

AUXILIARY OPERATIONS GROUP

11.101  
Guerrilla Warfare



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Handwritten:*  
Auxiliary Operations Group  
Washington

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
LONDON

March 6th, 1943

SUBJECT: Auxiliary Operations Groups

TO: Colonel W. J. Donovan, Director, O.S.S.

Introduction

Guerrilla Warfare, which has been a concomitant of armed strife from time immemorial, has been exploited, during the present war, on a larger scale and with more careful organization and planning than ever before. With certain modifications, guerrilla units have, in fact, become part and parcel of the great armies of the world.

Organized irregular bodies are of particular interest to the United Nations in the current conflict since the enslaved nations have, as a result of Axis conquests, a continuous source of trouble to the enemy and could well be of incalculable assistance to the Allies - particularly when the moment for invasion comes.

One of the tasks of O.S.S., and its counterpart in the British Service, has been to contact and assist the various resistance groups and "secret armies" of Europe. Within enemy territory (or enemy controlled territory) contact must, in the first instance, be carefully made by individual operatives skilled in intelligence and the task of organization. Eventually, with reasonable good fortune, local organizations may be built. These may be inducted highly trained groups (either nationals or those who can pass for nationals) of saboteurs and subversionists who, alone or with the aid of friendly natives, will institute a campaign of action against the enemy.

The work of the original Agent organizer and that of the subsequent sabotage groups is fostered and encouraged, to the greatest possible extent, by material aid from without. It is hoped that such organizers and groups will not only be able to contact resistance leaders in the area in which they are working but that, with or without the aid of local nationals, they will receive and transmit intelligence, locate "safe houses" and, from time to time, carry out isolated programs of subversion and sabotage.

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The units so formed are irregular bands - constantly moving to avoid the detection of the local authorities, counter-espionage and counter-subversive agents and army patrols. They live within the country - often for long periods of time. They are in communication with their headquarters in friendly territory and are in touch with local resistance groups. Their numbers, however, are not large (and they are becoming increasingly hard to find) and they are often - though highly courageous - not military men. They are, in truth, the pioneers whose great objective is to lay the foundation for a resistance force within when "invasion time" arrives.

### The Second Wave Auxiliary Operations Groups

The problem of organizing and activating, at or near D-Day, the resistance groups with which our organizers are in contact has been one with which the U.S. and British S. S. have long been concerned. In its struggle to find a solution the S. S. proposed, July last, organizations consisting of teams of three men (two officers and a W/T operator) each - all speaking the language of the country in which they were to operate. Such teams would be the focal point for resistance group organization and control.

The team idea was a step in the right direction but it did not go far enough. In the first place, the unit is not sufficiently large to operate alone in event contact is not made - and this will often be the case since point-to-point work in the dark of night are not easy.

Secondly, witness the parachute troop landing in North Africa in connection with the invasion there.

Thirdly, no considerable number of natives could be quickly organized and trained by so small a unit;

Fourthly, there is no sizeable military "core" into which local resistance may be fitted (or with which they may be "brigaded") and through the medium of which they can be manipulated as a fighting force; and

Fifthly, there is a lack of organized fire power which will be badly needed in operations of the type visualized.

It is clear that larger, highly trained, language-speaking groups are needed to meet the requirements of our "second wave" plan. One result of conversations had during last January with General Banfill, Chief of the Forces of the Norwegian Government in Exile, General Banfill explained a growing scarcity of men who could be used in leading parties and of a complete lack of W/T operators who are always in demand in work of this nature, and asked for men for this work. He also ex-

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... willingness to consider the induction, into Norway, with his own...  
 ... of a few Norwegian speaking Americans. These American...  
 ... live within the country only by virtue of the protection...  
 ... to which they might be attached. They would, how...  
 ... as teachers, workmen and observers and - near invasion time -...  
 ... in checking and confirming, for our own Army Staff, the...  
 ... submitted by General Hausteen's organization on which, in connection...  
 ... the allies must largely rely.

As a result of conferences with General Hausteen it was proposed that...  
 ... Auxiliary Operations Groups - each of which, in...  
 ... of from 15 to 25 highly intelligent Norwegian...  
 ... heavily armed and well officered. Each man would be capable...  
 ... in one or two pertinent subjects and among them there would be...  
 ... of wireless operators.

The primary function of the A.O. Groups will, of course, be to act...  
 ... as rallying points for local patriots. These they...  
 ... and help. And, the natives there will be many with prior...  
 ... of these are available they will be incorporated...  
 ... of the A.O. Group (the squad) which will be expanded accord...  
 ... the language of the...  
 ... no uncertainty, no inability to transmit orders...  
 ... actual incorporation of local patriots into the A.O...  
 ... at least, be trained to work...  
 ... under their own leadership.

The A.O. Groups will be skilled in sabotage, demolition work, small...  
 ... unarmed combat and field craft. They will...  
 ... training and a course in combined operations. Each...  
 ... "cater" type. They should all be non-commissioned of...  
 ... N.O.C.'s.

Although A.O. groups will be used, principally, at or near invasion...  
 ... these groups should be laid in the interim. Gen...  
 ... interest in the groups was aroused by reason of the...  
 ... rather than by the thought of their employment in con...  
 ... They could - as Groups - be kept reasonably...  
 ... "one shot target" operations - alone or with...  
 ... Many of them - including W/T operators - would...  
 ... in connection with preliminary...  
 ... work.

Auxiliary Operations Groups should be heavily armed. When employed...  
 ... they should carry with them extra arms, ammunition and...  
 ... uniforms for new recruits). They should be large...  
 ... they might, with luck, carry out a mission even with...  
 ... They should be elastic - but self-contained...  
 ...

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Such groups - at zero hour on D-Day - and thereafter, in event of airheads were established, could be made to "pay their way". Their preliminary work (and the work of O.S.S. organizers who should precede them) among resistance factions having been properly performed and adequate equipment having been supplied by boat, submarine or plane, they would be able to take and hold strong points of reasonable dimensions, partially or wholly immobilize transportation and communications in limited areas, attack specific targets and, where all, act as reception committees and organization and communication headquarters for paratroops, Rangers and the advance units of invasion forces. Either alone or with paratroop aid they should be able to support air operations at given points and even capture and hold, temporarily, important fields.

Following a successful landing O.S.S. Agents would recede into enemy held territory to begin, again, or to continue their work of contact, organization and intelligence. The A.O. Groups should, at this point, be attached to combat units to be used as Ambush Patrols and raiding parties. They will work closely with Rangers, Commandos, Sappers and Engineers. They will be highly skilled in field craft and, being language-speaking will, to a limited extent, be able to infiltrate enemy lines and work with native groups and individuals. A short time after the period of a further advance they may be used, again, as they were at invasion time.

While A.O. Groups, once battle lines are drawn, should, in all logic, be attached to combat units (Divisions, Brigades or even Regiments), the final decision regarding the validity of operations proposed for them should rest to the greatest possible extent consistent with military discipline and organization - with the A.O. Command. This Command will be able to appraise the feasibility of a planned operation and will recognize the limitations of their own groups. Operations of the type envisioned should not be carried out solely for the purpose of "keeping the units busy". Often, if abortive, they will only disclose and hamper broader movements and would better never be commenced.

In our consideration of Auxiliary Operations the "team" conception has not been overlooked. The S.O. Groups are, purposely, to be heavily officered with the view not only of meeting heavy "liquidation" but also because two or three officers from each unit should undoubtedly precede, by a day or two, the groups to which they are attached in order to establish contacts, do preliminary planning and be on the ground to receive their commands on "D" Day.

#### The Need for A.O. Groups

The request for operational units of the type herein described has come not only from our Norwegian Allies but, also, from our own Theatre Commanders in North Africa and the Middle East. Here, indeed, the request has gone made more recently than by General Harstein. Permission to expedite such a course has been expressly given by AFHQ and USARPAC in the authorization obtained, in these Theatres, by the undersigned as Special Representative of the Director of the Office of Strategic Services. In AFHQ, in point of fact, was the liaison had with Brigadier Whiteley (Deputy Chief of Staff) who has acted, at least preliminarily, on the request of O.S.S., centered about our ability to supply, at the earliest moment, an unlimited number of A.O. Groups.

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for use in and from that Theatre. It was urged by Brigadier Whitely that this be made the primary objective of O.S.S. in the Western Mediterranean. He and other members of the Staff who were present at our conferences not only recognized the potential value of these O.S.S. units but confirmed the belief that they can be supplied, sufficiently and quickly, only from the great reservoir of language-speaking groups which is to be found in the United States.

#### Conclusion

The usefulness of A.O. groups has not only been confirmed by members of our Army Staffs in the Theatre which has been visited but by an actual inspection, by the undersigned, of operations on the Tunisian front. Here O.S.S. groups are working, in the South, with our own Second Corps and, in the North, S.O.E. groups are attached to the First Army. The operations have not, in truth, proved too successful. This, however, has not been because the need for units of the character described does not exist but rather because the groups which have been employed were "improvised", under the spur of necessity, from among natives who possess neither the intelligence, skill or equipment for the work demanded of them. These natives are largely of the "saboteur" type - tough, courageous men who would be useful to an O.S.S. organizer but whose talents are largely wasted in the assignments which have been given them. In spite of their limitations they have, however, made some valuable contributions - both on the information and action side - to the work of our combat units. They have demonstrated, beyond question, that the need for Auxiliary Operations units is a real one.

The impressions gathered in Tunisia lead to one more conclusion: It would be foolhardy - and certainly not utilitarian - to undertake the organization and expedition of A.O. Groups unless O.S.S. is properly authorized to proceed with a program of organization, training and equipment calculated to produce detachments capable of fulfilling, completely, their intended missions. The units must be a part of our armed forces and, since time is of the essence, should be drawn from enlisted groups who have already received a course of basic training. As pointed out above, they must be highly intelligent and well disciplined. They should be trained in organization work, in intelligence, subversion, combat operations, sabotage, field craft and scouting. They should be parachutists and many of them must be skilled in communications. They should be lightly but carefully equipped. They must be highly mobile, self-contained units with an abundance of fire power and striking force. Above all, they must be heavily officered and well led. They will need something of the same qualifications and equipment as had General Montgomery's desert bands who served him so well in the African campaign.

In order to implement the program herein suggested provision will have to be made at once for a Table of Organization, for recruiting from existing units and for proper equipment and supplies. Training will offer no great

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
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difficulty. Preliminary training will be done in the United States and "refresher courses" can be given in the field where O.S.S. and other facilities are already in existence. Equipment and supplies can, in the main, be obtained from army sources once an A.O. program is actuated.

One major difficulty remains unsolved, viz: the method of incorporating local patriots into the A.O. Groups, or into cooperating local units, so as to give them the protection afforded members of an organized, uniformed military unit. They should be enrolled in our own Army or in an established military organization of the Government in Exile with which they are identified. They should most certainly be given some distinguishing uniform. Even if this cannot be done, their services will undoubtedly be available since most of them will have weighed - long ago - the penalties of failure.

Since time is of the essence, a proposed "Outline of Organization" and "Table of Organization" as well as lists of "Unit Requirements" of supply, equipment and transportation are submitted herewith.

I await your further orders in the matter.

  
Ellery O. Huntington, Jr.,  
Lt. Col., AUS.

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AUXILIARY OPERATIONS GROUPSTABLE OF ORGANIZATIONPersonnel required each area.(assumption 1 Detachment 2 Sections)

## GRADE

UNIT	DUTY	GRADE													TOTAL.	
		COL.	LT. COL.	MAJOR	CAPT.	1st LT.	2nd LT.	STAFF SGT.	1st SGT.	SGT.	TECH. SGT.	CPL.	PRC.			
A. O. GROUP COMMAND	(DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS & COMMANDING OFFICER)	1														1
" "	EXEC. OFFICER		1													1
" "	SUP. & TRANS. OFF.			1												1
" "	PLANNING OFF.			1												1
" "	ASST. EXEC. OFF.				1											1
" "	ASST. S & T OFF.				1											1
" "	ASST. PLAN. OFF.				1											1
" "	CLERICAL ASSTS.									2		2				4
TOTALS		1	1	2	3					2		2				11
AREA COMMAND	AREA COMMANDER		1													1
" "	EXEC. OFFICER			1												1
" "	PLANNING OFF.				1											1
" "	ADM. ASST.									1						1
" "	CYPHER CLERKS & MESSENGERS											1				1
TOTALS			1	1	1					1		1				5
DETACHMENT - CONTROL UNIT	DETACHMENT COMMANDER			1												1
" "	EXEC. OFFICER				1											1
" "	ADJUTANT					1										1
" "	S. & T. OFF.					1										1



(continued)

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UNIT	DUTY	COL	LT. COL.	MAJOR	CAPT	1ST LT.	2ND LT.	STAFF SGT.	1ST SGT	2ND SGT	3RD SGT.	CPL	PTG	TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL (Dwd)		1	2	4	5	3		1		3	2	10		31
SECTION * OPERATIONS UNIT	SECTION C.O.				2									2
" "	(OPERATIONAL ASST. AND PLANNING CPT.					2								2
" "	MEDICAL CPT					2								2
" "	ADM. ASST.								2					2
" "	COMM. ASST.										2			2
" "	SUB & TRANS & MESS										2			2
" "	SECTION CLERK											2		2
" "	COOK											2		2
" "	W.T. OPERATOR												2	2
" "	CYCLER CLERKS & MESSENGERS												6	6
TOTALS					2	4			2		4	4	6	24
PLATOON ** COMMAND UNIT	PLATOON LEADER					2	2							4
" "	2ND IN COMMAND									4				4
TOTALS						2	2			4				8
SQUAD *** BASIC UNIT	SQUAD LEADER										8			8
" "	W.T. OPERATOR											8		8
" "	SQUAD MEMBERS												32	32
TOTALS											8	8	32	48
GRAND TOTAL		1	2	4	7	9	2	1	2	7	14	22	40	111

\* = Requirements for two sections

\*\* = Two Sections or four Platoons.

\*\*\* = Four Platoons or eight Squads.

Upon expansion (through induction of patriots) the following would

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- (3) Former "Seconds in Command" of the Platoons would become "Platoon Leaders" and the 4 former Squad Leaders would become "Seconds in Command" of the 4 Platoons.
- (4) There would be left 1 Wireless Operator formerly with each of the 4 original Squads. One such W.T. Operator would be placed with each of the new Platoons.
- (5) Section Headquarters would remain as originally constituted - i.e. a total of 12 officers and men.
- (6) A comparison of the Sections before and after the induction of members of local resistance Groups would, therefore, be:-

TYPICAL SECTION.

(2 Platoons 2 Squads each)  
Original Status

(4 Platoons 4 Squads each)  
After local induction

SECTION	Original Status				After local induction			
	Officers	N.O.Os	Enlisted men or Members	Total	Officers	N.O.Os	Enlisted men or Members	Total
<u>SECTION</u>	3	5	4	12	3	5	4	12
<u>Total</u>	3	5	4	12	3	5	4	12
-----								
<u>PLATOONS</u>								
1st	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2
2nd	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2
3rd	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	2
4th	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	2
<u>Total</u>	2	2	0	4	2	6	0	8
-----								
<u>SQUADS</u>								
<u>1st Platoon</u>								
1st Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
2nd Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
3rd Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
4th Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
<u>2nd Platoon</u>								
1st Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
2nd Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
3rd Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
4th Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
<u>3rd Platoon</u>								
4 Squads	-	-	-	-	0	0	20	20
<u>4th Platoon</u>								
4 Squads	-	-	-	-	0	0	20	20

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	Officers	N.O.Os	Enlisted men or Members	Total	Officers	N.O.Os	Enlisted men or Members	Total
	3	5	4	12	3	5	4	12
<u>Total</u>	3	5	4	12	3	5	4	12
<u>PLATOONS</u>								
1st	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2
2nd	1	1	0	2	1	2	0	2
3rd	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	2
4th	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	2	2	0	4	2	6	0	8
<u>SQUADS</u>								
<u>1st Platoon</u>								
1st Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
2nd Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
3rd Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
4th Squad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>2nd Platoon</u>								
1st Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
2nd Squad	0	1	4	5	0	0	5	5
3rd Squad	-	-	-	-	0	0	5	5
4th Squad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>3rd Platoon</u>								
4 Squads	-	-	-	-	0	0	20	20
<u>4th Platoon</u>								
4 Squads	-	-	-	-	0	0	20	20
W.T. Operators	0	4	0	4	0	4	0	4
<u>Total</u>	0	8	16	24	0	4	80	84
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	5	13	20	40	5	13	84	104

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- (7) A normal Detachment should probably consist of 4 Sections - i.e. an original total of 160 officers and men (exclusive of Detachment Headquarters of 15 officers and men) as this would be the minimum required for an operation against strategic targets where local aid (never assured) is unobtainable. When expanded as visualized the total Detachment would consist of a force of 416 officers and men (exclusive of the Detachment Headquarters Group of 15). This would be a sizeable enough Group to undertake combat operations of considerable proportions - particularly if, after the first surprise blow, paratroop aid were given.

March 6, 1943

AUXILIARY OPERATIONS GROUPSOUTLINE OF ORGANIZATIONBASIC UNIT - SQUAD:

Squad Leader	...	1 - Technical Sgt.
W/T Operator	...	1 - Corporal
Squad Members	...	4 - P.F.O.'s (Corporals)

Equipment: Suitcase set type short wave "Transceiver", carbines, automatic or semi-automatic rifles or sub-machine guns, grenades and 1 light or heavy machine gun.

COMMAND UNIT - PLATOON:

2 SQUADS		
Platoon Leader	...	1 - 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Second in Command	...	1 - Sergeant.

OPERATIONS UNIT - SECTION: (Note (1).)

2 PLATOONS		
Section Commanding Officer	...	1 - Captain
<u>Note (2):</u> Operational Assistant (Planning)	...	1 - 1st Lieut.
Medical Officer	...	1 - 1st Lieut.
Administrative Assistant	...	1 - 1st Sergeant.
Communications Assistant	...	1 - Tech. Sergeant.
Supply, Transp. & Mess Supervisor	...	1 - Tech. Sergeant.
Section Clerk	...	1 - Corporal
Cook	...	1 - Corporal
W/T Operator	...	1 - P.F.O.
Messengers & Cipher Clerks	...	3 - P.F.O.'s

(Note (1)): Section Hqs located at or near operational Hqs of Combat Team.

(Note (2)): Section Hqs Unit under Command First Lieut. (Planning Officer) equipped with carbines, grenades, "Transceiver" set and mortar.

CONTROL UNIT - DETACHMENT (Hqs): (Note (1))

2 (or more) SECTIONS		
Detachment Commander	...	1 - Major
Executive Officer	...	1 - Captain
<u>Note (2):</u> Adjutant	...	1 - 1st Lieut.
Supply & Transportation Officer	...	1 - 1st Lieut.
Communications Officer	...	1 - 1st Lieut.
Administrative Assistant	...	1 - Staff Sergeant.
Supply & Transp. Assistant	...	1 - Tech. Sgt.
Communications Assistant	...	1 - Tech. Sgt.
Clerical Assistants	...	2 - Corporals.
Messengers & Cipher Clerks	...	2 - Corporals.
W/T Operators	...	

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6 March '43Auxiliary Operations Groups - Outline of Organization:

(Note (1)): Hqrs will be near Division, Brigade or Regimental Hqrs.

(Note (2)): Detachment Hqrs Unit under Command Adjutant - second in Command Staff Sergeant. Equipped with carbines, grenades, two "B" set Transmitters and Receivers and Heavy Mortar or Heavy M.G.

AREA COMMAND (Hqrs): (Note)

All Detachments operating in and from Theatre.

Area Commander	...	1 - Lieut.Colonel
Executive Officer	...	1 - Major
Planning Officer	...	1 - Captain
Administrative Assistant	...	1 - Sgt.
Messengers & Cipher Clerks	...	2 - Corporals

(Note): Headquarters will, for convenience in operational planning, be at or near Theatre Command Hqrs and presumably, therefore, at O.S.S. Hqrs in the Theatre. Equipped with carbines or automatic pistols.

GROUP COMMAND (Hqrs): (Note)

Director of all Groups wherever operating.

Commanding Officer A.O. Groups	...	1 - Colonel
Executive Officer A.O. Groups	...	1 - Lieut-Colonel
Supply and Transp. Officer A.O.Groups	...	1 - Major
Planning Officer A.O. Groups	...	1 - Major
Assistant Executive Officer A.O.Groups	..	1 - Captain
Assistant Supply & Transp.Officer A.O. Groups	...	1 - Captain
Assistant Planning Officer A.O.Groups	...	1 - Captain
Clerical Assistants	...	2 - Sgts.
Clerical Assistants	...	2 - Corporals

(Note): Headquarters at O.S.S. Headquarters, Washington, D.C., or at O.S.S. Field Headquarters in respective Theatres as circumstances may require. Equipped with carbines or automatic pistols.

AUXILIARY OPERATIONS GROUPSUnit Requirements

(Assumption: 1 Detachment - 1 Section - 2 Platoons -  
4 Squads)

ORIGINAL REQUIREMENTS:

Personal Equipment for Detachment Headquarters Unit totaling  
15, Section Headquarters Unit totaling 12,  
Platoon Command Units totaling 4, Squads  
(with W/T Operators) totaling 24, or a  
grand total of 55.

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total</u>
Underwear (cotton)	2 suits	110
Underwear (light wool)	2 suits	110
Sox (light)	3 pairs	165
Sox (wool)	3 pairs	165
Garters	1 pair	55
Shoes (regulation)	1 pair	55
Shoes (paratroop)	1 pair	55
Suspenders	1 pair	55
Shirts (O.D. wool)	2	110
Shirts (cotton)	2	110
Tie (O.D.)	1	55
Cap (oversea)	1	55
* Cap (fur-lined)	1	55
Battle dress (tunic & trousers)	1	55
Web belt	1	55
Leggins (special)	1	55
Bedding (oil silk & kapok)	1	55
Poncho (rubber)	1	55
Shelter Halves - oil silk - per 1/2	1	55
Jacket (field) plain	1	55
* Jacket (field) fur-lined	1	55
Overcoat (short)	1	55
* Gloves (fur-lined)	1	55
Knapack (strap & suspenders)	1 (large)	55

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	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total</u>
Cartridge belt	1	
Cartridge clips - 45 automatic	2	55
" " 30 calibre carbine	4	110
Cartridge clip pouches - 45 auto- matic	1	220
" " pouches - 30 calibre carbine	2	55
First Aid Pouch (special)	1	110
Canteen	1	55
Mess Kit	1	55
Holster for 45 Automatic (& thong)	1	55
45 automatic Pistol	1	55
45 ammunition	1	55
30 calibre carbine	20 rounds	1,100
30 cal. ammunition	1	55
Smatchet	60 rounds	3,300
Utility knife	1	55
Plastic and Fuse Carrier (special)	1	55
Grenade Carrier (special)	1	55
		55

• Northern units only.

Armament

Mortar (2")	2	
Mortar (2") ammunition shells	100	2
Mortar (60 mm)	1	100
Mortar (60 mm) ammunition shells	20	1
Machine Gun (light)	1	20
Machine Gun (light) ammunition	500 rounds	1
Machine Gun (50 cal.)	1	500 rounds
Machine Gun (50 cal.) ammunition	500 rounds	1
Sub machine gun (45 cal.)	5	500 rounds
Sub machine gun (45 cal.) ammunition	250 rounds	5
Sub machine gun (9 mm) Sten	5	250 rounds
Sub machine gun (9 mm) Sten ammunition	250 rounds	5
		250 rounds

Transportation

Command car & trailer	1	
G-P and trailers	6	1
G-P and ammunition car	1	6
G-P and field kitchen	1	1
G-p trailer and radio equipment	1	1
Motorcycle and side car	2	1
		2



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	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
Rations K - for 3 days	3	165
Rations Field - for 3 days	3	165
Headquarters Tent - silk	1	55
Cook Stoves (individual) (approximately 1 for every two persons)		30
<u>Supplemental Equipment for Resistance Groups</u>		
Carbines (30 cal.)	30	30
Ammunition for Carbines -	per gun 500 rounds	15,000
Sub machine guns (45 cal.)	5	5
Sub machine gun ammunition	per gun 500 rounds	2,500
Sub machine guns (9 mm)	5	5
Sub machine gun ammunition	per gun 500 rounds	2,500
45 Automatic or 38 Luger	15	15
45 (38) ammunition	per gun 50 rounds	750

SECRET

*Guerrilla Units 10,308  
x Philippines  
x Whitney, Courtney.*

*(Duplicate Filed  
Philippines 10,914)*

November 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division.

Subject: Organization and Training of Philippine Manpower.

1. Examination of the program under which citizens of the Philippines, enlisted in the Army of the United States or inducted under the Selective Service and Training Act, are being organized and trained as infantry units suggests that the real potential value of this manpower to implement General MacArthur's plan for future Philippine operations is being over-looked.

2. It is understood that to date there are over five thousand Filipinos enrolled under this program--little short of the number required to bring two regiments to full strength. Having in mind the relatively small and static group from which this manpower is selected for military service, it is not, however, to be expected that the tactical units organized therefrom will be able to meet the standards of either age or physique which other comparable units of the American Forces are able to maintain. As a consequence, it can hardly be hoped that, organized and trained as infantry units, they could ever reach the tactical proficiency of other similar units with a much lower age bracket and a correspondingly higher state of physical fitness. This, in turn will either result in the ultimate elimination of such units from any force dispatched to the Philippine theater under General MacArthur's plan of future action, or their inclusion therein for political or ideological reasons at the expense of accommodations otherwise available for comparable forces of much greater striking power.

3. In the opinion of the undersigned, on the other hand, the real potential value of this Philippine manpower may not lie in its ultimate conventional employment in force as now being organized and trained, but rather in its utilization, individually or in small units, trained to execute special operations missions for which peculiarly adapted by reason of origin, race and language, in furtherance of General MacArthur's general plan for the reconquest of the Philippine area, and to such use as he may require, as required:

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a. to infiltrate into enemy occupied areas for the purpose of organizing, encouraging and leading native resistance;

b. to counter Japanese propaganda and that of collaborating native political leaders;

c. to sabotage enemy installations;

d. to engage in security services in the maintenance of contact with, and to carry instructions to forces now committed to guerrilla warfare;

e. to prepare landing and beach facilities as required;

f. to act as guides and interpreters, and organize natives in strategic areas to facilitate landing operations and cross country advance, once our troops are landed in force; and

g. to develop information on enemy installations and movements and obtain such information as may be shared with the people of the general area.

None of the foregoing objectives are dependent upon size or physical physique, but rather on native ability, including familiarity with the area concerned, fluency with the local dialect and ability to command the full confidence of the people, coupled with rigorous training and careful indoctrination.

4. Underdeveloped has great respect for the Filipino people, having lived among them and worked with them for over a dozen years. Their future welfare, primarily their education, health, and economic progress, and their freedom, their good will and their best interests, existing adverse conditions, they are not to be taken for granted. Ability they cannot envy, or resent, for they are not to be over-looked--but their genuine interests, to their progress and appeals of their own well-being, must be taken for granted or too little for granted. It is not to be taken for granted to find instead, open hostility or indifference to our cause. These factors involve psychological operations, and must be weighed in planning future Philippine operations, and of them, if all else, is primarily not to be lost.

5. Such considerations do, however, suggest the potential value of implementing the latter's plan for future intelligence operations, by conducting selected and trained and carefully

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**SECRET**

instructed Filipinos to advance action designed to accomplish any or all of the missions hereinafter outlined. To be able to effectively do so, requires searching classification, careful indoctrination and highly specialized and diversified training.

6. For the reasons hereinafore stated, it is recommended that revision be made of the criteria governing the organization and training of Filipino manpower now available to the United States, to envisage its ultimate employment in a true sense as "Philippine Scouts" (a name highly respected by the Filipinos), either individually or in relatively small tactical units, in areas of the Philippines where by reason of origin, race and tenor, commitment to action may be made with best chance for success. Such units operate to date available to General MacArthur's future employment a force of inestimable, rather than dubious, value.

Geoffrey Whitney,  
Colonel, Air Corps.

**SECRET**

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November 18, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division.

Subject: Organization and Training of Philippine Manpower.

1. Examination of the program under which citizens of the Philippines, enlisted in the Army of the United States or inducted under the Selective Service and Training Act, are being organized and trained as infantry units suggests that the real potential value of this manpower to implement General MacArthur's plan for future Philippine operations is being overlooked.

2. It is understood that to date there are over five thousand Filipinos enrolled under this program-- little short of the number required to bring two regiments to full strength. Having in mind the relatively small and static group from which this manpower is selected for military service, it is not, however, to be expected that the tactical units organized therefrom will be able to meet the standards of either age or physique which other comparable units of the American Forces are able to maintain. As a consequence, it can hardly be hoped that, organized and trained as infantry units, they could ever reach the tactical proficiency of other similar units with a much lower age bracket and a correspondingly higher state of physical fitness. This, in turn will either result in the ultimate elimination of such units from any force dispatched to the Philippine theater under General MacArthur's plan of future action, or their inclusion therein for political or ideological reasons at the expense of accommodations of service available for comparable forces of much greater striking power.

3. In the opinion of the undersigned, on the other hand, the real potential value of this Philippine manpower, does not lie in its ultimate conventional employment in force as now being organized and trained, but rather in its utilization, individually or in small units, trained to execute special operations which are peculiarly adapted by reason of origin, race and training, in furtherance of General MacArthur's concept plan for the conquest of the Philippine area, and to such end as to require no special requirements.

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**SECRET**

- A. to infiltrate into enemy occupied areas for the purpose of organizing, encouraging and leading native resistance;
- B. to counter Japanese propaganda and that of collaborating native political leaders;
- C. to sabotage enemy installations;
- D. to engage in courier service in the maintenance of contact with, and to carry instructions to forces now committed to guerrilla warfare;
- E. to prepare landing and beach facilities as required;
- F. to act as guides and interpreters, and organize natives in strategic areas to facilitate landing operations and cross country advances, once our troops are landed in force; and
- G. to develop information on enemy installations and movements and maintain such contact as may be desired with the people of the several areas.

None of the foregoing objectives are dependent upon age or youthful physique, but rather on native ability, including familiarity with the area concerned, fluency with the local dialect and ability to command the full confidence of the people, coupled with rigorous training and careful indoctrination.

4. Undersigned has great fondness for the Filipino people, having lived among them and worked with them for over twenty years. Their future welfare, possibly their salvation, however, now requires careful and frank appraisal of both their strength and their weakness, their good points and their bad, lest under existing adverse conditions they be over-burdened with responsibility they cannot carry, or responsibility they can carry be ever-looked—lest their continued resistance to enemy propaganda and appeals of their own collaborationist leaders be taken too much or too little for granted—lest we base our plans on friendly aid to find instead, open hostility or indifference at strategic points. These factors involve psychological considerations, well known of course, to General MacArthur, and which he has undoubtedly carefully weighed in planning future Philippine operations, and of which he, of all men, is probably best able to judge.

5. Such considerations do, however, suggest the potential value of implementing the latter's plan for future Philippine operations, by committing selected well trained and carefully

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

instructed Filipinos to advance action designed to accomplish any or all of the missions hereinbefore outlined. To be able to effectively do so, requires searching classification, careful indoctrination and highly specialized and diversified training.

6. For the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is recommended that revision be made of the doctrine governing the organization and training of Filipino manpower now available to the United States, to envisage its ultimate employment in a true sense as "Philippine Scouts" (a name highly respected by the Filipinos) either individually or in relatively small tactical units, in areas of the Philippines where by reason of origin, race and tongue, commitment to action may be made with best chance for success. Such would operate to make available to General MacArthur's future employment a force of incalculable, rather than dubious, value.

Courtney Whitney,  
Colonel, Air Corps.

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

November 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR Lieutenant General S. D. Embick, U.S.A.,  
Operations Division,  
General Staff.

Subject: The Philippine Situation.

1. This will serve to restate in memorandum form my views with respect to the Philippine situation as I expressed them orally to you the other day.

2. In any examination of the subject matter, I believe we must look upon the Philippines and its people realistically, as a land area comprising more than 7,000 islands, inhabited by approximately 17,000,000 potentially loyal people, lying athwart the Japanese flank. How we utilize this land area and employ these people will determine, in no small degree, the future course of the war in the Pacific.

3. Those of us who knew the Philippines knew that they are far from occupied by the Japanese in a literal sense-- knew that, whereas certain strategic areas are occupied, to cover any great portion of the Archipelago would require an amphibious invasion by a great armada of ships, carrying vast numbers of occupying forces, many months if not years to accomplish. Neither the time, nor men, nor ships have been available to the Japanese for such purposes. To the contrary, from reports filtering in, it appears quite evident that positions in the Philippines are but thinly held and that over the vast area involved, enemy occupation is the exception rather than the rule.

4. Those of us who know the Filipinos, on the other hand, know that it would be folly to take too much for granted the continued loyalty of the masses, for:

a. They fought our occupation at the turn of the century;

b. Ever since they have been indoctrinated with the ideology that ~~some~~ ~~India~~ demanded our

CONFIDENTIAL



immediate expulsion as the sovereign power--  
that, to use the words of one of their great  
political leaders, "A Government run like hell  
by Filipinos was preferable to one run like  
heaven by Americans";

3. They have been very conscious of racial  
distinctions--they are not susceptible to Japa-  
nese anti-white propaganda;

4. Their security under American protection,  
long touted as political dogma of our own,  
failed when they most needed it, leaving them  
bereft of protection, leadership or even en-  
couragement from a sovereign upon whom they had  
long been taught to depend;

5. With the assistance of American historians  
as propagandists, and our failure to extend our  
moral encouragement, and leadership to the Filip-  
ino people in their emergency, we made  
and influenced among the masses a false  
line and many of their own great political  
leaders chose the path of open Japa-  
nese collaboration as the only way out.

6. Even in consideration of the Japanese considerations  
and any others not specifically mentioned, it is our  
pending nationalization of land, and the fact that  
have in any case to be met in the Philippines  
upon our return, or upon the day when we shall  
that they will have long since succumbed to the  
made available to them, and when we shall  
Japanese equipment have become available, and  
against us. On this ground, we think the line of  
Eastern war effort--as it should be--and  
certainly rest in the balance.

7. Although not yet completely convinced on  
position, I believe there is only one way to  
telligent employment of force, and it is our  
can be done to reunite them if we can  
islands without the Japanese. In the  
pine situation, a potential, separated and  
that flank.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. In this I am influenced by the history and history is replete with instances in which the small but survived where military force has failed. With proper leadership, direction and encouragement, it can be equally so with the Filipinos. Such leadership, direction and encouragement may, however, only be obtained through direct personal contact with the people, by frequent display of the flag, and by the utilization of every opportunity for the telling employment of force against the common enemy.

8. Foremost among the great common enemies to us now, the potential value of which we have not yet fully recognize, is the Filipino manpower base and its potential the value of which does not arise from our ability to draw therefrom a combat unit, however large, for inclusion in our military organization, but rather in our ability to find therein individuals or groups from each of the several islands of the Philippines—individuals or groups who are well equipped and properly trained and instructed, and who are fully committed to the discharge of any military duty that we wish. In such employment the value of the trained individual may be measured in terms of manpower alone, as his contribution may well be one that a large unit of other nationalities could not hope to achieve—and should we overlook the fact that there appear to be already available to us in the Philippines, American and Filipino officers and men, our own men and our own Corregidor were left in widely scattered areas and in only a rallying point, however, and given a proper understanding of the fact that the towns of the Philippines have been ideally to successful tactics of individual units, and that we ourselves may well adopt the counter-offensive tactics of the Japanese, as the opportunity to do so presents itself.

9. It is based upon these considerations that I urge thought be given to the development of some means of early strengthening our position in the Philippines, at least to the extent of preventing the further deterioration of our position and in view, I propose:

a. That the training of Filipinos be given to an extent to produce a well equipped, mobile force in each of the Philippines and that they may be considered to assist with best chance for success.

b. That for purposes of placing the Philippines in a strategic line across of

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military fortunes in the area involved, but I believe the principles therein stated are as controlling today as they were then, and may be of interest to you. I particularly call your attention to the proclamation proposed for issuance by the President, which was presented by Colonel Donovan and generally concurred in, subject to a definite plan of accompanying military action. Its interest now lies in the principles in which the President seems to have been in general agreement which, while now more limited in application, are little different than at the time the action was initially proposed.

Courtesy Whitney,  
Colonel, Air Corps.

1 Encl.  
Tabbed memo. A - R.


**CONFIDENTIAL**

15995B

To: Mr. Halliwell

Referred from Colonel  
Donovan.

Noted with thanks and copied  
for our basic file.

  
RDH

Director's Office

(9908)

100-2976

*Guerrilla Units 10,361*  
*\* Philippines (C. Richards)*  
*\* Richards, Atherton*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

*July* 159958  
*July 1-22*  
*July 1-22*  
*July 1-22*

TO: Colonel Donovan  
FROM: Lt. Col. Atherton Richards  
SUBJECT: Potential use of Philippine guerilla forces.

DATE: 2/6/43

In a conversation the other evening with President Quezon of the Philippines, he stated that he was in constant communication with many areas in the Philippines where active resistance was continuing against Japanese inroads. He further stated that the Filipinos conducting the resistance were, on the other hand, being "picked off" in small numbers. He was of the opinion that if authoritative word could be sent these elements of resistance to "lay low" until an appointed time, much eventual gain would transpire.

He further stated that he had been advised that a considerable number of Filipinos had ostensibly become collaborationists with the Japanese. These individuals, however, actually were a means of warning their countrymen when any Japanese activity was planned to attack resistance elements.

Although recognizing that the foregoing comments might be primarily for submitting proof of the loyalty of the Filipinos to the President's auditors, it is recommended that consideration be given to possibly a more correlated program for conserving the guerilla spirit of the Filipinos and making it available for concerted action at an appropriate time.

*AR*  
A. R.

*Guerrilla Units*

*10,301*

*10,301-A*

*Guerrilla Units  
10,301  
10,301-A*

Guerilla Units 8067a  
X Foreign Groups  
X Suggestions

August 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Colonel Goodfellow

FROM: Colonel Donovan

In making up your foreign guerilla groups, and in talking about them, it has been suggested that:

- 1) Referring to Czech groups you should not forget Slovaks.
- 2) In German groups do not forget Austrians.
- 3) In Italian groups probably consideration should be given to whether Italian Communists will participate.



Guerrilla Units 10,301  
x Foreign  
x Bilingual  
x Organization  
x McNamara

Guerrilla Units 10301.A  
x Guerrilla Warfare  
x Organization  
x Requirements  
x War Dept.

{ See - Personnel Military  
10,953  
Request for allotment  
3/15

*Guerrilla Units 10,301A*  
*\* Guerrilla Warfare*

**SECRET**  
*\* War Dept*  
*\* Organization*  
*\* Requirements*

Annex K.  
JCS - 170

March 18, 1943

Memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Organization for the conduct of guerilla warfare.

1. A memorandum dated February 18, 1943, Subject: Organization for the conduct of guerilla warfare, was submitted to you from me. This memorandum is hereby withdrawn and the following is substituted therefore.
2. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff #156/W/D, dated December 23, 1942, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services is charged with the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare, the personnel to be provided for guerilla warfare to be limited to organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of guerilla units.
3. As stated in the previous memorandum, in order to comply with this directive I have sought the advice and recommendation of General Smith, General Magruder and General Fellers.
4. The Commanding General, AFHQ, has approved in principle the plan for OSS operations in North Africa, which plan provides for the dispatching to that theatre of from four to eight groups or nuclei to be used as such and as organizers and fomenters in areas adjacent to that theatre.
5. In order to train and supply the operational nuclei for the North African theatre and to train other groups of nuclei which may be called for by Commanding Generals of other theatres of operations in the future, I would like to proceed as follows:

SECRET

a. To procure teams of specially selected personnel, officers and enlisted specialists, now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. This personnel will train special language groups within the United States or within the various theatres, which language groups will be commissioned or enlisted in the United States Army and will be used as the organizers, founders and operational nuclei for the organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare as directed by the Theatre Commanders.

b. It is proposed to select the personnel who will compose the training groups and nuclei from among individuals who speak one or more of the following 24 languages, or who have these racial backgrounds:

- |                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| French          | Hungarian |
| German          | German    |
| Dutch           | Romanian  |
| Danish          | Bulgarian |
| Belgian         | Austrian  |
| Italian         | Greek     |
| Sicilian        | Norwegian |
| Sardinian       | Korean    |
| Yugoslavian     | Thai      |
| Albanian        | Serbian   |
| Polish          | Japanese  |
| Czechoslovakian | Arab      |

c. The composition of a training team and an operational nucleus is to be as follows:

<u>Training Team</u>	<u>Nucleus</u>
1 Captain	1 Captain
1 1st Lieutenant	1 1st Lieutenant
1 1st Sergeant	1 2nd Lieutenant
1 Staff Sergeant	1 1st Sergeant
1 Sergeant	1 Staff Sergeant
2 Radio Operator, technical, 4th or 5th grade (Specification Serial No. 777)	1 Sergeant
	2 Radio Operator, technical, 4th or 5th grade, (Specification Serial No. 777)

- 3 -

**SECRET**

6. In order to proceed with the organization and training of personnel to carry out the above program, it is requested that the Office of Strategic Services be given an allotment of:

48 Captain  
 48 1st Lieutenant  
24 2nd Lieutenant

Commissioned Officers 180

40 1st Sergeant  
 48 Staff Sergeant  
 88 Sergeant  
 120 Radio Operator, technician 4th or 5th  
 grade (S.G.N. 777)  
 72 Corporal and technician 5th grade

Non-commissioned Officers 384

Total Army Personnel 564

William J. Donovan  
 Director, Office of Strategic Services

*Guerrilla Warfare*  
*X Organization*  
*X Requirements*  
*X War Dept.*

February 22, 1943

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE

I am forwarding the attached memorandum  
for the Deputy Chief of Staff on the subject of  
organization for the conduct of guerilla warfare.

William J. Donovan  
Director

*2/18 Ltr to  
Dep. Ch. Staff.*

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

February 18, 1943

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff  
 War Department  
 Washington, D. C.

Subject: Organization for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare

1. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated December 23, 1942, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services is charged with the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare.

2. In order to comply with this directive, I have sought the advice and recommendation of General Smith, General Magruder and General Fellers. Based upon their report and subject to your approval, I would like to proceed as follows:

a. To procure teams of specially selected personnel, officers and enlisted specialists, now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. This personnel, after a course of training, will be sent to the various theaters to recruit and train special language groups within the theater. The language groups selected and trained within the theater will be used as the organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei for the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare as directed by the Theater Commander.

b. Each training team to be selected and sent to the theater would be limited initially to:

1 Captain  
 1 First Lieutenant  
 1 First Sergeant  
 1 Staff Sergeant  
 1 Sergeant, and  
 2 Radio Operator Technicians  
 4th or 5th grade (Specifica-  
 tion serial No. 777)

**SECRET**

-2-

These to be selected from trained personnel now within the Army and from among the following language groups:

French	Hungarian
Corsican	German
Dutch	Roumanian
Danish	Bulgarian
Belgian	Austrian
Italian	Greek
Sicilian	Norwegian
Sardinian	Korean
Yugoslav	Thai
Albanian	Filipino
Polish	Japanese
Czechoslovakian	Arab

c. The personnel to be trained within the theater for use as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare to be limited initially to groups of three officers and not more than eleven enlisted men for each language group, each group consisting of:

- 1 Captain
- 1 First Lieutenant
- 1 Second Lieutenant
- 1 First Sergeant
- 1 Staff Sergeant
- 3 Sergeants
- 3 Corporals, and
- 3 Radio Operator Technicians,  
4th or 5th grade (Specification serial No. 777)

This personnel to be selected from the alien language groups indicated in Paragraph b above, and to be commissioned or enlisted in the U. S. Army and to wear the U. S. Army uniform.

3. In order to permit the organization and training of personnel to carry out the above responsibility, it is requested:

a. That this office be given an initial allotment of:

**SECRET**

-3-

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 24 Sergeants, and  
 48 Radio Operator Technicians,  
 4th or 5th grade (Specifica-  
 tion serial No. 777)

Personnel to be procured from the Army and to consist principally of trained personnel from the Engineers, Ordnance, and Signal Corps Branches.

b. That this office be given an initial allotment of:

1 Colonel  
 1 Lieutenant Colonel  
 4 Majors  
 1 Captain  
 8 Second Lieutenants  
 1 Master Sergeant  
 6 Technical Sergeants  
 8 Corporals  
 10 Privates, First Class

for use as administrative, training and overhead within the Office of Strategic Services and theaters.

c. That an initial allotment and procurement objective be authorized for the procurement of personnel of the various alien language groups within theaters for use as organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units to be made as follows:

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 Second Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 72 Sergeants  
 72 Corporals  
 72 Radio Operator Technicians  
 4th or 5th grade (Specifica-  
 tion serial No. 777)

This personnel to be selected from the alien



-4-

language groups indicated in Paragraph 2. b above, and to be commissioned or enlisted in the U. S. Army and to wear the U. S. Army uniform.

d. All the above to be in addition to any previous allotments and procurement objectives authorized for the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan  
Director

JF:ARS

**SECRET**  
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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO


TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

FROM: Major General John P. Smith, USA

SUBJECT:

DATE: February 18, 1943

I am returning herewith the re-draft of my memorandum incorporating your comments and a re-draft of a memorandum for your signature to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The personnel indicated in Colonel Lowman's memorandum have been included in both papers. Colonel Lowman's memorandum is also returned herewith.



J. P. S.

Attachments (2)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

*File Copy*

February 18, 1943

Memorandum for the Director of the Office of  
Strategic Services

Subject: Organization for the conduct of Guerrilla  
Warfare

1. In compliance with your memorandum dated January 30, 1943 on the above subject in which you asked for advice and recommendations. The matter covering the organization for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare has been carefully studied by General Fellers, General Magruder and myself, and the following comments and recommendations are submitted.
2. The directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services the responsibility for the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Paragraph 7 (a) (3) of this directive includes this activity as one of the special operations to be conducted under the Office of Strategic Services.
3. In view of this, it appears that your organization is already prepared, under Special Operations, to train personnel for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the personnel to be provided for Guerrilla Warfare must be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerrilla units. My conception of the key personnel to be used as organizers and instructors in this training would be teams of specially selected personnel who are now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. These teams, after a course of training, would be sent to the theater to recruit and train special language groups within the theater. These trained special language groups within the theater will, in turn, be used as the organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. It is believed that the first group, that is the training teams of selected personnel, should normally be limited to about two officers and not more than five enlisted men for each language group, and that the groups of

**SECRET**

-2-

organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei to be trained within the theaters, should be limited initially to about three officers and not more than eleven enlisted men. The personnel within the theater who are selected as organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei should be enlisted and commissioned in the U. S. military service and should be permitted to wear the U. S. Army uniform. By limiting the key personnel for the organization of Guerrilla Warfare to the above size, it will permit their easy transportation by plane or submarine to areas where Guerrilla Warfare is to be organized and conducted.

4. Based upon the above conception of the organization for and the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, it is suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment for personnel to be selected from military units within the United States to be used for the training within theaters of organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units. The initial allotment to include:

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 24 Sergeants, and  
 48 Radio Operator Technicians,  
 4th or 5th grade (Specification serial No. 777)

This personnel to be limited to appropriate teams from among the following language groups:

French	Hungarian
Corsican	German
Dutch	Roumanian
Danish	Bulgarian
Belgian	Australian
Italian	Greek
Sicilian	Norwegian
Sardinian	Korean
Yugoslav	Thai
Albanian	Filipino
Polish	Japanese
Czechoslovakian	Arab

5. It is further suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment and procurement objective of:


SECRET

-3-

24 Captains  
24 First Lieutenants  
24 Second Lieutenants  
24 First Sergeants  
24 Staff Sergeants  
72 Sergeants  
72 Corporals  
72 Radio Operator Technicians  
4th or 5th grade (Specifica-  
tion serial No. 777)

to be selected from among the various language groups, indicated in Paragraph 4 above, to be recruited and trained as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units within theaters of operation as the needs in the field develop.

6. Recommendations. It is recommended that request be made upon the Deputy Chief of Staff as set forth in the attached memorandum.

  
John P. Smith  
Major General  
U. S. Army

1 Incl.  
(ltr to Dep Ch. Staff - 2/18 - encl w. Deane ltr 2/22)

**SECRET**

February 10, 1948

**Memorandum for the Director of the Office of  
Strategic Services****Subject: Organization for the conduct of Guerrilla  
Warfare**

1. In compliance with your memorandum dated January 30, 1948 on the above subject in which you asked for advice and recommendations. The matter covering the organization for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare has been carefully studied by General Fellers, General Magruder and myself, and the following comments and recommendations are submitted.

2. The directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services the responsibility for the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Paragraph 7 (a) (3) of this directive includes this activity as one of the special operations to be conducted under the Office of Strategic Services.

3. In view of this, it appears that your organization is already prepared, under Special Operations, to train personnel for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the personnel to be provided for Guerrilla Warfare must be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerrilla units. My conception of the key personnel to be used as organizers and instructors in this training would be teams of specially selected personnel who are now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. These teams, after a course of training, would be sent to the theater to recruit and train special language groups within the theater. These trained special language groups within the theater will, in turn, be used as the organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. It is believed that the first group, that is the training teams of selected personnel, should normally be limited to about two officers and not more than five enlisted men for each language group, and that the groups of

**SECRET**

-2-

organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei to be trained within the theaters, should be limited initially to about three officers and not more than eleven enlisted men. The personnel within the theater who are selected as organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei should be enlisted and commissioned in the U. S. military service and should be permitted to wear the U. S. Army uniform. By limiting the key personnel for the organization of Guerrilla Warfare to the above size, it will permit their easy transportation by plane or submarine to areas where Guerrilla Warfare is to be organized and conducted.

4. Based upon the above conception of the organization for and the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, it is suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment for personnel to be selected from military units within the United States to be used for the training within theaters of organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units. The initial allotment to include:

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 24 Sergeants, and  
 48 Radio Operator Technicians,  
 4th or 5th grade (Specification serial No. 777)

This personnel to be limited to appropriate teams from among the following language groups:

French	Hungarian
Corsican	German
Dutch	Romanian
Danish	Bulgarian
Belgian	Australian
Italian	Greek
Sicilian	Norwegian
Sardinian	Korean
Yugoslav	Thai
Albanian	Filipino
Polish	Japanese
Czechoslovakian	Arab

5. It is further suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment and procurement objective of:

**SECRET**

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24 Captains  
24 First Lieutenants  
24 Second Lieutenants  
24 First Sergeants  
24 Staff Sergeants  
72 Sergeants  
72 Corporals  
72 Radio Operator Technicians  
4th or 5th grade (Specifica-  
tion serial No. 777)

to be selected from among the various language groups, indicated in Paragraph 4 above, to be recruited and trained as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units within theaters of operation as the needs in the field develop.

6. Recommendations. It is recommended that request be made upon the Deputy Chief of Staff as set forth in the attached memorandum.

John P. Smith  
Major General  
U. S. Army

1 Incl.

jps/ars



**SECRET**

Colonel William J. Donovan

February 18, 1948

Major General John P. Smith, USA

I am returning herewith the re-draft of my memorandum incorporating your comments and a re-draft of a memorandum for your signature to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The personnel indicated in Colonel Lowman's memorandum have been included in both papers. Colonel Lowman's memorandum is also returned herewith.

J. P. S.

Attachments (2)

JPS:ARS

**SECRET**

February 18, 1948

**Memorandum for the Director of the Office of  
Strategic Services**

**Subject: Organization for the conduct of Guerrilla  
Warfare**

1. In compliance with your memorandum dated January 30, 1948 on the above subject in which you asked for advice and recommendations. The matter covering the organization for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare has been carefully studied by General Peppers, General Magruder and myself, and the following comments and recommendations are submitted.

2. The directive issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigns to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services the responsibility for the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Paragraph 7 (a) (3) of this directive includes this activity as one of the special operations to be conducted under the Office of Strategic Services.

3. In view of this, it appears that your organization is already prepared, under Special Operations, to train personnel for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the personnel to be provided for Guerrilla Warfare must be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerrilla units. My conception of the key personnel to be used as organizers and instructors in this training would be teams of specially selected personnel who are now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. These teams, after a course of training, would be sent to the theater to recruit and train special language groups within the theater. These trained special language groups within the theater will, in turn, be used as the organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare. It is believed that the first group, that is the training teams of selected personnel, should normally be limited to about two officers and not more than five enlisted men for each language group, and that the groups of

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-2-

organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei to be trained within the theaters, should be limited initially to about three officers and not more than eleven enlisted men. The personnel within the theater who are selected as organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei should be enlisted and commissioned in the U. S. military service and should be permitted to wear the U. S. Army uniform. By limiting the key personnel for the organization of Guerrilla Warfare to the above size, it will permit their easy transportation by plane or submarine to areas where Guerrilla Warfare is to be organized and conducted.

4. Based upon the above conception of the organization for and the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare, it is suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment for personnel to be selected from military units within the United States to be used for the training within theaters of organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units. The initial allotment to include:

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 24 Sergeants, and  
 48 Radio Operator Technicians,  
 4th or 5th grade (Specification serial No. 777)

This personnel to be limited to appropriate teams from among the following language groups:

French	Hungarian
Corsican	German
Dutch	Rumanian
Danish	Bulgarian
Belgian	Austrian
Italian	Greek
Sicilian	Norwegian
Sardinian	Korean
Yugoslav	Thai
Albanian	Filipino
Polish	Japanese
Czechoslovakian	Arab

5. It is further suggested that the War Department be requested to authorize an initial allotment and procurement objective of:

**SECRET**

-3-

24 Captains  
24 First Lieutenants  
24 Second Lieutenants  
24 First Sergeants  
24 Staff Sergeants  
72 Sergeants  
72 Corporals  
72 Radio Operator Technicians  
4th or 5th grade (Specification serial No. 777)

to be selected from among the various language groups, indicated in Paragraph 4 above, to be recruited and trained as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units within theaters of operation as the needs in the field develop.

G. Recommendations. It is recommended that request be made upon the Deputy Chief of Staff as set forth in the attached memorandum.

John P. Smith  
Major General  
U. S. Army

1 Incl.

jpa/ars



**SECRET**

*This is excellent  
the words of  
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of the*

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

February 5, 1945

*Redrafted  
2/18 sent.*

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Organization for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare

1. Under the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated December 23, 1943, the Director of the Office of Strategic Services is charged with the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare.

*Based upon the recommendation of the  
directive, it is proposed to proceed as follows:*

a. To procure teams of specially selected personnel, officers and enlisted specialists, now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications. This personnel, after a course of training, will be sent to the various theatres to recruit and train special language groups within the theatre. The language groups selected and trained within the theatre will be used as the organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei for the organization and conduct of Guerrilla Warfare within enemy and enemy-occupied or controlled territory as directed by the theatre commander.

b. Each training team to be selected and sent to the theatre would be limited initially to:

*1 - 2/T  
1 - 10/12*

- 1 Captain
- 1 First Lieutenant
- 1 First Sergeant
- 1 Staff Sergeant
- 1 Sergeant, and
- ~~1 Radio Operator Technician 5th Grade~~

These to be selected from trained personnel now within the Army and from among the following language groups:

**SECRET**

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French	Hungarian
Corsican	German
Dutch	Roumanian
Danish	Bulgarian
Belgian	Austrian
Italian	Greek
Sicilian	Norwegian
Sardinian	Korean
Yugoslav	Thai
Albanian	Filipino
Polish	Japanese
Czechoslovakian	Arab

c. The personnel to be trained within the theatre for use as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei for the conduct of Guerrilla Warfare in territory controlled by the enemy, to be limited initially to groups of three officers and not more than nine enlisted men for each language group, each group consisting of:

1 Captain  
 1 First Lieutenant  
 1 Second Lieutenant  
 1 First Sergeant  
 1 Staff Sergeant  
 3 Sergeants  
 3 Corporals, and  
 1 Radio Operator Technician,  
 5th Grade.

This personnel to be selected from language groups indicated in Paragraph b above.

3. In order to permit the organization and training of personnel to carry out the above responsibility, it is requested:

a. That this office be given an initial allotment of:

24 Captains  
 24 First Lieutenants  
 24 First Sergeants  
 24 Staff Sergeants  
 24 Sergeants, and  
 24 Radio Operator Technicians, 5th Grade.

**SECRET**

-3-

Personnel to be procured from the Army and to consist principally of trained personnel from the Engineers, Ordnance, and Signal Corps Branches.

b. That this office be given an initial allotment of:

- 1 Colonel
- 1 Lieutenant Colonel
- 4 Majors
- 1 Captain
- 2 Second Lieutenants
- 1 Master Sergeant
- 6 Technical Sergeants
- 8 Corporals
- 10 Privates, First Class

for use as administrative, training and overhead within the Office of Strategic Services. *7 others by command.*

c. That an initial allotment and procurement objective be authorized for the procurement of personnel of various language groups within theatres for use as organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of Guerrilla units to be made as follows:

- 24 Captains
- 24 First Lieutenants
- 24 Second Lieutenants
- 24 First Sergeants
- 24 Staff Sergeants
- 72 Sergeants
- 72 Corporals
- 24 Radio Operator Technicians, 5th Grade

d. All the above to be in addition to any previous allotments and procurement objectives authorized for the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan  
Director





*Laurel Units 10, 301*  
*Approved*  
*x Lt. Lingell*  
*x Major*  
**SECRET**  
*McNarney, Gen.*

January 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General John Magruder  
Major General John P. Smith  
Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers

FROM: William J. Donovan

I am asking for your advice and recommendations in a matter referred to us by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney.

Under our directive, JCS 155/A/D, we are authorized under Paragraph 7, subdivision (a), section 3(c), as to our psychological warfare functions, we have

✓ "the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare".

By the terms of subdivision (c) of the same paragraph it is provided that

"unless otherwise specifically authorized, personnel to be provided for guerilla warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerilla units".

As interpreted at the meeting of officers at which the directive was announced the term "operational nuclei" was construed as meaning small uniformed foreign groups of about thirty-five in number.

Under the terms of this directive so construed it has been my intention to carry on experimental work in North Africa. I purpose doing this by organizing

**SECRET**

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certain of the Corps Franc made up of young men between eighteen and twenty-three and available to us in groups of officers' patrols to be used in guerilla operations on the Tunisian front. This has the approval of the French authorities, and David King by agreement with the French was to act in liaison between Colonel Eddy and the French High Command.

It will be borne in mind that in our operations we make a distinction between partisan bands and our guerilla units.

We use the term partisan bands as applied to those groups of an Allied country which we have assisted in organizing and equipping and to which we furnish instruction in modern demolition.

The guerilla units are organized and trained by us and are under our control subject to the orders of the theatre commander. It has been our plan to use various racial bi-lingual groups. Upon this basis some months ago we had set up and processed through the various divisions of the War Department tables of organization for such a guerilla unit. I think those tables are apt to make the organization too large and rigid.

It is for that reason I would like to have your views.

While I think we should have the authority to select men who are now in the Army and who have the required language and racial qualifications, I also think we should be permitted to take men into our service to be in our uniform who are already located in the areas where we are operating. For example, in addition to the French in North Africa we could organize Italian groups to fight in Tunisia. In the Middle East we could make use not only of the Yugoslavs and Greeks and Poles with which groups we already have close relationship, but we might very well include Bulgarians and Hungarians.

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**SECRET**

I don't need to suggest to your gentlemen that the selection of these groups abroad in the very territory where we operate would help solve our logistic problem.

I would like to suggest, too, that by doing it in that manner instead of having training centers in America we would avoid certain of the political difficulties inherent in such organizations.

I believe that if we keep these units small and use them in the beginning at least for coup de main, we could more quickly get them into the field. To do this properly we will need the support of the War Department. We would need from them officers specially qualified for this work such as engineer and ordnance officers. Unless we are able to get the means to carry it out it would be useless for us to attempt it.

Will you therefore make a study as speedily as may be and let me have your recommendations which I will forward with my comments to General McNarney.

W.J.D.

**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan


DATE: 30 January 1943

FROM: Colonel Goodfellow

SUBJECT: Uniformed Bi-Lingual Groups for Guerrilla Warfare

Colonel Nelson phoned and said he had talked with General McNarney in regard to the recruiting and training of uniformed troops, bi-lingual, of various racial groups for guerrilla warfare to be used by theatre commanders. General McNarney is of the opinion that these groups can be best recruited, trained and used by the Office of Strategic Services.

He asked that Colonel Donovan have his three general officers -- Major General Smith, Brigadier General Fellers and Brigadier General Magruder -- submit a study and recommendation to him which would include the number of officers and enlisted men to a troop, the number of troops, their racial divisions and the type of training which they would receive, together with a general idea of the way in which these troops could aid the war effort.



M. P. Goodfellow

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

To:           Lieut. General Joseph T. McNarney  
 From:         W. J. Donovan  
 Subject:      Uniformed Bi-Lingual Troops for Guerrilla Warfare

Colonel Goodfellow has received word from Colonel Nelson that you are agreeable to the Office of Strategic Services recruiting and training uniformed troops, bi-lingual, of various racial groups for guerrilla warfare to be used by theatre commanders under directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is in accordance with discussions had with General Marshall and a directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at whose direction some months ago we set up and had processed through the various divisions of the War Department tables of organization for such a guerrilla unit.

As you realize, an all-nations command for guerrilla warfare of this type would tie in intimately with S.O. There should be troops of the following racial groups:

European Theatre

French\*Squadron (French and Corsican)  
 Dutch-Danish-Belgian Squadron  
 Italian Squadron (Italian, Sicilian and Sardinian)  
 Yugoslav-Albanian Squadron  
 Polish Squadron  
 Czechoslovakian Squadron  
 Hungarian-Roumanian-Bulgarian Squadron  
 Austrian Squadron  
 Greek Squadron  
 Norwegian Squadron

Far Eastern Theatre

Chinese-Korean Squadron  
 Thai Squadron  
 Filipino Squadron  
 Japanese Squadron

Will

\*8 Troops to a squadron, and  
 44 men and three officers to  
 a troop

Will you designate Colonel Argo in G-3 or some other officer to work out the details of the activation of these bi-lingual squadrons so that the recruiting and training can start at the earliest possible time?

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
Director





## SECRET

g. NORWAY. (June 16, 1942)

War Department announced formation of Norwegian Battalion of Army of United States.

f. Italy. (June 23, 1942)

President in answer to Honorable Thomas D'Alessandro, Jr., House of Representatives, disapproves request to form an Italian Battalion. Reason:

Should not be formed because of many involvements that would result from such action.

e. GREEK. (June 23, 1942)

General Malleskey answers Mr. Sumner Welles request to draft great numbers of Greeks by saying, formation of a limited number of Greek Battalions is approved.

h. POLAND. (August 3, 1942)

Secretary of War advises Mr. F. F. Wegrzynak, Polish Morning World, New York, that formation of Polish unit not favorably considered. Reason:

Many U. S. commitments make it inadvisable to form unit requested.

i. AUSTRALIA.

G-1 states that 2 Australian separate units have been requested, but a reply similar to h above is anticipated.

2. PRESENT POLICY.

a. As noted in paragraphs 1 h, g, f, h, i, above, the trend with respect to the formation of nationalistic units in the Army of the United States, appears to carry general disapproval on the part of the War Department.

b. It is noted that a Filipino Unit, a 1st Foreign Battalion, a Norwegian Unit and a limited number of Greek Battalions have been approved by the War Department. G-1 indicates that the formation of these units constitute a "political gesture" and should not be accepted as a policy for the approval of other nationalistic units.

c. The disadvantages in the formation of nationalistic units greatly outweigh the advantages.

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**SECRET****Disadvantages:**

Once begun, unless curbed, there is no limit to commitments;  
 Replacements would be difficult;  
 Language difficulties;  
 Possibility of involving U. S. in areas where it is desired to avoid strategic commitments;  
 Such units would fight for isolated reasons and not in furtherance of the over-all U. S. war effort;  
 Diversion of material;  
 Contrary to Americanism.

**Advantages:**

Political gesture, thereby gaining support of foreign organizations and foreign press agencies within and outside of the United States;  
 Available for special assignments.

3. There are three known instances of War Department disapproval regarding the formation of nationalistic units outside the limits of the United States.

a. In answer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, on April 9, 1942, indicated unfavorable consideration on question of forming Chinese units in Hawaii.

b. Colonel Feltus recommended that a Legion be formed in the Middle East to "save the situation". This recommendation evoked no known reply on the part of the War Department.

c. Lt. Colonel Fennshaw, Chief of Military Mission in Ecuador, desired to form an All American Attack Group in South America. Chief of Staff disapproved this request June 17, 1942.

**4. CONCLUSIONS.**

It has been the policy of the United States Government for many years not to emphasize various racial backgrounds. In the furtherance of the war effort this general policy should be adhered to. Provisions as contained in War Department circular 136 dated May 7, 1942, afford ample opportunity for aliens and allies with first paper, to serve the cause of the United States. Circular 136 permits such persons to take the oath of service and obedience.


RICHARD G. LIBBAY,  
 Colonel, U.S.C.

Chief, Combined Subjects Section.

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## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 20, 1948

### MEMORANDUM TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT

**Subject: Sabotage Operations and Guerrilla Warfare**

#### I. Discussion.

1. The conduct of organized sabotage in areas occupied by the enemy has become an essential mode of warfare, and today this type of military operation is a proper function to be carried on by the armed forces. It is, therefore, important that there be created units composed of personnel speaking the proper languages, which can be especially trained for this type of warfare, and employed in accordance with a well-conceived and thoroughly coordinated plan of action extending throughout all territories occupied by hostile forces. In the initial phases of such activities, the operations will be carried on largely by individuals or small groups accomplishing isolated missions, but rapidly these individuals or small groups should develop into larger units, and the forces involved will inevitably develop into guerrilla warfare groups capable of conducting operations on a large scale. The activities of these guerrilla forces will be an effective means of preparing an area for offensive operations by our Army, and will greatly assist in the ultimate success of our forces. In those areas where large-scale offensive operations are not planned, the guerrilla units will continuously immobilize large elements of the enemy forces.

2. The usual conception of sabotage and guerrilla operations is based on a theory of localized responsibility for organization and operation, but under conditions of modern warfare as carried on in the present world-wide conflict, this decentralization into isolated groups engaged on independent and unrelated missions is improper. A definite command in the military forces should be created to plan and conduct this type of warfare throughout the world. Without such centralized planning and control, the full possibilities of sabotage and guerrilla warfare cannot be utilized.

3. There is attached hereto tentative tables of organization for a GUERRILLA BATTALION and its component

- 2 -

elements. A memorandum setting forth the basis for the organization is also attached hereto. The Guerrilla Battalions consist of linguistically qualified and specially trained personnel, whose training, equipment, and tactics are in each instance especially designed for a certain theater of operations. After these units have been organized, equipped, and trained, they should be moved to the theater of operations in which they are qualified to operate. In those areas of guerrilla activities where the United Nations have established active theaters of operation, the guerrilla units will be assigned to the military forces in such theater, and constitute an integral element of such forces. However, in those areas in the world occupied by enemy forces and not in an active theater of operations, guerrilla warfare should nevertheless be carried on against the enemy, and in such instances the units will operate under the direct command of Guerrilla Group Headquarters located in the United States.

4. In the United States there are, at this time, many thousands of individuals of foreign birth or foreign descent who are either in the armed forces or eligible for enlistment therein, and these groups should be gathered together and formed into guerrilla forces. These units, composed of personnel of unquestioned loyalty to the United States, will also supply trained cadres for the formation of guerrilla units to be composed of foreign nationals recruited from among anti-Axis groups in foreign countries. The military effort that can be achieved by a full utilization of the strength of such foreign language groups is tremendous, and will be a potent factor in achieving final victory. In the development of work of a related character, the Coordinator of Information Service Command has had repeated opportunities to recruit for the Army large numbers of individuals thoroughly capable of carrying on successful operations against the enemy in hostile areas. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a means whereby such individuals may be taken into the Army, and their full value made available in the war effort.

5. The Guerrilla Group Headquarters in the United States should operate directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be authorized to utilize resources of the Naval, Military, and Air forces. The necessity for operating in maritime areas, as well as land areas, requires such an organizational setup. In these operations there must be a definitely established UNITED CO LAND, and the air, naval, and land forces operating as Guerrilla Units must be assigned to the Guerrilla Group and there be no possibility of a division of command.

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II. Action recommended.

The Secretary of War directs that:

1. Effective immediately, there is established the FIRST GUERRILLA GROUP. The Commanding General, First Guerrilla Group, will establish headquarters at Washington, D. C.
2. The First Guerrilla Group will be composed of the necessary command and service elements, and initially consist of ten GUERRILLA BATTALIONS. Tentative tables of organization for the Battalions are attached hereto as Appendix "A".
3. a. Cadres of Commissioned and Enlisted personnel for ten Guerrilla Battalions and supporting service elements will be assigned to the First Guerrilla Group by the War Department. Procurement objectives for appointing Commissioned Officers and recruiting Enlisted personnel from United States citizens or foreign nationals, as provided for in the attached tables of organization, and as required for command and administration, will be provided to the First Guerrilla Group by the War Department.
  - b. The Navy Department will allot such personnel and equipment as may be required by the First Guerrilla Group for the organization and conduct of operations requiring the use of naval equipment.
  - c. The Army Air Force will provide the necessary equipment and operating and maintenance personnel as will be required for the conduct of reconnaissance, transport, and combat missions to be carried on by the First Guerrilla Group.
4. Commanders of Armies, and Task Force Commanders, will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through proper channels, their requirements for assignment of Guerrilla Battalions to the areas with which they are concerned. Such reports will contain all available details regarding the area in which the Battalions are to operate, the missions with which they will be charged, and the objectives sought to be accomplished.
5. The Commanding General, First Guerrilla Group, is authorized to procure from the materials and resources

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available to the armed forces, such supplies and equipment as is necessary. He is also authorized to procure from other sources, such special types of supplies as may be deemed proper.

  
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Enclosures

GUERRILLA BATTALION

Designation: \* Guerrilla Battalion

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Unit	Technician Grade	Headquarters T/O 7-	Headquarters Company T/O 7-	3 Guerrilla Companies T/O 7-	Total battalion	Attached Medical	Aggregate	Enlisted Cadre	Remarks
2 Colonel-----		1			1		1		*Insert number of battalion. *Three Medical officers to be attached to companies. *One Dental officers *Three Medical technicians to be attached to companies *Litter bearers to be attached to companies.
3 Lieutenant Colonel-----		1			1		1		
4 Major-----		4			4		4		
5 Captain-----		8	1	3	10	1	11		
6 First Lieutenant-----		4	4	3	11	4	15		
7 Second Lieutenant-----		2	3	9	14		15		
8 Total commissioned-----		18	8	15	41	5	46		
9 Master Sergeant-----		10	3	12	25	94	29	15	
10 Technical Sergeant-----		14	2	12	28	34	15		
11 Staff Sergeant-----		18	2	22	42	8	63	48	
12 Sergeant-----		15	26	66	107	105	29		
13 Private, first class} including-----		14	21	165	200	12	272	20	
14 Private-----		6	12	51	72	75	60		
15 Technician-----	3rd	6	12	51	72	75	60		
16 Technician-----	4th	6	12	51	72	75	60		
17 Total enlisted-----		67	128	300	495	18	603	193	
18 Aggregate-----		85	133	315	526	43	649	193	
19 Carbine, Cal. .30 M1-----				84	84		84		
20 Demolition Kit OM1-----				237	237		237		
21 Gun, machine, Cal. .30 M1919 A4-----			4	6	10		10		
22 mortar, 60-mm-----			2	2	4		4		
23 Pistol Cal. .45-----		37	37	315	377		377		
24 Rifle, Cal. .30 M1-----		44	22	96	162		162		
25 Submachine gun, Cal. .45-----		4	17	84	105		105		
26 Car, 2 passenger-----				6	6	1	7		
27 Truck, 2 ton command-----				4	4	1	5		
28 Truck, 2 ton weapon carrier-----				6	6	1	7		
29 Truck, 2 1/2 ton cargo-----				14	14	1	15		





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Unit	Battalion									
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Company Headquarters										
Platoon Headquarters										
Section Headquarters										
1 squad										
2 squad										
3 squad										
4 squad										
5 squad										
6 squad										
7 squad										
8 squad										
9 squad										
10 squad										

Rank/Grade	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Captain	1										1
First Lieutenant	1										1
Second Lieutenant	1										1
<b>Total commissioned</b>	<b>3</b>										<b>3</b>
Master Sergeant, including											
Sergeant Major											
Chief Demolitionist											
Communications Chief											
Reconnaissance Sergeant											
Technical Sergeant, including											
Platoon Sergeant											
Section Leader											
Staff Sergeant, including											
Squad Leader											
Sergeant, including											
Runner, light machine-gun											
Runner, 80mm mortar											
Scout, observer, intelligence											
Private, first class, including											
Demolition man											
Runner, light machine											
Assistant, 4th											
Runner, 80mm mortar											
Assistant, 4th											
Munitions carrier, 4th											
Operator, radio, 2nd											
Operator, radio, 4th											
Rifleman, automatic, 4th											
<b>Total enlisted</b>	<b>97</b>										<b>97</b>

Insert letter of company.  
 Insert number of Battalion.  
 All officers and enlisted men are demobilized, and except for light machine gun section and 80mm mortar section and medic operators, carry demobilization kits. Armed with carbine.  
 All officers and enlisted men armed with the pistol. Armed with rifle.  
 Armed with sub-machine gun.  
 Equipped with radio set.  
 Equipped with radio set.

Equipment	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	Total
Carbine, cal. .30 M1											
Demolition kits (DMK)											
Gun, machine, cal. .30, M19 A1											
Mortar, 80mm, cal. .80, M19 A1											
Pistol, automatic, cal. .45											
Rifle, Cal. .30, M1											
Submachine gun, cal. .45											

Summary of Grades and Ratings

Captain	1	Master Sergeant	6
First Lieutenant	1	Technical Sergeant	12
Second Lieutenant	1	Staff Sergeant	22
<b>Total commissioned</b>	<b>3</b>	Sergeant	9
		Technician, 3rd class	22
		Technician, 4th class	22
		<b>Total enlisted</b>	<b>100</b>
		<b>Total strength</b>	<b>103</b>

**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 11, 1948

**MEMORANDUM****To Accompany Appendix "A"**

The purpose of the tentative tables of organization is to provide a basis for the organization of units to be engaged in the planned and coordinated conduct of subversive activities, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the enemy. The conduct of such important operations warrants a definite organization, and should not be carried on by improvised groups of a localized character.

**Basis**

The basis of organization is THE INDIVIDUAL. Each man is trained as a saboteur, and is especially prepared to operate as an individual or in small groups in hostile territory. Emphasis is placed on training as a Demolitionist.

The basic unit is the Demolition Squad, and in most theaters of guerrilla operations, such as China, the Balkans, the Near East, and the East Indies, the Demolition Squad will supplant the individual as the basis of organization. The Demolition Squad is composed of:

- 1 Leader - (Demolitionist, armed with carbine)
- 1 Demolitionist, (armed with large demolition kit)
- 2 Scout-Observers - (Demolitionists, armed with rifle and small demolition kit)
- 2 Automatic-Riflemen - (Demolitionists, armed with sub-machine gun and small demolition kit)

This squad can perform important missions without aid from local sources, inasmuch as it possesses the necessary demolition equipment, reconnaissance elements, and fire-power. In those cases where the local population can be utilized, this squad would constitute a nucleus around which native agents, operatives, saboteurs, and guerrilla fighters would be organized.

- 3 -

The DEMOLITION PLATOON is composed of three demolition squads and a small platoon headquarters.

The PLATOON HEADQUARTERS is composed of:

- 1 Lieutenant- Platoon leader (armed with carbine)
- 1 Technical Sergeant - Platoon Sergeant (armed with carbine).
- 2 Privates - Munitions Carriers (armed with rifle and carrying reserve demolition equipment).
- 2 Privates - Radio Operators (armed with rifle and equipped with portable radio apparatus).
- 1 Private - Automatic-Rifleman (armed with sub-machine gun).

The Platoon is designed to conduct subversive operations and sabotage over an extensive area and provide the necessary reserves of personnel and equipment and communication facilities. A platoon of this type would be a proper force to be sent into a large city, or a small state. The platoon could carry out important ventures and the Platoon Leader could utilise his personnel as a nucleus for the organisation of native forces throughout the area.

The GUNRRILLA COMPANY is designed as a unit to conduct operations in a large geographical area and to engage in specific enterprises on a large scale.

The Company includes three demolition platoons which can be utilized by the Company Commander in two ways:

1. The platoons can be responsible for operations in geographical subdivisions of the Company Area.
2. The platoons may be organized as specialists and engaged along functional lines as, for instance, one platoon to engage in railway sabotage; another platoon to engage in military sabotage; another platoon to engage in intelligence operations.

vides the [redacted] platoon, which provides the [redacted] of a type that will be [redacted] against critical installations [redacted] forces.

The Company [redacted] the necessary communications personnel [redacted] Technicians. These Technicians serve as [redacted] Company Commander, and would be specialized [redacted] the operating platoons and train the native auxiliaries.

It will be noted that the Guerrilla Company is completely free of administrative and supply elements. It is a "fighting outfit" and must "live off the country."

The HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, GUERRILLA BATTALION, includes all of the administrative, operating, and supply echelons for the entire organization.


The Battalion Headquarters Section includes the following agencies:


Headquarters - Exercises the functions of command and directs the activities of the entire organization throughout the area concerned. The Commanding Officer may be on the staff of the Commanding General of the particular theater of operations, or may operate as an independent command, acting under orders received from Guerrilla Group Headquarters.

Operations Section - This section plans the subversive activities to be carried on, determines the need and timeliness of sabotage, and coordinates the work of the companies.

Intelligence Section - This section secures information of enemy activities, strategic points, and targets, as well as necessary information of enemy control measures. It is on the basis of this information that the Operations Section makes plans.

Communications Section - This section maintains communication with higher Headquarters, and with the companies. It also provides the necessary maintenance and repair facilities for the communication equipment of the lower echelons.





4 -  
**5th Battalion - To be composed of 4 Guerrilla Companies as follows:**

- 2 Greek Companies
- 1 Albanian Company
- 1 Italian Company

**Note:** The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in Egypt, and to be charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in Greece, Albania, and Italy.

**6th Battalion - To be composed of 7 Guerrilla Companies as follows:**

- 1 German Company
- 1 Dutch Company
- 1 Belgian Company
- 2 French Companies
- 1 Spanish Company
- 1 Portuguese Company

**Note:** The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in Great Britain, and to be charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in Holland, Belgium, France, and adjacent territories.

**7th Battalion - To be composed of 6 Guerrilla Companies as follows:**

- 5 Chinese Companies
- 1 Korean Company

**Note:** The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in Chungking, China, and to be charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in Occupied China.

**8th Battalion - To be composed of 5 Guerrilla Companies as follows:**

- 1 Thai Company
- 1 Burmese Company
- 1 Malay Company
- 1 Cantonese Company
- 1 Indian Company

**Note:** The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in India, and to be



- 7 -

charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in the India, Burma, and Singapore area.

9th Battalion - To be composed of 5 Guerrilla Companies as follows:

- 1 Javanese Company
- 1 Dutch Company
- 1 Malay Company
- 2 Maritime Companies

Note: The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in Australia, and to be charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in the East Indies.

10th Battalion - To be composed of 5 Guerrilla Companies as follows:

5 Philippine Companies

Note: The organization and training of this Battalion to be designed to operate from Headquarters in Australia, and to be charged with the duty of harassing and destroying the enemy forces in the Philippine Islands.

Garland H. Williams  
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry

*Francis W. Lane* 2965

- ✓ *Special Service Troops*
- ✓ *Commandos*
- ✓ *Navy Dept.*

February 6, 1942

The Honorable  
 The Secretary of the Navy  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

I enclose a proposed set-up, which should be considered only as the first approach, although it embodies the fundamental principle which I think should govern this organization.

As I told you, I have not finished my studies and final recommendation, but I hope to have this by Monday.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

ORGANIZATION:

The official name of the Organization is:  
"Special Service Troops".

The unofficial name might well be "Yankee Raiders"  
or some such term.

This will be an independent command and will report  
to the President through the Secretary of the Navy.

It will be composed of volunteers from all branches  
of the Army and the Navy who have had at least six months  
service, and of those non-service men who are specially  
qualified.

MISSION:

The Organization's mission will be twofold:

1. To carry out small independent raids or occupa-  
de-mains.
2. To act in conjunction with larger attacking  
forces of the Army and the Navy.

COMMAND:

The commander of the forces will be a Brigadier  
General. He will have as consultants, representatives  
of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Air Force.  
These consultants will hold the rank of Colonel or corres-  
ponding grade. He will have as Second in Command a Colonel;

- 2 -

as Operations Officer, a Lieutenant; as Supply Officer, a Lieutenant Colonel. Training will be carried out under the direction of the Brigadier General with the assistance of his consultants.

COMPOSITION:

The command will be comprised of two units:

1. The Fighting Unit.
2. The Supply Unit.

The Fighting Unit will consist originally of 3,200 men divided into 64 troops of 50 men each.

For tactical purposes the troops should be organized into battalions and regiments. Each battalion will have a Lieutenant Colonel, Commanding; a Major, Second in Command; and an Adjutant. Each regiment will be commanded by a Colonel with a Lieutenant Colonel as Second in Command. Since these units will operate by themselves, it is necessary that the commanders be given sufficient rank.

As part of and formed within the Fighting Units, there will be communication and demolition groups.

It will be necessary to attach transport planes, boats and other equipment for landing parties, and to have available such arms and equipment as may be needed for the particular mission to be performed.

- 3 -

**SUPPLY:**

The Supply Unit will be organized at and operated from a central supply base. As part of the Supply Unit there will be one detachment for each troop. It will be the duty of each such detachment to procure from the supply base all supplies needed by the troop with which it is assigned. The Supply Unit would be used only at the base and would be detached from the fighting unit in any operation. The independent organization of this unit will free the men of the Fighting Unit from all fatigue duty. The reason for this is that, in any given operation, the units would, as a rule, consist of small parties, seldom exceeding one troop or at most a battalion. When a larger unit is required, for example to act as the arrow of penetration for a large combined force, the Unit will be supplied by such combined force.

**GENERAL:**

The organization will be enlarged to whatever size might be necessary as training, experience and organization methods warrant.

It is understood that for any of these operations the units would be dependent upon air, sea, or land forces of the regular services for transportation and equipment other

- 4 -

than the basic supplies and equipment which they themselves possess.

Since the basis of training of these men is their physical condition there must be a competent physical instructor and medical staff.

Provisions should also be made for Chaplains.

This organization shall have a distinctive uniform and will be prepared to act as Air Infantry and engage in jungle, island, and mountain fighting.

Special Instructions by [unclear]  
Set up [unclear]  
[unclear]

February 8, 1942

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

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qualified.

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These consultants will hold the rank of Colonel or corres-  
ponding grade. He will have as Second in Command a Colonel;



- 2 -

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- 8 -

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- 4 -

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February 6, 1942

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The Secretary of the Navy  
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tives of the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and

- 2 -

the Air Force. These Consultants will hold the rank of Colonel or corresponding grade. He will have as Second in Command a Colonel; as Operations Officer, a Lieutenant; as Supply Officer, a Lieutenant Colonel. Training will be carried out under the direction of the brigadier General with the assistance of his consultants.

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GENERAL:

The organization will be <sup>as required</sup> ~~adjusted~~ to whatever size

- 4 -

might be necessary as training, experience and organization methods warrant.

It is understood that for any of these operations the units would be dependent upon air, sea or land forces of the regular services for transportation and equipment other than the basic supplies and equipment which they themselves possess.

Since the basis of training of these men is their physical condition there must be a competent physical instructor and medical staff.

Provisions should also be made for chaplains.

This organization shall have a distinctive uniform and will be prepared to act as Air Infantry and engage in jungle, island and mountain fighting.



*Yuramela Chanare 3965-A*  
*x Solberg, Head, SOS*  
*x organization*  
**SECRET**  
*KSO*  
*XSOE*

**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 13th, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVAN

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN SOS  
(SPECIAL OPERATIONS SERVICE)

CHARTER

The charter of SOS is to undertake subversive action of every sort and description against the enemy, subject always to the overriding consideration of what the policy or policies for the time being of the President and the government may be.

The duty of SOS is primarily to lay down and equip missions in any part of the world which may, either now or in the future, be a proper and suitable base from which to operate against the enemy, and, secondly, to see that such missions are in a position to communicate with headquarters in Washington as quickly and as secretly as may be possible.

OBJECTIVES

The Axis powers by the enormous extension of territory, which they at present control, and by their brutal behavior to the inhabitants have left themselves open to all sorts of subversive warfare.

Without outside support, however, it is quite impossible for the people concerned to continue such warfare for long owing to the lack of direction, control, communications, materials, etc.

The SOS organization should endeavor to exploit that situation.

**SECRET**

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The Axis is waging total war and must be answered in the same way. Its fifth column must be out-columned. Information shows that it is vulnerable; that it makes elementary mistakes and its methods are not infallible.

Our job is to have our organization ready to cooperate whenever the word is given. At any time we may be asked by the Chiefs of Staff if we are in a position to immobilize Japanese shipping, or to sabotage Japanese moves in Thailand, Manchuria, or Korea. We may be requested to sabotage French merchantmen in Dakar, or to destroy strategic communications in occupied or unoccupied France, Belgium and other European countries. Always subject to the high policy of the government, we must be in a position to develop operations on short notice.

The oppressed people must be encouraged to resist and to assist in Axis defeat, and this can be done by inciting them, by assisting them and by training and organizing them.

We must make up for lost time and we must go to our task with a will. There is so much to be done and so little time in which to do it.

**POLICY**

In the main the policy is divided into (a) long term and, (b) short term.

(a) Long term policy consists in establishing and maintaining in various countries a number of focal points or bridgeheads, staffed by men whose main task is to organize a network of organizers and agents, depots of arms and explosives, etc., and any underground propaganda that may be necessary to the ultimate objective of embarking on large scale operations or of securing a general uprising.

(b) Short term policy, while keeping the eventual object in view and working towards that end, meanwhile consists of exploiting all enemy possibilities and attacking the enemy and maintaining the offensive.

**LINE OF ACTION**

SOS should be working along two separate lines which are in their ultimate stages intimately connected.

**SECRET**

First is the search for targets of immediate importance which can not be successfully or conveniently engaged by normal military measures. These are targets within enemy or enemy-occupied territory which can be attacked by nationals of the country concerned who are already in that territory, or who can be transported there by air or sea after special training.

In this line it should be possible for SOS to cooperate with the regular forces through the respective high commands, both at home and abroad.

The second line of action is underground attack against the enemy in his home country and in countries he has occupied; also the employment of counter-measures in countries he has not occupied but where his influence is being asserted, or in countries which he may intend to occupy in the near future.

#### METHODS OF ATTACK

The most obvious method of attack is sabotage of transportation, machinery, oil installations, freight trains, shipping, power stations, etc.; in brief activities which directly impair the enemy's air, land or sea effort.

These attacks are supplementary or complementary to regular air, military or naval operations. The primary method of operation is to find an established contact with elements in countries concerned which are actively hostile or dissident, or in any way opposed to a policy of collaboration with the Axis. These opposition parties are then tested to discover their extent and capabilities and the degree of control or cooperation that can be established. SOS should work in closest possible cooperation with emigre governments established in America and in Great Britain and with foreign groups in the United States.

#### SOS ORGANIZATION

##### Policy and Control

The Coordinator of Information is responsible to the President for SOS and dictates the high policy to the Chief personally or through his Chief Executive Officer. He also assumes the responsibility for contact with the State Department.

-4-

**SECRET**Chief and Staff

Internally SOS headquarters has its chief with his deputy. All questions of policy are dealt with by them exclusively.

The Chief of Staff is responsible for coordinating work between the departments and for liaison with government departments including service departments. He transmits all matters which can not be decided on his own level to the Chief and sees that action is taken on all matters under the latter's direction.

Directorates

There should be seven directorates:

1. Director of operations (an experienced military man of high rank who remains on the same level as Chief of Staff)
2. Director of Missions
3. Director of Intelligence and Liaison
4. Director of Security
5. Director of Services
6. Director of Finance and Administration
7. Director of Scientific Research

Country Sections

Country sections constitute the basis of SOS operations and all other sections such as operations, supply, administration, intelligence, etc., are ancillary and exist in order to serve need of Country Sections.

SOS should embrace operations in two separate fields:

1. Those conceived and carried out from Washington.
2. Those centered in various SOS missions abroad.

**SECRET**

-5-

The first group governs enemy and enemy-occupied territories in Europe, Africa and Asia. The second group covers missions which we may establish in friendly or neutral territories (for instance, British possessions and South America).

An area for which operations are directed from Washington is under Director of Operations with the assistance of the regional head for the territory. Should a neutral territory become hostile it passes from the jurisdiction of the Director of Missions to that of the Director of Operations.

#### Director of Operations

The Director of Operations is responsible for operations training and all country sections as mentioned above. The Director of Operations performs this function through his planning staff in the operations section. All proposals of action of whatever nature will pass through and be received by Country Section. The necessary detailed information is received from Intelligence Division.

When formulated, a plan goes to Planning Section for coordination and redrafting. After approval it goes back to Country Section to be put into execution under supervision of Operations Section.

Training and special training schools also enter within the jurisdiction of the Director of Operations.

#### Director of Missions

The Director of Missions is responsible for the supervision of all missions abroad and the normal course would be for his projects to be referred to Washington for approval or veto on general policy grounds and then for such projects to be turned into plans and operations locally. If, for instance, in connection with the Iberian peninsula, it is necessary to plan an operation to be carried out for this country, the same procedure will be followed as for a project being considered by a Country Section under the Director of Operations.

#### Director of Intelligence and Liaison

The Director of Intelligence is responsible

**SECRET**

for collection, collation and distribution of intelligence pertaining to SOS operations. He remains in close contact with the Chief of American SIS (Secret Intelligence Service).

All service intelligence and all information regarding targets which comes into possession of Country Section is recorded in the Intelligence Section.

There should be planning and technical special sections in existence. The former supply the intelligence required for the planning of projects and the latter intelligence on technical matters, e. g. oil and railways, provision of sabotage handbooks, etc.

This service takes care of liaison between SOS and other governmental departments.

#### Director of Security

Security should be linked with intelligence, and therefore the Director of Security comes under the Director of Intelligence.

The former is the liaison officer with security service and maintains close contact with the British Security Service in this country, the FBI, the Army and Navy Counterintelligence.

An organization like the SOS must in the national interest be as secure as is possible. The security aspect of its operations should be developed with a particular object of guarding the safety of those who actively take part therein, and of preventing the leakage of information to the enemy.

#### Director of Services

The Director of Services should have a triple role. He should look after supplies, scientific research, and production. Supplies include everything from pens and paper to arms and ammunition, from knives to explosive devices, from electric torches to wireless stations.

#### Director of Scientific Research

The Director of Scientific Research is responsible for all new devices, new methods of attack, or for such new methods of employing old devices as entail research or experiment.

-7-

He works in the closest possible liaison with the technical intelligence sub-section, and, in cases where a specific operation is involved, no advice is given without prior consultation with the Director of Scientific Research.

Director of Finance and Administration

This essential service provides the means by which SOS is maintained at headquarters and in the field. This section is also responsible for engaging of new personnel, promotions, increase in salary, etc., and, in this respect, works very closely with the Director of Security.

The attached organization chart shows at a glance the key functions in the organization, and your authority is requested to proceed forthwith to:

- (a) Select and engage men for key positions including the regional heads with their corresponding liaison and secretarial staffs.
- (b) Find suitable quarters for the organization in a separate building in which the SIS organization may also be housed. It is estimated that for the two organizations a building sufficiently large to accommodate two hundred people would be suitable for the initial organization and operations.
- (c) Obtain for SOS a sum of \$5,000,000. for the first year's operations.

  
Robert A. Solborg,  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff

APPROVED

William J. Donovan

## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

**SECRET**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 12th, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL DONOVANBRITISH SOE  
(SPECIAL OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE)

In line with the assignment you have given me to organize and head up an American SOE, and, as per your instructions, I went to England to study the organization and functions of the British SOE, and, upon my return, beg to report as follows:

1. The British SOE has been in existence about a year and is today composed of 500 officers and 1,000 other ranks in its administrative and instructional cadres. It is headed up by a cabinet minister who is responsible for SOE to the War Cabinet but is not a working member of the organization. The management and control is in the hands of outstanding personalities of the British industrial, banking and legal world. They are all commissioned officers in the Army, Navy or RAF.

2. The administration and training high command occupy in London four separate buildings and for security purposes are registered as "Interservices Research Bureau". They possess in the British Isles twenty-seven separate and distinct training schools for instructors and students, and a number of laboratory research and production centers, where certain materials and prototypes of equipment are developed and manufactured.

3. The operatives are exclusively foreigners (Norwegians, Poles, Czechs, Dutch, Spanish and French) and are recruited and carefully selected for training from their respective national armies or from refugee groups arriving in England. The training is composed of three or four phases and lasts from two to three months. The sequence is as follows:



-2-

**SECRET**

- a) preliminary school
- b) paramilitary school .
- c) finishing school
- d) parachute jumping school and wireless for specially selected men

All training centers are run by military personnel, both commissioned and non-commissioned. The students wear battle dress and are subject to military discipline and regulations. There are roughly three hundred students in training throughout the various schools, including special Norwegian operational parties.

4. To date one hundred-twenty agents have been trained and landed in occupied countries by parachute or from submarines and boats. Thirty-two distinct operations have been performed with success and only three cases of failure have been registered.

5. The SOE have at their disposal a squadron of aircraft, Whitely, Lysander, and long-range Halifax transports for long-range expeditions such as Poland, Czechoslovakia. They use a conveniently situated airdrome and operate during moon periods.

6. Finance is drawn from the Treasury on the secret vote and the Director of Finance presents his estimated expenditures in a lump sum for each coming month and obtains a Treasury sanction. A typical six months breakdown of expenditures is as follows:

a) H. Q. administration	£185,000
b) training	£125,000
c) production and research	£ 50,000
d) operations abroad	£500,000

Total	<u>£860,00</u>
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roughly equivalent to \$6,880,000.

*Robert A. Solborg*

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Lt. Colonel, General Staff



