

Eddy - W. A. - III

CONFIDENTIAL

LES PORTS MARITIMES

Cherbourg

Le port de Cherbourg, qui est le plus grand port de France, est situé sur la rive nord-ouest de la Manche.

Le port de Cherbourg est un port de commerce et de guerre. Il est le plus grand port de France et le deuxième de l'Europe. Le port est situé sur la rive nord-ouest de la Manche. Le port est un port de commerce et de guerre. Il est le plus grand port de France et le deuxième de l'Europe. Le port est situé sur la rive nord-ouest de la Manche.

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
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
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17. Dans certains cas, il est possible de faire des circuits pour certains des supports de papier...  
du Ministère de la Guerre. Il existe également des  
Bureau Militaire (dans le Bureau Militaire - par  
exemple - communications. Selon...



1. La zone est traversée la nuit par des chalands. Il y a des filets qui sont installés à l'entrée des ports; il y a aussi des mines qui sont installées jusqu'à 20 km en ligne. Le poste d'écoute est à l'arrière. L'ennemi pourrait nous donner des indications à ce sujet.

2. Il y a peu de temps à ce lieu sur le port des chalands; en liaison avec l'ennemi, la marine et l'aviation. Il y a de nombreux points de vue, dont un sur le port, un autre sur l'ennemi, et c'est la même direction que celle des chalands. Le poste d'écoute est à l'arrière de l'ennemi, avec des postes de liaison et des postes de 27.

3. Les postes d'écoute de l'ennemi, dans certains cas, sont des postes de liaison et de liaison.

4. L'ennemi doit passer une barrière.

5. L'ennemi, à la pointe doit passer une barrière.

6. Les ports d'égout sont très vulnérables; les chalands peuvent venir pour se défendre et peuvent se défendre avec succès par la défense.

7. Les postes d'écoute de l'ennemi, dans certains cas, sont des postes de liaison et de liaison. Les postes d'écoute de l'ennemi, dans certains cas, sont des postes de liaison et de liaison. Les postes d'écoute de l'ennemi, dans certains cas, sont des postes de liaison et de liaison.

MINISTRE DES MINES ET DE L'ENERGIE

MINISTRE DE L'INDUSTRIE

1. Service d'Exploitation des Mines  
Société  
Société

Exploitation

2. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

Exploitation

3. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

4. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

5. Service de l'Inspection et des Etudes Minières au Maroc

6. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

7. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa (Société Antariou)

8. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

Exploitation

9. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

10. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

Exploitation

11. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

12. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

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23. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

24. Service des Mines de Bou Arfa

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2015/01  
13-8-42I.T.  
OF STATISTICS

## MINEROLOGY DIVISION OF MOROCCO

Name of the  
DevelopmentNature of Additional Products  
Prepared or Produced

• Sherif Phosphate Company Kouribga Louis Gentil	Phosphates
• Bou Arfa Mining Company	Metallurgic manganese
• S.M. en Nam (M. de L'hausse(?))	" "
• Saerif Mining Studies Co., Inc.	" "
• Moroccan Prospecting and Mining Studies Company	" "
• Omnia Nord Africain	" "
• Mines de Zicouine (Inter-mine company)	" "
• Bou Roine	" "
• Bou Arfa Mines Company	Dioxide of manganese
• Sherif Mining Studies Co., Inc.	" "
• Tazouit (Matis)	Lead
• Mines of Djebel Saloref Company	" "



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1. Aouli Mines Company	Lead
2. Moroccan Company of Djebel Cheber	"
3. Royal Alsatian Mines Company	"
4. Sidi Mohamed Ben Amor Mine	"
5. Sellidja Mines Company	"
6. Haut-Guir Mining Company	"
7. Gundafa Mining Company	"
8. Assif El Mal Mine	"
9. Adrar Mines	"
10. Tafilalet Mining Company	"
11. Bab Cedra Mines	"
12. Moroccan Company of Djebel Chicker	Zinc
13. Haut-Guir Mining Company	"
14. Gundafa Mines	"
15. Assif el Mal Company	"
16. Tiflet Company	"
17. Moroccan Company of Mines and Chemical Products (Ait Amar)	"
18. Boulhaut Mines	"
19. Kettara Mines	"
20. Noualine or Rhaba Mines	"
21. Bou Isma and Tafgout Mines	Antimony

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14. Tafilalt Mines	Antimony
15. Iokou Mellal Mining Company	"
16. Discontinued Mines (Mines Arretees)	"
17. M. Manfroy at Oulmon	"
18. " " "	Tungsten
19. Molybdenum Company	Molybdenum
20. Bou Assert du Craare Mining Co.	Cobalt
21. Mines and Graphite company of Morocco	Graphite
22. Thous Company	Vanadium
23. Imaghene Mine Company	Salt
24. Souk el Arba de Tlesse Mines	"
25. Anzalagh Mines	"
26. Aengour Mines	Molybdenum
27. Bou Amer Mines	Cobalt
28. Anti-Atlas (Ouarguato region) Mining Company; searches for copper	Copper
29. Djerrid	Coal

2918/31  
13-8-42I.T.  
OF STATISTICS

MINEROLOGY DIVISION OF MOROCCO

Firm Names of the  
DevelopmentsNature of Additional Products  
Prepared or Produced

1. Sherif Phosphate Company Kouriga Louis Gentil	Phosphates
2. Bou Arfa Mining Company	Metallurgic manganese
3. Glib en Nam (M. de L'hausse(?))	" "
4. Sherif Mining Studies Co., Inc.	" "
5. Moroccan Prospecting and Mining Studies Company	" "
6. Omnium Nord Africain	" "
7. Mines de Zidoune (Inter-mine company)	" "
8. Bou Feine	" "
9. Bou Arfa Mines Company	Bioxide of manganese
10. Sherif Mining Studies Co., Inc.	" "
11. Tsoua Mines (Mefia)	Lead
12. Mines of Djebel Salbref Company	"

- 2 -

13. Abuli Mines Company	Lead
14. Moroccan Company of Djebel Cheber	"
15. Royal Asturian Mines Company	"
16. Sidi Mohamed Ben Amor Mine	"
17. Zellidja Mines Company	"
18. Haut-Guir Mining Company	"
19. Gundsafa Mining Company	"
20. Azzif El Mal Mine	"
21. Adrar Mines	"
22. Tafilalet Mining Company	"
23. Bab Jedra Mines	"
24. Moroccan Company of Djebel Chicker	Zinc
25. Haut-Guir Mining Company	"
26. Gundsafa Mines	"
27. Assif el Mal Company	"
28. Tiflet Company	"
29. Moroccan Company of Mines and Chemical Products (Ait Amar)	"
30. Boulhaut Mines	"
31. Kettara Mines	"
32. Moualine er Rhaba Mines	"
33. Bou Iskra and Tafgout Mines	Antimony

- 3 -

34. Tarilest Mines	Antimony
35. Ichou Mellal Mining Company	"
36. Discontinued Mines (Mines Arretees)	"
37. K. Manfroy at Oulmen	"
38. " " " "	Tungsten
39. Molybdenum Company	Molybdenum
40. Bou Azzert du Graare Mining Co.	Cobalt
41. Mines and Graphite company of Morocco	Graphite
42. Theuz Company	Vanadium
43. Imaghene Mine Company	Salt
44. Souk el Arbs de Tiese Mines	"
45. Azslagh Mines	"
46. Aezgour Mines	Molybdenum
47. Bou Azer Mines	Cobalt
48. Anti-Atlas (Ouarzazate region) Mining Company; searches for copper	Copper
49. Djerada	Coal

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330001-7

AP # 'V' E' AME

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330001-7

C O N T E N T S

TAM      DATE      DESCRIPTION -

A.      10/1/42      Letter from Carleton S. Coon, outlining  
plans for distributing leaflets.

## Enclosures:

1. General Leaflet for Morocco.  
Original and translation
2. Riffian Leaflet. Abu el Krim
3. Nationalist Leaflet. Allal el Fassi
4. Derkawi Leaflet.

B.      9/23      Letter from Col. Eddy regarding negotiations  
with the Moors.

## Enclosure: Report by C. S. Coon

1. The Situation regarding the Possible  
Use of Moorish Personnel
2. Interview with Si Hamid Mekka in Fez, 8/11/42
3. Interview with Mulay Larbi, 9/11/42
4. Meeting with Riffian Leaders, 9/15/42
5. Interview with Sidi, Ahmed ben Saddik  
et Tugkan, Barkawa Brotherhood, 9/16/42
6. Copy of Haigbender's Letter  
(In Spanish; Translation in ~~Translation folder~~)
7. Map, Spanish Morocco. (in pencil)

C.      9/12/42      Letter from Felix Cole, American Consul General.

Enclosure: Weather Observations, Algeria  
(in pencil)

(O V E R)

CONTENTS  
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E.

O N I REPORTS

Date	Serial #	Subject
10/1/42	258-42	Instructions for use of <u>French Aviation Code.</u> (in French) + <u>Trans.</u>
9/24	256-42	Atlantic Coast line... <u>Observation Posts</u>
9/24	255-42	Algerian Moroccan Border: <u>Winds, Coastal Defense, beaches, Roads.</u>
9/24	254-42	Algeria, Nemours. <u>Additional Data: Roads, Mines, Troops.</u>
9/22	249-42	French Morocco, <u>Casablanca Harbor Coastal Defense, Naval Dispositions.</u>
9/22	248/42	Occupied France <u>German Aerodromes.</u>
9/21	247-42	French Morocco <u>Gasline Storage Plants.</u>

MISCELLANEOUS

10/1/42 Letter of transmittal from Col. Eddy enclosing:  
Report, Chief Pilot, Port Lyauter.  
 (Filed in Translation Folder.)  
TAB C.

E.

O N I REPORTS (Originals, transcriptions ~~also filed~~  
~~in Translation Folder.~~  
~~TAB A.~~

ITALIAN AVIATION (In French) + Trans.  
~~Highlight versions in Translation Folder.~~  
~~TAB B.~~



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
 UNITED STATES ARMY

WAB/mgr

2 September 1942.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel William J. Donovan,  
 Director of Strategic Services,  
 24th and M Street, N.W.,  
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you for your reply to my telegram regarding security in North Africa. Colonel Bentley is back and I hope he has not stirred up our people with news of any preparations. It will be too bad if he has sent our observers rushing around the countryside to measure airfields and pace off the length of bridges to arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards and the French. Security is very much jeopardized already. General De Gaulle has telegraphed from Beirut, Syria, a strong protest against the Allied plans. His representative called on the Area Commander here day before yesterday for the same purpose, stating that he had learned of the Allied plans from New York, Vichy, and two other unnamed points. There seems to be considerable evidence to prove that Americans have talked with the Free French in New York and Washington, and they, of course, have spread the news around Free French circles. In any case, so far as Tangier is concerned, I shall make it one of my principal jobs to spread deception rumors and to act as if I had nothing to do upon my return.

I have had many interviews here in London, including General Gruenther, General Clark, General McClure, General Anderson (British), Admirals Stark and Kirk, and, of course, conferences with the staff of S.O.M. and O.S.S. Yesterday afternoon I spent with Mr. Sheperdson in conference with Colonel Dancy and representatives of the Free French, with whom I have completed arrangements to assist their liaison officer in Tangier. I think it is much better to promote this legitimate request of the Free French to have a liaison officer in Tangier, though I shall be careful that he engages in no organizing adventures. Yesterday I sat for two hours in a staff conference, conducted by General Clark, who discussed the revised plans which, as you know, are still not a matter of complete agreement between the two missions.

General Gruenther asked me to dictate to his warrant officer a list of services which O.S.S. might perform in conjunction with Operations.

Col. William J. Donovan from Lt. Col. W. A. Eddy, 2 Sept 1942

This is very much like the memorandum I left for you, but I had to do it hurriedly and on the spot without too much time to cover all the ground. I enclose copy of that memorandum.

Incidentally, I told General Gruenther that Colonel Black, G-2 for General Patton, had asked formally for certain routine intelligence data which I had proposed to send to you in Washington to be shared with Colonel Black or anyone else concerned. General Gruenther insisted that this is the wrong procedure, that centralized planning is done by the Area Commander's staff in London whereas the assignments of any one Force Commander are subject to change. He instructed me, therefore, to send pertinent data to O.S.S. here in London who will transmit it to G-2 or G-3 of the Area Command, who would, in turn, see that it reaches the person or persons who will use the information. I shall, in the absence of contrary instructions, communicate in the first instance, *regarding approval,* with Colonel Gruenther here in this office, whom I shall count on to provide copies for you and for the Area Command. Is this all right? If you see Colonel Black you might explain the situation lest he be expecting to hear from Tangier directly.

There is an important matter which I would like to have passed on to Colonel Elton F. Hammond, Signal C., c/o Office of The Chief Signal Officer, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.: In conference with Colonel Hammond, General Patton's signal officer, it was agreed that I should send to Washington, to be given to him, copies of my WT signal plans and schedules for one-way communication from Tangier to ships at sea. After consultation here with the technical experts, this plan needs to be revised. My WT set, like all in our North African chain, works on plans arranged for a fixed distance with special crystals and frequencies chosen for those distances. These sets are therefore not at present equipped for a series of communications where the distance is daily changing. I propose, therefore, to transmit intelligence by my WT to Gibraltar, leaving it to the Admiralty and the Royal Navy wireless at Gibraltar to communicate with the Force Commanders. I assume they will be willing to transmit messages in my U. S. Navy code, duplicate of which should be on board ship.

I am leaving to you and to the Area Commander execution of the plan to have the State Department recall Knox and Culbert on leave. I should rather have that not be the subject of telegrams from the Legation at Tangier to Washington, because we are always uncertain of the security of the State Department codes, and I am therefore hoping that it can be done between London and Washington and merely the simple orders issued to North Africa. Both men should come to London enroute.

In the case of Karl Clopet, hydrographer in my office, I shall send him on leave of absence to London, presumably for a rest and to see his family. In fact, I shall tell him nothing more than that except, of course, to suggest that some of our people in London will be interested in information which he can give. I do not want him or his associates

Col. William J. Donovan from Lt. Col. W. A. Eddy, 2 Sept 1942.

In my office to know that he is going to Washington. On arrival in London he will be told to report to Colonel Guenther in this office. Colonel Guenther will see that he talks with the staff which are doing the detailed planning and works with them over their charts. After two or three days in London he will then be sent on by Colonel Guenther to Washington to report to you, and through you to be attached to General Patton's staff where he should remain as long as General Patton wants him. I shall give him a letter authorizing his travel home to London on leave and stating his salary and the date through which that salary was paid. On the basis of this letter I should be grateful if Colonel Guenther here and your office in Washington will make subsequent payments to him, since he is and should remain on our payroll.

Our partners in S.O.M. here in London insist that North Africa headquarters for the Joint Mission should move to Gibraltar whenever the Area or Force Commander sets up his headquarters there, presumably some days in advance of "D" date. To this I replied that I could make no such move without orders from you and from the U. S. Navy, since I am attached to the American Legation which is my post. This is a serious matter even though a detail, and it should be understood that I will remain at all times in Tangier unless the Navy gives me orders to the contrary. *Army facilities by which could easily be maintained and transported*

My chief anxiety still continues to be that there is too much complacency regarding Spain. I feel certain that the Spanish threat on our flank and in our rear is a much greater hazard than French resistance. Otherwise, I feel quite encouraged about my interviews in London and in Washington, and I return to my post with real hope for the future. I am leaving for Gibraltar tomorrow and should reach Tangier Friday evening, September 4th.

I am glad to learn that you will soon pay a visit to London, where I shall leave a copy of this letter in case it misses you in Washington. Assuring you of my readiness to follow out your commands at any time,

Respectfully yours,

*W. A. Eddy*  
 Lt. Col., U. S. Marines,  
 Naval Attache,  
 Tangier.

1 Incl:  
 Copy of Secret Memo for  
 Gen. Gruenther dated  
 Aug 30 1942

**SECRET**COPY

London

September 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FROM LT. COL. W. A. EDDY

I told General Gruenther that Colonel Black, G-2 for General Patton, had asked formally for certain routine intelligence data which I had proposed to send to you in Washington to be shared with Colonel Black or anyone else concerned. General Gruenther insisted that this is the wrong procedure, that centralized planning is done by the Area Commander's staff in London, whereas the assignments of anyone Force Commander are subject to change. He instructed me, therefore, to send pertinent data to O.S.S. here in London who will transmit it to G-2 or G-3 of the Area Command, who would, in turn, see that it reaches the person or persons who will use the information. I shall, in the absence of contrary instructions, communicate in the first instance, regarding Cymmet, with Colonel Gruenther

-2-

here in this office, whom I shall count on to provide copies for you and for the Area Command. Is this all right? If you see Colonel Black you might explain the situation lest he be expecting to hear from Tangier directly.

**SECRET**

August 20, 1941

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR**

To confirm our conversation of this morning I have the honor of making the following recommendations:

1. That Frederick F. Gilbert, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Casablanca be brought to London and later to accompany the expedition to Casablanca. Mr. Gilbert is a graduate of the Naval Academy, Class 1918, and is thoroughly familiar with the Port of Casablanca, with the nearby coast and ports to the north, and with the leading French officials. For the past year he has been an intelligence officer, serving under the cover of Vice-Consul and Control Officer, checking up on the economic aid program in French North Africa.
2. John Crawford Knox, Captain U. S. Army Reserve, inactive, now serving as Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Algiers to be brought out as soon as possible to London and later to return with expedition destined for Oren. Captain Knox is a graduate of Saint Cyr, the French West Point, to which he is one of the very few Americans ever admitted, and served for several years as a commissioned officer in the French Army. This background, together with his own resourcefulness, has given him access to French military officials and government officials from whom he has secured most valuable intelligence. I can think of no one who would be more useful as a guide and aide to those who will have the responsibility in Algeria whether civil or military.
3. Captain David W. King, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Casablanca, is to be the principal agent on shore, with duties corresponding to those exercised by Mr. Gilbert. When the expedition will have one man on boat and one man on shore--each equally qualified for this special service.
4. Island H. Rounds, formerly captain, U. S. Army, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Oren, to be the principal agent on shore with duties corresponding to those of Captain Knox. Rounds has been for over a year in Oren where he is in the confidence of the leaders of the French Separatist Movement and where he works in close cooperation with the Polish and British secret services in addition to heading up our own OSS in the province of Oren.

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2. I would like to mention for the (S) administration of French North Africa, the subject of Mr. Murphy, Chief of Mission at Algiers. Mr. Murphy is a close friend of General Huxford and of General Hunt, enjoys the prestige which the French accorded by my American in North Africa.

3. In Tunisia I would recommend as regional administrator Mr. Hubert A. Doolittle, American Consul at Tunis. Fearless and aggressive of American rights, who has the warm support of the French Government he shares their dislike of the Italians and Germans.

4. In accordance with your own suggestion, I should be happy to remain at Tangier to be of similar assistance in French Morocco.

5. I recommend that Capt. Clapot, hydrographer and expert on beaches and ports on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, be brought to London as soon as possible. Clapot was for eight years captain of the salvage tug boat company which operated in the coast of Morocco where he knows every rock and buoy and wreck, as well as being an expert on the very treacherous swell which is perhaps the chief hazard for any landing party. Clapot is now employed in my office in Tangiers and I can arrange to have him sent to London immediately upon my return in the next two or three days.

6. I recommend that a signal plan be arranged, both at Casablanca and Tangiers, for communication with the approaching convoys by our secret wireless sets in North Africa to transmit last minute information regarding troop movements, Axis or Vichy defense measures and political developments.

7. I recommend that on D-Day, when the landing operations actually begin, I be authorized to arrange for the identification of the members of the German Assistance Commission at Casablanca and for any members of the German or Italian Assistance Commission who may then be in the city of Oran. About twenty of the German Army and Navy officers live together in a hotel in Casablanca and the assignments have already been made for this job to men who have the identification materials already in their hands. I might add that our principal agent in Casablanca is the father of a boy who was shot as a hostage in Paris recently and the Friday is reportedly making permission to carry out his assignment.

8. I should like instructions regarding sabotage to be performed on D-Day. Our groups are prepared to destroy key power stations, tunnels, and bridges connecting Morocco with Algeria and they are prepared to include (S) reinforcements the Port of Rabat and the Port of Agadir. Such operations were in

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utilization of such personnel and will probably not be necessary if we receive the working party. However, it will be possible to visit the site and test the aircraft at once, if the working party is that of your side. The question also arises whether you wish to attempt the destruction of the working party of the French Navy or whether you prefer to guide it through the air and other facilities to us. It is of course, in general, your wish is paramount upon the whole class of working party of the French Navy and its main assignment was the transportation of the French Navy and of the aircraft under the flag's control.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**W. A. HUNT,  
Lt. Col., U. S. Marines,  
Naval Attache,  
MANAMA, SAUDI ARABIA.**

**SECRET**







UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tangier,  
October 1, 1942.

Col. William A. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and C Streets,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

At Colonel Eddy's suggestion Gordon Browne and I have been working on the problem of preparing leaflets for distribution by airplane on D day. Our first attempts have been with those to be printed in Arabic.

The first enclosure is a general leaflet to be dropped all over Morocco, wherever there are sufficient concentrations of Moslem population to make it worth while. We enclose both the Arabic text, written in vulgar Moroccan Arabic, and the English original. You will observe that the language is a bit flowery, but that is the style which is most effective here, as I have discovered after working on the local Arabic press for the last few months. If you do not like the instructions to kill our enemies, that line could easily be deleted without detriment to the context.

We also propose to make up personal letters from Abd el Krim, Allal el Fasi, and the Dorkawi, and to print these or have them printed with a photograph of each leader on the appropriate leaflets, and with a forged signature at the bottom. It is a task of considerable nicety to imitate the style of each man, and the enclosed English versions represent a first attempt. I believe that we can obtain the photographs and signatures here, but that again will take several days since inquiries must be made with the utmost discretion. There is a book called "Les memoires d'Abd el Krim" of which my wife has a copy in storage, and which should be also in the Library of Congress, which has Abd el Krim's signature, in case we cannot obtain one here.

The Abd el Krim and Allal el Fasi letters could be used of course only if we are to produce these men. I am sure that they would not object to the forgery, since it would serve their ends, and am also sure that the Dorkawi would not disapprove, but I do not want to consult him on the matter at this time.

You will recall that the other branch of the former OSI has a handbook on Morocco for use of American soldiers, prepared originally by Gordon Browne and myself, and revised while I was still in Washington. Our general leaflet to Moslems should have as its counterpart.

Sincerely yours,

Arabic Invitations to be recited at the beginning of the  
Prayer.  
Translation.

Praise be unto the only God.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

O ye Muslims! O ye beloved sons of the Maghreb!

May the blessing of God be upon you!

This day is a great day for you and for us, for all the Sons of  
Adam who love freedom!

Behold! The day hath come! Behold, the day of deliverance!

Behold! We the American Holy Warriors have arrived!

Our numbers are as the leaves on the forest trees and as the grains  
of sand in the sea.

We have come here to fight the great Jihad of Freedom!

We have come to set you free!

We have sailed across the great sea in many ships, on many beaches  
we have landed, and our fighters swarm across the sands and into  
the city streets, out into the wide country side, and along the  
highways!

Shout from the hilltops; shout from your housetops and from  
the mountains, and may the sound of the drum be heard in the land,  
and the clatter of the women, and the voices even of small

children! Assemble along the highways to welcome your brothers  
who have come to set you free!

Behold upon our fighting men and you will find them pressing to the  
front and gladdening to the heart. We are not as some other Christians  
and whom you have known, and who trample you under foot. Our  
soldiers consider you as their brothers and will treat you as  
brothers, for we have been reared in the way of Islam. Our sol-  
diers have been told about your country and about your noble  
brothers and they will treat you with respect and with a friendly  
spirit in the eyes of God.

in their eyes and in their smiling faces, and may the Holy  
Spirit be happy in their holy work.

Treat us therefore as brothers as we will greet you, and help us.  
If we are thirsty, show us the way to water. If we lose our way  
lead us back to our camping places. Show us the paths over the  
mountains if need may be, and if you see our enemies, the Germans  
or Italians, making trouble for us, kill them with knives or with  
stones or with any other weapon that you may get your hand upon.  
Help us as we have come to help you, and rich will be the reward  
unto you as unto all who love justice and righteousness and  
freedom.

Pray for our success in battle, and help us, and God will help  
us both.

Let the day of freedom hath come!

May God grant his blessing upon you and upon us.

General Leaflet for All Moslems in Morocco.

الحمد لله وحده  
ولا يدوم الا ملكه

يا اهلنا المسلمين المضرية

بعد الشك عليكم والتشبه والاكرا

تعليمكم ما هو اليوع بنفسه ان كنا وانتم وجميع  
بنه اادم اليه كيجبوا الحريه وصل والحمد لله.

امنا الامريكان المجاهدون في صلاب الحريه

وصلنا العندكم هذا النهار على عداد اوران

اشجار جينا باش نجاهدوا ونقتنونوا معكم

في صحت الحريه وباش انصكوا ارضابكم من  
الظلم ومن اللد والجوع والعري.

امنا صيبا في الجور في عداد كبير الامريكائات

العكس ~~الله~~ والشركوا في عداد المراهن

المعريه وبالسواصل الحريه بالمبريه

سلاكرنا الفويه المصوره بالله هيد خلوه

في عداد المدونه ويدوزوا على عداد من  
الكروفات

نقادكم يا احبابنا باش تعملوا العلامات  
بالنار العاميه فوق الجبال وموق الكبي  
صنوع عليكم وعلى وادكم باش تهلكوا واتولود  
بازغارت الكافات بالترتيب والتهديد  
في كل حربه ان يدوزوا عليها خونكم الحماة  
الجاؤ يعكوا رفاكم ويعضوا الكع  
الكع الحربه

هاد العسكري ديالنا الضاع تشوبوهم  
مرحانين ولها صكين ودا منين من عين  
ما احنا نش بحال انصارنا الضرب ان  
كنتم بولهم قبل ان كانوا فهوركم  
العسكري ديالنا بعملوكم بحال خونتم ويعونكم  
ويعنوا عليكم احنا تعلمنا باش نكونوا  
حرار هونين بسيد مكسولين

انك تكثر المراكمة في السرور والسرور في الفيلد  
 وكثير من ذاك كل شيء في انك وعبدك بل لا  
 المباركة وحتي ارجعتموا عندهم بحال اهابهم  
 انك تعرفهم وتعلمون فيك هذا انك  
 في جنوا اعليكم في وجه الله العظيم  
 انك ما كلفه موتك بينكم لو غنتكم  
 وانك انظر في وجههم تعرفوا انك في  
 قلبهم واعيونهم وحالتهم كلها في ضالك  
 الخدمة المباركة الجهاد في مهنة الحربة  
 فبئسوا بالصراع عونونا بلش نصرموا بكم  
 اذا اعلمنا انهم في الماء واذا تلنا  
 وريونا في هه الحربة واعلمونا بالهربة  
 انك في الجبال واذا <sup>تبتوا</sup> اللمان او  
 الخليلك بحسب عمل صينا شرراً أفندلوا  
 بالحدود او بالارض او بالبحر  
 عنونا بلش انك صينا ونكون بلش يكون

النصر والبرج كله الكلم والكل واحد الي كيب  
الحق والحريه .

نصه الله تعالى باش يعونا على النصر  
على كل واحد ال ضد الحريه .

بإيماننا  
هنا هو الي اننا نعلم يوم الحريه  
وصل والحمد لله نطلبه تعالى ان يعيننا جميعاً  
دامت بلاد الصالحين .

Note: This is Moroccan vulgate. Please do not try to change into  
a more classical or Eastern form. Please retain the Moroccan  
usage with the letters F and Q.

ف = ب NOT و  
ق = ف NOT (ك) ل



Praise be unto the only God!

In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful!  
Men of the Rif, my countrymen! O warriors of Beni Urzaghol, of  
Tamsaman, of Beni Tuzin, of Taforsalt, of Beni Ullank, of Beni Saiz,  
of Caliya, of Kebbana, of Beni Bu Yahyi, of Merzouga, of Ouzouza,  
of Beni Amart, of Bokeya, of Taguist, of Beni Izzert, of Beni Bu  
Fren, of Mostassaa, of Mtiwa, and of all other tribes who fought on  
our side in the days of old, listen for I shall inform you:

Behold I, Sidi Mohammed ben Abd el Krim el Khattebi, am returning  
to my country and my people.

For sixteen long years I have been away from you, but now I am on  
my way back, and this time I am returning to stay.

This is the day. This is the day of freedom, the day when we shall  
cast the Spaniards back into the sea, even as at Melilla and at  
Laguaira of the Chouara in the glorious days of old.

My soldiers! O my khalids of a hundred and my khalids of fifties,  
those of you who are left, O Councillors, assemble! Assemble by  
families and by bones and by khmases and by tribes, under your  
leaders, and prepare to fight, for the Americans are landing on  
the beach and they are our friends. They have come to advance on  
their enemies and on ours, and to restore freedom to our land.  
Help them. You know how to fight. So do they. O you tall reeds of  
the Rif, ye who are in the Spanish uniform, pick up your rifles and  
kill those Spaniards who resist you, but don't kill the Reds who may  
work with us. Take their guns from the Spaniards when you have killed  
and give them to your comrades who are unarmed. Revolt! O you who  
are by the batteries at the edge of the sea, kill the Spaniards at  
the machine guns and at the machine guns, and keep them from firing on  
our planes and American planes.

God will help you and will give you the victory. You will see the Americans

You are welcome to come to the  
 beach, land and prepare to help us.

(Signed)

**NATIONALIST MESSAGE:**

Praise be unto the only God!

In the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful!

Behold I, Allal el Fasi, after long years of captivity, have returned  
 to lead you in the path of freedom.

The Americans, who have brought me home, are landing on the beaches  
 and they are marching through the Meghreb like lions on their way to  
 fight the enemies of freedom.

May God grant success to their valiant arms, and may God grant us  
 freedom with their help, for it is their task, by God's will, to  
 set the world of men free.

Those of you who can fight, fight for them and with them if any of  
 their enemies cross their path.

Those of you who cannot fight, greet them as brothers and help them.

They are not as other Christians, for they are friends of the Muslims.  
 They do not wish to destroy our religion nor to trample us underfoot;  
 they do not wish to take our lands or our property, nor to treat us  
 as slaves. They are the lovers of freedom and they are our allies and  
 our friends.

Light fires on the mountain tops and on the hills, shout from the  
 reefs and from high places; let there be joy in the land and welcome  
 to our guests, verily the guests of God, the Americans who will  
 help us to set ourselves free.

Gather to greet them and to help them; guide them to water and over  
 the mountains, be kind to them and helpful in every way, and they in  
 return will help you, for although they do not speak our language  
 they understand us.

May God lead us on the path of righteousness, for with God's help we shall restore freedom and the rights of our beloved fatherland, and of the Moroccan government. Rejoice, for the Americans are here with me; rejoice, and prepare to help them, to help me, and to help yourselves.

(Signature)

LEAFLET #2: INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL DERKAWA:

O thou who findest this paper--show it to those among you who are of the brotherhood of the Derkawa, who obey my commands.

Praise be unto the only God!

in the name of God the Compassionate the Merciful!

I am the Sheikh Sidi Mohammed ben Seddik el Chemari, the commander of your brotherhood, give you the following orders. These are my commands. Our friends the American soldiers have arrived to set our beloved country free. We of the great brotherhood must help them, each of us as he sees the way. If they wish you to fight side by side with them, fight. If they are thirsty, give them water; if they are hungry, feed them. If they need guides to show them the paths over the mountains or across the wilderness, be their guides. Do everything in your power to help them and to confuse their enemies. You may await further instructions from me.

OBEY THESE COMMANDS.

This is the great day of days, the day of Jihad, the day of Freedom, the day which we have long awaited.

Let us pray together for victory and deliverance.

(Derkawi dikh, special prayer)

(Signature)

(Seal)



**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NAVAL AIR FORCE  
September 1944

PH  
Tingier, Morocco

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Director of Strategic Services  
24th and D. Streets, N.W.,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I enclose herewith a report by Charles S. COON, covering negotiations with the Moors for the co-operation of Gordon ROWE, I have followed their program and have been present at some of the interviews with Moorish leaders and the recommendations from them have my full support.

We are sending this report to you alone, with no copy to London and with no file copy in any office. Coon and I both recognize that this is a delicate matter and we leave it entirely to you whether to use it or to suppress it. We are quite aware of the disturbance which would be caused in the State Department and in the Foreign Office if it were known unnecessarily that we had been dealing with tribal chiefs on this basis. The report proposes, of course, only operations to be undertaken in the event that the official diplomatic expectations of the Allied Nations with regard to the Spanish and French governments should break down.

As authority for this subversive approach to Moorish Leaders, I would refer you to my telegram No. 10 (March 1942) and to your telegram to me No. 7 (March 7th, 1944). Also, to our recent conversations in Washington, when I assured you that we are in touch with Moorish leaders to prepare them to act with us, if necessary. Also to the fact that Messrs. Coon and Brown were sent out here with specific instructions to develop S.O. work along these lines. It hardly need to add that the Chief of Mission here and our British colleagues, as well as other representatives of your Office, have not been informed of our activities with the natives.

In the event that you approve further preparations along this line, I should be glad to have your authority for substantial subsidies to defray expenses of native troops and to make it possible for the General named in the report to obtain time to pay for Moroccan troops if he should revolt against the Spanish.

Enclosure.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. [Signature]

During the last four weeks members of the "League" have acted in accordance with their instructions to mobilize, have spent most of their time analyzing the entire situation in Morocco and in interviewing leaders and representatives of the most strategically important groups. The information so obtained may be interpreted in terms of possible allied military operations in this area, as follows.

### I: Immobilization of Straits Area.

It is necessary for us to see that the whole Straits or Gibraltar area is immobilized before or on D day. We are not here concerned with the Spanish side of the Straits, only with the Moroccan side.

### II: Our Relations With Spain.

In our relations with Spain concerning Morocco, there are three possibilities:

- (1) Spain will not oppose us.
- (2) They will oppose us, but a simultaneous rising of other parties in Spain will weaken this opposition.
- (3) They will oppose us unitedly and in full strength.

In the event of the second and third possibilities, favorable action by Moors would be greatly to our advantage. Since we cannot know that Spain will not oppose us, it would be extremely unsound to risk a passage of the Straits without first making sure that a wide area on either side is first under our control. This could only be done peacefully by a military occupation by our troops with full Spanish consent. Such an event seems hardly likely.

### III: Possible Spanish Action.

We must anticipate every possible Spanish action against us. These actions, in the Moroccan area, are five: (See Map #1)

- (1) To close the Straits, impeding our movements B and C.
- (2) To attack our landing point A, either before or after our landing, with troops from the Larache-Alexander area, proceeding along the coastal plain.
- (3) To close the Taza corridor with troops from the Melilla garrison. These troops could approach the corridor over flat, treeless land all the way.
- (4) To send part of the Melilla garrison eastward along the coast to oppose our landing at B.
- (5) To open the airfields in the Spanish Zone to the Luftwaffe, giving the Germans bases from which to attack by air all of our expeditions, as well as Gibraltar.

It is apparent that Spain is in a very strategic position to hamper our movements. Her military preparations in this area have been intense for several years; that her leaders have made a tentative pact with the Germans is to be assumed. Her power could include the domination of the French Zone, and the seizure of other areas. The Spanish have been carrying out against the French their active propaganda work since it is suspected that she is trying to build the groundwork for an alliance with them.

#### IV. Counter Operations.

There are several ways to block these projected actions on the part of the Spaniards. We are concerned here only with the Moorish aspect. We must mention, however, that there is no necessary area of conflict between the Moors and the Spanish Reds, or between the Moors and the Brigades group. In other words, a Moorish campaign would not inhibit the use of these other elements.

Operations designed to block these actions would be:

- (1) A general revolt of Moorish troops, hindering Spaniards everywhere.
- (2) The defection of General Muzion and his garrison, hindering Spanish action #2.
- (3) A tribal uprising in the whole western part of the Zone, including the Anjora, Jebels, and Ghomara countries, hindering Spanish action #1.
- (4) A Riflian uprising. The Riffians could march on the Taza corridor via Ozenaya or via Beni Tuxin, either holding it for us against the Spaniards or meeting the Spaniards before they arrive there. These Riffians could also attack the Melilla garrison, preventing Spanish action #4.

All of the above actions would impede or prevent Spanish action #5.

- (5) To promote civil disobedience in urban populations, thus hindering Spanish KC work, transport, and communications.

#### V. Continuance of Fulfilling This Program.

As the enclosures will indicate, we have already taken most of the preliminary steps needed, and have several movements on ice. What still remains to be done is as follows:

- (1) Approach General Muzion. Several highly placed contacts including influential Moors, have given us reason to believe that he is accessible. The approach can be made through his father-in-law or brother-in-law, but is too risky to attempt before the last moment. It is of course always possible that the Spaniards would dispose of him before he could take any action, but this would create dissatisfaction among his troops, and among all Moorish soldiers in the Spanish army.
- (2) Obtain about \$100,000 to use at our discretion in preparing groups for our use.
- (3) Rescue Abd. el Krim from Moroccan. This is essential since the Riffians would have basis for unity without him. There seems to be no one else capable of uniting and leading them without backing, or able to inspire them to fully effective action. He is almost a God in Riffian eyes, and they would rise to a man with tremendous influence.

(4) Abd el Krim and Allal el Fassi are the only leaders taken on the status of a full-fledged national leader and among many of the city people who are not avowed nationalists. The presence of these two men would unify the Bloc of Morocco, and in the Spanish zone the actions of the Arab population could be easily controlled by his utterances. In the French zone he could be counted on to keep the Moors from alienating the French if we would guarantee to see that the basic rights which the Moors want were to be granted them. In case the French army should turn against us, or in case the Germans should arrive in force to oppose us, then Allal el Fassi could be counted on to arouse campaigns of civil disobedience, and could help the Oulawi, the Berkawi, and other groups to revolt of the native troops and tribal organizations.

(5) To continue our present relationships with groups already contacted, and to meet them in motion if and when so instructed.

#### VI: Conclusion.

We trust that the importance of the native factor in possible operations has been sufficiently indicated. As we stated in our cables #81, 82, and 83, to Victor, Washington, the natives may well hold the balance of power in the event of crisis. They form the majority of the population, and include the best fighting men in North Africa. There are many of Abd el Krim's veterans among them, men who know how to handle arms and to conduct guerilla warfare in difficult terrain.

We believe that we are in a position to utilize this native factor to the advantage of our forces. For the maximum chance of success we repeat our suggestion that Abd el Krim and Allal el Fassi be brought to Gibraltar where one of us will go to meet and prepare them.

As to the details of operations to be planned, we offer at the moment only the suggestions of the Moors themselves, some of which may be practical, others impractical, and others of which may be capable of use with modifications.

September 28, 1942.  
Tangier, Morocco.



Enclosure #1.

Interview With Si Hamid Molkwa in Fez, August 11, 1948.

On August 11, 1948, CSC interviewed Si Hamid Molkwa in Fez at a secret rendez-vous. Si Hamid Molkwa is the acting head of the Nationalist party group in Fez in the absence of the party's leader.

Numbers of Followers:

Si Hamid stated that most of the people of Morocco are with him and the Nationalist party. He further stated, however, that he could not depend on the religious brotherhoods such as the Alesawa, since his party is religious in nature and puritanical, and that they are trying to cleanse Islam of such heresies. Hence the Nationalists oppose the brotherhoods, and these groups cannot be reached through him.

Aims of the Party:

The aims of the Nationalist party are national unity with an emphasis on religion; he wants no regional self government, and stated: "Morocco is a small country, it cannot be split up regionally like the United States of America." He dislikes intensely the Berber Dahirs, granting the Berbers regional self-government on the tribal council basis and the use of traditional Berber law instead of Koranic law. He seemed rather lofty toward the Berbers; he could see no difference between them and other Moroccans, and stated that all or almost all could speak Arabic. He said that the Arabization of Berbers was a natural and inevitable process. It was the interviewer's opinion that Si Hamid did not fully understand the Berber problem and was taking a snobbish and unwelcome point of view toward it.

Toward France, Spain, and Germany:

The French have been very severe with the Moroccans and unfair, and if they are to remain they must modify their attitude. They must grant the Moroccans equality with Christians, and this would include political equality and equality of opportunity for education. Some of the French are fine men, but most are bad fellows; they vary greatly and many of them are untrustworthy. (It is a universal complaint of Moroccans that Christians do not keep their word). For the moment, however, there is little that the Moroccans can do about it.

As for Spain, the Spaniards are much worse than the French and want to make Morocco a Catholic country. If Spain invades the French zone, the Nationalists will help the French, providing proper concessions are granted them by the French.

As for Germany, the Germans are very bad. They have tried to get in touch with Si Hamid but he has refused to see them or communicate with them. Abd el Kadir Torres and others who play with the Germans are not true Nationalists; they have been cast out of the party. If the Germans enter Morocco the Nationalists will support the French against them, and if the same conditions as in the case of the Spanish are a matter of fact they will probably resist the German invasion. The Germans and Spaniards would be worse than the French in

Howell the Nationalist

The Moroccan prefer Americans to all other Christians, and would like our help in restoring justice after the war. He was pleased with President Roosevelt's speech, but smiled as if we were idealistic children, and stated: "It is too late, America cannot win; you started too late." He seemed well informed from a French point of view about the war in Russia and in Egypt and took a gloomy view of the future.

Ideas of Resistance.

The Nationalists have no arms and are not fighters; they would resist by civil disobedience a la Ghandi, and by the force of their religious sanctity. Little or nothing to bank on of an active nature.

Main Desire.

The best thing that we can do for them is to get Allal el Fasi out of forced residence and take him to England, America, or Gibraltar. If this were done and known there would be great rejoicing throughout the land and the Nationalists would be for us look stock and barrel. Allal el Fasi over the radio would electrify the country. Even if we can't get him out, at least get all the news of him that we can and let them know; they would be immensely grateful. They have not heard from him for two years. Si Ahmed thought that the British had taken over Brazzaville and could not understand why they had not released him.

The Sultan.

When I asked, do your people wish to keep the present Sultan or get a new one, Si Ahmed looked at me as if I had asked about his sex life, and replied, "I cannot tell you that. That is too intimate a question." Then he added, "The present Sultan was for us and very good, but the French held him incommunicado now for two years and we cannot find out how he stands."

Conclusion.

Si Hamid Mokkwa is the most religious of the Nationalist leaders and his point of view may not be wholly representative. Si Ahmed Belafrej, an exiled leader previously interviewed in Tangier, took a more political and less religious attitude, and Allal el Fasi is said to lack the pious slant of Si Hamid.

The Nationalists are numerous and have great influence in the cities and some of the Arab country districts. Allal el Fasi is a martyr and if he were produced at the proper moment his appearance would have a strong effect; we could not count on the Nationalists for military operations, but could expect them rather to unite the non-Berber parts of the country and provide leadership through the person of Allal el Fasi. This is equally true of both zones; in fact, the greatest center of Nationalism in recent years has been Fez. In practical terms we could get Allal el Fasi to urge the people to be quiet and sit tight, or to carry on a campaign of civil disobedience, whichever might be most useful.

Interview with Muley Larbi on September 11, 1948.

On Friday, September 11, 1948, Eddy and Coon interviewed Muley Larbi, the Glawi's secretary and a relative of the Sultan, at Meaghi's house. The interview lasted about an hour, during which time Muley Larbi talked continuously. Eddy asked him a few leading questions only. The essence of the conversation is as follows:

The Sultan of Morocco is a sort of divine king. In his health and prosperity lie the health and prosperity of the country; he is revered. When the Sultan travelled last year in Berber country, where no Sultan had been before for generations, the Berbers all flocked around him and offered him fealty. This was particularly noticeable in the tribe of Zaian. The Khalifa of the Spanish Zone is very loyal to the Sultan and does not wish to be set up as a rival. There should be a Khalifa for each of the major areas of Morocco.

Morocco should be united, and not split up into zones. The Sultan approved the taking of Tangier by the Spaniards because this meant one less zone.

If Americans should come the Moslems would be very pleased. The Moroccan troops would revolt rather than fight us. So would most of the French army. The only ones who would stand against us are the Senegalese, the Indo-Chinese, and the Foreign Legion.

If Americans should enter the Spanish Zone the Spaniards would fight us. If we should enter the French Zone, by passing into the Spanish Zone, the Spaniards would cross the border to attack us. But General Maunier would go over on our side.

Enclosure #12.

Meeting of September 15th With Rifian Leaders.

Present: Mohamed Bu Drea, el Hajj el Hadi ben Amuz el Urriagh- (former Khalifa of the Penna of Tetuan), Eddy, Coon, Brown, ...

This interview was the culmination of a series of rendezvous between Coon, Brown, and Bu Drea, with Guanus. In earlier interviews the general Rifian situation was discussed, and the rescue of Abd el Krim fully covered. Bu Drea also gave us military information during these interviews. All of these rendezvous were conducted in utmost secrecy after elaborate preparations, and in a different place each time, since these men are well known and were risking their lives in meeting us.

Bu Drea had previously arranged for el Hajj Hadi to visit the Rif on the occasion of his son's wedding, and to meet and talk with some of Abd el Krim's old leaders, and to make up an operational plan.

They agreed that without arms they could not do anything. They agreed that they would not do anything without arms.

After a short notice, they would get together 1,500 men at the Imaceron (spelt Bin Zeron on Spanish maps) Airport, and seize it. At this moment American aircraft would land and unload rifles for the 1,500 men. These fifteen hundred would seize and hold three landing beaches which they designated for twenty-four hours, during which time a small American or British landing force should debark under their cover. This force would bring more arms for the rest of their men, to the number of fifteen thousand, who would then be coming down out of the mountains. With this armed force and with our aid they would then seize the whole central Spanish Zeno, cutting off all communication by land between Melilla and Tetuan, and attacking the Spaniards further where indicated. The fifteen thousand men would be mostly from Beni Urriaghel and Tamsaman; this force would be augmented from other tribes, including Beni Amert, Beni Lusin, and Bokoya, and by wholesale desertions from the Spanish army.

Abd. Hajj had requested one million pesetas (roughly \$50,000 on the Tangier market) to be distributed at the proper moment among the men. He was told that such a payment was not feasible at the moment, but that after the men had assembled and had formed a fighting force they would be taken care of in every reasonable way (on condition, of course, that such a plan was to be put into execution). We gave him 20,000 pesetas (roughly \$4,000) for expense money in making his arrangements, and we agreed to an equal amount monthly until it should be decided whether operations involving his people were to take place. Arrangements were made for further reconnaissance men needed.

Note:  
The Imaceron (Bin Zeron) airport is on the Nekor plain, at 650 E x 632 N.

The three landing beaches are:

1. Busciur (Busciur on the map) in Bokoya tribe just west of the Nekor, at the mouth of the Wad Busciur. 633 E x 634 N.

2. Jdir itself, the beach opposite the islands. 646 E x 641 N.

3. Harsh, a point on the beach between Beni Urriaghel and Tamsaman. Impossible to locate on any map in our possession. The boundary between Beni Urriaghel and Tamsaman is the Wad Nekor. The beach is near 636 E x 641 N, as closely as we can discover.

Nekor and el Harsh have deep water, so that steam vessels could come in close; Jdir is shallow, good only for barges and small craft.

These men also agreed to work on the Riffian soldiers in the Spanish army in the Straits and Atlantic coastal areas not to fight against Americans if so ordered. They proposed to do this work at the right moment through Riffian non-coms and Lieutenants and Captains. They stated that the whole Moorish part of the Spanish army is against Spain and that they would go over on our side once they had the word.

Then they discussed General Masera, a former officer of Abd. el Kadir who is now in command of the Spanish forces in the Melilla area. They said that it would be difficult to approach Masera, but that they would be furnished with the

Spanish and they watch him closely. He seems to contact his  
 might cost his life. However, they felt sure that General Mazlan  
 would revolt in our favor, even without being asked.

When asked whether or not a Riffian uprising would conflict  
 with the restoration of the Sultan's government to power, they  
 said No. The Rif would become a province with Abd el Krim as  
 wazir under the Sultan. They seemed somewhat vague about which  
 Sultan they wanted; Bu Dras said "Abd el Aziz" (who is very  
 popular in Tangier) but el Hadi would not commit himself.

Enclosure #4.

Interview with Sidi Ahmed ben Saddik el Tuggani, the Chief  
 of the Berkawa Brotherhood, in His Headquarters at Tangier,  
 on September 16th, 1942.

Present: The Berkawi, Coon, Guesus.

As in most such interviews, the Moslem leader did most of the  
 talking. He spoke rapidly and had everything well organized. We  
 came there under the pretext of giving him some money for his  
 new annex to the Mother Church---the head mosque of the sect  
 at Tangier. He had sent a circular letter to all Legations and  
 Consulates and I was sent by Mr. Childs to arrange a contribution.  
 He used this meeting as an opportunity of discussing operations,  
 and opened the subject himself. He needed no urging.

Relations with Spanish:

(The Berkawi speaks, in first person). At the time of the  
 Spanish Civil War I obtained guns and ammunition from the Span-  
 ish Reds from an agent called el Khleh, the son of a Moorish  
 father and a Spanish mother. (el Khleh is now in Rabat). When  
 I was ready to deliver the goods, at the chosen moment, el Khleh  
 informed on me, to an official named Megil (?) (The Spanish  
 Controller) Then the Franco people seized most of the guns, but  
 I still have some of them hidden away. The Spaniards caught many  
 of my men and put them in jail, but they didn't catch me. The  
 case came up before the Tribunal three years ago, and I was  
 let off. This was a famous case; you will probably find a record  
 of it in the Legation files.

After this I got in touch with Juan Boigbodor, with whom I  
 became friendly. A month and a half ago I received an (undated)  
 letter from Boigbodor, by hand (See enclosure #5). This was an  
 innocuous letter to give the messenger a chance to speak to me.  
 The messenger delivered this orally from Boigbodor: "There will  
 be a change in the Spanish government between September and Oc-  
 tober. Also, if the British take Tripoli, Spain will join England.  
 If the Germans take Egypt, Spain will join Germany and fight  
 England. At that moment the Reds will rise, and I request you,  
 O Sheikh, to help the Reds at that time." I then wrote Boigbodor  
 a letter back, saying, "I am ready."

Boigbodor also had the messenger tell me that he might get

... should want to communicate with him, I would be as though the British or Americans in Tangier.

### Revolt in the Mountains.

Seven months ago in the month of Muhad two friends of mine came to me, one from Khmes in the Jebala and the other from the Ghomara, and they said that they wanted to start a revolt, and asked if the English could help or not. So I then went to the British Legation and saw a tall thin man with a moustache and a somewhat long nose (Mr. Casadyne?) who sent me to Col. Ellis. I met Col. Ellis on the mountain. Col. Ellis said, "We can't do anything at present because we don't want to make an enemy of Spain at this time."

I said to Col. Ellis: "Give me only fifty men to land at Tigassas of the Ghomara, fifty English soldiers, and in a few days I will raise between three and four thousand men of the Ghomara (The sheikh is himself a Ghomari)."

The man from Khmes said: "I need only three men to start with; I can go myself to kill the Spanish officers in their offices; I will do this with my own hand on condition that the British make a landing in the Ghomara at the same time."

The tribes of Ahl es Sherif, Boni Yusof, and Sumata (in the Jebala) are ready to fight and they want to kill all the Spanish soldiers in their tribes and take their arms, but they need a little money. There is an officer there of the soldiers who is ready to revolt for a little money.

I would like to synchronize a revolt in the Ghomara, Khmes, Sumata, and in the Anjera country. This will keep the Spaniards busy. All the Anjera people are my followers; they all belong to my brotherhood.

In the time of the Keds I gave two thousand pesetas to a kaid of the Anjera, and the pantiards caught him. They beat him with a whip, giving him 2,500 stripes, so that he was nearly dead, and then throw him in jail. That man is now free again and ready to fight. He keeps coming to me and saying, "Now is the time, let's go."

(Note: The Anjera is the tribe on the Straits, between Tangier and Ceuta).

I would like to fight both France and Spain at once, to unite Morocco.

In all tribes in both zones I have one million followers all organized and ready to revolt. I am ready to go out and lead them myself. We want the British and Americans in here, to give us freedom and equality between men, and an opportunity for education. You can handle all external affairs for us, as long as we have internal equality and justice in our land.

Tell your government I am ready, with a million men at my command.

~~Enclaves~~

Copy of Bolgbeder's letter.

Hotel Capitol, Hafidjo Carrien, Jose Antonio 41, Madrid.

Dr. Sidi Ahmed ben Saddik el Tuggani:

Mi querido amigo---.Oportunamente recibí por correo su amable carta y su cariñoso saludo que tanto agradezco. Aprovecho el momento en Marruecos de su primo Sidi Arufa, para contestarle y recordarle nuestra buena amistad, que comenzó cuando yo fui a Tangor a darle el pésame por la muerte de su padre y continuó luego durante el glorioso movimiento nacional, cuando usted se ofreció a trabajar a las órdenes de nuestro caudillo Franco.

Respetuosa salud de su buen amigo y ....(illegible)

Juan Bolgbeder.

Handwritten notes on the left side of the page, including the word "Action" and other illegible scribbles.





**SECRET**

THE SITUATION REGARDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF  
THE POSSIBLE USE OF MOROCCAN PERSONNEL IN  
MILITARY OPERATIONS.

During the last four months members of the Tangier OSS staff, in accordance with their instructions in Washington have spent most of their time studying the native situation in Morocco and in interviewing leaders and representatives of the most strategically important groups. The information so obtained may be interpreted in terms of possible allied military operations in this area, as follows.

i. Immobilization of Straits Area.

It is necessary for us to see that the whole Straits of Gibraltar area is immobilized before or on D day. We are not here concerned with the Spanish side of the Straits, only with the Moroccan side.

ii. Our Relations with Spain

In our relations with Spain concerning Morocco, there are three possibilities:

- (1) Spain will not oppose us.
- (2) They will oppose us, but a simultaneous rising of parties in Spain will weaken this opposition.
- (3) They will oppose us unitedly and in full strength.

In the event of the second and third possibilities, favorable action by Moors would be greatly to our advantage. Since we cannot know that Spain will not oppose us, it would be extremely unwise to risk a passage of the Straits without first making sure that a wide area on either side is first under our control. This could only be done peacefully by a military occupation by our troops with full Spanish consent. Such an event seems hardly likely.

iii. Possible Spanish Action

We must anticipate every possible Spanish action against us.

**SECRET**

Those actions, in the Moroccan area, are five: (See Map #1)

- (1) To close the Straits, impeding our movements B and C.
- (2) To attack our landing point A, either before or after our landing, with troops from the Larache-Alcazar area, proceeding along the coastal plan.
- (3) To close the Taza corridor with troops from the Melilla garrison. These troops could approach the corridor over flat, treeless land all the way.
- (4) To send part of the Melilla garrison eastward along the coast to oppose our landing at B.
- (5) To open the airfields in the Spanish Zone to the Luftwaffe, giving the Germans bases from which to attack by air all of our expeditions, as well as Gibraltar.

It is apparent that Spain is in a very strategic position to hamper our movements. Her military preparations in this area have been intense for several years; that her leaders have made a tentative deal with the Germans is to be assumed. Her reward would include the acquisition of the French Zone, and the campaign of abuse which the Spanish have been carrying out against the French in their native propaganda work clearly suggests that she is trying to build the groundwork for an excuse to invade.

#### IV. Counter Operations

There are several ways to block these projected actions on the part of the Spaniards. We are concerned here only with the Moorish aspect. We must mention, however, that there is no necessary area of conflict between the Moors and the Spanish Bedi, or between the Moors and the Belgeder group. In other words, a Moorish campaign would not inhibit the use of these other elements.

SECRET

Operations designed to block these actions would be:

- (1) A general revolt of Moorish troops, hindering Spaniards everywhere.
- (2) The defection of General Muzien and his garrison, hindering Spanish action #2.
- (3) A tribal uprising in the whole western part of the Zone, including the Anjera, Jebala, and Ghomara countries, hindering Spanish action #1.
- (4) A Riffian uprising. The Riffians could march on the Taza corridor via Gzennaya or via Beni Tuzin, either holding it for us against the Spaniards or meeting the Spaniards before they arrive there. These Riffians could also attack the Melilla garrison, preventing Spanish action #4.

All of the above actions would impede or prevent Spanish action #5.

- (5) To promote civil disobedience in urban populations, thus hindering Spanish HQ work, transport, and communications.

#### Techniques of Fulfilling This Program

As the enclosures will indicate, we have already taken most of the preliminary steps needed, and have several movements on ice. What still remains to be done is as follows:

- (1) Approach General Muzien. Several highly placed contacts, including influential Moors, have given us reason to believe that he is accessible. The approach would be made through his father-in-law or brother-in-law, but is too risky to attempt before the last moment. It is of course always possible that the Spanish could create dissatisfaction among his troops, and among all Moorish soldiers in the Spanish Army.

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(2) Obtain about \$100,000 to use at our discretion in preparing groups for our use.

(3) Rescue Abd el Krim from Reunion. This is essential since the Riffians would have no basis for unity without him. There seems to be no one here capable of unifying and leading them without bickering, or able to inspire them to fully effective action. He is almost a God in Riffian eyes, and they would rise to a man with tremendous enthusiasm if we could produce him.

(4) Rescue Allal el Fasi from Brazzaville. He also has taken on the stature of a deity among the Nationalista and among many of the city people who are not avowed Nationalists. His presence would inspire and unify the Bled el Makhzen, and in the Spanish Zone the actions of the urban population could be largely controlled by his utterances. In the French Zone he could be counted on to keep the Moors from attacking the French if we would guarantee to see that the basic rights which the Moors want were to be granted them. In case the French Army should turn against us, or in case the Germans should arrive in force to oppose us, then Allal el Fasi could be counted on to arouse campaigns of civil disobedience, and could help the Clawi, the Derkawi, and others cause a revolt of the native troops and tribal uprisings.

(5) To continue our present relationships with groups already contacted, and to set them in motion if and when so instructed.

## VI. Conclusion

We trust that the importance of the native factor in possible operations has been sufficiently indicated. As we stated the natives may well hold the balance of power in the

SECRET

event of crisis. They form the majority of the population, and include the best fighting men in North Africa. There are many of Abd el Krim's veterans among them, men who know how to handle arms and to conduct guerilla warfare in difficult terrain.

We believe that we are in a position to utilize this native factor the advantage of our forces. For the maximum chance of success we repeat our suggestion that Abd el Krim and Allal el Fasi be brought to Gibraltar where one of us will go to meet and prepare them.

As to the details of operations to be planned, we offer at the moment only the suggestions of the Moors themselves, some of which may be practical, others impractical, and others of which may be capable of use with modifications.

Enclosure #1.

Interview with Si Hamid Mekkwa in Fez, August 11, 1942.

On August 11, 1942, CSC interviewed Si Hamid Mekkwa in Fez at a secret rendezvous. Si Hamid Mekkwa is the acting head of the Nationalist party group in Fez in Allal el Fasi's absence.

Numbers of Followers:

Si Hamid stated that most of the people of Morocco are with him and the Nationalist party. He further stated, however, that he could not depend on the religious brotherhoods such as the Aissawa, since his party is religious in nature and puritanical, and that they are trying to cleanse Islam of such heresies. Hence the Nationalists oppose the brotherhoods, and these groups cannot be reached through him.

Aims of the Party:

The aims of the Nationalist party are national unity with an emphasis on religion; he wants no regional self-government, and stated: "Morocco is a small country, it cannot be split up regionally like the United States of America." He dislikes intensely the Berber Dahirs, granting the Berbers regional self-government on the tribal council basis and the use of traditional Berber law instead of Koranic law. He seemed rather lofty toward the Berbers; he could see no difference between them and other Moroccans, and stated that all or almost all could speak Arabic. He said that the Arabization of Berbers was a natural and inevitable process. It was the interviewer's opinion that Si Hamid did not fully understand the Berber problem and was taking a snobbish and unwise point of view toward it.

Toward France, Spain, and Germany:

The French have been very severe with the Moroccans and unfair, and if they are to remain they must modify their attitude. They must grant the Moroccans equality with Christians, and this would include political equality and equality of opportunity for education. Some of the French are fine men, but most are bad fellows; they vary greatly and

many of them are undependable. (It is a universal complaint of Moroccans that Christians do not keep their word). For the moment, however, there is little that the Moroccans can do about it.

As for Spain, the Spaniards are much worse than the French and want to make Morocco a Catholic country. If Spain invades the French Zone, the Nationalists will help the French, providing proper concessions are granted them by the French.

As for Germany, the Germans are very bad. They have tried to get in touch with Si Hamid but he has refused to see them or communicate with them. Abd el Khalek Torres of Tetuan and others who play with the Germans are not true Nationalists; they have been read out of the party. If the Germans enter Morocco the Nationalists will support the French against them, under the same conditions as in the case of the Spanish. As a matter of fact they would probably resist the Germans even without conditions; the Germans and Spanish would be worse than the French in their treatment of Moslems; the French are severe enough.

#### Toward the U.S.A.

The Moroccans prefer Americans to all other Christians, and would like our help in restoring justice after the war. He was pleased with President Roosevelt's speech, but smiled as if we were idealistic children, and stated: "It is too late, America cannot win; you started too late." He seemed well informed from a French point of view about the war in Russia and in Egypt and took a gloomy view of the future.

#### Ideas of Resistance.

The Nationalists have no arms and are not fighters; they would resist by civil disobedience a la Ghandi, and by the force of their religious sanctity. Little or nothing to bank on of an active nature.

#### Main Desire.

The best thing that we can do for them is to get Allal ai Fasi out of forced residence and take him to England, America, or Gibraltar. If this were done and known there

would be great rejoicing throughout the land and the Nationalists would be for us lock stock and barrel. Allal el Fasi over the radio would electrify the country. Even if we can't get him out, at least get all the news of him that we can and let them know; they would be immensely grateful. They have not heard from him for two years. Si Ahmed thought that the British had taken over Brazzaville and could not understand why they had not released him.

#### The Sultan.

When I asked, do your people wish to keep the present Sultan or get a new one, Si Ahmed looked at me as if I had asked about his self life, and replied, "I cannot tell you that. That is too intimate a question." Then he added, "The present Sultan was for us and very good, but the French have held him incommunicado now for two years and we cannot find out how he stands."

#### Conclusion.

Si Hamid Mekkwa is the most religious of the Nationalist leaders and his point of view may not be wholly representative. Si Ahmed Belafrej, an exiled leader previously interviewed in Tangier, took a more political and less religious attitude, and Allal el Fasi is said to lack the pious slant of Si Hamid.

The Nationalists are numerous and have great influence in the cities and some of the Arab country districts. Allal el Fasi is a martyr and if he were produced at the proper moment his appearance would have a strong effect; we could not count on the Nationalists for military operations, but could expect them rather to unite the non-Berber parts of the country and provide leadership through the person of Allal el Fasi. This is equally true of both zones; in fact, the greatest center of Nationalism in recent years has been Tetuan. In practical terms we could get Allal el Fasi to urge the people to be quiet and sit tight, or to carry on a campaign of civil disobedience, whichever might be more useful.



Enclosure #2Interview With Mulay Larbi on September 11, 1942

On Friday, September 11, 1942, Eddy and Coon interviewed Mulay Larbi, the Glawi's secretary and a relative of the Sultan, at Menebhi's house. The interview lasted about an hour, during which time Mulay Larbi talked continuously. Colonel Eddy asked him a few leading questions only. The essence of the conversation is as follows:

The Sultan of Morocco is a sort of divine king. In his health and prosperity lie the health and prosperity of the country; he is revered. When the Sultan travelled last year in Berber country, where no Sultan had been before for generations, the Berbers all flocked around him and offered him fealty. This was particularly noticeable in the tribe of Saian. The Khalifa of the Spanish Zone is very loyal to the Sultan and does not wish to be set up as a rival. There should be a Khalifa for each of the major areas of Morocco.

Morocco should be united, and not split up into zones. The Sultan approved the taking of Tangier by the Spaniards because this meant one less zone.

If American should come the Moslems would be very pleased. The Moroccan troops would revolt rather than fight us. So would most of the French Army. The only ones who would stand against us are the Senegalese, the Indo-Chinese, and the Foreign Legion.

If American should enter the Spanish Zone the Spaniards would fight us. If we should enter the French Zone, by-passing the Spanish Zone, the Spaniards would cross the border to attack us. But General Muzian would go over on our side.

Enclosure #3Meeting of September 15th with Riffian Leaders

Present: Mohammed Bu Draa, el Hajj el Hadi ben Azua el Urriaghli (former khalifa of the Pasha of Tetuan) Eddy, Coon Browne, Guesus.

This interview was the culmination of a series of rendezvous between Coon, Browne and Bu Draa, with Guesus. In earlier interview the general Riffian situation was discussed and the rescue of Abd el Krim fully covered. Bu Draa also gave us military information during these interviews. All of these rendezvous were conducted in utmost secrecy after elaborate preparations, and in a different place each time, since these men are well known and were risking their lives in meeting us.

Bu Draa had previously arranged for el Hajj Hadi to visit the Rif on the occasion of his son's wedding, and there to sound out three other of Abd el Krim's old leaders, and to make up an operational plan.

They stated that without arms they could not start an independent revolt in the Urriaghel--Alhucemas area, but that they could do so under the following scheme, which they proposed:

After a short notice, they would get together 1,500 men at the Imezoren (spelt Ein Zoren on Spanish maps) Airport, and seize it. At this moment American aircraft would land and unload rifles for the 1,500 men. These fifteen hundred would seize and hold three landing beaches which they designate for twenty-four hours, during which time a small American or British landing force should debark under their cover. This force would bring more arms for the rest of their men, to the number of fifteen thousand, who would then be coming down out of the mountains. With this armed force and with our aid they would then seize the whole central Spanish Zone cutting off all communication by land between Melilla and Tetuan, and attacking the Spaniards further where indicated. The fifteen thousand would be augmented from other tribes, including Beni Amart, Beni Tuzin, and Bokoya and by wholesale desertions from the Spanish army.

El Hajj Hadi requested one million pesetas (roughly \$50,000 on the Tangier market) to be distributed at the proper moment among the men. He was told that such a payment was not feasible at the moment, but that after the men had assembled and had formed a fighting force they would be taken care of in every reasonable way (on condition, of course, that such a plan was to be put into execution). We gave him 20,000 pesetas (roughly \$1,000) for expense money in making his arrangements, and promised him an equal amount monthly until it should be decided whether operations involving his people were to take place. Arrangements were made for further rendezvous when needed.

NOTE:

The Imezoren (Ein Zoren) airport is on the Neker plain, at map grids 650.5 E x 632 N.

The three landing beaches are:

Bu Skor (Busciur on the map) in Bokoya tribe just west of Alhucemas, at the mouth of the Wed Busciur. 633 E x 641 N.

Ajdir itself, the beach opposite the islands. 646 E x 641 N.

El Harsh, a point on the beach between Beni Uriaghel and Temsaman. Impossible to locate on any map in our possession. The boundary between Beni Urriaghel and Temsaman is the Wed Neker. The beach is near 656 E x 641 N, as closely as we can discover.

Buskor and el Harsh have deep water, so that steam vessels could come in close; Ajdir is shallow, good only for barges and small craft.

\*\*\*\*\*

These men also agreed to work on the Riffian soldiers in the Spanish army in the Straits and Atlantic coastal areas not to fight against Americans if so ordered. They proposed to do

his work at the right moment through Riffian non-coms and Lieutenant and Captains. They stated that the whole Moorish part of the Spanish army is against Spain and that they would go over on our side once they had the word.

Then they discussed General Muzien, a former officer of Abd el Krim who is now in command of the Spanish forces in the Larache area. They said that it would be difficult to approach General Muzien because he is known to be dissatisfied with the Spanish and they watch him closely. To attempt to contact him might cost his life. However, they felt sure that General Muzien would revolt in our favor, even without being asked.

When asked whether or not a Riffian uprising would conflict with the restoration of the Sultan's Government to power, they said no. The Rif would become a province with Abd el Krim as wazir under the Sultan. They seemed somewhat vague about which Sultan they wanted; Bu Draa said "Abd el Azia" (who is very popular in Tangier) but el Hadi would not commit himself.

Enclosure #4

Interview with Sidi Ahmed ben Saddik et Tuggani, the Chief of the Derkawa Brotherhood, in His Headquarters at Tangier on September 16th, 1942:

Present: The Derkawi, Coon, Guesus.

As in most such interviews, the Moslem leader did most of the talking. He spoke rapidly and had everything well organized. We came there under the pretext of giving him some money for his new annex to the Mother Church---the head mosque of the sect in Tangier. He had sent a circular letter to all Legations and Consulates and I was sent by Mr. Childs to arrange a contribution. He used this meeting as an opportunity of discussing operations, and opened the subject himself. He needed no urging.

Relations with Spanish:

(The Derkawi speaks in first person) At the time of the Spanish Civil War I obtained guns and ammunition from the Spanish Reds from an agent called el Khleh, the son of a Moorish father and a Spanish mother. (el Khleh is now in Rabat) When I was ready to deliver the goods, at the chosen moment, el Khleh informed on me, to an official named Megil (?) (The Spanish Controller) Then the France people seized most of the guns, but I still have some of them hidden away. The Spaniards caught many of my men and put them in jail, but they didn't catch me. The case came up before the Tribunal three years ago, and I was let off. This was a famous case; you will probably find a record of it in the Legation files.

After this I got in touch with Juan Beigbader, with whom I became friendly. A month and a half ago I received an (undated) letter from Beigbader, by hand (see enclosure #5). This was an innocuous letter to give the messenger a chance to speak to me. The message delivered this orally from Beigbader: "There will be a change in the Spanish government between September and October. Also, if the British take Tripoli, Spain will join England. If the Germans take Egypt, Spain will join Germany and fight England. At that moment the Reds will rise, and I request you, O Sheikh to help the Reds at that time". I then wrote Beigbader a letter back saying, "I am ready."

Beigbeder also had the messenger tell me that he might go to America, but he was not sure of this. If he should go and I should wish to communicate with him, I should do so through the British or Americans in Tangier.

### Revolt in the Mountains

Seven months ago in the month of Mulud two friends of mine came to me, one from el Khmes in the Jobala and the other from the Ghomara, and they said that they wanted to start a revolt, and asked if the English could help or not. So I then went to the British Legation and saw a tall thin man with a moustache and a somewhat long nose (Mr. Gascoyne?) who sent me to Colonel Ellis. I met Colonel Ellis on the mountain. Colonel Ellis said, "We can't do anything at present because we don't want to make an enemy of Spain at this time".

I said to Colonel Ellis: "Give me only fifty men to land at Tiguisas of the Ghomara, fifty English soldiers, and in a few days I will raise between three and four thousand men of the Ghomara (The sheikh is himself a Ghomari).

The men from Khmes said: "I need only three men to start with: I can go myself to kill the Spanish Officers in their offices; I will do this with my own hand on condition that the British make a landing in the Ghomara at the same time.

The tribes of Ahles Sherif, Beni Yusef, and Sumata (in the Jehala) are ready to fight and they want to kill all the Spanish soldiers in their tribes and take their arms, but they need a little money. There is an officer there of the soldiers who is ready to revolt for a little money.

I should like to synchronize a revolt in the Ghomara, Khmes, Sumata, and in the Anjera country. This will keep the Spaniards busy. All the Anjera people are my followers; they all belong to my brotherhood.

In the time of the Reds I gave two thousand pesetas to a

a kaid of the Anjera, and the Spaniards caught him. They beat him with a whip, giving him 2,500 stripes, so that he was nearly dead, and then threw him in jail. That man is now free again and ready to fight. He keeps coming to me and saying "Now is the time, let's go."

(Note: The Anjera is the tribe on the Straits, between Tangier and Cueta).

I would like to fight both France and Spain at once, to unite Morocco.

In all tribes in both zones I have one million followers all organized and ready to revolt. I am ready to go out and lead them myself. We want the British and Americans in here, to give us freedom and equality between men, and an opportunity for education. You can handle all external affairs for us, as long as we have internal equality and justice in our land.

Tell your government I am ready, with a million men at my command.

Enclosure #5.

Copy of Beigbeder's letter.

Hotel Capitol, Edificio Carrion, Jose Antonio 21, Madrid.

Sr. Sidi Ahmed ben Saddik el Tuggani:

Dear friend:

I have just received your very nice letter and most thoughtful greeting for which I thank you very much. I take advantage of the arrival of your cousin, Sidi Arafa, in Marruecos to renew our good friendship which began when I went to Tangier to console you for the death of your father and which continued during the glorious national movement, when you undertook to work under our "caudillo" Franco.

Affectionately yours,

Juan Beigbeder.






**AIR MAIL**

Algers, Algeria, September 13, 1942.

Transmitting Weather Observations.

**SECRETLY CONFIDENTIAL**



I have the honor to transmit herewith weather observations made by the Observatory in Algiers covering a period for the past 1000 days. It is believed that this information may be of interest to the Weather Bureau of the Departments of the Navy and Commerce.

This information was obtained by Vice Consul Boyd and ~~from~~ from a reliable and confidential source, and may be given a rating of A-1.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:  
Weather observations.

Original and photographs in the Department  
Two copies to Naval Attaché, Tangier.

220  
228-243

PREVISIONS DES VENTS POUR 1968 (CONTINUATION)

Mois	N. N.	Mois	N. N.	Mois	N. N.	Mois	N. N.	Mois	N. N.
Jan	10	Fev	10	Mars	10	Avr	10	Mai	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31									

- I - Saison de 1 à 6
- II - Saison de 5 à 6
- III - Saison de 7 et au-dessus

Indépendants et irréguliers. Les vents soufflent avec les vents d'ouest et balayés avec les vents d'est. Si le vent est fort par temps calme c'est un signe de vent d'ouest. Généralement les vents sont plus faibles en hiver qu'en été, sur un littoral les vents d'ouest soufflent. La différence de vitesse dépend surtout de la direction, parfois et irréguliers - généralement ils suivent la direction des vents. Le vent souffle plus fort en hiver, et il souffle sur la côte Est.

Mois	N. N.	Est	S. N.	Est	S. N.	Mois	N. N.	Est	S. N.
I	10	10	10	10	10	I	10	10	10
II	20	20	20	20	20	II	20	20	20
III	30	30	30	30	30	III	30	30	30
IV	40	40	40	40	40	IV	40	40	40
V	50	50	50	50	50	V	50	50	50
VI	60	60	60	60	60	VI	60	60	60
VII	70	70	70	70	70	VII	70	70	70
VIII	80	80	80	80	80	VIII	80	80	80
IX	90	90	90	90	90	IX	90	90	90
X	100	100	100	100	100	X	100	100	100

- I - Niveau de 1 à 4
- II - Niveau de 5 à 6
- III - Niveau de 7 et au-dessus

Les courants sont insignifiants et irréguliers. Les courants sont avec les vents d'ouest et baissent avec les vents d'est. Les courants de mer sont faibles par temps calme c'est un signe de vent d'ouest. Généralement les courants sont plus forts en hiver qu'en été, car au hiver les vents d'ouest dominent. La différence de niveau d'énergie est faible. Les courants sont irréguliers - généralement ils suivent la direction des vents. Au Cap Ratier part au nord-est, et il revient sur la côte Est.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330001-7



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330001-7

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial: 134-12 Memorandum Index Guide No. 745-100  
 (Use space below each report, 1 to 1-24, 2-10)  
 (C) correspondence with USAF (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps)  
 (Make appropriate reference to each report)

From: 1. S. Duval, Atlanta at Tunis, Morocco Date 1 October 1942  
 (Title, Unit, Office, District, Office, Station, or Person)

Reference: 1. S. Consul H. Woodruff  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source: Informant Evaluation: B  
 (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)  
 when position is given)

Subject: 1. S. Duval Tunis Instructions for use of French Aviation  
 (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Make separate report for each title) Code  
 (Nation reported on)

NOTE - (List enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)  
following are instructions for use of French aviation Code at Tunis.

1. S. DUVAL SUR LE CHIFFREMENT DES SIGNAUX MILITAIRES A-T.  
 Principe du chiffrement.  
 Le chiffrement des signaux du code G.P.A. est obtenu a l'aide d'un nombre -  
 clef.  
 Le chiffre du nombre clef est utilise pour transformer les chiffres  
 du message clair.  
 Les lettres de ce message signal ne sont pas transformees.

2. S. DUVAL SUR LE CHIFFREMENT DES SIGNAUX MILITAIRES A-T.  
 Le chiffrement est effectue par une suite incoherente comprenant 15 a 20 chiffres.  
 Le chiffrement de rombre-clef est effectue tous les heures a 0 h 15.  
 Le message est alors transmis.

3. S. DUVAL SUR LE CHIFFREMENT DES SIGNAUX MILITAIRES A-T.  
 Le message est transmis par une suite incoherente comprenant 15 a 20 chiffres.  
 Le chiffrement de rombre-clef est effectue tous les heures a 0 h 15.  
 Le message est alors transmis.

4. S. DUVAL SUR LE CHIFFREMENT DES SIGNAUX MILITAIRES A-T.  
 Le message est transmis par une suite incoherente comprenant 15 a 20 chiffres.  
 Le chiffrement de rombre-clef est effectue tous les heures a 0 h 15.  
 Le message est alors transmis.

5. S. DUVAL SUR LE CHIFFREMENT DES SIGNAUX MILITAIRES A-T.  
 Le message est transmis par une suite incoherente comprenant 15 a 20 chiffres.  
 Le chiffrement de rombre-clef est effectue tous les heures a 0 h 15.  
 Le message est alors transmis.

Col. Bonavia, Paris.

Approved for release by the Office of Chief of Staff, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. (If this report is to be distributed outside the Department of Defense, the Office of Chief of Staff, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. should be consulted.)

Dist.	Copy No.	Copy To	Copy From	Copy To	Copy From	Copy To	Copy From	Copy To	Copy From	Copy To	Copy From	Copy To

CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Army, Signal Corps, Fort Monmouth, N.J.  
Système TUNISIEN - Tunisie - Instructions de service de l'Etat-Major de l'Armée

(A) relever le résultat de gauche à droite en obtenant le cryptogramme qui précède de la caractéristique 77 et ensuite final.  
(groupe Miroir-signature ou groupe Miroir-précès d'authentification) constituée de toute chiffre à transmettre.

- 4. **CHIFFREMENT DU SIGNAL.**  
Le toute chiffre s'inscrit dans la ligne (signal à transmettre)  
le signal clair est obtenu en reliant sans tenir compte des retards  
chaques chiffres de la clef au chiffre correspondant du signal chiffré.
- 7. **exemple de chiffrement**  
soit à chiffrer le signal 02243 -71- 12- 804 - 127 avec le nombre clef au  
service 068127143684361 l'opération de chiffrement se présente de la  
manière suivante

2. a. **transf**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2
4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3
5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4
6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5
7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

clef en code

résultat

Le signal chiffre à transmettre (le final étant par exemple 1025 ETZ) sera  
02243 -44- 28- 250- 782- 1025- ATZ IMI  
02243 -44- 28- 250- 782- 1025 - ATZ AB ou VA

**CLEFS DE CHIFFREMENT**  
**LISTE No 00**

**Jour J**                      **Tableau des clefs**

---

1	4	1	9	3	0	2	8	7	5	2	9	4	0	7	6				
2	5	6	9	5	1	8	3	8	6	9	0	8	4	1	2	9			
3	2	2	9	0	2	4	7	9	1	1	5	4	1	1	9	3			
4	4	8	8	7	1	5	8	0	1	7	0	1	3	7	0	5	5	0	
5	6	2	5	3	4	5	4	5	7	0	9	2	6	2	2	4			
6	3	0	4	6	7	4	1	1	6	2	9	1	6	6	1	3	8	1	
7	6	4	9	0	0	3	7	6	3	4	7	4	8	8	9	8	0		
8	6	1	8	7	7	1	2	4	8	9	4	6	3	2	7				
9	6	9	8	3	6	2	5	7	1	8	2	9	1	4	1	0	3	7	
10	7	3	9	2	0	6	5	3	4	3	4	7	5	9	5	2	6	9	4

**REMAR** Le C.M.C. fixe le jour J  
Le chef de chiffrement est valable de 00h. à 24 h  
chaque jour (heure Greenwich)  
Les avions n'emportent en vol que la clef du jour

S. A. LLOY.  
Lt-Col, USMC(Res).

sentence in English or original

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CIPHERING OF THE SIGNALS OF THE CODE G. M. A.

1. Principle of the ciphering.  
The ciphering of the signals of the G. M. A. code is obtained with the aid of a number-key. Each cipher of the number key is used to ~~change~~ <sup>transform</sup> the ciphers of the clear signal. The letter of the signal is not ~~changed~~ <sup>transformed</sup>.

NUMBER KEY.  
The number key is an increment of 10 ciphers every hour. The number key is 00 every hour at 0 hour.

2. CIPHERING.  
The ciphering is obtained by adding 3 SQUARES OF N (I) to the signal to ~~change~~ <sup>transform</sup> the result.

3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SIGNAL.  
The signal is written from left to right on the line. The number-key in force is proportionally to one cipher of the number key indefinitely. The number key is changed continually so as to ~~change~~ <sup>transform</sup> the ciphers of the signal to use.

4. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SIGNAL.  
The signal to be ciphered is ~~changed~~ <sup>transformed</sup> by the square of the number key (reparatif) (number) in cipher. The result of the ciphering is the result of the ciphering. The result of the ciphering is the result of the ciphering. The result of the ciphering is the result of the ciphering.

5. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SIGNAL.  
The signal to be ciphered is written from left to right on the line. The number-key in force is proportionally to one cipher of the number key indefinitely. The number key is changed continually so as to ~~change~~ <sup>transform</sup> the ciphers of the signal to use.

6. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SIGNAL.  
The signal to be ciphered is written on the line (signal to be ciphered).



The clear signal is obtained in deciphering without taking into account the retentions (see retained) each cipher of the key of cipher corresponds to the signal cipher.

7. example of ciphering.

to cipher the signal GABES - 72 - 12 - 804 - 327 with the number key in use 468327141684361 the operation of ciphering appears in the following manner.

Signal to be transformed

Key in use

Result...

the signal cipher to be transmitted (the ~~\*\*\*\*~~ being for example 10.5 ET) will be

W W GABES etc. copy of original

KEYS OF THE CIPHERING LIST NO 00

Table of keys

etc. copy of original

The key J... sets the key J... of the ciphering is valid from 00h. to 24 h... carries in flight only the key of... key.



The following is a list of coastal observation posts on the Atlantic Coast of French Morocco. The evaluation is "A":

Sidi Moussa (on the coast, level with Tiznit).  
 Tiznit.  
 Taroudant.  
 Agadir (at the Kasbah).  
 Cap Rhir (or Ghir) at the lighthouse there.  
 Tamanaç.  
 Lighthouse at Cap Sim.  
 Mogador.  
 Telmest.  
 Saffi.  
 Lighthouse at Cap Cantin.  
 Qualidia (on coast road between Saffi and Mazagan).  
 Lighthouse at Mazagan.  
 Azemmour.  
 Lighthouse at Sidi Boubaker.  
 Soui-el-Thine (between Azemmour and Bir Djedid).  
 Bir Djedid.  
 Dar Bou Azza.  
 Lighthouse at El Hank.  
 Batteries at Oukacha.  
 Batteries at Fedala.  
 Battery at Pont Blondin.  
 Bouznika.  
 Tanara.  
 Rabat.  
 Sidi Boukneçel.  
 Lighthouse at Mehedia.  
 Port Lyautéy.  
 Si Allal Tazi.  
 Bouk el Arba.  
 Moulay Boumelham.  
 Had Kourt.

Note: The observation post at Dar Bou Azza is also the firing control post for the battleship JEAH DART.

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Monograph Index No. 100, 10

Serial: [ ]  
 From: [ ]  
 Reference: [ ]  
 Bureau: [ ] Evaluation: [ ]  
 Subject: [ ]

The following report, in reply to a confidential questionnaire regarding the situation at the German-Danish border, was received from Vice Consul [ ] on 28 September, 1942, and is quoted hereafter in its entirety.

- (1) The weather is not forecast from the prevailing N.E. winds and the surf is very high for [ ] and velocity.
- (2) (a) (2a) Approximately the same as reported for the Delta area.
- (3) On the whole it is a safe area that is of coast just like the balance of the coast of this country. It enjoys unusually good and clean weather throughout the year. The only unfavorable factors are the generally known ones: relatively high wind velocity, lack of sheltered bays and ponds with which the surf is kept at bay.

- (4) The area is a beach, situated inland from the beach station.
- (a) The beach is about 100 yds. long.
- (b) The beach is on a hillside of coarse, heavy rock-crete about every 15 ft. connected with a series of stone (and a few concrete) walls above ground and partially with concrete and wooden posts in the water. Behind the beach is a French non-combat zone, situated inland.
- (c) The beach is a beach, situated inland from the beach station.
- (1) The beach is about 100 yds. long.
- (2) A fence or wall of [ ] is situated just over the beach.
- (3) A narrow road ( [ ]) near the beach crosses the border leading to the [ ] road there is a sign through the sand-dune mountain (which that road was not seen by the observer).
- (4) The beach is very accessible from the beach. At 7 am within 10 minutes of the beach at [ ] there are low dunes but these do not present an obstacle to motorized traffic. From [ ] at [ ] distance of [ ] through [ ] the [ ] is [ ] ( [ ] to [ ] at [ ]).
- (5) The beach is very accessible from the beach. At 7 am within 10 minutes of the beach at [ ] there are low dunes but these do not present an obstacle to motorized traffic. From [ ] at [ ] distance of [ ] through [ ] the [ ] is [ ] ( [ ] to [ ] at [ ]).

Instructions by Originator: [ ]

Dist.	Off.	Div.	Sec.	Sub.	Spec.	Adm.	Ext.	Gen.	Off.	File.	Index.	Other.

U.S. Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia 23504

- (7) In summary, only such observation is the area mentioned already referred to and this does seem a serious one.
- (8) Not particularly steep. Perhaps a 10 degree slope at most.
- (9) No tank traps.
- (10) No shore in appearance to beach.
- (11) Unlikely to be satisfactory.
- (12) None until this spring and it is not believed any have been placed since.
- (13) Virtually unaltered in length on beach proper starting at Fort Say and going westward. The beach is a good wide beach for these purposes (average about 100 feet). An excellent flat cleared area exists west of Ft. Say (the flat is lost after leaving Fort Say and several hundred meters in width. A corresponding gap (with the appearance of an emergency airfield was observed) just south of landing along Horseshoe Road P.O. It should be mentioned however that the space suitable for landing planes was shorter, being about 600 to 800 meters in length and oriented N.W. In summary it can be said that there is no lack of landing space near Fort Say and Saida.
- (14) Special mention should be made of a little cove a few hundred meters west of Fort Say as it is sheltered from the west and northwest. It is connected with Fort Say by a one lane dirt road which passes over the neck of highland against which the beach at Fort Say exists. This little beach is about 250 meters long and 50 to 75 meters deep with a very gentle slope. This cove is used by the local fishermen for coming in and beaching their boats. A smaller locked port exists on the top of the little point between this cove and Fort Say. Immediately east of this little cove another one is to be found. Smaller the same depth and direction however twice as wide and therefore relatively less well protected. Furthermore the 1 lane road which ends here is only a track at this second cove.

III. PORTS.

At Fort Say, there was an attempt made to develop a small port. All that remains are two sections of breakwater stretching 30 to 35 meters out. The beams of these breakwaters are perhaps 100 meters apart. The section between has filled in so that it is just like the rest of the beach. The level of the breakwaters is very little above that of the sea and the protection offered is practically nil. There is nothing at all at Saida.

IV. LIGHTING.

Lighthouses and beacons as well as blackout regulations have been covered separately and previously. Both Fort Say and Saida are very small installations and show no lights after 9 or 9:30 P.M. No prominent lights exist along this bit of coast.

V. FISHING CRAFT.

About 1 or 2 very small fishing boats operate in good weather in the immediate vicinity. None are equipped with V.T. (This believed that all the fishing craft are open boats. This mentioned as an indication of size).

VI. MISCELLANEOUS.

The important military airbase is at Saida. The Fort Say and Saida parties - 1000 strong each respectively. Special mention should be made of a point about 3 km. SW of Fort Say. At this point alignment N.W. and Horseshoe P.O. are about 100 meters apart. This is the site of the Ford Line. Both roads are described by being along the coast for 100 meters in length. It is not known whether this point is used but in view of general information obtained from available sources a few weeks ago it is believed that operations are in fact being conducted in this area. The point is about 100 meters from the coast and is well protected. It is believed that operations are in fact being conducted in this area. The point is about 100 meters from the coast and is well protected. It is believed that operations are in fact being conducted in this area.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**F. B. I. Special Agent in Charge, New York**

The New York Post has today published a story which states that the FBI is conducting an investigation into the activities of a group of individuals who are alleged to be active in the New York area. The story further states that the FBI is conducting an investigation into the activities of a group of individuals who are alleged to be active in the New York area. The story further states that the FBI is conducting an investigation into the activities of a group of individuals who are alleged to be active in the New York area.

**W. A. RICE**  
**12-10-64**

ALGERIA

(Algerian-Moroccan border - Winds;  
coastal defense; beaches, mine-  
fields, and roads)

Evaluated "A":

1. Sea Conditions.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) approximately the same as reported for Macta area.

(6) The beach here is not protected from the prevailing N.W. winds and the surf is relatively high for a given wind velocity.

(7) (8) (9a) Approximately the same as reported for the Macta area.

(9) On the whole it can be said that this bit of coast just like the balance of the coast within our Department enjoys unusually good and clear weather throughout the year. The only unfavorable factors are the generally known ones; relatively high wind velocity, lack of sheltered bays and speed with which the infrequent storms arise.

II. Beaches

(1) No coast guns.

(2) No machine gun posts.

(3) No wire entanglements.

(4) Same as on balance of coast. Navy look-outs about every 15 kms connected with interior by phone (all telephone lines above ground) and patrols together with occasional lookout posts of the native Douair organization (with French non-coms and officers). Efficiency: fair.

(5) No minefields.

(6) There are 3 roads penetrating inland from this beach section.

- (a) R.N. 7 from Port Say to Lalla Marnia.
- (b) A Moroccan road of about the same importance (P.18) just over the border from Saidia to Oujda.
- (c) A smaller road (S. 401) near the Spanish Moroccan border leading to Berkane and from there to Oujda through the Beni-Snassen mountains. (This last road was not seen by the observer).

The two first roads are very accessible from the beach. R.N. 7 comes within 100 meters of the beach at Port-Say. There are low dunes but these do not present an obstacle to motorized equipment. From inspection at a distance of 2 kms through field glasses it looked as if access to road P.18 at Saidia was also easy. Just west of Saidia the dunes begin and appear to continue for the entire distance to the Spanish Moroccan frontier. Both at Port Say and Saidia there are houses back of the beach but these are sufficiently widely spaced not to prevent passage of vehicles between them.

(7) No parapets. Only tank obstruction is the dune formation already referred to and which does seem a serious one.

(8) Not particularly steep. Perhaps a 10 degree slope at most.

(9) No tank traps.

(10) No shoals in approaches to beaches.

(11) Understood to be satisfactory.

(12) None until this spring and it is not believed any have been placed since.

(13) Virtually unlimited in length on beach proper starting at Port Say and going westward. The beach is a good wide beach for these parts (averaging about 100 feet). An excellent flat cleared area exists west of R.N. 7 for the first 2 kms after leaving Port



Say and several hundred meters in width. A corresponding area (with the appearance of an emergency airfield was observed) just south of Saidia along Moroccan road P.18. It should be mentioned however that the space suitable for landing planes was shorter, being about 600 to 800 meters in length and oriented N-S. To summarize it can be said that there is no lack of forming up areas near Port Say and Saidia.

(14) Special mention should be made of a little cove a few hundred meters east of Port Say as it is sheltered from the west and northwest. It is connected with Port Say by a one lane dirt road which passes over the neck of highland against which the beach at Port Say ends. This little beach is about 250 meters long and 50 to 75 meters deep with a very gentle slope. This cove is used by the local fishermen for coming in and beaching their boats. A Douair lookout post exists on the top of the little point between this cove and Port Say. Immediately east of this little cove another one is to be found. Exactly the same depth and formation however twice as wide and therefore relatively less well protected. Furthermore the 1 lane road which ends here is only a track at this second cove.

### III PORTS.

At Port Say, there was an attempt made to develop a small port. All that remains are two sections of breakwater stretching 30 to 35 meters out. The bases of these breakwaters are perhaps 100 meters apart. The section between has filled in so that it is just like the rest of the beach. The level of the breakwaters is very little above that of the sea and the protection offered is practically nil. There is nothing at all at Saidia.

### IV Lighting.

Lighthouses and beacons as well as blackout regulations have been covered separately and previously. Both Port Say and Saidia are very small agglomerations and show no lights after 9 or 9:30 P.M. No prominent lights known along this bit of coast.

## V FISHING CRAFT.

About 7 or 8 very small fishing boats operate in good weather in the immediate vicinity. None are equipped with W/T. (It is believed that all the fishing craft are open boats. This mentioned as an indication of size).

## VI MISCELLANEOUS.

The nearest military airdrome is at Oujda.

Re Port Say and Saidia section - ADD UNDER ROAD CONDITIONS. Special mention should be made of a point some 3 kms SSW of Port Say. At this point Algerian R. N. 7 and Moroccan P.18 come within 75 meters of each other on either side of the Oued Kiss. Both roads are dominated by steep cliffs about 20 to 30 meters in height. It is not known whether this point is mined but in view of the general information obtained from excellent sources a few months ago about mine emplacements and preparations, it is felt that the answer is nearly certainly "yes". On the Moroccan side, the gorge is created by an isolated low mountain (El Kalaa). Gough lanes for agricultural purposes exist in the flat land west of El Kalaa and communication could be reestablished rather quickly.

The road from Port Say to Lalla Marnia skirts the SW edge of the Mairda hills and Traras mountains. No spot noticed where road could be destroyed so as to block it for any length of time. P.18, from Saidia to Oujda has not been travelled by either observer. It passes however through much more mountainous terrain and it is felt that it could be much more easily and successfully cut than R.N. 7.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Formal 21-10 Monograph Index Guide No. 400-100  
 Start new series each year 1.0. Form 9-59

From 1st Lt. Robert A. ... at Washington, D.C. Date 21 Sept 1952  
 (Ship, Air, Post, Clerical, Office, Station, or Person)

Reference SI 21-10, Vias, Convois, Mines, and ...  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc.)

Source Personal Observation and Informant Evaluation A  
 (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—Identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, checked, unreported, etc.)

Subject ALGERIA of Mersour Additional data re roads, mines, ...  
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Subtitles) (Main subject report for each item)

Summary—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following additional data has been received from Vias Convois ... and ... regarding road conditions, mines, and staiding of Army units in the Mersour-Boni-Saf, and Port Bay areas:

It has been stated in connection with the report on Mersour and again elsewhere that a battalion of the Foreign Legion spent some time this summer preparing defense positions both at Boni-Saf and Mersour. From an excellent source who returned on 16 September, 1952, from Mersour, Boni-Saf and Port Bay, it is learned that these defense positions are all earthworks of a very light nature, no tank traps, no concrete poured anywhere. At both Mersour and Boni-Saf land mine fields have been plotted on paper but none have been put ...

The same informant states categorically that the only stores of explosives for landing roads and bridges in the above area are at Elancon (Army stock) and ... (Army stock) and that the supplies are very small.

The same informant adds that the Navy has actually mined one or two ... the two roads leading from Mersour inland. He says he is certain that ... no mines so anywhere in this area.

The same informant states that as of a few days ago there were the ... of Army forces at the above mentioned places:

- 1. Company - 1st Battalion of Alger at Mersour. (Have personnel of the ...)
- 2. Company - 1st Battalion of Alger at Mersour. (Have personnel of the ...)
- 3. Company - 1st Battalion of Alger at Mersour. (Have personnel of the ...)

1st-Cpt, U.S.A.

Classification By Originator SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL

Routing slip to be used in U.S. I. Draw circle around each of units (columns) on the right that are to receive this material. If this material is to be furnished to any other unit, check (X) in the column of the unit to which it is to be furnished. If this material is to be furnished to any other unit, check (X) in the column of the unit to which it is to be furnished.

Op-10	1-10-1	A-E-C-D-V-F-S-Z										Head	Adm	Ext	Int	Off	Rel	Sec
		1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12																
File	Off	T.S.O.	C.A.R.	Sec.	S.S.A.	W.S.A.	U.S.A.C.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	U.S.A.	

The report quoted below comes from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy regarding Algeria - Nemours - additional data re: roads, mines, and troops. It is evaluated as A.

The following additional data has been received from Vice Consuls Rounds and Knight regarding road conditions, mines, and stationing of Army units in the Nemours-Beni-Saf, and Port Say areas:

It has been stated in connection with the report on Nemours and again elsewhere that a battalion of the Foreign Legion spent some time this summer preparing defense positions both at Beni-Saf and Nemours. From an excellent source who returned on 16 September, 1942, from Nemours, Beni-Saf and Port Say, it is learned that these defense positions are all earthworks of a very light nature. No tank traps. No concrete poured anywhere. At both Nemours and Beni-Saf land mine fields have been plotted on paper but none have been put in place.

The same informant states categorically that the only stores of explosives for mining roads and bridges in the above area are at Tlemcen (Army stock) and Nemours (Navy stock) and that the supplies are very small.

The same informant believes that the Navy has actually mined one or two spots on the two roads leading from Nemours inland. He says he is certain that the Army has not done so anywhere in this area.

The same informant states that as of a few days ago there were the following Army forces at the above mentioned places:

- Nemours - One battalion of Algerian Tirailleurs. (Navy personnel of the two coast batteries must be remembered).
- Beni-Saf - One battalion of the Foreign Legion. This battalion was in Syria and is probably the only unit which, as a unit, would put up a real fight against us.
- Port Say - and Siadia - Two companies of Tirailleurs for both places.

**Form 104-1**  
 (Rev. 1-25-60)

**Monoprint from Report**  
 (If available, give title and number of report)

**From:** U. S. Naval Air Station, San Diego, Calif.  
 (Full name, grade, position, office, and address)

**Reference:** Vice Admiral H. H. King (22, 22-100)  
 (Director, correspondence report or related report, etc. if applicable)

**Source:** Observations and Informant  
 (All other sources, including intelligence, commercial, etc. if applicable)

**Subject:** JAWAN, JAWAN, JAWAN, JAWAN, JAWAN, JAWAN  
 (Name reported on) (Main title of report) (Reference) (Other information)

**Summary:** (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated, giving important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

There are enclosed herewith sketches of the port of JAWAN, showing the positions of vessels in that port on Sept. 12th (8:00 a.m.) and Sept. 18th (9:30 a.m.). These sketches, however, will be forwarded to Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, U. S. Army.

The Navy has installed lookout posts in each of the two (2) titan cranes in the port of JAWAN.

All contacts report that the results of the gunnery practice held outside the port on September 8th and 9th were nothing short of lamentable. The target was hit very rarely. As already reported, part of the exercises were held at night, during which the destroyer SIMON rammed the destroyer TEMPEST. SIMON'S bows struck TEMPEST amidships, scraping upwards towards the latter's bows. SIMON'S bows and TEMPEST'S middle plates now are being repaired. One (1) man was killed outright; another is reported to have died of injuries and five (5) were slightly injured.

It is reported that the destroyers were unable to keep station during manoeuvres, but this may have been due at least in part to squalls during the night of September eighth.

At any rate, orders have been given for these exercises to be repeated and to be varied by "alerte" sorties by destroyer, gunboat and submarine units.

W. A. EDDY,  
 Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

**Distribution by Originator:** General, Colonel, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, Lieutenant Junior Grade, Lieutenant (jg), Ensign, Chief Petty Officer, Petty Officer, Seaman, Airman, and other ranks.

No.	Grade	Name	Signature	Date	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials	Initials
1	General														
2	Colonel														
3	Major														
4	Captain														
5	Lieutenant														
6	Lieutenant Junior Grade														
7	Lieutenant (jg)														
8	Ensign														
9	Chief Petty Officer														
10	Petty Officer														
11	Seaman														
12	Airman														

This document contains information which, if disclosed, could be harmful to the national defense. It is to be controlled and copies made only as authorized. If possible, prevent disclosure of this information.



The following is a report on Occupied France, Aviation, and German Aerodromes. It is evaluated as "B".

Informant called today (September ninth) stating that he had arrived about four (4) days ago in Morocco from France, that before coming here he had entered the occupied zone clandestinely to see his parents, who live at Laon. While moving around the neighborhood, he found that three (3) aerodromes which he had noted in 1940, were being used by the Germans and were still unbombed. They are:

(A) at COUVRON - about 9 km on the road LAON - LA FERIE - AMIENS, very near CREPY EN LAONNAIS. This is used by about 100 German bombing planes. It is equipped with a wireless station. Gas depots, bomb depots are underground but there are four (4) large concrete hangars which may easily be seen. There are four, 4-motor planes here.

(B) at AULNOYE, about 4 km from LAON on the road from LAON to CRECY S / SERRE. This is used by about 400 German bombing planes. The field is about 7 km long and is situated between the road to CRECY S/ SERRE and the road to MARLE. The field is on both sides of the road from LAON to AULNOYE (which continues to CRECY S/SERRE). There are two "pistes" one real, one faked. The faked piste is on the section of the field which lies between the road LAON-AULNOYE-CRECY S/SERRE and the road LAON to MARLE. This field is equipped with underground hangars, bomb depots and gasoline depots. About 8 days ago, when informant was there, he saw that the sugar factories near the field were being used for the stockage of materiel and munitions. He saw about 120 or 130 railroad wagons in the factory yards, loaded with bombs. These factories are situated near the railroad station at AULNOYE. They have not been working for a long time and have been used since then by the Germans as a munitions depot.

(C) the third field is at LA PAIX, near Sissonne, at a distance of about 11 km from LAON on the road between LAON and SISSONNE. This is used by about 100 German planes, mostly pursuit groups. It is on the right side of the road going from LAON to SISSONNE, a little before the crossing of the Laon-Sissonne road with the LIESSE-CORBERY road.

Report made under the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2002

From: **General M. J. ...**

Reference: **...**

Source: **...**

Subject: **...**

Herewith in a table of gasoline storage plants belonging to the various companies of the Government in Morocco. By "bulk storage" is meant cylinders or tanks with pipe line connections in city or town, as well as to gasoline trucks; "by warehouses" is meant cylinders or tanks with pipe line connections to railroad tank cars as well as tank trucks. Warehouse figures do not include shed or other undercover storage for drums. Tanks generally range in size from 50 to 300 cubic meters.

**RUDE INCREASE**

(Expressed in cubic meters).

ROLES	ALGERIA	SENEGAL	LIBYAN	CHAD	EGYPT	SAUDI	AFGHANISTAN	YEMEN	TOTAL
Algeria	19,578								19,578
Senegal	19,188	14,951		7,194	5,100	3,870			47,143
Libya	4,180	785		4,195	6,424				15,584
Chad	1,550								1,550
Egypt								1,075	1,075
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>34,316</b>	<b>14,736</b>	<b>11,389</b>	<b>11,624</b>	<b>11,574</b>	<b>3,870</b>	<b>1,075</b>	<b>1,075</b>	<b>83,549</b>

**WAREHOUSES**

ROLES	ALGERIA	SENEGAL	LIBYAN	CHAD	EGYPT	SAUDI	AFGHANISTAN	YEMEN	TOTAL
Algeria	3,778	596.5			150		450		4,974.5
Senegal	450		180						630
Libya			75						75
Chad									
Egypt						1,550		1,550	3,100
Saudi									
Afghanistan									
Yemen									
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,228</b>	<b>596.5</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>1,700</b>	<b>1,550</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>1,550</b>	<b>11,529.5</b>

<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44,525</b>	<b>15,336.5</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>11,774</b>	<b>12,644</b>	<b>4,420</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>2,625</b>	<b>95,739.5</b>
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Distribution By Originator: **General McClure and Col. Gwathrey, London**

Routing slip to be used for all reports... (Detailed routing instructions)

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Rev.	Dist.	F. & D.	C. & E.	Sec.	S. & A.	M. & R.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...



- (1) The French Government has the right of retention and a strong ability of that right to be exercised.
- (2) Only possible French companies.

The CIMA company is a subsidiary of French C.I.F.

The S.F.L. company (St. Louis) is a subsidiary of French Air-oler group.

The C.M.C. company is independent under French management (Mr. Thomas).

The H.M.T. company is independent under French management (Mr. Grandot).

The C.H.A. company is subsidiary of British American (British's group).

W. A. EDDY  
Ident. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

Herewith is a table of gasoline storage capacity belonging to the various companies of the Group, as in Morocco. By "bulk storage" is meant cylinders or tanks with pipe line connections to ship at the dock, as well as to pipe line trucks. By "warehouses" is meant cylinders or tanks with pipe line connections to railroad tank cars, as well as tank trucks. Warehouses figured do not include shed or other undercover storage for drums. Tanks generally range in size from 30 to 300 cubic meters.

The evaluation is "A".

**BULK STORAGE**  
(Expressed in cubic meters).

TOWNS	SHELL	SYOC	CIMAR	CMC	DE. 15	SNPP	ATLAS-TIC	OH	TOTALS
Casablanca	15,675	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,675
Fedala	19,125	16,851	-	7,194	5,100	2,370	-	-	50,640
Port	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iquaway	4,180	785	-	4,193	6,434	-	-	-	15,592
Safi	1,550	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,550
Agadir	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,875	1,875
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>40,530</b>	<b>17,636</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>11,387</b>	<b>11,534</b>	<b>2,370</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1,875</b>	<b>85,322</b>

**WAREHOUSES**

Casablanca	1,775	356.5	-	212	150	-	450	-	2,943.5
Rabat	450	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	600
Port	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iquaway	-	-	75	-	-	-	-	-	75
Petitjean(1)	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
Meknes	200	305	150	186	-	1,850	-	1,500	4,191
Fes	300	50	-	216	-	-	-	-	566
Taza	200	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	245
Oujda	568	97	-	144	-	-	-	-	769
Marrakech	150	340	144	157	-	-	-	-	691
Mazagan (2)	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100
Settat	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
Safi	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,793</b>	<b>1,210.5</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>1,850</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>10,415.5</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>44,323</b>	<b>18,846.5</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>12,301</b>	<b>11,684</b>	<b>4,220</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>3,375</b>	<b>95,729.5</b>

(1) The Petite Charrienne Gas Refinery at Petitjean has a storage capacity of about 910 cubic meters.  
(2) This gasoline tank connection.

- 2 -

The CINA company is a subsidiary of French C.I.P.

The S.F.I. company (NY Aoyala) is a subsidiary of French Moroc-  
cain group.

The C.M.S. company is independent under French management  
(Mr. Thomas).

The S.M.T. company is independent under French management (Mr.  
Grandet).

The C.N.A. company is subsidiary of Omnica Moroccan (Spain's  
group).

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco  
1 October, 1942.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations,  
20 Grosvenor Square, London.

Dear General McClure:

When the Chief Pilot of Port Lyautey was smuggled through here on his way to England he left with us some notes on the special requirements for entering and landing at the various ports on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco. This is of course the kind of information he will give in person but since he wanted it to be delivered in any case, in the event of some accident to him on route, I am sending it forward just as he wrote it.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. ADDY,  
Lt-Col, USMC.

Copy to:  
Director of ONI, Wash, D.C.  
Col. Donovan, Wash, D.C. ✓

*1/10/42, cf: / translations folder*

Avant la construction des jetées 1912 l'eau du fleuve déversait ses eaux par de larges ouvertures. Ces ouvertures très étendues pour le débit du fleuve entraînait des variations faisant changer constamment un chenal à profondeur variable dépassant rarement 1.90 au zéro des cartes françaises.

La construction des jetées orientées au N 48 E est apporté un grand changement dans le régime du fleuve, les deux jetées qui ont sensiblement la même longueur 1.800 mètres environ sont à leur extrémités distantes de 500 mètres.

Le chenal varie entre les jetées sensiblement parfois à l'intérieure: faiblement à l'extrémité des usoirs où le chenal n'est parfois pas très large mais invariablement parallèle à la jetée Sud.

Après les dragages de cette année 11.600<sup>m<sup>3</sup></sup> la hauteur minimum sur les petits fonds étaient aux derniers sondages de 4<sup>m</sup> au zéro marin mois d'août 1942. Cette hauteur d'eau étant variable il serait utile d'avoir de fréquents renseignements.

L'entrée d'un navire à Ménéchia est subordonné 1° au temps qu'il fait, 2° à son tirant d'eau, 3° à l'instant de la marée. En hiver il y a parfois d'assez fortes crues et à ce sujet il est bon de rappeler qu'un grand barrage situé à El Kansera joue le rôle de bassin régulateur. Sa construction entrainerait un mouvement d'eau considérable dans le fleuve; la région serait en outre privée d'une source d'énergie électrique appréciable.

Après l'Armistice Juin 1940 nous avons pu entrer et remonter en rivière avec des moyens de transport qui consistaient en barques dont les plus grandes pouvaient être chargées

En résumé l'on peut entrer à Ménéchia à l'instant quel moment de l'année si le temps le permet avec un navire de tirant d'eau de 4<sup>m</sup>.00.

Et qu'actuellement étant donné que nous avons un banc de 4<sup>m</sup>.00 ce même navire pourrait avec 1<sup>m</sup>.60 d'apport de marée entrer à Ménéchia avec un tirant d'eau de 3,50 + 1,6 = 5<sup>m</sup>.10.

D'autre part étant donné que le banc en riviére sur les plus petits fonds est de 2<sup>m</sup>.40, un navire peut très bon entrer à Ménéchia sans pouvoir en raison de son tirant d'eau monter à Port Lyautey.

À Ménéchia il n'y a véritablement pas d'installations portuaires mais il y a des possibilités pour en effectuer de rudimentaires avec promptitudes.

De chaque côté des jetées la plage s'étend sur une dizaine de kilomètres.

Prenons la plage Sud de la jetée où est édifié une petite agglomération qui a pris le nom de Ménéchia plage. La dune qui a une altitude d'une dizaine de mètres environ s'étend presque en arête jusqu'à Bouknadel le versant Est de la dune est surtout aux approches de Ménéchia coisée est propre à l'embuscade, un poste de guet relié par téléphone et par signaux optiques y est installé dans une petite guérite.

Pour tout ce qui concerne les défenses de l'entrée du Senou vous avez eu par l'intermédiaire du groupe de Port Lyautey les meilleurs renseignements.

Le phare est à une élévation au dessus de la mer de 51 à 52 mètres son horizon visuel est donc d'environ 11 milles.

Des photos un plan des dernières années Mai 1941 ont été fournies à Charles il ne doit pas être impossible d'en avoir tout au moins un esquisse de la carte de Ménéchia.

La plage aussi bien que le fond de la mer ont approximativement une inclinaison, autrement dit une pente de 10% environ.

Donc par beau temps c'est à dire avec une houle inférieure à 3 un navire du type Marquise de Labusar ou autre navire possédant des caractéristiques semblables qui a marée remonté route à bonne allure en direction de la plage se trouverait par la suite dans des conditions d'échouage telles que l'équipage pourrait débarquer à pied sec. Ces navires allège avaient un tirant d'eau de 2<sup>m</sup>40 à l'arrière et moins de 0<sup>m</sup>50 à l'avant.

Chargé de 800 tonnes environ leur tirant d'eau pourrait être de 3<sup>m</sup>20 à l'arrière et 2<sup>m</sup>80 à l'avant. C'est un type de chaland de haute mer propulsé par deux machines.

Par houle inférieure à 2 le navire sa mission terminée pourrait vraisemblablement, reprendre la mer surtout si l'on a eu la précaution de laisser tomber une ancre à l'arrière un peu avant l'échouage.

Par houle supérieure à 2 l'immobilisation voir même la perte du navire, devait être envisagé mais sa mission je tiens à le préciser, aurait été effectué.

Combien pourrait on mettre d'hommes avec tout leur fournissements abord d'un navire du type que je viens d'indiquer.

Pour un temps limité à 3 heures mettons 800 hommes soit environ une centaine de tonnes de charge vivantes avec leur bagages le navire peut parfaitement avoir en plus 300 tonnes de matériel divers, munitions, engins, mécaniques ou autres qui seront de toutes façons parfaitement récupérables et apporté à pied d'œuvre.

L'importance de Mahéchin n'échappe à personne sa possession est la clef qui donne l'accès au Babou Navre par son terrain escarpé mais ce terrain est très difficilement accessible par voie terrestre.

la possibilité de venir à bout.

La distance est de 12 à 15 kilomètres sans pont. Cette distance est entourée de quelques barrières. L'objectif serait de s'environner 50 hommes plus une compagnie de travailleurs.

Un millier d'hommes bien équipés qui en pleine nuit débarqueraient sur la plage à deux ou trois kilomètres de Médhia plage contourneraient les défenses et feraient une marche d'environ 8 kilomètres en terrain boisé mais très accessible et prendrait par surprise une position d'art de tout premier ordre.

L'intérêt que présente un débarquement analogue sur la rive droite est une question qui peut avoir toute importance et pour lequel la possession de quelques voies de communications vers la frontière Espagnole présenteraient quelques avantages.

E A B A T

Etant donné l'ensemblement du Port il ne présente pas beaucoup d'intérêt au point de vue portuel.

Néanmoins un navire du type que j'ai décrit peut parfaitement accéder jusqu'au quai de Rabat à marée haute (marée de vives eaux). Là aussi la surprise pourrait jouer un grand rôle dans la réussite d'une entreprise hardie qui brusquement jetterait en plein centre de la capitale un contingent de 500 à 1000 soldats. L'état d'esprit de la population ainsi que celui de la plupart des éléments de l'administration nous étant favorable la réaction qui est assez faible, ne demanderait pas mieux que d'accepter le fait accompli.

En raison des conditions climatiques sur le site, l'opération sera limitée au printemps, mais les avions transportent le matériel par mer.



LE PORT

Port bien abrité de la houle mais très étroit  
et très encombré; peu de place pour deux ou trois navires et  
encore cela dépend il de leur tonnage. N'est accessible  
que si les batteries du Port Elondin sont réduites au  
silence. Il y a lieu de tenir compte pour les mouvements  
de navires des heures des marées.

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TRANSLATION

*Report about the port of Lyautey  
10/1/42*

Before the construction of the jetties in 1919 the Sebou watercourse emptied its waters through a large mouth. This estuary, which was too extended for the beginning of the river, filled up constantly with sand; this caused a constant change in a channel of variable depth, which rarely exceeded 1.90 to the zero of French maps.

Construction of the jetties located at S<sup>0</sup> 42E brought about a large change in the course of the river. The two jetties, which have approximately the same measurements as to length--about 1800 meters--are 500 meters apart at their ends.

Interiorly, the channel varies considerably between the jetties; slightly at the end of the pier-heads, where the channel is often not very big, but always parallel to the Sud jetty.

After this year's dredgings, the minimum depth of under-keel water --116000<sup>m</sup>3--was at the last soundings at 4<sup>m</sup> to the naval zero in August 1942. Since this depth of water is variable, it would be useful to have frequent data.

Entry of a ship into Mehedia is governed by (1) the weather; (2) her draft; (3) the tide. During the winter there are fairly large rises, and in this connection it is well to remember that a large dam located at El Kansera acts as a regulating basin. The destruction of this dam would cause a considerable rush of water in the river; also, the surrounding region would be deprived of an appreciable source of electrical energy.

After the Armistice in June 1940 we were able, with make-shift means, to enter and dock in the river about thirty ships, of which the largest could easily carry seven to eight thousand tons. Concerning navigation of the river--i.e. navigation of the 10 miles separating Mehedia from Port Lyautey, an explanation of this would prevent me from keeping strictly to the point as I wish.

In summary: it is possible to enter Mehedia at any time of the year, weather permitting, with a ship whose draft is 4.00.

Even given that we have a level (zero) of 2<sup>m</sup>40, this ~~max~~ ship could, with a 1<sup>m</sup>60 rise in tide, enter Mehedhia with a draft of 3.50 plus 1.6 = 5<sup>m</sup>10.

On the other hand, given that the in-the-river level of under keel water is 2<sup>m</sup>40, a ship could easily enter Mehedhia without being able, because of her draft, to go to Port Lyautey.

At Mehedhia there are really no port installations, but there are possibilities for installing rudimentary one promptly.

On each side of the jetties the beach extends for about ten kilometers.

Consider the southern beach of the jetty where there has been built a small agglomeration which has taken the name of Mehedhia beach. The dune, which is about 10 meters high, extends almost in a crest to Bouknadel. The eastern slope of the dune, particularly at the approaches to Mehedhia, is wooded and suitable for ambush. A sentry post connected by phone and by visual signals is installed there in a small sentry box.

Concerning defenses at the mouth of the Sebou, you have the best information from the Port Lyautey group.

The lighthouse is about 51 to 52 meters above sea level; its visual horizon is therefore about 14 miles.

From photographs, a chart of the last soundings in 1941 were given to Charles; it should not be impossible to get in at least a tracing of them and forward it.

The southern as well as the northern beach have about a 1<sup>m</sup> slope.

Thus, in good weather-~~ice~~, with a swell less than 1-2 m, of the Marquise de Labussay type, or other ship having similar characteristics, which would at (high) tide sail at a good rate of speed toward the beach, would upon grounding be in a position such that troops could disembark dry-footed. These lighters had a draft of 2<sup>m</sup>40 at the stern and less than 6<sup>m</sup>30 forward.

Loaded with about 800 tons, their stern draft could be about 3.20 and forward draft 2.80. This is a type of high-hull lighter propelled by two engines.

If the swell were less than 2, the ship, when its mission was finished, could feasibly put to sea again. This would be possible especially if anchor were cast to stern a little before ground-lag.

If there were a swell larger than 2, immobilization or even loss of the ship should be envisaged; but her mission, I point out, would have been completed.

How many men, with all their equipment, could be put on board a ship of the type I have just indicated?

For a period limited to three hours let us use 800 men--that is, about 100 tons of live cargo with their equipment. The ship can perfectly well have, in addition, 300 tons of divers' materiel, munitions, engines, mechanical or otherwise, which will in any case be recuperable and brought nearby.

The importance of Mehedhia escapes no one. Its possession is the key to entry to the Sebou harbor. This harbor is possibly not very convenient, but one can at least work in calm waters and ships judiciously chosen for their tonnage and loaded with some forethought can bring in materiel of all sorts.

Mehedhia is defended by a 6 piece battery whose range is from 12 to 15 kilometers. This battery is surrounded by some barbed-wire. The naval effective is about 50 men and a company of riflemen.

A thousand well-equipped men debarking at night on a beach two or three kilometers from Mehedhia, by their skill and defenses by making an 8 kilometer run in wooded terrain which is very accessible, and by surprise take a key position of first importance.

The interest in a similar debarcation on the right bank can be a question of first importance; possession of some lines of communication towards the Spanish frontier would have several advantages in this connection.

### R A B A T

Given the sanding-up of the Port, there is not much of interest here from the harbor point of view.

Nevertheless, a ship of the type I described could easily reach the Rabat pier at high tide (springtide). There also surprise could play a major part in the success of a daring enterprise which would suddenly catapult a contingent of 800 to 1000 soldiers into the very center of the capital. Since the opinion of the population as well as that of the majority of the sections of the administration is favorable to us, the garrison would ask nothing better than to accept the fait accompli.

1. Because of approach conditions on the coast, there should be rigorous surveillance of the draft of ships transporting the necessary materiel.
2. The type of ships judiciously chosen can exert a happy influence on the result of the operations.

### F E D H A L A

Port well protected from the swell but very narrow and obstructed; little room; two or three ships, and even that depends on their tonnage. Not accessible unless the Pont Blondin batteries are silenced. Account must be taken of hours of the tide for movement of ships.

Even given that we have a level (zero) of 1<sup>m</sup>00, this same ship could, with a 1<sup>m</sup>60 rise in tide, enter Mehedhia with a draft of 3.50 plus 1.6 = 5<sup>m</sup>10.

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Concerning defenses at the mouth of the Sebou, you have had the best information from the Port Lyautey group.

The lighthouse is about 51 to 52 meters above sea level; its visual horizon is therefore about 14 miles.

From photographs, a chart of the last soundings in May 1941 were given to Charles; it should not be impossible to obtain at least a tracing of them and forward it.

The southern as well as the northern beach have about a 10% slope.

Thus, in good weather--i.e., with a swell less than 3-- a ship of the Marquise de Laboumar type, or other ship having similar characteristics, which would at (high) tide call at a good rate of speed toward the beach, would upon grounding be in a position such that troops could disembark dry-footed. These lighters had a draft of 2<sup>m</sup>40 at the stern and less than 5<sup>m</sup>30 forward.

Loaded with about 800 tons, their stern draft would be about 3<sup>m</sup>10 and forward draft 2<sup>m</sup>50. This is a type of high-speed lighter propelled by two engines.

If the swell were less than 2, the ship, when its mission was finished, could feasibly put to sea again. This would be possible especially if anchor were cast to stern a little before grounding.

If there were a swell larger than 2, immobilization or even loss of the ship should be envisaged; but her mission, I point out, would have been completed.

How many men, with all their equipment, could be put on board a ship of the type I have just indicated?

For a period limited to three hours let us use 300 men-- that is, about 100 tons of live cargo with their equipment. The ship can perfectly well have, in addition, 300 tons of diverse materiel, munitions, engines, mechanical or otherwise, which will in any case be recuperable and brought nearby.

The importance of Mehedia escapes no one. Its possession is the key to entry to the Sebou harbor. This harbor is possibly not very convenient, but one can at least work in calm waters and ships judiciously chosen for their tonnage and loaded with some forethought can bring in materiel of all sorts.

Mehedia is defended by a 6 piece battery whose range is from 12 to 15 kilometers. This battery is surrounded by some barbed-wire. The naval effective is about 50 men and a company of riflemen.

A thousand well-equipped men debarking at night on the beach two or three kilometers from Mehedia beach could skirt the defenses by making an 8 kilometer march in wooded terrain which is very accessible, and could take by surprise a key position of first importance.





**CONFIDENTIAL**

Form 10 (Rev. 12-13-59)

FOYUARD: **U.S. Naval Airbase, Algiers, Algeria**

REFERENCE: **File General No. 11, 1943**

SOURCE: **Interview and observation**

SUBJECT: **NORTH AFRICA - Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Aviation strength.**

The following is a list of aviation units distributed throughout Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

**Situation de l'aviation en A.F.N.**

- ALGERIE**
- Saïet : G.T. 1/22 15 Anlots 143 plus 5 farman.
  - G.S. 1/5 13 Liore 45.
  - Rabat: G.C. 1/2 26 Curtiss
  - Marrakech: G.B. 1/23 13 Liore 45
  - G.B. 1/52 13 Potez 63
  - Agadir: G.B. 2/32 13 Douglas
  - Casablanca: G.B. 1/32 13 Douglas
  - G.C. 2/5 26 Dewoitine
  - Mostest: G.B. 2/23 13 Liore 45
- TUNISIE**
- Qujda: G.T. 3/15 20 Anlots 143.
  - La Senia(Gran): G.C. 2/3 49 Dewoitine 520
  - G.N. 2/52 15 Bloch 175.
  - G.B. 1/11 13 Liore 45
  - Tafaroual (12 miles south of Gran): 24 Dewoitine 520
  - 12 Glen Martin light bombs.
  - Navy Base Arcaw: 12 Latoceros.
  - Maison Blanche(Algier): G.C. 2/3 26 Dewoitine 520.
  - Blidar: G.B. 1/19 13 Liore 45
  - G.B. 2/61 13 Liore 45
  - G.T. 2/15 20 Potez 540
  - G.C. 3/6 26 Dewoitine 520
  - Satiff: G.N. 1/36 13 Potez.
- MOROCCO**
- Tunis: G.N. 2/33 13 Bloch 175
  - G.B. 1/25 13 Liore
  - G.B. 2/25 13 Liore
  - S. el-ahmedi: G.C. 2/7 26 Dewoitine
  - Labest: G.C. 1/8 10 Potez 63

Reserve 1/10 des effectifs en avions. Un equipage par avion et un avion.  
Pas d'equipage de reserve entrainees.

Distribution By **CG 501 Gibraltar**

Stamp: **RECEIVED**

Classified	Declassify on:	Authority:

The following is a list of aviation units distributed throughout Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. The evaluation is "A":

Situation de l'aviation en A.F.N.

MAROC

Salé: G.T. 1/22 15 Amiot 143 plus 5 farman.  
 G.B. 1/5 13 Liore 45.  
 Rabat: G.C. 1/2 26 Curtiss  
 Marrakech: G.B. 1/23 13 Liore 45  
 G.B. 1/52 13 Potez 63  
 Agadir: G.B. 2/32 13 Douglas  
 Casablanca: G.B. 1/32 13 Douglas  
 G.C. 2/5 26 Dewoitine  
 Meknes: G.B. 2/23 13 Liore 45

ALGERIE

Oudjda: G.T. 3/15 20 Amiot 143.  
 La Senia (Oran): G.C. 2/3 49 Dewoitine 520  
 G.R. 2/52 15 Bloch 175.  
 G.B. 1/11 15 Liore 45  
 Tafaroui (12 miles south of Oran): 24 Dewoitine 520  
 12 Glen Martin Light bombs.  
 Navy Base Arzew: 12 Latecoeres.  
 Maison Blanche (Alger): G.C. 2/3 26 Dewoitine 520.  
 Saida: G.B. 1/19 13 Liore 45  
 G.B. 2/61 13 Liore 45  
 G.T. 2/15 20 Potez 540  
 G.C. 3/6 26 Dewoitine 520  
 Setif: G.R. 1/36 13 Potez.

TUNISIE

Tunis: G.T. 1/33 13 Bloch 175  
 G.B. 1/25 13 Liore  
 G.B. 2/25 13 Liore  
 Sidi-Ahmed: G.C. 2/7 26 Dewoitine  
 Gabes: G.C. 1/2 10 Potez 63

Reserve 1/10 des effectifs en avions. Un équipage par avion en service. Pas d'équipage de réserve entraînés.

Serial 100-44  
 From U. S. Naval Attache at **LAGOON** Date **Sept 24, 1957**  
 Reference **File 100-44**  
 Source **PERSONAL OBSERVATION AND INFORMATION EVALUATION**  
 Subject **HAZARD APPROACH Landing Force Area in Region of MEDINA**

MEDINA is very much less defended than Casablanca. To take this town and its port it would be necessary rapidly to overcome the coastal batteries at PORT BLONDIN at the mouth of the river Bouzika, and the mixed battalion of spahis and infantry that constitutes its garrison. This could be done by a small group of tanks which could be landed at the creek called ANSE DE DAVID (see map) which is one of the four possible landing places between CASABLANCA and RHABAT - the others being the beaches at SKIRIRAR, PORT BLONDIN and at MEDINA itself.

The creek called ANSE DE DAVID is a small creek easily accessible to vessels or barges drawing not more than 3 meters - and it is practicable even when a rough sea or a swell is on. It is situated at 15 kilometers from Port Blondin. It is watched by only 5 or 6 native watchmen who practically are unarmed and whose only means of liaison with BOUSNIKA (where there is a larger guardpost) is one horse between them. Consequently warning could only be given by telephone to BOUSNIKA, and arrangements can be made to cut the lines between this point and Bouznika, or better still, between Bouznika and Rabat and Casablanca.

This creek is joined to the old seafront highway between Rabat and Casablanca by a "piste" or track which would be difficult except for caterpillar tractors or vehicles adapted to rough and sandy terrain. It would also be possible to get on the highway by an easier route which crosses the property of one Boullier (left bank of small stream shown on map). Although this man's sentiments are dubious, he would not give alarm, since there is no telephone nearer than Bouznika or the east (7 to 8 kilometers away) and a farm 2 kilometers from Port Blondin (12 to 13 kilometers) on the west.

Suggestions as the Landing of Forces: The success of a landing could depend on the rapid putting into action of tanks or armored vehicles landed from barges or amphibians such as the "Alligator" tanks and the paralyzing of the coastal defenses. We suggest the following:

- 1) Night Preparations: Silent landing of paratroopers and if possible of troops by air on the rear.

Distribution By Originator: **General Rogers and Col. Quarrier, London** (Signed) **General Rogers**

Routing slip for use in G. N. I. Draw circle around unit or units (as shown on the distribution sheet here) to which the document has been routed for information, for further routing, or for retention. Indicate by check (✓) on this copy the number distribution sheet routing not provided for on this form, use black dots.

Op-15	Op-20	A-E-I-DE-EE-EE										Map	Index	Code	File	Other	Other	Other
		1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100																

of the coastal defenses, and to take them to the beach. These tanks would advance towards the beach, with most of the tanks supporting the other tanks, and to the river mouth.

2. Landing of tanks. A large group (two of groups) would land the tanks, supported by land at least 20 tanks, and 2 advanced machine gun units, at the beach, and to run them up to a point 2 or 3 kilometers near the river mouth (mouth of the stream). This to be calculated according to speed of tanks.

From HANGCHUA the tanks would split into two groups. One, including the tanks would proceed by the coastal road, the second, including the tanks, proceed by the river (5) machine gun units, would go to the HANGCHUA road, just over the level crossing and split again into two (2) groups - 1 group of ten tanks and 1 group of five (5) machine gun units.

This last group of tanks could choose either of two routes to go to HANGCHUA:

1st. HANGCHUA The road going from the KASSAN of HANGCHUA, then the dirt road along the railway, then the road going to the river mouth from kilometer 33 of the HANGCHUA-RAST road.

2nd. HANGCHUA Road from the KASSAN of HANGCHUA to the Rast road, the Rast road itself for 5 kilometers, and the road that starts from km 33 of that road and leads to the river mouth.

Both groups of tanks, coming one from the east, the other from the south, should arrive at their objective simultaneously (time to be calculated in consequence). The second should of course travel faster than the first group.

(REMARKS) It may be noted that prior to the landing of forces there would be men who would go to their posts and act as guides. It is somewhat difficult to find a sufficient number of men who know the country and who also speak English but there are most our landing forces or parachutists will be well versed in the matter of roads, bridges, etc. There will also be men who will take over temporarily or temporarily possess telephones, telegraph and electric light plants, and even the telephonic connections between batteries and base control stations. It would be advisable to send teams to furnish these guides with some sort of a token rather than to give them a pass-word, as the latter might leak out. I will furnish by next courier a list of the number of men and the places to which they would go in case of emergency.

The greatest menace to any landing would come from the fleet at Cebu. Presently the number of submarines and destroyers here were increased from an average of 7 or 8 units, to 11 or 13; and from 5 to 6 destroyers, to 10 or 11. Obviously these units constitute a real danger. Various little groups have organized themselves on one of the destroyers with the intention of sabotaging the engines if they are ordered out against the Americans, but it naturally would not be so easy as this to get the fleet out of action. I would therefore like to suggest the following method of hitting the fleet at Cebu. The entrance to the harbor is only 100 meters across and is closing off a five or six-hundred foot wide canal filled with green, shallow, and some other heavy cargo vessels the entrance would be completely blocked in the night. Cannon could take the long to pierce if we failed to get the port completely. This would not only prevent the fleet from leaving but would give the greater portion of the fighting planes in Cebu a chance to destroy the landing fleet, especially if we dropped a few light bombs near the harbor to draw their attention to the beach.

This blocking plan would have to be done from the night of the landing, or at least a few days before, with a few days of work on the part of the Americans. It would be the same as the plan to be carried out at the time of the landing.

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**First Phase:** ... ..  
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**Second Phase:** ... ..  
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**Third Phase:** ... ..  
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The following is a report on Landing Force, Area B, Rabat of Fedala, French Morocco. It is evaluated "A":

"FEDALA is very much less defended than Casablanca. To take this town and its port it would be necessary rapidly to overcome the coastal batteries at PONT BLONDIN at the mouth of the river Mefelik, and the mixed battalion of spahis and infantry that constitutes its garrison. This could be done by a small group of tanks which could be landed at the creek called ANSE DE DAVID (see map) which is one of the four possible landing places between CASABLANCA and RABAT - the others being the beaches at SKRIRAR, PONT BLONDIN and at FEDALA itself.

"The creek called ANSE DE DAVID is a small creek easily accessible to vessels or barges drawing not more than 3 meters - and it is practicable even when a rough sea or a swell is on. It is situated at 15 kilometers from Pont Blondin. It is watched by only 5 or 6 native watchmen who practically are unarmed and whose only means of liaison with BOUZNIKA (where there is a larger guardpost) is one horse between them. Consequently warning could only be given by telephone to BOUZNIKA, and arrangements can be made to cut the lines between this post and Bouznika, or better still, between Bouznika and Fabat and Casablanca.

"This creek is joined to the old seafont highway between Rabat and Casablanca by a "piste" or track which would be difficult except for caterpillar tractors or vehicles adapted to rough and sandy terrain. It would also be possible to get on the highway by an easier track which crosses the property of one Boullier (left bank of small stream shown on map). Although this man's sentiments are dubious, he could not give alarm, since there is no telephone nearer than Bouznika on the east (7 to 8 kilometers away) and a farm 2 kilometers from Pont Blondin (12 to 15 kilometers) on the west.

"Suggestions Re the Landing of Forces. The success of a landing would depend on the rapid putting into action of tanks or armored vehicles landed from barges or amphibians such as the "Alligator" tanks and the paralyzing of the coastal defenses. We suggest the following:

\*1) Night Preparations: Silent landing of paratroopers and if possible of troops by air on the rear of the coastal defense lines to take them in the rear. These troops could advance towards the coast, under cover of the woods bordering the river SEFFREK - up to the river mouth.

\*2) Landing of troops at Zero Hour (time of general attack) less the time required to land at dawn 20 tanks and 5 motorized machine gun cars at the ANSE DE DAVID and to run them up to a point 2 or 3 kilometers near PONT BLONDIN (mouth of the river). Time to be calculated according to speed of tanks.

From MANSOURIA the tanks would split into two groups. One, including ten tanks, would proceed by the coastal road; the second, including ten tanks preceded by the five (5) machine gun cars, would go to the CASABLANCA-RABAT railroad, pass over the level crossing and split again into two (2) groups - 1 group of ten tanks and 1 group of five (5) machine gun cars.

This last group of tanks could choose either of two routes to go to Pont Blondin:

1st itinerary: The road going from the KASBAH of MANSOURIA, then the dirt road along the railway, then the road going to the river mouth from kilometer 33 of the CASABLANCA-RABAT road.

2nd itinerary: Road from KASBAH of MANSOURIA to the Rabat road, the Rabat road itself for 5 kilometers, and the road that starts from km 32 of that road and leads to the river mouth.

Both groups of tanks, coming one from the east, the other from the south, should arrive at their objective simultaneously (time to be calculated in consequence). The second should of course travel faster than the first group.

(NOTES: It may be noted that prior to the landing of forces there would be men who would go to their posts and act as guides. It is somewhat difficult to find a sufficient number of men who know the country and who also speak English, but those who meet our landing forces or paratroopers will be well versed in the matter of roads, bridges, etc. There will also be men who will take over temporarily or temporarily paralyze telephone, telegraph, and

electric light plants, and even the telephonic connections between batteries and fire control stations. It would be advisable to avoid leaks to furnish these guides with some sort of a token rather than to give them a password, as the latter might leak out. I will furnish by next courier a list of the number of men and the places to which they would go in case of emergency.

The greatest menace to any landing would come from the fleet at Casablanca. Recently the number of submarines and destroyers here were increased from an average of 7 or 8 subs, to 11 or 13; and from 5 to 6 destroyers, to 10 or 11. Obviously these craft constitute a real danger. Various little groups have organized themselves on some of the destroyers with the intention of sabotaging the engines if they are ordered out against the Americans, but it naturally would not do to count on this to put the Fleet out of action. I would therefore like to suggest the following method of bottling up the Fleet at Casablanca. The entrance to the harbor is only 100 meters across and the sinking of a five or six-thousand tons cargo vessel filled with stone, mineral ore or some other heavy cargo across the entrance would effectively block it for 48 hours. Cement would take too long to remove if we wished to use the port ourselves. This would not only prevent the ships from leaving but would occupy the greater portion of the fighter planes in Casablanca in protecting the bottled-up Fleet, especially if we dropped a few light bombs near the harbor to make them think we intended to bomb the Fleet.

This blocking boat would have to come from Spain or Portugal under the flag of either of these nations, with a full cargo of wood on top of the material. No boat in this harbor under our control is large enough to do the job. The most we could hope for would be one of the Phosphate tugs.

I might mention the fact that due to the French pride in the port of Casablanca as one of their outstanding colonial achievements, and the fact that it is the principal naval base in North Africa, the coastal and aviation defenses are heavier there than in any other place on the coast.

As soon as the Fort Elmoriz and other batteries have been silenced and the Vichy troops dispersed, the attack on Fedala could be made, and new tanks and troops landed on the beaches at



Pont Blandin and Fedala.

Meanwhile the machine gun cars landed at Base de David should have arrived at the cross-roads at the Fedala railroad station and Fedala and Casablanca roads from where they could spread themselves over the rear of the few Vichy troops stationed in Fedala.

2) Landing of forces in number and extension of line of attack. By landing troops and vehicles in the port of Fedala itself, while bombing planes would intervene over Casablanca, Rabat and Medouna (airfield there) to prevent reinforcements coming up.

Once the port of Fedala were taken, its harbor would permit the landing of men and material in sufficient numbers to deploy along the coast and inland in order to establish an effective beach-head. An attack on Casablanca from Fedala would be facilitated by the numerous roads leading there, permitting the surrounding of the city on a radius of over 25 or 30 kilometers - and it is not protected by any landward defences.

4) Operations on Skirirat and Rabat (see map) could be effected in the same way, but would be limited to the landing of caterpillar-tracked vehicles able to go over any kind of terrain. It would be impossible to land ordinary wheeled vehicles. This could be done in the three following phases:

First Phase (Landing): Seizure of railroad station and electric plant at Station. Creation of a bridgehead in front of the river Yquem - the only natural defence between Skirirat and Rabat. Bridgeheads to be established before the road and railroad bridges of the Casablanca-Rabat route.

Second Phase: Infiltration of infantry by the Skirirat Cued (river) Yquem coastal track, using the track between the dunes and the railroad. Passage of the river at its mouth by these elements. Progression and infiltration of tanks through the Tensara forest, followed by parachutists landed in that wooded region.

Third Phase: Attack against Rabat made by land and by sea (by land on road No. 22 - see map). An associated map will be forwarded immediately upon receipt, direct to General Motture, London.

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

**Serial** 154-42  
**From** U. S. Naval Attache at HANOI  
**Reference** Vice Commanders D. L. Bounds and M. B. Knight  
**Source** Personal Observations  
**Subject** ALGERIA IES ANDALOUSES - TROUVILLE AREA

**Summary:** (Give a brief summary of report, containing substance, locality, dates, etc.)  
 The following report, in reply to a questionnaire concerning insofar as it applies to IES ANDALOUSES - TROUVILLE AREA, was received from Vice Commanders Bounds and Knight, by this office, today, and is quoted herewith:

**PRELIMINARY:** This is the coast of the plain called "la plaine des ANDALOUSES", the general point of which is EUU-SFER. This plain stretches from IES ANDALOUSES to TROUVILLE (the foot of the DJENEL BANTON) and runs inland as far as the north (south of CAP FALCON). It is completely ringed in by the MURDIA MURDIALGO which runs in an arc to the south from the sea just west of IES ANDALOUSES to the sea again just east of TROUVILLE (the MURDIA is nothing but a spur of the MURDIALGO).

The coast can be divided into three (3) beach areas:

- (a) IES ANDALOUSES proper;
- (b) The beaches called "LES CORAILIERS" and "LES CORAILIERS". These beaches are next to one another and begin about 6 kms from IES ANDALOUSES (to the northeast).
- (c) The virtually uninterupted beach which runs from CAP EUU-SFER village to the foot of the BANTON (just east of TROUVILLE).

In the body of this report the above beaches will be referred to as (a), (b) and (c).

- 1 - SEA CONDITIONS. 1 - As already reported, the prevailing wind blows from the northwest, often veering towards evening to the north.
- 2 - Strong breeze (twigs and small branches in motion).
- 3, 4, and 5 - Covered in first report handed in (on MADGA area).
- For (a) and (b) surf is higher than normal for a given wind velocity. For (c) surf is from average to below average.
- 6, 7, 8a, and 8b - see report on MADGA region.

- 11 - BEACHES. 1 - This entire stretch can be covered by the four 175 mm guns of the two BANTON forts. While the exact angles of fire are not known, one should bear in mind the 75 mm battery of MADGA on this point and the hillside battery (from memory - 10 mm) about 1/2 mile south of SAINT-ANNE DE MANS EL KENIR; these last two can cover

**Distribution By Originator:** [Illegible text]

**Comments:** [Illegible text]

TO	FROM	DATE	TIME	CLASS	STATUS	REMARKS
154-42	154-42					

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likely area, a good part of the area ... ..  
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- (a) No machine gun posts known along this coast.
- (b) No villages.

(c) Special feature of this bit of coast is the listening station at Cap Falcon. It is equipped with high powered listening devices primarily intended for the detection of submarines. Heavy look-out posts at Ain el Hadyr, Cap Falcon and Cap Lancelot. Naval beach patrol; densely populated area. Coast watching posts in this area can be termed "efficient".

(d) No mine fields in front of (a) and (b). In front of (c) there may be the line of mines referred to in previous reports from a point about 5 to 600 meters east of Cap Falcon to a point about 1 km off shore from the village of Genset. These mines were put down in 1939-1940 and it is thought that they are still in place. The Navy being such a competent expert here it is impossible to get correct and full information. We have heard occasionally opinions that the mine barrage no longer exists, however the course followed by outgoing and incoming vessels makes us rather think that at least a good part of the old minefield is still there.

(e) There exists a small stock of mines in Oran.

(f) For this section we will take each separate sub-area in turn.

(a) Narrow two lane hard surface road ends in the village of Lec and continues on in other roads at the eastern end of the beach. The beach itself is backed by dunes and by the end of the hard-surfaced range just back of the dunes. The only access from the beach is from its eastern end up a very steep dirt track (sharp rise of about 10 to 20 feet), then through the village and along road G-24. In other words a bottle neck.

(b) No better. Backed by narrow dirt road (2 lanes) joining G-24 (narrow 2 lane) at Cap Falcon. About 1 km before Cap Falcon the dirt road backing the beach at (a) becomes hard surface. This lane does not connect with anything to the west of (b) except by dirt tracks which are very bad. To reach this dirt road from (a) one must pass through from 75 to 150 meters of sandy low dunes depending on the spots. This could be done given enough mine netting and other anti-tank devices as the grade is not very steep in many places. On the whole though the exits from the beaches are few and the outlet from the beach section itself is only restricted in potential value.

- (c) All of (c) is backed by a fair two lane hard surface road paralleling the beach at from 50 to 200 meters depending on the spots. Unfortunately there are two big obstacles:
  - (1) There is a sharp ridge back of the beach for its entire length no higher than 10 feet at the east but occasionally higher.
  - (2) In several spots (Cap Falcon village and then occasionally from Ain el Hadyr to the eastern end of the beach) there are narrow and sandy lanes going from the beach to the interior. However are not good enough for a serious assault and they pass through mine closely held.
  - (3) From Ain el Hadyr to the eastern end of the beach there is practically an impassable line of mines which is also as to mine disposal and recovery.

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1. General. The coast of the Department of Constantine is one of the most beautiful in Algeria. It is characterized by its rugged and rocky terrain. The coast is marked by a series of small bays and coves, each with its own unique character. The water is clear and blue, and the sky is a deep, clear blue. The overall atmosphere is one of tranquility and natural beauty.

The coast is marked by a series of small bays and coves, each with its own unique character. The water is clear and blue, and the sky is a deep, clear blue. The overall atmosphere is one of tranquility and natural beauty.

(7) The beaches (sandy and other materials for boats) has been completely covered under (8). As it was pointed out earlier, the water is all dark brown around the perimeter at (1), then (2), and finally (3) in descending order.

(8) The steepness of the beaches throughout the coast is a characteristic. It is the terrain immediately back of the beaches which would cause trouble. In all cases, however, the beaches are gentle in slope.

(9) No man made tank traps - the natural obstacles have already been mentioned above.

(10) No shoals or rocks in immediate approaches to beaches at (a) and (c). A few rocks and shoals (right inshore) at (b).

(11) Holding ground for parent craft is good.

(12) No land mines in area.

(13) The beach at (a) is about 1.5 km in length and from 30 to 50 meters in width depending upon the spots. The beaches at (b), two in number are each about 1 to 500 meters in length and average 35 meters in width. The beach at (c) stretches virtually uninterrupted from the foot of Cap Falcon village to the foot of the Sardinia in east of Trouville. It is very narrow, nowhere being more than 20 meters in width. In some places the sand was washed away during the past few winters and the underlying rocks denuded. In several places there are rocks about 1 foot below the surface (personally seen at Ain el Turck, Sousseville and Trouville) a few yards off shore. A boat coming in would be held-in even though the occupants could get ashore.

(14) It is the considered opinion of these observers that this region is desirable that it may seem attractive from a study of maps but that after personal inspection it is much less advantageous as a landing point for any kind of a force. (See (6)).

All Ports. No ports of any kind in this stretch of coast.

Lighting. Covered separately in report for coast of the entire Department of Constantine. For information it might be mentioned that the Cap Falcon lighthouse is at the center of this bit of coast and is now working. A vast majority of the houses along this densely built up coast are summer villas. Until the end of October this coast is lighted up well into the evening (10 to 11 P.M.). After that the coast is dark, the permanent villages of Les Andalouses and Ain el Turck showing hardly any light after 9:30 P.M.

Fishing craft. Few men professional fishermen operate from this coast. A few men come from the town of Les Andalouses and from Les Andalouses and work close to shore not going further out than the Ile Plate.

Airfields. The nearest airfields at La Senk and Sfarouel are the subject of special reports being filed at this time and of our special attention.

The following report on Algeria, Les Andalouses-Trouville Area, was submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Eddy and is evaluated as "A":

**PRELIMINARY:** This is the coast of the plain called "la plaine des ANDALOUSES", the central point of which is BOU-SFER. This plain stretches from LES ANDALOUSES to TROUVILLE (at the foot of the DJEBEL SANTON) and runs inland 10 kms at the most (south of CAP FALCON). It is completely ringed in by the DJEBEL MURDJADJO which runs in an arc to the south from the sea just west of LES ANDALOUSES to the sea again just east of TROUVILLE (the SANTON is nothing but a spur of the MURDJADJO).

The coast can be divided into three (3) beach areas:

- (a) LES ANDALOUSES proper;
- (b) The beaches called "LES CORAILLEURS" and "LES CORAILLETTES". These beaches are next to one another and begin about 6 kms from LES ANDALOUSES (to the northeast).
- (c) The virtually uninterrupted beach which runs from CAP FALCON village to the foot of the SANTON (just east of TROUVILLE).

In the body of this report the above beaches will be referred to as (a), (b) and (c).

**I - SEA CONDITIONS.** 1 - As already reported, the prevailing wind blows from the northwest, often veering towards evening to the north. 2 - Strong breeze (twigs and small branches in motion). 3, 4, and 5 - Covered in first report handed in (on MACTA area). 6 - For (a) and (b) surf is higher than normal for a given wind velocity. For (c) surf is from average to below average. 7, 8, 8a, and 9a - see report on MACTA region.

**II - BEACHES.** 1 - This entire stretch can be covered by the four 192 mm guns of the two SANTON forts. While the exact angles of fire are not known, one should bear in mind the 75 mm battery of MERS EL KEBIR point and the hillside battery (from memory - 90 mm) about 2 kms south of SANT-ANDRE DE MERS EL KEBIR; these last two can most likely cover a good part of the sea and

beach of area (c). Also battery of four 75 mm AA guns near radio station 1 km NW of Ain el Turck, another one of the same composition at Bouisseville and a third one (including in addition 2 - 37 mm and 8 - 13 mm machine guns on Mers el Kebir point.

(2) No machine gun posts known along this coast.

(3) No wiring.

(4) Special feature of this bit of coast is the listening station at Cap Falcon. It is equipped with high powered listening devices primarily intended for the detection of submarines. Navy look-out posts at Mers el Kebir, Cap Falcon and Cap Lindles. Usual Douair patrols; densely populated area. Coast watching set-up in this area can be termed "efficient".

(5) No mine fields in front of (a) and (b). In front of (c) there may be the line of mines referred to in previous reports from a point about 5 to 600 meters east of Cap Falcon to a point about 1 km off shore from the village of Canastel. These mines were put down in 1939-1940 and it is thought that they are still in place. The Navy being such a watertight compartment here it is impossible to get direct and A-1 information. We have heard occasionally opinions that the mine barrage no longer exists, however, the course followed by outgoing and incoming vessels makes us rather think that at least a good part of the old minefield is still there.

(5a) There exists a small stock of mines in Oran.

(6) For this section we will take each separate sub-area in turn:

(a) Narrow two lane hard surface road ends in the village of les Andalouse or in other words at the eastern end of the beach. The beach itself is backed by dunes and by the end of the Murdaodjo range just back of the dunes. The only exit from the beach is from its eastern end up a very steep cart track (sharp rise of about 40 to 50 feet), then through the village and along road C-84. In other words a bottle neck.

(b) No better. Backed by narrow dirt road (1 lane) joining C-34 (narrow 2 lane) at Cap Falcon. About 1 km before Cap Falcon the dirt road backing the beaches at (b) becomes hard surface. This lane does not connect with anything to the west of (b) except by cart tracks which are very bad. To reach this dirt road from (b) one must pass through from 75 to 150 meters of sandy low dunes depending on the spots. This could be done given enough wire netting and other anti-sand devices as the grade is not very steep in many places. On the whole though the exits from the beaches are few and the outlet from the beach section itself is sadly restricted in potential volume.

(c) All of (c) is backed by a fair two lane hard surface road paralleling the beach at from 50 to 200 meters depending on the spots. Unfortunately there are two big obstacles:

- (A) - There is a sharp ridge back of the beach for its entire length no higher than 3-feet at the most but perpendicular.
- (B) - In several spots (Cap Falcon village and then occasionally from Ain el Turck to the eastern end of the beach) there are narrow and twisty lanes going down to the beach. These however are not good enough for motorized equipment and they pass through villas closely built.
- (C) - From Ain el Turck to the eastern end of the beach, there is practically an uninterrupted line of villas, often so close as to make demolition work **necessary**.

General comment. The penetration inland from this coastal plain of Les Andalouses is perhaps the weakest point. There are only two roads: (A) the two-lane hard surface road which skirts the shore to Mers el Kebir and Oran. This road is mined at the Recher de la Vieille and at another spot just east of this. These are the two only mines which we are certain are now loaded with explosives in the Oran area (though we believe some of the others are). This road could be blocked thoroughly in view of the fact that it is built on the face of a nearly perpendicular cliff. (B) the fair hard surface road (width one lane) which

crosses the Murdjado and connects with R.N. 2 at Bou Tlalis. This road is winding and could also be cut without much difficulty though repairs would be easier than on the coast road. The steepness of the Murdjado is such from end to end of this region that it is believed that cross country penetration for any kind of motorized equipment would be impossible.

(7) This section (parapets and other obstacles for tanks) has been completely covered under (6). As it was pointed out serious obstacles exist in all three beach areas; the greatest at (c), then (a), and finally (b) in decreasing order.

(8) The steepness of the beaches themselves present no obstruction; it is the terrain immediately back of the beaches which would cause trouble. In all three places the beaches are gentle in slope.

(9) No man made tank traps - the natural obstacles have already been commented upon.

(10) No shoals or rocks in immediate approaches to beaches at (a) and (c). A few rocks and shoals (right inshore) at (b).

(11) Holding ground for parent craft is good.

(12) No land mines in area.

(13) The beach at (a) is about 1.5 kms in length and from 30 to 50 meters in width depending upon the spots. The beaches at (b), two in number are each about 4 to 500 meters in length and average 35 meters in width. The beach at (c) stretches virtually uninterrupted from the foot of Cap Falcon village to the foot of the Santon 1 km east of Trouville. It is very narrow, nowhere being more than 20 meters in width. In many places the sand was washed away during the past two winters and the underlying rocks denuded. In several places there are rocks about 1 foot below the surface (personally seen at Ain el Turck, Bouisseville and Trouville) a few yards off



shore. A boat coming in would be holed-in even though the occupants could get ashore.

(14) It is the considered opinion of these observers that this region is deceptive; that it may seem attractive from a study of maps out that after personal inspection it is much less advantageous as a landing point for any kind of a force. (See (6)).

III Ports. No ports of any kind in this stretch of coast.

IV Lighting. Covered separately in report for coast of the entire Department of Oran. For memorandum sake it might be mentioned that the Cap Falcon lighthouse is at the center of this bit of coast and is now working. A vast majority of the houses along this densely built up coast are summer villas. Until the end of October this coast is lighted up well into the evening (10 to 11 P.M.). After that the coast is dark, the permanent villages of Les Andalouses and Ain el Turck showing hardly any light after 9:30 P.M.

V Fishing craft. Few professional fishermen operate from this coast. A few open boats go out from Les Corailleurs and from Les Andalouses and work close to shore not going further out than the Ile Plane.

VI Miscellaneous. The nearest airfields at La Senia and Tafaraoui are the subject of special reports being filed at this time and of our special attention.

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Reference: [redacted]

Source: [redacted]

Subject: [redacted]

The following is a complete list of the German and Italian Condottieri formations in French Morocco at this present time. Names follow in alphabetical order and not according to rank.

- ADLER, Engelbert, non-commissioned officer, wireless section.
- ALBERT, Fritz, sergeant, sanitary corps.
- AUER, Dr. Hans, German Consul General and chief of intelligence.
- SARINIS, Hans, 1st Lieut., infantry, in sub-commission at Fedala.
- BESSE, Otto, senior corporal, chauffeur and interpreter in army commission.
- BENJAMIN, Dr. Council of administration, interpreter French and Italian in Commission controlling armament and munitions.
- BENJAMIN, Gustav, Flight-corporal, mechanic on flying staff.
- BISCHOFF, Paul, Lieutenant, adjutant to General.
- BLOCH, Hans, non-com., A.A. services, clerk in Fedala.
- BREUER, Dr. Otto, Major of Cavalry, Chief of sub-commission in Marrakech.
- BREUER, Hermann, Sergeant-major, administration commission, speaks French.
- BROCK, Paul, Corporal, administration commission, Hotel d'Anfa.
- BURKH, Hans, special section chief, interpreter French and Italian, attached to aviation in Fedala.
- CAPIER, Gunter, Major Air Force, Chief of Air Commission at Fedala.
- CHOLLEBAUER, Wilhelm, Major Air Force, Chief of wireless section.
- COLEMAN, Hermann, non-com., clerk in army section of commission, Fedala.
- COLEMAN, Thomas, non-com., air radio operator.
- DE BECK, Dr. Horst, Colonel, Chief of sub-commission at Meknes.
- DE WIT, Martin, air corporal, chauffeur and mechanic, ground staff.
- DE WIT, Paul, non-com., aviation, mechanic on air staff.
- DE WIT, Friedrich, non-com., mechanic (in Wiesbaden).
- DE WIT, Hans, Corporal, clerk in transport park.
- VON DREIER, Alfred, Sgt. sergeant major.
- VON DREIER, Johannes, Captain, in commission at Fedala.
- VON DREIER, Hermann, 1st Lieutenant, administration, Anfa.
- VON DREIER, Hans, sergeant major, sergeant major, air pilot.
- DILL, Hans, sergeant major, transport number, commission at Fedala.
- DREIER, Friedrich, Chief corporal, wireless section, Villa Parada, Anfa.
- DREIER, Hans, Chief corporal, draughtsman in army commission, Fedala.
- DREIER, Kurt, Sgt. sergeant major, pilot aviator.
- DREIER, Dr. Fritz, Lieut-Comdr Navy, Chief of Naval Intelligence, Villa Parada, el Meknes.
- DREIER, Walter, Sergeant, Chief wireless operator, Villa Parada.
- DREIER, Hans, Chief corporal, clerk, sub-commission, Marrakech.
- DREIER, Heinrich, non-com., chauffeur.

Inspected by: [redacted]

Notes: [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION	DATE	BY	REASON
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL  
 75 12041

French Air Force, Italian Air Force, 22 April 1945

BARON, Hans Frank, pilot sergeant major, administration commission, Villa Igiea.  
 BARNETT, Special Section Chief, Interpreter French and Italian at Rome.  
 BARNETT, George, sergeant, wireless section, Villa Igiea.  
 BARNETT, Karl, sergeant, wireless section, Villa Igiea.  
 BARNETT, Robert, chief sergeant-major, air radio.  
 BARNETT, Reinhold, pilot-sergeant major, air mechanic.  
 BARNETT, corporal in sub-commission III at Rome.  
 BARNETT, Martin, corporal, wireless operator, Villa Igiea.  
 BARNETT, Inspector, specialist for minerals and petroleum, Villa Igiea, under  
 von HIPPEL, Dr. Theodor, Lt-Col, chief of sub-commission IV for fuel (see at  
 Rome).  
 BARNETT, Mark, corporal, chauffeur sub-com. at Marrakech.  
 BARNETT, Otto, corporal, telephonist in Army commission.  
 BARNETT, Karl, chief corporal, chauffeur to Army commission, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Karl, 1st Lieut., chief of Army commission at Anfa.  
 BARNETT, Graf Georg, Lieut, French-Italian interpreter, sub-commission at  
 Marrakech.  
 BARNETT, Wilhelm, clerk in section IX b.  
 BARNETT, Willi, chief corporal, clerk and interpreter Arabic and Italian,  
 sub-commission, Meknes.  
 BARNETT, Werner, chief corporal, sanitary corps.  
 BARNETT, Jerry, non-com, chauffeur of intelligence section, Villa Igiea, under  
 JAIN, Karl, Captain in commission of control of armaments and minerals, Air-  
 Staff, Casablanca.  
 BARNETT, Ludwig, regimental serg. major, air pilot.  
 BARNETT, Erich, special section chief, French interpreter at Villa Igiea.  
 BARNETT, Paul, non-com, telephonist.  
 BARNETT, Hermann, chief corporal flying staff, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Willi, chief corporal, chauffeur Army commission, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Karl, regimental serg. major, post office.  
 BARNETT, Otto, lieutenant, clerk and chauffeur to von HIPPEL.  
 BARNETT, chief wireless operator, wireless section, Villa Igiea, Casablanca.  
 BARNETT, corporal artillery, telephonist and clerk sub-commission IV Meknes.  
 BARNETT, Hans, flying corporal.  
 BARNETT, Dr. Hans, Colonel medical corps, chief sanitary corps.  
 BARNETT, Alfred, sergeant, mechanic.  
 BARNETT, Walter, corporal, clerk.  
 BARNETT, Roman, fusilier, chauffeur Army commission, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Max, non-com, wireless section sub-commission II Marrakech.  
 BARNETT, Heinrich, corporal, interpreter French, Spanish, Arabic.  
 BARNETT, Heinz, flying corporal, air radio (radio operator in bugler).  
 BARNETT, Erich, Lt-Col, Medical corps.  
 BARNETT, Walter, sergeant, mechanic.  
 BARNETT, Hans, corporal, wireless section sub-commission II Marrakech.  
 BARNETT, Paul, Major in General Staff of General (section Ia).  
 BARNETT, Herbert, non-com, chief artillery sergeant Fedala commission.  
 BARNETT, Reinhold, corporal, tailor.  
 BARNETT, Dr. Friedrich, SS non, interpreter French and Italian in sub-commission  
 at Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Paul, flying non-com, clerk of air commission at Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Heinz, flying major, chief of photographic and air services section.  
 BARNETT, Adolf, 1st Lieut, artillery, sub-commission, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Ludwig, Lt-Col, chief of section I b.  
 BARNETT, Heinrich, 1st sergeant major, clerk at Anfa.  
 BARNETT, Corporal, clerk in Army commission, Fedala.  
 BARNETT, Hans, 1st serg. major, sergeant in sub-commission II  
 Marrakech, speaks French well.  
 BARNETT, Fritz, chief special section, Interpreter French, Italian and English.





[Illegible text]  
 [Illegible text]  
 [Illegible text]  
 [Illegible text]  
 [Illegible text]

Route followed by planes: [Illegible]  
 but this is done from time to time, and [Illegible]  
 usual route for [Illegible]

Between Mawwila and Algiers they fly over the [Illegible], they are [Illegible]  
 is stationed in Casablanca, but, [Illegible], to [Illegible], this is [Illegible]  
 readiness.

**ITALIAN AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE**

- [Illegible], Giovanni, Lt-Col of Infantry, Chief of the Italian Commission.
- [Illegible], Natalio, Capt of Infantry, administrative affairs, speaks French.
- [Illegible], Giovanni or Nino, Major Infantry, speaks Italian and French, attached  
 to German commission in Fedala, Chief of Italian Intelligence, friend  
 of Van [Illegible].
- [Illegible] DI SAN [Illegible], Luigi, 1st Lieut, Interpreter German and French.
- [Illegible], Andrea, Flying 1st Lieut, speaks French.
- [Illegible], Pietro, sergeant major, part newspaper officer, code telegraphist (wireless).
- [Illegible], Maximiliano, sergeant of Infantry, South Tyrolean origin, speaks poor  
 French, German interpreter.
- [Illegible], Dominico, sergeant Infantry, chauffeur and interpreter.
- [Illegible], Ignazio or Nino, flying pilot-sergeant, chauffeur of Chief of  
 commission, speaks poor French.
- [Illegible], Paolo, flying sergeant, administration and book keeping.
- [Illegible], Dante, seaman, port affairs.
- [Illegible], Arnaldo, seaman, speaks French, telephonist.
- [Illegible], Tunisian origin, chauffeur to [Illegible], local employee.
- [Illegible], chauffeur, locally hired employee.
- [Illegible], born in Casablanca, chauffeur to [Illegible], lives 100 m. [Illegible].
- [Illegible], porter of Villa [Illegible], Casablanca, local employee.

The foregoing are detailed in Casablanca and Fedala. In addition, there  
 is a small sub-commission at Oujda which is attached to the commission at Oujda.  
 This sub-commission comprises 3 officers, of whom Major [Illegible] is the chief, and 6  
 men.

[Illegible]  
 [Illegible]

**FRENCH MOROCCO**  
**German and Italian Armistice Commission,**  
**Names.**

The following is a complete list of the German and Italian Armistice Commissions in French Morocco at the present time. Names follow in alphabetical order and not according to rank.

ADLER, Englebert, non-commissioned officer, wireless section.  
 ALBERT, Fritz, sergeant, sanitary corps.  
 AUER, Dr. Hans, German Consul General and chief of intelligence.  
 BARTELS, Hans, 1st Lieut., Infantry, in sub-commission at Fedala.  
 BECKER, Otto, senior corporal, chauffeur and interpreter in Army commission.  
 BEHRENS, Dr. Council of Administration, interpreter French and Italian in Commission controlling armament and minerals.  
 BERMANN, Gustav, Flight-corporal, mechanic on flying staff.  
 BLUMBERGER, Paul, Lieutenant, adjutant to General.  
 BODE, Hans, non-com., A.A. service, clerk in Fedala.  
 BOLTZE, Dr. Otto, Major of Cavalry, Chief of sub-commission in Marrakesh.  
 BORNEMASSEF, Gerhard, Sergeant-major, administration commission, speaks French.  
 BRAUN, Paul, Corporal, administration commission, Hotel d'Anfa.  
 BUDER, Hans, special section chief, interpreter French and Italian, attached to aviation in Fedala.  
 CAPITO, Gunter, Major Air Force, Chief of Air Commission at Fedala.  
 CHRISTMANN, Wilhelm, Major Air Force, Chief of Wireless section.  
 CORLEIS, Hermann, non-comm., clerk in army section of commission, Fedala.  
 LOEWNER, Thomas, non-comm., air radio operator.  
 HESCHENDORF, Horst, Colonel, Chief of sub-commission at Meknes.  
 ALVERS, Martin, Air corporal, chauffeur and mechanic, ground staff.  
 ENGEL, Walter, non-comm., aviation, mechanic on air staff.  
 ENGELHARDT, Friedrich, non-comm., mechanic (In Wiesbaden).  
 ISSERLANGE, Hans, Corporal, clerk in transport park.  
 von EISEL, Alfred, Reg. sergeant major.  
 von FRIEDEN, Johannes, Captain Army Commission at Fedala.  
 HIRSH, Hermann, Chief inspector, administration, Air.  
 FROELICH, Hans, Regimental sergeant major, air pilot.

FULLER, Klaus, sergeant major, transport master, Commission of Fedala.

GARRIE, Friedrich, Chief corporal, wireless section, Villa Pagoda, Anfa.

GATSMAN, Hans, Chief corporal, draughtsman in Army commission, Fedala.

GELLHAUSEN, Kurt, Reg. Sergeant major, pilot aviation.

GIBHARDT, Dr. Fritz, Lieut.-Commander Navy, Chief of Naval Intelligence, Villa Dar el Beida.

GISCH, Walter, Sergeant, Chief wireless operator, Villa Pagoda.

GLOXIDE, Werner, Chief corporal, clerk, sub-commission, Marrakesh.

HANMELAI, Heinrich, non-comm, chauffeur

HANGSEL, Hans Franz, pilot sergeant major, administration commission Hotel Anfa.

HARTMANN, Special section chief, interpreter French and Arabic at Meknes.

HECKT, Georg, Corporal, war correspondent, propaganda section.

HEUMER, Karl, sergeant, wireless section, Villa Pagoda

HERMELICH, Helmut, chief sergeant-major, air radio.

HEMMELMANN, Reinhard, pilot-sergeant major, air mechanic

HERMANN, corporal in sub-commission III at Meknes.

HEISS, Martin, corporal, wireless operator, Villa Pagoda.

HEURR, Inspektor, specialist for minerals and petroleum, Villa Mirador, Anfa.

von Hippel, Dr. Theodore, Lt.-Col., chief of sub-commission IV for Fes (now at Meknes).

HIRCHE, Kurt, corporal, chauffeur sub-comm. at Marrakesh.

HOECK, Otto, corporal, telephonist in Army commission.

HOEPPER, Karl, chief corporal, chauffeur to Army commission, Fedala.

HOFFMAN, Karl, 1st Lieut., chief of Navy commission at Anfa.

HONENWART, Graf Georg., Lieut., French-Italian interpreter, sub-commission at Marrakesh.

HONLNER, Wilhelma, Clerk in section II b.

HON-THIER, Willi, chief corporal, clerk and interpreter Arabic and Italian, sub-commission, Meknes

JACOB, Werner, chief corporal, military corps.

JACOBS, Johnny, non-comm, chauffeur of intelligence section, Villa Dar Beida.

JANN, Karl, Captain in commission of control of armaments and minerals, Meknes, Casablanca

JELIN, Heinz, regimental sergeant major, air pilot.

JURMANN, Fritz, special section chief, French interpreter at Villa Mirador.

KALHBERGER, Paul, wireless operator.



KARL, Hermann, chief corporal flying staff, Fedala.  
 KAROS, Willi, chief corporal, chauffeur Army commission, Fedala.  
 KERN, Karl, regimental serg. major, post office.  
 KETTER, Otto, Boatman, clerk and chauffeur to von RUFFIN.  
 KREBIER, chief wireless operator, wireless section, Villa  
 Pagoda, Casablanca.  
 KITZLA, corporal artillery, telephonist and clerk sub commission  
 IV Meknes.  
 KORECKY, Hans, flying corporal.  
 KOWALEWICZ, Dr. Hans, Colonel medical corps, chief sanitary corps.  
 KUEHNLE, Alfred, sergeant, mechanic.  
 KUETZ, Walter, corporal, clerk.  
 LACHOTTA, Roman, fusilier, chauffeur, Army Commission, Fedala.  
 LANGER, Max, non-com, wireless section sub-commission II Marrakesh.  
 LANGENHEIM, Heinrich, corporal, interpreter French, Spanish,  
 Arabic.  
 LARS, Heinz, flying corporal, air radio (radio operator in Tangier).  
 LAUSCHNER, Erwin, Lt. Col. Medical corps.  
 LEHKE, Walter, sergeant, mechanic.  
 LINNER, Hans, corporal, wireless section sub-commission II  
 Marrakesh.  
 LORENZ, Emil, Major in General Staff of General (Section Ia).  
 LOEW, Herbert, non-com, chief artillery sergeant Fedala commission.  
 LUTWIG, Reinhold, corporal, tailor.  
 LUTZ, Dr. Friederich, SS man, interpreter French and Italian in  
 sub-commission at Fedala.  
 MARDER, Paul, flying non-com, clerk of air commission at Fedala.  
 JANKE, Heinz, flying major, chief of photographic and air service  
 section.  
 MAMTZ, Rudolf, 1st Lieut. artillery, sub-commission, Fedala.  
 MATT, Rudolf, Lt-Col. chief of section 1 b.  
 MAUERER, Heinrich, Reg. Sergeant major, clerk at Anfa.  
 MAYBAUM, Werner, Corporal, clerk to Army commission, Fedala.  
 MERVELLT, Hans Graf, Reg. Serg. Major, draughtsman to sub-commission  
 II, Marrakesh, speaks French well.  
 MEINBAKKE, Fritz, chief special mission, interpreter French, Italian  
 and English.  
 MEYER, Wolfgang, Chief serg. major, administration in Anfa.  
 MEYER, Engelbert, non-com, administration in Anfa.  
 MOYER-SCHLEIER, Heinrich, Naval Lieut. naval commission.  
 MITSCHMANN, Dr. Herbert, special mission chief, speaks French,  
 Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Russian.  
 MICHENUS, Heinz, corporal, photographer at sub-commission II Marrakesh,  
 film operator.

MESSNER, Flying major, air commission Fedala  
 MUELLER, Ernst, flying sergeant, mechanic  
 MUESTER, Viktor, chief special mission, interpreter French, Italian, and English, at Anfa  
 NETTE, Otto, Reg. sergeant major, mechanic, chief of ground personnel.  
 NEUMANN, Kurt, seaman, Anfa.  
 ORZOL, Ernst, chief flying corporal, chauffeur, sub-commission III in Meknes.  
 OSTERLAND, Dankwart, flying under-officer in wireless section at Villa Pagoda Anfa.  
 PAUTZKE, Willi, flying chief sergeant major, mechanic.  
 POLZIN, non-com, clerk and draughtsman to sub-comm. II at Marrakesh.  
 RAHNY, Karl, corporal, chauffeur.  
 REDDIN, Werner, chief corporal.  
 REH, Arthur, flying corporal, air commission, Fedala.  
 REIMANN, Werner, non-com, air radio (In Wiesbaden).  
 RIEBE, Bruno, sergeant major, clerk commission of control of armament and minerals at Ain Seba.  
 RIEDEL, Hans, flying sergeant pilot (In Wiesbaden).  
 RYSTON, Gunther, chief corporal, army commission, Fedala.  
 ROSENOW, Adalbert, chief special mission, interpreter at Marrakesh.  
 SACK, Erwin, flying major, AA artillery commission.  
 SCHENKEL, Heinz, non-com, infantry, courier service.  
 SCHLIMMER, Xaver, flying corporal, wireless operator, Villa Pagoda, Anfa.  
 SCHLICKER, Max, chief special mission attached to Navy commission, speaks French.  
 SCHLADT, August, Naval sergeant, clerk in Anfa.  
 VON SCHMEDITZ, Lt-Comdr Navy, commission controlling armaments and minerals in Ain Seba.  
 SCHNEIDER, Karl, corporal, personnel section, II b.  
 SCHOETTLE, Karl, corporal, chauffeur.  
 SCHREIBER, Hermann, sergeant, wireless section Villa Pagoda, Anfa.  
 SCHUBACH, Edmund, corporal, wireless section Villa Pagoda, Anfa.  
 SCHUBERT, Bruno, non-com, photographic section.  
 SCHUBERT, KARL, flying sergeant, mechanic.  
 SCHULZ, Willi, regimental sergeant major, army commission, Fedala.  
 SCHUMPFER, Werner, Unteroffizier (non-com, chauffeur, postal section)  
 STEPHEN, Karl, regimental sergeant major.  
 STEINKE, Hans, major in sub-commission (army) at Fedala.  
 STROHMEIER, Anton, corporal.  
 SCHMIDT, Ist Lieut., photographic section.

SPOHN, Rudolf, regimental sergeant major, Intelligence section,  
 arms mechanic.  
 STEINBRECHER, Helmuth, Captain,  
 STOLADINOWITZCH, Corporal, mechanic  
 TAUBERT, Alfred, sergeant.  
 TEMPEL, Dr. Heinrich, Captain of artillery, control of weapons  
 and equipment, Fedala army commission.  
 THEILNER, Gunther, chief corporal, Anti-aircraft section, chauffeur  
 of von Saek in Fedala.  
 TISCHER, Reinhold, non-com. administration section, Anfa.  
 TOBAGEN, Johannes, corporal, telephonist at Villa Pagoda.  
 TROMBETTER, flying sergeant, mechanic  
 TROMPLER, Heins, chief flying corporal, mechanic.  
 UZCKERT, post office, corporal.  
 VOEL, Werner, non-com, chauffeur, and French interpreter to  
 commission controlling armament and minerals.  
 VORWITT, Eugen, chief special mission, interpreter in Fedala for  
 Army comm.  
 WAISS, Josef, flying corporal.  
 WICKAPFDT, Rudolf, chief sergeant major, sanitary corps.  
 WEISS, Wener, non-com, interpreter in Espionage bureau, Villa Dar  
 Beida.  
 WEISSMULLER, Walter, corporal, clerk,  
 WERDER, Johann von, Cavalry colonel, Army commission, Fedala.  
 WESELOH, Adolf, flying corporal in Fedala, speaks French and Italian  
 WIESE, Karl, regimental sergeant major, administration in Anfa.  
 WINNEFELD, Heinz, Fusiler, transport park at Villa Dar Beida.  
 WOLFRUM, Gerg, Cavalry sergeant major, photographic section.  
 WOLLE, Ludwig, corporal, chauffeur of von MOENCH in Fedala.  
 WODETZKI, Dietrich, flying chief corporal.  
 WOLTERS, Edouard, chief special mission, speaks Italian and Arabic,  
 Anfa.  
 WOLF, Haven clerk to Army commission in Fedala.  
 von WUHLISCH, General, Chief of the E.J.A.  
 ZUBER, Alwin, non-com, chauffeur to Von Hoffman of the Navy Commission  
 ZIMMERMAN, Alfred, corporal, telephonist and addresser in Villa  
 Pagoda.  
 ZUENKE, chief corporal, chauffeur to commission controlling armaments  
 and minerals at Ain Seba.

The foregoing list includes members of the German sub-commission  
 at Fedala, Helmes, Yez and Marrakush. These sub-commissions are  
 made up as follows:

**FEDALA:** Members of commissions for the control of aviation, armament and minerals, army, anti-aircraft, etc., lodged in Hotel Miramar (now the headquarters of the commissions)

Ground floor: BUDER BEH  
MAEDER KARL  
LACROTTA WOLLE  
CAPITO  
1st floor: VON FRIEDEN  
REBELON  
CORLAIS  
GATSMANN  
BACK

Second floor: BARTLES  
LUTZ  
LOWE  
HOEFER  
VORWIT  
BODE  
WULF  
NANTZ  
MAXBAUM  
THEILEN  
TEMPEL  
FUELLE  
RISTOW

**MARRAKESH:** Sub-commission (called sub-commission II) lodged in Hotel Mamounia:

MERVELDT ROSENOW HOHENWART BOLTZE LINDNER  
HIRCHE FOLZIN GLOEBE

**MEKNES and FEZ:** Sub-commission III for Meknes and sub-commission IV for Fez are lodged in the Hotel Transatlantique at Meknes, members of the Fez commission traveling thither daily and returning at night:

ECKERSDORF MINNEMANN VON HIPPEL HOEPPNER HERMANN HARTMANN  
KITZKA

In this hotel vacant rooms have been reserved for the use of the Casablanca and Fedala commissions should an emergency - such as an Anglo-American attack on the coast, or a British commando raid - cause these commissions to flee inland. These precautions were taken following rumors that the British were planning a commando for the purpose of kidnapping German commissioners at Anfa, Ain Elab or Ain Saba (suburbs of Casablanca near or directly on the beaches). These rumors have been taken so seriously that the Germans in Fedala and Casablanca now keep their effects ready packed and have been trained to clear from the hotels, complete with baggage, within 15 minutes.

**Airplanes belonging to the German Commission:**

D-ANAJ Heinkel III  
 D-ACLA Heinkel III (armed)  
 D-ACLY Heinkel III (armed)  
 D-ACLI Heinkel III (damaged at Fos and motor taken down)

D-ACDE Junkers 52  
 D-ACLE Heinkel III (armed)  
 D-ACLE Heinkel III (armed)

Route followed by planes: Officially, it is forbidden to fly over Spain, but this is done from time to time, and sometimes they even fly over Gibraltar. Usual route is: WIESBADEN-ALGERES-CASABLANCA, sometimes stopping at ORAN.

Between Marseille and Algiers they fly over the Balearics. Only one plane is stationed in Casablanca, but, according to reports, this is kept in constant readiness.

ITALIAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION

LUSETTI, Giovanni, Lt-Col of Infantry, Chief of Italian Commission  
 PUDENZANI, Natale, Capt. of Infantry, administration affairs, speaks French.  
 GARBAGNATI, Giovanni or Nino, Major Infantry, speaks German and French, attached to German commission in Fedala. Chief of Italian Intelligence, friend of von GIBHARDT.  
 NEGRI DI SAN FRONT, Luigi, 1st Lieut. Interpreter German and French.  
 RAPPA, Andrea, flying 1st Lieut. speaks French.  
 LA GUZZI, Pietro, sergeant major, port non-com officer, code telegraphist (wireless).  
 BRIDA, Massimiliano, sergeant of infantry, South Tyrolean origin, speaks poor French, German interpreter.  
 DI POI, Dominico, sergeant infantry, chauffeur and interpreter.  
 CUNESTRI, Ignazio or Nino, flying pilot-sergeant, chauffeur of chiefs of commission, speaks poor French.  
 CATTARU, Paolo, flying sergeant, administration and book keeping.  
 FRANCHIOLI, Imma, seaman, port affairs.  
 LAFINENZA, Aranda, woman, speaks French, telephonist.  
 SILVIA, Tunisian origin, chauffeur to CATTARU, local employee.  
 RUFFINO, chauffeur, locally hired employee.  
 BURNETT, born in Casablanca, chauffeur of LUSETTI. Lives 149 Rue de Lorraine.  
 BURNETT, partner of Villa 149, wife, locally hired, local employee.

The foregoing are detailed in Campblair and Fedala. In addition, there is a small sub-commission at Oran which is attached to the commission at Oran. This sub-commission comprises 7 members of whom Major Fright is the chief, and 6 mem.



A 20 kilomètres environ de l'ancien village de l'Émilie, dans une zone marécageuse, il y a un passage à niveau, à l'ouest de la route, qui traverse sur la route.

A 15 km de nouveau l'Émilie, avec un passage à niveau, à droite de la route. Le tracé du village n'est pas adapté pour un trafic bilatéral en raison de la disposition des maisons.

Après l'Émilie, BÉLIZIENS, environ 10,000 habitants. Région avec rizières, qui sont situées avec la route, sur l'ancien de l'Émilie (ville).

De Belizien à Orleanville, quatre ving huit kilomètres de route très large, presque plate, suivie par la voie de chemin de fer, dans une région aride, de cultures de céréales.

Après le village d'Inkeruan, embranchement sur la route pour Anni Monasa (chemin d'intérêt commun).

A signaler un pont, ou ponton à un virage avant le village de Charon et un passage à niveau avant Orleanville, à Galakoff.

A Orleanville (20,000 habitants, sous préfecture) garnison de tirailleurs sénégalais, entrée en ville par une ancienne porte, étroit, deux virages dans la ville, un à droite, l'autre à gauche, et sortie également par une porte étroite. Route large.

D'Orleanville à Foutcha, quelques virages (5 km). Région riche, belle végétation. Après Foutcha à signaler un pont avec virage pour le chemin de fer. Côte et virages jusqu'à Oued Fodda à 25 km d'Orleanville. Région riche, cultures d'arbres fruitiers depuis la mise en service de barrage d'Oued Fodda, à 25 km sur la droite de la route, à pied de l'Ouarsenis.

A la sortie d'Oued Fodda un pont de chemin de fer, en haut d'une légère côte, pont étroit.

Puis plus rien à signaler jusqu'à St. Cyrille des Attafs, avec un hôpital catholique (Sœurs Blanches) organisée chirurgicalement, dans un pays peuplé d'Arabes convertis au christianisme.

Ensuite Duperré à 60 km d'Orleanville. Après le long de la route, région riche. Avant, village de Rouina, anciennes mines de fer, exploitation la guerre et arrêtée.

De Duperré à Affreville quelques côtes, un pont très mauvais, un virage à environ 4 km de Duperré. Puis plus rien d'intéressant jusqu'à ALFREVILLE, environ 10,000 habitants.

Les deux routes:

1 - La Nationale No. 4 par MEDJANA, 7 km de côtes avec de mauvais virages.

2 - La Nationale, en sortant d'Affreville sur l'ancien à gauche à 5 km, qui rejoint la Nationale No. 4 à l'ouest de la route.

Le tracé de la route, à l'ouest de la route, est en fait, un tronçon et l'autre est en fait, long, sans interruption.



III. Affaire de Boudjaja, 2 av. de l'Indépendance

- 1 - Sur Boudjaja, un commandant local, nommé par le régime
- 2 - Pour éviter une intervention des forces de l'air, il a été
- 3 - Noté la grande détermination des forces de l'air.

A Boudjaja il y a eu une course aux armements.

De Boudjaja à Alger, une d'abandonner l'opération (il est resté  
large, dans la Mitidja, pendant toute cette période).

Après Baba Ali, un pont et un engagement à droite sur les  
de Constantine et Biskra Gares.

Support mieux établi ailleurs.

N. A. ILMK  
Lieut. Colonel, ILMK (RAT).

The following additional information on Algeria received September 17, 1942 from Vice Council Boyd is an addenda in reply to a confidential questionnaire. The evaluation is A.

NATIONAL HIGHWAY NO. 4 - FROM ORAN TO ALGER.

Leaves ORAN towards the marsh of La Senia (aviation camp) the highway is cut by the narrow Hamman Bou Hadjar road (probably railroad) (grade crossing not guarded).

The road is about 12 meters wide, in very good condition (almost an express highway until it reaches St. Denis du Sig) (Banked curves).

La Senia is a small village, it is important only because of the aviation camp and the civil airdrome.

Twenty-eight kilometers from Oran, Ste. Barbe du Tlelat (a fork of the Morocco road). In the village the road is very wide and one can not make a mistake. The railroad and the road also branch away to Sidi Bel Abbes and Tlemcen towards Morocco. Similar to many Algerian villages this one is built along the edge of the road.

Between Oran and St. Barbe du Tlelat, cereal cultivations which give the country an arid appearance, especially in summer.

Twenty-five kilometers from St. Barbe du Tlelat, is the more important village of St. Denis du Sig, as usual built along the edge of the road. Quality of the road is still very good.

Five kilometers after St. Denis du Sig, on the right is the fork of the National road No. 6 which goes to Mascara, it should be avoided.

Twenty-three kilometers from St. Denis du Sig is the important city of FERREGAUX which has about 30,000 inhabitants. There is considerable quantity of laborers because of the railroad shops in this locality. The former municipality was communist and socialist, considerable agitation.

The road crosses the city, there is no possibility of making a mistake.  
No obstacles to report so far.

At about fifty kilometers from Perregaux, is the village of l'Hillil. Between these two places there is a grade crossing at the station of Nouvion, the village is on the road.

Fifteen kilometers from Nouvion, l'Hillil there is a grade crossing at right angles. The crossing of this village is not easy for an automobile because of the disposition of the houses.

After l'Hillil, RELIZANE which has about 10,000 inhabitants. Vegetation is abundant which is in contrast with the rest with one exception the oasis of l'Hillil (water).

From Relizane to Orleansville there are eighty-eight kilometers of very wide almost flat road which follows along the railroad through an arid region of cereal cultivations.

After the village of Inkerman comes a branch in the road for Ammi Moussa (a road of general interest).

To be noted: a bridge as one comes out of a curve before the village of Charon and a grade crossing before Orleansville at Malakoff.

At Orleansville (a town which has 20,000 inhabitants and a subprefecture) there is a garrison of senegalese sharpshooters. One enters the city by an old narrow gate, then two curves in the city, one to the right the other to the left. One leaves the city again by a narrow gate. The road is wide.

From Orleansville to Ponteba, there are some curves (5 kms). The region is rich, beautiful vegetation. To be noted after Ponteba, a bridge with a curve under the railroad. Slope and curves rising to Oued Fodda twenty-five kilometers from Orleansville. Rich region, fruit trees are in cultivation since the dike (or dam) at Oued Fodda was completed, twenty-five kilometers on the right of the road at the foot of l'Ouarsenis.

As one comes out of Oued Fodda there is a railroad bridge, up on a slight slope, narrow bridge.

Nothing further to report until St. Cyprien des Attafs, which has a catholic hospital (White Fathers) and a surgical organization. The region has an Arab population converted to christianity.

Duperre follows at sixty kilometers from Orleansville. There are trees along the road, the region is rich. Before reaching the village of Rouina there are some old iron mines, in use before the war but work has now ceased.

From Duperre to Affrevill a few upward slopes and a very bad bridge on a curve at about six kilometers from Duperre. Nothing more of interest until Affreville which has about 15,000 inhabitants.

The two roads:

1. La Nationale No. 4 through MILIANA, nine kilometers on a rising slope with bad curves.

2. The shortcut, coming out of Affreville on (probably towards) Medea on the left at 2 kilometers, runs into the Nationale No. 4 at Vesoul Benian.

From Vesoul Benian, to Bourkika, winding roads through forests, up and down grades for about sixty kilometers. Wide, well metaled.

Bourkika, turn to the right to go towards El Affroun (14 km) excellent road almost straight.

El Affroun to Mouzaiaville, six kms. Here again two roads:

1. Towards Blida, continuing to the right, bad bridge before Blida.

2. To avoid a very disagreeable crossing of Blida, join the "Route Nationale" before Boufark, by Oued el Alleug.

At Boufark, on the left turn on the principal square.

From Boufark to Algiers, no serious obstacles (30 km),  
wide road, through the Mitidja, very rich plain (vignards).

After Babs Ali, a bridge and a fork in the road on Qm de  
Constantine and Maison Carree.

A more complete report will follow.

Monograph Index Guide No. 6094  
 (To correspond with SUBJECT given below - See G. H. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

Form U. S. Naval Attache at TANGIER Date Sept. 18th, 1942

Reference Vice Consuls J. J. RONALD and R. A. KNIGHT  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Personal Observation and Informant Evaluation "A"  
 (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject ALGERIA (Main title as per index guide) MEMOURS (Subtitle) Winds; Coastal Defense; Artillery

Summary.—(Place under careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following report, in reply to a confidential questionnaire insofar as it applies to MEMOURS, was received from Vice Consuls Ronald and Knight, by this Office, on September 18th, 1942, and is quoted in full:

PT I. 1 - The prevailing wind is northwest.

2, 4 and 5 - See answers submitted towards end of August for the MACTA region. These should have reached Tangier during the very last part of September. (Reference: TR. #324-42).

The MEMOURS beach is sheltered from the prevailing northwest winds by the headland just west of it. It can be said that for a given wind velocity, the surf is from average to below average in height.

6, 8a and 9a. See answers submitted for the MACTA area as same conditions of sunshine, tides, calm days, mist and fog obtain. The protection from the prevailing northwest winds is not as good as in western portion of the MACTA coast. On the average it can be said that the surf conditions near ARZEW are better than on the MEMOURS beach.

PT II. 1 - Coastal Guns: At MEMOURS there are two (2) batteries: 155 mm battery. It consists of four (4) Naval rifles of this caliber and is situated at the top of the 124 meter hill immediately to the northeast of the town. These four guns are in working order. The guns are so placed that they cannot fire at ships coming very close inshore as was proved during the MEMOURS fight of the night of March 1941, when a British destroyer was able to come in very close with impunity.

75 mm battery. It consists of four (4) guns of this caliber and is situated on the point to the west of the town near the lighthouse. At least two (2) of these guns are in working order and it is strongly believed that all four (4) are now in commission. These guns are needed so as to obviate the handicap of the 155's. The officer who was in command at MEMOURS at the time of the fight mentioned to the report officer that he would have sunk the British destroyer above referred to if the 75's had been in commission at the time of the fight.

3, 7 and 9. - Until the end of June 1942, it can be said that there were no machine gun posts, wiring, parapets or tank traps back of the beach.

Prepared by: [Redacted] 201, Gibraltar; General Moulins, London; Colonel [Redacted]

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It is noted, however, that a... first to... construct and... at... It had been... ing officers that these... machine gun emplacements; no... imaginations have been put up...

1 - Coast Watching Organization. Some... along the... is... are overhead). Lookout post of Navy at... battery). MEMOURS is completely dominated by the Navy... is in effective control of the entire municipality. In the... area it can be said that the coast watching organization is efficient and "smart".

2 - Mines. None until two (2) months ago and practically certain that none have been laid since. It is not known whether the Navy disposes of any stocks of these ashore.

3 - Roads behind beach. A good road parallels the beach. There are no... but several sheds and constructions of light type between beach and road. These are sufficiently widely spaced to permit the passage of motorized equipment but as the beach area is so small they present an effective and relatively important obstacle. There is also a plus wire fence which separates the reserved bathing beach (150 meter bit at western end of the beach) from the road. This, however, is only intended to keep... from the beach and does not present any kind of a military obstacle. The road which parallels the beach (only a few meters from it) comes to a dead end to the west. Towards the east it passes over the OUB EL KERRA on a concrete and steel bridge about 80 feet long; over as close to the sea the OUB here only has a trickle of water excepting after heavy and very infrequent rainstorms. In MEMOURS proper, just to the east of bridge just mentioned, the road branches: G.C. 7 towards HERRONIA and... and A.H. 7a towards... Both these roads are good hard surfaced highways. Both are suitable for two lanes of traffic excepting in mountainous spots where the road is narrow and consequently form single lane bottleneck points. G.C. 7 to HERRONIA and... passes over the OUB EL KERRA at a point about 7 km from MEMOURS on a concrete and steel bridge about 100 feet long and 25 feet above the usually dry river bed. There is one other principal bridge obstruction on the way to... where the road passes over the... river at a point about half way between HERRONIA and... It is a modern steel... about 200 feet long and about 20 feet high. It is... lead limit would be around 20 tons (because of the length of the span). The... river, is the... stream it is... not a... during the dry season the... no dry... and they are... to a... This road... 25 km... the...

**MEMORANDUM**

**U.S. Navy - Amphibious Operations**

9 - The beach is not steep - 25° to 30° degrees. There are no obstacles in the approach to the beach. The beach is 25 meters high however and would make out as well as indicated on the 1/50,000 maps and charts.

8 - The beach is not steep - 25° to 30° degrees.

10 - There are no obstacles in the approach to the beach. The beach is 25 meters high however and would make out as well as indicated on the 1/50,000 maps and charts.

11 - Good.

12 - Reliably informed that there are none at present. It is thought however that the work done this summer included preparatory work for their disposition and a complete study of the ground for their most effective placement.

13 - FURNISHING AN AREA. The beach is very short not being more than 300 meters long. A small harbor for fishing craft has been built at its western end since the 1/50,000 maps were last revised. This harbor has thus cut out about 150 meters of beach bringing it down to the 300 meter dimension just mentioned. The beach is about 50 meters deep virtually no space available on the other side of the road which borders the beach.

14. Although it is recognized that the small deep water port of MEMORUM would be extremely useful, a landing here is strongly discouraged as long as there might be possibilities of resistance, because of the relative power of the Navy here, it is felt that this is the spot where resistance should be most expected.

The two batteries; the smallness of the beach; the lack of a forming-up area; the ease with which the two roads leading inland can be cut,

all contribute to make a landing at MEMORUM a difficult operation. Furthermore, should it even succeed, a landing party would find itself faced with a very difficult task of penetration inland.

III - POWER. 1 - Already reported. Two capacity, 11 or 6 units from two (2) to seven (7) tons capacity and are available. The "high" supply of unloading vehicles also found at this landing at MEMORUM for the Mac. (capacity 1000 lbs).

2 - In working condition but that is all. The amount of heavy ground and some parts is considered to be in good condition and level of repair of amphibious tank is considered to be good.

3 - Supply of these is good.

4 - No communication with MEMORUM.



CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Naval

7 - Plans have been made to construct a bridge over the river, and

8 - Bridges (both railroad and highway) and road cuttings, especially narrow cuts on mountainsides, have been proposed. The plan is that it would take very little time to build the cuts and proceed to blow them up.

10 - No exact figures on rolling stock. However, on the several Officers' army trips to M'EROUAN, they have usually seen the port sidings rather full of railroad cars. Have seen as many as 10 to 100 railroad cars of various kinds at one time. Their condition seemed better on the whole than the average of Algerian rolling stock. M'EROUAN from this point of view is benefitting from the official favors shown to the Mediterranean-Niger.

IV - LIGHTNING. Covered separately and recently for whole coast.

V - FISHING CRAFT. M'EROUAN is an important fishing center. There are about fifteen (15) boats operating out of the port; of these there are about three (3) trawlers, the others being small boats. Reliably reported none have W/R. Because of fuel shortage they only operate during periods when conditions are favorable to a good catch. Operate up and down coast within a radius of twenty miles or thereabouts.

W. A. EDDY  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

**ALGERIA    NEMOURS**  
(Coastal Defence, Minefields & Roads)

The following report, in reply to a confidential questionnaire insofar as it applies to Nemours, was received from Vice Consuls Rounds and Knight, by this Office, on September 18th, 1942, and is quoted herewith:

Coastal Guns:

At Nemours there are two batteries: (a) 155 mm battery. It consists of four Naval rifles of this caliber and is situated at the top of the 124 meter hill immediately to the northeast of the town. These four guns are in working order now. The guns are so placed that they cannot fire at ships coming very close inshore as was proved during the Nemours fight of the end of March 1941, when a British destroyer was able to come in very close with impunity. (b) 75 mm battery. It consists of four guns of this caliber and is situated on the point to the west of the town near the light house. At least two of these guns are in working order and it is strongly believed that all four are now in commission. These guns are disposed so as to obviate the handicap of the 155's. The officer who was in command at Nemours at the time of the fight mentioned to the Control Officers that he could have sunk the British destroyer above referred to if the 75's had been in commission at the time of the fight.

Until the end of June 1942, it can be said that there were no machine gun posts, wiring, parapets or tank traps back of the beach. It is known, however, that a Foreign Legion detachment was sent first to Nemours and later to Beni Saf during this summer to construct and prepare field defenses against any force landing at Nemours. It has been reliably reported to the above reporting officers that these field defenses include trenches and machine gun emplacements; no one has mentioned that wire entanglements have been put up or tank traps dug.

Coast Watching Organization

Same native Douair setup as along the balance of the coast

with Navy lookouts about every 15 kms connected with headquarters by phone (all telephone wires are overhead). Lookout post of Navy at Nemours itself (115 mm battery). Nemours is completely dominated by the Navy which is in effective control of the entire municipality. In the Nemours area it can be said that the coast watching organization is efficient and "smart".

### Minefields

None until two months ago and practically certain that none have been laid since. It is not known whether the Navy disposes of any stocks of these ashore.

### Roads Behind Beach

A good road parallels the beach. There are no dunes but several sheds and constructions of light type between beach and road. These are sufficiently widely spaced to permit the passage of motorized equipment but as the usable beach area is so small they present an effective and relatively important obstacle. There is also a plain wire fence which separates the reserved bathing beach (150 meter bit at western end of the beach) from the road. This, however, is only intended to keep undesirables from the beach and does not present any kind of a military obstacle. The road which parallels the beach (only a few meters from it) comes to a dead end to the West. Towards the east it passes over the Oued El Mersa on a concrete and steel bridge about 80 feet long; even so close to the sea the Oued here only has a trickle of water excepting after heavy and very infrequent rainstorms. In Nemours proper, just to the east of the bridge just mentioned, the road branches: C.C. 7 towards Nedromah and Tlemcen and R.N. 7A towards Lalla Marnia. Both these roads are good hard surfaced highways. Both are suitable for two lanes of traffic excepting in mountainous spots where the road is narrow and consequently from single lane bottleneck points. G.C. 7 to Nedromah and Tlemcen passes over the Oued El Mersa at a point about 7 kms from Nemours on a concrete and steel bridge about 100 feet long and 25 feet above the usually dry river bed. There is one other principal bridge obstruction on the way to Tlemcen: where the road passes over the Tapma river at a point about half

way between Nedromah and Tlemcen. It is a modern steel single lane bridge about 200 feet long and about 20 feet high. It is estimated that the load limit would be around 20 tons (because of the length of the span). The Tafna, however, is the exception among the local streams; it is a river and not a Oued and has water the year round. During the dry season the flow is very much reduced but there are no dry crossings and there are many pools where the water is from 20 to 4 feet deep. Furthermore, its banks are generally steep. This road could be easily rendered impassable in the mountainous 25 km stretch south of Nedromah (Monts des Traras). In many spots the road follows the mountain side with a steep cliff on one side and a sheer drop on the other. It would take a considerable amount of work to repair cuts in the road at such spots. During the summer extensive military manoeuvres were held in the Nedromah region and it is reported that the troops have prepared several spots for dynamiting the road.

Road R.N. 7A passes through similar terrain but to a lesser degree. There are no mountain side spots such as on GC 7 where a charge of dynamite could necessitate completely rebuilding the road. The major obstacle on this road is a bridge about 16 kms from Lalla Marnia over a deep Oued; it is roughly 100 feet long and 40 to 50 feet over the river bed.

S - The beach is not steep - 5° to 10° degrees.

There are no shoals in the approaches to the beach. At night one should watch out for the rock called "Les Deux Freres". These are 23 meters high however and easy to make out as well as indicated on the 1/50,000 maps and charts.

Reliably informed that there are none at present. It is thought however that the work done this summer included preparatory work for their disposition and a complete study of the ground for their most effective placement.

#### Forming up area

The beach is very short not being more than 300 meters long. A small harbor for fishing craft has been built at its western

end since the 1/50,000 maps were last revised. This harbor has thus cut out about 150 meters of beach bringing it down to the 300 meter dimension just mentioned. The beach is about 30 meters deep virtually no space available on the other side of the road which borders the beach.

Although it is recognized that the small deep water port of Nemours would be extremely useful, a landing here is strongly discouraged as long as there might be possibilities of resistance. Because of the relative power of the Navy here, it is felt that this is the spot where resistance should be most expected.

The two batteries: the smallness of the beach; the lack of a forming-up area; the ease with which the two roads leading inland can be cut.

all contribute to make a landing at Nemours a difficult operation. Furthermore, should it even succeed, a landing party would find itself faced with a very difficult task of penetration inland.

#### PORTS

1. Already reported. From memory 5 or 6 cranes from two to seven ton capacity and one heavy duty "bigue" capable of unloading railroad cars (some of these have been landed at Nemours for the Mediterranean-Niger this year).

2. In working condition but that is all. The extreme shortage of heavy grease and spare parts is constantly bringing the efficiency and level of repair of Algerian heavy equipment downwards.

3. Supply of these is low.

4. No demolition plans are known.

5. As of early July, there was no boom at Nemours. It is not believed one has been established since.

6. Ample. Standard gauge; Nemours spur connects with

main east-west line at Zoudj-El-Eahal on Algerian side of Moroccan frontier.

7. Plans have been made to scuttle a freighter in harbor entrance.

8. Bridges (both railroad and highway) and road bottlenecks, especially narrow spots on mountainsides, have been prepared for mines so that it would take very little time to insert the charges and proceed to blow them up.

10. No exact figures on rolling stock. However, on the Control Officers many trips to Nemours, they have usually seen the port sidings rather full of railroad cars. Have seen as many as 75 to 100 railroad cars of various kinds at one time. Their conditions seemed better on the whole than the average of Algerian rolling stock. Nemours from this point of view is benefitting from the official favors shown to the Mediterranean-Niger.

#### Lighting

Covered separately and recently for whole coast.

#### Fishing Craft

Nemours is an important fishing center. There are about fifteen boats operating out of the port; of these there are about three trawlers, the others being small smacks. Reliably reported none have W/T. Because of fuel shortage they only operate during periods when conditions are favorable to a good catch. Operate up and down coast within a radius of twenty-miles or thereabouts.

Serial 144-142 Message 144-142  
 (First four series each year, 1 - 4 - 2 - 4 - 0)

From U. S. Naval Attache at SAIGON Date 14 Oct 1964  
 (City, fleet, and, district, office, station, or person)

Reference Via General A. P. Knight  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous reports, etc., if applicable)

Source Personal Observation and Information Evaluation High  
 (As stated, personal observation, publications, press, etc., including special reports, when practicable, etc.)

Subject ALGERIA SAIGON 144-142  
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Serial) (Date)

Note: (Here enter a useful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

**A - IS-B ANDALOUSES.** Under this name we will consider the coast which starts at Les Andalouses and reaches eastward as far as Trouville. Excellent beach at Les Andalouses proper about 2 km long. However, the road leading to this beach (hard surface - wide one lane) ends at the eastern end of the beach and there is a sharp drop of about 50 feet which would have to be worked before being possible for motorized equipment. The beach is wide - about 100 feet - but backed throughout by dunes covered with rather thick and tough small trees and by a rather steep hillside immediately back of the dunes. From a landing point of view, beach is good and sheltered from northwest winds by OAK LINHES. Good beach again six to seven km east northeast. About 1.5 km long backed by dirt road leading around OAK PALOON (1 lane) and joining 2 lane hard surface road at OAK PALOON village. Access to road from beach is difficult as it is separated by rather steep and sandy stretch varying from 50 to 100 meters. Works in a couple of spots just off shore. From OAK PALOON to TROUVILLE, there is practically a continuous beach however for the whole distance there is a sharp drop between beach and land from 15 to 50 feet high. At AIN EL TROUX and at the eastern extremity narrow lanes come down to the beach. It would be difficult to get motorized equipment off the beach. Beach is narrow throughout - 10 to 20 meters at most - in many spots last winter's storms have carried sand away so that rocky foundations at beach show through. From AIN-EL-TROUX to TROUVILLE there are rocks in several places a few meters off shore which come to within a foot or so of the surface. The great objection to this region is that - it is completely separated from the hinterland by the MOUNTAIN RANG, which although not very high (300 meters) is abrupt. This mountain swings in a semi-circle back of the flat coastal area from LES ANDALOUSES to TROUVILLE. There are only two roads leading from this flat coastal strip: The coast road (on the face of the Jebel Canton) to TROUX-SH-KHIN, and thence to OAH. This road is lined in two (E) spots; at the BACHEN DE LA VIRILLE and another spot 100 hundred meters further east; these mines are loaded with explosive now. The road to BACHEN-SH-KHIN; this winds and is only one lane wide in spots; it climbs to about 300 meters and can be cut temporarily to the steeper mountain sections. It can certainly be easily defended. The steepness of the MOUNTAIN RANG prevents any possible ground security penetration.

Classification by Originator: Secret; Control; Security; Information; Intelligence

Control: Secret; Control; Security; Information; Intelligence

NO	DATE	INITIALS	NAME	POSITION	STATUS	CLASS	GROUP	REMARKS
1	14 OCT 1964	[Signature]	[Name]	[Position]	[Status]	[Class]	[Group]	[Remarks]
2								
3								
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7								
8								
9								
10								

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

1/10/68

TO: USAID, WASHINGTON, D.C. FROM: USAID, ALGERIA

**1. MIRA:** (This section is devoted to a report on the  
 location of the old road which was built by the  
 French from the old road and a lot of dirt in  
 to the desert (south of the TUNIS KISS). This old road was  
 made by good narrow low land and was used  
 (see V) leading to LALLA MARRIA. About 10 km from the  
 old road there were some small villages. The road was on the  
 other side of border. Examined through field glasses it appears  
 to stretch indefinitely. Marked by lines. About 10 km from  
 Mira to Moroccan road to MANTIMPHRY IN KISS and WASH. This  
 road looks like narrow low land surface type. Algerian and  
 Moroccan roads are parallel on either side of border (within 1  
 to 2 km) as far as MANTIMPHRY IN KISS. Moroccan road crosses  
 WASH SHASHYH mountains afterwards where it could be cut. Algerian  
 road skirts the MIRA hills. No places were noticed where any  
 sections out in the road could be made. Seems best area for large  
 landing near MIRA. OASIA troops however are close.

W. A. HICK  
 Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).



The following information has been submitted by R.B. Knight and is evaluated "A":

**SECRET**

"A - LES ANDALOUSES. Under this name we will consider the coast which starts at Les Andalouses and reaches eastward as far as Trouville. Excellent beach at Les Andalouses proper about 2 kms long. However, the road leading to this beach (hard surface - wide one lane) ends at the eastern end of the beach and there is a sharp drop of about 50 feet which would have to be worked before being passable for motorized equipment. The beach is wide - about 100 feet - but backed throughout by dunes covered with rather thick and tough small trees and by a rather steep hillside immediately back of the dunes. From a landing point of view, beach is good and sheltered from north-west winds by CAPE LINDLES. Good beach again six to seven kms east northeast. About 1.3 kms long backed by dirt road leading around CAP FALCON (1 lane) and joining 2 lane hard surface road at CAP FALCON village. Access to road from beach is difficult as it is separated by rather steep and sandy stretch varying from 50 to 100 meters. Rocks in a couple of spots just off shore. From CAP FALCON to TROUVILLE, there is practically a continuous beach however for the whole distance there is a sharp break between beach and land from 15 to 50 feet high. At AIN EL TURCK and at the eastern extremity narrow lanes come down to the beach. It would be difficult to get motorized equipment off the beach. Beach is narrow throughout - 10 to 20 meters at most - in many spots last winter's storms have carried sand away so that rocky foundations at beach show through. From AIN-EL-TURCK to TROUVILLE there are rocks in several places a few meters off shore which come to within a foot or so of the surface. The great objection to this area is that - it is completely separated from the hinterland by the DJEBEL MURDJADJO, which although not very high (500 meters) is abrupt. This mountain swings in a semi-circle back of the flat coastal area from LES ANDALOUSES to TROUVILLE. There are only two roads leading from this flat coastal strip: The coast road (on the face of the Djebel Santon) to MERS-EL-KEBIR, and thence to ORAN. This road is mined in two (2) spots; at the ROCHER DE LA VIEILLE and another spot a few hundred meters further east; these mines are loaded with explosives now. The road to BOU-TLELIS: this winds and is only one lane wide in spots; it climbs to about 300 meters and can be cut temporarily to the steeper mountain sections. It can certainly be easily defended. The steepness of the MURDJADJO prevents any possible cross country penetration.

"B - SAIDIA. (This section is reported on even though in French Morocco it is closer to ORAN than to CASABLANCA).

**SECRET**

Excellent beach from the old small and filled up port of PORT SAY, to the border (mount of the FOUM EL KISS). Wide but backed with medium dunes. Backed by good narrow two lane hard surface road (RN 7) leading to LALLA MARNIA. Access to road possible for several hundred meters near PORT SAY village. Excellent beach on other side of border. Examined through field glasses it appears to stretch indefinitely. Backed by dunes. Access possible at Saidia to Moroccan road to MARTIMPREY DU KISS and OUJDA; this road looked like narrow two lane hard surface type. Algerian and Moroccan roads are parallel on either side of border (within 2 to 4 kms) as far as MARTIMPREY DU KISS. Moroccan road crosses BENI SNASSEN mountains afterwards where it could be cut. Algerian road skirts the MSIRDA hills. No places were noticed where any serious cut in the road could be made. Seems best area for large landing after MACTA. OUJDA troops however are close.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial **62-47** Memorandum No. **100-402**  
 (Classification) (Priority) (Date) (Time)  
 From **U. S. Naval Attache** at **TANANARIVE** Date **29 Feb 1954**  
 (Subj, Post, Unit, District, Office, Station, or Person)  
 Reference **File Serial J. O. 1000**  
 (Directive, Correspondence, Previous Report, etc. if applicable)  
 Source **Personal Observation and Informant** Evaluation **"A"**  
 (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—Identify (As reliable, doubtful, unclassified, etc.) when practicable, etc.)  
 Subject **AVIATION NORTH AFRICA (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) All Stations**  
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Submitted) (Make separate report for each item)

Summary: (State entire careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following actual number of planes in military airports, without specification as to serviceability, in NORTH AFRICA (French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) has been acquired from a most reliable source:

- TUNISIA** - El Aouina (Tunis) Airport 26 Miore planes  
 18 Bloch 175's  
 Bidi Ahmed Airport 26 Det. 520's  
 Gabes Airport 5 Potes 63-11
- ALGERIA** - Setif Airport 15 Potes 63-11  
 Maison Blanche Airport 58 Det. 520's  
 Blida Airport 26 Douglas  
 Oran Airport 26 Det. 520's  
 15 Miore  
 13 Bloch 175's
- MAROC** - Rabat Airport 26 Curtiss  
 Sale Airport 18 Miore  
 Casablanca Airport 26 Curtiss  
 13 Douglas  
 Agadir Airport 13 Douglas  
 Marrakech Airport 13 Miore  
 13 Potes 63-11  
 Meknes Airport 13 Miore

W. A. HEDY  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

Distribution By Originator: **SOX, Gibraltar; General MacLure; London; Colonel [unclear]**

Routing slip below for use in O. N. R. Draw circle around unit or units (as shown on the distribution block below) to which the report has been sent for information, for further routing, or for retention. Indicate by check (X) on this copy the appropriate boxes.

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AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignements sûrs)

A la frontière Tunisie-Lybie aucun changement.

A Zuara toujours le 68ème groupe autonome d'aviation observation avec l'escadrille 24 sur l'aéroport 709 que nous supposons être Misurata et l'escadrille 33 à Zuara même.

Le 69ème groupe d'observation avec la 118ème escadrille est dans la région de Tripoli et la 145ème escadrille autonome de reconnaissance maritime à Pisida. Ces groupes d'observation viennent de percevoir des Caproni 312 appareils civils. Ces appareils seront armés. Les derniers venus du 3ème magasin d'aviation de Parme comportent une tourelle arrière avec une mitrailleuse Scotti. Sur les autres appareils des tourelles arrière seront montées pr-élevées sur des Caproni 311 accidentés. Il est question également de monter une mitrailleuse de 12,7 à l'avant. Théoriquement ces appareils sont destinés au transport du matériel des escadrilles, mais le fait que le commandement italien envisage de monter à bord de ces appareils des lances-bombes nous laisse supposer qu'à cause d'une certaine pénurie de matériel on envisage d'utiliser ces avions pour du bombardement de nuit.

Les derniers appareils Caproni arrivés à Tripoli portent les numéros 12640 et 12469. Nous avons identifié également les appareils 12351, 12352, 12353 et 12354.

Par ailleurs la 250ème escadrille aéro-silurante et se trouve à Pise le 3 août.

La 225ème escadrille de transport est à Castel Viscardo le 8 août.

Il est confirmé de source très sûre qu'un certain nombre de Stormi ont été dissous. Néanmoins, de source également sûre, nous savons que les groupes qui constituaient ces Stormi sont devenus groupes autonomes. Nous vous communiquerons la semaine prochaine la liste des Stormi dissous et des groupes autonomes.

AVIATION ALLEMANDE (renseignements sûrs)

Ont atterri en Algérie:

le 11 août les JU.88 suivants - 5MA - M7GH appartenant au Kgr. 806  
F6EH appartenant au AG.122  
C6X0

JU.52, C3MH

Aviation allemande stationnée en Sicile et Italie Sud:

- 1er groupe KG.54 à Catane
- une unité indicatif O.6 équipée en JU.88, escadrilles B-3-K-1-M-X et O quelque part en Italie Sud
- groupe AG.122 escadrille H à Catane, escadrille K à Trapani
- escadre KG.10.1 en Orbeo et en Orbeo, escadrilles A-N-L-3-M-U-V &
- Kgr.806, escadrilles B-3-K-1 à Catane
- escadre KG.77, 3ème groupe, escadrilles B-3-K-1 à Catane

- 2 -

- NR.606, escadrilles N-K et L, région Océane
- NR.2, escadrilles H-K et L, bassin méditerranéen
- NR.100 a participé à l'attaque du convoi en 11 août et peut être retourné en Océan
- Enfin, nous avons identifié une unité d'indicateur S.T

**Aériation allemande en France -**

Ont été identifiés:

- NR.1/I Avord
- NR.2/I quelque part en France
- NR.2/II Hollande
- NR.2/IV région de Cognac
- NR.3/IV Chièvres
- NR.4/IV Avord
- NR.6/U et 6/V Bretigny
- NR.40/III Orléans-Briey-Bordeaux
- NR.40/IV " "
- NR.53/III Chartres
- NR.53/IV Allemagne Sud
- AG.33/L Orly
- 123/H et L région de Brest

le 3.9.42

TRANSLATION

Italian Aviation (trustworthy reports).

On the Tunisian Lybian front, no change.

At Zuara still the 68th autonomous aviation observation group with the squadron 24 on airport 709 that we suppose to be Misurate and squadron 33 at Zuara itself.

The 69th observation group, with the 118th squadron, is in the region of Tripoli and the 145th squadron for maritime reconnaissance at Pisida. These observation groups have just gathered civilian machines of Caproni 312's. These machines will be armed. The last ones, which came from the 3rd aviation storage depot at Parma, had rear turrets with Scotti machine guns. On the others, rear turrets will be mounted taken off Caproni 311's that have been damaged. They are also considering mounting a 12,7 machine gun in front.

Theoretically these machines were to be used to transport the materiel for the squadrons but the fact that the Italian command plans to mount bomb racks on these machines, makes us think that because of lack of material they plan to use these planes for night bombing.

The last Caproni machines to arrive in Tripoli bore the numbers 12640 and 12469. We also identified the machines numbered 12351, 12352, 12353, and 12354.

Moreover, the 250th torpedo plane squadron was at Pisa on August 3.

The 225th Transport squadron is at Castel Viscardi August 3.

It is confirmed by a very trustworthy source that a certain number of Stormi have been dissolved. Nevertheless, from an equally trustworthy source we know that the groups that make up these Stormi have become autonomous. Next week we will give you the list of the Stormi that have been dissolved and of the autonomous groups.

TRANSLATION

## German Aviation (trustworthy reports)

## Landed in Algeria:

August 11, the following  
JU.88's

5MA-M7GH belonging to KGr.806

F6BH belonging to AG.122  
C6XO

JU.52, C3MH

## German planes stationed in Sicily and South Italy:

- 1st group KG.54 at Catania
- one "unite indicatif" (signal corps unit?) C6, equipped with JU.88, squadrons B-H-K-L-M-X and O partly in South Italy.
- group AG. 122 squadron H at Catania, squadron K at Trapani
- squadron LG.1 in Greece and Crete, squadrons A-K-L-C-N-U-W and F
- Kgr. 806, squadrons B-H-K-L at Catania.
- squadron KG.77, 3rd group, squadrons D-S-T at Comiso.
- KGr. 606, squadrons H-K and L, around Catania.
- KG.2, squadrons H-K and L, Mediterranean basin.
- KG. 100 took part in the attack on the convoy on August 11 and seems to have been sent back to Greece.

Finally, we have identified one "unite d'indicatif" (signal unit?) 8.T

German Aviation in France ;

Have been identified

KG 1/I	Avord
KG.2/I	Somewhere in France
KG.2/II	Holland
KG.2/IV	Region of Cognacq
KG.3/IV	Chievres
KG.4/IV	Avord
KG.6/U and 6/V	Bretigny
KG.40/III	Orleans, Erixy, Bordeaux
KG.40/IV	" " "
KG.53/III	Chartres
KG.53/IV	South Germany
AG.33/L	Orly
123/H and L	Region of Brest.

3.9.42



*Duplicate Translated Victor*

**AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignements aers)**

10 aout 1942 48ème escadrille du 37ème groupe de transport en 355  
 18 aout 1942 225ème escadrille en 363  
 24 aout 1942 136ème escadrille en 104 (P. M. 3200)  
 25 aout 1942 40ème escadrille d'observation, aéroport 507  
 (Capitaine commandant l'escadrille, Capt. LANTINI)  
 26 aout 1942 225ème escadrille de transport en 363  
 27 aout 1942 197ème escadrille en 512 (Savignone)  
 30 aout 1942 2ème magasin "extra" en 216 (ce qui d'après  
 l'état de ce magasin pendant le temps de paix donnerait 10 - Fiesse  
 100)

22 juillet 1942 22ème escadrille de bombardement terrestre à 511  
 28 juillet 1942 2ème magasin "extra" en 216 (ce qui d'après  
 l'état de ce magasin pendant le temps de paix donnerait 10 - Fiesse  
 100)  
 (commandé par Cap. MOZZOLI)

1er sept. 1942 57ème escadrille du 32ème groupe du 10ème Stormo  
 de bombardement en 507

**Appareils vus le long des côtes tunisiennes:**

Appareil de la 113ème escadrille  
 Cant 2.506 B de la 196ème escadrille  
 Nombreux Cant de la 144ème escadrille  
 Nombreux appareils des escadrilles de transport séries 600 et 224  
 S.79 de la 56ème escadrille  
 S.79 de la 14ème escadrille  
 Cant 2.506 de la 189ème escadrille

**Atterrissages en Tunisie:**

14 Septembre 1942 - 3 Fiat CR.42 matricules 8913, 8932, 8171  
 série XI-AS. Ces appareils appartiennent à la 53ème escadrille  
 et venaient d'Italie pour rejoindre le 15ème Stormo  
 à Bengazi. Ils étaient convoyés par des pilotes d'Udine.  
 Appareils neufs arrivant en renfort et dotés de phonie.  
 Après avoir fait escale à Ciampino et à Pantellaria ces  
 appareils se sont égarés et ont atterri dans le Sud Tunisien.

20 aout 1942 - un CR.42, matricule 8937, Série XI-AS, appartenant  
 à la 26ème escadrille (ou 20ème - note du dactylographe)  
 a aussi atterri en Tunisie. Ceci semblerait établir que  
 tout le 15ème Stormo s'est transformé en Stormo de chasseurs  
 bombardiers.

Le S.82 qui a atterri en Tunisie le 9 aout 1942 appartenait à  
 la 617ème escadrille du 144ème groupe du 48ème Stormo de  
 transport.

20 septembre - un Fiat G.50 de la 39ème escadrille du  
 160ème groupe venant de Tripoli.

- 2 -

AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignements sûrs - suite)

Le 2<sup>ème</sup> groupe de chasse s'appelle Fulcini. Il est commandé par le Major SCARFERRA depuis la disparition de Lt. Col. QUARANTOTTO au-dessus de Malte le 15 août 1942. Ce groupe est à Pantellaria depuis début 1942 et agit sur Malte et protection des convois. Il est partiellement équipé en Ca.2001.

Les trois commandants d'escadrilles sont:

Capitaine FASSI  
Capitaine GASPERONI  
Capitaine TEJA

Insigne: oiseau tenant une mitrailleuse sous son aile

17 août 1942 - 145<sup>ème</sup> groupe autonome de transport en 705  
(Castel Benito)  
18<sup>ème</sup> Stormo en 3<sup>ème</sup> Z.A.T.

13 juillet - 68<sup>ème</sup> groupe O.A. à Zuara  
24<sup>ème</sup> escadrille O.A. en 709  
33<sup>ème</sup> escadrille O.A. à Zuara  
69<sup>ème</sup> groupe O.A. et sa 118<sup>ème</sup> escadrille en  
Tripolitaine

Des Ca.312 ont été livrés récemment à l'aviation de Lybie (matricules 12351, 12352, 12353, 12354) et affectés au 68<sup>ème</sup> et au 69<sup>ème</sup> groupes O.A.

Les appareils 12469 et 12640 sont également arrivés et le 12469 a été affecté à la 24<sup>ème</sup> escadrille O.A. Il est destiné au transport du matériel de l'escadrille.

Ces appareils arrivent armés d'une tourelle avec mitrailleuse Scotti de 7,7 ou bien sont armés en escadrille au moyen de tourelles prélevées sur les Ca.311 accidentés.

AVIATION ALLEMANDE (renseignements sûrs)

Unité 8.9 est la Z.G.210

Des hydrés hexamoteurs H.V.222 ont survolé la France libre et appartenait à l'unité 8.4

- 3 -

RENSEIGNEMENTS DIVERS SUR L'ITALIE (valeurs bonne mais non garanties)

Au 15 juillet 1942 le paquebot "Conte de Savoia" était à Fiume et le "Rex" à Venise.

Le dimanche 12 juillet l'usine Saprioni de Sesto Calende et l'usine Pirelli de Biscosa étaient arrêtés.

Livraisons italiennes à l'Allemagne: (par mois)

- Beryllium (alliage léger extra dur)
- un centaine de moteurs D.B.601 et D.B.601 AA par des usines, dont Reggiane
- 20 à 25 Me.110 construits par Reggiane
- 50 appareils d'école Nardi 315

Macchi de Varese fabrique 6 à 7 Me.202 par semaine.

Reggiane à Reggio Emilia en produit autant.

Fiat sort de 30 à 35 G.50 par mois.

La production aéronautique italienne serait par mois de 300 appareils et de 500/600 moteurs, y compris les livraisons à l'Allemagne indiquées plus haut. La production se décompose ainsi (par mois):

chasseurs	80 à 100
bombardiers	60 à 70
transport	25 à 30
reconnaissance	20 à 25
école	70 à 80

La construction du P.108 n'est limitée à 30 appareils dont 24 ont formé le groupe d'un stormo - construction probablement abandonnée.

Le programme de construction 1943 doit porter surtout sur la chasse et ensuite sur les avions torpilleurs.

Le chasseur 1943 (Italie) doit être un monoplane, à aile basse, 4 vitrilles, de 12,7 m et un canon. Moteur de 2,000 H.P. refroidissement à liquide. Il approchera le 700 km/heure. Deux avions sont à l'étude: le Me.205 et un autre dont l'ingénieur serait mort en avril 1941.

RENSEIGNEMENTS DIVERS SUR L'ITALIE (valeurs douteuses sans confirmation)

Le MC.205 dérive du MC.202 (renforcement horizon et pontails d'ailes). Il devait avoir un moteur D.B. 601 (?) de 1500 CV mais il n'atteignait que 600 Km/heure. On l'a donc équipé d'un moteur D.B. de 2,000 CV. Trente MC.205 sont en construction. La cellule pèsera 250 kilos de plus que le MC.202 et le moteur 500 kilos de plus que le D.B.601. Le MC.205 sera à moins variable que le MC.202. Il est muni de 4 mitrailleuses de 12,7 à 500 coups minute (2 minutes de feu à cette cadence). On envisage de lui ajouter un canon.

Corps expéditionnaire en Russie:

Il serait de 250,000 hommes sous commandement général **CAMPANELLI**. En juillet sont parties les divisions Tridentina et Julia.

La division Mantone est en Grèce, région de Préveza. Le régiment Bussoleno est dans les Alpes.

Essence synthétique:

Une usine d'essai utilisant des lignites en Sardaigne produirait (?) 100,000 tonnes par an pour l'aviation. Une usine à l'étude à Arsa non à loin de Trieste. Production étudiée: 2,000,000 tonnes.

Vedettes rapides:

Construites actuelles à Brindisi. 44 ont été livrées de janvier à avril 1942 dont: 8 pour flotte Dodécannèse  
20 pour flotte Sicile  
8 pour flotte Grèce et Albanie  
8 destination inconnue et Afrique du Nord

Les moteurs Mercedes Benz vont y être remplacés par des moteurs allemands Hauptmag..

En un an 90 vedettes ont été construites à Brindisi et 80 à Gênes: en tout 170.

RENSEIGNEMENTS MARINE

Bateaux ayant transité le long de la côte est du Cap Bon:

10 août	vapeur IKBY, route nord
11 "	deux sous-marins, 1 torpilleur, route sud (nationalité inconnue)
13 "	1 vedette rapide italienne échouée plage Melilla
	1 torpilleur IZFI route sud
14 "	torpilleur IKBT vient d'échouer vedette rapide italienne échouée le 13 août
15 "	torpilleur Monte Christo, route sud

- 5 -

RENSEIGNEMENTS MARINE (très sûrs) suite

24 août      vapeur ICHI, route sud  
               "      Lenso (vient à Tunis, route nord)  
               "      XKBY (vient de l'ouest), route sud  
               "      IJHD (vient de l'ouest), route sud (IBSD - Corjeau)

25 août      vapeur ITLD, route sud  
               "      Maggio, route sud (vient de Tunis)

26 "      vapeur Armando, route sud, s'échoue Kelibia  
               2 vedettes rapides Italiennes 549 et 560, route sud

27 "      vapeur Pachina, route nord, qui touche mine nord de  
               Kelibia  
               torpilleur Sagittario passe remorqueur à Armando  
               remorqueur IOBT, route sud (vapeur échoué)  
               vapeur IJPG, route sud  
               2 remorqueurs Terracino et IPQA (Lugaria) vers vapeur  
               échoué

28 "      vapeur Corjeau, route nord (vient de Sousse)  
               vapeur Lupa, route nord, allant à Tunis  
               voilier à moteur ILTV, route nord

29 "      "      "      INGB, route sud (vapeur échoué)  
               "      "      "      IJGE et 2 voiliers dont 1'un IJH  
               (vapeur échoué)  
               3 dragueurs, route nord (l'un porte No.R.D.33 indicatif  
               IAGN)

30 "      vapeur IYVZ, route sud  
               voilier ISKJ, route sud (vapeur échoué)  
               Armando appareille avec 4 voiliers et 3 remorqueurs  
               (est restés 4 jours!!!)

1er Sept      Lenso, route sud, vient de Tunis  
               3 dragueurs et 1 petit aviso (IAGM) restent à Kelibia  
               les 1, 2, 3, et jusqu'au 7 septembre)  
               2 voiliers à moteur dont 1'un ITDO

4 "      Maggio, route nord, va à Tunis

6 "      Aprile, route nord, va à Tunis  
               Lupa, allant à Tunis  
               2 voiliers mouillent à Hammamet, route nord, Vinicio I  
               INZY et Viardina IOHQ

7 "      1 voilier BRON di Caprino, route nord, allant à Tunis  
               vapeur Ascianghi, route sud  
               torpilleur Circe (IASP) et vapeur ARGONTEA (route  
               route sud)  
               draguamine No.31 et 3 dragueurs, route nord après  
               avoir mouillé à Kelibia.

8 "      torpilleur Circe et vap. ABULLA, route nord

9 "      vapeur ITLO, route nord

10 "      2 dragueurs dont 1'un B.175

12 "      1 ar. de dragage (IAGV), 5 dragueurs  
               vapeur L.12, route sud

13 "      torpilleur Circe et vapeur Vileau, route sud (cabinés  
               hors bord pour le vapeur)  
               vapeur IJH, route sud  
               "      Maggio, route sud, vient de Tunis

Aviation:

145ème escadrille R.M. toujours à Pisida - activité nulle ou faible - nulle le 15 septembre.

Identification officers:

Commandant Défense Tripolitaine  
" Place Tripoli  
" S/Secteur Nalut  
" Carabiniers de Lybie à Tripoli  
" Secteur Zuara  
" Artillerie de défense de Tripoli

Général ARMANDO  
Colonel d'ANDREA  
Lt-Col. SEFYERI

Col. CONTADINI  
Col. VASCO

Col. MENJURIO

Unités: Dépot 85ème Régiment Infanterie, Jefru  
" 86ème " " Zavia  
2ème groupe Spanis, Zuara  
311ème dépot de télécommunication, Tripoli-Mellaha  
6ème batterie de côtes, entre Tripoli-Ras Ahmar

Bateaux: 11 septembre 1 firocisterna, route est  
13 " 2 dragueurs de mines, route est  
14 " 1 cargo, route est  
Nuit du 14/15.9 1 cargo passe devant Zuara, route Tripoli

Deux évadés de Suassi ben Aden le 10 septembre:  
GRUMP or GRAMP Charles, classe 1913, né à Londres, matricule 1631845  
CAREER William, classe 1914, né York, matricule 4318441  
Pas d'incide de recapture.

Rations Ouest Tripolitaine:

Italiens: 150 grammes pain par jour  
2 kilos pâtes par mois  
150 grammes de conserves par mois

Arabes: 110 grammes de céréales par jour  
500 grammes pâtes par mois  
100 grammes de conserves par mois

## ITALIAN AVIATION (trustworthy reports)

August 10, 1942 48th squadron of the 37th group of transport in 355.

August 18, 1942 225th squadron in 363

August 24, 1942 136th squadron in 104 ( P. M. 3200)

August 25, 1942 40th autonomous observation squadron, airport 507 (Captain in command of the squadron Capt. LANDANNO)

August 26, 1942 225th squadron of transport in 363

August 27, 1942 197th squadron in 512 (Stagnone)

August 30, 1942 12th central pool "magasin central" in 216 (which, according to peacetime stationing, would be 216 - Paggio Rotatico)

July 22, 1942 62nd land bomber squadron in 516

July 28, 1942 2nd unit of aerial torpedo training planes in 426 (commanded by Cap. MOJOLI)

Sept. 1, 1942 57th squadron of the 32nd group of the 10th Stormo of bombers in 507

---

Machines seen along the Tunisian coast:

Machine of the 113th squadron.

"Cant" Z.506 B of the 196th squadron

Numerous "Cant" of the 144th squadron.

Numerous machines of the transport squadron series 600 and 224.

S.79 of the 56th squadron.

S.79 of the 14th squadron

"Cant" Z.506 of the 189th squadron.

---

## Landings in Tunis:

September 14, 1942 - 3 Fiat CR.42, register 8913, 8932, 8171 series XI-AS. These machines belong to the 53rd squadron and came from Italy to rejoin the 15th Stormo at Bengazi. They were flown down by pilots from Udine. New machines arriving as reinforcements and "dotes de phonie" (?) After having landed at Ciampino and at Pantellaria, these machines got off their course and landed in South Tunis.

August 20, 1942 - a CR.42, register 8937, series XI-AS, belonging to the 26th squadron (or the 20th - typist's note) also landed in Tunis. This would seem to establish the fact that the 15th Stormo was changed into Stormo fighter bombers.

The S.82 which landed in Tunis on August 19, 1942, belonged to the 617th Squadron of the 144th group of the 48th transport Stormo.

September 20 - a Fiat G.50 of the 393rd squadron of the 160th group coming from Tripoli.

## ITALIAN AVIATION (trustworthy reports - continued)

The 2nd fighter group is called Pulcini. It is under the command of the Major SCARPETTA since the disappearance of Lt. Col. QUARANTOTTI over Malta on August 15, 1942. This group has been at Pantellaria since the beginning of 1942 and works over Malta as well as protecting convoys. It is partially equipped with Re. 2001.

The three commanders of the squadron are:

Captain FASSI  
 Captain GASPERONI  
 Captain TEJA

Insignia: A bird holding a sub machine gun under his wing.



August 17, 1942 - 145th autonomous transport group in 705  
 (Castel Benito)  
 18th Stormo in 3rd Z.A.T.

July 18 - 68th group U. A. at Zuara  
 24th squadron U.A. in 709  
 33rd squadron U.A. at Zuara  
 69th group U.A. and its 118th squadron in  
 Tripolitania.

---

Some Ca.312 have been recently delivered to Lybian aviation  
 (registered 12351, 12352, 12353, 12354) and attached to the  
 68th and 69th groups U.A.

Machines 12469 and 12640 have also arrived and the 12469  
 has been attached to the 24th squadron U. A. It is to be used  
 for the transport of materiel of the squadron.

These machines arrived armed with a turret and a Scotti 7,7  
 machine gun, or were armed in squadrons by means of turrets taken  
 off damaged Ca. 311's.

---

GERMAN AVIATION (trustworthy reports)

(Unite) Unit S.9 is the Z.G. 210

Six motored hydroplanes B.V. 222 flew over Free France and  
 belonged to Unit X.4

VARIOUS REPORTS ON ITALY (evaluation good, but not guaranteed)

On July 15, 1942, the steamer "Conte de Savoia" was at Fiume and the "Rex" at Venice.

Sunday, July 12, the Caproni factory of Sesto Calende and the Pirelli factory of Biocca were stopped.

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Italian deliveries to Germany: (by month)

-Beryllium (light alloy extra hard)

-one hundred motors D.B. 601 and D.B. 601 AA by the factories of which Reggiane is one.

-20 to 25 Me. 110 built by Reggiane.

-50 Nardi trainer planes 315

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Macchi of Varese makes 6 to 7 Mc.202 a week

Reggiane at Reggio Emilia produces as many.

First sends out 30 to 35 G.50 a month

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The airplanes production of the Italians would be 300 machines and from 500 to 600 motors a month, including the shipments to Germany mentioned above. The production breaks down as follows: (Monthly)

fighters	80 to 100
bombers	60 to 70
transport	25 to 30
reconnaissance	20 to 25
trainer planes	70 to 80

The construction of P. 108 is limited to 30 machines of which 24 formed the group of one stormo - construction probably abandoned.

The construction program for 1943 will emphasize pursuit planes first and torpedo planes next.

The fighter 1943 (Italy) should be a monoplane, low wings, four machine guns of 12,7 and a cannon. Motor of 2,000 H.P. liquid cooled. It will do nearly 700 km/hour. Two planes are being studied: the MC.205 and another, the engineer of which died in April, 1941.

The MC.205 is derived from the MC.202 (reinforced undercarriage and "poutrelles d'ailes" (struts?). It should have a motor D.B.603 (?) of 1500 CV but it could only do 600 km/hour. They then equipped it with a motor D.B. of 2,000 CV. Thirty MC.205 are under construction. The body will weigh 250 kilos more than the MC.202 and the motor 500 kilos more than the D.B. 601. The MC.205 will be less maneuverable than the MC.202. It is armed with 4 machine guns of 12,7 at 500 shots per minute (2 minutes of fire at this pitch). They plan to add a cannon.

Expeditionary corps in Russia:

It will consist of 250,000 men under the command of General CARIBOLDI. In July the Tridentina and Julia divisions left.

The Mantone division is in Greece, region of Preveza. The Cussoleno regiment is in the Alps.

Synthetic gasoline:

A test factory using the lignites in Sardegna will produce (?) 100,000 tons per year for aviation. One factory under consideration at Arsa not far from Trieste. Contemplated production: 2,000,000 tons.

## "Vedettes rapides:"

Actual construction at Brindisi. 44 were delivered from January to April of which:

- 8 for the Dodecanese fleet
- 20 for the Sicily fleet
- 8 for the Greece and Albania fleet
- 8 unknown destination in North Africa.

The Mercedes Benz motors will be replaced by German Hauptmag motors.

In one year 90 vedettes were built at Brindisi and 80 at Genoa: in all 170.

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 NAVAL REPORTS

Ships having gone the length of the east coast of Cap Bon:

August 10	Steamer IKBY, route north
August 11	two submarines, 1 destroyer ("torpilleur") south route (nationality unknown)
August 13	One fast Italian vedette, grounded on the Kelibia beach. One destroyer (torpilleur) boat IZZI, route south
August 14	Tugboat ICKI come to free the fast Italian vedette that grounded on August 13.
August 16	Tugboat Monte Christo, route south
August 24	Steamer ICHL, route south " Leneo (going to Tunis, route north) " IKBY (came from the west) route south " IBHD (came from the west, route south IBHD-Corjeau)

August 25

Steamer ITLD, route south  
 " Maggio, route south (came  
 from Tunis)

August 26

Steamer Armando, route south, grounded  
 Kelibia  
 Two fast Italian destroyers (torpilleur)  
 549 and 560, route south.

August 27

Steamer Pachina, route north, hit a  
 mine north of Kelibia.  
 Destroyer (torpilleur) Sagittario,  
 towing the Armando  
 Tugboat ICRT, route south (steamer  
 grounded)  
 Steamer IJPG, route south.  
 2 Tugboats Torracino and IPQA (Lugaria)  
 towards the grounded steamer.  
 Steamer Corjesu, north route (came from  
 Sousse)

August 28

Steamer Lupa, north route, going to  
 Tunis)  
 Motor sailboat ILJV, route north  
 " " INGB, route south (steamer  
 grounded)

August 29

Motor sailboat IUGE and two sailboats  
 of which one was PCH (steamer  
 grounded).  
 3 dredgers, route north (one carried  
 No. R.D. 33 indication IAGN)  
 Steamer IYVZ, route south  
 Sailboat ISKJ, route south (steamer  
 grounded)

August 30

Armando formation (appareille) with  
 4 sailboats and 3 tugboats.  
 (remained 4 days! ! !)

September 1

Laneo, route south, came from Tunisia  
 3 dredgers and 1 small dispatch boat  
 (IAGN) remained at Kelibia the 1st,  
 2, 3 and until the 7th of September)  
 2 motor sailboats, of which one was ITDO

September 4 Maggio, route north, going to Tunis

September 6 Aprile, route north, going to Tunis  
Lupa, going to Tunis  
Two sailboats, anchored at Hammamet  
route north, Vinicolo I INZY and  
Viardina IOHC.  
1 sailboat EROE di Caprino, route  
north, going to Tunis.

September 7 Steamer Ascianghi, route south.  
Destroyer (torpilleur) Circe (IASP)  
and steamer ARGENTEA (IBCM) route  
south.  
Minesweeper RD.31 and 3 dredgers, route  
north after having anchored at  
Kelibia.

September 8 Destroyer (torpilleur) Circe and  
steamer GIULIA, route north.

September 9 Steamer LILA, route north

September 10 2 dredgers one of which was B.172  
1 dispatch boat Valguira (IAGV) 5  
dredgers.

September 12 Steamer IMEJ, route south  
Destroyer (torpilleur) Circe and steamer  
Veloce, route south (wooden cases on  
bridge of steamer)

September 13 Steamer ICIL, route south  
Steamer Maggio, route south, came from  
Tunis.

VARIOUS REPORTS FROM THE SOUTH (trustworthy)

Aviation:

145th squadron R.M. still at Pisids - activity none, or weak - none September 15.

Identification officers:

Commandant, Tripolitanian Defense	General ARMANDO
" Place Tripoli	Colonel d'ANDREA
" S/Secteur Nalut	Lt. Col. SENTLERI
" Carabiniers of Lybia at Tripoli	Col. CONTADINI
" Secteur Zuara	Col. VASCO
" Artillery of Defense of Tripoli	Col. MERCURIO

Units: Headquarters 85th Regiment Infantry, Jefru  
 " 86th " " Zavia  
 2nd group Spahis, Zuara  
 311th headquarters of telecommunication, Tripoli-Mellaha  
 6th battery reserve ("de cotes") between Tripoli-  
 Ras Ahmar

Ships: September 11 1 "firocisterna", route east  
 " 13 2 minesweepers, route east  
 " 14 1 cargo, route east  
 Night of 14/15.9 1 cargo passed by Zuara, route Tripoli

Two escaped from Suassi ben Aden September 10:

GRUMP or CHAMP Charles, class 1913, born in London, register  
 1631845

CARRIER William, class 1914, born York, register 4348441.  
 No chance of recapture.

Rations west Tripolitania:

Italians: 150 grammes bread per day  
2 kilo of "pate" (probably spaghetti) per month  
180 grammes of preserves per month

Arabs: 110 grammes of cereals per month  
500 grammes of "pate" (probably spaghetti) per month  
100 grammes of preserves per month.



AVIATION ITALIENNE

Le 20 août un Fiat CR.42, numéro matriciel 8997 série 1000, a atterri en Tunisie; numéro sur certificat 20/2, appartenant donc à la 20ème escadrille du 16ème groupe du 15ème Stormo qui aurait donc été transformée en aviation de chasse.

Par ailleurs, nous avons confirmation que le 2ème groupe de chasse et le 51ème Stormo de chasse sont en action sur Malte. Le 2ème groupe est commandé par le Commandant Pilote GUARDIA et le 51ème Stormo est commandé par le Colonel Pilote MARIANO.

La 617ème escadrille de transport équipée en Savoia 82 appartient au 144ème groupe du 48ème Stormo.

Nous avons identifié de source très sûre le 145ème groupe de transport à Castel Benito.

Par ailleurs la 62ème escadrille de bombardement terrestre est en Sicile (aéroport 516).

La 40ème escadrille O.A. sur aéroport 507 et la 235ème escadrille de transport sur aéroport 363.

Il semble confirmé que suivant vos questions de la semaine dernière le 4ème groupe du 7ème Stormo, escadrilles 14 et 15, soit bien revenu en Sicile. Il est équipé en Savoia 79 et nous avons pu identifier quelques appareils de la 14ème escadrille.

Par ailleurs vous demandiez ce qu'était advenu du 37ème Stormo. Nous pensons qu'il est en Sicile avec ses deux groupes 54 et 55. Nous croyons savoir que le 55ème groupe est devenu un groupe de transport. Nous ne sommes pas d'accord sur le fait que le 116ème groupe appartienne au 37ème Stormo. Nous pensons que si les 116ème et 115ème groupes existent ils appartiennent au 40ème Stormo.

L'escadrille Benito Mussolini appartiendrait plutôt au 47ème Stormo composé des groupes 106 et 107 et équipé en Piaggio 106.

Au sujet des unités dissoutes dont nous vous avons parlé la semaine dernière, dans un document officiel de la Reggia Aeronautica datant d'un an nous avons trouvé un nombre considérable de groupes et d'escadrilles autonomes. Par exemple, les groupes 18 et 23 composent le 3ème Stormo sont cités comme groupes autonomes alors que nous n'avons pas trouvé trace du 3ème Stormo; de même les groupes 2 et 3 du 6ème Stormo sont cités comme groupes autonomes alors que nous n'avons pas trouvé trace du 6ème Stormo; de même les groupes 33 et 34 du 11ème Stormo sont cités comme groupes autonomes alors que nous n'avons pas trouvé trace du 11ème Stormo. Avez-vous une confirmation ou un renseignement quelconque permettant de confirmer cette dissociation de l'armée?

Avez-vous des nouvelles de l'11ème Stormo, groupes 41 et 42, qui avaient été signalés à Malte le 19/8/43?

- 2 -

AVIATION ALLEMANDE

Nous avons noté cette semaine un trafic assez important de l'aviation allemande entre Catane et la Crète. Nous ne savons pas s'il s'agit d'unités quittant la Sicile pour se rendre sur un autre théâtre d'opérations car de nombreux avions qui ont quitté Catane pour la Crète sont revenus à Catane pour vingt-quatre heures plus tard.

le 9.9.42

## TRANSLATION

ITALIAN AVIATION

August 20 a Fiat CR.42, registration number 8937 Series 11 AS, landed in Tunisia; number on the cockpit 20/2. This would therefore belong to the 20th Squadron of the 16th Group of the 15th Stormo, which would therefore have been transferred to assault aviation.

Also, it has been confirmed that the 2nd pursuit group and the 51st Stormo pursuit are in action over Malta. Commandant Pilot Scarpetta is at the head of the 2nd group; Colonel Pilot Remondino commands the 51st Stormo.

The 617th transport squadron furnished with Savoia 82 belongs to the 144th group of the 48th Stormo.

From a very reliable source we have it that the 145th transport group is at Castel Benito.

Also, the 62nd land bombardment squadron is in Sicily (aerodrome 516).

The 40th squadron O.A. at aerodrome 507 and the 27th transport squadron at aerodrome 363.

It seems to have been confirmed that, following your questions of last week, the 4th group of the 7th Stormo, 14th and 15th squadrons, have returned safely to Sicily. It is equipped with Savoia 79 and we were able to identify some machines of the 14th squadron.

You also ask what had happened to the 37th Stormo. We believe that it is in Sicily with its two groups--54 and 55. We believe that the 66th group has become a transport group. We are not in accord with the information that the 116th group belongs to the 37th Stormo. We think that if the 116th and 115th groups exist, they belong to the 40th Stormo.

The Benito Mussolini Squadron belongs rather to the 77th Stormo, composed of 106th and 107th groups, equipped with Piaggio 108.

- 2 -

Re the disbanded units about which we spoke last week, we found a considerable number of autonomous groups and squadrons in a year-old official document of the Regia Aeronautica. For example, the 18th and 23rd groups, making up the 3rd Stormo, were cited as autonomous, even though we did not find any trace of the 3rd Stormo. Likewise the 2nd and 3rd groups of the 6th Stormo are listed as autonomous, even though we have not found any trace of the 6th Stormo; also, the 33 and 34th groups of the 11th Stormo are listed as autonomous, even though we did not find any trace of the 11th Stormo. Do you have any confirmation or information of any sort which would allow us to confirm this dissolution of Stormi?

Do you have any news of the 12th Stormo, groups 41 and 42, which had been remarked at Rhodes in October 1941?

#### GERMAN AVIATION

This week we noticed a rather important flow of German aviation between Catane and Crete. We do not know if this is in connection with units leaving Sicily to go to another theater of operations, since numerous planes left Catane for Crete, only to return to Catane 24 hours later.

EDDY, E. J. I

C O N T E N T S

TAB	DATE	DESCRIPTION
A.	10/8/42	Letter from Gordon Browne enclosing: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Forged Letter from <u>Abd el Krim</u></li> <li>2. Forged Letter from <u>Allal el Fasi</u></li> <li>3. Forged Letter from the <u>Derkawi</u></li> <li>4. <u>Photo of Allal el Fasi</u></li> <li>5. The <u>Derkawi's signature</u></li> <li>6. Tracing, <u>Col. Heigbeder's signature</u></li> <li>7. Report, Browne's meeting with <u>Tassala</u></li> </ol>
	9/24 10/5 10/5 10/5 10/8	Five letters of Transmittal (carbons) from Co. Eady to Gen. McClure
C.	9/23	Letter of Transmittal to Gen. McClure enclosing copy of: <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arrivals &amp; Departures of German and Italian Personalities at and from El-Aouina Airport near Tunis. 8/15 - 8/31/42</u></p>
D.	9/12	Letter to Secretary of State enclosing copies of: <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Report from Member of Crew of Clan Ferguson.</u></p>
E.	9/17	Report from <u>Karl Clonet</u> , British Hydrographer, American Legation, Tangiers. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <u>Morsie &amp; Possible Reactions of the French in Morocco.</u></li> <li>2. <u>Miscellaneous Personalities, Connected with Shipping, and at Legation</u></li> </ol>

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 9/17 2. Letter from Col. Eddy to Knock, Instructions  
 9/17 O N I REPORTS.
1. German Gun Positions and Troop Concentrations, Morlaix, France. # 241-42
  - 9/17 2. Coastal Conditions, Mersa Bou Zedjar, Algeria # 242-2
  - 9/16 3. Water Supply, Railroads, Telephones, Algeria, Morocco. # 240-42
  - 9/16 4. Lighthouses, Oran, Algeria # 239-42
- G. no date Report, (in French)  
Italian Aviation, Shipping, etc.
- H. 10/2 Memo from Vaudeuil to Col. Eddy with Attachments:  
 (in French)
1. General Description of N. Africa, Morocco. 8/42
  2. Reactions of the Moroccan Tribes and Ants During the Last Two Years 8/42
- I. no date Report (in French)  
The German SR, Political Intelligence, etc.
- MISCELLANEOUS:  
 Unattached memo : Tides, unidentified river







LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tangier, Morocco  
October 8, 1944

Colonel William A. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and E Streets,  
Washington, D. C.

*Copies to 2.1*

Dear Colonel Donovan:

The material in this envelope will supplement that sent in the last pouch. It contains:

- A forged letter from Abd el Krim
- A forged letter from Allal el Fasi
- A forged letter from the Dorkawi
- A photograph of Allal el Fasi
- The Dorkawi's signature
- A tracing of Col. Juan Beigboder's signature
- A report on Gordon Browne's last meeting with Tassels.

We understand that French leaflets are being prepared elsewhere. We do not feel competent to undertake writing a Spanish leaflet, but include Beigboder's signature in case this may be useful. Someone like Archibald Macleish or T. R. Ybarra could probably do an excellent job on the Spanish leaflets. Abd el Krim's picture could be obtained from a newspaper morgue; his signature from a book called "Les Memoires d'Abd el Krim" in the possession of my wife.

We were very pleased to hear Mr. Murphy's oral report on your interest in our activities.

We discussed the rescues of the two leaders with him; we all feel that if these two jobs are to be done they should be done at the last moment to avoid complications; after all they could be flown to their destination in short order.

With best regards,

*Walter S. Brown*  
*Gordon Browne*

Abd al-Krim's Letter.

الحمد لله وحده  
والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده

عن عبد ربه المجاهد عبر سبيل حربه الوفي

شكراً لله عبد الكريم الخكّاب

الذين انضموا إلى المسلمين وأصحاب المجاهدين من بنين وبنات  
بلستان - بنين شوزين - تهرسيب - بنين وليشيك - بنين سيب  
كدييه - كبد انه - بنين بوياسي - المالك السه - كزنايه -  
بنين عمار - بھوريه - تركيبيست - بنين التيجت - بنين بوجراج  
قھيقوا - مسكاس - وغيرهم من الأضواء الذين جاھدوا من  
عبر الماضين - (الله عليكم محمد عليهم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته  
أما بعد .

جاءتكم من علمكم ان هذه لستة عشر عامًا تقريبا  
جاءتكم وولكن العزيم كل هذه المدة من النجس والارث  
كيف شاء بعد .

اعلمكم ان الله تعالى في سنة تقريماً على من بالسر جمع البر وكمن  
المحسب على عيسى وافضل وصداقة ومبدأ والهيئة لذات والبراه  
نسباً سيدنا محمد عليه افضل الصلاة والسلام وثابته (الله  
الوحي مع من هو كازان بسافر منكم بالحيات والبنحزنا الله  
على تعالى على من عذرتنا وختمت بخاتمة على من قام على معنا  
بمبدأ والبر ان زينة السرا كما تقع على يدكم وكنتنا

Abd el Krim's Letter

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته

يا فؤاد المخلص ويا فؤاد المحمدي ويا فؤاد المناجيد  
 ويا فؤاد المحمدي ~~الذي~~ من كان ازال منكم بفتح الحيات  
 ويا فؤاد المجاهد من سيد الله ومب خيرة مكنه  
 مع كل امور - اخص - اخماس - وبقيله - استعدوا  
 مع ريشةكم اثم وارثوا واثابوا واثابوا من  
 سيد حربكم - بها انا واثاب فاءنا الاعريكان  
 فادمين عليكم البيع على عداد الرمل والحصي  
 وأوراق الاشجار نازلي من كل فرسة وعلى شوالها  
 البحر في اعانتنا واليهادون في عدونا والجزيرة  
 من بيوتكم وارضكم وتملكوا حربكم وحرية ارضكم  
 وعليه جناحكم اه تعينوا اعداءنا واعداءنا  
 الاصريكان من كل جهة ومكان وان تشتعنوا بهم  
 وبأمرهم وكما بهم تورعوا بهم وساعدوا عليهم من  
 واعداءهم وساملوهم معاملة الاخ العاقبة  
 الحر انهم جاءوا يخلصونا من عدونا ومن العالم  
 والاشهاد  
 فيا كل من هو طمس كثر اعداءنا الاميان  
 تمكن الشانه من سلك وانشد اعداءنا الحزيرة

Abd al-Kaim's Letter

(PTO)

عدوكم وعدوكم وعدوكم  
 اغتلبوا كل من وجدتموه ضد لنا ارضنا  
 اصحابنا الامريكان  
 اليوم من الرضوخ من الاصبايين كما تقتلونهم  
 انهم من جانبنا ومثلية معنا  
 بكل ما تفتنه وادب مع السلاح اذ يدور له من لبيس  
 له عدو من اخوانكم الصبايين  
 قتلكم ان تقتلوا اولاً الاصبايين اصحاب  
 المدافع ليس يضر بون البوابير او  
 الطيارات الاصبايين وحلبنا الاصبايين الذين  
 جاءوا لبعك ارضنا من الاستعباد والظلم  
 عن الضريب العاجل اكون معكم بحول الله وقوته  
 كونس اليوم لانت مع اصحابي الامريكان الذين قد  
 واغتنفوني من يد عدوكم وصانعي البيع عندكم  
 بارحاً من روبرا شاكر فضل الله تعالى رسالته عليكم  
 على شهر مضيق امريكيه عن الشهادة الجرم لا يعرف  
 الضبير كونس لست اراه بعين عنكم بل فرجاً منكم  
 وليس دايماً معلوم بالله تم بكم  
 استبشروا وابلثوا واستعدوا لما فتنة لانفسكم وكل  
 عن الضريب العاجل ان الله تعالى والشك عليكم ورحمة الله  
 من الصبايين السلطان والبعين الوكس

turn over

Letter of Allal el Fassi

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم  
وكل حبل وكافوا (الابالسة العليين)

وطول الله على ما كان في يدي

واوجوا بعهد الله اذا اهدتم

عن عبده المجاهد عمر لسيد الخيرة والرحمة

علال العباسي الشاه وولي

اخواني واصرفاي الجاهلون من بسيل الخيرة والرحمة

المشاكل عليكم ورحمة الله  
اذا بعد

لقد قضت سنين عديدة فظنيتها بالسجون وبعك منير، لسبب انه علي

برحمته وخلعتني على يد الاوربي كانوا قواها لهم ارجح ذلك الذي اظن

المحبوب وكما جاهدتم نازليين اليين جدي كل من اصيل الخيرة

قاربي جرحكم بفتح بالمشرب كذا (الاسود ارضي صا صدي الجند

جدي بسيل الخيرة  
منظية تعال ان ينصرتنا قرأنا لهم من (الاشهاد

جسيت اعانتهم تحول انك نتمسك لداخريتنا ان ان اذاع

الواحد ونصيبهم الفليس ضوانهم بسيل صود العالم اجمع

من بين اذاع من الاستعباد  
اخواني واصرفاي المسامحة - كل من كانت له قدره ان الجاهل

بدر بسيل الله وعرفه وظهره بله ان الجاهل منكم من الساعات

Note to Composer: Do not change this text in any way. It has been very carefully composed and is correct for the purpose intended. Be sure to use Moroccan P's and Q's (4)

العامد المشاركة التي من الله علينا بها في حقه  
وهي السلباء العاصية

عاصروا بهم وصبرهم وعبور صغوبهم جانب بجانب  
افتلأ كل من هو ضام وضرم وكل عدو لكم  
ومن لم يكون له فدرية على الجهاد اولدواع وله ان يرشدهم  
كإضوان له اعينوهم للونهم ليسوا كخيرهم من النصارى  
التيهم اصحاب المسكونة بلا غرض عندهم التداخل بس  
او البلاد او يستخرون اعداء واما خروص افتحة الغير  
يعتقدون عب الحرية - بهم اصرفانا وهم اعباننا  
او صيكم ان توفدوا النيران على كل جبل وكرة عالية  
وهللو با صوانكم من اعلى كل سطح وبحل على لتبروننا  
لهم برحمتكم وترحمتكم ~~لهم خيركم~~ ان تبرعنا زعيم الله  
داك امريكانيون الذي جاءوا ~~انتم~~ عانتنا وتسلم ارفاننا  
من الاستعباد

منحسبكم ان تفرموا انفسكم بجماعتكم لربهم ورسولهم  
وكونوا لهم خير وصين  
ارشدوهم الى الماء والى الحريف وعلو الجبال - اعطسوا عليهم  
مفادلكم واللعن على كل جهة ومكان - واستجروهم بحازونهم على رؤسهم  
واللعن على كل ذلك واستجروهم

معصومك، عفا عنك عن جميع لغتك  
 وزودت سداكنا معكم برالغريب العادل تحول الله  
 وهنا تسمعون صوتي ونحسب الله هو الطي والحرية  
 ومكاننا السرايا المحبوب وايل الله الشريفة  
 التنبسروا ٧٥٧ الامريكانيون هنا وحج  
 واجرحوا الاستصراة لا عانتم واعانتم  
 والشيء عليكم ورعنا الله تخلص وركلته



Letter of The Dorkawi

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

السُّوْمِيَّةُ الشَّادِلِيَّةُ

كل ما عثر على من هذه الورقة بلا اطلاع عليها اغنيه من الكفرية  
ولكن ما له رغبة فينا .

من مبراه شريف القديم الفخام  
شيخ الكفرية الله  
الله

الى اخواننا وضد اخطا الموضوعي بهناية الله ورسوله . السلام  
عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته .

هذا واعلمكم ان فوات اصدفانا الا امر بكنيون فذ  
اتوا اثناء ليخاضوا وقرينا المجرى من الاستعداد

وعيت لغاوا الحركت الباع الكويد يلزم علينا ان اعينهم من  
كل وجهة وعليه .

جدا طلبكم ان تجاؤوا ~~لهم~~ جنب جنب حسا لمرهم  
واذا رجعت لوضع عطسانين بالافهم الماء .

واذا وجدتموهم جعائني بل لظهورهم  
واذا اختلفوا على الحرب فليدفع لها والى الكفرى على الجبار او ارضاء

وكونوا لهم خير معين من جميع الاصور واوجعلها كل بلدين كقولكم  
لنفسوهم واعلموهم بالهدى الذى به وليس بيا اعداءهم

ولا علس سلسلدر او امير اخرى بعد هذا والله اعلم  
وانتصره

انفسنا واحتملوا علمهم اننا اذقم

هذا هو اليوم العظيم وهذا هو الجهاد العظيم  
هنا يوم عيد الحرية

وهذا هو اليوم الذي كنا نترجوه بعارف الصبر

نسأله تعالى ان يهب علينا بفره الله السميع الوهيب  
يا مبيد الكافرين يا ذا الجلال والإكرام



ALLAN EL FASI

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

حضرت صاحب السعادة سفير الولايات المتحدة الامريكه  
بخطبي تجيبت واخر اول

وبعد بان اقدم لهما تلك اعمل اشكرات واكيب  
التقيت على الملحقين الكسنته وهي مسموعه ادهم ورتك  
اتي ووقعتها لمفيع زا وقتنا مشا ركته منك في امر المارك  
استحضرنا على رضا مسكه في الزاوية وتوسيعه في الاصله  
بحا واصل السر لهما في ايه يدعي لك الخيرات وتكرير عليك  
اشواخ اشبع والمسر است في عا جيتت شاعته وفضل رساله  
رضت ما تقبل في ابر اخر منا وضا ادهم لمنو بنتا ورس

٥٥٤  
رضاه

صدره الشريف  
المرقله

١٥٤٦

Signature of Col. Juan Beigbeder

*Juan Beigbeder*

Present: Gordon Browne, Randolph Gussard, Tassels

The interview lasted three hours.

Speaking of the activities of himself and Mr Keys (Abd el Hadi ben Azuz, the Riffian leader who won the victory of Kelaia de Sloss in the Riffian war and who was present at our September 14th interview) Tassels reported as follows:

After our last interview he went back to Tetuan where he lives, and then went on a trip to Ajdir, his original home, in Beni Ourriagel. He first proceeded to Villa San Jerjo where he saw the interventor of the Central Rif, Colonel Sanchez Perez, discussed crops and prices with him, and obtained permission to take ten quintals of grain to Tetuan. Then he went on to Ajdir where he stayed a few days, continuing his cover of a business trip. Apparently Mr. Keys joined him at Ajdir.

A consultation took place between four men, Tassels, Mr. Keys, Shaib ben Aissa, and Ben Mohammed el Akhil el Bokkiwi. Shaib ben Aissa is Tassel's brother-in-law; he lives at Bu Hem, Abd-el-Krim's old home. Ben Mohammed lives at Tafinsa, between Imezoren and Busicour. These four men are all former officers of Abd-el-Krim's army. They are the only ones who are acquainted with the Riffian Master plan which they drew up and submit for our approval. A fifth man, Bu Zemat, Tassels uncle, was consulted about part of the operations, in which he himself is personally concerned.

#### RIFFIAN OPERATIONAL PLAN

#### IN THE EVENT THAT SPAIN AND SPANISH MOROCCO JOIN THE AXIS IN WAR AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS THEIR PLANS PROPOSE:

- (1) An allied landing at the beach of Busicour (described later) by a force of 2000 men from Gibraltar, to be met at the beach by a picked Riffian force of 1000 men. Munitions must be brought in by the landing party for the Riffians. The Riffian force is to be limited to 1000 to avoid giving the Spaniards the tip off. The next day 3000 picked Riffians will arrive and from then on others will pour in. The Riffians at Busicour will be under Shaib ben Aissa and el Akhil el Bokkiwi. The arms to be brought in the first day should consist of rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades sufficient for 4000 men.
- (2) A simultaneous landing at el Harsh nearby (described later) by a landing force of 3000 men. They will be met on the beach by 1000 Riffians, and 4000 Riffians will appear the next day, all picked men. Rifles, machine guns, and grenades for 5000 Riffians needed. From then on reinforcements will come in quantity. The Riffian forces at el Harsh will be led by Tassels.
- (3) The airfield at Imezoren (spelt Einzeron on Spanish maps) is an important Riffian gathering point (described later) and should be occupied by Allied paratroopers and transport planes should land as many rifles, machine guns, and grenades as possible. 500 picked Riffians will support this attack, and next day 3000 others will arrive as reinforcements. They suggest landing here and...

(4) In one week 80,000 Riffian fighting men will be assembled throughout the country, providing rifles for them can be brought in. This does not include the Gzennaya, but if given the word they will come over from the French Zone. Tassels reports they can count on the support of a large majority of the Riffian troops in the Spanish Army. He also said that probably some of the Spanish officers, secretly, heeds, would bring their Spanish troops over to support the Allies.

Tassels explained that this plan is based on the assumption that the Tangier-Tetuan-Ceuta area, or the Melilla area be attacked first or simultaneously with these operations. If the major Allied attack should be in the central Rif in the area mentioned above or in a nearby area, he requested diversionary attacks on Melilla or Ceuta to prevent the Riffian operation being squeezed from both sides.

#### Description of Busicur:

Location: British War Office Map of Sp. Morocco, 1941. 1-50000. 632.7 E -- 644.3 N on purple grid. There is fairly deep water close to the beach. It is guarded by ten soldiers only, there is no protection against a landing. There are however coastal batteries and anti-aircraft on the island off Ajdir (Alhucemas) and on the mountain in back of Villa Sanjorjo.

#### Description of el Harsh:


Map as above. 657.2E -- 642.5 N. El Harsh is not on the map, but is part of large beach extending from Villa Sanjorjo to Cape Quillates, halfway between the Wed Nokor and the lighthouse on Cape Quillates. There are no protecting guns and no troops at that area. It is covered by guns on Alhucemas island.

#### Description of Einzoren (Einzoren)

Location: 634.6 N --- 649.6 E. This is the principal airfield of this part of Spanish Morocco. It is seldom used at present; there are no protecting guns on the airfield itself; anti-aircraft is located on the isle of Alhucemas and in back of Villa Sanjorjo. The field is guarded by very few men at present.

#### Financing

Tassels reported as follows on the sum of money (20,000 pesetas, or \$ 1000) which he and Mr. Keys were given on Sept. 14th. They spent the money in the customary Riffian manner of establishing "liff" or alliances (See Coon, C.S., Tribes of the Rif, p. 105) through ritual shame compulsions. Because of the need for secrecy, small amounts of cash were being given instead of the usual sacrifice of cattle or sheep in front of the recipients' houses. He mentioned Abd el Krim's use of this custom, saying that Abd el Krim had used up all his money, cattle and sheep, and finally mortgaged his lands in making liff. Shaib ben Aissa is using 3500 pesetas and Bu Zolmat an equal. Kaddah ben Said of Targuit in Beni Hassan and Mfahl ben Inoun are using 1000 pes each. In establishing liff these men usually pay out 50 pesetas in each case, sometimes a little more. Some money is being spent for transportation and for hospitality by the key men.





**LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**NAVAL ATTACHE**

Tangier, Morocco.

8 October, 1942.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations,  
20 Grosvenor Square, LONDON.

Dear General McClure:

I take pleasure in forwarding the following series of reports:

- (A) Letter dated 5 Oct., 1942, from Vice Consul Reid regarding transmissions to German submarines by Mr. Zimmer with sketch of location of W/T transmitter.
- (B) Memo dated 2 Oct., 1942, from Vice Consul Knight confirming information submitted on area across the Sebkra from Lourmel to ElDjesira Island and Valuy.
- (C) Letter dated 29 Sept., 1942, from Consul General Cole enclosing negatives of 3 destroyers and 2 submarines in Algiers harbor.
- (D) Letter dated 22 Sept., 1942, from Consul Doolittle regarding Naval Lookout Stations in Tunisia.
- (E) Letter dated 29 Sept., 1942, from Consul General Cole regarding activities of one of the SCHIAFFINO steamers around the Cap de Fer, just west of Bone.
- (F) Memorandum dated 30 Sept., 1942, from Vice Consuls Reunis and Knight forwarding a map showing the entire telephone system of the Department of Oran.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. EDUY,  
Lt-Col, USMC.

Copy to:  
Col. W. J. Donovan, Washington  
Col. G. B. Guenther, London OSS.

**LIGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**NAVAL ATTACHE**

**Tangier, Morocco.**

**5 October, 1962.**

**Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.  
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations,  
20 Grosvenor Square, LONDON.**

**Dear General McClure:**

**I take pleasure in forwarding the following series of reports:**

- (A) Memorandum regarding telephone-tapping devices.**
- (B) List of electric power stations with sketch showing barrages and localities supplied.**
- (C) List of coastal batteries with sketches of Agadir and Fedala attached.**
- (D) Information supplied by an Officer of the Renseignements, member of group.**
- (E) Program of action and possibilities of execution suggested by P F T group, also their questionnaire as to precisely what we want done.**
- (F) Program of interruption of electric power for railroads and lighting.**
- (G) A series of ten (10) maps showing:
 
  - (a) Telegraph and telephone lines overhead and underground.**
  - (b) Lines to post of command and observations, fire control, etc.**
  - (c) Host of the batteries along the coast. Would like definite instructions as to which of them should be cut or used for transmitting false news.****

**Respectfully submitted,**

**V. A. KIDD,  
Lt-Col, USMC.**

**Copy to:  
Col. F. J. Donovan, Washington,  
Col. G. H. Gantner, London (NS).**

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SE/AS ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.  
5 October, 1942.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations,  
21 Grosvenor Square, LONDON.

Dear General McClure:

I take pleasure in forwarding a series of reports from Algiers and Oran. Due to lack of clerical assistance, it is regretted that time precludes the reproduction of this material for distribution and translations to be made by this office.

Enclosures cover the following subjects:

- (A) Letter dated 27 Sept., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd regarding the proposed new air fields in the vicinity of Bone.
- (B) Letter of 1 Oct., 1942 from Vice Consuls Rounds and Knight regarding the disposition of the units making up the Division of Oran for the month of September, 1942.
- (C) Letter of 25 Sept., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd enclosing an Admiralty map of the port of Algiers showing all new construction up to 24 Sept., 1942.
- (D) Map of Tipasa.
- (E) Continuing map of Tipasa section (Kolea).
- (F) Sketch of section Glenona to Tipasa.
- (G) Sketch of Part of Tipasa.
- (H) Sketch of roads Tipasa to Algiers (70 kms).
- (I) Sketch of coast garrison posts Algiers to la Guelta (all connected by telephone).
- (J) Report in details on above sections.
- (K) Letter of 30 Sept., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd regarding the Fake Commando surprise attacks carried out at and near Algiers.
- (L) Letter dated 1 Oct., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd enclosing first month's weather observations made in Algiers.
- (M) Letter dated 1 Oct., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd enclosing secret report of the Chief of Staff of 19th Army Corps Algiers on the Fake Commando attack 24-25 Sept., 1942.

Respectfully submitted,

Copy to:  
Col. F. [Name], Washington  
Col. G. [Name], London

N. A. BOYD,  
Lt-Col, USMC (Ret)

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

5 October, 1942.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, USA.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.  
Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.  
20 Grosvenor Square, LONDON.

Dear General McClure:

I take pleasure in forwarding a series of reports from Algiers.

The enclosures cover the following subjects:

- (A) Letter dated 26 Sept., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd regarding an electrical alarm system at entrance to the port of Algiers and report that harbor of Algiers and vicinity is not mined.
- (B) Map of the Port of Algiers giving depth of water and an indicator giving the route to follow for boats entering the port.
- (C) Illustrated edition entitled "The Great Dams and Irrigation Systems of Algeria" prepared by the Irrigation Service in Algeria for the Hydraulics Exposition held at Liege, Belgium in 1939.
- (D) A confidential annuaire Universite d'Alger Institut de Meteorologie Physique du Globe de l'Algerie.
- (E) Letter dated 1 Oct., 1942 from Vice Consul Boyd enclosing:
  - (1) Map of the vicinity of Sidi-Ferruch.
  - (2) Sketch of the vicinity of Sidi-Ferruch giving all details as to cement pill boxes, fortifications and emplacements of the two 75 m/m guns defending this section of the coast, etc.
  - (3) Sketch of houses etc in the vicinity of the beach at Sidi-Ferruch.
  - (4) Report in detail on the above.
- (F) Aerial photograph showing part of Tunis and Italian Armistice Commission building.
- (G) Sketches of Aerodromes Italiens (Mouchadriques) including Bolzano, Belluno, Padova, Venezia, and Motta di Livenza.
- (H) Letter dated 19 Sept., 1942, from American Consul Bealville transmitting further technical data on Tunisia, including 26 photographs and notes relating thereto.

Respectfully submitted,

Col. E. J. ...  
Col. ...

F. A. ...  
...

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

September 18th, 1945.

Tangier, Morocco.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, U. S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations  
20 Grosvenor Square, London, England.

Dear General McClure:

I enclose a series of reports from Algeria which have just arrived. Since the pouch for London closes in a few hours, I shall have no opportunity to reproduce this material for distribution and I am therefore sending it all to you.

Vice Consul John O. Knox (Captain, U. S. Army Reserve) has already reported for duty in London and would be useful in analyses and interpretation of these reports from his own region. The enclosures are as follows:

- A - Letter of September 18th, from Vice Consul Boyd, containing pertinent comment.
- B - Reply to questionnaire on Port of Algiers, given to me in London in Norfolk House.
- C - The defenses of the Port of Algiers.
- D - Information on the docks of Algiers.
- E - Memorandum on visits to the various ports in Algeria.
- F - Port and Docking facilities in Algeria.
- G - Electrical Power in Algeria.
- H - Algerian Communications System.
- I - The Water Supply of Algiers.
- J - Algerian Railway System.
- K - Hospitals in Algeria.
- L - Cold Storage Facilities in Algeria.

General McIlure.

- 3 -


9/19/49

K - Geography of the Northern Area of the Spanish Pro-  
tectorate in Morocco.

Respectfully submitted:

Copies to:-  
Colonel W. J. Donovan,  
Washington;  
Colonel G. B. Swenther,  
London.

W. A. HERR  
Lieut. Colonel, USMA (ret).



12

1  
2

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

September 25th, 1948.

Tangier, Morocco.

Brigadier General R. A. McGuire, U. S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations  
20 Grosvenor Square, London, England.

Dear General McGuire:

I enclose herewith a survey of the coast in the vicinity of COBEO, Algeria, made by a good contact of ours, a French Army officer. I would refer this to Vice Consul John G. Knox, already on duty in London, for further comment.

Since the material is in French and includes rough sketches in ink, which we do not have time to copy, I am sending you the material just as it is.

Respectfully submitted:

Copies to:

Colonel W. J. Demay,  
Washington,  
Colonel B. G. Gaenther,  
London.

W. A. RICE  
Lieut. Colonel, VANG (Det).

Enclosures.



ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF ITALIAN PERSONNEL FROM AIRPORT NEAR TUNIS FROM August 15-18, 1941.


ARRIVAL	HOUR GMT	DEPARTURE	HOURS	FROM	TO	NAME
		16/8	1000	Palermo		FRANZONI Maria Eduardo Conchetta
		S.82 617/6				VALIERI Rodea Lidia Orazio
						BUSACCA Claudio Ennio Carlo
						PIPITONE Matere AVARINO Fernando DONADIO Antonio SORISTIMIANO Giuseppe SERCHIA Aurelio SCIACCA Salvato FDLI Gaetano VALIERI Adriano
12/8	0800	16/8	0840	Sicily	Sicily	JU.88 L.I. EAP Pilot FIEDLER
13/8	1100	16/8	0730	"	"	JU.88 M.7 BEL Pilot SEULTZ
		16/8 S.73 I.DOUL		Palermo		KIPTMULLER - schoolteacher (?) German, and six German survivors
16/8	1340			Palermo		COLOMBO, Ernesto Italian, employee at Italian Consu- late in Tunis
		17/8 S.73 I.DOUL	0715	Palermo and Rome		SERRA, Paolo Italian, Direc- teur of Bunny- fish factory
20/8	0755			Algiers		BRANCA Gerardo, Lt. Colonel, Italian
S.75 I.B350		20/8	1130	Rome		GIOCONTE Giovanni Attache Civil Affairs Italian PALANZINI Roberto Student (?) Italian travelling with a latrine passer

ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN PERSONNEL AT AND FROM EL-AOUENA AIRPORT NEAR TUNIS FROM August 15-31, 1942.

ARRIVAL	HOUR GMT	DEPARTURE	TIME	FROM	TO	NAMES
		16/8	1000	Palermo		PRANDONI Maria Eduardo Conchetta
		5.82 617/6				VALIERI Rosa Lidia Orazio BUSACCA Claudio Emilio Carlo PIPITONE Matere AVARINO Fernando DONADIO Antonio SCRISFIMIANO Giuseppe SERCHIA Auriello SCIACEA Salvado PELL Gaetano VALIERI Adriano
12/8	0800	16/8	0840	Sicily	Sicily	JU.88 L.1 EAP Pilot FIEDLER
13/8	1100	16/8	0730	"	"	JU.88 M.7 BEL Pilot SHULTZ
		16/8 5.73 I.DOUL		Palermo		KIPFMULLER - schoolteacher (?) German, and six German survivors
16/8	1340			Palermo		COLOMBO, Ernesto Italian, employee at Italian Consu- late in Tunis
		17/8 3.73 I.DOUL	0715	Palermo and Rome		SERRA, Paolo Italian, Direc- teur of Tunny- fish factory
20/8 3.75 I.BESO	0755			Algiers		BRANCA, Gerardo Lt. Colonel, Italian
		20/8	1130	Rome		GIOGIOTTI, Giovanni Attache Civil Affairs Italian PALAMBERTI, Roberto Student (?) Italian travelling with a liaison partner

page 2

ARRIVAL	HOUR GMT	DEPARTURE	HOUR	FROM	TO	NAMES
20/8 1. DOUL	1225			Rome		RICCARDINI, Quirino Engineer, Italian CAPRIZZI, Calagero Civil Adjutant (?) (travelling with laissez- passer)
		22/8 1. DOUL	0720	Rome		DA ZARA, Guido Infantry Colonel Italian; CACCIATORE, Armando Italian, Student (?) (travelling with laissez- passer)
						SILIMBANI, Giacomo Consul General  plus four German survivors and one Italian survivor (aviators)



NY 111

Confidential

Rome, Italia, September 11, 1942.

Subject: Submitting Copies of Reports from  
Members of Crew of GLAN EXETER

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to submit herewith copies of letters from two members of the crew of the GLAN EXETER, sunk in the Malta convoy of August 11-13, 1942, addressed to the Marine Department of Messrs. GAYNOR, IRVINE & Co., London. These letters give excellent eye-witness pictures of the affair and are believed worthy of reporting.

Respectfully yours,

Copy of  
read orig  
ML

H. A. Duclittle  
American Consul

Enclosures:

1. Copy of letter of Aug. 25, 1942, from A.H. Nisak and D.H. Jamieson of GLAN EXETER to Messrs. Gaynor Irvine & Co., Ltd., London.
2. Copy of letter of Aug. 25, 1942, from R.S. Russell of GLAN EXETER to Messrs. Gaynor, Irvine & Co., Ltd., London.

In duplicate to Department  
Copy to Legation, Rome  
Copy to Naval Attaché, Rome  
Copy to Embassy, London

500

NY 111

COPY

General Manager,  
La Kor,  
Tunis  
N. Africa

25th August 1942

Marine Dept.  
Messrs. Cayser, Irvin & Co, Ltd.  
2 St. Mary Axe,  
London E. C. 3.

Gentlemen:

I beg to send herewith my account of the loss of the T.S.S. "Glan Ferguson", as I assume that Capt. Cassar and Mr. Miller, the Chief Officer, have been taken to Italy as prisoners of war.

The vessel was torpedoed by an enemy aircraft on the starboard side in the vicinity of the engine room at 2103 on the 12th August 1942. She immediately burst into flames and there was a loud explosion on the after-deck. Whether this was due to a bomb or an explosion in the cargo, I have not been able to ascertain definitely. As soon as she was hit, the vessel took a very heavy list to starboard and commenced to settle by the stern. The order to abandon ship was given at 2105, and five minutes later the vessel foundered. The petrol in the cargo came up to the surface and blazed furiously for at least 24 hours.

Watches had been doubled after passing Gibraltar, and the fourth officer, Mr. Macmillan and myself had the first watch. When I arrived on the boat deck it was an inferno of flames and I could not get to my own boat. I went to the foredeck where the port raft had jammed in its slides. There were many people there and several were jumping overboard, but as the ship had a lot of headway on her they were quickly lost to view. We eventually managed to launch the raft and out the painter just as the ship foundered. We were so close that the paravane wires scraped over my steel helmet and narrowly missed dragging the raft down with the ship.

On the raft were Capt. Cassar, Mr. Miller, Lt. Com. Makkajohn (passenger), myself, and 14 members of the crew. We stayed in close proximity to the flames all night in the hope that we might pick up survivors although it seemed impossible that anyone could be alive in such a large area of ablaze, and also in the hope that we might be rescued ourselves. At dawn we saw three lifeboats upturned and badly damaged, and also the bodies which were unrecognizable. About two miles away we observed three rafts with men aboard them. We paddled across and were overjoyed to find that in all 44 officers and men of our ship were on rafts, and apart from the Fourth Engineer and one of the Boatswain the water was badly burnt, all were well. We found the rafts were the four rafts of the "Glan Ferguson" and the rest of the crew were on the other rafts.

About noon we saw a craft making for us. It turned out to be an Italian submarine, which came alongside and hailed us. I asked us if we were in distress, though this was rather obvious, and when we agreed that we were, he said he would report our position and send assistance. At 1.30 a large German flying boat circled over us and then alighted and taxied alongside. The forward gunner, who had a cannon gun trained upon us, made gestures as to whether we would surrender, so we all put up our hands. He then went a rubber dingy across and took 32 men aboard the aircraft, saying he would be back in two hours for the rest, took off and disappeared to the Northward.

We re-divided the men so that there were 8 aboard each raft. Mr. Macmillan the Fourth Officer and myself were on one raft with another in tow, and Capt. Cowzar and Mr. Miller on one raft with another in tow. The aircraft returned just before dark but did not alight, probably because of the amount of wreckage which was floating on the surface.

On the morning of 14th August a breeze sprang up and we set off for Cape Bon, which was visible in the distance. We kept in touch with each other after dark by signalling with life jacket lights. About 2200 the wind shifted so we lay to a sea anchor till dawn, when we agreed to proceed independently as the breeze had dropped. The others were making for Cape Bon, but I decided to make for Zembretta Island to have a better chance if the wind came away from the Southward. We paddled for 14 hours until we were exhausted and then put out the sea anchor. About 1700 a Red Cross seaplane with Italian markings circled around us alighted and took off the crew of one of the rafts and made off to the Northward.

About 0030 on the 16th August, a fresh breeze sprang up, so I made sail for Zembretta. We passed about 50 feet to leeward of the island despite frantic efforts with the paddles, so I decided to make for a village on the mainland. While on this leg we saw a seaplane circling around off Cape Bon, and I presume that the other rafts were picked up by this aircraft, although we were out of sight of the other rafts.

Approaching the land we saw an Italian destroyer apparently at anchor, so I decided to go to her and surrender, not knowing what the natives ashore were like. However, she turned out to be a derelict on the rocks, and by good fortune we made a good landing clear of the surf at 1200 on 16th August. Some Italian fishermen welcomed us, and treated us very well, and the French authorities collected us in the afternoon.

A French naval officer informed us that some rafts had been picked up off Cape Bon and that on one of them was written "54 survivors of the Ferguson taken to Italy by the Italian". This was written on the ceiling of the raft by Mr. Miller while we were waiting for the French aircraft to return. Judging by my own experience the weather did not seem such as to warrant rescue being sent for.





Officer died in the boat after being picked up.

The American Consul has been telegraphed home, presumably to our next of kin but we would greatly appreciate it if you would be so good as to notify our next of kin of our safety as we are only permitted to send one letter per week and they take anything up to three months to reach home. I trust that this letter will go through Diplomatic Channels and reach home in a shorter time.

I remain,  
Yours faithfully,

(signed) A. E. BLACK 2/0

(signed) D. H. MACGILLIVRAY 1/0

O  
O  
P  
Y

Internal Affairs  
La Haye  
Tunis  
N. Africa

COPY

25th August 1942

Marine Dept.  
Messrs. Cayser, Irvine & Co. Ltd.  
2 St. Mary Axe  
London E.C.3.

Gentlemen:

I herewith submit an account of my own experiences following the loss of the T.S.S. "Glan Ferguson" on the evening of the 12th August 1942. Mr. Black has already written his report of the actual torpedoing, which I have read, and with which I concur.

On reaching the boatdeck shortly after the order to abandon ship, I found the whole after end of the deck ablaze, including my own boat. The second mates' boat however was still intact, although the falls had begun to smoulder. There were only 2 A.B.s besides myself on the Starboard side, and owing to the intense heat had great difficulty in cutting the bellybands adrift. We managed to clear away the boat and lower it, and the lamp-trimmer, who had arrived on the scene shortly after me, cleared both falls. Owing to the headway the ship was making, the fore'd painter parted, leaving me just sufficient time to follow the A.B.s down a lifeline into the boat as it swung round to the after painter. This we managed to do and we passed down the side of the ship, so close however that the after Starboard gunwale caught under the rudder of a landing craft which was projecting about six feet from the ship at No. 4 Hatch. There was a great deal of flame and smoke belching from a huge hole in the ship's side and we were unable to push the boat clear. Fortunately it cleared itself as it was on the point of capsizing, tearing out a large section of the gunwale.

We then drifted clear and began looking round for survivors. It was at this point, some three or four minutes after leaving the ship, that she foundered, leaving a large area covered by blazing petrol. I ventured as near the flames as I dared and picked up 4 or 5 survivors. Since the blaze was spreading rapidly I deemed it advisable to row clear. The lifejacket lights directed us to others and in about 3 hours had picked up 44 men. The Chief Radio Officer, Mr. Maloney died a few minutes after being lifted into the boat, and as he had no visible signs of injury appeared to die from shock.

The boat had been making a good deal of water.

and kept it well under control for the remainder of the time we were in it. Quite a number of us were suffering from parched throats, owing to the fumes from the petrol, and we were very thankful for the smoking gun, which was part of the boat's stores.

We kept well clear of the fires all night and as it got light could see the smoke and flames still rising, some 3 or 4 miles away. As far as I could see there was no sign of life although the sea was covered with empty petrol tins. I imagined we were the only survivors, or that others had been picked up by other craft. Consequently I shaped a southerly course for Cape Bon, and since there was no wind, most of the distance was covered by rowing. Mr. Gibson, Chief Steward was in some pain from a broken rib, and we made him as comfortable as possible. Others were treated for minor injuries. At odd intervals during the day, Italian planes circled round us, but did not interfere.

About 0800 on the 15th land became visible above the haze, about 2 points on the Starboard bow which I imagined was Cape Bon. Later this turned out to be the island of Zembra. In periods of calm I had great difficulty in making a number of firemen and greasers take their spell at the oars. In fact they have been a constant source of trouble the whole time.

I attempted a landing on the Western side of Zembra, but owing to a slight swell and the number of rocks in the vicinity, decided to abandon the idea and make for the mainland. As we cleared the island, 3 French Coastguards attracted our attention and came alongside. They guided us to a small beach on the South side where we landed about 1500. We were very well treated and spent the night there. Next morning the 14th a French Naval tug came off and we were all taken aboard. Although we had to remain below decks, we had two very good meals. The tug landed us at In Doulette about 1730 and we were taken by lorry to a camp at Ben Fichta, with the exception of Mr. Gibson who was taken to a hospital in Tunis.

As Mr. Black has included a full list of survivors and mentioned the conditions existing at our present camp, I will not repeat same.

I remain

Yours faithfully

(signed) M. MURPHY, M/O



**SECRET**

14-00000

ROUTED TO AND RECORDED

DATE

DATE

Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Remarks
	Req'd.	Rec'd.		
1. Mr. [Name]	10/6	10/6	[Signature]	Original copies are available in case they are needed for individual files.
2. Lt. [Name]			[Signature]	
3. Capt. [Name]				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				

MORALE and POSSIBLE REACTIONS of the FRENCH in MOROCCO

if subject to an ALLIED OCCUPATION.

*Morale  
A French Reaction  
Morocco*

The morale of the people in French Morocco has undergone many changes and may have some bearing on what to expect should at any time an allied expeditionary force be sent to occupy North Africa.

Following the collapse of France, the French people in Morocco were shocked at the rapidity of the German advance in their mother country. When France capitulated, as may be expected the morale fell to zero but nevertheless high hopes were held that North Africa would become the headquarters of the government and that the fighting would continue.

The formal optimistic news were withheld from the public for many days. It was at this period that Britain lost her great opportunity to be welcomed by the French in this country. The appearance of British soldiers and sailors would have been greeted with enthusiasm and a small army.

When the news of the fall of France and the arrival of refugees at Casablanca was made public, again gave way to hope and reaction set in, but when the news of the armistice were published and it was clear that France's fighting nation ceased to exist. Hostilities were not to be carried on from North Africa, naval vessels were to be interned and the help of French prisoners.

The morale of the soldier and sailor was at its lowest. The long parade of drunken men round the boulevards, discipline no longer existed, men of the forces only ignored their superiors. Order was restored by naval patrols and cafes prohibited. Only foreigners in the barracks.

At this time the name of De Gaulle became more familiar, great hopes were placed in this general and he had then thousands of men who were pleased to join his forces the morale rose a great deal. The fact that Britain had not collapsed and had every day was a relief.

De Gaulle, is very temperamental and he lacks the stability of Churchill. As time went on a growing element of propaganda held Britain responsible to a great extent for the fall of France with the result that the British lost a great extent the popularity and admiration of the French in Morocco.

When the bombardment of the French fleet at Mers El Kebir, a definite hostility towards the British was manifest exploited by Axis propaganda, De Gaulle also was involved as having condoned this "l'acte de reversion". This was followed a few months later by the Dakar fiasco under the orders of De Gaulle, with the result he lost perhaps 70% of his followers whilst the British were most popular.

When it rose again, the sickle and the hammer were chalked up on walls. As it appeared but as the Germans advanced into Russia it relapsed and

the people became apathetic until following the attack on Pearl Harbour the United States of America declared war. Morocco had always hoped that America would join forces with Britain and when the French saw their wishes fulfilled they again had new hopes.

During this period it must be remembered that North Africa had been subject to months of German and Vichy propaganda and Marshal Petain was considered as the saviour of France. No man during the history of France had so much publicity, his photograph appeared in every shop and office, extracts of his speeches were pasted up everywhere until it became an obsession. All doctors, lawyers, government servants and the Legionnaire swore allegiance to Petain as a compulsory measure to involve North Africa to support the Vichy government in its policy of collaboration with the Axis powers. The newspapers were Axis controlled and German and Italian commissions were established in the big towns until the Frenchman of Morocco was reduced to a state of docility with little desire to aid or abet those nations fighting for the liberty of France as much as their own countries. It may be true to state that in North Africa the people were content to remain as 'lookers on' with no wish to help and the hopes that the allies would extract them from their difficulties.

In this report it follows that these conclusions refer to the French in Morocco collectively and has no reference to the metropolitan Frenchman for it must also be remembered that Morocco is not subject to conditions existing in France. It is questionable if the people realize in Casablanca, Marrakesh etc what it means to have an army of Axis occupation around them or to experience the food situation which prevails in France, further, the type of Frenchman in Morocco is not of the same caliber as his brother in France, he falls much below that.

Following the departure from Morocco at the end of March this year the Legionnaire or ancien combattant had formed into a strong group and were very much pro-Petain. These men smart under the defeat of their country, when the chance they might endeavour to vindicate themselves by taking part actively at any attempt against occupation of Morocco.

They have not sworn oath to Laval.

Another movement which has developed in Morocco is the 'Jeunesse Française'. This is based on similar lines to the Nazi and Fascist Youth Movement and these youths are brought up with the idea of restoring their country by blindly following the Marshal Petain and all that means.

This summary may give a fair idea of impressions based on personal observation and experience and one without prejudice.

Considering what may be the reactions by the various fighting forces and the civilian population of Morocco were an allied expeditionary force to attempt to occupy this country, it may be assumed that opinions may vary a lot but in any case it is a matter entirely of speculation.

It was common talk in Morocco when America became involved in this war that sooner or later she would come over to 'look after' North Africa and very many hoped that the day would soon come.

The reasons why the British were not even considered is obvious, I may be open to serious criticism but as a Britisher working alone in a French company for 10 years and having lived with a French family it was clear to me that the Frenchman is not nor ever has been a friend of Britain, nor ever will be, collectively speaking. There exists an envy and jealousy of Britain and as I was told many times if France were ever to be defeated, Britain would mathematically cease to exist within a few weeks. Such was not the case and there is at heart a feeling of resentment that Britain did carry on without their help. It did not require much Axis propaganda after the shock of their defeat to involve Britain as a cause of it. However that may be, there is a poor spirit shown always by excuse in involving others and their latent dislike became active. The French Navy inwardly jealous of the Royal Navy found a means to express their intolerance following the Mers El Kebir affair. This all pointed to their sympathies with the Americans and it remains to be seen to what extent their complex natures will re-act if the Americans at any time consider occupying Morocco.

There is no reason to suppose that North Africa would remain passive at an allied invasion of this country, or even an American invasion any more than the French have remained passive in Syria, Dakar or Madagascar. It may be assumed that resistance would be greater given the fact that geographically it is nearer the Axis powers and is more directly under Axis and Vichy control. The coast and the ports have been mined and everything points to resistance.

The French Army in Morocco composed of French, Moroccan and Senegalese troops will carry out orders from the superior officers and there is a little doubt that the general staff will comply with instructions from the top.

Approximately 50% who would like to give a free fight to the invaders and it may depend on what strength and equipment the invaders would be the deciding factor on a weak resistance but it is based upon their own losses which if heavy would incline them to prolonged resistance.

The Navy is more apprehensive although there were frequent political disputes concerning the sailors in Casablanca there is little doubt that whatever orders they may receive they will carry out. There may be 40% of the navy who would like to remain passive.

The aviation was mostly pro-ally and could be counted as having as much as 70% on our side with a good portion willing to join forces with us given the opportunity. This percentage may have diminished but it is significant that R.A.F. planes flying down the Moroccan coast have been brought down when intercepted by French fighters, this leaves a doubt as to what could be expected or if there are German aviators who would make sure of the job of doing as much damage to an expeditionary force, as possible.

It is difficult to say what would be the reactions of the French troops in North Africa were they to be re-inforced by Axis troops to resist aggression, I do believe that there would be a great number of deserters or men endeavouring to cross over to the opposite side, for in spite of all, the allies have not conquered their country and actual contact with Germans and especially Italians might lead to a very complicated situation and turn in our favour. This seems logic but again is only a matter of speculation.

In planning this question of an eventual attack on Morocco the most difficult problem would be to land and establish bases to operate



from and this is a matter of great importance and upon which every-  
 thing evolves and would be the deciding factor at the start of success  
 or failure. This question is very delicate were Morocco to be  
 chosen as initial point of attack for it would depend mainly on  
 the state of the weather existing at zero hour. From personal experience  
 the most favourable time would be during the summer months from April to  
 September inclusive when the chances of experiencing the least swell and  
 breakers down the coast exists. It would be a matter of chance and luck to  
 get favourable weather during the other months. The whole coast is seldom  
 free from breakers and the operation of landing troops and material over  
 these breakers and in the surf would lead to disaster before a footing  
 was made so that good weather is essential for such an operation.

In an alternative there remains the ports of Morocco; Safi, Casablanca  
 and Agadir. It is not possible to attack and capture directly. Here again  
 the state of weather plays a part, certainly not to the extent to  
 that mentioned in the above paragraph.

Safi, Agadir and Agadir are subject to westerly weather  
 with gales in varying degrees.

At Agadir the bar at Mehdia would be impracticable  
 to enter and would require great care in entering.  
 The bar is entered during bad weather.

The port of Agadir is a vessel of 9,000 tons with the assistance  
 of a tugboat, M.W. and sea.

The port of Agadir is a vessel of 10,000 tons and 2 or 3 vessels of  
 1,000 tons and swell in this port is at

the port of Agadir is a vessel of 1,000 tons but one  
 vessel of 1,000 tons and is used as

the port of Agadir is a vessel of 35,000 tons and is used as  
 a base for the fleet.

The port of Agadir is a vessel of 1,000 tons and the cost of taking it might lead  
 to a long stay in the port as a base.

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Page....4.

*Harold V. Gloppe*  
 5<sup>th</sup> October 1942.



Chantiers Naval Gallinari Casablanca.

Both brothers Gallinari are pro-French and work 100% with and for the Navy. They are not to be trusted.

Chantier Naval Roblin & Lasteo. Casablanca.

Suspect Lasteo of being pro-ally. Roblin -uncertain.

Casablanca.

Inspector general for the Bureau Veritas Mr. Gouriez. My conversations with him lead me to believe he is pro-ally and although tied up with Navy, Army and Air force he has a vast knowledge which if the occasion presented itself he would pass on to us, but not under the present circumstances.

" El Jefe de Obras Mr Le Marrec. is probably pro-ally.

" Public Works. The engineers of the Travaux Publics may be considered pro Vichy and are dominated by the Admiralty. It is difficult to say what are their personal opinions.

" Towing and Salvage Company. Captain Aillet 100% pro ally and one of our most useful contacts.  
Mr. Larouche. engineer 100% pro ally very inventive and one of our contacts.  
Mr. Rey already mentioned. 100% pro ally one of our contacts.

Port Lyautey. Mr. Bouda. Comptroller Adjoint, 100% pro ally who has given excellent information relating to all matters of the region of Port Lyautey up to the Spanish Frontier. An outstanding personality and one who awaits the opportunity to help us in any way whatsoever.

This list is compiled from my own personal knowledge of all these men many of them I have known for years and it is not founded on hearsay.

*H. V. Gloppe*

*6<sup>th</sup> October 1942*

List of Personnel at American Legation

TANGIER.

Mr. Childs. Minister.  
 Mr. Schott. Secretary. (replaces Mr Scotton -resigned-)  
 Mr. B. Geir. Vice-Consul.  
 Mr. H. Schwartz. "


Mr. Robertson. " 1st.  
 Mrs. Anderson. "  
 Mrs. Taylor. "  
 Miss Childs. "  
 Miss Kennedy. (reading)  
 Mr. Westerman. (office)  
 Mr. Abrison. Accountant. (Br)

Col. Johnson. Military Attache.  
 Maj. Stewards. Asst. " "  
 Mr. Bennett. " " "  
 Mr. Tidwell.  
 Mr. Lodioli. (Br)

Lt. Col. W. W. Widy. Naval Attache.  
 Capt. " " Asst. " "  
 P. Hatzler. Chief " "  
 W. Loman. "  
 P. Clapet. Hydrographer. (Br)  
 Mr. Tompeter. (Br) (attached to Vice-Consul)  
 Mr. Criss. W/T. (Br)  
 Mr. Lawson. W/T.

-----

*Handwritten signature and date: 6-6-1902*



*Fieldy*  
*Richard*  
*W. A. RUBY*  
*W. A. RUBY*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WAS:JFE

NAVAL ATTACHE

September 17th, 1948.

Tangier, Morocco

Mr. Frederic P. Gilbert  
American Vice Consul  
American Consulate  
Casablanca, Morocco.

Dear Mr. Gilbert:

I am taking it for granted that upon your arrival in Lisbon, you will find awaiting you orders from the State Department, covering your further movements.

In the event that there should be some slip in this matter, I am writing to inform you of the original reasons for your journey for which I was responsible. In the absence of other instructions, you should proceed to Washington by the first available transportation, either by Clipper from Lisbon to New York, or if that is delayed, by plane to London and thence by Clipper to New York and Washington.

On arrival in Washington, you should report first to the State Department, to whom you are primarily responsible but in the absence of any instructions from them you should further report first to Colonel William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, 24th and M. Streets, N.W., who in turn will introduce you to Major General George Patton, U. S. Army, to whose Staff you are to be attached.

Any expenses in connection with your travel not paid by the State Department, will be paid to you by Colonel Donovan, upon presentation of this letter.

Sincerely yours,

Copy to:-

~~Colonel W. J. Donovan~~  
Colonel G. B. Gendner;  
Vice Consul John Crawford Inak.

W. A. RUBY  
Lieut. Colonel, USAF (Ret.)

*Handwritten notes:*  
C. A. ...  
A. ...  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

September 11th, 1944.

NAV: JPM

Tangier, Morocco.

Mr. John Crawford Knox,  
American Vice Consul,  
American Consulate General,  
Algiers, Algeria.

Dear Mr. Knox:

Although you are travelling under formal orders from the State Department, I want to give you some additional information in the event that you should fail to receive proper orders during your trip. It is to be regretted that there is no passage on the plane for Lisbon tomorrow and rather than have you wait a week, Mr. Childs has agreed to have you proceed by way of Gibraltar and London.

At Gibraltar, if you are not met, please report to Colonel Nixon-Jarke, who is staying with the General Commanding the Garrison, Major General Jardine, next to the Cathedral. Colonel Jarke is informed of the purpose of your visit and is arranging for your priority passage, on a Government plane, to the United Kingdom. On arrival in London, you should, of course, first report to the American Embassy, 41 Grosvenor Square, to see whether the State Department has any instructions for you. If not, you should then inquire for Colonel G. B. Guenther, U. S. Army, at 472 Grosvenor Street, who is the representative of Colonel Donovan, in London, for secret operations. Colonel Guenther will take you to the Theatre Commander's Headquarters, which originally requested your travel, where you will be given your assignment.

In the event that there should be any complications with orders from the State Department, you should of course communicate with Vice Consul F. P. Gilbert, at the American Legation, Lisbon, Portugal, which you can do by telegraph through the American Embassy, London.

Any expenses incurred in this trip, for which you are not reimbursed by the State Department, will be paid to you by Colonel G. B. Guenther, on presentation of this letter and will be charged to my Office.

Sincerely yours,

Copy to:

Colonel G. B. Guenther, USA,  
Vice Consul F. P. Gilbert.

W. A. RICE  
Lieut. Colonel, USA (Ret).

INFORMATION REPORT

Serial: 24144  
(Classify each page, i.e. 1-45, 2-46)

Monograph Index Guide No. 100  
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. Use U. S. I. form 100-100  
Make separate report for each main title.)

From: H. R. Naval Attache at BANGOR Date: Sept. 17th, 1944  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference: Vice Consul F. S. Gilbert  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source: Informant Evaluation:      
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with— identify when practicable, etc.) (Authentic, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject: Occupied Brittany, Morlaix (Brittany), France, Gun Positions  
(Main title as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Area appropriate)

(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

Witness reports is a tracing (large scale) of the coast near MORLAIX, France, showing German gun positions, troop positions, boom barriers, et cetera, given to Mr. Gilbert by a French staff Major, native of this part of Brittany, who has just returned from leave in France. Naturally he had to go into the Occupied zone en route. Mr. Gilbert has known this officer and his wife for nine months and is confident of their sentiments as being pro-us. However, this is the first time he has ever furnished us with any military information and it is quite possible that he has been so advised in this case by his superiors.

The notations of names, descriptions in English, et cetera, were inscribed by Mr. Gilbert under the direction of the French Major. The program noted in lower left corner are the steps to be taken in the opinion of the French, prior to making a large scale landing in this peninsula. That opinion considers simultaneous landings at this point and at another on the southern side of the Great Peninsula as the most effective means for taking Brest and maintaining a position in Occupied France.

Attention is called to the fact that the Germans have taken over all the large houses (chateaux) on estates, forming a second anti-air line of defense running along some 20 kilometers from the coast. Troop concentrations are, generally speaking, in this line and frequently moved from point to point in it. In the opinion of the informant, there were at the end of August, 200,000 German army plus five (5) mechanized divisions in Occupied France.

The same French officer given public opinion in Brittany as 30% pro-anglo-Naxon and 20% non-resistant to either side.

Mr. Gilbert has furthermore been advised that contact should be established with Mr. Marc Penher, a 30-year old French civilian, native of Morlaix, who escaped to England in June, 1940. His present whereabouts are unknown to his French friends here. Penher is reported to know every inch of this section of the coast, rocks, tides and weather, through having sailed around there all his life.

Distribution by Originator: General, Business, and Admiral Staff, London.

Printing instructions: This report is to be printed on the distribution blank below in which this particular copy of this report is to be marked and prepared for its final distribution. Indicate by check (✓) on this copy the complete distribution of other copies of this report.

Dist. to	Dist. by	Dist. on	Dist. by	Dist. on	Dist. by	Dist. on	Dist. by	Dist. on	Dist. by	Dist. on
Genl	✓	Admiral Staff	✓	Business	✓	General	✓	Other		
Naval	✓	Other								



CONFIDENTIAL

REF. 041-10,

U.S. Naval Airbase, FASBINE, Morocco.

Another party whose local knowledge about these matters and also the MOROCCAN (southern) side of the Great Pyrenees, is an Englishman (whose mother is a French Bretonne) named James Blackburn, an old friend of the informant. He was last known to be at Queens College, Oxford, in 1934.

W. A. EDDY  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

U.S. Tracing (only copy) forwarded to General McClure, London.

**Serial** 041-42 **Monograph Index Guide No.** \_\_\_\_\_  
(Start in a series each year, i.e. 1-40, 3-40)  
(To correspond with SUBJECT, give index and O.T. number of each issue. Make separate report for each issue.)

**From** U. S. Naval Attache **at** TARLEIR **Date** Sept 1942  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

**Reference** Vice Consuls G. L. Rounds and R. E. Knight  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

**Source** Personal Observations **Evaluation** NAF  
(As data, personal observation, publications, press, etc. with identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

**Subject** ALGERIA MERSA BOU ZEDJAR - Coastal Condi-  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Make separate report for each issue) tion.

Summary.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The following report, in reply to a confidential questionnaire in so far as it applies to MERSA BOU ZEDJAR, was received from Vice Consuls Rounds and Knight, by this Office, on Sept. 14th, 1942:

**I - Sea Conditions.** Answers to these questions are to be found in report filed on MAUTA region. Only variations are:

6 - The average height of the surf is greater than in the Mauta region, western part which is protected by the ARKEW headlands, as this bay opens towards the northwest, from where the prevailing wind comes.

9 - It is recommended that sea data about this area be obtained from the Polish Mission at Gibraltar. We know that they have dropped or picked up a courier here on more than one occasion.

**II - Beaches.**

- 1 - No coastal guns within range of MERSA BOU ZEDJAR.
- 2 - No machine gun posts within range of Mersa Bou Zedjar.
- 3 - No wiring within range of Mersa Bou Zedjar.
- 4 - There is a coast watching post above the fishing village consisting of four (4) native Douairs and one (1) non-com. There are other posts at about 15 kms on either side of the same side and occasionally - about once a day - patrols in between. Efficiency: from fair to good. There is a Navy lookout post on west point of BIKER BAY. It is connected by telephone with LOURMEL. Line could be easily cut (overhead).

- 5 - No minefields. None closer than Oran, where stock is very small.
- 6 - Road No. G-20 from LOURMEL (where it joins RN 2) comes to within a hundred feet of the beach. No obstruction between beach and end of road. Road is very good two lane, hard surface road all the way between LOURMEL and beach of BOU ZEDJAR. Road has to cross coastal hill range which here however does not rise about 800 feet; road itself does not go higher than 475 feet. A few turins; no steep grades. This is only access to beach and the road does not bisect bay until LOURMEL.

Distribution: Originator SOI, Gibraltar; General MacLure, London; Colonel Donovan, Washington.

There are 10 copies of this report. 1 copy each should be sent to the following offices (as shown in the distribution block below) for their information and for their use. Indicate by check (X) for this copy the complete distribution. This report is not to be distributed outside the limits of the distribution block.

A-S-C-D-E-F-G-H-I		Monograph	Archives	Naval	CinC West	Naval Air	Naval Air	Naval Air	M. I. D.	H. O.
100-150	100-150									
100-150	100-150									
100-150	100-150									

- 8 -

6/17/66

U.S. Naval Activities, SAIGON, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

- 7 - No parapets or other obstacles of any kind for tanks.
- 8 - The beach is not steep (12 degrees minimum).
- 9 - No tank traps. No dunes.
- 10 - No obstacles in approach to beach of BOU KHUAT proper.
- 11 - Don't know; but have been told by people who should know that holding ground is good all along this coast.
- 12 - No land mines.
- 13 - The beach in the eastern cove (the one which we have been talking about) is from 5 to 400 meters long and from 20 to 30 meters wide. For forming up purposes there is a flat area not separated from the beach towards the southern end; it is about 200 meters deep and adjoining the last stretch of the road. Also should be mentioned is a small fishing port near the village, average fishing trawlers come alongside of pier.
- 14 - In addition to the beach of BOU KHUAT proper which we have been talking about, there is another beach twice the size immediately adjoining. See sketch. This second beach, the eastern end of which is no more than 5 to 400 meters from the end of the road, is backed also by a forming up area in the central stretch and not separated from it by dunes. Between the two beaches there is a rocky point. The terrain at back of the point is rough but passable for motorized equipment, thus giving access to the road.

This is excellent spot for a landing party of fair size, about two regiments, with reasonably prompt forming up and advance. Defending elements would have to come all the way from CHAN or AIN THOUKHENT. At latter place there will be no more than four or five companies, even after the arrival of part of the Pakistan Tirailleurs Regiment, which is expected soon and which will be divided between CHAN, ARHEU and AIN-THOUKHENT. This is the least guarded and least protected beach of its size and possibilities of the Department. Of course, it does not offer the facilities for a large scale operation which are to be found in the MACOA region, especially in the ARHEU end.

(Sketch mentioned and photograph being forwarded to London).

W. A. REEK  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

Monograph Index Guide No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (By correspondence with 212571-12) (Make separate report for each such title.)

From U. S. Navy, Atlantic at TANANARIVE Date 20 Sept 1948  
 (City, town, post, district, office, station, or person)

Reference U.S. Reports by Lt. Harold and E. E. Knight  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Personal Observations and Interviews Evaluation W-1  
 (As official, personal observation, public hearing, press conference with—classify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, corrected, etc.)

Subject ALGERIA - MOROCCO Quantitative - Water Supply  
 (Within reported on) (Brain this as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Make separate report)

Summary—(Here enter careful summary of report, consisting of substance of abstractly stated, include important facts and figures.)

The following information, in reply to questionnaire of Bureau and Algeria, was received from Messrs. Roanda and Knight, by this Office, on September 14th, 1948:

1 - From where does the water supply for ORAN come from other than that from MISSAKOUMBY? The ORAN water supply comes from three (3) reservoirs: BRIBELIAN - 15,000 cubic meters a day; BAZ-KI-AIN - 4,750 cubic meters a day; FORT ALBIN - 500 cubic meters a day. Until September 14th, 1941, 26,000 cubic meters a day were pumped from ORAN but as the water level decreased by 1.67 meters during the previous four (4) years, the above reduction in the pumping was dictated. Since Sept 1941, the level has about held its own.

2 - Where is the water supply stored (reservoirs or water towers) before distribution to the town of ORAN, and what is the volume? The water reservoir is in the suburb of BOKMINE. A sketch map (1/50,000 scale) showing exact location of reservoir and beginning of pipeline to BAZ-KI-AIN, is attached. Another sketch map (1/50,000 scale) shows the pipeline's course from BRIBELIAN to the reservoir.

3 - Is there a boom or a net across the entrance to the harbor of ORAN, between the breakwater and the first wharf, appears to be a boom net. Is this boom drawn across the entrance to the harbor at night? Yes; it is drawn across the harbor entrance at 7:00 p.m., sometimes later - when a ship leaves the harbor.

4 - Is there a mine-field and, or a net boom on the general line between BAZ-KI-AIN and POINT CASABERTY? We have never been able to obtain conclusive information on this subject. From sources (2) we do believe reliable understand that the mine field put out during 1939-40 has never been swept. We further understand that the mine field is made up of two (2) lines: a - From about 500 meters off the shore to a point about 1 km off CASABERTY VILLAGE. b - From the shore to a point about 1 km off BAZ-KI-AIN VILLAGE, leaving a passage of about 200 meters wide between the two extremities. The correctness of the above seems confirmed by the fact that departing steamers invariably follow the

Classification: SOI, Gibraltar; General McClure, London; Colonel Donovan, Washington.

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No.	Date	A-1-C-1-D-1-E-1-F-1-G-1-H-1-I-1				Morg. Sec.	Admin.	Index	Gen'l. Serv.	Sec. Nav. Div. (Nav. Sec.)	War. Office	M. I. D.	S. S.
		1	2	3	4								
		Y. A. S. A. S.	S. A.	M. S. S.	Sec.	M. S. S. C.	C. S. S.	Gen. Sec. Per.	Gen. Sec. Per.	C. S. S. A. T.	Gen. Sec. Per.	Gen. Sec. Per.	

... after leaving ... they are ... observed a ship ... the ... the ... but are a little ...

5 - On the high ground above and inland from the old Spanish fort and BARRA GHEE at ORAN ... anti-aircraft or coast defenses ... noticed on the MERDJADJO Island from the old Spanish fort of BARRA GHEE have 4 - 90 mm anti-aircraft guns and these are manned by the Navy.

6 - For any reason he given for the heavy fall in the volume of merchant shipping at ORAN? The observers do not agree with the statement that there has recently been a heavy falling off of merchant shipping at ORAN during the recent past. ... in Algiers correlates the shipping information for all of North Africa, ... and including July, ORAN held its own compared to Algiers, with a tendency of improvement relatively during the last six weeks. The necessary work for August has not yet been done but from preliminary information inspected quickly there did not seem to be any sharp drop in volume. For a two week stretch there was no eastbound courier therefore the Oran merchant shipping reports were sent to Casablanca for cabling there. For unknown reasons these were sent to Tangier from where they were only mailed by the office of the Naval Attache. A copy of this report shows that the shipping was for "Tunisia (Oran)". It further indicated King's name as source and rounds as reference. Perhaps this strike of minor confusion had something to do with the impression that shipping has fallen off heavily here.

7 - What type of telephone equipment (I.T. & T., West. Etc., or Erickson's) is used by French telephone companies in (1) Algeria, (2) Morocco (3) Tunisia? Not answered.

8 - Accurate location of RW shops (if any) at ORAN? Can they do emergency welding, forging and rivetting? There is a RW shop at ORAN. It is situated in the suburb of VICTOR MERD, just east of the normal gauge line to SAHRA-BARRA-DU-REHLAG, between storage tanks of the Shell Company and of the S.A.F.C.E.

9 - Also, location and capacity of rock crushing and screening plants within 50 miles of ORAN. Do they need repair? What? There are three large rock crushing plants in the immediate vicinity of SAINT ANNE DE MERD EL KERRI and all are working for the MERD-EL-KERRI harbor project. They are all three connected with MERD-EL-KERRI harbor by overhead conveyors. One of these is about 1.5 km inland from SAINT ANNE and the two others are in the immediate vicinity east of SAINT ANNE. Can't give anything on capacity but this can be given as "important".

10 - Storage stocks of road tar, sand asphalt, or liquid asphalt available in ORAN at present? Practically none.

11 - A sketch or plot of the road ...

CONFIDENTIAL  
REF ID: A1

U.S. Coast Guard, Norfolk, Virginia

5/25/42

to ORAN - scale 1/20,000 or approximately equivalent. Attached  
under "A".

11 - Names and street addresses of all boat makers (with boat type and material of hulls, etc.) in ORAN. All these materials are available in the  
General stocks; Societe des Grands Hydrographes et Grands Bateaux  
des Hautes Alpes, (Paris; Bureau of Harbors, Avenue Victor (Boulevard)  
Harbors; Bureau: Jules Girard, 22 Ave Alexandre de Young, Paris.  
(President of local Maritime Engineers Association); St. Engineer,  
45 Rue Pasteur, Oran; Girard, 15 Blvd Hippolyte Girard, Oran.  
In 2. All stocks are 100%.

12 - Chemical analysis of water (both sources) used in ORAN, to  
show only: Hardness; turbidity (clearness); mineral salts  
present and bacterial purity. Will have analysis in a few  
days. The BRUNIAN water is very hard and very salty (about 2 1/4  
grams per liter). The water from HAL-EL-AIN is sweet and is con-  
siderably used for supplying the ships in the harbor. The France  
is mixed with the BRUNIAN water to improve it. Until 10 years ago  
the lower town had sweet HAL-EL-AIN water but now they have the  
same as the rest of ORAN.

14 - Name, home address, office address and telephone number of  
resident (French) city engineer at ORAN. Is he pro-Vichy or  
sympathetic to Allied cause? Engineer in charge of harbor of  
port: Mr. Baquens; office - Remparts; home - 22 Blvd de France  
de nuit; phone - 212-21. Engineer in charge of lighthouse, har-  
bor and buoy: Mr. Garcia; office - Mole de Centre (in port).  
Engineer for West-Oran: Mr. Bony; office - Moussemeh  
62 Avenue de la Republique. Engineer for East Oran: Mr. Eginard,  
office - 4 rue Calandini. Engineer, director of the Port of Oran:  
Mr. Le Brun; office - Mole de Centre (in port). Continents of the  
above five are not known.

(Sketches mentioned being forwarded to London).

W. A. HUNT,  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 250-411  
 Date 10-14-42  
 From U. S. Naval Attaché  
 Reference Vine Corsica I. I. 1000  
 Source Informants and Personal Observation  
 Subject ALBERTS ORAN Lighthouses

The following information, in reply to "Part IV of question" was received from Messrs. Bwanda and Knight, by this office, on September 14th, 1942:

M.B. About four to five months ago, we forwarded a book and supplement dated the end of 1940, or the first part of 1941, giving all light, beacon and navigational data for the Western Mediterranean. This book, unusually up-to-date in view of the current war, conditions and precautions would answer all questions asked. It is believed that a careful search in Tangier would reveal this book or trace of where it was sent. This publication was secured just before courier time and it was not possible to memorize the key points or to make notes, it should be constantly borne in mind that we have no safe filing place in Oran excepting on our persons. We respectfully ask that this be remembered and that when repeat questions are asked we cannot, as other offices can, consult our files but must start from scratch again excepting for what we are able to remember. In the impossibility of securing another copy of the book referred to, we submit the following information as well as a map (dated 1937) from which the bulk of the information was obtained.

Lighthouses and Beacon Lights. Starting from the Moroccan frontier (we know of no lights along the short strip of French Moroccan Mediterranean Coast) and travelling eastward, we find:

- Lighthouse, on point about 600 meters west of town. White flashes; fully visible at 22 miles; now working.
- Lighthouse, on island of this name 2 kms due north of the mouth of the ORAN River and 9 kms west of ORAN. White flashes. Fully visible at 22 miles; now working.
- Lighthouse, on main of tiny islands of this name north-west of ORAN. White flashes; fully visible at 22 miles; now working.
- Lighthouse, on tiny island of this name, 10 kms due west of ORAN.

COI, Gibraltar; General McClure, London; Colonel [unclear]

Serial	Op. No.	AS-C-1-1-P-1-E	Class.	Index.	Subject	File	Dist.	Coll.	M.I.C.	H.Q.
250-411										
64	110	235	Eq.	333	W.A.S.	100	250-411			PAT.

that the team is slowly outlined. During practice starts since air arrival it can be said that the team has been really thoroughly blanketed out but not one hundred percent.

It should be remembered that most nights are clear and that night visibility in this section is generally good.

7. - Same conditions as for (6) excepting that electric lights are scarce and villages after 11:00 p.m. are asleep and black. In the larger ones there are occasional street lights at intersections.

8. - No other prominent lights along coast excepting those mentioned in the lighthouse section. The distances at which they are "fully visible" indicate their relative prominence.

9. - Lighting: The lights at MONTI CRISTO, between ORAN and EL MANSOURIAH, where construction work is going on at night. There are many lights on the side of the mountain and these are visible from a great distance towards the sea and are very bright. This point is about one-half way between SAINT ALICE and EL MANSOURIAH and ORAN proper.

(Map being forwarded to London).

W. A. EDEY,  
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).



**NAVIGATION**

**POINT DE LA VILLE LIGHTHOUSE**, on small island, 1 mile NNE of the FORT DE LA POINTE. Red flashes, fully visible at 10 miles; working.

**POINT DE LA VILLE LIGHTHOUSE**, on small island, 1 mile NNE of the FORT DE LA POINTE. Red flashes, fully visible at 10 miles; working.

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**POINT DE LA VILLE LIGHTHOUSE**, on small island, 1 mile NNE of the FORT DE LA POINTE. Red flashes, fully visible at 10 miles; working.

In addition to the above, the entrances to the ports are marked by the usual small red and green lights.



In case of the lighthouses I know that the system of lighting has been modified because of the shortage of various raw materials. It is not known whether or not this change in lighting media has materially changed the visibility radius.

2. - Little can be reported at this time. Reference is again made to the navigation book referred to above. It might be worth while to mention the large red buoy about 1 km out from the foot of the point at CANASTEE VILLAGE and which marks the turn in the channel out of Gren. Leaving Gren, ships follow the shore until this buoy when they steer sharply to port and onwards.

4. - Comments made in first section.

5. - Ice above, none to our knowledge are temporarily blocked-off. They are either permanently out of commission or not working.

6. - In theory all lights should be hidden by lightning curtains. Along the front of Gren and other harbors, these curtains are permanently anchored and there are no other lights. In the other sections of the town, various lights are in use. However, it can be said that the system of lighting is in theory correct and that the lights are not working. It is not known whether or not this change in lighting media has materially changed the visibility radius.



AVIATION ITALIENNE (renseignements sûrs)

Le Fiat G.50 de la 393ème escadrille du 160ème groupe s'est abattu en feu le 19 septembre à Djërba. Pilote parachuté dont venait soi-disant de Castel Benito. Le No. 393 est peint sur le fuselage, mais le pilote a dit appartenir à la 375ème escadrille. Il confirme pourtant 160ème groupe. Considère que le G.50 est un appareil mauvais dont son groupe use les derniers exemplaires. Était perdu et s'est jeté volontairement en parachute.

20 août 1942	186ème escadrille en 509
5 septembre 1942	239ème escadrille en piqué en 502
2 "	197ème escadrille en 512
7 "	40ème escadrille G.A. en 507
4 "	escadrille commandée par le Capitaine <b>NELLA VALLE</b> Vittorio en 786
27 août 1942	section de vol autonome sur aéroport M.E.K. en P.M.23

Des éléments d'aviation qui devaient quitter Moggia début septembre pour l'Afrique ont reçu contre-ordre

AVIATION ITALIENNE (valeur non garantie)

3,500 parachutistes de l'école de Chivasso (école Wenger ?) ont été dirigés sur le Sud de l'Italie vers le 15 août 1942:  
 4 trains vers Reggio Calabria  
 2 " " Bari \*\*\*\*\*

Il y a un commandement allemand sur le terrain de Chinisia (Sicile).

SECTEURS POSTAUX ITALIENS

P.M.1	Italie	P.M.25	Italie
P.M.2	Grèce	P.M.27	Lybie
P.M.3	Lybie	P.M.28	Péloponèse
P.M.6	Italie	P.M.29	Péloponèse
P.M.9	Rome	P.M.30	Italie
P.M.10	Piùve	P.M.31	Lybie
P.M.11	Cyrénaïque	P.M.32	Balkans
P.M.12	Montenegro	P.M.33	Balkans
P.M.16	Italie	P.M.34	Lybie
P.M.18 (7)	Péloponèse	P.M.37	Albanie
P.M.18	Balkans	P.M.38	Péloponèse
P.M.19	Italie	P.M.40	Balkans
P.M.20	Italie	P.M.41	Italie
P.M.22	Albanie	P.M.42	Italie
P.M.23	Italie et Péloponèse	P.M.43	Italie

**NUMEROS DES SAUX ITALIENS (suite)**

P.M. 45	Peleponèse	P.M. 93	Balkans
P.M. 46	Italie	P.M. 94	Italie
P.M. 47	Italie	P.M. 95	Italie
P.M. 48	Peleponèse et Albanie	P.M. 96	Lybie
P.M. 49	Albanie	P.M. 97	Balkans
P.M. 50	Italie	P.M. 100	Balkans
P.M. 51	Balkans	P.M. 101	Balkans
P.M. 52	Albanie	P.M. 102	Russie
P.M. 53	Lybie	P.M. 103	Italie
P.M. 54	Lybie	P.M. 106	Balkans
P.M. 55	Lybie	P.M. 109	Lybie
P.M. 58	Balkans	P.M. 110	Italie et Balkans
P.M. 60	Balkans	P.M. 112	Italie et Balkans
P.M. 61	Balkans	P.M. 113	Italie
P.M. 62	Balkans	P.M. 116	Russie
P.M. 63	Sicile	P.M. 121	Balkans
P.M. 64	Sardaigne	P.M. 123	Lybie
P.M. 65	Balkans	P.M. 131	Italie
P.M. 66	Italie	P.M. 132	Lybie
P.M. 67	Bari	P.M. 133	Italie
P.M. 68	Balkans	P.M. 151	Italie et Albanie
P.M. 69	Novare	P.M. 152	Russie
P.M. 70	Albanie	P.M. 153	Italie et Albanie
P.M. 72	Lybie	P.M. 154	Italie et Albanie
P.M. 73	Albanie	P.M. 155	Macedoine
P.M. 74	Italie	P.M. 156	Italie
P.M. 75	Sardaigne	P.M. 167	Italie-Lybie
P.M. 76	Italie	P.M. 200	Italie
P.M. 77	Italie	P.M. 201	Italie
P.M. 78	Alexandrie	P.M. 202	Balkans
P.M. 79	Italie	P.M. 203	Italie
P.M. 80	Italie	P.M. 206	Balkans
P.M. 82	Balkans et Russie	P.M. 207	Italie et Balkans
P.M. 83	Russie	P.M. 210	Lybie
P.M. 84	Italie	P.M. 220	Tripolitaine
P.M. 85	Lybie	P.M. 221	Tripolitaine
P.M. 86	Balkans	P.M. 250	Lybie
P.M. 88	Russie	P.M. 402	Italie et Balkans
P.M. 91	Balkans	P.M. 550	Mer Noire et Orbe

- 3 -

ARMEE ITALIENNE (très sérieux)

On a des indices certains de l'arrivée en Cyrénaïque de divisions italiennes du type normal, s'est-à-dire d'une valeur offensive médiocre. Ces renforts paraissent correspondre à la volonté de défendre les arrières, aussi bien secteur côtes que Sud.

Ont été signalées:

Division Pistoia  
 " Parma  
 " Assietta  
 " Frioulo  
 " Eug.di Savoia (1ère Division Celere)  
 " Tevere 1  
 " Tevere 2  
 " Savoia  
 " Folgore (identifiée récemment avec Q.G. à Nalut, Tripolitaine; Folgore peut représenter l'appellation conventionnelle d'une autre division)  
 " Macerata (153ème division)

Il n'est pas certain que ces divisions soient complètes. Il s'agit peut-être seulement d'éléments de ces divisions. Ce qui est net c'est que leur arrivée a provoqué une crise de ravitaillement qui s'est traduite par une réduction sensible des rations (voir dernières notes à ce sujet).

MARINE ITALIENNE (très sûrs)

Ces jours-ci les bateaux suivants ont eu des accrochages le long de la côte tunisienne:  
 vapeur "Palombo" échoué à Nabeul, désechoué et coulé (sousmarin?)  
 voilier à moteur "Aquila" coulé (sousmarin?)  
 vapeur "Carbonia" coulé par l'aviation  
 remorqueur (?) "Castor" échoué à Djerba - reparti (?)  
 vapeur "San Michele" entré se réfugier à Sousse. A reçu délai de 24 heures pour en sortir (signalé par télégramme).

Le vapeur français "Iberia" a également été coulé. Il transportait du sucre et du bois à Sfax.

ARMEE ITALIENNE (très sûr - source Sud)

2ème groupe escadrons Saveris - Zone marine  
 Colonel MAZZARI commandant le 20ème parc spécial automobile (carburants) en P.M.3  
 Colonel VASCO commandant sous-sector Zone  
 1er bataillon de génie Lybique - Tripoli

- 4 -

AVIATION ITALIENNE (très sûr - source Sud)

Major GARGIULO commandant Icteria Tripoli  
Colonel MARFIRE, secteur ouest aviation de Lybie  
145ème escadrille R.N. à Pisciotta. Son effectif au 19 septembre  
était 4 Cant Z.501 (tous efficients) et 5 Cant Z.506 (efficients)  
parmi lesquels ont été identifiés les Cant Z.501 matricules 35588,  
35528, 35596.

La 145ème escadrille était récemment en 755 P.M.3700.  
Le 18 septembre dans la matinée un groupe de 10 chasseurs  
italiens est passé devant Marsa Zuara route ouest.

MARINE ITALIENNE (très sûr, Source Sud)

Le 21 septembre un bateau devant Zuara, route est  
Un motonave est allé de Zuara à Tripoli dans la nuit du 22 au 23/9.  
Le 19 au matin un gros bateau marchand devant Zuara  
Navire hospital "Laurana" à Zuara le 19 septembre.  
3 dragueurs de mine le 18 septembre devant Marsa Dila, route ouest  
Dans la nuit du 18 au 19 un gros cargo a fait route de Zuara  
à Tripoli, vitesse 9 noeuds.

MARINE ITALIENNE (source "Beppo")

Les italiens ont perdu un assez grand nombre de MAS par  
fragilité des coques en bois. Depuis 1942 ils fabriquent des  
MAS en duralumin de 120 T. Sont armés de 4 torpilles dont 2  
sous tenailles sur les côtés et 2 en réserve; 2 mitrailleuses  
Breda de 13,2, 1 lance-bombes sous-marines; poste radio de 250 w.  
Cinquante de ces MAS seraient partis de Brindisi pour Valona et  
la Grèce en Avril. Cinquante seraient à Catane.

Des "Orilli" et des "Canots torpilles" ont été embarqués sur  
un certain nombre de cuirassés, croiseurs, contre-torpilleurs.  
Des torpilleurs et des sous-marins auraient été dotés de torpilles  
homines (?).

On se plaint du manque de force de l'explosif de la torpille  
italienne; des ingénieurs allemands sont arrivés pour y remédier  
à Naples et à Fiume.

Le croiseur de 16,000 T. "Trento" aurait été soulé lors de la  
rencontre de juin à Pantelleria.

Les croiseurs "Montenapoli" et "Eug. di Savoia", gravement  
endommagés, sont en réparation à Taranto.

Le voilier à moteur "Sisto di Marsia" a été coulé en mars 1942  
le voilier à moteur "Agrigento" a été coulé en mai 1942.

Le yacht auxiliaire "Sisto di Marsia" gravement endommagé est en réparation.

- 5 -

MARINE ITALIENNE (Source "Esppo")

Outre les MAS en duralumin, les Italiens construisent des auto-siluranti de 150 T. Ils sont armés de 2 tubes fixes à la proue, 2 lance-bombes sous-marins à la poupe - 4 mitrailleuses, vitesse 48 à 49 noeuds. Construits à Livourne. Ces engins auraient participé au dernier combat en Méditerranée - 4 sont entrés à Tripoli vers le 26 août.

Le 35,000 T. "Imparo" aurait terminé ses essais et serait entré en escadre.

Le "Roma" sera prêt également dans deux mois.

"Le Cavour", sorti de Tarante, est rentré en escadre.

Un cuirassé type "Littorio" est en réparation à Tarante.

Le navire hôpital "Fevere" coulé à Tripoli au début de l'année a été renfloué. Prêt à repartir.

Les italiens construisent des chalanda à moteur en bois - vitesse 12 noeuds avec 2 Diesels. Peuvent charger en cale 300 T. plus 4 chars sur le pont. Armés d'un 76 et de 6 mitrailleuses de 20 m/m. Les armes des chars peuvent coopérer à la défense. Débarquement sur les plages grâce à un panneau avant qui peut se rabattre.

Trois voiliers à moteur de 500 T. dont l'Emilio, sortis en 1942, ont du rentrer en cale. Leur coque soudée ne supporte pas leurs moteurs trop puissants.

Viareggio construit des voiliers à moteur de 100 à 250 T. en série (6 en mai dont 3 pour la Société Aochetti de Gènes).

Source sérieuse :

Entre le 1er et le 5 août sont entrés à Tripoli :

vapeur "San Simoni" de 15,000 T venant de Naples avec 3,000 hommes (escorte de 7 contre-torpilleurs)

vapeur "Orto" avec 4,000 T. de vivres

Le 6 août, vapeur "Paoline" avec 3,000 T. de charbon et 2,500 T. de vivres.

Le 15 août vapeur "Giulia" avec 7,000 T. de vivres et 20 gros chars.

Source "Esppo"

Venise construirait des sous-marins type japonais à deux hommes.

le 26.9.42

P.S. On nous signale que la construction par les  
allemands d'un terrain d'aviation dans les environs de Saint-Denis.  
Ce terrain englobe 3 villages qui vont être démolis et les tra-  
vaux sont déjà commencés. L'église du premier village ayant servi  
à combler le sinistère!!

Le terrain du Mans (Arnage) était au début septembre dans un  
presque total état couvert de morceaux de grilles déposés 2 x 2  
verticalement. Il devait cependant y avoir une piste maintenue  
car il y avait au moins un appareil, motor en route, près des  
hangars.

Je suppose que ce qui suit est connu, mais je le précise  
cependant: les allemands camouflent les wagons citernes en France  
en construisant autour un faux wagon à marchandises au moyen de  
lattes et de bambou.

Le Me.110 dit "ZESTORER" équipé définitivement la chasse  
de nuit allemande. Il est équipé de détecteurs ultra-sensibles,  
d'où, pour éviter l'interception des magnétos, on a été  
conduit à l'équiper de moteurs DIESEL-JUNKERS.

La base de CHINISIA (près de TRENTE) en Italie est une  
base de stockage allemande de la LUFTWAFFE; en particulier  
tout le matériel de la LW. destiné à l'armée italienne y est  
concentré.

On signale que nous n'allons plus à LIVOURNE chercher du  
carburant d'aviation. Il y aurait donc lieu de s'occuper, dès  
maintenant, des dépôts qui s'y trouvent.

On signale que, d'ici deux ou trois mois, le code OTVA  
va être remplacé par un nouveau code (qui vous parviendra en  
temps utile).





FORCES FRANCAISES COMBATTANTES  
MISSION DE GIBRALTAR

*Douglas*  
GIBRALTAR, le 2 octobre  
2, LIBRARY CAMP  
TEL. 661

Le Capitaine J. Vaudreuil  
French Liaison Officer  
au  
Colonel Eddie

Merçi de votre mot de sympathie a la suite de la  
carte de mon ami Clemorgan. J'attends des instructions de  
Londres pour savoir les mesures que je dois prendre et l'au-  
torisation de partir d'aller a Tanger.  
Je vous envoie ci-joints pour votre information  
des renseignements recueillis par 2 officiers francais ayant  
été en contact avec tout dernier.

*Sincerely yours.*

*J. Vaudreuil*



RAPPORT

IMPRESSION GENERALE SUR L'AFRIQUE DU NORD

LE MAROC

Il y trouve une grande analogie avec la zone libre, avec les différences suivantes:

1) L'Afrique du nord semblait (lors la phase de séquestration de certains jeunes gens souhaitant rejoindre l'armée Française et qui se sont trouvés à bout de ressources, dans les sous-bois d'Oran, de Jazoul nos, de Tunis.

2) De nombreux réfugiés étrangers qui ne démontent pas contre l'ennemi connu ont une influence heureuse dans les milieux qu'ils ont traversés ce sont les Polonais, les Belges, les Espagnols, les Italiens anti-fascistes, les tchèques et les Yougoslaves.

3) Les mesures de police semblent avoir été plus rigoureuses que partout ailleurs, notamment contre les étrangers ci-dessus mentionnés, dirigés à la région étrangère et actuellement traités comme des malheureux. Les autorités se désintéressent totalement de leur situation matérielle et morale, malgré la sympathie qu'ils inspirent à leurs chefs directs: (Camp d'Im Bou, d'Oued Zem, de Bou Arfa, etc..)

4) Les mesures de police et de terreur quand elles sont connues, sont prises non en vue de promouvoir partiellement contre l'arbitraire.

5) Les services porteurs se désintéressent plus que partout ailleurs de la vie nationale (Bergeot à Alger, Epinet à Casablanca) et du milieu d'officiers et de snobs, en éprouve la déception de la victoire de l'Allemagne.

6) Les indigènes obligés à donner à la propagande allemande de la suite de celle qu'on peut normalement concevoir en France, les motifs invoqués doivent être exclusivement:

a) l'Allemagne comme article de foi, pour éliminer les autres articles de propagande des 166 membres de la Commission de contrôle.

b) l'absence absolue dans nos alliés, l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, de toute pensée de nous supplanter, dans nos colonies.

c) l'article de foi est indispensable pour éviter la création de courants et les causes ambitieuses et cupides, pourraient se servir de l'indigène comme (el Glaoui, El Mokri)

7) L'absence de tout fait de la propagande au Maroc, et dans les autres pays, la commission Allemande dépense des sommes énormes pour convaincre la majorité des indigènes envers leurs chefs indigènes, les troubles seraient à prévoir.

8) L'absence de quelques chefs indigènes alliés au plus haut grade.

9) L'absence d'Abd el Krin pour conjurer ce danger.

10) L'absence de l'Allemagne au Maroc, vu leur passage à la Réunion en 1937, non seulement alors que la France pouvait alors compter absolument sur son allié.

11) Monsieur Rabent à El Djouid (Km 45, route de Casablanca à Marrakech) est un homme d'un bon sens lors de la 14-18, ancien président des mutilés et des combattants au Maroc, jouissant de l'estime et de la sympathie de tous au Maroc, très lié avec Abd el Krin pour éviter, par ailleurs, les relations Françaises et Espagnoles au Rif en 1925, et pour avoir servi à l'armée Française.

12) La liaison entre lui et les autorités Françaises n'aurait rien de particulier de cet avis, et servirait volontiers de médiateur entre la présence d'Abd el Krin et l'Allemagne, par exemple, suffirait à empêcher les services du Maroc Espagnol ou il a conservé tout son prestige.

13) La question d'Abd el Krin est également en Afrique du Nord, pour les mêmes raisons.

au sein de l'equipe qui...  
...utilisées...  
...était promise...  
...de quelque...  
...ne veut plus de l'exploitation...  
...de la domination...  
...l'autre acceptent l'equité de traitement...  
...est une question qui doit être entendue et sur laquelle il  
...peut lieu de revenir.

Les Juifs patriotes, et ils sont légion, acceptent de rester dans  
...afin de ne pas exciter les passions, ils acceptent les mesures  
...imposées par le gouvernement car il savent bien  
...leurs tourments cesseront le jour où les Français redeviendront  
...de la France.

La vie en Afrique du nord et particulièrement au Maroc n'a  
...modifiée du fait de la guerre, pour les gens fortunés, seuls  
...gens du peuple ont éprouvé les effets de la réquisition (vins  
...).

En ce qui concerne, nous pouvons cataloguer les individus d'Afrique du Nord  
...  
...les Français parfaits et parmi lesquels je compte à dessein  
...et étrangers que j'ai mentionnés et qui malgré leur misère,  
...à se sacrifier pour leur patrie d'adoption.

Ce sont tous ceux qui ont souffert de notre défaite, qui ont  
...l'envahisseur, qui ont compris, de leur doctrine, que tout  
...et administré par lui, est condamné à ne plus être qu'  
...d'esclaves.

Ces gens là, savent, que dans la multitude des problèmes qui se  
...devant le peuple Français, le premier de tous, le seul qui  
...actuellement, est la libération de la France métropolitaine.  
...autres problèmes, on les résoudra après; il nous faut d'abord aller  
...à l'ouvrage.

Ce groupe figurent tous les Alsaciens, Lorrains, tous les gens  
...ont occupés, qui ont vu leur pays sous la botte, et qui par là  
...vivent avec les leurs. Il y a tous les honnêtes gens excédés de  
...le sens patriotique et nos libertés, à assister à des  
...arbitraires, à des interventions étrangères agaçantes de sur-  
...que les manuels d'histoire attribuaient aux régimes déchus,  
...condamnations pour des crimes illusoire, à des harrangues  
...à convaincre que des illettrés ou des imbeciles.

Ces gens de toutes confessions de toutes formations  
...n'y a plus d'opinions politiques, tous sont unis par le  
...de la restauration Française derrière le chef qui  
....

Les diligents ou attentistes: Ce sont ceux qui pensent exacte-  
...à la catégorie précédente, mais qui n'osent pas le

... en a qui cachent leurs sentiments pour garder leur place,  
...que celle-ci est lucrative, il y en a aussi qui jouent ce jeu  
...seul au jour.  
...d'accord en tous points avec les précédents, sauf sur le  
...d'intervention.

Leur argument, est que la situation morale de la France et sa  
...éprouvées se sont sensiblement améliorées depuis l'armis-  
...en conséquence, il y a lieu d'attendre encore.  
...argumentation tombe au moment où, on envisage le cas d'une  
...intervention massive Française. Tous sont d'accord  
...la nécessité d'intervenir, mais la décision ne viendra pas d'eux.  
...la plus importante, non effectif ne  
...qu'au moment de l'action, quand toutes les décisions  
...prises, et les responsabilités assumées par ceux du pre-  
....

Les Petitionnaires: Les Petitionnaires sont en nombre as-  
....

Le retour de Laval...  
...considérablement leurs effectifs  
...considérant que la  
...à l'Etat  
...à l'Etat  
...à l'Etat

mais la connaissance de l'histoire  
à lui même, le peuple ne peut pas  
antérieures qui parcourent les différents  
factus dont l'histoire est faite.

Le relaps de Weygand lui fut mis en face de son rôle de  
des gens qui déclarent un arrêt de guerre, mais nous parti-  
sissent au moins contre une trahison.

La reprise de Laval porte à Petain un coup fatal, fait il cela  
pour éviter le pire, dit-on les premiers jours, mais quelques  
jours se passent et prouvent que "un pire état de gouvernement  
n'existait pas."

Des histoires marseillaises commencent à courir, le concernant,  
celles qu'elles n'auraient pas été de mise il y a un an, on l'oublie  
à cause de son grand âge et c'est pourquoi il a encore des partisans.

La Légion, le serment des Légionnaires semblait garantir une  
information de citoyens désintéressés, tout dévoués à la patrie.

La tendance s'est manifestée bientôt de poursuivre des buts d'  
secret par ailleurs, un excepte quelques fervents, restes fervents  
il y a encore quelques mois, qui suivaient leur chemin honnêtement  
sans s'apercevoir que tout était change autour d'eux.

Il n'est plus question que de répéter fidèlement les enseigne-  
ments reçus, sans faire intervenir ni la conscience ni la raison,  
bref il n'est plus question de se demander, si l'on agit encore dans  
l'intérêt de la Patrie, et les chefs de sections de Casablanca repe-  
tent, sans les comprendre, les enseignements que le général Fougère  
donnait de Vichy sur les perspectives de la guerre.

Les trois hypothèses envisagées, une paix de compromis serait éta-  
blie sur le dos de la France, l'Angleterre victorieuse garderait  
l'essentiel des colonies, bref, il faut souhaiter la troisième, car alors  
l'Allemagne victorieuse, disposerait de tellement de territoires à  
choisir qu'elle se désintéresserait à coup sûr des nôtres." Et cette  
tendance était transportée sans discussion.

La situation s'aggrave, du fait de la construction des S.O.I.  
par une grande partie des jeunes gens du P.P.F. déjà armés.

Il est à noter que le nombre de porteurs d'insignes de la Légion  
a augmenté considérablement, lors du retour de Laval.

La tendance est germanophile, la Légion dont les éléments jeunes  
sont presque exclusivement des membres du P.P.F., a abandonné son  
chef: Petain.

Les incertitudes jetées de chefs de sections, parmi lesquels sont  
des officiers, (colonel de Marignan, colonel Girniet, à Rabat et  
autres), ont eu pour effet de conduire cette association, vers la tutelle  
de l'Etat.

Il semblerait que cette association, s'inspire  
d'un plan même, appliquée à un Français de 1942, car tout Fran-  
çais de notre époque ne, dit germanophile, doit cesser de se faire  
appel à la patrie, il se dit Français.

Il faut pourtant en Afrique du Nord, répondre à toutes les con-  
ditions nécessaires; soit: être illettre,  
être imbecile,  
se complaire dans la douce existence actuelle  
se illusionner encore sur les promesses ger-  
(maniques

des gens qui réalisent ce tour de force de répondre à cette  
condition.

Quant on est en état n'avoir pas lu; MEIN KAMPF, il faut tout ignorer  
de l'histoire de France, il faut tout bannir tout souvenir de la guerre  
de 14-18, il faut considérer comme faux, ceux de la guerre de 40, consi-  
dérer comme vrai, tout ce qu'a dit Verdunnet en 39 et 40, tout ce que  
dit de Gaulle, de Laval, ceci nécessite un effort d'imagination  
extra-ordinaire.

On avoue comme Armandeau, est venu faire des conférences, sur la  
France dont Laval, ma par son patriotisme sur les instances de Petain, a  
été nommé à gouverner la France encore une fois, en la mettant à la  
disposition de l'Allemagne. Il discourrait devant la Légion sans être  
interrompu, il y avait quelque chose de pénible à entendre des gens  
français, parler sans cesse, braver la liste de ses stupides ar-  
guments.

La vérité est que ces gens ne savent rien, ils ne peuvent rien dire  
que des banalités, au lieu de cela, ils insistent que ces gens ne sont  
que des lâches, ils insistent que ces gens ne sont que des lâches, ils insistent  
que ces gens ne sont que des lâches, ils insistent que ces gens ne sont que des lâches.

Ainsi, nous ne pouvons pas dire que les gens de la région sont satisfaits, car ils ne sont pas satisfaits de leur situation nationale.

Il y a un autre aspect aussi dans la situation. De plus, il y a une gloire, une fierté, une fierté de l'argent mais ils sont accablés du mépris général. Le peuple, sauf quelques éléments tares à leur solde, tout le monde se réjouit, car tout le peuple souhaite la libération.

Il y a une crainte du Bolchevisme, est-ce l'origine des conceptions de ce genre? Mais, nous ne pouvons pas croire que les gens des dernières catégories soient nombreux. Ils tiennent la nuit du pays par ce que la loi leur impose, ainsi que les fonctionnaires animés d'un esprit de loi, ils ont l'argent mais ils sont accablés du mépris général. Le peuple, sauf quelques éléments tares à leur solde, tout le monde se réjouit, car tout le peuple souhaite la libération.

Les armes ont été livrées à la Wehrmacht. Comme munitions, nos canons ont 100 coups par pièce. Il nous faut donc nous appuyer sur nos alliés, et nos alliés sont tous ceux qui combattent.

Il y a une propagande adroite et sûrement mensongère. Le revirement que j'ai constaté chez certains officiers de l'armée d'armistice, cela me fait penser que j'avais commis auparavant, au raisonnement de la conscience droite, nous sont revenus bornes, nous sommes jaloux; je crois qu'il faut tenir compte aussi de cette situation. L'egoïsme des officiers de l'armée d'armistice, dans l'action, arrivés à se complaire dans cette formule: "ceux de l'armée française, de la vraie, de celle qui vit, de celle qui meurt pour la France. Au moment où le bruit courait de l'existence d'un débarquement américain en Avril, nous étions en train de construire pour un débarquement en force.

Il y avait trois formes envisagées: 1) une opération limitée que le but ne pouvait être que l'occupation de certains ports; 2) une opération qui aurait conduit à l'occupation de l'Afrique du Nord; 3) un débarquement en force, ayant pour objectif immédiat: Bizerte, Tunis, l'Italie.

Les deux premières formes ne comptaient aucun partisan, la troisième comptait pas de la dire 80% des suffrages. Les gens ne voulaient pas une élatte importante, Casablanca a dit que les forces unies dans l'impossibilité d'intervenir, les forces grossières unies motorisées et blindées, du matériel, des armes et des munitions débarquer sur nos côtes d'Algérie occidentale. Concurrentement des appels à l'armistice ont affirmé, le but et les intentions ultérieures de cette opération avait toutes chances de réussir et d'entraîner la chute de l'armée d'armistice, et de provoquer la mobilisation des forces.

Il y avait une propagande haineuse n'avait été faite contre l'opération. Le débarquement anglais comportait quelques adversaires, de nombreux arguments stupides mais trop souvent rabachés à la construction se trouvaient dans les deux régiments de la région.

Il y avait un débarquement envisagé sous cette troisième forme, il y avait une mobilisation des bonnes volontés, les alliés avaient dit que tout d'abord les ex-volontaires de la région et de l'étranger.

Il y avait des volontaires pour débarquer les premiers au pays.

Il y a une crainte du Bolchevisme, est-ce l'origine des conceptions de ce genre? Mais, nous ne pouvons pas croire que les gens des dernières catégories soient nombreux. Ils tiennent la nuit du pays par ce que la loi leur impose, ainsi que les fonctionnaires animés d'un esprit de loi, ils ont l'argent mais ils sont accablés du mépris général. Le peuple, sauf quelques éléments tares à leur solde, tout le monde se réjouit, car tout le peuple souhaite la libération.

... de la République...  
... deux lignes de...  
... un docteur...  
... le parti a...  
... l'empire...  
... les Gaulois...  
... Allouart...  
... les applique...

... aux administrateurs de l'armée...  
... aux administrateurs de son...  
... aux dirigeants de la libération...  
... et ligne de la France...

... parti, et a été un parti...  
... chiffres, mais je crois bien que tous les...  
... lignes de ce nom, au moment de l'existence, ils...  
... étaient 100% au...  
... parti, le n'a pu être effacé par les...  
... la perspective du retour du Front...  
... augmentation...: Tobrouck, Massacra, Koufra, Bir Achim!

... font partie aussi tous ceux qui ont éprouvé le désir de servir,  
... on peut facilement imaginer que seraient l'effectif des forces fran-  
... ces libres si périodiquement, nos jeunes et vieux volontaires, avaient  
... embarquer dans les ports du Nord, de Normandie, de Bretagne, de Corse,  
... d'Algérie, de Tunisie, et avec quelle ferveur ils auraient suivi tout  
... qui sont morts et meurt, ou dans les prisons de Barcelonne, tous  
... actuels sont des volontaires qui à bout de ressources  
... de passer, ont dû chercher refuge dans l'armée d'assi-

... ceux qui cherchent un chef, beaucoup avaient choisi  
... imitations finissent par laisser ses plus farouches  
... "il a dû le voir fléchir" dit on, pour l'excuser, "mais il n'  
... et il a été coulé par son entourage d'ambitieux".  
... parti, il est parti sympathique, son enro-  
... lui a fait du bien, mais en attendant de lui un acte  
... reproche certains de ses relations.

... notes, les vrais chefs ont été écartés, comme un  
... le disait un jour au Général Huntziger, celui-ci  
... "ce qu'il faut  
... "

... Gaullistes, ce sont les autres et, combien en

... indique par un de nos amis, poursuivi pour propos  
... de la police qui l'interrogeait: "Quand  
... 20 millions de Français, quand vous en aurez  
... aux travaux d'écarter pour 10 ans, vous serez à peu près  
... la Révolution Nationale, telle que vous l'

... resterait bien peu en effet, il ne resterait que ceux qui  
... "pour ce que ça dure".

... par la plupart des officiers et des civils...  
... sont...  
... Allemagne qui ont très...

... autre part les allemands n'ont...  
... trouve contre eux les Américains qui...  
... Les Américains semblent très...  
... je crois qu'un corps de...  
... auraient prévenus, qu'il est...  
... auraient leur appui total.


... il est déjà très difficile de savoir ce que pensent les indigènes...  
... il est encore plus difficile de savoir ce que pensent les...  
... riches et cultivés, qui ne sont pas...  
... une croyance très commune. On trouve...  
... et très troubles par les divisions des Français...  
... Marocains, probablement soutenus...  
... beaucoup qui sont beaucoup prêts à se vendre au plus offrant...  
... Juifs: indigènes en général plus cultivés que les Arabes, et les...  
... comprenant une aristocratie tout à fait européenne, sont...  
... événements et naturellement avant tout germanophobe...  
... l'impression que la plupart d'entre eux restent fidèles à la France...  
... confiance dans le redressement de la France, et leur attachement...  
... sont souvent admirables, et cela d'autant plus que l'anti-...  
... et particulièrement lâche, qui se manifeste en ce moment...  
... est dirigé à peu près exclusivement par des Français.

... l'exécution des ordres formels que j'avais reçus, mettre à...  
... de l'atelier industriel de l'air les membres du personnel ayant...  
... deux grands parents juifs, ils étaient environ une trentaine; des...  
... une dactylo des ouvriers (forgerons, bourrelliers, peintres) et des...  
... Je les ai presque tous reçus individuellement avant leur départ...  
... avaient eu des parents tués au service des Français, la dactylo...  
... officier d'infanterie prisonnier à Nuremberg; aucun d'eux...  
... une parole de révolte contre la France, et tous m'ont dit qu'ils...  
... bien, que ce n'étaient pas les vrais Français qui les persécutaient...  
... étaient sûrs qu'un jour la France reprendrait son...  
... place.

... au Maroc, mérite un développement supplémentaire...  
... on se trompe lourdement en considérant que les...  
... anti-semites; l'antisemitisme actuel au Maroc...  
... entretenu par les Français; d'une part les juifs sont...  
... indigènes, que les commerçants, industriels et colons Français...  
... qui les ont exploités et ce sont ceux qui leur ont fait et leur...  
... la concurrence la plus sérieuse dans le commerce et l'in-  
... et même dans les professions libérales (médecins, avocats)...  
... certains Français (inutile de dire que ce ne sont pas les...  
... politique d'attiser les querelles entre arabes et ber-  
... d'autre part afin de détourner le mécontente-  
... de voir grandir... la suite des restr-  
... sucre et les cotonnades. Je me souviens d'avoir...  
... à Aïfa, chez Thouvenot, une Française...  
... plus facile que d'éviter la révolte des Arabes, il n'y a...  
... le Mellah (quartier Juif)...  
... Foudis, cela suffirait pour les calmer.

... de la question est assez curieux; beaucoup d'arabes...  
... ce n'est pas la même chose qu'arabes riches) décou-  
... Berbères (châleux) sont des Aryens, et que eux Arabes sont...  
... ethnologues, comme des semites et malgré que les conte-  
... envoyés au Maroc par le Maréchal (sans doute par exemple)...  
... remplace le mot; anti-semite par le mot; anti-judaïque...  
... et considèrent qu'ils savent tôt ou tard vires par...  
... juifs indigènes se sont adroitement procurés des...  
... l'entourage du Sultan, et qu'ils ont été jusqu'à maintenir...  
... que les Juifs Français qui étaient venus à...





QUESTIONS AUX LEADERS MAROCAINS DE L'ALGERIE

QUESTIONS AUX LEADERS MAROCAINS DE L'ALGERIE

...al que j'ai travaillé depuis l'armistice. ... que j'ai faite en Algérie, Tunisie et en A.O.F. ont été ... que j'ai pu faire des observations intéressantes à propos

...telle ou telle partie de la population Marocaine a ... l'arrivée et continuera sans doute à le faire ... se rapportent aux Marocains, tels que je cro-

- ... les groupes suivants:
- ... revendeurs, importateurs, industriels privés.
- ... ouvriers, petits commerçants, petits fonctionnaires.
- ... civils.

LEADERS MAROCAINS DE L'ALGERIE

... Ils souffrent d'une situation ... gens de cette catégorie dans la ... beaucoup d'illusions sur leur va- ... le préparé, d'abord par manque ... critique, ensuite par ce que la ... celle de Vichy, ne com- ... ont tout à fait à leur portée. ... la promotion parmi eux, de ... surtout pour les colons qui sont dissemi- ... beaucoup d'entre eux sont membres de ... "Volontaires de la Révolution Nationale" ... que au début de l'

... les couches le plus ... l'activité au pouvoir des ... qualification précie ... dans lequel ... conditions de travail des ... leurs droits de ... classe: communiste.

... nouveaux revirements ... victoire ... l'entrée en guerre de l'Algé- ... beaucoup possèdent que l' ... par des ma- ... travail forcé des indigènes, à ses sa- ... la concurrence juive. Certains ... à cette fin le re- ... administration française par une administration

... été donnée par ces deux points: ... les indigènes via à via de leurs emplo- ... par les largesses sans bornes ... commissions pour les ... les indigènes et surtout de ... salaires ... au travail ... pour la France

...cette sorte de...  
...l'artourage...  
...cette de ces...  
...aux quelles les Allemands...  
...le minerai de cobalt...  
...pour la partie...  
...que vos germanophiles...  
...les...  
...seulement, les Anglais...  
...les Américains.

...exemple: j'irai à l'improvisiste dans le bureau de l'ingénieur d'aéro-  
...Thevenot, (mais, en partie par conviction en partie par intérêt  
...je le trouve en conversation avec un propriétaire  
...le cobalt, qui m'est présenté sous le nom de Mouriaux,  
...pour l'orthographe) celui-ci se croyant entre amis, expli-  
...il a vendu avant 1939, aux Allemands, le cobalt in-  
...dispensable aux usines d'essence synthétique; selon lui les Allemands  
...ont grand besoin de rendre  
...il arrivera à leur en procurer sans passer  
...les groupements économiques de la métropole, ou des  
...lui serait perdre une grande partie des  
...silencieusement pendant pres d'  
...je fais clairement comprendre à M.M. que nous  
...me répond sans la moindre gêne  
...j'aime aussi les  
...ils m'ont déjà fait gagner beaucoup d'  
...si je fais de nouveau des  
...ils les Gaullistes et les

...le pétrole, actuellement président  
...de Cessa, faisait-il il y a six mois la con-  
...ne peuvent plus remporter une  
...et surtout de ne pas per-  
...avec les Américains, d'autant plus  
...les Gaullistes". "Je vois toutes  
...et j'essaie de lui faire com-  
...nous est imposée par les  
...contre les Américains mais  
...qui soutiennent les Anglais."  
...volontiers un Petinisme outrancier  
...l'argument d'autorité: "Le Maréchal vous in-  
...est le meilleur vis à vis du  
...pour ramener les égarés dans

...les Germanophobes semblent comprendre de  
...le retour de Laval au pouvoir, la nécessité de  
...s'accroît au dépend des Vichysois, et ils  
...de Gaule; ils ont en général beaucoup  
...qu'ils espèrent toujours voir arriver  
...plus d'intérêt que les Anglais dans la  
...trou-  
...l'attitude des Américains aux antilles  
...laisse en place les autorités Vichy-  
...travail pour les  
...la continuation de la lutte, c'est  
...de Gaule; cette attitude des Américains aux An-  
...constamment rappelés, par les

...l'influence du Clergé, je la crois presque nulle  
...l'église catholique, toujours très  
...l'affirmation de certains privile-  
...très peu de celle religion, chez les  
...la plupart des prêtres Marocains se comportent comme  
...mais nullement comme des apo-

...vous...  
...ils vous...  
...les Américains...

... un évitement plus facile...  
 ... avait été nulle...  
 ... préparés quel mouvement...  
 ... propagande en faveur de la "race" française...  
 ... et supprime Français travaillant sous ses ordres...  
 ... un seul... a demandé à partir et encore...  
 ... il est marie à une Allemande... distribution d'un questionnaire...  
 ... chacun devait indiquer: le nom, le lieu, la date de naissance de...  
 ... quatre grands parents, et éventuellement des autres grands parents de...  
 ... (le race également devait être indiquée), et questionnaire à pro...  
 ... avec tous, des produits injurieux à l'adresse de Vichy. Des ren...  
 ... confiants avec les micaes propres n'ont été fournis...  
 ... ateliers de...  
 ... employés de bureaux, dessinateurs, petits fonctionnaires...  
 ... comme... on trouve un assez grand nombre de légionnaires, ils...  
 ... les mots d'ordre d'obéissance au Maréchal, mais presque tous...  
 ... de la... se cabraient, dès qu'on leur demandait, s'ils...  
 ... la victoire Allemande. C'est cependant, dans cette catégorie...  
 ... qui se recrutent le plus de membres du R.P.F. ou de r...  
 ... (d'ordre légionnaire).

... employés qui travaillaient sous ses ordres, l'un d'eux, un...  
 ... était probablement chargé par le R.P.F. du fait de...  
 ... deux autres, deux agents techniques, Bécour et Pournier...  
 ... à grouper les ouvriers dans la lutte anti-allemande, mais...  
 ... maladroitement, et si peu discrètement, que j'avais...  
 ... ateliers, dont je connaissais les sentiments...  
 ... la comédie vis à vis d'eux.

5) FOURTE MIADRES.

... fonctionnaires d'un rang assez élevé...  
 ... pour la plupart...  
 ... beaucoup plus cultivés que les colons ou les industriels...  
 ... beaucoup moins sensibles à...  
 ...

... la proportion de Vi...  
 ... variable avec chaque administration...  
 ... donner quelques indications, assez sûres, sur...  
 ... des autres.

... (qui me semblent être en minorité) ne sont pas, comme...  
 ... par la propagande, ils sont beaucoup...  
 ... utile pour conserver leur pla...  
 ... de leur maîtrise...  
 ... de leur maîtrise...  
 ... de leur maîtrise...

... (à condition qu'ils soient d'une certaine importance) et surtout...  
 ... des propos très...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...

... des services centraux installés à...  
 ... des Américains...  
 ... de victoire...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...

... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...

... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...  
 ... de leur...

Il n'y avait pas un seul officier, dans les services  
 militaires professionnels d'aviation, qui travaillait dans  
 les services Casablanca, et il est difficile de considérer la présence à Vichy  
 d'un qui s'occupait couramment des affaires militaires, des services militaires  
 professionnels, et en l'occurrence d'un grand nombre de sous-officiers  
 d'aviation, mais en congé d'armistice, et qui devraient entrer à l'atelier  
 industriel de l'air, comme ouvriers civils de l'air, malheureusement dire  
 que s'ils étaient généralement de bons sentiments, ils étaient souvent des  
 bons camarades, et des parents, pour lesquels l'opposition du gouvernement  
 de Vichy, était une chose facile, pour leur manque de goût pour le travail.  
 Pour les officiers, il couraient de distinguer entre ceux qui sont en acti-  
 vité, ceux qui ne le sont plus.

Un assez grand nombre des officiers mis d'office en congé d'armistice,  
 n'ont été par ce que notoirement incapables d'exercer convenablement leur  
 métier (ce qui ne veut pas du tout dire, que tous les officiers de l'armée  
 armistice sont compétents et capables.) Beaucoup de ces officiers mis en  
 congé, ont essayé de se faire une nouvelle situation, dans les divers corps  
 dans les régiments, d'autres ont tenté d'obtenir des faveurs diverses en  
 faisant les propagandistes de l'ordre nouveau, et finalement il semble  
 que la majorité des officiers en congé soient Petinistes, et nous  
 nous souvenant de manipulations, il en est de même pour les officiers en retrai-  
 te.

Une minorité comprenant entre autre les officiers mis en congé sur  
 leur demande, ou par ce qu'ayant manifesté ouvertement leur hostilité à  
 certain, ou contre Vichy; pour de Gaulle; elle déploie une activité très  
 grande, dans certains cas, et malheureusement pour des raisons, dont  
 il n'est pas facile de ne pas être exclus, elle ne semble pas vouloir travailler  
 avec les officiers en service; chez ceux-ci pourtant, la proportion des  
 germanophobes et même des Gaullistes est, surtout depuis le retour de La-  
 val, incontestablement plus élevée que chez les officiers en retraite ou  
 en congé, et cela malgré l'activité des services M.A.

Les appellés ci-dessous, en quoi consistent ces services M.A. (Massees anti-  
 nationales).

1. La formation, ou l'établissement de l'armée, un officier est  
 chargé de la répression des menaces dites antinationales;  
 2. Le seul travail, qui lui est demandé est de lutter contre le

Leur tâche est de rapporter sur le moral des hommes et des offi-  
 ciers M.A. place à l'échelon supérieur du commandement  
 hiérarchique, il est en outre chargé de faire  
 passer, conformément à des directives qui lui sont transmises,  
 les ordres par l'ordre hiérarchique; par exemple, l'officier  
 commandant deux troupes du Maroc, s'adresse directement, aux  
 officiers M.A. de la division de Casablanca, ceux-ci s'adressent directe-  
 ment aux officiers M.A. des régiments de la division, et ainsi de suite;  
 3. Les officiers en charge du fonctionnement de ce service M.A. par le com-  
 mandant d'aviation, commandant des services administratifs, qui avait été  
 un officier M.A. de l'atelier industriel de l'air de Casabla-

Il est difficile de distinguer, pour faire le point des diverses opinions  
 des officiers de terre, de l'air, de mer.

En l'occurrence de l'armée de terre (en service)  
 L'occasion d'en rencontrer un assez grand nombre, dont je ne  
 puis pas donner des noms, chez mes camarades anciens polytechni-  
 ciens, étaient en général des capitaines ou des commandants.  
 Les officiers qui les professaient aux masses et les renseignements  
 sont nombreux, je crois pouvoir dire que la grosse majorité d'entre  
 eux sont germanophobes.

Les officiers sont Gaullistes mais leur position comporte des points, que  
 je ne partage pas avec les officiers en service, et qu'il est important de  
 préciser; ils sont disposés à tous les sacrifices pour chasser l'em-  
 pire, mais ils ne veulent pas être utilisés par les Anglo-saxons, ils  
 veulent les "aider" en tant qu'alliés. Certains de mes camarades m'ont  
 dit qu'ils ont été plusieurs fois repétés, qu'ils sont prêts à fournir tous les renseignements  
 possibles, à de Gaulle et à exécuter toutes les missions qui  
 leur seront confiées par de Gaulle; mais ils ne veulent à aucun prix com-  
 muniquer des renseignements, sans agents Britanniques ou Américains.

...qu'il n'appartient de le faire...  
...ne venant pas non plus...  
...qui s'occupent d'exécuter certaines missions...  
...par des gens dont ils soient sûrs qu'ils sont...  
...des chances d'aboutir...  
...semblent petit espoir...  
...actuels, même les vieux généraux...  
...diriger un mouvement...  
...semble très mal...

...d'officiers germanophiles...  
...de Syrie... la plupart des officiers ne comprennent pas...  
...Anglais ont renoncé ces officiers germanophiles...  
...fait, paraît-il, sans conséquence...  
...de l'armée de l'air... la proportion des Gaullistes est certai-  
...plus faible, que dans l'armée de terre... les opinions sont très  
...il est impossible de dire quelque chose de général...  
...officiers semblent surtout regretter de ne plus pouvoir voler et  
...je crois que ces officiers sont pres a se battre contre l'impos-  
...qu'on leur permette de voler ad libitum...  
...ne manifestent pas d'opinion très précises...  
...aussi bien incapables d'exécuter avec ardeur des ordres de l'  
...supérieure, que de désobéir

...de l'armée de mer... A de rares exceptions près, tout ceux  
...entendus parler étaient avant tout anglophobes, et anti-Gaullistes  
...mais pas toujours germanophiles... Une opinion très répandue  
...est que les Anglo-saxons, et surtout l'Angleterre, ne soutiennent  
...la France combattante, et que s'ils n'obtiennent pas une  
...sur les possessions de l'Axe, ils n'hésiteront pas à lais-  
...Gaullistes; l'exemple de la flotte d'Alexandrie, dont les  
...sont parés à mieux traités, que ceux des navires de la France  
...de la flotte de la Martinique dont les officiers, sont  
...pour les Américains, quoique ne cachant pas leurs senti-  
...anti-anglo-saxons; ces deux exemples sont constamment  
...l'opinion exprimée plus haut, et je crois qu'ils ont eu  
...de Darius, les rares officiers germanophobes  
...seraient passés assez nom-  
...dans les rangs de la France Combattante... Il est très proba-  
...l'Angleterre avait mis à la disposition de de Gaulle, la flot-  
...l'Amérique avait mis à la disposition de de Gaulle  
...ces bateaux auraient constitué un centre d'  
...attirer les équipages (presque tous  
...officiers germanophobes, mais fort proba-  
...revirement d'opinion, parmi beaucoup d'officiers  
...inattentive, et qui résisteraient difficilement au désir  
...bateaux battent pavillon Français, et  
...flotte importante...

...des Polonais, Belges, Espagnols, venus au  
...et pour la plupart, dans des camps de concentra-  
...contre les Allemands, et n'ont pas changé d'  
...nom d'une Française; Madame Surlet, femme d'un  
...dont j'ai parlé plus haut, et qui s'oc-  
...et une discrétion parfaite de rassurer des secours  
...très souvent

...ce que pensent les nombreux Italiens, et  
...depuis longtemps, mais j'ai pu constater en  
...aux qui auraient voulu être embarqués, dans nos  
...ou manœuvres, ne paraît pas moins être à de  
...pour les Anglo-Saxons et leurs alliés, contre  
...les Barbares (con-  
...les...  
...difficile...  
...après  
...après



... des services...  
... de l'Allemagne...  
... de la guerre...  
... de la France...

**FRANCE 1940**

Avant le début de cette guerre et avant le commencement des hostilités l'ensemble de l'ER allemand en France était divisé en 7 branches:

1. Le Service d'information de la A.O. (Auslandsorganisation de la NSDAP)
2. Le Service secret du "FRSI" (Propagandaministerium - Goebbels)
3. Le "Sicherheitsdienst" de la Gestapo (SS) - Gestapo, 4<sup>e</sup> section.
4. Le Service du "Verbindungsstab" (Rudolf Hess)
5. Le SR du "Generalstab des Heeres"
6. Le SR du "Generalstab der Luftwaffe"
7. Le SR de la "Kriegsmarine"

Evidemment ces sept services - en tout cas les quatre premiers - ne sont pas toujours différenciés d'une manière catégorique.

En ce qui concerne à présent ces différentes branches, leur organisation et leurs méthodes:

ad 1) la A.O.

C'est la A.O. = la "Auslandsorganisation" du parti nazi qui groupe et encadre tous les Allemands à l'étranger. La AO, antérieurement indépendant de la mission diplomatique (ou mieux: le service diplomatique antérieurement indépendant de la AO) est depuis février 1938 installée dans le "Auswaertige Amt" et dans les missions diplomatiques à l'étranger; le chef de la AO, NOBLE, est directeur au "Auswaertige Amt", les "Landesgruppenleiter" dans les différents pays administrativement au personnel diplomatique et sont par conséquent inattaquables. Le Landesgruppenleiter en France était K. ERICH, depuis la guerre en même qualité à Rome.

Le Landesgruppenleiter a sous ses ordres le "Ortsgruppenleiter" de la capitale et les "Stützpunktleiter" des villes principales du pays.

Le "Ortsgruppenleiter" Paris était le Baron von ... A part la Ortsgruppe Paris, la AO maintenait en France des "Stützpunkte" à Lille, Nancy, Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux et la Loire. Les "Stützpunktleiter" à Marseille, Lyon et la Loire étaient en même temps les consuls du Reich. A ... le point d'arrêt de l'armée.

A Paris la AO contrôlait:

... les services...  
... de la France...

Mais tous les membres remplissent un questionnaire (nom, adresse, langue, situation militaire, relations sociales, etc.) L'exemplaire de ce questionnaire va à Berlin, un autre est mis à la disposition de l'attaché militaire, le reste est en copie aux recruteurs du HR est grandement facilitée.

La AO contrôle en plus les organisations militantes suivantes:

La "Deutsche Frauenhilfe", groupement de femmes. Ce service dirigé par Heinrich, Paris, s'efforce surtout à recruter des femmes de ménage, des boues, etc., dans les usines françaises.

La section française de la "Deutsche Arbeiterfront" groupement dirigé par les ouvriers et les employés allemands en France sous la direction de M. BETTENDANN.

La "Deutscher Hilfverein", association de secours, était une organisation de mouchardage par excellence. Il était dirigé par M. ROCHLING.

L'organe de presse de la AO en France était la "Deutsche Zeitung in Frankreich", dirigée par le docteur KURT IHLEFELD, qui était en même temps agent principal de surveillance au "Sicherheitsdienst" de la Gestapo. (Ihlefeld travailla d'ailleurs de vers en Afrique du Nord, printemps 1959, pour "étudier" les fortifications françaises en Tunisie. Il a été renoué à temps).

En plus la AO contrôle:

(a) Le "Deutsch-Akademische Austauschdienst" (office universitaire allemand) Paris, Boulevard St. Germain, dirigé par le docteur SPRING. Ce service place en France des "étudiants", sélectionnés par la SS et ayant tous fait leur service militaire. Homme de liaison entre ce service et l'attaché militaire était l'ancien directeur de ce service, le capitaine Werner FICHT, qui passa pour un antihitlérien et qui travaille maintenant comme commandant au "Commando des Heers".

(b) Le "Hotelaustauschdienst" (service d'échange des employés d'hôtel).

La section de contrôle secrets de la AO, organe de liaison avec le "Sicherheitsdienst", est le "Informationsamt de la AO", dirigé directement de sa centrale à Hambourg. (Informationsamt veut dire service des parts).

et (c) le "Sicherheitsdienst de la Gestapo"

Ce service, formation secrète de la 4<sup>e</sup> section de la "Geheime Staatspolizei" ne maintenait pas en France une direction régionale mais des "hommes de confiance", comme Ihlefeld et autres.

Ce service rempli 4 missions principales:

(a) La surveillance des cadres du parti nazi, de la science allemande et de la mission diplomatique. Un des surveillants de la mission diplomatique à Paris était par exemple le télégraphiste de l'ambassade.

(b) La surveillance des contacts politiques par des hommes de confiance. Ce service avait des agents opérant dans les milieux politiques en France (mais pas dans les milieux sociaux). Un homme de confiance de "l'Institut de Recherches" travailla à Paris pendant la guerre.



(c) "Versteckter Lissol" (contrôle de la circulation des véhicules) et la Mark contrôle des transactions illicites de la banque "Sicherheitsdienst" employé dans les bureaux de la banque de la rue des prometteurs et en grande ligne des petits qui passaient pour les agents, "victimes de l'espionnage".

Aux consulats - Mr. GERICQ, pendant cette guerre à Bruxelles, en outre le banquier ROTHSCHILD, bureau 21 rue de la Paix, depuis la guerre d'abord à Amsterdam et tout récemment à New York.

(d) Les "Reichskommando", groupes d'executeurs et de provocateurs, recrutés dans les bas-fonds.

A part le "Hafenendienst", dirigé de Hambourg, le Sicherheitsdienst en France, abstraction faite des hommes de confiance dépendant de Berlin, fut surtout dirigé par la section de la Gestapo à Bruxelles, les petits agents utilisant le Luxembourg pour passer inaperçus en France.

ad 5) le service du "PROMI"

Le service du Proxi (+ Propagandaministerium) se divisait en deux sections:-

- (a) La mission secrète d'information et de corruption.
(b) La mission de presse proprement dite.

La mission secrète était dirigée par un attaché spécial, membre du corps diplomatique, pro forma sous les ordres de l'ambassadeur, en réalité dépendant directement du docteur Goebbels.

Les attachés spéciaux étaient:

- 1933/34 le Baron von DINKLAGE
1935/37 le Docteur SCHROEDER,
à partir de 1938 jusqu'au début de la guerre: Mr. O. FAEH.

Leur mission était d'informer le ministère de propagande sur tout ce qui se passait en France, de lancer les "notes d'ordre", d'essayer par des intermédiaires de corrumpre la presse française etc.

Parement, le représentant officiel du Propagandaministerium à l'ambassade allemande était le docteur FEHL, "Pressebeirat de l'ambassade"; Tous les journalistes allemands accrédités en France étaient réunis dans une association spéciale, composée d'une cinquantaine de membres: Cette association était dirigée par le docteur Nicolaus von GROTE; plusieurs membres de cette association sont été impliqués dans des affaires d'espionnage, par exemple le représentant de la "Berliner Boersenzeitung" à Paris, M. BACH, condamné à mort en 1940 par le conseil de guerre de Nancy. Un autre journaliste de cette association M. FELL, représentant le "Berliner Lokalanzeiger", était un officier de renseignement réparti pendant la grande guerre en service de la IIIe; Feli s'installa au début de la guerre à Bruxelles, de même que le fameux journaliste REINHOLD qui passa officiellement pour un grand ami de la France (il a écrit le "Der Kampf in Algerien") et qui est en réalité un agent important du "Fernnachrichtendienst".

Il est à remarquer que certains journalistes allemands en France à partir vers le 15 août 39 sous l'égide de la presse, la plupart de ces journalistes devaient se rendre à Paris, les autres en France et certains devaient se rendre en Algérie...

Le Verbindungsstab, le centre de liaison, a été créé par le Reich à la fin de la guerre mondiale. Ribbentrop, le ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Goebbels et le Reichsmarschall Helmuth Weitzel (Reichsmarschall Kittel). Au Verbindungsstab, Werner Vilhelms von Berlin, exerçait au dernier lieu, les renseignements recueillis par les différents bureaux des SS allemands. Mais il est évident que le bureau Werner au Verbindungsstab est sous l'autorité personnelle de Hitler un propre service de renseignements, une espèce de super-Gestapo uniquement responsable devant le Führer et son remplaçant. Ce service est destiné à la fois au contrôle de la Gestapo et le même et au complètement des renseignements parvenant des services compétents. Hitler, se méfiant des renseignements qui lui sont fournis par les différents organes officiels et secrets, voulant d'ailleurs toujours faire du neuf en réglementant les méthodes classiques, porte un intérêt tout particulier à ce service au sein du Verbindungsstab. Les subterfuges les plus machiavéliques, la désorientation, le bluff colossal, tous ces véritables "Armes secrètes" de Hitler sont forgés dans ce bureau. Nous reparlerons ensuite de quelques exemples typiques de la guerre des "fausses nouvelles" qui ont joué un rôle capital dans le succès final.

Ribbentrop, avant de devenir ministre des affaires étrangères du Reich, fut émissaire de ce "Verbindungsstab", de même que disciples, les Abetz Schilling von BARDELEBEN, professeur GRUBER et tous ces envoyés spéciaux que nous avons vu à l'œuvre en France.

Une idée particulièrement ingénieuse du Verbindungsstab était la fondation du Comité France-Allemagne en abusant de la bonne volonté des organisations des anciens combattants français. Du côté allemand les négociations préliminaires furent menées avec les anciens combattants français par le "Reichskriegsopferführer" Oberländer - personnage insignifiant - et son secrétaire H. von KOBDEL (qui est en quelque sorte le premier parachutiste allemand, vu ses exploits pendant la guerre mondiale) et qui appartient précisément à la "clique Sachsenberg" dont nous venons de parler.

À Paris, les agents du Verbindungsstab entretenaient des salons mondains, littéraires et artistiques, lieux de rendez-vous fréquentés à la fois par la meilleure société internationale de la capitale, par les attachés militaires allemands et même par des allemands de marque qui passaient pour des "antifascistes".

Le plus connu de ces salons était celui de la famille von SCHNITZLER, (une von Schnitzler est une amie d'école de Mrs von Ribbentrop, née Heckell). Au début de la guerre ce salon se transféra à Bruxelles. Inutile d'ajouter que le ministre Sieburg se trouvait toujours, et à Paris et à Bruxelles en compagnie des Schnitzler.

Un autre salon de ce genre, financé par le Verbindungsstab était à Paris le salon de la famille von KURHMANN. K. est le frère du fameux Kuchlmann, secrétaire d'état aux affaires étrangères de l'Empereur. Kuchlmann et Schnitzler affectaient naturellement de désapprouver les méthodes violentes du régime Nazi de sorte qu'on finit à les prendre pour des gens très sympathiques.

Le Verbindungsstab a choisi entre autres un lot de jeunes dames allemandes de la meilleure société qu'on trouva en France et que les Reichsmarschall et Kuchlmann ont en relation avec des personnalités françaises influentes. Le brave professeur Werner de l'Institut Pasteur, secrétaire général du Comité France-Allemagne ne le voulait probablement pas croire qu'il était possible d'obtenir ainsi de ces jeunes dames par leur beauté et leurs talents, les services de l'Allemagne. La preuve de son mépris est que ces dames ont été envoyées à Paris, pendant la guerre, dans des salons où elles ont fait un contact avec les agents du Verbindungsstab.

... les services de renseignements allemands ont été très actifs en France pendant la guerre, utilisant à l'heure la méthode spéciale du bureau de la Neue Wilhelmstrasse.

Un autre de ces salons politiques a été tenu récemment par les activités à Paris au cours de cette guerre. Il s'agit des Allemands d'origine, ayant acquis la nationalité allemande, les Hasberg - des nazis fervents - sont les propriétaires des grandes usines de ce nom qui produisent en Allemagne de la soie artificielle et des matières explosives. En utilisant la visite de leur pays, les Hasberg restèrent jusqu'à l'invasion de la Belgique en liaison constante avec des agents notables du Verbindungsstab, en particulier avec W. Friedrich Sieburg.

Je reviendrons sur les agissements des agents du Verbindungsstab en citant dans un autre chapitre de cette étude quelques exemples saillants de désorientation politique, méthode spéciale du bureau de la Neue Wilhelmstrasse.

né 4/71 Les SR de la Wehrmacht (Armée, Luftflotte, Kriegsmarine)

Les services compétents ont dépisté et arrêté avant et pendant cette guerre nombre de petits et de grands agents de la Wehrmacht domiciliés en France ou émissaires spéciaux des bureaux de Berlin, de Casnel, de Wiesbaden et d'autres. Je ne reviendrai pas sur ces faits qui échappent d'ailleurs à mon champ d'observation. Je tiens néanmoins à jeter la lumière sur quelques traits caractéristiques de l'espionnage allemand en France.

La Méthode "Ouvverte".

Au cours des dernières années, particulièrement depuis l'intensification du réarmement allemand, l'Allemagne a efforcé d'organiser d'innombrables voyages individuels d'étude pour les officiers de la Wehrmacht, notamment pour ceux qui appartiennent aux différents échelons des états-majors. Il était de règle que les officiers destinés à opérer en cas de guerre en France passaient d'office une partie de leur congé quelque part en France. Ces voyages n'étaient nullement secrets. Abondamment pourvus de devises, ces officiers ont pu obtenir facilement des visas de tourisme. Leur mission était relativement simple: se promener dans une région choisie et ouvrir les yeux afin de retenir dans leur mémoire toutes les particularités intéressant l'E.S. allemand, tels que: les aéroports auxiliaires, la situation exacte des usines, des centrales électriques, des ouvrages en cours d'exécution etc. Défense absolue était donnée de prendre des notes ou de photographier. Si l'officier a pu nouer des relations, tant mieux. Un rapport obligatoire devait être fourni à la retour de ces officiers-touristes, comportant tous les détails des observations faites. Uniquement au cours de l'exposition aéronautique en hiver 1938-1939 la Luftwaffe envoya à Paris environ 500 de ses officiers. Les officiers avaient l'habitude de descendre à Paris notamment à l'hôtel de Georges.

Il est à remarquer que la Luftwaffe utilisait régulièrement les lignes de l'aviation commerciale allemande entre Paris, Marseille et l'Allemagne, en mettant à bord des avions de la Luftwaffe des émissaires et des officiers auxiliaires qu'on échangeait régulièrement et qui n'étaient pas traités par des autorités civiles mais des officiers de la Luftwaffe. Comme la Luftwaffe avait aussi des lignes de nuit...

Il est évident qu'avec ces réseaux de tourisme organisés, à l'Allemagne des sommes considérables.

(b) La Méthode Secrète

Vous avons parlé à plusieurs reprises des points d'appui créés par le SR allemand dans les milieux de commerce, dans les entreprises d'exportation et d'importation, dans les établissements de transports. Notons quelques-uns de ses points d'appui à Paris en relation avec les SR de la Wehrmacht:

Un agent venant de l'Allemagne arrivent à Paris se présente d'abord, pour entrer en relation avec son service dont il ignore évidemment l'adresse, à la "Anlaufstelle" installée soit dans une agence de voyage, soit dans un Hotel où il dit son mot de passe sur quoi le service prend contact avec lui. Un exemple: En relation avec l'espion JAHN cité plus haut, nous avons dépeint dans son temps le procédé suivant:

L'agent arrivant à Paris se présente à une heure convenue à l'Hotel Terminus, gare St. Lazare, où à cette heure-là le portier "ULFF (placé par le "Internationaler Hoteltauschdienst") est de faction. Comme mot de passe l'agent demande une chambre à trois lits par exemple. Le portier lui dit que l'Hotel n'est pas en mesure de satisfaire ses desirata et le dirige par un autre lieu où l'homme de liaison du service l'attend.

Nous venons de mentionner les points d'appui du SR parmi les étudiants (officier de liaison: Picht) et parmi les journalistes: Baron, Fell, von Grote, KRUG ZUR NIDDA et autres.

Dans la représentation parisienne de Siemens le SR utilisait à Paris les directeurs BUSCH et PASTERICK; à l'agence de Voyage HAPAG M. von BOEHN; à la représentation CENTROPA (chemins de fer allemands) le directeur STREIBL. L'agence de voyage Centropa avait une succursale camouflée qui était destinée à continuer en France pendant la guerre: il s'agit de la AMEROP, fondé par la Centropa avec capital américain et ayant son siège social à New York. Le personnel international de la Amerop était choisi par la Centropa, à Paris par M. Streibl.

À la maison parisienne de la I.G. FARBEN l'homme de confiance du SR allemand était le directeur VRAMER, à la chambre de commerce allemande à Paris M. KUNTZE. Pour des opérations bancaires était utilisé Mr. KOENIGSMANN (antérieurement M. ELJAT) de la représentation de la DEUTSCHE BANK.

Tout SR a comme tâche principale de se documenter sur la capacité de chargement (le débit) des différentes gares sur le territoire ennemi, sur l'ensemble du matériel roulant disponible, sa répartition et son état.

Ainsi, il y a quelques années, les Allemands et les Italiens prirent l'initiative pour créer au sein de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale à Paris un bureau annexe, le "Internationaler Beharlungsbüro", une espèce de bureau international de statistique ferroviaire. Ce bureau, d'apparence anodine dirigé par des ressortissants de pays neutres a rendu aux Allemands des services inestimables.

Enfin, nous avons vu que les Allemands avaient installé en France depuis le début de la guerre un réseau de bureaux de liaison de Paris avec les bureaux de liaison de Berlin. Ce réseau de bureaux de liaison de Paris avec Berlin était dirigé par des ressortissants de pays neutres à l'instar des services inestimables.

Le SE allemand s'efforce d'obtenir particulièrement à grouper les systèmes légionnaires de la légion étrangère, résidents en France, malheureusement non sans succès.

### LA GUERRE DES "FAUSSES NOUVELLES". L'ANNE DÉCIDENTE LE HITLER

L'information tendancieusement fautive et la désorganisation politique de l'adversaire ne sont pas une invention nouvelle des Allemands: cette méthode pour saper et désorienter l'ennemi est vieille comme le monde. Mais le 3<sup>e</sup> Reich a perfectionné et amplifié cette arme redoutable, la portant à un degré jusqu'ici inconnu. Voici quelques exemples de cette guerre de bluff, organisé par le Verhandlungstab:

1934/35 l'Allemagne proclame officiellement son réarmement aérien. En ce moment elle n'est pas prête à opposer une résistance armée à un veto éventuel des puissances occidentales. Aussi Goering appelle-t-il la petite flotte aérienne de quelques 250 avions de guerre sa "Risiko-Luftflotte". L'Allemagne a donc tout intérêt à laisser apparaître ses préparatifs dans le domaine de l'aviation de guerre comme infiniment plus impressionnant qu'ils le sont en ce moment. Bien sûr, les initiés en France sont au courant, mais il s'agit d'impressionner l'opinion publique en France et surtout en Angleterre et de la paralyser de peur. Les journalistes anglais et français reçoivent donc un jour la visite de quelques "anti-hitlériens" qui leur confient en secret des documents authentiques sur les nouveaux avions allemands, tout en indiquant des chiffres énormément grossis quant au nombre des avions construits. Un éditeur anti-hitlérien à Paris publie même un livre largement répandu en Angleterre "Dix mille avions allemands prêts au départ". Le matériel lui a été vendu par un journaliste se disant anti-hitlérien DUISBERG, en réalité agent du Verbindungstab.

Les mêmes manœuvres de bluff notamment en ce qui concerne l'aviation et l'artillerie lourde (en ce temps les points faibles du réarmement allemand) se répètent en Angleterre, et au moment de l'introduction du service militaire obligatoire en Allemagne, et au moment de la remilitarisation de la Rhénanie.

Vers 1936 se forme en FRANCE et en ANGLETERRE autour de quelques émigrés de marque qui ont l'oreille du Foreign Office et un peu du Quai d'Orsay la "Deutsche Freiheitspartei" (Parti allemand de la liberté). La Freiheitspartei représentée en France par le Dr. SPIECKER et l'ex-ministre KLEPPER, en Angleterre par l'ex-ministre TREVIRANUS (appartenant d'ailleurs à la clique Sachsenberg) prétend avoir en Allemagne des confidents parmi la haute bureaucratie du régime et les industriels qui n'attendraient que le moment propice pour renverser le 3<sup>e</sup> Reich. Vu la duplicité de l'âme allemande il est difficile de dire si Spiecker et Treviranus ont agi de bonne foi ou non mais il est certain que le Verbindungstab est arrivé à induire en erreur les services anglais jusqu'à 1940 en fournissant de faux renseignements par l'intermédiaire des confidents de la Freiheitspartei. Spiecker rencontrait par exemple depuis des années tous les mois à Bâle son confident allemand, l'industriel OTTO WOLFF, vicaire ami de Schleichner. Otto Wolff passa pour un anti-hitlérien mais en réalité il organisa en contact avec le Colonel SMITH toute l'exportation et l'importation du matériel de guerre allemand. Otto Wolff dit par ex. à Spiecker "Laissez Hitler faire, l'année va le renverser sous peu et alors la paix ne sera plus en danger". Spiecker se presse d'informer Londres et Sir Robert Vassall sur la façon dont ces informations par les voies de Treviranus en lui ont en contact avec le ministre des Finances du Reich Dr. Brüning et son ministre et le gouvernement anglais.

Les Allemands ont été contraints à l'usage de la force à l'égard de l'Allemagne. Les Allemands ont été contraints à l'usage de la force à l'égard de l'Allemagne. Les Allemands ont été contraints à l'usage de la force à l'égard de l'Allemagne.

En été 1938 vint à Londres le confident du Fischer, le capitaine WICKHAM (actuellement à St. Francisco), qui vint pour un demi-pourcent. Wickham alla voir Lord Halifax et lui raconta confidentiellement que Hitler se débarrassera avec peu de la clique belliqueuse du parti, de Ribbentrop et de Himmler mais qu'une attitude trop interventionniste de l'Angleterre empêcherait de réussir cette opération. Cet entretien Wickham-Halifax a déterminé en partie la politique flottante de Chamberlain dans cette époque.

On pourrait citer d'innombrables exemples de ce genre mais je pense que cette courte énumération suffit.

En parlant du SR allemand nous avons cité en première ligne des agents ressortissants de l'Empire allemand. N'oublions pas que la tâche des Services allemands à l'étranger a été largement facilitée par le fait que nombre d'Allemands de cœur sont de vrais ressortissants de pays neutres. Au Brésil par exemple vivent 125,000 nationaux allemands, la minorité ethnique allemande s'évalue à 600,000, la plupart d'entre eux ayant acquis la nationalité brésilienne. En Argentine vivent 140,000 allemands et en plus 100,000 naturalisés. Inutile de parler des autrichiens et des Tchèques des Sudètes. Parmi eux le SR allemand a trouvé pas mal d'appui. On a arrêté au début de la guerre les nationaux allemands en France, d'ailleurs seulement en partie, mais les naturalisés étaient inattaquables sauf en cas de flagrant délit.

Je me suis volontairement limité à cette esquisse sommaire. Néanmoins tout point qui présenterait un intérêt particulier pour le Service pourrait faire l'objet d'une étude plus approfondie.

Bar 4.00 meters water at base.  
River 2.30 meters water at base.


( Maximum high water above base 3.20  
At bar )  
( Minimum " " " " " 1.90  
At high water (Spring, Sept. & March) (1.90)  
Best at bar 7.00 m. worst at bar 5.00  
At low water (Spring, Sept or March) (1.90)  
at bar 4.00 m. 5.00 m.


In rainy season, rise and fall is often as much up the river as at the bar, dependent on wind or other winds, etc. Therefore, approximately same calculation applies, with substitution of 2.30 for 4.00 m. Average conditions next month, when good, have 1.90 m. up river, then had base 1.90 m. up river.

Next month estimate 12 to 15 days impossible to get into river (40% to 50%) but will not resist current but river may be blocked by sinking a ship, 60 yards is minimum width of channel.

Ref: 2.

French naval tide tables differ from ours basically as explained by sketch below:








EDDY FOLDER # VI

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			(1. <u>Assignment Orders to Civil Affairs Section</u> <i>Filed: Eddy - Personal Folder</i> )
			2. Report from Vice Consul <u>David W. King.</u> <u>Political Situation in Casablanca,</u> during and after D-Day.
			3. Technical report on <u>W/T Communication, Gibraltar &amp; N.Africa</u> during 10 days before D-Day.
11/22			4. Translation, unidentified source, " <u>Das Reich</u> <u>The Plan for ttack...German Correspondant,</u> concerning United Nations plans, etc.



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NAVAL ATTACHE

WAB:JPH

**SECRET**

Tangier, Morocco.  
November 23rd, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director of Strategic Services  
24th and E. Streets, N.W.,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

As I have already reported by telegram, you will know that I am in Tangier for a day or two and returning immediately to Algiers, for temporary duty in accordance with your desire and in accordance with temporary orders from General M. W. Clark, U. S. Army, copy of which is herewith enclosed.

As soon as political conditions settle down I shall gather reports on the several areas in which we have been operating and assemble them into a single report for you. It is obviously quite impossible to do this yet. In the meantime, I enclose copy of a report by David W. King of Casablanca and also copy of a report on the technical side of the W/T communication over our chain between Gibraltar and North Africa during the ten days before D-Day; this report prepared by Squadron Leader Malloy, who was in charge of the W/T operators at Gibraltar.

Respectfully submitted:

*W. A. Eddy*  
W. A. EDDY,  
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret.).

Enclosures:  
Three (3).

November 12, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Vice Consul David W. King, Casablanca.  
 Mr. Robert D. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC.

The last instructions and alert signals had been given during the day of November 9 to the resistance groups at Fez, Fes, Rabat-Sald and Casablanca. These instructions had been modified at the last minute by the notice that no sabotage was to be undertaken without the consent of friendly military authorities, in view of General Bethouart's plan to deny General Nogues and address troops and district authorities on a specially arranged radio studio, ordering that no resistance be made to the U.S. forces. Consequently, no sabotage was done.

However, General Bethouart himself modified his plan at the last minute, and went up to Rabat early in the evening to address an ultimatum to General Nogues to the effect that the latter either cooperate or submit to arrest. The plan failed, and General Bethouart was himself made a prisoner before midnight, while General Nogues warned commanders of land forces and Admiral Michellier of the expected arrival of U.S. forces. Michellier declined until about the last minute to believe the report, thereby decreasing the preparedness of the Navy at Casablanca. Before midnight, apparently on Nogues' orders, police forces went up to Anfa to assist the flight of the German and Italian commissions here. Rita, who was preparing to take a "roughneck" gang up to deal with the commissions, was made prisoner by the S.O.L. General Mayer and Mr. Bagby went up to Rabat before 4 a.m. to present General Nogues with the President's message. They were not cordially received, but were allowed to return to the Consulate. Before dawn the Consulate and its Annex were surrounded by SOI and Gardes Mobiles and the occupants held prisoners. The air bombing of the port started shortly after dawn. The Jean Bart was unable to fire its large guns. The docks were heavily shelled, and the D.C.A. batteries at El Hank were put out of action. Fighting was heavy at Ain Sebaa. The aviation field was bombed. The precision of the dive bombers was admirable. Civilian casualties from bombing were practically all and all military and naval objectives hit were practically wiped out.

On Monday night, the Consulate staff imprisoned in the offices were obliged to leave about midnight for internment in Kasbah Fez. The next day Admiral Michellier surrendered, and the population of Casablanca welcomed the entry of the American forces. On Wednesday the Consulate staff was returned to Casablanca. Estimates of casualties in the Navy varied between 950 and 2,000 killed, and popular feeling against the Admiral was high, especially as he was reported to have remained in his air-raid shelter during the battle, after ordering an ill-equipped fleet out to fight a superior enemy. Five navy ships and three submarines were sunk, the Jean Bart damaged and scuttled, six other naval vessels were or less badly damaged, seven large merchant vessels and a number of small craft were sunk. In addition to these, three vessels, the REQUIN, the LOMAIN, and the DAHONEY (merchant marine) escaped and ran aground between Marrakech and Fez.

Reports

Reports from resistance groups at Port Lyautey indicated that fighting had been severe, especially as French sappers sank landing barges in the river Sebou before U.S. fighters could overcome this opposition. Resistance in Meknes and Port Lyautey lasted about two days. Fighting else was fierce at Fedala but of shorter duration. There was less resistance at Saffi. The airfield at Rabat-Sald and the airfield at Marrakech were heavily bombed, also the field at Moulouza. Casualties on the French Moroccan side have not been published, it is believed that two battalions of Tirailleurs may have been wiped out.

**POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES.****Civilian population.**

The enthusiasm of the population over the entry of U.S. forces diminished rapidly during the next few days when it was found:

(1) that the Jews in Casablanca immediately got out of hand and provoked the Arabs (who were further stirred up by the S.O.L.) so that rioting went on for four days in the native city of Casablanca, with a number of deaths on each side;

(2) that de Gaulle sympathizers were not released, but that arrests of pro-American sympathizers continued;

(It was necessary to obtain immediate orders from General Patton forbidding military or civil executions without his order, to prevent the sudden "liquidation" of political prisoners).

(3) that the S.O.L. were allowed to resume their terrorist activities two days after the entry of the American forces, arresting de Gaulle sympathizers in their homes and assaulting in the streets wearers of de Gaulle or American flag badges;

(4) above all, that General Neguba and his clique of Vichyist district officials and judges were to be retained in office, and that the entry of the American forces was not going to change the political structure of the country.

The negotiations between the American authorities in Algeria and Admiral Darlan alarmed all but the relatively small pro-Vichy element and the Navy. The disavowal of these negotiations by General de Gaulle did not aid matters, and for more than a week the situation was tense.

**ARMY.**

A large number of the officers in the Army were in sympathy with the "Bethouart coup" and were furious at his interment and at the treatment meted out to Commandant Champagneux (who ordered his men not to resist). Various projects for the release by force of General Bethouart were conceived, and it was reported that some of the Affaires Indigenes officers had got the length of raising native militia for a "coup de force", before they could be dissuaded by promises of the General's speedy release. Further, they were indignant at the return of General Neguba to Morocco as commander of French Moroccan forces, declaring that he had behaved in an unbecomingly manner in fleeing to sea after ordering resistance, and that they would not follow him in action. It is no exaggeration to say that for two days there was a near-outing amongst officers in the Army. A tense situation was reported in Marrakech, where General Neguba had declared, three days after hostilities had ceased, that he would resist any American force approaching that city, and it was necessary to send a force of American dive bombers over the city for demoralized purposes.

they knew at the time to be futile, is over. One of the INDIANOGUET and JEAN BART reported that they were obliged to work their guns under the menace of their officers' revolvers. Port officers have declared their intention of obstructing as much as possible the use of the port by U.S. vessels. The morale in the navy and merchant marine is low, and some sabotage may be looked for. The Chief of Naval Police - a known pro-German, still is in office, and as he is in control of transmissions, still is jamming French broadcasts from London and U.S.A. while leaving Axis broadcasts free.

### Civil Administration and Public Services.

In almost every public administration and public utility service we have a number of friendly officials and employees willing to cooperate with us, but there also is a large number of men who are inclined to obstruction or even sabotage. It was apparent shortly after the entry of the American forces that the latter class of officials had received secret orders to be as obstructive and inert as possible in the execution of their duties and in the reorganization of public utility services. Practically no action was taken to stop rioting between Moors and Jews in Casablanca until pressure was brought to bear upon the French officials, while arrests of pre-Axis agents and sympathizers were blocked by secret orders from the Residency. Similar orders were given at the same time to continue arrests of pro-Ally sympathizers. One of the most active officials in this has been M. Poussier, controller of the district of Casablanca, who has been responsible for a number of arrests of degaullists by S.O.L. men.

### PRESENT SITUATION.

- (1) Firm measures have been taken with the Jewish community and its chiefs, and the inter-racial rioting has died down (for the time being)
- (2) Action has been taken in regard to the secret orders issued by the Residency concerning the arrests of pre-Ally sympathizers and the liberation of pro-Axis agents and sympathizers.
- (3) The S.O.L. are being dissolved.
- (4) The release of General Bethouart, and the appointment of General Giraud for North Africa, followed by the statement contained in the President's speech regarding the temporary nature of the set-up in North Africa, calmed down the effervescence in Army circles. Feeling against Neguib still is high and conditions are unsettled. Most of the officers are anxiously awaiting the arrival of General Giraud in Morocco to express their sentiments, and their grievances, to him.
- (5) No change in the attitude of the Navy.
- (6) All quiet in Marrakech, where General Martin has received American officers cordially.

(7) The civilian population is quieter, but not quiet; the President's speech having induced them to hope that there shortly may be a change of regime in North Africa. It is thought that conditions would be improved by (a) the introduction of a press outside of the control of the Mas group, which has no prestige; (b) judicious propaganda to counteract the effects of two years' Nazi propaganda; (c) revision of broadcasts from RADIO MAROC.

(8) It is the opinion of sincere co-operative French officers and civilians that there will be no genuine co-operation on the part of the French officers and officials still in power because they are frightened that the Germans may come back into Morocco, either through Spain and Spanish Morocco or by air direct to French Morocco. This is a genuine fear on the part of General Nogues. Mr. Hardion, Monsieur Poussier at Casablanca, the ranking Generals and their staffs. They believe that our Task Force will push on to Tunisia, leaving Morocco unoccupied and at the mercy of German and Italian fifth column activities and at the proper moment, by a German-Spanish invasion force. They are worried because such vital points as FES, MEKNES and OUJDA, on the way to Algeria, have not been occupied and are open to sabotage or raids from Spanish Morocco. Points of specific proof:

(a) General Nogues has told his officers and officials that we are to be considered as invaders pure and simple.

(b) A French Military Mission of thirty (30) men has been assigned to our Headquarters. The purpose of this Mission is to keep control of all key institutions in their hands and **slow things down rather than put us in contact with the technical heads and get things going.**

(c) If we made contact with any co-operative head such as Mr. Zimmerger or Jenes, of the Post, Telegraph-Telephone, he is either removed or severely reprimanded.

(d) The anti-aircraft batteries are still manned by French army and navy crews and the officers commanding the batteries have received orders not to fire on any axis planes.

(e) No move has yet been made to remove some fifteen thousand (15,000) Italian, German and other enemy subjects from the coast where they are in a position to signal us off there and pass information by W/T and over the Spanish-Moroccan border.

The mobilization that is going on is being used to send friendly French officers and men to points in the interior where they will be cut off by the American Forces. P.P.F. and S.O.L. men are only being mobilized if they can be put in key positions such as posts and telegraph.

To sum up the situation, the authorities in power are playing their cards in such a way that if the Germans should return they could clear themselves of any accusations of co-operation with us.



S-2-P-1

U. S. C. SECRET

November 10th, 1942.

(LOWAY OPERATION)REPORT ON W/T COMMUNICATIONS.

1. I think that it is fair to say that the W/T network covering the area of this operation has been 100% successful. All Agents were on the air to Gibraltar, and always received in time the traffic addressed to them. This traffic was far heavier than was anticipated as we had to carry every communication with North Africa, whatever its origin. One or two points have come to light which should be altered in any future undertaking of this sort.
2. OPERATORS
  - (a) CASABLANCA - A good, punctual operator, but not very regular in his appearances.
  - (b) GRAN - A good sender but a slow reader. Punctual and quick on the uptake.
  - (c) ALGIERS - The world's worst operator, but he aroused our admiration for the tenacity with which he stuck to it until all traffic was cleared. Many corrupt messages from this station.
  - (d) TUNIS - A grand operator.
3. TRAINING. It is interesting to note that I have never seen any of the above operators. They were selected by the Americans on the spot, and trained by me by "correspondence course" through the U. S. North African Pouch. All through the difficult and hard-working time up to "D" these operators never failed.
4. TRAFFIC. The average daily traffic over the seven days up to and including "D" was 25 telegrams per day. The heaviest day was "D-1" with 37 telegrams. Algiers held the station record on "D-4" with 23 telegrams. Especially towards the end of the operation there was a lot of trouble with incorrectly encyphered messages from Algiers.
5. EQUIPMENT. The S.O.E. "B" suitcases issued to agents worked splendidly throughout the operation, over distances ranging from Casablanca (230 miles) to Tunis (860). At the main station at Gib., the R 107 receivers were excellent and so were the T 1154 transmitters, but the Webb 250 watt transmitters, though good, needed constant skilled attention.
6. PERSONNEL. Of the base operators no praise could be too high. They worked more hours than could be counted and refused consistently to be beaten by interference, atmospheric, fatigue or any other thing. The new draft have done far more than I expected because they made up in zeal what they lacked in experience. Finally Lieutenant Fordham has been an indispensable tower of strength, a rock in a weary land.

~~SECRET~~

7. DETACHMENTS. By "D plus 2" all the Special Signal detachments with the Task Forces were on the air to HQ. This reflects great credit on the officers in charge of the detachments, working with inexperienced men insufficiently trained.

8. CONCLUSIONS. (1) It is possible to train agents who already have W/T experience without seeing them, provided they are carefully selected by the man on the spot for training.

(2) The LMT 2 code is definitely unsuitable for this type of work. At the end of a heavy period there were many wrongly encyphered messages. These of course were of no value at all, whereas in other types of cypher, only the corrupt group would have been unintelligible.

(3) It is advisable to have an organization such as was not possible in this case, where the cypher personnel are housed in a building with the W/T receivers.

MALLOY  
10.11.42

To:-  
L/M  
S/CD(O)  
18



Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1941

Special Issue

The Plan for the Attack

By the Author

Tangier, End of November

While Anglo-American propaganda is making laurel wreaths for General Eisenhower, those here who know the background situation are thinking more, in view of the expensive North African adventure of the United States, of Colonel Edy and his mysterious activity as the Military Attache at the American Legation in Tangier. He not only gave big dinners and held sumptuous champagne parties but increased the number of his collaborators until he finally provided his staff of seven "Assistant Military Attaches" with diplomatic passports—much too large an establishment for such a small Legation—which, incidentally, is not accredited to Spain but to the Emperor of Morocco in Rabat. Nor was it difficult to recognize these gentlemen, like the Chief, as "Invasion Specialists", mainly officers of the Marines or of Naval "Aviation". And if there could have been any doubt, these gentlemen themselves saw to it that everyone was well-informed as to their tasks by taking constant motor trips along the Atlantic Coast from the Strait of Gibraltar to the South Port of Agadir.

Edy's mission was of course directly supported by the American Charge d' Affaires in Tangier. Consul General Child, who also held the newly invented office of "Controller of the Consulates in North Africa"—an unusual function in view of the fact that there was also a "Chief of Control of the Vice Consuls", Consul General Murphy in Algiers, formerly Counsellor of Embassies in Paris. These two "diplomats" thereby had a convenient excuse for travelling around wherever they liked in their flag-decorated automobiles.

Edy, Child and Murphy devoted themselves to covering the French zone of Morocco with the dense network of "official agents" designated as Consuls, Vice Consuls and other points within the Protectorate for the ostensible purpose

of supervising the distribution of supplies arriving from the United States. The promised deliveries did not come, but the Vice Consuls were not bothered by this, and above all, the Director of this strange organization is Mr. Solberg, American Plenipotentiary for Economic Questions in Rabat, Morocco, who is working in Morocco, while Consul Hill took care of the Sultan of Morocco and the Assistant Consul and Mr. Murray devoted his free attentions to the other consulates in the Capital.

Thus, ample opportunity was found to get in a good word with the leading men of Morocco. In towns where God knows the Americans had no business to be and where there were neither American citizens nor any economic interests, there were suddenly American Consulates for example Fez, where two Vice Consuls who made their appearance, and at Marrakech, in both cases, the Americans occupied the deserted British Consular premises. They sought and found social connections and thus opened the channels to work which the propaganda leaflets which were brought in their diplomatic pouches could be distributed among the population. The activities of these 70 Americans were clearly making themselves felt before the military occupation. The tone of the Moroccan press revealed a fear of offending American feelings. Influential Moroccans, like the 60 year old art-Negro Pasha Glaoui of Marrakech, a rival of the Sultan, had reason to expect the fulfillment of their personal wishes by the Kings of Roosevelt. Other nobles fell for the promises of democracy made by the President.

Another effective method proved to be the granting of American protection to natives. This is still highly attractive to many, especially to Moroccan Jews, since they thereby escape the jurisdiction of the native pashas. In the Ghattois, the so-called Mellahs, the efforts of the United States naturally were received with great sympathy, for the Jews urgently desire the abolition of the restrictions which the Vichy government imposed on them by the Jewish Statute. Since the Moroccan Jews speak Arabic, they performed important service for the Vice-Consuls as informants, interpreters, and propaganda writers in the Arabic language. One result of this cooperation is the miniature photo book with rules of conduct and practical hints for intercourse with Moroccans which the Yankess carry with them in the knapsacks when they landed. To get back to Colonel May, his preliminary



ELL.A.A. III

COL. WILLIAM A. EDDY.

Index, Volume VII. (Packet #.102, March 8, 1943)

TAB	DATE	SUBJECT
M.	3/2/43	LETTER FM. COL. EDDY. Re Carleton Coon Report.
	2/23/43	<u>C.S. COON REPORT.</u> Covering tour with Special Detachment OSS/SOE, Tunisian front. 1/1 - 2/19/43.
L.		<u>REPORTS TO ARTHUR GOLDBERG fm. G. F. WISSE.</u>
	3/2	On <u>General de Gaulle.</u>
	3/3	On <u>Arkel's Activities.</u>
	3/4	On former Secretary of <u>Railroad Workers Union</u> in France.
K.	2/28/	<u>D. C. DOWNES REPORT.</u> "Recruiting Problems in N. Africa" Discussion of prison camps, French feeling toward U.S. etc.
J.	2/9	Original of Document: <u>FREEDING THE PRISONERS</u>
I.		Reports illustrating <u>TYPES OF PRISONERS IN VARIOUS PRISON CAMPS.</u>
H.		REPORT ON <u>SPANISH INTERNEES</u> IN VARIOUS N. AFRICAN CAMPS
G.	2/26/	<u>ECHO D'ALGER</u> , Newspaper call for release of prisoners.
F.	2/21	REPORT BY <u>MAJ. COLLEGE JASON</u> , British SOE Inspection Trip to <u>French Internment Camps, N. Africa.</u>
E.	2/20	REPORT ON <u>FRENCH INTERNMENT CAMP CONDITIONS.</u>
D.	2/24	<u>GERMAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BASED ON CARTAGENA, SPAIN</u> Re CARL FRICK.
C.	1/9	<u>ORDER OF THE DAY.</u> Young Communist Party, Algiers.
B.	2/25	<u>W/T CLANDESTINE STATION, S. FRANCE.</u> Intelligence report.
A.	1/1 - 3/4	<u>W/T CLANDESTINE STATION, PEARL HARBOR, Corsica.</u> Intelligence report.



Contents of Trays No. 106 - addressed to Col. R. J. ...

March 1954, 1955.

1. Envelope addressed to Col. Donovan
2. " " " Lieut. H. W. Sadler USN, Navy Department.
3. " " " Lieut. S. Simpson, USN.
4. Package of six envelopes addressed to Major Berry M. Sage.

Report No. 102 - March 4th, 1944 (Addressed: Col. DeGroot)

- 1. O.S.S. Report - CORSEA. Jan. 31-Feb. 7th inclusive.
- 2. " " Feb. 8th - 15th inclusive
- 3. " " Feb. 16th-Mar. 4th inclusive
- 4. Letter to J. J. Goldberg - subject: General DeGaulle.
- 5. " " " - subject: Activities
- 6. Notes dated March 4, from the former secretary of the Railroad Workers' Union in France.

Office of Strategic Services,  
A. P. H. Q.,  
ALGIERS, ALGERIA.

March 2nd, 1943.

Colonel Wm. J. Donovan,  
Director of Strategic Services,  
24th & E. Streets,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Col. Donovan,

I enclose copy of a most interesting report by Carleton S. Coon, covering his tour of duty with the Special Detachment OSS/SOE on the Tunisian Front January 1st to February 10th.

Although his report does not include this point, I want to testify that his single-handed services were of tremendous value to O.S.S. The only American present he made up for lack of numbers by energetic and expert organization of Arab sympathizers and agents, being the one principally responsible for overcoming hostility by Arabs in his part of the Front. In addition, his own S.O. work in setting booby traps to close roads to enemy approach and his valuable advice and council to the officers commanding the troops, saved many lives on our side, and increased the effectiveness of our operations. I think it would be nice if his wife could be told these facts.

From a less personal point of view, Carl Coon's report gives a graphic picture of conditions existing with the Detachment, with lessons for us to apply in future operations elsewhere.


In the meantime, Carl has been returned by doctor's orders for rest and recovery from the verge of nervous exhaustion. A week in Algiers has not proved sufficient and again under doctor's orders he left today for Tangiers, there to remain three or four weeks. In Tangier he is greatly needed to give wise advice on the maintenance of the S.O. Moorish organization which he and Gordon Browne built up. There also he will not be subjected to the physical and nervous strain of his recent weeks at the Front.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. Eddy  
W. A. EDDY.

Enclosure: Report by  
Carleton S. Coon.

Tak M.



SECRET

**THE ARAB BOYCOTT**  
**1937-1939 - FRANCE**

On my arrival in Paris, France, in 1937, I was informed that the Arab boycott was being organized in France. I was told that the boycott was being organized by the Arab League, which was a branch of the Arab League in London. I was told that the Arab League was a branch of the Arab League in London. I was told that the Arab League was a branch of the Arab League in London.

My first stop was in the city of Paris, France, where I was met by a friend of mine, a man named Levy. Levy was a young Jew from Saarbrücken, and Levy is not his real name. He claims to be a descendant of the son of a wealthy man, a chain of hotels, and a chain of hotels throughout France. He also claims to have been a member of the Arab League, which was a branch of the Arab League in London. Levy was a young Jew from Saarbrücken, and Levy is not his real name. He claims to be a descendant of the son of a wealthy man, a chain of hotels, and a chain of hotels throughout France. He also claims to have been a member of the Arab League, which was a branch of the Arab League in London.

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Stephen Lovett has subsequently been withdrawn to his own regiment and replaced by Lieutenant ADAMS. There will be said about these matters and posts later, at the moment it suffices only to mention that the majority of the posts' commanders who had had I.O.E. training in Malaya. The others were officers drawn from different regiments who were ignorant of the existence or purpose of our organization, and consequently, however competent they may have been, they were incapable of understanding our motives, and insisted on organizing our men in an infantry company. This failure to staff the posts with men from our organization led much to do with the character of the work performed in these places.

That afternoon I was given a car and a driver named ADAM, a small rotund Frenchman from the Marseilles Central, who contacted me in SEIKHANE by way of Sack of Asha and SARAKHA. He had never been over the road before and was in considerable perplexity, particularly during the latter part of the journey when we were obliged to travel in the dark without lights. Between SAKHA ABZAS and Sedjane we passed an unexploded bomb in the middle of the road, which had recently been dropped from an aeroplane. Several A.I.'s were engaged in extracting it. Meanwhile traffic was greatly delayed and we were obliged to drive within a few inches of the bomb. When we eventually reached Sedjane and found Lieut. HALLIDAY's headquarters, I was shown into a small partitioned room in which a company of officers, some of them Sumatran, was awaiting. Lieut. Richards, whom I recognized despite his prominent beard, arose and explained to the others: "There's Carl Gove; now the company of rogues and cut-throats is complete". They all arose at my entrance, tipping the table over and spilling all their food and drink on to the tiled floor. After the confusion had ended, I was introduced to a number of people, including Colonel GARDNER, in charge of the Company, and a tall darkish like figure with a bushy mustache, named Lieut. Colonel TAYLOR, who kept stretching his whiskers as he leaned over the fireplace with a pipe in his hand. Another individual who was very silent during the evening, was a red-headed Australian sergeant named Mr. SMITH, who figures subsequently in this narrative.

The next morning Lieut. Richards, Mr. Gove, and I went by truck to SAKHA ABZAS by the motor road which leads to SAKHA ABZAS. There we engaged in stripping a beam which had recently fallen in a grove of fig trees. Two of the trees had been snapped off at the trunk and this caused the owner, the Sheikh, considerably. The Sheikh eventually produced a number of horses, and we proceeded on our way to the beach. This is a journey of four hours on foot. The horses were extremely scrappy and were covered with saddle sores.

At this point something should be said about the transportation situation between Gap Serrat and the outside world. Gap Serrat is 25 kilometres from Sedjane to which post it is connected by a dirt road. At the time of our arrival at Gap Serrat, German patrols had previously fully mined this road in several places, and upon the last attempt of light vehicles to go over it, a Bren-carrier had blown up, and the Army was unwilling to allow vehicles to travel on that road with men or supplies. The only route was the one to SAKHA ABZAS, where we used the motor road to reach the junction post. This road belongs to the main road and the members were in residence, Lieut. ADAMS and his 11th Squadron. Both of these were subsequently

placed in U.S. uniforms. Both personnel and supplies were brought to Sidi Meshrig by truck from Sedjaneau.

At Sidi Meshrig the procedure was to ask the Bedouin, who are locally called "Corporal" to supply horses. He did this by sending runners around the various Gaurbis to produce their horses and take us up. The horses which arrived were in such a poor condition from overwork and starvation that usually we rejected two or three at sight out of every ten, and on the way we usually had to shift loads and send one or two back again. The total equine population of Sidi Meshrig has never been more than 20, and of these at least eight only about one were in condition to carry men and material to Gop Serra. Subsequently we obtained a certain amount of fodder for these horses from Major HADDE, and we also secured three mules shortly before the conclusion of the post. Those of the Bedouins who made this journey usually preferred to walk part of the way since the horses were slow and extremely unsatisfactory. This technique of transportation made our supply system extremely vulnerable. If the Bedouins had so wished, they could have cut the path which we took almost at will, and have isolated us completely from the outside world, particularly since our approach was imperceptible during the months of January and February owing to the high winds and the condition of the water.

Returning to the narrative. Richards, Dr. Chiu, and I started up the road to Gop Serra on the available horses. Dr. Chiu however refused to ride his, since it was in too poor condition, and walked; whereas an Arab jumped on its back. This was invariably the procedure; as someone dismounted from a horse to spare it, someone else got on it. When we arrived at the next group of gaurbis, one of our men ran across the countryside and shouted for another horse, and finally secured one, but Dr. Chiu refused to ride this one also, with the assent of the Arabs, who proceeded to use this one as well for their own transport.

Before coming on this trip I had been told that one of the chief reasons for our difficulty in infiltrating people through the Italian lines was the telegraph system by which the natives alerted to each other from hilltop to hilltop and mountain side to mountain side, warning others in advance of our approach. Since one of the people who had reported this system had known Arabic, I was extremely sceptical from the start. On this first journey, one such shouting was noted, but I found out that it was merely a man who was looking for a horse for Dr. Chiu, shouting all over the valley in an attempt to secure one, and could in no way be construed as a hostile warning. On all other occasions when I heard this shouting taking place and no real explanation could be found. In one instance a man was shouting to his son across the valley: "Hey, you young fool, bring in the pack for supper". In another case a boy was shouting to a girl to bring him to "mama" in reply, and he could locate her. Shouting over long distances is a very common practice for these Arabs and is an essential part of their daily activities. Whereas I do not state that our own men were using this method, I am sure that I have never witnessed it. I believe that in many cases in which it was used, it had nothing to do with us.

Gop Serra. The village at the foot of the mountain. One of our patrols was challenged as



in the dusk. Upon recognition they let us through, and we proceeded up the hill to the lighthouse, where we retired. The post had been left in charge of Lieut. John Adams WARREN.

The personnel of Cap Serrat from this moment had consisted of Lieut. Richards, a 24-year old scholar who graduated from Cambridge with a First in English literature, and who had previously been engaged in sea operations of the English Channel. Lieut. Richards speaks French perfectly, and has an outstanding ability in handling French personnel, so much so that the enlisted men on his staff were extremely loyal to him. He showed outstanding ability and personal courage in his management of this very difficult post over a period of over two months, and deserves great credit for his distinguished effort.

Under him was Lieut. WARREN, the son of an American father and British mother, born in England but brought up in California, who spent the life guards at the age of 17, served seven years in those posts, then joined the Foreign Legion. At the outbreak of the present war he attempted to leave the Legion and join the British Army. For this nefarious act he was condemned to a life imprisonment at which point he entered Algiers and opened the doors of the prison. Warren proceeded to Jemteubine and Bone to join Richards, where he was made an officer in the Special Detachment. Warren concerned himself chiefly with personnel and their requirements. He was responsible for the post; he carried out morning inspection, assigned groups for patrol, and in general took charge of the normal functioning of the camp, whereas Richards was more concerned with intelligence and preparing for special operations.

Dr. Chin fitted himself immediately into the group and opened a clinic for the care of our personnel, and of the natives of the surrounding area. He lacked at first medical supplies for this, but obtained them later from Bone. He was subsequently able, on this account, to save the life of Lieut. Warren and of a number of other personnel who featured in subsequent action. He was also able to contribute to the needs of many Arabs, and this had an outstanding effect upon our relations with the native population. Dr. Chin's action, as much as anything else, helped to change our relations with the Arabs from unfriendly to friendly, and it is earnestly recommended that more medical clinics of this type be set up all round the front wherever possible.

My own duties were more elastic. I had charge of interrogating hostages and prisoners, also giving out supplies of cloth, tea, sugar and so forth, and of whatever demolition activities were necessary, aside from the special duties by the Captains NKS and Gaudin. It was my nightly duty to lead the troops in the area on either side of the bridge which was the main axis of attack against the Italians. On one occasion, during the night of the 1st of August, Warren and in the absence of Lieut. Richards, I took charge of the post for a few days.

The duties of the Special Detachment included maintaining a lighthouse at night, maintaining a guard through the night, and so forth, also leading out patrols into the wide expanse of the sea's land stretching between us and the Italians. The country consists of three types of environments: wide sandhills stretching far inland, forests of scrub oak reaching to the shoulder and affording

abundant cover for anyone willing to keep his head down, and some forests in which one can walk unobserved at a certain distance, though visibility between the trunks was greater than that in the scrub country. This country is ideal for patrol operations, since a small party can move within a few yards of the enemy unobserved and can remain in hiding during the day with little chance of observation. This advantage of course was enjoyed by both sides. The Italians could creep up within a few yards of our position at the bridge without the slightest difficulty. Similarly our patrols could duck under the bushes and hide successfully when a large Italian patrol approached.

During my stay at Cap Ferrat, our operations took three forms: Defensive, Observational, and Offensive.

Defensive operations included manning the beach, manning the bridge and, later on when the river dried, manning the beach, as well as my special activities in setting booby traps, signal wires, rockets and so on, so that we could be warned of the enemy's approach.

Observational activities consisted in looking over the country at the beach with powerful glasses, in sending out patrols for information, and in the use of Arab watchers and informers who kept us fairly well advised of the movements of the enemy. We had two watchers on the hill between the bridge and ONIHANN at all times, prepared to warn us by the use of incendiaries by day, and either lighthouse sky rockets or Vercy lights at night. Similarly we rigged a green sky rocket in the window of Commandant Ferrin's house so that if his family were attacked by the enemy he could let us know immediately. Up to the time of my departure the Commandant had not needed to use this signal. As for the enemy, we soon learned that they had two main camps, one at MAJAN on the ISLE ABENI Peninsula, and the other at the ford over the GUSS River, each of these consisted of 200 to 300 men. There were two other posts between Saad Marra and Sadjanawa.

Offensive operations were few in number and small in scope owing to the small size of our parison. We could not afford to risk the loss of personnel. Our total strength averaged from thirty to fifty men of whom many were often on the sick list owing to over-fatigue and mal-nutrition, as well as the fact that they had all been previously in jail and had had no time to recover their health before entering our service. They were constantly pricking their hands, feet, and legs on the huge thorns so abundant in that area, and suffering from infection. Others suffered from scabies, and one man was a mass of sores from this parasite. Others had fevers and abdominal cramps and other ailments, and it was often necessary to send them back to Pig Hill as unfit for service. One man sent to Pig Hill was cross-eyed, he had lost his glasses several months previously and was unable to see, and we had to send him back eventually. The first group of four men sent to us as Spaniards were sent to us in the first place. And one of these had wounded legs so that he could not walk more than a few yards. He too had to be returned almost immediately. Some of whom were tasked to operate our offensive operations owing to these various reasons. Offensive operations consisted of several mining expeditions in enemy territory, offensive operations.

although individuals took it upon themselves to act without orders.



under him as his direct responsibility and treated them with some respect, tolerance and understanding. His presence in the Bay served more to increase our importance to our local war effort. Lieut. Richards stayed with us almost his entire and spent two to three hours each day consulting with the Commandant. Besides the Commandant himself there is Mrs. Farina, her son Jacques, and his twenty-two year old daughter. All except Jacques are in bad health, the two women suffering mostly from malaria. Jacques wife and children were evacuated by boat on the day we arrived, he passed them on the road, riding along with the family of the Lieutenant's helper who also departed that day.

Dr. Chin, realizing the importance of medical and surgical work in that area, left after a couple of days for TAMAKA and then to get together the necessary supplies. Richards and I stayed there one week. During this time the routine of the post proceeded normally. Aside from this, we were subjected to constant alerts and on one occasion were badly machine gunned by a Mousoucheh. Luckily no one was injured. My duties consisted of building up the defenses of the bridge over the Sikina by booby traps, installing a signal system for the farm, and interviewing Arabs. My booby trap program, although it took much time, was not a great success. I caught no snakes and I know of, the total casualties being one Arab and one cow. One of our many traps in the woodpile cut-off to the right of the road beyond the bridge, a favorite place for the enemy to sneak up. I finished just at dusk, having also set three alarm signals on and before the bridge. Having just finished and retired to our side of the bridge, I heard one trap go off, and we all dashed into the bushes. Then another, and then an Arab, one of our signalmen, dashed through the gap, his legs going like pistons, his hands clutched at the back of his head. Before we could stop him he came through all three signal wires, producing a pop-pop-pop! and collapsed at our feet. He had only one small skull-frag fragment in the back of his head, though he had put off three grenades. Dr. Chin patched him up and he insisted on going home to let his wife know that he was alive. Later he returned for treatment and was soon fully healed.

When I arrived, we had a number of prisoners in the care of a soldier named SIMON who was rightly named. Initially he resembled a chimpanzee. He had been knocked around in the Foreign Legion and was now taking it out on helpless Arabs. These were made to sleep in a stinking watercloset without enough room to lie down and with insufficient bedding. He led them out on fatigue duty each day, to clean the privies, to clean out our mess, to chop wood with a rattok, etc. and periodically smacked them with a piece of rubber hose, which I soon took away from him. I saw to it that the prisoners were placed in more humane quarters, and turned over to HALIMI, a Jew of Constantine, rather than to SIMON. Halimi was much more humane and understanding, and became my #1 assistant in Affairs. etc. etc.

Our method of treating the Arabs was greatly hampered by our use of force. The distrust Arabs and vice versa, and could not be overcome. They were constantly and most annoyingly at each other's throats at Akkas, and they at times took away presents from the other. The food was too good for them. The work of all was to be done, and on three occasions captured Arab guards were executed. The other two men held the rest

of the people of Bay with other people. They were very happy to see the people of Bay. ...

... the people of Bay were very happy to see the people of Bay. ...

... the people of Bay were very happy to see the people of Bay. ...

... the people of Bay were very happy to see the people of Bay. ...

As a solution to this case, we kept ...

were to receive the same pay as in Bizerta. This arrangement was eminently satisfactory; the two with us worked well. Ezzouk brought excellent information, as well as honey, eggs, etc. Unfortunately Ezzouk was killed in a machine gunning after I had left, and I do not know where Yusuf went when our force evacuated the post. I had planned to use him in Bizerta for intelligence if his job could be got back. We were waiting to hear from our W/T man in Bizerta.

Space forbids details of all our hostages, but we found that when we entered a distant village where loyalty was wavering, we could take the eldest son of the most important man and hold him in the lightness pending his father's arrival. The old man invariably came with gifts, demanding his son. He was sent back to get good information of enemy positions, and when he saw the second time his son was released, if the information was satisfactory. With one exception this system worked, and the sons in most cases became accustomed to the garrison life and liked it there. This use of hostages was our chief source of intelligence aside from the work of our own patrols.

Our most useful man of all was BRAHIM, an ex-Firailleur who had escaped from prison in Germany. He went at once (after my arrival) to Matouf, Ferryville, etc., calling eggs, and upon his return gave an accurate account of Italian positions, supply dumps, etc. Later I sent him and his friend Ali to blow the Finkha-Ferryville line, and if possible to wreck the train. Lt. HANCOCK and I made up the charges at HANCOCK, and Mr. Beaumiller sound them in a postoffice. The idea of using a postoffice was originally that of Richards and Galt, who intended to use it for printed propaganda. I do not yet know whether or not Brahim wrecked his train. We trained him well at the Sudan Hill, his lead was well concealed, and he was an expert at infiltration. His whole scheme was carefully planned and if anything went wrong it was not from lack of planning and foresight.

Returning to Cap Barrot; BRAHIM left after two or three days to get his supplies, Richards and I after a week. We went to Sedjonne via Sidl Hachrig and at Sedjonne mounted a truck with five hostages, a British driver, and a British sergeant for Pig Hill. At the town of Djebel Abied, just before the bridge, we saw five enemy aircraft approaching. He jumped, the hostages scattered, two making for the hill to the left, the other three under the truck with Richards and others. I tried to run clear of the road, tripped, fell on my face in the sand, and was shot at; bullets landed very close to me. Then I got up and we ran into a building. A Stuka dive-bombed, aiming for the bridge which it barely missed. It made a crater 50 feet wide and 20 feet deep in the bank, the edge some 70 feet from us. The building tottered but held; a tile fell from the roof, hitting me on the head, and bounding on to Lt. Richards' head. I had on my grey felt hat, and soon an egg-shaped lump arose on my pate.

... disappeared, and after a prolonged search we fell ... From Pig Hill we went to ... there we picked up ... and valuable supplies including a great deal ... reported to Corps at ... BRAHIM ... to give us regular ... we were ... for our proper tasks.

... as was BILL JUNE, the Controller Civil, who opening markets to compete with Matouf and about one ... of Sidl Hachrig. The market business eventually was handed over to ...

and Major WARREN, who have handled it very well. A group of  
bearded French colon near Hill Moritz with an American  
Bunker. Around has long been at odds with the command and  
his face was rubbed against eight cows from an American  
cattle was dependent on the milk for his sustenance and that of  
family, and consequently was starving. Unfortunately, the  
Americans had lodged around in this place of ignorance  
provided to French Agent from the area under control. He  
I finally arrested his assailant and sent him to the  
guard.

When we got back to Hill Moritz we found the  
from the commandant's office. The 1st Lt. was an  
American private and was Lt. Richards, who was  
they had started out for the night with the commandant  
reference. They refused to go on with us, saying they  
had been captured. They were up to the commandant's  
room again. At the same time I found the commandant's  
nearby Captain GRAY, Lt. RICHARDS, and an American  
named McVILLAIN, who had recently been promoted from private. He  
wanted me to try the deserters as a company officer, but  
then over. He seemed to be very interested.

That night the commandant decided to take over the  
the bridge. For some reason which I cannot remember, other than that  
I was very tired, I failed to go down at dusk to get  
usual. Lt. RICHARDS and Capt. GRAY set out with  
to take up the post. Now the system was up until that  
bridge was observed by day from the commandant's  
post went down for the night to man the line and  
I usually went down before the post to check up  
went down with me to guard me, or failing him, one of the

That afternoon 200 Italians went to Warren village, over  
the ridge, tied up all the natives, searched over the bridge  
and lay in ambush, either for us or the guard or both. When the  
saw they threw percussion grenades, killing Lt. RICHARDS and  
killing two other privates, and Capt. GRAY, and leaving  
for dead. The other two privates were in the bush and  
Lt. Richards, who was at the time, heard the noise and  
found the two privates, left them, came back and got up  
supply. We went down (Richards, Levidor, Chin, myself and  
and searched but found no trace of the four missing men, including  
Warren. Next morning Warren walked into the fare and collapsed. He  
had an Italian field dressing on his head, with the  
his scalp. An Arab had picked him up and kept him in his  
night. His pockets had been emptied, presumably by the  
we heard from natives that Gray and the two privates had been  
treated once the captors found they were not French.

We buried privates Field and Parsons near the bridge  
and set up a 24-hour guard at the bridge.

The day after the attack, Col. THURM and Capt.  
BURNING appeared. They were not heard of the attack. They  
went below to get weapons. He set a good many, and started  
to plan the mining of the beach. On the way one of our  
and we returned to the bridge to find the commandant  
lodged in a tight group near the bridge in full view of the

We explained to them that they were very vulnerable, and advised (I at least being a civilian and Michael Gubbins ~~not~~ being a ~~commander~~ officer) them to spread out, and command the bridge from either side. Then we went back to warn Ferrin, and returned toward the bridge. Near the scene of last night's attack we found the commandos together again ~~at~~ a ~~distance~~, out of sight of the bridge, which was undefended. One man with a ~~flares~~ was to the right of the road, the others to the left. He joined them on the left, heard voices ahead, saw moving objects, and deciding that little could be done with the existing force, we (Gubbins and I) went back to the lighthouse as quickly as possible and told Richards and Trevor. Trevor reprimanded Gubbins and myself, particularly me, for "giving an order" dispersing the men from the bridge; he blamed us, especially me, for their present position. He ordered out the whole commando, ordered Gubbins and me to proceed over 100 yards in advance of the commando to the Italian "position", or the place just to the left of the bridge where noises had been heard, and threw in magnesium flares. He lashed tynules to flares, took strikers, and started off. When we got within 15 yards of the bridge we lit our flares, tossed them, and ducked. We found no trace of the Italians, but the booby that went off had apparently been set off by some instrument for nearby we found a piece of metal which did not come from our equipment. They had presumably seen Gubbins and me setting the traps, whether or not they had actually crossed the bridge as we had supposed we could not determine.

Returning to the lighthouse, we found Col. Trevor comfortably slumbering in Lt. Richards' bed. He never went to the bridge at all, and next morning left early by the coast road, in Arab dress, on Richards' horse, with an Arab guide.

A few days later the commandos left, but not until after having carried out one patrol into No Man's Land. This was to allow Gubbins to mine a warabout.

This brings us back to mining operations in general. Before this, the week before, Cap. John SYRE had been sent up to mine the limestone farm, where Arab patrols often spent the night. After elaborate planning between Richards and Ferrin, it was decided that Capt. Syre was to use a piece of pig as trigger, to avoid killing Arabs. He set out with a patrol under Gross, with Ali ben Amer as guide, reached the farm, killed a pig, and rigged his trap. On the way back they were ambushed, and Ali ben Amer dropped a roll of Cordtex. Gross was nearly captured, shots were exchanged. The Italians were standing in the bushes with brush in their helmets and veils over their faces. Our men subsequently adopted these techniques. They arrived exhausted and in a cab. Later we heard that the Italians sent a man in to hit a stick to the west, and detonated it from a distance, demolishing the mine without loss.

The ~~mine~~ ~~was~~ ~~equally~~ ~~if~~ ~~not~~ ~~more~~ ~~unfortunate~~. He went out with ~~the~~ ~~mine~~ ~~to~~ ~~mine~~ ~~the~~ ~~warabout~~ ~~where~~ ~~the~~ ~~Italians~~ ~~convened~~. ~~The~~ ~~mine~~ ~~was~~ ~~used~~ ~~only~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~fall~~. ~~The~~ ~~mine~~ ~~is~~ ~~not~~ ~~equipped~~. ~~Commandant~~ ~~Ferrin~~ ~~said~~ ~~that~~ ~~he~~ ~~should~~ ~~have~~. ~~Gubbins~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~Arab~~ ~~woman~~ ~~and~~ ~~her~~ ~~son~~ ~~went~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~mine~~ ~~and~~ ~~played~~ ~~with~~ ~~it~~. ~~The~~ ~~woman~~ ~~was~~ ~~the~~ ~~one~~ ~~who~~ ~~was~~ ~~bringing~~ ~~the~~ ~~mine~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~first~~ ~~place~~. ~~The~~ ~~old~~ ~~man~~ ~~was~~ ~~sent~~ ~~back~~ ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~mine~~. ~~He~~ ~~brought~~ ~~back~~ ~~second-hand~~



but valuable information, was sent out again for more personal observations, and never returned. The Italian caught him. If he did not tell them all he could about us, I will be surprised, because we had not exactly treated him with the utmost consideration.

After another ten days or so I was ordered to transfer by Col. Anstruthers. After some opposition locally I left, for with the departure of the Commandos I was needed. Subbia was also supposed to leave but he stayed on as that there would be serious contact with Italian and dislocation during my absence. Arriving at Pig Hill I met a messenger from Col. Anstruthers that coming to the immediate control of General Subbia (Capt. Subbia's father) I should stay at my post as I returned to Cap Serrat. Meanwhile Major Torrance made me a uniform with three green pipes. I took over the hat of the late Capt. Richardson who had blown himself up opening a box with a shell in a trench, and hammering the cap, and thus accepted I went back by way of Sidi Mochria. I took with me Major HUDSON, the man who under Major Clark gives out supplies, and Capt. LITTLEWOOD, of the Psychological Warfare.

When I got there, Richards was ordered back to corps to see about getting more provisions, and I was left in command. One night we had an alarm; our two watchers of the Ghirra ridge bogged off only for fishy business. All was dark, when the commanding wanted as a guide to meet them at Sidi Mochria el Aoud, was loth to go; Arabs told Commandant Ferris that the Italians were to attack that night. I found that the men on the semaphore could see and hear nothing, so I posted a guard around the top of the hill, and gave flares to the guard on the beach, since the water in the river was low and natives were fording constantly at beach level. Also the beach could not be seen directly through the bulge of the hill overlooking the Ferris farm. There was much grumbling about this but I insisted. I had meanwhile been ordered back to Suez by Col. Anstruthers but delayed 24 hours for this purpose. Then the wireless went off and we ran out of fuel; we had to send for goats to slaughter. In the morning I went to Sidi Mochria, thinking to meet Richards with the provisions, as expected. When he did not appear I got on a mule which had been sent there for him from Sidi Mochria, and trotted back the 17 km. to the Sidi Mochria road, hopped a French carrier, and had MacAndrews send the provisions right away by truck. The next morning I went to Pig Hill where I found Richards still in process of discussing reinforcements.

Col. Young and Major Michael (Big) Crosby arrived, Richards went back. Young, Crosby and I made a tour of the old MARCH post, and I went back to Sidi Mochria with Young, leaving Major Crosby in charge of the Sidi Mochria area. Young went to go to the hospital where he was operating.

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to Cap Serrat it because a sort of  
who wanted to set up a secret  
also men, and we also got a  
for Dr. Jinn. The setting  
the French, whose habit to  
cause they defeated  
the edge with their  
decontaminated, and  
his death ray.

Arriving at Guelma I was soon sent back with Sgt. Young on a tour of the ports; with Major Crosby we visited el Anassa, el Anassa and MEDJANAH; then we got a lorry-carrier and went up to the beach. It was the very badly showed up water road, where we passed many of our vehicles. We also passed Lieut. Richards riding in a lorry in the company of a Commodore and other naval officers on the way to Medjana where he (Richards) had been summoned by the Brigadier. The Commodore had come to see about sea operations.

When we got to the neighbourhood of the sea, we saw the R.A.F. damaged. We went up to the lighthouse where we found Young and others. We stayed for lunch, during which time Sgt. Young advised that the position was untenable for us, particularly about the Medjana road. We let no Arabs through because we had concentrated there, and also because the enemy would certainly reach the place once they found the R.A.F. installed. It was no good for infiltration, and we had called for our infantry duties. At long last we had no longer held the northern part of the United Nations line.

We took Johnny Warren off in the lorry-carrier, and proceeded to Medjana. Johnny and I and Crosby walked down the street; Johnny with his beard and bandage looking like the Spirit of '76. We got in a lorry and he sent Johnny off to the hospital in Bone, whence he was subsequently moved to Mahona.

Sgt. Young and I went to Fig Hill and Guelma. On about the 10th February our men finally pulled out of Cap Serrat and went to MAHONA for a much needed rest, all but Mr. Olin who stayed on (and is to my knowledge still there) awaiting the arrival of an R.A.F. surgeon. The need for this is due to the attack the enemy made by air on Cap Serrat a few days before the evacuation of our men. They machine-gunned the lighthouse, the R.A.F. camp, the village of Medjana, and the Electric-Sign-Mechanic camp. They killed Hassan, three R.A.F. soldiers, several Arabs of Medjana, and one Arab woman on the trail. They wounded a number of R.A.F. personnel. They dropped a bomb within a few feet of the lighthouse. Mr. Olin had to stay to care for his wounded while others buried the dead. When he gets out he deserves a long rest and a decoration.

Part of my history is a stay of a few days at Guelma and Mahona, where I ate and drank on the fat of the land, trained British and All to blow their train, trained another All sent by Capt. Warrell to lay anti-personnel mines, and prepared for the southern campaign. It seems that All #2 had been sent by Warrell with an oral message that I was to train him to take out a German minefield of taller mine. I knew not how, nor did any of the R.A.F. present. The idea was that All was to clear a path in the field flanking a gun on a hill so that vehicles could make a surprise attack. That seemed to me hardly an or R.A.F. business, and to be the result of Warrell's misconception of my functions. I was trained to lay anti-personnel, to get the actual supply trains via the Medjana road, and to take him back to Fig Hill on my way to the north.

... needed in my Studebaker to Fig ... snow in the past, and lost ... driving skill of the sea ... The next day Sgt. Young was ... post commanders, including

Blanchard, Gannery, Norrell, and Adams (who replaced Lovett) which was the basis a weekly affair and a very excellent one indeed, since previously the commanders in many cases had not met. Norrell complained that what he had really wanted all the time was to learn how to fight Marines, which Norrell himself or anyone at Pig Hill could have taught him.

Thence I proceeded via La Paz to the south, and at TAMPICO the corps headquarters picked up Sgt. BYRNE; I took Major Sage's Renault and he took my Studebaker; the reason being that I was following a ferry and would be retrieved if the Renault cracked, while the Studebaker being a good car could be counted on to stand the puff alone. QUINCY, SAGE, ROBERTSON, ROBERT, the four sergeants, and 25 odd Spaniards had arrived the previous afternoon and were encamped at Castus Castle above SANTELLA. He went to Castus Castle. Later Byrnek arrived; during his ride the Studebaker had developed an ominous knock.

Now it seems that the southern show had been lined up as follows: Capt. MADDY-Kilmer had gone to KASABIAN and gotten some 25 odd members of the Loyalist Spanish navy out of internment. Over 100 remained. He took them to Mahon. Then he cracked a car (a usual British procedure) and went to the hospital for one month. But Brandy-Kilmer, Major Quincy (whom I have long known as master of the Villa Lourdes mess in Gibraltar) a 21-year old Major, was given charge of the training and use of these men.

Quincy's personality, in view of subsequent events, needs some elaboration. He is a mixture of Hammy and Cervantes. He was born in Rosariffe, of an Irish family owning hotels, reared there and in England, and from his physical appearance must inevitably have Spanish blood. He is bilingual, bi-cultural, and individual. He has at all times a far-away look in his eyes. He is reserved and shy, but once you break the ice his intimacy is simple and charming. He is like an Aztec sacrifice to Huitzilopochtli, the god of war; he lives in ecstasy in anticipation of a glorious end. He is one of the bravest men I have ever known, and one of the most irresponsible. As a glorious individual and friend, I salute George Quincy, but as a leader of men I deplore him.

Several other personalities merit description before this narrative continues. Jerry SAGE, Sgt. Byrnek, Sgts. Gaff, Milt Falson, and Sgt. Lasowski, Capt. Robert, 1st. Robertson, Lt. Crosby, Lt. Col. Austruthers, Lt. Col. Young. If this be considered too personal, this part of the narrative may be omitted. But I consider it essential to the understanding of the events which followed. It is extremely objective, and in all cases, as in the case of Major Quincy, I feel personal affection for the individuals involved.

1. Jerry SAGE. Sage is a young man of extreme physical good fortune, tall, handsome, athletic, full of energy and of personal courage. He has all the traditional American virtues: loyalty and compassion and a keen sense of justice. He must have been a campus hero when he was in college. He is a fine parachutist, a great man with his hands, quick, agile, and fearless. He has a facile sense of humor but little depth or intelligence. He will spare his men but spare himself, and he likes an superior authority, always wants to take charge. Yet he is a soldier and will obey orders if they appear suicidal, once he is convinced of the regularity of the procedure. As a planner, he seems

better than Quiney but leaves much to be desired. A Homerie hero, half a berserk. With Quiney and Sage, we are in the midst of the Klid. Added to this, we must remember that Sage, like Quiney, is fresh from the schools of war; he is anxious to practice the trade which he has so well learned, and so long awaited. He cannot await the clever, the discreet opportunity, to smite the enemy with maximum effect; he must cut with sword and chariot at the first dust of battle; he is no Odysseus, he is an Achilles.

2. Sergeant NYNE. The big Bohunk, the Slovak from Hawaii. A huge, handsome Slavonic American, the perfect Holy Cross Fighting Irish. A young man of gigantic physique and boundless energy, full of wile; he rides a motorcycle perfectly; he can keep the convoy together, and can scout the countryside far and wide for tyres, spare parts, wheels, underwear and medical supplies; the supreme scavenger and searcher, and barometer of information, completely reckless and completely practical. Wholly independent yet obedient to orders, the sergeant supreme. A jack of all trades, an improviser, always with a smile, never dismayed, loyal to Sage with a fanatical loyalty. A man to toss anywhere and land on his feet. A perfect American.

3. Sergeant GOFF. A small, wiry, idealist. A former tap dancer and Vanderbilt trapper, who fought in the Spanish wars for his ideals of freedom, and became one of the world's most accomplished and renowned guerrillas. Brooklyn with self-acquired learning. A man of profound depth of feeling and sensitivity, an exquisite sense of justice.

4. Sergeant Milt Felson. The Fighting Jew, who loathes all who do not love freedom. An idealist like Goff, who fought in the same wars and on the same side, and with the same bravery. This is a Jew at his best, clever and fine and subtle, and witty.

5. Sergeant Lassinsky. I know him least of all. But what goes for Goff and Milt goes for him as well, in less spectacular way perhaps. But a man of complete confidence.

6. Captain Robert. 38 years old, too old for this racket, as I at 30. He is a Canadian, part French part Gaelic Scots. He is square and solid and tough as nails. He had 27 relatives killed in the last war, and has personally killed only three Germans. He has 14 to go, and he will get them. He is a first-class soldier and a complete berserk. Nothing on God's earth can stop him save lead and steel. And he too has fought guerrilla wars; this is his sixth campaign. "Only one I fought for conviction, that for France, because I am a Catholic". A curious man to lead loyalists, and he hopes they will not find out which side he was on.

7. Mr. Alexander Red Wilson. A small, wiry Scots youth with a heavy jaw could cut with a knife. A city scalle, slightly shy, and as wild as the rest in a quiet way. A very expert man at demolition. Gang and self-reliant and completely fearless. He and Robert should get through where Quiney might not trap on.

8. Mr. Victor Brady. A former Massachusetts. What we Yankees like to think about is the luxury of being proud of our majority. The few, or the many, you. Heavily intelligent, sound of judgment, prior of all, a scholar and a man of decision. He has the makings of the perfect executive, the perfect leader, despite his years.

and inferior rank. Physically less endowed than men like Sgt and Roberts and Quincy, but mentally far their superiors. He should be promoted at once.

9. Lt. Col. Anstruthers. Here we deal with the one difficult personality to describe. A brilliant man (only 38) who has let his legs go to some extent for he is very fond of fine foods and wines and lives in the city. A glandular case who goes to sleep in conferences, but who has an extremely subtle sense of humour which is sometimes cruel in an almost farcical way. He has never visited the outposts of his realm nor exposed himself to any personal danger other than through his erratic driving of motor cars. He is very intelligent and very quick. He has a very difficult job in handling the Army on the one hand and his men on the other. He loses grace and when he gives an order which seems disagreeable fails to explain why. A little tact would make him more popular, but this lack of tact seems to be the result of dryness. He is honest and loyal but wholly theoretical. He would like to be liked but does not know the way. He cannot handle the epic personalities under him nor can he assist them in the planning of details. A scholar and a soldier on paper, and a sincere individual, wrongly placed.

10. Lt. Col. YOUNG. The Gael of the Nordic Age. A huge, husky, Philadelphian survivor of a Scot, fluted and bagpipe playing, full of slang and Scots and easy judgment. Tough as nails and more so than MacCool. Wise in the handling of men, a disbeliever in overdoing and so clever in human relations as he is naive in books. When he appears doubts alloy, confidence returns, for he is the perfect leader of men in battle. A man to follow to hell and damnation, with the pipes starting.

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Now that the dramatic persons are in line, we shall proceed with the events of the first week of the southern campaign and the role of OSS/ACZ in it.

Tuesday, February 9th. On this day General Gubbins, Lt. Col. Young, Avril (Young's chauffeur) and I visited TUESDA. On the way Gen. Gubbins drove his car with Young as passenger, Avril drove my Land Rover with me as passenger. We proceeded to 2nd Corps headquarters where we encountered Lt. Col. AMERS, a coarse, red haired, anti-nosed individual who greeted Gen. Gubbins as Colonel. He then introduced both me and Young as Colonels. We were all colonels together. Alers exclaimed with oaths and obscenities that he hoped we were not from OSS, they had sent down a bastard named BOURGAIN who had messed things up in general. Col. DABNEY was at the mess. We went to the mess and ate with Col. Quincy and others. Col. Quincy was fortunately far different from Alers, so returned with him to the tent where we discussed problems in general and in particular the developments on the Bourgain case which I have since the last time. General Gubbins and Col. Young explained the role of the OSS and was most understanding and helpful. He showed me the map of the situation, in which he was greatly interested. The Bourgain case had already been done and was a good lesson. The Bourgain case was to come down, long.

on this day, the OSS was vital to the south. I train Alers and Avril to the south. They return after Sage drives his car over a landing.

Thursday, February 11th. After a snowy passage, MacMillan, Sage, Quiney, Robertson, and the Spaniards again depart for the south. They pass Tobocon and the Tobocon gap, camp in the pine forest in the region beyond the Tobocon gap, the second patch of forest beyond Tobocon and beyond the five mile stretch of Doerserschnitt Moorland.

Friday, February 12th. On this day I busied myself at Fig Hill, south of Kaddis, and Bulla Regia, getting my Studebaker fixed, getting new tyres, and getting cloth, tea and sugar for Arabs. I saw Col. Allen and Major Hayden, and determined that from Monday on I could get Arab supplies from Haydon at MAKTAR, where he would then be established. Col. Young and Major Michael Crosby were at Fig Hill; Spanish Terraces was in the hospital where Col. Young and I visited him. Young was to take him to Quolma the following day via Tabarka and LaGalle, to visit Johnny Marwan en route. Meanwhile Quiney, Sage and company proceeded to Camp 10 known as CAMP CACTUS, where they established themselves in a cactus patch some 6 km west of BSAIFIA overlooking the town. They must have worked hard on that camp for it was very well camouflaged.

Saturday, February 13th. I proceeded alone from Fig Hill via La Raf to BSAIFIA, where I met Sgt. Bysak, raided the GI stores for clothing and equipment, stopped at TABARKA for gasoline, and went on to Camp Cactus, arriving about dusk. Sage had been to SIRI BOU ZID to see MacMILLAN, and was to establish a second and separate camp there near MacMillan, which was considered advantageous owing to the proximity of the spot to the front. Quiney and I were to continue on at Camp Cactus.

Sunday, February 14th. Quiney, Sage, Bysak and I proceeded to Scetla, en route to SIRI BOU ZID to lunch with General MacMillan. At Scetla we stopped to have my Studebaker fixed and to load up with water for Camp Cactus. He found out that my car could not be fixed there, and also that the Germans had burst through in two places and had cut off MacMillan's headquarters. We found this out only casually by conversation, otherwise we would have blundered right into the enemy. We went back to Camp Cactus and watched the battle from the hill, great clouds of dust as the tanks roared across the plain, five Stukas dive-bombing one of the artillery batteries and taking it out about 4 km below us; a Messerschmitt machine-gunning the road and cutting one jeep and one passenger car with drivers of both. We ducked constantly into the cactus at alerts and got our hands full of spines.

The day was filled with visits to various headquarters, mainly to G-2 and G-3 which were just across the road in the far pasture. Soon in front of us we saw the German armored division, subsequently lost and found again. Jerry was the name of the tank commander who said that if we kept watching the road we would see the German heavy tanks as they rolled over. He did and we didn't want to see them. Jerry went over to see if we could see them. He refused to play. Then Jerry and I went to the pasture; the G-2 and G-3 were there. Jerry said: "The Germans advanced on the night of the 13th. They were going to attack their advance on the night of the 13th. He did not know where these tanks were going or what route they would take. Quiney and Sage came here and

and called me, Robert, Robertson and the sergeants into consultation. He agreed that Plan A was pure suicide without results, Plan B unworkable because of its vagueness, and that both were beyond our powers. Jerry was very loth to give in and so was Quincey, while I was the chief exponent of refusal. Quincey backed me before Jerry did. The sergeants backed me, which finally turned Jerry. I wanted to retire to a better position to see how things went before we started to operate; Quincey wanted to take all of us into a range of barren hills to the east, to hide out and let the Germans go by. He was obsessed with this idea. So was Robert; Jerry backed me in rejecting it. Such a party could carry food and water for less than 48 hours in addition to equipment and we would get caught as soon as we came down for water. It did not make sense. Even Robert finally admitted this. Robertson did not say much; he was game for anything.

Quincey and Sage went to G-1, G-2, and talked with Col. Howe, who was distraught. When they said we had rejected his ideas he said "All right, I will turn you over to Col. - (I forget the name) to take part of our defensive line". "Defensive line?" said Quincey with an uplift to his voice. Howe showed temper, turned on his heel, and said "Goodnight, there is nothing further to be done." and departed.

Quincey and Sage went back to camp feeling badly slapped. Both were extremely chastened. He decided to shift camp backward, and did so, to camp #2, just in front of Camp #1, where we entered a meadow with woods on either side and camped under the pines. This was a good way from Camp Gertie, passed Hazzert and Theloyte, and behind the first ridge facing the plain.

Monday, February 12th. The fog persisted, and Quincey and I started out for the valley. I rode my Stutzcar as far as the Toboon airport where it ceased to run and I left it in charge of an anti-aircraft battery, well out of the way of pillagers. Then I joined Quincey and we went on to Gertie arriving about 4 p.m. We saw Anstruthers and Young, and Anstruthers took down statement. They both felt we should have reported to Corps and should get back at once. Col. Young asked: "Should I come?". I walked over Quincey's shoulder, knowing that only Young could fix matters. He ate quietly and left, arriving at corps after midnight. Quincey and Young saw Col. HWHIT and all was OK, we were to keep in touch with them daily at 10 a.m. and arrange our activities. Then we went to camp, couldn't find it because it had been shifted, and I slept under a tree while Young and Avril slept in Young's car and Quincey kept searching until 3 a.m. when he found the camp, came back, and slept near us.



Tuesday, February 13th. We found the camp across the meadow, well concealed, and learned that Sage had been to McQuillen's headquarters the previous day in a motorcycle, and McQuillen had expressed gratitude to us and vice versa. Young, Quincey and I went on a tour, visiting various places. At all these places Young and Quincey were official. Later in the afternoon I visited the Sgt and laid plans for Tuesday the 13th. After for Tuesday the 13th. Then we visited Corps, while I stayed at Gertie. That night all of us had chips.

...to find the signal corps ... from a motorcycle ... some 12 miles east; we ... all American, and we









March 2, 1943

To: A. J. Goldberg  
 From: G. P. Van Arkel  
 Subject: General deGaulle

Last night a meeting was arranged between a former official of the deGaulle movement in London and five former Communist deputies to the Chambre des Deputes who had been in concentration camps in North Africa and who were among twenty seven former Communist deputies so held who were released about February 23. This official was editor of "France Libre" and intends to publish an edition of his paper in North Africa; while a part of the deGaulle movement, he operated the paper independently of the movement itself.

He reported that he had severed his connections with deGaulle. He reviewed the history of the movement; stated that the British had, at the time of the fall of France, picked up deGaulle because he was the most important French military officer at that time in England and had used him as a rallying point for those French elements which wished to continue the resistance. He attacked the leadership of the movement for what he considered to be their weakness at the time of the St. Pierre and Miquelon episode and their fears of the reactions of the State Department and the Foreign Office, and thought that the entire matter had been badly handled. He stated that there had been an anti-democratic tendency within the movement itself; for example, he stated that proclamations of deGaulle were issued in the form "Nous, General deGaulle, Directeur de la France Libre ... etc." in the manner of a feudal lord rather than in the manner of a democratic assemblage. He stated that decisions within the movement were made by deGaulle personally rather than through a democratic action, and that he saw in the movement an authoritarian rather than a democratic hope for France.

He stated that deGaulle had insisted that all the ministers surrounding him had been required to join the army under him; since they were thus subject to being sent into action at any time, he had an absolute control over their activity which prevented any real differences from being brought into the open. He expressed his concern over the absence of any real civilian participation in the movement, and thought that this too was indicative of an authoritarian trend. He stated that Andre Phillip, and the other representatives of the left in the movement, were virtually held prisoners within it and exercised no real voice; he was, apparently intentionally, entirely obscure concerning the position of Chenier, the Communist representative, within the movement and made no such statement concerning him.

He expressed no conclusions or suggestions for action, yet it seemed implicit within his remarks that he thought a new movement should be started, independent both of Giraud and de Gaulle. I was unable to learn how the meeting was arranged; the editor stated that he regretted the necessity of reporting such facts, and that he had no desire to add a further division to the present divisions among the French, but that he felt the necessity for reporting

the facts as he saw them.

This report comes to me from an entirely reliable source. I have been unable to learn whether the views expressed represent a real division within the de Gaulle movement or merely the views of a single individual.

*JM*

To: Arthur J. Goldberg  
 From: G. P. Van Arkel  
 Subject: Activities

March 3.

I thought it might be well to give you more or less a weekly summary of activities in the nature of a progress report.

To the present writing, progress has been slow, though I have been here just a week and under the circumstances it is hardly surprising. I have ascertained that none of the persons to whom I had introductions are at present here, which is something accomplished though not too encouraging. I have further gotten in contact with channels who will introduce me to the trade union people, which includes a number of rather important trade union leaders from France; I am to see the first of them this afternoon and expect to meet a good many others during the latter part of the week. Since the trade union movement here, apart from the vichy trade unions which seem to be quite without influence, is entirely underground, it has been something of a task to win the confidence of people in touch with trade union activity to the point where I can meet them. That spade work is now accomplished, I trust, and from this point on matters should move more rapidly.

In the meantime, various persons whom I have met are to give me reports on trade union activity here and in France which should be prepared shortly and which I shall send on as soon as received. There have been the usual number of false leads; one man on whom I had counted rather heavily to enter Tunis and make contact with the trade union groups there petered out, and at the moment there seems to be no one available to do the job. There remain important elements there of the trade union and liberal groups, and it would seem highly desirable to me to establish contact with them, but the recruiting job is difficult under present circumstances.

I attach a brief report which may be of interest; I have since ascertained from sources familiar with the deGaullist movement in London that the editor who spoke is perhaps the outstanding representative of the liberal point of view within the movement, and observers here are inclined to treat his defection from the deGaullist movement as a matter of considerable importance, representing more than an individual disillusionment.

Everyone here has been most helpful in furthering the work; Sawley Potter and Arthur Roseborough have been particularly decent about helping me get settled. I now have a car assigned me and I trust that greater mobility will mean a speed-up in production. Donald Downes has been suffering from a bad cough which has prevented his getting much sleep and is not in too good shape at the moment. I'll get some stuff off to you this week and report further at the beginning of next week.

March 4, 1948

The former secretary of the Railroad Workers' Union in France, who was in prison under the Vichy regime, furnished the following information:

Background:

Though his knowledge of the trade union situation in North Africa was somewhat limited, he had the following observations to make. The trade union movement has always been weak in North Africa (1) because the French government has always been opposed to the creation of any industry in North Africa. He cited as examples the phosphate, iron, paper and cork industries; although the raw materials are extracted here, they were always sent to France for processing with the result that there were no great number of industrial workers to be found here. 2) The native population, grossly underpaid (he cited as an example 1.25 francs or about 3¢ per hour paid to ordinary native labor), uneducated, and anti-French, had never been susceptible to organization. Further, employers in general in this region were more adamant in their opposition to the organization of their employees than were employers in France.

As a result, prior to the fall of France, organization had attained important levels only in the longshore, railroad and building industry and among the civil servants. Under the laws of the Third Republic, civil servants were denied the right to organize themselves or to carry on any union activities; in practice, the law was not enforced, with the result that civil servants were organized de facto and not de jure. After the fall of France, Vichy had undertaken to enforce the law as written by discharging all civil servants thought to belong to trade unions, with the result that their membership declined to almost nothing.

The railroad workers during the years 1936-1938 had a union with a total membership of about 7500. Upon the accession of the Vichy regime, a new set of officers was appointed by the administration. The only workers who attended meetings thereafter were those few who favored the collaborationist policies of the regime; membership in the union dropped to less than 250, any worker who spoke out against the policies of Vichy was immediately ordered to report to the prefect of police and was thereafter jailed. Within the last two weeks, a group of some three hundred railroad union members held a meeting and elected new officers; they demanded a financial accounting of the old officials which was refused, and it appeared that all dues collected by the Vichy officials had been used for purposes of propaganda. The building workers have likewise elected new officers recently. During the period of Vichy control, all union meetings were carefully and systematically spied upon by the local police; no meetings might be held except as called by the Vichy officials, with the result that the workers felt themselves in a state of siege and for the most part attempted to work out their problems in any way that suggested itself outside the framework of the trade union.

By a curious paradox, the Vichy laws governing trade unions, notably the "Charte du Travail", were never applied in North Africa. It appeared that even prior to the fall of France, especially in the case of social legislation, there was a lag between the application of laws to continental France and to Algeria which sometimes amounted to as much as four or five years. Hence, the Charte du Travail, with its provisions for compulsory arbitration, etc. adopted in November 1941, had not yet been applied in Algeria by the time of the American landing; the present disposition of the authorities appears to be not to apply them at the present time.

On March 2, a group of Communist deputies who had been released from prison met with M. Peyrouton. They asked that the right of organization be accorded the workers of Algeria; Peyrouton is reported to have replied that there was nothing which he was more anxious to do, and that he would endeavor to grant the privilege provided that the trade unionists of the country would agree not to attempt to organize native labor. (Parenthetically, the only important organization which included Arabs was the longshoremen which had a membership of about 2,000 between 1936-1938). They also demanded that the trade unionists now imprisoned in North Africa be released in order to assist in the prosecution of the war, a problem which Peyrouton said he was studying, and that they be granted the usual freedoms of the press, of assembly, of speech and of organization so far as the granting of those privileges would not interfere in the prosecution of the war. They specifically stated that they did not ask that the right to strike be granted for the duration of the war; M. Peyrouton is reported to have stated that he would take the matter under advisement.

He stated that if the right to organize freely were granted, the trade unions would be in a position to render material aid to the Allied Nations. For example, he stated that at Maison Blanche, the site of the airport for Algiers, there was a brand new airplane factory which had produced one plane a day up to the fall of France; at present, he reported, it is manufacturing gadgets for officers' uniforms and sewing machine parts. He stated that the maritime arsenal at Oran was lying completely idle, though its personnel included highly skilled mechanics from the naval base at Toulon and its equipment was among the best in the Mediterranean. Before the British and American landings, there were some 2,000 guards along the railroad lines; at present, practically all of them had been withdrawn by the local officials. He stated that this and similar information could be made available to British and American officials only if the right of organization were granted so that the trade union might act as a clearing house for such information.

He claimed that there was reason to believe that sabotage was delaying important parts of the common fight against the Axis. He cited as an example the threat of a strike among the workers building a shelter in the Rue Hoch in Algiers; they had been unable to obtain bread. One of his associates had made

and had learned that there was an abundance of flour at Oran; it was claimed that there was no available transportation, though he said that railroad workers had reported that empty cars were being hauled from Oran to Algiers. Axis propagandists, he claimed, were using these facts to good advantage, particularly among the native population.

He stated that there was at present no organized communication between the trade unions of France and North Africa. He said that there were among the trade unionists still in concentration camps many who would be willing to undertake a mission into France, but stated that any such commitments should be made after, rather than before, their release, and that their release from the camps, according to his views and those of his fellows, should not be made contingent upon their agreeing to do any particular chore or mission for the Allied Nations. Once they had been freed, he felt that there would be no particular difficulty in finding appropriate personnel. As an alternative, he suggested the possibility of a committee making a trip through the camps to ascertain conditions for recruiting purposes; he stated that this matter was one to be discussed with his fellows, while he himself was too old to undertake such a mission, he was willing to cooperate to the fullest extent in making available the names of reliable people among the railroad workers of France.

He stated that workers employed by the administration on the airport at Maison Blanche labored under serious handicaps; they quit work at five, but there is no train returning to Algiers before eight o'clock, which is usually about forty minutes late, with the result that they are putting in a day of about 19 hours. The canteen has been closed and there is no place for eating. Other difficulties are described on the attached folder which was distributed to the workers; he promised to submit a detailed report on conditions.





**SECURITY PROGRAMS IN NORTH AFRICA**2/21/43  
**SECRET**

During the first two weeks in February, I visited some of the concentration camps in Algeria and Morocco (and the Territoires du Sud) in company with Major Geoffrey Paulson (S.O.A.) of the British Army. The objective of our trip was to recruit individuals and groups for "special services" of OSS and SOE.

We had passes to these camps issued and signed by Colonel Chrétien, chief of the Military Security of the Douzième Armée of General Girard's staff. These passes secured for us the positive cooperation of those persons, military and civilian, responsible for running these camps.

We visited the following camps: Ben Arfa in Morocco, Beni Sakil in Morocco, Colomb Bechar and Kenassa in Algeria and Territoires du Sud. On an earlier trip, Major Paulson and Mr. Springs (American vice consul in Tunisia) had visited Djelfa, Boger, Boghari, and Berroughia camps located in south-central Algeria. To a lesser degree I am using the material gathered by Springs and Paulson to augment my own report.

*Paulson's report is enclosed. (Tab F)*

**LEADS**

The prisoners in these camps fall into the following categories with few exceptions:

1. Men who joined the Foreign Legion as volunteers for the duration of the war in the winter of 1939-40. These come from all nationalities with Poles, Germans and Austrian Jews as the greatest single group. Their motive was to fight against fascism and nazism.
2. Interned enemy aliens, mostly Germans and Italians.
3. Veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Republican Army
  - a. Spaniards
  - b. Men of the various international brigades and outfits like the International Brigade, Garibaldi Legion, etc.; (Poles, Germans, Austrians, Belgians, Greeks, Yugoslavs)
4. Individuals stranded in North Africa by the war.
5. Foreign residents of North Africa whose political views do not agree with the present régime.

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came into power with the fall of France.

### CONDITIONS

The above groups are all treated alike in the camps, very badly. For the rigors of the Sahara climate, cold nights and scorching days, the housing is inadequate. The men are miserably clad and dangerously underfed. A sample menu at Bou Arfa was imitation coffee for breakfast and no solids, no sugar, no milk. Noon, a thin vegetable stew in unsalted water. Night, the same as noon with a small piece of coarse bread. Once a week a small portion of meat. The best of the camps from the material point of view is Kanassa, the worst probably Djelfa. We did not see the disciplinary camp of Hadjerat M'Gild where it is reported the treatment is brutal and the living conditions worse than Djelfa. Until these men were given their so-called freedom early in February they were paid from 2 to 4 francs per day; from this deductions were made for their tools and for their food in some cases. There is reason to believe that much of the outgoing mail, especially that which might aid toward freeing an individual is destroyed by the supervising officers.

One finds it hard to find a justification for the treatment given these men. A large part of them have only committed the crime of enlisting in the French Army to fight for France. The real motive appears to be that only by these methods could the Mediterranean Niger Railway get cheap enough labor to build the Transsaharian Railway and the mines get sufficiently cheap labor to make worthwhile the mining of the low grade ores and coal found in the far north. I base this remark on statements by mine managers and the Engineer in chief of Construction for the Mediterranean Niger Railway. Much of the bad treatment is due to the low grade of Frenchmen who are the officers and group leaders charged with guarding, maintaining and disciplining the prisoners; We found many of them openly anti-ally, pro-German, venal and cruel. Mr. Pierre Lasserre, the Chief of the Mediterranean Niger in Colomb Bechar told us that he found most of these officers "merely brutes, sadists, who in all justice should be shot for their treatment of the internees in this territory."

The general supervision of all the G. T. R. (Foreign Workers Groups) depends on a central office in Rabat for Morocco and in Algiers for Algeria. The actual group leaders who handle the men are appointed by them but these men are responsible at each camp to the military chef-de-poste or other military officer controlling the locality. There is thus a joint responsibility for the conditions under which these men work and live. The military blame the civilians

-3-

and the civilians blame the military for the bad conditions existing.

We hear many stories of deaths and cruel and unusual punishments in the Disciplinary Camp (C. T. N. No. 6) at Hadjerat el Ouldj. Had we heard these only from the prisoner, I should have discounted them but the officials of the Mediterranean Niger as well as certain civilian chiefs of labor groups told similar stories and confirmed the stories of several prisoners. There is one group now being punished for having made and displayed an American flag at Kouadja the day the armistice was signed between Admiral Darlan and General Eisenhower.

The men other than the enemy aliens in the camps have been notified that they are free. This took place while we were in the camps, Feb. 9th at Colomb Bechar and the 13th at Bou Arfa.

That this was in effect no freedom at all but left the persons in the camps under the same conditions as before (save for a pay rise) can be seen from appendix N° 1 and N° 2 attached.

It might be well to reaffirm that according to M. Lasserre of the Mediterranean-Niger and Capitaine Alexandre, Chef du Groupement des Travailleurs Etrangers at Colomb Bechar none of these internees were sent there for any criminal offense, but merely because it was assumed that they disagreed with the policy of the government (i.e. the policy of Vichy).

It is the consensus of opinion in the camps that actual conditions had become worse since the landing of the Allies in North Africa. This was due to the surprise of the keepers and chefs de groupements that they were not immediately relieved of their charges. This was especially true when we even failed to liberate the nationals of the United Nations. This cynicism regarding our attitude toward our national and ideological allies passed even to the prisoners when it was noted that Count Gnapski, Polish Consul in Algiers, visited the camps to free the Poles and according to our own observations in the camps, freed only the Polish Catholics. All the Polish Jews were left behind on Gnapski's theory that they could not prove their Polish citizenship.

With the exception of one Captain Robert, every military man connected with the camps whom we met was more or less openly anti-United Nations. Until the 1st of February 1943 this was reflected in the absolute prohibition against any internee's

listening

listening to American or English radio broadcasts.

At Gelamb Mechar we tried to interrogate whatever Italian anti-fascists might be interned and this was blocked by the authorities. This, we ascertained, was in order to cover up the scandal connected with this group. After we learned Italians were rounded up elsewhere to please the Americans and the British, they were classified in three groups: Fascists - uncertain, and anti-fascists. Some time in January a Lieutenant Schaffer of Giraud's 2e Bureau arrived in Gelamb Mechar and freed the Fascist Italians.

Upon enquiry at the headquarters of the 2e Bureau in Algiers this story was confirmed with some embarrassment. The excuse given was that the "poor little Lieutenant had made an error and shortly the Italians will be rearrested and reinterned". (Captain Collins).

#### Morale and Physical Resistance.

The Spaniards and Poles and some Yugoslavs have stood up better, mentally and physically, than the others. The Germans, especially the Urban Jews of Vienna and Berlin, doctors, lawyers, painters and professional men, have been for the most part broken in body and spirit under the discipline, poor conditions and extreme climate of the camps. Major Paulson agrees with me that the Spaniards are a very valuable group of men for para-military operations and for S O work. This is also true of the Polish Jews and some of the others.

I have located 14 W/T operators among the Spaniards. One among the Yugoslavs and several high officers of former paramilitary organizations.

As of today there are about 7,000 non-French available in these camps of whom half can be considered as potentially useful if paramilitary work were to be undertaken on a large scale. About 60% would be Spanish veterans and about 20% former Legionnaires who engaged for the duration.

I have been somewhat verbose on the conditions in these camps because they affect not only our enlistments from these camps but from all the anti-axis emigrés in North Africa. Always there is a pretty solid front in refusing to serve in any capacity with the French or under-French-officers. There is a growing disposition toward us based on the continuation of these camps and camps

Colonel

-1-

refusal to release political prisoners.

Attached is a copy of the 2000 (copy, p. 5) summarizing the release of the prisoners and understating their number by 600. All these groups here, Republican French, Anti-Communist Italians, Republican Spanish, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Belgians, and the rest know full well that these people have not been released. It is natural that they should blame us and view our promises and intentions with some cynicism. (Tab. G)

The fact that so many people who aided our landings here were punished for it, jailed, deported, sent to camps and only now are some of them being released has also hurt us. We Americans are suspected of being people who abandon our friends of other days to the mercy of people who only a few months ago we agreed were our natural enemies.

If even a weak imitation of the magnificent pre-D-day job done in North Africa is to be repeated elsewhere we must be able to recruit resolute anti-fascists and anti-nazis of the various occupied and enemy nationalities to do the ground work. There can be no control vice-consuls in Italy or Yugoslavia. The American laissez-faire attitude toward the French Administration in North Africa is making this enlistment most difficult.

Attached (appendices 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) are various lists of especially qualified men available in the camps whom we are considering for various missions or jobs. (Tab. I)

Arrangements have been made with Colonel Chrétien's service of the 2e Bureau to release these volunteers to us and when we need them. Colonel Chrétien met with considerable opposition from M. Rigaud, chief of the Political Bureau of the Government General but reports he has won his point.

*D. C. Downes*  
D. C. DOWNES

ENCLOSURES attached.







C.N.  
 MEDIE... NIGER  
 INGEN... EN...  
 LA... CONSTRUCTION  
 SECR... MIAT

Colomb Béchar, le 9 février 1943

NOTE DE SERVICE

1046 BA /MOP

Cont: ts T.C.E.

A dater du 10 février, les T.C.E. mis à la disposition du MERNIGER par le Groupement Sud Oranais, pour lesquels les Chefs de Service auront fait des propositions d'emploi à M. l'Ingénieur en Chef de la Construction seront libérés entièrement du Groupement et mis sous contrat au traitement provisoire de 70 francs par jour avec effet rétroactif à la date du 1er février.

A compter de ce jour ils seront considérés comme employés du MERNIGER et bénéficieront à ce titre de tous les avantages que peuvent avoir actuellement les ouvriers du M.N.

Ils seront logés et nourris par le M.N. dans les mêmes conditions que leurs collègues et pourront également prendre leur nourriture en ville si cela leur convient mieux. Ils ne seront plus d'autre part, abstenir à rentrer le soir à 9 heures comme il était indiqué jusqu'alors.

Toutefois il est rappelé aux T.C.E. qui comme tout employé du M.N., ils sont requis militaires et qu'ils ne peuvent en aucun cas quitter Colomb Béchar de leur propre autorité; tout contravenant sera immédiatement recherché par les autorités locales et remis à la discipline.

De plus il est recommandé aux T.C.E. circulant en ville d'avoir comme tout employé du M.N. une attitude correcte et disciplinée.



L'Ingénieur en Chef de la Construction

Signe Velle.

atif à la note n° 1046 BA/MOP du 9 février

La situation des T.C.E. mis sous contrat provisoire à 70 frs. par jour sera revue incessamment et chaque T.C.E. verra son salaire réajusté selon sa spécialité au même taux que les employés du M/N/.

Tab J



0 Approximate 469

To illustrate figures  
mean to be used at SMS

mean. (B) The  
mean. (B) The

mean.

Approximate 4

YUGO SLAVS IN FERRARA AND OTHER PLACES

BRADON PAVICOV

Captain in the International Brigades; fought throughout the war in Spain. His position is similar to that of the others.

Remarks: - Made a good impression. Tough and troublemaker. His considerable experience should make him a useful man as a guerrilla leader.

BRADON KOVIC

Professional sailor. Experienced navigator. Claims to have passed all the necessary examinations for Master's certificate. Jugoslav Merchant Marine. Graduate of Institut Nautique at Dubrovnik.

Remarks: Also made a good impression. Claims to know well the whole Adriatic Coast and is anxious to do active work against the Axis. Knows also Italy and Sicilian Littoral.

ANTON KONDICHI

Radio Telegraphist. Served 120 days instruction with Legion 1940 Sidi Bel Abbas. S/O in U.S. Army. Deserted and joined Legion because he wished to fight vs. Germans and his country was in the hands of Germans. Born 1914 at Bijelina on frontier between Serbia and Bosnia.

Remarks: Appears to be an excellent type. Might well justly be considered as R/I man.

ELLA MARINA

Cook. Not seen but recommended by others.

LATAN MARKO

Shoe maker. As for Obersta.

In addition there are 3 further Yugo Slavs at Kouda who are also present but whose names were not known to informants.

ITALIANS IN COLONY BIRHAN AND KENABIA

ARRIGO DE CHINA

About 40. Born in Palermo. Served in Italian Army at Florence 1935-37. Profession Interpreter(?) probably also for protocols. Wife French, now in Paris at 10 Rue de ... speaks, German, French and Italian fluently. Expelled from France a number of times. Said by others in camp to be anti-Fascist.

Remarks: A 'possible' would probably do anything for money.

Francesco Azzurro Age 24. Born in Livorno where his father is now. Father anti-Fascist who escaped to Algeria where he is now a chauffeur. Was an officer in Italian Artillery Regiment. Left Italy 2 days after Armistice and escaped to Marseilles where he alleges he was concealed from Armistice Commission by French.

Remarks: A 'possible'. Certainly intelligent but uneducated and at the moment very excitable.

Francisco BLAZIO In disciplinary camp at Hadjerat E'Gild. Served in Garibaldi Legion under Col. Paoletti in Spain. (Suggest D. cables for opinion of him). Captain in above units.

BOU ANFA, le 6 Janvier 1943.

Liste des ex-engagés volontaires pour la durée de la guerre  
dans l'armée française (Légion étrangère) intéressés dans les  
Groupements des travailleurs depuis leur démobilisation le 23  
septembre 1940 et désireux de servir dans et de se mettre à  
la disposition des armées alliées (anglaises et américaines)  
mais en aucun cas sous le drapeau français:

Abraham Bruno	03-11-02	Heilbronn	apatr. commerc;	E. V. L. 2. classe
Abraham Max	17-8-06	Muerberg	ex-alle;	employé de " " "
Arens Kurt	12-8-94	Frazer	ex-alle.	commerçant " "
Hercules Frederic			Polonaise	soudeur " "
Barrachina Raffael	12-3-14	Barcelona	espagnol	plombier " "
Bauer Heitor	6-8-18	Berlin	autrich.	commerçant " "
Barnstein Heinz	24-4-08	Allenstein	ex-all.	employé indus. " "
Baum Julius	6-3-12	Krumbach	autrich.	chauffeur V. R. G.
Braun Julius	5-3-92	Oedenberg	autrich.	commerçant " "
Buller Joseph	00-9-05	Rodaun	autrich.	fourreur " "
Burger Charles	31-3-17	Vienna	autrich.	étudiant " "
Di Agostini Silvio	10-11-04	Rigolate	italien	wagon " "
Dufour Henry	20-12-20	Loussane	suisse	jardinier " "
Hissmann Leopold	1-4-96	Frankfurt/M.	apatr;	contracteur " "
Fleschel Walter	21-5-13	Dièvre/Mosel.	ex-all;	standartiste " "
Furtz Edgar	5-6-13	Colmar	ex-all;	dessinateur " "
G. Edgar	21-4-13	Berlin	ex-all.	wagon " "
G. Dionisio	26-12-06	Madrid	espagnol	plombier " "
Gerber Werner	26-2-07	Plauen	ex-all;	comptable " "
G. Arthur	22-1-02	Dortmund	ex-all.	fourreur " "
G. Brenner Max	16-4-19	Klein-pöchlarn;	autr;	tailleur " "
Heini Charles	27-5-07	Vienna	autr;	chauffeur " "
Hoffmann Joseph	19-10-94	Vienna	autr.	commerçant " "
K. Nicolai	3-8-07	Gravelette	barrois	compt; ass; " "
K. Schellenbogen				
Heinz	13-3-04	Vienna	autr.	electricien " "
Klein Harry	23-3-04	Vienna	autr.	tailleur " "
Koppel Francis	14-9-04	Vienna	autr.	Technicien " "
Krasta Gustave	24-5-01	Kett	ex-all.	chauffeur " "
K. Alfred	29-1-18	Vienna	autr.	commerçant " "
K. Wilhelm	1-9-08		russe	privat; " "
K. Henry	2-10-20	Vienna	autr;	ing. éléct. " "

-11-

Lehner Hans	5-5-17	Vienna	autr.	Administrateur V. D. G. de la
Lavy Alfred	28-7-97	Saarlais	ex-all.	commerçant
Lavy Henry	22-3-94	Dahn	ex-all.	employé de banque
Lirgen Hermann	8-10-95	Neuwirk	ex-all.	typographe
Mansoni Germain	1-5-03	Trente	italien	Maçon (cuisinier)
Maraldi Aristide	25-3-93	Cosina	italien	maçon
Marcus Erich	15-4-19	Berlin	sans	sans
Maslow Hermann	19-2-07	Kathenow	ex-all.	opticien-sec.
Matzner Fritz	28-2-14	Vienne	autr.	ingénieur-élec. B. D. V. G.
Meier Gert	21-9-21	Stuttgart	ex-all.	sec; compt;
Meneghetti Carlo	22-9-04	Fessolange	italien	ajusteur-mec.
Link Werner	11-9-11	Katzenow	apatride	navigateur
Mikolozsy Robert	24-12-95	Vienne	autr.	commerçant
Ortaiz Ortega Francisco	1-6-11	Setenil	espagnol	cultivateur
Orndorff Manfrd	15-11-08	Berlin	ex-all.	sec, comp.
Ortiz Jacob	5-11-03	Philipopol	autr.	chauffeur.
Ortiz Hans	15-14-03	Vienna	autr.	journaliste
Ortiz Jacob	11-4-03	Lichtenau	ex-all.	commerçant
Ossenthal Charles	17-8-19	Vienna	autr.	étudiant
Palf Rodolphe	28-9-12	Kehl	ex-all.	marinier
Scherwitzel François	3-9-12	St; Ruprecht	autr.	tailleur
Sei Okasa	6-6-98	Yokohama	japonaise	maçon-décorateur
Simon Eugene	6-12-96	Ruttig	ex-all.	commerçant
Stern Otto	7-6-40	Vienna	autr.	tailleur
Stoffmischer Henry	13-2-10	Offenbach	ex-all.	maroquinier
Stoffmischer Leon	11-4-10	Wutshachingen	ex-all.	mechanicien
Stor Georges	26-12-01	Budapest	indeterminé	commerçant
Stor André	10-11-12	Vulcan	roumaine	medecin
Stor Jean	6-1-10	Barcelona	espagnole	tourneur-mec.
Traub Walter	8-12-15	Treves	ex-all.	étudiant
Weill Edward	30-9-98	Karlsruhe	ex-all.	chimiste
Weill Paul	26-7-99	Czerkawitz	autr.	fabric. instruments medicaux
Weissly Theodore	26-4-00	Vienna	française	entrepreneur
Zenstmayr, Rathold von	22-10-00	Munich	autr.	historien d'art
Zichlawa Erich	12-9-20	Vienna	autr.	dessinateur
Zur Garcia Zamora	12-4-25	San Puebla Valverde	espagnol	agriculteur
Zur Munch	16-6-20	Canarias	espagnol	marinier
Zur			espagnol	
Zwettler Joseph	26-12-02	St. Cristoph (Aosta)	italien	peintre
Zwettler Aron	23-11-00	Yessini (Aoste)	roumaine	dentiste
Zwettler Saul	1-4-11	Bayona	espagnole	comptable
Zwettler Paul	29-10-21	Yessini	italienne	mechanicien

San-Aria, le 9 Fevrier 1943

ANNEXE DE LA LISTE DES S.V.D.G.

Spécialités professionnelles et militaires:

Barrachins Raffael armée espagnole républicaine motorisée 2e classe  
 infanterie " "  
 Bariss Ramon " " " " " "  
 Diaz Philippe " " " " " "  
 Gomez Carlos " " " " " " sous-officier  
 Gaarz Ernest " " " " " " mitrailleur-interbrigades  
 Strittsacher " " " " " " infanterie soldat  
 Link Werner " " " " " " "et artillerie, sergent de  
 transmission

Abraham Bruno, armée américaine

Levy Alfred " allemande 14-18, Cdt. d'une compagnie des pionniers

Linga Hermann " allemande 14-18, sous-officier infanterie

Weill Edouard " allemande 14-18, sous-officier artillerie et D.G.A.

Koppel Frederic Organisation paramilitaire, Chef d'une compagnie  
 d'infant. Spécialité: combat des rues)

Zehetmayr Retholu Organisation paramilitaire (Frescorps) Lieutenant  
 (Oberlieutenant, chef d'une compagnie) spécialité: combat  
 combat des rues et des montagnes)

Gerber Werner: Infirmier

Burger Charles: Infirmier

Manzana Armée italienne (artillerie)

armée austro-hongroise, chasseurs alpins 'Kaiserjaeger'

Darias Ramon " espagnole republicaine infanterie, soldat

Diaz " " " " " "

Matzner Fritz (26) Operateur T; S; F;

Welt Paul Legion, motorisé, chauffeur

Cretier Joseph, armée italienne (alpins) caporal

Startz Aron, armée roumaine (dentiste militaire)

Langues vivantes: (autre allemande et française)

Bernstein English-italienne

Abraham Bruno English

Burger-Charles English-italienne-espagnole

Gaarz Espagnole

Koppel Russe et espagnole

Orechudesch English-italienne

Mina Espagnole

Zehetmayr English

Gerber English

Leufar Espagnole-roumaine-portugaise

Matzner English-espagnole

Startz Roumaine

Welt English-turque-grecque-espagnole



**COMMISSIONI DEI TRAVAI E DEI SERVIZI IN AREE INDUSTRIALI**

**DEL 1974**

**LISTE NOMINATIVE DEI RESEARCH GRANTS ITALIANI CONCESSI AD**

**QUINTONOME**

BORGONZOLI PIETRO	30 Janvier 1921	Entrepreneur E.P.
PODRING Georges	20 Avril 1900	Ajusteur mecanicien
COSTA Antoine	52 ans	manoeuvre
COSTINI Joseph	41 ans	manoeuvre
DE ZOLI Edoardo	40 ans	ouvrier
DIQUAL Sylvio	40 ans	negot
FARINA NATALIE	30 ans	
FRANCA Germain	40 ans	cuisinier
FRANZINI Carlo Giuseppe	22 Sept. 1904	ajusteur mecanicien
FRANZINI Aristide	46 ans	negot
FRANZINI Carlo	37 ans	negot
FRANZINI René	42 ans	barman
FRANZINI Angelo	30 ans	negot
FRANZINI Enzo	35 ans	negot
FRANZINI Pierre	20 mai 1907	agriculteur

LISTA DE NOMBRES PARA LOS DISTINTOS SERVICIOS

COMISION POLITICA

Mustaqueo Gomez Espinosa	en DUBAI
Luis Beltran del Castillo	"
Tortajada (Medico)	"
Francisco Ramirez	en Casablanca
Aurelio Ariznavarreta	en Marrakech

LISTA DE SECCIONES

Juan Miro Navajas	en Laxhese - penal-
Eusebio Garcia Garcia	" " "
Luis Tapia	en Casablanca
Antonio Ruiz Armenta	en Djelfa

LISTA DE INTELIGENCIA

Jose Arciles Ortiz	en Meknes e Port-Lyautey
Francisco Ruiz Aguayo	" Casablanca
Antonio Garrido Nottle	" Bou-Arfa
Joaquin Centurion Centurion	" Boug-Gakil
Juan Bejar	(Consultar las listas generales)
Jose Belmonte del Agila	" Kenaisa
Jose Lara Diaz	" " "
Jose Escarbajal Llop	" Oran
Francisco Ruano Ledesma	" " "
Emeterio Meruelo Gomez	" Djelfa
Simeon Agilera Bonachera	" Boghar
Eleodoro Alessiz Aguirre	" Beni-Ouquill
Gregorio Romero Cabezuolo	" Kouadja
Antonio Guanoz Yaguez	" " "
Jose Chicano Casado	" Bou-Arfa

GENERALISTAS

Victoriano Garcia Bueda	en Bou-Arfa
Luis Molina Ordoñez	" Bou-Arfa
Luis Garcia Fuentes	" Bou-Arfa

- 2 -

Manuel Jey  
 Manuel Olivinos Lopez  
 Rodrigo Centudo Garcia  
 Diego Oserson Lopez  
 Aniceto Roca Hernandez  
 Juan Gordon Martinez  
 Manuel Alvarez Martinez  
 Fernando America Bustica  
 Francisco Perez Rodriguez  
 Agustin Moreno Caro  
 Carlos Marcos  
 Rafael Salgado Gil

en Colomb-Bechar  
 " "  
 " Beni-Oakil  
 " Kenadsa  
 " "  
 " Djelfa  
 " "  
 " Kenadsa  
 " "  
 " Colomb-Bechar  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 (Consultar las listas de Boghara)

PARA TRABAJOS DE MASA

Jesus Penilla Lomas  
 Fernando Luras Gonzalez  
 Severino Cocho Gil  
 Jesus Caballero Gomez  
 José Luis Estéban  
 Matias Hernandez  
 Pedro Roble Gil  
 Eusebio Rama  
 Claudio Moreno  
 Suso  
 Francisco Sanchez Giron  
 Antonio Pulido  
 Francisco de las Heras  
 Leon Garcia Garcia  
 Francisco Sevillano Gomez

en Kenadsa  
 " "  
 " Colomb Bechar  
 " Kenadsa  
 " "  
 " Oran  
 " Bou-Arfa  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 " 6a Compania Disciplinaria  
 " Kenadsa  
 " Adra ( en el Sur de Colomb Bechar )  
 " En el 1º Grupo destacado en las  
 proximidades de Alger.

RESERVAS

Ignacio Lopez Domingo  
 Ysidoro Moreira Pese  
 Guillermo Iñedo  
 Antonio Martinez Nieto  
 Acoran Torgano  
 Manuel Lopez  
 Alfonso Navarro Alonso  
 Dangras  
 Rodriguez

" Alger  
 " Kenadsa  
 " Oran  
 " Djelfa  
 " "  
 " Alger  
 " Beni-Oakil  
 " Djelfa  
 " Oran

NOTA: - Oliven es un buen elemento practicante que en el caso de necesidad de organizacion de servicios sanitarios puede ser transferido a la 6a Compania Disciplinaria.

**LIST OF MEN AT COLONEL BOSHAR FOR IMMEDIATE USE**

Radio man: Evaristo Jimenez	Group T U D
Cplas: Angel Merchan Gave	Merniger
O: Miguel Prieto Melina	"
Manuel Melina Ordenez	"
Milton Fabio Juanillo	"
Leocadio Fuentes	"
Manuel Garcia Casara	"
Luis Rios	T U D
Rafael Moreno Jimenez	Merniger
Antonio Martos Gelde	"
Mmanuel Carreras	"
Domingo Moraton Jimenez	"
I. Leon Garcia Garcia	Merniger now in Adraz
Angel Martinez Cabarron	Merniger
Hernandez de la Blanca	Menaba (Merniger)
Cacho Gil	Merniger
Salvador Garcia Perez	"
Antonio Oller Garcia	"
Francisco Marchal Valdivia	T U D
San Miguel Varea	Merniger

**Group No. 2 at Kenada**

Radio: Leidor Moreira Pose	
Cplas: Jose Belmonte del Aguila)	these men especially experienced
Jose Lara Diaz	
O: Fernando Amador a Bastiana	
Tomas Barbeito Garcia	
Julio Gomez Roy	
Raphael Cabares Priego	
Antonio Cuencavazquez	
Jesus Lopez Fernandez Antonio Mendez Navas	
Francisco Moreno Pascual	
Aniceto Roca Hernandez	
Raphael Otero Alvarez	
Francisco Perez Rodriguez	
Miguel Caparras Lopez	
Juan Sales Garmon	
I. Jesus Pinilla Lucas	Laboratory worker
Fernando Douzal Gonzalez	accountant
Jose Fox Tena	pilot
Gregorio Romero Cabanella	chauffeur
Jose Fernandez Navarro	seller
Juan Fernandez Regales	electrician
Vicente Valina Vidal	pilot, also RADIO MAN
Jesus Caballero Gomez	electrician
Francisco Diaz Utano	accountant
Salvador Mateo Hernandez	spicer

Francisco Gaspar Navia  
Francisco de la Haza Gonzalez  
Jose Luis Mateos  
Eduardo Piliado Sierra

**NOU ALFA**

Opus: Victoriano Garcia Rada (Div. Commander of Guerrillas)  
O: Antonio Ponte  
Felix Perez  
Francisco de la Torre  
Uquiane Bermudez  
I. Aniceto Salas Real  
Vicente Jimenez Vega

OUU DA some Alger head officer of Merniger

RADIO: Ignacio Lopez Dominguez Brd. Co; of Merniger, Alg M-N  
Alger

Opus: Joaquin Centurion Centurion, 2nd Co. Merniger Beni-Oukil  
(Gudja)

O: Manuel Calvino Lopez " " "  
Rodrigo Centuro Garcia " " "  
I. Eleodora Aleaniz Aguirre 1st Co; "  
Francisco Sevillano Gomez " " Now near Alger  
Alfonso Navarro Alonso " " Beni-Oukil (Gudja)  
Eusebio Cabanillas Alfaro Atelier Gudja Merniger  
Bonifacio Perez Gomez 1st Co. M-N, now near Alger  
Aparecio Calatayud Atelier M-N Gudja


Special Intelligence worker behind enemy lines: Aurelio Garcia  
Barbero, Base Mobile, Beni-Oukil, Gudja.

**DELTA**

Eustaquio Casas, Gov. of Algeria fd; of Pro.  
Luis Beltra del Castillo, Ed; of Volao

Utic: Antonio Martinez Niote  
Abraham Torrens

Guerrilla men in Spain  
Radio Technician



Q These documents were indistinguishable by Spanish sources. To us who wanted the copies they do not seem exaggerated.

Please photostat them for my file.

RUC

MOST SECRET

## REPORT

SITUATION IN THE DIFFERENT PLACES WHERE SPANISH REFUGEES  
ARE INTERNED OR IMPRISONED.

Maison-Carré (prison)  
 Military prison at Algiers.  
 Lambéze (prison) Constantine.  
 Berroughia (prison and camp)  
 Djelfa (camp)  
 Port Lyautey (French Moroccan prison)  
 Carnot (sick camp -- hospital)  
 Fouka-Marine (residence for mutilated men)  
 Bou-Arfa, )  
 Colomb Bechar ( work camp centers  
 Kenadza )  
 Plus various disciplinary camps and penal camps in desert regions,  
 created since the arrival of the Anglo-American forces in North  
 Africa.

The arrival in North Africa of Anglo-American forces which came to wage the war of the United Nations against Hitler and accomplices in the name of liberty and democracy, induced the Spaniards to hope that soon all antifascists who had been persecuted and imprisoned as the result of measures of Axis inspiration, would soon be released. (It might be observed that these measures which still have not been invalidated by the French administration, were applied with zeal and enthusiasm by Hitler's friends.) These hopes were strengthened by the declaration of President Roosevelt over the radio (and ignored by the Algerian press) in which it was clearly stated "That all the antifascists imprisoned in North Africa would be liberated immediately". In spite of the time that has passed without these declarations being put into execution, the morale of the Spanish antifascists remains very high, as they are also certain that soon principles of justice, liberty and democracy will be applied in this country and will overcome the obstacles raised up to the present time.

What was the reaction of the Spanish political refugees in various parts of North Africa? There was great joy that the Axis had lost important aid from this territory. This joy was manifested in all parts and continues to express itself in generous offers of collaboration with the Allied forces and a healthy desire to be useful in the common effort to annihilate Hitler and his accomplices.

The Spanish political refugees who are already experienced in the war against Hitlerism (24 months in Spain of unequal struggle and almost 4 years of firm endurance of all kinds of persecution in North Africa) have understood that their experience may be useful to the Allied cause and for that reason have traced the lines of a frank collaboration with the Allies, whose objectives are the same.



-2-

same as theirs.

What was the reaction of those opposed to these refugees: Prison directors, chiefs of concentration camps, guards, captains, lieutenants, etc.

anger and rage at the time of the landing, then fear that they might have to lose their jobs because of their opposition to the Allied cause. Under the pretext of maintaining order, a series of military disciplinary measures had been instituted, including the installation of machine guns, with the object of repressing with bloodshed any demonstration of joy on the part of the Spanish who, however, were able to meet the situation calmly and not to fall into the trap laid for them by these chiefs, who, as the situation is prolonged are becoming more insolent and disposed to let out their rage on the Spanish, wishing to represent them as men unfit to mingle with the rest of society.

What is the treatment actually meted out to the Spanish political refugees in spite of the arrival of the Allied troops?

To begin with Maison Carrée prison where the food ration has been cut to less than half what it was before the Allied landing and where the men condemned to hard labor are obliged to do more work than they were before. The result is that the Spanish in this prison are now in a precarious state of health due to overwork and malnutrition.

In Lambèze prison the same treatment is meted out to them, also in Ferrougnia prison, where the food gets worse and worse and the treatment of the prisoners also.

At Djelfa the bullying of the Chief of the camp who makes the men do hard labor for 250 grammes of bread per diem has reduced the food rations of sick and invalid men who are unable to furnish the effort required by the Chief who follows up such treatment by threats of sending them to Spain, putting them before the alternative of joining the French Foreign Legion or going to Spain.

In the camps of Fouka-Marine, Suzzoni and Gernot (concentration camps, camps of sick and mutilated men) the situation of the Spanish is getting worse as a result of the stopping of their manufacture of rope-soled canvas shoes, so that they are now suffering the horrors of famine since their food ration is totally inadequate to sustain a human being.

Recently at Bou Arfa they took twenty Spaniards and sent

them

-3-

them immediately to the disciplinary camp, after a terrible beating, because they had refused to eat their soup (which had been altogether unacceptable, since it consisted of nothing but turnips boiled alone in water). Also this gives us the idea that in spite of the desire of the Allied nations to free the oppressed from Hitler's yoke, the principles of liberty and democracy which animate the peoples of Washington, London and Moscow are being shamelessly sabotaged in this country, and our living conditions are being made worse, obviously with the intention of discrediting these principles of liberty of the Allied Armies and shaking our faith in them.

What offers have actually been made to the Spanish political refugees after the arrival of the Allied forces in North Africa?

- 1) Indifference and refusal of the requests of those oppressed by Hitlerism in the prisons and disciplinary camps.
- 2) Indifference and incomprehension of their desire to return to the condition of free men who are entitled to certain international political rights under the international laws governing political refugees.

3) They are invited to enlist in the French Free Corps, without consideration of their physical condition and capacities. They have been incorporated in new (work) companies resembling those already formed in various points of the Sahara desert, and have been sent to places in which the climate was terribly harmful to their physical condition worn down by 6 years' suffering and persecutions, and these companies are staffed by men who were yesterday the friends of Hitler (and probably still are) and who by their conduct are unable to get on with the Spaniards.

What do the Spanish political refugees think of this situation which is so contradictory?

In the first place, they think that in the first moments of their struggle with the military elements in North Africa, it was necessary for the Allies to negotiate, to make certain concessions, to treat with these elements, but these measures should not be carried to the point of weakness and allow the enemy to be lodged in the house to carry on his work against the Allied cause whenever occasion offers.

They also think that the putting into practice of a sound war policy will require the collaboration of all healthy anti-

Nazi

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Nazi forces in the country capable of furnishing a contribution to the common effort for the destruction of the Axis.

They think that employment and therefore responsibility should be given to the most experienced of these men who would be important in the struggle to ensure the application of the above mentioned policy and to prevent sabotage and desertions.

They think that the continuance of the situation in which the Spanish political refugees find themselves is caused by sabotage on the part of those who should apply the democratic principles expressed in the declarations of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin and even those of the French authorities in North Africa which are now the allies of the United Nations.

The Spanish refugees also think that the prolongation of a situation such as the present one, which implies the lack of a sound war policy, may result not only in discontent on the part of the Spanish but also of all the Algerian people which sees that in spite of the time that has elapsed since the Allies landed in North Africa, the country continues to be a huge concentration camp with prisons full of men who have fought against Hitler and who are punished for that reason. This discontent may also be based on the fact that all restrictive legislation is maintained intact while the least desires of the Algerian and Moroccan peoples for liberty are refused, in spite of the fact that this principle of liberty is the essential principle of the liberal democratic programme of the fight against Hitler, Mussolini and their accomplices.

What offers are made by the Spanish political refugees to the Axis cause?

The offer of all technical or professional aptitudes to be found amongst their group - cultural, industrial, agricultural, commercial, etc.; which would furnish their maximum effort in the fight against Hitler.

The offer of military aid in case Spain should throw herself into the war on the side of the Axis: we have regular officers who have served in the Spanish armed forces on land, sea and air. We would like to establish the bases of this wholehearted collaboration on the obtention in principle of three minimum points which represent our most immediate aspirations:

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1) Immediate release of all Spanish political refugees from the places of detention in which they now are (prisons, concentration and penal camps, work camps, etc;)

2) Immediate re-establishment of international political rights regarding political refugees and the abolishment of contrary legislation.

3) Freedom to work for all Spanish political refugees with possibility of employment in the different activities of the country.

Peculiar situation which has arisen at Bou-Arfa, Colomb-Béchar, since the landing of the Anglo-American forces in North Africa.

BOU ARFA - Under the pretext of maintaining order automatic weapons have been placed where ditches and trenches are being dug, and the native mounted troops have been reinforced. Further, the Spanish political refugees have been forbidden to listen to the English or American radio broadcasts, to leave the camp, or to walk about in groups of more than two. At curfew, 19:30 patrols went round the Spanish camp upon the orders of Captain PILLET (French Aviation) these patrols insulted the Spanish, threatening and provoking them.

Captain Pillet, who is in charge of the Spanish work-gang "C", frames orders directed against the Spaniards, and insults them. For instance his phrase "These - - Spanish had better not forget that the Anglo-Americans haven't arrived at Bou Arfa yet, and that I'm in command here", and "Any man caught listening to the radio will be sent immediately to the disciplinary section";

COLOMB BECHAR - The same precautionary measures were taken at Bou Arfa, where the garrison was reinforced by 2 companies of the Foreign Legion, and arms were distributed to Axis sympathizers (Legion des Combattants) while at the same time the homes of Spanish refugees were searched. Also, at the home of Madame Fifi, Hotel Mestre and the Hotel de la Palmeraie, meetings were held with the object of opposing the Allied forces.

Upon the insistence of several staff officers (expressed apparently at these meetings) the Colonel commanding the territory of Ain Sefra (Colonel LIEBRAY) replied "We can neither revolt nor defend ourselves because 80% of the Foreign Legion are Spanish, and in the important nuclei of Colomb-Béchar, Bou-Arfa and Kenadza,

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The Director General of the Mediterranean-Niger railway, M. Chadenson, fled from Colomb Bechar without taking leave of anyone. It was known that he intended to go towards Oujda and escape through Spanish Morocco, but he was reassured when he heard the declarations on the radio to the effect that all the French authorities were to remain at their posts. After that he went to

Algiers where he undertook to have the work companies maintained in order to retain his position and its advantages. His argument was that all Frenchmen were mobilized in their occupations and that this mobilization extended to the Spanish, which is contrary to all international laws and all orders or decrees, and to which all Spanish political refugees are opposed, as they consider it to be simply the continuation of the policy of oppression to which they have been subjected up to this time under the direction of the Axis Powers.

(trans:sjc)



PRISON DE PORT LYAUTEY (Merses)

Louis Lafin, and about 20 more.

Attention is called to the fact that in all penitentiary centres where Spanish political refugees are to be found, the conditions of life, ill treatment, bullying, food conditions, provocations, etc., have noticeably worsened since the arrival of the Allied forces in North Africa. The explanation of this state of things, which at first seems incomprehensible, is very easy. In all these centres there are officials placed there by the Vichy authorities because of their moral defects or because of their known sympathy for the Axis, with the result that as these men consider the Spanish antifascist refugees as their natural enemies, they aggravate their situation by ill-treatment. These fascist officials, whether they are in the camps, the work companies or the prisons, were for a while stupefied and seared by the landing of the United Nations' forces, as they well expected that rapid justice would be meted out to them. Once these first moments of stupefaction were over and the turn of events showed a general indifference to political conditions in the country, these officials considered that they could continue their activities with impunity, and now inflict all kinds of vexations on the Spanish refugees, with the intention of discrediting the cause which the Democracies are defending and to discourage the men on whom they inflict such reprisals.

The uninterrupted struggle which has gone on during nearly seven years (32 months of war and 4 years of exile in the desert) has reduced all the Spanish political refugees to such a condition of physical exhaustion that for the time being, the aid which they could bring to the common cause (with some exceptions) could hardly be more than a close collaboration in the sphere of war economy in North Africa, taking into account the fact that the major proportion of the Spanish refugees have some profession or technical capacity (engineers, doctors, mechanics, surveyors, etc.) which could very usefully be employed.

The question of finding homes for the Spanish refugees cannot constitute in any way a problem for the French administration. We find that hundreds of Algerian families are willing to shelter Spanish exiles, if only the French administration will take rapid action on such applications and not oppose all kinds of obstacles to them as has happened up to the present time. The Spaniards

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who through this means (offers of shelter) can be placed at liberty will not become public charges, but on the contrary, will furnish a useful aid to French economy, as it would be very easy to absorb them into the various enterprises in which the lack of manpower is already being cruelly felt.

February 18, 1943.



## BRIEF SUMMARY OF INFORMATION ON THE CAMP AT MOURMEL

In the camp at Mourmel there are about 500 internees of various nationalities. Most of them have been there since the month of April 1941. In November and December 1941 the convoys of internees arrived from the camp at Vernet (Ariège).

### I. Physical condition of internees and sanitary conditions of camp.

The physical condition of the internees is unsatisfactory for reasons which we will briefly indicate:

(a) There is a certain number of convalescents (about 20 to 30) recognized as such by the camp doctor. The majority of these are between 20 and 30 years old.

Their medical treatment is practically nil, except for a few injections of calcium salts, supplied by private sources and not by the camp.

Their food ration is the same as that of the other prisoners, consequently insufficient for the nutrition of a normal man.

Their lodging (in wooden sheds) is also the same as that of the others. Some of them are lodged in a part of one of the large shed, separated from the other part by planks; Some of them are in the camp infirmary.

(b) Chronic invalids (heart diseases, stomach diseases, nervous diseases, rheumatism, etc;) about 70.

Their lodging and feeding conditions are the same as those of the others, therefore insufficient for normal men.

(c) Old men and invalids. About 30 internees are over 50 years of age. (50 to 64 years). There are about 15 or 20 mutilated or infirm men.

Their lodging and feeding conditions are the same as those of the other internees. They have no beds.

(d) A certain number of spastic and paralyzed men. They are fed and lodged in the same way as the other internees.

(e) Infectious diseases. There have been and still are some epidemic diseases in the camp.

1. Recently an epidemic of jaundice occurred and affected about

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150 internees (jaundice, fever, diarrhea).

2. Colitis resembling dysentery with bleeding from the bowels (70 internees affected)

3. Diarrhea, often accompanied by fever, in the endemic state, affecting practically all the internees at times.

These diseases, plus frequent epidemics of influenza, usually mild in form, have seriously reduced the general condition of the patients as they are habitually underfed and weak; further, it is impossible for them to obtain the diets their condition requires.

At present these epidemics are disappearing but isolated cases still persist. They have been preceded by fits of ague and fever which have prepared the way for them, affecting more than 350 internees.

All these epidemics have seriously affected the general condition of the patients and prepared the way for tuberculosis.

Their consequences, immediate or distant, will be felt for a long time.

## 2. Sanitary Condition of the Camp.

### 1) Medical Organization.

a) The camp infirmary is installed in a wooden shed, has no ceiling and the wind blows through numerous cracks in the walls and between the walls and the roofing. The two little iron stoves cannot heat the place.

b) The consulting room has no facilities for examination (not even an examination table); there is no laboratory and practically no medical instruments (some forceps and lancets, syringes and only one thermometer) no means of sterilizing instruments.

c) Dental and oral consultations are given by a dentist interned in the camp and a French dentist who visits the camp once every 2 or 3 weeks. There are no dental instruments except a pair of forceps and some instruments belonging to the interned dentist.

The number of dental cases is very great. Owing to the general weakness and malnutrition, the teeth of the internees loosen,

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deeny and are rapidly infected.

The treatment of the patients is less than elementary. Remedies and surgical equipment are lacking. In spite of the fact that skin sores and ulcers are general and slow to heal.

In summer practically all the internees suffered from skin sores which lasted for weeks. Only the serious cases were sent to the military hospital at Djelfa. Flies are numerous at the camp and infirmary, give no peace to the sick, and help to spread disease.

Most of the sick are obliged to sleep in their huts owing to lack of space at the infirmary and so help to infect others.

There is only one delousing room with sulphuric gas appliances to combat the bugs and lice which infect the huts and infirmary.

The general treatment is reduced to a minimum owing to the lack of medicines, even for urgent cases. The sick cannot receive the necessary diet. Sometimes the infirmary sells condensed milk to them. It only gives them herbal infusions.

### 3. SANITARY CONDITIONS.

a) The huts are crowded (120 to 150 men in each) for the larger ones and 25 to 30 in the smaller. The cubic space of air is 6 to 8 per man. The huts are 20 meters long and 4 meters wide, with 2 windows unpainted and closed by planks.

The internees sleep on planks in two tiers. Their mattresses touch each other. They are infested, fleas, bugs and lice, swarm over the huts and make life very painful; as in view of the overcrowding of the huts it is impossible to keep clean and combat the parasites. Owing to the cold it is necessary to keep windows closed at night. There is no heating.

b) The latrines are all in the open, and are insufficient in number (10 for over 50 internees) are badly installed, and impossible to keep clean, with the result that the internees relieve themselves anywhere and infect the camp. This and the fact that the latrines are always open contribute to attract the swarms of flies that spread disease.

c) Water is very difficult to get. There is no shower.

There

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There are no arrangements for bathing or washing oneself in the camp.

c) There is a small stream about 100 meters from the camp where the internees go to wash. There are no arrangements for washing clothes. The clothes are washed by the internees in the stream where they wash their bodies. The soap ration for toilet and washing purposes is 75 grammes per month and per man; it is very poor in quality.

d) There is a hot shower on Sunday mornings and between 5 and 7 pm on other days, eight showers for 200 men. About 600 men go regularly to the showers.

e) The food of the internees is insufficient. It does not include more than 1700-1800 calories at most. It consists, for the workers, in about 500 grams of bread per diem, soup at midday and soup at night, and a panikin of barley coffee substitute in the morning. The food is monotonous and contains no vitamins. One quarter liter of wine is given on Sundays but not always. The only drink is spring water, unboiled. There are practically no fats - 12 liters of oil per diem for the whole camp. Practically no meat (small quantities of meat, usually camel, are given about not more than twice a week). This food does not permit of hard work, and work is obligatory during 8 hours a day (7.30 AM to 11.30 AM and 1 to 5 PM). It is forbidden to purchase provisions in town. Any provisions entering the camp clandestinely is confiscated and the bearer imprisoned. Parcels are becoming rarer and rarer.

## II. COMPOSITION OF THE CAMP

a) Spanish numbering around 480 of which 10 alone are not ex-  
veterans of the Spanish war.

The other 470 are interned only because they fought in their own country in defense of the legal government of the Spanish Republic against internal rebellion and against the military intervention of Germany and Italy. These 470 Spaniards had been interned before in various camps in France (Argelos, Collioure, Le Vernet) after they had passed the French frontier with the Republican army. From there they were sent to North Africa and an unjustified measure of repression, stimulated by a pro-German press in France.

b) The non-veteran Spaniards (10) are powerful cultivators who have lived, some for more than 15 years in North Africa. Their internment has been motivated by their activity in favor of their refugee compatriots.

c) Foreign volunteers in the Spanish Army... they were interned when they passed the border... Spanish Army. The only reason for their internment... had fought in Spain for the legal... went from camps in France to... against them by the pro-German... from a national point of view... they are divided as follows:

- Poles;.....111
- U. R. S. S. ....91
- Russian refugees in France, Ukrainians
- Belorussians, Moldavians, and others
- possessing Russian documents;
- Germans (antifascists) 36
- Czechoslovaks.....24
- Rumanians.....9
- Hungarians.....10
- Austrians.....8

Many of these men have lived in France for more than 10 years (especially the Poles)

d) Political and administrative internees, numbering 122.

Most of these men have been interned for so-called breaches of administrative laws, but really for political reasons, or owing to social or religious persecutions, as in the case of the Jews. These men may be classed as follows:

- Poles.....15
- Russian refugees.....21
- Germans.....10
- Hungarians.....8
- Austrians.....6
- Russian resettlees 30

To this number should be added some men of other nationalities who have lost their country, such as Armenians, Belgians, Rumanians, Spanish, etc. There are of course among them some miscellaneous - very few in number - for whom we cannot be responsible.

**PROMPT SITUATION**

a) Amongst the internees, there are about 100 Spaniards who had made their request to be returned to Spain about 3 months ago and others who already had made this request when in France.

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There are about 100 internees who have requested to leave the Embassy of the U.S.A. at Algiers or to be repatriated. The transfer of some of these from France to Djaffa for repatriation.

- b) There are 2 Spaniards who are under the protection of the Government according to the Mexican Decree of August 1942.
- c) 10 internees of various nationalities possess a visa for the United States, Mexico or other American countries and no French exit visa.
- d) 45 Spaniards, ex-veterans, who have their families and have a regular economic situation and identification papers.

#### PROBLEM OF THE RELEASE OF INTERNEES

In view of the facts set forth, we ask that you be asked to consider the proposals outlined below, relating to the release of all the internees in the camp of Djaffa.

- A. Release of all those who have their residence in France, whose identification papers are in order and who before their internment were regular residents of this country.
- B. Evacuation of all invalids, mutilated or aged men who wish to leave and their hospitalization in military establishments or in institutions in which they could have normal treatment.
- C. Release of all Spanish refugees in possession of visas regarding their previous sojourn in Algeria.
- D. Evacuation of all the other internees (as well as those mentioned in paragraphs A, B, C, if the project concerning the transfer to the internment camps at Algiers or Oran is not carried out) to another winter at Djaffa where living conditions, because of the climate, shelter conditions and food, are more favorable than of the precarious physical conditions of the present camp.
- E. One must consider the possibility of some of these internees re-entering normal civil life on the basis of their own private contracts, labor agreements.
- F. It should be recalled that amongst the internees there is a large number of skilled workers.

There are about 100 internees who have requested their documents at the Embassy of the U.R.S.S. at Paris or have for repatriation. The transfer of some of these from France to Algeria protected their repatriation.

b) There are 12 Spaniards who are under the protection of the Mexican government according to the Mexican Decree of August 1943.

c) 30 internees of various nationalities possess a entrance visa for the United States, Mexico or other American countries but have no French exit visa.

d) 43 Spaniards, ex-veterans, who have their families in Algiers and have a regular economic situation and identification papers in order.

#### PROBLEM OF THE RELEASE OF INTERNEES

In view of the facts set forth, we ask that you be good enough to consider the proposals outlined below, relating to the immediate release of all the internees in the camp of Djelfa.

A. Release of all those who have their residence in Algeria, and whose identification papers are in order and who before their internment were regular residents of this country.

B. Evacuation of all invalids, mutilated or aged men who desire to leave and their hospitalization in sanitary establishments or in institutions in which they could have normal treatment.

C. Release of all Spanish refugees in possession of legal documents regarding their previous sojourn in Algeria.

D. Evacuation of all the other internees (as well as those included in paragraphs A, B, C, if the project concerning them is impossible) to the internment camps at Algiers or Oran so that they may not pass another winter at Djelfa where living conditions are impossible because of the climate, shelter conditions and food, and especially because of the precarious physical condition of most of the men.

E. One must consider the possibility of part of these internees re-entering normal civil life on the basis of offers to shelter, private contracts, labor engagements.

F. It should be recalled that among these internees there is a large number of skilled workers, technicians, etc; An effort

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should be made to facilitate such and other contact between the internees and the Government or representatives of other countries and the representatives, in order to permit them to recognize their rights and national privileges.

4. Direct contacts should be made between the internees and the organizations for aiding them or whom they may receive help from their Committee of Four Spain, Committee for Aid to Spanish Refugees, New York, and similar organizations in Mexico, London, Portugal, etc., and the Red Cross.

We apologize for the hasty manner in which this report has been written, and trust that you will find in you a broad and benevolent understanding of our situation, so that all honest political internees in this case may take part, as free citizens, in the effort of the United Nations to save humanity and civilization.

Camp at Njalfa.



