

SECRETMISSION OF THE MO BRANCH, OSS-ETOI. INTRODUCTION:

The operations of this Branch of OSS must continue throughout all phases of the war in Europe. For the purpose of this discussion it is assumed that there will be no formal surrender on the part of Germany but that the war will end when Germany is completely occupied by Russian, British and American forces in the sections assigned to each of these nations.

Also, the assumption is that as our troops progress the Nazi Party will go underground and will attempt to continue their operations under cover for an indefinite period presumably until the out-break of the next war which they are undoubtedly now planning.

The proposed operations of MO must be broken down into specific phases which relate to the military and/or political situation.

Phase I. This period extends from the present time through the date of complete occupation of Germany by Allied forces. During this period subversive activities of this Branch should be carried out by the following methods:

1. Infiltration of agents for the purpose of disseminating printed material including black leaflets, pamphlets, stickers, stencilled messages, posters and so forth. Such agents will also be responsible for dissemination of rumors of two types: one which will be effective on enemy front-line troops and, secondly the type of rumor which is designed to effect the morale of the civilian population and is more strategic than tactical.

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b. Dissemination of black literature by air when and if pin-points in enemy territory become available.

c. Distribution of black literature in neutral countries where they will be picked up by German agents.

d. Black radio operations purporting to be sponsored by dissident elements within enemy country.

e. Contact with influential personages, in those regions of Germany which have been occupied, who may be persuaded that the best interest of Germany lies in the extermination of the Nazi Party and who thus believe that a degree of collaboration with Allied Forces will most effectively and expeditiously accomplish this objective (while it is apparent that extreme care must be exercised in this selection, this method is considered as probably the most effective and can be illustrated by reference to the Plan Phillip).

It is emphasized that the methods outlined above should be continued throughout the process of occupying Greater Germany and should not cease on an arbitrary situation such as the fall of Berlin.

On the other hand, should Germany unexpectedly surrender unconditionally NO activities should henceforth be conducted as outlined in Phase 2 below.

Phase 2. During the period in which Allied Forces are in occupation of Germany.

During this phase NO operations will be carried out by the following methods:

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a. Exploit the natural cleavages within the country such as -
 catholics versus protestants; underground labour groups versus
 sympathisers with Nazi attitude towards unionization; historical
 differences between the various Duchies and Principalities which
 now comprise Greater Germany; agricultural interests versus in-
 dustrial and economic interests, and so forth, all for the purpose
 of preventing solidarity of opinion and concerted action on the
 part of the German people.

b. Form competitive underground groups who combat the various
 underground organisations which the Nazis will have formed. Such
 'underground' organizations as may be inspired by MO should:

(1) Covertly preach a doctrine which is not inimical to
 Allied interests.

(2) Actively combat the Nazi propaganda spread by Nazi
 underground organizations.

(3) Sustain confusion in the minds of the people which will
 exist after Germany is completely occupied.

c. Operate black radio stations purporting to be the mouth-piece
 of the underground groups enumerated in para. b. above.

d. Print and distribute black literature with spurious underground
 groups as their apparent sponsors.

e. Continue to spread subversive rumours which will be picked up
 by Nazi underground.

During Phase 2, MO operatives who enter Germany during Phase 1
 should gradually be replaced by operatives with a sound commercial or

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governmental cover, such as UNRRA, Civil Affairs and so forth.

The rapidity with which this replacement will take place should depend upon whether or not P and PW activities are maintained by the occupying forces. The replacement should be completed by the time P & PW activities are officially discontinued.

All MO activities during Phase 2 should be coordinated with MO activities in neutral countries.

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field report by John H. Marsching

file
Marsching
 DATE: 20 January 1945

1. Attached is a report from Mr. John H. Marsching who acted as Chief of the Technical Unit of SI/ETO. Attached also are comments on this report by Col. H. W. Dix.

2. Mr. Marsching's report is a detailed account of the establishment, organization and procedural methods of the Technical Unit. He comments that his unit was at all times short of equipment, clerical help and necessary reference material.

3. Mr. Marsching makes the following recommendations in connection with any Technical Unit which may operate under SI in ETO:

a. Technical reports received in Paris should not be processed by the Reports Dissemination Unit there.

b. The London Technical Unit should make periodic summaries of information contained in previous OSS reports but should confine itself to subjects which might have exceptional operational value at a given moment.

c. The adoption of a roster of four persons to carry on the work of the Technical Unit and, if possible, the addition of two capable translators for French and German intelligence.

d. It would be desirable to get from the Army, Navy and Air Forces priority lists to be used for briefing instructions. Col. Dix believes that this recommendation is too broad unless exceptional discretion is employed.

Attachment

W. B. Fantick
 W. B. Fantick
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

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FROM:

ROUTINE AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA ...

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Del'd		
1. T. J. H. Hester				WTH	
2. W. H. Shepherdson				WTH	
3. General Hester				WTH	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
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20.					

Each entry must be numbered in sequence from 1 to 20. The number of entries must be equal to the number of entries in the list of names. Each entry must be signed by the officer who is responsible for the entry. The officer's initials must be written in the column labeled "Officer's Initials". The date received must be written in the column labeled "Date Rec'd". The date delivered must be written in the column labeled "Date Del'd". The comments must be written in the column labeled "Comments".

16037
Field Report
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 10 January 1945

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Mr. Marsching's Report on Scientific Section, UK

Mr. Marsching's report and Colonel Dix' comments
thereon, are submitted herewith.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

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*Field Report***Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Mr. W. H. Shepardson
 FROM : Col. H. W. Dix *HWD*
 SUBJECT: Mr. Marsching's Report on Scientific Section, UK.

DATE: 3 January 1945

Attached is Mr. Marsching's report of his work in UK.

He makes remarks on several situations and shows the operations of the Scientific Section, UK, as completed for part of October and all of November.

In regard to his recommendations I have checked with him on numbers one, two, and six and I believe that the headquarters in London holds more possibilities for such an office being more helpful than at Paris or elsewhere. This conclusion is made bearing in mind communications facilities and opportunity of obtaining quicker and fuller information from the British and from the headquarters of other countries, such as The Netherlands and Poland.

Recommendations three, four, eight, nine, ten appear satisfactory.

Recommendation five is believed to be too broad unless exceptional discretion is employed.

Recommendation seven and its sub-heads appears satisfactory from experience and has the opportunity of being exceptionally helpful under proper guidance.

It is believed that the technical section,-- its establishment, growth, and use should be under the guidance of Colonel Chittick and within the definite responsibility of the SI head in London.

Amuse and Toledo. Papers on these topics in London are now in the hands of Captain Mroz who knows very little about them or their backgrounds. When Colonel Madrox left London he turned them over to Mr. Horton, and with Mr. Horton's transfer to Paris the papers were turned over to Mr. Marsching who has left them with Captain Mros. I recommend that Colonel Chittick be given enough administrative information to take care of these two topics and to determine the future operations with these topics for STO purposes.

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Lind. Export**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 1 January 1945

TO : Colonel R. W. Dix

FROM : Mr. John H. Harshbarger

SUBJECT: Reestablishment of Technical Unit,
Reports Division, SI, OSS, London, England

rel-2-45

Arrival in SIC

Arrived in London, England, on 8 October 1944. The next few days were taken up by the processing into the London OSS organization. The various sections of the organization are located in different buildings and considerable time is consumed until all the necessary visits are completed. Furthermore, the search for a billet had to be undertaken at once because the Army billet assignment upon arrival is only a temporary arrangement and is supposed to be limited to about a week's occupancy. The housing situation in London is very serious and practically no quarters are available within walking distance of the offices, except at unreasonable rents.

Shortly after my arrival Mr. W. H. Shepherson informed me that the last plan calling for my early departure for Bern, Switzerland, had been changed and the original plan to set up a Technical Unit under the Reports Division, at least temporarily, was to go into effect.

A few days later Lt. Col. G. C. Bowman officially confirmed this action and advised me that Capt. E. A. J. Morris would be assigned to me, only temporarily, as an assistant. Mr. J. W. Gold, Deputy Chief of the Reports Division, was notified, requested to provide office space and make the necessary arrangements which would enable us to get organized and to function.

OSR-SIC Organizational Changes

Shortly before arriving in London, the Paris OSS Office had been opened up and a large part of the London staff and some of the files had been transferred to Paris. It was only natural that a certain amount of reorganization was due after this move with attending functional delays.

Furthermore, the organizational set-up of the London Office was subjected to certain revisions. Upon my arrival the SI and the R & A Sections operated independently, the latter apparently under the direction of SI, but shortly thereafter, a committee was effected and designated as LINA with Mr. Gold as its chief. This new arrangement enjoyed only a brief existence when the former status apparently was reinstated.

Another factor affecting month operations was the transfer of the London APO and the Paris Office and its return to London, thereby creating a temporary confusion in the handling of the mail and messages, which situation however was remedied within a short time.

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Colonel H. W. Dix

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When the Paris Office was opened, it received the designation of OSS Detachment (Advanced) and the London Office - OSS Detachment (Rear) which latter designation was subsequently changed to OSS Detachment (Main).

Owing to the movement of some key personnel to Paris and some remaining in London, which latter office up to that time had been the directive unit in the ETO, apparently some question of authority arose which, it is believed, finally was vested in the London Office.

These changes have been recited as they will explain why the Technical Unit could not begin its disseminations until eleven days after my arrival, namely on 17 October 1944. Even this interval of time is not too extended when considering the time it normally takes to set up the machinery for the operation of a unit of this type.

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Colonel H. W. Dix

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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE TECHNICAL UNITPersonnel

John H. Marsching, in charge
Capt. E. A. J. Mroz, assistant
Sergeant Earl D. Brodie, assistant (arrived 12 Nov. 1944)
W. Kliefoth (arrived 9 Nov. 1944 for special briefing on chemical plants in Germany)

Sources of Information

CSS field and outpost reports, Bern, French, Dutch, Norwegian, Czech, Polish Intelligence, British War Ministry, Royal Air Force Research and Development Services, Broadway, etc.

Classification of Material

Air/Technical
Bacteriological Warfare
Chemical Warfare
Electronics
Explosives
Fuels
Medical
Military/Technical
Naval/Technical
Research Establishments
Miscellaneous/Technical

Special Projects Material

Teledo
Crossbow

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Colonel H. W. Dix

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OSS LONDON DISTRIBUTION LIST

G-2	FAAA	(First Allied Airborne Army)
A-2	USSTAF	(U.S. Strategic Tactical Air Force)
COMNAVH		(Commander Navy Europe)
CH. SURG.		(Chief Surgeon)
Med. SER.		(Medical Services)
Bartlett		(Major Bartlett, Asst. Military Attache, U.S. Embassy, London, - Biological Warfare)
Calvert		(Major Calvert, Asst. Military Attache, U.S. Embassy, London - Secret Weapons)
MI-6		(Military Intelligence, British)
SFHQ		(Special Forces Headquarters)
EWI		(Economic Warfare Division)
NI		(Naval Intelligence)
R & A		(Research and Analysis)
SO		
NO		
OWI		(Office of War Information)
PWD		(Psychological Warfare Division)
PWE		(Psychological Warfare Executive)
CAD		(Civil Affairs Division)
EAC		(European Advisory Commission)
X-2		
R & D		(Research and Development)
USEMB(G)		(U.S. Embassy, Grosvenor Square)
USEMB(B)		(U.S. Embassy, Berkeley Square)
Wash.		(Washington)
Cairo		
Rome		
Neri		
Caserta		
Paris		
SI Labor		
SI Training		

For comparative purposes the Paris list is also given. When Paris disseminated a technical report, a copy is sent to the London Office showing its distribution and in this manner duplication was avoided.

OSS PARIS DISTRIBUTION LIST

G-2	HEADQ w/t	(G-2 Supreme Headquarters Amer. Exp. Force, wireless/telephone)
G-1	4th AG w/t	(G-2 4th Army Group)
G-2	12th AG w/t	(G-2 12th Army Group)
G-2	3rd Army w/t	
G-2	7th Army w/t	
G-2	9th Army w/t	
G-2	FAAA	(G-2 First Allied Airborne Army)
G-2	STOMA	(Southern Theater Operations United States Army)

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Colonel H. W. Dix

A-2 USSTAF
 A-2 9th AF
 COMUSNAV
 FI
 R & A
 MO
 FWD
 ONI
 OSRD
 CAD
 X-2
 CD
 USMB
 Wash.
 London
 Caserta

(A-2 United States Staff Air Force)
 (A-2 9th Air Force)
 (Commander United States Navy)
 (French Intelligence)
 (Research and Analysis)

 (Psychological Warfare Division)
 (Office of War Information)
 (Office Scientific Research and Development)
 (Civil Affairs Division)

 (United States Embassy)
 (Washington)

SI Labor
 SI Training
 SI German Desk

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Colonel H. W. Dix

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Special Activities

When the Technical Unit was established Mr. Gold obtained the Special Projects files on Azusa, Toledo and Crossbow, which Mr. Horton had handled personally before his departure for Paris, and turned them over to me for safekeeping. Inasmuch as Mr. Gold was unfamiliar with these subjects, he also expected me to take action on cable matters and see to the proper distribution of the information.

The files contained very little material and possibly Mr. Horton took most of the material with him to Paris.

Mr. M. Berg

On 30 October 1944 Mr. M. Berg suddenly showed up at the office and was brought up to date on the subjects to which he devoted his research work. At all times he was supplied with all the information he requested subject to my personal discretion. It came to my attention that Mr. Berg complained to Col. Seale that information was being withheld from him, which was not true. If Mr. Berg did not receive information promptly he was to blame because he only paid the office infrequent visits and after finally obtaining his address, it was necessary to phone him when information or instructions for him were received. His attitude was inclined to be impatient, critical and extremely independent. Mr. Berg eventually left London without announcing his intentions or plans.

Mr. M. Kliefoth

On 9 November 1944 Mr. M. Kliefoth arrived in London and was turned over to me by Lt. Col. C. C. Bowman pending a decision as to his next mission. It was finally decided by the Administration and Mr. Macleod to attach him to an OSS Field Force, during an operational move within the next ten days into enemy territory, having Cologne as its objective. Mr. Kliefoth's task was to consist of a search of the files of enemy chemical plants or laboratories for any type of new chemicals in manufacture or contemplated, new developments or research work in progress. I immediately put Mr. Kliefoth in touch with the necessary sources of information for the names and addresses of all the principal chemical works and laboratories in and near Cologne, names of scientific personnel in that region, furnished him with a plan of Cologne, etc. When I left London Mr. Kliefoth had been thoroughly briefed and had his working material all prepared.

Mr. Macleod

The office of Mr. Macleod was furnished with requests for our outposts for additional information. The Technical Unit therefore made it a rule to supply Mr. Macleod with memorandums containing requests for more technical information on certain vaguely reported items by furnishing him with indications and also with names of plants and localities where such information might possibly be obtained. It will be at least three months or more before

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Colonel H. W. Dix

this procedure will show any tangible results and although the net positive results will be a small percentage, they might be of inestimable value.

General RemarksEquipment:

Almost total lack of office paraphernalia. Great dearth of necessary stationery. Typewriters in bad condition. We even had to take parts from one damaged machine and, by our own repair work, make another machine usable.

Reference Material:

No previous technical files available. No technical books, dictionaries or a good atlas on hand for our own use.

Clerical Help:

No private secretary available, a real necessity in our work for security reasons. There was a pool of typists which sufficed for routine work, but all reports had to be written longhand. Many of the reports and all the correspondence of a security nature had to be done by ourselves.

Registry:

The filing system for the original reports was very poorly indexed, which made it extremely difficult to find such documents. Steps had been taken to remedy this condition, and it is understood that considerable progress has been made in that direction.

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Colonel H. W. Dix

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PRESENT ROUTING OF OSS EUROPEAN REPORTS

This presentation is made for reference in connection with some suggestions mentioned under recommendations.

According to the Reporting Board the present flow of the intelligence reports listed below is as follows:

Bern Reports, both cable and pouch	(Washington (London (Paris (ordinarily received here first)
Dutch Reports (original only - have not been processed in London)	(London - first (Paris - second, if at all. (Washington
Norwegian	
Czech	
Polish	
Broadway	
Belgian (pouch)	Washington
F.F. Reports	Paris first and usually only. Washington

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Recommendations

1. The continuation of a Technical Unit in OSS London under SI direction, because the technical reports can be processed earlier there and more quickly forwarded to the advanced and main echelons in Paris and London. Furthermore, all organizations contacted and advised of the new set-up of a technical unit expressed their unbounded satisfaction as they had considered it a long-felt need. The proof was confirmed by the many telephone calls and personal visits.
2. The Technical Unit in London will also be able to uncover a certain amount of British technical intelligence information - not ordinarily disseminated - by establishing a close and personal contact with the personnel in the numerous British technical establishments. In these rare instances where information might be withheld from OSS, it could be called to the attention of the pertinent military, air or naval technical experts, who probably could then obtain it through their own official channels.
3. The Technical Unit should also periodically disseminate a short summary of the information contained in previous OSS reports but only on such subjects which might have exceptional operational value at a given moment.
4. The Technical Unit should also evaluate the technical subjects in the reports received and request further definite information by means of indicators furnished to the proper agency.
5. The Technical Unit should secure from the various technical experts in the Army, Navy and Air Force in London a list of their priority items and, with their assistance, work out sets of indicators to be used for briefing instructions.
6. In London the Technical Unit is located very much closer geographically to the OSS European agencies, which is a vital time-saving asset when supplementary information on reports is urgently requested.
7. The personnel of the Technical Unit should consist initially of four persons, namely,
 - 1 officer or civilian in charge, familiar with the previous technical reports, the method of operation, and capable of making the necessary British Intelligence contacts. Language qualification: thoroughly proficient in German or French, preferably both.
 - 1 officer or civilian, as an assistant, trained in the processing of the reports. Same language qualifications as mentioned above.
 - 1 enlisted man or civilian, capable of assisting in the processing of reports, doing elementary research work, etc. Same language qualifications as mentioned above.
 - 1 efficient secretary, proficient in shorthand, typing, filing and general office administrative work.

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This staff should be organized as a permanent unit and remain together as such, forming the nucleus for any expansion when the increased volume of work or added projects require additional staff members.

This staff should also be supplied with the necessary technical reference books, dictionaries and a Stieler's Atlas by the Washington Office because these items are not procurable in London.

8. The report disseminating unit in Paris should be discouraged from processing any strictly technical reports, which activity should be confined to the Technical Unit in London.

9. The Technical Unit should have at its disposal two efficient translators of technical material, one for German and the other for French reports. It has been our experience that the Armed Services and Government agencies lose interest in even valuable reports when they are submitted untranslated.

10. A very close cooperation is recommended between the Reports Division and the Technical Unit in London for the purpose of obtaining the earliest possible access to pouch or cable reports containing technical information.

In this connection it is recommended (see Plan of Present Routing of OSS European Reports) that a set of the FF reports be sent direct to the Technical Unit in London.

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T-p ↑

~~Col. Downman~~
What do you think? ✓
Case
called Col. Downman's
office to bring this to
his attention
Director's Office / 8 NM
12/28/58

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Even No. rolls!

[Exposure is 1/2 @ f.6.3]

SECRET ^{16,030} Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report from Lt. Col. David Talley

DATE: 26 January 1945

1. Attached is a brief report from Lt. Col. David Talley of Communications WFO which includes the following recommendations for OSS Communications operations:

a. OSS units operating in enemy territory should be provided with communications direct to the appropriate Army formation, as well as a radio circuit direct to the Base Station.

b. Separate base stations for the various branches lead to overlapping and duplication of effort. All traffic should be handled by the OSS base radio stations. The Communications Branch should be responsible for all radio and wire communications of the OSS in the theater of operations.

c. Communications training should be standardized and included in the curriculum of all OSS schools.

d. Army Service Schools should include a course on the OSS, its purpose, organization and methods of operating with the Army in the field.

Mr. Clegg

Col. Hansen received a copy of this report
 [initials]

W. B. Fantel
 W. B. Kantak
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

Attachment

Somehow
 when in your
 think
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O.S.S. Hq.
Washington, D.C.

16.030

S*E*C*R*E*T

Field Report
x Laidy: Hanna & Co
x Signal Communication

8 January 1945

SUBJECT: Signal Communication for O.S.S. Units in European Theater of Operations

TO : Director, O.S.S., Washington, D.C.

1. a. Radio communication work in Special Force units attached to Army Group, Army and Corps Headquarters have been covered in previous reports. It is the aim of this letter to briefly outline specific recommendations for improving signal communications in any future O.S.S. work in the E.T.O. or in other theaters of operation.

b. The recommendations in this report are based both on personal observations in the field and from experience gained as Signal Officer to the American Director, E.M.F.F.I. (Col. Joseph Haskell) and as Deputy to the Chief Signal Officer, Special Force Headquarters (Br.) This is in addition to my previous work with the Signal Corps, Hq. ETOUSA and as Radio Officer with V Corps Hq.

2. Efficient radio communication was an important factor in the successful accomplishment of the SO Branch mission in the European Theater of Operation. The Communication Branch, OSS, provided the base station radio facilities and the trained personnel in co-operation with the Chief Signal Officer, SOE (Br.) Both American and British radio apparatus were utilized for this purpose. The field radio equipment used by SF Detachments attached to Army Group, Army Hq. or lower formations, and that used by agents, Jedburgh Teams and other field personnel was of either U.S. or British manufacture but based on similar engineering designs and standards.

3. a. Due to radio communication arrangements existing prior to the SO Branch organization in the ETO, it was necessary for each field agent, Jedburgh Team or mission on the Continent to have its individual radio link with the base or home station in England. The S.F. Detachments with the 1st Army Group and the several Army Hq., likewise maintained their own radio circuits to Base Station 53-C in England.

b. Radio sets used by field personnel were of the portable "alandestine" type with a crystal control transmitter of 10-25 watts output power. The "sky Wave" propagation properties were utilized to provide reliable radiotelegraph communication over 100-500 miles from the home station in England. The fact that these small suitcase radio sets worked so well is a tribute to the engineering and design skill of the Communication Branch.

4. a. Messages from agents and units in the field destined for S.F. Detachments or O.S.S. Liaison Officers attached to

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Army, Corps or Division Hq, had to be relayed through the base station in England for the reasons stated in Par. 3a above. This caused delays in the transmission of intelligence or other reports from field units or agents behind enemy lines to the Corps or Division Commander primarily interested in such information.

B. It was first necessary for the agent or Jedburgh radio operator to transmit the message to the base station (in England) for subsequent relay to the particular SF Detachment concerned. The SF Detachment Commander, after decoding the message, would deliver it to G-2 and G-3 of the Division Commander's Staff. Delays from 4 to 6 hours or more were to be expected under these abnormal conditions.

C. It is felt that direct communication between Division Hq. or lower formations and SO or other agents in their sector should be provided in future operations. Radio apparatus for this purpose should be designed to function with Army radio sets usually employed in the field.

5. The following recommendations are made as per Par. 1 above:

a. Agents, Jedburgh Teams or similar OSS units operating in enemy territory should be provided with radio communication direct to the Army formation concerned with their work. Speedy and efficient transmission of intelligence and other reports will be possible. This is in addition to other radio circuits provided to the Base Station.

b. The OSS Base Radio stations established in a theater of operations should handle traffic for all components or branches of the OSS. Separate base stations for SO, SI or other branches require duplication of frequencies, equipment and operating personnel and lead to unsatisfactory operating conditions.

c. The Communications Branch to be responsible for all radio and wire communication needs of the OSS in the theater of operations. Close liaison with the Signal Corps, Navy or other governmental communication agencies should be maintained by the Communication Branch in this connection.

d. Radio operating and other communication training, including the handling of codes and ciphers, should be standardized and included in the curriculum of OSS schools.

e. Army Service Schools should include, in their studies, a course on the OSS, its purpose, organization and methods of operating with the Army in the field.

Copies to:
Colonel Lawson
Lt. Colonel Booth

David Talley
David Talley
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps

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16.030
Field Report
J. J. David

8 January 1945

SUBJECT: Signal Communication for O.S.S. Units in European Theater of Operations

TO : Director, O.S.S., Washington, D.C.

1. a. Radio communication work in Special Force units attached to Army Group, Army and Corps Headquarters have been covered in previous reports. It is the aim of this letter to briefly outline specific recommendations for improving signal communications in any future O.S.S. work in the E.T.O. or in other theaters of operation.

b. The recommendations in this report are based both on personal observations in the field and from experience gained as Signal Officer to the American Director, I.M.P.F.I. (Col. Joseph Marshall) and as Deputy to the Chief Signal Officer, Special Force Headquarters (Mr.) This is in addition to my previous work with the Signal Corps, Hq. HQUA and as Radio Officer with V Corps Hq.

2. Efficient radio communication was an important factor in the successful accomplishment of the SO Branch mission in the European Theater of Operations. The Communication Branch, CGO, provided the base station radio facilities and the trained personnel in co-operation with the Chief Signal Officer, SOH (Mr.) Both American and British radio apparatus were utilized for this purpose. The field radio equipment used by SF Detachments attached to Army Group, Army Hq. or lower formations, and that used by agents, Redoubt Team and other field personnel was of either U.S. or British manufacture but based on similar engineering designs and standards.

3. a. Due to radio communication arrangements existing prior to the SO Branch assignment in the ETO, it was necessary for each field agent, Redoubt Team or mission on the Continent to have its individual radio link with the base or base station in England. The U.S. Detachments with the 15th Army Group and the several Army Hqs. likewise maintained their own radio circuits to Base Station SO-C in England.

b. Radio sets used by field personnel were of the portable "communication" type with a crystal control transmitter of 10-20 watts output power. The "one way" propagation properties were utilized to provide reliable radiotelegraph communication over 150-200 miles from the base station in England. The fact that these small suitcase radio sets worked so well is a tribute to the engineering and design skill of the Communication Branch.

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4. The following recommendations are made as per Par. 1 above:

a. Agents, Jedburgh Teams or similar OSS units operating in enemy territory should be provided with radio communication direct to the Army formation concerned with their work. Speedy and efficient transmission of intelligence and other reports will be possible. This is in addition to other radio circuits provided to the Base Station.

b. The OSS Base Radio stations established in a theater of operations should handle traffic for all components or branches of the OSS. Separate base stations for SO, SI or other branches require duplication of frequencies, equipment and operating personnel and lead to unsatisfactory operating conditions.

c. The Communications Branch to be responsible for all radio and wire communication needs of the OSS in the theater of operations. Close liaison with the Signal Corps, Navy or other governmental communication agencies should be maintained by the Communications Branch in this connection.

d. Radio operating and other communication training, including the handling of codes and ciphers, should be standardized and included in the curriculum of OSS schools.

e. Army Service Schools should include, in their studies, a course on the OSS, its purpose, organization and methods of operating with the Army in the field.

Copies to:
Colonel Leman
Lt. Colonel Smith

David Talley
Lt. Colonel, Signal Corps



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

16,025
Field report

TO : Acting Director ✓
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report from Lt. Joseph Charles


DATE: 26 January 1945

1. Attached is a report from Lt. Joseph Charles (RAA/ETO) which gives in some detail an account of his activities in the theater. Among this officer's duties in England was that of assessing and reporting the trends in British opinion. In this connection Lt. Charles comments that American officers would have done much to improve Anglo-American relations if they had accepted more invitations to speak or to appear at the various ceremonies to which they were invited.

2. His principal difficulty was conflict with the State Department and other American agencies reluctant to see OSS undertake the evaluation of Anglo-American relations. Similarly Lt. Charles reported that at times it was difficult to maintain good relations with the British. These difficulties, he adds, will probably tend to increase until after the next general election.

Attachment required
AS

Attachment



W. B. Kantack
 W. B. Kantack
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

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16.025

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~Field Report~~

Charles.

P.A.

FYO

12 January 1945

TO: Major General William J. Donovan
via Dr. William L. Langer *W.L.L. per. ltr.*

FROM: Lieutenant Joseph Charles, USMCR *J.C.*

SUBJECT: Field Report in accordance with
General Order No. 63

I have returned to Washington after having been out of the country for a little more than two years. All of this period except for travel time was spent in Great Britain. I was sent over as a civilian by R&A and was commissioned as a First Lieutenant 11 November 1943, but I was given permission by Colonel Bruce to remain in civilian clothes, so that my being in the service has not hampered my work.

My main assignment was to follow British opinion at both the informed and the popular levels, on topics which were of interest to R&A, Washington. Since I had been in London longer than most of the other R&A personnel there, and had more opportunity of meeting British officials and people prominent in public life than many of my associates, I undertook also to act as contact man, and to introduce my colleagues to various groups and individuals in Britain.

In addition to my specific assignment on Britain, I also aided in general work of the R&A office which had

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nothing to do with Britain. At one time I went for about six months without working on British materials at all, because of pressure of demands for work on the Continent, shortage of R&A staff, and apprehension lest my "political reporting" be regarded unfavorably by the United States Embassy in London.

My headquarters were at all times with R&A, London, but during the periods while I was chiefly engaged in following British affairs I travelled widely. I spent some time in Northern Ireland, and have been from Plymouth in Southwestern England to Thurso on the northern tip of Scotland. I was in every county of England except Rutland, and in all but two of the counties of Wales also. This travelling was usually done in connection with speaking, which proved my most effective means of following British opinion on the popular level.

My methods of following opinion in Britain were as follows:

- A. Covering press and periodicals.
- B. Attendance at important meetings and lectures at which questions of interest to R&A were discussed.
- C. Talks on American subjects, which were followed by questions from the floor and discussion.

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D. Tours of Britain with the Anglo-American Brains Trust.

E. Contacts with British officials, writers, and people prominent in British public life.

The parts of my work which were described under A and B require no additional comment, as they are obvious methods to follow. The methods of ascertaining British opinion by direct contact with people of all sorts over the whole United Kingdom are, however, of somewhat greater interest.

There was a constant stream of requests for American speakers on the United States. The level of interest all over Britain in America and Americans was extraordinarily high. Since I had taught American history and am particularly interested in Anglo-American relations, I was asked soon after I arrived in London to give talks on various American topics, and I was given permission by Shepard Morgan, who was then Chief of R&A, London, to give such talks. My connection with OSS was never mentioned at these lectures, and as a matter of fact was not known by the people introducing me. I talked before both service and civilian audiences, speaking usually for the English Speaking Union, the Ministry of Information, the British Army and Navy education programs, the Office of War

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information, and various local organizations. The audiences were of every sort and size. I have on the same day talked to a group of six men who were at an isolated gun site, and to an audience of twelve hundred men at a large British camp.

In addition to these talks, which gave me an excellent opportunity of getting the opinions of the British people on a great variety of subjects through the questions and discussions which followed each talk, I also appeared with the Anglo-American Brains Trust. This organization was made up of a group of men who visited both British and American military units and answered questions from the floor about Britain and America and the relations between the two countries. There was a group of about fifty to sixty men that we could draw on which was composed of American officers and officials and British officials and business men who knew America firsthand and were particularly interested in relations between the two countries. Five or six of us would go out for a single meeting, the majority being Americans if the meeting was with British troops or British if the meeting was for American troops. My work with the Brains Trust not only gave me additional opportunities for getting the reactions of people in the services on many of the current problems,

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but it also gave me several valuable contacts with British officials.

Few of my contacts with British officials and members of Parliament were made through official channels. This fact had the advantage that comparatively few of the people from whom I got information knew of my connection with OSS. In general my most valuable contacts were personal ones which it took some time to establish. Most of my informants with whom I maintained close personal contact must have had some idea of what I was doing, but I assume that they thought I would give the British side fully and fairly in reporting on points of friction between the two countries, and some of them occasionally sought me out to volunteer information.

As I have indicated above, my work fell into two parts, that dealing with Britain, which is my special field, and that in which I contributed to the general work of the London office. Since I have been engaged only in the former for some months now, and will presumably be engaged only in British work in the future, I will discuss only the British field in describing the general progress of work in which I was engaged. In order to cover this topic it is necessary to indicate the duties of the people who have been working with me.

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From my arrival in London January 1943 until June 1944 I had no assistance in the work of following British opinion except the part-time services of a P-1, who clipped and summarized significant articles in newspapers and periodicals. On 17 June Mrs. Phyllis LeRoy of the Africa Section, R&A, arrived in London in response to my request that she be sent over to follow British opinion on Colonial problems. After Mrs. LeRoy's arrival we arranged a division of labor, according to which I followed British opinion on matters relating to the Continent, to America, and to British internal politics, while she followed British opinion and policies with regard to all other parts of the world, but with her main attention devoted to the British Empire. In September 1944 Mrs. LeRoy and I were given an office of our own, which had not been possible before because of shortage of space. Shortly after that we were given an American secretary of our own for the first time. In November 1944 Lieutenant John Sparks, USNR, who had been in the Economics Section of R&A, London, joined our staff and has since been working with us on British problems. Lieutenant Sparks has been of great assistance in many ways, among them in aiding with speaking such as I have described above. He has recently received permission to wear civilian clothes and consequently he should be even more valuable in the future.

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As these remarks indicate, shortage of space, of staff, and in particular of secretarial help have at times severely hampered the prosecution of the work on Britain which might be done in London, but these particular handicaps have been largely overcome.

There is one aspect of the work which I have described which is worth some attention. Although I began giving talks for various British organizations with the sole view of getting first-hand contact with as large a number and as great a variety of the British people as possible. I soon became impressed by the importance of speaking as a contribution to good will between Britain and America. In the effort to maintain cordial relations with Americans in Britain, the British are in most instances the wooers and ourselves the wooed. When this state of things becomes too accentuated it works against cordial relations very noticeably. It seemed to me while I was in Britain that many American officers and officials stationed in Britain could have learned more about the country and could have done much to improve relations with the British had they accepted more invitations to speak or to appear at various ceremonies to which they were frequently invited. The task of enlightening the British people about America is an immense one, and I do

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not feel that a greater readiness on the part of Americans in Britain to explain America to the British would accomplish a great deal very soon, but if we gave evidence of greater willingness to meet the British half way in their efforts, the mere gesture would in itself be significant.

The main difficulties which confront a member of R&A in Britain who is attempting to report on British opinion and the probable direction of British policies stem from two quarters, namely, other American agencies and from the British themselves. All American agencies seem to be eager to get into some aspect of Anglo-American relations. Partly because of this tendency perhaps, the same people at the American Embassy in London seem to have a dog-in-the-manger attitude toward some aspects of the London work in which R&A, Washington, is interested. I have no suggestion for clearing up this aspect of the London situation which would be effective very soon. The question is one which depends ultimately on the general relations between OSS and the State Department. As they find us increasingly useful and as the personnel of the two organizations become better acquainted, the State Department will presumably give us better facilities, or perhaps even cooperation, in fields which they have previously wished to keep to themselves.

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The difficulties which any representative of R&A in London may have in getting the British to communicate freely with him depend first of all upon himself, his personality, background and general manner of approach. Even if these qualities are such as to make a favorable impression upon people from whom he hopes to get information, the amount that he can get will vary greatly from one time to another and from one topic to another. A number of people in London with whom I previously had good contacts have been incommunicative for the past six to eight months, a situation which will, I expect, continue for some time, as I presume that Anglo-American relations will grow more rather than less difficult until after the next general election.

The specific difficulties which I personally encountered in the field all came under the head of working conditions in the London office, which were changed as soon as more office space and personnel became available, or to the general difficulties arising out of relations with the State Department or with the British themselves, which I have described briefly above.

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~~SECRET~~Field Report

12 January 1945

TO: Major General William J. Donovan
via Dr. William L. Langer

FROM: Lieutenant Joseph Charles, USMC

SUBJECT: Field Report in accordance with
General Order No. 65

I have returned to Washington after having been out of the country for a little more than two years. All of this period except for travel time was spent in Great Britain. I was sent over as a civilian by NSA and was commissioned as a First Lieutenant 11 November 1943, but I was given permission by Colonel Bruce to remain in civilian clothes, so that my being in the service has not hampered my work.

My main assignment was to follow British opinion at both the informed and the popular levels, on topics which were of interest to NSA, Washington. Since I had been in London longer than most of the other NSA personnel there, and had more opportunity of meeting British officials and people prominent in public life than many of my associates, I undertook also to act as contact man, and to introduce my colleagues to various groups and individuals in Britain.

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- C. Talks on American subjects, which were followed by questions from the floor and discussion.

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**D. Ties of Britain with the Anglo-American
Brain Trust.**

**E. Contact with British officials, writers, and
people prominent in British public life.**

The parts of my work which were described under **i** and **j** require no additional comment, as they are obvious methods to follow. The methods of ascertaining British opinion by direct contact with people of all sorts over the whole United Kingdom are, however, of somewhat greater interest.

There was a constant stream of requests for American speakers on the United States. The level of interest all over Britain in America and Americans was extraordinarily high. Since I had taught American history and am particularly interested in Anglo-American relations, I was asked soon after I arrived in London to give talks on various American topics, and I was given permission by Shephard Smith, who was then Chief of ISA, London, to give such talks. My connection with OSS was never mentioned at these lectures, and as a matter of fact was not known by the people introducing me. I talked before both service and civilian audiences, speaking usually for the English Speaking Union, the Ministry of Information, the British Army and Navy education programs, the Office of War

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

✓
11 January 1945

16022
Field Report
Hochschild
X-2
EVO

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton
FROM: Roger A. Pfaff, Lt. Col., Inf.
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch
SUBJECT: Major Walter Hochschild's Report on
Overseas Activities

We are transmitting herewith Major Hochschild's report completed upon his return from overseas. It contains some interesting points and observations. Major Hochschild is leaving OAS to return to civilian life as vice-president of his company and is also securing a release from the armed forces.

Roger A. Pfaff
R.A.P.

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16.022

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 January 1945

TO: Lt. Col. Roger A. Pfaff
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

FROM: Major Walter Hochschild, AC

SUBJECT: Report on Activities

1. The undersigned joined the X-2 Branch in ETO on 15 February 1944. After a period of indoctrination and preliminary training I was placed in charge of the German Desk at the London Headquarters of X-2 and continued in that capacity until the 19th of August. The functions of the Desk consisted of the preparation of material for SHARP cards, analysis and interpretation of certain features of the German Intelligence Services, and preparation for field operation of the SCI units.
2. On 20 August I was ordered to proceed to the Continent where I joined the SCI Detachment which was attached to T Force, the latter operating under 12th Army Group. T Force entered Paris on the 25th of August, the day of its liberation. The activities of the SCI Detachment during the ensuing period contributed materially to the success of the T Force operations, a fact which was orally acknowledged by Colonel F. P. Tompkins who was at that time the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer, Lt. Col. M. C. Lyon.
3. On 5 September I was ordered to proceed with an SCI unit to Headquarters Third Army at Chalons-sur-Marne. We remained there until 8 September when we rejoined T Force at Verdun where they had moved from Paris and where they remained until 15 September. During this period there was no opportunity for SCI work but the CO, T Force assigned to me the mission of investigating a reported underground factory for the production of V-1 located at Thil on the Luxembourg border. The Detachment, of which I was in charge, arrived at Thil approximately six hours after the departure of the Germans. The factory was located and inspected and a report was made substantiating the fact that preparations were being made to manufacture large quantities of V-1 and recommending that air technical experts be sent forward immediately in order to make a thorough examination.

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4. On 13 September T Force moved its headquarters to Luxembourg where it remained until 10 October. On 16 September I was placed in command of an SCI unit and ordered to Nancy, arriving there the morning after its liberation. The Unit remained there for two days, operating as part as a T Force Detachment and then returned to Luxembourg. During the period of the Luxembourg operation the SCI Detachment again rendered valuable service to the T Force Mission.

5. On 10 October T Force moved to Spa, remaining there until 21 October when it moved to Remouchamps some nine miles west of Spa where it remained until the German counter-attack was launched on 16 December. During the early part of this period Aachen was captured by First Army. Although permission for T Force to operate as a unit in Aachen was not granted, the SCI Detachment was allowed to function from the day on which Aachen fell. This is eloquent testimony of the value placed upon SCI operations by the G-2 Sections of 12th Army Group and of the Armies. For a period of approximately ten days the SCI unit was active in Aachen and a substantial quantity of important documentary material was acquired and processed.

6. On 21 November I was ordered to proceed to Metz in command of an SCI unit which was to operate under G-2 of the Third Army. The Unit arrived there on the morning following the liberation of the city and was still in operation at the time of my departure on 25 December. The Metz operation was highly successful both as to personalities who were apprehended and as to documents captured. Amongst the latter were some Top Secret files of the greatest importance and value.

Remarks - There seems to be no doubt that the skepticism with which X-2 was at one time regarded by G-2 has been completely removed by the results accomplished by the ETO Branch Headquarters and its SCI unit operations since "D" Day. The intimate knowledge of the structure of the German Intelligence Services and its methods of operations which is possessed by X-2 has proved to be of the greatest value on innumerable occasions. The high regard for the functions which X-2 is capable of performing has been evidenced repeatedly; outstanding advocates of X-2 are Colonel Sands, Chief, CIB, G-2, 12th Army Group and Colonel Conrad, AC of S, G-2, Communications Zone, ETO.

It is the writer's suggestion that less stress be placed upon the language qualifications of officers selected for field duty with SCI units. While a knowledge of German or

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French, as the case may be, is valuable; it is by no means essential. It is almost always possible to secure the assistance of CIC personnel for interrogation or examination of documents. The most important and desirable qualifications for SCI officers consist of the following:

- a. Thorough knowledge of the German Intelligence Services structure and methods of operation.
- b. A comprehensive understanding of the operations and aims of X-2.
- c. Sound judgment in the evaluation of interrogation reports and documentary material.
- d. Calmness under pressure and first-class physical condition.
- e. Personality and the ability to get along with others.



Walter Moehschild
Major, AC

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OSS Form 4001
Rev. 27 44

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

TO	NAME	DATE	INITIALS
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	J. W. Anchinoloss		
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	A. W. Salloway		
	J. H. Desoyes		
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	A. L. Dart		
	H. H. Hamilton		
	L. R. Houston		
	C. S. McClelland		
	J. L. McDowell		
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This is a duplicate of a report
received from your office. The
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to the Acting Director.

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FIELD REPORTS-VOL IX
15,000
15,000

of

FIELD REPORTS

VOL. XII

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BOLTE, CHARLES G. 17,003	Field Photo	FETO	3.
BROWN, PAUL C. 17,007	Communic.	IB, CHINA	4.
JONES, NEWTON J. 17,008	Field Photo	FETO	5.
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GLEYSTEN, LT T.C. LYNN, CAPT. ROBT. B 17,012	SI	CHINA	7.
FULLER, EARL 17,013	SI	MEDTO	8.
CROSBY, HELEN 17,014	SI	ETO	9.
SUKER, CAPT. ORMAN 17,015	SI	YUGO	10.
CHRISTMAN, WILLIAM B. 17,016	SI	ETO	11.
GSTHINER, FRED N. 17,020	SI	ETO	12.
WHEELER, WILLIAM J. 17,023	Field Photo	ETO	13.
KELDER, MAJ. REX 17,027	R&D	MEDTO	14.
CLARK, LT. ELLENY 17,028	R&D	MEDTO	15.
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MARCH, HAROLD M. 17,038	SCH.&TRAIN.	MEDTO	20.
MILLER, LT. JAMES G. 17,039	SCH.&TRAIN.	ETO	21.
KAISER, STUART B. 17,040	SP.FUNDS	MEDTO	22.
GLEASON, FRANK A. 17,041	SO	SACO	23.
JURAN, LT. NATHAN H. 17,050	Field Photo	ETO	24.
ELSE, CAPT. GERALD F. 17,053	SI	MEDTO	25.
LEE, MAJ. THOMAS B. 17,059	X-2	ETO	26.
NICHOLS, OSGOOD 17,071	MO	ETO	27.
NEBBITT, PAUL 17,072	SI	ETO	28.
HORRICK, J.E. 17,073	Communic.Br.	CHINA	29.
MELION, A.L. JR. 17,081	SI	SPAIN, SWITZ.	30.
BETTER, LT.COL. R.W. 17,100	Field Photo	All theatres	31.
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CHRYSTOSTOMAS, CAPT. GEO. C. 17,141	COMMUNIC.	NETO	34.
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CARROLL, E.M. 17,143	SI	ETO	36.
JOOST, MAJ. S.B. 17,144	SI	FETO	37.
BOOKBINDER, LT. GEORGE 17,145	SI	MEDTO	38.
WALDBERG, PATRICK C. 17,146	SI	ETO	39.
DORFMAN, ISAIAH 17,147	SI	ETO	40.
PENDLETON, LT. WILLIAM 17,148	MU	MEDTO	41.
MORRY, EDWIN 17,149	SI	ETO	42.
CLINTON, DE WITT 17,150	SI	MEDTO	43.
HAWKINS, HARRIET 17,158	SI	MEDTO	44.
JENNINGS, LT. CDR. ROBERT 17,159	MO	ETO	45.
VINCIGUERRA, CAPT. STEPHEN P. 17,162	SI	ETO	46.
WILSON, THOMAS. S. 17,172	SI	ETO	47.
COX, ARTHUR 17,173	SI	MEDTO	48.
DONAH, LT. NICHOLAS 17,180	SI	MEDTO	49.
NICKHAM, MAJ. JOHN 17,181	SI	CHINA	50.

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[REDACTED]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 8 June 1945

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Sgt (P) E. J. Rader, USAR
(Field Photo/US-7th Army)

1. Specialist Rader's last assignment was to photograph GI tactical infiltrations on the 3rd and 45th Division fronts in France. Previously, in July, he covered the 2nd New Zealand Division and filmed its entry into Florence.

2. Improvements should be made in cooperation between GDS Supply Departments overseas and advanced units in the field. GDS personnel who held inferior ratings and whose work with advanced units puts them in contact with high-ranking officers should be given civilian status for the duration of their mission.

✓
S. P. Karlee
Lieut., WFF
Reports Office

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 23, 1945

To : Director, Office of Strategic Services
From : W. J. Rader, Sp1c (P), USNR
Field Photographic Branch
Via : Branch Chief
Field Photographic Branch

SECRET

Subject: Overseas duty from August 1942 until December 1944

1. Reported to Field Photographic Branch, OSS, London, England, on September 1, 1942.

2. On November 10, 1942 departed via ship from Liverpool to Algiers, North Africa, for duty at AFHQ, with the Army Pictorial Service, a branch of the Signal Corps. With the exception of the night of November 22, when our convoy was attacked by a large force of enemy bombers, I did not obtain any action pictures. Most of my duty while attached to Army Pictorial Service consisted of covering routine photographic assignments in and around Algiers. I made a short film in color on the native Spahi horse guard. This colorful group act as guards at the Governor General's palace at Algiers. Col. Zansuk used several scenes from this picture in his feature picture on the North African invasion. My duty terminated on December 22, 1943. Along with other members of the Branch, I sailed from Algiers on December 23, 1942. We arrived in London on January 2, 1943 and returned to duty with the Field Photographic Branch.

3. On January 12, 1943 I reported for duty with Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, Westward Ho, North Devonshire, Col. Courtney, British Army, Commanding. The unit consisted of three men. One man, C. W. Moran, CSP, USNR, remained in London at Combined Operations Headquarters. W. C. McEdwards, CSP, USNR, and myself were stationed permanently at the Experimental station. While stationed here we made eight feature length films for C.O.E.E. This involved the exposure of 135,000 feet of 35mm motion picture negative. We also made 3,000 4x5 still pictures. The work done here was mostly the coverage of all amphibious operations. The landing of tanks, guns, trucks, and all types of equipment from landing craft. The testing of various types of explosives against different types of enemy beach obstacles were photographed. Col. Courtney expressed his sincere thanks to our unit for our work with him and went on record to say that without our photographic aid the presentation of the work carried out there would have been most difficult. Our duty was completed on November 22, 1943. We returned to Field Photographic Branch, London, for further assignment.

Director, OSS

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SECRET

March 23, 1945

4. On March 10, 1944, I sailed from Avonmouth, England, for Algiers. This time for duty at 2677th Headquarters Co., OSS, (PROV). Emmett Vogan, Photo, USN, was assigned to this Headquarters with me. We took along 1,500 pounds of equipment. We arrived at Headquarters Co. on March 24, 1944. Vogan was dispatched to Caserta, Italy, with equipment to represent the branch there. I remained in Algiers. While there my duty consisted mostly of laboratory work. The reproduction of secret maps and documents obtained by agents in occupied countries, making photographic reductions of signal plans, and general photographic and reproduction work. On orders from Lt. H. Forbes, USNR, H. E. Hamlin, CPHOM, USNR, and I departed via plane on June 23 for Bari, Italy. Our mission was to film the activities of the Air Target Section and its work with the Air Corps. Due to several difficulties, this film was never made.

5. On July 16, 1944 Lt. Forbes ordered Hamlin and I to Caserta. Upon arrival we were told by Lt. Forbes that we were to join the 2nd New Zealand Division, and film their entry into Florence. On July 18 we departed for the OSS forward Company at Seina. While awaiting orders to join the New Zealand Division, Hamlin and I made a short film about the activities of the SI and MO Branches, and their use of Anti-Nazi German prisoners in operations behind enemy lines. The 2nd New Zealand Division, along with the South Africans and Eight Indian Divisions, entered South Florence on the morning of August 4. By a lucky turn of events, Hamlin, Vogan, two New Zealand Army cameramen, and I were able to infiltrate into the city about one hour before the advanced units of this great and colorful army arrived.

We narrowly escaped capture by entering Florence ahead of the Army. Because of having status of "war Correspondants, we were all unarmed. The motion pictures that we obtained, however, more than made this risk worth taking. These pictures which were filmed by Hamlin and I, in color and black and white, were turned over to the New Zealand Legation by Field Photographic Branch, Washington. As we were the first ones in the city, we were able to give the 2nd New Zealand G-2 a fairly comprehensive intelligence report regarding the remaining German positions there. This brief period of duty with such a gallant body of men was a most happy one, and I would welcome the chance to work with the New Zealanders again. On August 6 we returned to Seina and turned all exposed stock, including script notes, over to Lt. Forbes. On orders from Lt. Forbes, Hamlin and I returned to Bari to complete our duty there.

6. We departed from Bari for Caserta on August 17, 1944. On August 18, Vogan, Hamlin, and I departed via convoy for Southern France, debarking at St. Tropez, France. Upon contacting OSS Headquarters, we were ordered to proceed to the Forward Company, 888 G-2 at Marseilles, France. While en route Hamlin was seriously injured in a jeep accident. I managed to get both Vogan and Hamlin into an evacuation hospital. Vogan's injuries were slight, so we departed for Marseilles the next day, leaving Hamlin behind. We reported into 888 G-2 on August 27, 1944. The next day I departed for Grenoble to

SECRET

March 23, 1945

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Director, OSS

Upon arrival I contacted Mr. Dewitt Clinton, Team Captain. It was my desire to travel with the team and photograph the briefing and actual placing there to the lines of agents. A combined 45th and 3rd Division, SSS Combat Team was to penetrate from Bourgoin to Lons-le-Saunier, a distance of 125 miles. Lons was deep into enemy territory, and it was our job to contact resistance groups and place agents in villages along the road. I made a short film of this operation. Upon returning to OSS Headquarters at Grenoble, I was told that Vogel had been accidentally injured and had been returned to Italy. I was forced to carry on alone. I joined the 3rd Division, SSS Combat Team at the 3rd Division forward CP, Captain Robert Thompson commanding. I remained with Capt. Thompson until my duty was completed. I photographed several SSS short range intelligence missions while with the 3rd Division. Because the shortage of personnel which was caused by losses in action, I volunteered to remain with Capt. Thompson to help him in any way I could.

All of the SI personnel had received intensive training enabling them to do this type of work, and the painstaking efforts of Mr. John Niles and Lt. Poniatofsky who did so much to help a willing amateur was greatly appreciated by me. Besides filming the operations whenever possible, my work consisted of the training, briefing of agents, contacting resistance groups, and the actual placing of them to the lines.

I was on 11 operations with Capt. Thompson's group. I have worked with several branches of the OSS in the field, but I firmly believe my duty with the French SI was by far the most productive, and I hope to continue with them in the future. Col. Gamble, Commanding Officer, SSS G-2 7th Army, was most cooperative, and it was by his sincere cooperation and all around kindness that did much to aid me in photographing the operations of the SI Branch which has been made into a film by the Field Photographic Branch under the title of "SI in Action". I departed from SSS G-2 7th Army for London via Paris on November 10, 1944, arriving in New York on December 22, 1944. I reported at Field Photographic Branch, Washington, on December 26, 1944.

7. Cooperation between OSS Supply Departments overseas and advanced units in the field could be improved. It was virtually impossible to secure much needed supplies from the Supply Department while stationed in Algiers. This was repeatedly experienced while I was with the SI Branch in France. At one critical period our operations were virtually brought to a complete standstill, because of the inability to receive much-needed operational supplies from the Supply Officer at the SSS Forward Headquarters CO.

Because of the shortage of personnel and the rapid advance of the 7th Army, it was impossible to send any men back to Headquarters to pick up much needed supplies. These supplies were on hand at SSS Headquarters.

Director, OSS

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SECRET

March 23, 1945

Living conditions and messing facilities for enlisted personnel in the STO, and especially in NATO, run from good to very bad. Conditions in Bari, for example, were quite good. The enlisted men had a nice club where drinks were served, and a well-equipped recreational room. On the other hand, living conditions at Caserta for enlisted personnel were very bad. Such conditions only aid in dampening morale. It is understood, of course, that one cannot expect any luxuries while in a combat zone, but it would help if the bare necessities could be provided.

8. I have spent many hours in explaining to the American Army and Allied personnel just what a "sailor" was doing so far away from a ship. In France I discarded all Naval insignia and was listed as an Official War Photographer, knowing only too well the thorough means used by German Intelligence Officers in Prisoner of War interrogation. I resorted to this ruse in case of capture. It has proved most difficult for an enlisted man to work with Allied high officials. It would be a great help if OSS personnel who held inferior ratings and who work with advanced units and who constantly come in contact with high-ranking allied officers and civilians, be put on civilian status for the duration of their missions. I was given this status while working with the French SI and it proved a great help in every way.

W. J. Rader

W. J. Rader
Sp1c(P), USNR

[REDACTED]

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: **CWO Robert E. Phee, USNR**
(Field Photo Unit)

DATE: 8 June 1945

17000
Field Report
x Rhea, Chet R
x CBI
x Field Photo

Chief Photographer Phee is a veteran of the North African campaign and in October 1944 was decorated for his work in Burma. He last served on Field Photo Unit #23.

Shawlin
S. F. Karlow,
Lieut., USNR
Reports Office

Attachment

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 24 March 1945

VIA: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

FROM: Chief Photographer Robert R. Rhea, S(I), USNR
Member of Field Photo Unit #23 - CBI

SUBJECT: Reports from Officers Returning from Field

1 December 1943 - Arrived at Hq. Det. 101. Parachuted into Kothhead Group 18 December 1943. Stayed with and photographed activities of Kothhead Group until 18 March 1944.

Joined Merrill's Marauders (Provisional Unit 5307) 18 March 1944, and remained with them until 24 May 1944 after the fall of Myitkyna Air Strip. Came out at that time because all equipment and film were wet.

5 July 1944 accompanied Lt. Comdr. Pier to Shadup (General Stillwell's Combat Headquarters) to see Colonel Peers for further assignment for myself and Spl/c (P) Wesley Barry. I was assigned to activities of #101's Light Planes. Spent four weeks accompanying Sgt. Pilots K. T. Anderson, Pavlenchik, and Waller on every mission they flew, which resulted in a one-reel motion picture entitled "Burma Butterfly". Went to Trincassala 30 August 1944. Shot stills of types of landing boats and native craft collected there for NW. Made some 16mm movies of NW preparations for missions with Royal Navy.



12 December 1944 - back to Hq. Det. #101. 1 January 1945 left Calcutta for United States. 12 January 1945 arrived in Washington.

Our job was to record in pictures activities of Det. 101 in India-Burma and AQ4 in Ceylon; air, sea, and land. We also covered related military operations such as Wingate-Coekran Expedition, Lode Road, Merrill's Marauders, etc. For further information covering activities suggest you refer to Overseas Return Report of Charles G. Balte 2, Lt. S(I), USNR.

The suggestions I could have made about improvements would have concerned supply of fresh film stock monthly and reports as soon as possible to the man in the field on results of his work, but from what I have learned since being back, these difficulties have been overcome.

Robert R. Rhea
ROBERT R. RHEA
Chief Photographer, S(I), USNR

SECRET



Top ↑

To: Dr. McGowan

Please look at the sugges-
tion here.

Recommendation #2
agrees to me noted.
F.L.H.C.

21 June 1945
Director's Office

Even No.

Exposure is 1/35 @ f.6.3

Top ↑

To
Jan McInerney
Please look
in the register
line D

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

DATE: 6 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Charles G. Bolte 2, USNR
(Field Photo/FPO)

1. Chief of Field Photo Unit #23 whose mission was to photograph OSS activities in China, Burma, and India.

2. Recommends monthly maintenance checks for cameras; criticizes Washington's recruiting policy of promising immediate promotion upon arrival in the theater and then failing to live up to these promises, and also criticizes the policy of not informing the men of the exact nature of their field duties prior to their departure from the U. S. Suggests that for reasons of health and efficiency personnel in FPO be permanently replaced at from 12 to 18 months or returned to U. S. every 12 months for a 30-day furlough.

3. Attached is a narrative history of FP Unit #23 for the History Project.

Shawlow
S. P. Karlow,
Lieut., USNR
Reports Office

Attachment

SECRET

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 April 1945

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building

VIA: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

FROM: Charles G. Bolte 2, Lieut., S(I) USNR
Former CO, Field Photo Unit #23, CBI Theater

SUBJECT: Report Requested from Officers Returning from Overseas

1. MEMORANDUM

a) Reference is made to my report of 20 November 1944, entitled "Narrative History, Field Photo Unit #23, Period September 1943 to September 1944", forwarded to the Director of History Project. This is a comprehensive outline of the field activities in India, Burma, and Ceylon, performed by Field Photo Unit #23, and is attached as Enclosure 1. This enclosure will reveal the field duties and activities of Field Photo Unit #23, locations, and dates.

b) Among projects covered by still and motion picture cameras were: Complete operations of Detachment #101; Amphibious operation "Sugar Leaf II" (NU Submarine Operations from Kandy, Ceylon); Operations of Detachment #404; the jungle drive of Merrill's Marauders from Shadnag to Myittha, Burma; the second Wingate Long Range Penetration into Burma from Maitakandi and Lalaghat in Assam; the operations of Second Troop Carrier from Dinjan, Assam into Burma targets.

c) Completed are: "Preview to Assam" (activities at Assam base, Det. #101); "Camera Report #1" (#101 operations in air and at Burma agent camps); "Burma Butterfly" (story of rescue, evacuation of wounded, and supply operations of Det. 101's Light Plane Squadron); "Chained" (jungle trek of Merrill's Marauders). These are one-reel motion pictures. Prints are available at Washington Office, Field Photographic Branch.

d) Also complete are five still photographic albums; three on general activities and personnel of Detachment #101; one on Schools and training program of Det. #101; and one titled "Medical Report, Detachment #101". The latter two are being forwarded to Washington for reproduction.

e) Four additional motion picture subjects are now in process in Washington. Additional photo albums are being prepared by Field Photo Unit #23 replacements at Det. #101.

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Director-2

19 April 1945

2. CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPROVED

a) During the first year of our overseas service, September 1943 to September 1944, there was a distressing shortage of supplies, particularly for 101 operations. Fortunately, the photographic unit had ample supplies on its arrival, both photographic supplies and personal gear.

b) Cameras, raw film stock, printing paper, lenses deteriorated rapidly during the monsoon seasons. Despite the efforts of two excellent and well-equipped camera repairmen, it was virtually impossible to keep our cameras in A-1 operating condition.

In the future, it is recommended that photographers on jungle assignments turn their cameras in for a monthly maintenance check. The exchange of a reconditioned camera for a field camera should be effected in the field to avert loss of time in photographic operation.

Further, it is recommended that photographers operating in "weather problem" areas carry only small amounts of raw stock for their cameras - new stock to be supplied at intervals as needed.

c) Excessive heat made it difficult for us to maintain developing fluids at a constant temperature of 68 degrees. Thus, our still photographic work was slow per unit until the arrival of a refrigerator eleven months after we reached the theater.

At this writing, the still photograph processing plant at "B" Camp, Nasira base, Detachment #101, is complete. Air conditioning and refrigeration have materially reduced the problems caused by weather.

d) Personnel of Field Photo Unit #23, and of Detachment #101, performed superbly under the most trying conditions.

3. SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES

a) A valid criticism is made of the recruiting policies (in Washington) of OSS for Detachment #101. In the field numerous cases were encountered wherein enlisted personnel had been promised immediate field promotions on their arrival in the theater. Failure or inability to follow through on these promises caused dissension among the men.

It is also true that many of the men had been inadequately or misinformed as to the exact nature of their field duties prior to their departure from the United States.

b) In this theater malaria is endemic and epidemic. Personnel are subject to cholera, dysentery, typhus, and a host of other tropical diseases. Diet is restricted. All types of infections spread rapidly. Body rashes and skin ulcers are common.

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Director-3

19 April 1945

c) Personnel must operate at peak efficiency in a climate which produces excessive heat during the 18 week long monsoon rains which sometimes log over 200 inches a year.

d) After personnel has served roughly twelve months in the theater, there is a marked increase in the incidence of periods of depression, morbidity, and general emotional instability. These signs of mental deterioration are manifest even to a layman.

Therefore, it is recommended that:

- (1) Personnel be replaced permanently at from 12 to 18 months; or
- (2) Personnel be returned to the United States every twelve months for a thirty (30) day furlough.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles G. Bolte 2

CHARLES G. BOLTE 2
Lieut., S(I) USNR

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20 November 1944

TO: DIRECTOR OF THE HISTORY PROJECT

FROM: THEATER COMMANDER, FIELD PHOTO UNIT #23, OSS., Wash.D.C.

SUBJECT: Narrative history, Field Photo Unit #23; Period, September 1943 to September 1944.

REMARKS: Since Unit #23 is but a segment of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, it seems advisable to write this in narrative style with emphasis on points stressed in the formal suggested outline.

Unit #23 was activated in the summer of 1943; its mission, to record with stills and motion pictures the activities of OSS in China, Burma and India.

There were nine men in the original group:

Lt. Comdr. Kenneth M. Pier, Motion Picture Sound Engineer
Twentieth Century Fox, sailing master, radioman, mechanic;
veteran of Pacific and North African campaigns.

Lt. Guy Balto, writer-director OSM-OVI movie shorts, "Bomber",
"Japanese Relocation", "Lake Carrier", former radio writer.

W/O Robert R. Rhee, veteran Hollywood cameraman, veteran of
the North African campaign.

Cap Charles R. Bohmy, veteran Hollywood cameraman.

Sgt 1/c Robert R. Beato, Hollywood special effects man; pat-
tern maker, carpenter, mechanic.

Sgt 1/c Theodore S. Vucelja, still man, ass't Mitchell camera
operator. Veteran of South Pacific and Australia.

Sgt 2/c Wesley E. Barry, former Ass't Director, Hollywood.
Still man, small motion picture camera operator.

Sgt 2/c Harry A. Martin, former Hollywood Technicolor laboratory
man; ass't Mitchell camera operator; veteran of South Pacific
and Australian campaign.

Sgt 1/c John E. Smith, still camera and laboratory man; ass't.
Mitchell camera operator.

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(2) History, Field Photo Unit #23

Sp 1/c Arthur J. Meehan, laboratory technician, still man.

In preparation for the mission, the crew went through commando school and received in Field Photo classes special instruction on photographic conditions in CBI.

Commander John Ford, Director of the Field Photographic Branch and W/O Jack Pennick embarked with the men from New York on September 21, 1943. With them they carried two vehicles with trailers and 11 tons of equipment which included personal gear, complete still and motion picture camera equipment, sound equipment, still laboratory equipment, repair kits, portable field developing kits; printing paper, raw stock and miscellaneous items.

Commander Ford's purpose in joining the expedition was to make a quick survey of the theater before moving on to the European theater. Lt. Cmdr. Pier and Lt. Bolte proceeded the crew to CBI via air. On arrival in Calcutta Lt. Cmdr. Pier opened contacts in Calcutta and in nearby military areas while Lt. Bolte proceeded to the headquarters of Detachment #101 at Masira, Assam. There he attended schools and training classes, surveyed camps, read confidential reports, flew operational flights over Northern Burma in preparation for a script outline of the complete activities of Det. #101.

Commander Ford and the crew arrived in Calcutta on November 21 after a 61 day voyage via the Panama Canal to Australia, Ceylon, then Calcutta. At Tollygunge Col. Bifler briefed the crew, gave them the background of #101, told them about operational conditions, what they were expected to do in Assam and Burma. Later the men were sent via train to Masira where they were installed temporarily at "B" camp.

When Commander Ford arrived at the headquarters of #101, the script, a rough outline of the operations of #101, was ready for his inspection. After a conference between Commander Ford, Lt. Col. Peers (Col. Bifler's Executive Officer) and Lt. Bolte, the script was revised and approved.

Meanwhile the crew moved the gear to "B" camp, the permanent Field Photo Base. Necessary repairs to the bungalow were begun and plans laid for the construction of a still laboratory, repair shop, and storage vault.

Shooting on the master picture started at dawn on December 26 at the Shwong Bridge since the introduction of the picture called for atmospheric background shots of India. Being shooting first camera. Prior to this, Bob Mee was parachuted in to Captain Vincent Carl's advance camp in Burma to photograph operations in motion pictures and stills. This parallel shooting operation was planned in order to shorten the length

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(3) History, Field Photo Unit #23

of the shooting schedule (set roughly April 15, 1944).

Shortly after the first of the year, Sp2/c Harry Martin was assigned to accompany Lt. Larsen and a group of agents to another location in Burma. From Fort Hertz, they walked in to the camp of Lt. Commander J. Luce.

During this period Sp2/c Wesley Barry was sent to Ceylon to photograph the building of OSS installations there.

While Beebe and Meehan carried on construction at the "G" camp bungalow, the first camera crew of Bohay, Swain and Varalyay, directed by Lt. Bolte, continued to photograph background shots.

During this period, the tonnage of supplies dropped into Burma was increasing rapidly. Several agent groups were on the trail. New interior bases were being established. Photographers were assigned in rotation to accompany the #101 drop wallah, Lt. Tom Riley in each flight mission over Burma. By this method, every man in the crew received combat flight experience... Burma terrain, supply and personnel drops were photographed from the air and from the ground (by Rhea and Martin).

On 18 Jan. 1944 three Second Troop cargo planes enroute to Lt. Comdr. Luce were attacked by a formation of 18 Zeros and shot down. Two crashed in flames near the camp of Lt. Comdr. Luce. Martin was dispatched immediately to rescue possible survivors, identify and bury the dead, photograph the operation.

The third plane flew for several minutes after the action before crashing. Its exact whereabouts was unknown. #101 patrols were alerted. Approximately three days after the attack, word came to the #101 base at Mawla (via radio) that the plane had been discovered. Lt. Bolte was dispatched with Pharmacist's Mate James Cloyd to Fort Hertz to join Lt. Ted Barnes in a rescue mission. Enroute to the third plane, they met its pilot coming out unhurt. Five days from the plane, they found the injured radio man who had been brought to a British outpost. This plane was found, its dead identified and buried. Of the 23 aboard the three planes, the pilot and radio man of the third were the only survivors. In this action Sp1/c Arthur J. Meehan (photographer) lost his life together with five other men of Detachment #101.

Lt. Bolte returned to base. Rhea and Martin remained to continue photographing jungle activities. At the Asean base the first camera crew completed its background studies and began work on #101 base installations, administrative, operations and communications personnel, then progressed to schools and training work with students in isolated camps at the base.

During this period, Lt. Comdr. Pier returned to #101 from amphibious operations below Calcutta. After reviewing progress, he determined to increase #101 Field Photo personnel. Two men, Cpl A. B. Williams and Sp1/c Rodney Youle, were assigned duty with Commanders

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(4) History, Field Photo Unit #23

Miles in Chungking, were brought down from China and a third, Spl/c Gerald Titus, was brought up to Assam from Calcutta where he had been serving as a camera equipment purchasing and expediting agent for Pac 15, of the Royal Observer's Office. Williams and Yould were photographers...Titus, a camera repair man.

On the eve of General Orde Wingate's second long range penetration of Burma, Williams and Yould were dispatched to Hailakandi to photograph the operations of Col. Philip Cochran's air group which was to support the penetration.

During this period General Merrill's Marauders started their thousand mile drive south to Myithyina (walking miles not air). Since their path lay roughly through the area patrolled by Lt. Comdr. Luce's men where W/O Nhee was working, it was determined to send him to intercept and join one of Merrill's columns. This he did, having completed the section of the master #101 film assigned to him.

During this period the first camera crew completed its work at #101, moved to Dinjan, Assam where it photographed arrival and departure of several troop planes carrying #101 drops. Bomber and fighter plane activities were also covered to fit in with the final sequence of the rough outline. Cargo flights were made, then the group, now augmented by Barry who had been recalled from Ceylon, moved to Port Hertz for further work. From Hertz, Barry and Barry drove to La Amag /a and below to cover the fall of Imphal, which was besieged by General Wavell's forces.

The first camera crew then returned to the Assam base where it was assigned to make pickup shots of training activities. Yould and Williams returned from Hailakandi at the finish of the Cochran air show after Wingate's men had established the road block below Myithyina. Martin was assigned to escort Japanese prisoners to Assam from Lt. Comdr. Luce's Burma base.

This assignment completed, he returned to the Assam base.

Shortly thereafter #101 was assigned the job of landing a group of men on an island off Ceylon in Japanese-held waters for reconnaissance. Owing to his previous experience with the British on a similar operation, Lt. Comdr. Kenneth Pier (now Chief of the Maritime Unit Operations) was put in charge. Spl/c Harry Martin accompanied the group to Ceylon to photograph the training period which included jungle and surf work. Martin accompanied the rescue group to the island in a British submarine, went ashore as a photographer-guard. Lt. Comdr. Pier remained aboard the sub to direct the operation. At the end of ten days the submarine took the group off the beach and returned to Ceylon where the shore party was hospitalized.

Lt. Comdr. Pier returned to the Assam base, took Nhee and Barry back to Burma to photograph the stage at Myithyina. Barry photographed the work of #101 patrols which intercepted escaping Myithyina defenders while

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(5) History, Field Photo Unit #23

Rhee worked with #101 Light Plane Squadron which was bringing Kachin nurses in to Dr. Seagrave's hospital at Myitkyina, evacuating wounded and rescuing wounded crew members of crashed American combat planes.

Lt. Belte relieved Lt. Comdr. Pier at Myitkyina. There he was joined by Varalyay and Swain. Barry was sent down the Irrawaddy to work with Lt. Martin at a new camp. Varalyay flew to Kwik and walked with a company of Kachins under Major Joost, down to Sina.

Lt. Belte, Swain and Rhee returned to the Assam base. Cap's Bohny and Williams relieved them at Myitkyina. After the fall of Myitkyina, Bohny returned to base... Williams remaining behind to photograph the installation of the new #101 base at Myitkyina.

Shortly before September 1, 1944, Lt. Comdr. Pier took Rhee, Martin and Swain to Ceylon to start photographic operations there.

CITATIONS:

Sy 1/c Arthur J. Nechan	Posthumous Purple Heart
Lt. Comdr. Kenneth Pier	Bronze Star
W/O Robert Randolph Rhee	Bronze Star
Sy 2/c Harry R. Martin	Bronze Star
Lt. Guy Belte, Recce for	Air Medal
Capt Charles Bohny, Recce for	Air Medal

COMMENTS:

Owing to its assistance in the rescue of air corps personnel, Field Photo Unit #23 was included in a blanket commendation for #101 from Brig. Gen'l Earl S. Hoag, Commanding Officer, India-China Wing, Air Transport Command. During this period it is estimated that #101 facilitated the rescue of over 50% of air corps personnel downed in Burma.

CONCLUSION:

In the final analysis, the motion and still pictures will tell the story of #101 - also serve as a yardstick to determine whether or not the work of Field Photo Unit #23 (during the year September 1943 to September 1944) has been successful.

SECRET

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(s) History, Field Photo Unit #23

If it has been successful, the success is due largely to the guidance and cooperation of the staff of Detachment #101, particularly Lt. Col. Peers under whom we served a greater part of the year.

Too much cannot be said for the work of the crew - all members of the United States Naval Reserve, average age 34, who - in a years time, produced some of the most unique film footage ever recorded.

Lt. Charles G. Bolte 2
D-V(S) USNR for
Lt. Comdr. K. M. Pier

SECRET

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director's Office

DATE: 23 June 1945

FROM : Major Willis

SUBJECT: Overseas Report of Paul Brown's

The attached report, which was read by Colonel Leeman and myself, illustrates clearly the problems encountered when thorough clearance of all theater authorities concerned is not obtained prior to the launching of a given project. A great deal of indecision existed during the eighteen months planning for the installation of MB broadcasting stations in the Far East.

Mr. Brown was taken from KCA by our special request in order to undertake this work for MB, but owing to circumstances beyond our control, not perhaps those of MB also, he languished on a list in our Branch for over a year awaiting final decision as to where these transmitters could be installed. This whole operation proved a rather sad chapter from our point of view, but I believe it does emphasize the importance of tying up loose ends of any contemplated project into a neat tight package before they are brought to our Branch to be executed from a technical end. It is water over the dam now, and we have probably all profited by the experience.

Attachment

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 18 June 1945

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Paul Brown
 Comm. / IB and China

17,049

Field Report
+ Brown, Paul

1. Mr. Brown travelled to Karachi, Kunning
 and Calcutta from January 1945 through May 1945 to
 survey the need for radio transmitter installations.

Note: He has sent me by air to make the
 actual installation - not survey the need
 for them.

S.K.
S.P.R.

Attachment

To make with
 any note
 for comment

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 29 May 1946

TO : Office of the Director
 VIA : Chief, Communications Branch
 FROM : Mr. Paul C. Brown

SUBJECT: Trip to India-Burma and China Theaters

1. Left Washington January 22, 1946 and arrived February 20, 1946 after a delay of 6 days in Camp Miler, Karachi for reallocation. Immediately upon arrival, I contacted the MO Branch and found that there was nothing in view for the immediate present as far as radio transmitter installations were concerned. However, the MO Branch was negotiating with the British for the use of a 5 KW RCA Short Wave Transmitter located about one hour's ride from the MO Office. After some delay, we visited this Transmitter and found that it was poorly installed and needed a number of parts before it would be ready for service. During this time, Lt. Withrow was trying to get permission for the MO operation of this Transmitter from both the British and American authorities. This however, did not materialize and a discussion between Lt. Withrow, Colonel McGee and General Timberman followed and it was agreed that there would be no British and American joint operation.

2. On April 4, 1946, I left for Kunming expecting to start the installation of the RCA 7½ KW Transmitter for the MO Branch. After a delay of two or three days, I arranged a meeting with Lt. Auchincloss, Major Swenson, Major James, Lt. Colonel Deering and Colonel Heppner. It was found that MO at that time (April 6) had been misinformed as to the permission required and had only verbal o.k. on the matter. Steps were immediately taken to secure the necessary permission.

3. An examination was made of the transmitter equipment in Kunming and it was found that much of the necessary equipment had not yet arrived;

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

29 May 1945

and that the major part of that already there, was stored out of doors because of lack of storage space. The immediate prospects of installing the transmitter were nil because necessary building construction had not yet been commenced; and the prospects of finishing same within 3 months were very poor. It was decided that the best thing to do was to return to Calcutta and possibly be of help to the MO Branch which was considering the installation of a 5 KW RCA Transmitter in the Signal Corps compound. Accordingly, I left Kunning on April 12 and discussions were started for the installation of said transmitter.

4. Sometime had been spent in trying to design an adequate electric fence to serve as a security measure for a camp in the progress of installation by MO outside Calcutta. Not long afterwards, I was informed that the 2nd, 5 KW RCA Transmitter which MO had hopes of securing from the British was being installed by the British in their own compound for their own purposes. This eliminated the chance of any transmitter installation work as far as the CBI Theater was concerned for at least 3 months. As a result of this, Lt. Colonel Porter and myself decided that it would be better for me to return to the States, the reason being that a number of men were already enroute to Kunning who had experience in this type of installation. 1. Accordingly, I left Calcutta 11 May for Washington.



(STANDARD FORM NO. 64)

Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 13 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Sp 1/a (P) Raydon J. Jones
(Field Photo/210, P180)

From August 1944 on, studied and taught methods of disguise by the use of makeup. Developed "War Paint" which OSS men in Burma found so successful that Col. Peers ordered Jones' return to the U. S. to expedite the production of the paint and to introduce it to the U. S. Army. A training film was made illustrating its use.

S.P.I.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 May 1945

To: Director, Office of Strategic Services
Administration Building

Via: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

From: Newton J. Jones, Sp1c(P), USNR
Field Photographic Branch

Subject: Overseas Returnee Report

Assignment on Disguise

1. 28 August 1944 to London. Contacts were made through Major Watts Hill with British Intelligence. There methods of disguise were thoroughly studied, techniques exchanged, and sources of supply established.
2. Demonstration on Quick Changes and Temporary Disguise were given instructors and students at "Milwaukee." Classes were held and students tailed on problems. None were recognized or suspected.
3. Trained an instructor to carry on as thoroughly as time would permit.
4. Wrote the training manual "Personal Disguise" based on the following:
 - a. Six years motion picture makeup experience.
 - b. Study and development of established British methods.
 - c. Application and development of proved expedients used by men in the field.
5. Photographic illustrations were made and returned with the sixty-five page manuscript to Field Photographic. Lt. Kellogg followed through and Reproduction printed it. As far as I know it is the only manual of its kind.

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Director, Office of Strategic Services - 2

6. In October, Major Hill returned to the States. I was ordered to India.

7. Left 1 November 1944 for 101.

Comment: The work was excellently received by officers and men in the field. Major Louis D. Cohen can verify this. Cooperation was complete.

My only criticism is that I was ordered to India too soon. Classes at "Milwaukee" were just beginning to really roll and I left with some misgivings due to the instructor's lack of a background of experience to meet new situations.

8. November 16 reported to Major Sam G. Lucy at 101 in Assam. Contact was made with Captain Michael Georges and his staff. It was soon determined that the methods of disguise used in the ETO do not apply in the Far East. "War Paint" was developed, tested and at Colonel Peer's request furnished and dropped in to our men in Burma. This phase is best described in the attached letter of commendation by Captain Georges.

9. During classes in Assam and Burma, instructing native and white students in the use of this skin color, wrote and photographed a training film in color showing why and how war paint is used.

10. Colonel Peer ordered my return to the states to expedite the production of 3,000 units of war paint for our men and to introduce the item to the Army. To establish a supply there until this order could be filled, left formula and raw materials with one of Major Lucy's men and taught him how to mix the colors.

11. Left Assam 1 March 1945. Stops were made in Calcutta and Ceylon where the item was demonstrated and officers trained in its application.

12. Arrived in Washington 12 March 1945.

Comment: Complete cooperation all along the line, both officers and men. Major Lucy and Captain Georges especially helpful.

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Director, Office of Strategic Services - 3

Since returning the training film has been cut, narration recorded, and prints are now being made.

Arrangements for kits were made through Mr. McHugh. Necessary items for the kits were collected; then flew to Factor's laboratories on the coast where formulae and machines were adjusted, a hair-blackener developed, and containers filled.

The complete kits are now being assembled at Field Photo - graphic.

Newton J. Jones
Newton J. Jones
Sp1c(P), USNR

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C
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P
Y

DETACHMENT 101
SCHOOL HEADQUARTERS

16 February 1945

Subject: Letter of Commendation

To: Commanding Officer, Field Photographic Branch
O.S.S., Washington, D.C.

1. Newton J. Jones, Spl/c(P), 564-94-09, USNR, has been assigned to this Detachment since 16 November 1944 to date and has been attached to the R & D Branch, while experimenting with camouflage materials. During that time, he has developed a compound known as "War Paint".

2. Although the plan for its use was conceived in the States, a great deal of work remained to be done in order to obtain the proper color and consistency in the substance and thus make its use applicable in the field where American officers and enlisted men operated with native troops. Towards this end, Jones enlisted my aid and began experimenting with the students engaged in training here. These included Burmans, Karens, Shans, Gurkhas, Kachins, and various other groups. His plan was to produce one, possibly two formulas that covered all of these groups when the "Paint" was applied to the skin in various amounts.

3. After much experimentation with the students, and consultations with officers and men in the forward areas, the product known as "War Paint" was developed. It has proved very popular with students leaving this school for operations in the field. They feel that with the instruction they have received from Jones in quick make-up, and the use of the paint any occasion that would arise where a quick change was necessary would be easily met. The American officers and men who go through the Orientation Course given here take the substance with them into the field without exception.

4. It is my belief that Jones has done a commendable job in developing "War Paint" and it is my firm opinion that it will save the lives of many American personnel now operating with native troops simply because their light skin, covered with this substance, will not cause them to stand out from their group and thus offer the Jap sniper an easy target. I am also of the opinion, from my contact with him for the past several months that he is definitely officer material.

/s/ Michael P. Georges, Capt., Inf.
School, Commandant

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****TO : The Director****DATE: 13 June 1945****FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office****SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Sp 1/c (P) Spencer L. Ballibarger
(Field Note/P)**

Sp. Ballibarger served in the China Theater from June 1943 to May 1945, working behind the lines in Jap-held territory for the U. S. Naval Group at Chungking.

SK
S.P.I.

Attachment

612
JUN 13 1945
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

19009

Field Report

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 22 May 1945

VIA: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

FROM: Spl/a (P) George L. Hallibarger, USNR

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report

On 23 March 1943 I left Washington, D.C. on temporary duty orders to report to the Commander, U. S. Navy Group, Chungking, China, such temporary duty to be indefinite. I arrived in Chungking on 20 June 1943 and was assigned to CSp (P) Robert Eastman and CSp (P) A. E. (Daddy) Williams of Field Photographic Branch. Our job was to construct a small darkroom and turn out copies of maps, charts, stolen enemy documents, etc., for Commodore Miles of U. S. Navy Group, Commander in Chief of all U. S. Navy personnel in China.

Until 25 December 1943, to the best of my knowledge, OSS was under Commodore Miles of the Navy. At that time General Donovan arrived in Chungking and took over OSS and started their own office. My orders were transferred and again I was back with OSS in Chungking. I sat around for the following three months doing absolutely nothing. OSS did not have the equipment in China to do any work. What photographic materials there were picked up by Lt. Comdr. Kenneth Pier and taken to Camp 101, OSS, in Burma. He left orders to start a school for agents, but since there was no equipment to carry out this order, I refused, so was given no jobs whatever.

On 7 May 1944 I learned that Commodore Miles was planning a trip to the Coast of China. Lt. Col. Arden Dow, OSS, talked me into asking the Commodore like going with him. On 10 May 1944 I was transferred back to Commodore Miles for work. I went by truck on 20 May 1944 to Kueiyang, Kweichow, Kweichow, and at Chien Yang, I met the Commodore again. From here we traveled together to Kungling by truck and by river boat down the Wu River to Foochow, taking pictures of the river and the types of craft on the river.

I arrived in Foochow 12 May 1944 and waited around for the next few days, getting a little gear together. While in Foochow I made pictures of docks, harbor areas, Standard Oil's old compound, etc.

On 25 May 1944 I started with the Commodore down the river from Foochow by motor boat to the straits. Here we made pictures of the entrance to Foochow Bay, also pictures of Jap Island, occupied by the Japs, and then started sailing on down the Coast of China, taking pictures in proximity of the entire Coast Line, of beachhead, air base possibilities, sea plane base, harbors, and sanctuaries, Fukien Sound, Hsiao Pootai, Hsiao Pootai, Quanyang, Little Quanyang, and of Amy Island, all Jap held territory. Pictures showed

SECRET

Director, OSS-2

22 May 1945

their airplane bases, seaplane bases, inside of Amoy Harbor, radio stations, power house, hospitals, submarine base, garrisons, etc. On 2 July 1944 we finished our work and I took my film back to Kanchow and from there took a plane back to Calcutta, India. The laboratory there went to work on the film and making 68,000 prints to be sent to all those interested in the Coast of China. I arrived in Calcutta on 9 July 1944.

On 20 July 1944 I received a wire from Commodore Miles to prepare for another expedition with Capt. William Painter of the U. S. Navy. On 27 July I left Calcutta and met Capt. Painter in Kunning, China. We flew to Kanchow, took a truck to Lishia, and walked down the river to Wenchow, making pictures of the road, river, bridges, etc. At Wenchow we made pictures of the harbor and the entrance, taking soundings, etc. We then started up the coast to Shanghai, making all our pictures the same as for reconnaissance. We photographed Haimen, Wimerd Sound, ending up outside of Shanghai at the river entrance. Meantime the Japs had recaptured Lishia and were heading for Wenchow, so we walked for five days back down the Coast to Wenchow and beat the Japs by two hours. They were on the west side of the City. We laid in a canal boat and were covered up and taken out of the City and here Capt. Painter and I separated. Capt. Painter headed for Foochow before I fell and I went back to Chein Yang and then back to Amoy with a large camera for other work there on Amoy Harbor and installations. Here I met Capt. Painter on 1 November 1944, finished with my work, and again went back to Kanchow by foot and took a plane to Calcutta, and turned in my work to U. S. Naval Groups. 26 Registered copies were made of the work and they were sent to MacArthur, King, Nimitz, etc.

I arrived in Calcutta on 9 November 1944 and stayed there until 3 January 1945, and I again left for Commodore Miles and went back to China, this time to go out with the Famous Chinese 4th Column. I arrived in Kunning on 4 January 1945 and flew to Cheik Yang, took a jeep to Yunnanling, river boat down the river for four days, and walked six days before catching up with the Column. Our work was in the lake district of Chengsha, Jap held territory, all behind the lines, made a raid on Ningshan and stayed with the Column until 15 March 1945, left and walked back to Cheik Yang, flew to Yunnanling, then to Chungking, and was transferred back to OSS after turning in my work. I was sent back to the States on 6 May 1945.

For two years OSS did not do a thing photographically in China, and right now (May 1945) in China they are three years behind schedule. All the work I did was for the U. S. Naval Group. Commodore Miles has all records of my work and the places I was ordered to.

I enjoyed working under Commodore Miles of the U. S. Naval Group.

Respectfully submitted,

George L. Mullibarger

GEORGE L. MULLIBARGER
Spl's (P), OSS

SECRET

17.012
Field Report
X Gleysteen

15 June 1945

Mr. Whitney Shepardson

Director

Returned Report of Lt. Gleysteen and Capt. Lynn.

X Lynn

On the report of Lt. Gleysteen and Capt. Lynn, I think this is a very good example of what can be done on these reports. I hope you are calling it to the attention of others in your unit and wish that it could be made available to others.

W.J.D.

Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

17.013
Field rep

TO : The Director

DATE: 13 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Earl Hiller
(SI/MS-110)

Served in Bari from October 1944 to April 1945 when he was a member of the Hungarian Desk and the Budapest City Team. Earlier he was attached to the Spanish SI desk at Algiers and was in charge of the SI/MS 'office' in Bilbao, Spain.

Sk.
S.P.K.

Attachment

SECRET

17,013

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Field Rep

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 4 June 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

x Fuller, Earl

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions Submitted by Mr. Earl Fuller

SECRET

x SI

x WEDTO

Mr. Fuller's report on field conditions is forwarded herewith.

Whitney H. Shepardson
 Whitney H. Shepardson

SECRET

RECEIVED
 JUNE 14 1945
 OFFICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 17, 513

TO Chief, SI
FROM D. DeBardleben

DATE: May 31, 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions by Earl Fuller

I have no comments to make on this report which offers
no criticism or recommendation.

ADJB-
D. Deb.

SECRET

17,013

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

Earl Fuller

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 31 May 1945

TO : Director, OCS
Through Chief, SI

FROM : Earl Fuller

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

A. Accomplishments and Assignments in the Field1. Assignment in Spain

From 26 May 1942 to 17 February 1944, I was in charge of the SI-OCS office in Bilbao, Spain. My cover was Oil Attache, checking Spanish tankers, passenger and freight ships and Campea Shore installations. I used the cover name of Eliot, and the symbol S-5. During this time, I built up three main underground chains for operation in occupied France, and I was active in the Franco-Spanish so-called underground railway, getting upward to a thousand Frenchmen through Spain, and also several British and American airmen who had been shot down over France. I was also connected very closely with the Basque underground movement in Bilbao, and in turn they helped me with my connections on the French Basque side. On 17 February 1944 I left Spain for Portugal, presumably by the request of the Spanish Government. However, this may not have been the case, since it is very clear that the American Ambassador, J. Carlton Hayes, did everything in his power to get all SI-OCS personnel out of Spain, and we have only his word that I was pronounced "persona non grata" by the Spanish Government.

2. Assignment in Portugal

I arrived in Lisbon on 18 February 1944 and reported to the American Legation. I remained in Lisbon until 26 March, and during

SECRET

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that time I assisted X-2 in their filing rooms. On 25 March, I received orders from Washington, D. C., to report to the Spanish Desk in Algiers.

3. Assignment in Algiers

I arrived in Algiers on 27 March 1944, and remained there until 15 June 1944. During that time I was attached to the Spanish Desk and was able to assist them considerably due to my former Spanish contacts and knowledge of the underground in France. On 15 May I worked out a plan, whereby I was to parachute into Yugoslavia in order to penetrate Hungary through the oilfields of southwest Hungary. I am very familiar with that part of Hungary having drilled most of the oil wells there during the period 1937-1941. This plan was officially approved by Lieutenant Colonel Gamble and Colonel Glavin, and on 14 June, I left the Spanish Desk and proceeded to Bari, Italy.

4. Assignment in Italy

I arrived in Bari, Italy, on 15 June and remained there until 10 August. During that time it was made clear by the American Mission in Bari that it would be impossible for me to go into Yugoslavia because of the existing strained relations between the American Mission and Marshal Tito. I was given the Hungarian Desk and at once started recruiting the following men for a possible team to enter Hungary: On instructions from Mr. Robert P. Joyce, I engaged Mr. Scott Aradi, former press attache to the Hungarian Ambassador to the Vatican City. Mr. Aradi became political adviser. On my own judgment I engaged Mr. Magyary (better name Hely), a Hungarian Priest.

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in the Vatican City; Mr. Kovacs (cover name Core), a Hungarian radio technician; and Nicolas DeBohery, a Hungarian radio technician who was at the time with Communications-OSS in Bari. I also sent for Corporal Bela Herzeg and Lieutenant Nicolas Doman, who were in Cairo at that time. On 10 August 1944, I left for the USA on a temporary assignment in the interest of the Hungarian Desk. During my absence, Lieutenant Doman was temporarily in charge of the Hungarian Desk.

5. Visit to the United States

I arrived in Washington, D. C. on 13 August 1944 and immediately contacted Mr. R. Foster and Mr. D. DeBardleben. I stated to them my mission which was the gathering of more information on the Hungarian oilfield officials, and more specific data on Hungary and its political background. This information was compiled for me while I spent three weeks leave in California.

6. Return to Italy and Delay There

I returned to Bari, Italy, from Washington, D. C. on 2 October 1944 and remained there until 16 April 1945.

Upon my return to Bari, I found things much changed. Due to trouble with other sections, Lieutenant Doman had been relieved of the desk by Lieutenant Colonel Howard M. Chapin, formerly a Major in charge of the Central European Desk. Also during my absence, Lieutenant Doman had engaged four Hungarian prisoners for war for infiltration purposes. These men, upon my return, were sent back to their former prison camps. Eight days before I returned to Italy Lieutenant Tibor Keszthelyi of the Five Team had temporarily taken

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charge of the Hungarian Desk.

With the formation of the Hungarian Budapest City Team during the latter part of August, under the command of Major A. G. Flues, much of the work had been taken away from the Desk. However, upon my return from Washington, I was given a very good position on the team in case it ever went in.

On 7 October 1944 the Dallas team, consisting of Lt. Tibor Keszthelyi, Sgt. Steve Catlos, Moly, and Cora, left for Slovakia. They arrived by plane the same day accompanied by members of the Czech Desk and also members of a British mission. Upon arrival in Slovakia on 9 October Lt. Keszthelyi took both Moly and Cora to the Hungarian border where they proceeded separately to Budapest. Moly was assigned to go to Admiral Horthy, Regent of Hungary, and urge him to throw out the Germans and capitulate to the Allies. Moly did get to Budapest on 14 October, and that same evening Moly met and had a forty-minute private talk with the Regent. At that time, Horthy was very depressed. On the following day, 15 October, the Regent did try to capitulate, but the attempt to throw out the Germans failed, and the Regent was seized and imprisoned, and Budapest was faced with a large siege and destruction. Moly also was to deliver a message to a radio man in Budapest. He found that the man had been executed long before. On 17 October, Moly went into hiding in Budapest and withstood the terrible siege by the Germans. When the city fell on 13 February 1945, Moly gave himself up to the Russians and in March was returned to Italy. Moly was able to give us much first hand information. However, he was extremely biased against the

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Russians and their treatment of the Hungarians. Cora was assigned to go to the main factories in Hungary and agitate against the Germans, and if possible to start an underground movement. Cora has not been heard of since he was last seen in Budapest by Moly when he stated that he was proceeding to the western part of Hungary. In the meantime I waited in Bari with the Budapest team hoping and expecting to get the opportunity to go into Hungary. We were told that the Russians were the cause of the delay. During the wait, I was not permitted to engage any agents. However, I put forward several plans for penetration. One was that we should engage agents and drop them immediately into German occupied Hungary, then to build up and have good covers when the Russians came along to occupy the whole of Hungary - as they now have. Another plan was for me together with three officers and a radio operator to make a blind drop at the base of Lake Balatone. The purpose of this plan was to contact friends of Andor Gellert, who had been formerly with the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm, Sweden. All of my plans were turned down because of the possibility of SDPTU entering Hungary and completing the job first hand. On 9 December 1944, a group of four Hungarian men, one Hungarian woman, a two-year old child and one Dutch officer stole a Heinkel III German plane in Paps, Hungary, and flew it to San Severo, Italy. This Hungarian group claimed to be members of MFE (Hungarian Free Movement), and they furnished many good reports. During their stay in Bari, from December 15, 1944 to April 18, 1945, they were in custody of the Hungarian Desk and were known as the Kurt Gese party. The Dutch officer was checked and

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proved to be a member of the Dutch underground movement in Budapest. He was also taken care of by us until February 1945, when the British returned him to England.

To return to the Slovakian situation as has been reported, the Germans sent in two divisions to break up the Slovakian Partisans in November, forcing all of our groups to flee toward the Russian lines. With the majority of the group, Lt. Tibor E. Keszthelyi was captured on 12 December 1944. It was reported that Lt. Keszthelyi had been executed by the Germans in March 1945. On 1 April 1945, the Russians said that they had found the body of Lt. Keszthelyi.

On 1 April 1945, the Hungarian Desk was transferred to Caserta, and on 1 May, the Russian high command formally refused the entry into Hungary of the Budapest City Team Unit. In the meantime, I had been helping HQ at the Fifth Army Front and at the prison cages in Florence, Italy.

On 4 May, I was informed by Lt. Colonel H. M. Chapin that, since I had requested to be returned to the States for reassignment in case the Hungarian show ceased to exist, he was giving me the opportunity to do so. However I could stay if I wished. I went to Caserta on 8 May, and on 11 May I sailed for America.

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During all of my experience in the Hungarian Section, I worked under the command of Lt. Colonel Howard M. Chapin. My relations with him were very good at all times, and it was a pleasure to serve under him.

B. Conditions in the Field that Might be Improved

The difficulties that I experienced in the field were in no way sufficient importance to enumerate.

Earl Fuller.

Earl Fuller

SECRET

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Retainee Report: Miss Helen Creeby
 (NY/210)

DATE: 13 June 1945

Miss Creeby was attached to the Reporting Board in Caserta as Political Reports Officer for intelligence from Albania, Jugoslavia, and Greece from December 1944 to May 1945. Previously she served as Political Reports Officer, London.

S.P.K.

Attachment

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17.014

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 June 1945

Field Report
*Crosby, Helen*X SI
X ETO

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Miss Helen Crosby

Miss Crosby's report concerns her activity as Political Reports Officer in the London Reports Division and in the Caserta Reports Section, in both of which offices she performed excellent work in editing and processing inherently difficult material. She deserves much credit for the quality of political intelligence disseminated by London and Caserta.

Miss Crosby mentions the dissemination by Caserta to Washington of material which was useless because it had appeared in the New York press two weeks before it arrived in Washington. It should be remembered, however, that the dissemination of such material by the Caserta Reports office to field recipients was useful to them and that such material, if it duplicated New York press reports, was killed when it reached the Washington Reporting Board, SI. Miss Crosby has indicated the Reporting Board's attempted solution of providing the field reports offices with a press clipping service to assist in some elimination of press duplication.

Duplication of State Department intelligence arose not so much from lack of field liaison with State Department representatives or lack of directives from SI Washington as from a common desire on the part of OSS and the State Department to obtain information on vital and current political developments from different types of sources. Thus, many political developments were confirmed by either OSS or State Department, depending on which had first uncovered the information.

Lt. Bailey's investigation of the requirements of the State Department and other agencies should in some degree increase specific intelligence direction from Washington to the field. There is, and has been, a constant exchange of letters between the Reporting Board, SI, and the field reports officers. These letters contain criticism of reports, requests for new or further intelligence and commendation of former reports.

Miss Crosby in her report, as Mr. Christman in his, emphasizes the important relationship at the echelon between reports officer and the formulation of directed intelligence.

W. F. Christman
Chief, SI
17.014

SECRET

17,014

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

29 May 1945

TO: Major General William J. Donovan
Via Chief SI

FROM: Mrs Helen Crosby

SUBJECT: Field Report of Helen Crosby

1. Duties in Field

The undersigned was attached to the London Reports Division in January, 1944, as a Political Reports Officer charged with the processing of all incoming political intelligence for the Balkans and later for Germany and Austria. This processing included the evaluation of source and content, collation of materials, editing and dissemination of reports. In the summer of 1944, a SIRA unit was established for Germany and Austria and the undersigned worked closely with members of the SIRA Branch in work which was broadened to include political summaries and special studies. From December 1944 to May 1945, the undersigned was attached to the Reports Section in Caserta as Political Reports Officer for Greece and Albania and later for Yugoslavia.

2. Conditions in the Field

a. General Remarks

The discussion of field conditions below applies only to the political sections of the Reports Divisions in London and Caserta during the periods indicated above. It will be noted that many of the field problems discussed below have been brought to the attention of Washington in letters from the field; in some cases action has already been taken.

b. Reports Office Problems in the Field

1. The problem of duplication of OSS intelligence with that collected and disseminated by other agencies, while no problem in Washington, created difficulties in the field. In Caserta, with the exception of radio monitoring reports and delayed press clippings, the Reports Office did not have access to material gathered through other channels. The result was that the Reports Office reproduced and disseminated a certain amount of useless material (for example Washington would receive Caserta reports identical with stories published in the New York press two weeks earlier). Although in many

-2-

since such duplication serves as a valuable double-check, much of the duplication was identical and simply created needless work. Duplication with State Department material was never carefully studied although London (but not Caserta) received copies of delayed State Department cables and could use these as a guide to State Department coverage and interests. At present, of course, no field offices receive any State Department material and must depend upon either direction from Washington or liaison with State Department representatives in the field in the matter of avoiding duplication of effort and integrating the OSS program with that of the State Department. And, as we have implied above, such liaison in the field is not always successful--essentially because no particular effort has been made, apparently, by either OSS or State to provide personnel and give adequate weighting to the importance of this liaison.

The duplication with newspaper information has been noted above. In this connection, mention should be made of the failure of the Caserta Report Office to tap press channels in Italy. Repeated attempts were made to get Italian dispatches of the various American news services functioning through Rome. All attempts broke down either on through technical difficulties (cable facilities etc.) or censorship tangles (some of the Greek dispatches were handled thru London etc.). Finally it became clear that Washington was the logical place to collect the necessary newspaper material and Washington set up a clipping service for Caserta which was most useful and would doubtless prove valuable to other field offices existing in a press vacuum. It is felt however, that the analysis of duplication between OSS and press coverage should take place in Washington where the materials are readily available, where the total perspective is broader and obviously the problem of duplication with State Department material can best be handled in Washington. It is felt that if a thorough study of this problem were made, some OSS effort at preventing duplicating the work of other agencies could be transferred to fill important gaps in the overall intelligence picture.

2. A closely allied problem was that of the lack of direction from Washington on the definition of intelligence targets. In many cases the Reports Office was called upon to draw up political directives for the guidance of agents in the field. These outlines would have resulted in more valuable intelligence if the Reports Office had had a clear-cut knowledge of the current political interests of OSS Washington and other Washington agencies. The political issues which appear to be the most significant in the field are not necessarily the most important for Washington (cf. discussion of duplication above). It was felt particularly unfortunate that at a time when the military reporting needs were no longer urgent, and when agents were shifting from military to political reporting and were in a most favorable position to gather information invaluable to the operation of the future "enter" projects of OSS, they could not be given specific direction--

-3-

at least through the Reports Office which, in the field was called upon in many cases to prepare political directives. This matter has also been mentioned in letters of Lt. Bailey.

3. One of the most persistent problems to the Political Reports Office in both London and Caserta was that of liaison with agencies receiving OSS reports. The responsibility for such liaison was, as a rule either assigned to a Reports Section staff member, in addition to other duties or handled in a haphazard fashion by various staff members on a personal basis. The result was that the Political Reports Office, although generally aware of "customer" needs, lacked, as a rule, specific and current knowledge of the intelligence requirements of "consuming agencies". With such knowledge the Reports Section might have been much more valuable in screening intelligence for the particular interests of the agencies, forwarding material for special studies etc. It is realized that this difficulty arose primarily from the understaffing during 1944. It is not known what steps have been taken to correct the situation in London. In Caserta, however, a special liaison officer was appointed with the sole responsibility for this liaison. This situation was successful although it is felt that direct action-level liaison of Reports Officers with geographic "opposite numbers" might have been quicker and more expedient.

4. In some cases the poor quality of political intelligence reporting could have been greatly improved by a more careful political briefing of the agents. Agents who had been thoroughly trained for military reporting were often transferred to the political field as soon as the military situation had cleared. In some cases these agents had even an unclear notion of the nature of good political intelligence that much of their reports were useless and were not disseminated. If provision had been made for these agents to return to the main field office for a short course in political reporting (handled perhaps by representatives of the XI Debut, XII, and XI Reports), it is thought that much time and effort for both agent and Report Officer might have been spared.

5. A Reports Office problem in both London and Caserta was always the unbelievable time and effort spent by the editors in processing semi-literate translations. Often translations would have to be completely rewritten simply because the English was so poor. In a job where time always decreases the value of the intelligence, it should be emphasized that in the hiring of translators, their fluent knowledge of the English language is most important.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET17,0015
F. 12/14/40

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Osman Saker
 (SI-Yugoslavia)

DATE: 13 June 1945

1. Capt. Saker was a member of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito and previously served as assistant SI Chief at Bari.

2. OSS teams in the field should have access to essential supplies and services. It was difficult to understand how American supplies and planes were available to British and Russian Missions in Yugoslavia and apparently unavailable to OSS.

J.
S.P.K.

Attachment

SECRET

JUN 14 1945

17.012
Field Report
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

** Suker, C-PT Dr. Homan*
 DATE: 4 June 1945

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions Submitted by Captain Orman Suker

X SI **SECRET**
X Lysenko

The attached report submitted by Captain Suker is
 forwarded for your information.

William V. Robertson
 William V. Robertson

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 31 May 1945

TO Chief, SI

FROM D. DeBardleben

SUBJECT: Comments on Field Report of Captain Orman Saker

Captain Saker's moderate criticisms appear to be entirely justified. It is hoped that his experiences and those of his colleagues will assure efficient administration in future operations.

DDB.
D. DeB.

SECRET

17, 015

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

Captain Orman Suker

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SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, OSS
Through Chief, SI

FROM: Captain Orson Baker

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

DATE: 28 May 1945

1. What I did in the Field

a. Duties Previous to OSS

Enlisted in the United States Army on 18 November 1942 at Fort Snelling, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Received basic training and attended Officer Candidate School for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Commissioned on 8 July 1943.

b. Duties at OSS

Reported to the Office of Strategic Services 18 October 1943. Attended training schools A-3 and A-4 during November and December 1943.

c. Duties Overseas

(1) Departure

Departed for overseas 20 January 1944.

(2) In Cairo

Arrived in Cairo 20 February 1944. In Cairo was assigned to SO staff as target and training officer which position I held until I left for Italy.

(3) In Bari

Arrived in Bari 20 May 1944. Worked two weeks in Reports Office with Lt. Mike Mitchell (USNR). I was then assigned Assistant Chief, SO, in Bari under Lt. E. W. Derranian (USNR), and worked in that capacity until October 1944. At that time the SO and SI teams in Yugoslavia were placed under the direction

SECRET

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of the SI Section in Bari, and I was made Assistant SI Chief under Lt. Holt Green (USNR) until 15 September at which time I was appointed Chief, Yugoslav Desk, Bari. I worked in that capacity until 15 January 1945.

(4) In Belgrade

Transferred to Belgrade 16 January 1945 as member of Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.

(5) Return to U. S.

Returned to United States on 20 April 1945.

1. Conditions in the Field Which Might be Improved

a. Cairo

The Cairo base has, of course, long since been materially reduced. However, during my stay there the organization was dispatching and supervising teams in Yugoslavia and Greece. The distance from the Cairo base to these teams in the field was considerable and, as a result, there were many operational and administrative difficulties, especially for the Yugoslav teams. It would have been much more practical if bases could have been established earlier in Italy to service and have direct control over the teams in Yugoslavia. The Allies were already in Italy and a base with the regular Army would have been very helpful.

At the time of my arrival no adequate training program was in operation. I believe that it is very essential that a program be well planned for personnel before they arrive in any area of the theater, that is, for the personnel who are destined to work as SI, SO, or combat teams in the field. It is essential that this program

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be in full operation when personnel arrive as there sometimes is a considerable lapse of time before the teams go into the field. This period of waiting is very hard on agent personnel. A good training program including languages and athletics is essential.

h. Training Program in Bari

In Bari the same suggestions would have been applicable as stated for Cairo in regard to an adequate training program.

i. Servicing of Teams in Yugoslavia

Servicing of the teams in Yugoslavia was a very important function which could have been considerably improved, especially during the early stages of agent work in Yugoslavia. We were dependent upon our Allies for the use of their controlled planes and the dropping and landing of supplies and equipment to our men. Jeeps were not made available to our people until too late in the game although Russian and British teams were supplied in the field with jeeps at quite an early time; that is, as soon as it was practical to move jeeps in by water or land them. In a few instances jeeps were parachuted to Russian and British teams. A much better job of [SI work] could have been done by our people if they had had means of travelling about the areas as did the other Allied teams. The plane transport factor was also very important in the original placing of teams in the field; that is, by parachuting or landing. Our position as to getting more useful SI information more quickly could have been materially improved if we ourselves would have had planes in our command to dispatch our teams. It was often a matter of weeks or in some cases up to three and four months before a team finally was

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placed in the field after it had been alerted. It was true that weather held back many flights and other operations that were given higher priority held us back, but the Allies gradually pushed our teams into second place. The last six months of our work in Yugoslavia was considerably improved as all necessary supplies and transportation was eventually obtained for all teams. However, it might be remembered in future plans for operations in other theaters that we should be there first with planes, jeeps, and adequate supplies for our men and that we should have control of their delivery and not be dependent on other countries even though they be our Allies.

The above is by no means intended to give the impression that the Allies were not cooperative. It was natural for them to want to get their own ~~interests~~ ^{interests} as quickly as possible. Possibly arrangements on higher levels were in accord with this plan as these Allies were directly responsible in this particular theater.

3. Specific Difficulties in the Field of Which I Personally Became Aware

a. Mihailovich Incident

The placing of a team under Lt. Colonel Robert McDowell to work with Draza Mihailovich caused considerable difficulties for the rest of the teams in Yugoslavia. The purpose of the McDowell team - to convert American airmen - was good in theory. However, the presence of the team in the country caused considerable difficulties in operations for the other teams in the field. The situation at one time became so tense that local Partisan Corps commanders in Yugoslavia told American personnel that they would not cooperate with them until the team to the opposing faction was removed. As stated before, placing of this team was probably within our rights but a clear-cut understanding

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- 5 -

of the situation should have been had by the British, the Partisans, and ourselves. The information then in turn should have been passed down to the Partisans and our teams so that no misunderstandings would have taken place. As a result of the above situation, we lost faith with the Partisans and the intelligence work of several of the teams was held up considerably.

b. American Personnel as Members of British Sub-Missions

During the greater part of 1944 our SO people in Yugoslavia were members of British Sub-Missions, and as such were under the supervision of the British, although theoretically, we received the intelligence information that was sent out by them. At the same time the SO teams were operating in the field and SI teams were also in every stage of organization to the SO teams and in a few cases actually occupying the same quarters. This, of course, was a duplication of effort as the work of both teams was primarily the same. During the early fall of 1944 it was decided to place all American personnel in the field, whether SO or SI, under our command.

SO teams as such then ceased to function and complete SI coverage was sought for all Yugoslavia. At this time an erroneous team withdrawal order was issued to the SO teams by the British (See Progress Report of Yugoslav Desk dated 1 to 15 October 1944).

c. Boat Incident

During the summer of 1944 a special type boat - P664 - was made available to the Bari base for operations in the Adriatic. This boat could have been very helpful in transporting supplies and personnel to the Yugoslav coast. However, Navy regulations governing the

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- 5 -

of the situation should have been had by the British, the Partisans, and ourselves. The information then in turn should have been passed down to the Partisans and our teams so that no misunderstandings would have taken place. As a result of the above situation, we lost faith with the Partisans and the intelligence work of several of the teams was held up considerably.

b. American Personnel as Members of British Sub-Missions

During the greater part of 1944 our SO people in Yugoslavia were members of British Sub-Missions, and as such were under the direct supervision of the British, although theoretically, we received the intelligence information that was sent out by them. At the same time the SO teams were operating in the field SI teams were also present sometimes in very close proximity to the SO teams and in a few cases actually occupying the same quarters. This, of course, was a duplication of effort as the work of both teams was primarily the same. During the early fall of 1944 it was decided to place all American personnel in the field, whether SI, under our SO teams as such then ceased to function and complete SI coverage was sought for all Yugoslavia. At this time an erroneous team withdrawal order was issued to the SO teams by the British (See Progress Report of Yugoslav Desk dated 1 to 15 October 1944).

c. Boat Incident

During the summer of 1944 a special type boat - PS44 - was made available to the Bari base for operations in the Adriatic. This boat could have been very helpful in transporting supplies and personnel to the Yugoslav coast. However, Navy regulations governing the

SECRET

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
Adriatic made it impractical to use the boat.

Summary Remarks

All the above difficulties mentioned in this section are not complaints as such but are difficulties which I personally was aware of and which hindered SI operations in Yugoslavia. They are all difficulties which I believe could have been remedied considerably had a clear cut policy on higher levels been established.

Orman Suker
Major Orman Suker

SECRET



17016
Field Report
X Christman, Kim

15 June 1945

Dr. Whitney Shepardson

Director

Reference Report of William B. Christman.

Have you pursued the recommendation that you make on this report because it sounds sensible.

W.J.D.

Office Memorandum **SECRET** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

17,020
Feldman

TO : The Director

DATE: 14 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Fred B. Gathelmer
(NY/110)

Mr. Gathelmer served with the French SI desk in London starting January 1944 and later assisted in the liquidation of the Surox and Frost networks.

S.F.H.

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17,020
Field Report
x Osetheimer, Fred R.
x SI
x STO

MEMORANDUM

6 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS
FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson
SUBJECT: Field Report, Fred R. Osetheimer

Mr. Fred R. Osetheimer, whose field report is attached, was recruited by SO and assigned to duty in STO. Upon his arrival at the Training Center in England it was found that he was physically unfit for SO operations and he was transferred to the French Desk SI, where his work in the liquidation of Sussex and Proust agents and recruitment of agents for German Operations was a distinct contribution.

His report is routine and his few suggestions for improvement have either been remedied or have become obsolete.

Mr. Osetheimer intends to return to Europe in an unofficial capacity as soon as possible, with the idea of making his home in France where, prior to the war, he had resided intermittently for many years. Although he has resigned from OSS, he would be most willing to undertake any post-war assignment this organization might have wherein his qualifications could be utilized to good advantage in France.

W. H. S.
W. H. S.

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE

17.020

MEMORANDUM

June 4, 1945.

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services

THROUGH: Chief, S.I. Branch and Secretariat

FROM: Fred R. Ostheimer

SUBJECT: Report on Overseas Duties in the ETO.

A. Duties and Activities:

I was recruited by S.O. branch on August 1, 1943, in view of undertaking missions behind enemy lines in France.

After training was completed in the United States, I was sent to the United Kingdom in the early part of December and there went through various checking courses and the SAB school in particular. I was then given a thorough physical examination which, after verification of metabolism, brought the decision that I was not fit for such operations.

I was then transferred to S.I. branch at the end of January 1944 and was first attached to Chief European Desk for a few weeks.

In March I was assigned to the French Desk, Operations Section, and was charged together with H. Ben Smith with the organization of S.I. French Desk operations. This Operations Section was charged with the receiving and sending of all messages to and from our agents in the field, and as the number of these increased, a great deal of activity was required.

As soon as our forces had advanced sufficiently on the continent to allow the installation of forward echelons, I was assigned to this and in charge of the French Desk, S.I., Paris up to the time when the main section was transferred under the direction of Major O'Brien in the course of September 1944.

SECRET

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From then on we were mostly charged with the liquidation of the various networks that had been built up (Sussex and Proust in particular). This consisted largely in helping the agents to be released and also taking care of all those who had assisted them in the field, including the writing up of recommendations for awards and distribution of letters of commendation.

In November 1944 after Major O'Brien's departure, I was in charge of French Desk activities which for some time remained the same, until it was decided to organize new teams for coverage of Germany. At this time we started recruiting and screening candidates for this work and organized a training school in Paris suburbs. These prospective agents were later sent to the United Kingdom for completion of their training, final briefing and dispatching. This latter work in particular was taken care of by Mr. Haviland who had previously done the same work for those agents who were parachuted in France and was very well equipped for this organization.

Activities of the French Desk, S.I., continued on the same lines but with decreasing volume, so that it was deemed unnecessary to stay on any longer in Paris, and I therefore requested to be released at the end of April 1945.

B. Conditions Which Might Be Improved:

a. Physical examination of personnel should be sufficiently thorough in the United States in order to avoid finding afterwards that they are physically unfit after many months had been spent in training.

b. Making of plans has proven to be most difficult. If it had been decided earlier to prepare missions for the procurement of intelligence in German territory, these missions could have been organized and placed long before the time when this was finally decided on, and the missions could have been productive of valuable information. Unfortunately, this matter of sending French agents into Germany was only settled in November 1944, and there was not much time to organize the missions properly. The use of French agents was most justified, as Frenchmen could go in and mix with civilian workers and deportees with a perfectly safe cover and run but few risks.

c. Communications with agents in the field were in general satisfactory. However, it was found difficult to have all necessary information regarding all possible available means

SECRET

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of communications, and in particular in many cases agents were sent in the field with sets which could not be operated for any length of time without an outside source of electric power, whereas there were some hand generated sets which could have been used with very satisfactory results. Along the same lines, it can also be mentioned that J and E communications system with planes was developed very satisfactorily, but unfortunately too late and with not enough equipment available, so that in spite of the facilities that they afforded, the J and E set was not used extensively.

C. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Became Aware:

None.

John R. Callahan

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

June 4, 1945.

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services

THROUGH: Chief, S.I. Branch and Secretariat

FROM: Fred M. Oethelmer

SUBJECT: Report on Overseas Duties in the ETO.

A. Enlistment and Assignment:

I was recruited by S.O. branch on August 1, 1943, in view of undertaking missions behind enemy lines in France.

After training was completed in the United States, I was sent to the United Kingdom in the early part of December and there went through various checking courses and the GMB school in particular. I was then given a thorough physical examination which, after verification of metabolism, brought the decision that I was not fit for such operations.

I was then transferred to S.I. branch at the end of January 1944 and was first attached to Chief European Desk for a few weeks.

In March I was assigned to the French Desk, Operations Section, and was charged together with H. Ben Smith with the organization of S.I. French Desk operations. This Operations Section was charged with the receiving and sending of all messages to and from our agents in the field, and as the number of these increased, a great deal of activity was required.

As soon as our forces had advanced sufficiently on the continent to allow the installation of forward stations, I was assigned to this and in charge of the French Desk, S.I., Paris up to the time when the main station was transferred under the direction of Major G. W. in the course of September 1944.

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From then on we were mostly charged with the liquidation of the various networks that had been built up (Basson and Frenet in particular). This consisted largely in helping the agents to be released and also taking care of all those who had assisted them in the field, including the writing up of recommendations for awards and distribution of letters of commendation.

In November 1944 after Major O'Brien's departure, I was in charge of French Desk activities which for some time remained the same, until it was decided to organize new teams for coverage of Germany. At this time we started recruiting and screening candidates for this work and organized a training school in Paris suburbs. These prospective agents were later sent to the United Kingdom for completion of their training, final briefing and dispatching. This latter work in particular was taken care of by Mr. Haviland who had previously done the same work for those agents who were parachuted in France and was very well equipped for this organization.

Activities of the French Desk, S.I., continued on the same lines but with decreasing volume, so that it was deemed unnecessary to stay on my leave in Paris, and I therefore requested to be released at the end of April 1945.

1. Conditions Which Must Be Observed

a. Physical examination of personnel should be sufficiently thorough in the United States in order to avoid finding afterwards that they are physically unfit after many months had been spent in training.

b. Making of plans has proven to be most difficult. If it had been decided earlier to prepare missions for the procurement of intelligence in German territory, these missions could have been organized and planned long before the time when this was finally decided on, and the missions could have been productive of valuable information. Unfortunately, this matter of sending French agents into Germany was only decided in November 1944, and there was not much time to organize the missions properly. The use of French agents was most hampered, as Frenchmen could go on only with civilian papers and therefore with a perfectly safe cover and was not possible.

c. Communication with agents in the field was in general satisfactory. However, it was found difficult to have all necessary information regarding all possible available sources.

SECRET

of communication, and in particular in many cases agents were sent in the field with sets which could not be operated for any length of time without an outside source of electric power, whereas there were some hand generator sets which could have been used with very satisfactory results. Along the same lines, it can also be mentioned that J and E communications system with planes was developed very satisfactorily, but unfortunately too late and with not enough equipment available, so that in spite of the facilities that they afforded, the J and E set was not used extensively.

G. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Became Aware:

None.

John A. Patterson

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

June 1, 1945.

TO: Director, Office of Strategic Services

THROUGH: Chief, S.I. Branch and Secretariat

FROM: Fred R. Gathener

SUBJECT: Report on Overseas Duties in the ITO.

A. Duties and Activities:

I was recruited by S.O. Branch on August 1, 1943, in view of undertaking missions behind enemy lines in France.

After training was completed in the United States, I was sent to the United Kingdom in the early part of December and there went through various checking centers and the SAS school in particular. I was then given a thorough physical examination which, after verification of metabolism, brought the decision that I was not fit for such operations.

I was then transferred to S.I. Branch at the end of January 1944 and was first attached to Chief European Desk for a few weeks.

In March I was assigned to the French Desk, Operations Section, and was charged together with E. Ben Smith with the supervision of S.I. French Desk operations. This Operations Section was charged with the receiving and sending of all messages to and from our agents in the field, and as the number of these increased, a great deal of activity was required.

As soon as our forces had advanced sufficiently on the continent to allow the installation of our own wireless, I was assigned to this and in charge of the French Desk, S.I., Paris up to the time when the unit was transferred under the direction of Major Graham in the course of September 1944.

SECRET

From then on we were mostly charged with the liquidation of the various networks that had been built up (Benson and Freund in particular). This consisted largely in helping the agents to be released and also taking care of all those who had assisted them in the field, including the writing up of reports and memoranda for awards and distribution of letters of commendation.

In November 1941 when Major O'Brien's departure, I was in charge of French Desk activities which for some time remained the same, until it was decided to organize new teams for coverage of Germany. At this time we started recruiting and screening candidates for this work and organized a training school in Paris suburbs. These prospective agents were later sent to the United Kingdom for completion of their training. Final briefing and dispatching. This latter work in particular was taken care of by Mr. Harland who had previously done the same work for those agents who were persecuted in France and was very well equipped for this organization.

Activities of the French Desk, S.I., continued on the same lines but with decreasing volume, so that it was deemed unnecessary to stay on any longer in Paris, and I therefore requested to be released at the end of April 1943.

3. Conditions Which Exist in Germany

a. Physical examination of personnel should be carried out through the United States in order to avoid finding afterwards that they are physically unfit after long months had been spent in training.

b. Sorting of plans has proven to be most difficult. If it had been decided earlier to prepare missions for the procurement of intelligence in German territory, these missions could have been organized and placed long before the time when this was finally decided on, and the risk was could have been protective of valuable information. Unfortunately, this matter of sending French agents into Germany was not decided in November 1941, and these agents were sent to Germany in the summer of 1942, and the lack of French agents was more important in Germany. Aid to the resistance with civilian workers and operations with a perfectly safe cover and was not the reason.

c. Some persons who worked in the field were in general satisfactory. However, it was found difficult to have all necessary information regarding all possible available means

SECRET

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of communication, and in particular in many cases agents were sent in the field with sets which could not be operated for any length of time without an outside source of electric power, whereas there were some hand generator sets which could have been used with very satisfactory results. Along the same lines, it can also be mentioned that J and E communications system with planes was developed very satisfactorily, but unfortunately too late and with not enough equipment available, so that in spite of the facilities that they afforded, the J and E set was not used extensively.

E. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Assume Answer

None.

Fred A. Guthrie

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

17,023
Field Report

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Chs (P) William J. Wheeler, WHR
(Field Photo/ETO)

DATE: 12 June 1945

x Field Photo

x ETO

Overseas from June 1943 to May 1945, Chief Wheeler was with the Field Photo/IMA Documentary Project (IFDP) at headquarters at Nogent-sur-Marne near Paris where he was in charge of captioning, distribution, and filing. Previously he worked as cameraman on a project for OWI to cover Merchant Marine activities, later as liaison man to channel material from all photo units covering D-Day operations.

SK.
S.F.K.

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

6 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building
 FROM: Secretariat, Administration Building
 Chief, Field Photographic Branch
 RE: Csp(?) William J. Wheeler, USNR, #412-12-19
 SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report

I departed 16 June 1943 from Washington, D.C., for duty in connection with a project for the Office of War Information, Allen D. Slogler, Lt. Comdr., U.S. Naval Reserve, Officer in Charge of Unit. Subject covered was a complete motion picture film coverage depicting Merchant Marine activities. This project actually commenced approximately two months earlier when a complete motion picture coverage was obtained of preliminary activities such as numerous ships being loaded with equipment, munitions, guns, planes, tanks, locomotives, etc. Also the methods engaging the crews through the Maritime Labor Union, also revealing the procedure followed during the briefing of the ship's masters, etc. About seven weeks were spent about the port of New York to complete this preliminary coverage. I participated as a motion picture cameraman. The second phase of this project commenced with the departure on 16 June 1943 of the unit aboard the Liberty ship, "Joseph E. Johnston", from Boston, to complete a motion picture record of activities aboard ship during actual passage. The subject depicted the actual operations performed by all officers and men, above and below deck, while on duty also at recreation. A very accurate record was completed during the course of the journey. I participated as a motion picture cameraman. I believe the total footage was around 40,000 feet. Unusual incidents occurring during the trip were three: The ship, "Joseph E. Johnston", fell out of the convoy of 97 ships due to boiler trouble and laid up five days at Halifax for repairs. The journey was resumed in a new convoy of 97 ships, but boiler trouble arose again, the ship being forced to leave the convoy and travel unescorted at about 4 knots speed for about 36 hours to St. John's, Newfoundland, where 6 additional days were spent for additional repairs, awaiting a tow tractor. After the third start, the unit finally arrived in London, the destination, after 33 elapsed days -- between 14 June and 13 July 1943.

Several days after the arrival of this unit in London, the group was dispatched to Exeter, England, the area around Devon and Cornwall, (O.W.I. activities report), to make a motion picture coverage of special maneuvers staged by the 29th Rangers.

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U.S. Army Commando Group. The maneuvers consisted of an assault on beaches, similar to the continental coast line, to test out actual problems under artificially reproduced actual war conditions. I participated as a motion picture cameraman. The Unit then returned to London completing the temporary additional duty and awaited orders to return to Washington, D.C., for reassignment.....

In the interim a large unit of personnel under Lt. Comdr. Spencer, USN, arrived in London, and a branch headquarters was set up, whereupon a set of modified orders were received by our group directing us to this new W.T.O. setup. The setup consisted of Lt. Comdr. Spencer, USN, as Commanding Officer, Lt. Armistead, USN, as Executive Officer, Lt. John McClain, USNR, Lt. Comdr. Stetler, USN, Lt. Neiben, USMC. It became quickly evident that this group of officers could not and would not work together as a team and separation in different directions soon resulted.

In addition, personal activities under the new regime for myself included several assignments as motion picture cameraman for the British on experiments of new secret equipment, such as tanks, guns, and explosives, especially designed to crack the Siegfried lines defenses.

For the 300 sponsored Royal Air Force film, I made a trip as cameraman to Castle Archdale, Northern Ireland in November 1943, for a two-week period, and obtained ground and air coverage on some sequences. Several flights were made in Sunderland flying boats, which were based here and used in long range submarine hunts.

In the fall of 1943 I took an aerial gunnery short course at a combat crew school CWSO #11, Bovingdon, England. The course included two flights in flying fortresses, one at extreme high altitude - 32,000' for actual practice. These flights were over the North Sea.

I gave some technical assistance on the production L-30 in Areas 2 and 3 for a brief period.

At this period Field Photo Branch, London, assumed responsibility for all reproduction work in the W.T.O. Branches of OSS. This set-up was, however, later turned over to the Army. Five weeks of this period I was placed in charge of a section of this laboratory, and with several assistants completed a very heavy back-log of unfiled material, which during that particular time was extremely essential to several OSS agencies, such as X-2 and SI branches.

In May I was assigned originally as a port director, but later changed to act as liaison man to assist in the channeling of incoming material from the units covering the operation. This material was given #1 priority and a 24-hour watch setup in operation for a considerable period to facilitate the processing

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and distribution of the material. Good teamwork on this project made it possible to set this complete motion picture record to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in record time.

Following Lt. Armistead's departure to France, about July 1944, to arrange the preliminary set-up for the OSS, SHAEF approved Documentary Project. I acted in his absence on administrative functions and brought into better condition some of the files and related systems.

About 26 September 1944, I flew in a Marauder to Chartres, France, front line 9th Air Force headquarters at that time, with equipment designated for the new Documentary Project. Five days later I reported to Coutainville in Normandy where temporary headquarters for the Project were in operation, but with inadequate laboratory facilities. About a week later I moved to Nogent-Sur-Marne, on the outskirts of Paris where permanent headquarters were set up with the assistance of about 30 Navy Seabees from Cherbourg. These men built two complete laboratories for the organization and operations on a large scale were possible thereafter. The Documentation Project as set up in the ETO is headed by Lt. Armistead, USAR, Field Photo Branch, OSS. A complete ground and air coverage of all ports, major and minor, is being obtained photographically. Under this set-up H&A Branch of OSS, operating in the ETO, is receiving every assistance and cooperation from Field Photo Branch, enabling them to carry on their portion of the program action calls for ground and air photographic coverage on strategic installations on the continent of Europe.

I assumed charge of the captioning, distribution, and files and records of the Project with several assistants. All work in connection with the entire project was channeled by me through the entire process: records - laboratory - captioning - hectographing - and distribution; also the setting up of priorities, etc. In this connection I worked in very close cooperation with Lt. Armistead. A complete system was established and in the succeeding months continually improved. At the close of each week, a special sectional report was compiled by me and used by Lt. Armistead as a source of information for obtaining data for regular monthly reports. I have been engaged for approximately the past 3 months in this capacity. I was very happy to be of assistance to English Bott and crew going to CBI, also assign Cooper on way to Italy. I spent considerable time with these men giving them data relating to the entire procedure employed, thereby enabling them to profit by the six months' experience gained through the pioneering of this Project.

The Documentary Project has made a very fine progress, up to 21 May 1945 when I left Paris. The men in the field are generally very enthusiastic about their work, and the laboratory men are doing a swell job. It is discouraging, however, that the entire Project is undermanned in every section. However, I believe this

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situation will be remedied in the near future. Lt. Kellogg, USNR has been in this area and in consultation with Lt. Armistead for a considerable period, and I believe a solution is being worked out.

At the time I left, all major ports in France had been completed, both ground and air coverage, minor ports nearly completed, both ground and air, and R&A Field Units had completed ground coverage on inland areas representing approximately 65 percent of the interior of France. Maps had been drawn by R&A designating sections to be covered by air, but actual photography from the air for R&A inland installations had not commenced. This was due to priority placement of units into German areas where operational coverage, both ground and air, were obtained of such major German ports as Bremen, Bremenhaven, and Hamburg, also teams were sent into Checho-Slovakia -- another team was covering the area of Denmark, and Kiel.

It is absolutely essential to increase the personnel of this project in every section, to cut down time required to complete project, even though they be civilians if military personnel are not available. Also, in fairness, to the men who are working very hard and need more rest. I personally have been working very hard and often late into the night during the past 8 months, a bit tired, and glad of the opportunity to obtain some leave. I have been overseas approximately two years this time, I also spent a period overseas in Iceland between December and February 1941-2, on the OSS photographic mission to Iceland.

On 21 May 1945 I left Orly Field, Paris, and flew to London. There I received orders to return to the U.S. I left London by air 27 May 1945, 9:30 a.m., arriving in Ireland about 12:15 p.m. same day. Due to weather conditions I stayed at Limericke, Southern Ireland that night, taking off via Pan American Clipper from Foynes, Ireland about 2 a.m. 29 May 1945 - via Newfoundland, via New Brunswick, and arrived in New York about 10:30 p.m. 29 May 1945, cleared U.S. customs about 1 a.m. 30 May 1945, stayed over night in New York at Commodore Hotel, returning by D.C. R.R. arriving 7 a.m. Washington, D.C. 31 May 1945, and reported into Field Photo Branch, Washington, D.C. 31 May 1945 at 1 a.m.

I have also reported since my arrival to the OSS Naval Command and the U.S. Naval Barracks to adjust my accounts and allotments and wish to apply for leave.

Respectfully submitted,

William J. Wheeler
William J. Wheeler
CSP(P), USNR

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USS EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Date *10/10/50*

PD

NO.	RANK	INITIALS
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	
	E. H. Dargatz	
	E. van W. Cleveland	
	E. W. Gainer	
	J. H. Hooten	
	E. J. F. ...	
	E. T.	

Top ↑

Executive Officer

Will you please give me a
memorandum showing just the
specific recommendations
that will be sent to the
field with regard to R & D.

7/11/45
one form 3-12
(1300)

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Director's Office

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

✓ 17,000 - 201

29 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: General William J. Donovan
 Director, OSS

FROM: Lt. Col. John M. Jeffries
 Chief
 Research and Development Branch

SUBJECT: Returnee Report of Major Rex Keller

Attached hereto is a Returnee Report made by Major Rex Keller, formerly Chief of RAD in MEDTO, on which General Donovan has penned a notation for comment from RAD.

I am in entire agreement with the points outlined in Major Keller's report. Referring specifically to the comments condensed by the Reports Office in their memorandum dated 12 June 1945, which is also returned herewith --

2. a) "Personnel returning from enemy territory should be more thoroughly debriefed".

As a result of a memorandum dated 21 February 1945 drawn jointly by Colonel Sigelow and the writer for General Donovan's signature and directed to all Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of Missions, it became possible at the close of the Italian Campaign for our representative there to debrief agents. As a result, valuable information has been received on the use of special OSS weapons and devices and on the results obtained. An effort is being made to have the same type of reports made from other theaters. To date, however, we have been unsuccessful in obtaining such reports.

2. c) "A qualified member of RAD should be on the Planning Staff."

Experience of RAD Chiefs in the field has been that they were not called into conferences planning missions, but were rather asked specific questions regarding the operation of devices, weapons or explosives that had been selected for use after the fact of selection. It has long been

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General William J. Donovan

-2-

29 June 1945

my contention that RAD should serve OSS as the Ordnance Department serves the Army. When an Army mission is planned, the Ordnance officer is called in to make recommendations on the weapons to be used to accomplish a specific mission. RAD field Chiefs should be given an opportunity to recommend the best weapon, device or explosive to accomplish a certain desired end rather than being simply asked how to function the specific item already selected. In the memorandum of 21 February 1945 referred to above drawn for General Donovan's signature, some attempt was made to accomplish this desired end. So far no results have been obtained.

2. d) "U.S. Government should start the collection of complete files of all Technical Devices, Methods, and Ideas that can be procured from all parts of the world."

It is my understanding that the Technical Section of SI is at the present time compiling such a file.

2. e) "RAD should enter new theaters earlier."

At the present time there is apparently only one theater to enter: The China Theater. RAD is at present allocated three slots in that theater. It will not be possible to accomplish the desired ends with such a small allotment of slots. I have recommended that a larger number of slots be made available to RAD.

John M. Jeffries
John M. Jeffries, Lt. Col. CN

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Reference Report: **Ref. No. 1011**
Ref. No. 1011

17,027
 Build up
 DATE: 12 June 1945
 R & D
 WED TO
 1011

1. From September 1944 on, acquainted all OSS branches in Europe with the technical knowledge, devices, and services developed by R&D in Washington.
2. a) Personnel returning from enemy territory should be more thoroughly debriefed.
 b) A school should be established to aid all concerned with parachute dropping programs.
 c) A qualified member of R&D should be on the Planning Staff.
 d) U. S. Government should start the collection of complete files of all Technical Devices, Methods, and Ideas that can be procured from all parts of the world.
 e) R&D should enter new territory earlier.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17,027

Field Ops

30 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions, upon Return from
 Foreign Duty

TO: The Director, OSS, Washington, D. C.

THRU: Chief, R&D
 OSS Secretariat

FROM: Major Rex Keller

Author's Duties: - To function as Chief of the Research and Development Branch of Strategic Services in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

More specifically - to make known to all OSS Branches in MEDITO the specialized technical knowledge, devices and services developed by R&D in Washington, and acquired through liaison with similar allied units, National Inventors' Organization, O.S.R.D., the Army and Navy, and other foreign theaters. Certain new specialized technical intelligence was also acquired within MEDITO, and channeled back to those concerned.

The work included the instruction in, and sometimes providing of, Special Weapons, Equipment and Methods; the procurement and supply of enemy uniforms, arms, accessories and insignia for operational use; the making of highly specialized documents; the providing of Special Technical Assistance to the OD Branch; and the maintenance of adequate files and displays, and making demonstrations in order to quickly and easily acquaint Staff Members, Branch Chiefs and Section Heads with all that R&D was prepared to do for them.

Activities: - Arrived in MEDITO on 30 September 1944, and proceeded to Caserta, Italy via Algiers. After reporting to the Strategic Services Officer, Colonel Giavin, the author spent two and one-half weeks visiting OSS field installations throughout the theater and in conferring with Operators and Detachment Commanders, to determine their particular needs and to advise them of the new R&D services to be made available.

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Upon completing these visits, an estimate of the situation was made and, in joint conference with the OSS MEDTO staff and R&D representatives from Washington and London, an outline of proposed procedure was drawn up, which was submitted to, and approved by, Colonel Glavin.

Retaining all available personnel in the theater (it had been proposed to send some on to the Far East) the approved outline was promptly carried out. Previous work with, and knowledge of, our personnel made the task of putting "the right man in the right job" easy, and all five sections of R&D were soon functioning, and all requests from other branches were filled with a prompt, high-quality service, as attested by numerous letters of appreciation, and oral thanks from nearly everyone served.

The Documentation Division of R&D at Rome, expanded until it was serving every branch of OSS in the theater, as well as the Staff, and even the British SOX units.

The Special Weapons and Technical Division of R&D covered all Instruction Groups and Schools & Training areas, including Agent Dispatching and Partisan Aid - all the way from southern Italy right up to the northern front.

The Camouflage and Agents' Clothing and Accessories Division of R&D was successful in obtaining needed items from many sources in Italy, from several sources in the Balkans and Egypt, from France and London, and even some from the United States, thanks to the valuable cooperation shown us in all this work. (Note:- The static condition of the north-Italy front made procurement from that source extremely slow.)

The CD Liaison, Cache and Photo Division of R&D at Bari, though short handed, still kept up with all technical requests of the CD Branch and was enthusiastically complimented by the Chief of CD, both orally and in written reports. (See R&D and CD bi-monthly reports.)

At the R&D Administrative Office in Caserta close liaison and cooperation was maintained with the Theater HQ Staff and through them with other Allied organizations and with AFHQ. A central administrative office-force and comprehensive files were established there in order to promptly aid either the Staff or the Field. A good display of our own and enemy weapons, equipment and accessories both attracted otherwise busy executives to the R&D offices and helped "sell" our functions quickly. Personalized demonstrations were also employed whenever possible.

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When later we received the Washington request to reduce personnel, both the Staff and the author felt that all RAD personnel had by then become well enough established, known, and experienced in their work so that some of them could take on extra work and that the full percentage of "cut" requested could be made without seriously impairing the overall services of RAD in the theater. Capt. Allison, in particular, had demonstrated ample executive ability, and was assigned to handle RAD's administration along with his other work.

Suggestions: 1. The author, personally, was fortunate in having enjoyed good health every day of his overseas service, but feels, from observation, that some improvement could be made in the wholesomeness of the foods sent overseas. However, this is principally an Army problem, and USG procures most things through their 'Service of Supply'.

2. RAD work could have benefitted by a more thorough de-briefing of all personnel returning across the lines from enemy territory. A complete de-briefing is suggested, with use of an appropriate and comprehensive questionnaire. The information thus obtained should be promptly disseminated to all concerned. This would help the immediate program of the Branch as well as the overall long-range effectiveness of the whole organization. Detailed records for the "USG Diary" would also be more complete. This whole effort could also be helped by alerting personnel before they go in (during the original briefings) on certain things to look for, to collect if possible, and to get out if possible.

3. The author recommends the establishment of a technical parachute "Dropping" School (not a parachute school) as an enlarged "Fishing for Drops" Course, to aid all concerned with parachute dropping programs; and taking to them all the experience gained in the North African, England and Continent dropping work, and especially the experience gained in recent tests in the U. S.

4. 'Standard Procedure' Outlines, prepared from all the USG field experience gained in handling Army, Navy and Civilian personnel all these organization, would help all concerned.

5. The author has frequently felt that RAD could be of more value to USG, and could help make USG field operations more effective, if a qualified member of RAD were on the planning Staff, where he would become alerted early to all proposed operations and could possibly better aid those operations with his specialized technical knowledge.

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6. The author also feels that some unit of the U. S. Government, possibly the National Research Council, the O.S.R.D. or the Patent Office, should start the collection of (and should permanently maintain) complete and comprehensive central files on all the Technical Devices, Methods and Ideas, that it is possible to secure information on from all parts of the world. The immediate work would consist principally of combining the many files of independent U. S. units, including theaters when finished, so far as security permits. Such centralized information would benefit both national emergencies and the normal peace endeavors of a wide number of activities; and would save many millions of dollars in otherwise multiple duplication of effort in all future research work.

7. Resulting not only from the author's recently completed mission, but from years of world travel and observation, and previous military intelligence service, the author also most earnestly recommends the continuance of comprehensive Foreign Intelligence similar to that now maintained by this organization in all vital parts of the world and for many years to come (until some world organization takes over world-wide intelligence functions and disseminates "digested" intelligence properly). "Forewarned is forearmed."

8. Earlier entry of well prepared R&D personnel, supplies and equipment into new theaters hereafter will, of course, greatly increase the overall effectiveness of the Branch.

Ex Keller
 HENRY B. KELLER
 Major, PA

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20 June 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan
Director, GDS

FROM: Lt. Col. John M. Jeffries
Chief
Research and Development Branch

SUBJECT: Returnee Report of Major Rex Kallier

Attached hereto is a Returnee Report made by Major Rex Kallier, formerly Chief of R&D in HHSO, on which General Donovan has passed a notation for comment from HSO.

I am in entire agreement with the points outlined in Major Kallier's report. Referring specifically to the comments contained by the Reports Office in their memorandum dated 27 June 1945, which is also returned herewith --

2. a) "Personnel returning from enemy territory should be more thoroughly debriefed".

As a result of a questionnaire dated 21 February 1945 drawn jointly by Colonel Sigler and the writer for General Donovan's signature and directed to all Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of Stations, it became possible at the close of the period covered for our representative there to submit reports. As a result, valuable information has been obtained on the use of special title companies and devices and on the results obtained. An effort is being made to have the same type of reports made from other theaters. To date, however, we have been unsuccessful in obtaining such reports.

2. c) "A qualified member of HSO should be on the Planning Staff."

Reports of HSO Chiefs in the field have been that they were not called into conference planning matters, but were rather called specific questions regarding the operation of various weapons or equipment that had been selected for use after the time of selection. It has long been

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General William J. Donovan

-2-

29 June 1945

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1. d) "U.S. Government should start the collection of complete files of all Technical Devices, Methods, and Ideas that can be procured from all parts of the world."

It is my understanding that the Technical Section of SI is at the present time compiling such a file.

2. e) "R&D should enter new theaters earlier."

At the present time there is apparently only one theater to enter: The China Theater. R&D is at present allocated three slots in that theater. It will not be possible to accomplish the desired ends with such a small allotment of slots. I have recommended that a larger number of slots be made available to R&D.

John M. Jeffries, Lt. Col. CG

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Economic Report: *1944-1945*

17,027
 Field Report
 Clark, H. E. E. E.
 DATE: 12 June 1945
 R+D
 MEDTO

1. Mr. Clark was Chief of the Camouflage and Reconnaissance Division from October 1944 until March 1945.
2. Operating instructions should be more closely coordinated with headquarters, and permission should be given more freely by theater headquarters to collect enemy equipment for use by G.I.

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17,028

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

30 May 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, Office of Strategic Services
Thru: R & D Branch Chief & Secretariat *fyf*

FROM : Ellery D. Clark, 1st Lt. Ord., R & D

SUBJECT : Report on Temporary Duty with 2477 Reg't, OSS (Prov.), MEDTO

1. Description of duties and activities in the field, specifying dates and places.

Reported for duty at R & D, HQ 2477 Reg't, Italy, 9 October 1944 and proceeded to become acquainted with R & D and other OSS activities in MEDTO.

The first visit was to the R & D Reproduction Plant in Rome on about 20 October.

Next a visit was paid the G-2 Branch in Bari on about 2 November, to study R & S liaison there.

Continuing on to Brindisi from Bari on 5 November, a study was made of the mechanics of the OSS drop program which was carried on in conjunction with the British.

On 10 November, in an emergency, the writer reported to the G-2 Branch in Bari as R & S Liaison Officer to do cash and photography work, until a specialist in this field could be trained in the Rome R & D Reproduction Plant.

On 16 November the writer was appointed Chief of the Division for procuring and maintaining Camouflage and Heavy Equipment items for the outfitting of our agents working out of the Mediterranean theater.

The writer was successful in procuring and issuing many items of Camouflage and Heavy Equipment, in addition to arranging displays of certain of this equipment in the headquarters office for briefing purposes.

On 6 December the writer made a comprehensive survey of all the printing facilities in Bari, conforming with a Request from Washington.

Due to requests from the field for special Brown uniforms and equipment, the writer left Bari on 5 February 1945, to visit the 9th and 6th Army fronts to obtain supplies of these items. This trip, being authorized

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by OSS headquarters and AFHQ, netted a large truck load of materiel, many items of which had been unobtainable in the past. The 5th Army POW Headquarters, the Partisans on the 8th Army Front, and the Captured Enemy Materiel Section (British) with the 8th Army were of great assistance in this matter.

On 14 March 1945 the writer signed over to Capt. Allison, Acting Chief, R & D, MEDTO, the files, materiel, and equipment used in the performance of his duties as Chief of the Camouflage and Enemy Equipment Division, and on 30 March returned to the U. S. per the Director's order to reduce personnel in the theatre.

- b. The following are some of the conditions in the field that the writer believes might be improved.
1. Closer coordination and understanding between operating detachments and headquarters.
 2. Have standard procedure for outfitting personnel going into the field, so that one person will not have everything issued to him, while another has to purchase or cannot obtain items that are vital to his work.
 3. The specific difficulties of which the writer personally became aware are as follows:
 1. It was difficult to obtain permission from AFHQ to collect enemy equipment for OSS uses, even though their Captured Enemy Materiel Section could not satisfy our urgent needs.
 2. The writer feels that higher rank would have been a tremendous advantage to him in accomplishing results in the field where so many contacts had to be made with high ranking officials in outside units.

Ellery D. Clark

Ellery D. Clark
1st Lt. Ordnance
Research & Development Branch

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Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. Philip S. Brown
(12A/110)17,029
Field Report
x Bureau, 71 Philip's
DATE: 12 June 1945
R + A 4270

1. Since January 1944 worked on damage assessment in England for the Economic Objectives Unit of the Embassy's Economic Warfare Division.
2. Regrets that assessment work was hampered by competition instead of cooperation between contributing agencies.

S.P.K.

Attachment

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DIRECTOR, OFFICE

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MEMORANDUM FOR
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

**HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON**

7 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Duty in England from January 1944 to February 1945.

TO: Dr. Langer, Chief of R and A Branch, Office of Strategic Services

In compliance with General Order #63 (revised) of 12 March 1945, the following report of my service overseas is submitted.

A. Description of Duties.

After about 5 weeks of travel and detention at replacement depot in England I was able to report to the Economic Objectives Unit of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy about 1 February 1945. I spent a week at 40 Berkeley Square with Captain Kindleberger and others, learning as much as I could about their activities, and then went to Princes Risborough to join the Anglo-American staff of the RE/8 division in the British Ministry of Home Security, which was engaged in analysing damage caused by aerial bombardment in U.K. and Germany. I remained at Princes Risborough during the remainder of my stay in England - i.e. until the end of February 1945.

Immediately upon my arrival at Princes Risborough, I began writing production loss assessments of damage to individual German factories. The factories chosen for the issuance of printed assessment reports were, in the main, those designated by Colonel Richard Hughes of the Target Selection Committee of the 8th Air Force. Until about November 1944, when all assessments requested by the 8th Air Force were completed, I gave almost full time to this work. Since the targets chosen for assessment were largely aircraft and aero engine factories, I, together with Mr. Dembits and Mr. Dearborn, visited several British aircraft factories and took other steps to study British experience under German bombardment. Assessments were made on the basis of (1) background studies of British experience, (2) intelligence gathered largely by E.O.U. on specific factories, and (3) careful interpretation by trained photo interpreters of aerial photographs taken before and after attack.

I lived with a private family in Princes Risborough, wore civilian clothes (until I was commissioned a few days before my return to Washington), and observed for the most part the conditions of work of the British staff. I constituted the bulk of the staff.

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Report on Duty in England (Cont'd.)

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2 April 1945

3. Conditions that might be improved.

Since damage assessment by the RE/8 Division has been largely discontinued and the Division's activities largely reoriented to the requirements of the British ground survey of aerial bombardment on the Continent, and since the remaining American (OSS, FEA and NDRC) personnel is now being withdrawn, there is little point in elaborating on "conditions that might be improved".

C. Special Difficulties.

The principal difficulty - one that caused the damage assessment work at least to have little operational importance - was the detachment of the organization from the planning groups of both the RAF and the 8th Air Force. Target selection and damage assessment should ideally have been organized on a joint basis, at a higher level, and have been much more systematic - instead of being conducted by so many independent and competing small groups. But given the set-up, with which OSS was confronted at the outset, participation by OSS in the work at Princess Risboro was a constructive step and so long as EOU was directed by Morse and Kindleberger the assignment of economists to P.R. was certainly worthwhile; in recent months, partly because of personality conflicts, relations between E.O.U. and RE/8 were not cordial. Also in recent months, production loss assessments have had even less operational significance than they formerly had.

I returned to Washington 3 March 1945, and after 13 days furlough commenced work with the Joint Target Group, to which I was detailed by the Far Eastern Division of RAA. *of factories other than and refineries*

Philip S. Brown
 PHILIP S. BROWN,
 2nd Lt., AUSA,
 (Assigned to duty with
 RAA Branch)

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE:

12 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

x Campbell, Waldemar D
x R+A x WEDTOSUBJECT: Returnee Report: Waldemar D. Campbell
(RA/WEDTO)

Mr. Campbell served as an [redacted] in Algiers, Sicily,
and Italy from December 1943 to March 1945.

S.P.I.

Attachment

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SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.17, 630
Field Report

5 April 1945

TO: Capt. Hugo Will

Subject: Report of returnee pursuant to General Order 63
Revised of 14 March 45.

a/ Brief description of duties in MEDTO.

October-December 1943, RAA Branch, Algiers. Research and analysis on target work for SO and OG; evaluation of incoming SI target material for SI and the Reports Board.

December 1943. Scant three weeks of political reporting in Palermo, Sicily, interrupted by urgent call from Algiers for manpower.

January-March 1944, Algiers. Activities identical with those of October-December 1943, plus combing of all captured enemy documents (mainly German) funnelling from MEDTO thru Algiers to London, screening for material of immediate interest which could be reproduced or abstracted for use in MEDTO or Washington.

March-July, Caserta. Continuation of target work, with emphasis on work for SO and MAAF; analysis of MAAF's program of communications interdiction in Italy.

July-August, Rome. Collation of scattered SI and other intelligence on munition dumps, bridge repair depots and oil storage in Northern Italy--for MAAF, Tactical Air Force, 18th AF, and SO.

September-March 1945, Bari. Briefing of SI officers and agents having projects in Austria and South Germany; planning for immediate post-hostilities activities of an OSS city unit for Vienna; acting chief of RAA, Bari from October to March 1945; organization of all procurable materials on Austria and South Germany to serve as the CID of Bari for use of SI, SO, CG and MG.

b/ Conditions in the field that might be improved.
c/ Specific difficulties.

In these regards I feel most competent to judge my own branch, RAA, and the Services which took care of the body. RAA has such competent leadership and other personnel in the field that I am nothing but proud to have been associated with them, and think that problems of relations with other branches and organizations were solved with a minimum of difficulty. Also the services of 2477 Regiment were better than I had hoped for and I return to the States with a sense of how much was done for our well-being.

**SECRET***Waldemar B. Campbell*
RYA



TCP ↑

Miss Q.D.

I have notes as
to this and will
handle in the field.

Copy

Egypt

seen

es of

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*Field Report 17.031*

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 21 June 1945

FROM : Colonel Doering

*x Ballachey*SUBJECT: Report of E. L. Ballachey, SAT/IBT, attached

I met Mr. Ballachey in Ceylon but did not investigate his work sufficiently to know whether his complaints are justified or not. Col. Coughlin and members of his staff told me that Mr. Ballachey was very irritable and short-tempered, that it was very difficult for the people to get along with him, and they were very happy when he decided to leave.

If an untrained man was placed in charge of the actual assessment operation, it of course was wrong.

I think possibly the quickest way to get the other side of this would be to ask John Coughlin for a report.

*TO Putzel
 → Ned
 Please do this
 TO Lt. S. Wilson
 for action*

0. Q. Q. Q.

SECRET

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

17,031

DATE: 18 June 1945

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Ererton L. Ballache
S&T/IBT*Field Report
+ Ballache*

1. Mr. Ballache, was Chief of Assessment in Ceylon from February to April 1945. ✓

2. He states that the Commanding Officer as well as the members of the assessment staff had very little training or experience in assessment, and that the quality of the candidates selected by the recruiting staff was inferior. There seemed considerable confusion as regards assessment in general.

3. Col. Robinson notes in handwriting that he does not understand how the Commanding Officer mentioned, not a Schools and Training man, had been placed in charge of the school.

S.P.K.

Attachment

7. *Ac. Summary*
for comment
10-5-45
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● 2013 年 12 月 1 日

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

Dr. Callender

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is to determine the scope of the problem. This involves identifying the specific areas of concern and the objectives of the study.

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**17.031
Field Rep 51

x Ballachey, Egerton L

TO The Director through Colonel H. L. Robinson

DATE: 22 May 1945

FROM Egerton L. Ballachey, Area W

x Schels & Tung

SUBJECT Report on Field Conditions

x I B T

A. Duties and activities in the field.

On 1 February 1945, I succeeded Dr. R. S. Lyman as Chief of Assessment at Camp X in Ceylon. As chief, my duties consisted of directing the assessment of the native, agent-candidates processed at the station. The final responsibility for maintaining and improving the efficiency of the assessment program devolved upon me.

On 11 March 1945, the assessment station was transferred to a sub-camp in Camp Y, the basic training center in Ceylon, by order of Col. John G. Coughlin, Strategic Services Officer, IBT. I remained at the assessment station in Camp Y as Chief until my return to Washington on 14 April 1945.

B. Specific difficulties encountered in the field.

1. The Commanding Officer of the Camp X assessment station was a man without training and experience in assessment. His position was officially limited to the supply and maintenance of the camp. However, he had come, in the course of time, to assume authority over matters of policy and personnel which were directly and immediately related to the assessment program. The lack of a workable and clear-cut division of authority between the administrative officer and the Chief of Assessment tended to interfere with the efficient direction of assessment activities and to complicate the task of introducing the changes in procedures and in personnel which appeared to be realistically indicated.

2. The members of the Camp X assessment staff, with one exception, were without training and experience in assessment; only one member of the staff had any previous experience in the Far East. The lack of a trained and experienced staff was a handicap in our attempts to improve and refine assessment procedures and thus increase the value of assessment services to operating branches.

3. A much greater personnel problem, however, was created by failure to appreciate the vital importance of selecting assessors who possess the characteristics essential for the evaluation of personality. The problem of securing and evaluating the assets and liabilities of candidates for OSS operations

There was not
S&T assessment
staff personnel
and apparently
was selected on
random by Capt.
Thorn.
(HAR)

The C.O. of Camp X was Capt. H. L. Robinson who was not an S&T officer. When he assumed the C.O. of the assessment station he had no idea of the importance of the assessment staff and the need to select the best personnel for the job. It was my responsibility to select the best personnel for the job. I was in a strong position to do this. The assessment staff was not strong. I was in a strong position to do this. I was in a strong position to do this.

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is a very difficult task, particularly when the candidates are non-English speaking members of diverse Far Eastern cultural and national groups. It is essential that the members of the assessment staff be selected for those personality traits, skills and abilities which define aptitude for the work. Several of the members of the Camp K assessment staff displayed neither interest in nor aptitude for the complex and difficult job in which they were engaged. It had apparently been the practice to use Camp K as a dumping ground to get rid of people who were either surplus, troublesome or incompetent.

4. It was the judgment of the assessment staff that the quality of candidates selected by the recruiting officers in Calcutta was generally very inferior. Approximately one-third of the recruits from the Calcutta area were recommended for rejection by the Camp K staff. The status in the organization of the head of the Calcutta recruiting office enabled him to evade responsibility for his work by offering unsupported criticisms of assessment personnel and methods based upon a most cursory examination. An efficient relationship between recruiting and assessment can only be secured by maintaining the independence of judgment of both, thus securing two independent evaluations of all candidates. In OSS, Washington, the professional integrity of assessment has been respected; in SHAC, on the other hand, recruiting officers were permitted to influence the assessment program and, in several cases, to reverse the recommendations made by the Camp K staff. This is a situation which is not conducive to the development of an assessment program of maximal value to the organization.

C. Conditions in the field which might be improved.

It is suggested that:

1. The Commanding Officer of an assessment station should be a qualified assessor who is familiar with the unique and complex problems of assessment. The administration of the station could be handled by an executive officer subordinate to the assessor in command.

2. The need for great care in the selection of assessment personnel should be recognized by the responsible officers in the field. Assessment in the field should be, as it is in OSS, Washington, a professional, expert service and, if it is to succeed, it must be treated as such.

3. The methods and personnel of the assessment staff should not be under the review or subject to the criticism of the recruiting staff, since if the recruiting staff turns up inferior candidates it is natural for it to justify its errors by destructive

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- 3 -

criticism of the assessing personnel and evaluation procedures. It should be considered an elementary organizational principle that the work and the decisions of the assessment staff should be reviewed only by those operating official charged with the responsibility for the final activities of agents. The relationship between recruiting and assessment should, of course, be cooperative but the independence of judgment and action of each should be preserved. In the evaluation of human beings, two heads are better than one only if there be two actually.

E. L. Ballachey
Egerton L. Ballachey

SECRET**Office Memorandum****UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Reports:

(Classification, 1945)

Date: 12 June 1945

X SURGEON X ETO

X HSDTB

1. Chief Services Officer at Algiers and Caserta since May 1944, before which he served as Supply Officer in London.
2. Believes Services should be given more responsibility and freer reign in matters of base establishment and supply, and Services personnel and equipment should precede operational personnel into the field.
3. The attached album shows Services' installations and comforts at the GND headquarters at Caserta.

S.F.A.

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CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17, 03 2

5010

Field Report

23 April 1945

TO: The Director

Attn: Capt. W. B. Kantaak

THROUGH: Mr. Louis, Ream, DD-Adm. Services ~~SR~~

SUBJECT: Report of Services Officer, OSS/MEDTO.

1. Pursuant to General Order No. 63, Revised, 14 March 1945, there is submitted herewith a report of my duties and activities in the field, difficulties encountered and conditions which are thought to be subject to improvement.

2. During the past 18 months I have been on continuous overseas duty with OSS. From mid September, 1943, until early May 1944, my assignment was that of Supply Officer, OSS, ETO, with headquarters at London. From early May, 1944, to date my assignment has been that of Services Officer, 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov), with main headquarters at Algiers from about 8 May 1944 to 6 July 1944, and at Caserta, Italy from about 6 July 1944 to date.

3. As Supply Officer, OSS, ETO, I did not function on a Staff level nor is that assignment likely to be generally considered one involving operational responsibility. For these reasons, and the additional reason that about 10 months time has elapsed since the termination of that assignment, it is not believed necessary to comment on my experiences in connection therewith.

4. As Services Officer, OSS, MEDTO (8 May 1944 to date) my duties are those of a Staff Officer, under the Theater Strategic Services Officer (Col. Edward J. F. Glavin), to whom I am responsible for establishing and maintaining all of the Administrative Services facilities and activities required by OSS throughout the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. These facilities and activities include those ordered by Administrative Services, Washington, with the exception of Budget, Fiscal and Finance. The various company and detachment headquarters for which Regimental Services is responsible include Caserta, Rome, Bari, Brindisi, Siena, Florence, Ravenna, Cecina, Rossignano (Phonetic spelling)

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CONFIDENTIAL

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and the "city teams" established in various Balkan cities.

5. In the field particularly, great stress and importance is placed on the procurement, establishment and maintenance of headquarters installations, offices, billets, messing facilities, transportation facilities, and adequate supplies. The number and variation of problems that these responsibilities present in the field have a very direct bearing on field operations. Somewhat by way of illustration, but primarily for the general information of those concerned, there is submitted herewith rough sketches of the Headquarters and Caserta areas together with photographs of certain parts of the Headquarters installations.

6. Establishment and maintenance of the Caserta headquarters presented problems more or less typical, depending upon local facilities and conditions, of those encountered in the establishment and maintenance of the other numerous sub-headquarters throughout the theater. For the most part local conditions and facilities are quite unsatisfactory. Except for the bare buildings, requisitioned to form the bases for these installations, practically everything in the way of facilities have to be supplied or provided for by Services. This involves remodeling and renovation of buildings; installation of water and electric lines, sewer, latrine and bath facilities; provision for emergency power and light; procurement or construction of furniture, furnishings and space heaters, and the procurement of fuel. Shortages of material, equipment, supplies and personnel constitute the greatest difficulties in this connection.

7. Shortages of vehicles, drivers, maintenance personnel and parts are the principal problems in connection with the maintenance of adequate motor transportation. These problems appear to be most troublesome at the Rome headquarters where approximately 40 passenger type vehicles are at present in operation to serve about 90 officers and American civilians (exclusive of X-2); and where demands for additional vehicles and complaints about existing transportation facilities originate most frequently. Civilian type vehicles are in greatest demand and as a result most of the Rome vehicles are of Italian civilian make, and either driven by the officer or person to whom assigned or by native civilian employees. Maintenance personnel are also native civilians for the most part. Repeated surveys have indicated that, regardless of the critical shortage of available repair parts, Rome would have more transportation than required if the present vehicles were operated under a motor pool system. Such a system is, of course, objected to by those individuals and branches having vehicles assigned to their exclusive use. The motor pool system is in satisfactory operation at Headquarters and

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the other Company and Detachment headquarters.

9. Supply problems have been greatly reduced since Major Agostini arrived to take over Regimental supply. The ever present problem created by the apparent inability of the Branches to anticipate operational requirements is still troublesome but has been minimized as far as possible. Spot demands for supplies and equipment not previously included on estimated requirements are quite frequent and result in additional burdens being placed on the limited facilities and staff of the Supply Branch. Several additional enlisted men with considerable supply experience are needed preferably with OSS background.

10. From Services' point of view relations with the Army are quite satisfactory. Cooperation extended by certain Depots, Bases and local Army organizations has in some instances been especially fine. These favorable conditions are the results of continued efforts on the part of certain key Services personnel in the field, who in their contacts with the Army have established confidence in themselves and in OSS and a better understanding of OSS by those in the Army who can be of greatest help.

11. The following comments, in addition to those above, are submitted as suggestions for improvement in OSS/MEDTO, and/or as recommendations for future operations in other theaters:

- a. Forward field units should be attached for supply to the Armies they service.
- b. In the field Services should be strong enough and so organized as to assume full responsibility for all S-4 matters and be the only OSS contact with the G-4 of Allied Forces and U. S. Army Headquarters.
- c. Resurvey of Services requirements in the field, particularly with respect to the number and type of personnel. Careful thought and planning should be given to such requirements in new theaters of operations.
- d. Very important to have Services personnel, and equipment precede operational personnel and activities into the field. If possible Services units should be formed, completely

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- 4 -

briefed and equipped in the U. S. and sent to the field as a unit.

- e. Establish some uniform policy, comparable to that of the army, under which it will be possible to promote deserving enlisted men. At present we have over 30 enlisted men whose duty assignments warrant at least one, and in some cases two and three, grade raises but who cannot be promoted for lack of slots.

H. G. Lockwood
H. G. Lockwood
Lt. Col., QMC

enclosure

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

SECRET

17,038

Field Report

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Harold H. Clark
(S+T/Clark)

X Manual, Harold H.

DATE: 13 June 1945

X S+T X L&E/TB

1. Upon arrival in Caserta in October 1944, he was assigned as instructor for "Q" Section first at Bari and later at Leghorn.
2. Brief description given of agent training and of the difficulties besetting "Q" Section's operations.

S.S.K.

Attachment

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17,038

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

Schools and Training Branch
2324 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

31 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report on overseas service, October, 1944, to
May, 1945.
TO: The Director

1. Chief, Schools and Training Branch

2. Chief, Intelligence Branch

3. I was sent to Italy in response to a request made by Major (now Lt. Col.) [redacted], 2877th Reg. for personnel to city teams then being organized for Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and Dresden. I left Washington by air the afternoon of October 30th, and reported at Caserta the afternoon of October 31st. Major Chapin was away, but on October 24th the following day I talked with Lt. Com. Green, then personnel officer at Headquarters.

4. At the time of my arrival the city teams were fully organized and briefed, and had sufficient personnel. Since I had no unusual qualifications in the way of command of former and knowledge of Central Europe, it seemed that I might better be utilized in some other way, and I was kept at Caserta while the case was looked into. The following day Col. Robinson, Chief of Schools and Training Branch, arrived in Caserta. On a visit to Bari he learned that [redacted], then just organized there at Company B, was in need of a man for training, and he arranged to have me assigned. On November 4th I flew to Bari, reported to Major de Piolenc, Chief of Q Section, and was taken into the section.

5. Q Section had been in operation for about two weeks. The personnel consisted of Major de Piolenc, Chief; Capt. (now Major) Henriksen, training; Capt. Brinckerhoff, air operations officer; Capt. Bonnet, then recruiting in Paris; [redacted], [redacted] (WAC) and Oakley (WAC); and Pfc. [redacted]. There were in addition twelve agent personnel, installed in Villa Pasqua, just outside Bari. Other officers were assigned in succeeding months.

6. [redacted], of Schools and Training, who was sent to Italy as a [redacted] as I and for the same reason, was also assigned to Q Section, and on arrival in Bari went to Villa Pasqua to look after the agent personnel and teach them [redacted] and [redacted] arms.

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SECRET

TO: The Director

31 May 1945

by function was to teach the agent personnel all intelligence material other than briefing (done by Major de Piolenc and Capt. Brinckhoff) and demolitions and small arms, handled by Sgt. Branel. I took, in the company of Sgt. Branel and some of the agent personnel, a three-day course at the Allied Intelligence School at Arco Felice, near Naples, and obtained from the school a complete set of the pertinent parts of their mimeographed lessons. These lessons I translated into French, and continuously revised as new intelligence came in. In addition, I combined material from numerous other sources and wrote in French several further sections. After a month's work I had a fair sized syllabus in French covering the following topics:

- War and Security
- Reporting (General recommendations)
- Order of Battle (General explanations)
- German Organization:
 - The Wehrmacht
 - The New Infantry Division
 - Panzer Divisions, 1944 Type
 - Mountain and Light Divisions
 - Panzer Grenadier Divisions
- Identifications
 - Uniforms
 - Documents
 - Other Sources

- German Material
 - Artillery
 - Tanks
 - Self-Propelled and Assault Guns

- Selection of Dropping Points and Reception Committees
- Use of the Drop Bag
- General Reporting
- Political Reporting
- Radio Propaganda

6. The agent personnel of Q Section, some of whom had worked for me in North Africa, were recruited through and by arrangement with DDM, the French opposite number of OSS. All were native French except one, and he was a German Luftwaffe Lieutenant who had deserted to the Maquis, had served against his former compatriots, was sponsored by Archiduc, the Maquis leader, and by a French radio operator with whom he had worked in France and with whom he was teamed in Bari. The men were divided into basic teams of two men, one agent and one radio operator, to whom were added sometimes a third or a fourth man. All had had experience of some sort: in the resistance movements, as agents, or as escaped prisoners of war. It was planned to drop them into Austria and southern Germany, using

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To: The Director

31 May 1945

SECRET

lost or forced labor cover, and where possible into places with which they were familiar, or with which some member of the team was familiar. Radio operators were given training at the radio school conducted by Lt. Stenzel some miles south of Bari, and obtained additional experience through sport and long-range field contacts for some time after completion of their course.

Relations with AMER proved difficult and time consuming. The French organization was filled with jealousies, bickerings and rifts within, and was jealous of other allied intelligence agencies, particularly of ourselves. The military status, pay, future career, and insurance of the agents furnished subjects of argument and negotiation, but the most thorny question was that of communications and signal plans, which DGER was determined to control and to obtain thereby first fruits of intelligence obtained by men in the field, and which Major de Biencourt, naturally, was just as determined not to relinquish. A very cooperative French major, sent to Bari as liaison officer by DGER, took sides with us in the dispute, and for his pains was promoted to captain by his organization.

It was hoped to get two teams off during the November moon, but because of snags in arrangements, chiefly in connection with DGER, no operation was actually laid on until January, when one team, flown by the British at Brindisi, actually got off. Motor trouble, however, forced a return to base. The next night weather conditions were unfavorable, and the third night found the moon too bright. It was not until March that a team finally got away, and was dropped near Lake Constance, only to be overrun in a few days by the Germans. One man was never seen again after his jump from the plane, a second was wounded in the fighting as the Russians advanced and was hospitalized at Ducharest, and the third escaped to Bari and was flown up to Company C, to which the section later then moved. A second team of three men was dropped on March 18th at another point, near the Austro-German frontier, and nothing was ever heard of any of them. A team of two men was dropped April 10 and met by a reception committee north of Lake Constance. Contact was at once established with this team, but it was too late for them to contribute intelligence. A fourth operation consisted of getting a radio operator, non-parachutable, across the Swiss frontier into Germany; at last reports he had not been heard from. Finally an American team, working for Q Section, was ready to cross this frontier at the time of the armistice, but as far as I know never got across.

At the time of its activation Q Section had one contact man in Southern Germany, who occasionally contributed small bits of intelligence. With this exception the efforts and expenditure of the whole section for seven months did not produce a trace of intelligence.

SECRET

-4-

31 May 1945

To: The Director

The above said failure cannot be attributed to the incompetence or negligence of any individual in the section or organization, but must be laid to the account of circumstances beyond our control. However, the performance of OSS, as exemplified in the activities of Q Section and associated sections, is not above criticism. Briefly, there were two respects in which our performance might have been improved: first, the production of proper documents and authentic clothing and accessories was inadequate and insecure; second, not only in Q Section but throughout the three companies with which I was associated, there was consistent over-allocation of personnel, with consequent idleness, inefficiency, and dissatisfaction.

I include the account of my own activities. I was busy with teaching, translating, and organization of material from my arrival in Bari through about the first week of December. By that time the main groundwork was done, and since teams were being sent out, it was impossible to take new men in. I had to do the best I could. What remained was merely keeping the intelligence up to date, and, (during the frequent and sometimes prolonged absences of Major Henriksen in France and elsewhere on section business) handling such routine matters as came up in the office in connection with training and writing the fortnightly training reports. From January through April a total of nine agents needing varying amounts of training were added to the section, and these I processed in accordance with their requirements. But I was left, while at Bari, with long periods of almost total inactivity, except for such jobs as I could devise for myself.

On March 17, with Major Henriksen and eight agents, I flew from Bari to the newly organized company C in the vicinity of Ighiten. Major Henriksen stayed for a few days to settle us in a villa at Quercianella, and then returned to Bari, leaving me for a time as the sole representative of Q Section at the new company. I was for this period of about a week very busy, being the only one at the villa who could speak English and consequently answer the telephone, the only one authorized to drive, and to draw rations, and the only one to whom any company business affecting the section could be referred. When the rest of the section came up, I remained at the villa, taking care of the house end, and, as previously, of the intelligence instruction, and Sgt. Grammel, of whose personal qualities and value to the organization I cannot speak too highly, looking after the outside work, and keeping the boys exercised, practiced in arms and demolitions, and so on.

On May 3, on orders and in accordance with my own recent request, I left Company C for Caserta and the United States, arriving at Caserta by plane the same day and leaving Naples,

-3-

SECRET

To: The Director

31 May 1946

Re: as above. On the evening of May 20 I arrived in New York, and my 21st reported in Washington.

Harold M. March
HAROLD M. MARCH

f

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report - Mr. James G. Miller
(H/O/SAT)

17,639
Filed report
x Miller 27 Jan 49
DATE: 13 June 1945
x ETO x SAT

1. From February 1945 on, made a study of SAT in the United Kingdom and Paris, and submitted a report advocating the establishment of an "B" type assessment school in ETO.

2. Facilities necessary for establishing a personnel selection and placement program should be used more fully, and details of the present assessment program should be altered to increase the role of SAT in the field.

J.
S.P.R.

Attachment

SECRET

17037

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

20 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions Observed during Overseas Service.

TO: Major General William J. Donovan, Director.

THROUGH: Colonel H. L. Robinson, Chief, Schools & Training.
Secretariat.

In accordance with General Order No. 63, Revised, effective 12 March 1945, the following report on field conditions is submitted:

1. Departed from Washington 8 February 1945, flying to Scotland. Arrived in London 10 February 1945, reporting to the Adjutant and to Captain Shine, Chief of Schools & Training, E.T.O.

Devoted two days to visiting O.S.S. schools in the United Kingdom, and to getting first-hand information concerning some of the problems of training agents in that theater.

For one week interviewed representatives of various branches, in all about 15, concerning their attitudes on the desirability of an assessment program in E.T.O. One or more members of each of the important branches expressed his opinions on this question. In general the feeling seemed to be that such a school should be established in England. There was some slight opposition.

On 19 February 1945, flew to Paris, where about 15 further such interviews were conducted among O.S.S. personnel. The chief difference in opinion here was that the school should be located in France rather than the United Kingdom, in order to be nearer the field of action and to be accessible to a larger number of agents. Several consultations were held with Mr. Donald Adams of the Schools & Training assessment staff who had been attached to SI in Paris for some months, and who had many ideas about the establishment of an assessment program in E.T.O.

As a result of all these conversations on 1 March a report advocating the establishment of an "S" type assessment school was submitted to Colonel Forgan, Director, E.T.O., and on 3 March it was discussed with him. He deferred final decision until after hearing from the Chiefs of SO and SI in the theater.

In company with Captain Shine, made a 4-day trip from 8 - 11 March, at the direction of Colonel Gamble, Deputy Director in Paris, to the O.S.S. Field Detachments at 6th AG and 7th Army. Our purpose was to see what Schools & Training could learn from these operations and also to discover if we could help them in their programs of selecting, screening, and training agents.

From 12 - 27 March, acted as administrative officer of Schools & Training

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Branch in Paris, for a time being Acting Chief when no other Schools & Training officer was in Paris, assisting in the establishment of various agent training programs. Also interviewed psychiatrically a number of agents and made recommendations to the branches concerned on their usefulness. Also saw a number of minor medical cases while the regular O.S.S. Medical Officer was absent from Paris. During this time it was finally decided the war had progressed too rapidly to warrant an E.T.O. assessment program for the combat phase.

On 28 - 31 March 1945, as representative of Schools & Training, visited 12th AG, 9th and 1st Army O.S.S. Field Detachments for the same purpose as the others had been visited earlier. Also intended to visit 3rd Army Field Detachment, but this was impossible at this time because the detachment was moving forward.

1 April 1945 returned to Paris, visited the French DGER assessment school, and two days later flew back to London.

In London prepared reports, visited one of the British officer selection psychological assessment schools, checked the field performance records of a number of former students who had been assessed at "S," until leaving for the U.S. on 15 April 1945.

Arrived New York and Washington 28 April 1945.

2. During this mission overseas I had occasion to observe certain conditions which appeared to me susceptible of improvement.

a. Mainly these dealt with the personnel selection policy of the organization, which is, of course, the matter primarily concerning members of the assessment staff. Many diverse groups in O.S.S., both in the U.S. and in the theater, are concerned with getting the right men into the right jobs. Some of those who do this selecting are qualified for the work, but others are not. Certainly there was inadequate co-ordination of the various steps of this process in E.T.O. The O.S.S. procedure for choosing both staff personnel and agents has not yet been well integrated, although there are a number of members of the organization well equipped to do this sort of work.

To begin with, recruiting was carried on for E.T.O. personnel by a large number of agencies. The Personnel Procurement Branch in the U.S. and the Personnel Branch in the theater chose most staff members. The selection of agents, however, was hit-and-miss. Each of the Field Detachments (1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th Armies, and 12th AG) chose agents. So did SI, SO, NO, and I-2 desk men. Often several men in the same branch - for instance SI - were recruiting at the same time. Of course some of these recruiters had special contacts which made them able to obtain agents that others might not have found. But there were many reasons why this recruiting should have been better organized. It would have saved man hours, transportation, etc., concerned in the missions of many individuals going out after these agents, but more importantly, almost none of these recruiters had had any important experience in selecting agents or knew what traits and skills to look for. One or two, like Mr. Hyde of the 7th Army Field Detachment, showed remarkably good common sense judgment. He understood well the sort of people from whom he was choosing his agents, but he was an exception, and there were many cases of badly chosen agents.

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Efforts were made to unify recruiting on the continent, but these were never successful, largely because each group independently wishes to do its own selection. It is a rare person who does not believe that his own judgment of people is unimpeachable and better than most of the rest of the world, and this psychological fact interferes with the development of organized recruiting because so many individual units wish to choose their own personnel. Better choices would be made if trained personnel were used, and if all modern selection methods were employed.

This would mean that clearer job specifications would be made available to the recruiters. Also it would mean that recruiting should be done by interviewers trained and experienced to recognize the common mental and physical disabilities, to distinguish desirable and undesirable personality traits. Perhaps these recruiters could be given medical and psychological training in this, or perhaps a handbook could be prepared outlining such matters as: (a) The main variables of personality and how to estimate them; (b) interviewing technique, how to do this informally; (c) the various sorts of motivation and their reliability; (d) the evidences of emotional instability and their significance and prognosis; (e) the types of mental illnesses; (f) the kinds of intelligence and the sorts of jobs that people with these various types fit into; (g) the use of observing tests or reporting tests; etc.

Of course it was a shortcoming that all staff and agent personnel in E.T.O. were not assessed. If routine assessment had been established, no agent would have been trained like the one I interviewed in Paris. Investigation showed that he had a history of severe pyromania and discharge from the Army on that account, had been a patient at Bellevue Hospital, had burst out several times in unprovoked temper leading to violent arguments or fist fights, and probably suffered from traumatic epilepsy.

The personnel in E.T.O. was investigated repeatedly in one fashion or another. Each went through several of the following procedures: a recruiting interview, a security check based on SA-1 forms or on a "vetting" interview, an I-2 investigation, and assessment. Besides that they were rated in any schools they attended, and opinions about their performance were put in writing by their CO's and by others who worked with them. All this constituted a valuable body of personnel information, but it was never compiled. Parts of it were available to a number of persons, but all of it was not available to anyone.

Such information if properly used can increase the efficiency of an organization immeasurably by being the basis of placement of personnel. But in the hands of many people it can be neglected or, on the other hand, dangerously misused by becoming too widely known.

I suggest that for each member of the organization a dossier be made up containing all the information ever gathered on him - by the Personnel Procurement Branch, Schools & Training, Security, I-2, Medical Services, assessment, "vetting" - whatever investigation may be carried out on him. This should always be in the carefully guarded possession of a single branch - say Security. It should definitely accompany the individual to the theater, for it is usually there that final placement in a job or changing of jobs occurs. (But he should never see his own dossier, of course, as an Army Officer can see his Form 66-1) Security

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should never give up possession of the dossier, but should make whatever parts seem useful available to proper branch representatives before personnel is placed in any job. A personnel expert who knows this record should be consulted before any individual is given a job.

Various agencies, such as the Army, have established procedures, like the traveling job audit teams, to be sure square pegs are not put in round holes. O.S.S. as yet has no such procedure but with all the information learned about its personnel from diverse sources, we could do this better than any other agency.

The job should be done by the standards of professional ethics, and all care must be taken of the wealth of personal information learned about members of O.S.S. But if all this information were centralized and carefully guarded, there would be less danger of its being too generally disseminated than there is now. If any evaluations of a person were given even limited circulation throughout the organization they should be brief, objective, and in no sense intimate or revealing of privacy.

In a report to Colonel Robinson and the assessment staff written 20 February 1945, I showed that the assessment reports sent overseas were being consulted by some branch chiefs who were placing personnel, but that no wide use of advice on such placement was being made in E.T.O. A plan such as is outlined above should be of great benefit.

b. My observation of O.S.S. personnel in the theater naturally led me to recognize aspects of assessment which I feel should be improved. I went into detail on this in my report of 13 March to Colonel Robinson.

i. First, the personality variable of integrity is of prime importance and is an aspect of character which we have only half-heartedly attempted to evaluate. There is a great temptation for everyone in an organization that necessarily gives so much freedom to its members at all levels, to act without integrity on small matters. This includes many such minor things as misuse of transportation, taking lengthy lunch hours, shopping during working time, allowing small security lapses, or playing favorites. These piecemeal infractions add up to make for inefficiency. The American civil servant did not impress me overseas as being so aware as his British counterpart of how small breaches of responsibility on his part could affect the war effort. This organization needs ruthlessness now, but assessment must ascertain if it can whether this ruthlessness will be directed only toward the enemy.

ii. Second, assessment must make every effort to ascertain how individuals sent overseas are likely to spend their leisure time, for this definitely affects their working efficiency. Repeatedly we hear that students at the assessment schools do not enjoy having their sex life or their alcoholic habits probed, but in a number of cases these aspects of life have got out of bounds overseas, when persons are subjected to unusual strains, and assessment must make every effort to forestall such events. Moreover, it must be recognized that prevention in this is better than cure, for a way of living begun by a few can spread to many or at least go a long way to establish the reputation of the many in the outside world of rumor.

iii. Third, we must realize that in America we are assessing in general not agents, but those who will select and handle agents. We must realize that such a

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men must have, probably more than any other trait, ability to get along with others, good social relations. He must not be a prima donna. Desire for power must not be an important motivation for him. He must be able to become an effective member of a team. It is generally realized by most people who have been in this theater that individual competition for place, privilege, and power has been a chief stumbling block in the carrying out of operations. (Incidentally, it follows that the men who are going to have the most responsibility need the most thorough assessment, and it is certainly not desirable to permit them to go to "W" instead of "S" on the plea that they must save two or three days out of their busy lives. The extra time for careful assessment of this one aspect of their personality should make for greatly increased over-all efficiency in the theater.) (It is only fair to say that some of the men who have been most lacking in the ability to cooperate went to E.T.O. before assessment was begun in the United States.)

iv. Fourth, there can be little doubt that in America we are putting inadequate emphasis in assessment on the importance of understanding the culture and civilization being dealt with, on the degree of language knowledge and skills, and on the type of propaganda ability. Perhaps we feel in the assessment schools that, after all, evaluating this is the task of the desk men in Washington. It may be, but staff men going to E.T.O. were not screened well enough in these fields, no matter whose job it was. I have heard a number of complaints that personnel in R & A, in MO, and in SI, who were supposed to be experts on Germany or France, may have visited the countries and read about them, but simply did not have the feel for the culture, the continental attitude necessary to do effective work with and comprehend the people. Similarly, often candidates have said that they spoke fluent French or German, but actually it has appeared over here to be far less than that, sometimes unidiomatic or bookish. MO, for instance, sent several people to E.T.O. who could write fair German but found little to do, because they were not equipped linguistically to write convincing propaganda. People who speak languages with complete adequacy were too rare in E.T.O. Similarly, when MO asks for propaganda ability, it means real creative ability; there are few jobs for mediocre writers.

c. One or two matters concerning the Schools & Training Branch as a whole became apparent to me. The Branch had been established late in the E.T.O., after most of the other branches had been operating for some time. It operated under a general order to direct all training in the organization. The branch chief of the theater, Captain Shine, made this clear but did not press the point unduly, for he was met with a good deal of opposition from operational branches that had been running their own schools and saw no reason for relinquishing this function. Some groups co-operated willingly with this centralization of training, but others opposed it vigorously for reasons that were never made wholly clear and which seemed to run counter to the order. By the time I left the theater, training had still not come wholly under the Schools & Training Branch, although the matter had been compromised, largely through Captain Shine's diplomacy.

The schools in E.T.O. under the Schools & Training Branch were always badly in want of more instructors. This was chiefly because it was so difficult to find qualified instructors who spoke the necessary languages. It is difficult to see how this could have been remedied, but it was a bottleneck which if relieved, would have improved the quality of agent training.

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3. My suggestions as to field conditions which I observed in E.T.O. that might be improved, can be summarized as follows:

a. O.S.S. has the facilities necessary for establishing a personnel selection and placement program superior to any ever set up, but as yet the facilities are not well enough integrated. Suggestions for improvement are made.

b. Details of our present assessment are unsatisfactory as shown by field experiences, and should be altered.

c. The Schools & Training Branch in E.T.O. was unfortunately hampered from carrying out its basic function. Among other difficulties was an insufficient number of qualified instructors.

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