FRANCE

CONT'D

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

FRANCE

CONT'D

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Weekly Airgram No. 10
THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
Algiers, 13 Jun.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Ingrahm
2. Langer
3. Shepardson
4. X-2 - LaDocumph
5. Secretariat
6. Gardner
   NIO
   FO
   Planning Group
   Secretariat

Not for FO

France N 590
Intelligence Branch
Airgram

SECRET

Weekly Airgram No. 10. Algiers, 13 January 1944

THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
1940 - 1943

The history of the French Intelligence Services in the past year and a half is extremely complex. From the beginning the Gaullists conceded military leadership to Giraud, and after early stage, Giraud yielded the direction of political affairs to DeGaulle. The control of the intelligence services has been one of the critical objectives for which the opposing groups have contended. At present no final solution appears to have been reached with regard to the questions of function, organization or responsibility. Information on the story is incomplete especially on the earlier period. The material presented below, therefore, though believed to be substantially correct, should not be accepted as final.

I. Principal Personnel Parts and Personalities

1. B.C.R.A. (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action), a DeGaullist Service organized after the Armistice in June 1940 by Colonel PASSY, who continued to be its director in London and then Algiers. B.C.R.A. has the following principal divisions:

a. Information - obtaining military and other intelligence on enemy-controlled French territory and on foreign countries.

b. Operations - working with the resistance movements under General de Gaulle's direction.

c. Counter Espionage.

The most prominent names in the service have been those of Colonel PASSY, Commandant RAYNAL.

2. The unofficial French Services Gaullistes of which the Deuxième Bureau has established the major part. Included in the Deuxième Bureau are:

a) S.R. (Service de Renseignements) with subsections for Sabotage, Air Ferry - handling airplanes [illegible], Navigation, Service [illegible], Direction etc.

b) S.M.A. or S.E. (Service de Renseignements Militaires) - has [illegible] activities, principally in Unoccupied France and France [illegible]

c) A Resistance group section.

The most prominent names in these services were, General RONIN, Director des Services Spéciaux, Colonel RIVET, head of the Deuxième Bureau, Colonel de VILLENEUVE, head of S.P., Commandant PAILLOLE, head of the S.M., Commandant CLOTTES, head of the Resistance section.

There are in addition certain organizations such as the R.S.T. (Bureau de Surveillance Territoriale) which have worked with the intelligence services, but which are not included here, belonging more properly to the police system.

II. Activities of the Intelligence Services Prior to June, 1943

After the fall of France the former Deuxième Bureau had been dissolved by order of the Germans, but certain loose relations continued to exist between former members. The latter furnished a certain amount of intelligence to the British and Americans through connections in France and abroad.

In North Africa, American staff members gathering intelligence for the debarkation had considerable support from members of the French intelligence services. Among the most helpful were Colonel CLOTTES, head of the Deuxième Bureau in North Africa, his chief assistant, RONIN, Guy CALVET, a staff member under Dulin and Christian; ARMAND, who was head of the Bureau de Surveillance Territoriale, and MIGNON, the head of the Securite for the Department of Algiers. They supplied valuable information to the Americans up to the time of the debarkation and were both of great assistance in the preparation of the invasion themselves.

Shortly after the debarkation, two former members of the Deuxième Bureau, Commandant PAILLOLE and Colonel de VILLENEUVE, arrived in North Africa from France. Without difficulty in obtaining an appointment as Director of the Security Services. They immediately had two principal objectives: the first, to establish contact with their former associates in the Deuxième Bureau in France and remain the chief intelligence services; the second, to take stock of the Fighting French and establish contact with the resistance groups in France which were already organized.

controlled by the Gaullist forces, working through London.

Their relations with the Americans and British at this stage were not altogether clear. They forced the resignation of certain individuals who had helped the Allied landing, including Col. Chretien and his assistant Dultrel. A great part of Chretien's duties were turned over to TORRES, who had been head of the Securite Militaire at Oran and was a strong S.O.L. -- P.P.F. member and anti-Allied Vichy supporter. It seems clear that it was on the basis of information supplied by them that the persons who had aided the Americans before the landing, including leaders such as Schlary and Dr. Aboulker, were arrested at the time of the Darlan assassination for "moral complicity in a plot against the life of the American minister."

Meanwhile in London the Gaullist services were working under Andre Philip. The B.C.R.A. under the active direction of Col. Passy, a man about whom even Gaullist supporters have grave reservations, expanded rapidly in 1941 as DeGaulle saw the importance of a secret service. Its chief duty was the maintenance of relations with the underground groups, organizing intelligence and resistance in France through the facilities offered by the British.

Thus when DeGaulle went to North Africa in June 1943 there were in existence two independent intelligence systems, the resources to Giraud and those to DeGaulle.

III. The Gaullist Chief in Formation of the Committee

Shortly after his arrival in Algiers, DeGaulle was followed by Passy who was one of the latter's chief assistants, Gen. Cochet, TELAVIV. Thus far [illegible]

1. [illegible] superficially believed it were true in the part of the Americans, [illegible] contrary to the fact. Director of Facilities and Vulnerabilities feel that one of the reasons Chretien's dismissal was that he allowed an American channel [illegible] Vichy administration [illegible] were still in operation after [illegible] had been declared no longer in effect.

months both intelligence systems continued to operate side by side from North Africa. The Gaullists were resolutely determined not to allow their intelligence services to be swallowed up by the traditional services for two principal reasons. From the political point of view, it was obvious that the chief strength of the Gaullists (who had bad relations with the Americans, cool relations with the British, almost no arms or army, and no official posts) lay in their knowledge of and contacts with the resistance movement in France. The Giraudist services were fully aware of this source of strength and made repeated efforts to take over these connections. The secrets were closely held, however, for the Gaullists appreciated how seriously their position would be weakened if they lost contact with the base of their support, Metropolitan France.

The Gaullists insisted that there was a second reason for resisting absorption - that the Giraudists services were not secure, especially with regard to their attitude toward Vichy: that it was unsafe to turn over to them the cases of the resistance leaders. They based this charge on information 1) that the Deuxieme Bureau had been heavily infiltrated by Ron in the enemy camp before the war, and 2) that after the dissolution of the Deuxieme Bureau, former agents sent to the rear of the Germans were left in complete freedom but subject to the closest surveillance, so that, while nothing happened to the Deuxieme Bureau people, those who made contact with them were apprehended and in many cases shot. Moreover they asserted that in the earlier days in France reliable Deuxieme Bureau people had been concerned for saving themselves more than for organizing France. Consequently, the Deuxieme Bureau. On these grounds the Gaullists felt that it was dangerous to integrate and work with the old Deuxieme Bureau.

Nevertheless the Giraudist services, since under the direction of General Bonsot, [illegible] their own case. Strong it claimed that the military [illegible]

have its own intelligence services responsible to it and that he could not allow a civilian head of intelligence. Moreover, the men in charge of S.R. and S.M. protested to their superior professional competence in the intelligence business, charging that the Gaullist services were more a political instrument than an intelligence service.

IV. Transitional Evolution since October

This situation of dual intelligence systems grew so intolerable that the CFLN on 4 October adopted a decree, signed by General Giraud, which appointed an air corps general acceptable to both sides, General COCHET, to "coordinate" all intelligence. General ROMIER apparently went out at this time. The formula clearly saw Cochet above the B.C.R.A., headed by Passy, on the one side, and the traditional services, on the other, headed by Colonel RIVET, with Villeneuve and Paillole continuing as head of S.R. and S.M. In fact the merger never took place. The mere clash of personalities and personnalities persisted. There was neither unity nor unity. General Cochet resigned, claiming that he had insufficient power, and measures dragged on much as before.

On 18 November the CFLN taken its second merger decree, this time under the tutelage of and dominated by the Gaullists. A Gaullist source indicate that it was done without the prior knowledge of General Giraud. The decree on paper provides for an actual amalgamation of the services and places Gaullists in almost all the essential positions. It should be noted that Giraud is a member of the directing committee. A diagram appears below.

SECRET

Comite d'Action en France
(DeGaulle, Giraud, Emmanuel D'Astier)

Directeur des Services Speciaux
(Soustelle)
Cabinet - (Lt. Col. Servais)

Operational Direction (Col. Passy)
Algiers Hq. (Capt. Fuhrhen)
London Hq. (Comdt. Manuel)

Documents & Analysis Section (Col. Jousse)

Censorship & Military Security (?)

Collection & evaluation of intelligence

Section (Resistance in France)

Counter Espionage

Espionage in foreign countries

Civilian Info. (M. Thibaut)

Military Info. (?)

Military Security within the Army (including morale)

Censorship of mail, radio, and telegraph

Operation and Passy were mentioned as possible overall heads, but the man selected was Jacques Soustelle, a young man of 33 with a brilliant reputation, though little experience in intelligence, formerly head of information for the Fighting French in London and considered a staunch friend of the Allies.

In the early days of this Centre there was much talk of lists that were being drawn up by the new committee for the purpose of ill-fitting personnel in the traditional services. Pucheu and Bichelonne offered their resignations, and Communists spoke bitterly of the Centre as "factory of the intel France services." In fact the proposed factors of the existing services was a bitter compromise, although to date it has been neither too strong nor too weak. Letters from General Giraud were otherwise that "the Centre would have the military fetishes and." A member of Giraud's staff also stated that Giraud was opposed to transferring the F.F. and F.M., with all archives, to the

responsible to him as Commander-in-Chief and presumably continue in the same hands.

Gaullists, on the other hand assert that the decree of 10 November still stands.

[illegible] Present Situation

The Communist cases today shape up something as follows:

The veteran heads of the S.R. and D.S.M. feel that their organization alone has the professional competence and esprit de corps to provide the military with a [illegible] intelligence service, and that this is threatened with dismemberment by a group of amateurs whose primary interest is in building up political [illegible]. They also point to the dangers of combining intelligence and operations functions in the same organization, as the Gaullists propose with regard to the Resistance [illegible] the same organization. Moreover, at present men like Pallole and Villemaire are being thoroughly cooperative towards the Americans.

On their side the Gaullists maintain that intelligence is a business that one can learn and point to their more than three years experience in the business. Moreover, they emphasize that DeGaulle, in view of his acknowledged leadership of the underground movement, cannot allow himself to be cut off from this basis and that intelligence and direction of such a movement are inseparable and must remain in hands that are secure and friendly. They insist that the fundamental question is one of reliability -- the need of rooting out of the [illegible] intelligence system those elements who have collaborated with the Germans or with Vichy. They maintain that the cry "the army must have [illegible]" is a screen for covering such elements.

Pending the present impasse general continue indefinitely. A [illegible] that a new [illegible] will be necessary placing [illegible] and unbiased [illegible] under the Service Secrets of Gaullists, but is [illegible]

all strictly military intelligence to the S.R. and D.S.N. responsible to Giraud. It appears that M. D'Astier, Commissioner of the Interior and a member of the directing committee, approves this but that Soustelle (and certainly other Gaullists) resist it.

An agreement or at least a modus vivendi along these lines appears probable. Certain men like Commandant CLIFFET are now apparently accepted by both sides. The B.C.R.A. is more and more functioning as a sort of European ministry of the interior, providing the contacts between France and the CFLN for information and planning. It continues to gather military intelligence, but is apparently not primarily interested therein. Hence there would appear to be room and need for a scrupulously apolitical military intelligence service to serve the Commander-in-Chief and AFHQ.

Issue 5 [illegible]

1. Special Report - French Finance
- Crockett; 1000 frame note [illegible]

Distribution Sheet - 17 Feb.

SECRET

1 NATO
Special Funds

2 Mr. Scribner

3 Gen. Magruder
Mr. Shepardson
X-2
Secretariat



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0



Copie d'une lettre de Mr François Valentin au Journal de Lettre de Toronto.

Mr Valentin est de Nancy, ancien Président de la Légion de Chrétiens Tunisiens, dévoué serviteur de 1943. Il est actuellement dans le "maquis".

SECRET

Frank 31-36
x Frances
x Francisco
x Crocker St Rivers

S-P-E-C-I-A-L E-X-P-O-R-T

F-R-E-E-D-O-M F-R-A-N-C-E

SECRET

Date: 1/31/44

To: General John Magruder

Re: attached carbon of letter from Mr. Hughes to Dr. Langer and covering note to Col. Buxton from Mr. Hughes - SEC study covering biographical data and political tendencies of French officials in the Vichy Government.

For your further information.

The note on this same subject from Mr. Poole was forwarded to you earlier.

G. Edward Buxton

CONFIDENTIAL

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 26 January 1944

To: Colonel G. Edward Buxton

From: John C. Hughes

Subject: Letter to Dr. Langer, attached

As of possible interest, I am attaching herewith copy of a letter which I have just written Dr. Langer.

I don't know that there is anything we can do or want to do, but it seems to me a great waste of government money because I am sure that we have got more and better information available than anything they can get.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
[illegible]77th HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
EXPERIMENTAL (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512, U. S. ARMY

MEMORANDUM

29 January 1941

TO : Brigadier General William Donovan

FROM : 1st Lt. David C. Crockett, AC

SUBJECT : French Francs

1. This office made its first substantial purchase in French Francs [illegible] in operations in September of this year when a sum of twenty million French Francs were purchased from [illegible] Lebarthe. This represented the [illegible] resources of a group of French officers who made arrangements to get [illegible] funds out of France around 3, Sep. We paid for these at the rate of [illegible] francs to the dollar.

2. In November it became obvious that this supply would not last [illegible] operations this spring in this theater alone, so we made [illegible] for new sources of French Francs. The best sources [illegible] (1) Bank in Algiers, (2) [illegible] in North Africa, [illegible] (3) Chain, (4) Corsica, (5) Tangier, (6) Morocco, (7) Lisbon.

3. At about this same time Colonel Donovan's office wired us that they were [illegible] for us to buy French Francs for London. The latter part of Nov. [illegible] ship five million French Francs to London from our [illegible] on hand and this left us at that time [illegible] approximate balance after [illegible] operations of twelve million.

4. We received a cable from Colonel Donovan [illegible] Chief Julius [illegible] we [illegible] to bring out of France [illegible] million French [illegible] possibility of purchasing them. At [illegible] Major Williams and I con- [illegible] Colonel Williams of the Service Commerce [illegible] him if he knew [illegible] not in touch with Chief Julius [illegible] reported to have this sum with [illegible] French [illegible] Colonel Williams believed, [illegible] to the possibility [illegible] Chief Julius [illegible] I [illegible] made with Louis Dreyfus, if [illegible] [illegible] Colonel Donovan [illegible] [illegible] Colonel Donovan [illegible]

5. [illegible]

SECRET

4. We have made no effort from this office or from Washington to pur- [illegible] French Francs in Casablanca but Washington made inquiries through Lisbon [illegible] the purchase of francs in Tangiers through Lisbon. However, the market was [illegible] easily available. The dangers and risk in the type of franc and the possible [illegible] control of the serial numbers of the francs led Colonel Rehal's office in Washington to call off deals there. We cabled Cairo in January on the [illegible] that possibly there might be some French Francs in that theater as we have had considerable luck with purchases of other currencies there, but only [illegible] as a result, a small shipment at a very unfavorable rate and immediately [illegible] all efforts from the Middle East (this theater has so far procured for us Italian Lire and Reichsmarks at good advantage.)

5. Tunis, under the very able direction of Mr. A. Pittman Springs, suggested to us in December that they might be able to locate some francs, and we have purchased about one million from there to date. We look for another purchase of twenty-five million which we hope to consummate within a few weeks at the rate of two hundred to one dollar, the purchase being made with Algerian Francs that is four French francs for one Algerian Franc. The security of the purchase is excellent and as we deal through Mr. Springs and he in turn through the French Consul who deals with a number of Arabs. When I was in Tunis last November attempting to complete this deal I inquired into the effectiveness of using Louis D'or (one Louis D'or equals $8.50 cost to us) I could possibly [illegible] to ten thousand French Francs. As no purchases have been made under Louis D'or I take this figure as only a wild guess by our agent but I [illegible] to follow this through and have the gold at hand and expect to go to Tunis to arrange for a trial purchase as soon as my predecessor on the future value of the francs now and time to sink through the obsolete in which I have placed it.

6. In October when the Invasion mission in Corsica was getting established we sent a number of French Francs, in all one million of the original [illegible] purchase, to be used to finance this operation. Reports reaching this [illegible] indicated a chaotic currency condition on the island. With gold seal [illegible] our soldiers were being paid, they were able to buy French Francs [illegible] to five hundred to one dollar. Privately at two hundred to three hundred [illegible] the dollar, especially from Italian prisoners who over the next month's period were being gradually evacuated from the island and were anxious to [illegible] their pecuniary of French Francs in which they had been paid today human [illegible] for occupational lire or at the best trade with gold seal dollars. [illegible] was done late in the early part of November, I inquired [illegible] the situation in Corsica and he said on that we could unloaded up more [illegible] deal for a number of Francs Francs with gold seal dollars. I contacted [illegible] of the Finance Department and sent Captain Ainsworth with my [illegible] gold seal dollars in purchase up to ten million French Francs. During [illegible] time that the table was being presented the French Treasury Officials [illegible] us order forbidding the transfer of funds to the [illegible] they were requesting all the French Treasury outstanding on the island [illegible] for surrender and registration for exchange [illegible] new government currency overprinted [illegible] the dollar. We immediately dispatched to Ainsworth telling [illegible] Francs free and thought to be unknown [illegible] the time of the [illegible] moving on a counterfeiting ring or [illegible] we had been [illegible] were purchased at the rate to the dollar all were being [illegible] [illegible] at fifty to ten dollars. The change took place [illegible] November 16.

3. As there was no gold available to [illegible] [illegible] the purchase of francs with the gold seal dollars [illegible] there was no [illegible] [illegible] had stirred up considerable interest [illegible], and the X-2 staff on the island [illegible] were not turned in for exchange [illegible] several large amounts that were willing to hold on to the [illegible]. The reason that the local [illegible] French Treasury Officials only allowed [illegible] [illegible] was firstly, that the French [illegible] at the rate of five thousand francs [illegible] of surcharged notes from the banks [illegible] proprietor [illegible] per family per month. In other words a large [illegible] practical confiscation. [illegible] francs per person per family [illegible] allow withdrawals up to five thousand francs [illegible] from [illegible] month. It [illegible] from [illegible] [illegible] the gold seal dollars before the [illegible] night I had several deals with the gold seal dollars [illegible] could not get any indication that [illegible] other [illegible] was concluded, [illegible] [illegible] thing would transpire and Major Williams authorized my [illegible] [illegible] with a limited supply of gold [illegible] which [illegible] [illegible] to use gold for [illegible] [illegible] thirty thousand [illegible] dollars [illegible] Finance Officer, Algiers.

4. When we asked General [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] what we were doing and [illegible] [illegible] these dollars [illegible] [illegible] the aid of my purchases [illegible] the number of francs [illegible] [illegible] I sent to Colonel [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] a purchase with a few [illegible] [illegible] francs.

5. I [illegible] the X-2 staff [illegible] [illegible] of all [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in conference with the [illegible] [illegible] effect that [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] dollars in France and that no [illegible] France would be of any [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and that the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] that I [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] propaganda that I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

6. During my trip around [illegible] [illegible] the proprietors [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Fortunately I had completed my business there for the day and with my agent [illegible] to Ile Rousse for the night, and left Ile Rousse early the next morning for Ajaccio. The secret police were awaiting my arrival at the Hotel des Etrangers of Ajaccio and planned to arrest my agent and myself immediately that afternoon. When the A-2 staff explained to me this situation I immediately planned to see Colonel Guppar and explain why and what we were doing. Colonel Guppar was exceedingly serious and although he gave me no verbal consent to what we were doing, he much as implied he would wink at our operation. I also sent our agent to see him so that he would know the caliber of men we were dealing with. Lt. LaFon of our A-2 staff also saw him and explained the situation as well. Subsequently I entertained Colonel Guppar and several members of his staff at lunch and all was very harmonious.

13. I returned to Algiers and collected more gold and decided with Major Williams to secure [illegible] with blue seal dollars which was unfavorable, as we were only able to acquire francs at the rate of six dollars per thousand francs, but fortunately only spent two thousand four hundred dollars. On my return to the Island I found the situation had eased considerably, and in the two days that I was there collected one million eight hundred francs at the rate of one Louis d'Or ($8.88) per three thousand five hundred French francs, [illegible] five hundred [illegible] francs per dollar.

14. When I left the Island I left a supply of gold in a field safe that I had brought with me [illegible] of other gas operations through our agents and the staff that I had been [illegible] ing to Lt. [illegible] Crane who has been doing an excellent job and has [illegible] the purchase of two million more French francs at the same approximate rate. Lt. Crane cabled me this week that he had [illegible] another two million which [illegible] would [illegible] between the current rate and the Louis d'Or for two thousand eight hundred French francs all thirty [illegible] [illegible] to the dollar [illegible] cabled him to [illegible] and [illegible] a [illegible] from Captain [illegible] that due to [illegible] beyond their [illegible] further purchases [illegible] be made until my arrival in Corsica. [illegible] the [illegible] morning [illegible] a complete explanation of [illegible] which I shall make you in Washington. With Colonel [illegible] approval I [illegible] requested Lt. Crane immediately to return to Algiers to report on [illegible] at present and [illegible] happened in [illegible]

15. My feeling is that the French [illegible] by our purchases [illegible] [illegible] they have not gold with which to make [illegible] purchases [illegible] [illegible], as I [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] them and [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible] impossible for us to continue. [illegible] and my subsequent [illegible] Mr. [illegible] [illegible] by the French [illegible] "illegally" purchasing French francs at below the [illegible] I explained to Mr. [illegible] why we were [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

16. Colonel Ream's letter [illegible] to Major Williams and Emerson Bigelow's letter [illegible] which refers to my f[illegible]t report on the transaction dated January [illegible] (the [illegible] of this report is [illegible]lined above) tells quite clearly what use is contemplated with these French [illegible]. A considerable volume of them are to be used by our London [illegible]. Colonel Ream cabled me to ship fifteen million [illegible] London immediately, for as the [illegible]tish have been less successful than we in the purchase to date, we will prob[illegible]y sell between twenty-five and forty mil[illegible]. As I am now required [illegible] authorization to purchase an additional twenty-five million [illegible] total for purchase up to sixty mil[illegible]lion plus the requirements that [illegible] on hand now for use in this theater. Colonel Ream has established the [illegible] of $175.00 francs to the pound as per his letter [illegible] but I feel this [illegible] [illegible] and he means 175.25 francs to the dollar rate. This is the [illegible] [illegible] and it is what we have all in mind in purchasing from the British.

17. If we are successful in [illegible] fifty million francs, France can (from my last reports from all th[illegible]) [illegible] on hand on this purchase and being such a splendid deal [illegible] France is [illegible] and is [illegible] in "chain" if we arrange payment [illegible] [illegible] dollar to fill this [illegible] [illegible] the $500,000 over the [illegible] [illegible] to the dollar. That is, [illegible] million dollars the fifty million [illegible] would be at the established [illegible] to the dollar, can [illegible] French francs, but at the [illegible] [illegible] francs. We figure that we can [illegible] more purchase for a hundred thousand [illegible] [illegible] British at this rate mentioned in [illegible] [illegible] (point) will help to augment our [illegible]

18. Emerson Bigelow [illegible] [illegible] asked to purchase one million [illegible] at a rate of approximately two hun[illegible] [illegible] letter [illegible] approximately the [illegible] [illegible] and all efforts to purchase French [illegible] [illegible] Greenland and Canada are [illegible] [illegible]. For your information [illegible] [illegible] and have been transferred [illegible] Spanish. Europe, Lisbon [illegible] [illegible] of the year, 9,000,000 francs [illegible] [illegible] for these letter [illegible].

19. I will [illegible] [illegible] in getting.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Algiers – and this is my second point – did not undergo an internal crisis. I told you about the unfortunate effect of the November changes. [illegible] the fact that France was kept out of the Conferences [illegible] Lebanon, [illegible] although the energetic attitude of General de Gaulle was [illegible] appreciated. In short, Algiers is not any more the center of all hopes. [illegible] itself from evil. [illegible] Algiers [illegible] which is a [illegible] of resistance [illegible] in many minds, and [illegible] feel themselves [illegible] associated with [illegible] the elements of Resistance cannot [illegible] for the present [illegible] (justified) that they are not [illegible] dissatisfaction which is only [illegible] but which could [illegible]

On the other hand, such a state of mind [illegible] on the terrain of the [illegible] the part played by my friend [illegible] the [illegible] because [illegible] by the two Generals.

[illegible] the signs are far from [illegible] on the contrary, [illegible] relative, but [illegible] of the [illegible] was fatal. [illegible] also proved that the [illegible] public opinion, [illegible]

In the midst of all this, I am trying [illegible] and forming [illegible] [illegible]

/3 [illegible]

[illegible]

le 18 Décembre 1945

[illegible] une réponse qu'on me laisse espérer et dont la [illegible] [illegible] d'une occasion pour vous envoyer [illegible] il ne peut que confirmer ce que j'ai essayé [illegible] dans le second, sur la situatio[illegible] [illegible] et telle qu'on la voit en France.

[illegible]

SECRET

Mr. John C. Dugan,

Acting Director.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

Mr. John C. Hughes,

Acting Director.

[illegible] 1954.

[illegible]

I [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR Colonel Buxton

SUBJECT Compilation of Biographical Data on French Personalities

1. I am combining two papers bearing on the subject of the collection of biographical data on French personalities.

2. With respect to the activities of the SEC in this field, I agree that it is a costly duplication of effort and is an additional irritant to French sensibilities. However, I cannot see that the OSS is in position to advise the SEC in this matter unless we are approached officially by them, in which case we can offer them our facilities. I shall suggest to Dr. Langer that he discreetly make representations to this effect.

3. With reference to Mr. Poole's memorandum I agree with Mr. Montgomery's memorandum prepared for me on the subject. We have every reason to prepare biographical records on French personalities -- friendly or dangerous -- with which our armed forces in the zone that some will have to deal. This we should do regardless of the broad but later question as to who shall govern the France our soldiers reconquer. This especially in responsibility for furnishing the information vital to American forces, certainly before the politicians take over.

4. The manner of performing is the important point. Discretion in this we shall try to practice.

[illegible]
Deputy Director, Intelligence Service

[illegible]

Enquiry 13 064 A
X Officials
X Personnel

SECRET
X S.E.C.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General Magruder DATE: Jan. 31, 1944

FROM James A. Montgomery, Jr.

SUBJECT Biographical Records -- Information on France

This is with reference to memorandum from Mr. Poole to Colonel Buxton and Colonel Buxton's memorandum to you, both attached.

So far, the field unit of Biographical Records has interviewed very few Frenchmen, although it has at least one well-qualified interviewer for the work. According to both Lt. Deston and Mr. Cottrell, Mrs. Rado has proceeded very cautiously along this line because she is conscious of the fact that unless the right people are interviewed and the interviews conducted discreetly, dissatisfaction and misunderstanding may be caused in the foreign colonies. In fact, this is not a problem which is peculiar to the French. The Foreign Nationalities Branch was asked to suggest possible names for interviews, on the theory that the branch would know the right types of persons to supply information.

It is believed that Mrs. Rado is competent to handle the matter without causing complications. She has interviewed individuals of several other foreign nationalities in the past without any repercussions, and on the record should be trusted to pursue the same course in the future.

Whether or not FN wishes to subject some of its contacts to interviews is a problem for that branch to decide. As a broad matter of policy, however, there would seem to be no compelling reason why information should not be obtained on France. France is an enemy-occupied country, contains resistance groups, is a proper field for secret intelligence, and presumably will be an active theatre of military operations. The acquisition of biographical data on the area would therefore appear to be proper. It may be that the French are fearful about an extended military occupation, but this may be a necessary consequence of the German invasion. In any event, the information is not being obtained solely for FN.

In my opinion, therefore, the question is not whether to interview or do not interview, but whether the subjects of interviews are picked carefully and handled discreetly. So far as I am able to ascertain, Mrs. Rado has been [illegible] the right way.

26 January 1948

cc: Colonel Dunn

France 13,060A
x official
SEC.

Mr. William L. Langer
Director, Research and Analysis Branch
OSS, Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill,

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

SECRET

Date: 1/27/44

To: General John Magruder

Attached: Memorandum from DeWitt C.Poole re: collecting data on local leaders in France

Will you please let me have your opinion on the differences of viewpoint involved - if there are differences - between Messrs.Poole and Hughes on the one side and R & A Biographical Records on the other?

G.EDWARD BUXTON

SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

22 January 1944

MEMORANDUM TO GEN. W. EDWARD BURNS, ACTING DIRECTOR:

You will recall my discussing with you the proposal of Biographical Records to collect data on local leaders in France. Later I talked with Lt. Raymond Deaton and I understood that he agreed that no further field work of this sort should be done until you had had an opportunity to pass final judgment on the delicate political aspect.

Permit me to bring to your attention the attached Washington dispatch published in the New York Times this morning under the by-line of John MacCormac. This seems plain how careful we must be with respect to anything which may touch the susceptibilities of the refugee governments. Please note that the last two paragraphs of the Times article deal specifically with the French situation, which is of course the most highly charged of all.

RJS

Robert J. Joyce

P.S. This morning John Hughes spoke to me about the question of France and elsewhere proposed to be done by the New York Office of Strategic Services. He stated he is not in any way responsible for the foregoing with Gen. [illegible] and I understood that [illegible] to have outlined to the directors. [illegible] any action [illegible] the proposal to [illegible] Politically.

New York Times, January 22, 1944

U. S. and British Agreed Plan For Government in Fascist Italy

Allied Leaders [illegible]

Order Under [illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 20 December 1943

TO: Colonel Buxton

FROM: Lieut. Bane

SUBJECT:

The attached is a letter of thanks from General Hildring to you for sending to him the translation of a letter written by Monsieur Schreider in London to Monsieur Vignaux in New York. Your letter of transmittal, dated 10 December 1943, which is attached, was prepared by Mr. Hugh Wilson.

The letter from General Hildring does not seem to require an answer.

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane
Lieut (jg) USNR

1 Incl.

SECRET

Refer to:
CAD 014 France

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25

Transm. 13 Dec
Russian Group
Dionely Pub
Washington

18 December 1943.

Mr. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Buxton:

I appreciate receiving your letter of 20 December 1943, including copy in translation of a letter written by Monsieur Schreiber in London to Monsieur Hanau in New York, and an additional document containing the list of names referred to in the letter.

These papers are of extreme interest and will be of great value to us. Many thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending them to me.

Sincerely,

[illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible]

[illegible]

10 [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]
Acting Director
Office of [illegible] Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. [illegible]

I appreciate [illegible] letter of 10 [illegible] concerning [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] additional [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Frauen Bureau
+ Resettlement Groups
+ Schneider, E.
+ Vaquant, Paul

10 December 1949

Major General John E. Wilkinson
Chief, Civil Affairs Division
War Department
Room 3-E, Old Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Wilkinson:

I appreciate [illegible] tion a copy of a letter [illegible] by Prospect Avenue [illegible] in New York. This letter is [illegible] since you [illegible] also transmit a copy [illegible] the letter.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Grams 13 060
X Blanton Grams
X Schneider Grams
X Vignaux, Paul

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 7, 1943

To: Major E. J. Putnell, Jr.

From: Hugh R. Wilson

With reference to your memorandum of the 6th concerning the letter to General Hilldring, on the morning following our conversation I telephoned John Hughes and found that a copy of the memo was in his safe. There is no copy in S.I. of the memo.

Accordingly, I telephoned Mr. Thrum informing him of the above and he stated that he would make a notation on the letter to this effect and present it to Colonel Bunton for signature.

H.R.W.

Confidential

Urgent

Issue 13,060
x Resistance groups
x Chronicles
x Vignaud, Paul

Professor Paul Vignaux

New York

Upon receipt of your cable, I took the necessary steps to obtain the information requested. Gevin's answer has not yet reached me, but in the meantime I have been able to secure an important list of names which was in the possession of three persons who reached here last week. I am sending it to you by mail as according to the opinion of competent persons, the transmittal by cable even in code would entail some small risk. It is understood, according to what you stated in your telegram, that the strictest secrecy must be kept until the time of the liberation of the territories where the persons mentioned reside. The attached list is entrusted to you personally and the American services to whom it may be of interest. It should never be transmitted to any French service without consulting those who have entrusted me with it, through my intermediary. This list takes care of but one part of the departments situated in the region which interests you. The remainder has been promised me, but it will be necessary to wait some time as it involves a trip back and forth.

The request you sent me aroused a certain excitement among the French friends I had to notify of your telegram. But the excitement has even greater among the recent arrivals who brought the information contained in the attached list. It is very characteristic and very important, and I think it necessary to speak of it in detail. Being trusted by an American service and coming from New York, your request for information [illegible] received as an indication of the interest shown by the American authorities

agencies in the metropolitan resistance and in the democratic tendencies whose role is of prime importance. A delegate of the resistance groups immediately announcing his willingness to give me any useful information insisted upon telling me of the enormous relief felt by him and without doubt by his friends in France, in learning that the Americans are interested in the internal democratic resistance. Another, less expansive and more representative - he plays an important role in the resistance movements and in the Socialist Party - said the same thing in different words. A third one, a Parliamentarian who belongs to the old Socialist generation and a representative of the resistance movements, completed his remarks by saying that it would be well to try to reduce the animosity which the General shows toward the Anglo-Saxons.

Your cable had the effect of a curious psychological test which brought about exactly the same reactions in everyone:- more moderate in the case of the two friends who have been here for some time, more vivid in the case of the three who have just arrived. (Not including myself, five persons all told are informed on the subject, without counting Gouin who is in Algiers). This reaction is one of "relief" - which shows that there had been a doubt, a worry. On this score, I am in possession of numerous details. Within the ranks of the resistance movements - including the political parties and the trade unions - there is a definite fear, the fear of a removal of the Gaullist influences, the fear of Giraud, the fear of the Vichy elements maintaining the upper hand. And since it is expected that the Americans will land in the South, the question arises as to what their attitude will be.

I have called your attention several times to the fact that the complications in Africa are now the reason for General Gaul toward guilty

However I also keep you informed of the conflicts which since some time have arisen between the various underground organisations, namely the political parties, and de Gaulle. The present situation is very complex. The trend toward gaullism was to a certain extent a trend to the left as it was brought about mainly by the fear of "Giraudism", of "Vichyism", of "Fascism". I am definitely under the impression that this fact has had consequences which must be taken into account. The democratic elements - namely the political parties and the trade unionists - have acquired a sense of their power. For some time, various persons, arriving here, maintained that the "boulangiste" danger was not as serious as we believed as there were opposing forces at hand. This assurance has always seemed to me exaggerated, and on this point my friends and I have been in complete accord. With them, I still believe that this is partly an optimism destined to appease the fears of those who profess it, partly an optimism due to controversial opinion which is displayed in order to minimize or counteract the apprehensions of the doubters.

However, a new fact seems to appear which has nothing to do with this easy optimism and which must not be confused with it. This is the tendency shown by the various metropolitan resistance groups to assert their contemporaneity and, which is of greater importance, [illegible]. The trend of the left encouraged by the fear of "giraudism" etc. and the necessity of struggling the forces against the latter made it necessary for political reasons to note this existence - one of the first was the recognition of the parties, which had its representation at the composition of the National Council of Resistance. Similarly, it seemed [illegible] to insist upon [illegible] maintenance of the Military Committee and the [illegible]

is no longer possible, or at least not absolutely possible, as the selection of representatives, quite naturally, is influenced by the various groups and parties which must come to a mutual understanding.

There exists however another fact of even greater importance. Always desirous of guarding against the "giraudist" danger, official gaullism favored certain measures which should expose any metropolitan attempt directed toward this end. As far as metropolitan resistance is concerned, however, precautions are involved not only against "giraudism" strictori sensu, but also against "vichyism" (which official gaullism admits, without foregoing if need be the rehabilitation of well-known Vichy elements) and against "fascism" (about which official gaullism is silent). Actually, important understandings have been reached, embracing the gaullist resistance movements, political parties, and the trade unions, to insure taking over local control in order to prevent the Vichy elements from disturbing the situation by taking advantage of their de facto position.

Men have been designated in advance for all the important positions in the Mediterranean region and probably also elsewhere. Armed groups are prepared to intervene in order eventually to eliminate Vichy resistance. Action will doubtless await the Allied landing, but I am distinctly under the impression that the promised radio instructions will not be awaited if they seem to be delayed, and that in any case these instructions, which will doubtless be limited to a strictly military plan, would have no effect if, for instance, they requested the populace to be patient until the military operations had started on metropolitan territory. The occupation of local groups will be attempted and [illegible] locations such as there will be no serious German resistance and if the Vichy resistance will be a priori, as a rule, be easily overcome whenever evident.

Now, all of this has further increased the feeling of power of the internal resistance (metropolitan), - the general conviction that the hour of liberation is near contributes toward enhancing this feeling. A certain tendency to deal with Algiers as between equals has become evident in various ways. An important example, for instance, is the lists of the persons chosen to occupy the administrative positions in the Southern Zone. These lists were drawn up by mutual agreement by the resistance movements, the parties, etc. As a general rule as far as the political composition of the municipal delegations and of the departmental assemblies are concerned, it was decided to maintain the same proportion of representation which existed at the time of the last elections, after elimination of course of the Vichy elements, etc. and with the addition of some representatives of the resistance and of the trade unions - CGT and CFTC. A few deviations from this principle have been admitted for local reasons. These must be submitted to Algiers. However, in the case of proposed changes, I am assured that only those changes for which the reasons appear plausible would be accepted. There would seem to be the beginning of a mistrust which foreshadows the possible necessity of "defending the lists".

This mistrust had its beginning in the confused reports about the composition of the [illegible] group. This was increased by the [illegible] which came to the fore at the time an attempt was made to [illegible] the political parties, the labor groups etc. [illegible] similar conflicts have recently [illegible]. On the other hand, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of confidence, [illegible] [illegible]

you several weeks ago appears in many respects as a new accomplishment. Simultaneously, the underground Socialist press represented by several regional editions of "Le Populaire" (and by other publications of the Occupied Zone) has begun to strike a new note, which is not foreign to certain direct observations made here as a result of several changes.

The underground Socialist press has undertaken a campaign for multiple political parties and the Socialist Party is encouraging the re-establishment of the other parties, which for certain ones will be within local or regional cadres. This party plays an important role in the whole resistance movement in the Southern Zone and in the Occupied Zone. If its attitude has become more reserved within the last months, this is the result not only of the underground press but also of certain facts known to me. You doubtless remember a report quoted in one of my letters, a report drawn in very energetic terms and which spoke of the authoritarian and fascist inclinations of certain men in the gaullist resistance - this, in connection with the attempt to discriminate against the parties. The author of this report is here at present entrusted with an important mission not only by the party, but by all of the resistance organizations. Upon his return and especially at the time of the Allied landing, he will be called upon to take over important duties and this as a result of an agreement between the Socialist Party and the other underground movements.

I mention this fact as a possible sign that there are men available who, on the one hand, play an important role and who, on the other hand, have very definite reservations to make with reference to the "external" resistance. I recall again, merely as a question, that the qualified representatives of the Socialist Party stress the fact that the party considers itself bound to be guided by a contractual relation, and that [illegible]

contract will be rescinded if de Gaulle does not keep his promises. On the other hand, the qualified representatives of the same party, residing for some time already outside of France, state that in their opinion de Gaulle has not yet given the democratic guarantees which the party demands. Let me add - and this is perhaps the most striking fact about the people's state of mind - that the Socialist Party has been attempting for some time to save some of the funds actually on hand, as there is no telling what the future will bring....

Among recent arrivals, who are in no way connected with the Socialist Party, a certain attitude of mind which was previously much less common is noteworthy. Edmond Vermeil is willing to accept the presidency or the vice-presidency of a republican group in the making (not to be spoken of in public for the time being) which should act as a kind of vigilance committee against fascism. Ruegrt, who doubtless represents a certain radical element, is also somewhat apprehensive and in his first public declarations, he laid emphasis upon democracy, stating that to call oneself a republican, without any other qualifications, is without any particular meaning - Mussolini, he said, proclaims himself a republican...All in all, everyone is gaullist and as the author of the report "dream in very energetic terms" said to me: "We cannot work against de Gaulle, but we take our precautions".

You see how complicated the situation is. Out of all of the facts [illegible] a hypothesis is emerging which is worthy of attention. I have said, that the majority of those who believe that the chances of "healing" [illegible] will be accomplished a priori by the local forces, have abandoned [illegible] the struggle. But it is probable that among [illegible] that gaullism against "grandeur" does a situation has resulted [illegible]

constitute the basis of a reaction toward other possible "isms". (Weapons have been delivered to those to whom previously all assistance had been denied). Actually, this is the idea of those who state that certain precautions are or will be taken. But is it really necessary to let events take their course while awaiting new complications?

Referring to complications, it is important to bear in mind that the official de Gaulle propaganda within the underground movements intensifies the Girauldist-Vichyssois bogey as well as the American bogey. It does not quite transmit to those who are forced to listen to it the violent Americanophobia of the "higher spheres" and this is a remarkable fact. But it does spread a great concern and this in such a way that the final result is a reaction tinged with anxiety. The reactions brought about by your cable are very significant and characteristic. And therefore my friends and I wonder if something better cannot be done.

The following is a concrete example. The author of "the report drawn in energetic terms" is here as representative of the resistance organizations and the Socialist Party. I have said that he has been called upon to perform certain important duties: owing to the decision of the resistance movements, the political parties, and the federated and Christian trade unions, he should, at the proper time, become the mayor of Marseille. He was very favorably impressed with your cable and offered me his full cooperation with implicit trust. in making the attached list. It is only natural that he should want to get in contact with our American friends. These American friends whom I have been able to consult here are entirely agreeable to receiving him. I thought it best however to put off the meeting in order to write you this letter which should be delivered to you without delay.

The person referred to will return to France in a few weeks. Let us suppose once there he is asked: "Have you been able to get in contact with the Americans? What did they say to you?" and let us suppose he were obliged to answer: "I saw them, but they were unable to tell me anything". The psychological and political result would be so unfortunate that in my opinion it would be better to avoid this meeting.

This problem has come up several times and that is the reason why I have already informed you that in my opinion and according to my friends' advice, it would be very desirable that a contact be established with the democratic elements of metropolitan resistance and the affiliated elements outside of France. It is necessary to dissipate the misunderstandings accumulated by a tendentious propaganda. But let me return to our concrete case. I believe that an interview with the person who is here at present and with one or two other representative persons who have just arrived could be of great value. But it is also necessary that the conversation be of interest to this person and to his friends in France who in fact represent the whole of the resistance organization in the Southern Zone. My proposition is, therefore, to submit to the competent U.S. agencies the question of communicating to the corresponding American services in London information relating to the problems preoccupying the resistance elements and the political parties of the Southern Zone, or, if preferred, to offer the means of a quick round trip to Washington, the person involved having to return to France within a few weeks. If have not spoken of this plan to the interested party, but I feel sure he will be agreeable to it.

Please note that it is not a matter of asking for political recognition from France, but simply to establish contacts to the [illegible]

but to create a moral atmosphere. What is hoped for is the elimination of the anxieties and the uncertainties through a democratically inspired insurance and, let us say, through the manifestation of a desire to collaborate on the spot with the local forces which will inevitably emerge at the decisive moment and which at times, it seems to me, will have to replace the Vichy authorities which in many a locality will probably disappear in search of a refuge.

I would appreciate your sending me your answer by cable, even if it is negative. I will not hide however that a negative answer would be resented rather keenly by the qualified representatives of the resistance who sent for nothing more than "to reach an understanding with the Americans". I conclude herewith, although I have several other things to say to you; I have been promised that this letter with the attached list would be forwarded to you promptly and I hasten to deliver it.

Very cordially yours,

/s/ R. SCHNEIDER

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

car il y avait sur place des forces pour y opposer. Cette [illegible]
[illegible] a toujours paru exagérée, et pour ce [illegible] j'étais parfait[illegible]
[illegible] avec mes amis. Comme eux, je pense encore en ce moment [illegible]
[illegible] tantôt un optimisme destiné à apaiser les craintes de [illegible]
[illegible] tantôt un optimisme d'inspiration polémique qu'on [illegible]
[illegible] pour apaiser [illegible] les appréhensions des [illegible]
[illegible] en fait nouveau de [illegible] qui n'a rien à [illegible]
[illegible] et qui ne doit pas être confondu avec lui
[illegible] se manifestent les divers groupements de la réal[illegible]
[illegible] trop [illegible] le pays et [illegible]
[illegible] glissement vers la gauche [illegible]
[illegible] par le [illegible] et la nécessité de grouper
[illegible] a obligé le gaullisme officiel à faire
[illegible] des intérêts et la "reconnaissance" des
[illegible] ite national de la re-
[illegible] position à Alger, de Gaulle
[illegible] aux représentants de la
[illegible] que l'on prati-
[illegible] tout à fait réalisa-
[illegible] d'ailleurs
[illegible] considérable
[illegible] dérivent événe-
[illegible] tout la réal-
[illegible] la
[illegible] de la
[illegible] la
[illegible] de pouvoir

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

[illegible] apparence [illegible] étrangère. Il faut dissiper les [illegible] propagandes [illegible]. Mais je re- [illegible] entre qu'on entre en avec une personne qui [illegible] et avec [illegible] deux autres personnalités re- [illegible] peut être intéressant [illegible] conversation [illegible] intéres- [illegible] en France, qui repré- [illegible] la représentance française de [illegible] le soumettre aux [illegible] au sen- [illegible] relative [illegible] et des autres [illegible] pour le pouvoir [illegible] personne en [illegible] je n'ai [illegible]

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360005-0