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Office Memorandum - United States Government

To: Brig. General William J. Donovan  
From: Arthur J. Goldberg  
Subject: Labor Desk Activities Relative to Greece

Date: March 4, 1944

Pursuant to our conversation, I send you herewith a statement of the activities of the Labor Desk, CI at Cairo relative to Greece.

Since writing the report, we have received a cable (#22504) from Mr. Kollender in Cairo stating that Couvaras has been commissioned a second lieutenant and that the Pericles mission will depart next week.
Report on Labor Desk Activities in Middle East Theater Relative to Greece

Since arriving in Cairo in late November to set up the Labor Desk, Mortimer Kollender has concentrated largely on the establishment of contacts with the Greek resistance group known as EAM (National Liberation Front). With the approval of Colonel Moseraki and with assistance from the Greek Desk (Mr. Dow), his efforts have materialized into the Pericles Project.

The project aims at the immediate penetration of occupied Greece with the object of obtaining first-hand tactical intelligence of military, psychological, political and economic importance. The first phase calls for the formation of a small mission consisting of a Greek-American military security and a Greek to serve as assistant. The mission will be to discover means of developing effective channels for the exchange of information.

At the same time, efforts to develop such a relationship with the Greek resistance groups have met with varying success, to date. British contacts have been integrated in considerable measure, while American contacts, although occasionally made, have not yet been able to maintain a consistent pattern of contact; indeed, only one agent was able to maintain contact with a group of British agents, recently returned to Greece in January.
The 40th weekly report contains the following statement: "From informal talks with pro-EAM elements in Cairo, as well as other sources, the impression was gained that our (i.e., the Labor Desk's) connection with the Greek 'union' would be the best means to get in touch with the main resistance group inside Greece."

An attached memorandum prepared by Lieutenant Edition of the 'Rock Desk in Cairo supports the belief that the most numerous and effective resistance organization in Greece is the EAM with its guerrilla force known as the ELAS (National Liberation Army). According to the Union of Democratic Control, a London organization informing the British public on resistance movements in occupied Europe, the EAM emerged following the German occupation of Greece in 1941. The nucleus appears to have been the liberal, socialist, Communist and Agrarian groups who led opposition to the Metaxas regime. In any event, it is known to embrace today the only groups of organized labor in Greece, including the transport, dock, industrial, building and service trades, white collar, government and commercial workers. With these and other forces, EAM has directed a series of strikes aimed against the Greek quisling government and has also struck at German communications by destroying bridges, tunnels, etc. Today, EAM appears to
hold various mountain areas in the northwest and east-central areas.

Kollendor has established a relationship with the leader of the Greek Communist Union in Alexandria, one Karayannis, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War. Karayannis evaluated one man to accompany the staff member (Corporal Convaras) into Greece, but he did not measure up to the needed qualifications. On January 29, it was reported that Karayannis had presented a second and entirely satisfactory man, but it is necessary to obtain his temporary release from the Greek Army. There is also a possibility that Karayannis himself can be induced to take the job.

It should be noted that Karayannis has declined all remuneration for anyone provided as Convaras' companion. It is estimated that $1,000 will cover all expenses for the trip which should be completed within six weeks. Transportation to and from Greece will be by sea. It is believed that Corporal Convaras will be more effective if he can be presented to R.A.F. as an officer and steps have been taken to obtain a field commission for him as a second lieutenant.

Meantime, auxiliary personnel for the project are being recruited both here and in Cairo. One Greek radio operator is already on route to Egypt.
SECRET

Office of Strategic Services
H. S. Army Forces in the Middle East

December 2, 1943

TO: Balkan Section, OSS and A Washington

FROM: H. C. E. Edson, OSS Cairo

SUBJECT: A General Estimate of the Political Situation inside Greece.

A fact which emerges with ever-increasing clarity is the dominant, all but unchallenged position of EAM-ELAS within German-occupied Greece. Competing guerrilla organizations such as Col. Papagos' SEKA in Thessaly, PAS, the new form of the VNM in Macedonia, and the abortive EGA (Ethnik Organon Axi Matikon) in the Peloponnese, have been destroyed, rendered innocuous, or forced to join EAM-ELAS. The only guerrilla organization of any real importance existing in Greece today, aside from ELAS, is Col. Korfes' EDOK in Epirus. EDOK has been reduced to less than 5,000 men, whereas the most conservative estimate for the strength of ELAS is over 20,000.

EAM has also built up an apparently well-organized and effective system of controls within the cities and towns of Greece, open in the regions not under German control, more or less under cover elsewhere. The organization in each city or town is controlled by a Committee; there are subsidiary controls for the various quarters of a city and local controls for units as small as a number of blocks. Villages are ordinarily run by a four-man committee. By these methods EAM is able to secure information continually as to what is going on. EAM courts exist, in which persons charged with working for the Germans or being "anti-national," i.e., anti-EAM, are tried. If found guilty they are often executed, and there is no doubt that EAM has in this way effectively disposed of quislings. It is repeatedly asserted by EAM's opponents that persons whose only crime is disapproval of EAM's aims, and refusal to work for EAM, are gotten out of the way in the same manner, and it seems to be true that this has occurred in some instances. EAM is charged also with having betrayed member of rival organizations to the Germans, not directly, but by publishing the names of such individuals.
Clandestine newspapers - for example, in
recounting their political views and activities.
newspapers come, of course, into the hands of
the regions of Greece directly under ELAS
control. It is an administrative structure open
to taxes collected from the peasants - usually
and an attempt is made to maintain public
funds for the needy.

ELAS is strong in all parts of Greece, but particu-
larly in Central Greece (Sterea Hellas, the old Tsamuelli),
incisively, the ELAS forces are relatively small and hence the central
control. In Crete the guerrillas are Emeria but
the regulars have contact with EAM HQ. Moreover,
EAM is present, with greater or
less, in a vast area.

There is no doubt at all that ELAS is controlled by the
Communists. The chief figure is Samos,
by resistance in Western Macedonia. He
is known as an 'underground' and is described as "knowing
a man in a day". It is stated that when
meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece or the EAM no one else
attends to meetings entirely. Other "important
figures" are said to be from the same general area
and least characteristically Hellenic.

While the Communists use persons of el-
ization in the EAM, they control them.
There was a successful attempt by another polit-
icommunist domination of EAM.
ELAS have responsible positions in the ELAS
and, for the EAM Line on top their jobs,
and social position can and have joined
down positions of real power. It is be-
cause difficult anywhere in Greece to engage
activity without being a member of EAM; one
not at all. There is little doubt that it
was to cancel out or take over all other
organizations and guerrilla groups in Greece, so
that Greece is liberated the Allies will be faced with
acompit. It is this policy which led to the civil
war in Greece and Rhodes.

In a report No. 1470 the statement is made that the
civil war was "German inspired". This is true, but in a
different way than that report implies. The Germans are, of
headed men like Stavros would stubbornly pursue a program which they knew could not be fulfilled after the war. If they continue along these lines, it is surely because they do feel that the EAM programme can be put into effect, if not with the consent of England and the United States, then with the backing of Russia. EAM is consistently charged with having relations with Bulgarian Communists, and with not having a sufficiently "national" attitude towards Bulgaria. It is stated that Bulgarian Communists have helped EAM agents enter the Bulgarian occupied regions of northern Greece. Russia still maintains diplomatic representatives in Sofia, and contact between the EAM and Russia is feasible by this means. It seems not improbable that EAM believes it can count on Russian support after liberation.

But at this point we leave Greece and enter the whole problem of the relations between the Russians and the Communist-led resistance groups in Southeastern Europe as a whole. We have the National Liberation Front (EAM) in Greece, a probably Communist-led National Liberation Committee in Albania, Tito's Partisans - the National Liberation Army in many parts of Yugoslavia, while there is a similarly named organization with Communist leadership amongst the Slovenes. There may well be other examples unknown to me. In my judgment such similarity of organizational pattern and nomenclature can hardly be fortuitous. I believe that with this problem in mind NATO should embark on a study of these organizations as a whole, that the information from different areas should be pooled and compared, it may well be possible that we have to do with a concealed policy of Russian-Communist activity designed to appear in the form of spontaneous growths within the various occupied countries concerned.

To return to Greece. The opposition to EAM within Greece is widespread and deeply felt, but it is not powerful or effective. The common people want liberation and food - political matters are less than secondary. Many persons, as among them, who have strongly opposed the King, now that to save Greece from EAM domination the King should accept if it is the wish of the Allies. Another winter approaches. The Allies have ignominiously left in the Aegean. Russian successes continue. No policy is made by the Allies to counter the EAM by devising a policy which will steal EAM's thunder and hearten Greek people. Such is the political situation inside Greece at the beginning of December 1943, two years six months after the German conquest.
Dear General Donovan:

This letter is being written for two reasons; (a) I believe in its contents, and (b) Ambassador MacVeagh has suggested that I write it.

The question of relief to Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia after the retirement of the Germans, with particular emphasis on Greece, has been one which has been given a great deal of thought by USArmy, various civil agencies here, and the War Department in Washington. In Cairo it is felt that the soundest principle would be to have American participation on a basis with the British, and that, in the first stages, would be undertaken by military forces. Plans towards implementing such an effort have been nearly completed here by USArmy. The War Department has, on the other hand, recently taken the view that no American troops may be spared for this project and have stated that a maximum of 25 officers, as observers, would be furnished. This is nothing more than following along in the wake of the British, to share the blame if there is failure and receive no credit for success. It is a policy which I believe to be fundamentally unsound.

I can not argue from a military standpoint that American troops should be supplied for the purpose mentioned above as, obviously, they may be more useful in other theaters. I do, however, believe that there should be American leadership to the military mission which will undertake the task. It has become increasingly more evident in the past 6 months that the Greek people and government have a growing distrust of the British. I believe strongly that a first-class, high-ranking American General as Commanding General of the Joint Mission (even if no American troops are involved) would do much to allay the fears of the Greeks and would aid the latter in having confidence that a non-political, unselfish and honest effort would be made.

Ambassador MacVeagh has written a strong letter to the President on this subject, as well as cabling the State Department. He feels that this matter is of the utmost importance and suggests that, if you agree, it might be possible for you to express your views to the President, the State Department and the War Department, with particular emphasis on the first mentioned.

Sincerely yours,
Memorandum for: General Haerlider
Mr. Scribner
Mr. Shepardson
NATO
NATO Planning Group

From: Executive Office

Under date of 21 February 1944 the State Department sent to the American Legation, Cairo, a cable (088 No. 28976) to the effect that the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff have agreed to instruct the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that Greek soldiers are to be used when military considerations permit.

F. J. Putzel, Jr.
Ensign, USNR
Asst. Executive Officer
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO:        Brig. General William J. Donovan
FROM:      Lt. Colonel Florimond Duke
SUBJECT:   Greek Mission

DATE: January 14, 1944

The overall basic directive from J.C.S. to O.S.S., gives to O.S.S. the right to all intelligence operations and other activities in enemy occupied territory. Greece being one of the occupied countries therefore, the fate of, or any attempts to help, the Greek people lies in the hands of O.S.S. As Director of O.S.S., consequently it follows that this fate lies directly in your hands.

What are we doing about it? What is our policy concerning Greece? Are we to leave the fate of the Balkans entirely up to Russia? Should we somehow try to organize the Greeks and help the 90%, who are not Communists, to maintain a democratic form of government, which they have so long desired?

Up to now, it is my impression that O.S.S. is not doing anything in this direction and we are not attempting to do it in the proper, most effective way. The mere fact that the British are pulling out, is all the more reason why we should go in.

We have had three or four teams on some of the Islands of Greece and have been successful recently in landing two teams on the mainland. Only this week (January 13th) did we receive the first message from one of the teams on the mainland. These teams
are purely for information and are not designed to do the bigger
or more important job.

The crux of the whole situation in Greece is to find out
definitely how strong is the E.A.M., what the people think of it,
who are its leaders, what are its ambitions. Apparently it is the
strongest resistance group and I feel convinced that the proper
team, made up of Americans and Greeks, could live with this group,
work with it in the beginning and gradually guide it in the right
direction and make of it a real united force to combat the enemy.
This team, if properly selected, would have good chances of uniting
the different groups in Greece, who are now fighting each other.

I say this must be an American group because you have just
returned from there and know the situation. You must realise that
the British are now stymied in Greece and that the British would
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by letting an American
group attempt this all important task.

Certainly the one thing that the British Empire wants is to
keep Greece from becoming part of the Soviet Union. For strategical
and many other reasons, I am sure our country would feel the same.
Therefore, anything that this American group would do in Greece,
would be for the interests of Great Britain as well as ourselves.

I have spent three years now living among and knowing these
Greek people, and understanding them. They have confidence in me
and I can get any one of a dozen or more who would be willing and
most anxious to go with me into Greece to do this job.

Whatever policy you, the Theatre Commander, or our State
Department wanted concerning Greece, I am sure we could carry out. We should go there with a definite directive from you. Such a mission, I happen to know, would readily have the approval of the State Department, and the British S.I.S. in Washington.

I have various plans in mind, the organisation of which is simply a matter of detail and can be implemented very quickly along the lines of the plan selected by you.

In spite of adverse comments you may have heard about me in Cairo, I still believe that when you consider all the factors involved, that I will prove to be the best and most logical man you could find to head such a mission. I sincerely hope that, as soon as convenient for you after your return, I may have the opportunity to discuss this further and in more detail with you.

F. Duke
To: CBI, Buxton

The attached letter from Ambassador Steinhardt would not seem to call for a cable summary to Gen. Donovan in view of his imminent return. However, it should probably be summarized immediately for Cairo, since that will be the base used by Miss Cox for her project to stockpile in Turkey relief supplies for the Aegean Islands. Accordingly, a draft of a cable for Cairo has been prepared, for your initialling, if you approve.

Cable

[Signature]

Cable summarizing letter
sent to Miss Cox Cairo
2/3/44

(SECRET)
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Ankara, January 15, 1944.

The Honorable
Wm. J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Cairo, Egypt.

Dear Bill:

I was delighted to receive your letter of January 8th and to learn therefrom that you are well,—even if your letter was on business.

Needless to say I shall do whatever lies within my power to further Miss Cox's desire to create a stock of supplies with which to offer immediate relief to the Greek islands after their liberation. If she contemplates doing so on a small scale there should be little difficulty but if she has in mind creating substantial stocks then I foresee serious difficulties for the following reasons:

Insofar as concerns duty free entry, it is most unlikely that the Turkish authorities would permit the entry into the country of any considerable amount of supplies—even for relief purposes—without the payment of the customary duties. The customs laws here are severe and may only be modified by Parliament. Insofar as I am aware there is no provision for free entry excepting for the personal effects of the Chief of Mission—and they may not be given away or sold. Furthermore, having regard to the acute political situation here at the present time, it is most unlikely that the Turkish authorities would permit the entry of any considerable quantity of supplies without inspection. They have not forgotten the lesson of Norway.

Insofar as concerns the arrangements worked out between the British and the Turkish authorities for their military stores in Turkey, Miss Cox appears to have overlooked the fact that this arrangement comes squarely under the British-Turkish military alliance, that the stores are checked by the Turks on entry, that they are assigned to specified areas for a specific purpose and are regarded as part of the British obligation to provide military stores and equipment for Turkey in the event of the country's entry into the war.
As the Turkish-British alliance has always been recognized by the Germans, the Turks have permitted the British certain privileges which they have consistently denied to all other countries, including the United States, on the grounds that to grant similar privileges to a nation other than its ally might be regarded as provocation by the Germans.

In short, while I may be able to assist Miss Cox to achieve her humanitarian objectives within the diplomatic privileges extended to me by the Turkish Government, it is most unlikely that they will permit her to accumulate any substantial stocks of supplies in Turkey on a duty free basis.

On the other hand, it occurs to me that there must be some provision of Turkish law--similar to that which exists in other countries--permitting the entry of merchandise in bond without the payment of duty provided it is re-exported within a specified period of time. Miss Cox may wish to explore this possibility and I shall of course be glad to render her every assistance and facility in this regard.

I quite agree with you that the Samos episode indicated that the effective cooperation between Miss Cox and Captain Caskey could produce fruitful results and I am sure that it has been called to your attention that General Wilson in a letter to me graciously acknowledged the assistance rendered to the British forces.

I assume that on Miss Cox's return she will take up with me the subject matter of your letter and as I have said above I shall do everything within my power to assist her. If we are unable to help her carry out her plans, it will be solely because of the objections of the Turkish authorities which we are unable to overcome.

Affectionate regards to you,

[Signature]

 Classified in the Secretariat
26th November, 1943.

INSIDE GREECE

Military

A total of close to 35,000 (Greek) guerrillas are opposed to German and Bulgarian troops aggregating some 144,000 Germans plus some 87,000 Bulgarians.

Since Germans fear no attack by Allies on Greece, the guerrillas are holding in Greece about 3% German divisions and 4 Bulgarian which otherwise could be used elsewhere.

Political

Difficulty arises from one big simple fact: of the 35,000 guerrillas, close to 28,700 are controlled by a communist-led organization, the EAM (guerrilla branch called ELAS, but EAM-ELAS is one and the same for all practical purposes).

The rest of the guerrillas are either moderate in politics, or non-political. Col. Zervas' EDES is the largest minority band (c. 7000?). The rest are small, and largely disbanded, and many are in the firm grip of EAM-ELAS, which aims to swallow up all the others by civil war or otherwise.

At present EAM-ELAS "controls" 3/4 of the territory of Greece, including practically all important harbors and lines of communication. By "controls" is meant that sabotage and other activity in a given area is impossible without EAM-ELAS cooperation.

EAM-ELAS

Origin: Metaxas dictatorship forced communists underground taught them all the tricks of secret organization.
Size: Starting instantly when Germany occupied Greece, EAM-ELAS got the jump on all other groups and kept its lead by a big margin. EAM-ELAS has far more members than any other organization in Greece - more guerrillas, and more civilians. Counting all "fellow travellers", "innocent bystanders", and other affiliates, EAM-ELAS probably has the support of 20% of the population at least; at most it might be able to command a majority of votes.

Extent: While other Greeks talked, EAM organizers spread over the country and into the islands; everywhere there was a mushroom growth.

Appeal: Every possible group was approached and roped in: clerks, laborers, women, a score of others were organized in groups of their own. Marxist communism was played down. Liberation from the Axis was played up. Members organized strikes, printed clandestine papers by the dozen, went off to fight, stayed home to commit sabotage in cities; it was not just talk, it was fanatical devotion, and many died heroic deaths.

Control: In the provinces, throughout Greece, the EAM members are often the most educated and most valuable part of the population. In Athens the leadership is vested in a small group, the Kentron (Central Committee), many of whom are largely, not wholly, Hellenic in blood (many come from the southern Pindus region); humble in origin, strongly communist in sentiment, utter realists in action.

Funds: The Kentron in Athens controls the whole treasury.

Leaders: Santos, Secretary of the Kentron, a man of about sixty, described by an English source as "a man who knows how much a mile eats in a day." Called "Sabbayanni" (Greek Johnny), he presence at
a meeting is a signal that no one else shall speak." But he should not be under-rated: has held his position, steadily built up his organisation.

Policy: To attain a monopoly, control Greece, set up a communist state - after liberation; but in parts now liberated the EAM is already a state.

Future: Everyone says: "The Greek is not naturally a communist". But:

1) "Communist" no longer means "Marxian socialist". "Communist" now means "one who follows the party line: one who is, in effect, a Russian outside Russia". In this sense many Greeks are "communists".

2) EAM-ELAS has had years in which to cement loyalties, discipline members, etc. The Greek after his sufferings will not be quite the same as before. EAM-ELAS has roots everywhere: it cannot be ripped up and tossed away.

3) Beyond these factors, its future depends on outside factors.

OUTSIDE FACTORS: MILITARY

Granted the above facts or something like them, EAM-ELAS is the principal military force in Greece with which any policy imposed from outside must cope.

Those in control of policy have had various alternative courses to select from: (a) To treat EAM-ELAS fairly, but as one organization among many; or (b) to back some other organization attempting to destroy EAM-ELAS; or (c) to back EAM-ELAS exclusively, letting the others take their beating.
- 6 -

Of these alternatives, (a) has been tried, and (b) is about to be tried.

(c) In the early stage, Allied (that is, British) policy backed virtually all guerrillas who were attempting to combat the Axis effectively. This included ELAS. An equitable agreement was drawn up, presented, and signed by most of the guerrilla leaders. Under its terms, friction between bands was to cease, supplies were to be apportioned to quotas of men, etc. A Joint H.Q. was set up. EAM-ELAS participated. Supplies were sent in, enough ultimately to equip some thousands of men, though not sufficient to raise large armies for pitched battles. In a word, this policy aimed at guerrillas working harmoniously with each other in order to harass Axis troops and without political involvements.

On paper at least, and to some extent in practice, this was a statesmanlike policy, in that for some months there was little or no internecine strife; many German installations were sabotaged; whole areas were liberated; and British Liaison Officers in some numbers set up missions safely throughout large parts of Greece.

This policy has nonetheless failed; the reasons for the failure are political, not military.

OUTSIDE FORCES: POLITICAL

Allied policy (again really British) starts from geography. For any power which wishes to maintain stability in the Middle East, some degree of control over Greece is a virtual necessity, since nature has made Greece a bridge-head into Europe. Political control, which should leave Greece "free" in some reasonable sense, could be attained
(b) The political won out, and policy has now been altered so that EDES is to be built up in opposition to EAM-ELAS, which is to be starved of supplies and attacked on the propaganda front. It is too early as yet to describe this wholly new phase - new and ominous - into which the Greek problem is entering. But certain facts may be cited for guidance in formulating policy:

1) It would be desirable, from any point of view except the communist, to root out communism in Greece. Communism there means party control - that is apparent already - ; party control means party tyranny, especially in a country which has always been liberty-loving and ready to fight for liberty; and party tyranny means one-man rule, or one-group rule. Seen in this way, abstractly, a large body of moderate opinion in Greece would undoubtedly deplore EAM-ELAS.

2) But the situation is not abstract. As stated above, EAM-ELAS was a dynamic, courageous, imaginative, fighting organisation right from the beginning. It enlisted the support of good people all over Greece.

3) Policy from outside has been, in effect - that is, has seemed to the Greeks to consist in saying - "Greece shall freely choose whatever form of government she wishes, provided she chooses monarchy under George II. George II gives his word that there will be no more dictatorships." It is idle to point out that such a statement is scarcely fair to the Foreign Office. Greeks are wily and suspicious, they see that England has interests to further, they all too readily interpret policy with an unfortunately sinister emphasis.
4) A whole series of exacerbations, and most recently the fiasco in Leros and Samos, have had a further unfortunate result. The Greeks have become, momentarily at least, anti-British. Observers state in fact that anti-British feeling has never been more acute. The reasons are numerous: harsh treatment of the emissaries from Greece in September, concessions to Italians, refusal to the cabinet of communications with Greece, and a half-dozen other complaints.

5) What emerges from all this is one unhappy fact: for many months now the whole body of moderate opinion in Greece, which still had shied away from the communist aspects of EAM-ELAS, has been alienated. Not all the alienated opinion will go communist. It is hardly too much to say, however, on the basis of the above facts, that if a deliberate attempt had been made to drive people into the arms of EAM-ELAS, no more effective method could have been found than what has actually happened. While the Russians are winning the war, Samos has had to be surrendered without a blow.

In short, there is a growing consensus of opinion that a dubious policy (i.e., restoring George II), has been unfortunately implemented (viz., alienation instead of conciliation of non-communist Greeks). Widespread starvation threatens, and altogether the Greek situation has probably never been worse.
23rd November, 1943.

My dear General,

Thank you for your letter dated 20th November.

I am considering the many points which you have raised, and hope to discuss them with you before the end of the week.

I am very glad indeed that we are now on a good mutual footing again. I feel sure that our collaboration will really achieve something of note in this most interesting and important part of Europe.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

General [illegible] J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.
My dear General Cuffins,

1. Thank you for sending me the appraisal of the situation in Yugoslavia and Greece by Lt. Col. Judge. As a whole, his recommendations for a joint mission seems to us proper but, before sending in this mission, it would appear desirable to have them meet with General Wilson and General Hoyce together with the heads of our respective organizations in the Middle East in order to insure that the government policy by which each of us is controlled shall be fully explained and understood.

2. It is very gratifying to see your understanding of the needs of the situation here and of the importance of having our association in this Theater as close on Plans and Operations as it is in other Theaters.

3. The arrangement for the joint weekly meeting of our representatives, the placing of 3.I. and 3.O. men on the Priority Board, and your acceptance of our liaison officer in the R.A.F. traffic office should all make for more effective results.

4. I have learned that neither you nor we have a representative on what, I believe, is called the Defense Committee. If we are to complete this task, we both should be represented. I have talked to General Hoyce about this and, if you agree, would you take steps to see if this can be accomplished?

5. I trust, however, that there are but steps to bringing about a closer and more affirmative direction of subversive operations in the Balkans. There is an unusual opportunity through our joint efforts to give real support to military operations in other Theaters. I am sure you agree that this can be done only by closer supervision from here of the actual field operations in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania.

6. The strategic conception seems wise but the tactical fulfillment is sporadic and disconnected. To bring about a more coherent and integrated field effort, I wish you would consider a joint recommendation by us that the leaders of the various guerrilla groups be invited to send authorized representatives to Cairo or Beirut. If this were established, we should have closer control over each guerrilla chief so that, in the event a particular chief should elect to traffic with the enemy, an ultimatum to him would strengthen the position of our respective governments.
7. We have already discussed the possibility of the use of Operational Groups for island seizures and coup de main. We should have such a group here very soon which, after some special training in which I hope you will help us, might be used experimentally on a small and simple scale to try out the idea — at least in reconnaissance of islands.

8. I am grateful for your assistance of the last few days in sending material and men into the Balkans. I am told by Lt. Col. Toulain that he hopes soon to have in his hands additional supplies which he proposes to have shipped as soon as transport will be available.

We have kept General Royce fully informed and, as you know, we are receiving his fullest support.

Thank you again for all your help and I hope we will soon meet in America.

William J. Donovan

Major General C. McV. Corbitts, D.S.O., M.C.
Director, S.O.E.
APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN GREECE AS AT 16 Nov. 43
IN SO FAR AS OUR FUTURE RELATIONS WITH R.A./E.I.A.S. ARE
CONCERNED, by LIEUT. COL. V.A.P. HUDSON, R.E., M.O. 6.

16 Nov. 43.

Ref. Map. 1:100,000. GREECE

OBJECT.

1. To examine the present and future position in GREECE from the point
   of view of assisting the allied war effort in the following two
   events:-

   (a) No break in the present relations of the A.M.N. with
       R.A./E.I.A.S.

   (b) A complete and immediate break in relations between the
       A.M.N. and R.A./E.I.A.S.

ASSUMPTIONS.

2. It must be assumed that:-

   (a) The object of having a Mission in GREECE at all is:

      i). To contain the maximum number of first-class Axis
          troops in GREECE until such time as GERMANY is
          forced by the progress of the war to withdraw them
          for use elsewhere.

      ii). To ensure that when the Axis forces do withdraw, they
          are so hindered and mauled in the process that they
          cannot fight elsewhere without very considerable
          reorganisation, re-equipment and training.

      iii). To prevent, as far as possible, the destruction of
          ports, railways, communications, etc. which will be
          required by the Allies in the immediate post-
          occupation period.

   (b) It is agreed that the following are the ways in which
       these tasks can best be carried out:-

      i). The continual harassing of the enemy E. of C.

      ii). The keeping of the Greek Nation in a constant state
          of rebellion against the occupying Forces.

      iii). The building up of an organisation, either Allied
          or Greek, which can strike at the Axis Forces and
          their communications as they withdraw.

      iv). The building up of an underground movement in the
          towns which can prevent Axis demolitions and bring
          the normal civilian services back into operation
          at the earliest possible moment after the Axis
          withdrawal.
3. **Enemy Dispositions and Strengths.**

The detailed dispositions are given on the maps at Appendix A.

A brief survey reveals that there are at present—

- Five German Inf. Divs.
- Six Bulgarian Divs.
- The equivalent of seven German Independent Bdes.
- Fifteen low-grade German garrison or L. of C. Bns.

employed in the occupation of GREECE, giving a total of 144,000

German and 97,000 Bulgarian troops.

All reports indicate that this is insufficient to keep the country

in subjection and that the situation is causing the Germans

considerable alarm.

It is reasonable to assume that the number of Axis Divs stationed

in GREECE depends, in the first place, upon the German High Command

appreciation of the possibility of immediate or future Allied attack

or invasion.

At the present time they must have appreciated that there is

virtually no danger of more than a small scale Allied attack from the

WEST and that, until the line of the outer ring of Islands has been

breached and air bases established, there is virtually no danger

from the SOUTH and EAST. Our failure to hold LEMOS and COS must

have strengthened this belief.

If there was no Andarta threat to the enemy L. of C. and the country

could be trusted to remain quiet the maximum garrison that one would

expect to find there would be AA and GD units supplemented by one Inf.

Div. in each of EPirus and ACHINION, and possibly one Div. in ATTICA

and the PELOPONNESE as mobile reserves to counter any small scale

landings.

The remainder of the German forces, amounting to three-and-a-half Inf.

Divs, may be said to be in GREECE for no other purpose than to keep

the /
the country quiet and their L. of O. open. As their L. of O. lies entirely in ELAS territory it may be said that the great majority of this force is maintained by the ELAS guerrillas.

The Bulgarian forces come into a slightly different category because they are stationed in an area where there is virtually no threat of an Allied landing and only a slight threat from TURKEY. It can be assumed that for political reasons the Germans consider it expedient to keep about four Bulgarian Divs in an occupation rôle in that part of GREEK to which BULGARIA has always laid claim.

The remaining three Divs may be said to be in GREECE to counter the threat from ELAS guerrillas or because they are unemployable elsewhere. There seems little reason, however, why if the guerrilla threat was removed, they should not join the other Bulgarian forces fighting in YUGOSLAVIA.

Conclusion.
The conclusion is that the guerrillas are containing in GREECE the equivalent of three-and-a-half German and three Bulgarian Divs and that the vast majority of these are contained in ELAS areas. Should ELAS for any reason cease to be a threat to the Axis, and the A.A.N. based in ELAS controlled harbours be forced to withdraw into ENA and ENA territory, these Divs could be made available over a period of three to six months for more active employment elsewhere.

4. Location of Vulnerable Points.
The main rd and rail come and the principal V.Ps are shown in Trace att.

It will be seen that, apart from the ARAXON - ARMENIA - ALBANIA road, PHEVATA harbour and ARAXON and PAPHOS airfields, virtually all the main come and V.Ps lie well inside ELAS controlled territory. In particular, they cover the entire railway system and the principal ports at PYRAMUS - KALAMITA - YEROS and PAPHOS, as well as the area immediately surrounding the ARAXON area.
It is obvious that by far the greatest part of the maintenance traffic for the German Forces travels over the main roads and rail systems in the EAST, and also that this must constitute the principal evacuation route when the time comes for a general withdrawal. It is vital, therefore, that sabotage parties should have access to these main systems. This can only be done if relations with ELAS remain cordial.

Conclusion.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the vast majority of the V.Ps on the Axis L. of C. and evacuation routes lies in ELAS territory, and if we decide to break completely with ELAS and ELAM, only a very limited scale of sabotage, confined to the relatively unimportant WEST Coast, will be possible.

5. Guerilla Forces.

At Appx. "A" is a Map showing the dispositions of the various guerilla bands now active in GREECE. The relative strengths are believed to be:

- ELAS (EAM) armed strength ... ... ... 25,700
- EDES ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 5,700
- ENKA ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 400
- PAO (MAO) disbanded and split up ... ... ... 1,600
- EOK (PZLS) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 200

All PAO and EOK bands lies entirely in ELAS controlled areas and may be disregarded as they are playing no active part in either the civil war or in fighting the Axis. They could only exist with the permission of ELAS and EAM.

It will be seen that ELAS outnumbers EDES and ENKA by 6:1 or 1 and controls 9% of the entire country.

The guerilla forces in GREECE can be divided into three categories:

1. Very small detachments led by a strong British or Allied element for attacking difficult targets.

2. Poorly trained but reliable guerillas acting under the orders of MIDDE EAST for attacking enemy Ls. of C. and interfering with troop movements by attacking them on their return journeys, and in the rear, and particularly should be kept under cover in important areas.
Nearly all the free Greek guerrillas who are at the mercy of the enemy and cause them to maintain larger garrisons in Greece than would otherwise be necessary.

It will be seen, therefore, that all elements of the guerrillas are of use.

It is estimated that not more than approximately 50,000 embodied Andartes can be maintained in the field owing to the food problem, but arms can be supplied to other villagers who can be concentrated from time to time for special purposes. ELAS have recently called up some of these village reserves but reports from the field indicate that they have had to disperse again owing to the maintenance problem.

The existence and freedom of movement of large forces of Andartes depend upon the morale of the people in FREE GREECE. This can be maintained:

1. By continued Allied successes.
2. By the justification of the Allied Military Plan, even if Greece's freedom has to be delayed.
3. By giving the starving people, in particular the refugees, who are homeless as a result of enemy reprisals, every assistance possible.

Even if the morale of the Greek people can be maintained, the guerrillas will not assist the Allied war effort unless their own morale is also kept up. This can be achieved:

1. By giving to all elements sufficient reason to fight against the Axis now rather than to retain their troops for political purposes at a later date.
2. By the recognition of the efforts of the Greek guerrillas by their King and Government, and a close liaison between each.
3. By providing them with a considerable proportion of the war material for which they ask and which was promised to their representatives in CAIRO in Aug. This must be supplied whether it is tactically essential or not. It is estimated that the equivalent of 200 successful sorties per month will be required for this purpose.

In the event of a complete break with ELAS, it is reasonably certain that their bands will cease all activities against the Axis and either concentrate on disbanding ELAS completely, or, if they think, as seems likely, that the time is not yet ripe for such a move, they will husband their resources for
a coup d'état when the Axis forces eventually leave GREECE. There is little doubt that their recent moves against ELAS were, at least in part, due to their conviction that the German were pulling out. The recent German drives, however, have shaken them and they must now appreciate that they have timed events badly.

Conclusion.

The conclusion is, therefore, that although ELAS action against the Germans will never be very great, if we withdraw our support from ELAS and cease to provide money and clothing for the civil population, their anti-Axis activities will cease altogether and there will be no safe harbour in ELAS areas from which Allied sabotage groups can operate.

6. Covert Organisations.

All the big towns and vital installations unfortunately lie in ELAS controlled territory and would not be accessible except with their connivance and help. At the present time a considerable increase in sabotage groups in the principal towns is taking place, and, given a status quo, it should be possible to greatly extend our activities between now and next March. All reports tend to show that in the towns of SALONIKA and ATHENES EAM are the best organised and equipped body and that they may be sufficiently strong to seize absolute power as soon as the Axis forces leave.

Such sabotage as has been done in ATHENES has so far been carried out by independent non-political groups under direct orders of MIDDLE EAST. EAM have been content to leave them alone up to the present, but have taken no active part in sabotage themselves.

The immediate effect of a complete break with EAM would probably be to cause violent clashes between EAM and Right Wing organisations in ATHENES and SALONIKA. This would undoubtedly cause the Germans to move additional troops into the towns, or to tighten up their restrictions and regulations. It would also put EAM in the position of being able to put a stop to all our /
our covert activities by the simple process of exposing our cells to the enemy. Even if this did not happen, the increase in troops would make our operations extremely hazardous, or even impossible.

A further and possibly more serious aspect of such a break would be to prevent our building up an efficient counter-sabotage organisation for action when the Axis eventually decide to withdraw.

In the towns more than anywhere else time is required to get an efficient organisation going, and it is estimated that while a reasonably good sabotage and counter-sabotage organisation could be built up before March 44, the additional three months, which a delay in the Axis withdrawal until June 44 would provide, would mean a very great increase in the efficiency and number of these cells.

Conclusion.

The conclusion is that if, in so far as the towns are concerned, we wish to continue with our sabotage of shipping, installations, railways, etc., or wish to build up counter-sabotage organisations, we must maintain tolerably good relations with EAM and ELAS. The delay of the Axis withdrawal from March to June 44 would assist us to perfect our towns organisations, but without the goodwill or, at least, inactive apathy of EAM and ELAS, it would only be possible to organise cells on a very small and inefficient scale.

7. **THE ALLIED MISSION IN GREECE.**

At the present time there are 188 members of the Allied Military Mission in Greece, divided as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British/American</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERTAS Territory</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEKA</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAS</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition there are over 150 Greeks in our employ, for whose safety we have a moral responsibility.

There is no evidence to show that the mass of the Greek people is anything but.
but friendly towards the British and Americans, but ELAS contains a considerable heathen element led by ANES, who can be whipped into a frenzy by propaganda and inflammatory speeches, and can even be induced to attack Allied personnel. The murder of Lt. HUBBARD and the repeated reports of members of the A.M.A. being subjected to ill-treatment or discourtesy by ELAS leaders is sufficient proof of this. As long as we continue to send relief to the civilian population and maintain some sort of relations with ELAS, it is unlikely that large scale action will be taken against Allied personnel. Should we break relations with ELAS/ELAS and be forced to withdraw our L.C.S. from their territory, this will undoubtedly be the basis of such propaganda against us and members of the A.M.A. may well be killed, or held as hostages for the sending of gold and supplies to ELAS, no doubt extensively for the relief of the starving Greek people, but in fact to fill the political coffers of ELAS.

As has been pointed out in Para. 8 the bulk of the Andartes will not undertake overt action against the Axis but with their goodwill it would be perfectly possible, given the men, equipment and A/C, to put into GENOA a number of sabotage groups of about 30 men each, who, basing themselves in the safe areas controlled by the Andartes, could carry out as much sabotage as the reprisals against the civilian population would permit. The number of sabotage groups required is estimated at 18, of which 7 can be made immediately available. The main target areas, however, lie so far back in ELAS territory that it would not be possible to have them on ELAS territory alone and the goodwill of ELAS remains an essential.

Conclusion.

From the foregoing it can be seen that if a complete break with ELAS/ELAS is decided upon at least a month’s notice is required to enable the members of the A.M.A. now in ELAS territory to get to the relatively safe area as ELAS territory, to be evacuated by their own
If attacks are to be maintained against the enemy L. of C. it is essential that there is no irreparable break with ENSAS, but that every effort should be made to improve our relations by feeding and clothing the civilian population as well as the Andartes. The ideal would be to continue to keep A.I.O.s with the Andartes as at present and to infiltrate sabotage groups to work independently under Allied Officers.

8. Scale of Allied Support.
As pointed out in Para. 5 the supplies sent to the Andartes is not in direct proportion to the effort expected from them, but is very largely to bolster up their morale and maintain their confidence in the Allies. The present scale of successful sorties to GREECE has fallen to about 30 per month, whereas the original estimate given in Sep was 110. The reasons for this are:-

1). Lack of A/O,
2). Weather,
3). Commitments elsewhere, such as the campaign in the ANKAR, demands for propaganda leaflets, etc.

Should this state of affairs continue our prestige and, consequently, our popularity with the Andartes and civilian population in GREECE, will deteriorate seriously. It is worth recording that ENSAS, in spite of his serious lack of arms and amm, has recently placed boots and clothing as his number one requirement, and has commented that even he himself is barefooted.

The stoppage of arms and amm sorties to ENSAS will have little effect because of the huge quantities of warlike stores they took from the Italians (see App. B) and in comparison anything we send them will appear insignificant. There is an excellent opportunity here of justifying ourselves in sending ENSAS clothing and food only, while concentrating on sending EKVAS AND ENSA all types of warlike stores.

From this point of view the breaking of relations with ENSAS would not materially reduce their Military strength, but would merely alienate the vast
vast bulk of friendly Greeks on whom we rely for the furtherance of our policy towards GREECE after the war.

Alternative methods of supplying arms and stores have been fully considered, and although it would appear to be an easy matter to land stores on the SHOQ Coast from ITALY, this is not so, owing to the defences being constructed there by the Germans as a counter to the threat of invasion. Similarly, the only airfield available to us as the moment lies in ELAS territory - and that appears likely to be unserviceable for the next four months.

**Conclusion.**

Unless the number of successful sorties to GREECE is increased to at least 100 per month, the supply question will not affect the issue one way or the other. If, however, it is desired to continue active operations against the German L.O.O., it is essential that:

(a) The number of successful sorties be increased to at least 100 per month.

(b) Good relations be maintained with ELAS and the Greek people in their area by sending them a large proportion of the stores available. This will undoubtedly pay a handsome dividend in our post-war relations with GREECE.

9. **Summary of Conclusions.**

(a) The guerrillas are containing in GREECE the equivalent of three-and-a-half German and three Bulgarian Divs and the vast majority of these are contained in the area from SHOQ for one reason alone - to be a threat to the Axis L.O.O. and the A.R.M. based on ELAS controlled harbours, so far to withdraw into MEG and ELAS territory these Divs can be made available over a period of three to six months for more active duties elsewhere.

(b) The vast majority of the vulnerable points on the Axis L.O.O. and evacuation route lie in ELAS territory and if we decide to break completely with ELAS it is only a very small scale of evacuation, and that contingent to the relatively unimportant MEG area. We will in practice

(c) Although we may have immediate gains we will never be sure that we have made our gain and the enemy is sure to have been warned by the Axis of any action when it has become extinct once more.
(d) In so far as the towns are concerned if we wish to continue our sabotage of shipping, installations, railways etc. or wish to build up counter-searching organisations, we must maintain tolerably good relations with EAM/ELAS. The delay of the Axis withdrawal from March to June 44 would assist us to perfect our towns organisations, but without the goodwill or at least inactive apathy of EAM/ELAS it would only be possible to organise cells on a very small and inefficient scale.

(e) If a complete break with EAM/ELAS is decided upon at least one month’s notice is required to enable the members of the A.M.N. now in ELAS territory to get to the relatively safe SERVAS or ENKA territory or to be evacuated by other means. If attacks are to be maintained against the enemy L. of G. it is essential that there is no irrevocable break with ELAS, but that every effort should be made to improve our relations by feeding and clothing the civilian population as well as the Andartes. The ideal would be to continue to keep A.M.N. with the Andartes as at present and to infiltrate sabotage groups to work independently under Allied Officers.

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ii. Good relations are maintained with ELAS and the Greek people in their area by sending them a large proportion of the sorties available. This will undoubtedly pay a handsome dividend in our post-war relations with GREECE.

COURSES OPEN TO US.

10. If it is earnestly desired to achieve the objects set out in Para. 8 and is not our intention to subordinate our Military policy to our Foreign policy the conclusions reached in the foregoing paragraphs only leave one course open to us and that is to pre-empt EAM/ELAS and remain on friendly terms with them until the object of our Military policy has been achieved. This will be the time when eventually evacuate GREECE. It does not follow as a corollary that this policy is necessarily the one best calculated to further our post-war political aims. On the contrary it looks like heading over power in GREECE temporarily at least to a group of political power, none of whom have an unenviable past and an unnecessary future for us. It is also fair to assume, however, that the troops in GREECE are predominantly recruited in view, would not be used by us for offensive purposes and would replace it by one which would be more efficient at the outset. It is vital that if such a team of political power is allowed to assume power to GREECE with food and relief, then to a certain extent or the situation there would be an agreement. A major and ultimate post-war solution of the situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS

11. It is recommended:

(a) That a Committee composed of:

One Senior British Officer,
One " American,
One " British Diplomat,
One " American

who are fully briefed and who have a good background knowledge
of GREECE, should be sent to GREECE immediately and should hold
a conference to be attended by SINTAS, NEASA and ITALY to decide
the way in which the Greek Nation can best continue to the
United Nations war effort during the next 4 to 6 months.

It would be essential that these representatives of the United
Nations should be empowered to make decisions and proceed in
the name of the G, E, SINTAS and the British and American
Governments without referring the matter back to their chiefs.

The basic policy on which such a meeting would be held should be

1). The present guerilla set-up to be recognised as a fully
acceptable and no bands other than those whose representatives
attend the conference to be recognised by the
United Nations.

II). A territorial boundary to be agreed dividing NEASA, NEASA
and SINTAS sphere of influence.

III). Each party to agree directly under the control of NEASA
and to have a Senior Allied Liaison officer.

IV). The complete cessation of fraternisation within.

V). The agreement of all parties to accept military policy
orders and directives, and to carry it out without
reference to the effects on political issues.

VI). The guarantee by all parties to respect and provide for
Allied personnel extracted to secure same.

VII). The agreement of ALL parties to assist all front Allied
units (Greek groups sent in to accordance with N.A.T.O. military
policy).

VIII). The Italians in GREECE to be treated as FDL in accordance
with International Law.

IX). 15 Dec. should be set as the latest date when agreement
should be reached. Full instructions to follow.

(b) That sufficient supplies of "new" immediate military are

I). Provided that the British, together with the
GREECE forces and the British forces
in ITALY, 3/4 will be up to strength
in a.m. in a.m.

II). Provided that supplies are made available for the
Italian batteries and troops to be used in this
area, it is envisaged that no force
will be less than strength of 3,000
forces per each battery, including 1/4 men of the complement
ofITALY.
(c) That the supply of heavier support weapons should be immediately increased and made available for infiltration into Greece. These should be manned by skeleton Allied detachments assisted by locally recruited Greeks.

(d) That the relief scheme now being operated by the Allied Mission should be extended and every assistance and encouragement should be given to the village presidents to help them provide food and clothing for destitute and homeless civilians.

U.A.P. Rocket

Lieut. Col. G.S.

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**APX "B" to APPRECIATION of Situation in
GREECE as at 18 Nov. 43. by Lieut.-Col.Y.A.P.
YOUNG, R.N., M.C.**

Copy No. ...

**ARMS SEIZED FROM 24 PIRROILO DIV. as assessed by GEN. INFANTRY**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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<td>Hand grenades</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>567</td>
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<td>Rifles</td>
<td>4,684</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>LMGs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 mm mortars</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 mm mortars</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47, 3.5 guns</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76, 13 guns</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 guns</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored cars</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rounds
- 3,000
- 36,000
- 200,000
- 250,000
- 500
- 1,500
- Arty all types 510
- 20 mm guns on 40

Gen. INFANTRY considers that the total for GREECE would be approximately double the above figures.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan
FROM: William L. Langer
DATE: 6 November 1943

SUBJECT: Desirability of F.B.I. Surveillance of Admiral Sakellariou of the Greek Navy

It has been reported to me that according to the testimony of responsible persons, Admiral Sakellariou has been making statements of a disturbing nature. Sakellariou who has come to the U.S. on a special mission for the Greek Government-in-Exile, not only praises the Germans and the German way of doing things in general, but also belittles the war effort of the U.S. He says that if it had not been for the British, the Germans would have reduced the U.S. to capitulation in three weeks. Sakellariou was one of the leading Fascists in the Cabinet of Metaxas and was for this reason expelled from the Cabinet of the Government-in-Exile in March 1943, when an attempt was made to satisfy the popular demand that the Metaxists be removed from office.

He is now living at the home of the proprietors of the St. Regis Grill (1111 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.), who are apparently honest, simple folk, overwhelmed by the "distinction" of being able to offer hospitality to the "great Admiral", and disposed to accept the Admiral's story that he left the Cabinet in disgust because of its inefficiency.

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of Research and Analysis

cc - Mr. Whitney Shepardson
Major McDonough
1. Some of the most exciting stories of the war may be written about the experiences of our men who manned the cuiques. For example -- a load of grenades, bombs and assorted side arms was taken directly to the Port of Pireaus, overloaded with "Black Market" produce. The Italian authorities took the cheese, butter, olives and other food and helped our man unload the munitions -- in broad daylight. Several trips were made, always with the same result. If General Brereton gives me the time and if you wish me to, I will try to write a series of secret human interest stories that may serve you when lecturing to army groups.

2. Kapitanios "Y", the great Cretan guerrilla chief, has taken much cloth back to Crete where he expects to have made a unique uniform for his guerrillas whom he calls "Donovan's Bund". This group has been used outrageously by Huot who defaulted on commitments made to "Y" and to which he was a party. For further information see Major Beir, Captain Melas and consult Macfarland, all of whom were brought in by me to assist in the organization of "Y"'s intelligence group. Huot maintains that "Y" had only local importance whereas he is, today, the
dominant resistance figure on Crete. (See reports on "Y"s activities by Venizelos, himself a Cretan, and by Prime Minister Tsouderos, also a Cretan.) Feeling between "Y" and British S.O.E. is not good. It is good between him and the Advanced "A" Force.

3. The Epirote guerrillas are controlled by our Captain Alex Melas; will take orders through him from you; will not subject themselves to S.O.E. command.

4. Rubea guerrillas are controlled by our Major Elias, now "on ice" in Cairo, awaiting our orders. They will not accept S.O.E. command. They would not under joint American-Advanced "A" Force command. Elias is a political lieutenant of Alex Melas. Elias is willing to act, temporarily, on an intelligence mission. (He is an old agent of the late Greek Irregular Project.)

5. Elias, "Y" and Melas trust Macfarland; like Edwards. They will not accept leadership of any other officer presently in S.E., Middle East, unless that officer works under the direction of myself or Macfarland. Elias dominates the island of Rubea politically.
GREECE

X Polites

Greece is in ferment. But as Greece always is in turmoil it is only necessary to pick up the strands of old prejudices and match them with new developments.

No one political nor one military figure appears or even threatens to be dominant. Greece is a land of antis; when a leader dares appear, unity is achieved when all opposition joins to tear him down.

Greece is united today against the occupying enemy -- and against the King. Foreign attempts to line up all factions under George II merely solidify the opposition, rouse resentment against friendly foreigners and diminish operative action against the enemy.

Playing on this known Greek characteristic is the German on the one hand and the communist organizer on the other. Greeks are being told by the German propaganda machines that their King has made a deal with England for the cession of Greek territory and for the monopolistic control of air routes and communications. The Communist agents are saying that Britain proposes to re-enthrone George and perpetuate "the Fascist regime of Metaxas".

SECRET
Until recently the valiant but quarrelsome resistance leaders were saying, "But America is in this war; the United States is disinterested in our local politics; Roosevelt will let us decide our own political fate and will see that we are permitted to choose our own leaders." A combination of circumstances has changed such belief into one of cynicism; Greeks have been told that the United States has joined England in a plot to force Greece on them. They are told that their choice lies between German dominion, an Anglo-American plan to reestablish national Fascism and a Communist-Democratic state "protected" by Russia.

The Greek distrusts all three and Greece is in a ferment.

Disposition of the Greek People

Following the shock of German occupation, the Greeks remained completely inactive for about six months.

The Greeks divide and sub-divide under the following leadership:

1. Middle class
2. Workers
3. Democratic Party
4. Anti-democrats

5. Remnants of old parties

1. Middle Class. The Middle Class remained generally inactive for more than six months. Many in this class, for a short period, attempted to collaborate with the Germans. Senior Army officers, amically disposed toward the Tsolakoglou puppet government are included in this class. They, consciously or unconsciously, were of service to the forces of occupation. Later, many who had collaborated commercially with the forces of occupation and who had profited thereby, attempted to join one or another of the national resistance groups.

The Chief Officers, belonging to this group, who did not collaborate with the enemy are those who had been retired by Metaxas after the 1935 insurrection, the failure of which had brought dictatorship to Greece.

2. Workers. The first organized and effective reaction against enemy occupation sprang from this class. It was from this class that the E.A.M. (National Liberation Party) was built.
The Communist Party was not slow to seize this organization. As early as mid-1942, four Russian agents arrived in Saloniki to organize the E.A.M. after the pattern of the Yugoslav Partisans. (This was reported by the Greek Irregular Project at that time.) The Russian organizers completely copied their successful program in Yugoslavia. Non-Communists were encouraged to join this "the only effective resistance group". Democratic, Liberal and Popular Front ideologies were preached; Communist propaganda was held to a minimum. At first, the E.A.M. took the lead in every Anti-German activity and it was the first to create operative guerrilla centers. Finally, the strength of the E.A.M. grew to such an extent and the non-Communist members were so many, that it divorced itself (for a long period) from the Communist Party. At this point, leaders of the Middle Class and of the other political parties started negotiations with the E.A.M.

Workers and peasants of the E.A.M. were joined by Middle Class and wealthy patriots and continuous, though unplanned, sabotage was enthusiastically committed in factories, ships and on railroads and bridges. Parallel to the E.A.M., a number of democratic sub-parties joined forces in another
resistance organization. Those sub-parties cooperate with the E.A.M., but wish to remain independent, as E.A.M., after vainly appealing to British and American sources for help, turned to the radical Communist leadership. Until May 1942, the Government-in-Exile was advanced toward the Government-in-Occupied Territory, and the more moderate Government grew. Kanellopoulos from Greece was made his Vice-Premier, but with reservations over the several political parties, resistance groups of Mount Olympus, in Western Greece, and once Venizelos after the arrival of the Democratic leaders of the Democratic Party from Venizelos.

There is no coordination of intense political rivalry.
4. **Anti-Democrats.** The Anti-Democrats have concentrated on the creation of organizations whose aim is the preservation of their co-parties and the seizure of Army-Naval control after the war. These men fear a national general court martial in the event of an Allied victory, and very few have participated in action against the enemy. (A notable exception is Theotokis, son of the late Minister of War, who now has joined the democratic resistance forces.)

5. **Remnants of Old Political Parties.** Leaders of the remnants of old political parties have participated sporadically in action against the enemy and from time to time have cooperated with British agents. Until now, they have remained aloof from organized groups. Kafandaris, leader of a party of considerable strength has large potentials in organized resistance, but distrusts the E.A.M. and resents British support of the King whom he blames for the fascist dictatorship of Metaxas. His Chief lieutenant, Captain Alexander Melas, presently is in the United States. (Melas was a secret OSS agent in Greece until March of this year.)
Accomplishments of the Greeks.

Under their own initiative, the Greeks established secret radio sending-receiving stations and a caique ferry service between the mainland and Turkey. Both of these services have been taken over by combined secret services of the British -- much of this against the wishes of the Greeks. In the meantime, groups of patriots form, raid and break up. The most vigorous resistance groups are based on Crete and repeatedly have announced that they await American leadership before they take the field as an army.

Influence of Allied Powers

Greeks are influenced variously by Russia, Britain and the United States.

1. Russia. A small percentage of Greek resistance "troops" are influenced and elated by Russian victories. The larger percentage fears Russian successes as bringing communist influence and Russian control into Greece.

2. British Influence. Immediately after invasion British Intelligence (S.I.S.) and British Sabotage (S.O.E.) tried to contact occupied Greece. In the beginning and middle of 1942 certain English officers commissioned a number of dubious Greeks and Levantines whose activities in Greece
brought panic to the resistance groups. Until the middle of 1942 it is proper to say that English secret service activities in Greece yielded nothing but disaster. After the middle of 1942 the English Services worked in closer harmony with the Greek Government-in-Exile and conditions improved, but not to a satisfactory degree. After March 1943, the British undertook the financial support of first one, then another Greek resistance group and, through their power to give or withhold funds, have managed to control many of the Greek patriotic groups but with rather poor results. Guerrillas and saboteurs acted without a counting of the cost and vast reprisals were visited on the people of Greece. At the same time, it was announced in Greece that the British would impose the King on the people. A reaction has set in and Greece, traditional admirer of England, is showing dangerous signs of distrust and even hatred.

3. The United States. From every corner of Greece and from every island, the people clamor for evidence of American participation in Greece. Almost every fugitive from Greece has been charged by those who stay behind to try to get the Americans to participate at least on equal terms with the British. The notable bombing of Saloniki and Athens airbases
by the United States Ninth Air Force was greeted by the whole population of those cities running out to the streets to cheer "the Americans" while the German and Italian occupation troops took shelter.

In summary: Russia inspires fears of internal disturbance and England of exploitation. The joining of American efforts in the liberation of Greece -- under American leadership -- will allay Greek fears of our two Allies and diminish the rising opposition to them.

Resistance Groups and Chief Leaders.

Greece presents no great movements such as those of Mihailovitch and "Tito". Nor has Greece any single leader whose sway is as great as either of the two Slav generals.

The most noted, Colonel Zervos, is a small-time leader compared to Tito. The E.A.M. has no outstanding general. A group of more than five hundred Cretans formed by Kapitanios "Y" call themselves "Donovan's Band", and three hundred Andartis in Epirus call themselves "The American Legion".

This is both an asset and a disadvantage. But its promise is great. A single American officer, trusted by Kapi-
tunics "Y", and another endorsed by Captain Melas can raise a
levy of thousands who will act -- in discipline -- under orders
from the Middle East General Staff.

The operation can be repeated in every resistance
center of Greece. It can be executed under combined Anglo-
American Auxiliary Group Control. It will be dispersed, divided
and one group will be set against another under present S.O.E.
command. Cooperation and planning with the British Advanced
"A" Force is indicated under the leadership and authority of
the Director of OSS, the American Theater Command and the
British Middle East Commanding General.

U.A.
INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General W. J. Donovan
FROM: Ulises L. Amoss
SUBJECT: Greek Politics

DATE: October 21, 1943

1. Attention is called to the changed tone of Ambassador Kirk's cables.

2. His original position was that George II would be returned to Greece by the British with American support and there was nothing any Greek could do about it.

3. My many reports carried the opposite intelligence and warned that British E.O.E. policies in Greece would create a disastrous situation.

4. Attention is called to the fact that my activities - under criticism to you by Major Huot - had maintained relative calm in Greek Government circles - and in Greece and Crete. Cessation of these activities have allowed the guerrilla and Government-in-Exile situations to get out of hand as I forecast to you on the eve of your departure for the Middle East.

5. It is submitted that during my tour of duty in the Middle East, my activities were reported to Washington in detail and a directive was asked for; not received.

6. Whether or not unofficial influence is desired to keep a fighting ally fighting it is here maintained that the Director requires positive information expertly given.
7. It is submitted that present sources of Greek intelligence are inexpert, inadequate, sometimes fallacious and, therefore, dangerous.
TO: General Donovan
FROM: AMOSS
SUBJECT: BODOSAKIS

Bodosakis' proper surname is Athanasiades but, like Tito, he is known to the world by his Christian name-Bodosakis.

This man's career is a junior edition of that of Zaharoff. He began life engaged in many small and nefarious enterprises; is reputed to have dealt in drugs. He later became a munitions agent and eventually, he became a leading factor in shipping. More recently, he acquired ownership of many munitions plants.

He has the reputation of being completely amoral but thoroughly loyal to men who have helped him.

At present he lives in a suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York and entertains lavishly. His wife, whose beauty has not faded entirely, is said to be the brains behind Bodosakis. His business General Manager, Logothetis, is with him.

Admiral Voulgaris at present is the Greek Minister for Air. He was the first Chief of the Greek Fleet Air Arm. He was retired from the Navy after the abortive revolution of 1935. After retirement he became a highly salaried employe of Bodosakis.

Karapuntiotis is the present Greek Minister for War for which position he was withdrawn from "protective custody" in Khartoum. Karapuntiotis was a regular Army Colonel retired from the Army after the revolution of 1935 after which time he also became an employe of Bodosakis.

Ex-colonel Sophocles Venizelos is the only surviving son of the great Venizelos. At present he is the Minister of the Navy. He is more of a play-boy than a politician but is amiable, friendly and has ambitions. At this time he is receiving some very good political steering and it is possible that he may become a future Prime Minister of Greece. Bodosakis and his agents are responsible for the surprising acumen now shown by Venizelos.

Bodosakis, a thorough opportunist, will cooperate with the United States because he believes the profit of his country and himself is best assured thereby.
19 October 1943

TO: Colonel Amoss
FROM: General Donovan

Re your memo on Greek politics.

I would like to have specific information on the history of Bodosakis and the facts concerning the other three mentioned in that paragraph.

WJD
GREECE: POLITICAL

The Tsouderos cabinet is now unanimous in opposition to immediate return of King George on invasion. Tsouderos deserted the King and signed the secret manifesto demanding plebiscite before restoration. The King has a "political illness" that keeps him out of Egypt and prevents him from countersigning the Cabinet manifesto.

British political interests are considering abandonment of George. A deal has been proposed to Venizelos who has not accepted it.

The power behind the political throne of Greece will be Bodosakis who, through the ministers, controls the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force. Venizelos, Admiral Voungaris and Karapaniotis take his orders.

If Bodosakis is assassinated, a mutiny will break out. Communist agitators are assisting.

It would appear that the White House is not fully advised, else the President's telegram to Ambassador Kirk re the King's attitude toward the guerrilla chiefs might have been held back for further study. (It may be that the State Department is receiving edited intelligence from the East.)
NOTE: Caution: A deal may have been made -- despite full intelligence -- but steps should be taken to see that the State Department and White House do have complete information reviewed.
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A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.
TO: General Lyndon

MOST SECRET

REF: From Ted Denton from
SIC Section, A, 6/70/1

SUBJECT: New light on British policy

General Buxton would like you to read this and then have the members of
the policy committee read it after which it is to be returned to General Donovan's
files.

General Lyndon
Dr. Rogers
Mr. Sevillian
Mr. Chetton
Secretariat

[Signature]

MOST SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director
INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Harold Deutsch
FROM: Balkan Section, R. & A.
SUBJECT: New Light on British Policy towards Greece

DATE: Sept. 20, 1945

The resolution of the political leaders presented to the Greek Government-in-Exile, in which it was strongly urged that King George not return to Greece until the Greek people express their views in a plebiscite, naturally placed the King in a position of some delicacy. The King adopted the attitude that he could not give an answer until he had consulted with Churchill and Roosevelt, since any action he might take would affect not only himself but also other governments-in-exile. Telegrams were then dispatched to Churchill and Roosevelt. Churchill replied in a telegram received in Cairo on September 8:

"I have received Your Majesty's message. I venture to suggest in the view of His Majesty's Government the policy outlined in Your Majesty's Declaration of July 4th is that best calculated to serve interests of Greece, and they therefore hope it may be possible for Your Majesty to avoid any further statement at this stage about your own position when Greece is liberated.

"I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty that, whatever Your decision may be, His Majesty's Government will continue to give you the maximum support in their power."

From this telegram it is apparent that the belief created in some Greek quarters by Churchill's Quebec speech that the British would abandon their insistence on the return of King George before a plebiscite is without foundation and that British policy towards Greece remains constant. Churchill's reference to King George's "Declaration of July 4th" is most significant, for in this speech the King very strongly implied that he would return to Greece with the liberating armies; it was this Declaration which provoked the mutiny of July 5th in the Greek Army in Syria.

On September 4th or 5th Cairo received the following unsolicited telegram from Churchill to King George:
"I trust, Sir, you are recovered from your fever. We are all looking forward to your return to Greece at the Head of Your Army and remaining there until the will of the Greek people is expressed under conditions of tranquillity."

This statement is formal, and leaves no doubt at all as to the official British opinion. It is all the more forceful for having been made after the British were well aware that the resolution of the Greek political leaders had been presented to the Government-in-Exile.

A "basic directive for political warfare" sent from the Foreign Office to the Minister of State, Cairo, dated August 14th, gives a more elaborate statement of British policy:

"GREECE. Our policy is

(a) To encourage by reporting and paying tribute to their achievements of (sic!) all those resistance organisations which have agreed to collaborate with British Command Middle East; to promote unity between them by naming them all "National Guerrilla Warfare" by avoiding any mention of any individual organisation by name and by avoiding preponderant publicity whether explicit or implied for any one organisation.

(b) To maintain Greek morale in face of enemy reprisals by insisting on principle of retribution as an Allied war aim on responsibility of Germans, Italians and Bulgarians for war crimes committed against Greeks.

(c) To prepare Greeks to accept Greek King and Government:

(i) By emphasizing official Greek statements

(a) That it is the King's intention that question of regime shall be submitted to popular will as soon as freedom of country is complete and necessities of military operations allow and

(b) That Government intend, on liberation of Greece to submit their resignation to the King in order to give place to a Government fully representative of the people;

(ii) By presenting King and Government as main group (undecipherable) mainstay in the meantime with sending immediate food relief and in preparing Greek and European services for action against invaders."
"(d) To prevent discussions or mentions of frontier problems and to ban absolutely any attack by Greek speakers on other Greek organisations, parties, and individuals except those known to be collaborating with the enemy."

As of today, therefore, British policy towards Greece is clear-cut; King George will arrive in Greece on the heels of the Allied armies and will assume the government of the liberated country. The existing Tsouderos government will resign and, as soon as conditions permit, an election will be held. But Greek opinion remembers the plebiscite of 1935 by which King George was restored to the throne and which was notoriously rigged, and fears that any post-war election may be equally unrepresentative of the popular will.

British policy is to be viewed in the light of certain broad factors which all information in the possession of OSS indicates to be the governing ones in the present Greek political situation:

1. Because of his creation and continued support of the Metaxas dictatorship all Greek opinion regardless of social class and with negligible exceptions is opposed to the return of King George.

2. No political party or underground movement of any importance inside Greece is Royalist in political sentiment.

3. Since the Axis occupation the leaders of the established political parties in Greece have progressively lost contact with the people, who have turned to the underground organisations.

4. The effective underground organisations fall into two main categories: the republican underground movements whose leaders are chiefly army officers and the EAM (National Liberation Front).

5. The EAM, originally a coalition of democratic and left-wing groups, is far and away the largest underground organisation inside Greece. Its Central Committee is dominated by Communists. Since early 1943 the other political parties have broken with the EAM, but that organisation has continued to expand; numerically and in territorial extent it is very much the largest and most effective underground movement.

6. The rank and file of the EAM membership is not as a whole Communist but has joined the EAM as the most effective agency for opposing the Axis. There is no reason to believe that, as matters stand at present, the Communist leadership of the EAM is strong enough to bring about, or even to attempt, a Communist revolution in Greece after the liberation.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3 September 1943

His Excellency Stavros Theofanides
Minister of Mercantile Marine
Kingdom of Greece

Dear Stavros:

My General has kindly consented to deliver this letter to you personally.

He will explain to you that the Irregular Project will have to appear to disappear. At all events, the title of the Project will be eliminated. However, the sound and good services of this activity which we owe to your good officers will be conserved and in time expanded. This does not mean a defeat for us, but it is true that some people have talked out of turn and have possibly misrepresented a program they neither understood nor knew much about.

For the time being, I am remaining behind to arrange for a decent burial and to prepare for even better and more vital activities under such cover as we may deem proper and practical.

As you wisely pointed out to me on numerous occasions, jealousies may crop up among friends as well as enemies. Consequently, our "new" enterprise must be super secret, known only to yourself, General Donovan and the very few he will nominate to cooperate with us. I hope and expect to be seeing you shortly after the General's return.

In the meantime we will have to eliminate or sever contact with those who have been responsible for the leaks. One of these is Leon who should be recalled at once to Cairo to resume his military service, and I hope you will arrange that matter. I have no wish to injure the young man, but he is the prime reason for some of the leaks and gossip here especially among Greek circles, including the Embassy.

Jim and Alex are behaving themselves although they were treated outrageously. Jim was wickedly slandered and all the rumors we heard in Cairo were proven to be unfounded. Alex, of course, is a stormy political petrel, but he has kept his promise to keep politics out of his speeches while in this country. He
His Excellency  
Stavros Theofanides  

- 3 -  
3 September 1943

suspects, however, that some of his enemies have influenced unsuspecting people to try to discredit him, but like all you politicians he is not surprised at that. Incidentally, he has proven to be a good friend of yours and has come to your defense where it helps most.

You will find the General still as interested as ever in Greece and as willing as ever to do all he can to help Greece. He thoroughly appreciates the great work you have done and will do for us, and his complete confidence in you has never wavered.

Please be assured that we will keep the good work going, but for your sake as well as ours we will have to handle it much more secretly. I believe and hope the General will tell you that we will rejoin each other soon, though my advance base may have to be somewhat closer to Greece than Cairo.

I am going to work out the proposition of getting transportation for your wife, as I realize she is the only secretary you can trust in this the most delicate of all activities. In the meantime please keep control of our agents at the ports both inside enemy lines and out, and accelerate their reports, but please hold these reports until I indicate which cutout is to be used for transmitting them to us.

Please tell the Prime Minister on the one hand and the Vice Prime Minister and Ministers of War, Navy and Air that we will continue to cooperate with them and are hoping to be able to satisfy their every request.

With warmest personal wishes,

Affectionately yours,

Ulius L. Amoss  
Colonel, AC
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan
FROM: Col. Ulius L. Amoss
SUBJECT: Greek Irregular Project

3 September 1943

1. No one person has control of all of the pieces of the Irregular Project. McBain received from the Irregular Project Major Clavakis, former Chief Operations Officer of the EAM. McFarland inherited the negotiation for the secret ports in Turkey begun by Captain Zanias, Royal Hellenic Navy, and his crew. Hoot was offered Captain Y and his guerrillas, but did not approve of his doing business with this leader he mistakenly thought was a British agent. The activities of Captain Alex Melas are known partially to some of his officers in Cairo. West knows something of the activities of Theofanides but not all.

2. Theofanides has under his control the more regular network, but without his knowledge Melas still has in his hands the remnants of the network which was partially destroyed by German execution as reported in my earlier cable. The Theofanides network extends far beyond Greece itself and can cover the greater part of the globe. Melas is effective only in Greece and the Middle East. Neither knows the secret activities of the other.

3. There are several other independent agents and their satellites, but their success is yet to be proved.

4. No British service is aware of the extent of the Irregular Project. Through Hoot SOE knows of our dealings with the Cretan guerrillas who were supposed to act for us in reporting intelligence. SIS knows that I receive political intelligence from inside Greece, but has shown no interest in knowing the methods I use. Miss Veronica Grogan, for a long time secretary to Minister Reifer on Ambassador Biddle's staff in London and later secretary to the third man in the Middle East FWE, is our employee working in ISLD (SIS) in Cairo with the knowledge and approval of Colonel Teague (the successor of Captain Bowly). It was to have been her duty to take all reports as furnished by Theofanides and to give one copy to Col. Teague and the other to Col. West in my absence. Also on our list is Marco Bay, Chief of the Secret Narcotic Police of Egypt. No British service knows of this arrangement and with us only Guenther and West know, unless they have informed others of our staff. At the request of General Strahm we have two Greek female agents whose chief duties are to
prevent the framing of American officers. Naturally, neither Theofanides nor Melas knew of the existence of these agents. There are other pieces to our activities which were abandoned during my absence, but which General Strahm would expect me to resume if I were to return.

5. General Strahm, the Chief of Staff, knew at all times of my activities and gave them his personal blessing in the name of the Commanding General, but did not require or want to know the details of our operations so that he could at all times disclaim knowledge of them. Incidentally, if Ralph Royce, the new Commanding General, takes my very close personal friend General Larson as his Chief of Staff, I can arrange all details with both Ralph and the Swede before they depart for their new posts. I have the most intimate tie-ups both directly and indirectly with both these Generals.
February 11, 1943

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Arthur J. Goldberg

Enclosed you will find a copy of a memorandum which I sent to Commander Ravenel. I thought it would be of interest to you too.

Arthur J. Goldberg
To: Commander Ravenal
From: Arthur J. Goldberg

Information received from a confidential informant indicates that the Greek ship F.G. Kassos, sailing between Philadelphia and Lisbon, Portugal, on a voyage within the last two months, apparently by prearranged appointment met a German submarine in the Mid-Atlantic.

The informant stated that there was no question that the meeting took place; certain other facts he believes to be true but cannot be certain until the return of the suspected ship to Philadelphia. He further believes, on the basis of the information he has received, that either the Captain or the First Mate went on the German submarine and spent two and one half hours away from the Greek ship.

Through certain contacts which the informant has on the Kassos, he is certain that he will be able to verify and supplement the above information when the ship returns to port.

Arthur J. Goldberg

AJGoldberg/sh
2-10-43
FEBRUARY 26, 1943

R. GRIFFIN

ILLIAM A. KIMBEL

STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON GREECE

I refer to your memorandum and attachment of February 23rd concerning the above subject. I have been advised as following by the Department of State:

1. The United States recognised the Greek Government in Exile, which is a signatory to the United Nations, and a recipient of Lend-Lease aid.

2. The United States is pledged to liberation of Greece from the Axis and to restoration of her territorial integrity.

(Roosevelt, October 6, 1942;
Welles, October 28, 1942)

3. The two governments "pledge...mutual resources to victory...also collaboration in economic policies to make possible a lasting peace."

4. Our Government has no commitments as to the post-war government of Greece except that it expects that the country, when liberated, shall freely determine the government by which it is to be ruled. It has taken no stand on territorial claims.

Please instruct me if you wish to confer with an official of the Greek Desk at the Department of State.

W. A. K.

cc: Colonel Donovan
Colonel Buxton
Dr. Rogers

P.S. Clause 2 should not be interpreted to mean a guarantee of the original Greek boundaries and Mediterranean Islands.
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: Ulius L. Amoss

DATE: January 11, 1943

SUBJECT:

Attached are a series of reports based on information received through Greek Irregular Agents.

Since September we have been preparing a campaign to reach Admiral Canarius. As reflected in my report to you dated January 9, we believe we have most of the pieces in place.

There is a large mass of material we are sorting through for truth. I believe that it will not be long before we will have in your hands a projected program for breaking some of the parts of the Canarius Organization.

In addition to the reports enclosed, we have received and processed information on the Dodecanese Islands, the originals of which were sent to you.

U. L. A.
Major David Bruce
Ulius L. Amoss
Greek Irregular Report on Crete

Greek Irregular Agent #379 after contacting fugitives from Crete, reports the following:

Some thousands of patriots are hidden variously in the rugged mountains of Crete. While broken into small groups they are closely knit into one organization. They possess small arms and ammunition and believe that they are powerful enough to reduce all German occupation forces except those stationed at Canea and Heracleion. These patriots have a military court martial which sentences and executes any person suspected of having deals with the German forces of occupation.

On the Greek mainland communist forces have increased 60%. Informants claim that this is because neither Liberals nor Royalists have assumed any real initiative.

U. L. A.

CC: Mr. R. Davis Hallowell
    Mr. F. L. Belin
SECRET

January 5, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan
Hulio L. Amoss
German Inner-Intelligence Service

From our Greek Irregular sources we are informed that Admiral Canarius is now located in Berne, Switzerland, under an alias believed to be "Dr. Meyer".

It has been reported that the apostate Greek Admiral set up his general headquarters in Switzerland through fear of assassination by Himmler's agents. Because of this and other differences of opinion between Canarius and Nazi Party men, he has entered into relationship with the anti-Nazi German movement Foderland.

The sinister Greek Magnate Bodosakia, now in this country, is an intimate of Admiral Canarius. Bodosakia (who is not the informant in this case) has convinced me that he should be used by our Organization to contact and pervert Canarius and several Nazi and Pro-Nazi leaders in Rumania, Bulgaria and Spain.

I believe I can work out a plan whereby we can cover Bodosakia with complete safety and, after his work is done, eliminate him if it is then necessary in the interests of our country.

U. L. A.
Mr. James Murphy

Uliss L. Amoss

Greek Irregular developments.

Attached is a copy of a letter from Mercantile Marine Minister Theofanides together with a copy of a letter addressed by the Greek Prime Minister to OSS at our request.

It was agreed between Theofanides and myself to have the post of liaison officer created as a cover for James B. Underwood. As in the case of other agents used in this important and dangerous work we wish to mask his identity from all but yourself, Colonel Donovan, and any other representative of the Colonel's who should know it for service reasons.

It was understood between Theofanides and myself that on receipt of this letter I would cable to the Prime Minister giving the name of Underwood.

I hope the letter will come to your hands on arrival. In my absence the Greek Irregular Mission will be handled from New York by Major Ronald H. Pearce, his only liaison in Washington on the Mission is Mrs. E. L. Sieber, the rest of this Section not being informed of the details of this foreign movement.

U. A. A.
M. David Bruce
Ulissius L. Amoss
Greek Irregular Information on Germany

January 5, 1943

In my opinion the following should be communicated to Colonel Donovan.

General Beck, who was displaced by General Halder as German Chief of Staff, is the leader of the German anti-nazi movement Faderland. General Beck is under 24 hour surveillance by the Gestapo and is confined to quarters. He will be the military leader of a revolution and is backed by the expatriate, Greek Admiral Canarius.

A movement is on foot headed by a German General (name not disclosed) presently on the Russian Front to start a revolution there. This probably will be abortive as was the planned assassination of Hitler on January 1st. March probably will see an attempt by the Junkers to wrest control from the Nazis.

The above information is plausible but unconfirmed. Some credence should be given to it because it comes to us from several sources apparently emanating from different points of origin.

CC: Mr. R. Davis Hallowell
Mr. F. L. Belin

U. L. A.
Major David Bruce

December 21, 1942

Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Agent Paul's Report on North Africa

Greek Irregular Agent Paul reports the following
(probably no news to you, but cited just in case.)

Anglo-American plans called for simultaneous landings in North Africa and South France. Full collaboration had been arranged. German agents were tipped four days in advance and they occupied the south of France in eight hours.

The fleet at Toulon was to have joined the invading Americans and the failure explains part of what happened to the fleet.

U. L. A.
SECRET

Colonel Ellery Huntington
Major David Bruce

Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Intelligence concerning Guerrillas

December 11, 1943

The number of guerrillas has increased. They have no unified command. They are composed of bands not exceeding a hundred each while other groups are operating in much smaller numbers and individuals taken to banditry.

Conditions do not permit the formation of even one single corps. The problems are concealment and logistics. Rapid and safe communication between leaders of the various groups does not exist. Despite these negative factors these activities increasingly are felt by the Axis whose communication is constantly threatened.

The British have limited contact with some of the bands.

For a major uprising organization is indispensable. Most of the bands are officered by Greek Regular Army Officers but many of these forces must be integrated in order to effect serious results prior to invasion.

The second problem is the threat of continued
lawlessness even after peace has been declared. With the natural appetite for banditry whetted, it will be a difficult matter to persuade many of these daring men to follow the monotonous pursuit of peace.

U. L. A.

CC: Mr. F. L. Belin
SECRET

Major David Bruce
Colonel Ellery Huntington

December 11, 1942

Ulius L. Amoss

Latest Score Card of the Greek Puppet Line-up.

Premier: Professor Logothetopoulos.

Gotzamanis: Finance and National Economy.

General Moutsoulis: Communications and Merchant Marine.


General Marcom: Justice.

Tsironicou: Agriculture.

Galivas: Labour.

Gotzamanis although no more Vice Premier has retained much of his influence, receiving full support from the occupation authorities.

General Moutsoulis has already been mentioned in previous reports as collaborating with the Germans - (Anti-Venizelist).

General Bacos. Same comments.

Tavoularis. Friend of General Pangalos. During the latter's short dictatorship (1924) became prominent by his extensive "financial operations".
Tsirionicos. Completely unknown.

Culivas. Vice Secretary of the Greek Trade Unions; appointed first to this post by Dimitratos, of whom he is a friend.

U. L. A.
Major David Bruce
Colonel Ellery Huntington
Mr. F. L. Belin
Uliss L. Amoss
Greek Irregular Report

December 4, 1942

The following from absolutely reliable sources through our own agent is old - June to October. Our agent assures us that further intelligence will be speeded:

"AXIS OCCUPATION IN GREECE"

Repressive measures

Axis authorities are becoming more and more strict and severe with the Greek population, owing to increasing unrest.

The Iveroff prisons are completely full of persons arrested or under suspicion of sabotage, possession of arms, help to British soldiers, and communications to the Allies. Concentration camps are being established to accommodate the excess number of persons who cannot be housed in prisons. There are 500 persons already at one concentration camp at Larissa.

The following were arrested early in July in
Athens, on suspicion of being in contact with a Turk named TOXAN, sentenced for espionage in Budapest; architect KITSIKIS, industrialist POURIS, lawyer MICHAEL PESMATZOGLOU, and Mr. CANAKARIS-ROUFOS, politician from Patras; ALEXANDER ARGYROPOULOS, formerly chief of department of the Greek Foreign office, has also been arrested and put in solitary confinement in the Averoff prisons. His house was repeatedly searched by the Gestapo. The whole Zannas family has also been arrested; Alexander with his wife, Constantine with his wife, and Maltos with his two daughters. (Alexander's wife was later released). The reason for these arrests is not known.

Methods of Reprisals

The method of reprisals is also widely used by Germans in Greece. When three German soldiers were found dead on the road to Nigrita, (Macedonia), 20 peasants were immediately executed. Later, another 10 prisoners from the Jienicoule prison were shot. Among these were some former employees of the American Consulate.

Escape out of Greece

It seems that people generally complain of the complete lack of organization for the escape of persons who wish to join the Allied Forces. Individual attempts are difficult and dangerous, and very costly.
(Estimated at 100,000 drachmas per head last July). The occupation authorities are very watchful and strict in preventing such escapes. 10 persons have been shot and many others imprisoned for being caught in such attempts. Altogether, 50 persons only managed to leave Greece during July, and probably not the most useful.

Gestapo

A great number of Gestapo agents are now in Greece. Further, all Italian and German residents established there before the war are also used as Gestapo agents, as well as some Greeks of foreign origin.

Salonika Jews

All Jews of Salonika, from 18 to 45, are to be conscripted for forced labor in Macedonia. It seems that they are not badly treated, altogether, because the Greek population will not allow any abuse, and in many cases has given them shelter and protection against the Gestapo agents, the church itself having intervened very often in their behalf.

Restrictions to Shipping

The German port authorities of Peireaus issued an order forbidding fishing boats to enter or leave ports between sunset and sunrise, or to approach the coast at any point nearer than 300 m. Further, no small boat is allowed to come within 300 m. of any steamer anchored in the roads of Perama or Drapateon. Immediate
prosecution follows disobedience.

On the Evros River (Thrace), fishing in small boats or rafts is absolutely forbidden. Further, a strict curfew has been declared in the whole Evros prefecture. No person is allowed on the streets after 8:00 p.m. unless provided with a German pass.

Miscellaneous

(1) The following is reported as of early April, 1942. Allied aeroplanes flying over Kymi and Aliveri, bailed out several boxes containing machine guns, rifles, grenades, wireless sets, and ammunition. However, an Italian battalion stationed at Kymi, saw the boxes while bailing and immediately set out to collect them. Only 4 or 5 boxes with machine guns and grenades escaped their prolonged searches in the houses of the two villages. Three men were shot for concealing some of the above ammunition. The incident was unfortunate as it was known already that relatively important Italian forces were stationed in this district.

(2) A new autonomous economic Agency has been established in Macedonia with full powers to confiscate or freeze raw materials, foods and goods, "necessary for public consumption". This Agency cooperates directly with the Greek Governor General of Macedonia and the German occupation authorities. It is said that all goods thus obtained go to Germany, or feed the German
armies of occupation.

The German armies of occupation live practically only on Greek produce, importing very little of their food from other countries. 95% of Greek milk is taken over by the Germans. The same applies also to any other food stuff available, whether the harvest has been good or not.

During the months of June and July, the Germans "purchased" 10,000 woolen blankets from the Athens population, as well as all the refrigerators, "electric" or not.

Greek Labor for the Axis

Occupation authorities are doing their best to conscript labor to Germany. The latest method of securing the same is the medical inspection of all workers ordered by the Greek Ministry of Interior. The men are examined by German doctors, and those found fit are "offered" to go to Germany. Refusal is very difficult, as in most cases it entails concentration camp. Workers therefore try to escape the examination, but they are not allowed to take up any job in Greece without a medical certificate.

On July 14th, the tenth departure of workers for Germany was announced from Salonika. They were leaving for Vienna and Donevits. Construction workers were sent to Brisgau (Baden). Women workers were sent to
Ulm.

From Athens the fourth expedition of workers started June 7th, destination unknown.

The first expedition of workers from Chalcis left on the same day.

The Germans are further conscripting specialized technicians for many installations made in Crete. A number of them left for Crete July 16th.

The total number of workers is not known. However, it is reported that from Salonika 35,000 workers left in all up to the end of July, specialists or not. A thousand have been returned already as useless. The average number of workers in each expedition is computed at between 300 to 500.

The construction of the railroad from Komotini to Kirtzali continues with 2,500 workers. However, it has not yet arrived at the Bulgarian frontier.

Efforts are being made to complete the road from Patras to Kalavritra, Mazeica, Tripolis, There remains only a segment, Mazeica-Dara. This road will allow direct communication from Patras to Sparta, and Cytheon.

Defense works are being established on this road near the village of Liopesi; double trench 8 to 900 m. long, with defense directed towards Patras. Similar defense installations are at approximately 7 to 9 km.
from Patras, near the village of Vrachnica.
All telephone wires in the country are forcibly guarded
by local peasants who are responsible for their safety.
They are executed in cases of sabotage."

U. L. A.
SECRET

December 4, 1942

Major David Bruce
Mr. W. L. Hellen
Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Political Intelligence.

The Greek political scene roys. Sophocles Venizelos, presently in New York, (due in Washington today), no longer military attache, has assumed leadership of the Greek Liberal party in the name of his late father.

Venizelos after sulking and playing with the "bad boys" of the Laskaras regime because concerned over his future in Greece since Greek sources report that in Greece he has been called a "flannel Achilles sulking in a New York sayadrapar". So the ex-Colonel offered his military services to the Prime Minister who replied: "If you are offering your services to the fighting forces, please direct yourself to the Minister of War."

The amorous Colonel became peeved all over again and now wants to be given a commission in the American Army and to be stationed in Cairo.

(Despite the weakness of this soft son of a strong father, Venizelos can, should and will be used by us — discreetly.)
The published fears of the Liberal Party under Venizelos are:

Tsouderos is a scheming, honest and weak man.

To keep "in" with the British he will agree to anything.

The British show signs of ceding Greek territory to the Serbs and to the Bulgarians so as to fend off Russian offers.

Tsouderos is not man enough to head a Government that has to deal with such clever people as the British; he should be forced to resign.

Cstanbulazos (ex-Minister to Lond) is the man to take the post.

No objections are raised to the King -- if he will declare that he will not return to Greece until after the war and after a plebiscite.

The Liberals claim that they can prove the incompetence of the Tsouderos Government; the British won't listen to these complaints -- perhaps the Americans will. Anyway, Greece needs an American occupation for two years.

However, the Liberals are now a bit divided. Venizelos and Vlavianos have split over personal differences.

Venizelos now wants to publish his own newspaper in New York.

U. L. A.
C O P Y

Major David Bruce
Mr. F. L. Belin
Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Seamen and Loose Talk
(Greek Irregular Agent #173)

December 3, 1942

With the latest two sinkings of Greek boats near Lourenco Marques it seems that the Greek sailors are not sufficiently warned not to talk freely in public places and especially in ports where German Agents are most active. As an example of how careless they are, at a local Greek restaurant where I was eating, four seamen were sitting next to my table and I could hear all their conversation. They started by relating to each other their experiences in their last trips and it appeared to me that they are not working at present otherwise they would have mentioned the movements of their ships, feeling I suppose safe that they were in a Greek place. One of the seamen however related an incident which is worth noting. He said that two Greek seamen that were in Canada decided to take a walk to the American border and when they approached the Canadian and then the American Guard nothing was asked of them and entered the American territory without hindrance. They stopped at a place near the American border and had coffee and they were saying to themselves
that now that they passed so easy they could proceed to an American city and stay here. They debated for some time what decision they should take, but one of them who was more cautious said that probably the guards took pictures of them by hidden cameras and they will be arrested anyhow. They decided finally to return and wait till dark, jump the fence and enter without being spotted by the guards. When they arrived on the Canadian side they were stopped by a new guard who asked all kinds of questions and as the two seamen could not convince him that they passed before taking a promenade to the American side they were arrested and it took them several days before they were released, upon proper identification.

U. L. A.
December 3, 1942

Major David Bruce
Ulius L. Amoss
Bodosakis - (Greek Irregular Agent #173)

(The above subject is the sinister Greek
Munitions Magnate earlier reported on.)

In connection with the local activities of Mr.
Bodosakis I was informed that lately a new firm was
organized in this City by the name of the "Ethiopian
Purchasing Corporation" backed and financed by him,
with offices at the General Motors Building, 1775
Broadway, Room 508, New York City. His associates in
this new enterprise are Mr. Logotheti and N. G.
Dracopoulos. It is said that this corporation is
planning to do an extensive business with Ethiopia
in view of the fact Mr. Dracopoulos has many connections
there and a close friendship with King Selassie who
will extend to him every facility to close large trans-
actions. Mr. Dracopoulos before coming to this country
was living in London and was interested in the shipping
business.

U.L.A.
December 3, 1942

Major David Bruce
Lt. Colonel Ellery Huntington
Mr. F. L. Belin

Ulius L. Amoss

Delayed Report through Greek Irregular Agent

The following is absolutely reliable, sent by our agent, but greatly delayed. The latest news herein is as of October, the earliest, July:

GREEK PUPPET GOVERNMENT

General Pangalos is cooperating with the Puppet Prime Minister, General Tsolakoglou. The latter offered Pangalos a portfolio in his government in July, praising General Pangalos in an address at Lamia, July 5th and stating that Pangalos, alone of all the old Generals cooperated. During July Tsolakoglou, in many speeches praised the Axis, and himself. In Larissa, July 13th he was warmly and publically received by the Italian C.O. and by the German Occupation Deputy, Captain Wartzel.

The rift between Gotsamanis and Tsolakoglou (August) has widened. Present head of the Quisling Government is former Vice Premier Logothetopoulos.

Livieratos, who resigned as Minister of Justice
in June did so because Tsolakoglou would not accept the following conditions:

1. No Greeks are to be drafted to help Germans on the Eastern Front.
2. All constitutional acts to be signed by the Minister of Justice.
3. Financial assistance to be given to working classes.
4. Axis authorities must alleviate the food conditions.

Mivernotos (October) is well liked by the masses and may supersede Logothetopoulos at some near future date.

PUBLIC HEALTH

(October) Typhus is appearing. Yellow Fever in Salonika. Diet is more and more unbalanced, food of any kind gets scarcer.

Deaths in Athens during the past winter were 90,000 from starvation.

Drugs are almost non-existent. No anaesthetics or sedatives are available for operations. Germany sent fair quantities of quinine (July) and Ultra-Septil (Sulphamilimide) from Budapest for limited use for specific diseases on named cases.

Greeks who originated in rural districts are being evacuated forcibly from the cities no matter how long a permanent their residence had been.

U. L. A.
Major David Bruce

Ulius L. Amons

Greek Irregular Agent Paul's Report #5 re Paul Stokvis.

Agent Paul talked with the subject and reports as follows:

Stokvis is a Belgian; owner of a celebrated tablecloth and lace manufacturing concern in Malin. As of today Stokvis has been in this country 17 days.

On the German occupation of Belgium he and his wife drove for a distance of 1700 kilometers through Belgium and France to Beziers, Hérault, France. After about a week the German Government appointed him to be in charge of the fifty or sixty thousand Belgian refugees in that area. His task consisting of the lodging, grouping, feeding and the location of refugees who had lost contact with other members of their families. This occupation continued until the fall of France when he and several other Belgians operated an enterprise that helped young Belgians to escape for the purpose of joining the British Army.

They averaged forty to fifty a day who were spread
across the Spanish frontier. At first they passed their compatriots from occupied France to the cemetery which was located on the unoccupied side while the chapel itself was in enemy territory. They were able to cross the frontier by the device of their group joining funeral processions, first praying in the church then following the group to the grave in unoccupied territory. Since only half of the mourners returned to occupied France it was inevitable that the Gestapo eventually discovered the ruse.

Later they located parts of the frontier guarded by Austrians with whom the Belgian group made deals so that the guards turned their backs when groups escaped. In all of these activities they had great help from the majority of the population of occupied and unoccupied France.

For a long time the center of distribution was Béziers. Men under 18 and over 35 were officially allowed departure so that eventually it was worked out that all passports represented the bearer as being over 35 years of age. The escapees were given visas, tickets and money. In Spain a certain British Consulate certified that these men were British Colonials, where they would receive a visa for Portugal. From Portugal they were taken to a small island (name deleted) where a British vessel would pick them up.
Younger men who could not pass as over 35 were sent to the Spanish frontier where they arranged to have themselves arrested by Spanish police to whom they claimed Canadian citizenship. Spanish authorities usually interned them for about 30 days until the British Consulate could be notified by underground channels and would arrange to exchange small cargoes of wheat for units of 250 internees. The small wheat vessel took the "prisoners" back.

Stokvis had no knowledge of the number of Axis troops in unoccupied zones but said there were a considerable number though during the last three months the number had dropped.

After long operation in the Belgian underground railroad the French Surete asked Stokvis to assist in interpreting at headquarters for the repatriation of straggling German prisoners. He saw many who were apparently only deserters. The usual story was that they had been in the army since 1936 and were tired of the war. The French military turned them over to German authorities but in most cases sympathetic French officers destroyed the papers of arrest and frequently assisted them to disappear.

Stokvis arrived in this country at Baltimore and his address is C/O Mr. W. Price, 1041 Bushwick Avenue, Brooklyn, New York.
He presently has a minor position with McCutcheon's in New York, formerly one of his valuable customers.

U. L. A.

CC:  Colonel Ellery Huntington
     Mr. F. L. Belin
     Mr. Russell D'Oench
Major David Bruce

Ulysses L. Amoss

Report of Greek Irregular Agent #166

November 23, 1942

The following report is three weeks old, is transmitted by our own Greek Irregular Agent #166 from information he gathered from prime sources heretofore reliable. It should be rated B2-E.

1. A typhus epidemic has appeared in southern Greece, during which whole villages have been set on fire by the Italian military authorities to prevent spread of infection.

2. More Bulgarian peasants are settling in Western Thrace until November 30, and will continue the job in the spring, bringing the total Bulgarian immigration to 50,000 this year.

3. Sowing commissions will be appointed by the Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture in Thrace, Macedonia, Dobruja and Aegean districts, in order to expedite the ploughing and sowing.

4. Bulgarians, assisted by German military engineers are busy fortifying the Aegean coastline they
occupied in Greece, from Kavalla to Alexandroupolis and are reinforcing their garrisons in Eastern Macedonia.

5. The German Military governor of the city of Salonica has ordered all Greek officers to report to the city police on the first and the fifteenth of each month. This applies also to officers working on the road building operations of the Muller Company, who may report to that company.

6. Samos is now under financial supervision of High Command of Rhodes. The judicial courts are all under Italian control. Italian officers trying to be friendly with influential families, not successful. Greeks who have tried to escape from the island unsuccessfully are severely punished by the Italian military court. Italian racketeers are making a large profit out of the deforestation of the island.

7. All inducements of the German authorities have failed to lure Greeks to go to German factories. The men from Salonica who were tempted were sent to places in the Rhineland where many were killed or wounded in air-raids. Those who managed to return home arrived in a terrible condition.

CC: Colonel E. Huntington
     Mr. F. L. Belin

     U. L. A.
Major David Bruce
Uliss L. Amos
Agent Paul - Greek Irregular Agent

Agent Paul reports long discussions with Mr. Robert Beauvalas, and with Colonel Andr L'Homme, former General Manager of the armament factories of Puteaux, France.

The meetings developed only personal opinions concerning the present and potential operations in North Africa. These names should be noted, perhaps passed on to the W. K. Section as men of position who may be of use some day.

U. L. A.
REPORT NUMBER 2

FROM: PAUL CHATELAIN

TO: LIEUT. COLONEL ULIUS LOUIS AMOSS
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
TEMPORARY Q BUILDING
25th and CONSTITUTION AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL AMOSS:

I met Mr. Robert Beauvais at 6:25 P.M. Wednesday evening, November 11th in his apartment. He seemed very much pleased with the entire picture and turning of the war. Our conversation drifted immediately to what would happen to Petain. He replied that Petain would stay in France and try to keep the French people from revolting for the time being. I then asked him, "Why?" He replied, that the time was not ready to do such a thing, because no allied help could be given them for quite a while. He thinks that it would take us two or three months to consolidate our positions in Africa. Admiral Darlan will have charge of the French Fleet, and General Giraud will have charge of the French African Army. Going back to the French Fleet he doesn't think that any ships were sunk in the Bay of Casablanca. His thought was that this was just a clever new story for the German consumption.

Regarding General Giraud, Mr. Beauvais' reaction was that he would lead an army of 150,000 men well equipped and supposedly would be the cream of the French
Division. This army which would formulate after the Armistice is composed of a high caliber type of men. For example, if a Major in any of their divisions wanted to join this army, his title would have been Captain only. Soldiers were only accepted if they had been Corporal or Sergeant in other divisions. The choice men were taken, and he says that only two or three out of fifty applicants were selected.

Mr. Beauvais went on to say that there was one thing we would have to be very careful with, and that was - our soldiers. He said they were receiving $52.00 a month in American money, and with the rate of exchange they would be almost millionaires, and would be in a position to buy everything and anything. This, he said, would create hard feelings with the civilian population. The civilian population would see all of their merchandise purchased by strangers and have nothing left for themselves. This would create animosity.

Another thing that would have to be handled very carefully is the liaison between civilian population and the United States Army. The French Army and the United States Army.

He said that during the last war they experienced a great deal of trouble and friction because their French Liaison Officers did not understand the English temperament, and spoke very poor and broken English, therefore, making a pantomime out of a job which was so important.
This also applies with the English Liaison Officers who did not understand the reaction of French Officers, therefore, losing precious cooperation.

Mr. Beauvais said that a new form of government would be formed in Africa, probably headed by General Weygand. Mr. Beauvais then said he was ready at any time to serve his country on our side.

At 11:35 A.M. Thursday, November 12th, I had the visit of Colonel André L'Homme, formerly General Manager of the Factories of Puteaux, France, which has for years perfected, experimented, and produced cannons for the French Army.

He did not have much to say, but that he was wondering how much longer he would have to wait before he could be of any service or use in chasing the Germans out of France.

He also told me that practically every French Officer and soldier left at liberty would only be too glad to join forces again with the United States.

Looking forward to see you Saturday, and to personally thank you for your lovely and encouraging letter, I am

Sincerely yours,

Signed, Paul Chatelein
SECRET

November 12, 1942

Mr. James Murphy
Uliss L. Amoss
Greek Irregular Report on the Island of Leros

The attached is the second section of the work you asked our Greek Irregular Undertaking to do on the Dodecanese.

The information is compiled from reports of our own agents, plus other information. Sources are reliable.

Stampados and his staff compiled the report and drew the map. It has been cross-checked.

U. L. A.
November 11, 1942

Major David Bruce  
Ulius L. Amoss  
Greek Irregular Agent

Our Greek Irregular Administration expects to send Stavros Niarchos to Zurich. His function will be to arrange and implement courier service between Zurich and Vienna and Zurich and Budapest; to send credentials by these couriers to arrange repute by Greek Irregular appointees in Central Europe; to arrange frequent courier service between Vienna and Greece and Budapest and Greece.

The cover is official. He will go (if all arrangements are completed) to negotiate with the Swiss Government and Swiss interests for further use of Greek ships.

His biography:

Age - 34

Address - 109 East 55th Street  
Huntington, L.I.

Married - This wife (second) is from Athens. 
Niarchos’ (the name means Ship Commander)  
father was wealthy; lost his money. Young
Nearchos secured employment in the great flour mills owned by his maternal uncles, The Commanderos brothers, in the Pireaus. Bright and progressive, he became a successful general manager at the age of 26. He gave most attention to shipping problems. At the age of 29 he entered the Marine shipping business and prospered from the start.

He now owns:

One ship, Greek flag, chartered to the British. Two ships, Panamanian flag, chartered to the U. S. Shipping Administration.

He has lost four ships from torpedoing.

Character - He is known to all as straight-forward and honest. He has applied for a Greek naval rating, being prevented by lack of experience from securing a commission. We believe he will decide that our mission is more important than chief petty officer service in the Greek Navy. The Greek Government backs us up.

U. L. A.

CC: Colonel E. Huntington
Major David Bruce

Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Agent "Paul's" Report #3

November 11, 1942

1. Invasion of France: Paul is in touch with a Frenchman (an old friend) who knows French coastal terrain well. This person is subject to examination if his knowledge seems interesting.

2. Travellers to Mexico: Paul has friends who travel to Mexico regularly. They can be depended upon to execute any mission, the "dirtier the better".

3. Paul met Colonel W. C. Dolan U.S.A.A.F., stationed at Trinidad, and forty of his officer pilots. Spirit and morale excellent except for bitter anti-British feeling due to real or fancied affronts from British at Trinidad.

4. Interviewed Marcelle Visner, Monday, November 9th. Visner is a member of the Military Bureau of the French New York Consulate General. Upset by the upset (French-American relations.) Will
communicate his orders to Paul when received.

5. Talked with Adrian M. Rolland of the Vanderbilt Hotel Executive Offices. Rolland originated in Lyon, France. Through Rolland, Paul has met Mrs. Jehanne La Sauze who operates the "Modern School of Languages." Through her pupils many things can be learned; curious contacts made; C. E. can operate.

6. Talked with Robert Beauvais of the Matam Company, Long Island City. Beauvais was asked by Colonel J. Jacquin Air Attache of France (Ritz, Nov. 5th) if he, Beauvais, would be willing to return to France in the event of a rupture with the United States. Beauvais said he would agree to return if he could secretly serve the interests of the United States. Jacquin said, "I intend to do the same."

(NOTE: Beauvais was sent to the Ÿ S. by the French "Societe des Moteurs Gnome et Rhone" to dispose of machinery and steel they had bought before France capitulated.)

7. Talked with Greek officials but got nothing but Greek political polemics.

CC: Colonel E. Huntington U. L. A.
November 11, 1942

Major David Bruce  
Mr. F. L. Belin  
U. L. Amoss  
Greek Irregular Intelligence

The following is transmitted by our own Greek Irregular agent from our sources inside Greece, previously reliable. Delay in receipt here is three weeks:

Forced Labor

German-Greek Puppet campaign to enroll volunteer workers has failed. Force is now used. The Tsolakoglou Government is now medically examining all workers. Those who are fit "volunteer" to go to Germany or are placed in detention camps. The favorite ruse to escape dispatch to Germany is to evade medical examination. Steel construction experts and mechanics are those in greatest demand. Most workers are being sent to the Cologne and Essen areas.

Cotzamanis has succeeded in wresting most of the administration of the Puppet Government from General Tsolakoglou. He took a trip to Germany sixty days ago and is forwarding his campaign to supersede Tsolakoglou. Enmity exists between these two;
it can be capitalized.

**French Naval Experts**

French naval officers and men arrived at the Naval Base of Salamis. French naval workers from Toulon have arrived at the Skaramanga naval base. Some French soldiers have been seen at Elefsis.

**Demolition**

The Athens-Salonica railway line has been blown up at three separate points (dates not given) by Greek irregular bands. It is believed that these activities were inspired if not directed by British agents in order to slow the delivery of supplies to Tobruk via Salonica and Crete. This rail line is used to its utmost capacity by the Axis.

**Guerrillas**

Guerrilla activity is unabated in Macedonia despite serious German-Bulgarian attempts to stop it. A special pursuit body called "Rural Pursuit Police" has been formed. The troops are Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, and Greek. Officially this body is a police force, but its primary purpose is in order to neutralize increasingly active
of the populace. Actually the Corps patrols
mountain and remote country to suppress Guerrilla
activity. The men are armed with Submachine guns
and grenades. Atrocities, too numerous for our
Correspondents to list, are charged against this
modern Janisary army. So far the guerrillas scarcely
have felt the presence of The Rural Pursuit Police
Occupation troops and officials are catching the
"plague", believed to be bubonic, though our dis-
patches are not clear. Innoculations are delayed
due to an absence of serum.

U. L. A.
November 11, 1942

Major David Bruce
Colonel E. Huntington

Ulius L. Amoss
Greek Irregular Mission

SECRET

Premier Tsouderos cabled to Minister Theofanides approval to go ahead with Greek Irregular activities.

It is the belief of the Greek Irregular "administration" that personal contact should be made at once with important Greeks in North Africa because of their contacts into occupied countries.

U. L. A.
Major David Bruce

Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Progress

November 9, 1942

Over the week-end we had a planning meeting in New York with the following in attendance:

- Minister Theofanides
- Larry Miles
- Major Pearce
- Courier "William"
- Agents "Paul"
- "George"
- "H.C."
- "J.B." and Amoss

Under cover, independent of the U.S. Government, Agent "H" is leaving for Zurich for consultations with the Swiss Government arranged by the Greek Government.

Courier William missed contact with the Berne courier due to delay in Berne's dispatches. William's trip originated at La Guardia Field October 23rd and ended at La Guardia on November 4th.

Landings were made at Bermuda, Horta, Lisbon (October 24, 25, 26), Foynes (October 26-27), Fisherman's Lake (October 28-29 - with a short stop at Bolama). On board were Secretary Morgenthau, his Secretary Mr. White and General Dahlquist.
In Lisbon, "William" whose connection with us is entirely unknown, learned that Mr. Olivera, "a tough ex-Treasury agent" is head of the local O.S.S. that Olivera is "on the job" and present at all Clipper arrivals.

In Lisbon arrangements were completed to send uncensored mail to Berne, but the Berne courier did not arrive in time for personal contact (Air-Suisse).

In Lisbon official quotations on cork, woods, fish oil, etc. were received from Ray McDaniels ostensible head of the Portugal America Corporation but actually undercover operative for O.N.I.

From Fisherman's Lake flight was made to Belem, Para with a two hour stop at Natal. Minox camera was carried but with no opportunities for use.

On the return trip Mrs. Douglas MacArthur 2nd (Senator Barkley's daughter) was carried. U.L.A. meets Mrs. MacArthur at luncheon in Washington Wednesday, November 11th with an idea of possibly using her in Greek Irregular service abroad.

"William's" only other observation was the presence of increased members of Japanese in Lisbon and a search of his luggage.

The Prime Minister of Greece cabled enabling orders to Minister Theofanides and stating that details were coming by pouch.
Plans were made for:

1 - Establishment in Lisbon of an agent and a cut-out.

2 - Dispatch to Zurich of "N" who will negotiate official business for Greece with the Swiss Government. ("N" is in New York and is being trained by Major Pearce.)

3 - Courier service from Zurich to Vienna.

4 - Agency at B.A.

5 - Cataloging of all Maritime personnel, cross-checking with lists of the "Order of Ahepa" so that Ahepans coming from the various districts from which the Seamen originate can fill in character sketches of the men and their families.

6 - Observation of pro-Axis tendencies among Seamen through Axis tampering.

7 - Dispatch of a message to "Omicron" in Hamburg.

8 - Cross checking of lists of listening-post persons in Africa for security.

9 - Furtherance of reporting on Dodecanese Islands and utilization of the Dodecanese pilots now in the employ of the Suez Company.

10 - Searching of baggage in certain hotels (approved by F.B.I.).

11 - Dispatch of a special courier to London where I will receive further orders.

U.L.A.
From: Willis L. Amoss  
To: Major David Bruce  
Subject: Greek Irregular Communication System.

Oct. 26, 1942

Ahead of schedule our first courier left Friday morning and is due back in two weeks. Our second leg is now arranged for from Lisbon to Berne but for a limited volume of mail at one time. We are trying to increase volume by use of microfilm. (No wireless presently arranged for from Switzerland) An unsecured courier is available from Zurich to Budapest but we expect word from Zurich confirming safe and approved couriers from Zurich to Budapest and Zurich to Vienna. We have couriers from Budapest to Berlin and from Vienna to Belgrade and others.

U. L. A.

CC: Colonel E. Huntington
From: Ulius L. Amoss  
To: Major David Bruce  

Subject: Russians in Greece  
(Source Greek Irregular Agent. Reported in New York Saturday)  

Four Russian agents have arrived in Saloniki from Albania and Yugoslavia and three in Piraeus for the purpose of organizing communist bands to resist the Axis. The pattern of the Partisans in Yugoslavia. Some supplies (nature not reported) are said to have trickled into Greece. I suggest that this information be sent Colonel Donovan.

U. L. A.

Huntington Belin
From: Ulius L. Amoss
To: Major David Bruce
Subject: New Resistance Group in South Greece
(Source reported by Greek Irregular Agent in New York)

October 26, 1942

A group of more than three hundred ex-officers loyal to King George have organized somewhere on the slopes of Mt. Taygetos in the Peloponnesus. This group has sent word to me requesting drugs and 6.5 rifle ammunition. I suggest that Colonel Donovan may be interested in this report.

U. L. A.

CC: Colonel Huntington
    Mr. F. L. Belin
From: Ulus L. Amoss
To: Major David Bruce
Subject: Greek Irregular Courier Service

The first outward bound flight of our courier begins tomorrow; the first run of its kind. He is taking letters to our contacts in Lisbon and we hope that as results the second leg of our communications system will be established.

U. L. A.
From: Ulius L. Amoss
To: Major David Bruce
Subject: Greek Irregular Developments

October 19, 1942

Saturday in New York we concluded arrangements to open the Greek Lisbon post first for obvious reasons. Communications being indispensable we have made arrangements out of our own resources for monthly courier services between New York, Bermuda, San Juan, Port of Spain, Belem, Natal, Fisherman's Lake, Bolama, Lisbon and Foynes. Also once a month wireless messages will be received and dispatched in our own code by our own operators over a sending station he controls.

The first outward courier leaves about November first. (All of the communications including the courier, operator and use of the wireless messages cost us only $500 per month).

From Lisbon arrangements will be made for further courier service to Spain, Vichy, Paris, Berne and Vienna.

U. L. A.

CC; Colonel Huntington
Ulius L. Amoss

Major David Bruce

Greek Irregular Project on Vichy

Oct. 12, 1942

Saturday night at a private meeting arranged through factors belonging to the Greek Irregular Group, I met persons identified with Vichy.

NOTE: The following information is given for what it is worth. I do not know if it is new, nor yet if it is accurate.

1. Certain high Vichy personages here and abroad are willing to collaborate with United States representatives.

2. A list is being prepared of those secretly loyal; of those who may be used for certain defined purposes, but who cannot be trusted completely.

3. The bulk of the command at Dakar will agree to fake resistance to an American assault; the command will resist a British offensive with all means at its disposal.

4. Certain members of the Vichy group here will be willing to return to both occupied and unoccupied France to (A) return information and (B) to prepare
5. Laval is trying to represent himself as collaborating with Germany only to save France's strength for the "Day" when she can turn against her aggressors. This is false. Laval is inextricably bound to Hitler. He now fears defeat and is trying to hedge. However certain highly placed officials have arranged that among French labor conscripted for German industry, are highly trained saboteurs who will strike in the heart of Germany's war industry when the time to strike is signalled. It is difficult though, to keep hopes and secret enthusiasms high; if a second front could be managed soon, it would have advantage of undiluted enthusiasm, the longer the delay, the less effective will be the efforts of these patriots.

6. Colonel Jacquin former Chief of the French Purchasing Commission wants to be used in a confidential capacity.

7. A number of Axis agents are still employed by the Roosevelt, Waldorf Astoria and other leading hotels. Certain ones, (but not all) have been reported to F.B.I. but evidence enough is not at hand for actual arrest under the legal restrictions imposed by Mr. Biddle. Those remaining are American citizens; the hotel union protects them and Maitres de Hotel cannot
discharge them. Through loyal French and Greek room service, banquet and restaurant waiters and captains, we may investigate any person visiting any one of a great number of hotels in the United States, South America and in France itself. Communications established the same may be done on a smaller scale in occupied and enemy countries.

In this country, the F.B.I. has not been offered this service to any real extent. Among the hotel employees are many ex-service men, including pilots in European armies.

8. Men, whose representatives I met, are willing candidates for Counter and Positive Intelligence.

9. After the Secret meeting, at a dinner given for me ostensibly by Guy Lombardo, I met:


These officers have certain secret sources of information not directly concerning their services. These will be turned over to me. They seek certain other information. Details will be given me when General Larson visits me at our office in Washington.

U.E.A.
Major David Bruce

Ulius L. Amoss

Greek Irregular Project

October 7, 1942

As a by-product of this project I have a pipe-line into Vichy about which I will report when further advanced.

An important man in the Vichy-Axis group in New York has decided to "spill" and will cooperate otherwise. I meet him again Saturday night in New York under cover of a dinner to be given me by Guy Lombardol.

U.L.A.
NOTE:

SPECIAL INFORMATION BULLETIN #2, SECRET, KINGDOM OF GREECE
MINISTER OF WELFARE, INFORMATION SERVICE, No. 2077

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      to the Italian Occupation Forces. 33 - 34
During the beginning of October there were 5,000 sailors at Pylos. Many of them were wounded. Their appearance and their morale were bad.

AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:

Eleusis airdrome is not being used either by the Germans or Italians as an important base. Tatoi and Hassani airdromes in the Athens area do larger business.

The output of the Malstiniotis factory is 2 engines per day. 250 Germans and Greeks are employed.

CHAPTER 2 - Rebels Activity

During the months of September and October 1,900 - 2,000 men, 16-60 years old, were imprisoned by the Italians in the Parnassos area.

As a result of Italian reprisals more men from Fthiotis and Phokis are joining the rebels.

No Italian Army patrols venture to pass through mountain paths or mountainous villages. Greek rebels hold the mountainous country, receiving food rations from the farms and ammunition supplies from the air.

Frequent raids against the Axis garrisons. 300 Italian soldiers were killed during the rebel raids.
Rebels operating in the Lamia area have done the following:

On the 16th of October 100 cut the telephone line at Skorovo Baths, captured the whole force of local police. On the 10th of October 120 rebels cut the telephone line of the village Marathia Kerassohoriou (Karpenissi). They entered the Marathia village and took with them wheat and barley.

On the 12th of October 36 armed rebels cut off the telephone line of Fourna-Karpenissi (Euritania). They entered the village Fourna, destroyed the police station, and took away wheat and a uniform of an unarmed policeman.

On the 14th of October rebels entered the village Kalesmenon Karpenission and took away the wheat belonging to the village.
WAR DEPARTMENT
H.Q., ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942

Col. William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Acknowledgement is hereby made of the receipt of your letter(s) of November 24th, reference the training of the Yugoslav and Greek airmen with the Army Air Forces.

Please be assured that the problems raised are under consideration both by our War Department General Staff and the Army Air Forces.

Very truly yours,

S/ T. J. HANLEY, JR.
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Air Staff.

Original Filed: Yugoslavia, 7692.
November 21, 1942

Brigadier General Thomas J. Hanley
Room 3103
Pentagon Building
Arlington, Virginia

Dear General Hanley:

There are in the Middle East, with headquarters at Cairo, approximately 1,000 men of the Royal Hellenic Air Forces. The approval of the Greek Government having been obtained, it is now proposed that:

1. 33 of these officers, including 1 pilot commanding officer, 8 pilots, 8 co-pilots, 8 navigators, and 6 radio men, be brought to this country for training with the Bomber Command.

2. They be incorporated immediately into the United States Army as officers in training with provisional ranks until they can be properly rated upon finishing their training.

3. In order to round out eight complete bomber crews, 40 additional Air Corps personnel of Greek-American descent be selected as soon as possible and assigned to this company.

4. They be permitted to wear an insignia, bearing the word "Greece" on the left shoulder.

5. When their training has been completed, the eight crews be returned to the Middle East Air Corps Commander where officials
of the Office of Strategic Services will establish a direct contact in order to make use of their services from time to time for projects of the Office of Strategic Services.

Very truly yours,

Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. James Murphy
FROM: Ulis L. Amoss

SUBJECT: Dodekanese Information

DATE: October 19, 1942

Following your instructions, we have furnished 67 sheets of hydrographic charts of the Dodekanese to Mr. L. C. Miles of our Greek Irregular Mission.

A group of Marine captains are positioning the maps and are furnishing these other features as well:

- Topographical features.
- Military installations
  (As far as known).
- Miscellaneous Information.
- List of loyal Patriots presently resident in the Dodekanese.
- List of traitors used by Italian authorities.

We are following the Navy's detailed questionnaire for questioning these Dodekanese experts.

We can furnish speedboat pilots who know the waters of the Twelve Islands.

CC: Major David Bruce
   Lt. Colonel Ellery Huntington
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

From: Hugh R. Wilson  Date: August 14, 1942
To: Col. Donovan

I append herewith for your information a memorandum from Colonel Amoss dated August 13 regarding Greek ships under Swiss charter.

Hugh R. Wilson

Enclosure

SECRET
FROM: Ulius L. Amoss
TO: Mr. Hugh Wilson
SUBJECT: Greek Ships under Swiss Charter

DATE: August 13, 1942

Ten fast Greek freighters ply between New York and Lisbon under Swiss Charter and German safe conduct. These ships travel under sealed orders from the German Admiralty which, nevertheless, can be revealed to us in advance. It appears to me that there may be some value in submitting these courses to our Navy.

We have made arrangements to have secret observers on these ships, and will proceed to execute this facility when our Greek Irregular Project is completed and accepted.

I request that the above be brought to the attention of Colonel Donovan.
MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. James R. Murphy

From: Joseph Barnes

I am very much in your debt for the thoughtfulness with which you pass on things that are invariably helpful.

This refers specifically to the memorandum you passed on about your broadcasts to Greece. For your private information, the reference in the last paragraph of this memorandum to the undesirability of using persons known to be political opportunists or to have been sympathizers with the past dictatorship applies, I believe, to an incident in connection with an NBC program.

We have consistently opposed the use of persons of this type and will continue to do so.
July 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Joseph Barnes

FROM: J. A. Murphy

I am sending you a copy of a memorandum which was sent to Colonel Donovan by one of our Greek experts. I do not know what you may be doing on Greek broadcasts, but I thought you should have this for consideration.
July 22, 1942

DEPARTMENT FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

An editorial in The Greek Daily National Herald of New York for July 18, 1942, comments on the new broadcasting service to Greece from London, and adds certain information based on reports smuggled out of Greece about how shortwave broadcasts are received there. Emphasis is placed upon certain items which may be important in psychological warfare so I am submitting the substance of the editorial, translated from the original Greek, for your consideration.

The Greeks who listen to shortwave broadcasting do so at the risk of their lives. There are radios in cities and towns, and sometimes receiving sets have been set up in remote places in the open. The listeners report that they want news of real interest to the Greek people and of an importance proportionate to the great danger which they run. It is tragic for someone who risks his life to follow a broadcast, hoping to hear something which will relieve his intolerable anxiety, to hear only irrelevant banalities.

The questions which interest the Greek people today are these:

What is happening in the war experience on the
2. What is happening in America?

3. What is happening about food and relief for Greece?

4. What is happening to friends abroad?

The Herald adds in its editorial that these points ought to be taken well to heart by the broadcasters in London as well as by those who may be in charge of broadcasting to Greece from America.

Of equal importance, the broadcasters should be persons acceptable politically to the people of Greece. It creates only discouragement and despair to hear someone who is known to be a political opportunist, or someone who is considered in Greece to be a sympathizer with the past dictatorship, talk now about democratic institutions and spend much time in praising himself and his friends. The personality of the broadcaster may be fully as important as the substance of his broadcast.

John C. Wiley
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Ulises L. Amoss
TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton
SUBJECT: Secret meetings with Greek Prime Minister

DATE June 22, 1942

This is in reply to your memorandum of June 20th. Both David Williamson and Robert Cresswell reviewed the memorandums before it was sent to you.

The reason for the request for personal return of the memorandums is that we have made special provisions for filing this document in S/3 special file.
June 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: G. Edward Buxton
To: Ulises L. Amos

I am returning this report to you as you requested.

Have you acquainted David Williamson with this material because I think it belongs in SA/B files, possibly after deleting the names of some people whose security is affected although there should be some way to protect this in an organization dealing with secret intelligence.

FS
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1942

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Thank you for sending me your reports on Conditions in the Balkans.

These reports certainly leave no doubt of the terrible misery which the people in the Balkans are now suffering.

Sincerely yours,

A. M. Kamarck
Office of the Secretary

cc: James R. Murphy, Office of Coordinator of Information, Old National Institute of Health Bldg., 25th and E Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C.
May 20, 1942

Mr. Andrew Kamarok
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kamarok:

I thought you might be interested in the following report which we have just received from our man in Ankara:

"According to responsible Greek refugees arriving here Axis-dominated police Athens demand return of deceased bread card before issuing burial permits so it is a common sight in the streets of Athens to see dead left on sidewalks during the night with pillows under their heads and their hands crossed piously on their breasts. All identification removed because desperate families need additional bread card.

"Reliable figures show best fed Athenian workers get 940 calories daily. Schools closed March because
children mostly too weak to continue. Great increase miscarriages and premature births because of malnutrition. Prices on black market: flour 4500 drachmas per oka, eggs 250 asiece, potatoes 1800 per oka, olive oil 6000 pint, macaroni 6000, gasoline 3000, men's suit hundred thousand, shoes eighty thousand. Only articles available open market, matches and bread.

"Athens blackout begins 8:00 P.M. Piraeus quarantined end April spotted typhus. Hospitals avoiding operations because malnutrition prevents wounds healing."

Yours very truly,

James K. Murphy
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Mr. Wiley

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT: Operation of the British Intelligence in Greece

DATE January 12, 1942

You will certainly be interested in this secret report on the operation of British Intelligence in Greece. Corroborating the statements at the bottom of page 3, I may add, out of my own experience in Vienna during 1938, that Captain Kendricks, British Passport Control Officer, and the Chaplain of the English Church were both arrested by the Gestapo.
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN GREECE

January 7, 1942

It is our belief that the quality of the British Intelligence in Greece left much to be desired. We have heard many reports to the effect that much rudimentary information was lacking and in other instances was careless and even misleading. The British Intelligence can be contrasted to the painfully exacting German service that utilized every possible listening post and then checked and rechecked each item against itself as reported by many other official and volunteer agents.

The German consuls and private citizens managed to have themselves invited to visit various mills and industrial installations where they made copious notes on working conditions, labor supply, the type and condition of every machine, noting its capacity and the probable period it would reach obsolescence. The information was copied and filed in several German secretariats in Berlin, including a bureau from which German machine tool manufacturers were encouraged to draw information. I was present in the Lenaros-Kyrteis mills when the German Consul Fabricius, later German Minister to Rumania, made a complete survey of the plant and told me how it was to be used.
Contrasted to this was the British Service whose files were replete with some information and desperately short of other information, including such important data as to roads, road conditions, bridges and industrial installations.

Because of our distrust of the quality of British general information about Greece, I feel it highly desirable for us to assemble as much detail as we can to check against other data that may have come into American possession via British Intelligence channels.

Facts which follow were reported to me by a Greek ex-agent of the British who had also served with the Greek Military Intelligence.

After the World War the British Government established "listening posts" all over Europe. These posts were to be found in capital cities and important industrial centers.

Under the title "His Britannic Majesty's Passport Control Service" and with a semi-diplomatic status due to their affiliation with the British Consular Service, these offices were the nucleus of British Intelligence.

This division was controlled by the British Foreign Office, and in 1937 was directed by Sir Robert Vansittart.
In 1923 the Passport Control Office, Athens Station, was established. Located at Dragatsaniou Street No. 6 (near the old British Legation), it was organized by Mr. George Blackler, a British subject and a resident of Greece for more than 25 years.

Primarily, this station functioned as a suborganization of the British Consular Service. Checking through the Greek police all Greek citizens who wished visas for their passports, it also cooperated with the Greek authorities on all aliens, in transit through Greece, who intended to visit British territories.

With the evolution of political events in Europe, it was decided in 1933 to reorganize the service on a better basis. Ex-military men were given the chance to organize sectors on a military basis, and in 1934 the Athens Station was organized by an ex-Admiral of the Royal Navy. Headquarters were moved to Bucarest Street No. 10 (Metochikon Tamion Stratou) and the staff was increased.

Activities were confined to following up political agitations that would endanger British interests, and to checking on foreign influences that could also be detrimental to British diplomatic interests.
The station did not have executive powers. Both the Athens Station and the substation in Salonika reported directly to the British Foreign Office in London, using a special dispatch service (Imperial Airways). Outgoing dispatches left Greece each Tuesday evening; incoming dispatches were received each Thursday at 1:30 p.m.

Organization in 1935

During this year a Mr. Wallace O'Gowan (ex-Lieutenant in the Royal Air Force), who had acted as Intelligence Officer in Japan and Malaya, took command.

With his appointment, a Mr. Albert Crawford (ex-Corporal from a Middlesex Regiment) was appointed as assistant to Mr. O'Gowan. Crawford had served in the British Army Service Corps and had operated as a minor intelligence agent of the British Army in the Near East. His education was that of the average British soldier in the Near East.

Between Mr. O'Gowan and Crawford a bitter feud developed. The latter, uneducated and from a lower British class, resented O'Gowan, who was a gentleman and an officer. This feud developed increasingly until 1939, when O'Gowan resigned because of ill health.

O'Gowan was married in 1935 to his secretary, Miss Margaret Montgomery. He was an atheist and his wife a devout
Christian. His residence was at the Hotel Xenias Melathron,
Bucarest Street, Athens. Occupying a small suite on the
ninth floor, he retained a visiting room on the tenth floor.
Both suites were "sandwiched" between intercommunicating
doors.

During late 1935, the Passport Control Office enlisted
two more persons: Mr. Albert Wheel, ex-Warrant Officer of
some British regiment, who had served in the Greek Power &
Traction Co. and had been discharged on the grounds of mis-
appropriating funds. His duties in the Passport Control
Office were normal consular duties, affixing visas, and he
was not entrusted with intelligence work. Miss Alison J.
Barbour, who was the confidential secretary to both O'Gowan
and Crawford.

A Greek-British (Cypriote) doorman was retained, and
this man guarded the premises at night.

The station enlisted the services of Greek citizens
from all walks of life, including several agent-provocateurs,
who were in the pay of every foreign legation.

In 1936 the station headquarters were transferred to
a new building on University Street No. 19 (Gratsos Bldg.).
Occupying the third floor, the station was attractively fur-
nished and included some three combination files and safes.
During that time Juliana Bros., a fashionable clothing store, secretly operating for the Italian Naval Intelligence, leased the floor below the Passport Control Office. The fourth floor remained vacant until 1938.

All telephonic installations were carried into effect by the Hellenic Telephone Company.

Crawford married, in 1937, a Cypriote Greek divorcée. Her brother was serving a sentence of 20 years at harî labor for participating in the Cypriote revolts of 1927. Her first husband, an ex-journalist, had been jailed (no conviction) several times at the instigation of the Greek Military Intelligence.

This lady hated her husband because of his treatment of her. Altogether these factors should be taken into consideration, inasmuch as during 1937 and 1938 the Greek Army Intelligence (pro-British section) advised the Passport Control Office that a "leak" existed in their service in Greece and that this should be stopped.

In 1937 the telephone company installed phones in the office, and these were directed to a central point in the basement of the building. From there transmission was "channeled" to a listening post in the Monitor Section of the Greek Secret Police Headquarters.
Agents for the Passport Control Office were also recruited from the British colony in Athens. Most of these were employees and executives of the two main public utility companies, the Power & Traction Company and the American Express Company. Other agents were old British residents in Greece who talked freely at the bars.

With the Metaxas regime controlling all police centers and with the increasing pro-Nazi elements in the Greek Government, the Passport Control Office was closely watched. A taxi stand was established outside the building, all hack drivers being members of the Maniadaki secret police. All agents entering the Passport Control Office to report were trailed, and (as reported by Army Intelligence) by 1938 every British and Greek Passport Control Office agent had been catalogued and listed in the "archives" of police headquarters.

O'Gowan was advised on these points, and he immediately started to entertain agents in his hotel, while Crawford entertained at home. These activities, however, soon came to the attention of the Greek secret police.

In 1938 the fourth floor of University Street No. 19 was leased by Mr. Kurt Schlagdenhauffen (National Socialist Party), Director-General of the Greco-German Commercial Cultural Center for Greece. This man had been a major in
the German Army during the World War. He immediately organized a telephone listening post, paid the employees of the building to report the presence of any "aliens" persons, and in general set up a very systematic Gestapo counterespionage system, under the very noses of Messrs. O'Gowan and Crawford.

Greek agents reported these activities to O'Gowan, who promptly demanded that the station be moved to another region and be granted full diplomatic status. Crawford, however, succeeded in counteringmanding this measure.

Reports that pro-German Greek officials were holding key positions in administrative as well as military positions were made. London commented: "Very interesting; proceed with investigations."

When Germany invaded Austria in 1938, the Vienna Passport Control Office station was raided, and all members of the staff were imprisoned on the grounds that they had assisted the Jews in smuggling foreign exchange out of Austria. The raid revealed much important data on the British Intelligence system in Austria as well as in Germany. This was used later to the advantage of the Wehrmacht Nachrichtdienst. (German G-2).
Protective measures against German "tapping" were never taken, although pro-British members of the Greek Intelligence had advised the Passport Control Office of the imminent danger.

By 1939 the Germans were aware of all the agents employed by the British as well as of the schedules of operations, conversations, etc.

In late 1938 the presence of a German high frequency short wave sender in Athens was reported to the British. Certain measures were taken after the wave lengths were reported to them; however, no attempts to have this stopped through the official channels took place. The frequency operated on was 29,387, and the power of the station was about 1 1/2 KW. This station was reported later in 1940 as having been detected by the British Intelligence and successfully silenced.

Reports that certain senior Greek officers were in the pay of the Nazi party did not disturb London. In fact, General Tsolakoglou, the present German-appointed Chief of State of Greece, had been allowed during the Italo-Grecian War and when the German Army invaded Greece, to hold the key position in Pograditsa. This position served as the turning point and junction between Yugoslav and Greek forces. This position was the first to surrender to the
Germans without offering any resistance. Tsolakoglu did this before the Germans had marched down the Bitolj Pass.

Considerable more information on the general slackness of the British Intelligence could be reported. We are citing herewith two outstanding demonstrations of complacency.

1. Before the Germans invaded Greece, and while the British were shipping reinforcements into Greece, the German Military Attache was permitted to circulate in British military zones and camps quite freely, because "he could not be arrested by the Greek Government, as Greece was not then at war with Germany." All British press reports that large bodies of troops (300,000) had been shipped to Greece, were naturally denied by the German Military Attache. However, these reports had been circulated as a "war of nerves" against the Germans.

2. With the outbreak of hostilities the British did not know the disposition of terrain in the northern sectors facing the boundaries of Yugoslavia. Reports came through that British Staff Intelligence Officers (General Headquarters, G-2) were searching the region in armored cars two days before the onslaught trying to find the main road to Bitolj. This road, incidentally, is the only military road in Greece which the British could have used to stem the German panzers.
Other Information

The British Intelligence in New York failed to grasp the importance of immediate assistance to Greece in the form of materials and supplies to be purchased in the United States. It was officially reported to British G-2 that the Greek Consulate was blocking purchases for several suspicious reasons and that the newly-established Greek Purchasing Commission did not know how to act. The British Intelligence dismissed this matter as a "clash of personalities in all directions," and did not assist in clearing up the situation or in the shipping of materials to Greece.

On this point, it was the duty of the British Intelligence in Greece to gather information pertaining to the procurement of materials for the Greek Army in the advent Greece entered the war on the side of Great Britain. If the British Intelligence had collected and classified the needs of Greece before the war started, instead of the officials of the Passport Control Office quarreling on the questions of personal precedence, the British Purchasing Commission, in collaboration with the Greek Legation could have started purchases in November 1939, instead of waiting for Colonel Papavassiliou to arrive in New York by February of 1940.
Also, the British Intelligence failed to recognize the tactical disadvantages of terrain in Greece, had never carried out any surveys in Greece (for military purposes), and had contended with a shrugging of their shoulders and stating: "When the time comes, the British Navy and you (the Greeks) will turn the tide of the war in our favor."

Arrests of Passport Control Office officials were reported during October-November of 1939. It will be recalled that a Mr. Sigismund Payne and a Captain Best had been arrested on the Dutch border by Gestapo agents. The Germans had claimed that the British were prepared to contact German anti-Nazis and give instructions on future short wave transmissions from the Reich.

Both these gentlemen had served in the Passport Control Office in Vienna and had been listed by the Germans after the seizure of this office during the 1938 Anschluss.

Among the more amusing incidents of British Intelligence complacency in Greece is to be reported the following narrative:

The British Intelligence reported to London on the activities of the Italian Government in 1938. The Italians were offering Metaxas aircraft, equipment, tanks, rifles, and ordnance in exchange for "commercial air bases" in
various Greek Islands. London advised the British Minister, Sir Sidney Waterlow, to hand Metaxas a severe note. The Minister telephoned O'Gowan, advising him of his intentions and telling him that he (O'Gowan) was a "damned pest" for disturbing him.

Metaxas was notified through the Greek Police Telephone Monitoring System and promptly disappeared for a week "cruising" on a Greek destroyer which was on naval maneuvers. Meanwhile the British Minister "cooled" himself in the Hotel Grande Bretagne, eiring his views on the Greeks, his legation staff, and the British Intelligence Service.
INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Ulius L. Amoss
TO: Mr. Robert Creswell
SUBJECT: New Greek Vice Premier

DATE: May 19, 1942

The enclosed report from Miles is a description of the Greek Patriot Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who displaces Admiral Satella Sakellariou who was suspected of Nazi tendencies as Vice Premier of the Greek Government.

In view of Colonel Donovan's familiarity with this general subject and his special interest in it, I suggest forwarding the report to him.

Please note that this Kanellopoulos is not related to Nazi Agent Kanellopoulos who is now in Philadelphia.
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos
(The new Vice Premier in the Greek Government in exile)
Memo from L. C. Miles to Ulus L. Amoss.

Born in Patras, Greece in 1902.
Studied at the Athens University, Munich and Heidelberg.
Holds a Doctor's at Law degree of the latter University.
General Secretary of the Ministry of National Economy during
the "Coalition Government" (period 1924-26).
In 1929 he was given the newly created chair of Professor
of Sociology at the Athens University.
Has published several treatises on sociology, of which the
most important are listed below.

At the 1936 election he tried to form a new independent
political party, the "Unionist Party", appealing especially to
the younger generation. This was his first appearance in Greek
politics, and although public opinion was generally sympathetic,
his party did not meet with the electoral success which it
deserved, the main reason being the acute political division
of the Greek Nation, at the time, between Liberals (Venizelists)
and Populists (anti-Venizelists).

When Metaxas imposed his Dictatorship, Kanellopoulos
declared himself openly against it. He was arrested after an
article of his which appeared in the Presa, attacking the
Dictatorship and its policy. Late in 1936 he was exiled to one
of the Archipelago Islands and remained there until November 1940,
although overtures were repeatedly made to him by Metaxas who wished to "pardon him."

At the outbreak of the Italo-Greek War Kanellopoulos asked to fight as an ordinary private. This could not be refused, and he went through the whole Albanian campaign.

He returned to Athens on April 22, 1941, accompanying General Pitsikas (the latter was one of the Vice Chiefs of General Staff on the Albanian front). Being against the signature of the Armistice he was deposed by General Tsolakoglou and his followers. Kanellopoulos interviewed Tsouderos in Athens before the Government's departure for Crete. He remained behind however, working underground and escaped about three weeks ago. As reported he joined the Greek Cabinet in exile on May 5 of this year, as Vice Premier, taking the place of Admiral Sakellarion. It is understood that he will remain in Egypt representing the Government there, although this has not been officially confirmed.

Kanellopoulos has no relation whatever with the financial family of the same name. He is a nephew of the late Premier Dimitris Gounaris, shot by the Revolutionary Tribunal of 1922. Nevertheless, Kanellopoulos refused to join his late uncle's party (Popular) which is said to have offered him the leadership at one time.

Kanellopoulos is a progressive Democrat in ideas, full of energy and vitality. (Some older conservative accuse him of
being rather "pink" or even "red".

It is reported that his influence, especially among the younger men, has considerably augmented of late in Greece.

Books published by Kanellopoulos:

"The League of Nations" (1927)
"Sociology in Imperialistic Phenomenae" (1927)
"Sociological History and Critique of Social History" (1925)
"Carl Marx - Contribution to the History of Economic and Social Theories" (1930), and others.
July 16, 1942

Mr. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Donovan:

I received your cordial letter of May 15th, but upon learning that in the meantime you had departed, I waited until you return to write to you.

I welcome you and thank you from the bottom of my heart for your letter and its contents. You have obligated me very much, because I think I don't do very much for the U. S., to whom I am deeply indebted.

I am ready though to submit myself to any duty and to make every possible sacrifice for our beloved Country, which is fighting for Universal freedom and justice and for the New Day which is to come.

I was in Washington a few days ago, and would have come to see you if I hadn't been called back to N. Y. Rest assured though, that at my first opportunity I shall come to Washington to meet you personally, and express my sincere admiration toward you.

Sincerely yours,

Archbishop Athenagoras
May 14, 1942

His Grace, Athenagoras
Archbishop of North and South America
10 East 79th Street
New York, N. Y.

Your Grace:

The reports and descriptions of Greek-American youth of military age so kindly undertaken by you are coming in in splendid volume.

The care with which Your Grace has managed this important service is of great interest to our armed services and I wish to express my deep appreciation for your loyal and patriotic assistance.

Yours sincerely,

William J. Donovan

AMOSS: met.
May 14, 1942

His Grace, Athenagoras
Archbishop of North and South America
10 East 79th Street
New York, N. Y.

Your Grace:

Mr. Fragos has been sending us the voluminous census of Greek-American youth of military age and special ability. The care with which your Bishops and Priests have cooperated has impressed everyone and the report that, perhaps, as many as a hundred thousand names will be returned to us is astounding.

Your help is of signal value to the War effort and everyone is pleased and grateful. I hope I may have the pleasure of seeing you again soon.

With regard and affection,

Faithfully yours,

Ulius L. Amoss
MEMORANDUM

February 17, 1942

Notes from the Greek Press in the U.S.

From the Greek Daily National Herald of February 9, 1942

Statements attributed by the press to the Honorable George H. Earle, formerly United States Minister to Bulgaria, that the Bulgarians, from Boris down to the lowliest peasant, are grieved that Bulgaria is among the enemies of the United States, has aroused ire in the Greek-American press.

The Herald points out to Mr. Earle that Bulgaria voluntarily served as a springboard for the attacks on Yugoslavia and Greece, that in both countries the Bulgarians have been guilty of the most fearful outrages of plunder and slaughter, and that the Prime Minister has declared that Bulgaria will do everything to secure a victory for Hitler.

"That injustice, Mr. Earle, toward those of us who have stayed fast by America's side, in deed as well as in word -- how you wound the rights due to the people who today quiver beneath the Bulgarian sword!"

Indignation among Greeks in the U.S. over the question of food for Greece

The Detroit Athens of February 5, 1942, has a 6-column

Coordinator of Information: Foreign Nationalities Branch
editorial entitled "Whose fault is it?" in which it blames the Allied Governments and the Government of Greece in London for failure to send food into Greece to aid the starving people.

This represents a very general and widespread point of view among the Greeks in the United States. The Boston Athens is very outspoken, as is also the Greek Daily National Herald of New York.

Reference is constantly made to the appeasement of Vichy-France and Spain with food, "with boats that are loaded every day with thousands of tons of food from Africa, and from North and South America." The Detroit Athens accuses the allies of fearing France and Spain and hence relaxing the blockade, but of not fearing Greece and hence not relaxing the blockade.

The mounting indignation, it is the report, may crystallize into a strong political sentiment against the leaders of the present Greek Government in exile for not having more success in arranging for shipments of food.

Arab propaganda from Athens, Greece

Athena is reported by the London Times correspondent in Istanbul (now quoted in Greek-language papers in the United States) to be a center of Arab propaganda, with
many Syrian, Iraqi, and Egyptian paid agents of the Axis active there. An Arab newspaper will be edited in
Athens, according to the report, and the Athens radio broadcasts constantly in Arabic.

The former Prime Minister of Iraq, Gailani, and the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem have gone, or are going, to
Athens, the report adds.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

FROM:
David Bruce

TO:
Colonel Donovan

DATE
March 30, 1942

SUBJECT:

There is attached a copy of a memorandum dated March 26, 1942, from Mr. Amoss of this office, which may be of interest to you.

[Signature]
David Bruce

[Signature]
R.M.
FROM: U. L. Amos
TO: Mr. David Bruce
SUBJECT: Greek Archbishop

DATE March 26, 1942

The Archbishop was extremely pleased at having met and dined with you. He has told me that the entire facilities of his organization are at our disposal. He put it in these words:

"I have three Bishops, three hundred priests and a large and far flung organization. Everyone under my orders is under yours. You may command them for any service you require. There will be no questions asked and your directions will be executed faithfully. Please tell Mr. Bruce for me that this is so."

U. L. A.
MID 201 Papavasillon, George

JAN 10 1942

Lieut. Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of January 7 has been received and I note therein the reference made to Lieut. Colonel George Papavasillon, who presently is Chief of the Greek Military Purchasing Commission in New York. Information contained as to his pro-German beliefs and to his recent remarks sent to the Greek Minister in Washington, D. C. has been carefully noted. I am bringing the subject matter to the attention of the interested parties in this Division.

Your interest in forwarding these data is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND E. LEE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
CONFIDENTIAL

MID 201 Papavasillon, George

JAN 1 1942

Lieut. Colonel William J. Donovan,
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Sincerely yours,

RAYMOND E. LEE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL
January 7, 1942

General Raymond E. Lee
Acting Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Lee:

It has been reported to us that Lt. Colonel George Papavasillon is Chief of the Greek Military Purchasing Commission in New York, established in quarters furnished by the British Purchasing Commission. The Colonel is from the Greek General Staff. He is pro-German and has been noted for spreading defeatism whenever possible. He draws a salary while on duty here of $600 per month which, for a Greek officer of his rank, is a small fortune. His mission is ended and his government has suggested his return to Cairo, but up until the last few days he has managed to evade the issue, when the Minister of War in London cabled instructions to report immediately to London.

The Colonel addressed a very long and unbelievably insulting letter to the Greek Minister in Washington, saying, among other things, that he recognized no Greek government outside of Greece and commenting caustically to the effect that he was being ordered to return to military service when Greece had no army and no commanders except "a pitifully small number of mercenaries in the pay of the British."

The Greek Minister yesterday cabled excerpts of his letter to London, a reply coming during the same day ordering the Minister to hold a hearing in Washington with the cashiering of the Colonel indicated.

I am obtaining further information concerning his activities in the United States and will keep you advised.

Sincerely,

Murphy: Foy

William J. Donovan
M O S T  S E C R E T

January 7, 1942.

Mr. Poole:

//LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE PAPAVASILLON is Chief of the Greek Military Purchasing Commission in New York, established in quarters furnished by the British Purchasing Commission. The Colonel is from the Greek General Staff. He is pro-German and has been noted for spreading defeatism whenever possible. He draws a salary while on duty here of $600 per month which, for a Greek officer of his rank, is a small fortune. His mission is ended and his government has suggested his return to Cairo, but up until the last few days he has managed to evade the issue, when the Minister of War in London cabled instructions to report immediately to London.

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A further report on the Colonel will be submitted, offering facts concerning his activities in the United States and involving financial dishonesty and treasonable activity.
SECRET

January 7, 1942.

Mr. Pool:

Lieutenant Colonel George Papavassilicon is Chief of the Greek Military Purchasing Commission in New York, established in quarters furnished by the British Purchasing Commission. The Colonel is from the Greek General Staff. He is pro-German and has been noted for spreading defeatism whenever possible. He draws a salary while on duty here of $600 per month which, for a Greek officer of his rank, is a small fortune. His mission is ended and his Government has suggested his return to Cairo, but up until the last few days he has managed to evade the issue, when the Minister of War in London cabled instructions to report immediately to London.

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The Greek Minister yesterday cabled excerpts of his letter to London, a reply coming during the same day ordering the Minister to hold a hearing in Washington before the cashiering of the Colonel indicated.

A further report on the Colonel will be submitted, offering facts concerning his activities in the United States and involving financial dishonesty and reasonable activity.
June 13, 1942

Excellency:

I want to express to Your Excellency, and ask you to be good enough to bring to the attention of His Majesty, the high appreciation of myself and the rest of Colonel Donovan's collaborators, of the graciousness of His Majesty in being host to us at luncheon on Friday.

This function is one which will remain in our memory. We all considered it a privilege and an honor to be able thus informally to meet and converse with the King of Greece.

I am, Excellency, your obedient servant,

His Excellency

Simon P. Diamantopoulos,
Minister of Greece
June 13, 1942

Excellency:

I want to express to Your Excellency, and ask you to be good enough to bring to the attention of His Majesty, the high appreciation of myself and the rest of Colonel Donovan's collaborators, of the graciousness of His Majesty in being host to us at luncheon on Friday.

This function is one which will remain in our memory. We all considered it a privilege and an honor to be able thus informally to meet and converse with the King of Greece.

I am, Excellency, your obedient servant,

[Signature]

His Excellency

Cimon P. Diamantopoulos,

Minister of Greece.

HRWilson:clh
MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN:

The attached report on "The Visit of King George II of Greece" is being multilithed for distribution early next week. These two copies are being sent to you in advance of the regular distribution.

Attachments

JOHN C. WILEY
The visit of King George II of Greece to the Greek army stationed in Palestine and Egypt has, according to a variety of reports, been successful in allaying the anti-royalist disaffection of these troops and has restored their confidence in the King. This success was no doubt as much the result of British aid to the Greek army and navy, on which the King was able to report, as it was of the King's personal efforts. Whatever the reasons for its success, his visit has contributed substantially to the unity and determination of the Greek war effort.

A somewhat similar result may be expected from the King's visit to the United States. Here too he will face many types of disaffection, but with suitable backing of the needs of his people (if not for himself), it is likely that he will be able to stand as the symbol of a war with a common cause.

The Greek Bureau of Reseae City has recently distributed a emphasis the liberalization of th
Government in Exile. The Greek Government which went into exile as a result of the German invasion was the partial heir of the regime established on August 4, 1936, when royal decrees dissolved Parliament and General John Metaxas instituted a personal dictatorship during which laws were enacted by royal decree. Metaxas died in late January of 1941, during the war against the Italians, and was succeeded by N. Koryzis, who rejected the German ultimatum which preceded the German attack. On April 1, 1941, when it became clear that Athens would fall to the Germans, Koryzis committed suicide. In the great peril of that moment, the King experienced difficulty in appointing a new cabinet, but on April 21, Emmanuel Tsouderos, known as a liberal with London banking connections, became Prime Minister of a Government which included some ministers who had been in the Metaxas Government. It was with this Government that the King escaped first to Crete, from there to Egypt and finally to London, where the cabinet was formally constituted on September 24, 1941. So long as members of the Metaxas regime were included in the Government, there was great opposition to it among Greeks in all parts of the world, and particularly among those in the United States. The Bureau of Research stresses the fact that the appointment of Mr. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos as Vice-Premier has done much to eliminate the criticism of the Tsouderos Government. The new Vice-Premier, spoken of as one of the most eminent of the younger statesmen.
of Greece by the left-wing Boston *Ethnos* (April 17), was exiled by Metaxas in the early days of the dictatorship. He returned to serve at the front at the outbreak of the Greek-Italian war. Because he stayed on after the German occupation to lead the guerilla warfare until his recent escape, it is felt that he is in the closest contact with the Greeks still within the occupied country. Kanellopoulos replaces Admiral Sakellariou, who had been retained from the Metaxas regime.

Other changes in the cabinet of the Greek Government in Exile include the resignation of Mr. Nikoloudis who was Minister of Propaganda and Tourism and who was responsible for the Greek "Youth Movement," and the recent dismissal of Mr. Dimitratos, who was Minister of Labor. Mr. Dimitratos was originally sent to the United States as a special emissary of the Tsouderos Government, which had decorated him. All but a very few of the extreme right-wing papers greeted his dismissal with joy, but the ex-Minister himself vigorously protested against being charged with pro-Fascist sympathies and insisted that in Greece he was still regarded as the rightful leader of the laboring classes. The retirement of Admiral Sakellariou is the most significant cabinet change inasmuch as it removes the last member who belonged to the dictatorship of August 4, 1936.

It is reported that the King of Greece will be accompanied by his Prime Minister, Mr. Tsouderos, on his trip to the United States. The schedule calls for his arrival in Washington on
June 10, where it is expected that during his stay of approximately six days he will address the Congress. From here he will go to New York, where he will remain for approximately six days more. It is understood that the King and his party will then leave the United States.

This visit is anticipated with mixed feelings by the Americans of Greek descent in the United States and by Greek citizens who are residents of the United States. In the case of some, the King is contaminated by his association with the former dictatorial regime of Metaxas. Some of the liberal Greek newspapers in the United States find it difficult to overlook this connection; and there is a danger that the arrival of the King in this country will serve to arouse the political controversy which has more or less died down in recent months. On the other hand, the King and his Government have been making gestures obviously designed to placate the liberal democratic element. In addition, the fact that the King will be received by the American Government as the Chief of State of a country taking part in the war as one of the United Nations may serve to make criticism of him appear untimely even in the eyes of the most untractable Greeks.

The news reports from Palestine, Egypt, and London continue to emphasize the renewed leadership of the King as titular head of the Government which waged a heroic fight against both the Italians and the Germans and which has
reconditioned its army and navy to resume an active part in the fight of the United Nations. There is the ultimate hope that the King by his visit to the United States may serve to unify the various divergent political factions, that he may in his person be a symbol of unity, and that the Greeks, inspired by his presence, may remember vividly the glorious days of their fight in Albania. In this way they may be impressed by the gravity of the present situation in Greece itself, and may take a new resolve to carry on without internal dissension.

Some preliminary reaction to the visit of the King can be noted in the Greek press. The powerful Atlantis of New York, which has always been a supporter of the Monarchist party, comments editorially (May 19) that "The visit will have a symbolic character and will serve purely national purposes. However short it may be, it will certainly strengthen the bonds between the land of our birth and the land of our adoption and will remind the American public of the tremendous sacrifice of the Greek nation on the altar of the common struggle against Hitlerism and Fascism. In addition, it will give the Greek Premier an opportunity to bring the American Government up to date on the Greek share in the common war effort and on the plans for future action of the Greek forces fighting in the Middle East. Greeks and Americans of Greek extraction will feel patriotic emotion and justifiable pride because in a little while the leaders of the Greek
struggle will be among them and, we are sure, will demonstrate the feelings of love, devotion and reverence which they cherish toward those who in the face of great obstacles and in trying days directed the fight for the liberation of Greek lands from the abominable invaders."

The other powerful Greek daily, the National Herald, will apparently do what it can to preserve unity during the visit of the King. This will be an important contribution, for the Herald has consistently been outspoken in its rejection of everything connected with the dictatorship of Metaxas. Most of the other Greek papers, though their attitude is of less importance, will probably look with favor upon the royal visit. The Fryx and the Star of Chicago and the Canton, Ohio, Farthono are among this number.

The position which will be taken by the Communist Greek-American Tribune of New York is problematic. In the past it has taken the position that partisan politics outside Greece make very little difference; when the war is over the Greek people inside Greece, who have borne the brunt of suffering and privation, will decide for themselves what kind of Government they want. The visit of the King and his Minister may therefore seem to the editors of the Tribune to have relatively little significance. The Boston Ethnos may be critical, and there is apt to be a flare-up of indignation in the sometimes irresponsible Volks of Chicago. News of the King's visit.
came too late for any but perfunctory comment in the last number of Hellen. Since it is a monthly publication, its sentiments, whatever they may be, will play no direct part in conditioning the reception given the King by Greeks in the United States.

Organizations other than those predominantly Greek are also preparing to welcome the King and his Minister. The Near East organizations which have done educational and philanthropic work in Greece, together with the American Friends of Greece, will give a dinner in honor of King George on June 22. It is safe to say that all these are anxious to make the King's visit successful.

Regardless of the procedure of restoration in Greece when the war is ended, and regardless of the Greek people's decision for a continuation or a discontinuation of the Monarchy -- there is evidence from outside Greece that the King is not held in favor by the great masses of the people at the present time -- there is a general belief that the successful prosecution of the war will be best served if all Greeks and all friends of Greece can remain united now around the King and the Tsouderos Government. It is possible that the visit may open up old wounds and aggravate political differences among the Greeks in this country; but it is more probable that the visit may achieve a sufficient unity of emotion and purpose to permit the Greeks to concentrate their energies on pressing problems.
of relief and on the conduct of the war with a minimum of disagreement among themselves. If it is a success, it will be heartening encouragement to the Greek forces in the Near East and even (in spite of opposition to the King personally) to the people within Greece.
THE VISIT OF KING GEORGE II OF GREECE

The visit of King George II of Greece to the Greek troops stationed in Palestine and Egypt has, according to a variety of reports, been successful in allaying the anti-royalist disaffection of these troops and has restored their confidence in the King. This success was no doubt as much the result of British aid to the Greek army and navy, on which the King was able to report, as it was of the King's personal efforts. Whatever the reasons for its success, his visit has contributed substantially to the unity and determination of the Greek war effort.

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Other changes in the cabinet of the Greek Government in Exile include the resignation of Mr. Nikoloudis who was Minister of Propaganda and Tourism and who was responsible for the Greek "Youth Movement," and the recent dismissal of Mr. Dimitratos, who was Minister of Labor. Mr. Dimitratos was originally sent to the United States as a special emissary of the Tsouderos Government, which had decorated him. All but a very few of the extreme right-wing papers greeted his dismissal with joy, but the ex-Minister himself vigorously protested against being charged with pro-Fascist sympathies and insisted that in Greece he was still regarded as the rightful leader of the laboring classes. The retirement of Admiral Sakellariou is the most significant cabinet change inasmuch as it removes the last member who belonged to the dictatorship of August 4, 1936.

It is reported that the King of Greece will be accompanied by his Prime Minister, Mr. Tsouderos, on his trip to the United States. The schedule calls for his arrival in Washington on...
June 10, where it is expected that during his stay of approximately six days he will address the Congress. From here he will go to New York, where he will remain for approximately six days more. It is understood that the King and his party will then leave the United States.

This visit is anticipated with mixed feelings by the Americans of Greek descent in the United States and by Greek citizens who are residents of the United States. In the eyes of some, the King is contaminated by his association with the former dictatorial regime of Metaxas. Some of the liberal Greek newspapers in the United States find it difficult to overlook this connection and there is a danger that the arrival of the King in this country will serve to arouse the political controversy which has more or less died down in recent months. On the other hand, the King and his Government have been making gestures obviously designed to placate the liberal democratic element. In addition, the fact that the King will be received by the American Government as the Chief of State of a country taking part in the war as one of the United Nations may serve to make criticism of him appear untimely even in the eyes of the most untractable Greeks.

The news reports from Palestine, Egypt, and London continue to emphasize the renewed leadership of the King as titular head of the Government which waged a heroic fight against both the Italians and the Germans and which has
reconditioned its army and navy to resume an active part in the
fight of the United Nations. There is the ultimate hope that
the King by his visit to the United States may serve to unify
the various divergent political factions, that he may in his
person be a symbol of unity, and that the Greeks, inspired by
his presence, may remember vividly the glorious days of their
fight in Albania. In this way they may be impressed by the
gravity of the present situation in Greece itself, and may
take a new resolve to carry on without internal dissension.

Some preliminary reaction to the visit of the King can
be noted in the Greek press. The powerful Atlantis of New
York, which has always been a supporter of the Monarchist
party, comments editorially (May 19) that "The visit will
have a symbolic character and will serve purely national
purposes. However short it may be, it will certainly
strengthen the bonds between the land of our birth and the
land of our adoption and will remind the American public of
the tremendous sacrifice of the Greek nation on the altar of
the common struggle against Hitlerism and Fascism. In addition,
it will give the Greek Premier an opportunity to bring the
American Government up to date on the Greek share in the common
war effort and on the plans for future action of the Greek
forces fighting in the Middle East. Greeks and Americans of
Greek extraction will feel patriotic emotion and justifiable
pride because in a little while the leaders of the Greek
struggle will be among them and, we are sure, will demonstrate the feelings of love, devotion and reverence which they cherish toward those who in the face of great obstacles and in trying days direct the fight for the liberation of Greek lands from the abominable invaders."

The other powerful Greek daily, the National Herald, will apparently do what it can to preserve unity during the visit of the King. This will be an important contribution, for the Herald has consistently been outspoken in its rejection of everything connected with the dictatorship of Metaxas. Most of the other Greek papers, though their attitude is of less importance, will probably look with favor upon the royal visit. The Pnyx and the Star of Chicago and the Canton, Ohio, Parthenon are among this number.

The position which will be taken by the Communist Greek-American Tribune of New York is problematic. In the past it has taken the position that partisan politics outside Greece make very little difference: when the war is over the Greek people inside Greece, who have borne the brunt of suffering and privation, will decide for themselves what kind of Government they want. The visit of the King and his Minister may therefore seem to the editors of the Tribune to have relatively little significance. The Boston Athenæum may be critical, and there is apt to be a flare-up of indignation in the sometimes irresponsible Hellen of Chicago. News of the King's visit
came too late for any but perfunctory comment in the last number of *Hellas*. Since it is a monthly publication, its sentiments, whatever they may be, will play no direct part in conditioning the reception given the King by Greeks in the United States.

Organizations other than those predominantly Greek are also preparing to welcome the King and his Minister. The Near East organizations which have done educational and philanthropic work in Greece, together with the American Friends of Greece, will give a dinner in honor of King George on June 22. It is safe to say that all these are anxious to make the King's visit successful.

Regardless of the procedure of restoration in Greece when the war is ended, and regardless of the Greek people's decision for a continuation or a discontinuation of the Monarchy -- there is evidence from outside Greece that the King is not held in favor by the great masses of the people at the present time -- there is a general belief that the successful prosecution of the war will be best served if all Greeks and all friends of Greece can remain united now around the King and the Tsolakos Government. It is possible that the visit may open up old wounds and aggravate political differences among the Greeks in this country; but it is more probable that the visit may achieve a sufficient unity of emotion and purpose to permit the Greeks to concentrate their energies on pressing problems.
of relief and on the conduct of the war with a minimum of disagreement among themselves. If it is a success, it will be heartening encouragement to the Greek forces in the Near East and even (in spite of opposition to the King personally) to the people within Greece.
June 6, 1942

FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

I am handing you this in two copies in case you should care to pass on one copy to Joe Sherwood, for background guidance.

JOHN C. WILEY
June 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

In view of the approaching visit of King George II of Greece and his Prime Minister, Mr. Tsouderos, it occurs to me that a memorandum on the King and on the possible reaction to his visit among Greeks in the United States may be of interest to you.

King George II, the eldest son of King Constantine, succeeded to the throne of Greece in 1922, but after a revolt in December of 1923 was forced to abdicate and to leave Greece. He spent most of his exile in residence in England, and was recalled to the throne in 1935 after a coup d’etat and a referendum which showed a huge majority in favor of restoring the monarchy. It has been claimed that the referendum was "fixed" but there is no doubt that the political turmoil in Greece in the early 30’s led many to favor the restoration of a royalist government.

King George has never been a powerful monarch. On August 4, 1936, he allowed the dictator, John Metaxas, to assume control of the government and he issued decrees dissolving Parliament and suspending constitutional guarantees. There is evidence that his tolerance of the dictatorship and his flight from Greece at the time of the German occupation have caused him to lose
whatever popularity and affection he may have had among the people in Greece. Reports which have been brought out of Greece since the occupation show that the people believe their King to have deserted them in the hour of their supreme trial.

After final flight from Crete in the spring of 1941, the King and his Cabinet went first to Egypt, then to South Africa, and finally established headquarters in London. The British supported him and his Government-in-Exile in spite of the fact that the Cabinet contained members who had also participated in the dictatorship of Metaxas, and in spite of the fact that they were aware of the continuing resentment in Greece against everything connected with that regime. Apparently both the British and the Government-in-Exile have now come to realize that they must purge the Greek Cabinet of members who were associated with Metaxas. The last of these councilors, Admiral Sakellariou, was dropped from the Cabinet last month and in his place Professor Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, a hero of the Italian and German wars who had just escaped from Greece, was appointed as Vice Premier. This appointment is of particular significance, since Kanellopoulos, known as a rising liberal leader before the war, had been exiled by Metaxas on account of his views and possible influence.

While the Government was in London there was also disaffection among the Greek armed forces being reconstituted in Egypt and Palestine. The King and his Prime Minister were com-
pelled to visit Cairo and Jerusalem in order to win back the loyalty of these troops. Apparently they have been successful. Press reports from Egypt and also reports from London indicate that the liberalizing of the Greek Cabinet and the personal appearance of the King with his forces in the field have done much to win again a considerable popularity among his people, at least outside Greece. In the United States political opposition to the King among Greek-Americans has also died down in recent weeks, partly for the same reasons.

When the King and his party arrive in Washington on June 10, there is every indication that they will have a warm and enthusiastic welcome from the American press. In the opinion of Americans who know very little of the internal troubles of recent years in Greece, the King stands as the symbol of the tremendous sacrifices which the Greek nation has made in combatting first the Italians and then the Germans who invaded their country. It may well be that the visit of the King will serve also to unify various divergent political factions among the Greeks. So far as can be gathered now by following the preliminary accounts in the American newspapers, differences between liberal and right-wing in Greek politics will be largely placed on loyalty to the heroic Greek people.
In spite of differences among themselves, and constant arguments on Greek political questions which have appeared in the past months in the press, the Greeks of the United States and the Americans of Greek origin have already demonstrated a remarkable vigor in their participation in the war effort, as well as in their efforts to do whatever can be done for the relief of suffering in Greece. The presence of the King may well inspire them to carry on with a new unity their part in the common effort of the United Nations.

There may also be a favorable reaction that will make itself felt in the homeland of Greece. If word can be brought to the Greek people in the midst of their present suffering that their government and their King have won the hearty acclaim of the American people and have been well received in the United States, then they will feel a new hope in the knowledge that their servitude can not last forever if the resources of this country are once more pledged to their liberation.

Prime Minister Tsouderos broadcast from Egypt some weeks ago the promise that at the end of the war the Greek people should have the privilege of deciding upon their own form of government, that he and the King and the Government-in-Exile were merely holding their power in trust until the sovereign will of the people might be consulted. If the King
and his Minister should see fit to renew this pledge and to signify their adherence to the terms of the Atlantic Charter, political opposition to their government might be very much reduced both here and at home.

John C. Wiley
June 5, 1942

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In spite of differences among themselves, and constant arguments on Greek political questions which have appeared in the past months in the press, the Greeks of the United States and the Americans of Greek origin have already demonstrated a remarkable vigor in their participation in the war effort, as well as in their efforts to do whatever can be done for the relief of suffering in Greece. The presence of the King may well inspire them to carry on with a new unity their part in the common effort of the United Nations.

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and his Minister should see fit to renew this pledge and to signify their adherence to the terms of the Atlantic Charter, political opposition to their government might be very much reduced both here and at home.

\[ (\text{R.J.C.}) \, J. \, C. \, W. \]

John C. Wiley
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Official Dispatch

Date: June 2, 1961

FROM
JULIUS G. COLEMAN, JR.

To
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

Acknowledge
Priority
Routine
Deferred

Incoming Heading

RECEIVED

[REDACTED]

To:
A. E. DULLES

(U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

FROM:
[REDACTED]

(U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

SUBJECT: ALL AMBASSADORS ARE TO IMMEDIATELY ADVISE
HQ OF ANY DEVELOPMENT OF S. S. GOMES, AMBASADOR TO HON.
GUATEMALA, AT THE MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF STATE ON THE
MORNING OF JUNE 13TH, SUNDAY, JUNE 13TH.

EMBASSY WANTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE OFFICIAL REACTIONS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA ON THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE DEATH OF ONE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
2. THE CAPTURE OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
3. THE CAPTURE OF A NUMBER OF GOMES' ASSOCIATES.
4. THE CAPTURE OF A NUMBER OF GOMES' ASSOCIATES.

Please, advise the Department of the action taken and let
us have an early copy of the list for THIOFANIDIS.

A. E. DULLES

[Signature]

Operator's Record 5:35 PM
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Each comment should be numbered to correspond with comment line. A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment. Officer Designations should be used in To column. An Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) on the red or action taken should be indicated. Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry. For Officer Designations see separate sheet.
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUGH R. WILSON

FROM: MR. ALLEN DULLES

I had a long talk with Mr. Theofanidis, Greek Minister of Marine who, I understand, is in charge of the arrangements for the visit here of the Greek King. Amoss, of course, knows him well.

Mr. Theofanidis left with me the attached schedule with regard to the King’s visit to Washington. In this connection he said that he was anxious to arrange a luncheon at the Legation where the King could meet Colonel Donovan and such members of the staff as Colonel Donovan wished to include, up to a dozen or more. He wanted this to be, in effect, a "working" luncheon where our mutual problems would be discussed.

Mr. Theofanidis suggested that prior to the luncheon, possibly the King could call on Colonel Donovan at his offices, when these members of the staff who were to attend the luncheon could be present and when the work of the C01 could be discussed with the King.

I discussed this program last night with WJD and as a result I have written the attached letter which, I believe, conforms to the Colonel’s desires.

If, however, there are any changes or additions to suggest, please let me know immediately. I think it also would be a good thing if the Colonel would write a letter to Mr. Theofanidis, unless the latter is to be in Washington within the next few days, confirming the general understanding and also recognizing in an appropriate way Mr. Theofanidis’ interest in bringing the King into close touch with our work.

A.W.D. (signature)
630 Fifth Ave., R. 3803,

May 23, 1941

His Excellency
St. Theofonidis,
Minister of Mercantile Marine
of the Kingdom of Greece,
30 Rockefeller Plaza, R. 1519,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I caught Colonel Donovan last night just before he left for Washington and talked over with him the program for the King's visit which you kindly left with me. He wanted me to express to you his appreciation of your suggestion that a luncheon meeting be arranged between His Majesty and the Colonel and some members of his staff, possibly in connection with or after a brief "business" meeting at the offices of the C.I.

The Colonel suggested that luncheon on Thursday, June 11th, might be a very appropriate time for this meeting, this being one of the free dates which you mentioned to me.

The Colonel also wanted me to express to you his desire to entertain His Majesty while he was in Washington and will be in touch with you shortly with regard to the possibility of his giving a dinner on Friday, June 12th, this one of the free dates indicated on your schedule.

The Colonel asked me to inquire from you when you will be in Washington so that he could personally arrange with you.

Incidentally, if you have further ideas about His Majesty's visit to New York, I hope you will let me know, it would be a great honor if I could get together a distinguished citizens to meet with him here.

Faithfully yours,

A.W. Dallas
WEIDNESDAY JUNE 10
Arrive at Washington
Dinner at White House

THURSDAY JUNE 11
10:00 a.m. Leave White House for Arlington and Washington's Tomb.
1:00 p.m. Luncheon at Legation - free.
5:00 p.m. Reception to Chiefs of Missions and Military Attachés.
          Blair House
8:00 p.m. Dinner (by Secretary of State or Under Secretary of State)

FRIDAY JUNE 12
10:00 a.m. Call of Prime Minister on Secretary of State and
          Mr. Sumner Wells.
          Royal audiences at Legation.
1:00 p.m. Luncheon at Legation.
3:00 p.m. Visit to Red Cross Headquarters.
5:00 p.m. Women's Press Club.
8:00 p.m. Dinner - free

SATURDAY JUNE 13
11:00 a.m. Visit to Annapolis or Press Conference
          Dinner Asst. Secretary of State Berlin.

SUNDAY JUNE 14
Annapolis ?
Dinner at British Embassy.

MONDAY JUNE 15
12:30 p.m. Visit to Capitol
          Private lunch at Legation.
7:30 p.m. Dinner and reception at Greek Legation.

TUESDAY JUNE 16
        Leave for New York.
To: Col. Donovan

In view of the possibility that King George of Greece may descend on us, you may be interested in the attached memo's.

FROM: John C. Wiley
FROM: Ulius L. Amoss
TO: Mr. DeWitt C. Poole
SUBJECT: Prospective Visit to the United States of King George II of Greece.

The feelings of the Greek element in the United States regarding the person and the prospective visit of King George II to this country are rather mixed.

Violent political discords and disagreements have divided Greeks for many years, either in their own native country or abroad. This rift dates back to 1915, when the first disagreement arose, between King Constantine and Premier Venizelos, mainly on the subject of the entry of Greece into the World War. Greece was divided in two camps, the Royalists and the Liberals or Venizelists, the latter wishing for the establishment of a republic in Greece.

One cannot say that any immediate danger might threaten the person of the King, during his visit in this country, more than any other person of his rank or position. Account must be taken, however, of the Greek Communist organization, "Spartacus Club of New York," which might have to be watched, but it is understood that the F.B.I. is closely following and investigating this organization.
The more conservative Greek element fear that unpleasant attacks and comments may occur in the Greek, or even the American press, and for this reason consider the King's visit as ill-advised or ill-timed. Such incidents will do nothing to further the Greek cause in the United States and will render even more acute the dissatisfaction which exists in many Greeks as regards the King.

This fear, however, is not shared by the official Greek circles here who believe that the real dissidents are very few, and that under present conditions they will not dare take any action.
THE FIGHT AGAINST KING GEORGE II

Note: Separate reports on each of the following (except K. Venizelos) have been filed:

Persons covered in this report are:

1. K. KOTZIAS: Former mayor and later Minister-Governor of Athens under the Metaxas and Corizis Governments.
2. APOSTOLIDES: Minister of Finance under Metaxas.
3. DIACOS: Director of the Political Bureau of the Prime Minister (Metaxas).
5. K. VENIZELOS: Clever brother of the not-so-clever Col. S. Venizelos. Formerly in the Greek Diplomatic Service. Of some transitory but bitterly criticized importance behind the scenes during his great father's various tenures of office. His present major personal interest is merchant-ship operation. He is criticized for his deep prejudices which almost approach fanaticism. He is never openly in politics and is content to remain anonymous. He exerts great influence on his brother.
6. STELEOS PISTOLAKIS: Nephew of Eleutherius Venizelos. Came to the United States as a voluntary exile in 1936. He is very active in politics and, despite present reticence, should be observed as a possible coming man.
7. Theodore, the Greek daily publisher and politician. Let's talk, like. I remember you as a surfer. Under the surface, we had some problems alike. I hold you responsible.

I am not happy with your present policy. Theodore, I believe you should reconsider your stance. It is not in the interests of the country. Your actions are harming the country's security. Your loose coalition is not a stable one. Your determination is not strong enough.

Your actions are not to be taken lightly. They can lead to severe consequences. Your followers are alarmist, and their influence must be countered. We must work together to ensure stability and security.

I urge you to take my advice seriously. It is in the best interest of our country.
their agitation will burst the present straining ties between the members of the Government and that from the wreckage their own careers or ideologies will benefit.

Apostolides and Diacos, fully aware of the suspicions caused by their association with the Metaxas dictatorship are covering their tracks. They probably hope to disarm their critics, though they must realize they cannot hope to win the confidence of many of their enemies. Diacos, the sinister "brains" of Metaxas and Apostolides, the executor of Diacos' plans unquestionably expects again to win control of Greek affairs. In considering these men it should be remembered always that their flight was not caused by fear of the Germans, to whose service they have been faithful. They inspired the German appeasement policy of the Metaxas cabinet before and during the war with Italy.

Their fears are caused by the numerous bitter enemies they acquired during the four years of dictatorship. They were afraid of consequences to their persons during the chaotic days following the German occupation, especially since they no longer had the protection of Maniadakis' Greek Gestapo.

The above applies to the sinister Greek Himmler, Maniadakis, now in Buenos Aires, though, in addition, his role with and for the Germans is unknown but suspected on good grounds. This also applies to Kotzias who, however,
is built to play a different game. Kotzias is motivated mostly by personal interests and is likely to embrace the cause that appears to him to be the most apt to further his ambitions with the greatest degree of personal safety. His campaign includes Greek-American press interviews and articles and Greek-American public appearances. He also proposes to write a book or two. He hopes by stirring up Greek-American public opinion to exert pressure on the Government-in-Exile, and even imagines he may gain some support through American official channels. The first step he expects to achieve is appointment to a cabinet post. Until now his campaign has been a series of backfires, and he has stirred up very considerable antagonism among the Greek-Americans who like to talk about Greek politics but, for the most part, do not wish to be criticized by American friends for un-American dabbling in the politics of a foreign country. He has gained a minor moral support and a little financial aid due to his attractive personality and because of respect for his family. Despite his weaknesses, Kotzias should not be discounted entirely for he is thoroughly disarming on personal contact. He sways crowds, and under circumstances favorable to him can sweep his public off its feet. Under enemy tutelage he could be a dangerous figure.
Colonel Venizelos is the opposite of Kotzias. He is not greatly concerned with personal or prestige motives. His indolence and extra-curricular feminine attachments disqualify him from activities that would promote him politically, although his illustrious name and the indulgence he enjoys the Greek public would otherwise offer him a splendid chance at the premiership. He detests King George II and hates some of the ministers in the present cabinet. In a sense he is a spiritual leader of those Liberals who share his prejudices. He is thus prevented from active collaboration with the Government he serves and criticizes, though Premier Tsouderos greatly desires his help. He shows no enthusiasm for his duties as Military Attache.

Colonel Venizelos permits a strangely divergent crowd of dissidents to gather about him, united only in their opposition to the King. Certain of them are as much his enemies as they are enemies of the King. Many of them would never enjoy Venizelos' collaboration except on such occasions when he can use their opposition to the person he opposes. It may be that he neither appreciates nor cares for the duties imposed upon him by the weight of the name he bears or the position he holds as the King's military representative. But it is certain that many of the dissatisfied persons who
crowd about him are attempting, with various degrees of success, to use the magic power of the name of Venizelos.

The two principals who are exploiting the Venizelos auspices are Canellopoulos, the industrialist, and Vlavianos, the publisher. The first is gravely suspected of being a German agent, and at all events has been a vicious enemy of the elder Venizelos and of all who were in the Liberal camp. He has been a confirmed Royalist all his life. But now he is joined by Vlavianos, a Liberal under the banner of Venizelos, in bitter attacks on the King; while Vlavianos, who might be expected to attack the King, is also attempting to undermine Tsouderos, his own political leader. Both of these gentlemen unite in private and in semi-private conversations in anti-Government propaganda; while on the other hand, they try to establish friendly relations with Government members presently in the United States.

Both Canellopoulos and Vlavianos, and also Colonel Venizelos, have said that the Government-in-Exile should resign in protest unless the British Government repairs what they call the ungrateful omission of food shipments to Greece. In their criticisms of the British Government they ignore facts known to them and have been guilty of misleading
statements on this subject. However, they try to pin the blame on Tsouderos and the King and have been joined by Colonel Venizelos in these criticisms.

Vlavianos, as reported separately, has great personal political ambitions, which lead him to purchase the Greek-American Liberal daily, National Herald. Added to his private criticisms on the Government are his rather indiscriminate attacks on the Greek Minister in Washington, the Greek War Relief Society, and the Consul-General in New York. He proposes, as yet still in private, the re-establishment of a republic in Greece.

Pistolakis is successful in remaining obscured from the public, but he directs some sharp moves against the Government.

It is an unholy alliance of bitter enemies we have described. For this and other reasons it is a dangerous allegiance. If it continues, it may succeed in the actual overthrow of Tsouderos, but it contains so many explosive elements that it may blow apart. If it does, it will set off a train of feuds that will be a real detriment to the unified war effort; and it does affect the morale of American citizens of Greek origin.
Col. Dourman

The references to Manchades are particularly interesting.

FROM: JOHN C. WILEY
FROM: John C. Wiley
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Present Political Situation in Greece.

Date December 29, 1941

The following has been supplied to us from an excellent source:

Nearly all of the important political personalities in Greece have died during the last six or seven years (Venizelos, Papanastasiou, Michalacopoulos -- all Liberal Party Prime Ministers; Tsaldaris, Condilis and Vozikis). The few remaining leaders, such as Cefandaris and Sofulis, are too old and feeble to exert any real leadership today.

During the past years of dictatorship in Greece, no leadership has been developed among younger men and it is certain that the problems of leadership will be very difficult during the years following the war. The members of the Metaxas cabinet are not and never have been popular enough to have a chance of election to any important post in any free elections. The present cabinet in exile under Premier Tsouderos is composed of persons enjoying the universal respect for integrity and patriotism, but not one of them is a professional politician, all having attained
their reputation in other walks of life. In Greece, at least until now, the political system has been such that in order to succeed, a man had to have a large amount of political experience besides the ordinary requirements for a good statesman. In Greece this has meant that the successful politician had also to be an accomplished demagogue.

Regarding the sympathies of all present and potential political leaders, both inside and out of Greece, the great majority are anti-German, with a few notable exceptions. According to latest confidential and accurate information, even members of the Tsolakoglou government in Athens regret the collaboration with the occupation authorities and would resign but are prohibited from doing so.

There is, however, a certain doubt in Greece regarding the desirability of the return of the King after the war. In spite of his completely approved foreign policy, many persons of both major parties still hold him responsible for the long dictatorship and believe that his return would be dangerous to his personal safety and extremely bothersome to an orderly reconstitution of the post-war state. As a matter of fact, we know that trusted elder statesmen still residing in Greece have sent urgent messages to the Premier
in London advising the King to remain aloof from all contact with so-called leaders in England and in the western hemisphere and not to return to Greece until he receives a signal that it is safe to do so. The proposal is that after the war, free elections would take place and after the new government had taken charge the King would be officially invited to return. There is some belief here that the British Government will insist on his immediate return and the message was sent back to Greece to that effect; whereupon it was said that non-Greek military forces would then have to accompany the King. In all events, the government in exile has been advised to purge itself of all persons having had any connection with the Metaxas dictatorship. The above message was received by the Premier during the month of October.

One of the most disturbing factors effecting the King's popularity and reputation is his attachment to MANIADAKIS, a former Army officer with a rank of Lt. Colonel who was made Minister of Public Security by Metaxas. (As an interesting interpolation, his name is Mania -- it has the same meaning in Greek as it has in English -- plus "dakis", which means "son of".) Maniadakis is indeed a man with a grievance -- in his class in military academy, he was the
butt of all practical jokes and retains his burning resentment against many of his classmates even to this day. Once he assumed control of the Ministry, he invited German Gestapo authorities to Athens, who instructed him as to organization and operation, and it is said that his public and secret police were perfect little imitations of the German Gestapo agents. In his private office and personal waiting room there were pictures of Goebbels, Himmler and Hitler, and Himmler later visited Maniadakis and was received with public ceremony. The deaths of some of the former Prime Ministers and great popular leaders are attributed to Maniadakis.

When the government withdrew to Crete Maniadakis accompanied it and also escaped with the King to Egypt. There the scandal of his presence in the royal entourage was so great that the King was forced to dismiss him. He left the Near East by means of a Greek steamer which carried Maniadakis and a number of his officers of his secret police who were left at various ports of call. Maniadakis himself, with several aides and adjutants, later turned up in Buenos Aires still carrying strong-boxes which had been guarded twenty-four hours a day during the trip. The press of Buenos Aires was told by Maniadakis
that he had been sent to the western hemisphere by the
King as his High Commissioner for North and South America.
The Greek Minister to Brazil, Dendramis, protested to
Maniadakis that he had received no instructions and cabled
his resignation to the King. Since then Dendramis has been
persuaded to stay, but Maniadakis is still in South America
although it is said that he is planning to come to the
United States.

His business agent in the United States is a man
named Mermingas who lives, I believe, at the Lexington
Hotel in New York City. Mermingas was sent here during the
Graeco-Italo war with the commission to buy supplies for
the Ministry of Public Security. He carried instructions
to Greek authorities residing in this country which allowed
him to add percentages to the cost of his purchases, part
of which he has kept in trust for his superior's personal
use. A report on some of his actual purchasing transac-
tions can be assembled if desired.

It is certain that Maniadakis has a sinister hold
on the King, and through his secret police he has enough
explosive material on other personalities to make it un-
healthy for them to oppose him too openly. His chief
adjutant, Angelatos, is with him in Buenos Aires.
January 9, 1942

Mr. Murphy:

Mr. Wiley thinks the Colonel should see this.

E. J.

FROM: JOHN C. WILBY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

January 7, 1942

To:  Mr. Wiley
From:  Mr. Poole
Subject: DIAMANTOPOULOS, Greek Minister in Washington

We learn that Mr. Diamantopoulos, Greek Minister in Washington and accounted to be entirely ineffectual, is now asking the personal advice of our good friends as to his conduct in several instances. Among other questions, he worries about the position he should take regarding American requests for him to speak on the short-wave radio directed at Greece.

He has remarked that the American campaign to contact Greece by radio was entirely foolish and unnecessary. He argues that the Greek Government in exile should have one spokesman only, who should speak only from London. He is vaguely disturbed by the request to have the Consul General, the Archbishop, and other personalities deliver their messages to the people of Greece.

Our friend is embarrassed by the Minister's attitude; he attributes it to gross stupidity rather than to any desire to hold back on communication with the American Government. The Greek, he said, had no way of knowing what the Greek public might claim that this would embarrass, and he had suggested
that this was specifically the reason that these programs should be directed to Greece; it was the primary function of the Government in exile to keep the morale of the people high. The Minister, however, is very reticent under any requirement for direct action. He may be slightly influenced by his wife, who is a rather simple person from Constantinople and is unhappy in the United States.
REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN GREECE

December 31, 1941

The Peloponnesos is under martial law, cut off from the rest of Greece. Based on the latest information we have, the Germans are supervising a period of intensive training in the Peloponnesos. Attica is being used as a rest and convalescent center for German troops. All hospitals and large private homes have been requisitioned by the Germans for the German wounded from the Russian front. The watering resorts, largely in Boetia, are used as convalescent centers for higher ranking officers.

The islands off the Turkish coast are presently used as centers for intensive embarkation and debarkation training. The Bulgars have been stopped by the Germans on a line approximately paralleling Strumna. The Germans are in command of all key positions including anti-aircraft emplacements, air fields and coastal defense throughout the whole of Greece with heavy concentrations at Saloniki and Sunium. Although greater numbers of Italian forces are in Greece, their activities are confined to policing.

After the withdrawal of German troops for the Russian campaign about 70,000 remained in Greece, but it is indicated that within the last weeks large forces, whose numbers we do not yet have, have been pouring into the country. At first a great percentage of the German troops were Austrians. The Italian forces have been maintained fairly constantly at about 200,000, although
many regular army units have been replaced by Black Shirts and Carabinieri. Some units of Bersaglieri remain in Greece.

The withdrawal of great numbers of regular Italian troops was caused by a breakdown in the aggressive morale of the men who were found sympathizing with the Greek populace and expressing it openly. Italian troops, including officers, have expressed apologetic sentiments to the Greek people stating that the war was not of their choosing and that they were relieved that it was over and resented the coming of the German troops. There is a constant clash between the Italian and German troops with the Germans treating the Italians in a very high-handed way and the Italians not even hiding their resentment. German soldiers have tipped Greek street urchins to follow Italian soldiers chanting derisive remarks after them. At all events, the behavior of the Italians has been rather surprising in that they have attempted to help the Greeks find food and, although they were blocked by the Germans at each step, several times imported quantities of provisions which were promptly seized by the Germans. An important distinction lies in the fact that the Italians entered the country bringing their own supplies, whereas the Germans have lived off the country. The last German units entering Athens arrived in ragged uniforms and many of them especially officers, took uniforms from British prisoners which they are still wearing.

The lowest morale among the Germans lay with the Austrians. The Austrians have resented their having been employed as shock-
troops by the Germans in the Balkan campaign, but, nevertheless, they have displayed no sympathy toward the native people. The vaunted discipline of the Germans over their troops is non-existent in Greece because apart from official plundering, German soldiers are guilty of countless cases of outrage against the individual population and commanding officers reply in response that they can take no effective steps unless each guilty soldier is identified.

At last reports, the bridge over the Corinth Canal has not yet been replaced except by a pontoon bridge which opens for water traffic.

It is estimated that 7,000 to 10,000 British troops are at large in the mountains, villages and towns in Greece. These British troops are sheltered by the people and also by the official Greek constabulary and town police. The majority of the British troops have dyed their hair. It is understood that there is an organization comprising both of Greek officers and some of the British remaining in Greece. This organization has established a system of communication with the British forces of the Near East and is sending out very valuable information about strategic positions and, especially, the points that should be bombed by the R.A.F. Within the last month or two there have been some extraordinarily successful raids by the R.A.F. as a result of this underground communication. In the mountains around Athens, supposedly entirely secret ammunition and gasoline dumps have been
accurately attacked by the R.A.F.

Greece has been all but hermetically sealed by the Germans and even the few letters that had been permitted to leave the country after strict censorship are now entirely stopped so that the only means of communication are those devised by patriots in and out of the country who smuggle their information.

It is curious to note that one of the most successful pipeline of information goes by way of continental Europe through Switzerland.

From all the way back to the days when the islands of the Aegean were ruled by Crete, smuggling has been a source of high adventure and livelihood. The very descendants of these pre-historic smugglers have maintained constant "service" throughout Macedonian, Turkish, Venetian and whatever rule. With adequate preparation we can establish constant supply and information communication with the mainland of Greece.

As it is well-known, the Balkans have boasted another honorable and ancient profession since before history began; that of the Robin Hood type of bandit. As a matter of fact, some of the most successful officers of the Greek forces have been drawn from their ranks. The resistance of these bands to all forms of official control is passionate and they have the full support of the village and mountain population, among whom they merge with a complete cloak of invisibility. We have access to these chieftains and suggest that their organization and supply can be effected with
much more facility than would be imagined outside of C...

Sources of Regular and Quick Communication

The two points from which we can get quick information and two-way communication are Istanbul and Switzerland. If we can be provided with an airtight safe communication with Berne and Istanbul, we can arrange, even from here, an immediate flow of answers to all of the questions that may be asked us.

There are three Greek governments today; that of the government of King George II, the Tsolakoglou puppet government collaborating with the occupational authorities and a secret committee probably which/is in communication with the King's Government in England. It is the personal opinion of the writer that the King's Ministers would be well advised to be more influenced by the advices coming from the secret committee.
The Peloponnesos is under martial law, cut off from the rest of Greece. Based on the latest information we have, the Germans are supervising a period of intensive training in the Peloponnesos. Attica is being used as a rest and convalescent center for German troops. All hospitals and large private homes have been requisitioned by the Germans for the German wounded from the Russian front. The watering resorts, largely in Boetia, are used as convalescent centers for higher ranking officers.

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much more facility than would be imagined outside of Greece.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Memorandum

To: Mr. D. C. Poole
From: Ulus L. Ames

Subject: IMMEDIATE PROGRAM

Subject to approval, I propose to assemble for Greece the following:

1. Catalogue of all Greek political personalities wherever found, noting -
   a) Present address
   b) Present political affiliation
   c) History of past affiliations
   d) Association with Axis and/or Allied persons and movements
   e) Known abilities and weaknesses
   f) HOW classified as to loyalty by Premier Tsouderos and the King

2. Catalogue of Greek men of affairs presently in the United States, with personal history and appraisal of their attitudes, loyalties and potentialities. It should be noted that some of the ship owners and operators here are of doubtful loyalty to their Government. At least one has arrived recently, after having been flown from Athens through Germany and Italy.

3. Catalogue of Greek-American leaders showing their various affiliations.

4. Catalogue of
   a) Greek Societies in the United States and Canada
   b) Greek Publications in the United States and Canada

5. Description of the Greek Communist movement in the United States and its background in Greece.

6. Confidential list not to be written of leading Greeks in Greece, whose support and physical services may be had and trusted.

7. Topographical description of remote Greek regions loosely guarded, and populated by "Klefti", whose services are available. (Klefti are irregulars with a tradition of hundreds of years. Many of their chieftains are personal friends of mine.)

8. An initial report on Greek Munitions Industries to be delivered in person on Monday, December 29th, 1941.

9. Detailed and charted report on Greek Munitions Industries, Ammunition Dumps, Anti-Aircraft emplacements as executed under German supervision.
Memorandum to Mr. D. C. Poole from Ulius L. Amoss   December 24, 1941

10. Treatise on the integration of Greek finance into the German system.
11. Detailed study of Greek mines, topographically described.

It is understood that much of the above will be fluid, and will require constant additions and change as new information arrives from the source.

As instructed, I will follow the same pattern with regard to other countries, with which I have or can secure special contact.

I hope to have the privilege of discussing the above with you on Monday, and will, of course, expand or limit my program as may be indicated.

[Signature]
CODRINTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Enclosure

To: Mr. D. C. Poole
From: Julius L. Amos

Subject: IMMEDIATE PROGRAM

Subject to approval, I propose to assemble for Greece:

1. Catalogue of all Greek political personalities:
   a) Present address
   b) Present political affiliation
   c) History of past affiliations
   d) Association with Axis and/or Allied countries
   e) Known abilities and weakness
   f) How classified as to loyalty, by Preliminary Telephone

2. Catalogue of Greek men of affairs presently in the United States, their personal history and appraisal of their attitudes, characteristics, and possible contributions.
   It should be noted that some of these individuals have or have had a distinguished loyalty to their Government. At least one of them has been flown from Athens through Germany and Italy.

3. Catalogue of Greek-American leaders showing their various affiliations.

4. Catalogue of Greek:
   a) Greek Societies in the United States and Canada
   b) Greek Publications in the United States and Canada

5. Description of the Greek community and political background in Greece.

6. Confidential list not to be written over Greek citizens and physical restrictions may be limited to travel.

7. Topographical description of regions, c) Kefalonia, whose services are very valuable to hundreds of years. Many of these areas.


9. Detailed and charted reports on Greek "Anti-Aircraft" operations, etc.
Memorandum to Mr. D. C. Poole from Julius L. Amos

December 24, [19]41

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11. Detailed study of Greek mines, topographically described.

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I hope to have the privilege of discussing the above with you on Monday, and will, of course, expand or limit my program as may be indicated.
To: Colonel Donovan  
From: John C. Wiley  
Subject:  

Recognizing the Balkans to be Germany's vulnerable flank, the following operations are envisaged with respect to Greece and adjoining territories, North Africa being the forward base.

I. Operations already begun or about to be organized.

A. Procurement of information respecting:

(1) German and Italian forces now in Greece and adjoining regions - number, units, physical and moral condition. (First memorandum about to be submitted.)

(2) Greek munitions industries. (Statement herewith on the Hellenic Powder & Cartridge Manufacturing Company at Athens; Statements in preparation on affiliated companies).

(3) Strategic Mineral resources in Greece. (Report in preparation).

(4) Aerial Warfare. (Reasonably accurate maps to be submitted showing location of industrial plants and mining operations; exact location of anti-aircraft emplacements; military establishments, dumps, etc.; meteorological conditions).
(5) Current economic and political (social) conditions in Greece.

B. Harassment of enemy

Means are available in:

(1) "Klefti" or irregulars (bandits). There are American Greeks in the United States who know and command the confidence of the chief of these irregulars and also are ready, if aided, to go to Greece and establish contact with them.

(2) Eight thousand or more British soldiers in Greece, of whom 1200 to 1500 are in Athens and the remainder spread over the countryside and befriended by peasants. We have direct contact with the particular Greek citizen who has assumed leadership in connection with this force.

(3) General friendly disposition of the population and their readiness to do sabotage.

The practical problems are (1) Delivery in Greece of demolition materials and munitions. This can be organized from North African bases by use of Greek fishing boats operating up the Syrian coast and through the Greek islands, using long-existent smuggling facilities and "safe places." Also possibly by airplane.

(2) Recruiting in the United States of individuals ready and suited for adventure in and around Greece.
FN can find the individuals. OSS can do the training.

II. Tasks for the future calling for advance preparation now.

A. Discovering, training, and keeping available individuals who can precede and accompany the armed forces into Greece and adjoining territories for the purpose of making contact with the local populations, and also advising military commanders on political aspects and relations with the local populations. This, we all know, is of supreme military importance in Greece and the other Balkan countries.

B. Development and maintenance of contact with the Greek governments now in operation which include:

1. The government in exile
2. The Tsolagakiot government at Athens, and
3. The secret government at Kifisia. We have means of contact including the last name.

The determination of policy and branches of the Government to gather information and be ready to help put determined upon.
III. Procedure

Since the operations envisaged call for some very careful and systematic work by FN and close cooperation by FN with other branches and offices under the Coordinator, it is recommended that there be set up a very small Special Unit in FN. Under the close personal direction of Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole, this Special Unit would:

1. Accumulate secret files, particularly regarding individuals available for the work outlined above
2. Carry through the details of all the under-cover contacts and operations of FN
3. Provide an operating tie-in with K and L.

The personnel of the Unit would include one man of administrative experience and known discretion, at not more than $5,000 a year, and one to three women assistants. Such could be provided without doing violence to existing budgetary proposals.
January 6, 1942

Mr. W. S. Stephenson
Hotel St. Regis
New York City

Dear Bill:

I am enclosing a short memorandum in which you might be interested on the subject of certain operations in the Balkans.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure

Murphy:Foy
January 6, 1942

Captain T. S. Wilkinson
Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Captain Wilkinson:

I am enclosing a short memorandum in which you might be interested on the subject of certain operations in the Balkans.

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William J. Donovan

Enclosure

Murphy:Foy
January 6, 1942

General Raymond Lee
Military Intelligence
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Raymond:

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Murphy & Foy
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(3) **General friendly disposition of the population and their readiness to do sabotage.**

The practical problems are (1) **Delivery in Greece of demolition materials and munitions.** This can be organised from North African bases by use of Greek fishing boats operating up the Syrian coast and through the Greek islands, using long-existent smuggling facilities and "safe places." Also possibly by air plane.
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II. Tasks for the future calling for advance preparation now.

A. Discovering, training, and keeping available individuals who can precede or accompany armed forces into Greece and adjoining territories for the purpose of making contact with the local populations, and also advising military commanders on political aspects and relations with the local populations. This, we all know, is of supreme military importance in Greece and the other Balkan countries.

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1. The government in exile
2. The Tsolaklou government at Athens, and
3. The secret government at Kaffisia. We have means of contact with all three, including the last named.
The determination of policy rests with the other branches of the Government but it is our duty to gather information and find and maintain contacts and be ready to help put into effect policies determined upon.

III. Procedure

Since the operations envisaged call for some very careful and systematic work by FN and close cooperation by FN with other branches and offices under the Coordinator, it is recommended that there be set up a very small Special Unit in FN. Under the close personal direction of Mr. Wiley and Mr. Poole, this Special Unit would:

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The personnel of the Unit would include one man of administrative experience and known discretion, at not more than $5,000 a year, and one to three women assistants. Such could be provided without doing violence to existing budgetary proposals.
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 December 1941

TO:  Colonel William J. Donovan
     Robert Howard
     John H. Potter
     Joseph Barnes
     Robert Montec
     Irving Plene
     Ed Stanley
     James P. Farburg
     Paul Mead

FROM: Estelle S. Frankfurter

SUBJECT: Interview with Dr. Ruth Parmelee, Medical Missionary in Greece

Herewith is a summary of my interview with Dr. Ruth Parmelee, Medical Missionary in Greece for 17 years. I think she should and can be used effectively, probably best for personal broadcasts in Greek, in which she is proficient.

She will be in Washington until December 3rd and again on the 8th until Christmas. Between these dates she will be in New York, where she can be reached at 14 West 45th Street (Central Nurses Club). Her Washington address is 5545 Massachusetts Avenue (telephone Oliver 1514).
Dr. Parmelee, medical missionary in Greece under the Commissioners of the American Board of Missions, Chief of the American Women's Hospital since 1922 and American representative of the Greek Relief Committee, left Greece on July 30, arriving in the United States in September. She is now devoting herself to helping the Greeks in any way she can before returning to their country at such time as she may be sent. She suggests that since the Mission Board still has representatives there that connection be not referred to, rather that her American hospitals' service be used.

Dr. Parmelee ventured the guess that of the eight million population in Greece, from five to ten percent would have radios. Until her departure, three months after the German occupation, the popular stations listened to were the Cairo Station broadcasting in Greek and BBC, from London, broadcasting in Greek and English. Surveillance since her departure would of course have become stricter but even at that time when it was forbidden to listen to any broadcasts from neutral or enemy countries—i.e. to Germany—and therefore listening to Cairo and BBC was illicit, the Greeks continued to listen, with their windows and doors closed, keeping someone on guard. It was even said that Prime Minister Metaxis' daughter lost her radio through someone's hearing Big Ben from the street.

Dr. Parmelee thinks what the Greek people would most want to hear about are:
(1) Anything that would give them hope for a change in their affairs. She stated that they were very happy when they heard that the R.A.F. was returning to bomb, even though it meant the risk of physical danger to themselves.

(2) Anything about relief in the way of food or products, since they have been starving. As a letter of September 10 that came through the State Department poignantly put it, "Formerly starvation was on the people's lips; now it is in their eyes." The report of the first food relief load from Turkey was treated like a miracle.

(3) Anything to do with the defense program, air raid precautions and so forth, in the United States. The Greeks, according to Dr. Parmeleau, feel they are more closely allied through family kinship and through the cause of liberty, to America, than to any country.

She stated that many Greeks had studied in Germany. Some of these, she believed, must have acted as Fifth Columnists. Whereas there was uniform opposition to the Italians during their war, it was known that some Germans must have been friendly to the Nazi's cause. For instance, immediately after the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Germans were recalled home but soon afterwards they returned in increased numbers and there was a noticeable increase in the number of business agencies set up by them on their return. And significantly, after the Nazi invasion of Greece on the 6th of April, the Greek Minister of War asked the Prime Minister and the King to be allowed to give two month's pay as an Easter bonus to the soldiers (the
Greek Easter was on April 20th. This bonus was granted but the War Minister on his own initiative and without either advice or consent of the Prime Minister or the King, added to it "and leave". Great surprise was occasioned among the populace by seeing so many soldiers on the streets, on leave, at a time of great activity at the front. When the King called his Cabinet together for a discussion of the soldiers' leaves after the event, the King stated "You all deserve to be shot". The Prime Minister, Korisis, a sensitive soul who had been active in relief work, was so moved apparently by the royal remark that he committed suicide even before Cabinet and King left the country. At this time also, one of the Greek Generals, Tsolakokode, capitulated at Epirus—seemingly without the King's consent, since the latter made special reference to the capitulation on his leave taking on April 23rd.

Dr. Parmelee was very enthusiastic over the V for Victory Bond campaign, which I tested out on her, because so many Greeks at home were recipients of remittances from America. She was still impressed with the long queues outside the American Consulate awaiting the distribution of the sums her Relief Committee had handed over for the use of those who had formerly been dependent on remittances. The American Express Company is still sending money to American citizens—of whom, at last reports, there were 12 in Greece—but no aid can go to the Greeks themselves. However, she stated she feared the possible ill effects of publicizing the names of those for whom such bonds might be
bought, citing the case of the Greek Consul in Boston who told her he feared reprisals to his wife's relatives still there, as a result of his having spoken over Station WHUL. Dr. Parmelec suggested that the money collected through the bond sales should be translated into relief rations. And these, she hoped, could be stationed close enough to Greece for speedy distribution as soon as possible, regrettably, probably only after cessation of hostilities.

Dr. Parmelec cited three instances of what she considers hints of anti-German activities and probable indices of revolutionary action to come:

1. A Greek doctor, formerly a teacher in her school of nursing, in charge of a Red Cross first-aid station, on a train from the front by most devious means, ended his out-mourning to her by referring to the day of occupation and saying, "From now on, we are organized; we begin our efforts".

2. One of the many people who came to her before her departure with addresses of American relatives and friends to whom she was to take her message said, "There are a lot of arms buried". She thinks this evidence of the Greeks having retained weapons when they were given orders for them to surrender them to the Allies.

3. A lawyer who sent her a letter which he had asked to be sent to her at her home or to the American Ministry of Finance, was reported to take a spoken message and told her the letter requested her to send the Greeks
and urged that she urge upon the State Department that it keep in touch with the Greek Prime Minister, then in South Africa, now with the King in England.

I think Dr. Parmelee can be effectively used, probably best for personal broadcasts in Greek in which she is proficient.
August 22, 1941

Col. William J. Donovan
Apex Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I want to take this means of extending my thanks for your kindness to Mr. Apostolides and myself yesterday afternoon.

I feel, in view of the work accomplished yesterday, that the proposed plan for the relief of Greece is a long step nearer materialization, and that it will shortly be possible for us to actually undertake the shipment of supplies to that suffering country without fear of interception or loss.

Meanwhile, Colonel, it is my hope that you will be able to do something for Mr. Apostolides, the former Greek Minister of Finance. I know, if this is possible, that you will never have cause to feel the slightest regret, but rather will take pride in having assisted so capable an individual.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Spots]
TELEGRAM

Re: Dated July 15, 1941
Ree'd 11:30 a.m., 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1017, July 15, 5 p.m. (SECTION CONS)

Following from Reel.

"German action in permitting the occupation of most of Greece by Italian troops aroused fury among Greek population when first announced but the brutal strip- ping of the country by German troops in the meantime changed public opinion which now welcomes the Italian administration as very much the lesser of two evils. However shortage of food in Greece is already appalling and the country is faced with wholesale starvation within next few months unless relief is furnished by occupying countries. Shipment of canned milk recently sent by Italian Government for Greek population was seized by German military authorities who are also confiscating all meat for their troops and all other exportable foodstuffs particularly products of Greek canning industry for shipment to Germany. Starvation conditions are expected to result in uprisings which may well be serious since Italian military prestige is low in Greece and Greek troops are believed to have secreted much of their military equipment when demobilized.

Considerable troop movements have been noted in vicinity of Athens during past few days. These troops come from Crete which it is learned is being evacuated by German forces and turned over to Italian occupation. Well informed sources in Athens believe that after the departure of the German troops and planes Crete will be retaken by the British with aid of the Cretans most of whom are reported to be in hiding with their weapons. They feel able to deal with Italian troops and if some British aid is available the recapture of Crete by the British seems not impossible.

The German troops passing through Athens understood they were due for home leave but have been informed they are bound for Russia and a considerable amount of dissatisfaction is reported among them some having been seen weeping the night after receipt of their changed orders. In this connection D.R. Vogel, Secretary of the German Plenipotentiaries Office informed me in a final conversation that the present war had assumed proportions which were never expected or desired by his Government.

PHILLIPS
Dated July 15, 1941

Read 1:35 p.m., 16th

Secretary of State

Washington

1019, July 15, 7 p.m.

This is Section Two of Embassy's 1017, July 15, 5 p.m.

Considerable friction is reported between German and Italian troops in Greece and a rather heavy shooting affair occurred a few nights ago near my house in the suburb offyshiko which was only subdued by the use of a considerable amount of Italian motorized equipment. Although no official information is available, it is understood that a number of German troops were shot. Street incidents between German and Italian officers are frequently reported. Although most of Greece with the exception of Macedonia was turned over to Italian occupation by the Germans on June 25, the Germans had already sent capable men in various financial and industrial lines to Greece to reorganize the principal financial and industrial enterprises and acquire controlling interests in them. These persons are bringing their families and assistants to Athens and a considerable number of other Germans are also bringing their families to Greece to avoid the increasing British bombardment of Germany. The demand for housing accommodation by the Germans in Athens is so strong that I have even had considerable difficulty in preserving my own residence. The Greeks are simply told by the Germans that they must give up their houses although rent is paid in new German credit marks printed for use in Greece. In spite of the ostensible administration of Greece by the Italian authorities, the German plenipotentiary's office still retains control of supplies of food and gasoline for the diplomatic corps.

It was recently reported that the occupying powers proposed to allow the establishment of a Greek Foreign Office as a suboffice of the new Greek Prime Minister in Athens but this idea seems to have been given up.

Charles House, temporarily representative of the American Red Cross in Greece, has visited the British military hospital in Piraeus and reports that the Germans, who are still in charge of this hospital, have fully complied with the terms of the Geneva Convention and that British wounded there, who number over two thousand, have been treated with consideration. It is planned to send them to Austria as their recovery permits. Mr. House spoke personally to the British medical officer in charge of the hospital.
Lamentations
Not yours to give

LINCOLN MAC VEAGH
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America

Glade there you are back from all right after your long journey. And may Allah
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

Subject: Resources of Greece of Interest to Germany.

Unlike her neighbors Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Turkey, which normally have export surpluses of certain essential foodstuffs, Greece is not self-supporting as regards wheat, rye, rice, corn, barley, oats, dried beans, sugar, oil cake, meat and fish. In consequence Greece is only a liability to an invader from the point of view of food.

In most years Greece has an exportable surplus of olive oil but due to a poor 1940 crop and increased local consumption since the war, little or no olive oil surplus is expected in 1941. Figs, raisins, currants, tobacco, wine, fresh grapes and citrus fruits are other Greek export crops but they are not basic foodstuffs and cannot be regarded as wartime necessities.

Among other resources of interest to Germany Greece has limited quantities of naval stores, kid and lamb skins, as well as iron, nickel, chrome, manganese and magnesite ores.

The following table indicates the principal Greek products in which Germany has shown an interest in the past and which Germany may be expected to seek from Greece in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>Greek Exports to Germany</th>
<th>Total Greek Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1939 (Metric Tons)</td>
<td>1940 (Metric Tons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponges</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruit</td>
<td>7,064</td>
<td>8,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh grapes</td>
<td>4,130</td>
<td>2,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried figs</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>1,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currants</td>
<td>4,559</td>
<td>6,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raisins</td>
<td>6,148</td>
<td>16,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh vegetables</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>19,476</td>
<td>26,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olive oil</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wine</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>9,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw skins</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest products</td>
<td>6,255</td>
<td>2,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(chiefly naval stores)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>159,670</td>
<td>12,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel ore</td>
<td>57,785</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrome ore</td>
<td>22,878</td>
<td>1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>89,632</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>78,360</td>
<td>17,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>447,011</strong></td>
<td><strong>110,561</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The Transport Problem.

From the point of view of a country at war, Greek mineral ores are perhaps the most desirable Greek commodities but Greece has no smelting facilities and its ores (frequently of a very low grade) must be carried to Germany for processing. It became apparent at the close of 1939 that Germany could spare only enough freight cars to carry Greek exports having a high value for weight ratio such as tobacco, dried fruit and wine. Greece itself does not have enough freight cars to handle the country's internal traffic. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Germany will be able to transport from Greece important quantities of minerals. The stocks of Greek minerals awaiting shipment to Great Britain are at a minimum thanks to the energetic efforts of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. After these were lifted, a minimum of six months would be required to restore Greek mines to an operating basis if the sabotage, which would undoubtedly be attempted should be carried out.

Conclusion.

A German move against Greece will be entirely for other motives than essential foodstuffs or war materials: no surplus of the former exists, and the latter are generally in such crude forms, and in such limited quantities, as to make their transport by rail a costly and scarcely justified procedure.

George Lewis Jones,
Assistant Commercial Attache.
CONFIDENTIAL

Notes on the German Conquest
and Occupation of Greece.

Berlin, June 16, 1941.

(N.B. These notes are from memory only since the
writer was not able to bring any confidential
documents with him out of Greece. They are
intended to serve only as a basis for more
definitive reports when such documents,
including the writer's diaries, telegrams, etc.,
become again available to him in Washington.)
The Italians attacked Greece on October 28, 1940, and the Greeks immediately foresaw German participation when the time should be ripe. General Metaxas said to me early in November, "Let us not fool ourselves; when the spring comes the Germans will attack us." He said at that time, and this attitude was repeatedly reaffirmed to me right up to the final collapse, not only by him, but by his successor and by the King, - that Greece would resist German aggression in the same manner as it had resisted Italian, on the basis not that it expected to keep from being overrun, but that it believed in the final victory of England, and that the country owed it to its future to keep at least its soul alive.

Neither General Metaxas, whose plans for the defense continued to be adhered to though he died before the Germans came in, nor the King, ever believed in any very effective assistance, other than naval, coming from Great Britain. They naturally pressed for all the aid they could get from this source, but their strategy was so conceived that it could be adhered to whether the British sent seven or only three divisions. Neither did they take much stock in Mr. Eden's projected plans for possible Yugoslav and Turkish collaboration. The Foreign Office professed to believe in Turkey's assurances up to the last minute, but the military saw themselves fighting without such props against the combined armies of Italy and Germany and laid their plans accordingly.

**The First Plan**

Their first plan involved driving the Italian Army out of the peninsula before the spring came, with an army of 125,000 men plus whatever expeditionary force the British might send.
they could support the lightly fortified line along the Bulgar-
ian frontier with a large force located in the mountainous
bottle-neck of the Epirus-Olympus region.

This plan presumed the neutrality of Yugoslavia, but
was easily alterable to allow for a thrust by the enemy from
Bulgaria through the southern part of that country.

The Second Plan

However, as spring approached, the Italians had not been
driven out of Albania, chiefly on account of the severity of
the winter, the mountainous terrain, and the difficulties experi-
enced by the Greek Army in all matters of supply. The Germans
by this time had occupied Rumania and seemed likely soon to
enter Bulgaria as well. The Greeks then attempted a limited
offensive against the Italians to attain at least a shorter line
along the Skoumi River and release a number of divisions for
defensive purposes against the Germans, a modification of the
original plan as already outlined.

At the same time, in order not to precipitate German
aggression, the Greeks insisted that no British troops come to
the mainland of Greece until the Germans had actually crossed
the Danube. One British division was landed in Crete for the
defense of Suda Bay and a British military mission was allowed
to come to Athens to study the situation, but the small British
air force aiding the Greeks against Italy was not materially
increased and no British officers or troops were allowed in
Greek Macedonia and Thrace.

The Third Plan

When the Germans crossed the Danube and began moving
north on the Rumanian-Serbian border early in March, the British

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began to arrive in Greece. The Greek offensive to the Mesudi had been only partially successful and was now answered by an Italian counter-offensive, which indeed gained no ground, and cost the Italians dear, but effectively kept the Greeks from withdrawing troops to the south to meet the German menace. The British therefore assumed practically alone the central assignment in the Olympus region, their mechanized equipment and the nature of the terrain being counted on to make up for their lack of numbers. What Greek troops were available in this region were placed on the mountains and the British were expected to hold the German columns which might attempt to use the valleys. The plan was now changed again. As in all previous plans, the defense of the Bulgarian border was to be a delaying action only and the main effort was to be made in holding the Olympus region; but this now involved not the withdrawal of divisions from a shortened Albanian line, but a retreat under fire by the whole Greek Army in Albania, and especially its right flank, until contact could be established with the British.

The Attack

This last plan was the one finally attempted. The entrance of Yugoslavia into the war raised Greek hopes, but did not necessitate any change in the allied dispositions. The collapse of the Yugoslav armies in southern Serbia only rendered actual what had long appeared possible, namely, the appearance of the Germans in force at the Monastir Gap, pushing the British forward positions west of the Vardar and threatening to cut in between the British and the retreating Greek Army in Albania. No more than two Greek divisions were in the native region west of the Vardar, and these, under cover of darkness, were to move to the west to meet the Germans as they emerged from the Monastir Gap. The British order of battle was as follows:

- 3 -
Phase One of Operations

The British forces in Greece, the numbers of which had been kept a close secret, were now revealed to us by the British Minister as including no more than two divisions and one armored brigade. This brigade was used by General Wilson to delay the German penetration southwards from Salonika while he abandoned the whole region north of Olympus and west of the Vardar, and prepared to defend the line of the Aliakmon River, as well as to give the Greeks time to come south and take up effective positions on his left. The brigade was overwhelmed by German armored superiority, but gave a good account of itself. This phase of the battle was a race against time, the retreat of the Greeks being delayed less by the Italian pursuit than by the difficulty of the terrain and by the assaults of German detachments which, as the main body moved south, struck up into the mountains on the flank of their withdrawal.

The small British air force which had now been slightly reinforced, came into action at Salonika and during this phase was very useful in bombing tanks and machine-gunning troops and lorries. The tremendously superior German air force seems not at this time to have swung itself into general action, but nevertheless almost all the British and remaining Greek planes, perhaps 150 machines in all, were accounted for in western Macedon and to a lesser extent in Albania, ending this opening stage of hostilities.

1. Note: The German armored strength was estimated at Athens to be two full divisions.

2. Note: The British thoroughly destroyed the Italian air force and turned up all the aviation papers and maps besides evacuated the city of Athens. All the air stations were hit. The German air forces were successful in Salonika.
Phase Two of Operations

Forcing its way down from the Monastir Gap and pushing along the coast, the German Army came now into contact with the main British position along the Halicarnass north of Olympus, where the British inflicted heavy losses on the Germans as the latter crossed the river; but also the full weight of the German air force here came into play. British communications were continually harassed and the airfield at the main advance base of Larissa was actually captured and held for a time by parachute troops. After a short but sharp resistance the line gave way at both ends and the Germans entered the plain of Thessaly around both sides of Olympus. On the east, near Gerofti and later near Kalabaka, where the Greeks were just beginning to get back in some force after great difficulties in the mountains, the fight was particularly stubborn. When the British left Kalabaka behind them and the Greek resistance there was shattered, the Germans not only swept south through the plain but also turned west up the road which connects Thessaly and Epirus, and thus threatened to take the bulk of the Greek Army in the rear. It was this exploitation of the gap opened up by the rapidly withdrawing motorized British in the plain and the slowly re-forming Greek infantry in the mountains that decided the fate of the campaign. The British, with great speed and skill, escaped encirclement, somewhat to the surprise of the Germans, but the Greeks were trapped. And, after they had felt the full force of German bombing of their communications and bases in Epirus, Focion being almost completely flattened, and supply columns everywhere blocked or destroyed, they asked for an armistice. The British took up a final defensive position on the Chaoumazia Line, topographically the easiest in Greece, but they took it as firmly as the Halicarnass had been held.
It should be said that the British campaign was well handled up to this time, the best use possible being made of the means available. When taking up the Thermopylae position, General Wilson was careful to block the road leading southwest by which the Germans, moving down the west coast of Greece, were attempting to out-flank him. Thus Thermopylae was not turned, but forced, and the Germans paid for it. But something clearly went wrong at this time with the liaison between British and Greeks. I was with the British Minister, General Eyrewod, commanding the British Mission, and Air Vice Marshal d'Albice, commanding the RAF in Greece, when they received the news of the Greek surrender, and they were obviously taken completely by surprise. It was obvious that they did not regard the German penetration in the Greek rear as being necessarily decisive, and there are many Greeks today, including soldiers, who agree with them. In this connection, it may be noted that the armistice was signed not by the Greek Commander in the field, but by one of his subordinates, the leader of whom has since become the local "Quisling". An important Greek said to me just before I left Athens that General Metaxas had made his greatest mistake in attempting to resist Germany with a pro-German clique, meaning that his cabinet and his generals were largely drawn from King Constantine's adherents in the last war. The armistice certainly appears justifiable on purely formal grounds, but the question of whether more determined leadership might not have brought it

1. Note: The Germans used both armored units and Alpine troops in this action. No reliable estimate of the force used by members involved in this action can be obtained in Athens, but it was over 10,000 men. The attack took place just after 16:00 on the Greek and British forces, and both the air force and the British forces were in the area.
least a large part of the Greek Army safely back to the Thermopylae line will probably always be debated. When the rebellious generals were communicating with the Germans regarding an armistice, a mysterious order was issued in Athens dismissing all soldiers in that area to their homes and providing them with pay in drachma bills which had been raised from 100 to 1,000 in value. This order was speedily countermanded, but what appears to have been a plot involving the Ministers of Finance, War and Navy, resulted in not only a wave of defection spreading throughout the capital, but in the suicide of the Prime Minister, Mr. Keviis, and the formation of a new government. The British are supposed to have taken a stiff attitude in regard to this affair, and to have borne down heavily on the Premier for what had happened, and this is probably the origin of certain stories to the effect that they had him put out of the way.

The Pursuit

The British forces in Greece were evacuated from many points, including coasts and beaches, all the way from Chalcis, just south of Thermopylae, to Kalamata at the southern end of the Peloponnesus. The German pursuit was vigorous, but the British motorized equipment was of better quality than the German and it was chiefly through the use of their air force that the Germans inflicted damage on their fleeing opponents. By this time there was no allied air opposition whatever. Parachutists were used in the capture of the Isthmus of Corinth but failed to prevent the British from blowing up the road and railway bridge across the canal and thus delaying the approach of the pursuing columns. It appears that whenever the Germans raced up, their casualties were considerably greater than those of the British, but the effective dive-bombing of small Greek coastal villages, seaports and flights against supply trains. 
evacuation, brought the British losses up again. The British appear to have been able to evacuate safely about two-thirds of the total forces brought to Greece, but to have lost all their mechanized and armored equipment as well as their artillery and planes. After the main operation was over, the German troops who swarmed over the entire country not excepting even the smallest islands, appeared to be a badly dilapidated and considerably shaken lot of men. Their material was greatly superior to the British in quantity but inferior in quality, and the dearest hope of their soldiers seemed to be an early ending to a war in which constant victories bring them no rest.

The Capture of Crete

The German attack on Greece may be divided into two main parts, or operations, the first directed against Greece proper, and the second against the island of Crete with its important anchorage at Suda Bay. Subsidiary operations involved the seizure of less important islands of the Aegean, notably Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, while various smaller islands, not so strategically placed, in this area, as well as the so-called "Ionian" islands (Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Lefkada, Ithaca) on the west coast of Greece, were occupied by the Bulgarians. Little, if any, opposition appears to have been encountered in these captures, except at Lemnos when a small force of gendarmes and local guards beat off several attempts at landings. The German troops proceeded to these islands in small motored shipping craft, and possibly also in motor launches having木质 boats and rafts specially brought from the central islands in the rear of the advancing armies.
were trapped there, leaving the defense of Crete to a few detach-
ments of young recruits plus a British contingent of no more than
one division.

The Germans left nothing to chance in their attack on
Crete. For several weeks after the capture of Athens they con-
centrated a special corps of invasion troops in the coastal area
from Chalcis to Corinth, and while the armored divisions with-
drew northward, brought down a large number of light launches
and pontoon boats. These were transported on trucks, as the
railway had been thoroughly destroyed by the British, particularly
in the region near Thermopylae, where bridges and tunnels are
numerous. The Germans must also have imported a great quantity
of petrol by truck, and perhaps also by plane. While prepara-
tions for invading Crete by land and air were ahead, the German
motorized infantry which had pursued the British finally to the very
tip end of the peninsula (leaving, as I was told by an eye-witness,
at least 1,000 dead in the vicinity of Kalamata alone) began coming
back with its wounded, and the resulting traffic congestion on
Crete's limited roads was terrific. At this time also, the
wear and tear on the German vehicles became strikingly apparent.
Between Athens and Corinth, among several thousand vehicles there
were hundreds halted for repairs both for engine and tire trouble.

The lack of air opposition allowed the Germans, throughout the
entire campaign, to operate their planes free fields directly in
the rear of the fighting line. Thus at Piraeus they based their
bombers and fighter protection on Saloniki, Thessaloniki, and Ioannina;
and at Thermopylae employed the field at Loutra. For the Italian
campaign they developed the three Athenian fields (local, Marathon,
and Eleusis), and the fields at Corinth and Argos, and built new
fields at Nafplio, and between Smyrna and Nafplio near Argos.
devastating dawn attacks on the Greek airfields with machine guns and incendiary bullets rather than bombs, they inherited the runways in good condition.

When evacuating Athens, the British did not destroy the oil stocks (Shell, Socony, etc.) at the Piraeus, as they had done at Salonika. It seems the Greeks begged them not to, fearing the spread of fire. Among the stocks thus captured by the Germans there was a considerable amount of aviation petrol, but the subsequent intensive operations against Creta by a force of at least 1,000 planes over a period of a few days could not have been carried out without further stocks being brought down from the north, and the German achievement in this regard is worthy of remark, in view of the condition of the roads and the dangers to navigation. I heard of no petrol being brought in by sea at this time.

During the couple of weeks of German preparation, the British made several bombing raids on the airfields in the Athens area, but without important results. Antiaircraft defences were installed with a profusion unknown during the British occupation of the area. At one time there were eight antiaircraft guns on the Acropolis itself, and after these had been removed at the instance of better judgment, guns still remained on the adjacent hills as well as on the roofs of all important buildings in the city. During the Italian, German and British raids from October to May, planes passed repeatedly over the centre of Athens and were fired on intensively on every occasion. But no bombs were ever dropped within the city limits strictly speaking.

When the actual assault on Creta started, about the middle of May, the port of the Piraeus was still practically
on Greece early in April, it had been heavily bombed; many ships had been set ablaze; and after futile efforts to beg safe to safety, a vessel loaded with 200 tons of TNT blew up close to the Free Zone Wharf, totally destroying the only modern installation of its kind in Greece, and partially blocking the entrance to the inner basins. Later, further bombings sank more ships, notably during the British efforts at evacuation, and the harbor became cluttered with wreckage. Accordingly, no large part of the German expedition to Crete by sea left from this point. Convoys assembled at the island of St. George off Cape Sounion, and in the Bay of Kionia, near Nea Peramos, and perhaps at other points, such as Kyane in Naucra, - which would seem to give an answer to the question why so many German troops crossed to that island on the way down from the north. Bomber and fighter airplanes seem to have been based largely on the Athens airfields, troop-carrying planes on Megara and Corinth, and the dive-bombers on fields further south.

The attempt to invade Crete by sea was a complete failure. The convoys were made up of small Greek constance steamers - a few of which were left over in Greek harbors after the British evacuation and were assembled by the Germans from far and wide - and of small boats towed by Greek fishing smacks equipped with diesel motors. The passage was nocturnal and the protection was provided by Italian destroyers. As many as five thousand men were committed to a single convoy of this kind; all were heavily equipped and the small craft were packed to overflowing. How many such convoys attempted to reach the Island, I do not know, but I had advance anonymous information of the making of two. There may have been three, but probably not more, since the fate of the first couple created a notorious reaction among the troops slated to follow, and there were a number of statements...
out of hand at the evacuation points and suicides among
superior officers in Athens. The convoys appear to have
been intercepted by British naval patrols and decimated, the
men who fell into the sea being too heavily laden to swim,
even if they knew the art, and the Italian destroyers taking
to their heels or being suddenly sunk by the British guns at
practically point blank range. To judge from the reports of
Greek captains who escaped the holocaust, an estimated loss of
4,000 men per convoy would appear conservative. Few of the
Germans who survived came back to Greece, and there were no
reports from any source of any sea-borne formations having
taken part in the fighting on the island.

Crete was taken by attack from the air. A large force
of parachutists was employed, perhaps as many as 1,500 or 2,000.
These appear to have been "accounted for". One witness told
me of the New Zealanders remarking that they had never had such
good enemy shooting in their lives. The parachutists were fol-
lowed promptly, however, by swarms of bombers and dive-bombers,
whose unremitting efforts from low altitudes against slight air
opposition, disorganized British resistance, and drove it under-
ground. The bombers were then followed by hundreds of troop-
carrying planes whose occupants leaped out with machine guns and
grenades, and even small cannon, and took up positions front,
flank and rear before their opponents could get out of their
slit trenches, dugouts, and caves. The battle, in its resulting
confusion, appears to have been like nothing hitherto known.
The Germans secured an early hold on the airfield at Canea, near
Suda Bay, and were never thereafter dislodged from this key
position. At Rethymne and Heraklion, the British regained
control after first losing it, but wave after wave of troop-carry-
ing planes preceded by bombers and fighters swept in, while the
British received no reinforcements except a few volunteers.
British fleet shelled the Sanaa airfield, and effectively
defeated the German attempts to bring in troops by sea, as I
have already recorded, but was heavily attacked in turn from
the air, and lost at least two cruisers, the Alkenator and
the Leih, the latter already damaged and lying in Suda Bay,
and four destroyers. Gradually the overwhelming arrivals and
the lack of any relief to the British troops, as well as the
impossibility of organizing any position in the circumstances
created by the German methods, rendered further resistance
impossible, and the fleet covered a general evacuation. Some
three hundred severely wounded British were left in hospital
at Sanaa, and these were transported by German planes to Athens.
Other losses are hard to estimate from information available in
Athens, but it seems likely that the British claim to have saved
the bulk of the defenders is correct. German losses in planes
were clearly very heavy. One air transport convoy left Nafplia
with 130 planes and returned with only 90, approximately. It
was said that 300 of these unideniters found graves in
Crete, and that many crashed badly with the loss of all or most
of their passengers. An interesting aspect of the operation
was the use by the Germans of old machines which had passed
their proper time of service in the air, and obsolescent types. The
few British Hurricanes (no Spitfires were seen during the entire
Greek campaign) which came into action against them played little
with these abundant "targets", but their use was justified by their
numbers and the restricted British resources. In the early
stages, the Germans made some use of gliders, towed behind
regular planes to be cut loose at the chosen moment. These
gliders seem to have carried a dozen or more men, and to have
been regarded as specially dangerous by the troops required to
Ascend in them. A high-ranking air official, generally described

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In Greece with having been Richtofen himself, the commander of the German air forces involved in the campaign, was killed on the island of Aegina when demonstrating to his reluctant personnel the perfect safety of the device. Thereafter, little more was heard of it. When the operation ended, Crete was in German hands, but the British defenders had been few in numbers and the majority had escaped after inflicting exceedingly heavy losses and giving the German morale a distinct jolt. The impression was inescapable in Athens that the entire Greek campaign was both harder and more time-consuming than the Germans anticipated.

As might be expected, the liberty-loving population of Crete, composed largely of rugged if backward mountaineers, gave ardent support to the British in the defense of their island, old men and even women joining irregularly in the fray, and it is to be feared that vicious reprisals are being taken. The chief towns were of course practically destroyed by air bombardment.

The German Occupation

The German occupation of Greece has finally alienated any elements in the population which might previously have been called sympathetic. The Germans gave out that they were entering as "friends", and desired only to purge Greece of the British. But whereas they entered Salamina and Athens in a peaceful and orderly fashion, their subsequent conduct has been out of keeping with this excellent beginning. The British brought food with them and placed their troops in camps outside the towns, but the Germans entered the country to live on it, without a missionary, and billeted their troops on the population. In many cases this billeting was allowed to go on at the discretion of the troops themselves, who entered houses and occupied rooms, without orders from above, and then listed when they left, every-
feating and even wanton destruction appears to have been especially prevalent in the provinces, where cases of rape were also reported. In Athens, the senior officers, who had installed themselves in the best houses, driving the inhabitants to seek shelter in poorer quarters, occasionally attempted to temper the wind, but the general impression was inevitably that of a wave of ill-disciplined barbarism sweeping over a civilized community, with the result that the Germans and the "Quisling" government they set up, are now universally held in contempt as well as hated.

As regards the food situation, it should not be forgotten that Greece had already been at war for five months when the Germans came in, and her stocks were low. In addition, she cannot normally supply her wheat requirements, and has very little meat - even in peace times. Had the Germans brought food with them, they might have weaned an already almost starving population into thinking that they are indeed the liberators they claimed to be. But their "locust" tactics rendered this impossible from the start, and in addition, their grand gesture of turning the captured Greek Army loose instead of making it prisoner - as a tribute to Greek valor - recoiled on their heads for the simple reason that this army was but turned loose to starve. It would have been far better for the Greek soldiers to have gone to German prison camps, and far better for the country, too. The troops would at least have had something to eat once a day. As it is, they now exist in misery and rags over a land despoiled. Finally, the commandeering of all private motor transport (and even fishing vessels, for a time) and the destruction of rail communication, deprived the cities of their normal means of supply, and large centers like Athens and Salonika can no longer be fed by the abundant fisheries in Greek waters or receive the benefit of the still fertile gardens.
absolute nine of subsistence, at present, than that of the peasants, despite the greater spoliation of the country districts. When I left Athens on June 3rd there had been much talk in the German-controlled press of the willingness of the Reich to help the puppet government solve the situation, but no real step had been taken or seemed likely to be taken to that end. Greece is the poorest of European countries. Only 15 percent of her surface is arable land. She is facing real starvation, imminent starvation, and her people not only see that this state of things followed on the German invasion (the "New Order"), but have been sickened by the spectacle of German soldiers in the bun shops eating cream puffs from both hands.

The anti-German attitude of the people has been sharply underlined by a popular propensity to shear and distribute flowers and candies, cigarettes, etc., to British prisoners in transit through Athens, despite official threats and even wholesale arrests. The controlled press, as well as the German military authorities, has loudly lectured the public in this connection, expressing a rather naiif surprise at the same time that the Greeks will not recognize their "real" friends. Following the mysterious disappearance of the German flag from the Acropolis (which had been decorated with the Swastika the moment the first German troops entered Athens), the whole city was placed on curfew hours. Everybody must be home by 10 o'clock in the evening. As the Greeks love to sit out in the open air even most of the night in summer, this has been a real punishment, but if the Germans want the Greeks to regard them as friends, as they say, here again is a false step. Many Greeks are beginning to think that no way can ever be found to get along with the Germans.
unless it be abject submission, and to regard the possibility of the Italians coming in with something like hope, on the theory that between Mediterranean peoples there is always at least a chance of understanding.

Many developments in Greece appear to parallel those in other German-occupied countries. For instance, there has been an obvious lack of coordination between the civil and military authorities,—between the army command, the Gestapo and the Foreign Office representatives,—and this has led to much confusion and an increase of popular indignation, because of the frequent countermanding of orders and regulations. Then too, the Germans brought their own currency into Greece, specially printed marks of no value outside the country, and with these the troops have bought up practically all the supplies in the shops, leaving in exchange for a large part of the country's wealth mere paper. These so-called "marks" are valued arbitrarily at the Reichsmark rate of exchange fixed prior to the war, 30 drachmas to one mark. Their uncontrolled issue, however, and the fact that in the Italian occupied sections in the west of Greece, liras have been issued at a fantastically high rate, has created an impossible situation for the Bank of Greece. The puppet Finance Minister called on me just before I left and told me among other things, that he was attempting to convert the Italian rate and had received a promise from the Germans to canalize the new marks through the Greek bank of issue, so that at least he might have knowledge of the amount of currency in circulation, but apparently the situation still remains unsatisfactory.

Finally, another well known feature of the occupation has been the attempt of the Germans to "buy" control of all important industrial enterprises and businesses. Because of various kinds seem to have brought them almost complete success in this manner. I have heard that they now have a number of cases in court.
it would be to the advantage of the Greeks to yield control quickly, since the Italians might come in at any time and apply confiscation. Pressure was put on Greek ship owners to instruct their captains in all parts of the world to submit to German control, but it seems likely that the masters, at least in most cases, heard the instructions of the legitimate Greek government with greater sympathy, and have placed their ships in British hands.

When the Greek forces surrendered to the Germans in the north, it was understood in Athens that the step was taken expressively to avoid surrender to the Italians, whom the Greeks had defeated. The terms of the armistice, however, were never published, and the Germans promptly allowed the Italians to occupy the whole west coast as far south as the Gulf of Corinth, including the province of Epirus and the Ionian Islands, while at the same time they turned over to the Bulgars, who were not at war with Greece (if they had been, Turkey would have been obliged to fight on Greece’s side), the whole of Thrace and eastern Macedonia as far as the Struma. These two cynical violations of the “friendship” professed, constitute perhaps the greatest gopheries in an occupation singularly maladroit and ill-conducted. The resentment they have caused is universal in Greece and inurable.

To sum up, Greece is now more pro-British than at any time previously, because she has had the German myth exploded in her face. Instead of civilization, order and discipline, she is experiencing an ill-coordinated and shabby tyranny, with whose insincerities and inconsistencies she finds it impossible to cope rationally, and under whose violent and uncontrolled capacity she risks starvation.