

AFRICA - 1974



Each entry should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.  
 A line could be drawn across sheet under each comment.  
 Entries for questions should be used in To column.  
 Entries should indicate check mark insufficient before further  
 action is taken or nothing taken should be indicated in Comments column.  
 List should always be prepared to Redesign.  
 If no redesigns can separate sheet.

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22 March 1945

16,036  
 Africa (South)  
 Angola  
 State Dept  
 Rebutals

To: Director, OSS  
 From: Divisional Deputy, SI, Africa Division  
 Subject: Your Query of 20 March re Angola and South Africa

1. Mr. Shepardson has asked me to reply to your memorandum.
2. The lack of integration of OSS and State Department activities in Angola has been freely discussed with the responsible members of the Division of African Affairs and with Mr. Jack Neal and Mr. Fletcher Warren from the beginning of OSS representation in Angola in 1942 to date. At present the coordination of these activities is on as satisfactory a basis as can be expected. Certain phases of this coordination are not solvable on the lower echelon and must wait until the over-all relations of OSS and the Department of State have been clarified. Details of the problems are contained in the report on field conditions recently made by our principal representative who has just returned after two years' service in Angola.
3. It was decided in January by the SI Branch and the Department of State (i.e., Mr. Jack Neal and the Political Division) in consultation with Mr. Southgate

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and General Magruder to withhold action in persuading the American Minister to the Union of South Africa that OSS representation in the Union be continued until the over-all relations with the Department of State likewise have been clarified.

4. The operations of the Africa Division are very largely dependent on the over-all relations between OSS and the Department of State. When these relations are clarified, this Division will be able to go ahead with a number of approved SI plans.



R. Boulton

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8/16

The attached report has already been sent to the State Department by Dr. Langer on Saturday or Monday for the attention of:

Mr. Villard, Africa Division  
and  
Mr. Ireland, Division of Territorial Studies

PCH

*E. H. King 15,001***SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO**

TO: General Donovan  
FROM: William L. Langer  
SUBJECT:

DATE: 14 August 1944

*File*

I am sending you herewith a copy of a report prepared by Lt. Col. V. Lada-Mocarski. This was written in reply to a request from this Branch for any available information. .

*William L. Langer*

William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and  
Analysis Branch

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General Donovan

14 August 1944

William L. Langer

I am sending you herewith a copy of a report prepared by Lt. Col. V. Lada-Mocarski. This was written in reply to a request from this Branch for any available information.

William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and  
Analysis Branch

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**SECRET***Ethiopia 151001*Office of Strategic Services  
US Army Forces in the Middle East VLM/dc

27 July 1944

Refer to : 300/18

SUBJECT: Alleged British territorial designs in Ethiopia

TO : Deputy Strategic Services Officer,  
OSS, Mediterranean Theater.

1. In their letter of 22 June 1944, the R&A Branch, Washington, requested the R&A Branch here to obtain some information on the alleged British territorial ambitions in Ethiopia. The information below has been collected during my stay in Addis Ababa from 12 to 20 July 1944.

2. It is, of course, well nigh impossible to obtain an authoritative expression of opinion from British sources as to what their plans or intentions regarding the Ethiopian territory may be. The following has been gathered as a result of conversations with several American citizens in Addis Ababa, some of whom occupy responsible positions in the Ethiopian Government. Several of these persons, in turn, merely related the statements made by the Ethiopian Ministers or by other sources close to the Palace. No conversations on this subject were had with any Ethiopian in official or private capacity.

Perhaps the most interesting information was furnished by an American citizen who had previously spent some time in the British service, in territories adjoining Ethiopia. He had numerous occasions to discuss informally the future of Ethiopia with District Officers in the Sudan, with a British member of the Scientific Advisory Mission which arrived in Addis Ababa last Spring (this Mission is not to be confused with the US Technical Mission at present in Ethiopia); he also reported the remarks made by members of the British Legation in Addis Ababa, and those by the ranking officers of the British Military Mission in Ethiopia. His remarks, therefore, seem to reflect the composite views of various British officials in that part of the world. These views, however, do not necessarily represent those of the British Foreign Office, or of the highest British colonial officials dealing with the Ethiopian question.

3. The above-mentioned American stated that the District Officers in the Sudan left no doubt of their desire to see the ANUAKKE stretch of land, lying between the FIBOR and BARO rivers, incorporated into the Sudanese territory. Major Wooley, of the British Army, who at one time was British Consul at MAJI, is one

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of the exponents of this plan. He returned to Ethiopia with the Emperor and the British Army of Occupation in the Spring of 1941, in order to assume his former post at MAJI. The Ethiopian Government strenuously objected to his re-appointment, and after considerable difficulties, he was placed in the town of BOYALE, which is a double-town on the Ethiopian border, the Emperor insisting that he should reside in the portion outside of Ethiopia.

4. There is inclosed an original drawing representing the map of resources of Ethiopia, which I was told was prepared in June of 1943 for the revised edition of British Military Intelligence Handbook for that country. I have not been able to ascertain whether this revision has been published, and if so, whether the map in question was included in its original form. It will be seen that it leaves out the Province of OGADEN from the confines of Ethiopia, as if indicating that in the British eyes that province - now occupied by the British Forces and not restored to the Emperor - does not belong to that country.

5. The most ambitious statement of British aspirations for that part of East Africa heard by this American from the British, foresees the formation of a "Greater Somalia", which would include ALIALI, the British and Italian Somalilands, Ethiopian Somaliland, BOGAN, the Northern Provinces of Kenya, and ANUAKIE (MAJI). This territory, roughly forming a half-moon around Ethiopia, would effectively surround that country by British-controlled territory. My informant did not include French Somaliland into the "Greater Somalia", but I am not sure whether he considered that French Somaliland would remain French or whether he merely omitted any mention of it. Another American citizen, a highly placed Ethiopian official enjoying the confidence of the Emperor, and his Ministers, believes that the British have no designs on French Somaliland. On the other hand, he stated that the Ethiopian Government is worried by the alleged desire of the British to revise the Northern frontier of Ethiopia, to exclude certain territories, this in addition to the annexation of OGADEN Province.

6. The majority of the British officials in Ethiopia and surrounding territory, as well as the representatives of British commercial houses, speak freely of the "mistake" which was made by the British Government in restoring Ethiopia to the Emperor; they voice the belief that it should have been left as enemy territory; occupied by the British troops and so administered pending the final disposition of the Ethiopian question at the end of the war.

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7. An important American in Addis Ababa stated that his dealings with the British officials have convinced him that they are somewhat puzzled by the Ethiopian problem. While they are irritated by the attitude taken by the Emperor and his Cabinet, whom they consider ungrateful to the British, the problem of administering that country with the help of or through the native officials, is a most difficult one, considering the small number of Ethiopians who can be used for responsible positions. The local British officials would therefore be willing to rid themselves of this problem by turning it over to the Americans or at least by arranging for a joint Anglo-American supervision. The tenor of these officials' remarks is that Abyssinia is not important enough economically or otherwise, for them to battle against various odds, if the Ethiopians themselves do not care to have the British "help". A well-placed American in the Ethiopian Government took issue with this presentation of the British views. It is his feeling that the British are very much interested in remaining in Ethiopia, and that their seeming indifference is not genuine.

8. Whether or not the intentions ascribed to the British have any foundation in fact, the Ethiopian Government is evidently genuinely worried. It is my belief that their denunciation of the present Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty was largely motivated by the desire to do away with the preferential position which Great Britain occupies under this Treaty, lest it will result in that country's entrenching itself so solidly that it will become a clearly dominating factor, even after the present hostilities cease.

9. Mr. Howe, the British Minister in Ethiopia, returned to Addis Ababa, from London, on July 19, and he has made it immediately known to the Ethiopian Government that he is ready to open the negotiations for the new Treaty.

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United States  
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Equal British ~~SECRET~~ & ~~SECRET~~

3 February 1944

FROM: Donald Q. Coster, Lt. Col., AO  
TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan  
SUBJECT: Dakar Cover Plan in Operation "TORCH"

(1) As requested by you during our meeting yesterday, the following are the facts concerning the initiation and accomplishment of the Dakar Cover Plan in the North African invasion operations, insofar as my own activities in Casablanca prior to D Day were concerned.

(2) Before leaving for my post at Casablanca in January 1942, with the State Department cover of vice consul, you informed me that I was to use every means at my disposal to lead the Germans and Vichy French to believe that the American invasion of Africa would be focussed at Dakar.

(3) Following my arrival in Casablanca, I made contact with two men who were to prove the key figures in the carrying out of this plan.

(4) These men, who were known to me as Lederer and Valikis, were both Austrians and inseparable friends. They were fanatically anti-Nazi and had joined the Foreign Legion in 1939. After the fall of France they were interned along with many other Legionnaires in the camp at Sidi-el-Aychi in French Morocco. They finally escaped and made their way to Casablanca where they made contact with German Consul General Auer, the head of the German Armistice Commission. (They had previously known Auer in Paris where he was attached to the German Embassy.) At this point I must add that Auer is a well-known pervert and that one of these men also had homosexual tendencies.

(5) Auer agreed to make the necessary arrangements with the French authorities for their freedom, on the condition that they act as agents for

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the Armistice Commission. They soon after formed a working agreement with the local French Deuxieme Bureau along very much the same lines -- i.e., to supply the French with information picked up from their German contacts. All these Franco-German dealings were on a strictly financial basis.

(6) Through communication with a mutual friend in London, I ascertained to my full satisfaction that these two Austrians had always been violently anti-Nazi and that their present contacts were formed purely for the expediency of the moment.

(7) Further proof of their loyalty was afforded me when, after several preliminary meetings, they informed me that they would be willing to work for me without receiving any payment for services rendered.

(8) Our first steps were to pass on to the Germans several scraps of information which, while technically correct, were of little military value. These consisted mainly of facts of only local interest which the members of the Commission could have easily ascertained for themselves with a minimum of effort. For example: (1) Who in our group lived in such and such a house, and what time did they leave in the A.M. and enter in the P.M. (2) The license numbers of the cars belonging to the various vice consuls. (3) On what days did the diplomatic pouch leave for Tangier or Algiers.

(9) Finally, when it appeared to Auer and the other members of the Commission that Lederer and Valikis were able to pry any information that they desired from me, I decided that the time was ripe to play up the Dakar angle.

(10) On numerous occasions Auer had asked "his" men to endeavor to pump me for any crumbs that I might drop as to the time and place of any proposed Allied action aimed at French North or West Africa.

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**SECRET**~~Special Agent in Charge~~ **MOST SECRET & SECRET**

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(11) In the latter part of June, prior to my departure for London and Washington, I instructed my two agents to "shoot the works" on the Cover Plan. In other words, to inform the Germans that they had learned on first-hand information from me that the main Allied thrust was to be directed at Dakar. I told them to inform "our friends" that they had no idea of the date, but that the place was certain.

(12) Lederer and Valikis carried out my instructions to the letter, and the information was disseminated both to the German High Command and to Vichy.

(13) Proof that our phase of the Cover Plan was successful beyond all expectations, is the fact that on November 8th, nearly every German submarine in the South Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean had been diverted to the coast of French West Africa.

(14) Further visual proof was afforded me personally when, on November 9th at Tafaroui airfield near Oran, Major General Doolittle placed in my custody the 800 French Naval Air Force prisoners whom we had captured the previous day.

(15) The only remark which the French Commandant chose to make when I presented myself to him was: "Nous vous attendions à Dakar."

*Donald Q. Coster*

DONALD Q. COSTER  
Lt. Colonel, AG

United States

**SECRET**~~Special Agent in Charge~~ **MOST SECRET & SECRET**

**SECRET**

Mr. John E. O'Gara  
Executive Office  
Awards in Spanish Morocco

X Cosen, Captain  
X Salazar, Major  
10 October 1944  
X Brown, Captain  
X "et al."

The Director has instructed me to inform you that  
he approves the recommendations outlined in Lt. Colonel  
Schmidt's memorandum of 4 October to you on the above subject.

F. J. Putzell Jr.  
Lieutenant (j.g.), USNR  
Assistant Executive Officer

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**SECRET**

4 October 1944

To: Acting Chief, SI

From: Africa Division, SI

Subject: Awards in Spanish Morocco

1. General Donovan requested SI to explore further the recommendations for awards to Moroccan Groups as discussed by both Captain Gordon Browne and Colonel William A. Maddy in the attached correspondence.

2. The return of Mr. Richard Bowness, our Tangier representative, to Washington for leave and consultation has provided the opportunity for further consideration of this subject.

3. The recommendations emanating from these conferences are set forth in the memorandum of Captain Robert M. Rodas dated 2 October 1944. The proposed cash awards of \$20,750 are reduced to gifts of pepper and spices not to exceed \$1,000 in value. Both Captain Browne and Major Coen now concur in these recommendations.

4. These recommendations are hereby endorsed, and if you approve, it is suggested they be brought to the attention of General Donovan for final decision.

*A. W. Schmidt*  
 A. W. Schmidt  
 Lt. Col., AUS  
 Acting Divisional Deputy

APPROVED:

*W. G. Clark*  
 John M. Clark  
 Acting Chief, SI

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**SECRET**12/7/44  
Morocco, Spain  
2 October 1944

To: Acting Divisional Deputy, Africa Division, SI  
From: Robert E. Rhodes, Captain, CR  
Subject: Awards in Spanish Morocco

1. Major Coon, Capt. Gordon Brown and Richard Bowness, our Tangier representative, temporarily in Washington, and State Department Official who knows about the recommended awards, have been consulted.

2. Bowness states that the "Strings" organization has always received payment on a monthly basis in the amounts they have requested. They seem entirely satisfied with the arrangement. Normal payments run approximately \$300 monthly, and bills are presented for additional service when any special type of information or mission has been rendered necessary by a special request. Bowness thinks that a large cash payment would not be understood and would spoil their future usefulness.

3. The "Tessels" organization is not used at the present time, but communications are received from them from time to time. These indicate that they are entirely friendly although some of them have inquired about their "Sensor" Awards. Financially, it has fared better than the "Strings" chain.

4. Only 12 persons in the whole of Morocco may hold the Signal Service Award. At present there are two vacancies. Rives Chilas, the Diplomatic Agent, already has consented to reserve one of these for Bowness, who intends to give it to "D" when it is advisable to do so. The other is being held in reserve by the Diplomatic Agent.

5. The "Sensor" Awards are supposed to be made to persons who are bona fide representatives of American

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concerns. No one in Washington, including Bownass, knows of their having been used for other purposes. The award apparently is discretionary with the Diplomatic Agent. Whether it could be made or not would have to be determined after Bownass returns to Tangier and discusses the matter with Rives Childs. In any event, everyone agrees that awards at the present time tend to compromise both the United States and the recipients.

6. Recommendations are:

a. Make no cash payments unless we discontinue use of the "Strings" organization. If this is done current payments should be tapered off but no large cash bonus is indicated.

b. Obtain a Signal Service Award for Mr. D. and "Samsar" Awards, if practicable, for the two "Tassels" leaders. These awards should be made only when Tangier representative reports that the awards would not embarrass the United States or endanger the recipients or their relatives.

c. From time to time as long as the organizations are useful and we wish to preserve their friendship, comparatively small gifts of articles that are hard to get in Morocco should be made. Most acceptable gifts would be black pepper and spices, which are Arab culinary necessities, but extremely difficult to obtain. The gifts, of course, should be packaged without any indication of American identity.

7. Permission is requested to arrange the recommended gifts of pepper and spices, total value not to exceed \$1,000.00 and to further the Signal Service and two "Samsar" Awards whenever the political situation seems to make it advisable.

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*Robert E. Rhodes*  
Robert E. Rhodes,  
Captain, CE

Concern is above, but recommend that, if payments are made under Par. 6a, Driss be treated considerably more liberally than others of the organization, in recognition of valuable and dangerous services in the past. Major Don also concurs.

*John Brown*  
John Brown

To: Mr. Cheston

I wish SI would explore  
this further.

WJD

*Long as out to Schmidt*  
Director's Office

(330R)



SECRETHOLD FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

August 14, 1944

Memo for the files:

On August 14th I showed the attached memorandum to Colonel Wm.A. Eddy just before he left for Saudi Arabia.

Colonel Eddy states that this memorandum does not, in any way, change his opinion that all official obligations in connection with the people herein referred to were properly discharged.

He has no objection to an endeavor after the war to putting one or more of these men on the list of "protected Moors" but thinks that it might be hard to explain locally unless the Embassy in Morocco had some very plausible reason for recommending this action.

Apparently, since the time of George Washington, by treaty, the Sultan of Morocco gives us the right to have some twenty five Moorish citizens under the protection of the United States.

*GEB*  
G. Edward Buxton

GEB FS

10 Aug 1944

Date

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To: General Donovan

Colonel Bixton interviewed Capt. Brown and stated that the principal objective of the members of the organization referred to in the attached document is to deprive American citizenship after the war or the protection of the U.S. in their relations with the Government and other authorities.

Colonel Bixton recommends that you might want to give further consideration to Capt. Brown's information.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Col. G. Edward Buxton  
Room 119 Administration Bldg.  
FROM : Captain Gordon H. Browne  
SUBJECT: Recommendation for Awards to Moroccan Groups

DATE: 8 August 1944

*Trinidad, John*  
*X*  
**SECRET**  
*X*

1. In accordance with the suggestion of Colonel Buxton and Mr. Scribner, I met Mr. Bownas, OSS Tangier representative, in Gibraltar, July 28th. We had several long conversations together in which the following information was obtained.

2. Mr. Bownas is using the String (D) Organization for all Moslem intelligence. This organization was contacted by Major Coon and myself, used extensively by us, and was used for intelligence purposes by Waller Booth, clearing through me. Bownas has members of this organization in key areas in Spanish Morocco. They report to him on Spanish battle order and troop movements, providing routine information as requested of Bownas by Colonel Randolph, G-2. They have also been used by Bownas to penetrate a German signalling station in Tangier - have intercepted a small arms delivery, and do special jobs. They are paid by him at a minimal rates plus travelling expenses; for example, the Agent in Tetuan receives 300 pesetas a month. As always the information clears through Mr. Strings, no bonuses of any sort have been paid to this organization by Mr. Bownas.

3. The Tasse's organization has not been used by Bownas as by their nature they are not set up for intelligence work. He has not contacted them. They have not been paid any bonuses or awards by Bownas.

4. Bownas has occasionally used at least one of our previous Moslem Agents who is connected with these Groups, for submarine reports.

5. Bownas should not go to Tangiers for security reasons as it would have a far more affected Mr. Bownas' cover.

6. In view of the fact, since no bonuses or awards have been given, that all of the recommendations receive further consideration.

*Gordon H. Browne*  
GORDON H. BROWNE  
Captain AUS

Col. G. Edward Burton  
Room 118 Administration Bldg.  
Captain Gordon H. Browne

1 August 1944

Recommendation for Awards to Moroccan Groups

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1. In accordance with the suggestion of Colonel Burton and Mr. Scribner, I met Mr. Bowman, U.S. Foreign representative, in Gibraltar, July 28th. We had several long conversations together in which the following information was obtained:

2. Mr. Bowman is using the String (D) Organization for all Moroccan Intelligence. This organization was contacted by Major Dean and myself, used extensively by us, and was used for intelligence purposes by Walter Booth, clearing through me. Bowman has members of this organization in key areas in Spanish Morocco. They report to him on Spanish battle order and troop movements, providing routine information as requested of Bowman by Colonel Randolph, G-2. They have also been used by Bowman to penetrate a German signalling station in Tangier - have intercepted a small arms delivery, and do special jobs. They are paid by him at nominal rates plus travelling expenses; for example, the Agent in Tetuan received 300 pesetas a month. As always the information flows through Mr. String, no bonuses or awards have been paid to this organization by Mr. Bowman.

3. The Tannels organization has not been used by Bowman as by their nature they are not set up for intelligence work. He has not contacted them. They have not been paid any bonuses or awards by Bowman.

4. Bowman has successfully used at least one of our previous Moroccan Agents not connected with these Groups, for submarine reports.

5. myself, did not go to Tangiers for security reasons as it would have unfavorably affected Mr. Bowman's cover.

I therefore suggest, since no bonuses or awards have been given, that my original recommendations receive further consideration.

GORDON H. BROWNE  
Captain USA

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July 7, 1944

Memorandum to: General William J. Donovan

Colonel Eddy and I have spent considerable time discussing Gordon Browne's previous recommendation plus the attached statement recently received.

Bill Eddy says that his mind is very clear on the whole subject. He talked twice with Gordon Browne during the period covered by Browne's report and also told him that he had no authority to, in any way, commit the American Government to future payments.

Bill has also checked with Carleton Coon who was doing the same work with the same people and Coon recalls specifically receiving similar instructions. Coon knows all the people referred to by Gordon Browne and agrees with Col. Eddy that our indebtedness was fully discharged.

Col. Eddy says he sees no reason for us to hold any debate with Gordon on the matter and if this is your opinion I will so inform him.

GEB FS

G. EDWARD BUXTON

*Col Buxton*  
*He should and*  
*must accept*  
*the recommendation*  
*of Col Eddy*  
*Donovan*

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

**SECRET**

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton  
 FROM: Capt. Gordon Browne  
 SUBJECT: Moroccan Subversive Groups

DATE: 28 June 1944

It has been brought to my attention that Colonel Eddy disagrees strongly with my recommendations concerning awards to the leaders of our Moroccan Moslem organizations.

It is now a year since my recommendations were originally made. In view of the lapse of time and Col. Eddy's disagreement, I submit this memorandum in order to clarify the situation.

EFFECT OF LAPSE OF TIME

I left Morocco in July 1943. At that time the Strings and Tassels organization were left under the supervision of Lt. Roskinson, USN, who at that time was acting for S.O. On his departure in October 1943, the organization was reporting to Walter Booth, S.I., through an intermediary on an intelligence basis only. Booth was shortly replaced by Mr. Bonas, S. I., who again acted through the same intermediary. Because of the fact that I am unaware of the arrangements made by Mr. Bonas, and the possibility that the situation may have changed, I suggest that further consideration of the matter should be held in abeyance until I have the opportunity of looking into this phase of the situation next month while in North Africa.

In view of Colonel Eddy's strong disagreement of my recommendations, I submit the following remarks in order to keep the record clear.

I understand that his objections are on three grounds:

1. That such awards are unjustified in that payments were made on a cash and carry basis.

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2. That I had not the authority either to mention such awards to the Moroccan group or to bring the matter directly to General Donovan's attention without previous discussion with Colonel Eddy.

3. That the nature of the awards, cash and American protection (signal service and sunsars) are dangerous in that they would disclose the existence of our native groups.

(1) That such awards are unjustified .....

From the time that original contact was established with the two subversive groups, it was understood by all concerned that the monthly cash payments made were payments in full for services rendered, but that in event the subversive groups were actually used in combat operations, additional awards would be considered, not promised or guaranteed. After D Day, the organizations were closed down and payments ceased. Following D Day, several conversations with The Fifth Army were carried on in Casablanca between Coon, myself and Colonel Ratay G-3 and Colonel Lambert. Later conversations were held between the two colonels, myself and Wharton Tigar, my British opposite number. On their instructions, both subversive groups as well as Wharton Tigar's Spanish groups and the Fifth Army made a payment of approximately \$13000 to revive the 80 organizations, to extend them and to make certain of several leaders in vital areas who were under German pressure and influence.

*until Apr. 1943* 9403  
2001.

The Tassels organization received its usual \$200.00 per month. The Strings organization its running expenses only. On the recommendations of Mr. Williamson and Mr. Walter Booth, the Strings organization was largely expanded for intelligence work that was considered essential to the Fifth Army, but again running expenses only were paid. A border Patrol was set up within 48 hours at Mr. Williamson's request. Mr. Strings himself who collected the information from the members of the brotherhood, and who was the leader of the brotherhood, I firmly believe kept little or none of the money so expended, but passed it on to those actually engaged in intelligence work. He risked his whole organization, the lives of those actually engaged in intelligence work, and the lives of their families. He was told by me that I hoped that his work would be recognized, that I would try to secure for him some kind of award above his expenses, but it was explicitly stated by me at each meeting with him and many times to Driss, his go-between, that this was

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no promise, that governments were not easy to deal with and could not be counted on, and that it was for this reason that we insisted on full payment of expenses.

Mr. Strings was working for his country, not for money or other award, but he naturally hoped that his work and risk would be recognized in some fashion.

In regard to the other organization, Tassels - the same general statement is true, but they remained largely operational, and were not used much for intelligence work. The same statement was repeated several times to Tassels that I personally would do what I could to secure additional recognition for his services; but that there was no promise implied, and that governments were difficult to deal with.

I consider the awards mentioned in my recommendations to be justified. The cash award is figured to a minimum; the awarding of signal service certificates and sumsars after the war, or after a change in the type of Spanish Government is the more important. In fact, the matter of American protections is so much the more important, that in event of their being issued, cash awards are relatively unimportant, except for Driss (\$750). American protection certificates should be on a permanent basis, however. If they were issued and later withdrawn, the result would be ruination for those concerned.

(2) That I had not the authority, .....

With the departure of Colonel Eddy to Algiers in January 1943, my British opposite number and I considered it impossible to operate successfully without authority being delegated to us. Therefore we went to Algiers, discussed the matter with Colonel Eddy. He agreed with us and secured the attached orders for us, which are self explanatory. He was no longer keenly interested in Morocco, being concerned with the larger matter of the infinite complication of the Tunisian campaign, and later the impending Sicilian invasion, and so stated both to Wharton Tigar and myself.

It must be remembered in connection with the handling of the SO-SOM mission in Spanish Morocco, that I was in-

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formed of the "Backbone" plan which called for the invasion of Spanish Morocco by the Fifth Army, and the fact that the Germans were considering the invasion of Spanish Morocco. The Spanish attitude also was threatening. We believed, as did the Fifth Army, that action was probable. We were in continuous touch with Fifth Army Headquarters, Col. Howard, AC of S, G-2, General Gruenther, AC of S-G-3, and on occasions with General Clark. We were informed by Colonel Eddy that we were under the orders of the Fifth Army.

In view of the facts I considered then, that I had sufficient authority to deal with our subversive groups. On several trips to Algiers this was never questioned.

As to the matter of bringing the subject of these awards to the attention of General Donovan, I believed it to be the correct thing to do, and it is only today that I have been forced to consider that this would not meet the approval of Colonel Eddy. At the time of my original memorandum, I was a Civilian, the handling of the Moroccan groups had been solely in my hands for a considerable length of time and I had not seen Colonel Eddy for several months. It was with a great deal of surprise that I learned of the Colonel's displeasure with my taking up this question with General Donovan.

(3) That the matter of awards would be dangerous.

There is no question but that American protection for the recommended persons at this time would be extremely inadvisable, in that it would put them in personal danger, and expose our hand. This was mentioned in my conversation with General Donovan at the time the recommendations were made, and it is stated in the request, I believe, that such action could not be taken until after the war, or until a change in the Spanish Government. With a friendly government in control there would be no difficulty or danger in the issuance of "signal service and sunsar" certificates for the reasons mentioned in my recommendations. I believe there is no element of danger involved in the payment of cash at the present time if properly handled.

#### **SUMMARY:**

I suggest that further consideration of this question be delayed until I can determine, on my forthcoming

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trip, the present situation and report on it. At that time I believe that the awards should be considered on both moral and practical grounds. All of the men mentioned, with the exception of Driss (\$750), are men of means, as means is considered in Morocco.

The cash awards are not of extreme importance to them, they represent an appreciation of work well done. American protection under the existing system of establishing "signal service" and "sumsar" proteges, would be of the greatest importance, and is the usual method of recognizing valuable service in Morocco.

From the practical point of view, there is always the possibility that these groups may be useful as long as the Franco government is in power in Spain. In addition to this consideration, I was requested by S.I. to set up a permanent Moslem intelligence organization in Spanish and French Morocco. The Strings organization is the best possible organization of this nature, having lines into all levels of Moslem life and government in the Spanish zone. The Tassels organization is also of value for intelligence work, but to a very much lesser degree and is restricted to the tribes of the Spanish Riff.

The task of keeping these operational groups at the simmering point, neither too hot nor too cold during the Spring of 1943 was a delicate one as was the cooling off period, when operational use was definitely out and the groups were in consequence extremely disappointed. It was during this time that I considered it strongly advisable to mention the possibility of awards, saying that I would personally do what I could toward this end, but always with the explicit statement that there was no promise or guarantee involved.

*Gordon H. Brown*  
CAPTAIN GORDON H. BROWN

Attachment: 2

**SECRET**



(copy)

February 17th, 1943

FROM: O.S.S. Representative, G-3, A.F.H.Q.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, A.F.H.Q.

Subject: Certification of OSS/SON representatives, Tangier.

1. In accordance with S.O. Operation Instructions to me, Allied Force Headquarters, dated 14th October 1942, Paragraph 4(a), I was appointed to the Staff of G-3 to represent the Joint OSS/SON organization existing in North Africa. Subsequently I was ordered to A.F.H.Q. for temporary duty here.
2. I have left in charge of the activities and personnel of the Joint Mission in Tangier, Vice Consul Gordon H. Browne, O.S.S., and Edward Wharton-Tigar, S.O.E., who have been working in close liaison and with the supervision of the staff of the Western Task Force.
3. To make their responsibility official, in view of my indefinite absence from Tangier, I respectfully request that the Western Task Force be advised that Mr. Browne and Mr. Wharton-Tigar are the accredited acting heads of the S.O. and S.O.E. Mission for Spanish and French Morocco. This will enable them to work directly under the orders of the Western Task Force without any question of their authority to discharge the functions of the Joint Mission in that area.

Copy

SECRET

Secret  
Officers only.

SECRET

(Equals British MOST Secret)

Allied Force Headquarters

COPY No. 1

G-3 SECTION

19 February 1943.

SUBJECT: OSS/SOE Representatives.

To : Commanding General, 5th Army.

1. Vice Consul Leland L. Rounds is in charge of O.S.S. work in the province of Oran where he has been working since June 1941.

2. Vice Consul Gordon H. Browne and Edward Wharton-Tiger are in charge of the joint O.S.S. - S.O.E. mission in TANGIER. They are the accredited acting heads of this mission for MOROCCO.

3. This information is furnished to you in order to establish the identity and responsibility of these officials, whom you may wish to consult in planning. It is understood that prior to the activation of Fifth Army they were already working in close liaison with Colonel Lambert G-3, Western Task Force. You will appreciate that their connection with OSS/SOE and the existence of their mission should be disclosed only to the minimum number of officers to whom this knowledge is essential.

Lowell W. Rooks,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Copies to: Fifth Army (Copy 1)  
Col. Eddy (Copies 2 & 3)  
File (Copy 4)

SECRET

To: Colonel Burtin

Received January 12, 1948

It seems to me quite probable that the amount  
of C.R. Gold, that the subject is now not aware of  
any unpleasant news, and that he is now aware of  
my first interpretation of the situation, and that he  
will be able to handle the situation in a satisfactory  
manner.

Place with file  
W.B. Burtin June 29 1948

Colonel Edward Buxton  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Buxton,

I am glad to attach a comment to the enclosed undated memorandum to General Donovan from Gordon Browne. I was part of the OSS North African Mission during 1942 and until September 1943, so I am very familiar with the circumstances. As a matter of fact, the very excellent S.O. organization built up in the Moors of Spanish Morocco was the work of Carleton Coon. Gordon Browne acted as assistant.

1. The S.O. organization for operation "Backbone", as set forth in the enclosed memorandum to Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, herewith enclosed, is a fair and accurate statement.

2. The S.O. wants no native leaders were paid in full, month by month, to cover all expenses and obligations to them. I saw nothing. Further and larger payments were promised in the event Spain came over on the side of the Axis in 1942. It is clearly stated that we had no further obligation unless the latter decided to call out the tribesmen for action.

3. To reward any of these men with money is therefore not justifiable. If they were given public recognition, "Signal" would serve only to betray their anti-Fascist activities, and lead to their persecution by the Nazis. To mention again their activities in North Africa.

4. I have told this to Gordon Browne, ~~and he has agreed to drop the matter once and for all.~~

I have told all Mr. Browne's recommendations be dropped, and he has been told to drop the matter once and for all.

Respectfully yours,

William A. Brady  
Colonel, USMC



From: British H. Browne and Carleton Coon  
 Re: The Organisation of Subversive Groups in Spanish Morocco.

In the Spring of 1942 the Office of Strategic Services sent Captain Browne and Carleton Coon to Morocco to organize subversive groups in the Spanish Zone, under the leadership of Col. W. A. Eady, USMC. Col. Eady acted as Naval Attaché at Tangier, Browne as Vice-Consul and Coon as Special Assistant to the Legation. We enlisted the services of Randolph M. Gusus, a native of Fez who had British citizenship; he was an old friend and business acquaintance of Browne, and also known for many years to Coon. His aid has been and still is of vital importance to us.

We organized our subversive groups as part of our activities in the "Torch" operation, so that if Spain should enter the war against us we would be prepared to take action in Spanish Morocco. Since D-day we have maintained these organizations in case they may be necessary some day.

We are in contact with two groups: The TASSELS group, which is simply Abdelkrim's old army revived and reorganized under his own staff officers, and a potential religious brotherhood which we call THE D MEN under the suzerainty of their temporal and spiritual head, whom we call MR. SPRINGS or the BIG DEE.. The Tassels group is responsible for the Central Riffian tribes, particularly the Beni Urriaghel, while the D-men take care of the Ghomara confederation and a number of Jebela tribes. Between the two we cover the principal centres of native population in the Spanish Zone from which guerilla fighters can be drawn.

Subversive groups of Europeans, including Gibraltareans and Spanish Reds, have been organized by our British colleague, Mr. Edward Wharton-Tigar, who will discuss his work personally with General Clark. Relations between us and Mr. Wharton-Tigar have always been most cordial and we work together in complete cooperation.

TASSELS GROUP: Riffian army group, to operate under Coon, according to the following plans:

Plan #1 (arranged before D-day).

Paratroops to land at Imezoren (EinZoren) airport, to meet and arm 2000 Riffian waiting for them under Mohammed ben Azuz, Abd el Krim's vizir.

Troops to land by sea at Bu Sicur. To be met by 2000 Riffians under Shaib ben Aissa el Akhal and Sheikh Mohammed bu Zelmatt.

Troops to be landed by sea at el Harsh, to be met by 1000 men under Tassels himself (Mohammed Bu Draa, nicknamed Shiela). Coon to be with the landing party.

Plan #1a. (arranged after D-Day).

Since the Spaniards placed 3 tabors, totalling 1500 men, at Imezoren shortly after D, plan #1 was altered as follows: the paratroops were to land at Tamassint airport instead of Imezoren, and to be met at Tamassint by Hamid ben Azuz, Mohammed's son, with 2000 men. The parachuteists and Riffians would proceed to Imezoren where Mohammed ben Azuz with 2000 more men would join them. The sea operations would be the same as before.

In both #1 and #1a the numbers of Riffians to form the reception committee was to be small, since no larger numbers could be assembled without attracting suspicion. In the event of a successful landing, others, up to a maximum of 4000, would be called in.

Plan #2. (arranged after D-Day).



come over on our side.

Imezoren is chosen as a distribution point because the bulk of the population in this area lives near the coast. The mountains near the border are but thinly populated.

**Supplies:** Rifles, tommy or other submachine guns, machine guns, grenades--ammunition to suit ordnance. Also arm bands should be provided for Riffian allies, and some insignia for leaders.

**Finance:** Pay of Riffian soldiers should exceed the 250 pesetas a month (\$20) given by the Spaniards. Our five leaders should be paid more according to rank, and be made officers. *CHANG*

**Demolition and Sabotage:** Simultaneously with our arrival sabotage parties can cut communication and power wires if clippers are provided they can perform demolition tasks which may be required if we can have the time and materials to train them. This sabotage would have to be directed from the Gzennaya, using Gzennaya personnel.

**Signals:** Two signals have been arranged, a warning signal and an operational signal. At the warning signal Tassels and Azuz go to the Rif from their homes in Tetuan; at the operational signal they get their men to the appointed places.

**Warning signal:** any of the following

- (a) a messenger from Tangier gives Tassels a special handshake
- (b) The Germans enter Spain.
- (c) The American Legation in Tangier is seized.

**Operational signal:**

a series of two white flares dropped over Ajdir and the lower Nekor valley by night; during the next day preparations are made and the operation begins the following night, so that Americans and Riffians meet at Imezoren at dawn. *1 AUGUST 1941*

These signals can be altered as desired, providing we can get Tassels in from Tetuan to Tangier in time to tell him.

**IN E D MEN:** Ghomaran and Jebally group, under Browne.

**Plan #1:** Browne, with 60 D men and Gzennaya Riffians, takes out the Spanish guns covering the bridge at Agadir el Krush; then an American column crosses the bridge and proceeds to Sheshawen. At Sheshawen this column will meet the Big D and 500 men; the column then splits, one section proceeding toward Tetuan, another, with the Big D, goes eastward along the main road through the Ghomaran area, carrying arms. This second column is to raise men and arm them.

**Plan #2a:** Mr. D is to go in with the column from Agadir el Krush; otherwise the same as Plan #1.

**Plan #2b:** This is an alternate operation suggested by Mr. D, and if desired it can be performed in addition to #2a. A column with arms is to cross the border along the road 45 km. SE of Agadir el Krush, running to Suk et Tlate of the Beni Haid. This area is undefended. The column will proceed northwards and meet four local raids in the woods, and then go NE or NW as directed to and their men. 2,000 men can be counted on in this area.

**Plan #3:** If paratroops with arms could be dropped at Tiguisas of the Ghomara, 2,000 men could be counted on.

Zone, Big D should be given a suitable job, such as Khalifa or Pasha of Tetuan; the State Department should also be asked to give him a Signal Service recognition. He should also receive a personal cash payment since all funds so far given him have been paid out to his kaidas.

Demolition and Sabotage: This group should also cut wires and demolish objectives at the proper moment if so supplied and directed.

Intelligence: The D group is now being used extensively for intelligence in the Spanish Zone, and is the source of almost all Moslem information proceeding from the Spanish Zone.

French: It would be preferable to exclude the French from any operation which employed either Tassels men or D men.

Azerkane: Mohammed ben Azerkane, Abd el Krim's former Foreign Minister, who has been living in Mazagan since 1926 but who now lives in Settlat, is reported by a reliable Moslem source in Fez to have gone recently to Rabat, where he offered his services as a Riffian leader to the US Army. He was told, our informant states, to wait a while, that the time was not yet ripe. Azerkane is unpopular in the Rif; our five leaders will not cooperate with him, nor, in their opinion, would the Riffians follow him. We suggest that he be left out of any plans in this area.

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

To: General Donovan  
 From: Gordon Browne

The Sherif of the religious brotherhood of the Derkawi, better known to us under the code names of Mr. D and Mr. Strings, is the leader of one of our two subversive groups in Spanish Morocco. His real name is . . . . . Through Browne and Coon and their right hand man, Randolph Gusus, he put at the disposal of the Americans his entire brotherhood, for armed resistance or any other service we might require. As most of the western part of the Spanish zone owed him allegiance as both spiritual and temporal leader, this represented between fifteen and twenty thousand hard-boiled fighting men, willing to die in following his orders. This potential force was counted upon to disrupt the western Spanish zone during the TORCH operation, if the Spaniards or Germans moved against us from the zone. Attached is a list of tribes and leaders that were under his orders. The brotherhood was strong in other tribes that would have followed him, but without the same absolute degree of certainty.

After the American landings, this group was counted upon heavily by the Fifth Army in their BACKBONE plan. Armed mobile columns carrying arms were to enter the zone by Agadir el Kruch, splitting right and left along the main East-West road and the

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tribesmen were to come in to the road to secure area. The Sheriff was to go in with the column, or meet it at Chechaouen, to lead his men. Signals by plane even arranged. The plan for several months was all set to operate.

After Backbone was abandoned, the Fifth Army still counted heavily on the D-group in event the Germans moved into Spain or the Spanish zone. Similar plans were set-up.

On July 15 it was considered by the Fifth Army that the Spanish German threat was over, and the D-group was put on ice for operational purposes. But it was understood and arranged that it could be picked up again if necessary. The D-group supplied us in November with Spanish grenades, at our request.

From November 1942 on, this Group was asked to give us assistance in intelligence work. For many months all the Moslem reports, with occasional exceptions, on the Spanish zone, both military and political, came from this Group. Their holy men penetrated areas in which no movement was allowed. Their Caids and Sheikhs reported in to the Sheriff. They put out a border patrol at our request. They provided our guards in Tangier. They gave us much information on Spanish troop and material movements. All movement in this zone was reported to us through the Sheriff. This intelligence work was expanded by Walter Booth, and improved under his instructions.

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While this Group was not used as an operational force, we counted upon them and they were ready. They performed extremely well as an intelligence group. They endangered their lives and that of their families in performing this work, for the Spaniards would have executed any member caught working for us. The brotherhood endangered its existence as an order in putting themselves at our service.

I recommend most strongly that the Sherif receive a "Signal Service" and a minimum of \$10,000 in pesetas or gold. The payment to be made secretly now, if possible, through Randolph Gusus. The Signal Service after the war, or at any appropriate time.

"Signal Service" is a form of protection issued in Morocco by the American government through the State Department. Its origins go far back to our old relations with the Sultanate and is recognized in the Treaty of Algeiras. It has been issued for the saving of life, for services of unusual value, and in one case, for the presentation of land or buildings for or Legation purposes.

The money gift is a gesture only, for adequate payment cannot be made for distribution to the subsidiary leaders. But as a gift to The Sherif or the Brotherhood in recognition of their services, it would be most appropriate.

**SECRET**



The Fifth Army will support this request, if I can talk to them.

Photo and operational plan attached.

Official spelling of name:

\* Sherif Darkawi Sidi Ahmed Bensadik of Tangier

It is also recommended by Gordon Browne that Driss Ben Hajj Mohammed Mezzour, of Tangier, be granted \$750. This man was the go-between of the Sherif and Brown (and Coon), risking his life daily to make contact. He also delivered two donkey loads of hidden Spanish grenades to us before the landing, which were distributed to OSS men through French North Africa. He ran, and probably still is running, great risks for us. Payment to be made through Randolph Casus, American Legation.

**SECRET**

### Suggested Memorandum to the State Department

The Office of Strategic Services in the performance of its special work in Morocco, recognizes that the confidential services of Sherif \* Tangier, were of great importance to the American war effort.

This Office is very desirous of rewarding the Sherif, in an appropriate manner, and requests that a Signal Service protection be issued to him at the close of the war, or if a favorable opportunity should arise in our relations with Spain, at an earlier date. This recognition of the Sherif's important contribution is endorsed by former Vice Consul Browne (non-career) and former Special Assistant to the Legation, Gen. Browne states that the Fifth Army will support this request, (specifically, Lt. General Clark, Brig. General Gruenther, Colonel Howard) but that they are acquainted with the Sherif's services only under a pseudonym.

It is suggested that Signal Service be presented to the Sherif "for his invaluable advice to American government representatives concerning Moslem Affairs, both in Morocco and throughout the Moslem world during the years of the war 1941 - "

**SECRET**



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

To: General Donovan  
From: Gordon Browne

The subversive group known to us as the "Tassels" organization was built up and put at the service of the United States in June 1942. This group was to all intents and purposes Abd el Krims group of leaders whose Riffian forces defeated the Spanish in the Riffian war, and held out for four years against the combined armies of France and Spain. This powerful organization was operational only, being used for intelligence rarely.

Browne and Coon and Gusus were in constant contact with "Tassels", his real name, Mohammed Bu Dra (Father of corn), nickname Sheela. He is not to be confused with a Gaid and others of the same name. The nickname is important. He was a General under Abd el Krims, and of the same family. The other leader was

Ben Azuz, Abd el Krims vizier or prime minister, the war leader who defeated the French in the taking of Kelaa des Sless. Through this organization practically the entire Riff was with us, up to 50,000 fighting men or more if needed, as well as many Riffians in the Spanish army, who, however, would have fought for the Spanish for one day.

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The Riffians were to be used in conjunction with the TORCH operation, or before, in the event of a German move into Spain or Morocco. Their function was to split the zone and clean out the Spanish army from the interior in conjunction with landing forces from Gibraltar.

After the American landings in the French Zone, the group was counted upon heavily by the Fifth Army, both in the Backbone plan, or in the event the Germans or Spaniards moved against us. A mobile column was to cross the frontier in Gennaya area, in conjunction with paratroop operations, and the Riffian fighting men were to gather in several appointed places to receive arms and support our forces. Appropriate plans were made (see attached memo) agreeable both to the Fifth Army and the Riffians, signals were laid on, and this extremely powerful organization was at our disposal. Initial arms were to be delivered by air, by a mobile column, and, in the first plan (pre-landing) by landing parties.

Both Bou Drac and Ben Azuz took their lives in their hands each time they came in from Tetwan to meet Browne or Coon, and meetings every two weeks were essential. Bou Drac was at every meeting, Ben Azuz more rarely, as both were watched. Bou Drac was usually disguised by us en route to the various meeting places. If caught they would have been shot, if suspected, shot or jailed, and they were fully aware of the risk.

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This Riffian force was kept ready to act until July 15, when it was "put on ice" by Browne under instructions from the Fifth Army, with the proviso that it could be picked up again. It is still functioning and at our service.

I strongly recommend that Bou Draa and Ben Azuz be given \$5000 each in gold or pesetas, secretly, in recognition of their valuable services, and that each receive a "Signal Service" protection. If Signal Service is not possible (the Sherif of the Derkawi should be first for Signal Service) I recommend each be given a "sumsar". This form of protection is validated by the Treaty of Algeciras, is renewable each year, and gives the same protection as a Signal Service (see memo on the Sherif of Derkawi). It can be arranged that it never be cancelled. It should not be given unless the non-cancellable arrangement be provided, for, if cancelled the holder is ruined. The sumsar is usually and supposedly issued to a man representing American business interests. This, however, is theoretical and can be fixed up, providing the State Department is cooperative. It has been so arranged in the past.

The money should be paid secretly through Randolph Gusus, at present "interpreter" at the legation in Tangier. It should be given now if possible.

The Signal Service, or sumsar protection, should be delayed until the end of the war, unless a suitable occasion should arise.

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before hand in our relations with Spain.

The Fifth Army will support this request, if I can talk to them.

Photos and operational plan attached.

Official spelling of names:

Abdel Hadi Ben Mohamed Ben Azuse

Mohamed Ben Mohamed Boudra (Sheilah)

**SECRET**

### Suggested Memorandum to the State Department

The Office of Strategic Services in the performance of its special work in Morocco recognizes that the confidential services of Bou Draa and Ben Azus were of great importance to the American war effort.

This office is very desirous of rewarding these two Riffian leaders in an appropriate manner and requests that "Signal Services" protection be issued to each of them at the close of the war, or if a favorable opportunity should arise in our relations with Spain, at an earlier date. This recognition of their important contribution is endorsed by former Vice Consul Browne (non-career), and former Special Assistant to the Legation, Coon. Browne states that the Fifth Army will support this request (specifically Lt. General Clark, Brig. General Gruenther, Colonel Howard), but they are acquainted with their work only under pseudonyms.

It is suggested that Signal Services be presented to Bou Draa and Ben Azus "in recognition of the invaluable advice given to American government representatives concerning Arabic and Berber affairs during the years 1941 - "

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Mohamed ben Mohamed Boudia  
(Shulak), el Wragli

Shulak is the nickname  
el Wragli - refers to his father

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330003-5



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/24 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100330003-5

Abd el Haedi ben Mohamed  
ben Aguse, el Urrengli

el Urrengli refers to his tribe

BY HANDMOST SECRET

*Hall* *Pratt*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1st December, 1941.

Dear Bill:

I have not had time to run more than rather rapidly through your most interesting appraisal of the North and West African situation.

So far as I can judge from a rapid reading, the long-term aspects seem to me probably well-founded, the short-term aspects less so.

I referred last night in conversation to the German propaganda remarks about the value of Africa to the German European economy. This is well-covered by the geopolitical section and I do not think there is much more to be said.

My chief doubt is about the economic section and, more particularly, about the argument that, as Germany is not getting all she wants from North and West Africa owing to the weakness of the blockade she stands to make no short period gain by occupying the territories and looting them.

A judgment on this point depends on the facts. U.S. Government were informed officially by the U.S. Government just before I left for England that the local produce of North Africa going to German Europe had dropped to its lowest level since the Armistice as a result of the work of Mr. Murphy and the American observers. It was part of our understanding with the U.S. Government that, in return for our allowing limited American supplies to go in, no cobalt or molybdenum would be exported to German Europe, and it was also understood that the U.S. Government could purchase as large quantities of olive oil as circumstances permitted. We have been informed only of one shipment of cobalt or cobalt ore, and London is certainly under the impression that during the last seven months progressively less local North African produce of value to the enemy has been exported. It would certainly cause consternation in London if the economic section, as drafted in this report, were found to be accurate.

/H





-2-

*additional*  
*edible* f

If the report is not accurate as it stands, then of course the argument that the Germans stand to gain little by occupation falls to the ground. In order to judge all the risks the Germans might be willing to take in the military and diplomatic sphere by occupying North Africa to obtain the whole of its current output, it is necessary to assess the degree of need of German Europe for certain vital supplies that are to be found there. I should not myself, as the draft report does, group together wheat and wine on the one hand with olive oil, molybdenum and cobalt on the other. The degree of urgency of German need for the latter group of commodities is, in our judgment, very high indeed at the present time, and there is no source other than North Africa to which they can turn to secure even small quantities of these goods. If, therefore, they have been drawing from this territory during the past six to eight months less than the potential current output of these three commodities, then they might stand to make immediate short-period gains of great economic significance to themselves by a rapid occupation during coming months. The West African oil supplies are also of greater immediate value to Germany in maintaining the civilian fats ration than would appear in the text of this report.

But, of course if it is true that the whole exportable surplus from North and West Africa have been going to Germany in the last six months despite the arrangements made by the British and the American Governments, then my argument falls to the ground.

*naval* f

There are also a number of comments on the weakness of the British blockade in this area. This weakness was originally due to considerations in this area. During recent months our power to interfere with undesirable cargoes has increased, but the political considerations involved in using force against French ships have tended to restrain us from using the forces at our command. In particular, we were anxious not to indulge in any provocation of an unnecessary

/kind





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kind, except in extreme cases when shipments of rubber were known to be moving, because we wished to give a fair field to the U.S. experiment which included observers and regulated shipments. Under changed circumstances ~~a~~ blockade could be made more effective and could be very expensive in shipping. The Germans would have to bear this point in mind if they decided to occupy.

made

There are one or two other minor points. I see that Lisbon is referred to as an entrepot for German trade. I think there has been in the past six months extremely little of German trade, though some part of the limited imports allowed for Spain and Portugal may have been sent on. German exports from Lisbon have been extremely small, principally one or two permitted by us at the request of the U.S. Government for political reasons. The Germans therefore would have very little to gain in the economic sphere by occupying Lisbon.

shipment

I think the analysis also under-rates the difficulties the Germans would have in meeting economic conditions in Spain, were they to occupy that country. The deficiencies in Spain are the same as the deficiencies in Germany, Europe, and they are very severe indeed. At the present time there is substantial resentment in Spain about supplies of Spanish goods going on to Germany. Workers are refusing to handle such goods, governors of provinces are commandeering them for local consumption and, above all, hundreds of thousands of small-scale producers are hoarding supplies, and it is being found practically impossible to get them disgorged. Even olive oil has not been delivered to Germany on the scale which was originally promised.

I shall be very happy to arrange to discuss a number of these economic points with any of your people if you think that this would be useful.

I am not competent to express an opinion on the military semi-operational sections of this report. I suppose

/that



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that the basic material for this report was supplied by the military and naval experts of the U.S. Government who have considered all the operational and supply difficulties that any substantial force would encounter in moving through such extensive territories. Generally speaking, I am very much afraid of generalization about what the Germans can do operationally unless these are based on a very precise study. I well remember somewhat over a year ago the report about a probable German descent on Turkey proving on examination to be quite unreliable, as insufficient consideration had been given to the quantity of shipping and the number of railway waggons required to move and to supply the different types of German divisions over a period of time and also the amount of railway track, marshalling yards, storage warehouses and handling equipment necessary to sustain the operation. After these things had been fully scrutinized, the whole timetable had to be drastically revised and events have shown that this revision was fully justified. I have a feeling that in this case a careful study by military technicians might justify a somewhat different exposition of the difficulties the Germans would have to overcome and the probable length of time that it would take to do so.

Very sincerely yours,

Noel I. Hall

Colonel W. Donovan,  
Coordinator of Information,  
Federal Trade Commission,  
Constitution Ave. at 6th St. N.W.,  
Washington, D.C.