

## Office Memorandum

**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 12 June 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Stuart B. Kaiser  
(Special Funds/Medro)

1. Mr. Kaiser was in Algiers from April 1944 on as Special Funds officer, and later, during the closing of the Algiers base, he assisted the work of the French and Spanish SI desks.

2. Recommends that payments to beneficiaries by OSS should be made in person wherever possible, and that claims of agents and their families should be settled quickly. In addition, an OSS liaison should remain to wind up affairs in regions in which OSS is no longer active.

S.P.K.

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Although I was sent into the field to be Special Funds Officer in Corsica, I never reached that destination. Upon arrival in Algiers, April 20, 1944, I was detained for duty there. Later I spent a week in Tunis, observing the mechanism of the purchase of French currency and some of the other activities of OSS in Tunis.

Upon my return to Algiers I tried to make myself generally useful, as I was not at first assigned to any particular duties. Later on, I was given the specific job of cashier. When Special Funds Headquarters moved to Caserta in July 1944, I remained in Algiers. My duties were many and varied, and I had the specific task of arranging for liquidation of the Brandon Project, which had long been a source of concern to Special Funds.

In August 1944 The Special Funds office in Algiers broke down badly. At that time I took over the responsibilities of the office, although I was not the nominal head. In addition to my work in Special Funds I did work of a varied nature for almost every Branch. When the French and Spanish Desks moved forward I took over their duties, and I was able to be of considerable service to them. As the station complement of Algiers continued to diminish, the tasks of those who remained became more and more varied. I was kept busy up to the day of my departure with a large number of interesting problems.

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The Algiers office split up in July 1944. The main body moved to Caserta, taking its problems with it. We were left with a small office. This office became almost completely bogged down because of the inertia and incompetence of the Special Funds officer, <sup>(CAPT. WHITLOW)</sup> in charge. I took over the management of the office, and cleaned up an accumulation of undone business. The work of the office was brought and kept up to date. ~~Mathematics~~ <sup>Mathematics</sup> ~~element~~ was working specifically on the Brandon Project.

Brandon was a joint British-American mission, financed by OSS. When our agents went on this mission their salaries were accrued, and partial payments were made to next-of-kin. At the close of the Tunisian campaign the mission came to an end, and on 1 July 1943 we took over from the British the full responsibility for liquidating this project. Many agents were missing, and we started making monthly payments to known and available beneficiaries. It soon became evident that payments and accruals might continue indefinitely, and various attempts were made to substitute lump sum settlements. Not much progress was made until the summer of 1944, when the French Provisional Government agreed to assume our responsibility toward French nationals who had been employed by us. It became my duty to make the detailed settlement.

Our records on Brandon were incomplete and inaccurate and it took considerable correspondence and personal investigation to

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straighten them out. By the time that I had satisfied myself of the correctness of the Brandon accounts, Major Jannot, who was representing the French, was preparing to leave for France, which had been newly liberated. A plan was drawn up and agreed to by both parties on the eve of his departure. The plan has been in effect since 1 September 1944, and its details are on file with Special Funds. It was necessary to separate the 28 still missing agents into six different categories, with each category being given a different treatment.

It became advisable to revise the plan when France was almost completely liberated, and subsequent modifications have been made because of discovery of fresh information about the missing men. In all our negotiations, Major Jannot was most cooperative, and was always agreeable to suggested changes.

The value of the Brandon agreement is that it fixed our maximum liability in this project and ended any further financial responsibilities on our part after September 1, 1944.



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The following suggestions are made for improvement of conditions in the field.

#### MAKE PAYMENTS IN PERSON

I am firmly convinced of the value of personal contacts. Wherever possible, I believe we should adopt a policy of making our payments in person, especially when they are of a non-recurring nature. I am opposed to making payments through a bank if we can possibly avoid it, and I do not believe the smallness of an amount of money is any criterion of its importance.

In the Brandon Project, the payments which we are now going to make are not only final payments, but in most cases will be our first and only contact with the agent or his beneficiary. Because these agents were trained by the British, the connection of the United States with the Project is not known, and we are getting no credit for it. The prestige value to the United States of a personal visit by a French-speaking American is very great. The spontaneous reception which I always received from Brandon beneficiaries and agents always made the occasion an opportunity for forging a new link in the chain of Franco-American friendship. We should not neglect any opportunity for adding a link to that chain.

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# IMPROVE LIASON BETWEEN BRANCHES.

I believe that the system of keeping our various Branches in watertight compartments has been carried too far. It makes for hoarding of information, duplication and waste of material, and it estops OSS from developing its intelligence to the highest point. Good liason will not harm security, and it might serve to assuage interbranch jealousies. The security problem is always present in an exchange of intelligence, but I am convinced that we are putting too much emphasis on it in this particular. If S I has information of special value to X 2, the latter branch cannot function efficiently without S I help. The problem of overall coordination of OSS Branches is no doubt being constantly studied. It is certainly one of the most important problems facing us.

# IMPROVE LIASON INSIDE BRANCHES.

There must be better liason between Washington and the Field, and between the Field Base and its sub-bases. We need more expeditors whose sole occupation is to follow through to a conclusion all problems as they arise. It takes far too long to get an answer to a communication in the Field. A great many important questions go unanswered. A business house which neglected its customers would suffer. There is no reason to expect OSS to be immune from the consequences of such negligence.

The difficulties of travel in the field are appreciated, but there is no substitute for it. Cables and letters often give a

completely distorted picture. Conditions change fast in wartime, and more frequent trips will lessen the chances of so many mutual misunderstandings.

#### AWARD MORE DECORATIONS TO FOREIGNERS

The award of an American decoration to a foreign national is one of the best methods of gaining friendship. We should adopt a rather generous policy in this respect. We should also make every effort to expedite the award of medals for which friends of OSS have already been proposed.

#### SETTLE CLAIMS WITH FOREIGNERS PROMPTLY

Claims of foreign nationals should be settled as quickly as possible. In the past there have been unconscionable delays and it is to be hoped that the Board of Review and the Theater Counsel will bend every effort to come to quick decisions when demands of this nature are made on us. When a man has been of great service to OSS it is important that we do not adopt an overlegalistic viewpoint in examining his claim. We should make every effort to cut red tape and to avoid arousing unnecessary resentment.

#### USE EXTREME CARE IN TERMINATION OF AGENTS

Far too little consideration has been given to this subject. When the time comes that an agent's services are no longer required, we should make sure that he is treated with every consideration. We must see to it that the last impression which we make is a good one. The termination of agents' contracts should be entrusted only to men who are capable of handling the situation. We should make

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the agents aware of our appreciation, especially in cases where their patriotism has been the compelling motive in helping us. If we want to keep the friends we have made, we must work to keep them.

The termination of some of our Spanish Desk agents in Algiers was disgraceful. This important job was left to a young man who, according to all reports, treated them in an extremely cavalier fashion. Beside the need for simple justice, our need of friends in Spain of the future is obvious.

Our handling of agents is certainly one of the greatest problems facing OSS, and we must seek constantly improved methods.

LEAVE LIASONS WHEN WE LEAVE TERRITORY

We should have kept an official representative of OSS for a longer period in Algiers. We left unresolved problems behind us. Our Algiers connections felt that we had abandoned them, and we incurred considerable ill-will. Obviously we cannot staff an area indefinitely, but when we leave an area after long occupation it would appear to be good insurance to keep an official representative there for as long as the situation would seem to require.

MAKE MORE FRIENDS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The United States needs friends badly. We need new friends, and we must learn to keep the friends we already have. OSS has made grave errors in its treatment of people who have been kindly disposed toward us. The intransigent attitude of two Desk Heads

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in Algiers lost the OSS considerable prestige, and cost us considerable cooperation, according to members of the Resistance. Every OSS representative abroad should keep in mind that he is also a symbol of the United States to the people with whom he comes in contact. In particular, OSS civilians abroad in wartime cannot afford ordinary tourist behavior standards. In the vital matter of improving foreign relations the OSS has not taken full advantage of its privileged position. OSS needs indoctrination in this matter.

Stuart B. Kaiser  
7 April 1945

*Stuart B. Kaiser*  
*Special Funds*

*Filed in separate folder*





## Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Reports: Lt. Nathan E. Jernan, USMC  
 (Field Photo/ETD)

17,050  
 Field Report  
 X. cc: en, Lt. Nathan #  
 DATE: 13 June 1945  
 X Field photo  
 X ETD  
 X ETD P

1. Assigned to IPDP in France, he took ground photos of the minor Mediterranean ports as well as those from Hendaye to Arrachun and some in Belgium and Holland.

2. Check lists should be prepared for teams going into the field which would brief inexperienced personnel in the many small tricks which add to the comfort of life in the field. (A suggested check list is appended.) Lt. Jernan advocates preparing specialized brochures of IPDP photos for use by WMAA, FRA, AHS, and other agencies.

3. Attached are: copy of "Evidence in Camera" showing type of camera used, and a description of filing methods at Redwoodham, the British Air photo archives center.

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 S.S.K.

Attachments

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Outside Edges of green  
cord indicate the edges of  
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is  $\frac{1}{65}$  @ f.6.3

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APPENDIX

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17,050

Filing of photographs at Medmenham was done according to geographical position. A map of the world at one/25,000 scale is divided up into rectangles measuring 10 of latitude and 10 of longitude each. From the point of origin (the British point of origin is 75° north, 15° west) square are marked 01, 02, 03, in the direction east from point of origin around the world until square number 360 arrives at starting point. Starting from point of origin in a direction ~~west~~ squares are marked AA, AB, AC, etc., around the earth until square number ZZ brings the marking back to point of origin. Each of these squares is then referred to by its latitude and longitude position, as for example, square number 23BX. Each of these squares (master squares) are sub-divided in smaller squares of 10 minutes on each side giving 18 sub-squares each master square. These 18 squares are marked one to 18, inclusive, starting with one on the upper left hand corner and numbering horizontally through the three rows until number 18 is marked in the lower right hand corner. Any of these sub-squares can now be referred to, as for example, 23BX4. Index cards are made out for each 10 minute square contained in the master square and plot details are entered on each card.

Traces of the one/25,000 base map are marked showing each sortie and the photographic area covered by this sortie. A grid index on the same sheet identifies the sortie with the library sortie number.

To look any particular photograph in a given area, it is necessary first to find the number of the geographical square. This will be found on the one/25,000 square map. The trace which bears this number is then examined and individual photographs or sorties desired ~~are~~ shown on this trace. Using the index on the trace, a library reference number is found for each sortie. This library reference number refers to the position on the library shelf where the folder containing the desired photograph is to be found.

Each folder on the library shelves contains the photographs, plot plans of the sortie and a library card. The library card remains in the box until the sortie is drawn. This card is then retained by the librarian until the sortie is returned. See attached sample. Sortie numbers (given to the pictures by the flying agency) are cross indexed with library reference numbers in a separate index file so that photographs may be looked by sortie number instead of by geographical position if desired.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Fidel Report  
DATE: June 12, 1945

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on field conditions -- Captain Gerald F. Elze

Elze, Capt Gerald F.  
X Green X SI  
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The difficulties experienced by Captain Elze and his constructive criticism of organization and administration provide a valuable lesson in the conduct of SI activities. Captain Elze's experiences covered all phases of administering SI teams in the field and later of commanding an OSS organization.

Captain Elze stresses the importance of planning based upon the objectives to be attained. A general plan must provide for supply in proper quantity and according to a time schedule. In the conduct of Greek activities, supply frequently lagged behind operations because of lack of comprehensive planning.

There are difficulties of operation when branches act independently without over-all command. Close cooperation cannot be obtained unless some higher authority assures it. Personnel engaged in work concerning a particular area must be informed as to phases of other plans affecting that area.

The training of agents must be more complete -- stressing those duties that they will actually be required to perform. Much learned concerning the training of field personnel is now applied to courses in SI.

The Greek operations suffered a lack of several important requirements for efficient intelligence work -- transportation, training, competent translators, forged documents, etc. These shortages were due in large part to the inexperience of the organization and the necessity for building a base organization while conducting field activities. By maintaining an SI organization and plans for future possible operations under various situations, many such difficulties can be avoided.

Walter H. Shepard  
Walter H. Shepard  
JUN 13 1945  
DIRECTOR, OSS

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REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS  
Cairo and Greece

by

Captain Gerald F. Else, USMC

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 17,053

TO : Director, OSS  
Through Chief, SI

FROM : Gerald P. Elze, Captain, USMC

DATE: 6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions, Cairo and Greece

A. My Duties and Activities in the Field1. Supply and Equipping Officer of Greek Section, Cairo

I arrived in Cairo 29 November 1943. Mr. Young, Head of the Greek Section, was away on an inspection trip, and Mr. S. Dow was temporarily in charge. On Mr. Young's return, 5 December 1943, I gradually and informally took over the duties of supply and equipping officer for the Section. The job involved three main functions: (a) outfitting agents about to depart for the field, (b) acting as supply agent for our bases in Cyprus and Turkey, (c) arranging supply shipments to teams in the field, that is, in Greece.

2. Equipping of Agents

The equipping of agents was done in conjunction with the planning and briefing of the missions, and necessitated frequent conferences between Mr. Young, myself, and the boys. Usually these took place at the school.

3. Supplying of Field Bases in Cyprus and Turkey

The procurement and shipping of supplies to the bases was at first handled directly by me through the Supply Officer, Lt. (later Captain) Nicholas. Beginning in February 1944 we worked out an agreement with the Maritime Unit whereby I received the supply requests from the bases, reduced them to form, and passed them on to Maritime for requisitioning and shipping. In April 1944 Maritime

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assumed entire responsibility for supplying Cyprus, which had become a Maritime base. The Turkish bases did not reach this stage until the late summer of 1944; and throughout the spring and summer I continued to keep an eye on the packing, invoicing, and labeling of shipments to Turkey, since the Greek Section was in closer touch with Major Caskey and Lt. Savage (acting as supply officer at Boston) than Maritime was.

4. Supplying of Teams in the Field

The problem of supplying the field teams did not emerge seriously until the spring of 1944, but from then on it loomed larger and larger. It was a complicated business, involving radio communication with the teams themselves, liaison with Maritime, and contact with the field bases, especially Boston. In some cases supplies had to be forwarded from Cairo to Cyprus to Key West or Boston to a team inside Greece and finally to a second team further in. All these elements had to be coordinated. Beginning in early July we had the new task of arranging parachute drops and boat deliveries from Italy to teams in Western Greece, including Peloponnese. This involved the cooperation--always readily given--of Major Oliver, Major Ross and others in Bari, and negotiations with the British both in Cairo and in Italy. In all, five teams sent in from Cairo (I do not count Major Oliver's teams which originated in Bari) were supplied by air in one or more drops; four of them also received one or more deliveries by boat from Brindisi.

4. Executive or Operations Officer

As time went on I found myself more and more in the position

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of executive officer or operations officer of the Section. The title was never formally conferred. The Greek Section had no set organization: Mr. Young was not bureaucratically minded, and there was always too much for all of us to do. In general, Young did liaison with the Greek government and the British, finance, briefing of missions, and general planning; Captain Edson busied himself with recruiting, training, and reporting; and I handled supply, dispatching of missions, communications, and what might generally be called field operations. None of the functions were exclusive, and everybody consulted together on anything important. A principle frequently enunciated by Young was that all three of us should know enough about all the business of the Section to take it over if necessary. Nevertheless, as our operations expanded (at the peak, in September 1944, we had 23 missions in the field), I found the whole complex of "operational" problems more and more marked off as my special domain. In particular, Young tended to keep in closer contact with the older missions, which he had recruited and sent out almost single-handed, while the later ones fell more to me.

#### 4. Special Duties: Personnel, Liaison

In addition certain special or incidental duties came my way. Private, later Lieutenant, George Emmanuel, whom we attempted to plant under special cover in Cairo, figured as my particular protegee, and I saw him through the vicissitudes of reassignment as an interrogator, neutralization, commissioning, and dispatch to Greece as head of a mission. The group of American officers who were sent out from

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Washington to go into the field were turned over to me for reception, adjustment, and briefing--a long, wearing process as it turned out. Along in the summer of 1944 I began to take over some of the liaison with our opposite numbers in the British organizations, ISLD, and Force 133, and with the Joint Advisory Committee representing all secret organizations operating in Greece.

#### 7. Reporting Activities

From time to time I, like everybody else in the Section, lent a hand at editing reports, degarbling cables, and indoctrinating the missions in reporting techniques. During the peak of our wireless traffic from Greece, in September 1944 (during the German evacuation), Young, Eason, Sperling, and I were alternately on call to process high-priority cables outside of office hours and rush them to ISLD for forwarding to the RAF and the Navy. Some of those fall evenings, when we rushed through the dark streets of Cairo bearing shipping news hot from Athens or the Euboea channel, were as satisfying as any moments we got from our small and distant corner of the war.

#### 8. Trips to Alexandria

I went to Alexandria six times between December 1943 and September 1944, to escort agents and cargo or check on supply shipments. Our method of getting Greek agents out of Egypt was simple but effective. We dressed them in GI uniforms, assigned them suitable names, gave them movement orders signed by our own adjutant, and shipped them to Alexandria by truck. This went on for eight months, and the British check stations on the desert road (there

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were two) never once stopped them.

9. Trip to Haifa and Aleppo

In March 1944 I drove a jeep to Haifa, in company with representatives of ISLD, Force 133, and A Force (British escape organization), for a conference with two representatives of EAM. After the conference I proceeded to Aleppo, left the jeep, and returned to Cairo. The jeep was forwarded to Private (later Lt.) Georgiades in Eastern Thrace, by courtesy of the Turkish Emniyet, and was of great value in his operations.

10. Trip to Italy

On 28 May 1944 I escorted John S. Fatsas and three others to Bari, on their way to Greece. I spent about three weeks in Italy, attending to final arrangements for their departure and conferring with Major Oliver on mutual problems. From that time until I went to Greece in November, liaison with Major Oliver was my special concern.

11. Planning for Post-Evacuation Period ("Young Plan")

Late in June 1944 Major Sperling returned to Cairo and was appointed Planning Officer, to chart the forward movement of the Greek Section into Greece after evacuation. I kept in very close touch with him during July and August, and the vicissitudes of the so-called Young Plan were shared by us about equally. I was particularly interested in the supply program, which, thanks to the energy of Captain Nicholas, was developed and carried out in a highly satisfactory way.

12. Acting Chief, Greek Section

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On 5 September 1944 Mr. Young left Egypt on the first stage of the journey which was to end in Athens on the day of liberation, 12 October. I was appointed Acting Chief of the Section on 8 September. Colonel Aldrich had taken over as CO a few days before. The months of September and October were perhaps the busiest of all for us, with field operations continuing, a torrent of cable reports pouring in, and plans actively going forward for infiltrating the successive waves of the Young Plan and moving our own headquarters to Athens.

13. CO: OSS Athens

On 4 November Lt. Seeley, Lt. Peratino, and I departed for Athens by air. We arrived on 5 November and the next day I took over as CO, OSS Athens. (Mr. Young's resignation to go to UNRRA had been fixed for 1 November.) We plunged immediately into a sea of housekeeping problems: billeting, mess, furniture, transportation, personnel. Headquarters assignments were parcelled out, liaison was established or continued with the Embassy, EL, UNRRA, ISLD, and various British offices. The Greek teams began to move in and be decommissioned. By the end of November our organization was fairly well along, when the civil war (referred to as "the rebellion" or "the troubles", according to taste) began and hampering our operations for a month. For this period see my report submitted to the Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional), dated 31 January 1945.

14. Greek Desk, Caserta

On 10 January 1945 I was relieved of command in Athens, and

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opposite members back home. While in the Washington office in May and June 1943 I personally worked on the Greek Desk's share of an SI supply estimate for 1944. Some of the items we asked for might have been useless, or the quantities excessive; but many of them would have been worth their weight in gold. A year later we were still waiting for them. It was only after I had been in Cairo for months that I discovered the estimate had only been an estimate and the items had never actually been ordered. The responsibility for ordering them lay with the theatre. Why requisitions had not been made long since against the so-called supply catalogue, I do not know. In any case, no area operation should be initiated or allowed to proceed without a coordinated program of supply. The paucity of needed supplies which were available and could have been ordered caused us endless personnel troubles and heart-breaking delays in operation.

2. Coordinated Planning of Activities: Field vs. Staff

The Greek Desk just grew as best it could. It did not secure enough competent staff to handle the missions and process their reports adequately; or, conversely, it sent out too many missions for the available staff to handle. As missions got into the field in numbers the situation grew critical, and was saved only by the departure of the Germans from Greece in September 1944. Had they lingered two months more the Section would have been overwhelmed by the mass of its own tasks: missions to be serviced, personnel to be handled, reports to be edited. We had not observed the well-known basic principle that headquarters staff must be in a certain

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proportion to units actually in the field. In the case of a section working with foreign personnel, in a foreign language, the proportion of staff must inevitably be larger. OSS Cairo had no personnel section that could recruit or deal with Greeks in their own tongue. Its supply section could not talk to Greeks about the smallest item of equipment, even after lists of requirements had been prepared. The reports office could not process either cabled or written reports in Greek. The Labor desk, which had a mission in Greece, had no one in Cairo who knew Greek geography or the Greek language. The officer in charge of the Maritime Unit did not know Greek. All these services had to be supplied by the Greek Section. This should have been foreseen and planned for in advance.

### 3. Coordination of Branches -- "Task Force" Organization

Throughout my stay in the Middle East, we were plagued by inter-branch disputes and jealousies. Many of these were due to personal factors, or to general tension and overwork, but many were due, in my opinion, to the faulty vertical organization of OSS. The worst case was the long-standing feud between Maritime and the Greek Section; but SO, MO, Services, and the Labor Desk all had their wrangles with us. At one time the Greek Section held the virtually undisputed title of Most Hated Branch in OSS ME. Rodney Young was not the man to pour oil on these waters or spend his precious hours in diplomacy; he stuck to his job and let the ships fall where they might. He irked many people. But the basic trouble was one of organization. Theoretically SI, SO, MO,

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and Maritime were equal, coordinate branches, each doing its own job. Actually, so far as Greece was concerned, they were (with some reservations) doing parts of one job. Theoretically they had equal competence at their respective tasks. Actually the Greek Section, SI, had a reservoir of Greek knowledge, experience, and personnel that no other branch possessed. The other branches had to draw on these resources when they had Greek business on foot; and yet when they did so, it was not strictly SI business and came as a drain on our already busy staff.

The whole situation was false and constantly placed us in a false position. The Greek Section was an SI outfit and had no jurisdiction over the Greek operations of Maritime, SO, MO--or even, for that matter, of the Labor Desk. Yet these operations dovetailed with ours at every point and should have been most closely correlated with them. Young was tacitly and informally recognized by everybody, even by people who disliked him, as the chief man in OSS-ME for Greek matters; and in fact there was no other authority on Greece to whom people could turn. Therefore, his advice was constantly sought by the other branches; yet his loyalty, on paper at least, was to SI. He could give advice but no directions to others. If they did not consult him, the work as a whole tended to suffer from lack of coordination. If they did consult him, they tended to feel that his suggestions were partisan; he was "SI-minded" and thought only of his own branch, etc., etc. If they consulted him and did not follow his advice, he tended to think of them as incompetent or frivolous. His undefined position of predominance without authority irritated

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others without achieving unity of performance. Precisely the same pattern was repeated in Cyprus and Turkey.

The basic trouble was not Young's personality but the faulty organization of Greek affairs, which forced the head of Greek SI, whether in Cairo, Cyprus, or Turkey, into a central position yet prevented him from filling it. The only way out was negotiation with other desks and branches. It was endless and unsatisfactory. The Chief of SI was not a specialist in Greek matters and in any case had no more authority over SO, MO, and Maritime than Young did. The only court of appeal was the CO himself. Colonel Toulmin arbitrated again and again. In particular he made repeated decisions about the relations between Greek SI and Maritime; but they could not and did not stick because they did not remove the trouble. The result was unnecessary frustration all round. Each succeeding chief of Maritime began with feelings of good will toward us and ended with bitterness and disillusion. It was as if the Army set up three or four independent commands to operate in the same area; or as if a field army had no commanding officer but only a G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, each staffed from and responsible to its own branch and jealous for its own prerogatives. SO, MO, and Maritime personnel were selected and sent out by their own branches in Washington, without particular regard for the fact that they were going to conduct operations in Greece; and these officers jealously retained an SO, MO, or Maritime point of view, just as we fought and died for the principles of dear old SI.

The Army has long since solved this problem. Every field

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command has adjutants, intelligence, quartermaster, ordnance, engineering, and other officers, each recruited and trained by his own branch, but operationally subordinated to a field commander. The only sensible solution of our problem was that which Colonel Aldrich, a regular Army officer, adopted. Within a month after his arrival he made Major Caskey Chief of OSS Izmir; and when I went to Athens I went as Chief of OSS Athens, not as head of Greek SI. Thus the apparently insoluble was solved. But I think our previous bad experience was basic enough to illustrate a principle of wide application: that all operations in a given area must, so far as possible, be under the command of an officer responsible for that area.

I recognize that the very different situations of SI and SO-- the independence of SI, the dependence of SO--vis-a-vis the British in the Middle East would have made such an organization difficult to carry out. But I believe that the difficulties would have been less than those we experienced, and the advantages would have been enormous. To cite only one: SI might have gotten intelligence from SO officers, at least on their return from the field--a thing we never achieved because it was not an "SO function."

#### 4. Intelligence Direction

We suffered from beginning to end from lack of direction as to what kind of intelligence was wanted, in what form it was wanted, where it was wanted, which kinds had priority and which did not. The missions in turn suffered from this vagueness, which we merely passed on to them. In part the difficulty came from the fact that American forces never planned or conducted any operations in Greece,

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and the fact that the United States never had a clear policy toward Greece. Hence not much direction could be given to us by American agencies. Far from knowing just what we were supposed to get out of Greece, we were never even quite sure whom we were working for. The only organizations that tangibly used our intelligence, up to the period of liberation, were the RAF, the Royal Navy, and, to a very slight extent, the 15th Air Force.

Theoretically an intelligence officer is not required to know why he is gathering intelligence, or for whom. Actually, and especially in the early stages of development, an intelligence service cannot function without having some answer to these questions, and that for two reasons: (1) direction, and (2) morale. Our field officers can testify that their effectiveness was diminished and their morale sapped by the persistent absence of instructions on what and how to report, and by the gnawing suspicion--justified or not--that nobody paid much attention to their reports anyway. The glaring contrast constantly before our eyes, was the British, who had a completely definite, concrete policy to serve, and services which were concretely interested in the intelligence produced. They, of course, fell into the opposite pitfall from us: their policy was so definite that it seriously colored their reporting, and we, in our innocent undirectedness, often got the facts straighter than they did. But we also got masses of trivial, useless, or vague information which merely burdened the office staff and were eventually thrown away.

I am aware that this problem has already been given much study

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and that steps are being taken to remedy the trouble. Obviously such measures involve very high considerations of policy and organization, relationship to other agencies, etc., which I am not competent to speak about. I would only applaud what is being done and add one more word on the subject of morale. In my opinion topnotch people will not stick to intelligence work and give it their best unless they are convinced, at least in a general way, that their efforts are being intelligently directed and that their product is taken seriously and used somewhere by somebody.

#### 5. Training in Reporting

In this connection I should like to repeat what was said by me in a previous report and has been said again and again by Capt. Edison, that training in reporting is basic to all SI activity. The lack of it in our OSS-trained personnel in Greece was painfully obvious. Our best reports were made by people who had gotten their training either from the British or from the Greek Army staff schools.

#### 6. Rotation of Desk Personnel

The Near East section in Cairo had what seemed to me an excellent system of rotating desk personnel between Washington and Cairo. These periodical exchanges must have helped both ends of the line to understand each other and ironed out many difficulties before they grew serious. The cleft between "base" and "field" thinking (visible between Washington and Cairo and between Cairo and the field bases and field teams) needs constant attention to keep it from widening. In our case no exchange occurred, except for Mr.

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Dow's three-months stay in Cairo from September to December 1943. Our Washington Desk never lost contact and sympathy with us, and we were never troubled by serious cleavages in point of view; but even so the work of both offices would have been improved by more frequent personal exchange of views and news. I never pressed this matter because it might have seemed like a scheme for getting home oftener; and also the day-to-day work in Cairo was too heavy. I believe the local chief of SI might take it upon himself to suggest this sort of rotation from time to time.

#### 7. Broad vs. Detailed Supervision

I hesitate to speak of a matter which may smack of insubordination or questioning of authority. It concerns the question of the balance between broad and detailed supervision of subordinate officers. I believe firmly in the principle of responsibility, whether it is in the military or the civilian sphere, and that an officer must be held strictly accountable for his own acts and those of his command. As I said above, the principle of unified command was badly needed in Greek operations, and Colonel Aldrich brought us out of a desperate situation by applying it. As time went on, however, I came to feel that he sometimes tried to take cognizance of too many of the details of our operations and exercise too much detailed supervision. I know that this did not come from lack of confidence in me or the Athens staff, and there was never any question of our receiving Colonel Aldrich's whole-hearted support when we needed it, even when it meant long hours of labor or strenuous exertions on his part. He never stinted of his energy or his thought. Nevertheless,

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the effect of a very detailed supervision cannot but be to sap the nerve of the subordinate officer somewhat, to make him hesitate where he might better go ahead, and distrust his own judgment. This seems to me especially unfortunate in intelligence operations, where for the most part the methods cannot be military and decisions often cannot be made along military lines.

In this connection I would also plead that officers in our type of operation should be not only permitted but encouraged to report conditions exactly as they see them, with complete freedom. This does not contravene the principle of authority, for an order remains an order and an officer who does not carry one out when it is given deserves removal or whatever punishment is suitable. But he should remain free, in fact should be required, to report on any conditions which affect the execution of an order or which might, if considered, lead to a change or modification of policy. To do less amounts to neglect of his duty. This seems to me particularly the case where a responsible officer is stationed, as I was, at a considerable distance from his superior and is surrounded by a host of intangible and changing local conditions which have to be taken into account in determining our policies. It was in this spirit that I several times reported what I considered to be important facts with a bearing on our policy. I believe that British experience in Greece showed the danger of officers in the field reporting what they think headquarters wishes to hear, or failing to adduce facts that may not square with policy as it is established at the moment. British operations in Greece, both before and after liberation, were

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very seriously impaired because field officers did not report facts as they saw them freely and fully enough. I refer here to both intelligence and operational reporting.

C. Specific Difficulties of Which I Personally Became Aware

1. Lack of Transportation

We went through our Greek campaign (from August 1943 to September 1944) with second-hand caiques, the fastest of which made 8 knots. The slowest German patrol boat in the Aegean did 12. In spite of repeated efforts by Maritime and ourselves, no modern boat of even moderate speed was ever procured for the Greek operations. Once two fast craft were said to be on the way; then a rumor reached us that they had been repossessed by the Navy in Algiers. They were never seen or heard of again. The account of the delays to missions, delay of pouches from Greece until the material was worthless, hairbreadth escapes from patrols, non-arrival of supplies, etc., would make a tedious, not to say endless, story.

2. Lack of Training

In general nobody in the Greek Section was trained for his job. The only really trained agents we had were a boy who had worked for British Intelligence in Crete, and a few Greek officers who had some idea of military intelligence from their Greek Army training. The lack of OSS instruction in the techniques of observation and reporting was particularly scandalous. The school in Cairo had some value as a holding area and a psychological influence; as an institution for the training of SI agents it was laughable.

3. Lack of Translators

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Most of our material came in in Greek and had to be translated; yet we never had a good staff for the purpose. Translating should be done into the mother tongue, never out of it. Our translating staff was mostly made up of Greeks, and the performance was poor. The people who could have done the best translating were also the most competent in other ways and could not be spared.

4. Lack of Cooperation from Other American Services

On the whole the Army (USAFIME) tolerated us, but not much more. They were always suspicious of our aims and methods. It was difficult to get anything done which did not follow the letter of Army regulations. USAFIME shrank from assuming any responsibility for us irregulars. For a year we tried and failed to get a Middle East civilian pass for our most valuable man, a Greek citizen, who without it had no legal right to stay in Egypt. He had previously worked for the British, who provided him with passports, military identification papers (he was a civilian), and so on as required. We had to devise elaborate and very flimsy schemes for getting agents out of Egypt, because the Army could not be told about them. ONE generously gave cover to one of our men but would not permit him to talk to any Greeks for fear his activities might be misconstrued. UNRRA--the head of its Greek mission was an American--showed interest in some of our personnel, but shied off because it was afraid they might report to us; whereas the head of its "intelligence section," a British Lieutenant Colonel, came to UNRRA directly from Force 135 and there was evidence tending to show that he maintained connections with that organization. JICA was our rival

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and tried to become an intelligence-gathering as well as an intelligence-sifting agency. In general, however, other Americans did not bear us any particular malice; they merely seemed to be timid or not to be convinced that we were fighting the same war.

5. Documentary Difficulties

One case, that of a Middle East pass, has already been mentioned. We secured faked identity cards for our agents from ISLD, since we had no facilities of our own. In March 1944 we received an offer from the new CD Branch in Washington to duplicate any documents, seals, etc., in two to four weeks. Young sent a large order, the first of which was delivered three months later, and the most important seal was misspelled. (Most of the work, however, was nicely done when it was done.)

6. Lack of Rank

We were constantly handicapped vis-a-vis the British by lack of rank. In the Middle East it was the merest commonplace for American lieutenants, or at most captains, to be placed on committees, or asked to negotiate, with British majors and colonels. I attended a number of meetings of the Joint Advisory Committee (mentioned above in Section A, Paragraph 6), and only once was a person of lower rank than my own present. I attended a conference with two EAM representatives (see above Section A, Paragraph 9); the British delegates were a lieutenant-colonel and two majors, one of them a civilian with brevet rank. We tried to give our officers in the field a slight boost in the form of brevetting, but with a serious limitation: the general rule was that we could brevet up to captain

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but not above. In Athens my dealings with the British were almost entirely with majors, lieutenant-colonels, and colonels. We simply could not play the game of rank; and with the Balkan peoples such things count for a great deal. One of the finest features of Colonel West's mission to Greece was that he was a colonel.

*Gerald F. Elze*

Gerald F. Elze  
Captain, USMC

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****SECRET**17059  
*Final report*

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 6 June 1945

SUBJECT: Return Report: Major Thomas J. Lea, AG  
(X-2/RIO)

X 1-2 17059

1. Originally assigned to X-2 Iberian Desk, served as Chief of the SCI unit attached to Third Army, then as Executive of X-2 Branch, London, and later as Chief of X-2 in France.

2. The major need is for personnel - secretarial, officers, executives and desk heads, as well as for supplies, particularly American typewriters.

3. A plan is made for stronger leadership and discipline. A study of enemy and Allied intelligence methods should be started and used as a basis for a course for all intelligence men in any U. S. intelligence system that survives the war period.

*Sharrow*  
S. P. Karlow,  
Lieut. Col., USA  
Reports Office

Attachment

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**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**17,059  
Field Rep

10 May 1945

TO: The Director  
 FROM: Chief, X-2 Branch *Law*  
 SUBJECT: Report of Returning Officer  
 (Thomas B. Lee, Major, A.C.)

In conformity with General Order #63, issued by this Headquarters 18 August 1944, the following report is submitted.

**1. DUTIES**

The writer was recruited in October 1943 from the 8th Air Force in the U.K. where he had served from August 1942 as camouflage and Engineer officer, having reported for active military service in May 1942.

Recruitment was for a specific position as X-2 representative in Lisbon, Portugal, based on officer's knowledge of the Portuguese and Spanish languages and residence in Central and South America as well as some time spent in Portugal.

The writer was sent back to Washington for special training in the OCS areas which was completed December 24, 1943. However, he remained in Washington as Assistant Chief to Lt. Col. (then Major) McDonough, Chief, X-2 Branch.

Duties consisted of simplifying office routine, handling all mechanical front office details, and assisting in the setting up of a training and recruiting program.

At the end of February, the writer was dispatched to the U.K. for further desk training in preparation for the Lisbon position. At this time the Iberian Desk Head, Mr. Pearson, returned to the U.S.A. on a trip with Mr. Murphy, and the writer was made acting head of the Iberian Desk.

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In May 1943 it became apparent that to cover X-2 commitments to SHAEF all available military personnel would have to be used for SCI work. Consequently the writer was ordered to duty as Commanding Officer of the SCI unit attached to the CIB, G-2, Third U.S. Army.

Duties consisted in organizing and training the unit. The whole SCI plan was a new one to X-2 with no precedent and required field improvisation. The unit proceeded to Normandy in June and made its headquarters with the other Third Army OSS units under the general supervision of Colonel Vanderblue.

At the end of July, 12 Army Group ordered all OSS Army detachments withdrawn to Group level. SCI, whose major duties lay with the CIB, were stationed at 12 A.G. Rear, apart from the SI unit at 12 A.G. Forward. The undersigned officer was designated CO of the combined SCI units and spent most of his time travelling between 12 A.G. Rear and the Forward base at Rennes supervising all special counter-intelligence work for the Brittany and the Middle Western French area. At the end of August the whole unit was attached to the CI Section of the Paris T. Force and as such reached that city with the first elements of U.S. troops. At this time all SCI personnel were under the direction of Major Holcomb, the SHAEF SCI officer, under whom the Paris Base was established. The undersigned ran the interrogation center for T Force in cooperation with CIB, in the early phases, and SCI officers participated in the T. Force arrondissement target teams. Officer also acted as Executive for SCI Detachment at this time.

T Force pulled out of Paris in the first part of September and the 12 A.G. SCI unit proceeded to Verdun with it, leaving behind part of their personnel to become the Paris SCI unit attached to COM Z ETO. At this time the OSS Paris Base was set up, but to ease personnel limitations placed on it, the X-2 unit remained attached to G-2 COM Z. However, administratively the X-2 Branch in Paris (including SCI France) reported to OSS Hq. Until 12 September the writer acted as CO of the T Force (12th A.G.) Unit.

At that time he was recalled for duty in London as Executive of the X-2 Branch there, where he remained until March 8th, 1945. Duties consisted in supervising all military ETO/X-2 operations, personnel, promotions, supply, communications and plans, as well as local branch executive duties. Two main jobs were: a) the

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formulating of all plans for Germany and their integration with the Plans and Operations Staff, on the overall OSS/ACC plan, and b) the setting up of a thorough vetting and agent clearance system in complete cooperation with the other branches of OSS. This was the first time the charter for clearance of agents and missions was acted upon fully, necessitating a good deal of diplomatic discussion with personnel of the other branches, but ended in complete accord and the formulating of the system which is at present well under way.

Attempts were made during all this time to bring X-2 back into the fold in its proper relationships with the other branches of OSS. A certain measure of success was attained and relations were most cordial in London at this time.

During the month of January the writer made an inspection trip of X-2 offices in Caserta, Bari, Rome and Florence and made a full report regarding operations and changes required.

On March 5th, this officer was appointed Chief X-2 Branch in France, and as such his designated duties were the supervision of all X-2 elements in France, as well as the administrative details regarding the 6th and 12th A.G. (German) SOI Units, which had to be handled in France, such as supply, shipment of personnel, intelligence processing, and supervision of communications. An inspection trip of the Southern France unit was conducted with Mr. Murphy, Chief X-2. Another trip to inspect SOI units at 6th and 12th A.G. was also completed with Mr. Murphy.

On April 17th the writer left Paris for London to pick up orders to proceed to Washington. Reported to Washington April 23rd, 1948.

## 2. PROGRESS

In spite of administrative and organizational difficulties, X-2 work in the ETO progressed most favorably, increasing steadily in counter-intelligence output, control and apprehension of enemy agents, and penetration of enemy intelligence networks.

After the invasion of France by the Allies, the SOI teams were continuously in action, working closely with the GIB of the G-2 Sections of Armies, Groups and Communications Zones. The smoothness and efficiency developed by this personnel in their work with the military units did a great deal to establish the prestige of the Branch with the overall Theater Command. The work handled was

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prodigious - a steady flow of reports returning to Washington via London and Paris. Much of the work handled was of purely local interest but contributed to the overall job of nullifying the effect of the enemy intelligence services. Much of the work initiated in the early phases of the French campaign is only now bearing fruit in the occupation of Germany. Individual cases are too numerous to cite. The work covered enemy saboteurs, wireless operators, intelligence agents, their paymasters, couriers and informers, who crossed the lines, were parachuted, or stayed behind during the advance of the Allies.

The most reassuring aspect of the whole situation was the fact that there is no doubt but that American officers, well chosen and trained, can in a short time excel the average counter-intelligence personnel of other Allied or enemy services. The men of the first SGI teams deserve a great deal of credit for their modesty, aptitude and diplomacy during the initial phases of the campaign. With almost no precedent these new men learned to adapt themselves to outdoor and campaign conditions; were forced to handle criminal types and trained enemy espionage agents; had to cooperate with CIC and the CE personnel of the various Allied Intelligence Services; and produced a steady flow of vital counter-intelligence information of immediate and long range value. None of these men have been decorated or in any other way distinguished for the part they played.

### 3. FIELD CONDITIONS IN NEED OF IMPROVEMENT

#### A. The major need is for personnel:

##### a) SECRETARIAL

Enlisted typists and codists for Germany, German speaking if possible.

American women typists, codists and clerks for Paris and London to release present military personnel - (this may be already accomplished).

##### b) OFFICERS

Still required six officers with German qualifications, rank of Lt. or Capt. for Germany to release French speaking and non-linguists now there employed. Also 2 with Russian linguistic abilities.

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**c) EXECUTIVES**

In ETO there is a definite need for about five strong executive types, one for London, one for Paris, two for Germany and one for Italy. Should be strong, have dignity and be able to handle personnel, preferably civilians.

**d) INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS**

1) Two strong hard headed intelligence officers are needed; one for London, and one for Germany. These men should be mature and have experience in the handling of reports and intelligence staffs, might be transferred from Washington Staff.

**2) Desk heads are needed -**

a) In London - for the following desks: Italy, Scandinavia, France, Lowlands, Near East, Balkans (provided these are to continue to be handled from London)

b) In Germany - at least two more good desk men for processing intelligence material. Should have German language ability.

**B. SUPPLIES**

Crying need is for standard American type-writers. Undoubtedly a good deal of paper and other office supplies will be captured in Germany and can be used perfectly well. Probably as the Allied Armies reduce to occupational proportions much Army office equipment will become available.

The matter of supply is one with which OSS must deal strongly in any future operations, particularly in the case of vehicles. X-2 was forced to activate units in Paris during the last few months to secure the requisite number from the Army for German Teams.

**4. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES REQUIRED**

After one and one-half years spent in this Branch it becomes apparent that most of the X-2 problems are extensions of the more general OSS problems. These are the same problems that face any large organization of highly intelligent and individualistic people.

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**A. EXECUTIVES**

Due to the speed with which the personnel of OSS was assembled and to the original conception of the organization as a purely intelligence and special operations set-up, recruitment of executive, administrative, and leader types was not sufficient. A chronic difficulty with all intelligence systems - the balance of pure intelligence against pure organization - is the main one facing the X-2 Branch. The only way to solve this is by the recruitment of strong, conscientious men with international experience. These men cannot be attracted or recruited unless the proper inducements are offered: better salaries to compete with private careers and affairs, and the promise of permanence and future. This last is of course dependent on the future of the organization as a whole.

**B. PLANNING**

Although plans are no doubt in hand for the future operations of the organization, no statements as to timing, rotation of personnel, intelligence objectives or instructions, have been issued to lower units and personnel. This makes for poor morale and a lack of direction.

**C. DISCIPLINE**

The lack of discipline, somewhat due to the combination of civilian and military elements, is an outstanding fault. This will be extremely difficult, after the long period of laxity, to adjust. However, an intelligence organization, based, as it should be, on the principles of security, cover, and immediate execution of various functions should be scrupulously disciplined. No amount of discipline of the lower ranks, however, will ever be efficient unless discipline is enforced by all ranks. By this I mean scrupulous clear-thinking, universal obedience to superiors, observation of rules covering working and resting hours, the use of Special Funds, and operational supplies. Continuous control and inspection should be kept of all outlying base operations, all expense accounts and the personal habits of all staff members. Premiscuity and mixing personally with local population should be forbidden, except in the case of agents on missions. The lack of security or the possibility of its failure due to personal alliances with members of other nations is obvious. Although drinking

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and discussion of business in public is not common, its occurrence in any degree should be forbidden. Much would be gained by cleaning out our machine, tightening the screws and relaxing no rules. There is ample opportunity for the exercise of personal thoughtfulness, consideration and a warm human relationships within a well run organization. The lower ranks appreciate most a planned system, the knowledge of what to expect and to whom to refer their problems, and an explanation of where their work fits into the whole picture.

Another type of discipline necessary is that which causes executives to delegate authority, to back up their assistants, and to refer personnel problems to immediate superiors or personnel officers. They also should be taught to clear problems with all interested parties. This should be based on observation of a proper chain of command and the securing of sufficient and suitable people to handle the job. This type of discipline is a frame of mind which should be sold to members of an organization, but should not be so difficult to enforce if each individual understands the motive for it.

#### D. LEADERSHIP

*chips? high pressure with different*

Another great lack is leadership. Most of the leadership in OSS is based on affection. In a small group, consisting of secretarial and low caliber personnel, it is perhaps adequate to control by personal affection or promises. However, in a large organization, composed of intelligent, mature people, real leadership, based on respect for ability, consideration, foresight and judgement is a prime requisite. This again depends on proper personnel, and the cleaning out of all inefficiency, personal deals and sloppy thinking, to permit free scope for these men when found.

#### E. TRAINING PROGRAM

A thorough study of enemy intelligence and counter-intelligence methods, based on captured documents and interrogations, should be instituted as soon as possible. With these should be studied the methods of all Allied systems. The result of these studies should be made the basis for an intensive training course in the actual physical techniques for counter-intelligence. This should serve as part of a longer term training course for long-range CI men in any U.S. intelligence system that survives the war period.

*Thomas B. Lee*  
Thomas B. Lee  
Major, A.C.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Osgood Nichols  
(MO/ETO)

*Rec'd report 17,071*  
DATE: 16 June 1945  
*x Nichols (name)*  
*11 C x 370*

1. Attached to FWD, 12th Army Group, from January 1944 to January 1945 as Chief of Operations, and later as Liaison Officer with 1st, 3rd, and 9th Armies, Mr. Nichols then served with OPSAF/OSS London and finally the Secretariat.

2. Mr. Nichols states that psychological warfare being a new activity was always at the mercy of G-2 officers and was rarely allowed to contribute to advanced planning. He mentions branch autonomy as OSS' worst disease, kept alive by the desire of the various branches to gain maximum credit for their achievements. OPSAF became merely a rubber stamp because of this. The mixture of civilians and GI's in FWD created frictions which should be avoided. OSS and OWI should join to convince the Army on the potentialities of psychological warfare weapons.

*R.*  
S.P.K.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Field Report 17071*  
**SECRET**

*x Richard. Osmond*  
4 June 1945 *x M. D. x Eto*

TO: Director, SS  
FROM: [redacted] Nichols  
SUBJECT: Report on returning from Overseas

1. I joined OS/SS at the end of January 1944; departed for the [redacted] the first week in April; was attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch, 12th Army Group in May as Chief of Operations and later as Liaison Officer with 1st, 3rd and 9th Armies. I returned from the continent to OSS/London in the beginning of February for duty with OPSAF and later the Secretariat, leaving the theater 2 May 1945.

The selection of OS personnel for MTO was handicapped by its late start and by the lack of clear cut plans for its use. As a result many persons arrived in MTO who were not particularly qualified for psychological warfare or for whom there was not real need. London was not adequately prepared for their arrival and the result was considerable confusion.

I am qualified to give more than a fragmentary picture of MTO, since I was assigned to PWD within a week after my arrival in the theater. However, I spent a week in December with the field unit at Freport-Haussonvaux, Belgium. The impression I got was of a small group of hardworking men busy recruiting agents and moving them through the lines with small batches of black propaganda produced in London and selected for distribution.

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...tribution of ... was in the attach-  
... personnel to IAD at ... AF, Army Group and  
... and Army levels this personnel was  
... because of the key positions  
... effectiveness of combat psycholog-  
... attributed to the decision of OSS to aid in  
... debate about the extent of this  
... may not have shortened the war  
... considerable number of I.I. lives.  
... and GIs in IAD created unnec-

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... contributed to the sur-  
render of the enemy troops.

The greatest difficulty encountered by psychological warfare was the unwillingness to the Army. As a result, PW officers were forced to devote too much of their time to a role that of waterless cocker salesmen. PW was always at the mercy of the whims of Army officers. They rarely achieved the least recognition to let in on the advanced planning of a campaign, without which their efforts were bound to be of the same minor variety. Also, as a result, the Army assigned to the series of weak echelon officers and gave the men who were actually doing the work too little rank. The CO of the PW Army team was a second lieutenant.

7. It is strongly recommend that OSS join with OWI in a campaign to pull the Army from the top down on the weapons and capabilities of psychological warfare. Every effort should be made to establish a PW branch in the War Department staffed with first-class officers so that the experience gained in LTO and elsewhere will not be completely lost.

8. Joined JCSAF, JCS/London, the first week in February. JCSAF, a staff of highly intelligent, competent officers capable of doing the staff and planning work was gradually being formed to work by the autonomous branch set-up in LTO and the swift approval of JCSAF. It had been turned into a mere rubber stamp for projects which, in some cases, had already been put

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into operation by branch chiefs used to running their own organizations with a minimum of control from the top.

1. Branch autonomy seemed to me to be the greatest feature of the organization. It was a legacy from the early days of the organization kept alive by the desire of the branches to extract the maximum credit for their achievements and by the often unspoken sense of security. As a result, SI, X-2, SO and RSA were constantly creeping in each other's gardens. A few instances:

a. In 1951, any doubts of effort, SO/Stockholm recruited, trained and sent an excellent agent to Germany at a time when it was considered inadvisable for him to concentrate exclusively on intelligence work. Yet SI was springingly consulted on his selection and his intelligence reports were cabled to SO/London without even an information copy to SI.

b. X-2 was constantly sending positive intelligence cables from the continent back to Washington without information copies to SI. X-2 interpreted the suspicion that the smoke-screen of secrecy in which its plans, operations, communications and personnel were protected from the rest of the organization hid many potentialities for working constructively with the other branches. As long as X-2 is allowed to be the exception to so very ruled, it will be difficult to persuade the other branches to shed their own sovereignty in favor of better teamwork.

2. NSA and SI both attempted to send contradictory messages to their commands in Washington on Norway's request to Sweden for military aid.

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10. The Bern Mission is aware of this problem and has been making serious and fairly successful efforts in the past few months to achieve better coordination between the branches. The plans for the Bern Mission contemplate a lot less autonomy for the branches. It seems to me that this tendency should be encouraged.

11. The Stockholm Mission was a constant headache to London, both because it was such a grave disappointment as a source of intelligence. It seemed unable to apply some of the general rules of intelligence reporting and repeated requests for improvement were either ignored or produced interminate excuses. Several of us drew the conclusion after struggling with the problem for many weeks that OSS would have achieved better results from Stockholm if OSS/ETO, which was its nearest client during the European campaign, had had direct authority over its operation. It should be pointed out, however, that London's relation with the Bern Mission was functioning very smoothly at all times.

12. Conversations on the boat home with returning U. S. prisoners of war with experience escaping from German prison camps lead us to make the following suggestions:

1. MI and SO could well explore that channel for penetrating enemy territory. One of these ex-prisoners had spent five of his eight months in Germany on the loose, doing sabotage in a gun parts plant and derailling an ammunition train on the side. His most poignant comment: "What a job I could have done if I'd only had a radio."

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could assist the Army, Navy and Air forces in training prisoners to escape by parachuting specialists in as ordinary plane crew members and indoctrinating other prisoners in escape techniques on the spot. Surprisingly few Americans attempted escape from German prison camps, despite intensive indoctrination prior to capture, particularly by the Air Force. There was one instance of the senior American officer in a German prison camp who did his best to discourage such attempts.

*Osgood Nichols*  
Osgood Nichols

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033 Pofm 4151

*Mrs O'Donnell* <sup>Date</sup> 19 June  
~~Mr. JOHN WILSON~~  
To:

Let's talk about this.


*cut  
and  
for c*  
*Talked with  
Col. Downing  
JAW* *o.o.o.*

Office of the Executive Officer

*Eve* (30449)

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**SECRET**

17072  
Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
x Health Po

DATE: 15 June 1945

TO : The Director  
(b)  
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office  
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Paul E. Keabitt (11748)

1. This officer served in London as Acting War Diary Officer for SI from September 1944 to February 1945.
2. Capt. Hensbitt notes that there was a lack of cooperation between the various divisions of SI, that too little attention was paid to specific job requirements and the qualifications of the persons designated to fill them.

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SECRET/CONTROL

17,072

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.*Field Report*  
*x Nesbitt, Paul*  
*x SI x Eto*

6 April 1945

To: Major General William L. Donovan  
 From: Paul H. Nesbitt, Captain A. C.  
 Via: The Secretariat  
 Subject: Report on Field Conditions in accordance with General Order No. 63. Revised.

1. Duties and Activities in the European Theater of Operations, OSS Headquarters, London, covering the period 1 September 1944 to 13 February 1945.

The undersigned officer was recruited by OSS/SI in June 1944 for the Haskell Mission. Upon arrival in London on 1 September 1944 conditions on the continent had so materially changed that the assignment for which this officer and other officers were recruited and trained no longer existed. This officer was then assigned on 8 September 1944 to the job of Acting War Diary Officer for SI in the newly created War Diary Section. The function of this section was to write a comprehensive history of SI/OSS activities in the European Theatre of Operations. On 15 October 1944, Mr. Ernest Brooks from the London Desk, Washington, arrived in London and was appointed War Diary Officer. The undersigned became his deputy. About this time General Orders were issued transferring War Diary personnel from SI Branch to the Director's Office. Steps were immediately taken to increase the personnel of the War Diary Section in order to meet the manuscript deadline of 1 January 1945 set by Washington Headquarters. Additional personnel was recruited from the States as well as from other branches of OSS and a division of project assignments made.

The sections of the War Diary undertaken and completed by this officer comprised:

- a. A history of the Sussex operations including detailed stories on the activities of the individual Sussex teams.
- b. The Operational Activities of the Proust teams.
- c. A history of the OSS/SI Field Detachments with the 21st Army Group, 1st United States Army, 3rd United States Army, 9th United States Army Group and the First Allied Airborne Army.

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S E C R E T

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Information for completing the above projects was obtained from:

- a. Basic documents and historical records in the registry, London.
- b. Personal interviews with Division and Section Chiefs.
- c. Interviews with Sussex and Proust Agents and with returnees from OSS/SI Army Field Detachments.

All research and writing was done at OSS Headquarters, London, except for the period 20 October to 14 November which was spent in Paris interviewing Sussex and Proust agents who were not previously available in London.

This officer completed his project assignment for the War Diary Section on 1 February 1945 and was at that time released for return to Washington. Departure from the ETO was made on 13 February 1945.

2. Field Conditions and Specific Difficulties: Working conditions, from a physical viewpoint, were on the whole excellent -- adequate office space, an efficient registry for the procurement of documents and good living conditions. Weaknesses which did exist in the field were, for the most part, organizational in character. There was lack of coordination and cooperation between the various divisions of SI, perhaps in part due to the fact that the Directorship of SI, London, was constantly changing. Each new regime ushered in a new policy designed to streamline the organization. Personnel and policy changes were so frequent, that, in the opinion of this officer, the achievement of a sound, well-coordinated intelligence organization was next to impossible.

In the assignment of personnel to various jobs, too little attention was paid to the specific job requirements and the qualifications of the persons designated to fill them. Not one of the twelve research workers in the SI War Diary Section had had previous experience with SI/OSS and not one was a trained historian. Personnel was recruited seemingly regardless of background and training to work on the SI Diary. The result was that progress was slow, many man hours were wasted, morale was low and few seemed to know just what they were doing. Division Chiefs and Section Heads could have written histories of their respective activities and submitted them to a War Diary Editorial Board in a fraction of the time spent by personnel who had no previous knowledge of Division and Section activities.

Several factors made difficult the writing of a comprehensive and accurate OSS/SI War Diary. Chief among these was the lack of cooperation shown by certain key personnel and the limitations placed on travel for field research. This officer was expected to write a detailed account of Field Detachment activities with the various United States Armies and Army Groups yet when clearance was requested the Paris Headquarters for permission to visit the field detachments it was turned down on the basis that such a duty tour was not essential. The restriction on movement was such that a large part of the War Diary might better have been prepared in Washington than in London.

S E C R E T

SECRET

- 3 -

Security violations were frequent. On several occasions, when acting as Duty Officer, the undersigned found that secret and top-secret documents were left insecure on tables, desks, and in unlocked cabinets. These violations were reported to the Security Officer and although a tightening of control resulted, violations were still frequent as late as 1 February 1945.

The undersigned feels that SI/OSS did an excellent job in the MTO and was the major contributor of intelligence which made possible the rapid sweep of Allied Armies across France. The Sussex Operations alone justify the existence of OSS in the European Theatre of Operations.

*AMesbit, Capt AC*

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# ADJUTANT GENERAL'S RECORD SHEET

Accession No. . . . .

Date Rec'd SA . . . . .

No.	Room No.	Date	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. <i>Ch. 10</i>	1717	<i>JUN 18 1945</i>	<i>hm</i>	<i>✓</i>
2. <i>htg</i>	<i>JUN 19 1945</i>	<i>JUN 19 1945</i>	<i>hm</i>	
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<i>Kaufach</i>				

Each document should be numbered to correspond with number in TO column.  
If item should be shown across sheet under each column.  
Where investigation should be used in TO column.  
Each officer should initial entry and investigation before further review.  
If entry is not correct, then it should be indicated in COMMENTS column.  
Each entry should show date of review in TO column.  
The officer should indicate the general nature of the review.

10

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 June 1945

17,081

Field report

100-106-12

SI  
100-106-12  
Switzerland

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, O.S.S.  
FROM: Chief, SI Branch  
SUBJECT: Field Report of W. L. Mellon, Jr.

The attached report is rather short and sketchy. Subject was too modest and his report in itself does not show the very good work which he did in Spain when he replaced Noble in Barcelona. Later he served as head of SI on his return to Madrid.

At the conclusion of his assignment in Spain, he proceeded to Switzerland. According to Mr. Dulles, his manner of performance in that country was superior.

*W. L. Mellon, Jr.*  
W. L. Mellon, Jr.

Attachment

100-106-12

100-106-12

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7431 7, 81

MEMORANDUM

June 11, 1945

TO: Director, Jackpot, and Secretariat

FROM: GBT

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Report on Field Conditions

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The writer was employed by SI on July 17, 1942 and began training at "the farm" on August 10 in class no. 8. Completed training September 6. Applied for commission in Army through Colonel "Moss" who later advised that commission was refused. No official reason was given. For sixty days after indoctrination course prepared for departure to Portugal, first under USCC cover, later under private business cover in company with 324. Both projects fell through.

In December 1943 at request of 105, took over "Spanish desk" in Washington to replace temporarily Royal who left for Spain shortly thereafter. In June 1943 at instance of Carib left Spanish desk and took over French desk, where I remained until December 1943. After one month's leave, left for Spain on January 24, 1944, where I replaced Noble as head of Barcelona office. On May 30 was called to Madrid by 522 to serve as chief of SI in Spain until November 1, 1944 when I was transferred to Switzerland to replace 284 who had been operating alone in Geneva since the middle of 1942. Remained in Geneva working alone (with exception of a secretary, 1004, who arrived in January 1945) until May doing both SI and X-2 work. Left Switzerland on May 25, 1945 and returned to Washington via Madrid and Lisbon where I spent four days conferring with our people in those cities. Arrived Washington June 8, 1945. Conferred with Jackpot and Elton on June 9 and advised them of my intention to resign from OSS.

SWITZERLAND

During the two and a half years which Switzerland was surrounded by the Axis armies, OSS personnel consisted of a half dozen Americans assisted by a few American aviators interned in Switzerland who volunteered their services as code clerks and couriers. The record of that small staff reveals the effectiveness of a skeleton organization operating during wartime in a neutral

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country. In my opinion, the advantages which a small American SI staff has over a large one, extends into the fields of security, better relations with other organizations (especially diplomatic missions), unity of purpose, sense of individual responsibility, and morale. It cannot logically be contended that the size of a staff - at least, an SI staff - should be proportional to the size (either area or population) of the country in which it is to function, because both the quantity and quality of the intelligence covering all Europe collected in and from Switzerland during World War II clearly demonstrated the fallacy of any such formula.

#### SPAIN

If and when the "over-all" OSS-State Department policy is finally established it is important that agents with official cover be reinstated in a few of the principal Spanish cities. At the present time, it is my understanding that, outside of Madrid, OSS has only two or three agents under diplomatic cover (incidentally it may be of interest to note that not one of these is SI). SIS feels, as do I, that in future intelligence should be collected in Spain mainly by agents having private business cover, but that the need will continue to exist for OSS personnel in some consulates to insure safe and rapid communications with the central office in Madrid, as well as to coordinate the work of the private cover agents in his area.

In the rather special task of securing military intelligence it seems, in general, advisable that this function be supervised from a neighboring country both for the protection of our diplomatic missions as well as for the security of the principal agents involved, whose personal risks are greatly lessened if they have nationality foreign to the country in which they operate.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D.C.  
 FROM : Lt. Col. R. W. Estey  
 SUBJECT: Field Report

DATE: 9 June 1945

1. In accordance with General Order Number 65 (18 August 1944) report is submitted relative to the extensive trip taken by myself in the interests of Field Photographic Branch.

2. My duties with Field Photographic Branch have been those of Property Control Officer with headquarters in the South Agriculture Building, Washington, D.C. The specific assignment given me has been to conduct activities as follows:

a. Establish a complete listing of all non-expendable property secured for Field Photographic activities and to record it upon a central record system in Washington;

b. To physically inventory all Field Photographic property regardless of its location;

c. To reconcile all property originally secured with that actually physically inventoried;

d. To establish a reasonable accounting for all discrepancies between original property procurements and that shown by a physical inventory;

e. To inaugurate surveys and reports whereby discrepancies could be readily adjusted and property records brought into current adjustment;

f. To establish a property recording system throughout the entire Field Photographic Branch (domestic and foreign offices) whereby a property control could be exercised from a centralized point. This central control to be in the Washington office of Field Photographic Branch.

3. This work was begun on 5 August 1944 and by the early part of November 1944 it had reached a point where it could be carried on in the various theaters. One clerk (Mrs. Mayberry) was left in charge of the Washington activities. These activities represented the recording of data on property cards plus the taking of small sections of the physical inventory.

4. On 10 November 1944, I left for London, England, to carry on the activities of this work in the European Theatre of Operations. It required approximately three (3) months to make a complete check of Field Photographic property in this theater. At the completion of this period every item of non-expendable property had been located or accounted for in a satisfactory manner. When actual shortages existed surveys were inaugurated or reports covering the conditions and circumstances were submitted to the Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch.

5. On 2 March 1945, I visited the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations and conducted the same type of activity. At the end of approximately one (1) month all non-expendable property of the Branch had been located or accounted for in a satisfactory manner. When shortages occurred the Branch Chief was instructed to prepare and submit surveys.

6. On 5 April 1945, I moved into the India-Burma Theatre of Operations where the same type of activity was carried on. At Colombo, Ceylon, it was possible to fully establish a complete reconciliation of Field Photographic property. Certain shortages existed - these were accounted for in a satisfactory manner with instructions issued to the Acting Branch Chief to submit surveys covering the existing shortages.

7. The Field Photographic property in the possession of Unit 101 was in the process of being shipped to Unit 202 (China). No physical inventory of this property was taken as it would have necessitated the unpacking of crates and boxes, as well as materially delaying delivery in China where the property is badly needed for current operations. As an inventory of this property existed, instructions were given to forward copies of this inventory to China and Washington. These inventories are in transit at the moment. Upon receipt in Washington Field Photographic Branch will conduct a reconciliation. All shortages uncovered will be forwarded to the India-Burma Commanding Officer with a request for an accountability. It is believed this will not be too great a task.

8. On 22 April 1945, I visited Kunming, China, where similar activities were carried on. A reconciliation was readily brought about with no shortages of any description in existence. This finished my original mission for Field Photographic Branch.

9. Prior to leaving on this trip I was requested by Lt. Col. Doering and the General Counsel's Office to conduct certain investigations as to property records and conditions other than those of Field Photographic Branch. Reports have been submitted in writing and orally to Lt. Col. Doering.

Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch

7 June 1946

R. W. Halsey, Lt. Col., GSC

Report of Trip and Progress of Work

1. Upon my transfer from Field Photographic Branch to that of Strategic Office of Strategic Services Property Board, I believe it advisable to submit a report of my activities abroad and to include an over-all report of the present status of the Property Central Division of Field Photographic Branch.
2. On 10 November 1944, I left Washington for an extended trip to include visits to all Field Photographic Branches regardless of location. This trip has included visits to England, Scotland, France, Belgium, Italy, Egypt, India, Ceylon, Japan and China. Generally, these visits were to those locations where Field Photographic Branch has permanent headquarters, however, it was necessary to make visits to individual missions en route in the field.
3. The primary object of the trip was to locate, ascertain the current status and establish the accountability of all Field Photographic Branch property, regardless of location. With this activity was the study, comparison and establishment and maintenance of official records as regards this property.
4. Much difficulty was experienced in each theater, except China, in trying to make a reconciliation between actual shipment to these theaters and the actual property on hand (also property on actual loan). However, it has been possible to locate each item of property or to account for its present non-existence. I can only report that property has been located and actually counted. This applies to all theaters except Japan-China.
5. In the Japan-China theater, I found Field Photographic property in the hands of Japanese from Manchuria to China. Because of this, it has been impossible to physically inventory the property. At the moment, an inventory is in the mail of this theater of property. Upon receipt of this inventory (in Washington), a reconciliation will be made.
6. Even the completion of the Japan-China reconciliation, it is my belief all Field Photographic property will be accounted for in a most satisfactory manner.
7. It is believed that no evidence of property accountability can be made, in general, on any one of the theaters. There is no reason to believe that a quick and efficient reconciliation cannot be readily obtained at any time.
8. During this trip, it has been possible to acquire all Field Photographic property with their corresponding records Government property. There were many storage conditions in the hands of these individuals as to where their personal responsibilities started and stopped. These conditions

- 2 -

were not different than those found in the individuals of other Office of Strategic Services Branches, or the views found in those individuals who held executive positions in any Office of Strategic Services Branches abroad.

9. It is my belief, Field Photographic Branch is in an enviable position with the accountability of its property. Its records are current and maintained satisfactorily. Property which does not exist in the Branch, has a justified reason for its non-existence. All missing property is to be covered by a notice of savings - these savings are not in the process of preparation and should be about ready for presentation.

10. The Property Control Section (Washington) has undertaken a transaction activity of establishing a card record system of each type of property, and as to its location. This work has been in progress for approximately eight (8) months. I can report much history has been made and it should reach a stage, within three (3) months, where only current transactions will constitute the daily work.

11. To establish this Property Control system, it was necessary to make recordings from Purchase Orders to determine all items of property received for Field Photographic Branch. This necessitated the examination of all Purchase Orders and checking with the establishment of the Branch. To these records have been added the Military Supplies issued to the Branch, as well as all purchases made through Special Funds in foreign countries for the use of Field Photographic Branch.

12. Upon completion of this property recording, the next procedure was to analyze and record the distribution of this property to the various theaters. This activity has been well developed and has almost reached the stage where only current distribution comprises the daily work.

13. In each theater a local control system is in effect, where the Branch can easily account for each item of property currently delivered to them. Currently receipts are in existence for all items taken on photographic missions, as well as a group of receipts covering the loss of property in other theaters of interest of Strategic Services. Loss and outside Office of Strategic Services (such as Army, Navy or Foreign governments) are covered by properly covered receipts.

14. I returned to Washington on 27 May 1946. Until such time as a proper replacement can be secured to assume my former duties with Field Photographic Branch, I shall continue to aid in the continuation of the work, as well as give as much of my time as may be available in an advisory capacity to the Property Control Section of Field Photographic Branch.

15. During this trip, there were conditions which were thereby a certain amount of my time was devoted to supply information other than for Field Photographic Branch. These incidents have been covered by reports made at the time. Expense reports submitted to you have included mention of such activities.

- 3 -

16. I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the splendid cooperation I received from all members of Field Photographic Branch, regardless of the theater or location I visited. There were some incidents which at the time of occurrence were possibly of an unpleasant nature, but they were always due to a misunderstanding of my duties, rather than any desire to not extend a cooperative activity. Not once did I observe any degree of discourtesy or lack of interest in my duties and activities.

*R. E. Hest*  
R. E. HEST,  
Lt. Col., GAO.



TO: GENERAL

You sent a handwritten note  
to Mr. Shepardson asking him if he  
had any recommendations to make re  
eriswold

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yes of

Director's Office

No.

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17.003  
Fidel Report

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan  
 FROM : W. H. Shearson  
 SUBJECT: Roger Griswold

DATE: 17 July 1945

1. Griswold was never (as far as I know) adminis-  
 tratively under SI Branch.

2. I know, in a general way, of his mission set here,  
 of his work in Algiers in preparation of his time with 7th  
 Army, and of (eventually) his assignment in Paris.

3. So far as France is concerned I think the work  
 of this Branch is adequately provided for. Therefore I have  
 no recommendation to make.

*W. H. S.*

**CONFIDENTIAL**



FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 29 June 1945

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Col. Roger Griswold  
EO and SI/EO-Medio

Col. Griswold spent from May 1944 to May 1945 initiating a series of special missions in connection with the French Resistance groups. Rapid changes in the war situation, however, relegated him to liaison and supporting jobs.

Attachment

S. P. K.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 June 1945

17105  
Field Report  
x Griswold  
x SI  
x EVO  
x Med TO

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Chief, SI Branch  
SUBJECT: Field Report of Lieut. Colonel Griswold

Attached herewith Field Report of Lieut. Colonel Griswold.

Originally assigned to MO for service in North Africa, he later served in Caserta for that branch. Transferred to SI in late August, he served as liaison officer to the French.

Still later, he was stationed in Paris as Colonel Gamble's personal representative before serving as assistant to Mr. Cady, the Chief of the Secretariat.

His last assignment was with the 6th Army Group inspecting OSS units under the jurisdiction of that Group.

This officer has a good background knowledge of French. It is unfortunate that none of his assignments seemed to work out particularly well. It is felt that this was not the fault of the officer but merely due to mischance.

Col. Griswold has requested orders to be placed on inactive status.

*W. H. Shepardson*  
W. H. Shepardson

18892-614

14 June 1945

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: Lt. Col. Roger Griswold

SUBJECT: Field Report

The writer proceeded from Washington, D.C. to Algiers, Algeria, on 15 May 1944, in company with Mr. Ramon Guthrie, on a special mission for the Director, O.S.S. The writer was assigned to M.O. Branch. Underlying purpose of the mission was to contact French Resistance Groups and act as liaison between them and O.S.S., and in general, between them and the United States Armed Forces. To effect this it was intended that the writer and Mr. Guthrie should be attached to the French Army which should operate in the invasion of Southern France. Due to various reasons this attachment to the French was not implemented and adequate clearance for the project from AFHQ was never secured. While waiting however, the writer and Mr. Guthrie familiarized themselves as much as was possible with the operations of O.S.S. in that theater and made contacts with various French civilians which provided information in regard to political and social background of the French Resistance movement.

Late in August 1944 the writer proceeded to Caserta, Italy, where he described to General Donovan the apparent failure of the mission entrusted to him. General Donovan then caused the writer to be transferred to II Branch and ordered to report to the Commanding General Seventh Army for duty with O.S.S. Detachment operating under G-2, to act as liaison officer between that Detachment and the corresponding service in the French Army "B". The writer reported 2 September at Grenoble. For the next five weeks he served under Col. Gamble with G-2 382. Contact was made with the French officers of S.R.O., 55, (which later became the D.C.E.R., roughly corresponding to O.S.S.) Arrangements were made for the exchange of intelligence, etc., but it was soon evident that there was little to be done in the way of liaison work as originally projected. To be more fully occupied the writer went on several small missions for Col. Gamble, generally in the capacity of escort to some more or less unknown French agents in order to investigate their bona fides and those established, to assist in the utilization of their services.

In October it became evident that the duty of liaison officer with the S.R.O. was of little utility. Col. Gamble strongly felt the need of a personal representative with Headquarters OSS in Paris, so on 9 October the writer proceeded to this theater as liaison officer from HQ Seventh Army G-2 382.

Subsequently the Field Detachment Branch was established at Headquarters O.S.S., Paris, and this unit took over the duties of the writer. Col. Giblin wanted him to act as his assistant and the writer was accordingly transferred to HQ as HQ Detachment OSS, Paris. Col. Giblin

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-2-

returning to the United States. Col. Bruce requested the writer to serve as Assistant to Mr. Cody, the Chief of the Secretariat. He served in this capacity until the end of March 1945, when Col. Gamble attached him to duty as OSS Liaison Officer at Headquarters 6th Army Group and C.O. of the OSS Field Detachment there. The writer reported on 27 March at Vittel and remained on duty with G-2 6th Army Group until 22 May 1945, being variously at Vittel, France, Kaiserslautern and Heidelberg, Germany. During this period, at Col. Gamble's request, he made several inspection visits to OSS units under 6th Army Group jurisdiction, notably the Field Detachment G-2 Seventh Army, the Aquitaine Mission near Cognac with the French Army of the Atlantic, the detachments at Hegenheim and Colmar, France. Several conversations with Mr. Allen Dulles, at Hegenheim, led the writer at a conference with Mr. Allen Dulles to urge that greater emphasis be laid upon the utility to G-5 and Military Government in general, of the services of OSS. Subsequently two meetings were held between Col. Parkman and his staff and Mr. Dulles and members of his staff.

After the surrender of Germany it became evident that under the new plan for the 6th Army Group there would be no useful function for any OSS personnel; accordingly by direction of Col. Gamble the writer turned over command of the Detachment to Capt. Chase, his assistant, who was shortly thereafter to return the personnel to Paris. The writer reported to Paris the 23 May, to London the 26 May, and to Washington the 12 June.

Roger Griswold  
Lt. Col. AC AUS  
O-901715

**SECRET**



ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Abstention No. ....

Date Rec'd SA .....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd Pwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
Mr. [illegible]	[illegible]	JUN 25 1945 JUN 26 1945	[initials]	I am not particularly satisfied with the draft attached for your signature — I feel that Mr. Shipman's report is unnecessarily personal. However you know better than I that the London Reports Division has great virtues and some faults. But he is genuine for his own work and intelligence direction; get the accuracy first by comparison of London reports offer somewhat by comparison with other reports offered. But on the overall balance sheet the credits are very large.
Mr. [illegible]	[illegible]		[initials]	a.c.
Mr. [illegible]	[illegible]		[initials]	This can be filed

should be numbered to correspond with number in 7c column.

When used to draw across sheet cover, the  
proper designation should be used in 7c column.  
dark officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.  
action defined as action taken should be indicated in 6 column.  
checking sheet should always be returned to Registry.  
Rpt Officer designation on separate sheet.

## SECRET

17,120  
Field Report  
x Stephens, George R  
x SI x ETO

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Chief, SI  
SUBJECT: Field Report of Mr. George R. Shipman

Mr. Shipman's services to the Reports Division in London, mainly as head of the translation unit, have been excellent.

His report contains some personal irrelevancies. The view which he offers is doubtless partly derived from late entrance into ETO and a consequent unfamiliarity with procedure there, and partly from a characteristic frame of mind.

His criticism of confusion in the Reports Division can therefore, I think, be explained partly by the date of his arrival in ETO and the strains and improvisations of the first weeks after D-day, and partly because the London Reports Division was not as well organized as other Reports Divisions, perhaps because of the stress of operations.

His criticism of the treatment of personnel, and especially British personnel, may be well founded in an occasional instance. However, the policy of the Reports Division and SI in general has been to treat its employees, both British and American, with tact and consideration. Most SI employees have willingly been hewers of wood and drawers of water without reflecting bitterly on the state in which SI has placed them.

Mr. Shipman believes that a separate translation unit in a reports division is a mistake and suggests that the translators should be assistants to the reports officers. I believe that this suggestion is sound. It is, and has been, the arrangement in all reports offices except London.

*William H. Shepardson*  
William H. Shepardson.  
022

WHS 8 31 VM 112

ONE OF SEVEN

17, 120

**SECRET****INDEX**

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**SECRET**



17.120  
**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

14 June 1945

**TO:** Director, OSS  
**THROUGH:** Chief, SI  
**FROM:** George R. Shipman  
**SUBJECT:** Report on Field Conditions, Reports Division,  
 SI, London

**1. Scope of this Report**

This report covers my experience with the London Reports Division from 29 June 1944 to 8 June 1945. During that time my assignments were: (1) Translator and assistant reports officer in military section; (2) chief of Reports Division translation unit; (3) pouch sorting officer; (4) assistant editor. The last three jobs ran more or less concurrently; people in London had to learn to double in brass. The writer has had five years' experience in an old-line Civil Service agency, a fact which may somewhat color his views.

**2. Job History in London: Accomplishments**

a. My duties in the military section included processing and disseminating OB and troop movement information received from OSS and Allied sources, and translating and disseminating messages received from the agents sent out by Operation Eusex. I was also asked to assist in getting some system and organization into the unit, which badly needed it. Its problems arose partly from the hectic way the work was done, partly from the quality of supervision, and partly from the lack of qualified personnel. I for my part shudder to think what would have happened to the war in Europe if everyone dealing with this sort of material had been as ignorant as I was. Several Army officers in the section were not much better off than I.

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b. Hence I asked for a transfer in September 1944 and became chief of the translation unit, a job for which I had more preparation. This unit prepared English versions of German, French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese documents sent in by all sections of the reports division. The personnel included three British civilians, one American civilian, and two G.I.'s. The general standard of competence was high, and the mixture of nationalities made the unit an education in itself. I assumed responsibility for checking and editing all translations before they left the unit, and encouraged the translators to verify place-names, names of persons, map coordinates, and the like. To do this it was necessary to build up a reference shelf of gazetteers, technical dictionaries, and maps--not an easy task considering the shortage of books in London. Since London Reports had never even bothered to order an unabridged English dictionary before setting up shop, this reference library was somewhat revolutionary.

c. The job of sorting and routing incoming intelligence pouches was given to me after the volume of translation work had somewhat fallen off. The job had been held by various people who had succeeded in getting rid of it after six weeks or so; I held it for six months. I was the first to introduce a system for keeping records of incoming pouches and noting special instructions for handling the contents. This, I flatter myself, helped to eliminate some of the mad searches for missing documents that had been a regular feature of life in SI, London. When I finally got rid of this job, the secretary--a WAC corporal--who took it over learned the recording system in half an hour and did quite satisfactory work. Meanwhile I was made assistant to Mr. Christman, the London editor, and edited and checked a large share of the disseminations before they went out. This continued as long as London Reports remained in business.

### 3. General Problems and Suggestions for Improvement

In the following I have tried to mention only situations of the type that may recur in other field offices, where London's mistakes may point the way to some improvements.

#### a. Handling of Civilian Personnel

Even now my memories of my first month or so in London have a nightmarish quality that was not, I firmly

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believe, due entirely to the imminence of buzz-bombs. As I learned more about other American agencies in London, I could not help contrasting the befuddled way OSS civilian personnel was handled with the almost motherly care given by OWI. From our landing in Liverpool to our arrival in London our party was handled by a lackadaisical lieutenant who had to be prodded and pushed before he would even draw K rations, despite the fact that officers had been repeatedly advised over the ship's loud speaker system to draw rations for their men. We were billeted in a hotel at a price equivalent to \$5.00 a night. (OWI has its own billets for civilians.) OSS has a good dry-cleaning service and a medical service department, we discovered, but some civilians who had been in London for months had never heard of them. (Was civilian personnel so fearfully busy that it had no time to draft a memorandum for newcomers about these things, after a year in ETO?) A laundry service would have been a godsend and could have been provided without too much trouble; nobody did anything about it. There was a canteen in Duke Street where British and American employees of U.S. agencies could buy lunch for 2s. 3d. (45¢) and dinner for 3s. (60¢), as contrasted with 5s. (\$1.00) in most civilian restaurants; we just happened to hear about it. My clothing coupons were taken away from me when I received an AGO card, and I was in London seven months before I got any more. Meanwhile OWI was carefully notifying its employees of all available services, seeing that they had coupons and even buying theater tickets for them. I recall a tender little memorandum from the OWI services director advising employees that such and such a day was the deadline for the next six-month ration of vitamin pills. I am not advocating pampering of civilians, but OWI made life easier for its employees, while OSS simply let them sink or swim. OSS Washington has prepared a useful employee handbook; what prevented OSS London from doing the same?

#### b. Management of the Office

In evaluating the following, one should remember that I was sworn into OSS on 7 June 1944, D-plus-one, and sailed a week later, so that I had little opportunity to get the feel of the shop. Employees of longer experience, however, agreed with me that the London Reports Division in those days looked like a thriving outpost of Babel. Particularly, no one had time to explain anything. This sort of confusion, I suppose, is part of life in a newly constituted agency. One is permitted to wonder, however, why it continued after some of the pressure was off. There was a useful memorandum outlining the functioning of the London Reports Division which should have

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been given to all employees as soon as they entered on duty; one of our party discovered it at the bottom of some one's file six weeks after our arrival. Translators working under me had only the vaguest idea of what became of their product. There were too many people, I felt, working in their own little corners and knowing nothing of the relation of their job to the whole effort of the division.

Even after I had settled to the collar, several of the people who were supervising me showed by their questions that they had not an inkling of what was involved in my work. Here is a case in point. I was called into the reports chief's office to have my knuckles rapped. He had had a study made, he said, and the figures show that too much time elapsed between the receipt of pouches in the Reports Division and the arrival of the sorted material at the reports officers' desks. Was he aware that the entries in the pouch log, on which the study was based, covered not only my operation, but two others? No, he wasn't aware of that, and the reprimand lost most of its force when he found it out. I later examined the figures on which the "study" was based. If they were correct, they showed that more than half of the pouch material went through the three operations in less than one day. But in places, at least, they were obviously not correct. I remember that a series of two-digit figures gave a total of one in the last column. On this sort of work, which would have disgraced a \$1260 statistical clerk, my work was judged.

#### c. Treatment of British Personnel

I believe that many chances to improve Anglo-American relations were lost by the thoughtlessness and sheer stupidity of the American supervisors toward the British personnel. As a group, the British employees were fully as competent as the Americans in similar jobs. Most of the British girls who were rated as stenographers could actually write shorthand, which was something of a shock to one fresh from Washington. It was no fault of ours that we could not pay them the established American civil service salaries; their salaries were fixed by the Ministry of Labor, and most of them were intelligent enough not to resent the fact. There was a great deal of resentment, however, because certain Americans treated all British employees as if they were brawlers of wood and drawers of water. This did not go down well with people who were college graduates. I may be a bit rabid on this point, but some examples of inexcusable rudeness and stupidity should be reported.

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Hours of work when I arrived in London were from 9:15 to 6:15, with an hour off for lunch. A memorandum from On High changed the hours from 9:00 to 6:00, quite without warning. This wrought a real hardship on most of the British workers and on a good many American girls who were keeping flats. British shops do not open before 8:30, and there is already a queue by that time. Rationed foods have to be procured from the shop where the customer is registered, not from any shop that happens to be open. It was hard enough to get one's shopping done before work with the extra fifteen minutes; when the hours were changed, it was almost impossible. The person On High who issued the ukase--an American colonel who did not have to cope with any of these problems--became stubborn and reaffirmed the change in several memoranda. It was of course disregarded in practice; the British are used to running their own affairs and find their own ways of nullifying nonsensical regulations. I could not see that the work suffered because of it.

The established SI policy was that British personnel should eventually be replaced by Americans. The executive officer of SI Reports, a first lieutenant, decided to make some changes. He evidently made his plans without consulting the head of the Registry or any of the employees who would have to look for new jobs. His memorandum on the subject of "Changes in Registry Personnel" was quite innocently picked up by the British girl in the mail room, who asked the head of the Registry whether she had a carbon for her files. The Registry chief read the memorandum and promptly blew up. There were other explosions when the contents became known. Two of the British employees complained to the American chief of civilian personnel, who, I am pleased to report, phoned the executive officer in their presence and spanked him soundly for his tactless action. "We shouldn't have minded so much if he'd just called us together and told us about it," one of the British girls said.

The Registry was housed in a room partly below street level, where ventilation and lighting were unsatisfactory. One of the British employees ventured to complain to the same lieutenant about these conditions.

"Hell," said the lieutenant, who has never seen combat service, "after all, there's a war on."

"I know," said the British girl, a fragile blonde. "I was here all during the blitz--were you?"

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"Well," said the lieutenant, trying another tack, "there are plenty of people working underground today."

"Quite true," said the blonde creature. "They have special diets and get sun-lamp treatments three times a week. That's the law in this country."

These little tales are repeated, not as gossip, but to point up an unhealthy situation. The treatment of the British personnel in many cases was not only stupid but was a shabby return for the excellent work they had done. And any American who feels called upon to remind the British that there is a war on should be immediately removed from a position of responsibility and sent to an alienist.

#### d. The Brighter Side

In all cases of poor treatment of British personnel that came to my attention the offenders were American supervisors. There were many cases of good relations to balance these. On the GI echelon relations were excellent. The only thing necessary to get work out of the British employees was to treat them like people. If OSS ever uses non-American personnel in a foreign post again, I hope special attention is paid to the selection of American supervisory personnel. The example of SHAEF under General Eisenhower shows that a combined set-up works on a large scale, and there was little excuse for failure in a small organization like SI.

#### 4. Specific Problems in Connection with Jobs

With regard to specific problems and recommendations arising from the jobs I held, I should like to say the following:

a. Translations. I think that consolidating translation operations into one section was a mistake. While I was quite satisfied with the general quality of work turned out by my section, they had to handle such heterogeneous materials that they never became masters of the terminology in any one field. If the translators had been made assistants to the reports officers, they could have mastered the technical vocabulary and improved their background in the subject. Moreover, the work would thus have been more varied. A person who is skilled enough to make good translations generally suffers from the monotony of doing nothing but translating.

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Translators ought to have professional ratings and to be treated as professional workers. In London I was constantly fighting a tendency to draft translators for copy typing and such routine jobs. I am afraid the fact that some of them were British civilians encouraged this tendency.

b. Pouch control. The skill needed for this job is overrated. I found that it was getting too much for me to handle alone, and asked permission to use the translation section to help me. The answer was that it was a skilled job and there were security considerations involved. So one man did the work that could have been done by six people with a corresponding saving in time. The security objection seemed hardly valid. All "Control" disseminations were being stamped by a British civilian at the time this objection was made. As for skill, the job was temporarily taken over by a WAC whose skills were shorthand, typing, and knowledge of French, and possession of ordinary intelligence. She was allowed to keep the job and the routing process did not seem to suffer. It seemed a waste of time to assign a P-3 analyst to a job that could have been competently performed by a person with ordinary clerical skills.

c. Editing. There was a definite improvement in the quality of London disseminations after Mr. W. D. Christman became general editor. Paris evidently had no good editor to judge by the deplorable state of its reports as received in London. Moreover, the presence of an efficient editor with a professional approach to the job channeled the work and coordinated it much more closely than before. I believe that every office responsible for disseminations should have a full-time editor.

#### 5. Conclusions

With all its faults and fumbling, SI Reports, London, managed to accomplish something. It could have accomplished much more if there had not been so much administrative fumbling. To avoid such difficulties in another field post, I suggest the following:

a. Personnel in supervisory posts should be experienced in handling people. Their ability to organize and to cooperate with fellow-workers should be carefully explored. Their attitudes toward people of other nationalities should be considered in selection.

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b. The work of a Reports Division should be closely integrated and every employee should know how his work fits into the total picture. This end can be achieved by careful instruction of employees before they enter on duty, and by occasional staff meetings.

c. Care should be taken to prevent waste of qualified personnel on small jobs. This is a common failing of Government offices, not confined to OSS.

d. For specific recommendations, see paragraphs 3a, 3d, 4a, and 4b, above.

Respectfully submitted,

*G.R.S.*

George R. Shipman

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director  
FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat

17.141  
Field report  
x Chris T. or Toman, Capt. J. G. C.  
x Communications  
x H.E.T.O.  
DATE: 30 June 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. George C. Christagomas  
Communications/WFO

1. A Communications Officer assigned to Schools and Training in the Middle East, he subsequently served with the OSS/Greek mission in Athens.

2. His criticisms reflect general difficulties encountered by OSS in the Middle East during his duty there from May 1943 on. He particularly notes that the earlier establishment of British agencies left only agent-operator recruits of poorer quality for OSS.

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*cse*  
S.P.K.  
Attachment

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17,141

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## DETACHMENT "C"

12 June, 1945

TO : General William J. Donovan, via Chief, Communications Branch.  
 FROM : Captain George C. Chrysostomas.  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report on Radio-Agent Training, OSS-ME.

1. Undersigned was assigned to Schools and Training in May, 1943 by the Communications Branch, OSS-ME. After duty for twelve months as Chief Radio Instructor and five months as Acting Chief of Schools and Training; In September, 1944 when the school finally closed, was given the assignment as Communications Officer for the mission that went to Greece during the German occupation for the purpose of establishing a Base in Athens upon it's liberation.

2. Training activities improved considerably, when the school moved from the Ras-El-Kanayis Mediterranean area to the Cairo-Pyramid area for the following reasons.

(a) The school being closer to Headquarters, made it easier for the concerned Branch Chiefs without disrupting their routine working schedule to visit and interview their students more frequently and be in closer contact with the school.

(b) The new radio school being larger in size and equipped with all necessary technical apparatus, offered a better and speedier training and made it easier for the Instructors to teach.

(c) Since this was a finishing school and upon completion of the prescribed courses, the Agent and Operator were sent into the field without any further training, every effort was made to keep-up on latest developments in the areas of operation. Up-to-date information based on actual experiences was constantly added to the instructional material.

(d) To enable the faculty to observe and get a better picture of the character and habits of the students, an air of informality was encouraged during the course of their studies so that the concerned Deas would know more about their students personality set forth in periodic evaluation reports with a complete analysis of their progress and character, which proved to be very helpful in the planning of their missions.

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(e) The school offered the opportunity to the students to become acquainted among themselves, so that they may choose if they like to in teaming-up for their mission.

### 3. Difficulties encountered were:

(a) In view of the fact, that the British had radio schools and SI-SC training programs in effect long before we ever started, resulted in almost complete lack of recruiting good Operator-Agent material.

(b) Students that would <sup>have</sup> been eliminated under ordinary conditions, were kept in school and encouraged with patience in their training, due to the shortage of possible qualified recruits. For this reason, many scheduled missions were postponed until such time that the student was qualified for the field.

(c) Very confusing to the students were, the different changes of radio procedure and systems of cryptography, which had a tendency of slowing-up their training and progress.

(d) Due to the ELAS-BRITISH war of Greece, which was the cause to hamper operations during the months of November and December, 1944 of the Athens Base, resulted in delayed communications service with the sudden increase of radio traffic and unfortunate death of Sgt. Joseph Rudas, Message Center Chief.

(e) The unnecessary move of transferring the Greek Circuits from Cairo to Caserta was another cause for disruption of radio contacts and Greek Operations, since the Circuits were switched back to Cairo again a few weeks later.

(f) Lack of slots or freeze for EM promotions created problems at times, in that it was almost impossible to promote a deserving man, which was the reason in most cases for a down-fall of his morale and efficiency.

4. In as much as it can be said, that the Radio-Agent school had accomplished it's work and reached it's objective by just producing qualified Operators and Agents, the results of it's work are recorded on Individual mission reports and Branch history of the Communications, Greek SI, Slovenian SI and Labor Desks of the Middle-East Theatre.

5. As a documentary record of activities of the Radio-Agent school, OSS-ME, a pamphlet on practical maintenance of the SSTR-1 radio set was written in the English and Greek language, which was given to all operators going on missions.

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Another pamphlet was also written with all the necessary information compiled on the various subjects taught in order, with schedules and detailed presentation of the equipment used. In addition, a motion picture film was written and directed by the school heads, dedicated to the unsung heroes, agents and radio operators, who were and are in enemy territory. It primarily deals with the training up to the moment of departure for the field. This picture has been taken under actual training conditions. The title is "The Training of Agent and Radio Operator, Middle-East."

*George C. Chrysostomas*  
GEORGE C. CHRYSOSTOMAS

Captain, Air Corps.

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17.142

DATE: 30 June 1945

Field Report  
x Poole, Henry  
x R & A & Eto

- for W.D. -  
are

**S.P.E.**

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**SECRET**

31 May 1945

TO: Office of the Director  
Office of Strategic Services

*JH* SECRET

FROM: Lt. Kenyon Poole, USNR

SUBJECT: Progress Report on Work Done in London R & A from  
February 1944 to May 1945

Together with several other economic and political analysts I proceeded to London in mid-February, 1944, to assist in the work of R & A, London. It was thought when I left Washington that Mr. Sweazy, Mr. Sparks, and I might work on the cartel problem. Nothing developed along this line, however, and it was necessary for us to cast about for new projects. There were, of course, an ample number of good ones from which to choose.

In response to a prevalent belief that the Germans might shortly sue for peace, the military government staff had moved to England in the fall of 1943. When peace overtures were not made, a large number of specialists on various aspects of public administration were left in England with ample time to educate themselves on the special features of Germany's governmental framework. These specialists were grouped under such headings as public safety, sanitation, financial institutions, public finance, etc. It was with the latter two groups that I became associated in a consultative and research capacity. There were two distinct financial groups, one operating in Shrivenham and later in London on the research and policy levels (G-5, SHAEF), and the other engaged in training of personnel (the Civil Affairs Training School located first at Shrivenham, and later at Manchester). Both these groups required all possible research assistance in the following fields of German Administration: public finance and fiscal institutions, banking institutions, currency, accounts and audits, and insurance.

The G-5 SHAEF financial people, located in London and (until August 1944) working under Col. Gilchrist, required information on the nature of Germany's financial institutions in order to be prepared to supervise the administration of her financial system after the collapse of military power. To that end, full information was needed on the precise way in which each level of authority reported to, and received orders from, the next higher authority. Col. Gilchrist and his group made use of all British and American agencies located in Britain, including OSS. The Staff of R & A made very substantial contributions to this work, especially in the spring and summer of 1944.

The Civil Affairs Training School required much the



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same information as G-5 SHAEF, but the former needed it in a form which would be usable by a group of men with widely varying backgrounds, who would operate at the field level rather than at the level of the Ministry of Finance. The School derived some part of its factual information from the labors of working parties made up of the students. A much greater proportion of its information covering Germany's financial setup came from reports originating in other agencies. A third source of information was the lectures and discussions held by American and British experts who made periodic visits for this purpose.

By March 1944, I had become acquainted with the financial section of G-5 SHAEF, which at that time was located at Shrivenham along with the Civil Affairs Training School. My first work with them consisted of criticisms of the first draft of the German Financial Handbook, which was part of a survey of German Public Administration that occupied the major portion of the attention of the G-5 SHAEF people at Shrivenham for several months. Since the most important part of my work was the collection and analysis of economic and legal information, it was only necessary for me to make occasional visits to Shrivenham. I spent considerable time at the Wiener Library of German Information, the British Museum, the Foreign Office Research Department, the PID Library, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. In addition some material came to the R & A Reference Library. As time went on the last-named source became more and more important owing to the excellent work of Ralph Carruthers, who took the trouble to acquaint himself with the contents of many of the large number of specialized libraries in London, and who was very active in undertaking the purchase of German publications in neutral countries.

During the months from March to June, inclusive, I spent practically the whole of my time searching for and organizing material for the G-5 SHAEF group. I worked most closely with Major (now Lt. Col.) Morton Fisher, who was in charge of the Public Finance Section. The specific object of the research at that time was to prepare organizational charts which would provide an understanding of the nature of Germany's fiscal system. However, a great deal of time was spent in attempting to find answers to a wide variety of questions that occurred to particular individuals, or to their British opposite numbers, while working up this material.

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In addition to searching for materials for the Public Finance people, I also did some work for Banking Institutions. Lt. Bogdan was in charge of this section, and in addition to having occasional conferences with him, I was able to dig up miscellaneous bits of information useful in his work. As time went on, it was thought more efficient to siphon all requests for information through an Information Unit (Maj. Cation) which attempted to eliminate duplicated requests and to make requests for information as specific as possible. When this procedure had come into effect, copies of the perhaps a hundred different questions in the field of finance were put in the hands of all agencies cooperating with 3-5 SHAEP, with the request that they contribute whatever they could. For some time these request sheets formed the basis of my work projects.

In June 1944, a new member of the Finance Section, SHAEP Finance Section, now located in London, and the Finance Section of the Civil Affairs Training School, which had moved to Manchester. His work required him to make frequent trips to Manchester in order to assess the needs of the school and its proposed summer course. This course, which was to last from eight to ten weeks, was intended to bring new students so far as possible to a par with those who had studied at Charlottesville and other military government schools in the United States, and to prepare regional studies of administration in the areas expected to be under U. S. control. Major Mott asked me if I would place myself at his disposal, both for lectures and consultations in the school, and for the collection and organization of materials needed by the school and its Finance Section. It was agreed that R & A would be justified in assigning one of its members to this project for a limited time. I left for Manchester about the 3rd of July, and it was thought that the assignment would last for about a month.

At Manchester I made the acquaintance of the men who expected to operate in Germany at the regional (provincial) level of public finance. It should be noted in passing that before going to Manchester I had written the Public Finance and Banking Sections of a special handbook edited by Dr. Walter Dorn (also of R & A) who had been spending his entire time at the training school. Dr. Dorn was very cooperative in explaining to me the objectives and setup of the school, and assisted me greatly to give the school the type of information that most needed.

On my first trip to Manchester I spent four weeks. The most important single job which I did was to prepare a chart of the fiscal system of Germany. This involved differentiating the functions of the various levels of fiscal

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authority; i.e., the Ministry of Finance, the upper Financial offices, the Financial offices, the local tax offices, the Auditing Office, etc. It also required an analysis of controls exercised through the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Economics. The manner in which the Ministry of the Interior permeates the tax and expenditure structure of Germany's financial system made this job an extremely complicated one. On the basis of the chart thus produced, I gave detailed lectures, showing the functions of each relevant office in these three ministries, the states and provinces, and the cities and towns. In addition to lecturing, I worked on a consultative basis with the various members of the Finance Section, with the object of clarifying the many points of detail that came up in connection with those problems.

At the end of a month it was thought desirable that I should report to London, but I almost immediately received a request to return to Manchester, and spent a considerable part of August at the school as a result of a decision to lengthen the course. In the interest of accuracy it should be observed that the impossibility of knowing when the military situation would so develop that this group would be required to move to France made it difficult to plan the work properly. Consequently, the students at the school could not avoid a certain feeling of discouragement at the probability that any reasonably ambitious project would be interrupted before completion.

On my return to London about the end of August, it began to be apparent that neither the training school nor G-5 SHAEP, Financial, would continue much longer to need the type of information and analysis that R & A was in the best position to provide. As so often happens, the agency being serviced began gradually to collect a large staff of its own. Part of this additional staff consisted of native German enlisted men, who were able to translate verbatim and rapidly the German documents which were beginning to pour in from the continent after the liberation of Paris and the fall of Aachen. Also, after about the middle of September, when G-5 SHAEP began to receive consignments of captured documents by plane, it became clear that it was both a hopeless and a pointless task to read documents in order to learn how the German financial system worked in practice. The volume of the material was too great, and much better sources, namely prisoner of war interrogations and on-the-spot investigations, began to be increasingly available. The Civil Affairs Training School Group moved to France in September, thereby eliminating one of the two users. At the same time the G-5 SHAEP people, better staffed, were more self-sufficient and made fewer requests.

Col. Bernstein had taken charge of the Financial

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Section in mid-summer, becoming in effect the chief American adviser on financial and monetary affairs in the European Theater, and proceeded to expand the staff still further, especially at the professional level. The first results of this experiment began to be noticeable in the winter of 1944-45. During the fall of 1944, I spent a great deal of time at Prince's Gardens and later at Bushey Park, working more directly than before with Lt. Col. Fisher, who had by now become Executive Officer for Col. Bernstein. Although I answered every possible request, I had the impression that the time had come either to join the group permanently or to consider the possibility of using some portion of my time on other projects. In view of the fact that my training is far more oriented to problems of international financial and economic relations than it is to purely domestic German considerations, and because it was rapidly becoming apparent that international economic and financial questions were due shortly to have great, and even paramount, importance in the post-European-war picture, it was agreed by Messrs. Morso, Evans, Lunning and myself that I should be prepared to answer questions and write memoranda on financial problems of a greater scope than would be the case if I restricted my activities to Germany alone.

When not engaged in consulting with the G-5 SHAEF people, therefore, I spent my time after September 1944 in learning everything I could about the increasing number of financial and monetary agreements made by Britain, France, Belgium, Sweden, etc., and problems arising out of blocked international balances, exchange rates, prospective capital movements, redistribution of gold and silver during the war, inflation in all important countries (particularly with respect to their effect on the economies of countries like Great Britain and the United States), etc. A great deal of time was required in making a thorough analysis of the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the political and economic background of the various monetary proposals leading up to the Bretton Woods Agreement.

Although it was at first not entirely clear how OSS would use this work, the essentially political background of many of the financial and monetary agreements made it appropriate that someone in this organization be qualified to explain what was back of them. In order to facilitate this work, two types of activities were carried on. A check list of periodicals likely to contain political, financial, and general economic information on international capital and other transactions was made, and considerable time was devoted to keeping abreast of this information. Also, interviews were scheduled with British nationals for the purpose of obtaining as comprehensive a cross section of British opinion as possible. On the basis of this work some memoranda

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were sent to Dr. Langer for the attention of Mr. Conyers Reade.

It was possible to build up a pretty good conception of British attitudes through the reading of current intelligence from published sources. Memoranda were produced on the problem of blocked sterling balances and on the changed economic position of India during the war. A much more intimate idea of British opinion was gained through the personal interviews. Summaries of the more profitable of these talks were sent to Washington for the attention of Mr. Reade. Conversations were held with the following types of representatives of British opinion: business men, bankers, city editors, Treasury officials, and academic economists. In the course of this work I had many discussions with Lt. John Sparks, who is a specialist on British politics. Lt. Sparks was very helpful to me in the clarification of my ideas.

With the departure of Col. Bernstein's group for France in the early part of March of this year, I turned my attention exclusively to this work. Conversations with Mr. Morse as early as November, 1944, indicated that it might be helpful to the work of R & A if one of its members carried on this program, and subsequent meetings with him, as well as with Mr. Evans and Lt. Lunning, strengthened this view.

The instructions governing the writing of the present report contain a request for evaluation of the effectiveness of the London office. Since I spent almost the whole of my time outside of the office in the service of user agencies, there was little occasion for me to come into contact with purely organizational aspects of R & A, London. I had complete freedom in carrying out the objectives that had been agreed upon between myself and the branch and section chiefs, and every assistance was given me in making my work effective.



**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

**SECRET**

17.143

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. E. M. Carroll  
 SI/KFO

DATE: 7 July 1945

*Field Report*  
 x Carroll-

x SI.

x EVO-

1. Mr. Carroll served as liaison officer between SI/KFO and SHAF Forward, particularly the Operational Intelligence Branch of G-2, from August 1944 through May 1945.
2. His most pointed criticism is that the number of top-echelon SI personnel far outweighed the number of agents sent into the field.

SLK.  
 S.P.K.

Attachment

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Attached Report of E.M. Carroll on Termination of Duty in ETO

DATE: 12 June 1945

In the attached report, Mr. Carroll puts forward a number of thoughtful suggestions. Perhaps the most serious of the criticisms relates to the failure, as appeared to Mr. Carroll, of SI/ETO to give adequate and well-defined direction to the work of its agents, and to relate such direction to the requirements of SHAEP OI. In this connection, he also suggests that the overhead establishment of SI/ETO was excessive in relation to the number of trained agent personnel, and that the training of the operational and agent personnel in OB was not all that it should have been.

Unfortunately, the experience on which these suggestions are based related to the winter of 1944-1945. This was the period of doldrums between the earlier active and productive intelligence work in France and the later successful penetration of Germany. In both the earlier and the later periods, the work of the agents was related specifically to requirements regularly obtained from SHAEP, and Army groups and Army headquarters.

Mr. Carroll also questions the advisability of employing German agents for work in Germany. Plainly, special care is necessary in the recruitment and handling of such agents, but there has been enough successful experience to warrant continuation of the effort to use them.

*Walter D. Murphy*  
Walter D. Murphy



**SECRET**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 May 1945

TO: Director, OSS  
 FROM: Chief, SI  
 FROM: E.A. Carroll *EAC*  
 SUBJECT: Report on Termination of Duty in ETO

Service with Operational Intelligence, G-2, SHAEF

1. Toward the end of August 1944, Colonel Haskell, then Chief of SI in the ETO, named me Liaison Officer with SHAEF Forward, especially with the Operational Intelligence Branch of G-2. On 31 August, I proceeded by military aircraft under G-2 orders to Julieville, a point near Granville, Normandy, where SHAEF Forward was then arriving from Southampton. Radio Station "Salle" was set up in nearby St. Pere-sur-Mere to service SHAEF Forward.
2. On 31 September 1944, SHAEF Forward moved to Versailles where it was joined by SHAEF Main from London. Station "Salle" went out of existence temporarily due to the proximity of the OSS HQ Detachment in Paris. Thenceforth I made daily trips from Paris to Operational Intelligence.
3. At the specific request of Operational Intelligence, Station "Salle" and I, as its Chief, moved to Rheims on 21 February 1945. There I remained continuously on duty until 1 May 1945 when I was ordered back to Paris. Station "Salle" remained under Lieutenant Colonel Confield, OSS Liaison Officer to SHAEF.

Description of Duties

In general, my primary function was to facilitate the relations between SI and Operational Intelligence, G-2, to their mutual advantage. The following became my principal duties:

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1. The maintenance of continuous contact with Operational Intelligence officers important to SI either as possessing useful information or as recipients of SI intelligence. These officers were Brigadier Foord (Br), J.C. of Operational Intelligence, and his American Deputies, Colonels Curtis and Collins; Lieutenant Colonel Austin (Br), Chief of Enemy Armed Forces and his American Deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Pettib; Major Watkin (Br), of the German Army Section, and his aides; Major Ezra and Captain Liebmann of the Enemy Communications Section; Lieutenant Colonel Melville-King (Br) of the Planning Section; Captain Pyatt and of the G-2 Briefing Section.
2. Delivery of SI reports to the proper officers.
3. Securing appraisals and comments on specific items in these reports, principally as a basis for the evaluation of agents and other sources.
4. Securing specific questions to be forwarded to agents in the field.
5. Securing intelligence targets for the briefing of agents.
6. Securing military information to be used in the preparation of papers and cover stories for agents.

In addition, I made myself useful to SI in briefing a number of agents in Order of Battle Intelligence using both French and German, and in preparing brief comments for insertion in SI military reports.

#### Comments and Suggestions

1. Reviewing my connection with SI and Army Military Intelligence was both in Washington and the ETO, there was, in my opinion, too much delay in ascertaining the exact types of information, especially as regards Order of Battle, which the Army requires. Much of the earlier information from this own sources was therefore distinctly poor from the Army's point of view. It needs also to be said that

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some SI officer in charge of operations were either inadequately trained in this field or were not convinced of its essential importance. In the event of another war, these errors will doubtless be corrected but in the meantime, I would suggest the maintenance of contact with MIS regarding military and especially Order of Battle information desired from Western Europe.

2. From my experience as Liaison with SHAEF, I would suggest that G2 should coordinate its various contacts with military as more carefully. For example, there was for a time some uncertainty as to the relations between my functions and those of Colonel Canfield. The latter told me that for a long time he did not know that MO maintained a liaison officer at SHAEF. SHAEF's reaction to this state of affairs was not exactly enthusiastic. I am convinced also that SI contacts with Army M.I. should be in the hands of a man whose training commands the Army's respect.

3. Among my duties listed above, the procurement of specific questions to be forwarded to our agents produced the least satisfactory results. During my tour of duty in Washington as Liaison Officer with Colonel Lovell in MIS, such questions were secured in considerable number and, in some cases, with good results. SHAEF was also willing to furnish us such questions, but its experience with certain test cases was completely unproductive. Moreover, SI operational officers in the ETO were not really interested. They apparently operated on the principle of giving their agents a free hand to collect such information as they could according to circumstances. I should imagine that peace-time operations will require more control, and possibly this should affect the training of agents.

4. I question the advisability of employing German agents for operations in Germany. Before the surrender, it is possible that hatred of the Nazis or desire for revenge for injuries to person and family made some German agents reliable, but these considerations will not operate in the post-hostilities period. Except those who were moved by the desire for personal advantage in one way or another, I sensed a disturbing inner conflict on the part of the prospective German agents to whom I lectured.

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5. It is my impression that the overhead organization of SI in the FTO was distinctly over-manned especially with reference to the flow of information from SI sources. The only possible justification for this disparity was the prospect of eventual large-scale operations whose initiation, however, was constantly being delayed. I was never in a position to say whether the reasons for these delays were entirely convincing. In fact, the London authorities in charge of operations were excessively secretive, and Brigadier Poord felt that he should have been more fully informed as to plans and actual operations. In any event, for most of the winter of 1944-1945 practically the only reports from SI's own sources came from Switzerland.

6. My relations with the officers of Operational Intelligence were always most cordial. Even during the periods when the flow of information from SI's own sources was slight, our requests for briefing material and other military information were granted without difficulty. Enquiries as to what was being done about briefs already furnished did become somewhat embarrassing at times. I anticipated at first some difficulty because of my civilian status, but needlessly as events proved. So far as Operational Intelligence was concerned, military rank would have made no appreciable difference.

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**SECRET**17.1441  
Field-Reports  
Joost - SR**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Major S. B. Joost, Jr.  
 SI/PATO

DATE: 7 July 1945


X SI.  
X FAVO

1. Major Joost was in command of Area #1, Det. 101, from May 1944 to March 1945. He established an intelligence network in the region between the Irrawaddy River and the China border and organized three battalions of native Kachins.

2. He emphasized that key base responsibilities should be given to men experienced in the field. Relations with the Chinese were far from cordial. Liaison with the Air Corps was poor and our own men were at times bombed and strafed by our own planes.

S.P.K.

Attachment

**SECRET**

16044-613

**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Covering memo on attached report

DATE: 13 June 1945

**SUMMARY**

1. In the above-mentioned report Major Jeest relates the fact that he went in behind the Japanese lines in North Burma with General Wingate's Special Glider Force and established an intelligence network for OSS Detachment 101 (later known as Area One) in the region between the Irrawaddy River and the China border, related to the campaign from Myittha to Lashio.

2. Major Jeest went behind enemy lines in May 1944 and operated there until May 1945.

He organized 3 battalions consisting of 6500 men, through which he obtained vast amounts of tactical intelligence and some intelligence from the above-mentioned area. His unit also engaged in combat with the Japs, ambushing, and road-blocks. They killed 1137 Japs, destroyed 60 Jap trucks and other vehicles, and numerous Japanese ammunition and supply dumps. They gave invaluable assistance to General Merrill's Marauders in their campaign.

**STEPS TAKEN TO ELIMINATE DIFFICULTIES**

1. Major Jeest has familiarized Colonel Peers, Commander of Detachment 101, with the difficulties he encountered in the field, and Colonel Peers intends to take what steps he can to correct same. Since 101 operations in Burma have now ceased, and since it is now operating in China, whatever corrections are made by Colonel Peers in methods of operation will apply to the China Theater.

I agree with the observations which Major Jeest has made in the attached report, particularly those concerning the necessity of careful selection of personnel, to which too little attention has been paid in general in the past.

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**SECRET****CONTROL****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 8 June 1945

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Major S. B. Joost, Jr., FA

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

**1. Itinerary:**

1943 - June 1--Departed for the U.S. from India.  
 August 3--Arrived K. and  
 August 19--Arrived Meira, E. India  
 Aug. 19--Sept. 15--Instructor in a training camp  
 at Meira.  
 Sept. 15--Dec. 1--Air drop-packing  
 Dec. 1--Dec. 15--New Delhi with Colonel "Boggs"  
 Dec. 15--Feb. 15, 1944 - First Air Commando Force  
 (Col. Cochran)  
 1944 - Feb. 15--Apr. 15 - Dab Force, 77 Brigade, 3rd  
 Indian Div. (Wingate)  
 Apr. 15--May 5 - Joined Chinese Guerrillas in  
 Sinsu area.  
 May 12-26 - Hospital, Calcutta  
 May 28-May 31, 1945 - In command of Area #1  
 1944 in Field

**ACTIVITIES**

2. It is believed that the effecting of liaison with Col. Cochran's Air Unit was a most important step from the standpoint of a mutual exchange of information and facilities with Det. 101. By means of this start, a similar arrangement was made with Gen. Wingate's Special Force which enabled us to lay the groundwork for future operations. Starting with four companies of Kachins, northeast of Myittha, our unit grew in size until a total of nine battalions of 750 men each were in action in the Lashio area. From June 1944 to March 1945, a total of 1197 Japs were definitely killed (actual body count), some 60 Jap trucks and vehicles destroyed, as well as numerous camps and supply dumps. Assistance was given Merrill's Marauders, the Maw Fook Force and the American-trained Chinese forces in Burma through intelligence, guides and troops, the latter being used in spearheading and flanking actions. A comprehensive intelligence net was established throughout the area contributing both strategic and tactical targets for the air corps. Civil administration was instituted wherever consistent with military security, prices were controlled and relief to suffering natives given whenever possible. It is noteworthy that the Kachin troops behaved in an exemplary manner toward their traditional enemies, Shans and Palangs,

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**SECRET CONTROL**

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while fighting the Japs in the Northern Shan States. They exhibited a sense of fairness and justice which contributed greatly toward local cooperation and security on the part of the local people. In this connection and regarding the entire operation of Area One entire credit for its performance is due Capt. Larum Tang, a King's commissioned Kachin whose services we were fortunate to secure, and the complement of American and British officers and enlisted men whose courage, initiative and ability were of the highest standing.

#### CONDITIONS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPROVED

3. Unfortunately our main troubles developed with Base at 101 Hq., chiefly over supply problems and lack of cooperation. It is fully realized that this report is written from the field point of view and in all fairness it is acknowledged that the size of the operation continually outstripped Base. One glaring weakness at Base was the constant replacement of personnel in key positions, because of field requirements, by new men completely ignorant of their duties. This would result in confusion for a considerable period, at which time a new replacement would be made and the cycle would start again. It is absolutely essential that great care be exercised in selecting personnel for overseas assignment. It is further felt that key base positions should be occupied by men with actual field experience who realize and appreciate field conditions. This should assure prompt attention to answering messages from the field and avoid the usual disinterested attitude toward field requests, which are frequently demanding but are nevertheless of grave importance to the men in the field. It is also obvious that petty bickering and jealousy between Operations, B&A, B&B and MO resulted in individual efforts on the part of these branches rather than a cohesive, coordinated picture. Finally, a unit of the size and scope of Det. 101 requires a staff of competent, capable individuals, willing to devote their time to precise, dull administrative duties to further the success of the "glamorous" field operator, to relieve the Commanding Officer of needless and irrelevant minor problems, and to be actively interested in the welfare of the unit as a whole.

#### SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES

4. Our relations with the Chinese, both Guerrillas and Regular Army, were far from cordial. This was due to many factors, viz: the uncontrolled looting and raping by Chinese troops, their avowed intention of retaining North Burma including Myitthaing, Hsiao and Lashio for China, the constant

**SECRET CONTROL**

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harassment of British Burma villages and villagers by Guerrillas under orders from Chungking, Chinese jealousy of Kachin's equipment and weapons, and the insufferable attitude of most Chinese officers toward Americans. Fortunately, we enjoyed an independent position in this situation and by prompt action were able to either forestall or punish acts of misbehavior.

SOE occasionally attempted to interfere with our efforts especially in the case of the Dilwyn Plan which contemplated a similar program to ours in the same area. This plan had received the support of Admiral Mountbatten and was spiked finally through the efforts of Gen. Cannon of MCAO. While recruiting in our area the British realistically informed the Kachins that anyone joining the Americans would be unfavorably regarded by the British after the Americans left, that old Burma Rifle soldiers would lose their pensions and finally that service with the Americans would not count on their record. It is to their credit that when ordered to retire from our area, SOE did so and retracted their former statements, finally urging the Kachins to support us to the fullest extent.

The question of supply was acute at all times. To the very end the matter of mail distribution was haphazard. Mail written in the field to be sent to the States would be dropped back in several weeks after being sent out. Arms would be dropped without ammo, flashlights without batteries, etc., etc. Drop schedules were not followed and frequently drops were made from such high altitudes that 75% of the contents were lost. It should be reiterated that the field program was far ahead of supply, that this fact was appreciated by men in the field, but nevertheless it was felt that negligence and lack of interest at Base was frequently responsible for much of the difficulty.

One further example of this attitude is reflected in the inexplicable bombing and strafing of our own men by our own Air Corps. Despite the fact that our locations were regularly radioed to Base with all actual and impending changes, our road blocks and positions were frequently harassed from June 1944 through September 1944. A period of quiet then ensued until March 1945 when our installations and troops around Lashio received a thorough going-over. The morale effect of these actions was nearly disastrous on many occasions and their continual recurrence indicates an inexcusable lack of liaison.

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As far as Area #1 was concerned : / equipment was superior,

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the Japanese with whom we came in contact were incredibly stupid, poorly equipped in most cases and definitely on the losing side. Except for the usual toll of malaria and dysentery and occasional disheartening experiences with supplies our task was relatively simple and thoroughly enjoyable. Highest praise should be given the American officers and enlisted men who entered wholeheartedly into a rather strange existence and who earned the respect and admiration of the Kachin people for their courage, cheerfulness and resourcefulness.

Too much credit cannot be given Col. W. R. Peers for so successfully directing a rapidly expanding unit with a dearth of adequate personnel. Considering the scope and accomplishments of Det. 101, it was entirely through his untiring efforts that the unit enjoyed the complete confidence and support of Gen. Stilwell's and Gen. Sultan's Hqs. and it is undeniable that the Unit contributed immeasurably to the success of the North Burma Campaign.

*[Signature]*  
 W. R. Peers  
 Major, FA

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## Office Memorandum

SECRET  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7 July 1945

TO : Acting Director

FROM : Reports Office - Secretariat

SUBJECT:

Returnee Report: 1st Lt. George H. Bookbinder  
LI/MedIO, EIO

Until April 1945, Lt. Bookbinder was on the OSS mission to Romania. He toured Western Transylvania and Hungary, studying conditions under Russian occupation and talking to members of the Hungarian cabinet in Debrecen. In addition, he served as Liaison Officer with the Russian Military Command and the staff of the 2nd Ukrainian Army in Bucharest. Subsequently he went on a trip from Paris through Russian lines to Berlin with Major Hamel and returned to the U. S. with models of German rockets found at Nordhausen and Berlin.

Sx.  
S.P.K.

Attachment

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 15 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS  
 FROM: Chief, SI  
 SUBJECT: Report on field activities -- Lt. George H. Bookbinder

This report presents a brief account of Lt. Bookbinder's assignments and duties. It contains no criticisms or suggestions. However, it is considered adequate since Bookbinder has submitted orally and in writing numerous reports concerning his field activities to various interested individuals and groups in OSS.

Lt. Bookbinder's accomplishments in Rumania were considered as outstanding by his commanding officer, Lt. Cmdr. Wisner, who relied upon him to handle many important contacts with the Russians and the Rumanians.

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
 Whitney H. Shepardson

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

TO : Director, OSS 14 June 1945

VIA : Chief, SI

FROM : Lieut. George H. Bookbinder

SUBJECT: Report on Activities of Lieut. George H. Bookbinder  
During Tour of Duty overseas, January 1944-June 1945.

1. Subject officer left the United States in January 1944 as part of an SO team connected with the Cambridge Project. On arrival in Cairo, the whole group engaged in a series of training programs in connection with the same project. At the end of March 1944, subject officer went to Palestine where he completed a parachute course with the Royal Air Force. Returning to Cairo, he went through another series of training programs in various schools and areas.

2. In June of 1944 the Cambridge Project and all other SO projects connected with Roumania were abandoned. Lieut. Bookbinder was asked by Colonel West to return to the United States. The undersigned requested assignment to the Fifth Army in Italy in its drive up north. After an exchange of cables between Colonel West and Commander Green, then the Commanding Officer of Company B, Bari, it was decided to send the undersigned to Italy. The undersigned arrived in Italy on 18 June 1944 where he was given the temporary assignment as Billeting Officer for Company B. A month later the undersigned had the pleasure of meeting the Director of OSS, with whom he had a brief talk.

3. Subject officer remained in Bari until August 29, 1944, when, together with a group of officers and enlisted men, he flew into Bucharest, Roumania, on an evacuation intelligence mission. It should be noted that the undersigned submitted to Commander Green on August 23 (the day the Roumanian Government transferred its allegiance from the Germans to the Allies) a plan for the evacuation of Allied airmen shot down in Roumania.

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Upon return to Bucharest, General Schuyler requested the Russian ACC to allow Lieut. Bookbinder to proceed to Bessarabia to try and find his family and close relatives. Two months passed, and the Russians never answered that request. It seems that Moscow could not make up its mind in two months.

Upon completion of duty in Roumania, Lieut. Bookbinder left Bucharest on April 23, 1945, for Caserta, Italy. While stopping in Bari, Lieut. Bookbinder was called to report to General Henry H. Arnold. He had a half-hour conversation with the General, mostly on the Russian situation. A complete report was made of the interview and was cabled the next day by Colonel Glavin to General Donovan. Upon arrival in Caserta, Lieut. Bookbinder found that his Chief, Commander Wisner, had been assigned the job of Chief, SI, Germany, and the undersigned was very anxious to join Commander Wisner. An exchange of cables took place between Commander Wisner, Colonel Maddux, and Colonel Glavin; and Lieut. Bookbinder left Caserta on 30 April 1945, arriving in Paris the same day. There he reported to Commander Wisner, Colonel O'Malley, and various other branch heads. It was decided then to send the undersigned on temporary duty to Washington, D. C. to report on his activities with the Russians in the Balkans.

On 14 April 1945, the day the undersigned received his orders to return to the United States, a trip that was planned a few days previous was put in operation, and the undersigned was "requested" to proceed with Major Rand and Capt. Reitsky to Germany and especially to Berlin. The request was carried out and the above-named officers reached their destination after being given a party by the Commanding General of the Russian 88th Army, Colonel General Isvetaiev. They accomplished their mission in Berlin, visited Hamburg, and returned to their headquarters one week after they left. During this trip Lieut. Bookbinder accompanied by Major Rand also visited the famous underground factories at Nordhausen, Germany. Models of radio controlled rockets were found there and Lieut. Bookbinder brought them back to the United States and turned them over to Commander Shabson in connection with the Simmons Project.

8. In Washington, Lieut. Bookbinder reported to Colonel Burton, Assistant Director, OSS; Mr. Whitney Shepardson, Chief, SI; Lieut. W.F.M. Beale, USMC; Mr. Stephen B. Penrose; and various other branch heads in connection with his activities in the Balkans and in Germany. A special oral report was made to the Planning Group where Major General Smith, Colonel Bruce, Mr. Elice of the State Department, and Mr. Penrose were present.

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6. The undersigned did not experience any difficulties in his work with the Russians, Roumanians, or any of the other Nationals with whom he came in contact. He treated each one as a separate case and obtained good results. It is difficult to set up hard and fast rules and regulations as to how the dealings with various Nationals should be conducted. It must be remembered that each case must be dealt with separately and a satisfactory solution be found as time and place may require.

*George H. Boekbinder*

George H. Boekbinder  
First Lieutenant, Infantry

CHD :HMC

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## Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

DATE: 7 July 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Isaiah S. Dorfman  
SI/ETO

17.147

Field Report

Dorfman

SI

ETO

1. Served as Chief of the SI/Labor Desk in Stockholm from 15 July on. Prior to this assignment, Mr. Dorfman was in charge of the German Section of the Labor Division in ETO.
2. States that the Stockholm mission was hampered in its work by lack of facilities and specialized personnel and by slowness of pouch communication.

SK.  
S.P.K.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

23 June 1946

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS BY I. JEFMAN, LABOR SECTION, SI

Since July 15, 1944, I have been Chief of the Labor Section, SI, in Stockholm. Prior thereto, from September 1943 to July 1944, under the general supervision of George Pratt, I had been in charge of the German Section of the Labor Division in ETO. As such I was in regular touch with trade unionists in the British Isles who were refugees from Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition to obtaining intelligence in England, I recruited several German trade unionists in England to enter Germany as intelligence agents on our behalf.

SCHOOL FOR GERMAN AGENTS - "MILWAUKEE"

With the assistance of the training section, ETO, I planned and established a school (known as Milwaukee) to train Labor Section agents to be used in Germany. The training section supplied the basic SI training adjusted to suit our needs and w/T instruction. To teach the recruits about current living conditions in Germany, including the Nazi state and police organizations, important controls, rationing, registrations, documents, communications, transportation and conspiratorial practice and procedures, I prepared a curriculum and recruited instructors who taught classes in the German language.

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH - "DASH"

To assist the instructors and agents I assembled a research staff, known as Dash, whose principal function was to gather, classify and index,

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in Norway and was turned over to me before it was actually despatched from the German Legation.

#### PENETRATION OF GERMANY

Three agents were despatched for intelligence purposes from Stockholm for Germany by the Labor Desk, Stockholm, named respectively, Herman Brahms and Schiller. Brahms was recruited and despatched by Lillian Traugott. Herman and Schiller were recruited and despatched by me via Denmark. Schiller sent in valuable reports enroute to Germany and Herman reported once from Hamburg. Neither Brahms nor Herman have as yet been recovered. Schiller is now with Captain Richard Watt at Base A, Maastricht, SI, Germany.

#### CARL SCHUMER PROJECT - SI GERMANY

Five persons of German nationality who had worked closely with me in Sweden were prepared to work for SI in Germany. With the tacit, but not express, consent of the Swedish and Danish authorities, the five agents were on June 15, 1945, extra-legally transported by boat from Sweden to Denmark and thereafter to Maastricht in an OSS operational plane. After indoctrination at Base A, Maastricht, it is intended to use these agents for intelligence purposes in various parts of Germany.

#### SUGGESTIONS

Complying with the request to suggest possible improvements in the work of the Stockholm mission, following are my suggestions:

I believe the mission could have better performed its functions had it been equipped with facilities and personnel specialized in (a) Preparation and duplication of necessary documents; (b) Training of agents in military identification, code w/t, etc., and; (c) Despatch of agents. Mail and cable facilities could have been greatly improved.

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Although the London document section was most cooperative and efficiently conducted, the obtaining of documents in Stockholm from London was unnecessarily time consuming and at times therefore ineffective. This was in part due to slow transmission of mail between London and Stockholm and in part to the rapid change in conditions in Germany. Training of agents had to be improvised and at times depended upon the availability of certain employees of the Legation who were busy with other tasks. Details of preparation for dispatch of agents require specialized attention. The person recruiting agents may not be equipped or have the time to devote to this.

Communications by pouch, and at times by cable, between Stockholm, London and Washington were slow. Memoranda, not infrequently, took about three weeks in transmission from Stockholm to London or vice versa. The cable room was frequently overloaded with work, and intelligence which might otherwise have been cabled was sent by slow pouch.

I received most welcome cooperation from my superiors and associates in Stockholm, London and Washington.

  
I. S. Dorfman

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum •

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7 July 1945

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Reports: Lt. William H. Pendleton, USNR  
 MU/MedTO

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1. Lt. Pendleton was Chief of MU in the North African theater, arriving there in March 1944.
2. His predecessor in the theater had told Washington that attempts to organize MU work in the Mediterranean were "futile"; the Chief of Operations, NATO, did not want MU to operate from an advance base; the arrival of Maritime personnel was delayed four long months; and no instructions from Washington on which to plan were received. For these and other reasons, MU in NATO, and later in MedTO, accomplished almost nothing.

SK.  
 S.P.K.

\* This was Major Russell Duncan, USMC, a regular who was doing all in his power to have himself returned to the Marine Corps and was completely disinterested in his OSS responsibility.

S.P.K.

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 June 1945

From: Lt. William H. Pendleton, USNR  
To: The Director, OSS, Washington, D.C.  
Via: (1) Chief, Maritime Unit, OSS, Washington, D. C.  
(2) Deputy Director, SSO  
(3) The Secretariat, OSS

Subject: Report on field conditions met by Lt. William H. Pendleton,  
USNR, in MEDTO.

1. In order to give a correct picture of conditions met in the field, it seems necessary to describe some background leading to my assignment overseas and to narrate some of the highlights of the stay.

In the spring of 1943, a letter was received from Colonel Eddy by the Maritime Unit stating that no need for maritime personnel was anticipated in NATO. Major Duncan, USMC, was sent overseas to do liaison work but after his arrival was assigned to head up maritime operations. After a stay of only a few months, he left the theater in December of 1943 and stated on his arrival in Washington that attempts to organize a Maritime Unit in NATO were futile. His stay in Washington was so short that it was impossible to ascertain Major Duncan's reasons for this attitude or to learn much of the situation in NATO.

My name had been submitted to NATO in October or November of 1943 by the Maritime Unit as an available officer to assist Major Duncan there. In December 1943 a cable was received from NATO stating TCA and high ocean priority for my entrance into NATO had been granted. Subsequent exchanges of cables revealed I was to become Chief of MU in NATO, but no description of the situation there or outline of work to be accomplished was ever received. Conversation with available personnel returning from NATO gave little additional information.

After much delay, I finally arrived in Algiers on 4 March 1944. My only instructions from Washington were from the Chief of MU to the effect that I should survey the situation and send for personnel and equipment as needed. Soon after my arrival in Algiers I had a conference with Colonel Gamble, Chief of Operations, NATO, who indicated that he wanted MU to be mainly a service branch to SO and SI in their operations of a maritime nature. He did not want a large branch nor did he want me to go forward to an advance base. He stated relative to the latter, that in many cases new arrivals had found interesting billets at forward bases and that this left no administrative head at headquarters. On 11 March 1944, TCA and high ocean priority was asked for a group of four officers and six or seven enlisted personnel.

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J. While LT in MIA, and afterwards in MDT, never accomplished all that it might have, had personnel and equipment arrived when conditions for maritime operations were at their best, its record in fact of this is not a total blank. It was in the operation of supplies to Yugoslavia; the fine group of operations carried out by Lt. Kelly, Lt. Chislow and Lt. Hearn with the San Marco from the evacuation operations conducted by Lt. Allen with the P-54A in the Atlantic, certainly added to the record of OSS in that theater. All of these have been recommended for decorations.

*William H. Pendleton*  
*Per 70*

William H. Pendleton

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## Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 7 July 1945

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office  
 SUBJECT: Returned Report: Edvin S. Morby  
SI/Sweden

1. From June 1943 on, Mr. Morby worked in Malmo as Vice Consul, and later at the Legation in Stockholm.
2. He states that Malmo was too small to avoid being conspicuous, that it was less valuable as a source of information than had been hoped, and that communications were a great problem.

S.P.K.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS  
FROM: Chief, SI Branch  
SUBJECT: Field Report of Edwin S. Morby

Attached herewith Field Report of Mr. Morby who was sent to Sweden as Vice Consul at Malmo.

The suggestions he makes in regard to having representatives given orientation course at base Headquarters before assignment to an outpost are well taken.

The difficulties which he points out were more or less to be expected during the time that he was assigned to his station. It is felt that they could scarcely have been avoided.

*Whitney H. Shepardson*  
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment



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June 6, 1945

FIELD REPORT BY EDWIN S. NORBY:

I reached Malmo in June 1943, to work as American Vice Consul in the Consulate there, which was to be reopened under B. Reath Riggs after having been in existence earlier and closed in 1932. The office was to be reopened for the specific purpose of affording a convenient observation post in a seaport communicating chiefly with occupied Denmark, but also to some extent, directly and indirectly, with Germany itself. This purpose was not easily concealed. To begin with, it was apparent to the Swedes. Before leaving Washington, I called at the Swedish Legation, where the men to whom I was introduced all gave me to understand that they assumed the Consulate was supposed to serve as an observation post. At this same time the German radio was broadcasting announcements that an espionage center was to be opened by the United States in Malmo, in the guise of a Consulate. It may be stated incidentally that a German Consulate already existed in the city, under Herr Nolda, who was notorious for his earlier work in France and Norway, and was reported to have an elaborate organization in Malmo.

This situation meant that extreme care had to be exercised for a considerable period, during which it was necessary to appear interested only in consular work. This in turn was complicated by the fact that the Consulate was not actually opened until September, though negotiations over the lease of Consulate quarters and other similar business supplied a fairly convincing occupation.

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Before many weeks I was instructed to make a weekly trip to Halsingborg, about sixty kilometers from Malmo, to pick up a report on ship movements in Oresund, rail shipments of material, and on the numbers and types of German military and civilian personnel disembarked from the ferry from Helsingor, Denmark, and entrained at Halsingborg for Norway. These reports covered also German personnel returning from Norway and crossing by the ferry to Denmark. These were prepared by a Swedish official in the seamen's union, and were of very great value. Those covering the shipment of troops ended with the suspension of the Swedish government's permission for troops to be moved through Sweden, but the others continued until the end of the war.

A little later Carl Rogers and I engaged, through the union official mentioned, the assistance of a Swede living in Malmo, who was to try and cover Trelleborg, where another ferry service maintained direct communications with Germany. I picked up a number of reports from this man, but his efforts were not outstandingly successful, and he was paid off after a fairly short time. He had also been an active union man, but his contact in Trelleborg had left the city, and, while he managed to provide some information on shipments of materials, he proved unable to arrange for the penetration of Germany originally contemplated.

In late August the definitive collapse of the "model" relations between Germany and Denmark occurred, and the real influx began to pour into southern Sweden. It seemed unwise to attempt any immediate contact with any of these refugees, but through one

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young man who appeared a few times at the Consulate, I was introduced to several others, including two young men who appeared to be very promising. There was a lively illegal traffic at this time, though it was not so well organized as it became later, and these two men were confident of their ability to make the crossing at will, pick up intelligence through their contacts in Denmark, and eventually arrange a route into Germany. They did in fact make a trial trip, returning with some information promising enough to justify making more serious plans. Such plans were made, by which these men were to stay in Denmark for at least a matter of weeks, passing their reports to a third man who was to serve as a courier. On the first occasion, however, they were to return themselves and report on possibilities before proceeding. Unfortunately the man who had introduced me to them was picked up by the police for questioning on another matter, and, apparently interrogated about other refugees, revealed that the two men in question knew me. The police went to visit their room, arriving the very morning of their return from Denmark with some information for me, sufficient evidence to bring about their arrest and a one month's jail sentence. More or less with the tacit approval of a Danish-born police officer later very active in his assistance to the Danes, but at this time still a bit hesitant, they were allowed an opportunity to return to Denmark, whence they intended to forward the reports as planned. My own advice to them was to serve their very mild sentence and remain in Sweden inactively,

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but they refused to accept this advice, stating that if I no longer were interested, they planned to return in any case. Under the circumstances I naturally said I should willingly receive any information they could manage to send. But as I had feared, the police were now alert, and shortly afterward arrested the courier. This rather effectively hampered any further activities, and made my continued stay in Malmo of questionable value. Later one of the two men I originally worked with came back from Germany, where he had enrolled in an officers' school, and brought me a complete course of study which was of great interest. But his usefulness was obviously at an end. Very shortly thereafter I was transferred to Stockholm.

The moment for beginning my work in Malmo was perhaps unfortunate. The real turn from an extremely watchful neutrality to near cooperation with the Allies had already begun in Stockholm, but had not yet made itself felt in Malmo. Here the local police, out of contact with higher official policy, were still acting with great zeal, some pro-German members of the force being still influential. The turn was not long in coming in Malmo too, but it came a little late for my purposes.

As for working conditions in Malmo, it should also be pointed out that the city is too small for conspicuousness of a consular officer to be avoided. There are only three Consulates in the city with foreign staffs, and the population is much less accustomed to foreigners than Stockholm or Goteborg, for example, which are also enough larger to make unconspicuousness somewhat

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easier to attain. For this reason I think that on any future comparable occasion the use of a consular title for an agent in Malmo should perhaps be avoided. A clerk could be more useful. If the Consulate is retained, it will eventually melt into the landscape more than it could under the circumstances, though long existence in Malmo did not suffice to save the British and German Consulates from the same unfortunate attention concentrated on ours.

It seems also to be true that Malmo is less valuable as a source of information than had been hoped. With the organization of illegal traffic to Denmark after Allied victories made the police complaisant, it became possible to move people in and out of Denmark with relative ease, but they had still to cross Denmark to reach Germany, and, so far as I know, no really significant intelligence was obtained by the Allies in this particular manner. Stockholm and Goteborg as larger ports offered better opportunities for infiltration of Germany, despite their greater distance from that country.

As for information on Denmark itself, this was organized in the most admirable fashion by the Danes themselves, who supplied their reports to the Allies in exchange for other assistance. Malmo and the other Oresund ports were thus extremely useful in this activities, while I think that my estimate of their low value as intelligence sources for Germany is confirmed by the meagerness of information obtained from Germany even by the Danes, whose

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opportunities were greater than our own. It might be added that well-informed visitors ordinarily stopped in Malmö only en route to Stockholm, and were apparently seldom available in Malmö itself.

Communications with Stockholm were a great problem in the early days, before courier service was established, and particularly before telephone ciphers were instituted. Fortunately my own early trips to Stockholm could be made at times when I had the "PM" reports to turn in, until courier service made their transmission easy.

There was naturally an inevitable necessity for feeling one's way in the dark. Not until the Danish Intelligence reports were made available to the U. S. Legation in Stockholm was it possible to determine what information was needed, and what was not worth any risks. There were unavoidable difficulties at the beginning, and need not be encountered hereafter. However, I should suggest that any future agents in Malmö not only be given access to but be compelled to read all material in Stockholm in order to acquire an idea of what they must look for. In fact in peacetime, without the urgent pressure for immediate action, I believe it would be most advisable to assign agents to Stockholm for an extended period before sending them to Malmö, Göteborg, or other Swedish posts. The orientation they would there obtain, as well as the advice and experience there available to them from others, would prove invaluable when alone in the field. In the post-hostilities period there seems to be no reason this orientation could not be obtained.

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In fact, much of the above has little application to the situation that would be met in the period after hostilities, and is reported for the record.

The situation as it appeared in Stockholm was of course entirely different, and is perfectly familiar to this office. There is therefore no need even to recapitulate my experience at the Legation, except to mention the greater personal sense of satisfaction derived from working there than at Malmo. As a translator, processor and evaluator of reports, a liaison with Norwegian, Dutch and Polish organizations, and so forth, I was better able to see the work of OSS as a whole, and see the value of my own contribution. My own and also the organization's nervousness brought certain disappointments in my work in Malmo. In Stockholm the organization's maturity, and also my own, gave me almost exclusively satisfactory results, as well as a perspective that enabled me to find cause for satisfaction in my earlier work in Malmo as well.

*Edwin S. Morby*

Edwin Seth Morby

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**SECRET****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director  
 FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. DuPitt Clinton,  
SI/Kedro

DATE: 30 June 1945

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*Field Report*  
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1. Mr. Clinton was Assistant Chief of French SI in Algiers from April 1943 until the southern France landings, when he served as Chief of the OSS tactical intelligence team with the 45th Division. From September to December 1943 he was also in charge of SI activity based on Corsica and played a major role in developing the successful agent penetration program in southern France.

2. States that effectiveness of work in Algiers was greatly impaired by the lack of cooperation on the part of OSS/Services staff, and that organization as a whole was beset by "empire-building" rivalry between branches. Also notes that records of Navy personnel were not properly kept, depriving them of credit due them and interfering with chances of promotion.

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*C.F.K.*

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

18 June 1948

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: DeWitt Clinton--Field Report

The attached Field Report, submitted by Mr. DeWitt Clinton, is a brief summary of French SI operations in Algiers, Oran and Southern France, with particular reference to the work of the 7th Army Unit (OSS) and, emphasizing that phase undertaken by the intelligence team attached to the 49th Division.

Section Four, dealing with administrative red tape and alleged non-cooperative attitude of Services, seems justified in part in that all OSS units have, more or less, encountered similar problems ranging in intensity from mild squeaks to loud and angry howls.

As to Mr. Clinton's complaint in Section Five, regarding neglect of naval personnel records, this is a matter for the individual Company Commander. There has been useful neglect in this respect due to the fact that many Army OSS are not familiar with navy regulations pertaining to the maintenance of Navy "jackets", or records.

*WHS*  
W. H. S.

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## REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

Dewitt Clinton

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June 12, 1945

To: Director, OSS  
through Chief, SI

From: DeWitt Clinton

Subject: Report on Field Conditions, MEDTO, ETO

1. ITINERARY Left Port of Embarkation April 19, 1943. Arrived Algiers via Casablanca April 29, 1943. Left Algiers for Corsica, September 27, 1943. Arrived Ajaccio Sept. 29, 1943. Numerous trips between Ajaccio and Bastia. Left Bastia for Algiers December 20, 1943, arrived same day. Left Algiers for Washington about May 5, 1944. Arrived Washington about May 7. Left Washington for Algiers June 6, 1944. Arrived Algiers June 8, 1944. Left Algiers for Italy, July 15. Arrived Fossuoli July 18, 1944. Left Italy for France August 10, 1944. Landed St. Tropez (Red Beach Del) August 16, 1944. Accompanied 45th Division, 7th Army to Epinal, arriving that city Sept. 27, 1944. Left Epinal for Marseilles and Casserta Oct. 11, 1944. Left Casserta Oct. 18, 1944, for Washington. Arrived Washington October 21, 1944.

2. Background Statement I was originally recruited by French SI in September 1942, for a secret mission to France, where I had lived for some years, and where my parents were living at that time. The breaking of relations with Vichy in November, 1942, prevented my going, although I had secured a visa from the French Government.

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3. What I did in the field While waiting to join the OSS mission in Algiers, I received complete SI, SO and maritime training. Upon arrival in Algiers, and after an illness which required hospitalization for about two weeks, I was assigned to assist Henry Hyde, in charge of the French SI Desk. My duties included recruiting of agents for the penetration of Southern France, supervising the training of agents for the same purpose, and handling and supervising the activities of agents prior to their departure for the field.

Early in June, 1943, Mr. Hyde left for London for an operation which had to be flown from England. I was consequently left in charge of the French SI Desk during his absence (until early September 1943) being assisted by Jean Proulke. During this period I supervised the preparation of four SI missions; three to France and one to Corsica. The first of these (Mutton Perk) was parachuted successfully into France on September 19, shortly after the return of Mr. Hyde from England. The second, (Mathilda) was ready for the October moon, but due to weather and difficulty in obtaining our own operational aircraft, did not leave until January 7th, 1944. The agents for the third mission (Perk Chop) were turned over to the Labor Section who sent them to France from England. The mission to Corsica (Suet Pudding), which was prepared under my supervision by Jean Proulke, was delayed due to training difficulties and was not ready until about the time of the Allied landing in Corsica. Its members formed a part of the OSS mission to Corsica under Major Coon which accompanied the Allied invasion force. These men did much valuable tactical intelligence work during the Corsican campaign.

Late in September I joined the Coon mission in Corsica in time to participate in the final phase of the campaign and the capture of Bastia. I remained in Corsica, in charge of SI, under the command of Colonel (then Lt. Col.) Livermore, until December 20, 1943. During this period I recruited some forty agents who were sent to Algiers for training, of whom eight were eventually used by French SI and the balance who were usable, by SO. Early in November on orders from Colonel Livermore I took charge of the Bastia MI which had been set up Major (then Captain) Pascette of Italian SI. From there SI missions were prepared and sent into Northern Italy, Siles and the other islands lying between Corsica and Italy. I supervised the preparation of these missions, and in certain cases acted as conducting officer for the PT boat operations. I assisted Lt. (then JG) Peter Karlew in the setting up of the Allied Intelligence Pool in Bastia in collaboration with A-2, 63rd Fighter Wing, British SIS and SOE, and French SM. Intelligence was furnished on coastal maritime movements of the enemy, coastal fortifications, and much operational intelligence was prepared for OSS Algiers and the various similar Allied services on Southern France and Northern Italy, which made possible subsequent successful maritime operations from Bastia into these areas.

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A considerable body of documentary intelligence was secured in collaboration with Lt. Karlew on the political situation in Corsica, the German and Italian occupation troops there and in Martinia, and also upon the political and economic situation in France. We also secured a large number of identification documents both blank and models which served very usefully in later SI missions to France. In this we were very ably assisted by Jean Ffoulks in October.

In December, 1943, after the arrival of Mr. Thomas Stoneborough and Mr. Wayne Nelson (both at that time assigned to Italian SI), at Mr. Hyde's request, I was recalled to Algiers by Colonel Glavin.

From December 20, 1943, until July 15, 1944, I was in charge of SI operations for the French Desk under Mr. Hyde. I was also "Traffic officer", being responsible for the proper maintenance of contact with the SI networks in France by radio, and for our communications with the field generally, including liaison with the "Signal Section" under Lt. Colonel More. I also acted as assistant desk head. During this period upwards of fifty operations were planned and carried out, including body and supply drops by parachute and maritime operations from Corsica into France. I have no way of estimating the amount of traffic received by radio, but there were many hundreds of messages, both intelligence and operational, more especially during the latter part of this period.

The accomplishments of French SI, Algiers have been too extensively described in detailed reports by Mr. Hyde, Mr. Barnes and others, for it to be worthwhile enumerating them here. Perhaps the most important fact from a purely OSS standpoint was that we were able to sell ourselves to G-2, AFHQ and G-2, 7th Army upon the basis of concrete results and were fortunately able to live up to earlier performances. The solidity of the relations between Colonel Gamble's mission and General Patch's HQ was in no small degree made possible by the intelligence which had been secured prior to the planning phase and continued to be secured during that phase, often in response to specific requests from G-2, AFHQ and G-2, 7th Army. The contribution from the standpoint of the war effort as a whole has been evaluated in letters from the G-2s concerned.

On the 25th December, 1943, I returned to Corsica briefly for operation "Estate" which involved two agents whom we had recruited previously in Corsica and who were landed in Southern France on a joint SI-SO mission. The SI agent obtained within a month very complete coverage of coastal defenses from Marseille

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to the Italian border. Colonel Sloane, AC of S, G-2, AFHQ, in a letter to Colonel Glavin, speaking of this agent, stated in part: "He is undoubtedly the best single source mf in OSS on defences. His over-all rating on past performance is B 1-2." Two nights later I acted as conducting officer for an Italian SI operation "Richmond II", which involved bringing off an Italian general and six other officers and agents from the coast north of Civitavecchia. On this operation I was accompanied on the PT boat by Captain Bonfiglio of Italian SI. I was placed in charge of the operation since at that time Captain Bonfiglio had not had any operational experience.

The day after the above, January 1, 1944, I returned to Algiers, where I continued in ~~my~~ my duties under Mr. Hyde.

Upon May 5th, 1944, I returned to the U.S. for conferences and for leave to attend to certain very pressing personal matters. I returned to Algiers about June 6, 1944, where I resumed my previous duties. I was at that time in addition to my other duties attached to "Force 163" which was engaged in planning the invasion of Southern France and which was being assisted in that planning by those officers who were assigned to Colonel Gamble's mission.

About July 15, 1944, I went to Pozzuoli, Italy, together with other members of the French Desk, in the final phase of preparation for D-day. I was in charge of the French SI section of Colonel Gamble's mission until the arrival of Mr. Hyde just prior to the time of embarkation. I landed in France upon August 16, (D plus 1) with the advanced echelon, mf under Colonel Gamble. Until August 20, I was at 7th Army Hq assisting Mr. Hyde. I organized a mission to the island of Porquerolles at the request of G-2, 7th Army, which at the moment of departure was decided to be unnecessary. I made several trips to the area of Hyeres and Toulon, where during the siege of the latter city, I was slightly wounded by an anti-personnel mine, luckily not being even temporarily incapacitated.

Upon August 21, I was ordered to take charge of the tactical intelligence team attached to the 45th Division. I joined the 45th at Aspre, but was unable to begin operations until we reached Bourguin, 35 miles SE of Lyon. During this period I supervised the preparation and execution of about 31 infiltration operations through the German lines with varying degrees of success. The most noteworthy of these missions was a trip to Lons le Saunier which was at that time some sixty-five miles behind the enemy lines. I was accompanied on this mission by

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Mr. Wayne Nelson, of the 3rd Division team, Jean Ffoulke, William Clarke and William Rader all of my team, and two agents. William Rader was temporarily attached to the 45th Division team in connection with a mission for Field Photographic Branch. Through personal observation, and contact with the unusually well organized WFI of the Jura, the mission was able to ascertain and relay to Hq, 7th Army the fact that the entire department of the Jura was free of Germans save for one small garrison and we were also able to check and report upon the roads being used by the Germans in their retreat from the Lyon area. This information was stated by G-2, 7th Army as being of the greatest value, and was the basis for very extensive advances of the 3rd Division.

When the 45th reached the Moselle river, operations were attempted involving the use of W/t equipment, which prior to that time had not been available in a form permitting its use by other than trained radio operators. A certain measure of success was achieved, although the tightness of the German control in the area back of their lines made movement with this equipment a most difficult and hazardous venture. Nevertheless, tactical information of value was obtained which was used by the 45th Division in the operation of crossing the Moselle river, which, had our advice been followed completely, could have been effected without loss to our forces. This statement is not made lightly, for after an unsuccessful attempt had been made, ignoring our information, a second attempt succeeded, which was made in accordance with our suggestions, based upon intelligence obtained by our agents.

Shortly after setting up our Hq at Epinal, I requested permission of Colonel Gamble to return to the United States in accordance with an arrangement made with Mr. Hyde. This request was made in view of certain urgent personal matters which demanded my presence in the U.S. for a considerable period, and was agreed to by Colonel Gamble in the light of the length of my service overseas. I remained a short time at 7th Army Hq and left France for Washington via Cassette on October 12, arriving in Washington on October 21, 1944.

I cannot too strongly emphasize that the men who were associated with me while I was in charge of the 45th Division team were unwavering in their loyalty, devotion, courage and willingness to sacrifice themselves for our objectives. In particular, Lt. (then 2nd Lt.) William Duff, who was my chief assistant, distinguished himself at all times by his unusual courage,

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brilliance and devotion to duty, both in operations and the handling of intelligence. It is safe to say that he contributed a very large share in such success as the team may have achieved. Lt. (then Sgt.) Peter Hoguet, PFC William Clarke, Private Jean Froulke, and for the short time that he was with me, Lt (Jg). (then Knzign) John Garnett, all contributed greatly to the team and to its work. In addition Sgt. Belts and Cpl. Bennevelii of the Communications Branch, attached to the team, performed their duties faithfully and well and frequently volunteered for additional duties often of a hazardous nature. In my opinion Lts. Duff and Hoguet very definitely merit suitable decorations for their work with this team. The splendid work of our French Agent personnel, without whom little could have been accomplished, is the subject of a separate memorandum which is being prepared by Lt. Duff and myself.

#### 4. CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD THAT MIGHT BE IMPROVED

These were manifold, the majority springing from the fact that we were a new organization starting from scratch. Many of them have been corrected with the passage of time or have ceased to have importance. Possibly the following suggestions have some value for World War III. Much has been said about the difficulties which were encountered by French SI in Algiers through administrative red tape and non-cooperation by the Services organization. I cannot account for this upon any other basis than lack of understanding of the nature and importance of the work that was being done. Not until after the receipt of repeated evidence of the value attached by AFHQ and G-2, 7th Army to the fruits of our work, was any real attempt at cooperation made by Services, and then only upon orders which had to be repeated and insisted upon by the G-2. To the end, however, we were regarded as a group of "temperamental civilian screwballs". I believe that if the services personnel had been more carefully selected and had been given a clearer idea of what we were doing and of what techniques had to be employed, many of these difficulties would have been eliminated.

Another trouble was Branch jealousy and "empire building" leading to unnecessary red tape and disputes over administrative detail of no real importance. Although much was accomplished it is tragic to consider how much more might have been done had not a major fraction of our time and energy been spent combatting the people who were supposed to help us. I have even been forced to cancel operations because some detail of procedure could not be complied with by a set time limit. For an operation to be planned

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and executed it was necessary to secure the cooperation of at least four branches which in the administrative structure had equal authority with our own and which could not be forced to comply with our requests and needs except by order of the CO. That it was necessary to obtain such orders frequently is an indication of the struggle involved in doing this work. It is my opinion that SI operations of this type in the future would be greatly simplified if they could be conducted by a small self-contained unit having at its disposal all the facilities required. In this manner, once approval of the mission and the operation necessary for its accomplishment has been secured from the Branch Chief and the CO, the personnel charged with execution might proceed unhampered to its conclusion. It is safe to say that with such an organization at our disposal we could have accomplished at least 100 per cent more than we did.

## 5. SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES OF WHICH I PERSONALLY BECAME AWARE

If, as I assume, the above heading refers to the treatment which I personally received from the organization, I may say that I have always been treated with great consideration with the exception of certain matters relating to the handling of my salary, which were most unsatisfactory. The good treatment which I received, however, was not matched by that accorded many other persons who came to my attention from time to time. I have in mind more particularly the way in which the records of naval personnel have been handled so that upon their return to this country nothing is found in their files to indicate what they have done, thus interfering with their chances of promotion. There are many good officers who feel that they have had bad treatment, which is an unfortunate thing for the organization as a whole in addition to being unfair to the men themselves.

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