong world organization. From now on, not only this influence will weaken; so also will world organization.

So, as Wilson said in 1919, "Russia is the acid test". Will we, because of our disunity, be the tool in the diplomatic field, as we were in the labor field, of watering down strong world organization for peace under the guise of limiting Russia's power?

WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION

NUMBER

A-5452

COUNTRY Greece

ORIGINAL FILED. 44-751, 752

SUBJECT: Form of a War Between Russia and the Anglo-American

DATE OF INFO. 20 April 1948

DATE OF REPLY: 20 APR 11 1948

DISTRIBUTED 80 APR 11 1948

ORIGIN (Type)

THEATRE, New South

CONFIRMATION

SUPPLEMENT

Reference: HU-11700

SOURCE 2

NO. OF PAGES

EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION

ATTACHEMENTE

- B-2 1a There is a sharp increase in alarm in the rumors and real fear among all classes that war is imminent between the Russians and the Anglo-Americans. MAN-KHE claims that the rumors are inspired by the Right who, they say, not only believe in but hope for such a war to crush Communism.
- B-2 2a The non-Communist press is breasting at length the difficulties with the Russians at San Francisco, thus increasing popular fear of a conflict. Some Rightist papers are playing up the possibility that the Allies will not reach agreement.
- B-2 3a Some politicians, both Liberals and Royalists, say that if war is inevitable let it come now. Many Army officers say they would like to see such a war.

[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 26 March 1945

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : W. H. Shepardson
 SUBJECT: Attached memorandum 28 March from D. C. Shaw

The attached outline has been prepared by David Shaw after our talk with you, and after Col. Blankenhorn and he had talked with me.

These statements, if approved by you, will be used to brief the six or seven total personnel who will be on hand in San Francisco for the World Labor Organization which meets there on April 25th.

We discussed a somewhat more precise formulation of D. 5, but decided that it would be better in all the circumstances, to let it stand as now written.

WHS
 W. H. S.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16,535-
SECRET

25 March 1948

TO : Chief, OS
SUBJECT: Objectives Of Labor Division's Special Mission
FROM : David C. Shaw, Labor Division, OS-WASH

Objectives are to obtain intelligence of developments of the World Labor Organization, which has to be regarded as continuous, (both abroad and in U.S.A.) Developments began with World Labor meeting in London in February 1948; continued through committee meetings in London and Paris; will evolve through committee meetings Washington, April 10 and at San Francisco April 25; to be followed by committee meetings and reconvened World Conference, Paris, September.

Special mission will obtain intelligence as follows:

A. General

1. World Labor delegation's effect on the prosecution of the war, (abroad as well as U.S.A.)
2. World Labor delegation's effect on formulation of San Francisco agreements.
3. World Labor delegation's probable effect on adoption of San Francisco agreements.
4. Effect of World Labor organization on the predictable reestablishment of an International Labor office under a World Security Organization.

B. Special

5. Relationships between individuals of World Labor delegation and representatives of governments of foreign powers, both at San Francisco and abroad.

David C. Shaw

SECRET

SECRET

25 March 1948

TO : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Objectives Of Labor Division's Special Mission

FROM : David C. Shaw, Labor Division, SI-WASH

Objectives are to obtain intelligence of developments of the World Labor Organization, which has to be regarded as continuous, (both abroad and in U.S.A.) Developments began with World Labor meeting in London in February 1948; continued through committee meetings in London and Paris; will evolve through committee meetings Washington, April 16 and at San Francisco April 28; to be followed by committee meetings and reconvened World Conference, Paris, September.

Special mission will obtain intelligence as follows:

A. General

1. World Labor delegation's effect on the prosecution of the war, (abroad as well as U.S.A.)
2. World Labor delegation's effect on formulation of San Francisco agreements.
3. World Labor delegation's probable effect on adoption of San Francisco agreements.
4. Effect of World Labor organization on the predictable reestablishment of an International Labor office under a World Security Organization.

B. Special

5. Relationships between individuals of World Labor delegation and representatives of governments of foreign powers, both at San Francisco and abroad.

DOW:AE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

13 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following report on World Federation of Trade Unions and UNCIO was prepared by one of our representatives:

The World Trade Union Federation is an outgrowth of a meeting held in London in February 1945 at the call of the British Trades Union Congress. Invitations were sent to the labor movements of all United Nations countries, including Russia. In the United States, the CIO accepted; the AF of L did not, saying it did not choose to participate with the Russians.

The British sought to consult to discover means to mobilize the working classes to aid the war effort, to secure peace, and most importantly, to set up rational methods whereby after the war the workers of the world would not be the means of destroying each other through "out-throat competition." The last purpose was the most important to the British who were, and still are, fearful

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

of the status of the British standard, living in a postwar world.

But the CIO and the Russians had very different ideas about the London conference. Both groups, denied participation in world international labor organizations, wanted a clean slate, a new organization of world labor, revitalized by the war experience and definitely dedicated to political action on a world scale.

This conflict between the purposes of the meeting in London was obvious even before the meeting began. At the labor conference, the conflict became more acute. The British, with support of refugee European labor leaders in London, while participating in the meeting, tried to block any moves to make the meeting other than consultative. But they found themselves in a difficult position. Having called the meeting, they could not be the cause of its failure. William of the CIO, Toladano of the Latin American workers, and Kuznetsov of the Russians brought out of the meeting the basis for a new organization. The British, fearing Russian domination because of the large number of Russian votes and those of what they considered Russian-influenced countries, tried to get a voting basis

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

which would give them a real leadership.

During the London conference, Yalta was announced. This gave tremendous impetus to the new World Labor Organization. As Yalta was the high point of Russian influence, so also was it the high point of desire for new world organization, political as well as labor. The new world Labor Organization, coming to the same conclusions as Yalta, was pictured as a popular base among the working people of the world for carrying out the decisions of Yalta.

From London, the Continuations Committee moved to Paris, the permanent seat of the new organization. Here the decisions of London were implemented. A new organization was set up. The constitution was to be drawn in Washington on April 12, 1945, and then the Committee was to proceed to San Francisco to represent world labor at the UNCIO.

In the Washington meetings the differences, apparently ironed out in London and Paris, began to appear. The British, not yet fully committed to the new organization and retaining their membership in the IFTU, were the clear balance of power. If they pulled out of the new WTUF, it would mean the end of the WTUF.

The British, working through Oldenbrook of the ITF

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

and Schevenels, as well as Citrine, indicated that not only were they not overly interested in the new WTUF but also were inclined to stay out of the new WTUF unless they were able to achieve enough autonomy to keep the Russian influence at a minimum. At the conference itself Oldenbrook and Schevenels, in touch with the AF of L, attempted to "water down" the decisions of London and Paris. Citrine, anxious to protect the autonomy of the British FUC, fought to have the decisions of the WTUF of a non-binding nature. He got support from the CIO on this because of its desire for autonomy and the growing apprehension of some of its right-wing leaders for protection from "Russian-influenced" decisions.

The Washington Conference closed without really accomplishing anything. Skepticism and discouragement were the mood. The prospect for a strong organization was bad.

On the eve of the conference at San Francisco, certain things were clear:

- a) The strong organization proposed at London and Paris had been "watered down" in Washington.
- b) The "watering down" consisted largely in British and American agreement to take away the binding nature of the decisions of the congress of the new world organization and

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

substitute autonomy.

c) The British and certain American CIO leaders were worried over the strength Russia would be able to muster in the new organization and anti-Russian feeling was noticeable among both groups.

d) The British scheme to stabilize British wages, based on strong trade secretariats and the continuance of the ILO, became a real issue in the Washington conference.

e) The British, while participating in a new world organization, were making overtures to the AF of L and were far more interested in creating a world federation which would be acceptable to the AF of L than they were in creating a strong world trade union movement. If such a strong movement were created, because the representation would in one way or another be based on membership figures, the Russians with their large membership would dominate the new organization.

In both the labor and the political field, the real issue was Russia and Russian influence in the postwar world. At London the CIO was the bridge between the British and Russian workers; just as at Yalta, Roosevelt was the bridge between Churchill and Stalin. We had the balance of power, and we had it both in the labor and political field. But because of our

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

CONFIDENTIAL

disunity both in the labor and political field, we were robbed of the use of it. By the time of the Washington Labor Conference and UNCIO, the balance had shifted to the British.

Labor at San Francisco was barred from the UNCIO; it was actually physically isolated in Oakland. It was further isolated from the local labor movement of San Francisco Bay. Some of the AP of L leaders there, friendly to the WFTU, were prohibited from showing any support by strong AP of L pressure. The local CIO, dominated by Bridges, was barred by anti-Bridges elements in the CIO from contact with the WFTU delegates.

The isolation of labor from UNCIO has continued within the national delegations. British labor delegates profess that they have been rebuffed by their government in regard to the status they wanted for British labor delegates as advisors. The French delegates profess indignation at their foreign minister, Mautault, who has failed to appoint any labor advisor to the French UNCIO delegation.

In general the World Labor delegates feel that the San Francisco UNCIO atmosphere is, if not hostile, at least frigid. They feel that the atmosphere here is not one of "peace" or of "the problem of aggressors" but instead of a battle about Russia. The labor delegates "will do nothing to

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

impede UNCIO" publicly but privately they think the UNCIO atmosphere is anti-Russia and anti-labor. Labor Conference delegates resent the idea that their demand for status, as an independent international body, should be tied up with Russia or that the labor voice, given such status, would be automatically the voice of Russia. Labor delegates profess being stupefied by "such naive questions" as "why should labor have separate and independent organization in connection with a world political organization?" They seem to think that, given the history of the last quarter of a century of such independent bodies as the ILO and of other forms of independent autonomous trade union international organization, that the UNCIO should take it for granted that such organizations are an accepted part of any world set-up.

The labor delegates' "indignation and disappointment" at the present situation should be taken with several grains of salt. First, they did not expect to do very much better than they have done and they are looking to the future. They had been told in London that they would not be seated. Their future is the September meeting in Paris. Some delegates expect to get on "without benefit of UNCIO" though their experience here so far is a handicap which some of them think will

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

not be bettered. Two countries' delegates are looking to the future based on hopes of election returns. The French labor delegates express gratification rather than enthusiasm over the current French municipal election results. In the French general elections to come they count on a sufficient left majority to "check the de Gaulle government and create a very different atmosphere in Paris in September from San Francisco now". British labor delegates here are on tenterhooks over the imminent end of the war and possible immediate general election. They profess to see coming a shift to the left in Britain in that election.

In short, the Labor Conference "disappointment" here is colored by expectations that political events in the west of Europe will look in labor's direction in the next six months and so will result in a different status for a world labor organization at future UNCTO sessions. Wishful thinking naturally enters into these labor estimates, just as wishful thinking enters into some governmental estimates that the British, French and other political developments will be "safe".

The most important hitch in the World Labor Conference, of course, grows out of the division in American labor. The AFL policy seems to be thoroughly set for blocking the World

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

Labor Conference at all costs. This is not too disappointing to the British labor delegation whose desire is for a world labor organization which they control. The AFL-CIO division has been so whittled by recent events that West Coast AFL leaders who criticized the AFL attitude previously now say privately that they dare not open their mouths. They say they cannot sit on the same platform in this matter with CIO officials with whom they associate daily on governmental and other bodies.

The constitution of the new WFTU has just been announced. In essence, it shows:

a) The Russians, numerically strong enough to dominate all decisions, have willingly agreed to a voting scheme which will materially cut down their strength. Under the new scheme, England and the CIO can outvote the Soviet unions, even if they have only one-half the approximate membership. If the AFL came in, it and the CIO could almost match the Russian vote.

b) The Russians have compromised also on the question of the autonomy of the WFTU. While not as weak as the British wanted the organization to be, it does allow enough flexibility to preserve basic autonomy while preserving the semblance of

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL

world organization.

On the question of Trade Secretariats, one of the most difficult of the conference, the new constitutional provision, while a compromise, is clearly not in favor of the position of the British and Oldenbrook.

Here are the results of the labor:

1. ULCIO looked like a battle over Russia. The labor conference has achieved something that is the exact opposite. Notwithstanding the prevalence of anti-Russian feeling; and the frigid atmosphere of ULCIO, the delegates went about their solid job of completing their constitution. This they were unable to do at Washington.

2. World labor, as represented by the AFLU, although disappointed by the isolation recorded them by ULCIO, will not fight it. But it will not be enthusiastic.

3. A new world organization has been formed and the dissolution of the AFLU is, as its secretary has said, "almost a foregone conclusion."

In view of what happened in Washington, now can we explain the unanimity of agreement and the solid nature of the movement in the labor conference as contrasted with the apparent lack of unity at ULCIO? The answers would seem to be:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

a) The British, who held the balance of power at Washington, lost it in Oakland. When the AFL refused to pay its dues to the IFTU Secretary, the British would have felt they had no place to go except to the new organization. For the IFTU without the AFL would have been a shell.

b) The Russians at Oakland, unlike the Russians at San Francisco, were not fighting a battle for prestige and were not picking up every small item to battle over. They apparently really wanted a WFTU and were willing to compromise to get it.

c) The recent elections in France and the prospect of elections in Britain, indicated the growing strength of labor and the consequent weakening of conservative forces in Europe.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

6 May 1946

Dear Dave,

The World Labor Conference exploded into the open this noon in the shape of a press conference, satisfactorily attended and carried through, at the Palace Hotel in San Francisco. There they handed out the results of their labors in the shape of the enclosed.

I have no doubt that you will be reading summaries of this in the press on Sunday, but here are the texts.

I shall have a lot of comment later but for the moment would say the significant thing is this. UNOJO has been and continues to be a battle over Russia. The World Labor Conference has achieved something publicly that is not only not a battle over Russia but is, for the present, the exact opposite.

The word here is that the old guard of the IFTU despairs of reviving it as a rival. On the other hand, Bill Greer arrives here on Monday, for what purpose, precisely, we don't know.

In haste,

s/ Col. Blankenhorn

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

For Immediate ReleasePRESS SUMMARY OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD FEDERATION
OF TRADE UNIONS

The members of the Administrative Committee of the World Trade Union Conference today announced that they have reached unanimous agreement on the complete text of a draft constitution for a World Federation of Trade Unions. The Committee was charged with the task of preparing such a draft by the World Trade Union Conference which met in London from February 8 to 17, 1945. The Committee met for this purpose in Washington, D.C. from April 13 to 17 and continued its work in San Francisco from April 25 to May 5 when it concluded its sessions.

The preparation of the draft required decisions on a number of difficult and important questions of policy. All of the members of the Committee were animated in their work, by the determination to prepare a document which would provide for the establishment of a single, all inclusive, powerful and fully democratic world organization of labor. The Committee's work was carried on in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which enabled it to come to complete agreement on all questions and to reach full and unanimous approval to the final document.

The draft constitution is now to be circulated to the trade union organizations represented at the World Trade Union Conference, and submitted for final consideration and ratification to the reconvened World Conference in Paris which the Administrative Committee has decided shall be held on September 25, 1945.

The members of the Administrative Committee are: Benoit Frachon (France); Vassili Kuznetsov, Michael Iarazov (U.S.S.R.); Sir Walter Citrine, Ebby Edwards (Great Britain); Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Angel Confino (Confederation of Latin American Workers); Walter Schevoneels (International Federation of Trade Unions); J. H. Oldenbrook (International Transport Workers Federation); H. T. Liu (China); Sidney Hillman, Philip Murray (CIO), Louis Saillant (France).

Assisting the Committee as technical advisors were Herbert Tracy and Ernest Bell (Britain); Robert Chambyron (France); Lee Pressman, John Abt and Michael Ross (CIO).

The preamble to the draft constitution sets forth that the World Federation of Trade Unions exists to improve the living and working conditions of the people of all lands, and to unite them in pursuit of the objectives sought by all freedom-loving peoples as formulated in the declarations of the London World Trade Union Conference.

"The aims and objects (the preamble declares) can only be fully attained by the establishment of a world order in which all the resources of the world will be utilized for the benefit of all its peoples, the vast majority of whom are workers by hand and brain, whose protection and whose progress depend upon the union of all their organized forces, nationally and internationally."

- 1 -

The World Federation therefore proclaims its prime purposes to be to organize and unite within its ranks the trade unions of the world, regardless of considerations of race, nationality, religion or political opinion; to assist the workers wherever necessary, in countries socially or industrially less developed, to set up their trade unions; and to carry on the struggle for the extermination of all fascist forms of government and every manifestation of fascism under whatever form it operates and by whatever name it may be known.

The constitution further defines as one of the World Federations' main objectives the combatting of war and the removal of the causes of war by giving full support to the establishment of a powerful and effective international organization armed with all necessary power to prevent aggression and maintain peace; by supporting the widest possible international cooperation in the social and economic sphere, and measures for the industrial development and full utilization of the resources of undeveloped countries; and by carrying on a struggle against reaction and for the full exercise of democratic rights and liberties of all peoples.

The preamble also embodies the purpose of the World Federation to represent the interests of world labor in all international agencies, concerned with the problems of world organization.

Dealing with the composition of the World Federation, the draft constitution provides for the affiliation of national trade union organizations.

It is stipulated that, as a general rule, affiliation shall be confined to a single national trade union centre for each country; but, in exceptional circumstances, "more than one national trade union centre or individual national trade union organizations may be granted the right of affiliation."

Under the constitution the structure of the World Federation will consist of:

- (1) The World Trade Union Congress, which will be its sovereign authority and will meet every two years.
- (2) The General Council, elected by the World Congress and representative of all the affiliated organizations and which will meet annually.
- (3) The Executive Committee, which is to be elected by the World Congress, and will consist of seventeen members elected from amongst candidates nominated by the national centres and three members elected from candidates nominated by the Trade Departments. The seventeen members of the Executive Committee will be distributed on a scheme allocating three to the USSR, two to Great Britain, two to USA, two to France, three to the rest of Europe, one to China, two to Latin America, one to the Pacific area and one to Africa.
- (4) The Bureau of Management, which will consist of a Chairman and four Vice-Chairmen to be elected by the Executive Committee, and the General Secretary.

- 3 -

The constitution prescribes the method of voting in the Congress and General Council. Organizations with a membership up to 5,000,000 will have one vote per 50,000 members; organizations with more than 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000, one vote for each additional 100,000 members; organizations with more than 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000 one vote for each additional 200,000 members; and for organizations with more than 15,000,000 one vote for each additional 400,000 members.

The constitution makes the General Secretary, elected by the Congress, the principal administrative officer of the World Federation, with general charge of the staff, with responsibility to the Executive Committee for the administrative organization. Provision is made to maintain connections with affiliated organizations by the publication of a monthly bulletin and the issue of circulars in several languages, which are to be edited and published by the General Secretary under the general supervision of the Bureau of Management.

Funds for carrying on the work of the World Federation are to be provided by affiliation fees collected on the following basis: organizations with membership up to 5,000,000 will pay 14 per annum per thousand members; £ 2 per annum per thousand members in excess of 5,000,000 but less than 10,000,000; £ 1 per annum per thousand members in excess of 10,000,000 but less than 15,000,000; and ten shillings per annum per thousand members in excess of 15,000,000.

Provision is made in the constitution for the General Council to establish Trade Departments within the World Federation for such trades or industries as the Council may determine. The function of these Trade Departments is to deal with technical matters concerning their trades, and they are to have full autonomy in this sphere, within the World Federation, but no power to make decisions or carry on activities in connection with matters of general policy, jurisdiction over such matters being confined to the Congress, the General Council, the Executive Committee and the Bureau of Management. The Trade Departments are to be accountable to the General Council and to the Executive Committee for their activities.

Provision is made for each Trade Department to be represented in the Congress and the General Council by one delegate and one substitute who may vote at meetings of either of these bodies by show of hands, but will have no vote in the event of a roll-call or a vote. The Director of a Trade Department may also sit with the Executive Committee in a consultative capacity when it is engaged in the consideration of a question relating to the particular trade or industry for which the Trade Department has been established.

The Constitution provides that the headquarters of the World Federation shall be in Paris, France.

The autonomy of the trade union movement of each country is guaranteed by a specific article of the constitution. This article provides that decisions of the World Congress, its General Council and its Executive Committee calling for action by affiliated lodges are to be immediately communicated to them. Such decisions are

promptly to be submitted to the governing body of each affiliated organization and carried into effect by it, "unless within three months it shall have notified the General Secretary that, in its opinion, a particular decision cannot be applied by it, and shall present to the General Secretary a full statement of the reasons for its inability to give effect to such decisions." The General Secretary is empowered to submit this statement to the Executive Committee for its consideration and for such further action, in consultation with the affiliated organizations concerned, as the Executive Committee believes will promote the fullest practical application of the decisions of the Congress.

It is further provided that within three months after the adjournment of a Congress or the meeting of the General Council or the Executive Committee, each affiliated organization must advise the General Secretary of the measures it has taken to apply the decisions and to carry them out in its own country. It is an obligation on each affiliated organization to report to its constituents as fully as possible the deliberations and decisions of the Congress and the other governing bodies, with a view to promoting the most widespread interest in the work of the World Federation.

SECRET

CONFERENCE SYNDICALE MONDIALE
Comite Administratif
Secretariat

May 4, 1945

Honorable Edward R. Stettinius,
Chairman, Steering Committee,
United Nations Conference on
Industrial Organization,
Fairmont Hotel,
San Francisco, California

Dear Sir:

The Administrative Committee of the World Trade Union Conference has heretofore submitted to you the statement of our position regarding the participation of the World Organized trade union organization in the deliberations of the present United Nations Conference on International Organization and of the various bodies to be established pursuant to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

In order to clarify our position in this regard concerning the need for the direct representation of the World Trade Union Organization, the Administrative Committee of the World Trade Union Conference has today unanimously approved and has authorized me to transmit to you two proposed amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which cover this subject.

May we ask you to transmit copies of these amendments to the other Chairmen of the Conference, together with our request that they receive the approval of the Conference.

Very truly yours,

Philip Murray, Chairman
Administrative Committee,
World Trade Union Conference

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

Proposed Amendments to
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

Add to Chapter IX, Section D - a new paragraph (4)

"The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for the participation, in its deliberations and in those of the Commissions established by it, of the World Trade Union Organisation."

Add to Chapter V, Section B - a new paragraph (9)

"The General Assembly should make suitable arrangements with the World Trade Union Organisation for its participation in an advisory capacity in the deliberations of the General Assembly and the Security Council."

SECRET

Memo for David C. Shaw

7 May 1946

16535
do bar

Report on the French Delegation to UNCIO

The viewpoint outlined in the present report reflects the opinions and judgments of the left wing elements of the French Delegation. The facts described and the quotes have been given by highly reliable sources. A certain number of well known biographical and political facts are repeated here in order to make it clearer to readers unacquainted with French political trends.

Georges Bidault and de Gaulle

Georges Bidault, French Foreign Minister, is a Christian Democrat, member of the MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire), which can be described as a center-left party. He was before the war the editor of "L'Aube", leftist Catholic newspaper. During the German occupation, he became a leader of the Resistance, and was nominated by all Resistance groups and political parties as Chairman of the National Council of Resistance. Although his personal charm and pleasantness are great, Bidault's dominant characteristic is an extreme weakness of character. It is commonly admitted that de Gaulle, who wants to retain full personal control of French foreign policies, chose him precisely on account of this weakness.

It is now fully known--and Bidault himself admitted it--that before he left France, de Gaulle gave his Foreign Minister strict and detailed instructions for the UNCIO, with the imperative orders to carry out these instructions whatever opposition would rise from other members of the delegation.

Bidault has not departed at any time from the line drawn by de Gaulle.

Rene Pleven

Pleven, French Minister of Finance, and delegate to UNCIO, has been de Gaulle's personal friend and supporter since 1940. A successful businessman before the war (Chairman of an International Telephone manufacture in London), Pleven had never had any political activities until he became a part of de Gaulle's Free French Committee in July 1940. His personal opinions until then were reactionary in a conservative way; he was as well opposed to the extreme right fascist sympathizers as he was to the socialists and the extreme left.

SECRET

Memo for David C. Shaw

-2-

7 May 1946

Since France's liberation, in his successive jobs of Minister of Colonies and of Finance, Pleven has affirmed himself as the ablest and most competent statesman of the new regime. His authority has been steadily increasing, and he is regarded today as the real Prime Minister of France, and as the French government's spokesman, although he does not hold the title. It is true that he has enjoyed until now the unreserved confidence and support of de Gaulle. But, unlike de Gaulle's entourage, and personal advisers, he often opposed the General in important issues, and he steadily moved towards the left, while the General and his team of friends were moving east in the opposite direction.

Here at UNO, Pleven is known to have stood with Bonnet (left wing liberal), Moncur (socialist), and Miloux (Communist), on several issues where these delegates were opposed to de Gaulle's position.

Pleven, who is generally thought to be one of the supporters of the MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire), and a staunch Christian Democrat, has recently declared that he would run for elections as an independent candidate, with the support of left-wing Radical-Socialists. He also indicated, in personal conversations, as well as by taking stands which involved such conception, that he favored enough national unity with the Communists and the Socialists.

It is not entirely impossible that Pleven, who is the only friend of de Gaulle who has a real stature and authority, will become in the near future the leader of a left wing government in France. He will undoubtedly try to save General de Gaulle as a national leader, but it is doubtful that he will follow him, if de Gaulle persists in his reactionary and anti-democratic policies.

Francis Miloux

Disregarding Jean Paul-Moncur (socialist) who is old and whose influence is negligible, Miloux is the only representative of the French traditional left-wing at UNO.

Francis Miloux is a member of the Communist Party. Before the war, he had been for some time the General Secretary of the French Communist Youth Association. A native of Marseille, he was elected deputy of this town in 1930. In 1939, when the German-Soviet pact was signed, he was jailed by Vichy, along with 25 other Communist members of Parliament, and was liberated three years later, in Algiers, after the Allied invasion. In North Africa, he was considered the

62 - 100
SECRET

Memo for David G. Shaw

-3-

7 May 1946

leader of the Communist group and one of the rising young heads of the French C.P. Not a fanatic like some of his comrades, he is reputed to have an acute sense of diplomacy and political maneuvering. He was chosen as a member of the C.P.'s Political Bureau after France's liberation, and he is, together with Etienne Rajon, Waldeck-Rochet and Laurent Casanova, one of the four most influential new leaders of the Party.

Francois Billoux considers himself in the French Delegation to UNCIO as merely an observer, a "witness", as he says. He pointed out that whenever he was asked to answer questions about the Conference of the French Delegation, he systematically said "I have nothing to say"; which, he declared, meant that he had quite a lot to say, but that it was too explosive.

Billoux's opinion of Georges Bidault is not as harsh as the other left wing elements'. He stated one time that if Bidault was not always tied up by de Gaulle's orders, he would make a good Foreign Minister. It is interesting to note that Mrs. Odette Cornu, Bidault's private secretary, was Gabriel Peri's secretary before the war. (Peri was one of the most important Communist leaders. He was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943.) Mrs. Cornu is a Communist sympathizer, and through her intermediary, the Communist Party is informed of everything that goes on in Bidault's cabinet. It seems that Bidault is quite aware of this situation, and does not try to put an end to it. He apparently wants to make it clear in the eyes of the Communists that he is de Gaulle's prisoner, and that, would his hands be free, he would follow a line quite different. Personal relations between Billoux and Bidault are excellent. The same can be said of the relations between Billoux and Pivon.

The problem of a labor delegate

When Stettinius and Eden refused to accept the delegation of international labor representatives to UNCIO, the French delegation was pretty much stirred up by the question. The nomination of Kuznetsov as an official delegate of Russia gave grounds to the French leftists to demand of Bidault that he nominate either Gallant or Trachon as an official member of the French delegation.

Bidault had promised the CGT leaders in Paris that one of their representatives would be chosen as a French delegate to UNCIO. He insisted that such move would be in full accordance with the French traditions, France having always given labor its place in international negotiations. However, de Gaulle thought differently, and Bidault did not keep his word to the CGT.

62.1101

SECRET

Memo for David G. Shaw

-4-

7 May 1946

After the U.S. and British rebuffs to Labor, Gaillard and Pradon appealed to Bidault and demanded that he take action on the matter. On this question, all the French Delegates, including Alevin, Bonnet, Monnet and Milleux, gave their fullest support to Labor. Bidault hesitated for a moment, and, as Milleux explained, the nomination of Gaillard was within an inch of being achieved. But de Gaulle's instructions had been formal, and finally Bidault refused to yield, although he professed he was acting against his personal will.

Reactions of the French Delegation to the French election returns

Although very little information of a precise nature has arrived in this country, the leftist success in the recent elections has affected the members of the French Delegation in various manners.

The "gaullists" which constitute the greater part of the aides and personnel of the delegation were all convinced of a triumph of the right, with a strong come back of the radical-socialist party playing the part of the conservative center.

De Gaulle himself was confident that the Socialists would be defeated and the Communists would come out with much less strength than they claimed to have.

Within the French Delegation, Milleux had been told two or three times by political adversaries that his personal election in Marseille would be difficult and the results doubtful. The little information that reached San Francisco came as a great disappointment to the gaullists. On the other hand, the Labor Delegation, and the left wingers of UNCLC, are rejoicing.

De Gaulle and his power politics have received a blow. National elections will probably confirm this defeat, and give France a Parliament with a strong left-wing majority.

According to Milleux, one of the consequences of this leftist victory will be the creation, within the next eight months, of a united Communist-Socialist Party, which will be the government's party. This would mean that some elements of the Socialist Party will split or create an Independent group, including all the anti-Communist members. But, Milleux said, this new party will be negligible.

The single party, as a result of the fusion of the CR and the Socialist party, has been prophesied already by many spokesmen of the left. But Milleux is the first to have made a categorically optimistic statement on the matter.

SECRET

Memo for David C. Shaw

-5-

7 May 1945

According to Salliant and Frachon, de Gaulle is through unless he decides to separate from his friends, restore democracy, and give the people's representatives their right place in the government.

To one interlocutor who was expressing doubts as to the final results of the municipal elections, Millaux made the following reply: "Our government has not deigned to give us information on the election returns: this is a very good sign indeed; it means that we have won".

The success of the Christian Democrats (MRP), which seems to be great according to what is known here, is interpreted in various ways. According to Millaux (leader of "Ceux de la Resistance", left wing group) the MRP will back up the Communist-Socialist unity, just like all the other Resistance groups will. Millaux believes that a great number of former Vichyites, who were afraid to vote straightforwardly for the right, and who would like to redeem themselves, without however helping the communists or socialists, have given their support to the MRP. Salliant and Frachon expressed a somewhat similar opinion, saying that in Paris the MRP had benefitted by the votes of a great number of rightists, who expect to adapt themselves to the new language and the new formula and thus remain in power.

Patrick Waldberg

SECRET

3 May 1945

Memorandum

To: Mr. Shaw

From: Lt. Col. Blankenhorn

Subject: French Secret Service at San Francisco Conference

A principal agent of the French Secret Service here is Lt. Col. Brault of the DCER. He has some identifiable associates. The connections involve not only DCER (Direction Generale des Etudes et Recherches) and BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action), but, with the latter, certain operations of OSS in ETO.

Patrick Waldberg stumbled on the facts on a streetcar platform soon after arriving here. He bumped into a party of three speaking French and recognized Lt. Col. Brault of the DCER with whom Waldberg had worked as an OSS representative in various OSS-DCER meetings in Paris. Brault seemed surprised and slightly annoyed at the encounter. Waldberg explained to Brault that he was on leave, and, being a Californian, was here seeing his family and attending to business matters, and that he had already run into delegates Saillant and Fracon whom he had known in Paris, as of course Brault knew.

Waldberg: "Brault introduced me to his two companions, Kaminker, an official interpreter for the French Delegation, and Servant Schreiner, head of the French Press Delegation to the Conference.

"He stated he was here on a specific mission dealing with the prisoners and deportees problems. I asked him whether Soustelle or any other friend of the DCER was here and his answer was negative.

"Brault was known clandestinely as Jerome, and under this name represented the French Maquis in the London BCRA. In France, he was one of Trenay's close associates at the head of the "Combat" resistance group. Like Trenay, he is an extreme rightist and expresses political views very similar

SECRET

-2-

to those of the fascist "Croix-de-Feu" movement.

"After France's liberation, Brault held office in the DGER building in Paris, where he was in charge of the Prisoners and Deportees section. He worked for a while under Colonel Debasse, and then was given the direction of an independent service.

"There is little doubt that Brault is acting here as the eye of the DGER.

"Kamincker, official interpreter with the delegation, was formerly a business man. His reputation is that of a man of intrigues, ambitious and not very scrupulous. His functions here are of a subordinate order, but he willingly poses as an indispensable body.

"Servant Schreiber, who heads the French Press Delegation, was before the war the editor of a political scandal sheet called "Les Echos". His name infallibly evokes the famed corruption of the French Press. To all those who have had inside knowledge of the French political world in the past fifteen years, Schreiber holds the reputation of a blackmailer who would sell himself to the highest bidder."

cc: Col. Duxton

SECRET

Memorandum for David C. Shaw

APL and French Labor Delegates

Saillant and Fracon, delegates of the CFT to the WIO, asked to meet William Green during their short stay in Washington.

Green gave them an appointment before lunch time and received them in his office, where two other persons were sitting.

During the twenty to thirty minutes of this meeting, Green did not let them say a word, but he made them a violent scene, pointing a menacing finger to them from time to time, and accusing them of sabotaging world labor unity.

His main base of argumentation was that he, Green, and the AP of L had been the great friends the CFT had in this country; that the AP of L had helped the CFT often, and had given it support for many years. Now, the CFT representatives in the WIO, instead of coming directly to their old friend the AP of L, were visiting the WIO as strangers, displaying the most intolerable ingratitude. Green spent many words to describe all the evil he thought of the WIO. He did not allude to the WIO or to the general problems of international labor.

Saillant and Fracon were astounded and speechless. They said they had the impression of being insulted by an irresponsible jealous woman, who was accusing them of unfaithfulness.

Fracon and Saillant went away with a very poor opinion of Green's intelligence, and with serious concern over the seriousness of the split of American Labor.

2 May 1945

Policy and Personalities: French Delegation (UNCIO)

The French Delegation's policy at UNCIO has been to "wait and see". They have not committed themselves to any alliance; they have avoided taking sides or backing any particular power in the major issues. They have also avoided raising points that might have been causes for further conflicts or frictions.

One of the reasons for this attitude can be General de Gaulle's unwillingness to let France assume responsibilities in the Conference. He certainly thinks France has not been given full recognition as one of the big powers which he believes she is entitled to. Furthermore, he is less interested in collective security and the defense of democracy throughout the world than he is in territorial gains for France, and the building up of a strong authoritarian regime, backed with military might. His nationalistic conceptions, and his desire to have exclusive control of French Foreign Affairs are accountable for the mediocrity of the French Delegation.

Georges Bidault, Foreign Minister, is weak, irresolute and incompetent. It seems evident that de Gaulle chose him precisely because of these characteristics. During the German occupation, Bidault, who maintained a patriotic attitude, was elected by the Resistance groups and parties as President of the CNR (National Resistance Council). Bidault was before the war and still is editor of l'Aube, a center-left catholic daily, and he is a leader of the Christian Democratic Party, now rebaptized "Mouvement Republicain Populaire" (MRP). To be sure that he would retain full control of France's Foreign Policy, de Gaulle appointed Bidault his Foreign Minister. Bidault's weakness is now legendary, a weakness which does not appear only in his political behavior but also in his private life: it is known that he indulges in alcohol, and that on several occasions since his appointment he attended conferences while intoxicated.

The Chief of Cabinet of the French Foreign Minister is H. Palaise, also a Christian Democrat. Palaise is not a politician, but what the French call a "mondain". He has no convictions of his own, and will support the government line whatever it may be.

SECRET

-2-

Little is known of Minister Pleven's activity in San Francisco. He, more than Bidault, represents General de Gaulle's personal thought. He is also shrewder and infinitely more capable than Bidault. Pleven has been the only one in the present government of France to show real statesmanship qualities. A modern style reactionary, Pleven is sufficiently adroit to understand the French people's urge for social reforms and justice, and to speak an adequate language.

Rather than nominate Vincent Auriol (Socialist--President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Consultative Assembly) as a delegate to UNCIO, de Gaulle chose to send Paul Boncour, who is deaf and senile. Auriol, who until the last moment was expecting to go with the Delegation, is extremely embittered by de Gaulle's decision. This gesture will cause sharp criticism of the French Delegation by the French Socialist Party and other left wing organizations. It is obvious to everyone that Boncour is merely a dead weight, capable only of repeating outdated speeches which he already made in the course of a political career after more marked with failures than with successful accomplishments.

Francois Billoux, Minister of Public Health, Communist deputy of Marseille, and member of the C.P. Political Bureau, is here more as an observer for the French Communist Party and the left wing in general than as an active member of the Delegation. However, he is often consulted by Bidault, and his suggestions are sometimes followed. Bidault's speech at the Conference on May 1st has been considerably changed at the suggestion of Billoux.

It is interesting to note that, while the French Delegation has adopted a non-committal attitude towards the Conference, the French Communist Party appears to follow a similar policy in regard to the French Government.

De Gaulle, for reasons of national pride, believes that France has been treated unjustly by the Big Powers. In consequence, he patiently waits for conflicts to develop to a point where one of the Powers will need an ally. At that stage, he will commit himself and side with this power, but after he has made sure that his demands for France will be fully supported.

The French Communists believe that de Gaulle's government is not representative of the French people. They believe that the government's policy, for internal as well as for foreign affairs, is nefarious. But they cannot do anything to change this situation until general elections have taken place, and

CONTROL
SECRET

-3-

a real Parliament is able to express the people's will. Therefore, they maintain their two ministers within the Cabinet. These ministers hold minor offices (Air and Public Health), therefore they cannot be compromised in the failure of the government. Their task consists in underlining on every occasion the mistakes of their colleagues or of their President, and when it comes to a final decision, to yield in order not to break up national unity. This explains Billoux's part in the French Delegation to UNCIO: just as he does within the Cabinet Council, he acts here as a discreet reminder of the working class' will, making suggestions, observing what is being done, and carefully registering whatever mistake is being made.

Thus, the French Delegation to UNCIO, in the same fashion as the present Government of France, represents de Gaulle's personal will more than it does the French people.

It is to be noted that the left wing and resistance elements that are now in San Francisco are shocked at the composition of the French Press Delegation.

The French Government recently appointed officially Genevieve Tabouis as a press correspondent. Tabouis is one of the most unpopular exiles in the eyes of the French public. She is reputed to have sabotaged Franco-American relations by her repeated attacks against de Gaulle and the support she gave Giraud. She is also accused of having sold out to financial interests in the U.S., and of being both unscrupulous and irresponsible.

Other exiles of no reputation in France are officially attached to the Press Delegation here.

Pertinax is considered by labor delegates as a brilliant newspaperman, but also as one of the saboteurs of the Third Republic. His books are filled with acute criticism of the former leaders of France, generally well justified criticism, but his conclusions are equivocal, and can lead to fascist solutions.

Henri Torres, also in the press section here, was Laval's friend and disciple, and he is one of the French parliamentarians who are particularly discredited and despised.

(It should be recalled that French left wingers and resistance people were aroused against the French immigration in the U.S. They said that this immigration, composed of rich businessmen and a handful of second rate politicians, gave the

-4-

American officials and the public a wrong image of France. It also contributed to the misunderstandings between the American government and the French.)

Other members of the French Press Delegation are subject to criticism from these same groups. E. Helsey, a veteran of French journalism, was during many years the parliamentary correspondent of "Le Matin", one of the most dangerous fascist daily papers.

S. Schreiber, who heads the Press Delegation, is a known political blackmailer, formerly editor of a political scandal sheet "Les Echos".

The correspondents who belong to resistance or leftist groups are going back to France in a critical mood. Jean Jacques Mayoux, member of the Consultative Assembly, Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Commission, is now in San Francisco as a correspondent for Franc Tireur. He does not belong to any party, but his participation in Resistance groups for four years has given him standing among his colleagues of the Assembly. He reflects in a moderate and reasonable way the opinion of the progressive elements in France. His views on the French delegation to UNCIO are found to be not dissimilar to the above estimates.

SECRET

16-5-28
4 May 1948

From: F. L. Ryan

Subject: Dr. Halperin's conference with Lombardo Toledano

1. As to the labor conference: Lombardo is very much pleased with the conference. It has accomplished everything that it expected to do. A constitution has been completed. All member representatives are in complete agreement.
2. This is the story that Lombardo will take back with him to Latin America, and which he will immediately present to the CTAL.
3. As to the Quebec meeting: This will not directly deal with the WTUC, and is a meeting of the AIO. Lombardo will attend it. It will be held in June, 1948.
4. As to the failure to get an invitation to UNCIO: Lombardo says that no invitation was expected. When the London meeting was taking place, the UNCIO meeting at Yalta was underway. The WTUC immediately contacted the British, U.S., and Russian ambassadors, and asked to be represented at the UNCIO conference. The Russians approved, but Winant and Eden refused to permit WTUC participation. Therefore, Lombardo says, failure to get representation at this meeting was expected by the labor chiefs, and is merely a continuation of the policies adopted at Yalta. Labor did not expect to get such representation, but did agree that it should be applied for.
5. Lombardo did not appear to know of any meeting of the labor chiefs prior to the Paris meeting. This morning he is continuing his conferences with Murray about the constitution.
6. He did not have a copy of the constitution or other papers dealing with the conference. He stated that the constitution would be made public at the press meeting at the Palacio Hotel at 11 A.M. on May 5.
7. He expressed himself as greatly displeased with the types of ambassadors that have been appointed to Latin American countries and particularly to Mexico. He holds Stettinius directly responsible for this failure. He recited specifically the case of Mexico. The U.S. ambassador there is

SECRET

-3-

Rosenbaum. He holds himself completely aloof from the Mexicans and is surrounded with fascists. His doors are always locked. A girl from the U.S. Embassy has been attending the Mexican Labor University. She is so incompetent that it is known by all the students that she comes to the University to spy on Lombardo. She takes notes about Lombardo, and her activities are known to all the students who deeply resent the slight on Lombardo and the University. Lombardo hopes that Stettinius will be re-placed as Secretary of State, and that a new crop of ambassadors will be appointed by the U.S. in Latin America.

8. On Argentina, Lombardo said that his position has been stated openly, and that was the position that he was taking to Latin America. He felt that England and the U.S. had made a serious error with respect to Argentina, and their admission of a fascist state would not be popular in Latin America. The position of the CTAL with respect to Argentina will be precisely the same as its attitude toward Spain. Both in the eyes of Latin America labor are fascist states.

SECRET

From: P. L. Ryan

Subject: Interview with Lombardo Toledano

1. The labor conference is going very well. There are no points of difference at the present time except the following:
 - a. The question of representation came up early in the conference and has been solved.
 - b. A question remains as to how to bring about the legal death of the IFTU. This question arises very frequently, and is brought up by Oldenbroock and Borgevenala.
2. On Sunday, the conference met with the four foreign representatives and put up to them the question of presenting the labor proposals to the UNCTO.
3. R. J. Thomas left the Conference because he was an alternate to Murray and Wilburn and there was nothing particularly for him to do.
4. The arrangements for the Conference were not all that could be desired. He says that it taken him over an hour to ride from the home in which he is staying to Oakland. He goes by street car and train.
5. The position of the AFL with respect to the labor conference was not unexpected by Toledano. He says that Robert Watt is merely a messenger boy for the AFL Executive Council, and he has made the Executive Council's position clear a number of times.
6. With respect to UNCTO the big question remains as to what to do about the American trusts and cartel relations in South America. One major point here is the type of American diplomatic representative sent to South America. He complained that Ambassador Landerachmit in Mexico keeps to himself--does not mix with the Mexican people. Daniels was loved in Mexico because he loved the Mexican people. Landerachmit is the wrong kind of representative to send to South America. Nelson Rockefeller has done no good. In fact, he hasn't done anything. Men of good will who love the people are needed for representation.
7. Toledano says that his work in the conference will be completed Friday, May 4. He will leave San Francisco on ~~Monday~~ ^{Friday}, May 5.

SF

-2-

8. He chose a private home to live in so that he could avoid interviews and devote himself to work.
9. He has just completed a pamphlet in English which states the position of the CTAL on the many labor and social problems that must be solved. Copies will be sent to me.
10. He appeared to be hopeful of the results of the labor conference and untroubled.
11. On Argentina, and its recognition by the United States and its admission to the Conference, he said that it was clear to the entire working class and to all liberals in Latin America that the Argentina government was outright fascist. Its recognition by the United States and admission to UNCTO will be a severe blow to the United States and to its relationships to Latin America. This is because the fascist regime in Argentina and its connections with the Nazis is known to all Latin Americans. The United States has completely failed through its government representatives such as Nelson Rockefeller to gain the good will of Latin America. This is because they either do nothing, such as Rockefeller, or because they do not love the people. He added that the United States will suffer severely in good will in Latin America because of its support of the fascist government of Argentina.

101
SECRET

3 May 1946

Dear Dave,

The attached has some significance that I would like to explore if I had any time for such things. It is a speech of Attlee to American businessmen telling them how socialistic Great Britain is about to become in its great role of being the compromiser between Russia and the United States. Had I time I should like to know about its repercussions among American businessmen and officials at this Conference. In the other direction I should like to ask Attlee where his tongue was at the time he made the speech.

The speech was not reported publicly as far as I know.

It reminds me of a speech made by Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald at the Washington Press Club about 1928 or 1929 during his visit to President Hoover. MacDonald was described as knocking the Press Club audience for a loop by preaching pure socialism and assuring them of the imminence of a socialistic Britain. As I recall, the speech which was off the record was not reported publicly in England, care being taken to that end. You may want to look over this as another example of conspicuous double talk and figure out for yourself what it is meant to cloak.

The odd thing, of course, is the inherent validity of the suggested role for Britain as a compromiser between Russia and the USA, but a thing that is on the face of it valid may become the best possible cloak for entirely different aims. I wish I had the time to explore this tidbit of the Conference.

*/

Col. Blankenhorn

SECRET

May 3, 1945

TO : Col. Blankenhorn

FROM : F. L. Ryan

SUBJECT : Speech of Clement Attlee at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on May 2, 1945

1. The speech was before about 800 business men of San Francisco, and no newsmen were present. After the speech Attlee answered questions from the floor.
2. He pointed out that the war had necessitated wide socialization in England, and of very strict controls over economic life. This socialization had been accomplished largely under the leadership of the Labor Party, which includes among its members business men, military leaders, and professionals.
3. This socialization will be continued and extended after the war, covering telegraph, telephone, banks, railroads, steamship lines, mines, and other industries. All England except a few "strange" persons agree on this program.
4. On the question of international trade, he said that England, once the home of free trade, no longer recognizes it as the guiding principle of trade. Instead, it now appears necessary that international agreements should be arrived at between all nations which shall serve to guide trade into its most productive channels and that will lead to expanding commerce and industry.
5. As to England's position in world affairs, he said that this is a result of England's unique position as a compromiser. England's socialism is not Marxian socialism. Nevertheless, England is becoming one of the world's great socialistic commonwealths. As such, it is in the position of serving as a compromiser between the US, a capitalistic nation, and the USSR, a socialistic nation. It is the Labour Party's position that it must continue this work as a compromiser in the interests of world peace and to see that the United Nations shall stay united.

CONFIDENTIAL

PREPARED BY USSR DIVISION: R & A,
FOR CURRENT SITUATION REPORT.

3 May 1945
16 5 25
V2 6 25

SECRET CONTROL

Russian Champions Labor at San Francisco

The Soviet Union, proposing the right of organized labor to present its views to the San Francisco conference, has emerged as the champion of the embryonic World Trade Union Federation (WTUF). In a surprise move last week, Vassili Kuznetsov, chairman of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and a member of the official Soviet delegation to the conference, requested the Steering Committee to permit the WTUF to send a representative to the parley. The Russian pointed out that the International Labor Office is represented at the conference, but not all trade unions are associated with the ILO. One newspaper report said that Kuznetsov had also asked that the labor representative have an "advisory vote." However, the opposition within the committee was so strong that Kuznetsov was forced to withdraw his proposal without calling for a vote. 1/

In spite of this rejection, the WTUF has not given up its fight to win representation at the conference. In a formal letter to Secretary Stettinius on 2 May, WTUF representatives at San Francisco requested admission to the conference in a consultative capacity. The letter, copies of which were to be forwarded to each of the four conference chairmen, was signed by Sidney Hillman, CIO; Sir Walter Citrine, British Trades Union Congress (TUC); and Mikhail Tarasov, USSR; and Louis Saillant,

1/ New York Post, 1 May 1945. The New York Times, 29 April 1945, said that Ambassador Andrei Gromyko made the Soviet proposal. Subsequently, Foreign Commissar Molotov revealed at a press conference that the suggestion had been presented by Kuznetsov.

SECRET

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET CONTROL

- 2 -

France. Pointing to the 60,000,000 trade union members represented by the WTUF, the labor leaders wrote that it would be difficult for these workers to understand "the refusal of their conference to give their representatives an official consultative status so that their views on these crucial questions might be effectively presented and fully explored." 1/ With the release of the letter, British trade union leaders revealed that they were prepared to raise the question of whether the settling of international issues is a matter for "governments" alone at the forthcoming conference of the British Labor Party. 2/

The question of labor representation at the conference, first raised by the Russians, now looms as a new controversial issue. Foreign Commissar Molotov took care to reveal Soviet initiative in the problem, for at a press conference he volunteered the first news of the fate of the Russian proposal. Although it was foredoomed to failure, the Soviet suggestion constituted more than a gesture of traditional Soviet friendship for the working class. The Russians now have it on the record that they alone among the major powers supported the right of labor to be represented officially at the conference. Regardless of whether some of the labor groups desired the sponsorship of the Soviet Union, the Russians have given impetus to labor's aspiration to become an independent factor in international relations. In addition, the Soviet government became the first major power to recognize officially the WTUF as the international spokesman for labor.

SECRET

1/ New York Times, 3 May 1945.2/ Daily Worker, 3 May 1945.

SECRET CONTROL

- 3 -

SECRET CONTROL

By making the proposal, the Soviet government was giving official support to the position taken by the Soviet labor movement last year. Discussing the projected labor International, War and the Working Class in September 1944 proposed that labor be represented as an independent group in the various international organizations and at the United Nations' security conference. 1/ The World Trade Union Conference, which created the WTUF in London in January 1945, adopted the Soviet suggestion and authorized its interim Continuation Committee "to act as agent of the Conference to ensure trade Union representation at the coming Peace Conference and at all preparatory commissions or conferences." 2/ The conference reiterated its intentions to become an active political force in a special Manifesto which declared, "...the International Trade Union Movement will make its claim to a share in determining all questions of the peace and postwar settlements, and for representation at the Peace Conference and all international commissions and agencies concerned with the peace settlement in all its phases, beginning with the San Francisco Conference in April." 3/ In fulfillment of the conference resolution, the Continuation Committee appointed a group of seven delegates to represent the WTUF at the San Francisco parley.

1/ Zhukov, T. "Why Is an International Trade Union Conference Not Held?", War and the Working Class, 1 September 1944; cf., Allied Labor News, 24 November 1944.

2/ XL-6541.

3/ The Worker, 4 March 1945.

SECRET CONTROL

- 4 -

SECRET CONTROL

At its meeting in Washington on 14-17 April, however, the Continuation Committee was forced to change its plans when the American government as host to the conference failed to accredit the WTUF delegation. By not recognizing the WTUF, Washington obviously was escaping from becoming involved in an issue on which the major American labor organizations were divided. The CIO is supporting the WTUF, while the American Federation of Labor is boycotting the new organization. Instead of inviting the WTUF to send official observers, the American government asked the CIO and the A. F. of L. to send representatives who would be available for consultation should the American delegation desire advice. The Soviet government, in contrast, appointed Kuznetsov as an official member of the Russian delegation. Similarly, Mexico, Chile, and Cuba also named trade union leaders as members of their respective delegations. 1/ The British government did not appoint any trade union official, but included two members of the British Labor Party on its delegation.

Although it has now been rejected twice as the international representative of labor, the WTUF may still figure prominently in the conference proceedings. Even if the formal request to Mr. Stettinius is ultimately rejected, the WTUF seems certain to be discussed when the fate of the ILO is decided. Meeting on the sidelines at Oakland, the WTUF representatives are prepared to propose that organized labor have direct representation in the Social and Economic Council envisaged by the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Such representation presumably would be in addition to the labor delegates within the ILO, for the Russians at

1/ Daily Worker, 30 April 1946.

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET CONTROL

- 5 -

London successfully prevented the labor conference from committing itself to support the ILO.

The Soviet Union, critical of the structure and the record of the ILO and apparently desirous of pushing the WTUF, may hold out for official recognition of the new labor International within the Social and Economic Council. In taking such a position, the Russians would encounter strong opposition, for many groups seek to increase rather than to reduce the power and the prestige of the ILO. Certain British groups, for example, look to the ILO to furnish machinery to assist the United Kingdom in the achievement of its post-war economic aims. These groups favor international cartel agreements which could be arranged through the tripartite industrial committees established by the ILO in January 1945. ^{1/} At the same time, the AF of L, to preserve its own position in international labor circles, will prod the American delegation to retain the ILO. Similarly, the "old guard" in the international ranks of labor, personified by Walter Schevenels of the International Federation of Trade Unions -- which the WTUF seeks to replace -- and J. Oldenbroek of the International Transport Workers' Federation will fight to continue the ILO. In spite of this opposition, however, the Russians will have a bargaining point. For the ILO cannot function as an effective international organization without the participation of the Soviet Union. The Russians, therefore, conceivably could agree to rejoin the ILO -- after its connections with the League of Nations had been severed -- provided that certain changes

^{1/} Source S.

SECRET CONTROL

- 6 -

SECRET CONTROL

were made in its structure and provided that direct representation was accorded to the WTUP.

The Russians, however, are not likely to force such a show-down themselves, but instead are willing for the individual labor leaders to take the initiative in bringing pressure upon their respective governments. For by making the recognition of the WTUP a controversial issue, the Russians would be endangering the existence of the very organization which they would be championing. The Russians are conscious of the fact that national loyalties still supersede class loyalties and that many groups regard the WTUP as a possible future tool for Soviet diplomacy. As a result, the Russians may shy away from precipitating an open conflict between themselves, on one hand, and the American and British delegations, on the other. For in the event of such a controversy, the American and British labor leaders, by calling for the representation of the WTUP, would be placed in the embarrassing position of supporting the Russians against their respective governments. With the A. F. of L. attacking the WTUP as a leftist organization, neither the British nor the CIO desire to be found in a position of looking to the Soviet Union for support.

The Soviet delegates to the Oakland meeting have already indicated that they are aware of this Anglo-American hesitation. The Russians realize that the war-forged unity of the United Nations, more than any feeling of international solidarity of the working class, is responsible for the British and the Americans joining with the Russians in a labor coalition. Although the Russians perhaps more than any other delegation are pushing for a unified and effective labor organization, they are not insisting upon their demands in such a manner that would alienate the

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET CONTROL

British or the Americans. For the withdrawal of either the British or the Americans would again split labor on the international level and rob the Russians of their present opportunity to weld a unified organization. In contrast to the San Francisco conference, therefore, the Russians at Oakland are the chief proponents of unity.

While they have followed a conciliatory policy within the labor meetings, the Russians have not played a secondary role, merely adding their approval whenever the British and the Americans agreed. Instead the Russians have advocated the creation of an organization with certain powers over its affiliated members. The Russians apparently feel that they can afford to push the Americans and the British to a certain extent, because neither group at the present time wants to withdraw from the WTUF. Although they fear the numerical size of the Soviet labor movement with its 27,000,000 trade union members, and although they are apprehensive of Soviet prestige with the French, Latin American, and Eastern European labor groups, the British do not want to endanger Anglo-Soviet relations by quitting the WTUF. Similarly, the CIO, which has won its first foothold in international labor circles, does not want to give up its present position and thereby increase the prestige of the AP of L. Consequently, both the British and the CIO for the present are virtually forced to remain within the WTUF, although they can work for a less centralized organization than envisaged by the Russians.

Since the war and the resultant political agreement among the Allied powers has been the major factor in bringing together the present labor coalition, likewise the peace and its effect upon Allied collaboration will have a determining influence upon world labor unity. A weakening of

SECRET

relations among the Big Three might lead the British and the CIO to with-

SECRET CONTROL

SECRET CONTROL

draw from the WTU's, on the other hand, a strengthening of Allied collaboration would harden the base upon which the present efforts toward world labor unity are being made, and at the same time would strengthen the position of the Russians. Therefore, the future role of the WTU as a labor organization and as a political pressure group is being shaped at San Francisco. It is being determined not only by the labor leaders themselves in their own discussions, but it is also being decided by the deliberations of the United Nations' conference.

SF

SECRET CONTROL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

8099 PW

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession No. 7078Date Rec'd SA JUN 14 1942

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <u>Henderson</u>	<u>2007</u>				
2. <u>Registry Office</u>			<u>5/26/42</u>		
3. <u>Exec Div (W)</u>		<u>1/4</u>			
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

8099

CONFIDENTIAL

7182

June 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUGH R. WILSON
FROM: MR. ALLEN DULLES

Attached is a memorandum procured by Arthur Goldberg, relating to the role of labor in Axis and occupied countries of Europe.

This was prepared by a group of German and Austrian refugees working under the direction of Miss Toni Sender, a distinguished German refugee and a former member of the German Reichstag.

Arthur Goldberg tells me that the members of this group are prepared to cooperate in giving effect to the suggestions and proposals made in their memorandum.

I am in process of studying this memorandum and would be glad to have your suggestions. I am more and more convinced that this is a field in which ^{+ FIS} we can do really useful work.

A.W.D.


MEMORANDUM

Submitted by the following

NAMECOUNTRY OF BIRTHOCCUPATION AND AFFILIATION

Lorenz, Emil

Austria

Lecturer on Political Economy,
Institute for Workers' Education,
Vienna.Research worker in the Economic
Statistical Department of the
Chamber of Labor in Vienna, and
in the Research Department of the
Austrian Federation of Labor.Writer for various magazines and
trade union papers.

Lorenz, Emil

Germany

Son of the head of the Berlin
School System who created the Modern
Schools in Berlin in 1933.Active in Social Democratic Youth
Movement in Germany.Secretary, International Federation
of Teachers in France.Executive Member, workers' educa-
tion organization, "Aide de
l'Enfance Ouvriere," Paris.

Officer, Eva Levinaki

Germany

Member and Officer, White Collar
Workers Union in Western Germany.Member editorial staff of an
anti-Nazi publication house in
Paris.Member, French White Collar Workers
Union.

Sender, Toni

Germany

1920-33 Social Democratic member,
German Reichstag; member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Economics during
entire period.Labor member, City Council of
Frankfurt a/M, 1919-23.Editor Metal Workers Union
Magazine, Berlin.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>COUNTRY OF ORIGIN</u>	<u>OCCUPATION AND AFFILIATION</u>
Sender, Toni (cont)	GERMANY	<p>Advisor to President, Metal Workers Union.</p> <p>Active in French Labor movement for 4 years.</p> <p>Editor-in-chief, Frankfurt daily labor paper, <u>Volkrecht</u>.</p> <p>Editor, <u>Frauenwelt</u>, national women's magazine, Berlin.</p> <p>Labor lecturer and educator.</p> <p>For 3 years editor of Foreign Affairs on Belgium daily labor paper in Antwerp, <u>Volksgazet</u>.</p> <p>Since 1938, lecturer and writer in the United States.</p> <p>Published AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A GERMAN REBEL, which was made the Book of the Month by the British Labor Book Club in 1940.</p> <p>Member of staff of American Labor Education Service since 1940.</p>
Soffner, Heinz	Austria	<p>Leader, labor youth movement in Austria.</p> <p>Officer, Commercial Clerks Union.</p> <p>Executive Secretary, White Collar Workers section of the Austrian Federation of Labor of the Province of Carinthia.</p> <p>Active in the Austrian underground movement, 1934-38.</p> <p>1938-40, Secretary, Non-Partisan Federation of Austrian Emigrants in Paris, and member of the Refugee Committee of the League of Nations.</p>

Propaganda

In this present war, labor plays an infinitely more vital part than it has played in any previous war. The primary reason for this is the central place in the overwhelming importance of the production and use of material for combat. In the Axis powers, the stress has been placed on the manufacture of the means for warfare as opposed to the importance of the individual, whether in industry or at the front.

In spite of this importance in modern warfare, the organized resistance which labor in Germany and in the Nazi-occupied countries has so far been able to contribute, has not yet been able to undermine the totalitarian system. However, it seems safe to assume that even today the majority of German workers, with the exception of the younger groups, are still not Nazis at heart. It is safe, also, to say that almost all workers in the occupied countries oppose Hitler for national, political and social reasons.

This must be borne in mind, nevertheless. Hitler has succeeded, particularly in Germany, in overcoming mass unemployment. At the same time, however, he has combined terror, economic pressure and propaganda into a highly efficient system of using and controlling labor - both in Germany and in the occupied countries. This success has been facilitated by the lack of organized resistance, and by the inability in the past of democratic governments in Europe to enlist labor's cooperation in the fight against Nazis and fascists. In Germany, resistance has been further complicated by the fact that the masses have not been able to see any other alternative to a Hitler victory than a super-Versailles settlement.

- 2 -

The most fertile field, therefore, for hitting home the truth lies in reaching the laboring masses of Nazi-dominated Europe, with a picture of the situation there combined with the infinitely more dignified position of labor in the United States. It is likewise of equal importance to ferret out the sordidness and hopelessness of the lot of European labor for contrast with the American way of life to the American public.

To what extent, and how quickly, labor's struggle against Nazism and Fascism - through economic sabotage, armed resistance, or political revolution - will gain momentum and become decisive, depends upon many factors. Some of these - such as the general course of the war and its influence upon mass feelings and thoughts, after effects of pre-Hitler political movements, developments within and between underground groups - can hardly be influenced from the outside.

Quite a few important steps, however, can be taken now to accelerate and intensify this struggle. In addition to the military (the most obvious), securing, using and properly exploiting factual information can have vital effect. A high degree of coordination between our political warfare and our military effort is necessary in assuming leadership in this total war. The better our political warfare is done, the fewer sacrifices we may have to make on the battlefields. This means we must explore all means of information in order to obtain a picture as accurate as possible of the European situation. Without this, we will miss opportunities of reaching European labor with the truth; we will have fewer facts to give the American public as to life in lands where freedom has disappeared.

This memorandum, therefore, is devoted to work of securing correct information on labor in Nazi countries, the audience to be reached, suggested programs and types of material, and methods.

- 3 -

Information on Labor in Nazi Countries

The American press and magazines have faithfully carried news of the European situation. In the main, however, the news has been concerned primarily with military and political developments, for with the rigid censorship in Europe it has been difficult - if not impossible - to gauge accurately the mood of the enslaved peoples in the laboring class, and the effect of fascist government measures on them. There are other sources for this information, and in a very systematic way they should all be tapped and used.

The following sources are suggested: labor, current European publications, foreign broadcasts, free movements, underground movements, and other miscellaneous sources.

Labor

The International Labor Organization in this country.

In England; through the British Information Service, the trade unions, and groups of exiles in London members of the International Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Transport Workers, and former members of trade unions in the occupied countries, and so on.

Through groups of exiles in this country from Germany, Austria and occupied countries. Some of these can be found in independent labor groups - such as the Polish Labor Group, the French Labor Committee, the Austrian Labor Committee, and German groups representing the underground movement. Representatives of European labor can also be found in official delegations and political groups.

Individual workers or labor leaders recently arrived from Europe. These informants can be contacted through the groups mentioned directly above, or through refugee agencies, or through the U. S. Immigration Service.

News from labor friends in unoccupied France received through letters.

Appointment of labor representatives in England, Russia, and so on, to organize interviews with German soldiers and war prisoners.

- 4 -

Contacts with American organizations and research groups dealing with European labor questions.

The names of labor exiles in this country can undoubtedly be secured through the office of the International Labor Organization, the International Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, or through the files of the International Federation of Trade Unions.

European Publications

Germany

A very important source of information is the German press - the regular study of official German newspapers and periodicals, both for Germany and the occupied countries. A more complete list, than the one below, of the most important papers and periodicals can readily be compiled. All these papers are available in neutral countries, such as Portugal and Switzerland. The problem is how to get them here. Recent arrivals to this country with their experience in labor movements abroad can be most helpful in reading and interpreting these papers.

Certain official German publications might be singled out for special mention - particularly those dealing with regulations and war ordinances, collective agreements, and so on. The most efficient source of exploitable news can be found in such publications as the daily Der Angriff, or the weekly of the German Labor Front. The big newspapers are not as important for this purpose as the local ones or tabloids, whose readers come mainly from the labor class. Official publications, such as the Reichsarbeitsblatt or Der Vierjahresplan, contain regulations, laws and ordinances, as well as necessary current statistics. Statistics are also found in the bi-monthly Wirtschaft und Statistik, and in trade papers. Unfortunately, there is so far in the United States official German material only up to the beginning of October, 1941, and this material can only be of use if it is recent.

The following dailies are suggested:

Volksischer Beobachter (Munich and Vienna editions)
Frankfurter Zeitung
Neues Wiener Tagblatt
Hamburger Fremdenblatt
Neuer Tag (Prague)
Nationalzeitung (Hessen)
Pariser Zeitung
Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden
Der Angriff (Berlin)
Drahter Zeitung
Brüsseler Zeitung

The following are some of the periodicals:

Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit
Der Arbeitermann
Reichsarbeitsblatt
Schmiedebriefe der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
Nachzeitungen der Deutschen Arbeitsfront

- D -

Wirtschaft und Statistik
der Vierjahresplan
das neue Deutschland
Freude und Arbeit
Postale Praxis
 Business dailies and periodicals

Occupied Countries

Excerpts of German papers in such countries as Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Occupied France, Luxembourg.

Unoccupied France

All recent decrees and laws passed by the Vichy Government contained in the Journal Officiel. This source should be used extensively (for Labor Charter, etc.)

French newspapers arriving here from time to time. Certain ones especially, should be used and followed. A few suggestions are: L'Effort, Quinzaine, L'Action Française, L'Emancipation Nationale.

New books appearing in France, available through the Vichy Bureau "French Information Center" in New York.

Official Vichy statistics on wages, prices, economic developments (freight traffic, building activity), vital statistics, and so on.

Switzerland

The Swiss press, also, is a very useful source for German developments, although it does not contain much information on specific labor matters.

News on economic developments is available here in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

German Broadcasts

German short wave broadcasts should, of course, be followed, and listened to by those with experience in the European labor movements.

German long wave broadcasts should also be followed. For those planned for local audiences within Germany may be found useful, but only the most familiar with the particular district, in which the broadcasting is being done, would be able to select pertinent material.

Free Movements

Reports and publications of non-official sources may be obtained through the various emigrant organizations, and through the free movements. Here are some of the suggested publications:

Netherland News, Netherland News Digest
News from Belgium
Inter-Allied Review
Voice of Freedom
Poland fights, Polish Feature & News Service
News of Norway
Notes on Denmark
Release of Czechoslovakian Informants
Inside Germany Reports
Austrian Labor News
Lithuanian Cultural Institute releases
New Democracy
France Forever
 and so on

These reports and materials, however, should be used most carefully, and only after having been checked with other sources.

Underground Movements

All such movements should, of course, be contacted. Text and leaflets and newspapers should be followed.

The general situation in France, as far as resistance against the Nazis is concerned, should be investigated.

Miscellaneous Sources

Observers placed in neutral and other countries, where they can contact travelers, workers accepting work for or returning from Germany or occupied territories; follow local papers, etc.

Recently arrived exiles should be interviewed. Their names could be gained through the immigration authorities. Such interviewing should be done, in so far as possible, with the help of those familiar with the problem, and preferably those from the particular district from which the newer arrival has just come. A list of questions to be asked could be prepared in order to facilitate the interview and get the information desired.

Personal friends in England who still maintain the little contact which is possible.

Contacts in Sweden.

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Information through Friends' organizations.

Contact with imprisoned German seamen and those in neutral countries.

Contact with allied seamen.

Personal letters received from abroad.

Reports of people still in contact with European business concerns - mainly, of course, through incoming letters and cables. This news might be obtained through the mail censors.

Certain institutions in this country conducting research projects on current German labor problems - such as the Institute of Social Research at Columbia University, the Graduate Faculty at the New School for Social Research - for material and connections.

Audience to be Reached

In order to carry on any sort of a campaign for enlightenment, it is necessary to have an understanding of the audience to be reached and its mental make-up. It is impossible in this brief memorandum to survey the whole complex labor situation in Europe. Certain rough classifications, however, can be made of workers in Nazi-dominated Europe. There are:

1. Nazis and "collaborationists"
2. Workers resigned to their fate under Hitler
3. Workers offering resistance without specific political goal
4. Workers offering active resistance, connected with national resistance movements (i.e., Czechoslovakia, Norway, etc.)
5. Underground groups of trade unionists, Socialists, Communists (France, Belgium, Poland, Germany, etc.)
6. Individuals and groups formerly connected with one of the groups listed under #5, now forming political units, adhering to "heretic" socialist or communist programs
7. Workers resisting Hitler for other reasons, particularly religious (Catholic trade unions in France, Netherlands, Belgium, etc.)

The comparative extent of these groups can scarcely be estimated. Figures, however, are not necessarily all-important, since under the conditions of Nazi rule, individual initiative and small, well organized units is key

- 11 -

factories, and so on, count much more than mere, unorganized numbers.

The program to be initiated, must be both broad enough to satisfy as many people as possible, and precise enough to convince the masses of European labor of its seriousness and feasibility.

It is, perhaps, of greater importance to develop the program in such a way as to reach particular groups. The more one can address specific classes, the more efficient will be the news service. For example; news should be planned specifically for the navy yard workers at Lubeck; the women who lost their sons in Russia; the farmers; the Ruhr workers; the youth program; and so on. As many types of workers as possible should be individually reached.

Suggested Program and Types of Material

In addition to acquiring an understanding of the audience, one must also have a knowledge of history. This means, for example, learning what forces brought about Nazism and Fascism, and the steps leading to that state, particularly from the first World War through the German Republic. It means, also, knowing what the labor movements had gained in the past, and what they have lost since the advent of Hitler.

The report is recurrent that the spirit of hopelessness has been nourished among German workers by the fact that they do not see any other alternative to a Hitler victory but another, and perhaps worse, Versailles. They also dread the possibility of a repetition of the long lasting economic crisis during the time of the Republic. Only facts can re-establish confidence that the democratic processes can work to the benefit of the common man.

This is the essence of political warfare to be aimed especially at labor in the Nazi-controlled countries. Thus far, the war and peace aims of

- 9 -

the United Nations have not been specific and precise enough to overcome the popular fear abroad of a repeated Versailles, of a return to some pre-Hitler status quo, of another economic depression. This must radically change. These aims must be crystallized, if the cooperation of European labor is to be achieved beyond the present degree of more or less spontaneous and somewhat isolated resistance. These occasional outbursts do cause trouble. An organized campaign, however, is imperative if the United Nations are to be successful in securing labor in Nazi countries as a full-fledged ally in winning the war and winning the peace as well.

Whatever the material, it must be factual, simple, truthful, and should satisfy a need. It must be timed properly to reach the desired audience. It must be written or delivered by those who know their field, the language and the idioms of the country they are addressing, and by those who are recognized as authorities by the different national labor groups. As to Germany proper, it should be kept in mind that linguistic differences exist among the various parts of the country. Each section, therefore, should be addressed by someone who is very familiar with that particular dialect. Furthermore, the news must be associated with the everyday preoccupations of the particular group being addressed.

In addition to relaying back to Europe news of conditions over there gleaned from trustworthy sources, factual reports about this country should be given. Brief, simple presentations - preferably by German, French, and so on speaking workers - should be prepared about American labor; labor conditions, wages, hours, social legislation, standards of living, housing, and so on. Comprehensive reports about labor organizations, political freedom, trade union activities, labor education, and so on, are likewise essential. In this respect, the somewhat different set-up in America would have to be explained, and the terms and expressions adapted to European labor experience.

- 10 -

Every possible effort, then, should be expended in showing actual life in a democracy. This should be pointed up to emphasize the role of the worker in war time in our United States. Pictures by American workers of the liberty they enjoy, the recognition of their unions, the all-out effort in which they are participating, participation in industry, government and community affairs, their share in social security, should be presented. The sacrifices of all groups must be stressed. But on the other side, it should be demonstrated that the United States is especially interested in the common man, and is constantly trying to abolish the existence of the underprivileged.

It would be very impressive to present a clear picture of the productive power of the United States, to show convincingly that the United States can outproduce Germany and that its reserves in material, capacity and manpower eliminate Germany's chances to win this war in the end. Furthermore, as far as European labor is concerned, this is a strategic time to begin an offensive for peace aimed directly at the workers. It should be explained to them that there is an alternative to a super Versailles settlement. They should learn why Nazis are so hated abroad - their cruelties against the conquered, the falseness of their promises, their utter irresponsibility save unto themselves. The German workers should be told they can clean themselves from the suspicion that they condone these crimes by using every possible means at their command to paralyze the war machinery of the Nazis. There is no feeling of vengeance against a German people which frees itself from Nazi slavery.

The democratic New World Order must be described in precise terms and in a convincing way, in order to show that there will be a different world after this war is won by the United Nations, for the Axis powers cannot defeat the Allies. In this New World, planning for war will be replaced by planning for a peace without economic crisis and insecurity.

- 11 -

Labor in Nazi controlled countries must be told that:

1. The United Nations will back labor's effort in the elimination of social and economic roots of Nazism and Fascism (such as economic stagnation, disintegration of the middle classes, hopelessness of youth, no outlets for "surplus populations," and so on.
2. Wiping out Hitler's wrongs does not mean restoring the social and political status quo of 1933, which permitted Hitler's rise to power and his conquest of Europe. Compensation for damages suffered will be subordinated to the major interests of European reconstruction (for example, slum clearance, building low cost houses for the homeless rather than compensating each damaged house owner to the full amount). The United Nations will help by every means possible in post war reconstruction.
3. Feeding and housing, medical and social services will be a primary task for the day after Hitler's defeat. The United Nations expect the full cooperation of Europe's workers, who in turn shall get a democratic representation in all reconstruction projects.
4. The enormous national and international war efforts in money, materials, and man power must be converted to peace efforts of no less extent and intensity. Since war production has absorbed for years virtually all unemployed in all belligerent countries, peace economy, organized with the same all-out effort, ought to be able not only to provide work for all workers, but also to give them a decent living and social and economic security.
5. This social and economic security ought to be guaranteed, planned in its broad outlines, and properly supervised by international and inter-continental political and economic bodies.

- 12 -

6. In the meantime, war production in the United States is running on high, and the joint production of the United Nations begins to exceed that of the Axis powers. (As many figures as can be safely given out, should be used to show that contrasted with the Axis powers the limit of the United Nations is not yet in sight.)

7. And, again in the meantime, (?) thousands of German soldiers have fallen on Russian soil; (?) thousands more have been injured.

Methods

The methods used in disseminating this information must be direct, quick and adaptable. Because of their speed, broadcasts addressed to workers in Europe are perhaps most effective. They should be transmitted over short wave direct from this country. They should also be transmitted to England for relaying by long wave to the Continent, since short wave sets have been largely confiscated by the Nazis. Besides directly organizing such broadcasts, scripts should also be furnished for use to many stations, both here and in England.

These broadcasts ought to emphasize labor's war effort in this country and in all the United Nations, preservation of civil liberties in war time, the functioning of well-established democracy, post war planning - all these points suggested under the program section. Incidentally, all these broadcasts ought to be as factual, condensed and brief as possible, for the risks of the listeners must be taken into account. It must be borne in mind

- 13 -

CONFIDENTIAL

that broadcasts should in so far as possible be identified with the daily lives of the groups they are intended to reach.

In broadcasting, current examples should be given of Nazi lies, as, for example, a case cited recently in the New York Times, in which were given German broadcasts of the same day to America and to England which were exact opposites of each other.

It would be extremely valuable to have regular news items on "those who resist." These would be factual and true reports of resistance against the Nazis being conducted in Nazi countries. This is of the greatest importance, for it must never be forgotten that other people in Germany and German controlled countries do not know these instances.

Relate again and again the shame of the hostage conventions. Read letters - true ones only - of hostages, who have later been executed. The execution is certainly the high point of Nazi cruelty which strikes even those who otherwise are indifferent.

The usefulness of distributing leaflets from planes ought to be carefully investigated for every special case, both during a bombing raid and moments of comparative calm.

Ways and means of influencing directly specific groups of workers, nuclei of resistance, and other key persons (shop delegates, former leaders) are needed. There is little or no need to inflame these people against Hitler, but they do need factual information. They should each be convinced in a positive way as to the aims of the United Nations both in war and in peace, in order that they may be prepared to cooperate both in the invasion of the European continent and in winning the peace.

Both for general and specific propaganda, all the labor contacts abroad should be utilized as "outgoing" channels as well as "incoming" ones.

SECRET

- 14 -

The observer posts, suggested above as one source for information out of Europe, should be used both as "transmitters" and as "recruiting stations". Reference here is made to observers placed in neutral countries where they can contact travelers, workers accepting work for or returning from Germany or occupied territories, follow local papers, and so on. This can also be done through former European labor leaders, both in this country and in England, who still maintain some contact with continental Europe. Likewise, governments-in-exile in contact with labor in their home territories should be furnished with material for transmission into their occupied countries.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Richard Rohman
TO: Mr. John C. Wiley
SUBJECT: Coordination of Labor Efforts

DATE May 21, 1942

It is a matter now of some urgency to coordinate the efforts of this Agency in its work with labor organizations both here and abroad.

American and foreign trade union leaders whom we have contacted and who are establishing for us lines of communication and who are prepared to undertake specific actions abroad, are disturbed by the fact that they run into differing policies in other branches of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

Because of their doubt concerning certain elements, for example in the Foreign Information Service, Special Activities and other branches, we are now meeting with some reluctance on their part to cooperate. Material which was sent you last night of some importance, could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty. The fear was frankly expressed that our branch had no means of keeping its work confidential because of certain alleged leaks in the FIS. Since the lives of some of the persons working on our behalf are directly involved, they are terribly disturbed by the possible consequences.

Further, it is my considered judgment that the excellent work now being performed by the New York office vis-a-vis the labor movement must be coordinated with the work we are doing in Washington. I believe that this Agency must have a uniform labor policy, otherwise the confusion

- 2 -

will result in the loss of some of our most important contacts. I believe that all decisions in respect to labor made at the New York office ought to be cleared with Washington before final approval. I believe that no decisions should be made by the New York office before such approval.

Our people in New York are more capable, but do not quite understand the most delicate relations within the foreign labor movement. Assume, for example, that a decision were made for this Agency to deal with a French communist group; we would promptly lose all our French democratic trade union contacts. First, because the communists in the underground are quite indiscreet and have already jeopardized the lives of French non-communists in the underground movement. There have been executions already as a result. Second, the non-communist elements regard the communists as their eventual rivals in a post-war France, and would look askance at a United States Government Agency working with them. Finally, they regard the information from communist underground sources as being heavily loaded with propaganda and quite inaccurate. They believe that any actions based upon communist information would have unfortunate repercussions in France, especially upon the labor movement.

A mistake our New York office is likely to make is to deal with Paul Hagen and his group in respect to Germany. The New York office is considering sending five or six persons to Europe whom Hagen will name. Since Hagen's record, according to our investigations, is fairly dubious, any material his group may bring out of Germany is suspect in advance. Further, Hagen is very political in his outlook and we may help build him up in a postwar Germany. Finally, other groups we are now working with in Germany, whom we trust may be quite disturbed if they learn of any possible support for Hagen.

- 3 -

In conclusion, I should like to point out that our labor policy as affecting all branches of the Agency, must be fairly uniform in order to be effective. We cannot, for example, work with certain labor sources upon whom we rely for information, and refuse them, without any reason, the facilitation of our short wave to Europe, and yet this has been the fact. Obviously, if we wish to instill confidence in these groups who are working on our behalf, they are entitled to the same measure of confidence.

FIS has discriminated against genuinely democratic foreign labor groups because it was fearful that they might be also anti-communist. FIS has shown anxiety in this matter though it was quite irrelevant to the intention of these democratic trade unionists to strike a blow against Hitlerism, the common enemy.

While our organizational set-up may be such as to prevent us from intruding upon the FIS as regards general broadcasts, I think we have a stake in the broadcasts to labor, and we ought to have something to say about them if we do not wish our work in other directions to suffer.

R R

RR:el

A joint statement or "labor charter" emanating from such a conference, developed in democratic terms consonant with the objectives of the war, would make a profound appeal to the rank and file of labor in enemy and occupied countries, as well as in the United Nations. Its significant propaganda value in this respect is obvious.

While the labor movements in the United Nations are of varied political complexions, the possibilities of getting a common agreement at the present time seem to be very good. [The objectives which a charter by labor in the United Nations might cover have been in part stated in the Atlantic Charter, but they have not yet been made concrete.] It is not necessary, or even desirable, to wait upon governments to adopt a common charter dealing with the objectives


-2-

of labor in the war. A joint labor conference would be free of many of the restraints necessarily inherent in formal statements issued by the governments of the United Nations.

This plan would, of course, necessitate very careful preliminary consultation. The presence in the United States of Sir Walter Citrine, one of the leading British trade unionists, might afford an excellent opportunity of discussing the possibility of an agreement on the part of the labor movements of all the United Nations. Exploration could also be begun through representatives of the American labor movement, South American labor movements, Canadian labor, and such other labor representatives as are now in the United States. They, in turn, might call the proposed conference to meet in this country. Or, it might be possible that a nucleus in the United States could frame a document which could be ratified even in the absence of direct participation.

I realize that to some extent this is outside of our sphere, but we do have some very useful contacts in this field which could be of real value in helping to develop the labor program herein suggested, and I should be glad to see

TO: Col Donovan



From the desk of
HUGH R. WILSON

-3-

them utilized in this direction if we can do so without impinging on the field in which others may be legitimately working.

Feeling, as I do, that the labor movements in European countries may prove to be our best allies, both as sources of information and for S. O. work, it seems to me that this idea has considerable merit and should be fully explored.

Labor Organization 6309
 * United Nations
 * Emergency
 * Labor, 3/2/42

(DRAFT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COLONEL DONOVAN'S SIGNATURE)

File

The idea has been suggested that it might be advisable to call a conference in the United States of labor organizations of the United Nations for the purpose of formulating and issuing a joint statement expressing the united support of labor for the war effort against the Axis and their conviction that the hopes, aspirations, and program of labor the world over depends on the defeat of the Axis powers.

The President's Victory Labor Committee, consisting of representatives of the A.F. of L. and the CIO, might well be the official host for this conference.

Such a conference might have a profound effect upon laboring classes in the Axis countries. In addition to this, I feel that this type of gathering would offer an admirable opportunity to perfect information services in various parts of the world. It is heartening to realize how deeply laboring elements throughout the world believe in the necessity of victory. The International Transport Union Workers, for instance, are being already most helpful to us, and I have no doubt that such a gathering would furnish many other similar opportunities.

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg of Chicago is now working in my New York office. Mr. Goldberg has been attorney for various unions in his Chicago office. If the idea appealed to you, Mr. Goldberg might broach the matter informally to Mr. Green and Mr. Murray, in order to see whether they would collaborate in such an undertaking. This, of course, is a suggestion only and you may feel that some other method of initiating the matter is preferable in the event that you judge that the whole affair merits consideration.

give
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
COLONEL Wm. J. DONOVAN

FOR YOUR INFORMATION. IN
GENERAL I APPROVED.

F. D. R.

16.10.1942 4858

x mission
x involved nations
x T.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

March 11, 1942

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: MR. LUNIN
RE: MISSIONS TO UNITED NATIONS

I note that the mission that is being sent to India includes a labor relations man. I take it that his duties will be to show the manufacturers in India how to handle labor matters.

It has occurred to me that from the point of view of morale in the United Nations, every mission that we send should include a representative of organized labor. Virtually all of the United Nations are members of the International Labour Organization. Some have fairly well-developed labor movements, and the leaders of these movements have come in contact with American labor leaders at the various conferences of the ILO. I should think that the morale of the working populations of the United Nations would be markedly improved if there were somebody on our missions who was really interested in labor as such. I fear that there is a danger in having on our missions a "labor relations man", who is usually looked upon as the representative of the employer, with no corresponding representative of American labor.

There are no doubt many of the "older labor statesmen" in the United States who would welcome appointment to a mission and who could serve in a capacity similar to that of the labor people we sent to France and Italy during the last war.

