OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Major W. J. Donovan, Jr.

FROM: John C. Bates

SUBJECT: Dormann, Martin Lewis

CONFIDENTIAL

Replying to yours of [illegible], I attach herewith a biographical sketch on the above subject. This was prepared from various memoranda here in our office.

I trust this will be sufficient information for General Donovan, but if he wishes more detailed data on any one phase of Dormann's activities, we will be glad to see what we can do on this if you will advise us.

JCB

BORMANN, Martin Ludwig

Born: June 17, 1900 in Halberstadt

Was educated in Eisenach and Weimar. In June, 1918 he joined Field Artillery Regiment 55 in Naumburg; was discharged in spring 1919. Served an apprenticeship on a farm in Mecklenburg.

In 1920 known to have joined an anti-Semitic association (Verein gegen Ueberhebung des Judentums); about the same time he seems to have joined "Organization Rossbach" responsible for all so-called "Feme-Morde" such as Gathenau, Erzberger, Kurt Eisner. In 1923 he became Abschnittsleiter (District head) in that organization. In connection with the so-called Perchinger Feme-Mord he was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison as accessory to a murder.

From 1927 on he devoted himself more or less completely to the organization of the National Socialist Movement. He joined the SA in Thuringia, was a collaborator of the newspaper "Nationalsocialist", and in April, 1928 became Gauwirtschaftsleiter (district manager) for Thuringia. In the same year he was called to Munich to become a member of the supreme command of the SA.

After Hitler came to power he became one of the top leaders of the Party; after Hess went to England he became his successor in many of his functions. He is now Chief of Staff of the Chancellery of the Party (Leiter der Partei Kanzlei); furthermore, he has a high command in the SS and the SA (Obergruppenführer), he is a member of the Reichstag, a member of the War Cabinet and a member of the Council for the Defense of the Reich (Ministerrats für die Reichsverteidigung).

OK Sent to Washington

SECRET

2 March 194[illegible]

[illegible] to T/5 Bernard E. Hocking

[illegible]

You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to the headquarters [illegible] your military orders, where you will report [illegible] office of Strategic Services, [illegible] operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services for such theatre.

William J. Donovan
Director, OSS

[illegible]
Chief

J. [illegible]
[illegible] Director,

Major Carl [illegible] Hoffman
Agent, OSS

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS

LA SALLE STREET

CHICAGO

March 31, 194[illegible]

Dear General Donovan:

Your telegram was greatly appreciated and the compliments contained in it, while [illegible] deserved, will always be treasured by me. [illegible] who [illegible] young [illegible] from early childhood -- one of [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] we lost last [illegible] -- I have [illegible] specially deep satisfaction to note [illegible] effort and contribution was [illegible] to be part of the [illegible] in the war.

It was especially happy [illegible] in the last months of my [illegible] that you were back from your important field activities and [illegible] opportunity to become [illegible] but [illegible] one of the proud and [illegible] personalities of our country. It seems to me that you have an extraordinary group of men associated with you in the OSS organization and the organization is going to be a great one.

Please feel that if you or your associates at any time in any way came to, you can call on me or any of those who work with me to hew wood and carry water in these parts or anywhere else. I plan to keep reasonably in touch with you and, as in the past, to be in Washington three or four days each month. This is a fact, not just an impression gathered from P...

Everett Dirksen telephoned me enroute to his home in Pekin, Illinois, where he was being given a testimonial dinner, and indicated that you saw him. I particularly appreciate your being this because I did want you to have a clear impression of my record, character and interest in government, and I suppose that, of all the men in public life, he knows me, my home, my friends and my civic and business activities best.

I wish you continued success and, again, please feel that you and your associates have added another loyal disciple.

Sincerely,

Chairman of the Board

28 MARCH 1944

SEE BELOW

XXXXXXXX DONOVAN

OFFICIAL TELEGRAM

MR. MORTON BODFISH
221 NORTH LASALLE
C/O UNITED STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE
CHICAGO 1, ILLINOIS

DISAPPOINTED TO HEAR IT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REMAIN IN CHICAGO FOR REASONS STATED YOUR TELEGRAM BUT FEEL SPLENDID CONTRIBUTION YOU HAVE ALREADY MADE WILL PERMIT CARRYING ALONG AS YOU SUGGEST WITHOUT REQUIRING YOUR RETURN FOR REMAINING SHORT PERIOD AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. THE ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN MATERIALLY STRENGTHENED BY YOUR SOJOURN HERE AND I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE APPRECIATION OF YOUR EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES IN MY BEHALF.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

WESTERN UNION

1220

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
NT = Overnight Telegram
LC = Deferred Cable
NLT = Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

NEWCOMB CARLTON
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT

The time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, USA=

GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN=

1944 MAR 27 AM 3 04

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE WASHDC 26 MARDC=

COMPLETELY UNAPPRECIATIVE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN FIRST FEDERAL
SERVICE AND DUTIES WHICH I AM PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF
[illegible] FEDERAL [illegible] IN CHICAGO FOR SEVERAL DAYS.
[illegible] ALLIES AND COUSINS AND CAPTAIN
[illegible] AHEAD MEDIA LINES YOU
[illegible] PLAN WILL AWAIT ADVICE
[illegible] LOYALTY TO YOU AND THE
[illegible] YOU ARE
[illegible] THAT I COULD HAVE A

[illegible] SERVICE

EVERETT M. DIRKSEN
15TH DISTRICT ILLINOIS

WENDELL E. CABLE
SECRETARY

COMMITTEES
APPROPRIATIONS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Everett M. Dirksen

January 2[illegible]th, 1944

TRANSFER OF [illegible] DOUGLAS BOWLBY, USNR

SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to New Delhi, India, where you will report to the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services,

APPROVED:

Morton Bodfish
Deputy Chief, MO

APPROVED:

J. H. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

Lt. (jg) George Demas, Acting
FE Theatre Officer

1. September 1944.

Subject: Disposition of vacancies.

To: OSS Theater Board.

1. The following recommendations for promotion and assignments to [illegible] and for allocation of vacancies before submission [illegible] Board of Officers:

[illegible] Harry M. Britten - Promotion to Captain
[illegible] Valley III - Promotion to 1st Lt.

[illegible] - Assignment to Special Projects Off., OSS

[illegible] that action be expedited in order to present [illegible] 1 September 1944.

GEORGE B. RIGGIN,
Major, AGD,
Acting Recorder.

12 July 1944

[illegible] Officer Candidates

[illegible] Master Goodfellow

1. You are hereby authorized and directed in [illegible] President of the Board of Officers, [illegible] by paragraph 10, Special Order 104, Hq. and Hq. [illegible] dated 12 July 1944, to fill the six [illegible] officer candidate vacancies for the month of July allocated to this Agency by Letter of the Adjutant General, [illegible] Officer Candidate School, dated [illegible] June 1944, [illegible] backlog of officer candidates [illegible] not already [illegible] by this Agency, but who have not already [illegible] school.

2. [illegible] all appointments for the month of [illegible] of the continental [illegible] appropriate adjustments in the [illegible] Order [illegible].

William J. Donovan
Director

August 19[illegible]

Dear Colonel:

Wally Bonds

OSS
Form 68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 14 MARCH 1945 REC'D 1546 15 MAR 45

TO SIGEX, KANDY

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 6378

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR) (FOR INFORMATION)

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, FIELD SECTION, O'GARA, X-2

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] 037. GRANDSON AND HUTCHESON TO COUGHLIN AND TAYLOR. REFERENCES OUR CABLE [illegible]367 (OUT 2723) YOUR CABLE [illegible] (IN [illegible])

[illegible] AS HEAD CHIEF OF SI FOR IBT.

IN LINE WITH YOUR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL IT IS INTENDED HE AND YOU WILL APPOINT SUB-CHIEFS OF SI FOR ALL THIS BRANCH'S UNITS IN THEATRE [illegible] DIRECT UNDER HIS SUPERVISION.

[illegible] YOUR FRANK OPINION OF OUR PERSONNEL [illegible] BASED RECEIVE SUGGESTIONS.

ADM CHECK DMS EGW VB

TOP [illegible] 15 MARCH

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

United States

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

9 November 1944

VIA POUCH

Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Lt. Colonel Waller Booth is being transferred to Washington for reassignment. I am sure you are familiar with his record with OSS and lately he has been the officer in charge of a combat reconnaissance patrol for various Cavalry Regiments.

His work, in my opinion, has been outstanding and he has been in the front lines and most of the time in advance of the front lines for the past several months.

I do not think he has been in the Army long enough to rate any appreciable leave but it is respectfully suggested that if you could see your way clear to give him 30 days leave, it would be greatly appreciated and I can assure you very well deserved.

Sincerely yours,

Lester Armour

Lester Armour
Commander, USNR
Deputy Director

United States

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

United States

SECRET

SECRET & SECRET

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

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Washington, D. C.

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Sincerely yours,

Lester Armour
Commander, USMLO
Deputy Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN 11 MARCH 1944

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMPEL

SUBJECT: WALLER B. BOOTH

As of significant interest in our relations with Ambassador Hayes, I am sending you herewith correspondence concerning the work of Waller B. Booth which was handed to me at the Department of State.

W. A. K.

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The Foreign Service
of the
United States of America

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Madrid, February 9, 1944

S E C R E T

The Honorable
J. Rives Childs
American Chargé d'Affaires
Tangier

Sir:

A Spaniard named Jose PINTO Portillo has been reportedly arrested at Seville and is stated to have worked for the American and British Consulates there and for representatives of both countries at Tangier. He is known to have stated he had photographed certain "plans" from one of our offices with a camera provided by the Germans and has conferred with the German Vice Consul at Seville. After one of these conferences he apparently came to Madrid and returned.

It has been suggested that in view of these circumstances the appropriate officials in the American offices at Seville and Tangier be suitably warned. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to the American Consul at Seville.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

/s/ Willard L. Beaulac
Counselor of Embassy

Copy to Seville

COPY

Tangier, Morocco, February 15, 194[illegible]

VERY SECRET

The Honourable
Carlton J. H. Hayes
American Embassy
Madrid, Spain

Sir:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Embassy's secret communication of January 7, 194[illegible], concerning a Spaniard named Jose PINTO Portillo reported to have worked for the American and British Consulates in Sevilla, and who is known to have stated that he had photographed certain plans from one of our offices with a camera provided by the Germans.

This legation is only too well aware of the activities of this person and of his wife, Francisca PINTO. Jose Pinto Portillo was employed in 194[illegible] by the American Naval Attaché in Tangier, and he was subsequently arrested by the Spanish authorities and apparently consented to work for the Spanish Intelligence Service and for Axis Intelligence service as the price of his freedom. Through a hard luck story he persuaded the office of the Naval Attaché to employ his wife as charwoman. She is known to have been provided with a special camera by the Germans as well as with a very special master key which enabled her to open locked cabinets and to make photographs of various documents and papers. The office of the Naval Attaché, at that time in charge of Captain Frank P. Holcomb, and officers of the OSS were so far convinced that the leak which was discovered in 194[illegible] was due to a number of the Embassy staff that it was only after much correspondence that a wholly innocent person was not sacrificed. It was not until the arrival of Mr. Weller E. BOOTH, representing the OSS in Tangier, that the real facts regarding the leak in the office of the Naval Attaché were established by him, and it was definitely proven that Pinto and his wife were responsible. The information contained in your letter is further proof, if further proof were needed, of the facts established by the splendid work of Mr. Booth.

Very truly yours,

J. Rives Childs
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

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B0172BZ

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
United States of America

American Embassy
London

December 2, 1942

TO: Mr. George Bowden

FROM: George O. Pratt

From a leader of the Belgian illegal trade union movement who was in Belgium from June 1940 to July 1942, and arrived in London about November 1, I received information that the bombing of transport facilities by American and British air force units had not been as effective as it might be because the targets selected were not the principal or most important ones. For example, attempts would be made to bomb a single train or to bomb switch yards or bridges. The bombing of a single train, even though it might cause a wreck, was ineffective because traffic might easily be re-routed. The bombing of switch yards was similarly ineffective because the number of switching points throughout Belgium made it comparatively easy to re-route transport with a minimum of interruption. As far as the bombing of bridges was concerned, the targets were difficult to hit squarely and were thus put out of action, if at all, only for a short time.

The suggestion was made that if the targets would consist of the locomotive round houses, central repair shops and classification yards, there would be a much greater effect upon the transport facilities in Belgium.

Pursuant to this suggestion, I have requested that my informant prepare for me a brief summary of the location and probable condition of these three types of places, and the attached report has been given to me in response to my request. You will note that the report refers to three types of places, first, the bridges and viaducts, which, as I pointed out above, are very difficult to destroy. You will note also that he

points out that these bridges are situated in congested areas, and I suppose that one thing to be borne in mind in selecting a target is to select one that would cause damage without destroying the houses or lives of a number of people who live immediately adjacent to the target. You will note, however, he does name three bridges, the destruction of which would block traffic from and to Germany. These are situated near Liege and Namur. My informant then lists fifteen places where round houses are located which he considers the most important of the country, and although as he says, the Germans do not make a practice of leaving their locomotives in the round houses, he indicates that in winter it is difficult not to bring them in for at least a period every twenty-four hours, and that generally speaking, the time between 1 A.M. and 3 A.M. will find the greatest number of locomotives in these round houses.

The central repair shops are named, the destruction of which would have an obvious and serious effect upon transport in Belgium.

He also lists eleven places where the most important classification yards are located, and in talking with me about these classification yards he indicated that trains are made up in such yards in the normal fashion, and that these yards are not, in July, protected to any great extent by anti-aircraft batteries.

While I suppose that both our air force and the British air force commands have excellent bombing target maps, and while I suppose that they made elaborate plans for coming across, it is my thought that this information coming as it does not only from a completely trustworthy Belgian source, but from a person who himself was on the board of directors of the Belgian national railways, may have some weight in the determination of the targets at which we should aim. As my informant put it, it may be more sport to try to bomb a moving train, but the amount of destruction to be accomplished would be much greater if we would undertake to bomb the engines and their round houses, and the freight cars lined up on parallel tracks in classification yards.

GEORGE O. PATTON

Attachment

December 27, 1948

[illegible], Colonel [illegible]
[illegible]ronto, Canada

Dear Colonel Rooker:

[illegible] your letter of [illegible] as you say, practically a year ago [illegible] organization [illegible] and [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] satisfactory [illegible].

[illegible] the [illegible] general.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Donovan
[illegible]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

DATE

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Huntington

FROM: Colonel Donovan

Will you please prepare a reply to the attached for my signature.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 18th, 194[illegible]

Dear Colonel Donovan,

It is now [illegible] a year since I first had the privilege of [illegible] contact with your organization. During this year [illegible] at this Department [illegible] understanding [illegible] instructions and myself I want [illegible] ful year it has been for us [illegible] of [illegible] learned a lot from them [illegible] I do not think any better [illegible] than [illegible] our Joint Congressional [illegible] people [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] with the same ideals.

[illegible]

strength with a single dud included. I have played a very small part in all this and the present advanced stage of the Training is entirely due to the keenness, hard work and team spirit displayed by all the Members of the Training Staff.

In closing I should like to wish you and all your Staff a Merry Christmas and really big things in the New Year.

Yours very sincerely

R. Montgomery
Lt. Col.

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Temporary "L" Building,
Constitution Avenue,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
U.S.A.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FA 102-3110 '891

January 25, 1943

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and refers to the receipt of four letters of December 7, 1942 concerning the medical reports to London of Messrs. Robert J. Sloane, Charles O. Brigham, Raymond Hussey and Robert Blum.

[illegible] that [illegible] in [illegible] pleased to the earlier [illegible] in this connection [illegible] of January 5, [illegible] London.

Enclosure:
[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION of FA
BUREAU

ENCLOSURE

TO

LETTER DRAFTED

ADDRESSED TO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

[illegible], 11 January [illegible], to London.

[illegible] month, [illegible], [illegible]-
[illegible] education. [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] U.S. in U.S. Empire [illegible]
[illegible] U.S.S.R. [illegible] U.S.
[illegible] S-3 [illegible] V-E, [illegible]
U.S. [illegible] publication [illegible]
[illegible], 1943. [illegible]
[illegible]
U.S.

(U.S)

[illegible]-8/[illegible]

December 7, 1942

The Honorable
R. Borland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

This office desires to [illegible] George T. Ballou's [illegible] London, England, [illegible] analysis [illegible] files of Foreign Service officers. [illegible] should [illegible]

It is desired to [illegible] printed [illegible] available [illegible] London, England. [illegible] Mr. Ballou will [illegible] will [illegible] where [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Sincerely [illegible]

cc: Colonel Donovan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]

William J. Donovan

Mr. Goodrich

[illegible]-porah, Woodrow Wilson.

November 13, 1942.

Subject: Appointment in the Army of the United States.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Under the provisions of AR 605-10 and paragraph 6.a of a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, subject, Procurement of Officers in the Army of the United States from Civilian Life, dated October 31, 1942, it is recommended that the following named person be appointed in the Army of the United States to the grade and [illegible] date, as indicated below:

a. Woodrow Wilson Lorah

b. Grade for which recommended: 2nd Lieutenant for duty with the Office of Strategic Services, which [illegible] material.

c. The proposed assignment is [illegible] the procurement objective authorized [illegible] memorandum from [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] Strategic [illegible] Services, "Officers for the Office of Strategic Services," [illegible] 1, 1942.

d. [illegible] Qualifications: [illegible] by [illegible] in connection with [illegible] of the organization [illegible] directive issued by the Joint [illegible] Staff [illegible] dated [illegible] 1942. [illegible] in the Department [illegible] which department [illegible] civilian. [illegible] available [illegible] in other departments.

2. [illegible] Qualifications: [illegible] qualifications [illegible] satisfactory [illegible] for [illegible]

[illegible] professional [illegible] qualifying him for duty as a [illegible] officer. He has received special secret training while an employee of this organization, [illegible] fitting him for the position to which he will be assigned. He is a linguist and a [illegible] analyst. He is a graduate of the [illegible] University, [illegible] Los Angeles, where he [illegible] degrees. The duty [illegible] as a civilian.

[illegible]

[illegible] necessary.

[illegible] case.

[illegible] Unclassified

[illegible] indicates.

[illegible] considered

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 28, 1942

Subject: Assignment of Officer

To: The Adjutant General
Washington, D. C.

1. It is requested that 1st Lieutenant Edwin David Bonner, 0-461768, Signal Corps, now on duty in the Military Personnel Department, Signal Corps, Room 3E-287, Pentagon Building, Arlington, Virginia, be transferred to the Office of Strategic Services, Room 2039, Temporary Building "Q", Washington, D. C.

2. This officer possesses experience and ability which are deemed essential in connection with a secret training program being conducted by this office, and his contemplated duty is communications work in the field. The particular assignment for which transfer of this officer is requested has been approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is further requested that this officer report for duty in Washington, D. C., not later than December 5, 1942.

4. The assignment of this officer should be charged against the allotment of commissioned personnel for the Office of Strategic Services approved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to the Director of Strategic Services, dated November [illegible], 1942.

William J. Donovan
Director

AG 201-Bohner, Edwin D.
(11-9-42) FOA

1st Ind.

WCM-SVWW-DAW-1510

War Department, A.G.O., Washington, D. C., December 9, 1942. To:
Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

Reference to cable communication is not favorably considered as the services of Lt. Edwin D. Bohner are urgently needed in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO:

DATE:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

SECRET

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

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From The Desk Of:
Commander John Ford, U.S.N.R.
Field Photographic Branch
Office of Strategic Services

1[illegible] Nov 1942

Memo for
Mr. Murphy:

[illegible] understanding with our
[illegible] Information,
[illegible] copy
[illegible] printing
Services [illegible] Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] Officer

1 September 1942

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

Via: Officer-in-Charge, Office of Naval Officer Procurement, New York, N. Y.

Subject: BOLTE, Charles Guy -- Applicant for commission in Class D-V(S), U.S.N.R.

Reference: (a) Nav-36-EMJ of 16 March 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. After thoroughly interviewing the subject-named man as to his professional qualifications and background, it is recommended that he be commissioned in the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade), D-V(S), U.S.N.R., to be assigned to the Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department, for further assignment with the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services as photographic officer to be in charge of a camera unit subject to immediate orders to any destination in connection with pictorial reports of the current conflict.

2. Because of the urgency of photographic missions currently being planned for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is requested that immediate action be taken in the processing of Mr. Bolte's commission; and that the requirement that he attend the Officers' Training School be waived, (1) because of the specialized duties to which he would be assigned, and (2) because time is a vital factor in the success of the photographic ventures being undertaken by this organization.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

B. E. CUNNINGHAM
Captain, U.S.M.C.R.
By direction

October 13, 1942

Dear Admiral Leahy: Train
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Train:

I think you should see the attached message which [illegible] I understand that [illegible] at Istanbul. Regrets [illegible] of course, [illegible] mornings [illegible] I have so notified [illegible]

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

October 13, 194[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] I understand that

[illegible] have

[illegible] nothing

[illegible] I have not notified

Sincerely,

[illegible] J. Donovan
[illegible]

October 1[illegible], 194[illegible]

Major General John R. Deane
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Deane:

I think you should see the attached cable which [illegible] from our London office today. I understand that [illegible] is at Istanbul. We have [illegible] him [illegible] and, of course, know nothing [illegible]. I have so notified London.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director



Canadian Pacific Hotels

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

October 22, 1942

Mr. Joseph W. Brooks,
Chateau Frontenac,
Quebec,
Canada.

Dear Joe:

I have your letter, and of course I would be very pleased if you would give me as reference.

In relation to the Army Air Corps, I suggest you get in touch with Trubee Davison, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, War Department, Washington, D.C.

If I hear of anything for you, I will let you know.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

JOSEPH W BROOKS
[illegible] EAST 4[illegible] STREET
NEW YORK N Y

Joe Brooks

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: David Bruce

DATE: October 16, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

The following report was received from Lagos, [illegible], under date of September 25, 1942, which our African desk grades as "2, A-1":

"General Fitzgerald (USCO West African [illegible]) at Accra stated on September 20th that he is making efforts to remove the OWI [illegible] stationed in his territory on the West Coast (at Brazzaville and Lagos.) This was [illegible] to a head recently when Fitzgerald received a [illegible] razzberry from headquarters in Washington because George Bookman, the OWI [illegible] in Brazzaville, has sent a long cable in [illegible] to the effect that our troops had landed in Leopoldville, giving details. Fitzgerald said that he knows nothing about these [illegible] OWI men wandering about in his territory, doing these things without his knowledge which might easily place him in an [illegible] or even dangerous position. [illegible] flew down to Lagos and gave Bookman hell [illegible] from dissatisfied with the situation."

D. B.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ONE THIRTY-FIVE EAST FORTY-SECOND STREET
NEW YORK N Y

October 5th., 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

The attached is a memorandum [illegible] conditions in France which I have just received from one of my French associates. [illegible] it on to you as I feel its [illegible] may be of interest to some of your [illegible].

Sincerely yours,

William M. Brewster.

MEMORANDUM

ON THE SITUATION IN FRANCE

AS AT JUNE 30th, 1942

[illegible] the change in the situation in France during the first six months of 1942 [illegible] to be summarised, it should be described as a new step towards economic [illegible] following a especially severe winter and heavier consequences of the war.

It may not be verified that the 1941 crop, which was imported much more better, was in fact affected by 20% of the 1939 crop as far as wheat is concerned, 15% for potatoes and about 30% for sugar.

If after such a crop it was not possible to stop the bread distribution, it is due to the exceptional selling of the flour, and to a small importation from Algeria which brought a situation that appeared in June as being alarming.

Some comparisons of rationing between France and other countries are given below: (normal weekly rationing)

	France	England	Germany	Switzerland
Meat	180 grs (1)	578 grs (2)	400 grs (3)	500 grs
Fats & Grease	100 "	511 "	269 " (4)	186 "
Sugar	115 "	375 "	280 " (5)	100 "
Bread	275 " per day	free	322 "	free up to present time
Potatoes	3 kgs 300 per month	free up to March 1942	unknown but superior to France rationing.	free up to present time

(1) - [illegible] not entitled to integral [illegible] as [illegible].

The figures of official rationing are those applied in cities [illegible] included in the quantity of consumption of farm products.

[illegible] lack of supplies in the towns, and [illegible] of [illegible] has been noticed.

(1) - In fact, in first week of July, it was only 160 grs. To this ration, a supplement of 30 grs was granted for the youths.
(2) - Including meat, blood and ham.
(3) - up to April 5th 1942 - Since April 5th : 300 grs.
(4) - reduced to 206 grs on April 5th.
(5) - reduced on April 5th to an unknown figure.

(Compressed gas 36,000,000 cubic meters
for 6 to 8,000 cars.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

[illegible]

[illegible] billions. Those conversions [illegible] It is to the monetary position [illegible]

September 18, 1942

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Foreign Affairs
45 East Sixty-fifth Street
New York, New York

Dear Ham:

Thank you for your letter of September 16 with the enclosure of Dr. Brandt's memorandum.

I had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Brandt and found him very much impressed by him. I am told that he is probably the best expert on European food conditions in this country. The Economic Division of this office has frequently called him in for consultation to their very great advantage.

The memorandum on bombing attacks against Germany impresses me as very telling and thoughtful. The conclusions, as you probably know, are in fairly close conformity with present British and American bombing practice in Europe. Students of German economics, both here and in England, have come to the conclusion the German transportation system is about the most vulnerable part of the whole economy. The recent series of attacks on locomotives and trains in Germany and France, and the consistent attempt to bomb railway junctions, loading docks and so forth, bear this out.

The most obvious limitation to Dr. Brandt's proposal, as I see it, is that its successful operation would require very heavy day-light bombing. A large part of this bombing would have to take place without fighter protection, with resultant heavy loss. Large-scale bombing to date has only

such positions at night, and might, if both, include the secrecy which is really necessary to attack successfully the high objectives which Mr. Grundtvig has in mind.

Despite this, particularly Mr. Grundtvig's memorandum seems to me to be of sufficient importance to deserve the fullest consideration. I intend, therefore, to put it in the hands of our representatives in London, who are working on targets for the Eighth Air Force. I think from my talk with your Air Force, that, that this memorandum could be of great help to them. In fact certain of them are [illegible] might be big.

I am very grateful to you for sending Mr. Grundtvig's memorandum to me. I also [illegible] attention to his forthcoming article in the October issue of "Foreign Affairs."

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September [illegible], 19[illegible]

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. J. R. Murphy

FROM: Edward S. Mason Esm.

The enclosed may serve as a basis for a reply to Mr. Armstrong. I introduced Brandt to the Colonel last winter and he probably remembers him.

I am sending the memorandum to have it copied, and I would like to get a copy to Chandler Morse in London. Morse [illegible] working on targets for the [illegible] Office.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

45 EAST SIXTY-FIFTH STREET
NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS FOREAFFAIRS, NEW YORK

September 16, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Karl Brandt, formerly head of the Department of Agriculture at the University of Berlin and now in the Food Research Institute in California, is one of my best German friends and one of those whose opinions I value most. He has just sent me a copy of a memorandum which he prepared for Milo Perkins at F.E.A. He tells me that Perkins has not even acknowledged its receipt and, as the subject seems important, he suggested that I might like to pass it along to one or two other persons in Washington who might read it with profit. I hope you will find it interesting.

Yours as ever,

Hamilton Fish Armstrong

P.S. Brandt has an interesting article on German manpower in the October issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, published today. I think it probably is the most careful analysis which has been prepared so far - apart, of course, from estimates which presumably are being made by the Army and the Navy.

August 21, 1942

Recommended New Method of Bombing Attacks Against Germany

Memorandum by

Dr. Karl Brandt
(Economist, Food Research Institute, Stanford University)

I. The Weakest Spot in Germany's Economic Armor

Analysts of Germany's power of economic resistance have frequently made the assumption that the German food supplies and the supplies of motor fuel and lubricants are the weakest bastions in her fortress. According to all information available at present, it is exceedingly doubtful whether there is much or any truth in such assumptions.

On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that Germany's war economy is most vulnerable and already has had to stand the greatest strain in its system of transportation, which consists essentially of railroads for the long haul and the bulk goods with waterways and highways as inferior supplementary resources. Railroads are the chief means of transport, much more so than in the United States or Great Britain, because they use coal as fuel which is abundant. Waterways are inferior because of the long period of frost and the slowness of shipping. Highway transport is suffering from a scarcity of trucks, rubber, and fuel. The German railroads with their services today extend over a large part of the European continent. It is highly probable that disturbances or temporary paralysis of certain parts of the heavily burdened arterial system would yield a many times greater loss of man hours in industry and raw materials than that which would be the direct attack upon factories or other targets.

[illegible] tremendous industrial war boom, great shifts have occurred [illegible] the kitchens of food and fuel of the big cities. [illegible] of the people are employed today in the main industrial [illegible] away from the farms. Hence, larger freight [illegible] the urban population and supplies of household fuel [illegible]. The [illegible] the distant Russian front requires a constant flow [illegible] by rail from the Reich, which in turn imposes a heavier burden [illegible] and ammunition. The statements of German [illegible] and the comments of reliable foreign [illegible] and Sweden indicate that during the fall [illegible] in the spring of 1942, the German railroads [illegible] the exceedingly heavy assignments of service [illegible] food, industrial materials, and arms and ammunition to [illegible] of 1942, it is seriously discussed in German newspapers [illegible] of food would make an effort to shift a large [illegible] from its present location into the immediate proximity of the main consumption center, especially the Rhineland and the [illegible] Valley, [illegible] lack of supplies for many weeks. Potato [illegible] more, [illegible] into the pattern of farming in Eastern

Germany than it does in the west, but it is obviously impossible to move in addition to the congestion of other urgent shipments many million tons of potatoes in the short period between the harvesting season in September and October and the first killing frost, which frequently comes in the second part of October or earlier.

II. The Suggested Imitation of a Blizzard

According to the experience of leading German railroad officials, as for instance, Dr. Ludwig Homberger (up to 1938 vice-president of the German Reich Railroad Corporation; now professor at the American University, Washington, D. C.), the worst upheaval in the railroad service observed for over more than 20 years has been caused twice by blizzards, which fell over large parts of Germany. Heavy snows and the alternation of soft temperatures and hardest frost blocked the switches, caused derailments and endless delays, and hampered the necessary food supplies for the cities for weeks. The greatest efforts made were frustrated by the simultaneous effect of the weather upon all the traffic in the respective areas.

None of the bombing that has been applied to Germany by the RAF has, according to my knowledge, either tried to hit military targets in the industrial areas or ports or fortifications directly or, in so far as the transportation system was the object of bombing raids, the bombs were aimed at freight yards, switches, bridges, or main terminals. Usually such attacks were made in long intervals; frequently targets were hit squarely; but according to reports even big holes in the railroad bridges over the Rhine have been mended in two days or less.

It is suggested that a new method ought to be tried; namely, a method imitating the effects of a blizzard, namely simultaneous blanketing of [illegible] by bombing all the feeder lines of rails plus highways with a [illegible] in such intervals that complete repair is made impossible [illegible].

III. [illegible]

[illegible] in industrialized countries have a load curve for [illegible] which shows a high seasonal variation similar to that of [illegible] in [illegible]. The peak load for urgent freight shipping is [illegible] of from 8-10 weeks in the fall, covering the months [illegible], September, October, and early November, and in spring covering [illegible] of late February, March, April, and early May. The fall peak is [illegible] one in [illegible]. This peak is the result of heavy shipments of [illegible], [illegible], especially potatoes, fertilizer, and seed grain, and of [illegible] household winter supplies. In this war, the fall peak [illegible] by heavy requirements of the army at the Russian front, [illegible] provided with stockpiles for winter quarters and other materials, [illegible] which is jeopardized during the frost and snow season. At [illegible] shipments of potatoes and fertilizer are the most urgent ones, [illegible] must be shipped before the heavy frost sets in. Fertilizer [illegible] before frost and snow begin in order to get the fall-sown crops [illegible] into the winter season.

It is obvious that bombing attacks will have a much more telling effect if they take place in peak-load periods - preferably in fall.

The fall season is particularly advantageous from another angle. All over Germany, as over the northwestern part of the European continent, the period called in the United States 'Indian Summer' is normally favored with the most ideal weather - bright sunshine, cumulous clouds, starlit nights, that hold especially during the latter part of August or September and often the first two weeks of October. During that period, I know, from my own observation while using the airlines in Germany, that at night the rails are visible to such an extent that the pilots of commercial airlines use them for orientation at night.

IV. Suggested Method of Attack

It is suggested that for paralyzing communications a whole industrial area (i.e., - the Essen, Cologne, Dusseldorf district or the Hanover district) should be mapped out for continuous attack, stretching over a period of four to five successive weeks. Instead of flying into the center of the district, the bombing planes should attack in dispersion and, if possible, follow up all the main railroad tracks leading to the area, trunk as well as branch lines, and parallel highways. The planes should fly at rooftop level and drop bombs at short intervals on the tracks, in order to wreck the rails and pry craters into the road bed at as many consecutive points as possible up to the main receiving centers. It is assumed that modern bombing technique permits the use of an appropriate type of delayed-action bombs and their accurate placement on the right of way, so that real damage can be done. If in addition, bridges, switch-control stations, locomotive sheds and other installations can be damaged, the freezing of the [illegible] would be complete.

V. The Advantages of the Suggested Method

If it is possible to damage the tracks of a dozen or more of the [illegible] stretches with bombs dropped in a pearl-string pattern, [illegible] time to do the necessary repair work? So far with [illegible] the track repair crews have been moving by emergency [illegible] foot. This procedure would become impossible if 20 [illegible] blocked by 30 or 40 different bomb craters.

[illegible] bomber assault upon the military targets have resulted [illegible] anti-aircraft defenses around the factories in the [illegible] area. It is very doubtful whether much defense ar- [illegible] along the tracks. Shifting to a [illegible] forces by surprise. Until they [illegible] would consist of interceptor planes.

[illegible] unable to judge the military feasibility of this type of attack. [illegible] temporary paralyzation of the rail- [illegible] industrial area during the critical peak-load season

would probably affect the enemy's output of war industries, the food supplies of the urban population, and the morale, more seriously than the direct attack upon factories or upon isolated spots in the railroad system. If it can be prevented that the eastern potato supplies for the winter reach the Ruhr valley district in time before hard frost strikes, the shortage will be felt all winter long. If the movements of coal from the Ruhr to the central and southern provinces and to Italy are upset in fall again the shortage will be felt for many months.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

DATE:

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT:

[illegible] French sailors manning anti-aircraft positions [illegible] are ordered not to shoot [illegible] British planes. [illegible] persons [illegible] (Series I, #790, 7/[illegible]/[illegible])

FRA[illegible]

(1) French [illegible]

Recruiting [illegible] only [illegible] 60,0[illegible] [illegible] of the poorest quality. [illegible] of undemobilized troops [illegible] (Series I, [illegible], 7/[illegible]/[illegible] and [illegible])

[illegible] France

[illegible] that the [illegible] replace [illegible] [illegible] (Series [illegible])

[illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] to protect [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] pro-British. (Series [illegible], Navy [illegible], [illegible]). Bermuda Travellers [illegible], 7/6/[illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] opinion very [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] recommended [illegible] [illegible] could be counted on to [illegible] Travellers [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 1, 19[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] such as the Celtric mild [illegible] all testimony.

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WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

DIVISION OF INDUSTRY OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY BRANCHES

May 26, 1942

IN REPLY REFER TO:

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
15th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Colonel Shelton gave an inspiring talk to two hundred of my top staff this morning. It did [illegible] a great deal of good and I appreciate immensely [illegible] that made it possible.

[illegible] for you before long.

Sincerely yours,

William H. Nee
Bureau Chief

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May 26, 1942

Mr. Philip Reed, Chief
Bureau of Industry Branches
Room 500, Railroad Retirement Bldg.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Reed:

[illegible] tell you a little about Colonel [illegible]. He comes from Rhode Island, his forefathers [illegible] in the 17th century. He [illegible] from Colgate and from Harvard Law School. [illegible] Reporter and Treasurer of [illegible] Pennsylvania. [illegible] correspondent [illegible] Army in World War I. [illegible] Navy in 1940, [illegible] Navy, present [illegible] Naval Intelligence Commander and [illegible] from a conscientious objector [illegible] Donovan then became [illegible] of the file records [illegible].

[illegible] Donovan [illegible] Mary [illegible] Chemical Warfare Coordinator and [illegible] Active Area. I think your [illegible] will be [illegible] frankly to you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

[illegible] May 14, 1946

[illegible]

[illegible] to Marshall which I thought

[illegible] in all of which Jim

[illegible] interventic

[illegible] and corruption

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

sponsible administrative work.

During the day the following suggestions occured to me as being part of an order you might like to issue later. First, the Finance Section will give monthly statements to all branch heads showing the amount of money spent during the month and the amount left in the budget to be spent in the future. Second, I think that all Branch Heads should be requested to make report monthly of the general activities in progress in their branches with a brief statement of their [illegible] objectives in the coming month. I think this will [illegible] as much good to have to think as it will [illegible] our office. Third, I suggest an order [illegible] the matter of jurisdictional questions with [illegible] action contemplated by Branch Heads [illegible] in other executive branches, [illegible] should be required to report fully [illegible] the person in charge so that the matter can [illegible] other agencies concerned and all uncertainties [illegible] from Hall during lunch. [illegible] informed by one of the Budget Committee that [illegible] about the amount of money being spent [illegible] whether the results being obtained justify [illegible] large Information Agencies. One of the Committee (I

do not know his name) said to me in a letter chart that the Committee proposed to make a careful investigation so the [illegible] justify our Budget. We found our presentation this week before the Budget uniformly interesting and much more impressive than our appearance some months ago. This man [illegible] thought the President would like to get the [illegible] reorganization settled before the general budget [illegible] because of the reasons stated above.

[illegible] budget hearings today I heard Sherwood, Barnes, [illegible] lasting all afternoon. I thought they did a good [illegible] general impression. This afternoon [illegible] himself and confined himself [illegible] I heard Ginsberg for about a [illegible] straight forward, common sense [illegible]

[illegible] of the general COI chart [illegible] early this morning by Hall. [illegible] seemed to him [illegible] difficult and to move your [illegible] contact with the branches. [illegible] the fact that the [illegible] would require changes in [illegible] in your plan to inter- [illegible] your office and the branches

as far as detailed supervision was concerned. This satisfied him. I told him that the present set up was temporary and represented only the first phase.

I can be reached all day tomorrow through the New York [illegible]. I will be in Providence Saturday, back in New York [illegible] Monday. I propose to spend two or three days [illegible] Monday's meeting on 57th Street and Broadway after [illegible] definite recommendations.

WESTERN UNION

1201

SYMBOLS
DL - Day Letter
NL - Overnight Telegram
LC - Deferred Cable
NLT - Cable Night Letter
Ship Radiogram

Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

NCS 1 NL=WUX WASHINGTON DC APR 17 309P

COLONEL WILLIAM J DONOVAN=

HOTEL ST REGIS=

DEAR BILL: I SUPPOSE YOU'VE THE ORDER YOU DICTATED TODAY.
THIS IS IN MY OPINION A WISE AND HEARTENING MOVE WHICH
WILL BE MET WITH ENTHUSIASM BY ALL OF COI THEY DONT
KNOW THE ANY BETTER THAN I DO. HOPE TO SEE YOU TOMORROW=

BOB SHERWOOD.

345P..

COI. RPT COI.

WE WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

Col. Wm. J. Donovan 51

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Number: 8
Issued: 4/17/42
Effective: 4/17/42

SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANT COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION.

1. Effective this day, I herewith appoint Colonel G. Edward Buxton to serve as Assistant Coordinator of Information.

2. Colonel Buxton is authorized to act in my name in all matters affecting this Agency and he will be recognized accordingly.

William J. Donovan
Coordinator

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

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Copy for Col. Goodfellow
Copy for Colonel Donovan

[illegible] March 23, 1942

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] in Harvard, [illegible] he says [illegible] in Association in [illegible] endeavor to get a college education.

[illegible] Least [illegible] Workers in the Service [illegible] Corps at Camp [illegible],

[illegible] personnel [illegible] Corps etc.

[illegible] Colonel [illegible] local [illegible] to this [illegible] school [illegible], etc.

[illegible] the Army [illegible]

[illegible]

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

Not Used

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 18, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In view of your interest in points of possible danger and of protective measures on the West Coast, I thought you would be interested in the enclosed memorandum which summarizes a report I have just received from a confidential informant.

These data have not been verified by investigation and I am therefore unable to comment on the reliability to be given them. I thought, however, they would be made available to you.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 13, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In view of your interest in points of possible danger and of protective measures on the West Coast, I thought you would be interested in the enclosed memorandum which summarizes a report I have just received from a confidential informant.

These data have not been verified by investigation and I am therefore unable to comment on the reliability to be given them. I thought, however, they might be made available to you.

Sincerely,

Edgar

December 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM

The following is a summary of information received from a confidential informant outlining his observations of protective measures taken and of points of possible danger in connection with national defense in the San Francisco area. This source first referred to the protective measures taken and needed with regard to the principal bridges in the San Francisco Bay area.

He stated that the Golden Gate Bridge appears to be the best protected. He noted Federal troops with fixed bayonets stationed at frequent intervals the entire length of the structure and that no cars were permitted to stop. He also observed that the California Home Guard has men stationed at each end of the bridge and that these appear to be considerably above the general run of personnel of that organization in so far as general appearance is concerned.

The Carquinez Bridge over the Sacramento River at Vallejo was considered by him as the next best protected. He noted that members of the California Home Guard, which had just recently been organized in California and not yet inducted into Federal service, were in considerable evidence there. He was advised by one of the men on duty that they were operating on shifts whereby they were on duty for three hours and then off for eight.

[illegible] pointed out with regard to the Carquinez Bridge, [illegible] particularly with consideration to air raid precautions, [illegible] under this structure the plant of the C and H [illegible] was [illegible] greatly lighted and was visible from a great [illegible]. He also pointed out that a tall chimney in the same [illegible] was not blacked out and that there were a great [illegible] lining the highway apparently for several [illegible] the Refinery district, the town of Rodeo and almost [illegible] would undoubtedly serve as excellent guides to [illegible] and that the Hercules Powder Plant was apparently [illegible] area which was well darkened.

This source advised that the Bay Bridge running from Oakland to San Francisco and one of the longest and highest in the world, is very poorly guarded. He noted that it was extremely well lighted with amber fog lights high overhead, and from Twin Peaks, a vantage point some distance away, the entire structure stood out clearly even through a heavy rain.

The informant advised that the guarding of the Bay Bridge was in the hands of the California Home Guard. A corporal of that organization, an ex-soldier from the World War, advised him that their services were voluntary and on the basis of two hours on duty and four hours off. This same corporal advised that there was a machine gun furnished for defense at the Oakland approach of the bridge, but had no knowledge of protective measures elsewhere. The informant subsequently drove over the structure and failed to find any other persons on guard until he had proceeded approximately two-thirds of the way across the Bay to the western end of Yerba Buena Island. He found there a disreputable appearing individual with a gun, but in conversation it was learned he obviously had no knowledge of its use or of what his duties were supposed to be. The only other person the informant could find on duty at this bridge was a guard at the San Francisco end and he was found alone and almost asleep when the informant approached him.

The reporting informant noted with reference to air raid precautions that there were four huge red "blinkers" on top of the Bay Bridge and that from the vantage point of Twin Peaks, they were an obvious and easily found means of identification.

The fourth important bridge referred to by this source was the Dumbarton Bridge which crosses the southern end of the Bay from approximately Menlo Park to Newark. He advised that he failed to observe any guards stationed there.

The informant also advised that during two crossings he observed no guards at all on the Yolo Causeway which connects all east west traffic from Sacramento to San Francisco, nor could he observe any guards on the Yolo Causeway. He also noted that there were no guards on the important new Sacramento River drawbridge on

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Capitol Street about a half mile from the State Capitol, and commented on its importance in that it is the main artery there for east-west traffic and in the center of a principal warehouse district of Sacramento with many piers and docks and the freight yards of the Southern Pacific Railroad. He further pointed out that about 500 feet west of this bridge were located easily seen silver painted tanks of the Texico Company, the State Box Company with its vast lumber yards, Crown Zellerback paper warehouses, the Crane Company and innumerable other important plants. With further reference to Sacramento, the informant noted the fact that the city is surrounded by flood protection dikes with huge steel flood gates at all highway entrances to the city and that there was no evidence of any protective measures with regard to them.

This source of information next referred to the Marina in San Francisco where he stated he observed several sentries and what appeared to be "either anti-aircraft guns poorly concealed or machine gun nests". He stated, however, that automobiles were allowed to park freely within a few feet and that he counted forty-one there at one time. A short distance away at the San Francisco Yacht Basin, he saw men on guard duty but noted that there were also a number of cars parked there. He pointed out that this locality is at the immediate vicinity of the approaches to the Golden Gate Bridge. He also observed that the sentries, contrary to regulations, were talking freely with any passer-by who engaged them in conversation, and that many of the men who were apparently on sentry duty were merely "ambling about". In this connection, he advised that on Lands End, immediately below the Veterans Hospital and adjoining the Palace of the Legion of Honor, there were more cars parked even though it had been reported to him that the area had been heavily fortified. He observed that automobiles could stop there at any hour of the night and park with or without lights.

[illegible] his attention in his communication [illegible] commented on the fact that the activities [illegible] well known among the people [illegible] that he could count fifteen [illegible] point, being loaded from open docks,

and that there were many large cases marked "Buick", "Chevrolet", "International Harvester" and "Dupont" which can be freely observed by anyone walking or riding by. He also pointed out that it is generally known in San Francisco that troops were being sent out of there to the Orient and that one individual advised him that a Marine had stated there were about 9,000 men departing by ship every night. This same local informant and other sources contacted by my informant, expressed the opinion that the blackouts which had been occurring in the San Francisco area were solely for the purpose of distracting the public and keeping them off the streets during the hours when the troop ships put out to sea, and that the planes reported heard at such times were patrol planes from the Army airport on duty in connection with the troop ship departures.

The source of this report pointed out that the troop and material movements were not well protected from observation since they were taken from open docks which could be observed from [illegible] Street and the famous Fisherman's Wharf. He could observe freight cars containing the fuselages of five pursuit planes, trucks, tractors, "jeeps" and many other types of equipment, and observed a long line of soldiers going up the gangway of one ship. He observed [illegible] about 100 feet there was a group of civilians [illegible] and about 50 feet further on, there was [illegible] and crap joints" frequented by [illegible] character. In two visits during the night to [illegible] he observed several soldiers, but [illegible].

[illegible] distribution in the Bay area for [illegible] that the street lights [illegible] stated he could [illegible] from as far as forty-five [illegible] he could actually see [illegible] forty-two miles. The same applied to [illegible] reported that [illegible] thirty-nine miles north and [illegible] from all [illegible] hereinbefore, he [illegible] were the double [illegible] and streets in-

San Francisco which were easily identifiable. He observed that Alcatrez was brightly lighted and the fact even its brilliantly illuminated outlook tower was unchanged during the blackouts, convinced local people the warnings were not serious since Alcatrez is such an unmistakable landmark.

Another item of possible interest reported by the informant was his observation of four lines of Army trucks, two going down and and two going up the peninsula, all with unprotected bright head-lights. He stated he was told they were transporting troops from Fort Ord to the Embarcadero, and while waiting for them to pass, a local gas station employee volunteered the information that between 30,000 and 50,000 troops had been loaded on transports in that manner since December 7, 1941.

As an aid observation, the informant stated that in his entire travels through the area referred to herein in the period he was there, he did not once observe an officer checking on an Army or Navy outpost. He pointed out that he had an opportunity to observe numerous sentries, guards and other armed personnel, but no evidence of such inspections were undertaken by the commissioned officers.

Further notes of J. Edward Lanton on December 16, 1941.

DEC 20 1941

[illegible] English propaganda agent Lanterosa came to me yesterday about a San Francisco Japanese named Shigeki Uno who operates the Liberty Press at 1765 Post Street; also, publishes an anti-American paper in Sacramento called American Citizen.

This Japanese has been printing propaganda material in [illegible] English. The press and newspaper have been [illegible] at the order of the Treasury Department, freezing Japanese assets in this country.

The writer believes that he should be allowed to operate the press and [illegible] under pistol or stiletto, on the ground that [illegible] contain anti-Axis [illegible] and thus relieve the Japanese-American population on this Coast.

[illegible] Mr. Ilgen, head of [illegible] San Francisco, [illegible] another will have [illegible] Nobles thinks [illegible] they were [illegible] similar with the [illegible]

[illegible] for [illegible] Major General [illegible] condition, [illegible] letter to the [illegible] his services [illegible] and the [illegible] of these divisions.

[illegible] including [illegible] the [illegible] to Silverid [illegible] same time [illegible] condition.

[illegible] intelligence [illegible] tremendously [illegible] loud [illegible] [illegible] dollars.

[illegible] Colonel Donovan.

I lunched again with Mr. J. F. Neylan at the Huntington Apartments. He said that he was not in any way retracting any of his praise for Gen. Barrows, but that thinking overnight he had still another suggestion to make; namely, "Navy Bill" Ingram. Mr. Ingram, after graduating from Annapolis, where he had a distinguished athletic record and later coached the Annapolis football team, left the Navy some nine years ago at about

the age of 34. He coached the University of California football team for two years, and then through the influence of Mr. Neylan, was associated for a short time with one of the Hearst newspapers. And then for the last six or seven years has been a vice president in charge of public relations and labor relations for the Safeway Stores, a national organization doing about $600,000,000 worth of business. Mr. Ingram gets $25,000 a year and is now just reaching his prime at about 43 years of age. He is anxious to become active in the war in some capacity. He has some trouble with his back, which might prevent his entering the Navy actively, although he would be glad to do so.

Mr. Neylan says that he would try to arrange to have the Safeway Stores pay him part of his salary if we ever took him as our representative. Mr. N. says that Mr. Ingram is one of the most influential and popular men on the Coast with all classes of society, from the Southern Pacific Club and the Bohemian Club to labor circles, where he has successfully negotiated many contracts. He believes that Ingram could exercise more influence with Beck, the labor leader in Seattle, than any businessman on the Coast. Mr. Neylan says Mr. Ingram's personality and capacity are both very unusual. He thinks this name should be considered with that of Gen. Barrows.

He also suggests two very promising young men, but realizes that neither of them has any previous service background. Lewis Lapham, son of Roger D. Lapham of the American-Hawaiian Steamship Company; and Malcolm McNaughton, a young stockbroker. Both men are friends of Turner McBaine.

In addition, Thomas Adams of British Intelligence has given me the name of William Whitely, formerly with FBI in this area, now security manager for Vultee Aircraft. Mr. Adams says Mr. Whitely has a host of friends in this area and knows it like a book. His thought was that if we had one man specializing in anti-subversive activity, this man would be most excellent.

Mr. Adams tells me that he has a connection very close to Japanese who are thought to be dangerous in this community. He believes this connection very important and very trustworthy. He came to me with a long list of names (Japanese) secured from this quarter. The man is not willing to deal with the FBI for several reasons not necessary to state here which do not reflect upon the man himself.

I have arranged to have Mr. Adams give these names to Commander Carrigan, Capt. McCollough's assistant at ONI. Mr. Adams already has excellent relations with Commander Carrigan. He also has been working with Col. Forney, G-2, Ninth Corps Area, and I have asked Mr. Adams to give the same list of names to Col. Forney. I have also arranged to have him put through an emergency call to my office in New York when he believes that instant help is needed from our organization. Mr. Adams is the permanent representative of the English here.

More concerning the Japanese, Oka, described at the top of this report:

Mr. Adams says that this man had the courage to publish the Admiral Tanaka Memorial, which fact alone proves his opposition to the Japanese government, because the latter has made every effort to deny the existence of such a statement. Admiral Tanaka is said to have written a pamphlet at the time of Japan's entrance into Manchuria stating that this was only the first step. The succeeding steps outlined in the Tanaka statement called for occupation of China, then South China, then Indo-China, then Malaya, the Philippine Islands, and Hawaii.

Adams says Oka is well liked by loyal Japanese and should be allowed to operate both his press and his newspaper for local consumption under competent censorship. Oka has a nisei daughter, Mrs. Onuma. This daughter is well known to Mr. Adams, who regards her as both loyal to the United States and very intelligent person.

GEB:dj

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Further notes from G. E. Buxton - December 16 and 17, 1941

DEC 19 1941

December 16

Talked an hour with Mr. Clarence Lindner, publisher of the San Francisco Examiner. He is anxious to help our office in any possible way. He says the morale of this community is excellent and sentiment has solidified all opinion into one purpose--to win the war. He thinks the pioneer spirit is still alive in San Francisco.

He says the only question that he has heard is whether or not all sports are to be blacked out in California and allowed to run without hindrance in New York and Florida. Is the East going to take the sport business away from them, although there is a war, as they understand it, on two oceans? I enclose a clipping from this morning's Examiner along the same line.

December 17

Spent two hours with Mr. John Francis Neylan at his apartment. Mr. Neylan regards Mr. Charles Kendrick as a very high-grade and greatly respected citizen. It is his opinion, however, that Maj. Gen. David Prescott Barrows would be the best representative Col. Donovan could obtain as a liaison officer on this coast. I asked Mr. Neylan about Gen. Barrows because he had been recommended to me by Dr. Hayden of our organization. Later this afternoon I talked with Capt. McCollough of ONI, and he confirmed Mr. Neylan's opinion. He believes Gen. Barrows would be even more satisfactory than Mr. Kendrick. I enclose copy of comments given me by Dr. Hayden. Both Mr. Neylan and Capt. McCollough agree that Gen. Barrows is a man of great personal distinction and keen intelligence and would be treated with great respect by anybody connected with the government, Army and Navy, or FBI--provided he is interested in assuming such duties. I am told that he regards himself as a soldier rather than as a college professor, and has been very active in urging preparedness and active intervention. Mr. Neylan has arranged an appointment for me to see him at 10 o'clock tomorrow in Berkeley.

Capt. McCollough asked me to come to his office to meet an American who he says is probably better known on the West Coast of Mexico and to the highest authorities in Mexico City

than any other American businessman, James W. Swent, 300 Montgomery Street, executive vice president of the San Luis Mining Company; director of the Homestead Mining Company; president of the Triumph Mining Company, Idaho; officer and director of numerous other mining companies and director of several banks in Mexico. Fifty per cent of the San Luis Mine was once owned by Mr. Hearst, although it is now a smaller interest.

I talked to Mr. Neylan about Mr. Swent. Mr. Neylan checked him and endorsed 100% everything said by Capt. McCollough. He further said he knew him in person and would rather have his opinion on Mexico, and particularly the west coast, than anyone else. Mr. Swent has lived for 25 years in that section. He has been able to run his mine without interruption during all of the changing Mexican administrations during that 25 years.

Mr. Swent's son speaks Spanish like a native and has grown up spending much of his time on the west coast of Mexico. His son is now an ensign in ONI. The father sent the son to investigate a report of a great natural air field near La Paz, a little harbor near the extreme southern end of the Lower California peninsula. It was this report which Capt. McCollough wanted me to see. Photographs showed a perfectly flat, hard field one and a half miles long, three quarters of a mile wide, with not even a bush or a ridge. It was now the bottom of an arm of the bay and became separated from the ocean by a sand dune and dried out.

After talking with Mr. Swent I decided that we should give this information to G-2 of the Fourth Army. Capt. McCollough went on with Mr. Swent and me to see Col. Stroh, the head of that office. Col. Stroh seemed very much interested and said that the whole interview would be referred to a general who is charged with making the reconnaissance. (I understood this was to be Hillman or Millwell; I am not sure.)

Among other things Mr. Swent said that Gen. Rodriguez controls the northern half of the peninsula and is friendly to the United States. He was formerly governor of this territory and controls the fishing industry in that section. The governor of the lower half of the peninsula is Governor Muñoz. This man is anti-Obregón and has never liked the [illegible]. He was a trouble-maker when he was Minister of [illegible] and was placed by the present administration as far away from Mexico City as possible.

Mr. Swent says that many of the inhabitants of the Lower peninsula, and minor officials, also are unfriendly. He thinks they are more friendly, however, to the Germans than to the Japanese, probably because the Germans have been our enemies for a longer period. He regards the central government in Mexico as friendly, particularly because it has been in their interest to be friendly. The following places are regarded by Mr. Swent as dangerous areas, with dry lake beds suitable for planes to either land or take off:

1. Upper Sonora - dried lake beds.
2. North Cingalloa - dried beds and beaches.
3. The lower half of the peninsula, with special attention to the field at La Paz above referred to.

Mr. Swent says that a temporary reconnaissance will not be particularly valuable. Conditions change rapidly, and some [illegible] may be white today and black tomorrow. He thinks the situation calls for permanent observation. He is willing to [illegible] confidential relation with our organization and put about six of his Mexican employes and two of his engineers, together with his son, into these potentially dangerous places. He says, of course, it is very important that such arrangements [illegible] kept [illegible]. Mr. Swent wants no compensation himself. [illegible] his employes would satisfy them. I [illegible] this with you when I see you if you believe it is [illegible] thing it should be given consideration.

[illegible] leave the office immediately after [illegible] report; therefore he has not seen [illegible]. [illegible])

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Sports
San Francisco Examiner
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1941

Hialeah, Tropical Crowded; Stakes Lists Completed

Southern Officials Want to Help Pacific Coast Owners, But Haven't Accommodations; Whirly 'Shut Out'

NEW YORK, Dec. 16.—(INS)—Florida would like to supply a haven for race horses made idle by the Army's ban on racing in California, but Florida has no accommodations for them, according to John Clark, president of the Hialeah race track, today.

"We haven't three vacant stalls at Hialeah," said Clark, "and while we want to do everything possible to co-operate with horsemen everywhere, we simply haven't got accommodations to take care of their horses.

"All our major stakes were closed yesterday and that would make it impossible to get new entries. It is a pity, for instance, that a horse like Whirlaway will not be available for the $50,000 Widener Cup Handicap."

By FRED J. STROZIER

MIAMI [illegible] Dec. 16 (AP) [illegible] of the race horse world except Whirlaway already are listed for such important Florida stakes as Hialeah's $50,000 Widener Cup and can stretch their running legs here if war drives them from California.

Widener Cup and can stretch their running legs here if war drives them from California.

But while the elite of thoroughbred society is assured entry to the big events, racing leaders say there can be no wholesale exodus of run-of-the-mine horses from the war-threatened West coast to Florida's tracks.

The trouble isn't stable room, because many of them would find quarters. The view of racing leaders is that only a limited number of horsemen can make their feed

(Continued on Page 25, Col. 1)

Army Chief Explains His Racing Ban

"If on January 15, or any other date, the situation is alleviated, there will be no objection to opening the Santa Anita Race Track."

This reiteration of Army policy was made last night by Lieut. General John L. De Witt, Fourth Army commander, in answer to a plea by Dr. Charles Strub, general manager of the Arcadia track, for clarification of orders.

General De Witt, through the Fourth Army's public relations department, wanted it made plain that cancellations were not his personal doings—that he only made recommendations to the proper civil authorities and that it was up to them to decide what action should be taken.

Concerning the closing of Santa Anita he pointed out:

1—That he deemed a January 1 opening of the track unwise.

2—That it would be unwise to open the track at any subsequent date if the situation remained the same.

3—If the situation was alleviated it would be all right to open the track.

However, General De Witt would not predict when the situation might be eased.

Little Room for Coast

the Oregon- clicked so fast dribbling, at the to 31.

International News Reader Photo

Sports Parade

Fans Puzzled By Sports Ban

the Oregon-
er clicked so fast
and is dribbling, at the
33 to 31.

Sports Parade

Fans Puzzled By Sports Ban 'Blackouts' Here But Not in East

By Curley Grieve

The Pacific coast sports followers will grin and bear the blackout that has descended upon major sports events.

But [illegible] that they are asking [illegible] are a little [illegible]

already are listed for such important Florida stakes as Hialeah's $50,000 Widener Cup and can stretch their running legs here if war drives them from California.

Widener Cup and can stretch their running legs here if war drives them from California.

But while the elite of thoroughbred society is assured entry to the big events, racing leaders say there can be no wholesale exodus of run-of-the-mine horses from the war-threatened West coast to Florida's tracks.

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However, General De Witt would not predict when the situation might be eased.

Little Room for Coast Horses at Fair Grounds

NEW ORLEANS, Dec. 16.—(AP)—Owners of the Fair Grounds race track here said today they will start immediate construction of barns for 300 additional horses to aid turfmen whose winter plans have been upset by cancellation of the Santa Anita and Bay Meadows race meetings in California because of the war.

Tony Pelleferi, whose Bay View last year won the $100,000 Santa Anita Handicap, and associates in operation of the historic Fair Grounds here, said the move was under way.

"If most of the owners at Santa Anita will split their stables, sending here only the horses that can be in action for our meeting, we'll be able to give many stables some work to do," he said.

To Col. Donovan -
From G. E. Buxton.

DULLES

EM Chief

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[illegible] requires about 15 people [illegible] long term [illegible]. Although, as we had discovered that [illegible] were [illegible] with bad hearing and eyesight. [illegible] a troop of low scouts. [illegible] required the [illegible] that our vessel carries the [illegible] or a full person.

[illegible] a volume in our post could [illegible] out, nevertheless, [illegible] be important.

[illegible] that they [illegible] of [illegible] two, three [illegible] children. [illegible]

[illegible] on [illegible].

Notes made by G. Edward Buxton — Dec 4th to Dec 14, 1941 inclusive.

To Colonel Donovan!

December 14, 1941

[illegible] Washington with Curtis Munson by sleeper plane at [illegible] 8, 19[illegible], [illegible] arrived in Los Angeles at [illegible] 9, 19[illegible]. [illegible] met by Lieutenant-Commander [illegible] conferred with [illegible] Jan and Lieutenant Commander [illegible] Naval District Intelligence Officer, [illegible] headquarters in San Diego. [illegible] Naval District headquarters in Los [illegible] Japan's representative in Los [illegible] is a high [illegible] Japanese intelligence officer, [illegible] is an entrepreneur [illegible] the Japanese [illegible] unusual underground [illegible] China many personal connections [illegible] on the West Coast. [illegible] Americans.

[illegible] Munson and myself to San Diego that [illegible] San Diego hotel, we conferred [illegible] Naval Station, [illegible], and [illegible] San Francisco; [illegible] Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

[illegible] at 0[illegible] [illegible] took me [illegible] Fifth Naval District; [illegible] Lieutenant [illegible], [illegible] multi-million dollar defense [illegible]

[illegible] San Diego to live the [illegible] exclusive use of the range for the [illegible] consolidated aircraft plants.

[illegible] a point not quite to a [illegible] with [illegible] and [illegible] relative letters from [illegible]

[illegible] plans of the Consolidated [illegible] locked, and "it is [illegible] prohibited." [illegible] silver prints. [illegible] should be put out, [illegible] criminal [illegible], but this is [illegible]

[illegible] joint informal [illegible] tative each [illegible] conditions [illegible]

M.I.D.

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In addition, Col. Mikks had one company of anti air craft -

A.H.

[illegible] around 9:00 that night.
[illegible] in touch with local [illegible]

[illegible] aircraft plants in their [illegible] manager [illegible] problems, [illegible] Communist [illegible] all over the [illegible] officers of Army and Navy. He is [illegible] intelligence officer. [illegible] in Los Angeles so he could cover both [illegible] Angeles, and [illegible] turn to [illegible] five-hour bus ride to San Francisco [illegible] list of a blacklist. [illegible] Burnham, latter an official of [illegible]

[illegible] of jottings from my notebook [illegible] itinerary. [illegible] was an incentive [illegible] made on my return from the [illegible] history and rendered [illegible] for as concerns my discussion [illegible]

[illegible] concerned as most [illegible] one, in my opinion, which is [illegible] I was much interested in [illegible] officer at Fort [illegible] efforts to infiltrate the [illegible]

[illegible] efforts inviting enlisted men [illegible] to be communist- [illegible] assignment [illegible] clientele.

[illegible] and given a [illegible] officers. [illegible] told that [illegible] large salaries, while [illegible] were told that these officers [illegible] and refusal to obey [illegible]

[illegible] upon the loyalty [illegible] to maintain [illegible] signals to many [illegible] were given more [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] twelve hours after the [illegible] or to seek rest many until [illegible] and considered [illegible] on the point to be healthy or [illegible] alone now in [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] I have been [illegible] means of [illegible] that [illegible] not [illegible] cremation [illegible].

[illegible] require all [illegible] from [illegible] the [illegible] opinion [illegible] possible [illegible] but [illegible].

Lastly, I think it is extraordinary that there has been no report of sabotage from any Axis nationalities thus far in the past week. It may be there are many such examples, and that the information has been kept secret. If it is true that there has been no sabotage in the nation, it would appear to indicate a definite belief in a disciplined organization, and that for some reason it has not yet arrived.

On Tuesday, December 9, I visited Mr. Pieper and Mr. [illegible] and was [illegible] to visit the Presidio, where I met [illegible] with Lieutenant Colonel John H. Wilson, G-2, Ninth Corps Area, and Lieutenant Colonel Leslie A. Forney, Assistant G-2, Ninth Corps Area. [illegible] at evening I dined with Captain [illegible] of [illegible] for the Twelfth Naval District.

[illegible] the morning of the 9th, I went with Major Harris of [illegible] to hear the [illegible] of the crew of the Anzac Clipper which [illegible] near the Airfield in the Hawaii Islands. The [illegible] men nothing of the damage on Oahu Island [illegible] stopped only for an hour to refuel. [illegible] they heard a message in Japanese to their north-[illegible] about one-third of the way between Hawaii [illegible] say nothing.

[illegible] December 10, Captain Schullough took me [illegible] offices at 717 Market Street. He has a [illegible] activities cover the entire Coast. It [illegible] intelligence organization that I have seen [illegible] activities do not wish to describe [illegible]

[illegible] took me to call on the Chief of [illegible] District, Admiral Kilpatrick, and then on [illegible] Commandant. This district [illegible] about [illegible] small submarines and convoyed [illegible] naval aircraft at its disposal.

[illegible] Admiral Kilpatrick stressed the vital [illegible] Federal Office Building for [illegible] Captain Schullough to [illegible] assurances that the Navy would [illegible] activities with the [illegible] with [illegible] our intelligence and [illegible]

[illegible] is [illegible] and [illegible] commands [illegible] and [illegible] lots.

[illegible] Colonel Wilson [illegible] Ninth Corps [illegible] authorities be

given liberation to accept enlistments from applicants having only their first papers instead of second papers whenever the [illegible] Area Commander. He cited an instance of a [illegible] pilot anxious to fly with us and refused [illegible] had only first papers.

[illegible] went to see Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt who [illegible] hour. He said he was short of anti-aircraft guns [illegible] for the [illegible] and also short of planes, pilots, and [illegible]. He said his pilots were pretty tired [illegible] patrolling. He said he was not complaining, and that strong reinforcements were moving into the area. He [illegible] was in a particularly bad situation, that it [illegible] troops were on their way [illegible]

[illegible] tanks and the [illegible] that he was taking his orders [illegible] and [illegible] told the [illegible] from [illegible] at the moment [illegible] naval aircraft, that [illegible] pieces [illegible] aircraft.

[-3

[illegible] to [illegible] possible to get [illegible]. It is possible to [illegible] not change position

[illegible] possibility of [illegible] American Navy does [illegible] after a [illegible], it could only [illegible] and [illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible] vehicles [illegible] and [illegible] of this [illegible] cooperate.

[illegible] of the 10th [illegible] already

On December 11 I spent some time with Colonel Ahrends in charge of I.I.D. in San Francisco and his assistant Major Harris.

On December 12 I spent some time with Captain McCullough and Captain Kilpatrick, and also Mr. Flopper. That night a rumor spread along the south shore that an invasion was pending. Several hundred people left their homes and started east in automobiles with their families. This baseless rumor was caught and the consternant assuaged.

In the afternoon of the 13th, I went with Colonel Ahrends and Major Harris to the Presidio and informed General Strong and Lieutenant Colonel Stroh, G-2, Fourth Army, of the message just received. I again refuted the danger in Los Angeles.

Stroh

On December 15, I called Colonel Stroh and gave him a second message concerning Los Angeles, and then went with Captain Kilpatrick and Major Harris and told the story of both messages to Admiral Kimmel.

On Friday afternoon, and Sunday afternoon, the [illegible] spent in our office. Spent Sunday [illegible] with the chiefs of the British Intelligence.

G. Edward Buxton.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

San Francisco, Calif.

December 13, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan:

[illegible] stations herewith a proposed station [illegible] San Diego, California, San Francisco, [illegible], and Seattle, Washington. [illegible] estimate [illegible] following [illegible] which [illegible] as to location and personnel.

[illegible] second-hand radio, [illegible] Alaska. We have made no arrangements [illegible] City, although the San Francisco [illegible] of a radio board connected with [illegible] at that point. We did not [illegible] these units, although it is [illegible] that the same could be installed at [illegible]

[illegible], let me say that the [illegible] San Francisco and [illegible] General of the Fourth [illegible] Presidio, and he now encompasses all defense activities--land [illegible] extent land-based naval [illegible] the eastern [illegible] Pacific states.

[illegible] San Diego Headquarters [illegible] he lives in that city. [illegible] clerk and [illegible] for years

[illegible] he does not [illegible] father of [illegible]

[illegible] he has [illegible] of longevity in [illegible] Pacific Coast, and [illegible] miles certaining

individual cards, photographs, and data concerning the [illegible] of that movement. General [illegible] is very familiar with [illegible] the General has [illegible] doing, as is the [illegible] and [illegible] through his duplicating [illegible] material for their files especially in the last two or three years.

There is one important personality whom I have not asked about General [illegible], and that is General DeWitt. I recommend that you authorize me to ask General DeWitt for his opinion of General [illegible], and if the reply is favorable, I can (with your approval) ascertain by telephone whether General [illegible] would in an emergency be willing to live for a while in San Francisco. I do not think he would [illegible], but it is my guess that he would be [illegible].

If you decide that you wish to have posts in each of [illegible] four parts, I would then consult with General [illegible] in securing suitable representatives [illegible].

[illegible] assumptions for your [illegible] (1) that foreign [illegible] from [illegible] will not [illegible] situations, [illegible] to work [illegible] which [illegible] believe the need for your [illegible] increased.

[illegible] of liaison with the General [illegible], I [illegible] the [illegible] representative [illegible] service. [illegible] Commanding Officer [illegible], but except [illegible] conflicting jurisdictions [illegible] not corrected. I [illegible] achieve the status of

[illegible] many times that a [illegible] will be granted the [illegible] Navy, and [illegible] as [illegible] among the armed [illegible] officers are not in [illegible].

[illegible] very efficient commanding [illegible], but if so con- [illegible] that we inves- [illegible], Hollywood, Los Angeles,

ence military attache in Turkey, [illegible] of the [illegible] occupation [illegible] First World War; now 60 years old but active in [illegible] Colonel [illegible] said [illegible] mature [illegible] friend and fellow staff officer.

[illegible] said he regarded Colonel [illegible] very [illegible] Colonel [illegible] Colonel [illegible] some active service.

[illegible] head of the [illegible] organization [illegible] intelligence [illegible] a similar [illegible] division [illegible]

[illegible] recently [illegible] president of the [illegible] very [illegible] district [illegible]

[illegible] position [illegible] Colonel [illegible]

[illegible] interested [illegible] possible [illegible] your organi- [illegible]

[illegible] Colonel [illegible] visited

[illegible] because [illegible] change [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] from the

The following oil companies store vast quantities of oil [illegible] adjacent to these wells: Standard Oil Company of California, General Petroleum, Richfield, Shell, Texaco, Union, and some ten or twelve little companies.

The Los Angeles Shipyard and the Bethlehem Steel Shipyard are both building important crafts for the Navy, including four destroyers. The Maritime Commission is proposing to launch one ship a week in the 11,000 ton Liberty freighter class.

For the above reasons, I think you should have representatives at both San Francisco and Los Angeles. General Dolittle's company - Seattle - is of strategic importance, second only to Los Angeles because of the small aircraft plants located there. [illegible] the great Consolidated Aircraft [illegible] Lake. Furthermore, it is only two day sailing from the Japanese border. Japanese activities are a matter of great interest to both Army and Navy. I am not [illegible] the relative importance of Portland, Oregon.

[illegible] long, [illegible], and perhaps confusing letter, [illegible] forward it for your comments, and I am [illegible] comments.

[illegible] will perhaps serve as a basis for [illegible] eliminate any [illegible] and thus reduce the [illegible]

Very cordially yours,

G. Edward Buxton

[illegible] looking this over [illegible] report to you personally.

[illegible] like to add a few [illegible] information on this [illegible] information just [illegible] the Military and Naval [illegible] regarded as a supplement [illegible] and make desirable [illegible] than one government [illegible] of necessary [illegible] government building.

[illegible] wire where [illegible] of this can be



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

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

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270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK



Art Buxton

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

September 17, 1941

MEMORANDUM

With respect to the work of Major Buxton's office, it is thought that, if it has not already been done, a survey should be made showing the average of incoming refugees and other travelers, and their nationalities, from Europe and the Far East, and perhaps of Europeans and Asiatics coming into the United States from Latin American countries. The survey should be opportunely extended to cover the principal ports of entry into the United States on all coasts, but it is thought that fairly prompt attention is desirable with respect to the Pacific Coast ports. If it is desirable to pursue this type of work in New York, it would seem advisable to consider the question of spreading it to other important areas as well.

In connection with the related question of foreign language groups in the United States, it is suggested that the activities of Major Buxton as initiated in the New York area be extended by COI to cover such groups throughout the country. This would seem to be of particular interest to the division of COI which handles radio matters. Moreover, this field presents an interesting opportunity for effective coordination. If it is to be tapped haphazardly by the many interested agencies of the Government, such as State, War, Navy, etc., duplication and confusion would probably result. Since the State Department is perhaps not equipped to maintain regular contact with foreign language groups, it might be possible to recruit State Department support for this office to accept the major responsibility in the matter.

It is suggested that contact with Major Buxton's office and similar offices subsequently established, be placed in the hands of a responsible officer within this organization; that this probably would, for the moment at any rate, not be a full time job and might be assigned to an officer with other responsibilities as, for example, liaison work with the State Department. Such an officer could act as an executive assistant to a subcommittee of the Board of Analysts. One of his main duties would be to see that prompt and effective distribution was made of material sent in by Major Buxton's office. He would also be responsible for obtaining leads and suggestions from the Board of Analysts and section chiefs with respect to information it might be desirable to secure from refugees Major Buxton interviews or from other sources.

It would be helpful if Major Buxton would furnish this office with a list of the types of questions he now presents to those he interviews, so that suggestions for possible elaboration might be considered.

It seems desirable that this group should examine a considerable amount of material from Major Buxton's office so that as soon as possible it could prepare for him data giving him a more definite idea of the type of information which is desired by this office. It is contemplated that the advice of the chiefs of the geographical sections, among others, would be asked, and that the information furnished to Major Buxton would be specific as well as general in character.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

September 5, 1941

[illegible] Donovan
[illegible] Information
[illegible]

[illegible]:

[illegible]

[illegible] Administrator
[illegible] Export Control

[illegible] Brain- Army Intelligence
[illegible] Powers- Navy Intelligence

[illegible] your desire to avoid any interference [illegible] our [illegible] mutually supplement [illegible] cooperative and anxious to work [illegible] [illegible]. It is obvious, however, that [illegible] has [illegible] in the collection [illegible] psychologic and economic fields [illegible] technical military and naval [illegible], [illegible], etc. In fact, the two [illegible] Intelligence Officer [illegible] economic research con- [illegible] raw material in this [illegible] which they were committed to [illegible] Administrators: Army [illegible] contacts with the [illegible] business [illegible] statement although

[illegible] weekly meetings are desirable [illegible] in this area are represented and to [illegible]. For example, I suggested [illegible] prominent American Banker from [illegible] in this country on the Clipper that [illegible] on arrival he might be re- [illegible] their regular interview. Major [illegible] two hours with this American Banker from [illegible] could think of in all departments of inquiry

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

[illegible] Donovan,

September 5, 1941

[illegible] interview. Please [illegible] give your comments on this [illegible].

[illegible] another of our [illegible] interviewers [illegible], last [illegible] secretary [illegible] recently arrived from abroad. [illegible] any service further [illegible] conference in this district [illegible].

It is my plan to be here in New York tomorrow, [illegible] Providence, [illegible].

Very sincerely

Ned Brexton

Edward Brexton

[illegible] at his invitation. He [illegible] secret activities. I do not [illegible] in conjunction with Army [illegible] this morning. [illegible] opinions that more than two [illegible] results. [illegible] felt [illegible] before [illegible] any [illegible] it can be arranged [illegible] interviews with people who come [illegible] this [illegible] suggestion but merely [illegible] and certainly would [illegible] in anyway. I said that [illegible] officers. I told them that I would report [illegible] to you.

Edup. 1 G.

NLC:meg

August 25, 1942

Mr. Donald Alexander
Vice President
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co.
2450 Hunting Park Avenue
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Alexander:

A member of my staff, Mr. Norman L. Crowley, would like to call upon you the early part of next week sometime at your convenience.

We are desirous of obtaining certain vital and strategic information, and in your case you may be of considerable assistance to us.

I will be pleased to hear from you in this connection.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

BR/MR-7212
x Far East
x Aleutian Is
x G-2

[illegible] 7, 19[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] national [illegible]

[illegible] article [illegible] now connected with [illegible] has returned from [illegible]

[illegible] for several months prior [illegible] American military observer [illegible] of Malaya [illegible] East Indies. [illegible] Australia [illegible] went to the [illegible] United States and

[illegible] Problems

[illegible] lack of coordination [illegible] [illegible] certain.

[illegible] British [illegible] to have [illegible] [illegible] contrary [illegible]

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[illegible] would not greatly interfere with any [illegible] operations against Japan. Possession of [illegible] would shorten the airline distance to Siberia by [illegible] about 300 miles, because the meridian airline [illegible] those islands by that distance. The obli- [illegible] a [illegible] on, and newspapermen should have [illegible] once in their military leaders not to [illegible] military operations which our military [illegible] poor strategy.

[illegible] secret intelligence organization

[illegible] should far. [illegible] should get away from [illegible] military or naval intelligence should, [illegible] obtained in the interests only of the local [illegible] [illegible] should have [illegible] intelligence ser- [illegible] [illegible] secret intelligence [illegible] the [illegible] world, [illegible] for the local theatre [illegible] [illegible] and pro- [illegible] to tell the field organi- [illegible] [illegible] where it would be best to [illegible] by the service should [illegible] matter of order, but it [illegible] primarily intended for the [illegible] should include much more than [illegible] --that is to say, should [illegible] political, social, and psychological [illegible].

[illegible] little contact as [illegible] military and naval attaches, [illegible] civilian organization, completely [illegible] [illegible] merely natives of the [illegible] only in the Orient.

[illegible] of the organization [illegible] connected with each [illegible] the theater commander [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] through [illegible] The job of pro- [illegible] something which [illegible] the information [illegible] [illegible] gain the value

[illegible] to the problem's proper strategy [illegible] clouds are apparently [illegible] concrete [illegible] in any given area [illegible] thousands of [illegible] indicated [illegible] not [illegible] to; [illegible] [illegible] all [illegible] [illegible] case, for [illegible] is [illegible]

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Edmond L. Taylor

DATE July 27, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Report on Conversation with David Bowes-Lyon and Walter Adams.

I called on Bowes-Lyon and Adams at David's [illegible] yesterday afternoon and had a long conversation with them. David was very anxious to be filled in on [illegible] internal changes in this country and I gave him [illegible] objective picture of the situation.

[illegible] not anxious to maintain [illegible] cooperate in psychological warfare [illegible]

[illegible] the conversation, I mentioned [illegible] cable [illegible], an account [illegible] Hamburg (Jim [illegible]) which disturbed [illegible] David that according to this cable, [illegible] trying to convince [illegible] contacts in [illegible] London Office of OWI.

[illegible] And while the London contact with [illegible] their principal one, there would

[illegible] British and

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TO:

Brewster

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 28, 1942

Mr. William M. Brewster
417 Park Avenue
New York City

Dear Bill:

I have been looking into the subject matter of your letter of July 17th. We did desire to send you to Spain, but due to the change of plans we are unable to do so. I am sorry if you have been waiting to hear more definitely, but we had assumed that since Mr. Shapiro told you the Spanish matter had to be dropped that you had cancelled the subject. Mr. Shapiro thought he had been explicit in his statement. We are sorry if there has been any misunderstanding. As for the Near East, there is certain [illegible] which might enable us to make use of your services. However, everything is in such a preliminary state that it would be impossible to be more definite at this time. As soon as we work out we shall get in touch with you in the hope that you will be free to be with us.

Hoping to see you before long, I am

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Colonel Donovan

November [illegible], 1942

Refer to: [illegible] - [illegible], John [illegible].

Subject: Recommendation for Promotion

To: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that John [illegible] Brooks, 1st. Lt. [illegible] (-[illegible]) be promoted to the grade of Captain. Lt. [illegible] 1st. Lt. in the Army of the United States on [illegible], 1941 and has not subsequently been promoted.

2. [illegible] operations and [illegible] in the opinion of this office. It is expected that this position will be confirmed. It [illegible] the responsibilities of the [illegible] be commensurate with the rank of Captain.

3. [illegible] has shown his fitness for [illegible] and grade for [illegible] the entire period [illegible] June 15, 1942, [illegible] Lt. Brooks [illegible] office in this or- [illegible] interviewing officer [illegible] important [illegible] which [illegible] indicated that he [illegible] course of [illegible] for.

[illegible] in connection in [illegible] operations [illegible] the correct- [illegible] the position, [illegible] in so thoroughly [illegible].

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201 - Brons, John ...

5. [illegible] investigation and [illegible] report [illegible] of Lt. [illegible], and [illegible] in [illegible] case, [illegible] previously recommended [illegible] final action [illegible] result [illegible] the matter [illegible] jurisdiction of this office.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, [illegible]
Chief, Special Operations
Branch

1st Ind.

[illegible]

Office of Strategic Services, [illegible]
To: [illegible] General, [illegible]
Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

William J. Donovan
Director

AG 201 - Tress, John A.
(1-31-42)

JPM/jp-3505.

Orders.

[illegible] Dec 2, [illegible].

First Lieutenant John [illegible] [illegible] 09699A, [illegible],
[illegible] Office of Strategic Services,
[illegible] 25th and E Streets, [illegible],
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military [illegible] you proceed over [illegible] October 3, [illegible], from [illegible] to [illegible], Canada, and such other places as may be necessary, [illegible] for the purpose of carrying out the instructions [illegible] of the Office of Strategic Services, and on completion [illegible] duty return to your proper station.

[illegible] allowance of subsistence at flat per diem rate is authorized [illegible] period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the [illegible] in accordance with existing law and regulations. [illegible] 34 [illegible] 23-3.

[illegible] and officers [illegible] payment by [illegible] [illegible] submit a copy of the voucher, showing that [illegible] paid, when [illegible] and established for this order. [illegible] voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to [illegible] Office, Strategic Services, Fiscal Section, stating that [illegible] copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing [illegible] from the Office of Strategic Services.

J P McGuire

Adjutant General.
Officers Branch, Maj. McGuire tel 3059.

DISTRIBUTION:
[illegible] OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 25th AND E STREETS, NW WASHINGTON, D. C.
[illegible]
[illegible] FILE, [illegible] 3505.

September 25, 1942

[illegible]

TO: The Adjutant General
[illegible] Department
Washington, D. C.

[illegible] that necessary orders be issued [illegible] Army Regulations [illegible] Order, April 30, 1942, [illegible], to proceed from about October 5, 1942, on temporary duty [illegible] Washington, D. C., to Portland, Maine to such [illegible] for the United States [illegible] that duty is [illegible] and that such temporary duty to return to his station [illegible] Washington, D. C., the purpose of this [illegible] instructions of the Director of the [illegible] Services.

[illegible] request [illegible] under the requested [illegible] be issued [illegible] to the Office [illegible] Services.

[illegible] J. Donovan
Director

[illegible] nce

AGO 201 - Gross, John A.
(6-25-42)OF

JMC/jo-1505.

July 3, 1942.

Designation as Acting Quartermaster.

TO: The Security Officer
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

SUBJ: First Lieutenant John A. Gross (0-903574) A. C. S.

You are designated as acting quartermaster for the purpose of issuing such transportation requests as may be necessary for travel on official business in compliance with orders issued by me.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[illegible] Moffat

Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
DIRECTOR, OFFICE STRATEGIC SERVICES, WASHINGTON, D. C.
[illegible], U. S. DEPOT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
[illegible] OFFICER, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.
[illegible] QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.
[illegible] 1505.

[illegible]

J[illegible] 8, [illegible]

FROM: [illegible] Howard [illegible]ton

TO: [illegible]

SUBJECT: [illegible], July [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] security [illegible] of this agency.

[illegible] report [illegible] instruc-

[illegible] security [illegible] of this agency,

[illegible], Jr.

[illegible] Howard [illegible]ton
[illegible]

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Colonel Donovan

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Colonel Donovan

[illegible] – [illegible] George [illegible] Jr.

[illegible] recently spent more than a month [illegible] methods and the operations of [illegible] Jr. [illegible] coin.

[illegible] has been considered in [illegible] available officer [illegible] special study and training referr[illegible] characteristics and background for [illegible] is recommended [illegible] manner.

[illegible] the Special [illegible] Training Directorate [illegible] of any [illegible] which [illegible] the chief [illegible] this [illegible] the [illegible].

[illegible] which is the best [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] Jr.
[illegible] Colonel, AUS
[illegible] Branch

[illegible] j/vm

[illegible] "The [illegible] D. C.

[illegible] is the best [illegible]

[illegible] J. Donovan
Director

S E C R E T

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington, D. C.

JHD/sts/ed/1515

AG 210.31
(8-21-42)OA

September 1, 1942.

Subject: Orders.

S E C R E T

Auth: T. A. G.
Initials: [illegible]
Date: 9/1/42

Thru : Director, Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

To : Officers Involved.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in the military service that each of the following-named officers, AUS, proceed at the proper time on temporary duty, from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to London, England, and to such other places in the British Isles as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out instructions of the Director, Strategic Services, and upon completion of this temporary duty, return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Hilary C. Huntington, Jr., 0469476

Captain George T. Drewer, Jr., 0903213

2. Travel by military or commercial aircraft, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, army or naval transport, and rail is directed. TD by air from Washington, D. C. and/or New York, N. Y. to destination and return, is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission.

3. In lieu of subsistence, a flat per diem of $6.00 is authorized while traveling by military or commercial aircraft, and for the period of temporary duty outside the continental limits of the United States, in accordance with existing law and regulations. A baggage allowance of seventy-seven (77) pounds while traveling by military or commercial aircraft is authorized.

4. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such other places, in such order and [illegible] as may be necessary to carry out this mission. The duties to be performed in connection with this mission being exceptional, may require more than seventy-two (72) hours at different places for their performance, therefore, a delay for any period required at any place where necessary is authorized.

5. Travel is chargeable to FD [illegible] P 434-02,03 [illegible]625-23.

6. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number, and citation of this order, by letter of transmittal to The Adjutant General's Office, attention Fiscal Section, stating that the enclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

August 21, 1942

SUBJECT: Orders

SECRET

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Captain George [illegible] Brewer, Jr., Serial No. 0-[illegible], A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles and at duty as require, and upon completion of said temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will [illegible] to the Office of Strategic Services.

3. [illegible] Washington will [illegible] Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET

August 31, 1942

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: The Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D.C.

1. Request that necessary orders be issued directing Captain George H. Brewer, Jr., Serial No. 0-903213, A.U.S., to proceed at the proper time on temporary duty from Washington, D.C., to London, thence to such places in the British Isles as that duty may require, and upon completion of such temporary duty to return to his permanent station, Washington, D.C., the purpose of this travel being to carry out instructions of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Cost of travel performed under the requested orders will be charged to funds pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services.

3. [illegible] travel to and from the United Kingdom will [illegible] Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan
Director

June 6, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I am very grateful to you for your personal and confidential letter of June 3rd concerning Francois Briere, French Consul at Boston, Massachusetts.

We are very glad to have such information and hope you will continue to send us similar reports as you receive them.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan.

[illegible] 31, 194[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Cunard Line for [illegible] friend [illegible] 8:00 p.m., [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Kenneth Pyatt

DATE: August 1[illegible], 1942

TO: Mr. James Murphy

SUBJECT:

I refer to our telephone conversation about Mrs. Douvenelland the fact that the priority people refused to place her on her two sets of [illegible] plans.

I hope that Colonel Donovan does not [illegible] to this matter further, as it does [illegible] of priorities by various [illegible] [illegible] Donovan does not [illegible] who are not [illegible] assembled in the [illegible] report, at this [illegible] I [illegible] this matter any further, [illegible] to [illegible] our standing [illegible] to have a priority [illegible] I have a lovely word [illegible] Douvenelland about this [illegible] I also feel that Mrs. Douvenelland, [illegible] that we may have to

[illegible]

28th [illegible] 1942.

My dear Colonel,

I met [illegible] Bouverie last night and [illegible] of [illegible] her letter to me. [illegible] the situation. She is very anxious indeed to hear [illegible] there is any chance of [illegible] to [illegible] about it: [illegible] fretting.

[illegible] hope of accompanying [illegible] in London, [illegible]. I have also [illegible]!

[illegible] visit [illegible] colleague.

Sincerely yours

Hastings Ismay

[illegible] June 7, 1942

[illegible] Huntington

[illegible] J. Donovan

[illegible] about [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Security Office

DATE June 2, 1942

TO: Mr. James Murphy

SUBJECT: William Lacy Brewster

Mr. William Lacy Brewster has sent in Colonel Donovan's name for a reference and we would appreciate it if you would send us a memo with any information you have concerning his character, integrity and loyalty.

Ellery C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Col., A.U.S.
Security Officer

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: F. L. Belin

DATE Nov 25, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

In Mr. Tillinghast's absence, I am sending you, herewith, a copy of a report from Booth, in Valdez, to Peruborough, dated Nov 5, 1942, which may be of interest to you.

F. L. Belin

SECRET

(COPY)

Madrid
5th May, 1942

SECRET

Dear Arthur:

I arrived in Madrid the 25th of April and the pouch which closes tonight is the first opportunity that I have had to write you from here. There have regularly been pouches between Madrid and Lisbon every fortnight but sometimes, of course, there have been people with diplomatic passports travelling between the two cities, who could supplement the service. Only holders of diplomatic passports (with a few special exceptions) are allowed to carry the pouch. Smith and I, for instance, having special passports could not help.

Supplementing my cables, the whole matter of couriers might be gone into closely with State. The Charge d'Affaires at Tangier has not had a courier for four months and, as I indicated, there is no service at all between the Embassy and the various Consulates. This condition is aggravated by the assignment of Petroleum Inspectors to consular territories. Any couriers assigned should be, in addition to competent observers, strong and healthy, for travel is very difficult and it may be necessary at times for them to ride all night on hard board seats.

The transport situation is a difficult one, even on the main routes. Between Lisbon and Madrid there are three through trains weekly and three planes, upon all of which it is difficult to get reservations except well in advance. I had to change trains en route and it took from 11 a.m. to 8:15 p.m. (?) to come a distance that requires two hours by air. The plan is to assign me no particular territory but to have me a sort of general inspector covering all Spain, which is very desirable; particularly now that you have been able to arrange the car exchange. I will give you details of the negotiation in a separate sheet.

The handling of funds appears to be somewhat catch as catch can. Through [illegible] Lisbon I was able to exchange the [illegible] that you sent me.* Through local channels I can, presumably safely, swing a maximum of $1000.00 monthly. Possibly Lisbon can raise whatever might be required. However, a personal cheque on a U. S. bank is worth more than a government draft is not acceptable. The Embassy has a government car and it might be well in future when this negotiation comes and it might be well in future to open bank accounts under aliases, so that will be no record of the transaction even in Portugal.

---

*[illegible] not yet got it.

SECRET

I will use my own code for all, or nearly all of my messages. In this, as in other respects, the Embassy is short handed and my code saves the clerk's time. The stenographic situation is also bad; hence my reports will be in longhand. It had been my intention to avoid copies in any case, so, if you can read my writing, this should not make any great difference. Please tell W.L.R. that in my letters to him regular mail it will be the 1st, 5th, 9th, etc.; I think that this is what I told him but I may have made it the 4th, 8th and so on.

As regards Spain I have reread some despatches which, in the light of having met the Counselor of Embassy, ad interim Charge d'Affaires, have for me taken on a new authenticity. For a political background I feel that I can do no better than refer you to enclosures to despatches numbers 1228 and 1532, dated October 14 and December 11, respectively. These present a contrast to the other more sensational material which we have in our library but I have been unable to find any evidence that the analyses therein are not correct as well as the conclusions drawn. I am convinced that they were developed from mature consideration of carefully weighed evidence. You will find these despatches in our files; Baker knows where they are.

I am sending you among newspapers and other clippings an article which you may have read and which is typical of some of the sort of reports that we were receiving before I left the States. It is an interesting piece but I have been unable to find any foundation for the assertions of the author, Lucky. In fact, I was informed through the British Embassy that the man is not at all reliable, has not been in Spain in years and has no source of information here.

There have recently been consular reports, which you will doubtless get, which have to do with petroleum supplies among other things. One of these brought information of deposits of aviation gasoline in Spanish North Africa and another stated that there was a cache of aviation gasoline in Tangiers. If there is any information about this in I.S.I. or anything comes in direct, please let me know; I understand we have pretty complete personnel in French Morocco and Algeria and if they are getting anything from the Spanish side, we should like to know.

I am also sending you a group of photographs of the present cabinet as well as a brief sketch of Carceller (?) the Minister of Commerce. The Embassy has submitted

SECRET

biographical sketches of other important figures to the State Dept. where you can obtain them. I will check here to see what is lacking and will attempt to fill in the gap.

The newspapers I hope will give you a clear background against which to place the summary prepared by the second Secretary. This summary, though written over a four hour period, appears to be as accurate and informative as though it had been done yesterday. The clippings are revealing inasmuch as they contain information, direct and indirect, [illegible] restrictions, cooperation with Axis [illegible]. I will [illegible] time to send the clippings each [illegible].

[illegible] will [illegible] modified several times the [illegible] those lessons [illegible] for candidate [illegible] investigation [illegible] bellicose youth organization [illegible] recently modeled after [illegible] other [illegible] dictatorships. There are thousands [illegible] around the walls around Madrid proclaiming the [illegible] [illegible] the Falange [illegible] at the time of its [illegible] that the organization was, and is, [illegible] well [illegible] the [illegible] hall and [illegible] to produce a demonstration when [illegible].

[illegible] to get some idea of how many [illegible] [illegible] It has been difficult. The [illegible] at the Embassy shows something over [illegible] and [illegible] in a whole country. [illegible] believe this figure but [illegible] have [illegible] a substantial one.

[illegible] gave a report [illegible] morning at the religious [illegible] see how many would turn [illegible] hundred and three were children. About [illegible] were older uniforms but [illegible] all the children, not boys [illegible].

[illegible] conversations with people of all [illegible] civilian, all of which have [illegible] reports [illegible] alone.

[illegible] Embassy was informed [illegible] through Berlin that [illegible] control all possible [illegible] commanders, that

SECRET

I wrote you about from Lisbon, said there that an offensive by anybody was now out of the question because of climatic conditions. Why should news from Germany make the basis supplies? This man's command is now in Egypt on route to Persia having been withdrawn from Tobruk and vicinity.

Another thing. I crossed in the Nyassa with a Frenchman whom I had met before; Francois Bachy, Capitaine Corvette, commander of a destroyer at Dunkerque and Naval Attache of the Vichy Government, destined for Tokyo when the declaration of war turned him back. I saw a great deal of him on board and we spent ten days at the same hotel in Lisbon. He was very worried about the government change and was much affected when his good and respected friends in Washington resigned. He said that his hope was Darlan; that he and his fellow officers admired and respected Darlan as a man and as a sea-man and that the admiral had indicated to the commanders of French Naval vessels that at such time as he might be forced to give orders by the Germans they would come from him in such a form that it could be seen that the reverse was meant.

I hope to get moving about next week; in the meantime, all the best to all of you.

Sincerely,

/s/ Sally

P.S. - Please let me know anything specific you may want other than the general questionnaires.

P.S. - I forgot that I omitted living conditions. They are better than I expected but things are expensive. My room at the Palace Hotel costs pts. 50 per day with embassy discount and meals cost about pts. 30 for lunch and the same for dinner.

Donovan, William, Maj. Gen.

House of Commons
Canada

Ottawa, May 21, 1942.

Personal

Colonel William Donovan,
Coordination Office of Information,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill,-

Our friend "Audrey" in a recent letter to my wife, expressed her anxiety to receive a reply from you to a recent letter which she had written you. I told Angela to tell her that the time she gave for a reply, namely, 3 weeks, was much too short and that I had no doubt, if the letter reached you, you would reply in due time.

I hope you are keeping well and not working too hard.

We are here awaiting Mr. Mackenzie King's next move in regard to Compulsory Selective Service. He introduced a Bill about two weeks ago to remove Clause 3 from the National Mobilization Act which limited service to this Country, but, so far, has shown no hurry to bring it up for a second reading. In answer to a question of a member of the Opposition today, he said the Government must retain to themselves the right to select the time when they would bring this forward. The truth is that his French-Canadian followers from Quebec are giving him a great deal of trouble, as they do not want conscription and I think he is delaying matters in the hope that some event will happen to make it easier for him. Of course, the proper thing for him to do is to form a Union or Coalition Government and step aside and let somebody else lead such a Government. Eventually, I think, he will be forced to do this.

Angela joins me in kindest regards and all good wishes.

Yours very sincerely,

[illegible] 22, 1965

[illegible] "goodbye" last night.

[illegible] Lodge

[illegible] He said that

[illegible] conversations

[illegible] on de Gaulle.

[illegible] under

[illegible] tour in

[illegible] understand

[illegible], that he left.

[illegible] possibility "capture for

[illegible] de Gaulle sanc-

[illegible] received." From

[illegible] telegram

[illegible] of the "free

[illegible] place in London. In

[illegible] he was at a

[illegible] sudden benevolence, except con-
[illegible] Dixter was interested to estab-
[illegible] "[illegible]" [illegible] on, we were
[illegible]
[illegible] Dixter
[illegible] greatest fault was that
[illegible] heavy, bad time
[illegible] but it mostly-
[illegible]

U. S. Asks De Gaulle to Put Free French House in Order

By BERTRAM D. HULEN
Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, May 20—A conflict between two Free French Governors in New Caledonia has produced such a state of administrative demoralization that the United States has appealed to General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Free French movement, to straighten out affairs in the interest of the common cause. Great Britain is understood to be supporting the plea.

The situation is most acute in New Caledonia but is duplicated to an extent in other Free French regions, such as Syria, where the Free French are reported to be in controversy with the British, and in French Equatorial Africa.

In addition, military elements in the Free French movement want General de Gaulle to adhere to a strict military program, while other elements are represented as ambitious for him to adopt political objectives, which presumably would call for his recognition by the United Nations as the head of a government in exile.

In the face of these conditions the United States is urging General de Gaulle to concentrate his forces on the real job of administration and perhaps to order that the Free French will be able to oppose efficiently the common enemy rather than dissipate their strength by internal dissension.

The situation in New Caledonia has been the most troublesome. General de Gaulle appointed two Governors there, one civil and one military, although the latter had

DE GAULLE ASKED TO END CONFLICTS

Continued From Page One

the official rank of High Commissioner. They were, respectively, Henry Sautot and Rear Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu.

The two Governors became so violently opposed that an armed clash was narrowly averted. The populace sided with M. Sautot, but Admiral d'Argenlieu had the warships and other armed forces in his control. In these circumstances M. Sautot left for New Zealand and is now proceeding to London, where it is understood he will be assigned to another post.

The populace was so aroused, however, that Admiral d'Argenlieu found it convenient to leave for some other French island in the Pacific, as yet undisclosed. For the present, therefore, New Caledonia is without a Free French Governor but a successor to M. Sautot is being sent there by General de Gaulle.

5350

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 15, 1942

Military Personnel
Army Air Forces, Officers Section
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Captain Goetz

My dear Captain Goetz:

Enclosed is the necessary letter covering Major Bonnell's release from this organization.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

BRUCE

WILLIAMSON

CAMPBELL

DOUGLAS

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 15, 1942

Adjutant General
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

On Nov 3, 1941, S.O. 115, you very kindly assigned Major Geoffrey H. Bonnell, Air Corps Reserve, [illegible], to this office to perform [illegible] under my direction.

[illegible] on completed, we can [illegible] suggest that he be assigned back to the Air Corps.

[illegible] to avail ourselves of Major Bonnell's services for this period.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

June 15,1942

Marian,

I am returning your file on Major Bonnell. His rel use is nowhere to be found. Would you let me know if you come across it sometime.

Stacy Lloyd

Dated G.H. 5952

CONFIDENTIAL
COORDINATOR OF

June 15, 1942.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Colonel [illegible] wrote you to [illegible] Geoffrey M. Hemphill [illegible] [illegible] was kindly complied with [illegible] [illegible] of Intelligence [illegible] Special Order No. 115, [illegible]

[illegible] since Paper [illegible] [illegible] circumstances, [illegible] Caribbean [illegible]. Therefore [illegible] [illegible] organization [illegible]

[illegible] Very truly yours,

[illegible]

DATE _____

FROM _____

ROUTING

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Felix Bruce

DATE April [illegible] 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Major Geoffrey Harper Bonnell

[illegible] the matter of Major Bonnell's transfer [illegible] Colonel George of the Army Ferrying Command, and [illegible] to his transfer. When you have signed [illegible] letter, [illegible] it to Colonel George, [illegible] to the Secretary of War, and [illegible] quickly.

[illegible] Bonnell's station at Khartoum [illegible] the Ferrying Command [illegible] to that which we have set [illegible].

[illegible] copy of Major Bonnell's record.

Bruce

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be [illegible] north, [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]

An [illegible] forces in [illegible] [illegible] would develop [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] Chinese [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] or [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the enemy, [illegible]

[illegible] A long [illegible] attrition may well [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible]

[illegible] ion [illegible] or.

The roads of [illegible] are proposed as possibly [illegible] to a [illegible] by [illegible] for our [illegible]ion.

[illegible] the difficulties [illegible] the [illegible] from [illegible] up to Siberia.

[illegible] as long as the ratio of the naval forces is [illegible] by the [illegible]: 1) the [illegible]; 2) [illegible] it; 3) the Arctic Ocean.

[illegible] the Arctic Ocean, [illegible] navy, could provide [illegible] in [illegible] might look [illegible].

[illegible] along the Arctic [illegible] after [illegible] opened by [illegible] operations [illegible] understood [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], from the United [illegible] other [illegible] on its arrival either [illegible]. The only common [illegible] to the improvement of [illegible] communications in Siberia. Otherwise, the

perhaps

t

P. H. Borgese

University of Chicago

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Amateur Strategists

BY G. A. BORGESE

IT WAS impressive to hear again the rebuke of Consul Lucius Aemilius to the amateur strategists of his time—168 B.C.—as reported by Livy and quoted extensively by Mr. Roosevelt at his press conference of March 17.

There are, however, other stories. One is in Herodotus, I, 84. It refers to events of 546 B.C. when Croesus and the Lydian empire fell to Cyrus.

> Now this is how Sardis was taken. When Croesus had been besieged for fourteen days, Cyrus sent horsemen about in his army to promise rewards to him who should first mount the wall. . . . A certain Mardian called Hyroeades essayed to mount by a part of the citadel where no guard had been set; for here the height on which the citadel stood was sheer and hardly to be assaulted, and none feared that it could be taken by an attack made here . . . So then it chanced that, on the day before, this Mardian, Hyroeades, had seen one of the [illegible] guards descend by this part of the citadel after a helmet that had fallen down, and fetch it; he took note of [illegible] and now he himself climbed [illegible] Persians after him. Many ascended, and then was Sardis taken. [Translation by A. D. Godley.]

Another [illegible] 775 A.D. It is [illegible] such as Anastasius, [illegible] and the Chronicler of [illegible]

> [illegible] hope of forcing [illegible] the entrance of [illegible] there might [illegible] Pope, but made up his [illegible] when a deacon, [illegible] of the Franks. This [illegible] mountain pass to out [illegible] Italy. Charles, [illegible] before the passage. The [illegible] turned to disorder [illegible] of his Franks [illegible]

According to [illegible] of Charlemagne was an [illegible] If this is so, he could [illegible] from Mr. Roosevelt, [illegible] to risk. He was [illegible] As for the conqueror of Sardis, he was a Mardian, that is one of a nomad Persian tribe, obviously [illegible] had learned [illegible] things.

Neither [illegible] Mardian [illegible] deacon or minstrel [illegible] a seat in [illegible] rank in the General Staff. The lion of the fable does not know whether or when a little mouse may help him out of the net in which he may happen to be caught. Cyrus and Charlemagne were successful generals. It did not harm them to listen occasionally to "amateur strategists."

In the Wind

WENDELL WILLKIE and Thomas E. Dewey are still fighting each other for control of the Republican machine in New York State. Willkie has told friends that if Dewey is nominated for governor this year, he will bolt his party and support Lehman. Dewey, for his part, is seeking a new base of support in the American Labor Party's left wing, whose hundred thousand votes are often enough to swing a state election. In a move interpreted as an effort to curry favor with the radicals, Dewey recently proposed to the Board of Higher Education of New York City that it permit fifteen college teachers suspended on charges of communism to resign rather than be expelled, thereby permitting them to seek jobs elsewhere in the school system.

AN ADVERTISEMENT of the Neponset Woolen Mills in the *American Funeral Director* tells of a new material for shrouds called "victory cloth." It is, says the ad, "made for the burial-goods industry so that we may maintain the American way of life."

TWO MORE MAGAZINES have ceased publication because of war-time economic difficulties—the *Living Age*, a century old review of the foreign press, and the *Kenyon Review*, a literary journal edited by John Crowe Ransom.

AN EXECUTIVE of a metropolitan department store told reporters, off the record, that his firm's biggest hoarding story to date was about a $1,200 grocery order placed by a resident of a three-room apartment.

AN ITALIAN Socialist weekly, *La Parola*, published in New York, is presenting evidence of Fascist activity which the Dies committee had in its possession but refused to release. The paper has reproduced verbatim a rehearsal of testimony to be given by Girolamo Valenti, the anti-Fascist editor of *La Parola*, before the Dies committee. Although Valenti named men whom the government has since arrested, the committee called off the hearing after reading Valenti's evidence.

A FEW MONTHS AGO several divisions of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers agreed to donate part of their time and labor to making garments for the Red Cross. They requested that they be permitted to sew into each item an Amalgamated union label. Red Cross officials said that it was against organization policy to permit the union label, and so no Red Cross clothes will bear it.

[We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.]

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

THE NEW "REPUBLIC"*

BY I. A. RICHARDS

NO BOOK except the Bible has had so much influence upon us as "The Republic." In a very real sense we are its creatures. "That book," said the Yankee farmer to Emerson, who had lent him it, "has a great number of my notions." Socrates's words at the end of Book IX have come true, we are citizens of the state he founded. "The greatest of the Greek inventions," said Werner Jaeger recently, "was man himself." He meant Western man of course. The Chinese had Confucius and Mencius to do for them what Plato did for us: give them forever their picture of their true selves. We come short of it endlessly, of course, but it is of Plato's great mind that we come short.

Yet we may never have read a word of Plato. It is still true. Most of our serious thoughts have been echoes of his. Every successful student of Plato comes to feel that later literature is a whispering gallery. Plato's thought—miraculously united with Christianity in the third century—still might be the cry of very enthusiastic new discoverer of Truth. In this surprised country and Emerson's "Representative Men," should reading Plato himself seem too much.

Reading Plato himself is a big undertaking. Even among those who are trained and coached through it few successful readers will be found. A successful reader is one who knows [illegible] *the good* after his reading. [illegible] Plato, harder to learn about these things [illegible] Partly because we had already [illegible] from him before we opened his pages. But [illegible] "The Republic" [illegible] of such scope so well designed for [illegible] on the whole disciples [illegible] wrong. But [illegible] we are disciples—willing or unwilling [illegible]. The very spontaneousness of [illegible] sketches, the anticipatory [illegible] parallels, the [illegible] the gambit [illegible] through [illegible] all that at [illegible] How many [illegible] down toward the [illegible] ingredient of their [illegible] Plato intended them to feel. The [illegible] Dialogues pass us too easily. But [illegible] are models. We are meant to feel, [illegible] do. Unfortunately, this sort [illegible] so familiar to us that we miss the [illegible] Plato when we should be blaming sundry combative tricks in argument we ourselves use, in other guises, every day.

Again, as Plato develops the great parallel between society and the mind—which has shaped so many societies and so many minds—how many notice that Socrates says, "We shall never reach the truth this way"? This is a parallel, a figure of speech which is perpetually necessary, not an argument. The modern sociologist is apt to take his own arguments so seriously that he overlooks Plato's analysis of method and his hints that in "these things" even a Glaucon—surely the best audience that any man could ever hope for—must be content with parallels. On these and many other fundamental points the temptation to write yet further commentaries is irresistible. I have indulged it by putting what I have to say about "dialectic," and much else that is central here, into my How to Read a Page, which is published with this and is in its latter parts just some more of those "footnotes to Plato" of which, as Whitehead said, "Western philosophy consists."

"The Republic," as it stands in the English versions of the best scholars, is ineffective today for the very reasons which have made it effective in Plato's Greek. The main lines of its thought become lost among the qualifications and preparations and the polite and (to the Greeks) persuasive indirections.

The very familiarity, too, of some of the ideas prevents us from seeing their everlasting novelty. They are like our hands and feet; only now and then do we realize them and how much they do for us. Of all media which could guard us from this awakening shock, a translator's English which attempts to follow the Greek meticulously in minor detail and social tone is the most absorbent. Plato's style deployed endless exquisite devices for meeting attitudes and expectations in his readers which sprang from their milieu. These attitudes and expectations never arise in us; we have our own. A dummy discourse in English does not meet them, however well it is trained to ape the alien delicacies of the Greek. Nor does it help us in taking what Plato said to heart. Versions in nineteenth-century idiom did help the nineteenth century to realize itself. Today they have the uncanny effect of making Plato seem mid-Victorian. We hardly know which of two remote worlds we are exploring.

This is unfair both to Plato and to Jowett. But its causes lie deeper than even the perennial moral strife between intellectual generations. It is the effort to get *all* of Plato's meaning into our English—just that meaning and nothing less—which befogs the translator's prose. It is a wholly admirable effort and ambition from the point of view of scholarship *in Greek*. To try to say it in English is one of

* [illegible] the production of a new version of "The Republic" of Plato [illegible] on Basic English which has been prepared by I. A. Richards and will be published on April 8 by W. [illegible] and [illegible]

March 20, 1942

[illegible] Hoover
[illegible] Investigation
[illegible]

[illegible]:

[illegible] for your letter of [illegible] Mr. Tilley and [illegible] with the arrangements you have made for [illegible] furnishing. I feel [illegible] information will [illegible] appreciate [illegible] cooperation.

[illegible]

[illegible]

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
South Building
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In confirmation of arrangements which Special Agent G. C. Burton of this Bureau made with Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole of your office on March 3, 1942, I desire to advise that Mr. Burton has been designated by this Bureau to be the liaison man between the FBI and the Foreign Nationalities branch of your office. On the occasion of Mr. Burton's conference with Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole, these gentlemen outlined in detail the work of this new branch, and offered to this Bureau, through Mr. Burton, the privilege of calling upon them for information in their possession which would be of interest to this Bureau.

I feel that much information of value can be exchanged between the Foreign Nationalities branch and this Bureau, and I hope you will feel free to call upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation for any information which will be of value in this work.

Sincerely yours,

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE

TO:

SUBJECT:

117 East 60th Street,
New York City.
March 24, 1942.

Colonel W. Donovan,
Co-ordinator of Information,
Eighth Street,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

On March 16th I advised you as you requested of the receipt of some of the material which I had brought from Lisbon and of the loss of other. I am writing to tell you that as a result of a letter from the Assistant Collector of Customs this morning it is following:

"Due to an inadvertence, the enclosed papers, listed below, were not returned with the three packages recently delivered to you, which were temporarily held at the time of your arrival on the San Thome.

"We offer regrets any inconvenience [illegible] to failure to deliver this material with your other possessions."

There are still several pages of notes [illegible] report concerning the Alsace-Lorraine [illegible] re: Dr. Carrel.

In the material I expect from London, [illegible] parts of the Alsace Lorraine expulsions [illegible] a copy of the Carrel clipping. [illegible] important.

It is evident that greater precautions [illegible] papers taken from incoming passengers [illegible] unique information.

Sincerely,

Pierre Boneff

117 East 30th Street
New York City
March 18, 1942

Colonel W. Donovan,
Co-Ordinator of Information,
24th and E Street,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I was to advise you as soon as I had taken delivery of the material which I brought back with me from Europe. ~~through~~ Your secretary and I had assumed it would take three days. There was a full week's delay in transferring the negatives and contents of my two brief cases back to New York from Washington .... a total of three weeks, plus the six weeks devoted to the struggle of getting from London to Lisbon to New York.

The English and more French material, the latter taken to England at the request of Sir Noel Charles, [illegible] announced, has not yet arrived.

When I finally took delivery of the material brought with me, I found my notes and digests, all missing. I immediately reported this to the Customs authorities here, Mr. Fishman and to Mr. Herbert Gaston, Assistant secretary of the Treasury, Washington. On further checking of the material, I found other items missing: a secret report concerning the Alsace Lorraine [illegible], an exposé of the German plan for the colonization of France, [illegible] concerning Dr. Carrel. The notes remained in New York and were digests of facts concerning such [illegible] as: Jews, English and Americans in Occupied France, [illegible], Collaboration, Food, Vichy, German penetration, etc. [illegible] ninety-per-cent of the material was unknown in this country and [illegible] not to the interest of the enemy that it be [illegible].

Sixty per cent of the material can, I [illegible], be assembled. Forty per cent, unfortunately, was taken [illegible], notes etc. destroyed in Lisbon in order to keep [illegible] for Clipper travel.

I assumed the material in question would not be appropriated by the government without advising me and [illegible] regulation procedure.

Mr. Gaston advised me Monday last that [illegible] by the government. The Customs here in New York are [illegible] and investigation and have found no trace of [illegible] various departments through which it unnecessarily

[illegible] Department of Justice is now making an investi-
[illegible]tion.

[illegible] this is a very serious loss. To have undertaken
[illegible], which I did, have run the risks, endured, and have suc-
[illegible] in the task of bringing all back safely and then lose
[illegible] results of my labours at my own front door is rather dif-
[illegible] to bear, especially when it could have been so easily
[illegible].

I am still convinced as I was when I left England that
[illegible] this matter is of great and real value to the
[illegible]. However after nearly three months lost in getting
[illegible] to New York and in clearing my material through
[illegible], (from fifteenth to March sixth) I find I have to bur-
[illegible] my negatives and material in order to fulfill
[illegible] commitments.

[illegible] nevertheless, be anxious and willing to coopera-
[illegible] in any way that might be found possible.

[illegible] truly asked Commander [illegible] to advise you
[illegible] facts.

Sincerely,

Therese Bonney

[illegible]

March 11, 1942

Mr. Russell
Bureau of Customs
Winder Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Russell:

In accordance with our telephone conversation today, I am sending some papers which were found in a suitcase belonging to Miss Frances Wood.

I understand the bulk of her papers were returned to her.

1. Mrs. Boone, Jan. 14, 1942

2. Miscellaneous German newspaper and magazine clippings

3. [illegible] for [illegible] of trade

4. Correspondence [illegible] collaborating

[illegible]

[illegible]

March [illegible], 1942

[illegible] Dear [illegible]

The at[illegible] [illegible] Therese Bonney. [illegible] ill [illegible] [illegible] her papers [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] noti- [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] documents [illegible] [illegible] and returned [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

270 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

21 East 40th Street

March 12, 1942

To: Mr. James R. Murphy

From: William H. Vanderbilt

Subject: MISS THERESA BONNEY

Miss Bonney has called me several times on the phone, and came in to see me yesterday. She recited all her difficulties about her papers, documents, etc. She told me that they were finally returned to her but that some material was missing from the three packages which she brought with her.

The missing material is all descriptive of opinions and activities of the Nazis which could be used for anti-Nazi propaganda. All the missing documents came from her brief case, and they include the following:

A report of twenty to thirty pages about collaboration, collaborationist's views, etc.

A book "France-Allegiance" by Jacques Lorraine.

Jerry O'Day Carrell interview.

Secret report on Algiers expulsion.

Miss Bonney has been unable to trace these through the Customs, and she is afraid it is suspicious that everything that disappeared [illegible] against the Nazis.

Miss Bonney has much additional material, some from France and [illegible], arriving through Cook & Son. She is anxious to [illegible] protect this material from loss. Miss Bonney says the FBI is interested in the missing documents, and they [illegible] start an investigation as to what has become of them.

[illegible] to go over her documents, papers, etc. with anyone in our organization, have them photostated, etc.

WHV.

4792

Received on February 28, 1942, from Mr. Shirley Stephens, Chief, Enforcement, of the Bureau of Customs, three packages Nos. 1, 2, and 3, containing film, photographs and other tangible communications detained from Miss Therese Bonney by the collector of customs at New York, N. Y., for examination pursuant to the provisions of section 3(c) of the Trading with the enemy Act.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Personal and
Confidential

February 20, 1942

Dear Bill:

The Irish Minister, Mr. Brennan, came to see me yesterday.

In the course of our conversation he referred to [illegible] which had reached him that your office and O.F.F. [illegible] propaganda for use with the Irish people [illegible] troops in Northern Ireland undertook [illegible] fire. I had already told the Minister that [illegible] were stationed in Northern Ireland in the interest of our own security - which would be that of [illegible] - and not for purposes of aggression. I told [illegible] such rumors such as had come to him.

[illegible] had any objection to his calling [illegible] talking with you. I said I had none [illegible] would be glad to see [illegible] you these lines of [illegible] come to [illegible] in the background.

[illegible]

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

0103-1
W-1114-d

18 February, 1942.

[illegible] The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps,
[illegible]: Lieutenant Colonel William D. Puckle, Marine Corps,
[illegible] Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
[illegible] The Commandant.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 20 February 1942

[illegible] Washington, D.C.
[illegible] Corps,
[illegible] D.C.

[illegible] were available more were any
[illegible]

[illegible] Geo. Patton, Jr.

[illegible] L. Loventhal,
[illegible] by direction

[illegible] February [illegible]

[illegible] Marine Corps.

[illegible] Robert L. Buckley, Marine Corps,

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 725
WATSONVILLE CALIFORNIA

March 6, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Administration Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill,

I just received a letter from the office of the Surgeon General stating that at the present time there is no known indication for the need of an additional army hospital in this locality.

A thousand thanks for your prompt effort.

Sincerely,

Edward G. Burghard

EGB/b

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1942

[illegible] Bell:

[illegible] your note of February 15, enclosing [illegible] letter [illegible] received from Mr. Edward [illegible] Burghard. [illegible] offer of his home site for hospital [illegible] brought to the attention of the Surgeon [illegible]

Sincerely,

[illegible]

February 15, 1972

Mr. Edward L. Gardland
Route 3, Box 728
Petaluma, California

Dear Ed:

I have your letter. I [illegible] this but I will consider it [illegible] color.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

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February 15, 1949

The Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

Attached is a letter from a very reputable fellow. I don't know if you would be interested or not.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 725
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA

Febr. 8, 1942.

Dear Bill:

We have recently heard that both the Army and Navy are considering establishing hospital bases out here, and that sites suitable for this purpose are already being investigated.

Up to now we had not seriously thought of disposing of our property here, but upon hearing of the above, thought what an ideal spot this place would be for hospital purposes.

You see, we have a little over 25 acres, situated right on the Bay of Monterey, with woods and private beach. Our house is large enough, and so laid out, that it could immediately be used as an Administration building, and other buildings placed around or near it. If necessary, it could even be used as a temporary hospital, while any other building operations were going on.

The property is on the main road leading to Camp Ord which, by the way, is only a few miles away. A new State Highway is only about 3/4 of a mile from us, and a spurr line of the Southern Pacific Railroad runs right through one end of the property. So you see, transportation facilities are ideal.

From a health standpoint I doubt whether a better place could be found. All our guests and friends visiting us call it the Sanatorium, because of the recuperative climate. We also have excellent water, with plenty of it.

We originally expected my mother to spend quite some time with us, and as she would have numerous friends visit her, besides other members of our family, we built a rather large house. As usual, things did not work out as we expected, so that the house is really too large for just the two of us. It would be much better for us to have a smaller place, especially during these times, when all our efforts must be put to winning the war.

I have made some inquiries as to whom to see, but find that the only thing to do is to go right to headquarters. In the case of the Army that would be General De Witt, but I do not know who is in command of the Navy out here.

Not knowing General De Witt or the commanding officer of the Navy, I was wondering whether you would care to send me

II.

EDWARD G. BURGHARD
ROUTE 3, BOX 725
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA

letters of introduction to these officers, or to anyone else in authority. You may know of other channels to contact, and any suggestion or help you could give us certainly would be appreciated. As I said before, we feel that this place would be ideal for a hospital, or a place for convalescents, and would therefore like to have the opportunity of offering it for sale to the proper authorities. Perhaps you could look it over yourself for Col. Knox. We certainly would like to see you.

Well, Bill, many thanks in advance for anything you can do in this matter. Do give our best to Russ and Jo when you see them.

With kindest regards from us both -- lots of good luck!

Sincerely,

2816

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 27, 1942

Mr. James Murphy
Assistant to the Coordinator
Office of Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

The following information comes from Mr. Hubert Kleinpeter, friend of Frederick Brisson. Frederick Brisson is the husband of Rosalind Russell, the movie actress who has been invited to attend the President's Birthday Ball here in Washington, and also the son of Carl Brisson, very well known in the United Kingdom and throughout the Scandinavian countries as an actor.

Frederick Brisson has been in radio work for a number of years and manages the radio work of Herbert Marshall, Leslie Howard, Cary Grant, and others. He worked on a London newspaper and was correspondent for the Hollywood Reporter. He also organized the U.S.O. program in connection with the Hollywood Bowl.

Mr. Brisson speaks seven languages fluently and is anxious to get connected with the Office of Coordinator of Information during counter propaganda work.

Mr. Brisson was highly recommended by James D. Secrest, who is in charge of our regional service.

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Paynter
Chief, Economics Branch

2600

[illegible] ORDANCE WITH

[illegible] ALLIANCE [illegible] CHINA AND OTHER ASIATIC COUNTRIES

[illegible] LAY [illegible] EARLY [illegible] AFTERNOON

PLEASE [illegible] ADDRESS PERKASIE PENNSYLVANIA

[illegible] JAL H.

[illegible]

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100380001-2

JAN 12 19[illegible]

R. D. 3
PERKASIE, PENNSYLVANIA

January 8, 1948.

[illegible] William Donovan,
[illegible] Information,
[illegible]

[illegible]:

[illegible] suggested
[illegible] it covers
[illegible] mention.

[illegible] July or a few days.
[illegible] business and to
[illegible] from I am w
[illegible] it will be after
[illegible] phone.

[illegible] to know
[illegible] very en-
[illegible] which it
[illegible] of the prob-

[illegible]

[illegible]

Memorandum: To Colonel William Donovan

From Pearl S. Buck

It is already known that Japan is making much use in her propaganda in Asia of the prejudice of white people against peoples of color. What is not so well known is the effect which this propaganda is beginning to have. The strength in Japan's propaganda is the unfortunate fact that it is true that many white people do have a strong prejudice against people of color, and that there have been many white persons in China, Japan, Malaya, The Philippines, and India - Indeed, in every part where Japan is now using this propaganda, white men have been overbearing, arrogant and unjust in the treatment of citizens of these countries. Propaganda strengthens such [illegible]. As the propaganda says, "The white people will never give you equality because they have never granted equality to their own men. When you fight at the side of white men you are fighting for their rule over you." Japan cites as [illegible]:

1. England's continued unwillingness to grant [illegible] dominion status to India.
2. [illegible] colonial attitude toward all colored [illegible].
3. The discrimination which United States has always had toward colored Americans.
4. The fact that the U. S. navy will not allow colored members except in menial positions,

that no colored men are yet in the U. S. airforce, and that in the army colored and white are segregated.

Proofs of the effect of this propaganda are to be found among our Asiatic allies, especially among the younger people. All are seriously troubled by what might be a victorious white imperialism more difficult for them to overthrow in the long run even than Japanese rule. One hears such remarks as this, always spoken in confidential circles,

"We had better not allow the Japanese navy to be destroyed - we may need it against the whites."

"Even though I hate the Japanese, yet if we had to choose between being a dependency of the Japanese or of the Americans, we would choose the Japanese because they have no race prejudice to be a bar to the hope of future equality."

"After all, what proof have the English and Americans given of their real belief in democracy? They are not fighting for democracy but for themselves. We must fight for ourselves."

"If we destroy not keep the strength of Japan, which is the only modern nation in Asia, to fight the white modern nations for us must! If we destroy Japan, what will we do if the white people do not give us the democracy we want?"

Such remarks, and there are many of them, show a disturbed state of mind which has been increased by the following recent events:

1. Churchill's visit to Washington, which the people of Asia interpret as an endeavor to

cement union between England and the United States alone.

2. The "Union Now" movement itself, which excludes except in vague terms the democracy of China from the proposed federation of democracies.

3. ~~Our allies in Asia have further been disturbed~~ A tendency in such important officials as General Wavell to be colonial-minded even toward such leaders as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. An example quoted was that when Wavell in an interview expressed his thanks to the allies for giving him his command, he omitted mention of China though China has been carrying on the main war against Japan for so long in Asia.

4. [illegible] that in Washington, Churchill showed a lack of knowledge of affairs and persons among [illegible] in Asia and that his interest was not sufficient to help him to know or remember them when told.

5. The part of Churchill's speech when he spoke of Britain and the United States "walking side by side in majesty" etc. (his first public speech in Washington, see closing lines) was taken as confirmation of his "Atlantic-mindedness," by people looking from the viewpoint of Asia.

6. A tendency of American newspaper reporters and columnists

to lump the peoples of Asia together under the term "Yellow" or "Oriental." The Chinese especially very strongly object to this, and feel that as they never speak of "white" or "Occidentals," but always of nations, the peoples of Asia deserve also to be spoken of as nations and not by color or by "Orientals." A very sharp reference was made to this by an important Chinese official when he had just seen the Washington Times-Herald use the terms "those Orientals" a few days ago.

7. It must be taken into account also that it is inevitable that our severe losses in the Far Pacific have produced a conscious or unconscious rise of uprised feeling among all those who have suffered in some measure from white imperialism in the past. The prestige of the white man in the Far East, until this time based largely on the power of arms, has declined temporarily at least out of proportion to the facts. Pride of race even among our allies that a vision people has been able so to deal with a strong western power. Japan is quick to give this to racial account. She is saying, "You see we need not be afraid of the white man." India remains a test case for democracy in Asia. Much depends on the reply given by England

through Churchill to the recent request made by fifteen of the leaders of India, all of whom were moderates in politics. England has a bad record in the minds of Far Eastern peoples, including China. Japan will undoubtedly gain greatly if England continues her present uncompromising attitude toward India.

These are the chief facts which are at this moment aiding Japan in her dangerously successful propaganda in Asia, among all peoples.

What can we do to counteract this propaganda?

1. We must act for ourselves first, and remember that we have a relation to Asia which is not England's. We face the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. We have not England's dark record in the Far East and we must not now take it upon ourselves by allying ourselves so completely with England that to the people of Asia we seem to be one. Any union which is exclusively white and English-speaking will be an all-out aid to Japan.

2. We ought immediately to assure the Chinese of our determination to keep them with us on an equal basis with England. If the President could speak definitely on this point it would be most valuable to us. If China could be wholly re-

assured, then half the danger would be gone.

3. "But words alone will not reassure. A Chinese said the other day in a confidential conversation, "It is considered here that our war with Japan is chronic and so we are sent no help. Help is sent to places where war is considered acute. But five hundred planes, which could have been sent to us at any time, but were not, would have made it possible for us now to have attacked the Japanese strongly on the flank." Again: (quoted from a Chinese) "We begged that American planes and warships might not be so concentrated as they were in Hawaii and the Philippines. It has been our experience that this present war cannot be fought on the old methods of concentration. Dispersion is the word. But [illegible] given to us or to our experiences, [illegible] we have been fighting the Axis longer than anyone else. Now we think with acute regret [illegible] planes which were destroyed within a few [illegible] we could have won the war with them." Again: (quoted from a Chinese source) "We have [illegible] made of free China at the disposal of [illegible] for airfields. Dispersed airfields [illegible] inferior airforce able to stand off a superior one."

Again: "China has a feeling of let-down. She longed for the entry of America into the war

[illegible]ter all these years of struggle. Instead of having been given any relief, however, she is being asked to send soldiers to Burma and Indo-China."

[illegible]: "If China does not soon have help she will collapse economically. It has become a pressing problem to Chiang Kai-shek to know how [illegible] the Chinese army."

[illegible]: "The great danger is that England and [illegible] will fight this war as a colonial [illegible] It is not a colonial war. It is a [illegible] total war embracing political and [illegible] as well as military."

[illegible] not the United States realize [illegible] for the Allies that is in [illegible] Chinese people? Only the [illegible] against [illegible] Philippines, Malaya, [illegible] that is not their [illegible] colonies or empire. But [illegible] for its own [illegible] should be between [illegible] and non-Imperialistic [illegible] from Chinese and Filipino) [illegible] taken at once to [illegible] first and then the other allies [illegible] understand our determination [illegible] democracy?

a. There should be a continuing conference of strategy in Washington - not London, for the people of Asia strongly distrust England, but are inclined to and want to trust the United States. At this conference China ought to be represented on completely equal terms with England and the United States.

b. Decisions as to allocations of war supplies should be taken in joint consultation, and care should be taken that General Wavell does not bring a colonial officer's mind to bear upon the Chinese.

c. There is particularly in Washington much drawing-room talk against China, and the Chinese know it. People say, "After all, can you trust the Chinese?", "What can the Chinese do?", "Why don't the Chinese do something?" This is unjust [illegible] the Chinese have been doing a great deal for years, and have had no help as yet, and it [illegible] Chinese.

[illegible] be told that in speaking of [illegible] our allies also, they must [illegible] racial terms, nor should any terms be [illegible] would seem to disparage our allies on [illegible] geographical grounds. At present the [illegible] newspapermen and columnists is such - even of [illegible] columnists like Walter Lippman - that unwittingly they insult our allies in Asia.

7. Our generals and military men may be actually as dangerous as they are helpful in winning this war. Today war has to be won through the mind as well as through armies and weapons. The Japanese, like the Germans, are fighting a total war - not merely measuring arms. But many military men, American and English, seem unable to grasp this fact. It is natural to them to think in the old-fashioned terms of weapon against weapon, army against army. There ought to be complete liaison between Wavell and Chiang Kai-shek - political as well as military. It is doubtful whether Wavell can do this, and therefore it must be supplemented by others who can help him. China is fighting with full political consciousness but as yet we are not, nor is England. Generals can not seem to understand the new war. They think this war will be fought and won by tanks and airplanes only. Military men only know how to stand up to tanks and airplanes.

8. Next to China, the Netherlands East Indies are [illegible] total war. There are 400,000 Dutchmen in the East Indies who have no home now in Europe. This is the greatest concentration of white forces in Asia. There are only 80,000 Englishmen in India. Every effort ought to be made for the spiritual force of the Dutch who are

really fighting for freedom. Free men can fight ten times as well as colonials.

6. Australia, so far as I understand it, shows the same potential strengths. This can be confirmed by a talk with Mr. Casey, the Australian minister.

7. Finally, the imperative first step, which should be taken at once in order to reassure China, our strongest ally, and to cut the [illegible] of Japanese propaganda is two-fold - [illegible] a clear statement made by the President that we are fully aware of the importance of the Axis war in the Orient and that there is no danger of our giving it secondary attention. [illegible] relief help sent to China, even if it [illegible] only a comparatively small number of airplanes.

[illegible] to memorandum, I must respectfully call [illegible] the folly of believing that the Axis can be de[illegible]ted. Germany must be defeated, [illegible] her fascist group upon Asia, upon [illegible], the Americans will find an [illegible] war, because Japan is [illegible] fascist thinking than Germany is, [illegible] victorious, than Germany can be except in [illegible].

[illegible] but last long before Germany conceived [illegible] regime, Japan had evolved it completely. [illegible] records will show clearly the same scheme of

government, based on force, on contempt of the masses, on rejection of democracy, on aggressive warfare, on the use of lies and trickery and propaganda as weapons. As early as the middle of the sixteenth century this regime began to emerge. Korea alone saw it, for she saw herself as its first victim, as indeed she was. The present world war, of which the first world war was only a stage, may be directly traced to the period in which Japan began her definite aggressive policy by seizing Korea. Today's history only repeats that past event in broken treaties and useless promises. It is interesting to discover the direct [illegible] between Germany and Japan in the development of fascism in Europe. That the relation is direct no one can doubt, [illegible] primary source.

[illegible] facts, to believe that if Germany is [illegible] defeat Japan is therefore ignorance of [illegible] Japan victorious in Asia will be not [illegible] than a Germany victorious in Europe [illegible] would England perhaps be able to [illegible] to gain English strongholds in [illegible] upon the loyalty of India, or upon the [illegible] India. The [illegible] of Russia in the present war has [illegible] new power among the peoples of Asia. [illegible] relations in the Russian army. India [illegible] influenced by Russian successes. Russia [illegible] Asia today.

[illegible] India, must call attention to her right to [illegible] democracy, perhaps more truly a democracy than we [illegible] have ever been. China has long practiced a real

democracy, though on a plan different from the western plan, and it is natural that great distrust is aroused all through Asia when China is not solidly included with England and the United States, where she believes she belongs, ~~[illegible]~~ When China is not put on terms of equality with England and the United States, either actually or in planning, it is worth battleships and bombers to Japan in furnishing proof of what she is telling the peoples of Asia. Japan is trying to make this war a race issue, and we Americans ought to do everything we can to cut across that. It would be to our interest to insist that China be given of equality even if she did not altogether in all ways deserve it in order that Japan be proved wrong. But anyone who knows China will not allow that she is undeserving of equality. The [illegible] China has kept Japan from victory for [illegible] nearly five years, will one day be written [illegible] masterpiece of strategy in defensive war-[illegible] democracy is as real as our own, the basic [illegible] in its form rather than in its effect. It [illegible] democracy [illegible] western democracy has al-[illegible]

[illegible], not as my own opinion alone, but [illegible] many thoughtful persons in and out of Asia, [illegible] that the great danger [illegible] identified with England in [illegible] of Asia. We have a good record in Asia, [illegible] thinking. We are not feared there for past imperialisms. [illegible] may be one of great influence and friendly

strength or it may be full of danger. Let us combine our union with England only with an equal union with China, let us maintain our own policies toward the nations of Asia, and let us demonstrate to the peoples in Asia our determination to maintain our independence while we fight with full strength for democracy for all.

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JAMES P. BAXTER, 3rd

January 2, 1942

Telegram -- Official

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] PLAIN DUCK

[illegible]

[illegible]

The East and West Association

Devoted to mutual knowledge and understanding of the life of the Oriental and the American peoples

Forty East Forty-ninth Street, New York City

January 26, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

The Board of Directors of the East and West Association want you to be among the first to know of the founding of this organization, its purpose, and what we hope to accomplish through its activities.

The East and West Association was planned a long time ago by a small group of persons who are familiar with Far Eastern countries. We felt that in our modern world it was increasingly necessary to work for real understanding between the peoples of the east and the west. We feel that this is now crucial because of the war. Not only future peace but victory itself depends upon understanding which cuts across color and race and geography, and aims straight at the hearts and minds of people.

The enclosed memorandum tells of the plans of the organization and the channels we will use in developing its program more fully. We shall not duplicate the work of any other organization. Our purpose is not relief; our interests are not "humanitarian," but broadly human. We shall do no research; we mean not to collect new knowledge, but to disseminate widely the knowledge we already have.

We shall appreciate your inquiries and suggestions and we would like to send you from time to time further information about our work as it develops.

Sincerely yours,

Pearl S. Buck

Enc.

MEMORANDUM BY PEARL S. BUCK

East and West today are one. War has swept the peoples of the world together and whether we are ready for this union or not, we have been [illegible] it by necessity. The union will continue, whether we want it or not, after the war is over. Not the western peoples alone will [illegible] the war, nor will western peoples alone make the peace after the war. For the first time in human history the whole human race must [illegible] as well.

[illegible] essential today than ever, therefore, that the [illegible] East and West understand each other in all possible ways. [illegible] know one another. Our food, our ways of living, our feelings and [illegible] have become [illegible] to each other. But such [illegible] knowledge and we have not that [illegible] the Chinese, are [illegible] to us, and we are [illegible] the Japanese, are still less known, [illegible] to them. We do not know our own [illegible] of India, [illegible] Thailand, [illegible] know us. We do not even [illegible] the islands in [illegible] where [illegible] more [illegible] better. Outward circumstances [illegible] will separate [illegible] East and West in the [illegible] the [illegible] interchange [illegible] such interchange, there- [illegible] today, the East and West.

Association, a non-profit corporation, has been organized. Its purpose is to help ordinary people on one side of the world to know and understand ordinary people on the other side, in terms which ordinary people can grasp.

The East and West Association does not duplicate the work of any other group. It seeks to use and spread more widely, through various means comprehensible to the average person, the results of the study and activities of other organizations as well as of informed individuals.

The [illegible] means, planned so far, of disseminating this [illegible] knowledge include:

1. [illegible] programs, national, local and overseas.
2. [illegible] of motion pictures, documentary and [illegible].
3. [illegible] illustrated monthly magazine.
4. [illegible] forums and discussion groups, [illegible] these and other groups.
5. [illegible] and reference library [illegible].
6. [illegible] of the writings of East and [illegible] languages.
7. [illegible] members.
8. [illegible] and all other possible mediums [illegible] the western world.

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D R A F T

January 3, 1942

Dear Mr. Nelson:

To enable the Coordinator of Information to present [illegible] to the President and persons designated [illegible] will be given by him to the construction and [illegible] will be operated by this or-

[illegible] is to be under the [illegible] Administration. Three of [illegible], Mr. Hayford [illegible] structure, and [illegible] The [illegible] for the our-[illegible]

[illegible] for

some of the equipment to be installed. Certain experimental work is necessary in addition, as some of the equipment to be installed and constructed specifically [illegible]. This equipment consists of mechanical, [illegible], and related items.

[illegible] to prevent delay on necessary supplies, [illegible], which delay, it is essential, [illegible] project within as low in the "A" [illegible] I would [illegible] our personal [illegible].

[illegible] yours,

[illegible] J. Brown

[illegible]

DEC 8 1941

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I am attaching for your information a copy of my letter of this date to the Administrator of the Federal Works Agency relative to the building for our presentation activities.

Sincerely yours,

Director.

Attachment

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information.

JAMES W GERARD
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y.

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JAMES W. GERARD
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK CITY

October 15, 1[illegible]

Brigadier General [illegible]
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General [illegible]

[illegible] to present to you [illegible]

I [illegible] personally [illegible] Mr. Hunter [illegible] right and proper [illegible] gentleman [illegible] the highest recommendation in this city.

Very sincerely yours,

[illegible]

JWG:F