

GL

11/3/45
Glassmeyer, Pvt. S/Sgt.

14 September 1945

Mr. Allan Dulles
OSS Mission for Germany
APO 655
c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Dear Allant

I attach statement concerning Pvt. Edward Glassmeyer who is assigned to your office as part of the Secretariat under Colonel O'Malley. This statement was prepared by Hlyth & Co., who are very anxious to get him back for the purposes mentioned. I believe there are procedures under which enlisted men may be discharged if the war they do will assist in reconversion. I do not know that this is a proper case for application of this policy, but present it to you for review.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Chester
Acting Director

11,510

September 5, 1945.

Private Edward H. Sawyer
Serial Number 3184
OSS Mission to Germany
APO 654, 5th Street, New York, N.Y.

Born September 14, 1915.
Married December 1938
Children (2) Daughter, Marion, born October 23, 1939
Son, Edward born September 17, 1941.
(A third child is expected early next year.)

Employed by Elyse & Co., Inc. on August 1, 1936, which was
his first position after graduating from Princeton.
When he left Elyse & Co., Inc. was \$600 per month.
He was part of the New York office Buying Department, and as such
one of our most valuable men. Was drafted into the Army between
April 1, and May 1, 1943. (Is at present in Wiesbaden, Germany as
part of the OSS Mission to Germany.)

In a number of our Buying Department one important position he would
be that of assistant in the training of discharged veterans
entering the investment banking business.

*Secretary - District Office
under O'Malley in
Germany*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Lt. Harlow
FROM Secretariat
SUBJECT Attached correspondence

DATE: 29 August 1945

It occurs to me that you might want to have a look at this correspondence and include Mr. Gladstone's name in your files. Although we don't know anything about him, he seems to be thinking along the right lines.

[Handwritten signature]

T/4 Howard S. Cady

16708

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Bernard Gladstone,
343 Lexington Ave.
New York City.


July 31, 1945.

My dear Major:

Undoubtedly all the press clippings of importance are being submitted to you regularly, yet the enclosed from the New York Times may have escaped your attention. Since it is a very interesting criticism the thought occurred to me to draw your special attention to same.

I avail myself of this opportunity to refer to my letters dated April 30, and July 2, receipt of which had been acknowledged in your absence, hoping to be of more intrinsic service to your organization at some future date.

Sincerely yours,



ENC.

The OSS Gets It Coming and Going

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, July 30—The Office of Strategic Services, headed by Major General Donovan, rarely gets into the news because its work is necessarily secret. Its management has never had a press conference, so that only by relay and hearsay are any of its activities known or suspected. When, if ever, General Donovan, one of his principal aides or one of his daring field workers, can tell even a part of the OSS record without profit to a present or future enemy, a thrilling and effective story will be unfolded of scientific intelligence service in modern war.

Twice recently, however, the OSS got into the news, through no wish of its own. Along with the Army it was criticized by a House subcommittee for employing at least four persons whose backgrounds "reflected communism." Then a list was published of what were termed its "dominant key men" and these were from the other side of the tracks—Wall Street bankers or executives of big industries in their pro-war capacities. Previously there have been charges that "Fascists" have found a welcome on the rolls of the OSS. "Too many professors" have also been attributed to the Donovan office. And ever since the agency began to grow to its present large proportions, Washington jeeringly has spelled out its initials to mean "Oh So Social" because of the number of members of old and established American families (including the wives and devoted female assistants) who have gone to work there.

A government organization must obviously be thoughtfully and brilliantly recruited if most of those organizations are well-founded, or it must be a mere political catch-all and therefore inefficient and discredited by time-servers. Yet, except for the charges that "Fascists" have been employed in the work of the OSS and that men from big business and finance have "dominated" it, all the criticisms have foundation. And, as the opinion of this correspondent is that in one respect only, if the story of the OSS can ever be told, it will be revealed as having played an essential and even indispensible part in the winning of World War II.

The Key Men

General Donovan has publicly defended four of the Army officers in the list who were criticized by the subcommittee for having "Communist backgrounds," and has revealed that, with daring and valuable service in combat and with the addition of assignments in Europe. Much has been said about the loyalty and indiscretions in that work with these pre-war activities, he has not in public opinion whether they could have done more for the war effort. The fact that they were able to do so with such success in the United States, while the rest of the world will be how well they performed their duties. He has also revealed that the number of "key men" is "very small."

Among the "dominant key men" of the type who have been listed are Charles Clegg, Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Arthur H. Clegg, Lt. Gen. John A. Harbo, and others.

That can be said about the bankers and industrialists is that such were their pre-war activities, he has left public opinion whether these connections should damn them and the agency. The fact that they were bankers and big business men will be sufficient to do so with some groups in the United States, while the test of others will be how well they performed their duties. So far as this correspondent can learn, the answer is "Very well indeed."

Among the "dominant key men" of this type who have been listed are Charles Chesebrough, Col. David H. B. Bruce, Alfred du Pont, F. Lamont Bell, Atherton Richards, Lieut. Col. Alma M. Scaife, Whitney H. Shepherdson, Col. Edward Burton, Allen Bullen and the two sons of the late J. P. Morgan—Capt. Junior and Comdr. Henry J., USNR. It is quite true that all these came from the ranks stated. But to get a personnel balance of the OSS it is necessary to give another list of "key men."

When General Donovan began his work—it was then as Coordinator of Information—the need was for expert research into historical, geographical, political and ethnical problems for the benefit of American military and naval commanders. Therefore the OSS was originally manned by distinguished and practical scholars. Among these were—and many still remain in the agency—James P. Baxter, president of Williams College; Prof. William Langer; Edward S. Mason, Gerold T. Robinson, Bernadotte E. Schmidt, Charles F. Remer, Walter Dorn, John Albert Williams, Conyers Read, Joseph R. Hayden, Carvin E. Ruess, William M. McIlwain, Ephraim A. Sipkins and Lawrence Martin. Students of modern history will recognize in them names the highest talent in that field.

The Joint Chiefs Take Over

As the war horizon broadened, the OSS branched with it into a secret intelligence service for the President, and during young officers from the Army and Navy were sent on errands from which some of them did not return but all of which contributed to the victory that was achieved and the one to come. At this point the agency was taken over as a military arm by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a clear tribute to its war-winning value.

In the Washington and field headquarters other "dominant key men" operated—Army and Navy officers, journalists, etc., with no big financial or technical connections. Typical of these are Brig. Gen. John T. Magruder, Deputy Administrator, who has been Chief of Army Intelligence; Comdr. Edward L. Taylor, who wrote "The Strategy of Ticker"; Comdr. John Ford, chief of the invaluable photographic division, who was wounded in service; John F. Whitaker; and Capt. Jack Dwyer, skipper of the Phoenix. Diplomats like John Wiley and Hugh Wilson, in detached service, round out the list. It shows the OSS to be a remarkable body balanced and representative group, its personnel tallying to General Donovan's aim to a successful office of the many talents required.

form
point
was
recc
cour
trial
For
N
Er
Act
To
T
put
of
mai
dou
see
mei
Div
Inf
rial
sig
see
of
res
ow
wei
ren
All
men
the
ma
day
re)
I
All
ship
own
low
as
/err
real
the
ows
be
sup
a
all
U
and
plus
now
add
Add
ing
in
the
A
that
free
part
by
the
men
in
for
see
this
div
It
is
of
see
ing
see

Gladstone, Bern

J. L. L.

22 May 1945

Mr. Bernard Gladstone
323 Lexington Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Gladstone:

I should like to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 30 April to General Donovan, who is presently out of the country. It will be brought to his attention on his return.

Sincerely,

Robert Thrun
Assistant Executive
Officer

323 Lexington Ave ^{16.70} gladstone
 New York City,
 April 30 - 1945.

Mr. N. P. ...:

May I draw your
 personal attention to the
 article by Demaree Bess,
 entitled "How will we
 govern our slice of Germany",
 published in the Saturday
 Evening Post, April 14.
 It explains the
 present situation in a
 nutshell, and I believe

... the various
... will find
... into the
... facilitating
... which
... cow-
...

... can be of any
... -
... views
... -
... know.

Yours sincerely,
J. Edgar Hoover

28 FEB 1964

TO: [Illegible]

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

RE: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

6. [Illegible]

7. [Illegible]

8. [Illegible]

9. [Illegible]

10. [Illegible]

11. [Illegible]

12. [Illegible]

13. [Illegible]

14. [Illegible]

15. [Illegible]

16. [Illegible]

17. [Illegible]

18. [Illegible]

19. [Illegible]

20. [Illegible]

21. [Illegible]

22. [Illegible]

23. [Illegible]

24. [Illegible]

25. [Illegible]

26. [Illegible]

27. [Illegible]

28. [Illegible]

29. [Illegible]

30. [Illegible]

31. [Illegible]

32. [Illegible]

33. [Illegible]

34. [Illegible]

35. [Illegible]

36. [Illegible]

37. [Illegible]

38. [Illegible]

39. [Illegible]

40. [Illegible]

41. [Illegible]

42. [Illegible]

43. [Illegible]

44. [Illegible]

45. [Illegible]

46. [Illegible]

47. [Illegible]

48. [Illegible]

49. [Illegible]

50. [Illegible]

51. [Illegible]

52. [Illegible]

53. [Illegible]

54. [Illegible]

55. [Illegible]

56. [Illegible]

57. [Illegible]

58. [Illegible]

59. [Illegible]

60. [Illegible]

61. [Illegible]

62. [Illegible]

63. [Illegible]

64. [Illegible]

65. [Illegible]

66. [Illegible]

67. [Illegible]

68. [Illegible]

69. [Illegible]

70. [Illegible]

71. [Illegible]

72. [Illegible]

73. [Illegible]

74. [Illegible]

75. [Illegible]

76. [Illegible]

77. [Illegible]

78. [Illegible]

79. [Illegible]

80. [Illegible]

81. [Illegible]

82. [Illegible]

83. [Illegible]

84. [Illegible]

85. [Illegible]

86. [Illegible]

87. [Illegible]

88. [Illegible]

89. [Illegible]

90. [Illegible]

91. [Illegible]

92. [Illegible]

93. [Illegible]

94. [Illegible]

95. [Illegible]

96. [Illegible]

97. [Illegible]

98. [Illegible]

99. [Illegible]

100. [Illegible]

643

16 March 1945

Mr. Bernard Gladstone
 323 Lexington Avenue
 New York, New York

Dear Mr. Gladstone:

I have read your letter of 10 February and would like to thank you for your comments with respect to the article in the HERALD TRIBUNE. Since the matter is only in the proposal stage, it is of course impossible to forecast at this time whether a post-war intelligence agency will be established, or, if it is established, what its functions will be and who will be responsible for directing its activities.

I note from your letter that you have had considerable experience in Western Europe and that you have recently been repatriated. I am asking Mr. Irving Sorenson of this agency to make an appointment to talk further with you in the belief that you might be able to give him some information of immediate value to the war effort. I trust that you will find it convenient to see him.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
 Director

cc: Mr. John Hughes

AWH:mf

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Sulloway
FROM : W. H. Shepardson
SUBJECT: Attached correspondence from Bernard Gladstone

SECRETARIAT
DATE: 15 March 1945
2/12 2.
1945 MAR 16 PM 12 15

OSS

In line with our telephone conversation, I attach two paragraphs of a letter which might be substituted for the second paragraph of the yellow copy.

Will you, at the same time, notify Mr. Hughes of this, so that he can inform Irving Sherman.

WHS
W. H. S.

I note from your letter that you have had considerable experience in Western Europe, and that you have recently been repatriated.

I am asking Mr. Irving Sherman of this agency to make an appointment to talk further with you in the thought that you might be able to give him some information of immediate value to the war effort. I trust that you will find it convenient to see him.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : [illegible]
FROM : [illegible]
SUBJECT : [illegible]

DATE: 13 March 45

[illegible] copy of a letter to Mr. Bernard
[illegible] to General Donovan last February com-
[illegible] for a post-war intelligence agency.
General Donovan has signed the attached letter, but
[illegible] it as he asked me to talk with
[illegible]. He stated that he thought the suggestion was
[illegible] but it would be better to send a skilled intelli-
[illegible] to interview Mr. Macstone rather than a repre-
[illegible].

After you have had an opportunity to look at the
[illegible] would you please agree to your comments if you
[illegible] of [illegible] to call me.

Alvin W. Dulles
Alvin W. Dulles
Assistant Chief
Secretariat

To: General Donovan

Attached for your approval and signature is a proposed letter to Mr. Bernard Gladstone who wrote to you last month commenting on the proposal for a post-war intelligence agency.

At your request Mr. Olders in PFB has considered whether there is some possibility that a person of Mr. Gladstone's qualifications could be used in this agency at the present time. I have discussed the matter with Major Brown of PFB and since we have very little information on Mr. Gladstone other than that contained in his letter to you he has planned to have a representative call on Mr. Gladstone in New York.

E. J. Salloway
I thought the cover-up was good but it is better if we had a thorough background check.

SECRETARIAT - ROUTE 54
ATTN

NAME	INITIAL
Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

has etc

H Putyalo

1. Seams derivable
to acknowledge
2. Send this back
to antell, Mr.

40
119

Am I sure

↑ I need you
were into this
J.

Handled

17 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. O'Gara
FROM: C. S. Williams
SUBJECT: Bernard Gladstone

1. Security reported that this man returned on the Gripsholm on March 1, 1944 and I have been holding the case for further information. They reported last night that he was 63 years old and that nothing derogatory was known about him.

2. In view of his age and race, I do not recommend that we follow him up as a possible prospect for OSS. It should be noted that his letter only indirectly intimates that he might be interested in a job. I suggest, therefore, that this letter be given the same treatment that is accorded to other communications with General Donovan on the alleged plan for a post war intelligence organization.

Correct

Intuition

C.S.W.

not substantiated
General Donovan
in 63 to.

Suggest you require these communications and reach them your desk.
(5) C

I have asked Ned Putzfeld to acknowledge
(4) SI might be interested for later

44

17 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. O'Carra
FROM: C. S. Williams
SUBJECT: Bernard Gladstone

1. Security reported that this man returned on the Gripsholm on March 1, 1944 and I have been holding the case for further information. They reported last night that he was 85 years old and that nothing derogatory was known about him.

2. In view of his age and race, I do not recommend that we follow him up as a possible prospect for OSS. It should be noted that his letter only indirectly intimates that he might be interested in a job. I suggest, therefore, that this letter be given the same treatment that is accorded to other communications with General Donovan on the alleged plan for a post war intelligence organization.

C.S.W.

Enc.

New York City.

February 10, 1945.

*Richard W. ...
First War*

Major General William J. Donovan,
Director of the Office of Strategic Services,
Washington D.C.

Dear General:


Of all the proposed post-war activities to enforce a lasting peace your plan as described in this morning's New York Herald Tribune denotes unquestionably the most effective one.

Born and educated in Germany, having served in France with the A.E.F. during the last war, I had subsequently represented American business interests in Europe, and was expelled from Germany as foreign economic spy when Hitler came in. I have recently repatriated from Belgian and German internment camps.

Intimately acquainted with European pre-war conditions I have often wondered that diplomatic agents and military attachés did not succeed in curbing dangerous political movements. To be sure, not only Germany but a number of other countries as well have always exhibited influential and aggressive war-promoting parties whose propaganda poisoned the atmosphere. Indeed a centralized clearinghouse for just such information is a long felt want. I feel that the people of the United States at large should be more enlightened about your plan to combat unjustified partisan political criticism that tries to block a sincere and constructive effort to promote peace.

Very truly yours,

Richard W. ...



Gliders 13, 132
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SECRET

TO: Mr. Cheston
FROM: General Donovan
SUBJECT: Gliders for CAS Use

DATE: 5 May 1944

I have read these papers. It seems to me that Heppner is asking us to do a lot based on one maneuver.

WJD

Tracy
Noted
CSC
SECRET

24 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HARRMAN

SUBJECT: Gliders for OSS Use

There is submitted for your views memorandum from Colonel Quinn to Mr. Cheston on the above matter.

If the use of gliders for OSS work is deemed to be practicable, it will be easier to train glider pilots to be OSS's than the other way around. However, before this is done, we need some evidence that we shall be able to procure gliders and tow planes. These are available only if given to us by the theater commander out of the number allotted to him. What are the prospects in the theater of having gliders and tow planes allotted for OSS use?

G. Edward Huxton
Acting Director

HT:MB

SECRET

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

21 April 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Charles Cheston

FROM: Lt. Col. Robert S. Quinn

SUBJECT: Gliders for Sustained Efforts Involving Large Quantities of Equipment and Large Numbers of Personnel

Reference: Memorandum to Col. Burton, 17 Jan. 1944;
Memorandum to Lt. Bane, 1 Feb. 1944 -
copies attached.

Reference Cable #623 from Heppner to Donovan for Burton,
13 April 1944:

The amount of material and personnel transported by gliders behind enemy lines by Colonel Cochrane's project presents a very impressive record and should in no way be discredited; however, if the operation were looked into, it would be found that the operation involved equipment and services to transport this amount of material and personnel, more than is at OSS's disposal in all the various theaters of operations combined.

It has never been disputed that gliders do not have a place in operations where large scale and sustained operations are involved, and I repeat large scale and sustained operations. An interpretation of the Cochrane maneuver is included separately. It is, however, the opinion of the writer that for OSS activities, where normally large numbers of personnel and large quantities of equipment are not involved, glider use is not the best solution to our problems in most cases.

It also must be again pointed out that gliders for OSS use must come from the Theater Commander the same as aircraft. OSS cannot buy, ship, operate, and maintain a separate or independent air organization in a theater where the Theater Commander is responsible for the overall conduct of the war effort. The Theater Commander rightly would not approve such a venture nor does OSS have or is likely to get the qualified personnel necessary to operate and maintain a separate air effort.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

Regarding glider pilot training of Lt. Dabney, it is suggested that glider pilots already trained could be procured and sent there to assist in any glider effort that OSS might undertake with gliders and tow planes furnished or made available by the Theater Commander. The necessary time involved to give glider training to OG's is hardly economical. Why spend months training personnel in a specialty line which they might use once or very rarely, when it would be much simpler to procure trained glider pilots and train them to fit into OG's.

Robert Quinn
ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Col., A. C.

Attachments

SECRET

SECRET

Personal Estimate of Heppner's report that 1200 mules, 9000 men, and engineering equipment and building materials were transported far behind the Japanese lines in merely 3 nights - repeat, merely 3 nights.

To figure out the bare minimum number of gliders and tugs required to accomplish this task in 3 nights:

1200 mules @ 5 mules per glider (very heavy loading)	=	240	glider sorties
9000 men @ 15 men per glider (very heavy loading)	=	600	" "
Engineering equipment and building materials (barest minimum)	=	100	" "
Total minimum number of sorties		940	

$\frac{240 \text{ glider sorties}}{3 \text{ nights of operation}} = 310 \text{ glider sorties per night}$

$\frac{310 \text{ glider sorties per night}}{\text{maximum of } 3 \text{ sorties per glider per night}} = 100 \text{ gliders required}$

$\frac{100 \text{ gliders operating each night}}{2 \text{ gliders per tug}} = 50 \text{ tow airplanes (C-47)}$

Figuring minimum of 20% spares of gliders and tow airplanes, 120 C47A gliders would be needed and 60 C-47 tow aircraft.

It is doubtful if Cochran's project has that number of gliders and tow airplanes available, which leads me to the conclusion that the initial landing was made at night (in strength) and all the above listed supplies and equipment were flown in during the next 72 hours. The daylight operations were afforded aerial cover in all probability by the 3 fighter squadrons with the project.

SECRET

SECRET

001 0000 0000

Col. Dutton

You will recall that Col. Dutton had sent to you a special report on gliders, particularly with respect to an experimental prototype carried out by Capt. James Haggren. You will remember that he was enthusiastic about the possibility of using gliders for the purpose of...

The report by Capt. James Haggren, which was submitted to you, is attached to this memorandum. It contains a detailed description of the experimental work...

Since the report is so interesting, you may wish to refer to it in your report to the Board for the purpose of...

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

1 February 1944

TO : Lt. C. A. Sane

FROM : Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn

SUBJECT: Comments on Captain Joost's Report on Gliders

The following comments on report from Captain Joost are offered to supplement previous comments regarding glider landing of agents vs. parachute dropping of agents.

1. Captain Joost reports that on the night of the maneuver involving 20 gliders, the occasion was blessed with a full moon. Operation and maneuver involving the use of gliders are based upon good night visibility during the moon period and was not pure happenstance as inferred by Captain Joost.

2. The elapse time for the landing of 16 of the 20 dispatched gliders, plus the interval in which 10 of these 16 landed gliders were retrieved, presents aerial activity over a small area for a $4\frac{1}{2}$ hour period. If secrecy is of importance in this maneuver, continuous aerial activity over a $4\frac{1}{2}$ hour period is certainly inviting enemy attention. Of the 8 gliders remaining on the field, no mention was made as to why they were not snatched out of the field.

3. It is admitted and understood that as straight troop carriers and supply ships, gliders have a definite part in all ground operations. However, for normal OSS activity it is thought that parachute landings will offer as many personnel delivered per spot with a larger percentage of secrecy than can be secured by use of gliders.

4. Parachute troops or agents can be successfully dropped into areas where it is not feasible for gliders to attempt landings.

5. Parachute troops can be dropped during the moon period when lighting conditions are not feasible or profitable for glider operations.

6. Where the landing of bulky equipment which cannot be dropped by parachute is involved, a glider should be used. However, OSS

SECRET

SECRET

agents generally are not hampered with bulky equipment which cannot be dropped by parachute.

Captain Jost's report on the damaging of gliders while landing, with everybody stepping out calmly for a cigarette, is certainly dressed up for reader consumption. Glider landings at night during the Camp Mackall maneuvers resulted, on numerous occasions, in the need for doctor's service to attend members of the combat crews in gliders injured from normal rough landing accidents.

Captain Jost's experience in a glider tow, including cargo of 100-octane gasoline, depth charges, and explosives, indicates thorough unfamiliarity with night glider operation or complete unconcern for personal safety. If the latter is the case, he is to be highly commended.

Robert S. Quinn
ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Col., A. C.

SECRET

SECRET

TO: Colonel G. Edward Duxton 17 January 1944

FROM: Lt. Colonel Robert S. Quinn

SUBJECT: Glider Substitution for Parachute Drops for Landing Groups and Agents in Enemy Countries

The following reactions to statements made in cable from Tokyo, New Delhi, 14 January 1944, are offered for consideration:

The use of parachutes is certainly more economical and no more hazardous than night glider landings. The average cost per parachute is approximately \$500 each. The CG-4A glider, standard Air Force personnel and equipment glider, lists at \$35,000 each without spare parts. Smaller and less expensive gliders can be prepared. However, the unit cost per man per glider is out of proportion to the equipment cost per agent or parachute. Smaller glider cost per man carrying capacity is about the same as for the CG-4A of \$8,500 per man.

Disadvantages to glider use (successful landing):

1. Concealment of gliders as against parachutes after landing.
2. Retrieving of glider highly improbable as borne out by Airborne Command experience.
3. Glider pilot and co-pilot are obvious baggage on hands of CG's or agents unless especially trained for CG work in addition to glider work.
4. Feasibility of towing airplane and glider at low speeds of 100-120 miles per hour.
5. Loss of secrecy, or tipping off of mission intent, if airplanes and glider are spotted by ground observers. Parachutes can be dropped from tactical airplanes in conjunction with diversionary mission, allowing agents or groups to be dropped unseen to the camp if airplane is spotted by ground observers and jump not critically observed.

SECRET

SECRET

6. Extreme vulnerability of gliders and crew during landing and for some period thereafter if observed by enemy. If attacked immediately following landing, entire party is likely to be wiped out or captured and the mission a failure (carrying all your eggs in one basket).
7. Parachutists, if seen or attacked at night, a fair percentage will probably escape and can carry out the mission.
8. Parachutists can be dropped under night conditions where glider operation is not feasible.
9. In the event of an unsuccessful night glider landing attempt, possibility of injury and incapacitating of the entire party, including the excess baggage of pilot and co-pilot, is very high. Airborne Command figures, while not available, will show a large percentage of night glider landing attempts, under the most favorable conditions, not successful as compared to parachute landing.
10. Parachutists can land on terrain at night where it would be foolhardy to attempt a glider landing.
11. Airborne Command in their night glider landings depend upon ideal night conditions of full moon, good visibility, and rely upon pathfinder groups or friendly natives to designate fields and wind directions by lights to assist gliders.

Colonel Carter has been contacted and his reaction to the proposed switch to glider as against parachute was as shown above. The undersigned is greatly interested in seeing the conclusive evidence that gliders can land with safety at night and be sustained into the air again.

ROBERT S. QUINN
Lt. Col., A. C.

SECRET

OSI FORM 4001a

SECRET

Date: 15 Feb 1944

To: Col. Burton

The attached memorandum from Col. Heppner encloses a report on certain glider maneuvers conducted by the British in India.

A second copy of the report is being circulated (using Mr. Serizner, Col. Carter, and Lt. Col. Quinn) in view of their interest in glider operations and the report prepared by Col. Quinn for Col. Heppner on this subject. Show Col. Quinn was prepared and sent to Col. Heppner a memorandum on glider operations, and are asking him whether this document calls for further development of his previous report.



CAR
C. A. R.
The Secretary

SECRET

SECRETREPORT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. DONOVANWITH THE 5318th

January 13, 1944

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL WA. J. DONOVAN

FROM: CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. DONOVAN

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a report made to me by Captain Joseph J. Donovan. This report covers recent maneuvers of General King's forces and particularly the part played by the 5318th Central Air Group under Colonel Cochran.

2. From the briefing Captain Joost and reading his report it is concluded that the days for parachuting agents and equipment in this theater are drawing to a close. The possibilities of gliders are treated as. Their great virtue is their ability to land at the intended spot without injury to personnel or equipment even when the glider itself is wrecked. The fact that the glider itself is wrecked and its cargo can be snatched into the air is a great factor for secrecy and security of personnel.

3. As you know, a cleared spot is necessary for parachute landings. Such a spot is adequate for landing a glider. In the past few instances of agents being dropped with equipment so damaged that it was useless have been all too numerous. Glider landings would assure that the agents or parties will have means of communication with our bases once they have landed.

4. In addition, the possibilities for carrying out hit and run sabotage and demolition jobs by glider are numerous. A reading of Joost's report will show that this method has gone beyond theories and possibilities and is now practical reality.

5. I suggest: (a) that experiments with gliders be inaugurated in the States
 (b) that glider pilots be recruited
 (c) that our experts go into the question of gliders now in existence with a view toward making modifications and changes in design as our needs necessitate.

DJD/om

RJA

MEMORANDUM**SECRET**

January 14, 1944

TO: Lt. Colonel R. P. MEYNER

FROM: CAPTAIN S. B. JOOST

SUBJECT: Manoeuvres with the 5318th Provisional Air Unit

On the 5th of January 1944 at 0830 I accompanied Lt. Colonel Gaty in a C-42 south from New Delhi to attend manoeuvres conducted by a conglomeration of troops, including Ghatkas, West Africans, a battalion of the "Black Watch" and the 530th Tank Force. The part to be played by the 5318th Provisional Air Unit, commanded by Colonel F. Cochran, was to demonstrate ideal support of and liaison with ground troops by a composite air unit. The 5318th contains four separate forces as follows: 1-ops for reconnaissance and liaison; P-51s, fighters and bombing; C-47s, supply dropping, troop carriers and tow ships; and C-52s, troop and supply carrying gliders.

Inasmuch as the functions of the L-5s, P-51s, and the C-47s, except when used as tow ships, need no comment; this report will deal chiefly with the gliders. The ones used in this manoeuvre were 15-man capacity including pilot, co-pilot, or a 4,000 lb. pay load (these limits were exceeded, in several instances, 13 men being carried on one occasion). They are towed from the ground by C-47s fitted with a cable drum and braking device, similar to a fishing reel, or are snatched by the tow ship in flight by means of a snap hook threaded to a pole beneath the tow ship. In the latter case, the tow rope attached to the glider is suspended between two vertical poles, approximately 15' high and 50 yards in front, and is picked up by the snatch hook of the tow plane at about 90 mph. Two gliders may be towed at the same time from the ground, but only one may be snatched. For night pick-ups, white lights are placed on top of the vertical poles, and a large red light is placed on the ground in between the vertical poles approximately 50 yards in front and in line with the glider which serves as a bull's eye on which the tow ship can sight.

As a practical demonstration, a reduced column of about 200 fully equipped men were landed on a strip just seized by friendly troops, disembarked from the gliders ready to take part in the ensuing action. Similarly, it was shown that 3 mules with packtrains or 3 bullocks and 3 drivers could be carried in a glider of this type, by removing the passenger seats, installing a light framework brace and tying the animals to it. On the night of January 10th, with a full moon blessing the occasion, a night landing of twenty gliders loaded with troops and animals was made in a field previously reconed by an L-5. Extensive briefing was carried out with the glider and tow pilots involved, stressing landing instructions and para flying. At 2005 we were towed off the base strip, turned south and headed for the spot 30 miles away. Thanks to the bright moonlight the target was clearly visible from the air and we cut loose at an altitude of 200 feet, a half mile away and glided in noiselessly and darkly to a perfect landing.

Our glider carried flare-pots and a radio set for communication with the other tow ships. The flares were immediately set around the field, outlining the landing ground, and the radio communication set in operation. By 2130, 18 gliders had landed successfully and been parked according to the pre-arranged schedule. Two failed to arrive, having tangled tow ropes at the base strip. They cut loose about 7 miles away. As soon as the remaining 18 gliders had discharged their crews and supplies, unloading operations were begun. By 0100 the following morning 10 gliders

SECRET

had been lifted from the field, and the maneuver was declared over. Actually, considerable delay was experienced in these snatches because of trouble with the lights atop the snatch poles which are always knocked down by the impact of the tow hook on the line. This particular night problem was viewed by Admiral Mountbatten and General Wingate with considerable enthusiasm and definitely termed a "success".

While giving somewhat the sensation of a roller-coaster, a glider snatch is definitely not unpleasant, as shown by the reactions of the natives, bullocks, and West Africans as well as white troops. They apparently can land practically anywhere without serious injury to passengers or crew, even though the ship itself is a complete wreck. Many gruesome stories are told of careening between trees, breaking of the wings at the fuselage and ripping out the whole undercarriage as bullocks and everybody steps out calmly for a cigaret. At any rate, sufficient proof was given at these maneuvers to show that a prepared strip is not necessary to land the glider to avoid injury, as a number of forced landings were made without injury to personnel, even though the ships themselves were battered considerably.

The possibilities of glider use in this theater are enormous. In the first place, they can be used as straight troop carriers. Secondly, they may be used as supply ships where they may be set down with safety and either towed or snatched away. And thirdly, they could be used for night missions behind enemy lines where a group could be landed together for a particular job. It should be borne in mind that there are other types of gliders available—a three-man job and a 40-man type, towed by a B-17. They can land almost anywhere; they can be snatched out; and they can carry a large load.

The air unit in question is rather a picked outfit containing aces, celebrities, and prima donnas. The recent maneuver was the first time they had worked together as a unit, and with some of the rough edges polished off they should prove an extremely valuable adjunct to General Wingate to whom they are committed for the forthcoming campaign. Supply drops in Burma are a necessity. Landing of troops by air saves many weeks of marching and insures the arrival of vigorous combat personnel close to the scene of action. Evacuation of wounded by air is a morale as well as a tactical factor not to be belittled, and finally, the opportunity to set down a trained group of operators behind the Jap lines silently and together to perform special missions is of utmost importance.

Colonel Cochran has indicated his willingness to assist our operations wherever we can and it should be very possible to work out a definite plan whereby the air unit can achieve tactical training in actual operations with us now which should be of extreme value to them later on. They naturally hope to maintain the greatest amount of security regarding their forthcoming plans, and although their arrival in India has now received publicity, they are not at the present time willing to risk having a glider fall into Jap hands. This attitude will change undoubtedly in a short time.

The cost of the glider should be examined, and fully appreciated. The unit is outstanding for a lack of ground discipline; it resembles more an Explorers Club party. There is considerable friction between glider and tow pilots from a number of reasons. The first is the lack of training progress and operations become snafus. Complete cooperation is absolutely necessary in all cases, as well as considerably more practice. Apparently the cost of the gliders is a factor to be considered—\$27,000 for the 15-man type, and their uses should be governed except in emergencies with this in mind.

SECRET

- 3 -

Even with careful use under fairly ideal conditions, a number of gliders are going to crack up due to vagaries of pilots, tow-reefs, and other factors; practice, again, will minimize these accidents in actual operations. Several tow-reefs were broken during the recent manoeuvres through faulty drag-set or poor tow-ship approach, and these are not easily replaced at present. Each glider carries a repair kit for patching up holes and making minor repairs on the spot.

My first glider ride consisted of carrying eight 50 gallon drums of 100 octane gasoline and an assortment of depth charges and explosives. The pilot cut loose too late over the landing spot and suddenly found a number of trees preventing a 180 degree bank. Our air speed at the time was 120 mph and we landed at 90, mashed in and stopped just in time. Except for the cargo being carried, nobody would have given the incident a second thought.

As previously mentioned, Admiral Mountbatten and General Wingate were thoroughly impressed with the performance, and even the other British officers attending were enthusiastic. The manoeuvres ended for the 5318th on January 11, and we returned to base that night in a C-47.

Saj,mat

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

25
January 21, 1944

100-100000
100-100000
100-100000


Colonel E. Edward Burton
Acting Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Burton:

I desire to express the appreciation of the Department of Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Administration and myself for your kindness in loaning us your replica of the President's fifty-foot globe for display in the "Sky-Roads" exhibition. This globe was an outstanding feature of the exhibition and was of deep interest to everyone who viewed it.

I trust that sometime in the future it will be possible for us to reciprocate.

Respectfully yours,



Ben Stern, Director,
Information and Statistics



June 12, 1963
X Commerce Dept of
X Exhibit

December 13, 1943

Mr. Ben Stern, Director
Information and Statistics
Department of Commerce
Civil Aeronautics Administration
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Stern:

I have yours of December 9th confirming our telephone conversation relative to the Fifty-Inch Globe loaned to the Department of Commerce for the Airways to Peace Exhibition.

I take pleasure in confirming the verbal assent given to the use proposed "as the President's globe."

With best wishes for the success of your exhibition, I beg to remain,

Most sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Gifts 100 12,765
x Commerce Dept
x 211.6

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25
December 9, 1943

Colonel E. Edward Burtis
Acting Director, Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Burtis:

This is to confirm our telephone conversation this morn-
ing relative to the President's Fifty-Inch Globe, which was
shown as part of the Airways to France exhibition presented in
New York by the Museum of Modern Art.


That exhibition will open in the Department of Commerce
Auditorium on December 15th, under the auspices of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration.

As the President's globe is being repaired, the Office
of Strategic Services has kindly loaned us its own replica
for exhibit.

To present this in the printed program and elsewhere as
"A replica of the President's Globe," will cause us much de-
lay and thousands of dollars in reprinting programs, placards,
etc.

With your permission, therefore, we shall not call it a
replica, but use the placard prepared for the Museum by Mr.
Edward H. Bodd, Jr., of the OSS.

With expressions of highest esteem,

Cordially,

Sam Stern, Director
Information and Statistics



File 2765
X Commerce Dept of
War

23 October 1945

The Honorable Jesse H. Jones
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to your letter of October 11, 1945, the Office of Strategic Services will be very happy to loan to your Department a globe which it possesses similar to the one belonging to the President.

Our globe is at the present time being used by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, but we expect that it will be returned in time for display in your "Airways to Peace" exhibit.

Would you inform me of the place and the person to whom the globe should be delivered when it becomes available.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

WJD:FRUSON

Globe - 42765

X Commerce
X Exhibit

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brigadier General W. J. Donovan DATE: 19 October 1943

FROM: Secretariat

SUBJECT: Loan of Globe

The globe is presently on loan to the Senate but should be returned on or about the time of the exhibit referred to.

Major Doering feels that since the Secretary of Commerce was to have the President's globe, we should be able to share ours if it will not disrupt things too much. We have cleared the matter with the interested parties and it will not cause too much disruption, although Mr. Barton feels we are going to have to put a stop to this at some point.

It is therefore recommended that you send the attached letter to Mr. Jones.

Robert Thrun



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON

12/16/43
X 2/1/44

OCT 11 1943

*To
Major being
W.S. on your letter*

My dear General Donovan:

The Department of Commerce is planning to place the exhibit "Airways to Peace" on display in the Commerce Auditorium for the month of December. A feature of this exhibit, as displayed in the Museum of Modern Art in New York, is a fifty-inch globe belonging to President Roosevelt, which is in need of repair and will not be ready for use at the time of the exhibition here.

I am informed that the Office of Strategic Services possesses a similar globe, and I would appreciate your advising me as to the possibility of obtaining this for the exhibit.

Sincerely yours,

John J. Jones
Secretary of Commerce

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
27th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

1172

942000 SE

William S. Everett, Jr. (S) 1st Ind.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 20th and E Streets, N.W., Wash-
ington 25, D. C.

WSE/107/618

1 Oct 61

Re: The subject General

1. Approved and forwarded.

2. Upon being relieved from active duty Lieutenant Colonel
R. Everett Blanton, Jr., will remain with the Office of Strategic
Services in the position of Special Assistant to the Director.
In such capacity his duties and responsibilities will be to
assist and advise the Director with respect to the collection
of intelligence information received from outside agencies and
to continue to represent this organization on the Working Staff
of the Joint Intelligence Committee. As Special Assistant
Lieutenant Colonel Blanton's specialized training and ex-
perience in intelligence matters can best be utilized by this
agency if he is in civilian status.

3. In connection with basic request for relief from active
duty, the following information is furnished:

- a. Subject officer is qualified by training and experi-
ence with this organization for specialized duty
assignments of an intelligence nature peculiar to
this organization.
- b. A surplus does not exist in the command jurisdiction
of officers qualified and available to fill any duty
assignment for which the officer concerned is
qualified.
- c. A replacement will not be required due to the fact
that subject officer, upon being relieved from active
duty, will continue with this agency in civilian
capacity.
- d. Colonel Blanton is entitled to separation under
honorable conditions.
- e. No disciplinary action or reclassification pro-
ceedings under 502-510 are pending or appropriate
in this case.
- f. No hospital disposition board or Army retiring
board proceedings are pending or believed to be
appropriate.
- g. Complete and up-to-date copy of officer's quali-
fication card is enclosed (enc. 1).

- 2 -

4. Colonel Gleason has been directed to undergo a terminal type physical examination, the results of which will be forwarded as soon as available.

5. Officer's statement of Leave is inclosed (Incl 2).

6. Subject officer's date of birth: 14 March 1908.

7. Subject officer has completed the military assignments with this agency for which he was originally commissioned and is, therefore, recommended that he be relieved from active duty in order that he might serve this agency more effectively in a civilian capacity.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Maj Gen, USA
Director

2 Incls.
Incl 1. Copy of 3's SS-1
Incl 2. Statement of leave

20 August 1945

W. C. CLEGG, A. Everett, Jr. (S)

SUBJECT: Statement of Leave

TO: The Adjutant General

1. I was returned to active duty as a
Major, AMB, 17 June 1945.

2. During my period of active duty I
have taken _____ days leave of absence.

A. W. CLEGG, Jr.
1st Lt., AMB
Adjutant

MR. [Name], A. Barrett (5)(26)

30 August 1946

SUBJECT: Relief from Active Duty

THROUGH: Director of Strategic Services

TO: The Adjutant General
ATTN: Officer's Branch
Separations Section
Warrenton Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of Section III, 7B Circular 606, 1944, request that I be relieved from active duty in order that I may continue with the Office of Strategic Services in a civilian capacity.

2. Pursuant to paragraph 7, cited reference, the following information is furnished:

a. Office of Strategic Services

b. (1) Collects and analyzes such strategic information as may be required by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Plans and operates such special services as may be directed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Special Assistant to the Director. In this capacity I will be responsible for coordinating intelligence information received from other agencies and for representing the Office of Strategic Services on the J-5 Staff of the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), a position which can now best be performed by me in a civilian capacity.

4. On 9 January 1945 I entered on duty as a civilian with the Office of Strategic Services and was subsequently appointed Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, Research and Analysis Branch. On 17 June 1945 I was commissioned in the Army of the United States in the grade of Major and was placed in charge of the US Mission here and assigned to perform in charge of the Current Intelligence Staff. On 1 April 1946 I was detailed to the Office of Strategic Services to continue my work on the staff of the Joint Intelligence Group, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This appointment was made in order to continue the services of a commissioned officer.

- 2 -

3. It is the desire of the Office of Strategic Services that I continue with it in a civilian capacity to which I have agreed.

4. A brief resume of civilian and military background is herewith submitted. Prior to November 1942 I was Associate Professor of European history at Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts. At that time I was granted leave of absence from college in order to accept a position as civilian consultant to the Army Air Force, attached to the Directorate of Warplanes, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. I subsequently resigned from such position and entered on duty with the Office of Strategic Services as noted above. My only military training has consisted of a brief course of instruction for officers stationed on duty in Washington in the summer of 1942. In June - July 1941 I served for a brief period of temporary duty in the European Theater of Operations.

5. It is, therefore, respectfully requested that I be relieved from active duty with the Army of the United States.

S. HERBERT CLARKE, Jr.
Lt. Col., USA
6-120728



CONFIDENTIAL
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

11,721
Gleason, S.E.
✓

29 March 1945

Dear General Donovan,

While I am most grateful for your generous offer to take me along with you next week, I find it impossible at this time to get away.

There are a number of J.I.C. papers, of vital concern to O.S.S., on which I am working. Besides, I feel that this may be the moment to try again on the problem of re-organizing the intelligence set-up.

Perhaps when McGovern gets back, I can turn some of my work over to him, and plan to get over at the time that we start our R & A mission in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

S. E. Gleason

S. E. GLEASON,
Lt. Col., AUS.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Gleason SE. 11,721



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JAG/ed

20 July 1944

AGPO-P 201-Gleason, Sarrell Everett
(14 Jul 44)

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Promotion.

1. Reference is made to letter, your office, 201 Gleason, Sarrell E., Jr., dated 14 July 1944, subject as above, recommending the promotion of Major Sarrell Everett Gleason, O-924782, Army of the United States, to the grade of lieutenant colonel, Army of the United States.

2. The Secretary of War's Personnel Board does not favorably consider the recommendation for the promotion of Major Gleason.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Handwritten Signature]
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Glasson 11,721

JAG/AM

29 July 1944

ASPO-P JAG-Glasson, Sarah Everett
(14 Jul 44)

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Promotion.

1. Reference is made to letter, your office, JAG/Glasson, Sarah E., Jr., dated 14 July 1944, subject as above, recommending the promotion of Major Sarah Everett Glasson, O-921702, Army of the United States, to the grade of lieutenant colonel, Army of the United States.

2. The Secretary of War's Personnel Board does not favorably consider the recommendation for the promotion of Major Glasson.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULIO

**J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.**

CONFIDENTIAL

Gleason - 2.S. 11, 721

When kept in Personnel

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan

DATE: May 26, 1943


FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Application for commission - Everett S. Gleason

Attention: Mr. Cheston

A good many weeks ago an application for a commission for Dr. Everett Gleason, the Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, was drawn up. Nothing seems to have come of this and I am now told that a letter ought to have been sent to General Donovan.

If I remember rightly, I discussed this case with General Donovan and the application met with his approval. In his position as Chief of the Current Intelligence Staff, Dr. Gleason is obliged to deal constantly with high officers of the Army and Navy and as the official in charge of the Situation Room, it is necessary for him to deal with confidential and secret military information. Under these circumstances, it is obviously desirable and necessary that he should be commissioned. I recommend that he be considered for a Majority.



William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

To

Major [unclear]

*This case had to be approved by
the CBS Board and will be presented
to the Service shortly. WLL*


TO:

Forlan - please
copy - with section
... ..
... ..
... ..
... .. 22 May

[Handwritten mark]

FROM:

EXT.



[Illegible typed text, likely a header or address block]

[Illegible typed text, likely a salutation or opening line]

[Illegible typed text, likely the main body of the letter]

[Illegible typed text, likely a closing line or signature]

*Chief 14 May 65
 In case of. Please call 65
 [Illegible handwritten notes]*

9/26/45

SECRET

CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

HERBERT J. GLAVIN, OLC615, Colonel, Infantry, 8877th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services, for exceptionally meritorious service during duty of great responsibility from 14 September 1942 to 1 August 1945. As Strategic Services Officer, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Colonel Glavin was responsible for all Office of Strategic Services activities in the theater, including particularly the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations. Intelligence and sabotage teams organized, trained and directed by him produced results indispensable to the success of Allied military operations in Southern France, North Africa, and adjacent areas of the Balkans. Other teams placed in the field by him for the purpose of and supply of resistance groups in unoccupied territories aided greatly in the eventual freeing of those territories from enemy control. During the period 12 February to 7 May 1945, he was chiefly responsible for the transportation, security, communication and related requirements of Allied Force Headquarters in regard to the capitulation of German Forces in Northern Italy and Southern Austria. He arranged the entry into Switzerland, without incident, of high ranking Allied officers for the purpose of meeting German representatives, and later effected the safe passage of German plenipotentiaries through Swiss land and waters to Allied Force Headquarters in Italy for signing of the agreement ending hostilities in the Mediterranean Theater. Colonel Glavin's consistently intelligent planning, persistent efforts and brilliant performance of duty in the accomplishment of a multitude of vital tasks contributed exceedingly to Allied victory in the Mediterranean and European Theaters. Awarded the United States Military Academy from the United States at large.

APPROVED BY THE JCS SECRETARY

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Joseph S. O'Leary
 Joseph S. O'Leary
 Lt Col, AGC

SECRET

*Checked 14 Aug 45
 in file of Army copy 45
 [Signature]*

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV)
APO 512

20 July 1945

SUBJECT: Colonel E. J. Glavin

TO: Mr. Charles S. Cheston, Deputy Director,
Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

Colonel Glavin is returning to the United States the first week in August, awaiting reassignment by the War Department. He has asked and I have concurred that on his return to the United States, he will be granted his accrued leave of absence. Please have the Headquarters Detachment issue the appropriate orders confirming this verbal authority for leave of absence.

In the event that Colonel Glavin's new assignment is not announced prior to the completion of his leave, he has requested and I concur that he should remain on temporary duty with the New York office, pending the War Department assignment.

William J. Donovan
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Major General
Director

Form 10840

DATE 18 Jan 45

TO: Mr. G. S. Chester
Re: Promotion of Colonel Glavin

1. This, I think, belongs to you.
2. This is a carbon copy - presume no action, except informational.

John E. O'Sara
17

File
By Putzess ✓

FROM: _____

328141 _____ EXT. _____

SECRET

11-6

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 512

1945 JAN 17 12 22
11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Mr. John E. O'Gara, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

Transmitted herewith copy of letter of recommendation for promotion of Colonel EDWARD J. P. GLAVIN to rank of Brigadier General, submitted to the Commanding General, MTOUSA, by the Director.

Gerald R. Murphy
GERALD R. MURPHY
Major, AGD,
Adjutant.

1 Incl.



SECRET

1/19

SECRET

7/17

Gla...

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV)
APO 512

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal.

TO : Mr. John F. O'Gara, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

Transmitted herewith copy of letter of recommendation for promotion of Colonel **HERMAN J. P. SLAVEN** to rank of Brigadier General, submitted to the Commanding General, HQUSSA, by the Director.

GERALD F. MURPHY
Major, ASD,
Adjutant.

1 Encl.

SECRET

SECRET

Glasgow

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.**

201-Glasgow, Edward J. F. (0)

10 January 1948

SUBJECT: Promotion

TO : The Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C.
FROM : Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, AFM 518,
U. S. Army.

1. It is recommended that the officer named below be promoted as indicated:

Colonel Edward J. F. Glasgow, OLSK18, Infantry

Date of last promotion: 1 March 1945

Grade recommended: Brigadier General

2. A position vacancy exists for this recommended promotion in accordance with approved table of allotment for this organization. In this connection, attention is invited to so much of paragraph 1 of first endorsement from the War Department to the Director, Strategic Services, File AG 200.3 (11 Jan 46) FO-2-A, dated 23 January 1946, which reads: "Position vacancies for general officers are included in the number of colonels authorized, therefore, the allotment is reduced by one (1) colonel for each general officer assigned."

3. Colonel Glasgow occupies the position of Strategic Services Officer for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and as such, is finally responsible for all functions of Strategic Services in that theater.

4. (S,reflections attached)

5. There is no superior officer available in this command in the grade for which promotion is recommended who can be assigned to fill this position vacancy.

6. The relative rank of this officer has been considered, and to the best of my knowledge he is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

7. A similar recommendation was presented direct to the Chief of Staff, War Department, by the Director, Office of Strategic Services, and was returned without prejudice with the suggestion that it be submitted through the Theater Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

SECRET

**WILLIAM J. DOWDY
Major General, U.S.A.
Director**

SECRETJustification of Promotion of Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin
to Grade of Brigadier General

As Strategic Services Officer, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Colonel Glavin is in command of all OSS personnel in MTOUSA and CMAPUS. He is responsible for all OSS activities in the Theater, including particularly the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations. Because of the responsibility of these duties and the superior manner in which he has discharged them, it is believed that his promotion to the grade of Brigadier General is warranted.

By experience Colonel Glavin is well qualified for his present post and for the recommended grade. He is an officer of the Regular Army and has been in active service since his graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1927. He has attended the combined course of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and his last post in this country was at Headquarters, Eastern Defense Command and First Army. His present rank in the Regular Army is that of major, dating from 14 June 1944, and his present AYS rank is that of Colonel, dating from 1 March 1948. He was assigned to duty with OSS in September 1948, and shortly thereafter was appointed Strategic Services Officer in command of all activities in the North African Theater. Subsequently, his command was enlarged to include OSS activities throughout the entire Mediterranean Area.

With respect to the following specific duties of the Strategic Services Officer, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, it is believed that the grade of Brigadier General is justified by their importance and responsibility and that it is necessary to their proper discharge.

(1) The planning, organization, and direction of intelligence activities in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, including secret intelligence, counter espionage, research and analysis. OSS agents are the principal American source of secret intelligence available to AFHQ. Intelligence networks in Southern France controlled from both Spain and Algiers have contributed most of the ground intelligence received by this Headquarters and have been the subject of commendation by General Dovers and General Haffner. Other networks, including those in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have provided a continuing flow of intelligence from these areas. Germany itself is now being penetrated by OSS secret intelligence teams from this theater. Counter espionage teams have successfully penetrated the American armies into Southern France and in Italy they have contributed intelligence resulting in the capture of approximately 40 enemy agents and 17 radio sets. Research personnel assisting the 13th AFHQ and the 13th AFHQ in the collection of joint targets have been successful by General Dovers, G-2, AFHQ.

(2) Support and supply of resistance groups working jointly with British Special Operations Executive. OSS has furnished personnel and supplies for resistance activities in Southern France. OSS personnel and supplies sent to guerrilla groups in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have

SECRET

SECRET

not only bolstered resistance against the enemy, but have made possible the evacuation of more than 500 American airmen from Yugoslavia alone. In connection with these activities, it is particularly important that adequate recognition be given to the role played by U. S. Government and that everything possible be done to augment American prestige. These considerations alone would seem to justify Colonel Glavin's promotion.

(2) Coordination of OSS activities with the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and with the American forces in the field. He must in addition maintain a close working relationship with the heads of the British and French counter-parts of OSS in the Theater, with American diplomatic representatives, and with high government officials in Italy and the various Balkan countries.

Subject to the control and direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Colonel Glavin is the principal representative in the Mediterranean Theater of an independent American agency reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his relations with the heads of the British, French, and other Allied forces, he must deal with complete independence and without the support that a subordinate unit commander in the field can normally rely upon from higher echelons. He must to a considerable extent depend upon his personal prestige, and it follows that the recognition accorded to the American effort in this important field of operations and intelligence is wholly dependent upon his standing and position. At the present time Colonel Glavin is subordinated by way of the U. S. and Allied officers with whom he must deal, and as a consequence his effectiveness is unnecessarily penalized. It is believed that the effective prosecution of American interests requires that Colonel Glavin be given a rank commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Major General, U.S.A.
Director

SECRET

Form 52 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE January 1, 1945

REC'D January 2, 1945 6:30 PM

TO PARIS, FRANCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 171

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT *medto*

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

75101. To 100 from 100.

CONFIDENTIAL

Received message from General Lomitzer, Italy, congratulating you on promotion. He stated recommendation for Glavin's decoration delayed because Lomitzer policy provides that recommendations for Legion of Merit not approved until individual has completed, and no longer holds job for which award recommended. You may wish to discuss matter with Lomitzer.

CONFIDENTIAL


FILE COPY

DATE: 1/1/45 TIME: PM

SECRET

INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT



7117
Lawson, 21. 3. 4. 7

1 January 1948

Major General L. L. Lemnitz, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff
Advanced Headquarters
Allied Forces in Italy
APO 777, U. S. Army

Dear General Lemnitz:

Your letter to General Donovan of 16 December 1947 arrived shortly after he left for overseas.

However, he is just about to visit your theater and we have enabled him the substance of your note. He will undoubtedly try to see you, but in case that proves to be impossible, I know that he would want us to thank you for your kind remarks regarding his promotion and for your explanation of the theater rules respecting the award of the Legion of Merit.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Baxter
Acting Director

GEB:rar

7117
Glavin

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APO 771, U.S. Army

16 December 1944.

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General,

I was delighted to hear of your promotion as were many other of your friends in this Theater. It is very gratifying to us all to see your accomplishments at the helm of OSS thus recognized and rewarded — heartfelt congratulations.

Your letter to me regarding suitable recognition for OSS personnel in Italy was received sometime ago and, as you probably know, considerable progress has been made on that project to date. With regard to Colonel Glavin, however, there has been delay which is due entirely to strict enforcement of Theater policy that no recommendations for Legion of Merit awards are approved unless the individual concerned has completed, and is no longer holding, the job for which the award was recommended. Since Glavin still occupies the same position, AFOSMA will not approve the award at this time. I have just been informed by Major Sahling (who received his information from Major Mathews, Colonel Glavin's Acting Executive Officer) that the afore-mentioned policy is entirely responsible for the delay in Glavin's case.

The former Theater policy was based on completed service up to certain phase lines in Italy but that has now been modified as indicated above and the new policy is being strictly followed. I can assure you. In the case of my own headquarters, I have recently had five recommendations for Legion of Merit awards returned for this reason and they too must be held in abeyance until the present assignments of the officers concerned are terminated. I tell you this so that you may understand why no further action is possible in Glavin's case at this time. The foregoing remarks may also explain delays in making awards to other OSS personnel in this Theater.


- 1 -

HOLD FOR WJD

I repeat my best wishes, which were sent to
you by card earlier in the month, for a Very Merry
Christmas and a Happy and Victorious New Year.

Again, my congratulations on the promotion.

Sincerely,



L. L. LEMMINGER,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 312

7 117
MILITARY, C.C.C.S. F

14 December 1944

General Sir Henry Mitchell Wilson
Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater of Operations

My dear General:

In the occasion of your departure for new duties, may I
extend the best wishes of all members of the Office of Strategic
Services in this Theater, for continued success in your new
assignments.

It has been a source of great pleasure and pride for us to
serve with your command. We shall look back with pride on our
association in the Allied efforts and we shall continue to
serve the best interests of the Theater in association with
your successor.

Respectfully yours,

BERNARD J. P. CLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

cc to Lt. General J. T. DeLaney
Maj. General W. J. Donovan

OB

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

WDGAP 210.1 General Officers.

22 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN,
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:


Subject: Promotion of Officers.

Your recommendations for the promotion of the following officers were considered by the Chief of Staff, but their nomination was not submitted to the President. However, these recommendations may be resubmitted by you for reconsideration on future lists:

Brigadier General John Magruder, O-2736, FA,

Colonel David K.E. Bruce, O-900803, AC-Aus,

Colonel Edward J.F. Glavin, O-16815, Inf.


S. G. HENRY
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

Incls.

- Ltr fm O/SS, 31 Aug 44,
to C/S, w/incl.(Bruce)
- Ltr fm O/SS, 1 Sep 44,
to C/S, w/incl.(Glavin)
- Ltr fm O/SS, 27 Oct 44,
to C/S, w/incl.(Magruder)



SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CIA

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

6. [Illegible]

7. [Illegible]

8. [Illegible]

9. [Illegible]

10. [Illegible]

11. [Illegible]

12. [Illegible]

13. [Illegible]

14. [Illegible]

15. [Illegible]

16. [Illegible]

17. [Illegible]

18. [Illegible]

19. [Illegible]

20. [Illegible]

21. [Illegible]

22. [Illegible]

23. [Illegible]

24. [Illegible]

25. [Illegible]

26. [Illegible]

27. [Illegible]

28. [Illegible]

29. [Illegible]

30. [Illegible]

31. [Illegible]

32. [Illegible]

33. [Illegible]

34. [Illegible]

35. [Illegible]

36. [Illegible]

37. [Illegible]

38. [Illegible]

39. [Illegible]

40. [Illegible]

41. [Illegible]

42. [Illegible]

43. [Illegible]

44. [Illegible]

45. [Illegible]

46. [Illegible]

47. [Illegible]

48. [Illegible]

49. [Illegible]

50. [Illegible]

... [Illegible] ...

The officer has been considered, ... [Illegible] ...

... [Illegible] ...

Director of Strategic Services

[Signature]

Acting Director

RESTRICTED

of command of all OSS personnel in the Mediterranean Theater, including those who were assigned to any and all theaters. He is responsible for all OSS activities in the Theater, including particularly the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations. Because of the responsibility of these duties and the superior manner in which he has discharged them, it is believed that his promotion to the grade of Brigadier General is warranted.

By experience Colonel Glavin is well qualified for his present post and for the recommended grade. He is an officer of the Regular Army and has been in active service since his graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1907. He has attended the combined course of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and his last post in this country was at Headquarters, Eastern Defense Command and First Army. His present rank in the Regular Army is that of major, dating from 14 June 1944, and his present AAS rank is that of colonel, dating from 1 March 1945. He was assigned to duty with OSS in September 1943, and shortly thereafter was appointed Strategic Services Officer in command of all activities in the North African Theater. Subsequently, his command was enlarged to include OSS activities throughout the entire Mediterranean Area.

With respect to the following specific duties of the Strategic Services Officer, No. 1, it is believed that the grade of Brigadier General is justified by their importance and responsibility and that it is necessary to their proper discharge.

(1) The planning, organization, and direction of intelligence activities in the North including secret intelligence, counter espionage, research and analysis. OSS agents are the principal American source of secret intelligence available to AFSA. Intelligence networks in Southern France established from both Spain and Africa have furnished most of the ground intelligence received by this Headquarters and have been the subject of commendation by General Hays and General Eichelberger. Other networks, including those in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have provided a very valuable flow of intelligence for these areas. Current intelligence is now being provided by the secret intelligence teams from this Theater. Counter espionage teams have been

SECRET

SECRET

accompanied the American armies into Southern France and in Italy they have contributed information resulting in the capture of approximately 47 enemy agents and 17 radio sets. Research personnel assisting the MAAF and the 15th Air Force in the selection of joint targets have been commended by General Norstad, G-3, MAAF.

(2) Support and supply of resistance groups working jointly with British Special Operations Executive, OSS has furnished personnel and supplies for resistance activities in Southern France. OSS personnel and supplies sent to guerrilla groups in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have not only bolstered resistance against the enemy, but have made possible the evacuation of more than 500 American airmen from Yugoslavia alone. In connection with these activities, it is particularly important that adequate recognition be given to the role played by U. S. Government and that everything possible be done to augment American prestige. These considerations alone would seem to justify Colonel Glavin's promotion.

(3) Coordination of OSS activities with the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander MedTO and with the American Armies in the field. He must in addition maintain a close working relationship with the heads of the British and French counterparts of OSS in the Theater, with American diplomatic representatives, and with high government officials in Italy and the various Balkan countries.

Subject to the control and direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Colonel Glavin is the principal representative in the Mediterranean Theater of an independent American agency reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his relations with the heads of the British, French, and other Allied forces, he must deal with comparative independence and without the support that a subordinate unit commander in the field can normally rely upon from higher echelons. He must to a considerable extent depend upon his personal prestige, and it follows that the recognition accorded to the American effort in this important field of operations and intelligence is similarly dependent upon his standing and position. At the present time Colonel Glavin is out-ranked by many of the U. S. and Allied officers with whom he must deal, and as a consequence his effectiveness is unnecessarily penalized. It is believed that the effective prosecution of American interests requires that Colonel Glavin be given a rank commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.

For and in the absence of the Director of Strategic Services:

Charles S. Cheston
Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

SECRET

OK

HQ / HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
European Theater of Operations

12 September 1944

Dear Sir,

I tried to catch you in Southern France as I wanted to
take you back to London in order that we should pull together all
our thinking. Major Frobisher, who has sat in on the discussion
today, is fully informed on the way we are moving. Shearson
has consented to act as chairman of the planning group here, and
after he gets this started, he will be over to talk with you and
also with your planning board.

The military situation has broken a little too fast for
the original planning and that means some scrambling now. I am
glad to see the strikes that are being made in your area.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter that I have sent to
London.

I hope to be back in about three weeks.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director, OSS

Enclosure

RUA

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

glenn

AIR DISPATCH

FROM: 109

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1944

TO: *SLAVEY, CASH*

NUMBER: IEC 095

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

ERK

DO NOT FILL IN - FOR USE OF MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

109

Secretary, Photo

OUT18332

attach. is correspondence with War Department to date concerning recommendation for your promotion.

I have spoken with Generals Wilson, Devers, and Hooks about it, and suggest that you get busy.

W.J.D.

→ Mrs. O'D-

(File)

INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

COPY**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT
 War Department General Staff
 Personnel Division G-1
 Washington

15 September 1944.

Mr. Charles S. Cheston,
 Acting Director,
 Office of Strategic Services,
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cheston:

Your letter of 1 September 1944, recommending the promotion of Colonel Edwin J. F. Glavin to brigadier general, is being held in my office for consideration by the Chief of Staff when he next submits a general officer promotion list to the President. In view of the possibility that Congress may soon recess, the next list may not be compiled until after the November elections. However, I will see to it that you are informed as soon as any action is taken with respect to Colonel Glavin's advancement.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ S. G. Henry

S. G. HENRY
 Major General
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

SECRET

SECRETOPY

Col Glavin, Edward J. F. (O)

1 September 1944

SUBJECT: Promotion

TO: The Chief of Staff,
War Department General Staff,
Washington, D.C.

ATTENTION: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

1. It is recommended that the officer named below be promoted as indicated:

Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin, 016815, Infantry

Date of last promotion: 1 March 1943

Grade recommended: Brigadier General

2. A position vacancy in the grade of Colonel exists for this recommended promotion in accordance with approved table of allotment for this organization. In this connection, attention is invited to so much of paragraph 1 of first endorsement from the War Department to the Director, Strategic Services, File AD 11012 (11 Jan 44) PO-M-A, dated 25 January 1944, which reads: "Position vacancies for general officers are included in the number of colonels authorized, therefore, the allotment is reduced by one (1) colonel for each general officer assigned."

3. Colonel Glavin occupies the position of Strategic Services Officer for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and as such, is finally responsible for all functions of Strategic Services in that theater.

4. (Justification attached)

5. There is no surplus officer available in this command in the grade for which promotion is recommended who can be assigned to fill this position vacancy.

6. The relative rank of this officer has been considered, and to the best of my knowledge he is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

For and in the absence of the Director of Strategic Services:

CHARLES H. CHERRY, Acting Dir.**SECRET**

COPY

SECRET

Justification of Promotion of Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin
to Grade of Brigadier General

As Strategic Services Officer, MedTO, Colonel Glavin is in command of all OSS personnel in the Mediterranean Theater, totaling some 2,974 officers, enlisted men, and civilians. He is responsible for all OSS activities in the Theater, including particularly the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations. Because of the responsibility of these duties and the superior manner in which he has discharged them, it is believed that his promotion to the grade of Brigadier General is warranted.

By experience Colonel Glavin is well qualified for his present post and for the recommended grade. He is an officer of the Regular Army and has been in active service since his graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1927. He has attended the combined course of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and his last post in this country was at Headquarters, Eastern Defense Command and First Army. His present rank in the Regular Army is that of major, dating from 14 June 1944, and his present AUS rank is that of colonel, dating from 1 March 1943. He was assigned to duty with OSS in September 1942, and shortly thereafter was appointed Strategic Services Officer in command of all activities in the North African theater. Subsequently, his command was enlarged to include OSS activities throughout the entire Mediterranean Area.

With respect to the following specific duties of the Strategic Services Officer, MedTO, it is believed that the grade of Brigadier General is justified by their importance and responsibility and that it is necessary to their proper discharge.

(1) The planning, organization, and direction of intelligence activities in the MedTO including secret intelligence, counter espionage, research and analysis. OSS agents are the principal American source of secret intelligence available to AFHQ. Intelligence networks in Southern France controlled from both Spain and Algiers have contributed most of the ground intelligence received by this Headquarters and have been the subject of commendation by General Devers and General Frederick. Other networks, including those in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have provided a continuing flow of intelligence from these areas. Germany itself is now being penetrated by OSS secret intelligence

SECRET

SECRET

teams from this theater. Counter espionage teams have accompanied the American armies into Southern France and in Italy they have contributed information resulting in the capture of approximately 47 enemy agents and 17 radio sets. Search personnel assisting the MAAF and the 15th Air Force in the selection of joint targets have been commended by General Forstad, G-3, MAAF.

(1) Support and supply of resistance groups working jointly with British Special Operations Executive, OSS has furnished personnel and supplies for resistance activities in Southern France. OSS personnel and supplies sent to guerrilla groups in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have not only bolstered resistance against the enemy, but have made possible the evacuation of more than 500 American airmen from Yugoslavia alone. In connection with these activities, it is particularly important that adequate recognition be given to the role played by the U. S. Government and that everything possible be done to augment American prestige. These considerations alone would seem to justify Colonel Glavin's promotion.

(2) Coordination of OSS activities with the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander MedTO and with the American Armies in the field. He must in addition maintain a close working relationship with the heads of the British and French counterparts of OSS in the Theater, with American diplomatic representatives, and with high government officials in Italy and the various Balkan countries.

Subject to the control and direction of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Colonel Glavin is the principal representative in the Mediterranean Theater of an independent American agency reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his relations with the heads of the British, French, and other allied forces, he must deal with comparative independence and without the support that a subordinate unit commander in the field can normally rely upon his personal prestige, and it follows that the recognition accorded to the American effort in this important field of operations and intelligence is similarly dependent upon his standing and position. At the present time Colonel Glavin is out-ranked by many of the U. S. and Allied officers with whom he operates. It is believed that the effective prosecution of American interests requires that Colonel Glavin be given a rank commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.

Charles M. Cheston
Acting Director

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
WASHINGTON

Johnson, R. J. 7.17

15 September 1944.

Mr. Charles S. Cheston,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cheston:

Your letter of 1 September 1944, recommending the promotion of Colonel Edwin J. F. Glavin to brigadier general, is being held in my office for consideration by the Chief of Staff when he next submits a general officer promotion list to the President. In view of the possibility that Congress may soon recess, the next list may not be compiled until after the November elections. However, I will see to it that you are informed as soon as any action is taken with respect to Colonel Glavin's advancement.

Sincerely yours,

[Handwritten Signature]
S. G. HENRY
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1



COPY to Glavin, Caserta 20 Sept. 44
Via Air Dispatch

201 Glavin, Edward J. F. (O)

1 September 1944

SUBJECT: Promotion

To: The Chief of Staff,
War Department General Staff,
Washington, D.C.

ATTENTION: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

1. It is recommended that the officer named below be promoted as indicated:

Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin, O16815, Infantry

Date of last promotion: 1 March 1943

Grade recommended: Brigadier General

2. A position vacancy in the grade of Colonel exists for this recommended promotion in accordance with approved table of allotment for this organization. In this connection, attention is invited to so much of paragraph 1 of first endorsement from the War Department to the Director, Strategic Services, File AS 100.2 (11 Jun 44) FO-30-A, dated 25 January 1944, which reads: "Position vacancies for general officers are included in the number of colonels authorized, therefore, the allotment is reduced by one (1) colonel for each general officer assigned."

3. Colonel Glavin occupies the position of Strategic Services Officer for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and as such, is finally responsible for all functions of Strategic Services in that Theater.

4. (Justification attached)

5. There is no surplus officer available in this command in the grade for which promotion is recommended who can be assigned to fill this position vacancy.

6. The relative rank of this officer has been considered, and to the best of my knowledge he is the best fitted officer available in this command for the grade and position for which promotion is recommended.

For and in the absence of the Director of Strategic Services:

Copy to Glavin 20 Sept. 44
Via Air Dispatch

CHARLES S. CHRISTON
Acting Director

SECRET

Justification of Promotion of Colonel Edward J. P. Glavin
to Grade of Brigadier General

As Strategic Services Officer, MedTO, Colonel Glavin is in command of all OSS personnel in the Mediterranean Theater, totaling some 2,000 officers, enlisted men, and civilians. He is responsible for all OSS activities in the Theater, including particularly the collection of secret intelligence and the conduct of special operations. Because of the responsibility of these duties and the superior manner in which he has discharged them, it is believed that his promotion to the grade of Brigadier General is warranted.

By experience Colonel Glavin is well qualified for his present post and for the recommended grade. He is an officer of the Regular Army and has been in active service since his graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1927. He has attended the combined course of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and his last post in this country was at Headquarters, Eastern Defense Command and First Army. His present rank in the Regular Army is that of major, dating from 14 June 1946, and his present AEC rank is that of Colonel, dating from 1 March 1943. He was assigned to duty with the Strategic Services Office in command of all activities in the North African Theater. Subsequently, his command was enlarged to include the activities throughout the entire Mediterranean Area.

With respect to the following specific duties of the Strategic Services Officer, MedTO, it is believed that the grade of Brigadier General is justified by their importance and responsibility and that it is necessary to their proper discharge.

- (1) The planning, organization, and direction of intelligence activities in the MedTO including secret intelligence, counter espionage, research and analysis. OSS assets are the principal American source of secret intelligence available to AUSA. Intelligence networks in Southern France are controlled from both Spain and Algeria have contributed most of the ground intelligence received by this Headquarters and have been the subject of commendation by General Doyen and General Anderson. Other networks, including those in Southern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have provided a continuing flow of intelligence from these areas. Germany itself is now being penetrated by OSS secret intelligence assets from this theater. Counter espionage teams have as-

SECRET

Sept. 44

SECRET

-4-

accompanied the American armies into Southern France and in Italy they have contributed information resulting in the capture of approximately 47 enemy agents and 17 radio sets. Research personnel assisting the MAAP and the 15th Air Force in the selection of joint targets have been commended by General Horstad, G-3, MAAP.

(2) Support and supply of resistance groups working jointly with British Special Operations Executive, OSS and Canadian personnel and supplies for resistance activities in Southern France. OS personnel and supplies sent to guerrilla groups in Northern Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia have not only bolstered resistance against the enemy, but have made possible the evacuation of more than 500 American airmen from Yugoslavia alone. In connection with these activities, it is particularly important that adequate recognition be given to the role played by U. S. Government and that everything possible be done to augment American prestige. These considerations alone would seem to justify Colonel Glavin's promotion.

(3) Coordination of OS activities with the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) with the American Armies in the Field. He must in addition maintain a close working relationship with the heads of the British and French counterparts of OS in the Theater, with American diplomatic representatives, and with high government officials in Italy and the various Balkan countries.

Subject to the control and direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Colonel Glavin is the principal representative in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations of an independent American agency reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his relations with the heads of the British, French, and other Allied forces, he must deal with cooperative independence and without the support that a subordinate unit commander in the field can normally rely upon from higher echelons. He must to a considerable extent depend upon his personal prestige, and it follows that the recognition accorded to the American effort in this important field of operations and intelligence is similarly dependent upon his standing and position. At the present time Colonel Glavin is out-ranked by many of the U. S. and Allied officers with whom he must deal, and as a consequence his effectiveness is unnecessarily penalized. It is believed that the effective prosecution of American intelligence requires that Colonel Glavin be given a rank commensurate with his duties and responsibilities.

Charles S. Chester
Acting Director

SECRET

SECRET

9 October 1943

MEMO NDUS FOR Colonel Glavin

You will please see that in Italy OSS will be concerned with intelligence that can be gathered either openly or clandestinely there through our research group and through our intelligence officers of all kinds of information concerning the political, social, religious as well as economic position of the people.

It would be most helpful in all our plans to have what is working in the minds of the Communist and Socialist elements. It would also be advisable to tap all information we can through the church.

We have had made available to us the materials in the intelligence services of the Italians. This has been done at Brindisi, and we have there Winnaker of R&A. This ought to be pressed.

Also, at the suggestion of the Fifth Army Headquarters has taken over certain Italian officers and separate cells of intelligence. I do not know how good this will prove but it should not prevent us from setting up a network of our own in addition to the combat and operational work that is carried on. In other words we must not only have our strategic and operational intelligence but we must develop now our lines of communication for our post war intelligence.

William J. Donovan

SECRET

TO : General Donovan
FROM: Col. Glavin
SUBJECT: Time Schedule

Oct 5, 1948

Par. 1 Confirming discussion October 4th, the following is furnished covering dates in respect to departure of Col. Glavin to North Africa:

- a) Reported for duty September 4th.
 - b) Director's request to Col. Eddy for priority was sent September 1st.
 - c) Theater approval granted September 13th.
 - d) Special Relations request OPD in regular weekly letter sent Friday, September 17th.
 - e) Air priority from OPD and orders received September 28th.
- Note: Since September 28th to date five separate schedules for departure by air have been set up, and Col. Glavin with six other OSS representatives has been alerted for each schedule. All have been canceled for reasons unknown to me, but described as due to the exercise of higher priority by other officers, maintenance problems, weather, etc.

Par. 2 Conclusion: Allowing for the exercise of higher priority and for weather, it appears that these have caused only a maximum of eight days' delay. However, from September 13th to September 28th, a total of sixteen days or twice the above delay, appears to have resulted from unnecessary confusion in Special Relations.

Par. 3 Recommendation: That a qualified officer from OPD be secured and assigned as officer in charge of transportation and that every effort be made to clear, with a minimum time delay, all OSS personnel authorized to enter any theater.

[Signature]
E. W. F. Glavin
Col., Inf., USA

*An additional 24 hr delay is indicated
never abt. report. 6 Oct 48*
89

9-1-43

Phone call which General Donovan
received from JCS stated that Colonel
Glavin has been cleared for assignment
to OSS. Cable sent Eddy, Algiers,
this morning.

Ed.T.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 August, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
25th & E Streets, N.W.

Subject: Transfer of Col. Edward J.F. Glavin
to OSS

1. Attached correspondence reference transfer of
Col. Edward J. F. Glavin to OSS is returned herewith for
your information.

FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL J. R. DEANE:

Cecil J. Gridley
CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, G.S.C.

Incls.
(3) memos



CONFIDENTIAL

CJG

24 August, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
2500 & E Streets, N.W.

Subject: Transfer of Col. Edward J. F. Glavin
to OSS

1. Attached correspondence reference transfer of
Col. Edward J. F. Glavin to OSS is returned herewith for
your information.

For BRIGADIER GENERAL J. R. DEANE:

CECIL J. GRIDLEY
Colonel, U.S.A.

Incls.
(2) copies

abr

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

OPD 334.8 OSS (10 Aug 43)

23 August 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Transfer of Colonel Edward
J. F. Glavin to OSS.

1. Request of Director, Office of Strategic Services, contained in memorandum, Office of Chief of Strategic Services to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 August 1943, for the transfer of Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin, has been discussed by telephone with the Eastern Defense Command.
2. General Drum reports that he is unwilling to release Colonel Glavin for the duty desired by the Director, Office of Strategic Services.

J. E. Hull
 J. E. HULL,
 Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
 Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD.

Incl.
 Memo Fr. Sec.,
 JCS to OPD, 20 Aug,
 15 Aug 43, w/1
 Incl.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FIRST ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK

20 August 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan, U. S. Army,
Director of Strategic Services,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Circumstances seem to inject themselves just at a time that I had expected to arrange matters for you in connection with the officer you desired for the North African Mission.

You will note by this time next week of a change that is to come in connection with my service. Consequently, the decision in the matter in question had to include the opinion of another person. This blocked the whole affair so far as this headquarters is concerned. However, I don't see why your own pressure can't accomplish results in Washington. The opinion I have held has been adhered to in about thirty cases, but there are two cases in which my views and opinions have been over-ruled.

I hope to see you soon and learn of your fine experiences and your views.

With best of luck, I am

Sincerely yours,


H. A. DRUM,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

10 August 1945

MEMORANDUM TO THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR
DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF:

Attached hereto is a memorandum received from the
Office of Strategic Services. It is for-
warded for recommending approval.



JOHN R. DEANE,
Brig. General, GSC,
Secretary.

AUG 11 10 3 AM

8-11/782



IN

OPD WDGS



CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D C

10 August 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE
The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff

With the approval of his immediate superiors, I should like to obtain the transfer to us of Edward J. F. Glavin, Colonel of Infantry, Public Relations Officer, Eastern Defense Command. If it is not possible to obtain his transfer, I would appreciate his being attached to us for a period of three months.

The reason for this request is that we desire to have him act as executive officer in our North Africa mission, and if he can be permanently transferred, to place him in command of that mission after he had served for a time under the present commander. From my knowledge of this officer I think he would be most valuable at this important post, not only from the standpoint of this organization but as well from the standpoint of the high command there.

I greatly appreciate your making the request for this officer.


William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE
The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff

With the approval of his immediate superiors, I should like to obtain the transfer to us of Edward J. F. Gavin, Colonel of Infantry, Public Relations Officer, Eastern Defense Command. If it is not possible to obtain his transfer, I would appreciate his being attached to us for a period of three months.

The reason for this request is that we desire to have him act as executive officer in our North Africa mission, and if he can be permanently transferred, to place him in command of that mission after he had served for a time under the present commander. From my knowledge of this officer I think he would be most valuable at this important post, not only from the standpoint of this organization but as well from the standpoint of the high command there.

I greatly appreciate your making the request for this officer.

William J. Donovan
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FIRST ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK

7 August 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan, U. S. Army,
Director of Strategic Services,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Glad to have your note of August 5th and to learn that you are back in the United States. Your experience must have been most interesting and hope I get a chance to see you and learn about it.

At the time of your cable there were requests from the War Department for me to relieve three senior officers in this Headquarters. Consequently, the whole picture became quite "jammed" and I was forced to stand by the uniform policy that applied to all officers. I am sure you must realize the predicament that faces this Headquarters and there is nothing else I can do. I feel quite embarrassed as I always wish to be helpful to you. Why not try an official application, letting it come down that way? Maybe we can get a "kink" into the game that will be helpful.

With best wishes, and hoping to see you soon,
I am

Sincerely yours,


H. A. DRUM,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.

5 August 1943

Lt. General Hugh A. Drum
Headquarters Eastern Defense
Command and First Army
Governors Island, New York

My dear General Drum:

I have just returned and find your letter of July 10 in answer to my cable of July 8 stressing to you the importance of obtaining the loan of the services of Colonel Glavin.

I regret that you did not feel able to send him, not only on my own account but because of the value that experience would have been to you and your staff.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FIRST ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
GOVERNORS ISLAND, NEW YORK

10 July 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan, U. S. Army,
Director, Strategic Services,
1647 30th St.,
Washington, D. C.


Dear Bill:

I did not answer your letter of some days ago because I had been aware of your absence from the country. Am sorry that we missed each other just before you left. Do hope that you had an interesting and profitable trip. News of the day indicates that a movement is on in the Mediterranean.

I hope you will let me see you when you get back from your present absence.

With best of luck to you, I am

Faithfully yours,


W. A. LHM,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

SECRET, COI, CONFIDENTIAL

July 5, 1943

SECRET

Lt. General Hugh A. Drum
Headquarters First Army and
Eastern Division Command
Governors Island, N.Y.

Dear General Drum:

General Denevan who is abroad
has sent me the following cable which he
asked me to transmit to you:

"I regret that I was unable to
see you before I left. I did try to get
in touch with you, but you were away.
The importance of the request I made to
you has been emphasized more strongly by
my visit here. The next two or three
months are critical. I believe the ex-
perience of the officer whom we discussed
will prove invaluable to both you and me.
I therefore hope that you will be able to
make the loan of this officer."

I hope that you will find yourself
able to consider General Denevan's request in
view of his anxiety over the coming critical
months.

Very respectfully yours,

W. HAROLD BARNES

Acting Director

ONE JS

unavailable

W. Barnes

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

SE

June 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
FROM: John C. Hughes

I attach copy of the letter which you dictated on the telephone today and which I signed "Bill". The letter has been sent, by courier, to General Drum at Governors Island.

JCH


Washington, D. C.

June 6, 1943.

Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum,
Commanding General,
Eastern Defense Command and First Army,
Governors Island, New York.

My dear General Drum:

I went over to New York last week in the hope
of seeing you--they told us you were on an inspection trip.

I wanted to finish our talk but I fear I may
have to leave before this can be done. However, if there
should be any change I will telephone you, in the hope that
there will be an opportunity for a further visit.

In the meantime, I want to come back to the
question of Colonel Glavin. I understand perfectly you
could not wish to transfer him. But would you be willing
to loan him to us for three or four months, for duty in an
active theater? I feel less hesitant in asking this, be-
cause I believe that experience in an active theater might
make him of even greater value to you upon his return.
I stay as long as that period would aid us greatly, as for the
coming period we badly need a trained regular officer such
as Glavin.

Only if you feel that such an arrangement would
be actually advantageous, I would appreciate your giving us
the chance to use him on these terms. It is only because I
feel that way that I am making this request.

Trusting you will see it in the same light, I am

Sincerely yours,

(SIGNED) Bill

William J. Donovan,
Brigadier General.



Room 901, 90 Church Street
New York City 7
9 June 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
War Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

There has been no discussion here so far as I know in respect to the receipt of your letter or the preparation of any reply thereto. To bring the developments up to date, this matter was discussed with Colonel Huntington on April 26 in Washington, and he, in turn, made the original request at this Headquarters on May 8 and received the first refusal. On May 11, I had my daily discussion with the General about it, and he then informed me of his policy to the effect that he would not allow any officer on his staff to transfer unless there was a written guarantee of an immediate promotion. I explained that if this policy was based upon a desire to further the interests or the career of any officer, it would appear that in each case the wishes of the officer would receive some consideration and that an opportunity for service in many cases would be the officer's choice irrespective of an immediate promotion.

The discussion led nowhere. I assume that there was no conference on this subject following your visit to New York on May 27, and that our conversation yesterday marks the present status of the request.

On June 26, this year, I complete seven continuous years of service at this station, including field service during three army maneuvers and the completion of the combined course at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I have served with the Commanding General here since his arrival on November 7, 1938. Since December, 1941, there have been numerous transfers from the staff wherein there was no immediate promotion involved. A partial check, not including company grade officers, indicates that during the last six months forty-three (43) officers have been transferred from this Headquarters, and in each case there was no guarantee of any promotion and in almost all of these these officers have not yet been promoted. In one case an officer was transferred for duty in Australia; in another, in the Caribbean. In two other cases, officers transferred are now on duty with the Headquarters Second Service Command at the same garrison and remain in their same grades. Within this Section of nine, two officers have been transferred to other stations without any immediate promotion and without any demand that such circumstances be considered as a prerequisite for the transfer. In the G-3, or Operations Section, within this period six officers out of a total of twelve have been transferred without such prior requirement of immediate promotion. Practically every section in the Headquarters, both general and special, is represented in these forty-three or more changes.

General Donovan 9 June 43 2

It is equally true that there were at least five transfers wherein the five officers were promoted immediately on transfer or shortly thereafter to the rank of brigadier general. But the ratio of such transfers as against the large number without promotion appears to me to be slender support for the policy we have been discussing.

There is no intention on my part to secure any advantage over any of my associates, nor to deny to the Commander any service which cannot otherwise be secured for him. This section was organized on December 15, 1941, at which date I was directed to organize and run it. I have served in this capacity without interruption since that date and have developed commissioned and enlisted assistants, as well as civilian employees, into an organization that can carry on without considering any member "indispensable." My executive officer is a lieutenant colonel from the Reserve, with World War experience, now forty-five years of age and widely known in his civilian profession as the Managing Editor of the Hartford Courant. The Commanding General has complete confidence in him, and it is well placed and well deserved.

During the last three months, I have been on temporary duty in Bermuda, and have made extensive trips throughout this command and to Chicago. This office has been operated throughout this period almost exclusively by my executive officer.

While it is generally accepted that no one is "indispensable," the above circumstances are particularly applicable at this time in so far as my position is concerned.

I have resumed studies in French and Spanish. I am also engaged in taking the necessary additional inoculations and other medical treatment, including examination required prior to assignment for foreign duty. These steps may reduce any time interval prior to departure. If the assignment should be agreed upon for a four months' period on temporary duty or detached service, I assume no release from quarters' assignment would be involved. However, any transfer, temporary or permanent and irrespective of quarters' assignment, would be welcome.

I am confident that the Commanding General would not have discussed this matter with me at all had I not opened the discussion described above, on May 11. I am equally confident that he will refrain from discussing my reply to your letter, which we discussed yesterday. Therefore, and in view of all that has preceded, I believe that he will find some general reason for refusal or postponement and that a final decision will depend upon the action of higher headquarters.

My own view is, that after twenty years' service at the age of forty, I can count upon fifteen to twenty years ahead in my profession. Where I go in the future depends largely upon where I go now. Aside from any calculation in respect to a career, I am anxious to serve where the service may

General Donovan 9 June 43 3

be of more immediate benefit for the duration and of probable benefit to the service after the war. This may sound presumptuous but it is not so intended, and after careful consideration represents an honest opinion on the facts as I see them.

Whether all these circumstances should form the basis for a request for orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a decision you are best qualified to make. All this information is furnished in the form of a personal letter and for your personal use in arriving at an evaluation of these circumstances which affect my current assignment as well as the probabilities of any change in that assignment.

Irrespective of the final result, may I repeat here what I have said formerly, that I would be honored to serve with you and to do my best wherever assigned. I am grateful for your continued interest and efforts, and regardless of the outcome I shall continue to render such assistance to Colonel Huntington and your associates as my present assignment permits.

Respectfully yours



EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Public Relations Officer