FIELD REP' 'TS

VOL IV

16,020-16,092

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

[illegible] APPLICANTS

VOL. [illegible]

Name:	Branch:	Theater:	Tab:
[illegible], LT. C. L. [illegible] 1,020	IPDF	ETO	A
[illegible], MAJ [illegible] TER 15,042	X-2	ETO	B
[illegible] 15,[illegible]	R&A	ETO	C
[illegible] 15,[illegible]	COMMUNICATONS	ETO	D
[illegible] 15,[illegible]	SI	ETO	E
[illegible] 15,037	MO	ETO	F
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CURTIS, CHARLES C. 15,[illegible]	MO	METO	S
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Field Report 16,092

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x Army Rev x M.D.

SECRETARIAT DATE: 7 October 1944

x Cairo x Istanbul

TO: Reports Officer

FROM: David Williamson
Chief, Ba. & Med. Section-MO

1944 OCT 7 PM 3 52

SUBJECT: Enclosure

OSS

Attached are ~~three copies~~ one copy of a report dated October 4, 1944, by Mr. Ben Ames who has recently returned from Istanbul where he was the only MO representative. Before going to Istanbul Mr. Ames was Chief of MO in Cairo.

Appended to the October 4 report is a copy of Mr. Ames' report to Lt. Col. Hoot, dated March 7, 1944, and copy of his report to the Director dated September 15, 1944.

x Mr. D. Filler - Iran Building
Ingersol Taylor for info

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4 October 1944

To: Mr. David Williamson
Chief, Eu. and Med. Section, MO

From: Ben Ames

Subject: Supplement to Personal Activities dated 15 September 1944.

I submit the following supplement to my report of 15 September addressed to The Director from Cairo.

A number of personal observations and recommendations have been included in the hope that they may prove of value in reviewing past events and aid in future planning.

Ben Ames

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I. CAIRO AS AN MO BASE:

Cairo, originally set up as the MO-ME operating base to work against targets in the Balkans and Hungary, with advance bases or representatives at Istanbul, Smyrna, Alexandria and Bari, has, in my opinion, largely completed that mission.

When the over-all Mediterranean command shifted to Algiers, much of Cairo's territory was logically shifted to MO-MA. Today, Cairo's principal use is as a base against Greece, which will be very much lessened when it is possible to go into Greece proper. Even now, much of the production and dissemination is done by Bari.

The German voice broadcast from "Boston", which is partially served by the Yourgrau from Cairo will automatically dry up on German withdrawal. The station (100 watt) is not strong enough to reach further than Northern Greece.

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II. ISTANBUL AS AN MO BASE:

Istanbul's once unique position, which would have made an ideal center for MO operations, very largely disappeared with the breaking of relations with Germany. Added to this is the fact that material and agents from Turkey would have to pass through Russian-controlled territory to reach enemy target areas.

It was once hoped Istanbul would be valuable as a base from which advance bases in the Balkans might be serviced, but the complete lack of any understanding with Moscow on subversive activities against the enemy from this area rules this out.

The Germans made a planned withdrawal from Turkey, having doubtless taken this contingency into their calculations for several years, and left a strong network behind for carrying on subversive activities--espionage, C.E., black propaganda, rumors and the whole line. There are many well entrenched Germans--professors, etc. who have the Turkish Secret Police okay to remain--but for the immediate future most of these undertakings have been turned over to the Hungarians. A very large cross-section of the Turk population too, is pro-German and/or anti-Ally, and will promote German aims. Among them, of course, are many paid agents. Shortly before the break, the Germans shipped a large amount of gold to Turkey, undoubtedly to finance these activities.

While conditions are extremely difficult for MO operations in Istanbul at the present, I think in the future when the area is possibly internationalized, or at least there is a large

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international colony there, serious consideration should be given to firmly establishing MO there.

At present, MO should have a good representative attached to whatever mission OSS keeps in Turkey, if only to carry on correspondence and implement projects sent by other MO offices.

When I left Turkey I appointed, with the concurrence of the Chief of the mission, Robert G. Miner (R&A), MO representative. He is able and willing to do a very limited amount of MO activity. Any requests of him should be carefully explained. The Chief of the mission, Mr. John Maxon is extremely cooperative and has an interest and fair understanding of MO requests made to him should also receive intelligent attention.

III. CLOSER LIAISON WITHIN THE BRANCH:

A much closer liaison between the field and Washington and between theaters would be highly desirable. This is valuable not only so that actual plans and campaigns can be coordinated, but also to act as a stimulant to the formation of new ideas. Especially is it worthwhile in the case of small outposts who may have to do a lot of creative work on their own, to constantly realize there is a bigger organization behind them who are working for and with them. Operators in the field often have setbacks and the feeling they are getting nowhere. Many of them have not had the benefit of training in the U.S. or working in Washington headquarters, and reports or correspondence from the outside have the effect of pep talks and of reestablishing their confidence in MO activity in general.

In Cairo I believe we did not get all of the reports that Washington might have sent us, or always know everything that Washington was doing that might have been helpful one way or another. This was much more true of Istanbul, where very few reports or correspondence trickled through. In the case of Istanbul this was doubtless the fault of Cairo administration, which did not forward material. Doubtless some of the difficulty of receiving material in Cairo from Washington was caused by the involved routing through which it had to go, which caused it to be hopelessly misfiled or delayed.

The principal reason for lack of full and prompt reports and adequate correspondence from the field and between the

theaters can without doubt be laid to their lack of secretarial help, or at least of trained administrative personnel. In setting up a theater or field office of any size, it would be highly desirable to assign a person particularly adept and experienced in this kind of work. An ideal situation resulted in Cairo, when for a time, Lt. Edward Wilson, a former lawyer and advertising man, was assigned to MO and wrote a number of analytical reports.

IV. COOPERATION WITH OTHER OSS BRANCHES IN THE FIELD:

It is of the utmost importance for MO subjects to gain the confidence of, and work closely with other branches of OSS, such as SI, SO, X-2, etc. in the field. This also holds true of other agencies and Intelligence chains, such as G-2, ONI, Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies, etc.

Unfortunately there has always been a strong tendency on the part of other branches of OSS to withhold information on operations. It is of great benefit to MO to know, for instance, that SO contemplates sending a mission to an area in which MO would like to operate or make contacts, or to know the location of certain SI agents and the people with whom they are in contact. This information often enables MO to suggest that an MO man be attached to a mission, or at least a chance to brief other personnel and send in MO material, or to contact men already in the target areas.

The confidence and cooperation of these other operators can more easily be gained if the MO subject can exhibit some knowledge and understanding of the problems and work of his colleagues. This can also be furthered by his actually working with them; making reports and turning over information directly to the branch and individual to whom it may be of value.

An MO representative attached to a small mission in the field, isolated from a base because of inaccessibility or because it is undercover, should not be regarded as a separate entity, but as a member of the team. Recently, Colonel Toulmin told me of a plan to send teams to key points in Europe composed of SI, X-2, etc. but not including MO, as it was decided to limit the size of the

missions. I attempted to make the point that any MO man assigned to such teams would be chosen because they were particularly qualified to operate in the specific area assigned, and that they would be as much use to SI, X-2, etc. as they would be to MO. Thus, far from being a dead weight, they would strengthen the team.

On the other hand, an MO representative attached to such a mission would get the other members to help him. For such a team to work smoothly, the MO man should have some knowledge of, or training in, the functions of the other branches.

V. PUBLICIZING MO:

The Theater Commander, The Strategic Services Officer, and others in the field in a position to aid MO will do a lot more for us if they know something about us and what we accomplish. To get active cooperation it is a good idea to "sell" MO, to see that others know what MO is all about, and particularly to advertise its achievements. We should constantly explain: "What is MO?" "What is it doing?" The Washington office is in the best position to do a round-up of this information and pass it along in some usable form to the field.

In Cairo we sent a memorandum to all other OSS Branches explaining the functions and aims of MO and detailing the kind of help we would like to have from them. This met with a prompt and favorable response and proved to be of considerable help.

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VI. REPORTING MO ACHIEVEMENTS WITHIN THE BRANCH:

Whenever an MO project is an outstanding success its story should be told to other MO offices and operators to serve both as instruction and inspiration. One recent example of this is Colonel Vanda's experiences in setting up the MO black radio station at "Boston". Practically all hands in Cairo and Istanbul had a hand in the planning and putting this project into operation. Vanda returned from "Boston" more completely sold on MO and the future potentialities of the Branch than he had ever been before. When this black voice broadcast in German to Axis troops in Greece and the Islands got under way other OSS personnel in the field--British, Greek and American Army officers waxed exceedingly enthusiastic, sent in complimentary reports and many volunteered to help in this or any other MO operations. A version of Vanda's report should be circulated.

VII. COORDINATING TARGETS:

More coordination between theaters in attacking the same target would be desirable. A few good main or centralized themes or projects that can be constantly hammered away at, can be concentrated on, are better than many diversified and smaller ones.

An attempt was made at this in Cairo in conjunction with PWB. MO proposed that each week at the joint meeting which was held, priority targets be selected and then all hands should concentrate along these lines. Successful examples of this type of coordination were the "Das Neue Deutschland","White List", Generals Kreipe-Krech hoax, and other projects.

"Das Neue Deutschland", purportedly a German underground paper originated by MO-NA, was sent to other theaters so that it could logically have been "smuggled" out of Germany to neutral countries and there be given publicity in the foreign press. This was done via Portugal, Spain, Turkey, etc.

The "White List" project originated by MO-MK was forwarded and implemented by MO in other theaters as well as by the British. Purportedly these were lists being compiled in enemy and occupied countries by Allied secret agents and underground groups of those who actually helped the Allied cause. The direct opposite of a "black list", those lucky ones who supposedly made the list were to get all sorts of preferential treatment when the Allies occupied the country. Today there is a widespread belief in Europe that such lists are in existence. General Eisenhower's instructions broadcast to Austria on 1 October contained a reference to this "white list". (see page 18).

The Kreipe-Kreeh hoax was a campaign originated by MO-MI intended to convince German troops that their commanders believed the game was up and that the common soldier should be saved to rebuild a new Germany.

General Kreipe, German commander in Crete, was kidnapped by the British. Our story was that he gave himself up in protest against, what he considered, the useless slaughter of his troops, if he followed Berlin's orders to resist to the last man.

General Kreeh was killed by Greek Andartes near Sparta. Our version was that he was killed by the Gestapo while trying to escape to a British submarine. He left a letter to his troops justifying his attempted escape by pointing out Germany had lost the war and that it was criminal to sacrifice men's lives further. In this phoney document he stated he was taking this action in conjunction with another high military commander (General Kreipe) who was in perfect agreement.

This campaign was implemented by the media of rumors, black and white radio, planted letters and newspaper releases via Cairo, Alexandria, Smyrna, Crete, Istanbul, London and Moscow. OSS agents and British liaison officers inside Greece had copies of the Kreeh letter, Radio Moscow broadcast the story, the Turkish newspaper TAN front paged it, and OWI and the foreign press picked it up from there. (see page 12)

WHITE LIST

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"N. Y. TIMES -- London, Oct. 1--A spokesman for General Dwight D. Eisenhower told the Austrians in a broadcast tonight "to prepare for the arrival of the Allies." "The time has come for Austrians to give positive and active proof of their willingness to dissociate themselves from their German masters," the Supreme Commander said in official instructions broadcast.

"Austrians, in town and country, should form in all their local communities clandestine committees for the arrival of the Allies. These committees should be ready to provide all possible help for the Allies in regard to administration of local affairs, the purge of the Nazis, the preparation of black and white lists and the preservation of food stocks together with a safeguarding of transport and machinery."

The Austrians were told if these instructions were followed, the chances of Austria's becoming a devastated theater of war--as the Germans wish it to become--would be lessened.

Similar instructions to the Austrians were broadcast by Moscow radio today."

****

THE KREIPE-FRECH HOAX

22.04 hrs. MOSCOW (Russian Official Station) 15.00 hrs.

Inaudible.

40.22 hrs. SOVIET INFORMATION BUREAU COMMUNIQUE 21.40 hrs.

NEW EXECUTIONS IN OCCUPIED GREECE

"At the end of June, the Germans executed hundreds of hostages near Sparta in order to avenge the murder of the Leader of the 413th Battalion in the Peloponnesus, General(Kreich?). The main reason, however, was that they wanted to hide the attempt made by the General to escape. The General was arrested while going aboard a submarine to escape to the Middle East. A statement by General (Kreich?) was given by another officer to his men saying: "I am at the most difficult moment of my life. I am joining the enemy. I believe that I have done my duty towards you and towards Germany. I am see that we are carrying out unsatisfactory plans which lead us and Germany to destruction. Our troops in Russia have suffered a defeat unparalleled in the history of Germany. That is why I can see before me two roads. One leads to submission to the German Command, and the other to joining the enemy, with a hope that by doing this I may contribute to the salvation of Germany. The German Army is steadily marching towards destruction."

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VIII. WHITE vs BLACK PROPAGANDA:

Certainly the quickest and best means of reaching and influencing any wide section of the enemy in southeastern Europe at the present time is via radio and plane drop. In the early stages of the war black propaganda was of much more importance that it is now. But with the time element and wide distribution such important factors, white or slightly grey material would seem to be the most effective at this time.

This is also the feeling of many of the British PWB people in the Middle East who are stressing the black side less and less.

For MO to increase its effectiveness along these lines, a closer liaison and cooperation with OWI should be encouraged, and in many cases, plans and actual campaigns should be worked out and implemented jointly.

In Istanbul, where OWI had a large and well established staff compared to MO's one man, this worked out exceptionally well and to the advantage of MO. On a number of projects involving news plants, radio broadcasts, rumors, press conferences for local or foreign press, printing and reproduction, etc. some of their top men were taken into our confidence and proved both enthusiastic and [illegible].

Being widely known as an official U.S. agency working in the open, OWI in Istanbul was constantly being handed information, both real and planted, and approached by dissenters, underground operators, and others anxious to make a contact with the Americans. This information and these contacts were passed on to MO because close liaison was maintained with the higher echelons.

IX. COOPERATION WITH OWI

An example of MO cooperation with OWI in the field was the securing of time over Radio Ankara for American news and propaganda broadcasts.

With the difficulty facing MO operations directed toward Bulgaria and Rumania from Istanbul due to the tightening of German control immediately preceeding the Russian occupation, and the uncertainty of the Russian attitude toward MO's operating in this area, the most effective way of influencing these countries seemed to be by American broadcasts; news and propaganda broadcasts of a largely white nature.

Next to German stations and the BBC, the most powerful and popular broadcast station covering Southeastern Europe is Radio Ankara. With this in mind I sounded out Turkish authorities on the possibilities of getting time over Radio Ankara, either as a courtesy to the U. S., by direct payment, or the promise of lease-lend or priorities for needed replacements to equipment from America. The reaction was favorable and so I drew up concrete proposals for two broadcasts nightly, one in Bulgarian and one in Rumanian, with a third in Hungarian to be added later. A suggested Turkish objection, that if Americans were given time, her other two "allies", Britain and Russia would also have to be accorded the same treatment, was answered by pointing out that the British had Palestine and Cairo radios, and Russia had Tiflis, all unavailable to us. Turkey's strong desire to be allied as closely to America as possible at the moment, and to represent herself to the Balkan countries as being firmly in the good graces

of the Allies played a part in the final Turkish acceptance of the plan . . . "This is an American broadcast coming to you over Radio Ankara through the courtesy of the Turkish Government".

At this stage of the proceedings the project was turned over to OWI to close the deal. The services of MO's radio program expert, Lt. Colonel Vanda, were offered, but because of the time necessary to get the needed visas, were dispensed with.

MO's further interest in this project consist largely in being able to feed these programs a certain amount of "grey" material, or of stressing a propaganda theme that may promote some overall MO campaign. This can be inaugurated by any MO office by going through Robert Miner, MO representative in Istanbul.

[redacted]

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SECRET

16,088
Field report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 26 January 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Charles C. Curtis

1. Attached is a routine report from Mr. Charles C. Curtis who served with SI/ETO which describes his duties and activities in the theater. No special comments, criticisms or recommendations are included in this report.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

Mr. Chief:
No action required.

SECRET

OSS Form 2202

SECRET

FROM.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 1120-115

Date Rec'd. SA JAN 16 1945

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. [redacted]					Routine report, contains neither suggestions, recommendations nor complaints.
2. [redacted]	12N	JAN 1 1945			I agree with that that this report does not warrant comment.
3. [redacted], SI		JAN 20 1945			
4. WJD					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
An officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

16, 088
Field Report
x Curtis, Charles C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 20 January 1945
X S/
1 ETO

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mr. Charles C. Curtis

Mr. Curtis' report is submitted herewith for your information.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

1820-116
16,088
Field report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[redacted]

15 January 1945

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: Charles G. Curtis (civilian) SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

1. I sailed from New York, April 18, 1944, on the S.S. "Amsterdam", and landed at Greenock, Scotland, April 26; proceeded at once by rail to London, arriving there April 27th. Remained in London until December 7th, when I returned by air to the U.S.A., via Scotland, Azores, Bermuda, Washington, D. C. Arrived at Washington, D. C., December 10th, 1944.

2. During the first two or three months that I was in London, I was in charge of the Translations Room of the Reports Division, where I had four translators working under me: three women civilians, and one man who was a Pfc. The great bulk of the reports, and all the cables, for translation, were in French, but there was also some translating from German, Spanish and Portuguese.

3. In July, I was transferred to the French Desk of the Continental Division, for which Desk I had originally been sent over. This desk, under Major Justin O'Brien, was handling all the "Gaucs" and "Freucs" teams that were being dropped into France. The "Gaucs" teams were part of a larger plan known as "Gaucs" which was divided between OSS and the British Intelligence. Of this "Gaucs" plan, the teams handled by OSS were known as "Gaucs", those handled by the British, known as "Brisacs". These teams were composed of two French agents, each. We had little to do with the "Brisacs" teams. There were, in all, twenty-six "Gaucs" teams sent out. In addition, we sent out eighteen other teams of French agents, generally designated as "Freucs". Each of the latter consisted of two men, some of one.

4. My own work in connection with these teams consisted chiefly in handling the communications from the agents, insofar as they contained material needs. I received all the messages from the teams, typed out the same requesting equipment, supplies, money, etc. reported these requests, and kept lists of the needs of the agents until such time as they had been filled. Since this was my assigned work, the procedure among the half dozen members of the French Desk who handled these teams was extremely blind, and everyone did a bit of everything. My own work ranged from acting as a courier

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as far afield as Northamptonshire to (for a few days) preparing a daily summary of the Intelligence messages from the Sussex and Proust Agents. This task was shortly taken over by the Reports Division, who did all of the dissemination of this intelligence.

5. After the liberation of Paris I understood that I would proceed to France, shortly, as part of a civilian Intelligence Group to be headed by Mr. Rance White. This group was to go in three lifts, of which I was to be one of the third. Before the second lift left London, the whole plan was cancelled, and, like several of the others, I never got to France. I realise that this was a result of a change in K phor policy, and blame nobody for it.

6. By 1 November 1944, most of the "Sussex" and "Proust" Intelligence Teams had been recovered; but many of these agents came back to London for one reason or another, and the work of the last two months I was in London was chiefly taking care of these men, and cleaning up odds and ends of unfinished business.

C. Bailey C Curtis by
(Charles C. Curtis

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OSS Form 4001
(Rev. 7/27/44)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

TO | NAME | INITIALS

DATE 17 March

NAME	INITIALS
O. C. Doering, Jr.	
J. J. Monigan	
E. J. Patrell, Jr.	
R. Thrun	
D. C. Lee	
J. W. Auchincloss	
W. B. Eastack	
W. H. Miley	WBK
F. P. Pagliuso	
A. W. Sullivan	
J. B. Donovan	
A. W. Asgeth, Jr.	
A. L. Dart	
H. H. Hamilton	
L. R. Houston	
C. S. McClelland	
J. E. McDonnell	
J. R. Schlosser, Jr.	
Secretariat Files	
Director's Files	
G. C. C. Files	

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(15495)

Expires is 4 9 f 6.3

16,067
Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General W. J. Donovan

DATE: 15 March 1945

FROM : W. H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Comment on Field Report of John L. Calvocoressi

Pursuant to your request for comment on the above Field Report, Mr. Penrose, who was in Cairo during the period covered, has written a memorandum (attached) which seems to me to give careful, candid and fully informative answers to the questions raised by the report.

W.H.S.

for Capt Kaulback

SECRET

Field Cent 67
Transcriptions
71654 1307

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 2, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Stephen H. L. Penrose

SUBJECT : Report on Field Conditions by John L. Calvocoressi

1. Before proceeding to detailed comment on Mr. Calvocoressi's report, I would like to say that, in general, it is one of the most informed and mature reports which we have received from former field representatives. Most of its criticisms are completely valid, although in many instances the conditions which gave rise to them were caused by circumstances beyond the control of the field office. In the development of the Cairo office, it was necessary to make use of what personnel facilities were at hand without much experience in the type of operation involved. A series of mistakes were made, although a constant effort was maintained to correct them. Many of the weaknesses and failures pointed out by Mr. Calvocoressi have since been eliminated, and there is some ground for assurance that were the operation to be repeated now it would be done much more efficiently.

2. The comments in paragraphs A and B, on pages 1 and 2, are absolutely correct. It might be pointed out that the eventual arrival of Miss Crosby was the result of protracted efforts to secure additional Greek-speaking personnel who would be capable of processing field reports. The files of the SI Greek Desk will reveal that the need for such personnel was apparent early in 1944, although Miss Crosby did not arrive until July or August of that year.

3. With reference to paragraph B, the Greek Desk was not unique in its extensive consultation with the Reports Officer. From the earliest days of the Cairo office, such consultations were consistently held by the Near East and Yugoslav Desks also. It is true that the volume of Greek intelligence had, by the fall of 1944, far exceeded that of any other section and, consequently, it is possible that a

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larger proportion of the time of the Reports Officer was taken up by Greek matters. The Near East Section also cut the ditto stencils for its reports.

4. The criticisms made in paragraph C, page 2, are valid, although the reason for them took root in the slow delivery of personnel to the field. Every geographic section in Cairo was undermanned, at least by fully competent personnel.

It might also be mentioned that Mr. Young was a poor administrator, in that he kept his office in his head. The situation improved remarkably when Captain Else became Executive Officer, but even then Mr. Young attempted to do too much by himself. This was doubtless a hangover from the days when Mr. Young was practically alone in the office and was forced to fill all administrative functions. Additional personnel, in the form of Services men, briefing officers, conducting officers, etc., would have relieved the confusion immensely. Unfortunately, such men, particularly with a knowledge of Greek as well as English, were practically unobtainable.

5. The criticisms outlined in paragraph D, page 2, have been frequently repeated and have produced definite changes in training techniques. Unfortunately, these changes came almost too late to be reflected in the field work.

The writer, as Chief SI in Cairo, took up with Communications Branch on a number of occasions the question of the necessity for paraphrasing translations from Greek. He was unable to arrange for a change in practice, which caused at least a 30% increase in the amount of time spent in the processing of cables.

Inasmuch as pouch reports from Greece were smuggled out of occupied territory, brought by slow caique to Turkey and then were pouched in a roundabout fashion from Izmir to Istanbul, to Ankara to Adana to Cairo, it is not surprising that they were long delayed. The only possible solution to the inherent difficulties would have been the assignment of fast motorboats for work in the Aegean. This was never possible for reasons which are now historic.

Miss Crosby was perhaps the only person who could qualify for Mr. Calvocoressi's ideal. Such people do exist but they are very rare.

OSS Cairo did, at one time, have a war room but it was given up in favor of its establishment at Bari where the need

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appeared to be greater. The lack of the war room was felt in Cairo but competent trained personnel were not available to the Cairo office. A war room in OSS has unfortunately been looked upon as a dispensable luxury.

6. Mr. DeBardeleben has pointed out that the criticism stated in paragraph C, page 5, with reference to vagueness in terms of employment, has been corrected. It should be pointed out, however, that Greek agents were signed off in Athens when the operation closed with a minimum of difficulty, and, to my knowledge at least, with no claims of any major nature. It is actually astounding that the Greek operation was wound up and completed without such claims being made. It speaks well for the devotion of the Greek agents to that very desk personnel which was careless in the definition of its arrangements with the agents. So fortunate a situation has not existed in many other countries.

As regards briefing, it is true that briefing had to be done by desk personnel, none of whom had actually been in the field. Under such circumstances, briefing appears to be academic. However, since no OSS personnel had, at that time, ever been in the field, it was impossible to correct this fault.

With regard to the supply situation, it is true that in the early days supplies of missions were not properly organized. The situation was vastly improved by the assignment of an SI Supply Officer, but he was unable to do much with the Greek Desk, which preferred to control all such matters itself. This was one of Mr. Young's peculiarities but he was eventually persuaded to change his habits. At a late date also, much stricter control of the assignment of supplies was instituted than had been the case in the earlier days.

Numerous comments have been made on other occasions with regard to the inefficiency of the Maritime service in the Aegean. Mr. Calvocoressi's criticisms are thoroughly valid.

It is impossible to place too much emphasis upon the necessity for maintaining close relationship between base and field operator. In many cases, it was true that requests from field men could not be met for reasons outside of office control and on occasion they were interpreted by field men in light unfavorable to the base. The slowness of transportation was also a factor in apparent failures to deliver supplies on schedule.

7. As regards weakness in communications training, mentioned in paragraph D, page 7, there is no question but that the criticism is valid. An operator was usually qualified fit for

SECRET

field work if he could send and rece 7e 15 words a minute. This is incredibly slow but such was the urgency for getting operators into the field that a low standard of efficiency was, of necessity, acceptable. An unusual number of the men trained in Cairo worked out satisfactorily but it is not to be wondered at that some of them were failures.

In late spring of 1944, a system of regular reports from the Communications training school to the SI Branch was instituted. This enabled the geographic desks to follow more closely the progress of its trainees and was satisfactory when the reports from the school were accurate. On at least one occasion, school assessments were wide of the mark and men were used who should never have been put into the field.

Adequate charging equipment was scarce and motor-driven generators were too heavy to permit easy transportation in rough country. Wind-driven generators could be used only in certain areas. Thermopile chargers proved to be completely inefficient. The lack of a light portable and efficient generator, and/or battery charger, was one of the biggest weaknesses in the communications equipment picture.

8. With reference to the final comment on page 9, it is immediately agreed that every officer on mission should have some knowledge of the local tongue. From a practical point of view, this was almost impossible for one had to choose between Greek-speaking men who would be inefficient field operatives, and efficient field operatives who did not know Greek. The possibly ideal situation would have been officers of thoroughly American background who knew Greek fluently. Actual field missions had to be supplied with personnel who were not actually impossible. The great majority of them were far from ideal.

S.E.K.F.

SECRET

Top ↑

[redacted]

OSS Form 1084b

DATE 28/2/45

TO: Mr. Shepardson

General Donovan is referring this report to you for review and comment. His notes read:

Will you take up the question of these criticisms and then let me know which of these you find valid and what remedy you have directed should be applied to their correction.

FROM: Executive Office

(Signed) _____ EXT. ____

[redacted]

Expunge is 1/25 of f.6.3

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 23 February 1945

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report of John L. Calvocoressi.

1. Attached is a report from John L. Calvocoressi, who was with the Greek SI desk at Cairo and later moved forward into Evvia.

2. Drawing on his experience, Mr. Calvocoressi makes the following criticisms of the Greek desk:

a. failure to find qualified administrative personnel

b. lack of advance planning

c. lack of established techniques for obtaining and reporting information

d. lack of personnel fluent in Greek and English with editorial experience; and need for at least one person with previous military experience

e. poor mail facilities from Greece

f. unsatisfactory processing of reports by Message Center

g. lack of a war room.

3. Commenting on conditions in the field and relations between advance units and the base station, Mr. Calvocoressi makes the following criticisms:

a. training was not thorough; communications and cryptographic training should be included in all training

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programs

b. screening of prospective agents was inadequate

c. more care should be taken in preparing lists of supplies in conjunction with men aware of conditions in the field

d. more care should be taken to follow up requests from advance units for replacement supplies, news from home, etc.

e. briefing officers should be selected who are competent and well informed concerning field conditions and methods of carrying on intelligence operations

f. officers responsible for caique transportation should have marine or transportation experience. One American petty officer should be assigned to every caique to control the somewhat irregular behavior of Greek captains and crews.

g. employment contracts should be more specific (Mr. De-Bardeleben states that instructions on this subject have been sent to the field.)

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

DATE

TO: Mrs. Starr

Here is a copy of John L. Calvocoressi's report.

FROM: Anne Beale

(Office) EXT.

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

Outside Edges of green
[illegible] indicate the edges of
[illegible] camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

16,087
Field Report
x Calvocoressi

10 January 1946
x SI x Medit

Director, OSS, through Chief of SI

John L. Calvocoressi, Civilian

Report on Field Conditions

INTRODUCTION

The following report is divided into two main sections, since the writer filled two separate functions while overseas, viz., from 9 March 1944, attached to Greek SI Desk, Cairo, processing reports; from 2 August 1944, journeying to and operating in enemy occupied territory.

IN CAIRO

A. What I did in the field:

The processing of reports from agents in Greece, from personnel at our forward bases (notably Bagram) and from agents in Cairo (the latter reports relating to political affairs of the Government-in-exile, whereas other reports were of every nature—military, economic, political, etc.). This work involved a great deal of translating even where translation was not required, in many cases it was necessary to edit and group material, check place names and give grid references, and put into responsible English. There were also maps received from the field, which had to be translated, checked, and repatriated in cooperation with Lt. Kendall. Captain Wilson and the writer, while not doing all of the original translation, had to remain most of the other translations, and were responsible for every report as submitted to the Reports Office (until the arrival of Miss Gandy, nearly coinciding with the writer's departure on mission).

B. Problems of work and achievements in the field:

The volume and quality of the reports of the Greek Desk is a matter of pride, presumably. It is the writer's opinion that, from a small beginning, there was a steady and marked improvement, all, by fair lines, the volume of reports from the field [illegible] the Greek Desk was [illegible] the processing capacity of the desk. The Greek Desk was [illegible] with the Reports Office [illegible] and the writer [illegible] of the Greek Desk is [illegible] in most cases presented to the [illegible] with the [illegible] of the Greek section, the Greek Desk [illegible] to [illegible] of the

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master sheets, cheerfully assuming a slight amount of extra work in order to remove a great burden from the Reports Office--a burden more grievous because no member of the Reports Office staff had any previous contact with the Greek language or with Greece.

C. Personal observations and opinion of conditions in the field:

The Greek Desk in Cairo suffered from a lack of proper organization and administrative talent, intensified by the difficulty of running an office with very heterogeneous personnel. It likewise suffered from a lack of planning (admittedly a difficult problem)--personnel being obtained for one purpose and used for another or being found wanting; sharp fluctuations between comparative idleness and too heavy work; available last minute rushes; vagueness concerning functions, terms of employment, etc. As against this, the writer wishes to underline the complete conscientiousness and devotion energy of all personnel of the section, which perhaps in the long run outweighs temporarily shortcomings.

D. Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally became aware:

Criticisms of field conditions--specifically, as to reporting Reports, as received from the field, even making allowances for difficult conditions, were often deficient in content, precision, evaluation and other technical details. They also revealed faults in the technique of collecting intelligence--duplications, overemphasis of some types of intelligence, and neglect of others, and generalizations from isolated phenomena. Since this was the subject of many con- ferences between the Reports officers and the writer, the former making elaborate recommendations for better training of agents, which recommendations are in return, details are unnecessary. Mistakes in reports, in addition to basic inherent weaknesses and possible risks difficulties, were further increased by the treatment which they received in the message center, i.e., inaccurate translation followed by lengthy paraphrases (actually unnecessary usually, since a translation is in most cases sufficient for security purposes). This fault, the writer feels to be in constant attendance at the message center. (The adoption of the one-time-pad cryptographic method has recently eliminated the need for paraphrasing.) Much intelligence was made unusable and valueless from errors. This has frequently been pointed out by the Cairo Desk.

The ideal personnel for processing reports should be equally fluent in English and Greek (including technical terminology), able to type and possessed of editorial ability. Rarely combined all of these qualities, although it is impossible that such people should not exist. It is hard for such a staff should have military experience.

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Finally, while the editorial functions of a desk or reporting office have limits, a war room would be an asset not only in reporting but, also, in briefing of missions and direction of intelligence collecting.

MY ROUTE TO AN IN ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY

A. What I did in the field:

Mission Sugia had been established by Lt. Tom Sun in Hwia in the middle of the year (44). Its duties were to collect intelligence, particularly relating to shipping in the narrows between Hwia and the mainland (chief German marine escape route at the end of the period of occupation) and to encourage factors to supervise the distribution of supplies brought in by unique and traffic (Hwia being an important channel for the infiltration of missions and an important escape route); and to maintain liaison with guerrilla forces and local authorities (this was concentrated Hai territory, with the exception of a few enemy and puppet garrisons, and the patriotic forces were the 7th Regiment, 8th Brigade (later 11 Division) of HLAS). Also, British missions were conducted from this territory. The writer, corresponding as a lieutenant in the American army, was to join Lt. Sun, and act with him or independently, as they should deem fit, to the above purpose.

B. Problems of work and environment in the field:

At the time of the writer's arrival in Hwia, the mission consisted of Lt. Sun and radio operator "Harry", the latter, however, because of physical ills and psychological ruin, almost, was functionally dead, unable to today. There had also been an interpreter, recruited by the Bureau office, who had deserted. Attached to the mission was a small group of men too provided by the HLAS, for guards and supplies. It was therefore necessary to use temporarily the radio operator "Harry" of mission Sorgum, and for the writer to fulfill the function of interpreter (although his Greek at that time was negligible).

At first, the mission established a camp up in northern Hwia (at Hwamaktung), commanding a perfect view of the Hribert channel and the approaches to Yale Bay. With the arrival of a second operator, "Charlie", sent (a former Greek navy officer) recruited Chinese and Hwaiki, and trained, valuable intelligence would be sent in with the dangerous missions, at which time the writer would establish a new or alternate mission, commanding the mouth of Hwaiki.

Unfortunately, the arrival of the American War Correspondent, Constantine Poulos, was resented for some days with the mission, relieved the writer of some of his accompanying duties.

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The mission spent about ten useless days waiting to receive R. S. Young and party, in accordance with a mass of unclear and contradictory radio messages. Since Mr. Young, on arrival, proved incapable of reaching any decision as to future operations, the writer went off alone to negotiate various matters with EAM-ELAS. During his absence, Mr. Young took his party and Lt. Stix to Karyates (at the extreme south of Evvia), thus leaving the writer in charge of OSS affairs in Evvia and sent to the writer the correspondent Foules (who later went under EAM escort to the mainland), the radio operators "Manoli" and "Stamati" (newly arrived), and the interpreter "John", recruited in Smyrna at the urgent request of Lt. Stix, but, to the writer, a piece of excess baggage.

The writer, with the above OSS personnel and two andartes, established the Platana observatory and then, on about 15 October, 1944, moved his party to the Levkalitha (magnesite mine) of Afrati, near Khalkis. On 17 October the writer was severely wounded* by a soldier of a company of the Security Battalions (Greek Quislings), [illegible] when he was advancing to parley with a view to negotiating their surrender. Fortunately, the presence of the remainder of the mission was not revealed and they escaped unharmed.

Radio contact was maintained, and Mr. (acting Captain) John Patsens arrived a few days later to wind up the mission.

The mission, during the writer's time, accomplished the following:

Radio contact with Cairo, "Boston", "Mike", Young party in Karyates, and 7th Regiment II Division ELAS.

Extremely satisfactory liaison with EAM-ELAS authorities.

Production of written and radioed intelligence (writer's pseudonym, "Fleming")**

Harrassment of German and Quisling forces, and encouragement to the patriotic population***

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* The writer's life was probably saved by the devoted care of and ELAS doctor, Vassili Karkatsiras, using medicaments sent to ELAS by OSS.

** Messages from Platana probably contributed to the success of an RAF attack on shipping at Khalkis on 18 October 1944, which sank twelve vessels.

*** By the mission's presence, "public appearances" of patriotic rallies, and the issuing of proclamations against the enemy,

Reception of four caiques, of Mission Sorgou, Young party and an American War Correspondent.

Distribution of supplies to EAM (uniforms, shoes, medical and a small quantity of arms and ammo)

Transmission of money to the OSS missions in Athens

Procurement of the release of a British caique and passengers.

C. Personal observations and opinion of conditions in the field:

a. Personnel

Perhaps inevitably, the Greek Desk personnel was unacquainted with both actual field conditions and intelligence operations. Field personnel was largely drawn from the Greek armed forces, through EP (the secret department of the Greek forces). After a very brief interview, these recruits were turned over to the cabal. Thus, many inexperienced officers were sent detached (although, to the best of the writer's knowledge, no escaped during any disloyal act). In almost every case there was vagueness as to the terms of employment (there was no written agreement form), which has greatly complicated the task of winding up the missions and discharging Greek personnel. The shortcomings of the training, with respect to collecting and reporting techniques, have already been mentioned; there were also weaknesses in the instruction of communications and cryptography (v.inf.).

b. Briefing of missions for the field

Here again competent officers were lacking, and this service was very shoddy.

c. Supplies

The question of supplies for field missions developed into a [illegible] fight between the [illegible], the desk and the supply and equipping officers. As a result, necessary articles were lacking, while excess baggage was taken along. It is [illegible] that supply lines [illegible] [illegible] and that [illegible] be sent back to the [illegible] supplies and that valuable supplies should not be turned in [illegible] officers to be used in [illegible] photography, training [illegible] etc.

d. Transportation

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transportation to the field involved, in almost every case, the use of caiques (boats of two tons to one hundred tons, with power and auxiliary sails, commanded and manned by Greeks). These had inherent defects of lack of speed, etc. But more serious was the fact that of the American officers responsible for this service, only one had any marine or transportation experience, and few any knowledge of Greek. There were also various irregularities in the conduct of captains and crews (traffic in Jewish refugees, etc.) which could have been eliminated by placing an American petty officer on each caique.

e. Service in the field

The man in the field always feels that, so far as his base is concerned, "out of sight is out of mind". There is some reason for this. The base should pay scrupulous attention to requests for replacement supplies, news from home, etc., not only as a prerequisite for successful operations but also as a morale factor. Since every request could be handed from the field to Smyrna to Cyprus to Alexandria to Cairo (to Washington maybe), it could easily be buried. Also, the desk should constantly supervise and direct, in general terms, the intelligence activity in the field.

f. Communications

Written communications suffered all the vicissitudes of the caique service. Radio communications were well handled by the bases in general.

D. <u>Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally became aware</u>

a. Personnel of the mission

Lt. Tom Stix, AUS. Lt. Stix has all the qualifications to do good work, and was successful [illegible]

Sergeant [illegible] The writer believes [illegible] suited for field work.

[illegible]

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tremendous appetite and unauthorized requisitions of meat, sugar, rice, etc., finally stopped by the writer, threatened to create a difficult situation.

Operator Manoli: Hopelessly immature and a doctrinaire EAMite; also incompetent.

Operator Stamati: Immature, but quiet and well-disciplined, and somewhat more competent than Manoli.

Interpreter John: Of the gilded youth of Athens-in-Egypt, nevertheless tried to adapt himself to field conditions, and was as helpful as he could be. It has been pointed out that he was excess baggage.

John L. Calvocoressi, Civilian: Managed to learn Greek sufficiently, ride mules and their relations, and pretend to be an officer.

b. Supplies

Covered under Item 6 (c).

c. Service in the field

A minimal amount of our requests brought responses.

d. Communications (radio)

First, the operators Manoli and Stamati were not adequate [illegible] operators even for the relatively easy conditions obtaining in Greece. While knowing how to send and receive, they were virtually ignorant of [illegible] [illegible]. Moreover, they [illegible] at all [illegible], and [illegible] did not know the first principles of [illegible], and [illegible] operator Manoli was [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the responsibility for [illegible] lies with the Cairo headquarters.

The greatest difficulties arose when the writer was left [illegible]

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Moreover, operator Stamati had been sent out to replace Mario, using the same schedules, and to work for Stix; Captain Chrysostomos (who had been communications instructor at Cairo and was travelling with Mr. Young) had taken Manoli's crystals and schedules with "Boston". The Young party never saw fit to inform the bases of these dispositions, which created untold confusion until the writer apprised the bases (who, of course, should have been immediately informed by the Young party).

All these difficulties contributed to the losing of much vital spot intelligence on the very active enemy shipping passing between Evvia and the mainland.

c. Relations with the andartes

The mission was totally dependent on the andartes for transportation, shelter when necessary, and to some extent food; in return, of course, we gave considerable clothing, food, etc. to ELAS. With respect to intelligence, we were also in many respects dependent on ELAS or on the various civil branches of EAM.

Under such circumstances, it is very easy for the mission to drift into a situation where it only travels at the convenience of ELAS and only sees what the authorities wish it to see. Because Lt. [illegible] first had to rely on an interpreter who was primarily an EAM partisan, and later had no means of communication with local people, the writer found that the andarte "[illegible]" of the [illegible]* was almost running our affairs, a situation which he speedily corrected.

As to military intelligence, while ELAS had many informants, they were only interested in local [illegible] matters, which were of little interest to [illegible]. Non-military intelligence from local [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

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* [illegible]

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It is the writer's opinion that every officer on mission should have some knowledge of the local tongue. Conversations through interpreters are invariably distorted. Moreover, a mission operating openly should have more American personnel and, if possible, its own means of transportation, thus avoidir many difficulties.

John L. Salvoceresi

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan DATE: 22 February 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mr. H. G. Deignan

Tick Col Cooper + Mr Ripley that Ripley should not act as Chief of S.I. Ripley is an undoubtedly sincere and honest he doesn't seem a man

1. Attached is a report from Mr. H. G. Deignan, SI/SEAC who served as regional advisor on Thailand. The covering memorandum from Col. Hutcheson indicates the high esteem Mr. Deignan's work commanded in the field. In another covering memorandum Mr. Knollenberg states that this report confirms his contention that Mr. Ripley should be relieved of his post as Chief of SI at Kandy.

2. Mr. Deignan criticizes conditions in the field as follows:

(a) lack of clear distinction between duties of various SI officers, including Dr. Ripley, Maj. Reeda and Capt. Waring. (This criticism has been drawn to the attention of Lt. Comdr. Taylor in Kandy.)

(b) necessity for more clerical assistants - he notes in this connection if civilian women are employed they should be employed as typists, stenographers, etc., rather than administrative assistants. (This recommendation has been referred by the SI Branch to the Deputy Director, Personnel.)

(c) SI should maintain a master file of its own operations and projects - at present such information is scattered

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among the files of the CO, OPO, Registry and Communcations as well as SI. (This comment has been brought to the attention of the Chief of SI/SEAC and of Comdr. Taylor in Kandy.)

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

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16 GMC

Filed by 15 F

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd. FA.....

	Serial No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
	2037			BK	Shows an interesting relationship which I approve. ~~[illegible]~~ implementation [illegible] Supply should be released in accordance [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] Chief [illegible] J Kennedy BK.
[illegible]	1223				

[illegible]

16 0xo

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

X Deignan, H.G

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: , S I

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - H. G. Deignan

Mr. Deignan's report is submitted herewith. Your attention is called to Lt. Col. Hutchesson's covering memorandum.

Mr. Deignan's recommendations concerning clerical assistants have been brought to the attention of the Deputy-Director, Personnel, and his recommendations concerning the shipment of typewriters and the types to be used have been brought to the attention of the Deputy Director, Services for the information of Procurement and Supply.

I have suggested to the Divisional Deputy for the Far East, SI, that he recommend to the attention of the Chief, SI, in SEAC, the system of centralized records for all operations recently established in ETO and carried on under the able direction of Major Brooks Peters.

Whitney H. Shepardson

Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

SECRET
16,086

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 13 January 1945

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : South East Asia Sec., FESI

SUBJECT: Attached field report of Mr. H. G. Deignan

1. It should be recognized that Mr. Deignan has had extensive experience in Thailand and therefore is thoroughly familiar with the area, which is the reason for his connection with this Organization.

2. It should also be recognized that he is one of those primarily responsible for the very successful and productive operations which we are now conducting in Thailand, which are of so much current interest to other Government agencies here in Washington (besides being of vital interest to the Military and other United States agencies in the field).

3. Mr. Deignan's work has been praised by his Commanding Officers in the field, and both the State Department and G-2 have taken the trouble to state emphatically their appreciation of the information he has been able to impart to them here within the last week.

4. The attached report reflects Mr. Deignan's ability in its conciseness and choice of comments.

5. The suggestions mentioned in the first two paragraphs under "specific difficulties in the field" are being actively considered by Lt. Comdr. Taylor in Kandy.

A. D. Hutcheson, Lt. Col. AUS
Chief, South East Asia Sec.
Far East Div., SI

Attachment: report.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 January 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Chief, SI
Through - Executive Officer, SI

FROM : H. G. Deignan

SUBJECT : Report on Field Conditions

1. Itinerary.

The writer left Washington, 26 February 1944, for Kandy, Ceylon, via Los Angeles, Fremantle, Bombay, Madras (travel by rail, ship, rail).

He arrived again in Washington 31 December 1944, having traveled from Kandy by the facilities of ATC.

2. Duties in the Field.

The writer was listed as Regional Adviser on Thailand. He was, to greater or lesser degree, associated with all OSS activities initiated by the various branches of Det. 404 and relating to his geographical area.

A. Translation and Censorship.

Letters and other materials, originating from Thais in Det. 404 and addressed to diplomatic or private Thais within or without the Theater, were submitted to him for review and the preparation of an official translation for OSS files.

B. Thai Typewriting.

During the first 6 months of his stay in the Theater, no one, Thai or American, was experienced in the use of the Thai typewriter; the writer was asked to learn to use the machine and to prepare various materials required by Schools and Training and by the MO Branch, also Thai "bloodchits" and vocabularies requested from us by the AAF.

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This type of work was later taken over by Thai personnel acquired by MO.

C. Liaison Between OSS and Thai Collaborators.

During the early stages of the establishment of Det. 404, it was essential that our Thai assistants be held "on ice" for an indefinite period with as little discontent and lowered morale as possible. At this period, the writer was C.O. at Camp K (later turned over to Schools and Training) and chiefly concerned with wet-nursing our Thai personnel and establishing an intimacy with them. Similar jobs were from time to time found necessary, especially during the screening periods of new recruits and with such as were less fluent in English. Owing to the writer's long pre-war association with the Thais resident in the States, many of these boys were already acquainted with him and came to him with their complaints and difficulties, which were then presented to the proper authorities.

D. OSS Projects and Operations.

The writer took a prominent part in the preparation of Basic and Operational Plans for Thailand and in the briefing of outgoing parties, particularly in the geography and jungle-lore of the areas concerned.

E. Interpretation.

During recent months, the writer has been constantly busy interpreting and piecing together the information sent out by our infiltrated agents and the Thai Underground, in the light of his special knowledge of Thai politics, conditions and psychology.

F. Field Trips.

Disquieting political implications disclosed by monitoring of British Thai-language broadcasts from New Delhi led to the writer's despatch to New Delhi for consultation with officials of OWI and the Army's specialists in Political Warfare. A report on the trip was submitted to OSS Washington and through other sources, was brought to the attention of the State Department and OWI Washington.

In connection with the operation ARISTOC, the writer accompanied the party to an advanced air base in India for concentrated geographical briefing. In the lack of

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photo-reconnaisance owing to continuous bad weather, the willingness of the agents to go in, and of the RAF to undertake the sortie was based wholly on the writer's detailed personal knowledge of the drop-area as shown by his sketch-maps and verbal descriptions.

C. Consultation.

Although a member of SI Branch, the writer was almost daily called upon by members of other branches (SO, R&A, MO, etc) for information on communications, linguistics, etiquette, costume, etc., etc.

3. Progress of the Work in the Theater.

During the first half of the writer's stay in the field, while the detachment was just being set up and no progress at all was obvious, one had the feeling of working in a vacuum. Developments of recent months in the writer's area and the promise of greater developments to come would seem to justify the long months of preparation and, although it would perhaps be impossible of proof, it may well be that we have advanced phenomenally far in the relatively brief time that has elapsed. The writer believes that it was his suggestion that altered the routine operation CALAMANDER to the extraordinary operation HOTFOOT, the apparently successful termination of which has wholly altered the position of OSS/SEAC, vis-a-vis Thailand, and which will probably have far-reaching consequences for the grand strategy of the war in Southeast Asia and for the political future of Thailand.

4. Conditions in the Field Which Might be Improved.

A. Clerical Assistants.

We need more clerical assistants, whether GI's or WAC's, or civilian women. If the last are sent, they should be engaged as typists, stenographers, file clerks - not as administrative assistants who arrive in the field to find themselves placed in a pool and feel themselves demoted thereby. Owing to a real shortage of such assistants, the pool has been found necessary although each girl is already overworked by the duties of her own branch. When I left in December, one SI secretary was attempting to handle the paper work for seven men and finding it impossible to keep up-to-date or do a good job for any one of them.

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B. Typewriters.

Every SI representative should carry out a portable typewriter. Lacking clerical help, it was necessary for the men to do much of their own typing and as many as four SI people had to line up to use a single machine; if a machine broke down, it became an office tragedy.

The Hermes is light-weight and convenient, but has a weakness in the spring and new parts are not obtainable; the American makes are thus more useful for us.

5. Specific Difficulties in the Field.

SI should have a master file of each of its own operations and projects. In the case of recent critical Thai developments, we found that a study could not be prepared in reasonable haste because essential segments of the story were scattered among the files of the CO, OPO, Registry, SI and Communications, and not one of the files contained everything.

There seems to be no sufficiently clear line between the duties of Dr. Ripley, Major Reeda and Captain Waring, which means that office procedure sometimes goes astray and important information fails to reach someone's desk. An example of this recently occurred in the case of an important message from Thailand which was first seen by the writer and Major Hester eight days after its arrival, and by Captain Waring nine days after its arrival. Since we had all three been eagerly awaiting it and were greatly worried about potential developments, we were all irritated by this contretemps and the fact that we might have been put at ease a full week earlier.

In this case, no one in SI was at fault and it has seemed to me that whenever such slips have been brought to the attention of those in authority, a real attempt has been made to guard against repetition.

I have felt that the whole SI Branch has shown good teamwork and cooperation, and have no criticisms whatsoever against any of the men and women with whom I have been associated, with all of whom it has been a pleasure and privilege to work.

H. G. Deignan

H. G. Deignan

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

F Welch Report F

DATE: 19 February 1945

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from 1st Lt. Edward J. Welch

1. Attached is a memorandum from 1st Lt. Edward J. Welch who served with the SI detachment to the 3rd Army. The principal point emphasized in this memorandum is the neglect of the morale of the enlisted men. Factors contributing to this were the lack of promotions (especially as promotions were reported to have been made in London and Paris) and the lack of a satisfactory method of assigning men where their training and previous experience could be utilized. (An example of this can be seen in the use of Italian-speaking personnel in French areas.)

2. Reporting on actual conditions in the field, Lt. Welch states that at first this unit was swamped by a flood of irrelevant information from London thus necessitating the addition of a number of code clerks to the unit.

W. B. Kuntack
W. B. Kuntack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

16077
Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 27 January 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - 1st Lt. Edward J. Welch

There is attached the field report of 1st Lt. Edward J. Welch, dated 22 January 1945.

Your attention is called to the comments of Mr. Homer Hall.

Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTEROFFICE MEMO 24 January 1945

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: B. Hunter Hall

SUBJECT: Comments on Field Report of 1st Lt. Edward J. Welch

Attached is a junior officer report of considerable merit. It proves that by giving service it is possible to gain the respect of, and, establish amicable cooperation with, G-2. Although OSS is not equipped for tactical intelligence, there are times, I suppose, when we should be prepared to pitch in and give the other fellow a hand. Improved relationship with Army, especially G-2, should be courted at every opportunity. This report also backs a long contention of my own, i.e.; that OSS does not give the morale of its EMs the attention it deserves.

B. H. H.

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

22 January 1945

TO: Chief, SI Branch

FROM: 1st Lt. Edward J. Walsh

SUBJECT: Report of Activities in Field

ITINERARY

With regard to dates and place names, this report must be sketchy as I have no written records and do not recall the details of our travels.

The detachment of which I was a part left England for France about the fourth of July, and we were ashore about the fifth. We remained with the Army headquarters in the Cherbourg peninsula until we went operational. At that time we moved south to Brittany and then turned east passing south of Paris, bivouacking always in the open country and moving on an average every fourth day. Late in the Fall we set up headquarters in an inhabited place for the first time, this being the town of Nancy where we remained about three weeks. We then moved to the city of Nancy where the detachment was located at the time I left on the fourth of December.

PERSONAL ACTIVITIES

I was assigned to Area 3 on arriving in England and trained for some weeks with the First Army SI detachment. Then I was assigned to the Third Army SI detachment and helped to train the men in this unit. When we moved to France, I was in the capacity of Intelligence Officer. In general my duties were the supervision of the cipher section, supervision of the Intelligence section, who kept a situation map and order of battle map, and supervision of the clerical staff who processed the intelligence. All intelligence collected by our detachment or received from our bases in London or Paris came to me for consideration as to its value to our unit and for dissemination within our Army and to other outside sources. In addition, at times, though, I maintained liaison with the G-2 Section.

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PROGRESS OF THE WORK

Considerable difficulty was encountered at first in dealing with the G-2 section as certain important members of that section were openly contemptuous of not only OSS, but of the several other G-2 agencies assigned to them. At that time Capt. Byfield, executive officer of the unit, and myself found that we were not set up to furnish the kind of intelligence wanted at Army level, a fact which left us as the stepchildren of the section.

Our first progress toward being accepted came a short time before Third Army started the break thru. The Army had very little information on the defenses they would encounter in the area they were shortly to enter particularly in the coastal towns of Brittany. Learning of this need we radioed London and soon received the latest information regarding defenses in these areas. The intelligence section then translated the many documents and plotted the information on large scale maps which we submitted to the G-2. This work was gratefully received by the G-2 and the position of the detachment was vastly improved.

However, it was not until a month later that we became really appreciated. The army was moving east with Loire river on its southern flank, and we had been giving information of very considerable numbers of German troops just across the Loire from our practically unguarded flank. Apparently the intelligence was ignored until a few Germans made a reconnaissance in about company strength across the river and ransacked a town in our territory before withdrawing. The G-2 section was caught napping as it had not reported our information. However, as a result the G-2 saw that we had useful tactical information to offer, and shortly afterward I was invited to make my office in the situation section by the Colonel in charge. I moved in there and was given a desk and a large map. On this map I plotted our information and the map was used considerably by the G-2. From the information shown on this map, several air targets were picked out and bombed with considerable success.

From that time on relations with the G-2 section were extremely cordial and we were able to give them aid in many important matters. In one case we got a request to locate a long range artillery gun which was bombarding the town where our headquarters were located. We gave them the information in approximately six hours and as a result, the gun was knocked out and its crew killed by our artillery. In another case we located a German divisional headquarters and the subsequent bombing killed the G-2, G-3, and [illegible] of lesser officers of the headquarters.

SECRET

CONDITIONS TO IMPROVE

The only conditions which were persistently bad in the field pertained to the enlisted men and resulted in rather poor morale among them.

When our unit went into the field, the highest ranking enlisted man was a staff sergeant who later proved useless to us and had to be let go. As a result of this we had no men with sufficient enlisted rank to be first sergeant, and as we could get no ratings a first lieutenant did the work of a first sergeant. Our meter "sergeant" was a pfc. The intelligence man-com was a corporal in a job which in the G-2 section rated at least a staff sergeancy. Reports of promotions among the men in the London and Paris offices further depressed the men and morale was exceedingly poor.

Another condition which caused considerable dissatisfaction among some of the men was the feeling that they had been assigned to their job without consideration for their qualifications. Several men had spent most of their lives in Italy and spoke Italian as their first language. Several others had lived most of their lives in Belgium and Holland. These men felt that they were wasting their time at the jobs they were doing whereas they could be really useful in some other capacity.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE FIELD

In the field I encountered a number of difficulties several of which I have already discussed in previous paragraphs. Most of our troubles dissolved themselves eventually as in the case of our cipher work which swamped my staff with a huge volume of intelligence from London, most of which was useless to us. On our request we received three additional code clerks who came under the supervision of the communications officer thereby relieving my staff and myself. I also communicated with base giving them directions as to what they should send us and this resulted in a great improvement in the type of intelligence sent to us in the field.

Much of our difficulty was a result of a basic misunderstanding as to what sort of intelligence an army in the field requires. In general the OSS detachments were prepared to offer mostly strategic intelligence, whereas, at army level, strategic intelligence is not nearly as important as tactical intelligence. As a result of this our section had to change its conception of what it was to do in the field, and to this can be traced our early difficult relations with the G-2 and our occasional criticism of the service which the base office gave us.

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Edward J. Weid
1st Lt., FA

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

14,074

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 13, 1945

TO: Lt. N. J. Putnell, Jr.

SUBJECT: Frances Watts Stevens

1. With reference to the report of Mrs. Stevens, my recollection of the entire matter and my connection with it is as follows. This will be a very frank statement, and I trust it will go no further. Mrs. Stevens, in my opinion, should never have been recruited by OSS. Although constantly endeavoring to impress one on how discreet she was, she was very indiscreet and never should have been sent to the ETO. I do not know whether it was possible to cancel her transportation at the time Major Bibert stated that he cabled Washington not to send anymore MO personnel to the ETO, but we had several cases of personnel being sent over for MO who arrived too late to do the work that they were evidently recruited for.

2. Mrs. Stevens having arrived in London, it was true that she was told to contact the other branches with the possibility of some other branch being able to use her services. This was standard procedure with us before returning personnel to the United States.

3. After SI determined that they could not use the services of Mrs. Stevens, I ordered her return to the United States as I certainly did not wish her connected with our organization and simply hanging around London making herself, if I may say so, a great nuisance to all concerned.

4. The information contained in paragraph 2 on page 2 of Mrs. Stevens' report was certainly nothing new to any of us, and it was common knowledge that there was a possibility of these sorts of matters going on, and our continental organization had been warned previously of this situation.

5. When it was definitely determined that Mrs. Stevens could not be used in OSS ETO, she asked my permission to apply for a position with OWI. I gave her permission to contact OWI and after, in my opinion, an adequate length of time in which to determine whether OWI wished her services or not, and after having our Personnel Officer, Major Simmons, contact OWI and ask that organization whether or not they wished to employ Mrs. Stevens, and receiving a negative reply, Mrs. Stevens was returned to the United States.

6. I am sure that Mrs. Stevens is correct in stating that her experience in OSS was a disappointment, but I am also confident that there was no place for her in OSS ETO.

7. It is true that certain people assigned to various branches arrived in the ETO for whom we had no use. These we endeavored to transfer to other branches as soon as possible, and if this method was not successful, we endeavored to return them to the United States or to some other theater.

8. What Mrs. Stevens' knowledge of "inadequate evaluation of military intelligence" is, I have no idea because I think her own statement shows that she never really came into possession of any military intelligence by which she could judge whether the evaluation of such intelligence was correct or not.

Lester Armour

Captain Lester Armour

Top

OSS Form 4151

Date 1/29/45

To: Colonel Bruce
Captain Armour

For comments and return.

E. J. Putnell Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30M49)

Even No. rolls

Expense is 1/25 of G.3

SECRET

C O P Y

REPORT
OF
FRANCES WATTS STEVENS

I was recruited by OSS in April 1944 for MO work in France. Mr. Samuel Scrivener confirmed my appointment on July 10, 1944 after receiving a request from London for my services.

I went into training on July 25 1944, and sailed on August 23, arriving in London September 2. My orders were to report to Mr. Rae Smith. As he was not available, I reported to Major Dibert of MO at 40 Portman Square.

Major Dibert told me that due to the liberation of the major part of France, French MO operations were terminated and that he had repeatedly cabled Washington before the date of my departure not to send over any more MO personnel. He suggested that I do German MO... with the aid of a dictionary as I explained that my German was not sufficiently proficient. Not wishing to undertake a job for which I was not adequately equipped, I refused.

I was told to "go shopping" to the various departments and find out what I "would like to do."

I suggested that I could be of service in SI in France due to my long experience of that country, my intimate knowledge of all phases of French people, political feeling, present government officials and personal contacts in all strata of French life. (I had lived in France from 1930 to 1940.) As I was known in France as a lecturer on foreign affairs and writer on current events, my own professional status could serve as a plausible cover for my presence in Paris. Through my varied contacts I felt that I could gather considerable information and evaluate it correctly.

The first SI shift had already left for Paris with Major Griffith, head of French SI. His deputy in London, Mr. Homer White, told me that in his opinion I had the necessary qualifications to be of service in France and that he had requested my transfer from MO to SI in order to send me to Paris.

However, for reasons already known in Washington, no second shift was sent to Paris. But I was told to wait, that sooner or later I would be sent to France...and in the meantime to "relax and enjoy London." I found that the majority of OSS personnel were indeed "relaxing", if not "enjoying" [illegible]

After one month of complete frustration I created a small job for myself by separating some information I had gathered to explain to the heads of the Italian division. Though I was not assigned to the office, the short investigations I made for Captain Katek were the

sole justification (1) of my military from September 2 to December 12 when I sailed for the United States. In other work was found for me and I was not allowed to use my spare time as a volunteer instructor for the Red Cross educational service in our army camps in England.

However, during this period of enforced "idleness and enjoyment" London, a centrum of intrigue in fact was brought to my attention by a number of French officials whom I knew. A very high French official, whose name must be kept out of the report, told me of his serious concern about the leakage to Vichy of allied military information to be obtained through American contacts with French collaborationists still in the pay of the Germans. He pointed out that these people were using the friendship of American officers of French descent against secret and very high officials of Vichy... with grave consequences. In other words, Mr. Vichy, we complain, ignorance and gullibility and lack of cooperation with the French Resistance Bureau. In [illegible] Vichy is [illegible] Vichy their fellow officers against the wishes of French people under suspicion and due for arrest.

The fact that strategic secrets were not taken by the French government was due to the fact that [illegible] Vichy [illegible] the wrong of telling [illegible] by the U.S. and the French did not deny that the Vichy [illegible] of Americans. (A typically French policy.)

The French Ambassador in London, M. Rene Massigli, gave the [illegible] of the negotiations [illegible] Vichy [illegible] Rene Massigli he lived as he felt that I could be of service in [illegible] with the French people and our [illegible] for the benefit of our mutual interests.

I took this letter to Ambassador Father Arnour, told him all that I had heard, and the source of my information.

I was ordered to leave by plane for the U.S. the next day.

I requested and obtained permission to remain in London [illegible] I could [illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible] that I could not give [illegible] of this [illegible] and was for the first time [illegible]

I [illegible] in the [illegible]

The consequences of lack of coordination with Washington, lack of clear directives, miscasting of personnel, inadequate evaluation of military intelligence and general muddling in matters that require the highest competency add up today in thousands of lives lost on the battlefields.

It is greatly to be hoped that a complete reorganization of the London offices will take place.

/s/ Frances W. Stevens

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

16,074
Field Report
x Stevens, Frances Watts

2 February 1945

x SFO
x MO

MEMORANDUM

TO: Acting Director, OSS

FROM: Deputy Director, SSO

SUBJECT: Report of Frances Watts Stevens

Attached is Colonel Bruce's memorandum of 31 January on the above subject, to which is attached a copy of Mrs. Stevens' own report. You ask whether the second paragraph of Colonel Bruce's memorandum, stating that Washington had been advised not to send over any more personnel, is correct.

I believe that the statement is completely correct. On 12 August, London cabled that no more personnel for the MO Base should be shipped (Cable #66951). On 16 August, London cabled (referring to the previous message) that transportation should be cancelled for all people not having German ability, even though they were already alerted (Cable #67941).

Mrs. Stevens was alerted on 10 August. She sailed on 23 August. It would therefore appear that she was permitted to leave in direct violation of instructions from London.

On the other hand, I think it should be noted that under date of 4 July, the recruitment of Mrs. Stevens was approved by London (Cable #[illegible]), that only a brief time elapsed between the cables of 12 and 16 August and her departure on 23 August, and that according to her statement, which does not appear to be contradicted, she was permitted to remain in London for 3 months with no work to do.

Deputy Director-SSO

Attachment

SECRET

Top

To:

Director's Office

(type)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

16077
Field Report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING GROUP

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Mr Charles

TO: ~~Lieut. R. J. Puhrall Jr., USN~~

DATE: 31 January 1945

FROM: Colonel D. K. E. Bruce

SUBJECT: Report of Frances Watts Stevens

I fear that Mrs. Stevens' experience is similar to that of one or more other people recruited for MO work in France.

The important point seems to me to be to ascertain whether Major Dibert's statement, "not to send over any more personnel", is correct.

Mrs. Stevens was introduced to me by Wallace Phillips. I arranged for some of the SI personnel to meet her.

My recollection is that it was felt by all concerned:

1. That it was unwise to send a woman of such striking appearance, with no secretarial qualifications, to Paris, to engage in SI work there. It should always be remembered that this type of SI work in France was forbidden (a) by SHAEF and (b) by our agreement with the French Secret Service.

2. It was felt that the use of Mrs. Stevens in SI would be inadvisable under any circumstances, since she has no training in SI work and since her experience as a publicist might well lead her into indiscreet utterances.

3. The serious situation to which she refers as existing in Paris, is one which she mentioned to me and with which our organization was familiar but over which we had no control. It would have been most unwise for OSS to have interfered in such a matter. All that we could do was to keep our own personnel from association with people suspected of being collaborationists. The highest American military authorities were informed of the existence of the situation.

4. I can sympathize with Mrs. Stevens' feeling that her experience in OSS was a bitter disappointment to her. However, when she ceased to be useful for MO

SECRET

work she would not, in my judgment, have been of use anywhere else in OSS, ETO.

5. Further, in my personal opinion, she should not have been recruited for MO.

D. K. E. Bruce

D. K. E. Bruce
Colonel, AUS

Top

OSS [redacted]

Date 1/29/45

To: Colonel Bruce
Captain Armour

For comments and return.

E. J. Putzell Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

Even

Exposure is [redacted] of 6.3

16.074
Field Reports
Stevens

REPORT
OF
FRANCES WATTS STEVENS

SECRET

I was recruited by OSS in April 1944 for MO work in France. Mr. Samuel Scrivener confirmed my appointment on July 10, 1944 after receiving a request from London for my services.

I went into training on July 23 1944, and sailed on August 22, arriving in London September 5. My orders were to report to Mr. Max Smith. As he was not available, I reported to Major Dibert of MO at 40 Portman Square.

Major Dibert told me that due to the liberation of the major part of France, French MO operations were terminated and that he had repeatedly asked Washington before the date of my departure not to send over any more MO personnel. He suggested that I do German work with the aid of a dictionary as I explained that my German was not sufficiently proficient. Not wishing to undertake a job for which I was not adequately equipped, I refused.

I was told to "go shopping" to the various departments and find out what I would like to do.

I suggested that I could be of service in SI in France due to my long experience of that country, my intimate knowledge of all classes of French people, political factions, present government officials and personal contacts in all strata of French life. (I had lived in France from 1920 to 1940.) As I was known in France as a lecturer on foreign affairs and author on current events, my cover professional status could serve as a plausible cover for my presence in Paris. Through my varied contacts I felt that I could gather considerable information and evaluate it correctly.

The first SI chief had already left for Paris with Major Jacques Hass of French SI. Mr. [illegible], Mr. Kenn Dibble told me that in his opinion I had the necessary qualifications to be of service in France and that he had requested my transfer from MO to SI in order to send me to Paris.

However, for reasons already known in Washington, no second chief was sent to Paris. But I was told to wait, that sooner or later I would be sent to France, and in the meantime to "relax and enjoy London". I found such [illegible] of OSS personnel were called "relaxing", if not "enjoying" London.

After one month of complete frustration, I created a staff job for myself by [illegible] Major Dibert, who was pleased to delegate some of the [illegible] duties. Later I did get assigned to MO [illegible] the direct successor of Major Jacques Lacy were the

sole justification (!) of my salary from September 2 to December 12 when I sailed for the United States. No other work was found for me and I was not allowed to use my spare time as a volunteer lecturer for the Red Cross educational service in our army camps in England.

However, during this period of enforced "relaxing and enjoying" London, a serious situation in Paris was brought to my attention by a member of French officials whom I knew. A very high French authority, whose name must be kept off the record, told me of his grave concern about the leakage in France of Allied military information to the Germans through American contacts with former French collaborationists still in the pay of the Gestapo. He asserted that these people were using the friendship of American officers as protection against arrest and were being completely hoodwinked by them... with grave consequences. He attributed this solely to American ignorance and gullibility and lack of cooperation with the French Deuxieme Bureau. He stressed the need in France of Americans with greater knowledge and experience of his country who could direct and advise their fellow officers against the tricks of French people under suspicion and due for arrest.

The fact that stronger measures were not taken by the French government was due to the fact that General de Gaulle was at that time on the verge of being recognized by the U.S. and the French did not dare risk too sharp criticism of Americans. (A typically French policy!)

The French Ambassador to London, M. Henri Massigli, wrote the London office requesting that American restrictions against my entry into France be lifted as he felt that I could be of service in closer liaison work with the Sûreté Bureau and our SI branch for the benefit of our mutual interests.

I took this letter to Commander Lester Armour, told him all that I had heard, and the source of my information.

I was ordered to leave by plane for the U.S. the next day.

I requested and obtained permission to remain in London another week in which to see if I could transfer to OSS in Paris as I wanted a means of getting to France to make a personal investigation. As OSS told me that they could not give me an answer before at least a month as they were still waiting for Paris directives, I asked for sea transportation and waited for the first ship accommodation available.

My experience in OSS has been a very bitter disappointment as I had given up my own professional work at considerable monetary sacrifice to enter government service in the hope of being used in the war effort. Having broken my own professional contracts for this purpose, the net result has been a complete waste of time and government salary. Not personal considerations should not, and in my case do not, weigh in the balance of objective and justifiable criticism of the inefficiency of the directive heads in the London office.

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The consequences of lack of coordination with Washington, lack of clear directives, miscasting of personnel, inadequate evaluation of military intelligence and general muddling in matters that require the highest competency add up today in thousands of lives lost on the battlefields.

It is greatly to be hoped that a complete reorganization of the London offices will take place.

/s/ Frances E. Stevens

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Ques

Please see the
Col Brown
Pgs arrange
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any Comments
[illegible] case

Copy sent 1/12 [illegible]

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f. 6.3

16,074
Field Report

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 26 January 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Mrs. Frances Watts Stevens

Mr. Chester: Please note the last paragraph of Capt. Hankins comment. AWS.

1. Attached is a report from Mrs. Frances Watts Stevens who was recruited by MO for work in France in April 1944. After arriving in the theater Mrs. Stevens found that MO was no longer in need of personnel in France, had in fact "repeatedly" cabled Washington to that effect. It was later planned to send her to France for SI but this plan fell through when it was decided not to send the second wave on to the Continent.

2. Before leaving England Mrs. Stevens reports she was informed by a number of French officials of serious leakages of Allied military information. This situation, it was stated by a high official, was due to American officers, who, through ignorance and lack of cooperation with the Deuxieme Bureau, were associating with former French collaborationists still in the pay of the Gestapo.

3. After receiving this information Mrs. Stevens, with the backing of the French Ambassador to London, tried to go to France, at first with OSS and later with the OWI. When this failed, Mrs. Stevens returned to the United States after having spent three months in the theater during which time her job was the "self-assigned" one of providing what information she could to the chief of the Balkan Division of SI.

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4. The tenor of this report is highly critical and bitter, concluding with a strong and sweeping criticism of OSS/London. Comdr. Armour has not been available for comment and the MO Branch does not believe that any comment is necessary.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack,
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

[redacted]001a

Date: 19 January 45

To: Captain Kantack

Before the attached is summarized and sent in to the Acting Director, it would seem to be advisable to have MO present its side of the case.

C. A. Bene

C. A. Bene

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Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd. SA..... .....

Mr BRANCH 1-16-45

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.					
2.					
3. Director				KCM	
4. Secretariat					
5. Mr Donald Committee				LLSW	
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					

Comments should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

To proceed to next person after each comment.

Other designations should be used in To column.

An officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Any decision or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Slip when should always be returned to originator.

For further instructions see separate sheet.

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16.0

REPORT

OF

FRANCES WATTS STEVENS

SECRET

I was recruited by O/S/S/ in April 1944 for M.O. work in France. Mr. Samuel Scrivener confirmed my appointment on July 10th, 1944, after receiving a request from London for my services.

I went into training on July 23rd. 1944, and sailed on August 23rd., arriving in London September 2nd. My orders were to report to Mr. Rae Smith. As he was not available, I reported to Major Dibert of M.O. at 40 Portman Square.

Major Dibert told me that due to the liberation of the major part of France French M.O. operations were terminated and that he had repeatedly cabled Washington before the date of my departure not to send over any more M.O. personnel. He suggested that I do German M.O. ... with the aid of a dictionary as I explained that my German was not sufficiently proficient. Not wishing to undertake a job for which I was not adequately equipped, I refused.

I was told to "go shopping" to the various departments and find out what I "would like to do."

I suggested that I could be of service in S.I. in France due to my long experience of that country, my intimate knowledge of all classes of French people, political factions, present government officials and personal contacts in all strata of French life. (I had lived in France from 1920 to 1940.)

As I was known in France as a lecturer on foreign affairs and writer on current events, my own professional status could serve as a plausible cover for my presence in Paris. Through my varied contacts I felt that I could gather considerable information and evaluate it correctly.

The first S.I. shift had already left for Paris with Major O'Brian, head of French S.I.. His deputy in London, Mr. Homer White, told me that in his opinion I had the necessary qualifications to be of service in France and that he had requested my transfer from M.O. to S.I. in order to send me to Paris.

However, for reasons already known in Washington, no second shift was sent to Paris. But I was told to wait, that sooner or later I would be sent to France ... and in the mean time to "relax and enjoy London". I found that the majority of O/S/S/ personnel were indeed "relaxing", if not "enjoying" London!

After one month of complete frustration I created a small job for myself by reporting some information I had gathered to Captain Katek of the Balkan division. Though I was not assigned to his office, the short investigations I made for Captain Katek were the sole justification (!) of my salary from September 2nd to December 12th. when I sailed for the United States. No other work was found for me and I was not allowed to use my spare time as a volunteer lecturer for the Red Cross educational service in our army camps in England.

However during this period of enforced "relaxing and enjoying" London, a serious situation in Paris was brought to my attention by a number of French officials whom I knew. A very high French

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authority, whose name must be kept off the record, told me of his grave concern about the leakage in France of Allied military information to the Germans through American contacts with former French collaborationists still in the pay of the Gestapo. He asserted that these people were using the friendship of American officers as protection against arrest and were being completely hoodwinked by them ...with grave consequences. He attributed this solely to American ignorance and gullibility and lack of cooperation with the French Deuxième Bureau. He stressed the need in France of Americans with greater knowledge and experience of his country who could direct and advise their fellow officers against the tricks of French people under suspicion and due for arrest.

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I requested and obtained permission to remain in London another week in which to see if I could transfer to O.W.I. in Paris as I wanted a means of getting to France to make a personal

investigation. As O.N.I. told me that they could not give me an answer before at least a month as they were still waiting for Paris directives, I asked for sea transportation and waited for the first ship accomodation available.

My experience in O/S/S/ has been a very bitter disappointment as I had given up my own professional work at considerable monetary sacifice to enter government service in the hope of being used in the war effort. Having broken my own professional contracts for this purpose, the net result has been a complete waste of time and government salary. But personal considerations should not, and in my case do not, weigh in the balance of objective and justifiable criticism of the inefficiency of the directive heads in the London office. The consequences of lack of coordination with Washington, lack of clear directives, miscasting of personnel, inadequate evaluation of military intelligence and general muddling in matters that require the highest competancy add up today in thousands of lives lost on the battlefields.

It is greatly to be hoped that a complete reorganization of the London offices will take place.

Francis Wells Stevens

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

16,011
Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 19 February 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report from Mr. James Quesada

Attached is a report from Mr. James Quesada of the Spanish Desk of SI. Mr. Frank Ryan, Chief of the Spanish Desk in Washington, notes that this officer, who was recruited for operations which never materialized, is believed to be well qualified for use as an observer in Spain should further operations open up in that field. After stating the purpose for which his group was recruited, the composition of the unit and the methods used in dissolving it, the report is devoted to a series of excerpts from Mr. Quesada's previous reports concerning the Spanish political situation.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 12 January 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - James Quesada

There is submitted herewith the field report of Mr. James Quesada.

Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

16,071

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

January 13, 1945

TO: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson

FROM: Frank T. Ryan

SUBJECT: Jaime Quesada - Field Report

With the exception of the first six paragraphs, the subject's field report consists primarily of an analysis of the political situation in Spain. Into it he has included his own feelings and opinions which, while interesting and constructive, are nevertheless not appropriate subject matter for a field report.

Mr. Quesada, while an American citizen, is, however, more Spanish in character rather than American. He speaks the English language with difficulty.

Prior to his return from London where he was associated with the Spanish Desk, we received splendid letters of recommendation on his behalf from Robert Sherwood, Tom Cassady, and Lucer White, who spoke highly of his qualifications and expressed the hope that he would be reassigned to a post where his language and general knowledge of Spanish affairs could continue to be utilized. I am in hopes that, if and when we are ready to go ahead with new penetrations in Spain, that we will be able to use Mr. Quesada in some capacity, as I fully agree with reports from London that we should endeavor, if possible, to keep him in the Organization.

F.T.R.

Forwarded to Director
LE Bureau's report
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

December 12, 1944

TO: Chief, SI
Via: Executive Officer, SI

FROM: James Quesada

SUBJECT: Field Report

It is not necessary to enter into the details of my trip before my arrival in London as they are well known to you. A series of orders based on the lack of practice on financial "modus operandi", led to the incidents that unfortunately happened. My post was originally in Spain, but due to the incidents referred to, I was ordered to London.

The original project in London was to create a group for the gathering of political intelligence that, linked with other elements, would be in a position to furnish information - for the time being in England, and later on in France - on the actual and future status of politics in Spain, and counter-information on our Allies and enemies. This group was composed chiefly of a Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, a former Minister of Education, and an aristocrat - all Spaniards. The gathering of information went well until the dismissal of the components of the group in September and October of 1944.

The results of the work of this group started in London would have been highly satisfactory if the original project had been carried out and followed afterwards in France. But, as I said before, the dissolution of the Continental Division left this group without a guide and naturally without continuity of what could have been done to obtain information on Spain.

I was given, personally, the order to "dissolve" the members of the group. I was given no reason other than that the group had to be liquidated, with additional pay for its monthly assignment. Pressed by one of them for the reason of his dismissal, I assured him that this action reflected nothing personally on his activities. I told him "confidentially" that it

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was my belief that, in the conferences between "The Three", it had been "agreed, in principle, to partition the world into zones of political influence". In this division, Spain and Portugal had been "turned over" to England, and, consequently, the United States were "washing their hands" of these two countries, thereby fulfilling their part of the agreement. I do not know if he swallowed this, but it was the best I could think of at the moment.

In short, the project was excellent. It was well planned and would have given good results. But the project was dropped, I do not know under which "zone of influence" and was not carried out.

I am taking the liberty to copy in this report paragraphs of my writings of December 28, 1942 and May 18, 1943 which may be of interest today to read or to take into consideration. They refer mainly to the general policy of Franco's Government, internal and international, and reflect the sentiment of the Spanish people, according to my personal opinion. They are as follows:

On December 28th, 1942 I wrote:

"First, is that Spain is destroyed civily and from a military point, for the time being. -- Morally and materially the people has suffered the war (civil war), as you may say, at their "front door"... Besides it is calculated that one million casualties is the penalty of this war.... Their treasury, their industries, their economy, their agriculture, their national and private wealth, as well as their artistic treasury, are in bankruptcy.... The little they have left the Germans and Italians are doing away with... Individual liberty is restricted to a point never known in the country.... The food question can be explained in few words.... Since the middle of 1936 it has been gradually diminishing to about 50%... Everything is subject to "straperlo" (black market). The money depreciated and publicity rumors spread that the paper money was counterfeited in Germany. These and other things have made the Spanish people sick and tired of one and the other.

"The Army has no armaments (worthwhile). I have heard that Don Juan March, when the Civil War was over, sold the remnants of Finland for their war against Russia... with the idea of purchasing new material - which has never been done up till

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now. The majority of soldiers in the ranks are Leftists; the officers can be divided into right side Republicans and Monarchists. As you can see France is in a very difficult position; it would be dangerous for both him and the country if he were to incline the weights to one side or the other. The people, understanding this alternative, rest on it, confident in their neutrality.

The second point in the characteristic of the Spanish people is that they understand perfectly that "all" of their troubles do not emanate from the "Reds", but from poor governments in the last fifty years, and that they have no one to blame but themselves.

In regards to the payment of balances due for arms supplied by Germany and Italy, the people knew that they had to pay it one way or the other, and they now know that they have fully paid, the commercial balance being in Spain's favor. They know perfectly well now that the German help was egoistical. It was, among other things, an examination to test their new weapons on real human flesh. Having over-paid, having been despoiled of all that the Germans and Italians could get their hands on (among other things, all coined silver), and having been tested and experimented upon, it is more than enough that they should suffer a new invasion of their national territory, not freely authorized, that would despoil them of the little they have left.

The third point is the Nazi propaganda of their "Kultur". If there is any country in the world that systematically rejects such "Kultur", it is Spain. To live their life at the bugle-call because some "guy" orders it is beyond their comprehension and they simply won't do it. The "selection" of birth control, Nazi style, you cannot get into a Spaniard's head. He thinks that is done only with the bulls of famous breeds.

Another point, and this is very serious, is religion. As you know, Spain has no racial or religious problems, because there is only one. They fear that the Germans, after they are through with the Jews, will begin with the elimination of the Catholics, their worst enemies, inside and outside of Germany. On the other hand the ties between the Spanish people and the Germans are very light. Since the time of Philip II (Seventeenth century) they have had no wars or opposed interests of a serious nature. For the average Spaniard the help of the Germans and Italians was simply egoistic, as France and Spain, in the hands of the Popular Front, leaning toward Communism, would have been catastrophic in this war.

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The fourth point is Franco. Franco is not a statesman. His political creed is the Monarchy, and personally I think he is tired of all of them. But which is his EXIT? NONE, unless it is the Monarchy; that is to say, to hand the power AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY to JUAN III, son of King Alfonso. The political party with which Franco runs the Government is the so-called FALANGE. But neither is that a political party nor has it fulfilled its program (as always and everywhere). It is a group of "NEPOTISMO" (political favoritism), model in its class of disorganization, bureaucracy and favoritism.

But when should the occasion for a change to a Monarchy have arrived? That is the question. Franco will not hand the power over easily to the old political parties, nor would the people stand for it for fear of reprisals. In his speech of December 8, 1942, Franco said "Bolshevism or Fascism" or the "Spanish patriotic and spiritual formulae". Does he mean a Monarchy with Parliament?

The fifth point is the advantages or disadvantages for Spain to get mixed up in the World War. What aspirations can Spain have? To be left alone. What can they gain? Nothing. Does she know which of the belligerents would suit her best? Yes - none of them. What can they ask for in a future peace? They have nothing to give and nothing to hope for. What can they gain? Territorially nothing. Morally nothing. What can they lose? Much. The example of an Italy tangled with the Germans is at hand. (This was written December 28, 1942).

I told you before that Franco is not a statesman, and this does not need to be proved. He has shown it. Franco is, however, a military strategist and a good soldier. This cannot be denied. It is my belief that after the invasion of Africa, the Germans, having lost the war, will have no other alternative than to explode themselves within their frontiers and obtain a separate peace or locked themselves to the last man. All this to a long term (This was written December 28, 1942). If Franco sets Don Juan on the Spanish throne he thinks he does no treason to his friends (German and Italian) and he, fulfilling his political ambition, places the Spanish politics under the only way out at present. In short, is Franco going to hand over the country to the last Communist Government (Negrin) with whom he ended the Civil War? No. Is he going to "set up" another Republic, he being a Monarchist? Not if he can help it. Is he going to set up the Monarchy now? No. Don Juan is "nearly English" and his friends (the Germans) would not like it. What can he do them? Nothing. Hitler and rest in his neutrality, if they let him, until the Axis are worn out and then bow to Don Juan, with the help of England.

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With respect to Africa, I thing the Germans know they have lost it. They have no other way out but to fight while they make another stronghold in Italy and Southern France. The history of North Africa has always been the same. Neither the Romans, nor Charles V (who landed in Tunisia), nor the Catholic Queen, nor Philip II, nor King Sebastian (who landed in Alcazarquivir), could over-power it. The Political Testament of Queen Isabella warned her successors, the Kings of Spain, "against the invasion or war on the Moors". It is true that several European countries have had, and have, colonies in North Africa; France and Spain principally. But to a cost of continuous wear of troops, European and native, and of continuous uprisings; and if they hold on to them, it is due more to politics and diplomacy with Sheiks, Malymen, Guerillas and Sultans than through their armed forces.

In spite of everything Germany may decide to invade Spain to help her forces in North Africa, through the Straits of Gibraltar. In the press here (New York) a military commentator said the other day that, in such a case, the invasion would run along the coast of the Mediterranean; that is to say, Barcelona, Castellon, Valencia Alicante Granada, Malaga, with the Balearic Islands and Cartagenaria as air bases. I do not think so. The logical invasion would be Irun, Victoria Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Naturamadura, Sevilla, Cadis; that is to say through the Portuguese frontier. The first defenses for the Germans in the Strait would be Huelva, Sevilla, Cadis leaning on the other side on Spanish Morocco: Larache, Ceuta, Melilla. I do not believe in the invasion of Spain.

On May 18, 1943 I wrote:

We left my last letter with the beginning of the African campaign, that, in 181 days you have ended brilliantly - November 7, 1942 to May 7, 1943.

Why didn't the Germans invade Spain? To the average Spanish mentality there are few reasons free of political and diplomatic complications: 1) Public sentiment is against being dragged into a war, of no good consequence to Spain, and an internal conflict at every step; 2) France's conviction that the German withdrawal from Africa would leave them no alternative but to retreat to Europe and wait for the end, fighting to the last, and to get the least advantage of time; 3) with the campaign over in Africa Spain would remain virtually out of the zone of operations; 4) Spain had always a chance to enter the war afterwards if the invasion of Italy did not succeed, as they were still in contact with the Germans through the Pyrenees; 5) Now it is useless and late for the invasion of Spain by the Axis - Spain is a bottleneck on the Pyrenees.

SECRET

I believe that, from a military standpoint the question of Spain and Portugal is finished.

Since my last letter things have changed little politically in Spain. Franco does not count much for himself now, it is the "interests" he has created around himself. He is worn out, although, as a statesman, he had very little to wear out. He has maintained public order as he would have done it in the barracks.

Remember what I said in my letter of December 28 about the Nazi "Kultur" with reference to birth-control and religion? Well, several Spanish bishops in a "pastoral-letter" have denounced the "Nazi system as anti-Christian".

On the other hand (see my letter of December 28), certain "High Army (Spanish) Officers" have made it clear that they are against collaboration with Hitler or Mussolini, (this does not include France). These forces (church and military) work against the pro-Nazi tendencies of the Falange.

Franco has published decrees (in March, 1942) against rumors - punishable by death. This proves public excitement, but I do not think it will run into serious developments for the time being. This is the natural reaction to being free of the immediate fear of invasion.

I believe in the policy of contemporisation with Franco for the time being. This may attract the Spanish people by furnishing them a few things of what they lack. The more they are helped, the more independent they will become of the Axis. Besides that, the collapse of the Spanish industrial structure may run the country into a chaotic state or even a new civil war. On the other hand it is best to show the Spanish people who is their friend and who helps them as they have had recent and good examples of the German and Italian economic promises. On March 30, 1945 the London correspondent of the New York Times said: "It is rumored that a movement of acceptance of the Monarchy is spreading over Spain as well as towards the Allied cause, due mainly to the help offered by America and England, in the form of articles and foods."

I still do not see the propitious moment which France is hoping for to get out or install the Monarchy. In this respect, the internal political situation today, May 16, 1945, seems to me to the same as in December 28, 1945, when I wrote you last.

I do not know what the future policy of the OSS is, or when the incumbence of this special information will fail, but I take the liberty of calling your attention to the importance

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of Spain in the future - may we say in the next war, or in the continuation of this one - and give it a serial number III:

1) I have the belief that, in the course of one year or so, "peace" will be signed in Europe.

2) Then all Europe will have to join in "fighting" that peace for the settlements of each individual country, which is a hard fight.

3) When everything, on the surface, will seem to be quiet then every chancery in the world will begin to look for its new allies, even if they were enemies a few years ago.

4) The next war will be fought all over the world, clearly divided by two tendencies, perfectly defined: Communism and Anti-Communism; or between God-fearing people and Godless people. (My definition is a fight to the finish between "clean and unclean" people, morally and physically.)

5) Before the final world-wide clash comes, it will have to be fought out locally in every country, politically or by arms, through civil wars.

6) The main headlines of the struggle will be: Capital vs. Labor; Communism vs. Democracy; Religion vs. Atheism. All of these could be classified under two denominations: RIGHTS and LIBERTIES.

The outcome of the fight is for another generation to decide.

The immediate danger in Europe is its diversion to Communism. But, although painful, it would be the best thing that could happen in the long run. The people of Europe, outside of Russia, are more educated, more conscious of their traditions; there would be a reaction in the course of a few years and they would give the Communists a last and final fight. Labor classes in Europe still believe that they are "enslaved" at present. It is useless to preach to them on the tyranny of Communism. It is better to let them find out for themselves; they are asking for it.

But at the same time the United States should be prepared to keep on the margin of all this peace uproar. But keeping away

SECRET

means namely the opposite of its graphical meaning - armed to the teeth and even taking part in local or isolated campaigns as "neutral fighters", or helping one or the other country, counseling, or, in other words, being a POWERFUL STRIKING ARBITER.

One of the nations that can play a big roll in the future war is Spain. It was difficult up till now to move armies, particularly if they were mechanized, through the Pyrenees; but now Spain can be converted into the "airfield" of Europe. The large coasts on the Cantabric, Atlantic, and Mediterranean offer ample room for the supplies for such air bases. The Pyrenees are no longer a barrier. Moreover, Spain can be reached from Africa more easily than from Italy.

After the fake "peace" is signed in Europe, Spain will have no allies. Systematically they will reject France, Italy and Germany; Russia by all means. They may tolerate England, but they would certainly welcome the United States. A friendly, commercial-military policy to this end would help us enormously to avoid immediate future trouble in Europe, and we would be ready for the next armed conflict with a footing in South Europe.

Another very important item is the influence of Spain in Latin-America, as we have seen in the present war.

J. Q.

SECRET

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

To: Captain Lanham

Please return this to our files when it has served your purpose. The acting director has seen.

M. O'Donnell

Reply yes

Network's notes

Dent

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16070
Field Report
x Schmidt
x IRG
x ETO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 January 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan
Via: Dr. William L. Langer

FROM: Oswald A. Schmidt

SUBJECT: Report of Returning Personnel Conforming to General Order #63

1. Description of duties and activities of Oswald A. Schmidt, 12 March 1944 to 21 December 1944.

Attached to T-Force/SCI/12th Army Group/OSS-Paris. To check, examine, evaluate captured German map depots and materials and all other map agencies or houses, whether official or commercial, whether German or liberated nationals. To secure representative copies of all maps for the OSS map collection. To gather information about future map targets and information of German map output and types. To gain "know-how" for other map men preparing for continental operations.

2. Progress of work and achievements.

Authoritative knowledge gained of German maps and map depots in France and Belgium. Important and highly valuable maps obtained in quantity. The primary phase of the work completed when agreement with OSGS, SHAEF, G-3, Survey Section, and U.S. Engineers, Intelligence Branch had been concluded. Agreed to supply Map Division with duplicate copies of all maps taken by their representative organization.

3. Conditions in Field that might be improved.

Have the best general and loose orders possible so as to be unhampered in the field. One can get around with more restricted orders, but one has a better operational conscience with more comprehensive orders. G-2 pass and semi-attachment or SHAEF pass and semi-attachment are extremely helpful. Transportation Unit assigned to map man or men indispensable.

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16,061
Fieldwork

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 26 January 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Miss Dorothy H. Cox

1. Attached is a report from Miss Dorothy H. Cox who served with SI in Turkey with the specific assignment of gathering information from refugees on conditions in Greece.

2. Commenting on conditions in the field, Miss Cox states that the following basic continuing conditions, both political and organizational, hampered all activities:

a. Those persons who undertook the organization of the office had no previous experience and only theoretical training. (Miss Cox comments that the only way to obviate this difficulty is to establish a permanent intelligence service.)

b. As a result of insufficient coverage of certain areas, OSS was dependent upon Allied services with the result that it was frequently necessary to work out compromises which worked to our disadvantage in order to get certain vital intelligence.

c. Because this was a British sphere of influence and because there was no clearly defined U. S. policy, many OSS operations were seriously hampered.

d. In certain instances prominent Greek statesmen were unwilling to hold interviews because they knew the U. S.

SECRET

official attitude and felt that nothing could be gained through diplomatic channels. These people were most anxious to meet prominent U. S. liberals, but neither Miss Cox nor the Cairo office were able to put them in touch with such men. The availability of prominent men for interviewing was further complicated by the fact that frequently the older and better organized British service was able to prevent OSS from meeting these men.

3. Miss Cox notes the following specific difficulties ~~(which arose in the field)~~ that might be remedied:

a. The inadequacy and irregularity of the supply system. (Mr. DeBardeleben in his covering memo indicates that this situation is now believed to have been improved.)

b. The lack of specific directives as to the exact sort of information which was desired by Headquarters. (Mr. DeBardeleben notes that the importance of intelligence directives is now being stressed and efforts are being made to inform representatives in the field as to what information is wanted.)

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

16.06: Field Report
x Cap. Dorothy

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

DATE: 12 January 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report - Miss Dorothy H. Cox

There is submitted the field report of Miss Dorothy Cox.

Your attention is called to the comments of the Chief of the South East Europe Section, Captain D. DeBardeleben.

[signature]

Attachment

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Chief, SI

DATE: 12 January 1945

FROM D. DeBardeleben

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions submitted by Miss Dorothy H. Cox

1. The mission to which Miss Cox was assigned was an important one. She performed her duties in a most satisfactory manner and accomplished excellent results.

2. In paragraph 3, beginning on page 8, Miss Cox points out the advantages inherent in a permanent secret intelligence organization and the benefits to such an organization of a specific United States foreign policy. Few informed people will disagree.

3. In paragraph 4, beginning on page 12, Miss Cox writes of the difficulties of supply and shortages of maps, money and directives.

   a. The informal system at first employed in delivering supplies to OSS Aegean bases and from bases to personnel in Greece was subject to many irregularities. It was difficult to maintain a schedule for the caique service, upon which supply necessarily relied. However, reports indicate that as experience was gained by the SI personnel engaged in this important work methods of handling and accounting for supplies were improved.

   b. Arrangements for supplying SI personnel with maps and money are now included in operational plans of this section.

   c. The importance of intelligence directives is now stressed both here and in the field. Efforts are being made to inform SI representatives as to what our customers want to know.

D.DeB.
D. DeB.

Forward with approval
W. H. Chapman

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Chief, SI

DATE: 12 January 1945

FROM D. DeBardeleben

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D. DeB.
D. DeB.

Forward with approval
W. H. Chapman

SECRET

16,061

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, OSS
Through Chief, SI

DATE: 11 January 1945

FROM Dorothy H. Cox

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

1. What I did in the field.

a. Object of mission

The object of my mission was to go to Izmir, Turkey, and to get as much information as possible on conditions in Greece, using the incoming refugees as my chief source.

b. Establishing contact with refugees

Under cover of a civilian relief worker for the Greek War Relief Association, en route to Izmir to look into the condition of refugees fleeing to Turkey, I arrived in Cairo December 1942. There I presented letters of introduction to Mr. Bain, head of the American Red Cross and to Mr. Matthews (now Sir William Mathews) chief of MEWRA and explained my Greek War Relief mission to them. Mr. Mathews was cooperative, showed me the camp at Moses Wells and gave me letters to the heads of other refugee camps in Syria and to the British Consul General at Izmir. At the same time he made it quite clear that I could accomplish nothing by remaining in Turkey. He was willing that I should visit the various camps, but having done this said I could be of use only by returning to Cairo and working under his direction.

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The reasons for this were:

(1) The British considered the Near East their exclusive sphere and were unwilling that anything should be done there except under their direction. They welcomed American money and supplies such as they were receiving from the American Red Cross, but wanted all administration of refugee relief to remain in British hands. This seemed a question of general policy.

(2) It was almost immediately obvious to me that UNRRA was working closely with, and in its higher echelons formed part of the British Intelligence Service. Uncontrolled work by foreigners among the refugees would interfere with their setup and enable the foreigners to tap sources then available only to the British and so endanger their security.

After discovering that the British thought the refugees an important source of information I felt I should establish myself in Izmir independently of the British and as quickly as possible.

3. In Ankara

In Ankara, I called on the head of the Red Crescent (Turkish Red Cross), and on the head of the Iskan (Turkish Refugee Commission). These men had no objection to my working with the refugees in Izmir and cleared me with the

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Turkish military. I informed Mr. Mathews I would remain in Turkey. He in turn had the American Red Cross in Washington informed that I was acting contrary to his advice and urged them to give me no support.

d. In Izmir

It soon became evident that I would get little useful information without some official recognition of my OSS connection. It had been decided in Washington that this would not be necessary as I would work through two men also assigned to Turkey. When, after six weeks these men had not appeared nor any word of their coming reached me, at my request the Greek Minister to Turkey informed the Greek Consulate in Izmir that Greeks passing through Izmir should be sent me for interrogation and with instructions to answer any questions asked.

3. Progress of work.

a. Relations with the Greek Consulate

Relations with the Greek Consulate were excellent. The refugees passing through to the Middle East, about fifty to seventy-five a week, stopped in Izmir for periods varying from three to ten days, averaging four or five. During this time they had to register with the Consulate. Since at that time the Greek service had ceased to function in Izmir (except for Greeks attached to the British Intelligence), the refugees were not interrogated at the Consulate, but those

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whom [illegible] work considered as possessing [illegible]ation of interest were se[illegible] as clearly impossible for me to see them all. Since it is difficult enough to size up one's own countrymen on sight and almost impossible to evaluate foreigners as to reliability and intelligence, this initial weeding out proved most useful. It greatly lessened the chance of my interrogating a spy or collaborator whom I might have picked out in an unaided choice.

Note: It is said that one reason the British escape service was so little molested by the Germans was that the Germans wished to make use of it as a means of introducing agents into Turkey. Communication between their agents in Greece and Turkey was almost as important to the Germans as to the British.

b. Interviewing refugees

The refugees were questioned on military, political and economic questions. They worked hard to give good and accurate reports, again and again recommending and introducing someone else from the group in which they were travelling, whom they knew to be well informed on some particular airfield, port, etc., or who had brought out a report on economic or health conditions. This helpfulness on their part was due to the Greek's admiration for America, and for many months, even in 1944, his confidence that America would be the "savior" of Greece, and that the United States would surely see the provisions of the Atlantic Charter enforced, was unshaken.

SECRET

It was obvious even in the beginning that the majority of Greeks not only admired America but much preferred the Americans to the British. They were puzzled as to why the American Service was so inferior to the British both in number of personnel and equipment. The Greeks tried to make up for this discrepancy by helping all they could (at the beginning of 1943 there were more than 75 British in the service in Izmir).

2. Types of reports

(1) Military

The reports received through the questioning of refugees were never up to the minute news since it took them five to thirty days to reach Izmir from Greece. This made reports on military movements of little value, but did not affect the usefulness of reports on permanent military installations (which in many cases were extraordinarily accurate as I saw when visiting Chios, Mitylene and Samos and found barbed wire, gun implacements, etc., exactly in the positions indicated on maps drawn months earlier.

(2) Political and economic

Reports on the changing political and economic situation and on health conditions were not quite so valuable as if received earlier, but were of great use as being first-hand information coming from those directly concerned. If political reports were not

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invalidated by the lapse of time they were certainly colored by the sort of refugees passing through. These could be divided roughly into two categories, those arranging their own escapes and those brought out by British subsidized caique. In 1941 and 1942, thousands of poor Greeks, men, women and children, fled to Asia Minor because of the difficulty in obtaining food in Greece, but by early spring of 1943, shipments of food from America had eased this situation and the majority of those coming out were men who wished to serve in the Greek armed forces, those who had been too active in the underground and were wanted by the Germans and those with political ambitions. From this mixed group one get a variety of opinions which taken together gave a more or less true picture of conditions in Greece. By March of 1944 very few refugees arrived in Turkey except by British controlled caique. These were largely people wanted by the Government in Cairo, or friends of the government together with just a sprinkling of others. With only these refugees to question there was suddenly a strange unanimity of opinion, all were royalist.

d. Other sources

By this time our own service had expanded in the last two months and we had introduced our own agents into Greece.

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All the transient refugees had to be classed as untried sources which would not be evaluated as to reliability, so it was essential to establish reliable independent sources. The business of introducing these ag ats into Greece and the reports they sent out did not come in my province, but the fact that they existed and caique transportation was now a necessary part of our service did furnish me with a new set of persons to question. I became friendly with our own caique captains. As soon as they realized that we were eager to collect information in Izmir as well as from our agents in the field they began to bring passing caique captains who had made trips to ports not covered by our agents. These proved to be excellent sources, their intimate knowledge of the coasts and acute observation were most useful. The captains were fairly divided in their political opinions serving as a useful balance and check between the right wing adherents brought out by the British and a second new source which developed, the Antartes themselves. As a representative of the Greek War Relief, the Antartes came to me for supplies of clothes, food and medicine. In exchange they gave information. In many places (e.g. Samos, Mitylene Euboea) they had organized information services whose reports were available to us in exchange for a steady flow of supplies and (rarely) part payment of expenses. We had a few complete reports of this sort and many fragmentary ones.

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3. Conditions in the field which might be improved.

a. Advantages of a permanent organization

The basic reason for any lack of success met by the Izmir office was due to the fact that we were a new organization set up as it were in a void, without background and with all ramifications still to be established. All the mechanics of organization and communication had to be instituted by persons with only theoretical training and without experience. This was the greatest drawback to efficient and independent functioning.

The only obvious cure for this condition is the creation of a permanent United States secret service. In peace times the service would need only a skeleton force. Had such a service existed with only three Americans in Turkey, at say Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, those men would constitute a framework on which the expanded service necessary in wartime could rapidly be built. They would know how best to establish communication with similar agents in other countries, a reliable if not exhaustive counter-espionage service would already be in existence and their experience would be invaluable to new men entering the field. As it was, for all local personnel hired we had to depend on the Turkish secret service and the British counter-espionage. This made it necessary not only for both these organizations to know everything we were doing, but also for us to bargain and

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compromise with them. At this point, in spite of a feeling of irritation at being dependent, it is only fair to say that the British were very cooperative and that the success of the service owes much to them, also that our relations with the Turks seem to have been very well managed.

b. Necessary compromises

Compromise with our Allies was often necessary. When an offer by the Antartes on one island was made to put at our service all their information, personnel, and facilities to get reports on both that island and a neighboring one, this was turned down by us because the British had good coverage in island number one and we had promised to leave it to them although they had been unable to introduce an agent into the second island. The Antartes countered with the argument that although the British had an agent there, they would rather work with Americans and therefore we would get fuller reports, and penetration of the second island would be possible because they would make the effort for us.

In a second case, one of our missions was so tied to Turkish permission and approval of agents as to make independent work exceedingly difficult, almost impossible.

c. Difficulties due to lack of United States policy

In addition to these handicaps in getting our machinery working, there was the ever present fact that we were working in a British Theatre of Influence, that they had a definite policy with which we were in rather nebulous agreement but

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had no clearly defined policy of our own. Had our government had an intelligence service of long standing on which it had learned to rely, it would have been easier for the government to formulate an independent policy based on facts reported by its own operatives rather than on the opinion of a foreign although friendly nation. This may seem unrelated to the gathering of information, but it is not. In interviewing intelligent men a certain give and take is necessary to inspire confidence. At no time was it possible to give any definite answer as to the opinion of the United States and what America was doing about the Atlantic Charter, a question which arose weekly. At all times it was necessary to defend to some extent the rightist attitude of Great Britain as that of an ally with whom we were cooperating. We could only say that our immediate objective was to win the war and that the United States had no desire to interfere with the internal politics of any nation. While making my usual excuse to one astute politician, saying Greek politics was after all a purely Greek affair, he interrupted to say "Oh no, it is a British affair."

d. Political interviews

Interviews with dignified and reliable democratic leaders such as Politis, Sofoulis, Mylonas et al were not fruitful. These men had a real concern for and understanding of the troubles they saw ahead for their country. They were

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eager for American help and advice. They were also well posted on the official attitude of the United States and pronouncements of our State Department. One of these men, Mr. Sofoulis, I believe, went so far as to say he knew nothing could be accomplished through our diplomatic channels and his only hope of getting cooperation from the United States was to work through private organizations such as perhaps the Greek War Relief, and, by influencing public opinion here, change the official attitude. They begged for names of liberal Americans with whom they could discuss the conditions in Greece. I knew no one with authority to whom they could be sent, and apparently the Cairo office to whom they were referred was also unable to help.

e. Lack of organization

Our dealings with prominent politicians brings us to another disadvantage of being the less powerful, less well organized service. The British service alone was entrusted with bringing refugees out of Greece to Turkey. We had no machinery and no permission from the Turks to do this. When certain important generals came, or politicians (Papandreou is a case in point), we quickly got wind of their arrival, but the British would not allow them to be seen by any but the British. Even the Greek Consul General was not permitted to see them. Had we then had a long established service, it is probable that we would have had closer cooperation

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with the Greeks, that they would have made more use of our service and been less wholly dependent on the British. As a result, it is not improbable that a better understanding of the Greek situation could have been arrived at and the present troubles been less critical.

4. Specific difficulties.

a. Supply

The supply system presented difficulties. This trouble was probably also due to the newness of the organization, but here the lack of background was not a legitimate excuse. Much needed supplies could never be counted on to arrive in a reasonable time. Shipments arrived again and again without invoices. Things asked for urgently would be held up or removed at a point of trans-shipment. If they were useful there, the needs of the original addressee were apparently ignored. This was hampering to every phase of our operations. In gathering intelligence it was never possible to accept offers of reports in exchange for shoes, clothes or food, for it was impossible to promise things the arrival of which was so problematical.

b. Maps

For the first few months I had no adequate maps. When I left here it was not realized how essential a complete set of large scale maps was--nor had I realized this, would it have been possible to take them past the customs as part of the normal baggage of a civilian relief worker.

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c. Money

Another difficulty was money. It was at once apparent that for large scale operations gold was essential. So I realized I could make no headway in buying caiques, etc., until the Izmir branch was organized. To my amazement I found I could not spend any considerable sums even in Turkish lira. As a private individual each time I wished to cash a check it had to be cleared through the Turkish government's financial bureau. Here a record of every check was kept. I was questioned on how I had received the money, for what purpose I wished to spend it and then told I was spending a lot of money for a single woman with no children. Fortunately when the OSS was established this difficulty too was overcome, and the further difficulties and management of that branch office are not properly a part of this report.

d. Directives

To this there was one great exception, in two years of interviewing I was never able to get from headquarters any specific questions to which answers were wanted. Any pointers would have made questioning easier and in many cases information wanted was, I am sure, obtainable.

DMC.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

From
~~H Antel~~
[illegible]

For
~~Arthur Hasse~~
VPD.

hate C1 + C2 + return
to Secretariat
VP
13

~~Major Cuetz~~
~~Mr. [illegible]~~

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

16.042

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Field Rep 6

DATE: 22 January 1945

File

TO : Acting Director

FROM Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Martin Dinga

1. Attached is a report from Martin Dinga who was recruited in March 1944 for work with the Czechoslovak Section of SI/MEDTO. While associated with OSS Mr. Dinga worked primarily with the Turkish liaison officer in Cairo. In addition he made a number of trips to Palestine for SI. Since Mr. Dinga was primarily interested in work directed towards Czechoslovakia, in November when there appeared to be little chance that this program would be expanded, he asked to be returned to the United States.

2. The following recommendations and observations on conditions in the field are noted:

a. A realistic picture of the hazards, possible delays and difficulties which may arise should be presented to all prospective recruits. Washington should avoid any promises of commissions or ratings since the field may not be able to fulfill the promises because of T/O limitations.

b. If delays are encountered, personnel should be kept busy with refresher courses, intensive studies in allied fields such as radio and demolition courses, and intelligence reports and other reading material relating to the assignment. Conferences with desk and department heads would aid the morale of the agents during the waiting period.

Transship all adjusted after this [illegible]

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c. The training course at Cairo should be expanded to include more specific SI training and a broader picture of OSS. Because of lack of coordination between branch, desk and training personnel and because of over-emphasis of the security question, Mr. Dinga received little overall information on the organization.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

16043

Field report

x Dinga, Martin

x SI

x INFO

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 10 January 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Fie[illegible] [illegible]ons - Martin Dinga

The attached report from Mr. Dinga contains certain interesting observations on conditions in the field and points out certain difficulties which I have had re-stated in general terms for the benefit of other sections within SI Branch. In particular, I have brought to the attention of the Deputy Director, Personnel, the observations made in paragraphs C-1 and C-2 with regard to recruiting.

William J. [illegible]

Attachment

16,043

Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, OSS, through Chief of SI

DATE: 4 January 1945

FROM: Martin Dinga

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

A. What I did in the field:

Subject was recruited in the field (at Cairo, Egypt, while employed by the American Red Cross as a Club Director in the Middle East area. Several officers stationed at Camp Ataka (at Suez, Egypt) who had been interviewed and recruited by OSS suggested that in view of Subject's knowledge of the Slovak and Czech languages (and slight knowledge of Polish and Croatian) he might be useful in the organization's work.

At my initial interview with Lt. Comdr. McBaine, Mr. Stephen Penrose, and Captain Katek, it was proposed that I might be used by the SI Branch as an agent in Czechoslovakia. Shortly thereafter on March 29, 1944, I was employed by OSS and sent to the two-week training course at Cairo, Egypt. After completing the course, approximately the 15th of April, I was assigned to Mr. Paul Linsen, Chief of the Central European Section, and to Mr. Otto Jakes, of the Czechoslovak Section, to assist with the work on the Slovak Desk. During the next two months I spent my time reading the too sparse intelligence reports and monitored radio reports on Czechoslovakia and other central European countries--which hardly kept me occupied.

Approximately the first of June the Czechoslovak Section was transferred to the North Africa theater (Algiers) and Mr. Jakes went on to Bari, Italy, to do the ground work at that HQ. In the meantime, while waiting for the Czechoslovak work to develop, I was assigned to assist Captain (now Major) Sukhi M. Sadi, liaison officer of the Turkish Mission in Cairo.

B. Progress of work and achievements in the field:

On this assignment--assistant to the Turkish liaison officer--as in the previous one, there were long periods of waiting and inactivity. Inasmuch as there was hardly enough work for one person to do, it became my duty to carry on the work of the Turkish Desk while Captain Sadi spent practically all his time on Arab problems in the field at Cairo, Alexandria, Palestine and Syria and Lebanon.

The work of this desk consisted primarily in processing personnel destined for the Turkish Mission and procuring supplies and equipment which the Istanbul office requested. Some progress

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or efficiency was accomplished by organizing and simplifying most of the operations and procedures, which in turn increased the amount of "free" time at my disposal. This period of inactivity was gainful and interestingly occupied by reading practically all reports circulated in Central Europe, the Balkans, the Near East and particularly Palestine.

As a result of my reading of the reports and particularly those on Palestine, I became interested in the Terrorists' activities in Palestine and also of the possibility of gaining information from Jewish refugees migrating to Palestine from the Central European and Balkan countries. At this time, however, the Near East Desk had two men in Palestine who were covering this area. In addition to these two men, Mr. Eric Vesely was making bi-monthly trips to Palestine from Cairo to contact Czechoslovak and Polish peoples living in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem and refugees who had recently arrived from Central Europe and the Balkan countries.

Approximately the first of October 1944, Mr. Vesely was transferred to Bari, Italy. Mr. Pearce, therefore, asked me to continue the work which Mr. Vesely had started in Palestine in addition to my duties with the Turkish Desk. My first trip in Palestine was during the middle of October 1944, which was shortly after the capitulation of Bulgaria and Rumania and the liberation of certain parts of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Some of the information gathered was helpful and interesting, especially: (1) the attitude of the refugees toward returning to their native lands now that they were liberated or about to be liberated; (2) the attitude of the Jewish Yishuv toward the formation of the Jewish Brigade; (3) the Free Hungarian Democratic Movement in Palestine and London; (4) the organization of an all-Slav Congress in Palestine; (5) information on the Terrorists' activities.

On returning and recording the information gathered, I recommended in interviews with the head of the Near East Desk and Mr. Pearce, Chief of SI Middle East, that the project be dropped for the following reasons:

1. Very little if any new information could be gained on the Central European and Balkan countries as no refugees were coming to Palestine now that their home lands were liberated or about to be liberated.

2. Doubted the wisdom of sending a man on a short visit (six or seven days) as he would not have an opportunity

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to make any new contacts and his contacts would thus be limited to a small segment of the populace--Czechoslovak refugees and government employees. Also by the nature of these short visits he had to force himself on to people as it was impossible to make appointments in advance via mail or telephone.

3. Reticence on the part of the people to speak about Terrorists' activities as they were in constant fear that the Terrorist agents might become suspicious of them and thus endanger their safety.

4. Felt that two men in the field on the permanent basis could cover the Jewish-Arab problems much better than a person "flying in" for a short stay.

At this time, the early part of November, 1944, I reopened the question of my going into Czechoslovakia as a member of a mission as the work of the Turkish Desk was at a standstill due to the shrinking of the Turkish Mission. Mr. Penrose agreed to look into the possibility on his trip to Bari which he was to make during the middle of November. In the meantime, he asked me to make one more trip to Palestine. On returning from Palestine the last week of November, Mr. Penrose informed me that the Czechoslovak mission was still not ready to expand its personnel. Therefore, I asked that I be returned to the States as I saw no immediate possibility of doing any constructive, needed work and was extremely tired of sitting, waiting, and busying myself with "made" work.

C. <u>Personal observations and opinion of conditions in the field:</u>

The following points may seem trivial to someone who is not directly involved. I too was tempted to take this attitude when men spoke to me about them. However inasmuch as they affect the morale of the men it would seem important to me that the organization be aware of them as I am sure that it is interested in keeping up the morale of its personnel.

1. In recruiting personnel the interviewer should be "realistic". A typical question asked by many interviewers is "Are you willing to jump?" True, it is necessary for the interviewer to determine whether the prospective candidate has the courage, confidence, and willingness to jump into an enemy occupied territory and to operate there, but he could also make the prospective candidate aware of the fact that he may

have to wait for some time for this mission to materialize or may never go into an occupied territory. If the candidate is aware of this fact, then the long period of waiting, which does occur in many cases, will be more bearable as the candidate is prepared for it.

2. Desk Heads in Washington should not make commitments and promises of commissions and ratings which area officers are not able to keep--because of TO limitations. Frequently many enlisted men complain in Cairo of the ratings and commissions which were promised them.

Here as in No. 1, it would be better to sell the job realistically and avoid many later unnecessary "beefs".

3. There seems to be a tremendous overemphasis of the SI axiom. "Give your subordinates only the information which they need to conduct their job." This is fine and desirable if the person who is in charge of a mission or a desk head has the intelligence and foresight to determine what information should be given. Too frequently this leads to complete silence--a game of intellectual hide-and-seek.

4. It is advisable that desk heads and department heads have periodic conferences with the personnel assigned to them and waiting for assignment to the field, if for no other reason than to keep up their morale during the period of inactivity and to make sure they are aware of all the possibilities of using their time constructively. Often many future problems could be avoided by friendly counselling--which is the essence of good supervision. This too would overcome the feeling which I frequently encountered--the feeling of being forgotten or left out.

5. Circulate reports on the country in which the "waitees" are interested. Follow up and make sure that they are all made available to them.

6. During periods of prolonged waiting personnel should take refresher courses and more intensive studies in allied fields, as for example: SI men could use more work in radio as they never know when it will be necessary for them to send out their own messages. Also more information about the use of demolition equipment would be helpful. As long as personnel are not gainfully occupied, this will at least keep them busy and happy.

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7. It might be helpful to make available to "waitees" books and other literature on the history, geography, and cultural subjects of the country in which they are interested. In this way they would be better prepared to carry on a more intelligent and interesting conversation with contacts in the field--and what is perhaps more important, they will be occupied while waiting and have less time to become bored and demoralized by the wait.

D. Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally became aware:

Many points under this head were covered in C.

1. The training course at the school in Cairo seemed to me too superficial. This may be due to several factors. First, the school was essentially a radio school and thus the SI training was merely a survey of the field which the radio operators were given. Secondly, inasmuch as I was a "lone or special" student, it was impossible to arrange a schedule whereby the SI instructor could spend the required amount of time with me. However, the fact remains that my training was inadequate. As for example even the simple information of over-all structure of the different departments in OSS was not made available to me.

2. In my case there was too much supposition that the "other fellow" had given me the information which was necessary for my work. Mr. Pearces supposed that the school had given me all the information required and that Mr. Jakes would fill in with more detailed information and follow through on my training. Mr. Jakes, on the other hand, took the attitude that if I did not already have the information it was information which I was not to have. As a result, I had to slowly gather scribs here and there. During all this time I, of course, felt unhappy about the situation.

3. In going out on my first assignment to Palestine, I was not briefed by either the Near East Desk Head or the Chief of SI. As a result I went into the field rather "green". I am sure that many mistakes which I made could have been avoided by a short conference. This too is another example of desk heads supposing that the new agent has all the required information and technique and thus does not require any briefing. I am sure that much less damage would be done by reporting in a conference many of the things which the agent may have or should have known.

Martin Dings

Martin Dings

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16 042

Secret Report

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 26 January 1945

TO : Acting Director

FROM Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report from Arthur W. DuBois

Lt Helms memo attached indicates that SI is taking action on such recommendations as can be handled in Washington. AW

1. Attached is a report from Mr. Arthur W. DuBois, SI/MEDTO, which gives an account of his duties at Bari for the German-Austrian Desk.

2. Mr. DuBois notes the following difficulties which arose in the field, most of them due, he believes, to failure to begin necessary planning far enough in advance:

a) Failure to find qualified personnel to form well balanced teams. P/Ws with necessary maturity and balanced judgment could not be located, the proportion of Austrians was too small, sufficient numbers of German-speaking Americans were not available. Lt. Helms in a covering memo states that this was the first notice received by Washington of the shortage of qualified German-speaking personnel and a requisition has been filed for such men.

b) Insufficient time allowed to CD to prepare cover and documents.

c) Air transportation was not provided even when weather conditions were favorable.

d) Considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining certain special items (e.g., watches, compasses, arms and ammunition of Continental European make) although these items

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were in the possession of the Allied Forces.

3. Mr. DuBois makes the following general recommendations:

a) That as a security measure housing be provided P/Ws selected for field teams which will keep them entirely segregated-- previous housing was proved inadequate.

b) To attach to the German-Austrian Desk an Austrian or person of Austrian origin with wide knowledge of the country and of key persons.

c) To work more closely with the British in exchanging information.

d) To retain documents such as soldiers' pass-books in P/W camps.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

Field Report 16,042
x Du Bois, Arthur W.
x SI
x MENTO

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12 January 1945

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - Arthur W. Du Bois

There is enclosed the field report of Arthur W. Du Bois.

Your attention is called to the comments by the Operations Officer for the Central Europe Section, Lt. Richard Helms.

Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachments

16,042
Field report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] report

[illegible] training [illegible] description
[illegible] training procedures, are [illegible] [illegible] airy, [illegible] well-known [illegible] German [illegible] to penetrate [illegible] in military territory. [illegible] mention is given in the report to [illegible] qualified German-speaking personnel [illegible] lines. [illegible] so acute that non-German-speaking [illegible] dropped into enemy territory [illegible] need to be [illegible]. In fact, [illegible] report was [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] of German-speaking operators [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] is now in [illegible] German-speaking [illegible] turned up [illegible]

[illegible] aircraft and the procurement [illegible] equipment (paragraph C-[illegible] and C-4) [illegible] and [illegible] have been [illegible] Progress has been [illegible] difficulty of procuring [illegible] (paragraph C-7) apparently arises out [illegible] POW's and their papers. [illegible] the province of G2 [illegible] give little or no help.

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16,042
Field report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO: Chief, SI and to the Director, OSS

FROM: Arthur W. Du Bois, member German-Austrian Desk, SICE, Bari

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

(A) Work Done in the Field

The writer transferred from G-2 USAFIME to OSS on 7 August 1944; reported to Bari on 10 August where he was assigned to the German-Austrian Desk, SICE. He left Bari on 16 November on temporary duty in the U. S. His work comprised:

(1) Detail interrogation of German and Austrian POW agents.

(2) Formation of teams for penetration of Austrian and German territory.

(3) Preparation of teams: supplies, equipment.

(4) Briefing of teams with particular emphasis on procedure from time of drop, hideouts, cover, contacts and type of information required and methods to be employed.

(5) Selection of pin points for drops by use of POW information, maps, aerial and ground photographs and available information regarding targets, enemy troop locations, defences, topography, structures, habitations, population and other important features.

(6) Developing methods of signaling from ground to plane and plane to ground following drop and after drop is made.

(7) Preparation for Vienna City Team:

a. Listing of useful contacts

b. Listing of objectives

c. Procedure to be followed upon arrival in Austria.

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(B) Progress of the Work

(1) Detailed information concerning each of 20 German and Austrian POW agents was obtained.

(2) Four field teams were prepared for dropping, of which two were dropped prior to departure of writer for U. S. on 15 November. Two teams were to be dropped as soon as weather conditions permitted. Two other teams had been prepared but both projects had to be abandoned, one due to dissension, the other to movement of enemy forces into the dropping area.

(3) Preparations for Vienna City Team as indicated under (A) 7 were about completed at time of writer's departure on 15 November.

(C) Conditions in the Field Which Might be Improved.

(1) Most of the difficulties encountered may be attributed largely to the failure to commence the work at an earlier period. As it was, selection and preparation of men for field teams had to be unduly hurried. This resulted in the necessity of using personnel not wholly qualified for the work. The POW's -- the best that could be found on short notice -- lacked, on the whole, maturity and the level of intelligence desired. None qualified as radio operators. The proportion of Austrians was too small. To make up for these discrepancies it was necessary to add Americans and other non-Germans and non-Austrians to the teams. Lack of experienced German-speaking American radio operators-in fact lack of qualified German-speaking Americans who are not radio operators - made the formation of well-balanced teams virtually impossible.

(2) Shortness of time in which to prepare cover and documents threw a heavy burden on the C & D Sections. Consequently, this section was not always in position to furnish the required equipment and documents. Their effort was admirable as they frequently worked around the clock.

(3) It appeared at times that weather conditions had been favorable during moon periods but that air transportation for our teams was not being provided. This matter was being checked upon at the time of the writer's departure.

(4) That appeared to the writer as unnecessary difficulties were encountered in obtaining certain special items, such as watches, compasses, arms and ammunition of continental European make - in spite of the fact that great numbers of these articles were in possession of the Allied Forces but could not be obtained.

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(5) Closer cooperation with our British Allies - would not only be helpful but in the opinion of the writer such cooperation is of greatest importance. Exchange of information on methods - which had been inaugurated prior to the writer's departure - produced some very interesting and helpful results. This cooperation and exchange of information should be encouraged all along the line, except, of course, where such exchange would be detrimental to peculiarly American interests.

(6) Coordination of all SICE operations in the Mediterranean area including those of the Labor Desk under one head were deemed advisable for the purpose of proper supervision and integration of the work. This coordination it is understood, has been effected.

(7) In the opinion of the writer it would be very useful to have attached to the German-Austrian Desk an Austrian or person of Austrian origin with a wide range of knowledge of Austria and Austrian personalities. Such a person, who could be employed in an advisory capacity, would be most useful in interpreting information regarding Austria and in supplying information regarding individual Austrians in a degree that no American, regardless of his experience with Austrian affairs, could supply. The writer recommended the employment of Professor Dobretsberger, former Minister of Social Welfare, and Dr. Ludwig Priester, former Oberpolizeirat. Professor Dobretsberger was not employed because of the question of possible political implications. The section was still working on the case of Dr. Priester at the time of the writer's departure.

(8) In attempting to locate documents of POW agents, particularly the Soldbuecher (Passbooks), SICE was informed that these documents had been forwarded to the United States. In view of the importance of these documents in the planning and preparation of cover for these agents it is recommended that such documents be retained at the POW camps or so placed that they will be readily available to SICE.

(9) Housing provided for POW agents was found to be inadequate. It is recommended as a security measure that sufficient housing facilities be provided to permit complete segregation of the personnel of each field team as soon as the composition of the team has been determined.

Arthur W. Dorn Jr.

A.W.D.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director

FROM: Secretariat

DATE: 6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Col. L. D. Mann, AUS (Chief, MO)

1. Col. Mann describes MO's problems encountered and the solutions agreed upon on his recent trip to the China, India-Burma, and SEAC Theaters.

2. China Theater

A directive was issued appointing a PW officer to Gen. Wedemeyer's staff to supervise OWI activities, and set forth that MO report directly to the PW Board and confer with them on MO policy. "White" propaganda was assigned to OWI, "Black" to OSS. It was agreed to use Gen. Tai-Li's organization to distribute MO material. It was proposed to use Kaji's talents to the fullest if he was obtainable. (Kaji is a Jap liberal who fled Japan, and whom the State Department might consider for an important role in the Japanese government after her defeat.) The Bamboo Project was approved, and the 7½ KW transmitter was in the course of construction as planned.

3. India-Burma Theater

The Bak Project was approved. This is a plan to stencil the sign of the Bak (Burmese sword) on the forehead of a dead Jap, on an overhead vehicle, demolished bridge, or

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wherever acts of violence have occurred for the purpose of making the Japs believe that there is an organized movement on the part of the Burmese to rid their country of the invader. Also this plan might induce the Japs to place more guards on their lines of communications or withdraw more quickly from advanced positions.

4. SEAC

The Dah Project was approved by this theater as well. Col. Mann notes that British cooperation with MO/OSS was excellent even in areas of British domination in contrast to the lack of such cooperation experienced by OWI.

5. Attached are Col. Mann's itinerary, a copy of the China Theater Psychological Warfare Board's Directive, and a false surrender order, together with copies of MO's forgery, leaflets, and translations.

S. P. Karlow,
Lieut, USNR
Reports Office

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OSS Form 2202

SECRET

FROM: [redacted]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA .....

COL. [redacted]

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. COL. HIGHTON		4/10		[illegible]	Delay was occasioned by photostating exhibits which were all lost to the Director's office. KDM.
2. THE DIRECTOR				OSC	
3.		APR 17 1945		[illegible]	Hold for Director's return OSC
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16.041
Field Reports
Mann

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: REPORT OF TRIP TO CHINA, INDIA-BURMA AND SEAC THEATERS, BY COL. K. D. MANN, CHIEF, MO BRANCH, WASHINGTON.

TO: The Director

THROUGH: The Deputy Director, SSO.

1. Rather than attempt a chronological outline of the trip to China, India-Burma and SEAC Theaters, the problems encountered and the solutions will be set forth regardless of the sequence in which the events took place. An itinerary is attached as APPENDIX A.

2. CHINA THEATER

While Lt. Col. Little and Roland Dulin were inspecting operations in Burma, the writer proceeded to Kunming 16 February 1945, for conference with Major Faxon, then Acting Chief, MO China. It was quite apparent that considerable confusion existed between the MO Detachment operating under SACO and the MO group located at Kunming. In view of this situation, immediate conferences were required with Col. Heppner and General Wedemeyer's staff.

On 18 February, 1945, a meeting of General Wedemeyer's Psychological Warfare Board was called in Chungking to consider a draft directive to be issued governing all psychological warfare activities in the theater. The proposed draft was modified substantially to provide for (a) the appointment of a Psychological Warfare Officer on Gen. Wedemeyer's staff to provide detailed supervision of OWI activities and (b) to clearly set forth that MO should report directly to the Board and confer with them only on matters of MO policy. A copy of the final directive is attached as APPENDIX B. At the same conference, a proposal by OWI that a Psychological Warfare Section be established on General Wedemeyer's staff was rejected after the writer explained certain difficulties encountered under similar arrangements in the AFHQ and ETO, our basic objection being that a Staff Section could not operate without confusion to all concerned and it was considered preferable to assign the mission for white propaganda to OWI and the mission for black propaganda to OSS.

Having received a clear directive, we were in a position

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TO: The Director 28 March 1945

to discuss the type of MO organization which should be developed in the theater and how those plans would be related to the provisions of the SACO agreement. After conferences with Col. Heppner and General Chiasted, it was agreed that the possibilities for distributing our material through Gen. Tai-Li's organization should be exploited in every possible way, but that morale operations in the theater should in no way be restricted by the agreement. Accompanied by Col. Heppner, a conference was had with Gen. Tai-Li at which time our disappointment at the lack of accomplishment to date was expressed. After considerable discussion however, it was agreed to dispatch six Tai-Li agents to Lt. Squires, USNR, who is currently located on the East China Coast on a mission which is being conducted under the SACO agreement. It was also arranged to provide additional printing equipment for the MO unit under Major Monroe stationed in the Valley.

At this juncture, the Chinese Minister of Information started agitation to seek to control all propaganda originating in China, regardless of against whom it was directed. It was apparent that the Chinese desire was to control the editorial policy of MOI in their propaganda against the Japanese and if they could secure this limited objective, they hoped to control black propaganda likewise. Appropriate officers on Gen. Wedemeyer's staff, the Theater Commander's political adviser and Ambassador Hurley's counselor were apprised of the dangers inherent in the situation and decision taken by all concerned to resist any infringement of the American prerogatives.

Vice-Minister Szu and Mr. Hollington Tong, Minister of Information, gave a formal dinner for all American officers interested in propaganda activities, as part of their softening-up process. It was interesting to note that there were six casualties on the Chinese side at this dinner vs. none for the Americans.

A dinner was given by us to Gen. Wong and Gen. Pan of Gen. Tai-Li's staff, this being attended by Col. Heppner, Col. Little, Major Monroe, Major Stevens and Mr. Roland Dulin, on the American side. On this occasion certain details were discussed and decided with respect to methods of implementing joint SACO - OSS/MO operations.

At this juncture, it was learned that KAJI, a well known Japanese liberal who had fled Japan after voicing opposition to the militaristic league and fascistic tendencies, was being held a virtual prisoner by the Kuomingtong. We were advised by the State Department representative and political adviser, Mr. Service, that the American Government might consider Kaji for an important role in the Japanese Government to be formed after the military defeat of Japan, that he was an accomplished propagandist and was extremely anxious to contribute his knowledge and experience to the defeat of the existing

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regime in his homeland. Realizing that his advice and opinion would be invaluable in our black propaganda directed against the Japanese troops and the civil population, negotiations were started to secure his services. We were authorized to disclose to him the nature of our operations and he expressed a keen desire to associate himself with our efforts. General Wedemeyer's headquarters made strong representations to the Chinese that the individual be released for duty with us. The Chinese agreed in principle although they imposed certain unacceptable conditions. The project is still under negotiation and we are advised that we may expect his transfer to us without restrictive conditions. It is proposed to establish KAJI in a secure area in a region of Kunming where he will be joined by some of the Niseis now being dispatched from the states, and this group will constitute the production staff of all Japanese propaganda originating in the China Theater.

Lt. Robert North has been attached to AGFRTS and as of 15 February, 1945, he was operating behind the Japanese lines on the China coast and had held conferences with Lt. Squires at Nan'ping resulting in agreement as to the territories in which AGFRTS MO Mission and the SACO MO Mission would operate.

Lt. North's mission is to spread rumors, influence editorial comment in Chinese newspapers which are printed in occupied territories and to disseminate subversive leaflets which will be dispatched to him from Kunming.

Dr. William P. Fenn has gathered his mission at Chengtu which he will use as a base of operations prior to proceeding north to Sian. (Dr. Fenn's mission may be assigned to Yenan in the event approval is received from General Wedemeyer for us to send a mission to the Communist Headquarters in that area.)

Another MO operative who for many years was Inspector of Police in Shanghai, has been dispatched to that city.

Special commendation is made of Lt. Squires operations on the eastern China Coast centered at Nan'ping. He has been operating behind Japanese lines for approximately six months. He is providing Chinese newspapers in occupied cities with the proper grist for their editorials. He is disseminating subversive rumors widely and in general is implementing MO projects which are determined at OSS Headquarters in Chungking and Kunming. Colonel Heppner has instituted a request for a decoration of Lt. Squires.

The Bamboo Project has been approved and implementation already under way. An FO Officer was sent to the Indo-China border to prepare for operations in that country when

approved.

In regard to equipment, the 7½ KW is in the course of erection at Kunming, one channel to be used in the OSS communications network and the other channel for black broadcasts. All of the necessary printing equipment for the base plant at Kunming has by this time flown over the hump and is now being installed. However, as a result of our experience in Burma and the development of a Mobile Reproduction Unit, Colonel Heppner has authorized eight such units, four of which will be completely equipped and delivered over the road to China in the next thirty days. These units are capable of doing everything that the plants at Calcutta and Colombo can do, up to size 11 x 14. A complete unit moves in one Air Corps trailer with collapsible dark rooms, photostatic equipment, offset and letter press equipment. This development will enable field teams to produce material of tactical importance based on current intelligence.

Mr. Roland Dulin has assumed his responsibilities in a most satisfactory manner. He has exhibited his flair for organization and for instilling confidence in his subordinates. His relations with Col. Heppner and his staff are excellent and he has secured the good will of Gen. Wedemeyer's staff officers to such an extent that they are providing him with Nisei officers on a temporary duty basis. The writer believes that in view of the unlimited opportunity and calibre of MO personnel in the field and with the support of Col. Heppner, MO will make a definite contribution to the war effort in the China Theater.

3. INDIA - BURMA THEATER

For geographical reasons, I proceeded to Bhamo on the return trip from Kunming and reported to Col. Peers at his headquarters. The MO unit under command of Major Hamm (FWD.) and major Holdt (base), after many difficulties in the preliminary phases, have achieved considerable success in the field. This mission is considered the purest black operation that has been observed in any theater. To illustrate the nature of their operations, there is attached as APPENDIX C a copy of a false order from Gen. Kimura, Commanding General Burma Army and addressed to all commanders of the Burma Expeditionary Forces, dealing with the terms under which the Japanese officers and men may honorably surrender. This particular operation was merely the first step in a long range campaign which is discussed in detail at Appendix C.

In order to gain a first hand impression of the problems of the morale operations in the field, the writer

flew to the Forward Base in the Mongwi-Lashio Area, at which point MO agents were briefed and dispatched. This was particularly valuable in connection with the subsequent discussions held with ALFSEA and SEAC on the subject of the DAH PROJECT which is discussed below.

It was originally planned that Gen. Sultan's mission in Burma (NCAC) would extend up to and including the fall of Lashio, but in view of the success of the British amphibious operations at AKYAB and RAMREE, the NCAC mission was extended to include the fall of Mandalay. It is now believed the mission has again been extended to include the fall of Rangoon. This situation precipitated the question of whether or not the MO Detachment at 101 could be transferred to China where they are badly needed or whether they should continue until the final phases of the NCAC mission, regardless how far the latter was extended. MO had devised a DAH Plan which consisted of stencilling the sign of the Dah (Burmese sword) on the forehead of a dead Jap, or on a wrecked vehicle or on a demolished bridge, or wherever acts of violence occurred, all for the purpose of making the Japanese occupying forces believe that there was an organized movement on the part of the Burmese to rid their country of the invaders; and for the more specific purpose of inducing the Japs to place more guards on their lines of communication, or to withdraw earlier from advanced and remote positions and in general to harass them from the rear. Implementation of this project would develop the impression that Burmese minorities, whether they be Kachins, Shans or any other racial, political or religious minorities have finally found a common basis for cooperation. It was felt that the British, who have apparently pursued the policy of "divide and conquer" by keeping minorities in conflict with each other, would disapprove the plan in its entirety. If the plan were disapproved it was felt that MO would be too restricted in Burma to justify the retention of our unit in that area. However, subsequent discussions with NCAC, ALFSEA and SEAC, including the SUPREME himself, resulted in approval of the entire project. It was thus decided by all concerned to permit the MO Detachment with 101 to remain to the end of the NCAC mission. Furthermore, should military operations turn eastward into Thailand, we could use the MO Detachment currently in AKYAB as a cadre for an MO team into Thailand, re-enforcing it with Thai personnel or American experts, thus relieving the original MO unit at BHAMO for duty in China.

Upon arrival at Calcutta, the formal proposal covering the Dah Project was submitted to ALFSEA and discussed informally with Brigadier Gwyn and his Deputy, Colonel Creswell. The plan was also discussed informally with Gen. Maddocks, General Sultan's Deputy, attached to ALFSEA. Since it was the feeling at ALFSEA Headquarters that this matter, in view of the political implica-

tions, would be referred to SEAC, permission was secured to present the case personally and informally at the latter headquarters.

Prior to departure for SEAC, local representatives of Force 136, together with P W. Division of SEAC, suggested that MO undertake the operation of a 5 KW station at Calcutta (which has been built by the British) for transmitting black programs to Burma, Thailand, Malay and Sumatra and also that MO undertake responsibility for all black propaganda directed against the Japanese in the SEAC areas. It was apparent that these suggestions resulted from our earlier refusal to accept the British proposal that black propaganda activities of the British and American units in SEAC be consolidated. In view of the uncertain situation at SEAC, it was considered advisable to avoid further discussion on these two situations until conversations had been held with P. Division and Psychological Warfare Division at Kandy.

4. SEAC:

Conferences with Capt. Garnons-Williams and Col. Berno of P. Division and Group Captain Colin Bell of P. W. Section of SEAC together with representatives of Force 136, resulted in approval of the MO "Dah" Project and SEAC's approval was cabled to ALPSTA. All staff sections concerned were notified that we could not assume the responsibility of undertaking all of the black propaganda directed against the Japs by SEAC since (a) we had limited resources and (b) we did not wish to provide the British with an argument for the retention of MO personnel in SEAC should higher authorities decide that American resources be moved from that theater to China. This decision will in no way effect the volume of our work and we will simply redouble our efforts in this direction.

It was agreed by Force 136 that they would submit a formal paper to P Division requesting that OSS undertake operations to Calcutta. It was felt by all concerned that if the initiative be taken by the British themselves, the request would have more chance of being approved. This whole project is now under discussion and an early decision is expected.

Later conferences with representatives of Force 136 including Mr. McKenzie and Brigadier Anstey resulted in determination of various ways and means in which Force 136 operatives could assist MO in the dissemination of MO material, both verbal and written.

At a meeting with Lord Louis Mountbatten the foregoing items were referred to briefly and have all received his informal endorsement. It is quite apparent that the "supremo" was quite

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TO: The Director SECRET 28 March 1945

concerned over the possibility of American resources being withdrawn from his theater.

During the various conferences with the British Staff Officers, Brig. Gen. Timmerman, USA., General Sultan's Deputy and representative at SEAC, was kept continuously informed. It is considered that the British recognized the contribution which MO has made and are desirous that all of our resources in terms of personnel, equipment, etc. be exploited in every possible way. We were surprised to observe the willingness of the British to cooperate with us in the areas of British domination in which OWI experiences great difficulty.

An understanding was reached with Cols. Coughlin and Heppner that as soon as MO personnel completed their respective missions in SEAC and IB, competent individuals would be transferred to China where their services are urgently required. At the same time however, it was considered desirable that MO personnel complete the missions on which they have embarked.

K. D. Mann, Col., AUS
Chief, MO Branch

SECRET

EXHIBITS A, B, C, D of Appendix B

retained in MO Reports Office, 2005 Que.

TOP

To: Miss Halley

When you return the attached Mann Field Report to us, will attach a page listing the "exhibits" you have retained?

Thank you.

MJStarr

OSS Form 203
(Live)

Director's Office

of

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

APPENDIX A

SECRET

I T I N E R A R Y

January

23rd	Left Washington
24 - 29	Awaiting Air transportation in Miami
30 - 31	En route

February

10th	Arrived Calcutta
11th - 16th (inclusive)	Calcutta
17th	Arrived Kunming
18th	Arrived Chungking
19th - 25th (inclusive)	Chungking
26th - 27th	Kunming
28th	Arrived Shamo

March

1st	Shamo
2 - 4	Mongwi
5 - 8	Calcutta
9	Colombo - Kandy
10	Trincomalie
11 - 13	Kandy
14	Colombo
15 - 17	Calcutta
18 - 19	En route, arriving in Washington 20 March 1330 hrs.

SECRET

Washington

AFO 310
22 February 48

Air Echelon Headquarters, United
AFO
Headquarters, Fourth Air Force,
Headquarters, Services of Supply,
Headquarters, Chinese Combat
Headquarters, 20th Bomber Command,
Headquarters, Air Transport Command,
Headquarters, Chinese Training
Headquarters, China Air Service
Headquarters, Number 2,
AFO
Headquarters, 20th Bomber
Headquarters, Air Technical
Headquarters, Office of
Headquarters, Chief
Headquarters, Base A, Base

[illegible] and [illegible] tions, are not to be con-
[illegible] this directive
strued as subject to the [illegible] order issued to OSS
modify or limit any [illegible]
within the [illegible]

2. Responsibilities. The fields of operation as between the Office of War Information and the Morale Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services are as follows:

a. OWI is responsible for the preparation, [illegible] "white" propaganda, [illegible] and [illegible] that which is [illegible] or [illegible] but will not operate within [illegible] theater.

b. The Morale Operations Branch of OSS is responsible for "black" propaganda, [illegible] defined as that which [illegible] obtain on any territory, [illegible] to be an American source.

c. Relations [illegible] Psychological Warfare [illegible] with Allied non-[illegible] nor prohibited by [illegible] by a [illegible] [illegible] that the general [illegible] particularly on the [illegible] but this [illegible] enemy

[illegible] organization [illegible]

[illegible] Warfare [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

b. Mission. The Psychological [illegible] Unit shall, as [illegible] enemy-occupied [illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100340001-6

COMMITTEE REPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR [illegible]

DATE: 24 February 1945

PLACE: Office of OSS

ATTENDANCE:

J. R. Dickey, Col.
H. C. Stevens, Major
F. M. Fisher, Esq.

Meeting called to order at 1300 hours.

1. After considerable discussion of the present set-up, and of experiences with PWD organizations in Europe as reported by Colonel Dickey, it was decided that it would be wise to give the present organization a trial, before trying to work out a different system.

2. It seemed to the Committee wiser to encourage the evolution of a full-scale PWD from the present organization, based on the experience and recommendations of the Theater Psychological Warfare Officer and the Director of PW for OSS, rather than to create an artificial organization now, which might not fit the practical necessities of the situation in the Theater.

3. Therefore, the Committee recommends:

a. That the Theater Psychological Warfare Officer, of suitable rank and qualifications, be appointed with the least practicable delay.

b. That the Theater PW Officer and the PW effort be governed by the present (revised) Theater Psychological Warfare Directive.

c. That the Theater PW Officer make recommendations for his own T/O and T/E, as soon as practicable after entering on his duties.

The meeting adjourned at 1350 hours.

Appendix - Item 2 - Minutes 2-15-45.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

March 26, 1945

To: The Director, OSS

Through: Deputy Director, SSO

From: K. D. Mann, Col., AUS
Chief, MO Branch

Subject: False Surrender Order

To
Neil Brazier
For information
T
Comment

1. An authentic Japanese Order, namely #2895 of the Asiatic Army, was captured during military operations south of Bahmo. This order discussed the treatment of returning Japanese soldiers who had been captured by their enemy and had laid down a ruthless policy of punishment regardless of the reasons for capture. Our forgery amended the official order to provide an exception in the case of those prisoners whose capture was due to the prisoner's unit being encircled or if the subject was unconscious. A copy of the document, together with the translation, is attached as Exhibit A.

The purpose of the forgery was two-fold: (a) to make the Japanese Command in Burma take steps to modify its policy regarding surrender and subsequent punishment of Japanese who had been captured; (b) in the event that the policy was not actually modified, to make large numbers of Japanese soldiers believe that a modification order was in existence.

2. This document was placed inside of envelopes specially prepared to counterfeit official Japanese Army envelopes. Eight of these envelopes were addressed to the Japanese divisions engaged in North Burma at the time of the Order's date, one to each division. The envelopes were placed inside a captured Japanese dispatch case. An agent dressed in the uniform of the Burma Defense Army took the dispatch case into Japanese headquarters at Maymyo with the story that he had found it beside a wrecked vehicle on the Mandalay - Maymyo road. The story was apparently accepted for, after leaving

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SECRET

the dispatch case, the agent was allowed to leave. An authentic Japanese Army envelope, and one of our forgeries are attached, under Exhibit B.

3. To supplement and expand the effectiveness of the foregoing "plant" leaflets ostensibly prepared by the Japanese and consisting of surrender appeals to the Chinese, British and American troops were produced. The argument is used that even Japanese troops surrendered under the circumstances outlined in a new army order and that therefore Japan's enemies should also surrender under the "appropriate" conditions. The Japanese translations on the reverse side of the leaflets tells Japanese soldiers to accept the surrender of American, British and Chinese soldiers who waved the leaflets. Copies of the leaflets with translations are attached as Exhibits C and D.

Within two or three weeks after the spurious Japanese order was planted, various means were taken to plant these leaflets on Japanese troops and since the reverse side of the Chinese and British leaflets both carried a translation but was presumably directed to the American, British and Chinese troops, the Japanese forces would be informed of the existence of the official modification of the Japanese policy toward surrender of their own troops. Should any of the leaflets eventually fall into the hands of American, British or Chinese troops, caution was taken to inform Allied Commanders of the existence of such black leaflets.

4. It is emphasized that in many MO campaigns, we do not receive prompt and accurate estimates of the damage done to the enemy's morale or will to resist, so at the present time we cannot make any specific claims of damage done. However, this campaign is considered an extremely subtle and effective approach to the problem of inducing the average Japanese soldier to surrender.

K. D. Mann

K. D. Mann, Col., AUS
Chief, MO Branch

SECRET

OSS Form MC01
(Rev. 7/27/44)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

DATE 11/2

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	C. Dunning, Jr.	
	J. J. Madigan	
	E. J. Patrell, Jr.	
	R. Bree	
	R. C. Lee	
	J. W. Archibalds	
X	W. B. Kantack	
	W. H. Miles	
	P. I. Phillips	
	J. L. Sullivan	
	I. D. Jenevie	
	A. M. Smith, Jr.	
	A. L. Fort	
	B. H. Hamilton	
	L. R. Houston	
	G. S. McClellan	
	J. L. Mahoney	
	J. P. Sommers, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. C. C. Files	

Top

Date 11/43

Date

This was delivered directly to the Director and apparently has been in his possession since its receipt. It has not been seen by this office prior to this morning.

WJF

(23695)

Copies of the Executive Officer

Copies

SECRET

INDEX

SECRET

16,041
Field report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

10 October 1944

SUBJECT: REPORT OF VISIT TO MEDTO AND ETO

TO : DIRECTOR, OSS

THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SSO

FROM : CHIEF, MO

I. INTRODUCTION

In order to set forth the problems of MO Branch encountered on this tour of temporary duty and the solutions (when found), this report will not necessarily follow the trip chronologically but will deal with the various situations as they existed and as they stand at the present time. However, the itinerary is attached as TAB A.

Throughout the trip, it was emphasized that the MO Chief exercised no direct command in the various theatres, but would, as the conditions appeared to warrant, make recommendations or requests to the Strategic Services Officer in command in the theatre involved. In each instance, of which several will be noted in this report, the complete and wholehearted cooperation of these commanding officers was received.

II. MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

A. NORTH AFRICA OPERATIONS

Upon arrival in North Africa on 2 August, dis-

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cussions were held with X-2 representatives in Casablanca on the subject of rumor-spreading activities, and upon their request arrangements were made to provide them each week with a copy of the MO directive establishing the "line" to be taken on various military, political and personal subjects. Contacts were established to permit "planting" of stories on the Spanish Consulate at Tangier and in appropriate sections of the Medina at Rabat.

At Algiers, on 4 August, Sgt. Ogle (in civilian clothes) was found to be in charge of dispatching printing material by air to resistance groups in Southern France from where they were to receive further dissemination by the resistance groups represented by the Maquis. The source of printed material was largely from Rome, where Eugene Warner, MO Chief OSS-MEDTO, had established his base of operations. However, through local intelligence sources (chiefly SPOC), timely items were made the subject of pamphlets by Sgt. Ogle as sole editor, and the printing was done by arrangement with General de Gaulle's H.Q. at the Imprimerie Nationale, Algiers.

Certain British publications were also handled by Ogle who determined the mixture of Rome material, local leaflets and the British product. It should be noted that the British items were extremely long-range, dealing mostly with the subject of malingering, feigning illness, etc., and most of them had been printed three to four years ago. In contrast, the bulk of MO material had been produced within the week and, as in the case of Algiers production, often within the preceding 24 hours.

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"Das Neue Deutschland," printed bi-weekly in Rome, was made available for dispatch to France from N. Africa within 24-48 hours after it came off the press.

At this juncture, Sgt. Ogle had made a contact with the "Service Action France et Allemagne par les Prisonniers et Departes." This service was at the time attached to the "Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action," with M. Vaibel as Chef du Commissariat aux Prisonniers, and with the responsibility for foreign worker activity delegated to M. Deshartre and M. Auvray. The problem of securing distribution of NO material within Germany was outlined to these people, who readily agreed to provide it through the medium of their workers who were then passing frequently across the France-German border. Arrangements were then made to notify the proper groups within Southern France to undertake the infiltration. (Information was subsequently received in Paris indicating that NO material, particularly "Das Neue Deutschland," was taken across the border on regular schedules and until the Maquis groups were over-run by the 7th U. S. Army.)

In summary, it is believed that:

1) A widespread dissemination of NO material was achieved by air into France from N. Africa;
2) German garrison troops in that area were "exposed" to our subversive literature;
3) NO material was actually carried into the homefront of Germany itself.

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B. CONTROL OF BALKAN OPERATIONS

The major problem to be solved within the area of AFHQ was the degree of supervision of MO activities in the Middle East which should be exercised by MO at Rome. For a discussion of this problem, Mr. John Pistere, MO Chief at Cairo, had been requested to attend a meeting in Rome with the Chief of MO Washington, Mr. Eugene Warner, Chief MO AFHQ, and Mr. J. R. Pershall, Middle East Desk MO Washington. Discussions were held at Rome and Bari (with Col. Toulmin), and agreement reached that:

a) Mr. Pistere should move at once to Bari, bringing all but one or two of his staff with him;

b) All MO activities into the Balkans should be carried out by the Bari staff under the general supervision of MO Chief at Rome, Mr. Warner;

c) Mr. Pistere would be responsible for the dispatch of Rome material to Austria, Hungary and Jugoslavia;

d) Printing of MO material would be continued at Cairo or handled at Rome, whichever developed into the most satisfactory source.

C. BARI OPERATIONS

By means of Special Operations aircraft based at Brindisi, MO material was being sent regularly to Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia for dissemination by resistance groups. An arrangement was also made with a group in Northern Serbia to take MO material across the border into Austria. Both by air and by sea very large quantities of supplies were being

dispatched to Yugoslavia at the request of Marshal Tito. Between 10 July and 15 August, 1944 over 1,085,000 pieces were dispatched to the Balkan countries, including Austria and Hungary.

Prior to Col. Huntington's departure for Yugoslavia, arrangements were made for him to take Capt. Fielding (MO) on the mission whose function would be to explore MO possibilities in that area, carry out those approved by Col. Huntington (and by Marshal Tito's H.Q.), and requisition needed supplies, personnel and equipment from the base at Bari.

D. FIELD OPERATIONS

All front line infiltration in Italy was under command of Major Suhling, C.O. of Company E, then at Siena, Italy, but an MO man had been attached to carry out the specific operations. Mr. Warner had secured from a prisoner of war pen fifteen German POWs who had indicated their willingness to pass through the lines for the purpose of distributing black literature among German troops and spreading "front-line" rumors. At the time of this visit, seven such operatives had carried out their mission and all returned. One agent had posted a false manifesto, signed Kesselring, on a German vehicle and from a hiding place had witnessed the confusion caused by its appearance.

All such operations were cleared with the Special Operations section of B.S.S. Ops. Allied Armies in Italy. Call was made on this H.Q. to confirm that MO operations were being satisfactorily coordinated. All staff officers concerned expressed their complete approval of our objectives and methods. The PWB officer of Gen. Alexander's staff volunteered additional

assistance in the form of POW interrogations, daily intelligence summaries and PWD directives (for our guidance only). It was explained that the MO mission was longer-range than the military mission of AAI and that therefore our activities should not be controlled by PWB of AAI or even AFHQ. PWB agreed to this principle and offered to assist us in carrying out those portions of our mission which were to be

A subsequent conference with Gen. McChrystal, Chief of IPC and PWB on Gen. Wilson's staff, confirmed this understanding, and OSS was requested to prepare a revised directive for Gen. Wilson's signature, removing OSS-MO from PWB control and directing that MO activities be coordinated only by PWD.

Under this sub-heading of FIELD OPERATIONS, mention should be made of Col. Semble's detachment with 7th U. S. Army. The assault convoy had been loaded and conference with him could therefore not be had. However, it was determined that Lt. [illegible], MO, and a T/Sgt. had accompanied Col. Semble for the purpose of developing MO possibilities of front line operations. In addition, the dispatch of Capt. Crose from Washington to join Col. Semble was requested by cable.

E. BASE OPERATIONS AT ROME

The editorial staff for AFHQ operations was located outside Rome. Printing facilities had been arranged within the city and were available for night operation. Black pieces were written, edited, coordinated and printed under the detailed supervision of Mr. Warner. Copy for "Das Neue Deutschland" was received regularly from Washington and acceptable

portions incorporated into current issues. Relations with PWB, AFHQ were found to be extremely cordial with no apparent desire on their part to restrict MO activities. Mr. James M. Minifie, who was attached to PWB, AFHQ for liaison with Allied Control Commission, expressed a desire for additional broad gauge MO personnel for assignment with PWB and agreed to make the necessary arrangements for formal appointments, if he had the opportunity to accept or reject the candidates.

F. SUMMARY OF MO OPERATIONS IN AFHQ AND MIDDLE EAST

1. Rumor Machinery

Suggestions from Washington, as well as those developed in the theatre, are spread:

a) Among enemy troops in Italy by agents crossing through the lines;

b) Among German Balkan garrisons by resistance elements;

c) By MO representation at Istanbul;

d) To Spanish sources at Tangier;

e) In the market places of Tunis, Rabat and Cairo, where enemy intelligence will pick up.

f) In Rome on the organization left behind by the Germans.

2. Black Literature

Actual publications are distributed by:

a) Air to resistance groups in France (formerly), Serbia (for Austria), Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, Greece, Crete and Aegean Islands for planting on enemy garrisons.

b) Very secret means to neutral newspapers, consulates and embassies.

c) Front line infiltration in Italy and Southern France.

3. Black Radio

The sole operation of this nature was carried out by Cairo and is not considered of great strategic importance, but of tactical value in a demoralized area.

4. Coordination, Control and Supervision

All operations are coordinated with but not necessarily controlled by PWB of AFHQ at Caserta and its Middle East representative at Cairo. MO operations carried out at Cairo, Istambul, Paris, Rome and Algiers are controlled by Eugene Warner at Rome. Necessary coordination between ETO and AFHQ is achieved by direction from Washington and by exchange of literature between Rome and Paris (details of which will be covered under discussion of ETO operations below). It is considered that Mr. Warner, in spite of an acute lack of trained personnel, necessary supplies, and lack of adequate support from Washington in the early days of his operation, has achieved extremely satisfactory results. As always in the MO type of operation, exact results cannot be measured due to lack of a proper yardstick, but with the exception of black radio, MO means appear to be exploited to a highly satisfactory degree.

III. EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

A. CONTROL, COORDINATION AND SUPERVISION

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The first written charter for NO operations in ETO was published June 14, 1944 in a directive signed by Gen. Eisenhower. As set forth therein, all NO operations in ETO are controlled by the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Brig. Gen. R. N. McClure, Chief. Rumors, field operations, radio programs, publications are all approved by this staff division in detail or authorized by broad directive. PWE (black), on the other hand, appears to operate under a broad charter from the British Foreign Office approved quietly by other British agencies, both political and military.

While the distinction as to the type of control exercised over the American and British counterparts in the black propaganda field appears unfavorable to U. S., it remains an academic discussion, since PWE black operations are:

a) Currently limited to Soldatensender - a radio emission admittedly grey or pure white;

b) Rumors of a tactical nature which are approved by PWD;

c) The dissemination of suggestions for malingering, etc.

d) Confined to activity from the British Isles and thus are expressly forbidden by charter to operate on the continent - the area of our major interest.

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Until the first week in September, 1944 the Chief of MO, Mr. Frederick Oechsner, also served as Deputy Chief, PWD, SHAEF, in which capacity he appeared to serve in the dual role of solicitor and judge. He was expected to plead the case which he judged for the Chief, Gen. McClure. By arrangement with the Director, OSS, Mr. Oechsner, on 6 September 1944, became a Special Assistant to the Director, OSS and retained his post at PWD. To succeed him, Mr. Rae Smith was appointed as Chief of MO, OSS, ETO. Until this time, the responsibility for black as well as PWD functions rested in one person, a situation which was not conducive to aggressive black operations.

Under the existing organization, MO Branch provides necessary personnel, funds and equipment to PWD, SHAEF on the same principle as OWI and PWE. Once this personnel is transferred to PWD, orders are cut by SHAEF, militarily attaching them for duty to PWD, SHAEF or subordinate formations, and they report only to the Deputy, PWD through military channels. PWD officers, so attached, carry out no (repeat no) black operations, confining themselves to white leaflets and control of entertainment, press and radio in occupied areas.

To implement black operations, PWD issues directives to OSS-ETO, which have been prepared by MO Branch, authorizing specific types of activities (TAMS B and D). Such directives clearly delegate the responsibility to MO-OSS-ETO. Thus the Theatre Commander's control and supervision of black activities is through the Director of OSS-ETO and not direct from PWD. In view of this organizational structure, reports on PWD activities cannot be secured from MO Branch, ETO, but only through

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the Special Assistant to the Director, OSS or the Director OSS-ETO.

Coordination of MO activities with PWE and OWI is officially handled through PWD-SHAEF, but several visits with Mr. R. Sherwood, Chief of OWI Overseas Branch, indicated a satisfactory relationship between MO-OSS and OWI.

Since PWD activities, as carried out in ETO, are exclusively white, are outside the scope of the functions outlined for the MO Branch, OSS, and are conducted along purely military lines, the remainder of this report will deal solely with the black operations now being carried out or planned for the future.

B. AREA "B"

The British PWE radio program, "Soldatensender" (otherwise known as "Radio Calais") was instituted as a purely black operation, with its source apparently of German origin and directed primarily to German garrison troops in France and the Low Countries. However, after two or three years' operation, during which time the British Government invested several million dollars in the enterprise, the cover of the station became too thin to warrant its being considered a black station. None-the-less, the pretense is maintained even while the British officially admit that it now is grey at best.

In June, 1944, MO was requested to provide recordings of American music with German lyrics for the entertainment feature of their program. Recordings so furnished by MO have been so satisfactory that the MO contribution to the program now represents 35 to 40 per cent of the time on the air, and, contrary to the original understanding, subtle propaganda lines are

now woven into the fabric of the entertainment scheme.

MO personnel engaged in this operation are stationed at Area "R," the designation given to the location of the studios, editorial rooms, etc. In addition to the radio program, a daily newspaper in German, called "Frontpost," is published, incorporating the news broadcast on the previous evening's emission. This publication is "grey" at best, since its source is known as "Soldatensender," and it is dropped openly from Allied airplanes to German garrison troops. Four MO personnel are assigned to the task of writing and editing this publication.

The contribution of MO to this PWE radio and newspaper project is considered well worthwhile in terms of the money and personnel which this branch provides and, in addition, serves to maintain a very friendly liaison direct with PWE. It should be noted in passing that the operation does not come under control of PWD-SHAEF but is merely coordinated with that office through Mr. A. Greenman, British Deputy, PWD.

C. BLACK RADIO OPERATION, PARIS

The various meetings, disagreements, misunderstandings, resignations, and so forth, which were involved in finally getting this operation on the air, need not be recounted here; but since the preliminary steps may serve as a guide for future black radio operations in other theatres, they will be set down in some detail.

The subject was first broached to Gen. McClure, PWD-SHAEF, by this officer in London on 25 August 1944. The suggestion was not received with alarm, but it was directed that a

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staff study and draft directive, outlining the proposed operation in detail, be submitted at the earliest possible date. In order to compose the necessary papers, a radio station, a frequency, a proposed scenario with appropriate cover, a series of scripts, necessary recordings and required personnel all had to be developed in order to submit an objective plan. With the help of FWD 12th Army Group, then stationed in Versailles, the station and frequency were optioned and key personnel temporarily loaned or loaned back to MO from FWD.

On 6 September a meeting was held in Paris with Gen. McClure, Mr. Oechsner, and MO staff attending. Status of the project was notified to Gen. McClure verbally, who, having expressed satisfaction, was informed that draft directive would be submitted the following day. This study and directive (TAB B) was accepted without change, but concurrence of G-2 SHAEF was requested and secured enthusiastically.

It was then decided that Gen. McClure should seek the concurrence of Mr. Bruce Lockhart, Director of PWE. This officer reminded the General that PWE black radio was neither coordinated with MO nor controlled by FWD, but for policy reasons the decision stood. On 13 September, MO was notified of PWE concurrence and Gen. McClure's final signature to the directive secured.

Between 13 Sept. and 20 Sept. final scripts were prepared, minor changes made by FWD, approved by G-2, SHAEF, and the program was ready. On the morning of 21 Sept. the then Chief of MO-ETO decided to resign, if the minor changes suggested

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on the preceding day were finally made. The resignation was accepted, Mr. Howard Baldwin, with the approval of Director OSS-ETO, named Acting Chief, OSS-ETO, and the program went on the air at 2007 hrs. that evening.

A notice had been given to the U. S. and British press, and an informal request to the French Press to ignore the program had been made by PWD. G-2 SHAEF had decided not to notify G-2's of subordinate formations, since the program did not specifically designate the community where the revolution was supposed to be taking place. The U. S. and British press ignored the transmission, but TAB C shows the treatment given the program by "La Liberation," Paris daily.

The 12th U. S. Army Group was considerably agitated because the monitoring service of 1st U. S. Army reported to G-2 1st Army who awoke the C. G. (Gen. Hodges). The latter requested that 3rd U. S. Army be notified and telephone report made to H.Q. 12th U. S. Army Group. G-2 12th Army awoke the Chief of Staff who, in turn, awoke the C. G. (Gen. Bradley). Not until the following morning, 23 Sept., was the matter satisfactorily explained by PWD.

The foregoing incidents dramatize the effectiveness of this type of black radio operation on the monitoring services of both our own and enemy forces. Intensive enemy jamming greeted the program on second and subsequent evenings. From every standpoint, MO's entry into this field is considered by all concerned to have been an outstanding success, although later intelligence from German troops and Germany itself must be awaited to confirm original Allied Military estimates of actual damage to

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enemy morale. Additional scenarios, scripts, frequencies, and cover plans are currently being developed to follow on after our military progress on the Western Front destroy the cover of the present scenario.

D. FIELD OPERATIONS - 12TH U. S. ARMY GROUP

The directive from SHAEF, authorizing the formation of a field team and its attachment to FWD 12th U. S. Army Group, appears as TAB D. It was originally planned to form two teams, one to be attached to each U. S. Army (ie., 1st and 3rd), but in view of the brilliant leadership of the first team activated under command of Major Stacy Lloyd, it was decided to reinforce the first team with the personnel of the second, the commander of the latter to become Executive Officer to Major Lloyd.

The activities of the field team may be classified as follows:

1. Infiltration of black printed literature through enemy lines. Material which is produced in London, Paris and Rome is shipped forward to Maj. Lloyd at Luxembourg which is the current operating base. From that point, dispatching officers accompany agents to the point at which they are to be infiltrated, whether southward to the Belfort Gap, or northward to the extreme northern sector of the 21st Army Group area. Operatives proceed through the lines on foot, by bicycle or in vehicles, according to arrangements made. Some are instructed to stay behind enemy lines until they are over-run by our forces; others are directed to return upon completion of the mission; but all are thoroughly and carefully briefed as to the manner in which black printed material will be disseminated - greatest of care being exercised to insure

against revelation of its true source. By following up on the arrangements made earlier at Algiers with the Prisonniers et Deportes organization, the Paris commissariat is now providing operatives who have worked in Germany, who have complete papers and who volunteer to penetrate the homeland itself. These people will take with them copies of "Das Neue Deutschland" for judicious distribution to the Prisonniers et Deportes cells now existing throughout Germany.

2. Dissemination of "front-line" rumors. Every advantage is taken of timely intelligence secured from prisoners in divisional P/W pens who are questioned by MO intelligence officers attached to the Field Team. Rumors of withdrawals of flanking battalions planted on the center enemy battalion usually accomplish more than a lowering of morale - often they precipitate a real withdrawal which can be exploited by rumors planted back on the flanking battalions. With the eagerness for news, which prevails among front-line units, experience has shown that the enemy is gullible to a degree which can exist only among troops which are withdrawing in some disorder. Rumors regarding the state of the homeland, intentions of Party leaders, false situation reports on the Eastern front, spurious manifestoes - all are received with eagerness. At the time of departure, arrangements had just been completed to secure from 1st U. S. Army the services of sixty P/Ws who had volunteered to penetrate the lines for the purpose of telling their comrades the "true" situation.

3. Tactical deceptive activities. Occasionally the 12th U. S. Army Group directs the Team to employ its methods to

deceive the enemy as to the tactical intentions of U. S. formations. Two instances adequately illustrate this activity. MO was requested to make the people of Brussels believe that U. S. troops would liberate their city and thus indicate that 21st Army Group and 1st U. S. Army were to move northeasterly. This was achieved by sending an operative to Brussels prior to arrival of British troops to seek (rather openly) a building suitable for U. S. Army H.Q. At about the same time, it was desired that the enemy believe that the junction of the U. S. 3rd and 7th Armies would occur at Dijon. This information "leaked" from an MO operative who was dispatched to Dijon for the purpose.

4. <u>False orders</u>. With the enemy withdrawing rapidly, contact has been difficult to maintain; but with the development of a more static front, false orders will be planted in the form directed by tactical commanders.

It is emphasized that the foregoing activities have received the approval of all units down to and including H.Q.'s of Regimental Combat Teams. To insure that proper clearance had been obtained, the H.Q.'s of 5th Division XX Corps and 12th Army Group were visited and affirmative assurances received. No activities into the Low Countries were actually undertaken prior to approval from H.Q. 21st Army Group, only because of the fluid situation existing at the time and the lack of understanding between the lower echelons of the sector dividing lines. However, these activities were subsequently approved, and three MO detachments are currently operating in the area. With the arrival of the 7th U. S. Army (and presumably the 9th U. S. Army)

on the Western Front, and the assumption of their command by SHAEF, it is expected that MO field activities in the 7th Army sector will be supervised by Major Lloyd, and formal steps are now being taken at SHAEF to accomplish this objective.

E. EDITORIAL STAFF

Since the personnel which prepares scripts for the radio program also writes pamphlets and other black literary items, the editorial staff is considered as an entity with work assignments made to individuals attached thereto. This staff assumes responsibility for final editing and dispatch of the Harvard Plan to Stockholm. Copy prepared in Washington and dispatched by air is considered by the London staff to be, in the main, acceptable, although timely additions or corrections are made.

F. [illegible] LONDON

A small organization has remained in London to carry out the following duties:

1. Dispatch personnel as required to the Continent.
2. Administer the MO personnel who will remain indefinitely at Area "E."
3. Keep records of MO personnel attached to FWD.
4. Dispatch cables and mat[illegible] to Lisbon and Stockholm.
5. Eliminate unnecessary personnel and arrange their return to the U. S. where required.

Due to the very unsatisfactory administrative set-up of MO and its confusion with FWD, many misunderstandings

about personnel requirements arose, which in turn contributed to an excess or ill-chosen supply of individuals. Mr. Oechsner requires for PWD, during the occupation phase of Germany, five or six majors or lieutenant-colonels with German language fluency and familiarity with the psychology of the people. Beyond that there are no personnel requirements. Therefore, all individuals not now actively engaged in MO or PWD activities will be declared excess, and the Director OSS-ETO, if no position can be found for them in other OSS-ETO branches, will seek their return to Washington. Twenty such individuals have been so declared to date by MO.

8. LIAISON WITH AFHQ

With the exception of Hungary, MO-ETO and AFHQ have the common target: Germany. Activities should therefore be closely coordinated, and each theatre should distribute the others' publications as widely as possible. If "Das Neue Deutschland," for example, purporting to be printed inside Germany, appears not only in Hungary, on the Italian front, in the Belfort Gap area, but also among German troops in Holland and Norway -- the stronger the impression that it is actually printed within and dispatched to the periphery of the contracting circle. For these reasons, direct liaison has been directed between the MO chiefs in the respective theatres. At the present time, consideration is being given to a project for infiltrating through the Western Front "membership cards" in "Das Neue Deutschland Party" into Germany proper, and the advisability of having the Paris station refer to the Party or

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the publication is being discussed, but neither will be undertaken without the concurrence of Mr. Warner.

This ETO section cannot be concluded without a tribute to the energy, imagination and creative ability of Mr. Rae Smith, whose services will be greatly missed by MO London. Only months of frustration and lack of clearly-defined authority, coupled with the temperament frequently encountered in creative types, permitted him to request that his resignation be accepted prior to the previously agreed upon date. But without him, it is believed there would have been no active MO Branch in London or Paris and no radio program on the air.

Regarding the ETO-MO set-up as a whole, the Acting Chief has accepted his responsibilities in the spirit of contributing his utmost, but he feels that a creative type, familiar with German language and customs and a person confident of the effectiveness of pure black operations, should be found and designated Chief of MO-ETO. In this view, the Chief of Branch concurs.

IV. FUTURE PLANS

It is now apparent that U. S. penetration of Germany will come from the West and that occupying forces will be those operating under SHAEF. While armies under AFHQ may penetrate Hungary and even Austria, MO plans in AFHQ need no revision comparable to that required in ETO to adjust for the transition between the military occupying phase and the era of

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actual occupation and administration of the German State by Allied and Russian authorities. This subject was discussed with Gen. McClure and Mr. Oechsner, and the attached(TAB E) outline was submitted to the Planning Staff in London, which is currently functioning under the chairmanship of Mr. Whitney Shepardson.

Discussion of this general outline of objectives and proposed methods might properly be undertaken at an early date.

K D Mann

K. D. Mann, Colonel, AUS
Chief, MO Branch

(TAB "A")

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TAB A

ITINERARY OF MO CHIEF, MEDTO-ETO

1944

Aug. 1 Leave Wash.
2 Enroute.
3 Rabat-local arrangements.
4 Casa-Algiers.
5 Alg Ogle.
6 " Spoc.
7 " Pelabon Prisonniers et Deportes de Chartres.
8 Alg-Naples-Caserta.
9 " " "
10 Caserta-Rome.
11 Rome---Minifie---Warner.
12 Rome-printing plant, inspection.
13 Rome ---Fistere.
14 Rome --Siena.
15 Siena.
16 Siena - Rome.
17 Rome - Caserta ----Glavin.
18 Caserta - Bari. Toulmin, Huntington, Warner, Fistare, Fielding.
19 Bari, Brindisi.--Maj. Flynn, Lt. Jiminez.
20 Bari.
21 Bari-Caserta. Moce, Caffey, MacChrystal.
22 Naples-Alg.
23 Alg.-Ogle.
24 Alg.- Gibraltar.
25 Gib-London.
26 Smith, Oeschor, Delmar.
27 Country, editorial meeting, MO Base
28 London, Oeschner, McClure.
29 London.
30 Granville.
31 Enroute Paris.

Sept. 1 Paris-Lloyd, Hackett-Powell.
2 Reims.
3 Verdun-XX Corps, 5 Div.
4 Enroute Paris.
5 Paris-Le Breton de Chartres.
6 Meeting-McClure, Oeschner.
7 Paper on radio-McClure.
8 Shaef-Gen. Strong.
9 Shaef-Col. Peers-Paris.
10 Reims with Whitaker.
11 Paris-/ bodies.
12 Paris.

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13 Paris-Prisonniers et Deportes.
14 Paris-London.
15 London-Stirling-Hesse project.
16 Glasgow.
17 Glasgow.
18 Glasgow-Stirling.
19 London-Paris.
20 Paris-Gen. Strong. Meeting, McClure, Oeschner, Crossman re scripts.
21 Paris-Smith relieved-program on air.
22 Paris-Verdun (Powell)-Luxembourg-Hesse project-monitored station.
23 Luxembourg-Brussels - Lloyd, Amour, Bruce- Major Russell.
24 Brussels-Paris.
25 St Omer - Paris - Pacatte.
26 Conferences - Gen. McClure-Pacatte project. Not now.
27 Pacatte - Dibbert.
28 Plans re Irwin.
29 Personnel Review - Planning Committee.
30 Hesse Project.

Oct. 1)
2)
3) Enroute
4)
5)

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

11 July 1944

SUBJECT: The Recruitment, Training and Operation of Agents behind Enemy Lines for Psychological Warfare

TO: Chief of Staff, SHAEF

I. DISCUSSION

Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF, authority Operation Memorandum No. 8, 11 March 1944, ensures that directives of the propaganda agencies approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff are in keeping with the plans of the Supreme Commander and coordinate the activities of the various agencies insofar as they affect that part of the European Sphere for which the Supreme Commander is responsible. P.W.D. is authorized to conduct Strategic Propaganda which the above quoted Memorandum specifies as (1) radio broadcast (2) leaflets, (3) agents, (4) rumors.

TA B

The Office of Strategic Services is charged by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with the execution of all forms of morale subversion by diverse means including false rumors, "freedom stations", false leaflets and false documents, the organization and support of Fifth Column activities by grants, trained personnel and supplies and the use of agents, all for the purpose of creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the enemy. (JCS 155/11/D. 28 October, 1943).

In order to implement that part of Operation Memorandum #8 which concerns the operation of agents, it is proposed that P.W.D. assign to the Morale Operations Branch, Office of Strategic Services, the responsibility for carrying out that function for the following specific purposes:

(a) To recruit, train, infiltrate agents on the Continent for the purpose of demoralizing and confusing enemy troops by subversive methods not available to "white" propaganda,

(b) To recruit and screen agents on the Continent to be sent to the United Kingdom for training and dispatch from the United Kingdom for like purposes.

Personnel and equipment for subject Unit will be furnished between PWD, SHAEF, and Office of Strategic Services by agreement.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Office of Strategic Services establish a Morale Operations to be attached to P.W.D. SHAEF for duty with the P & PW

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FUSAC at the earliest appropriate time.

2. That General Koenig's mission be asked to nominate and attach to the Morale Operations Unit a competent Liaison Officer.

3. That the attached T/O and T/E (Tab A) be approved.

III. CONCURRENCES

OSS _____

French Forces of the Interior _____

G-2, SHAEF _____

G-3, SHAEF _____

CG, FUSAC _____

ROBERT A. McCLURE
Brigadier General G.S.C.,
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division

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[illegible]
Les abonnements
de « LIBÉRATION »
3 mois .... 140 francs
6 mois .... 260 —
12 mois .... 500 —
Les Petites Annonces
de « LIBÉRATION »
aux bureaux du Journal

LIBÉR

Rédaction, Adm., 37, r. du Louvre, Paris (2e).

ÉDITION

Pour une presse libre et propre

CHAQUE CITOYEN A LE DROIT D'EXPRIMER SA PENSÉE ET CELUI DE S'INFORMER

La nouvelle législation de la presse qui ne peut [illegible] déjà prétendre à la perfection, constitue cependant le soubassement d'un nouveau régime

PAR [illegible]

président de la Commission de la Réforme de l'État et de législation à l'Assemblée Consultative.

L[illegible]

DEPUIS 22 HEURES 19

UN POSTE ALLEMA

des appels à l'in

CE POSTE, QUI EMET SUR [illegible] METRES, [illegible]
VRAISEMBLABLEMENT D'UNE VILLE [illegible]

[illegible]

LA BATAILLE E

TA
C

TRUE COPY

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PW/7851/1

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

11 September 1944

SUBJECT: THE OPERATION OF "BLACK" RADIO FROM PARIS AGAINST GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL POPULATION.

TO : The Morale Operations Branch, Office of Strategic Services.

ATTENTION: Mr. Rae Smith, Chief.

FROM : Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, AEF.

1. Psychological Warfare Division, Supremem Headquarters, AEF, authority Operation Memorandum No. 8, 11 March 1944, ensures that directives of the propaganda agencies approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff are in keeping with the plans of the Supreme Commander and coordinate the activities of the various agencies insofar as they affect that part of the European Sphere for which the Supremem Commander is responsible. PWD is authorized to conduct Strategic Propaganda which the above memorandum specified as 1. radio broadcasts, 2. leaflets, 3. agents, 4. rumours.

2. The Office of Strategic Services is charged by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with the execution of all forms of morale subversion by divers means including: false rumours, "freedom stations", false leaflets and false documents, the organization and support of Fifth Column activities by grants, trained personnel and supplies and the use of agents, all for the purpose of creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the enemy. (JCS 155/11/D, 28 October 1943).

TAB D

3. In order to implement that part of Supreme Headquarters

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Operation Memorandum No. 8 which concerns "Radio Broadcasts" and that part of JCS 155/11/D, which refers to "Freedom Stations", PWD directs the Morale Operations Branch, OSS:

a. To establish, from existing radio facilities in the Paris region, a broadcasting station or stations purporting to be of German origin in order to spread false rumours, to create confusion and generally to break the will to resist in the German Armed Forces and Civil Population:

b. To reconnoiter on the European Continent further facilities for like efforts in support of the military mission of the Allied Armies in the field and the aims of the United Nations and to place in operation such facilities as may be approved by SHAEF;

c. To gather such intelligence as may be required for these operations.

4. PWD, Supreme Headquarters AEF, will provide such technical equipment, facilities and personnel as may be required by the Morale Operations Branch, OSS, if releasable by PWD.

5. The Morale Operations Branch, OSS, is to establish immediately a Morale Operations Unit to be attached to the Advanced Echelon OSS in the Seine Base Section, Communications Zone, for the purpose of implementing this directive.

6. The Morale Operations Unit of OSS, so attached, will

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operate under the directives of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, from time to time promulgated. For the purpose of prompt implementation of this directive, a transmission from Station Villebone Paris on a frequency of 1068 kilocycles between the hours 2000 and 2300 GMT is approved, subject to restrictions and controls enumerated in sub paragraphs a, b, c, d, below.

a. There will be no intrusion on Standard German frequencies.

b. Cover: The transmission will purport to emanate from the Commander of a garrison town who has long disapproved of Nazi politics and their disastrous interference in military operations. However, he has never thought of a revolt until he is ordered by an SS officer to use weapons to drive back into action elements of the Wehrmacht which are retreating. He has no personal or ideological ambition, and so he immediately calls on the best local elements to organize a local civil administration while he merely holds off the SS and Luftwaffe. However he knows that Germany's military position is hopeless and that her future is best served by destroying the Nazi Government and setting up a temporary one to conclude an armistice without underground or guerilla aftermaths.

c. Contents:

(1) Propaganda. The Commander and his appointed civil administrator will express their condemnation of

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the Nazi Party's determination to fight it out to the last man and eventually go underground. In subsequent broadcasts the commander will bring other substantial members of this community to the microphone. No statements will be made which commit the Allied Government to a policy for future treatment of Germany.

(2) News. The only straight news to be broadcast will be that previously released by PWD or put out by the enemy himself. Except by SHAEF directives to the contrary, there will be no deviation from the truth in dealing with the news of military events or the Allied political policy. False rumours will, however, be started about conditions inside Germany.

(3) Entertainment. This will be kept to a minimum necessary to retain an audience, its quality will be in keeping with the resources which would be available to a genuinely revolutionary group.

d. Controls and Coordination:

(1) The contents of each transmission will be approved by this H.Q.

(2) G-2 SHAEF will be continuously informed by MO of the frequency employed and contents of the program.

(3) Liaison will be maintained by MO with the Office of the French Ministry of Information to ensure a minimum of French newspaper and radio publicity for these transmissions.

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(4) MO will be responsible for informing British black radio operations of the form and content of these transmissions.

(signed) ROBERT C. MCCLURE,
Brigadier.