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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 10 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mrs. Harriet Hawkins
SI/Rome

1. Mrs. Hawkins served as editor on the SI Reporting Board in Rome from 19 August 1944 to 19 May 1945. The Reporting Board in Rome was placed under the Italian SI section and its work suffered from the arbitrariness of "Tessporine's gang." The main criticism, however, is against the excesses of OSS "rear echelon" personnel luxuriating in Rome on the benefits of both home front and front lines and in general regarding war as "a pretty good thing."

S.P.K.

Attachments

Hold for WJD

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

2 July 1945

TO: General Donovan

FROM: W. H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Attached Field Report from Mrs. Hawkins

Mrs. Hawkins's report points up in an acute form some of the elements of the work of Italian SI in Italy of which we have been aware for some time.

The situation no longer exists. The pity of it is that the work of Italian SI would have been much better if talent such as Mrs. Hawkins' had been utilized instead of being handicapped or rejected.

I asked to see Mrs. Hawkins as soon as I read this report, but she had gone on leave. I have asked to be notified as soon as she returns, so that I can discuss the whole matter with her fully.

WHS

W. H. S.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson

DATE: 20 June 1945

FROM: Alton Childs

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mrs. Harriet Hawkins

Since Mrs. Hawkins' field report seems mainly to concern the Italian Division, I am not qualified to write a covering memorandum for it except insofar as the Reports Section is concerned. I believe that Mrs. Hawkins is correct in her statement that the Reports Section in Rome had no independence of decision and did not follow the practice and procedure of other reports offices. OSS organization elsewhere has assumed that some independence and uniform procedure are desirable.

Alton Childs

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS

THROUGH: Chief, SI

FROM: Harriet Hawkins

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions
Reports Section, Italian Division, SI. Rome.

1. Scope of this report.

This report covers my experience with the Reports Section, Rome, from 19 August 1944 to 19 May 1945. I held the following positions during that period: 1) Editor of Political and Economic Intelligence. 2) Assistant to the Chief Editor, in charge of the processing of reports. 3) Chief Editor and Assistant Administrator. The last two positions included supervision of typists and translators, proof-reading, occasional translating and editing, and checking of edited material.

2. History of Reports Section, Rome.

When I arrived in Rome, I found Mr. James Franklin as sole representative of the Reporting Board, with the nominal function of reporting Political and Economic Intelligence. However, Mr. Franklin was handicapped by the fact that the Italian Division, SI in Rome gave him very little material to process. Repeated requests for material brought a few unimportant "pp" reports, with the request from Captain Caruso that they should not be altered from the form in which he had already sent them to Washington, and the promise that the regular flow of material would begin with the return of Mr. Vincent Scamporino, Chief Italian Division, SI, MMTO, who was then absent in Washington.

On Mr. Scamporino's return, about six weeks to two months later, the position of the Reporting Board continued to be as anomalous as before, and frequent requests to Mr. Scamporino for a clarification of our position and for material to process brought evasive replies.

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Around the end of November, a meeting was held in Caserta at which it was decided that the Reports Section, Rome, would come under the complete jurisdiction of the Italian Division, SI. Mr. Franklin returned to the States on temporary leave, and I was absorbed into the Italian Division, SI.

For another month there was no reports function as such. The Italian Division continued to process their reports as they had formerly done, and I continued to have little or nothing to do. I made a trip to Caserta in which I appealed for help to Mr. Theodore Ryan, Reports Officer, MEDTO, and was informed that the Reports Section, Rome, had been taken entirely out of his jurisdiction.

At the end of December, Mrs. Elizabeth Smith, Miss Grazia Avitabile, and Mrs. Mary Watson arrived from the Reporting Board, Washington, and the Reports Section, Rome, was formally established. It consisted of Captain Joseph J. Caputa as Reports Officer and Chief Editor, with myself as his assistant in charge of the processing of reports, the three new recruits from Washington and Miss Laura Warden (part-time secretary to Mr. Scamporino) as editors, with some translating work as well, Lt. Josephine Azzolina as military editor, Mr. Peter Sarcoli as translator, and several enlisted men as typists. The function was ostensibly that of the Reporting Board, and the same pattern of procedure was followed, with the notable difference that the whole was a function of the Italian Division, SI, and directly under the control of Mr. Scamporino.

At the beginning of May, Mr. Scamporino and Captain Caputa went north, and the Reports Section was turned over to Mr. Lawrence Battistini. Other personnel changes in the course of the period included the appointment of Mr. Joseph D'Amato as Administrator, and his replacement in that position by Mr. Franklin after his return from the States.

3. Chief Problems of the Reports Section, Italian Division, SI.

a. Personnel

The personnel of the Italian Division, SI, except for Mr. Franklin and ourselves, consisted of Italo-Americans, largely of Sicilian origin. (Mr. Sarcoli mentioned above was an Italian and not connected with this group.) They were known throughout the theater as "Scamporino's gang". They were organized under Mr. Scamporino with a peculiar gang loyalty, which made them act as a unit against outsiders, and which made them incapable of independent action. Mr. Scamporino did not tolerate insubordination. He laid down the rules, and no one was allowed the privilege of questioning his decisions. He permitted no one to transfer out of his branch, and there was no escape once an individual came under his domination.

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Except for Mr. Scamporino himself, and Captain Caputa, who were both hard and intelligent workers, there was no work done by the other members of the Italian Division in our office. They all held nominally important positions, and were rarely in the office, or, when they were, spent their time in yelling at each other and in playing games.

The attitude of these people towards the four women sent out by the Reporting Board in Washington was consistently insulting. They apparently resented the fact that they had been forced to accept outsiders, in the first place, and in the second place held the belief that no woman was capable of any activity outside the home. They treated us with a studied politeness which in itself was an insult, and at the same time contrived to make us feel that we were inferior and incapable of doing responsible work. Captain Caputa, under whose direct jurisdiction we worked, held the general assumption that we knew nothing about the work we were to do, and in spite of the fact that we were all professionally qualified personnel trained in Washington, with considerable background, and that I at least was a professional editor before joining OSS, he undertook to train us as though we were schoolgirls, and with a scarcely insulting attitude.

b. Output.

The technical weaknesses of the Reports Section in Rome are very closely tied in with the personnel problem. They sprang from the impulsive, capricious and arbitrary temperament of the Reports Officer. For example, after a report had been translated and edited according to his specifications, he would often rewrite it completely, then give it back to the editor to edit, and on its being returned to him, decide to rewrite it from a different angle. Thus each report was worked over until it achieved what he considered perfection. This painstaking method, although commendable for its intellectual alertness and energy, inevitably resulted in complete confusion in the office, where the editor involved had no way of knowing what was expected of her. It also resulted in the final report often being considerably different from the original which had come in.

The phraseology of the reports was a result of the same factor. Captain Caputa is a lawyer, and addicted to formal and legal phraseology. He preferred the use of a four-syllable word to a one-syllable word wherever possible, and stilted phrasing which was often difficult to understand. If we attempted to change this to normal readable English, we were informed that we were not writing for a newspaper, and the original phraseology was maintained.

The waste of paper was considerable. Captain Caputa was eager that the reports should look well on the page, and insisted on exorbitantly wide margins, so that a report which could have been

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squeezed onto one page was necessarily spread over two or three. With the use of the Ditto machine, this naturally snowballed into a tremendous consumption of paper on even the shortest reports.

c. Distribution.

Both Mr. Scamporino and Captain Caputa were so afraid of revealing their sources of information, that for a long time they could not be persuaded to give their reports any distribution to speak of outside of Washington. As the Reports Office in Caserta went to the opposite extreme, and believed in distributing everything to everybody, the Rome office finally reached a compromise whereby they sent their reports to a limited distribution list in the theater. However, distribution was never intelligently handled until the last month or so of the period under consideration. Valuable medical intelligence was buried, or sent to people who could not possibly have had the interest in it that medical agencies and personnel would have had. In this connection, the jealousy that existed between SI and R&A prevented SI reports being given R&A for the circulation which might have been helpful as, naturally, the topics covered were often the same. R&A reports that came in to us for months were read only by myself; later by the other women sent out by the Washington Reporting Board. They were never put to use.

4. General criticisms

The general criticisms of OSS, Rome, have nothing to do with the problem of the Reporting Board in that office. If a sweeping criticism could be made, it would be that in general OSS personnel in Rome, and I believe in the field generally, tend to measure success in terms of promotions, and effort in terms of automobile trips. It is true not only of OSS but of other organizations, that somewhere between the home front which is making its sacrifice, and the front lines which are making their greater one, there is the rear echelon which reaps the benefit of both. We had the food, the cigarettes, the Army privileges, the comforts and the glamor, and the general conception that on the whole war is a pretty good thing.

5. Recommendations

The Reports Section in Rome faced a unique problem which to the best of my knowledge has not been repeated anywhere else, and which I trust never will be. It seems useless, therefore, to make recommendations which would so largely concern personalities rather than policies. However, the following are emphatically recommended:

a. In sending Americans of foreign extraction to their original fatherland, it is recommended that a careful study be made of the

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attitude of the people in that country to their own nationals in America. For example, the North Italian and the Roman despise the South Italian and the Sicilian; yet the Italo-American personnel sent to Italy by OSS were almost entirely of South Italian or Sicilian extraction. This created a very bad impression in Rome, and OSS had a bad name there, largely because of Italian SI. They were both despised and laughed at, and much of the information given them was done with tongue-in-cheek precisely because of their origin. It seemed incredible to all those who understood Italy that such a mistake could have been made, and the cause of OSS so basically jeopardized.

b. If women are to be sent into the field on a professional basis (which - naturally! - I believe they should be) this should be made as clear as possible to the persons for whom they are to work overseas. The prevalent assumption in OSS in Europe that women are sent either for their sex appeal or stenographic ability (or both) makes it very hard for the serious "career" worker, who is trained and qualified to do professional work. Where she may be flattered as a woman for her real or imaginary charms, her ability in other respects is belittled. The results are serious. Not only does it gravely damage her morale and her self-respect as a capable person, but it also induces after awhile a feeling of desperation, whereby she has to fight for her position every inch of the way with the unaccustomed fervor of an old-fashioned suffragette. This should certainly not be necessary. It is no longer customary in America, and it should not be overseas.

c. The Reporting Board, if it is to function as such, should do so independently of the Division of SI with which it is associated. This is, I believe, amply illustrated in this report.

6. Conclusion

I am in no position to measure the contribution or the real value of the Reports Section in Rome. From what I saw of it, I should say it has accomplished virtually nothing, or done it so badly as to make it comparatively useless. The material we handled was unusually interesting, and there were moments when we could forget the unpleasantness of our situation in enthusiasm over the material itself. But the enthusiasms were short-lived when we saw what happened to the material by the time it left our office.

I regret sincerely that after a very pleasant association with the Reporting Board in Washington before I went overseas, I can say nothing favorable about the Reports Section in Rome. It was not a cheerful experience. It would not be honest to say that it was good in any way.

Respectfully submitted,

Harriet Hawkins

Harriet Hawkins

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 10 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Comdr. Robert E. Jennings USNR

Comdr. Jennings was captured by the Germans in September 1944 while on a mission for OSS in Walendorf near Luxembourg. His report describes in detail his treatment and life as a German prisoner until his liberation by the Americans in March 1945.

S.P.X.

Attachment

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HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
(FORWARD)

APO 887
10 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report Prepared by Lt. Cmdr. Jennings.

TO : Secretariat, Washington

1. The attached report prepared by Cmdr. Jennings after his arrival from Germany is forwarded for your information and files.

2. One copy has been given X-2, Paris; one has been retained in our files; and the third copy is attached hereto.

GEORGE W. ISAAC
1st Lt., AGD
Chief, Secretariat

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This paper also had "SCI" incorporated in it. To the best of my memory it was not SCI agents, but simply "S.C.I." in the heading. I was interrogated on this. In fact, this was brought up at every interrogation. I told them I knew Major Peppert very slightly, that I did not know what organization he belonged to, and that I had just run out to Valendorf on a trip while my car was being repaired in Luxembourg; that the reason all of us were captured was that the situation map was wrong; that as far as I knew Major Peppert was in the Supply Corps and I thought "SCI" undoubtedly meant "Supply Corps, Infantry", but I could not be sure of this because, being in the Navy, I was not familiar with the Army nomenclature.

I was asked if I knew Colonel Giblin. I said I did, but I had known him in New York, having been in the investment business myself. They asked me if I knew what was at 79 Champs Elysees, Paris, and I said I did not. They asked me if I knew where Colonel Giblin's office was in Paris and I said I did not as my contact with him was social. The main thing they kept referring back to was the fact that Peppert had this incriminating paper on him, which they thought definitely identified him in some secret intelligence work. To the best of my memory they did not mention OSS. However, they said Giblin was in a very dangerous business. Finally Gosevich told me he had discovered what "SCI" stood for and told me it meant "secret civilian intelligence", and that both Mrs. Legendre and I were in a very bad spot. I continued with my story that I was a Naval observer; that my association with Peppert was purely by accident; that I knew nothing of his work; and that I had simply met him that morning in Luxembourg. They also asked me if I knew Walter Rockshield. I told them I did, but that was also a purely social contact and I knew nothing about his other than that he was attached to some air corps doing liaison work. However, from the questions asked me on all my interrogations, I gathered they knew something of the work Rockshield and Peppert were doing in Luxembourg other than gathered from the paper they found on Peppert. They told me they were both well known and dangerous characters and that Mrs. Legendre and I being captured in the circumstances in which we were found proved to them that we must have some connection with both of them. On every interrogation I continued with my story that I was a Naval observer and knew nothing of this other work.

The last seven days I was at Altenahlen I was taken from my solitary cell and put in a large room with about 15 beds. There is one of these for officers and one for enlisted men. When they have finished with their interrogation of a prisoner, he is released from solitary, given a Red Cross box, and put in this room to await transportation to another destination. Amongst those officers who were in this room while I was there, I remember the names of Lt. Col. Hudson, Major Freddie Gough, Captain Briggs, all from the Arnhem show, and M Beattie of the RP. Beattie was sent on to Berlin and told he was being sent for by the Office of Propaganda Minister. The others were sent to the Stalag at Limburg. I later saw Col. Hudson at Duleg Camp. He arrived there on March 31 with a large group of British officers, evacuated from Hohenem.

During this period I was allowed to see Mrs. Legendre for short periods, while exercising in the courtyard under guard. We had little opportunity to talk, but she confided in me she was attempting to have her great story and that Gosevich was doing everything he could to help her.

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I was not interrogated any more after October 15 and on October 22 I was taken to the hospital at Hohenmark, which is in conjunction with the interrogation center at Oberursel. Oberursel is where all Allied air personnel are given interrogations, and was run by the Luftwaffe. I was again put in solitary confinement in this hospital, but had a very comfortable, small room with running water. I was interrogated here first on October 23 and 24 by a German Naval officer of a comparable rank of Lieutenant in our Navy. I do not know his name. From October 24 to November 8 I remained in solitary confinement and was allowed to talk to no one and was not interrogated. This is more or less the usual custom of trying to frost one out. On November 8 at 5 o'clock they took me to Oberursel and locked me in a cell there. These cells are very bad affairs -- the heat is controlled from the outside, you are only given one blanket, the window is barred and painted, and most of the time the heat is terrific and other times there is no heat at all. The food consists of black bread and coffee for breakfast, potato soup at noon and coffee in the evening.

On November 9 I was interrogated by a Lieutenant Kieffer of the German Navy. He insisted they were convinced I was a spy and the only way I could disprove it was to write them a report on our anti-submarine warfare because I must be thoroughly familiar with this if I were a Navy observer. I refused to write any such report, refused to discuss any matters with him, and stuck to my same story of being a Naval observer. After about two hours of this he sent me back to Hohenmark and I was told I would be on my way to Dulag Luft. I was again put back into solitary.

On November 10 two operators in civilian clothes -- one named Schmidt and the other Schmell -- took me up to a hunting lodge near Frankfort. It was a very attractive place, formerly owned by Opel, the automobile manufacturer. This is the place they take people when they consider fairly important, wine and dine them and treat them well, and try to get information this way. I had a good dinner there and had a very pleasant evening with these two people. The form of interrogation here was not positive. They simply wait and see if you won't break down through a sense of relief and in this way obtain information from you. They were very much interested in what would happen to Germany after the war end, in particular, what their lot would be. Schmell claimed he was not a member of the party. Schmidt admitted he was and thought party members would have a bad time. Schmidt had been a salesman for a jewelry firm, traveling in South America and the United States. I gathered Schmell had been associated with some trucking firm in New Jersey. Schmell said he had lived in India for two years, during the occupation. It was my impression that they were connected with the Gestapo in some way. They claimed to be civilian interrogators, assigned to Oberursel. There were no other prisoners with us at this time. On November 11 I was taken back to Hohenmark and again put into solitary.

On November 14 Lieutenant Kieffer again had me taken down to the interrogation center at Oberursel. It was the same sort of thing -- insisting I was a spy and the only way to disprove it was to write a report. He told me that both Schmidt and Schmell, after spending the night with me at Opel hunting lodge, felt I was not possibly one that I was a spy; that the only way to avoid being sent to the Gestapo was to write a report on some technical feature of anti-submarine detection. I told him I was everything I professed to be, that I would write no such report.

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report, and that as far as I was concerned he could send me to the Gestapo and the sooner the better. After two more hours of this sort of thing he said, "I will close the book on you and send you on to Dulag Luft." I said it was hard for me to believe this as I had heard it so many times. I asked if I would be looked up when I got back to Wohenmark. He assured me I would not be and I found when I got back to the hospital I was free to leave my room and mingle with the other prisoners.

This was the last time I was interrogated about anything relating to the circumstances under which I was captured. The case was definitely closed and never reopened. I think one of the most dangerous periods for a prisoner is when he is first released from solitary. After a long period of solitary confinement and interrogation, they usually release you into a large room with other prisoners or give you a certain amount of freedom to mingle with others. Your sense of relief is so great you are tempted to talk frankly to the other prisoners. The room can either be wired, or their own agents can be planted there. I noticed this tendency so many times, even with the more intelligent prisoners.

On November 13 I left Oberursel at 1200 with a draft of six, traveling by train. We arrived at Wetzlar at 1930. This camp is known as Dulag Luft and is a transient camp for all Allied air personnel. They arrive here from Oberursel after interrogation and are outfitted with clothing furnished by the Red Cross. The camp was in the command of Colonel Charles Stark, senior Allied officer, and I cannot say enough for the work, planning, executive ability and management of this camp as administered by Colonel Stark. Many of the cases here should have been hospital cases, but a temporary hospital was operated and they received the best of care insofar as it was physically possible to do this with the limited supply of medical equipment, drugs, and a very young, inexperienced doctor in charge. Outside the camp across the road in the German administrative side, there was a cooler where certain prisoners were held for political interrogation before they were released to the compound side. I spent five days there in solitary and was interrogated along political lines by Major Dorwanster and a Mr. Simmers, a civilian. As far as I could determine from the interrogation, they were interested in knowing your political views and what you thought the Allies, when victorious, would do to the Germans. I think their interrogation was more or less under the Greater Propaganda Minister and Foreign Office.

Another interrogator there was named Von Schelling and the interrogations were friendly. I felt part of it was propaganda to give you a good impression of Germany. Only certain prisoners were held on that side before going into the general camp at Dulag Luft. Nearly all with rank of Major or above had this additional interrogation, but a great number of the lower ranks and enlisted personnel were also put through this route. Prisoners coming to Dulag Luft were held anywhere from two days to three weeks, until a sufficient number had accumulated to make a large transport to send on to a permanent camp. When I first arrived, these transports were being directed to Stalag Luft 3, Sagan, about 80 miles southeast of Berlin. Later, most prisoners were sent to Gorlitz, which is located about 70 miles northwest of Stettin on the Baltic. The last six weeks all transports were sent to Nuremberg.

While I was waiting for transport, I became very ill with flu. On November 27 I was put to bed by with a temperature of 105. On December 2 my condition was so bad they decided to send me to the hospital at Giessen for a transfusion. I arrived at Giessen Saturday, December 3. I was put in a small room and nothing was

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done for me until Monday, when I was X-rayed and put back into my room. There was no discussion about a transfusion and everything seemed to be quite confused because there had been a rather severe bombing of Giessen on Sunday night. On Tuesday, December 5, the RAF again bombed Giessen, dropping 1,400 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the town and two of our seven hospital buildings were completely destroyed. Our hospital was knocked around and the town was flattened. From then on the hospital was complete confusion, as it was full of local wounded and none of us received attention. We had no water, heat, light, nor food. On Saturday, December 9, a Lt. Burningham, one of the German staff at Dulag Luft, came down and picked me up, returning me to Dulag Luft, Wetzlar. I was in the hospital there until December 26, and was more or less an invalid for another month.

When I recovered sufficiently to perform certain duties, Col. Stark asked me to stay on as a permanent member of his staff and I acted as Executive for him and as Camp Librarian. The camp had a good supply of International Red Cross food, was extremely well run, and the German authority was fairly sympathetic. Lt. Col. Becker was in command for the Germans. Major Dornseifer was in charge of political interrogation and they were both cooperative. I would say that one reason Dulag Luft was considered the best prison camp in Germany under the Geneva rating was that these two officers cooperated with Col. Stark and helped, rather than hindered, his management. The camp was under Luftwaffe authority.

Dulag Luft was located on a high piece of ground about eight-tenths of a mile from Wetzlar. The enclosure was in the form of a rectangle and surrounded by a double barbed wire fence about 15 feet high. A warning wire ran around the entire perimeter about 30 feet inside the barbed wire. You were warned you would be shot if you crossed this wire. Inside the compound were five barracks serving as living quarters and one for mess hall and kitchen. About half of one of the barracks was used as sick bay.

The Germans had two roll calls a day, one at 0845 and one at 1630. The time for roll call varied, depending on the number in camp and whether we were having two or three meals a day. From after morning roll call to 1700 the men were free to use the compound, within the warning wire. From 1700 to 2000 they must keep off the perimeter track, but could go between barracks. Lights were turned off at 2200. At this time the Germans usually turned a couple of police dogs loose in the compound. In each corner of the compound was a high tower, manned by guards with machine guns and search lights. There were three air raid shelters in the camp.

Incoming prisoners were usually in a rather deplorable state. They were outfitted from Red Cross supplies, of which we were nearly always in long supply. As they were nearly all lousy, they had to have a complete new outfit. They were then deloused, bathed and shaved. In this way we managed to keep the camp fairly free of lice.

Nearly all our food was furnished by the Red Cross. We had a good supply of provisions, Canadian and English packages. The German contribution was 1/5 loaf of black bread per man, some potatoes and some margarine. Once a week they furnished a small ration of meat. Without the Red Cross we would have starved, as many here in camps less fortunate. The Red Cross also supplied us with an ample number of books and games.

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The last several weeks, Wetzlar was more or less under constant bombing and strafing. On March 26 the German authorities heard that the American forces were in Weilburg, about 12 kilometers west of Wetzlar, and from then on there were many rumors going around the camp as to what would happen to us. We believed that we would be marched out at any moment and our sick were a great problem. We were also advised by some of our German stooges, whom we had managed to subsidize with cigarettes, etc., that Captain Schmidt, in charge of the guard and a man of very strong, fanatical party feelings, was threatening to burn both camps before leaving. We spent a very uncomfortable night and at five in the morning we were told to get on the road. After much bickering back and forth between Stark and Becker, the Germans said we could keep three officers of the permanent staff, Stark, myself and Lt. Jaros, our doctor, the padre and the sick and wounded, and about 30% of our non-commissioned permanent staff. This left 89 to march out and 149 to stay. This transport marched out at 7:30 the morning of March 27th.

At about 4:30 we could hear our artillery and heavy machine gun fire to the west and south, and German firing to the east and south. Becker had left a guard of three officers and 168 men, and about 25 women who had served on their clerical staff. Major Dorsseiter was in charge of the Germans and Lt. Weyrich Guard Officer. About 9 o'clock most of the Germans came in to our camp, thinking it would be safer with us than on their side. After the fire grew more intense, some were seen to lay down their arms. At 11 o'clock Col. Stark asked the German Lieutenant, Weyrich, to have his men turn in all their weapons. He agreed to do this and from then on the Colonel was more or less in command of the whole situation. We posted our guards in the towers and the gates were opened. Heavy fighting continued all around us during the day and night, and at noon March 28, Lt. Valentine, 7th Armored, I believe, arrived in a jeep.

The Colonel went back to divisional headquarters with him to advise them of our location. He returned about 2000. Fighting continued all around us through 29th and Allied prisoners began to stray in to us from all the surrounding country. By evening, on the 29th, we were up to a total of, roughly, 750 prisoners, all in bad condition -- lousy and hungry, most of them having come from Limburg. These had to be deloused, clothed and fed. On March 31, roughly 300 additional prisoners arrived from Stalag. Among these there were 11 British Brigadiers. They were well organized and they more or less took over management of our camp.

On the 29th a Major Tuson, SHAEF Prisoner of War Executive, arrived and more or less took command for SHAEF. He seemed to think it would be some time before they were organized to evacuate us, so Col. Stark and I decided to leave and report our condition to Major General Quesada. We got a German car at Wetzlar and left on April 1. We stopped in Mainz and advised General Quesada the condition of our camp and of the SHAEF representative's statement about the delay in evacuation. He was very much interested and quite upset. He gave instructions to see what could be done in the matter and, I believe, was instrumental in having a very quick evacuation order, as I understand all personnel from Stalag Luft are now in Luxembourg, having been evacuated through Giessen by air on April 2 or 3.

I arrived in Paris April 3 and reported to Colonel Forgan.

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Attached is a log I kept covering the last few days at Dulag Luft. All our records at Dulag Luft were turned over to Major Teese, PWX SHAEF. These should include a complete list of all the prisoners passing through the Dulag and the name of the Stalag to which they were sent from there, with date of arrival and departure from Dulag.

While a prisoner I met two men who could have been connected with OSS or SOE. A gunner named Chevalier told Col. Stark he had been with SO branch of OSS before D-day, and offered to be of assistance as a linguist. Col. Stark repeated his story to me and he knew more than enough to have been in the organization. The other man was Major Adamson, British paratrooper. He claimed to have been captured in Norway while on a mission. When Capt. Anthony Darling, our British doctor, was advised by the Germans, in February, that he was to be exchanged, Major Adamson gave him a message to deliver to a Colonel Wilson with a Baker Street address.

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CONFIDENTIAL

27 March 1945

0530 German order to evacuate all those able to walk with the exception of few permanent staff, who should remain to run the place. 143 remained including Col. STARK, Maj. JAROS, Lt. Comdr. JENNINGS, Capt. SHIFFIN, Lt. GILLE, and Capt. Rev. McGOWAN. German personnel left were 107 men, 34 women, including Maj. DONNEKIFER, Lt. WEYRICH, Mr. RICHARDS.

0730 Transport left (82 men)

0830 We hear gun fire and sounds of approaching vehicles. Germans from across the road move into our shelters.

0945 Near our troops are 4 miles west of us. Heavy gun fire all around.

1030 Heavy firing continues all around us. German guards are voluntarily laying down their arms.

1200 Col. STARK calls Mr. RICHARDS and Lt. WEYRICH into office and states that all guards turn in weapons and a system of joint sentry duty be posted. They agree and he is now in command - Maj. DONNEKIFER cooperating fully in this.

1430 Activity has been heavy all around us all afternoon.

1700 Fairly quiet for the moment.
Col. ordered Pvt. MEYERS and Pvt. [illegible] to be put in the guard house as they are obviously drunk. German guards brought liquor into camp. It has caused orders for no drinking including the Germans.

1800 Pvt. [illegible] breaks out of jail. Col. orders him back.

1900 German civilians bring in wounded American Pfc. (WORSTAN)

1930 Col. sends F/Lt. LYONS, Sgt. MENSCH, and Mr. RICHARDS to try contacting our forces in the west and report our position.

2000 It is reported Pvt. MEYERS is drunk and in possession of two guns, and over in the German Camp. Col. sends detail to arrest him. Find him in German quarters. Resists arrest, threatening several people with guns. Finally subdued by force and jailed.

2300 Still very active all around us - M.G. fire and artillery.

2345 Pvt. MEYERS and Pvt. [illegible] attempt to break out of jail which is not a very secure structure. Pvt. MEYERS again threatens violence. They both refuse to obey the Colonel when he orders them to stop beating their walls in places. They are forcibly subdued - tied and locked in other cells, being given medical treatment by Capt. [illegible] Pvt. [illegible]

[illegible] still [illegible] end of firing. Most of personnel [illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

28 March 45

0630 Fairly constant gun fire and activity all right.

1000 Dr. GRIFFIN takes wounded Pfc. into Wetzlar for operation.
Armored column passing to East of us.

1200 Lt. VALENTINE arrives in jeep.

1500 Col. STARK and Capt. GRIFFIN are off to Staff HQ with Lt. VALENTINE.

1700 Sgt. RANSON and Mr. RICKMERS return. There has been heavy firing around us all day.

1800 4 German paratroopers walk into camp and surrenders. They are locked up.

1830 Col. STARK returns with 3 War News Correspondents including Deldon.

2100 Things are fairly quiet. Pfc. dies shortly after operation.

29 March 45

0930 Spot planes landed on play field.

0945 Bugs were shot.

1000 Lt. Col. [illegible] of 7th Armored Division (?) arrived in jeep advising us of 750 POWs he had picked up. Limburg POW's are lousy and half starved. We have sent for them and will put them up here.

1200 Four Piper Cubs landed.

1400 Major [illegible] (?), Med. Officer arrived and will stay the afternoon in order to help with Limburg POW's.

1430 Col. STARK and party go out to recoy some German motor equipment.

1615 Major [illegible] gave Col. STARK a list of his people who he is anxious to have out of camp as they have strong party sympathies and might make trouble. Col. STARK turns them over to Infantry Patrol. They include the following:

Sgt. [illegible], Spl. [illegible]
Sgt. [illegible] Spl. [illegible]
Cpl. [illegible]

1930 Three lot of distressed POW's arrived and are deloused, bathed and clothed.

[illegible] Maj. [illegible] XPX executive arrives with load of POW's.

[illegible] We are to be loaded with POW's. They have been arriving all PM.

[illegible] Finished feeding for night. A/C are still to be del[illegible]

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30 March 45

Work continues through the day delousing and feeding POW's arriving in camp. Maj. TEESE returns and advises us to expect 320 POW's from Hammer in the morning. This lot will include 14 officers and 79 Field Grade Officers. Seven POW's return from our last transport, including W/Cmdr. CARLING-KELLY. Today the remaining German personnel was officially put to work in the office, on Kitchen Detail, policing camp etc. They are dealt with through Maj. DOMMEHLFER, Mr. RICHARDS and Sgt. KELLER. Work is going on to prepare for the maximum number this camp will hold. Medical Officers have arrived and are organizing their departments. They hope to start evacuating the worse cases shortly. The Hammer contingent starting arriving at 1100.

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P 162
Field Rep.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

19 July 1945

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report Submitted by Captain Stephen Vincigueerra

In response to your inquiry as to the way our present arrangements for taking care of the welfare of individuals in OSS are working out, the question seems to me to divide itself into (a) arrangements in the field and (b) arrangements in Washington. Captain Vincigueerra stressed three main points, (1) responsibility for awards, (2) responsibility for promotions and (3) responsibility for redistribution of personnel upon completion of their assignments. With regard to arrangements in the various theaters: as you know each theater has an OSS Personnel Officer whose responsibility is to work with the Commanding Officers of the various units to insure that awards are properly made, that the promotional policy is fair, and that officers are reassigned as rapidly as possible after completion of an assignment. The question of existing arrangements has been discussed with Lt. Col. Ralph A. Burns and he has expressed the view that "an office individual could accomplish the end desired by the writer of the report, particularly as that individual would probably be quartered in Washington. As it now stands the Overseas Personnel Officers who are close to the situation and have the end here, and ultimately what these are claimed through a central personnel activity."

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I understand that Lt. Comdr. Green did an excellent job as OSS Personnel Officer in MEDTO. At the present time, I am told, Major Little is performing similar functions in the China Theater, and Major Small in the India-Burma Theater. As an illustration of the recognition of the importance of the welfare of members of this Organization, I may cite the fact that Major Small is presently spending most of his time on the question of decorations for deserving personnel in the India-Burma Theater, particularly as regards 101.

With regard to present arrangements in Washington: awards are primarily a matter for Theater action, although each of the branches has been requested to submit the names of individuals stationed in Washington who are believed to be deserving of awards or decorations. As to assignments, the re-assignment of personnel is now the primary concern of the Personnel Procurement Branch, and my experience has been that the program is being carried forward efficiently. We have always had with us the problem of holding personnel (either individuals or groups) on the short for periods of time which have varied in length. Most of our men have understood, I believe, that waiting is a part of war. We have recognized the problems which such waiting is bound to raise and have always done our best to meet them. I can only speak for SI Branch, but I am sure that the other branches have had precisely the same attitude.

As far as Captain Vinciguerra's proposal for the appointment of an officer charged with "the individual welfare of all in OSS" is concerned, I feel that no single individual could possibly carry out such an assignment. The answers to the welfare of individuals in

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the OSS roots with the Commanding Officers of each unit, beginning with the smallest. Capt. Vinciguerra would himself, no doubt, recognize his responsibility to the officers and enlisted men under his command. In turn, I am sure, each of our Section Chiefs and Branch Chiefs in the field, as well as those in Washington, have recognized their responsibilities and have done their best to carry them out.

In summary, although I believe that Captain Vinciguerra's suggestion is meritorious, the proposal he makes is not feasible from an organizational standpoint. On the basis of the experience, particularly of the past four months, when we have had to deal with so many returnees, I believe that the present arrangements within OSS are organizationally sound. I recognize that we must all of us individually do our best to keep them working smoothly and efficiently.

I doubt that Capt. Vinciguerra is entirely familiar with the various arrangements already in existence in the various theaters and in Washington. I shall arrange to let him know the steps that are being taken along the lines indicated above.



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Field Report 17,162

Vinciguerra

SECRET

16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Whitney H. Shepardson

FROM: The Director

Dear Whitney:

In view of Captain Vinciguerra's letter about the officer looking into the individual welfare of all in OSS, I wish you would see how our present arrangements are working out, and then let Vinciguerra know what is being done.

WJD

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12,162
Final Report

SECRET

16 July 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Major Duncan Lee

FROM: The Director

I have noticed in some of the reports that it is suggested that the confusion of an airborne operation creates ideal circumstances for infiltration of agents. You might pass that on to Halliwell, even though they are now doing it.

WJD

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director DATE: 7 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Stephen P. Vinciguerra

1. Capt. Vinciguerra served with the First Allied Airborne Army from 8 September 1944 to the end of hostilities, during which time he was awarded the Bronze Star by the AAA for his work in Holland. Previously he was instructor for [redacted] and [redacted] agents.

2. States that the confusion of an airborne operation creates ideal circumstances for infiltration of agents, and suggests that a G-1 officer be appointed by OSS to follow up individual award recommendations and job transfers for OSS personnel.

S.J.L.

Attachment

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson, Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Captain Stephen Vinciguerra

The attached report is not only well prepared, but well worth reading. Captain Vinciguerra's contributions to the war effort, through his service with OSS, are regarded as outstanding.

His operations with the First Allied Airborne Army were hazardous, commendable, and unusually productive.

This report contains several constructive suggestions. A particularly good example will be found in the final paragraph. Vinciguerra has touched only in merest detail upon his relations with the First Airborne Army. It is understood that in the face of obstructionist tactics on the part of certain G-2 officers in that Command, Vinciguerra managed to maintain a friendly spirit of coordination which, later, brought favorable comment.

W. H. S.

Attachment

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23 June 1945

TO: Chief, S.I.

FROM: Stephen P. Vinciguerra, Capt. FA

SUBJECT: Field Report from ETO

Undersigned left for overseas on 12 December 1943 as a JEDBURGH, arriving 13 December at Glasgow, Scotland. After certain aptitude tests at Peterufield, England, I was rejected by SO for JEDBURGH work, and attached to SI Schools and Training under Major COHEN. From January to June 1944, I was an instructor for the SUSSEX agents, a joint Anglo-French-American undertaking, where I instructed in airplane identification, parachute jumping, map reading, physical training, and coding.

On the first of June, the SUSSEX training was completed, and I was transferred to Area "B" near Lenwood, England, to instruct the PROUST agents. In addition to the above subjects, I conducted exercises and problems with the complete cooperation of the RAF Provost Marshall upon British airdromes and other military installations. From July until September, I was Chief Instructor at the PROUST School.

On 8 September, I was scheduled to go on the MARCEL Mission under Lt. Col. Walter Scott Jr. This was an SI mission behind German lines in the area of the U.S. Seventh Army, where we were to work with the Maquis. Two B-24's were used, Col. Scott being in charge of one, and I in charge of the other. Due to faulty navigation, my pilot was unable to find the jump field, and my Liberator returned to England. The Colonel's plane made a successful drop, and he completed his mission without the help of the party in my plane.

Upon returning to England that night, I telephoned London to arrange for another attempt to reach our objective, but was told by Colonel John Boswell, SI Chief in London, that I was needed on another mission with the First Allied Airborne Army, and could not go into France. I was to report back to Lt. Col. Robinson Verrill, OSS Liaison Officer at FAAA Hq. in Amst.

Col. Verrill introduced me to my companion for the Holland airborne operation, Sgt. J. L. Leon Jungen, and we prepared to jump on 17 September with the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen, Holland. We were told that we were the only OSS men on this operation, but at the airfield I met three old JEDBURGH friends named Capt. Sellenberger, Lt. Verhage, and Lt. Todd, who were being sent in by U.S. Lt. Todd was killed, and Lt. Verhage seriously injured in the operation.

My duties consisted of establishing radio contact with London OSS in order to provide the airborne troops with immediate secret information that might come from agents in the field, and to study the feasibility of infiltrating agents into an enemy country during the conditions caused by the airborne operation.

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Both my radio operator and myself landed safely, but the radio set suffered damage due to improper packing. No radio contact was ever established, but many blank documents such as identity papers, passes, tickets, ration cards, and many sample filled documents were collected and sent back to London. Meanwhile, I was impressed in to service as Divisional Provost Marshall in the absence of the regular Provost Marshall, and given 54 glider pilots to act as military police. We handled, fed, and evacuated 2800 prisoners in the first week, and the Divisional Commander awarded me the Bronze Medal for this work.

During the fall of 1944, I was attached to G-2 XVIII Corps Airborne Headquarters, where my duties were to aid in planning future airborne operations, and to help plan OSS participation. One operation was planned for a Rhine crossing south of Cologne, but was called off due to the German Ardennes offensive.

During this offensive, the XVIII Corps was given two airborne divisions (82nd and 101st), and moved into the gap at St. Vith and Bastogne. The G-2 called for an OSS detachment from Col. Verrill, naming the team that we had prepared for the Rhine crossing. Despite the persona-non-grata status of OSS with the First United States Army, The XVIII Corps Hq. was allowed by FUSA to have us along as a Corps detachment. There my duties consisted of infiltrating agent teams, recruiting agents, recruiting guides, and locating safe addresses.

As soon as the Germans were completely repulsed (about 15 February) Corps Headquarters was pulled out of line and sent back into France to prepare for the Rhine Crossing operation north of Wesel to help the British Second Army cross the river. I stayed with the corps, and organized four agent teams who were to infiltrate the lines immediately after the drop and report back tactical intelligence. Two of these teams were in German army uniform.

The operation took place on 24 March. One was glider born, complete with Germany volkswagen, radio set, and uniform. A second team of uniformed personnel was parachuted. The third and fourth team, civilian dressed, went in by glider. All had portable radio excepting the volkswagen team who had a regulation army set.

Due to heavy anti-aircraft fire, one explosive shell of which struck the glider carrying the volkswagen, the best team was wounded, and the volkswagen damaged. I received shrapnel wounds also, but not seriously. The civilian team made a clean infiltration during which operation 58 Germans including two lieutenants surrendered to my party of four. I have recommended a Bronze Star Medal for one of my sergeants who was with me at the time of our skirmish, who was extremely aggressive despite wounds more serious than mine. The second uniformed team arrived safely by parachute, was promptly infiltrated, but lost its nerve and returned to our lines during the same day. The fourth team was successfully infiltrated the following night, but due to a sudden breakthrough of Allied forces, were promptly overrun.

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The situation moved so rapidly that Col. Verrill and the G-2 decided it was impossible to put agents out ahead of the troops, and too, they were no longer needed since the Germans were not resisting strongly, nor were they in any great force. Therefore, our detachment and the teams were withdrawn to recuperate and reform another operation.

The next operation was to be carried out by five regiments upon the German secret weapon laboratories at Missingen, south of Stuttgart. Col. Verrill and I organized another detachment including two volkswagon teams (I captured the second one at Wesel) to aid the 13th Airborne Division in its task. Two days before it was to take place, on 20th April, the First French Army broke through, and overran the drop zones, thus cancelling the operation.

From then until the end of the war, I aided Col. Verrill as OSS Liaison Officer at the Headquarters of the First Allied Airborne Army. Then I was alerted for return home, arriving here on 30th May, after eighteen months in the ETO.

On the whole, I am pleased to have had the opportunity to work for OSS. We did a great deal in the ETO, but I believe that OSS was capable of doing far more.

One thing that was proved is that agents can be infiltrated during an airborne operation. The confusion that an airborne operation causes, creates ideal circumstances for agents dressed either as soldiers, or as civilian refugees fleeing before the fight, to make a perfect arrival. They are known to have arrived safely because we accompanied them to safety, and helped them carry their equipment.

I can suggest two difficulties that might be improved. The first is a closer liaison between the different branches of OSS to let each branch know what the other is doing. We did not let Col. Verrill, the liaison officer with the airborne troops, know that it had operators ready to go on the Holland operation. We could have been of help to each other had we known beforehand of each other's participation.

The second suggestion is to establish a sort of G-1, an officer charged with the individual welfare of all in OSS. It would be his responsibility to see that awards and promotions are given to the unspectacular and obscure who are tucked away in some outpost but who do excellent work, as well as to those who are in the office all day. He would also be charged with redistribution of personnel when an assignment is completed, so that one do not sit around out of a job.

Stephen F. Vinciguerra
Capt. FA

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T-Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x Burton

DATE: 13 July 1945

TO: Acting Director

x SI

FROM: Secretariat - Reports Office

x ETO

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Thomas S. Wilson SI/ETO

1. Mr. Wilson served with the Labor Section of SI in Paris from February to June 1945. Previously he was Chief of the Labor Section in London.

2. He bitterly criticises OSS administrative "bottlenecks" resulting from vague directives, branch autonomies, overcrowded top echelons, unnecessary secrecy, and "buck-passing."

S.P.K.

S.P.K.

Attachments

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Office of Strategic Services DATE: 6 July 1945

FROM : Chief SI

SUBJECT: Field Report Thomas S. Wilson

Enclosed is a field report prepared by Thomas S. Wilson, member of the Labor Section SI, ETO.

He mentions three matters of considerable importance. All of them are the subjects of constant thought and effort.

(1) Better and more precise intelligence directions.

(2) More personal consideration to agents at the time of their "debriefing".

(3) Promotions for enlisted men.

His other criticisms are expressed in language which reflects his feelings, no doubt, but it also reveals personal characteristics which resulted in his ending up with OSS in no higher capacity, and with no greater responsibilities, than those with which he started out. George Pratt made him Acting Chief of Labor Section London November 1944 to February 1945: he was not good enough for the job and Lt. Bevan succeeded Mr. Wilson.

I call attention to his final paragraph "Despite the above critical remarks, OSS did on occasion do some good work."

That's one for the book!

W. H. S.

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28 June 1945

FIELD REPORT OF MR. THOMAS S. WILSON, LABOR SECTION, SI

1. DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES

a) From March 1943 to March 1944, I was attached to the Labor Section, SI-Washington, in a staff capacity.

b) From March 1944 to September 1944, I was in a staff capacity in the Labor Section, SI-London.

c) From September 1944 to November 1944, I was Acting Chief of the Labor Section in London and became Chief in November.

d) From February 1945 to June 1945, I was acting in a staff capacity for the Labor Section in Paris.

2. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD

a) Washington should give more definite advice to the operating personnel in the field regarding information which would be of interest in Washington and in regard to possible means of implementing the directives sent from Washington. The present directives are disgraceful indefinite.

b) A definite chain of command must be established with regard to London, Paris and new Germany. Present conditions result in jurisdictional fights, empire building and buck passing. Someone should be appointed to the responsibility and then given the opportunity to assume it.

c) The distinction between the SI and SO branches in a theater of operations should be abolished in order to eliminate jurisdictional quarrels and to prevent further opportunities for buck passing. It should

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be possible to create a more cooperative spirit in the organization by this elimination. Lack of cooperation within the organization is the order of the day today. Under field conditions the distinctions between branches became artificial.

d) Greater care in the selection of personnel should be exercised to the end that the employees would be more interested in the advancement of the organization than in their own personal advancement.

e) The present T/O should be inverted so that all the personnel will not be congregated in the top echelons and so that there will be personnel on the working or lower levels to do the necessary detailed work for the procurement of information. The organization already has too many 'coordinators' and too few working members.

f) There should be more cooperation within the branch than formerly, when more time was spent in intra-office jurisdictional fights than in prosecuting the war. Personal empire builders should be eliminated or controlled.

g) The various desk heads should be given definite information of other contemplated or operating projects so as to be able to assist or to secure help therefrom, as the case may be. Too much unnecessary secrecy in the organization causes lost opportunities for furthering operations and making use of qualified personnel already available.

h) The agent personnel which does the actual work should receive more aid, assistance, and recognition from OSS. OSS has already acquired a reputation in ETO for "kicking off" its agent personnel.

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i) The above also applies to the enlisted men, many of whom were asked to do work which in other intelligence outfits was being done by officers. These men secured little, if any, recognition and it was very bad for their morale to see their officers being promoted without receiving some recognition themselves.

j) Various administrative bottlenecks would be cured if a more permanent staff was on hand and if there would be less "junketing."

k) Some of the service desks became too "GI" to be able to procure supplies quickly enough for operational needs.

l) Both R & A and Reports Division should be of more assistance to the operations staff than formerly when their full time was employed for outside customers.

Despite the above critical remarks, OMS did on occasion do some good work.

Thomas S. Wilson

Thomas S. Wilson

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17.173
Field Reports
Cox

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 13 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. Arthur Cox
SI/Italy

1. Mr. Cox was with the SI Jugoslav section and served as its Chief from January to June 1945. Previously he served as communications officer in Istanbul.

2. His criticisms of the work in Jugoslavia elaborate on past reports. He notes the possibility of future penetration of Jugoslavia through the use of expatriates, which, as Mr. Shepardson comments, must be done with the greatest discretion.

S.P.K.

Attachments

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17.173.

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Fwd of Report

DATE: 25 June 1945

Cox

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions by Mr. Arthur Cox

In paragraph B 1, Mr. Cox invites attention to the necessity for coordinating the activities of the various branches in a particular area. This principle has been discussed at length by others with field experience, and most agree that there should be an over-all command charged with the direction and control of all OSS activities in an area. Coordination, involving information as to the missions of others, is at times in conflict with security. When security permits coordination is highly desirable.

Regarding paragraph B 2, there can be no doubt that unity of command, clearly defined and channeled, is highly desirable. Such an organization will be insisted upon whenever possible.

In paragraph B 3, the selection of personnel is again discussed. The SI Branch has learned its lesson well -- the necessity for choosing personnel qualified for a particular job, after taking into account the various aspects of that job.

Regarding paragraph B 4, it is certainly true that the quantity of intelligence provided by the Partisans decreased during the period SI representatives were with Mihailovich. However, it is doubtful that the quality of the intelligence deteriorated. Randolph always contended that the Partisans wanted SI to know -- much or little.

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Regarding paragraph B 5, it is generally acknowledged that more comprehensive and extensive training of field personnel is essential.

In paragraph B 8, Mr. Cox recommends the employment of certain Yugoslavs in future activities. It seems most likely that individuals known as hostile to the Partisan cause will in the near future be in no position to assist us. Even though they survive and remain at liberty in Yugoslavia, it is doubtful that they would possess access to secret intelligence. Employment of such persons should be undertaken with the greatest discretion.



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REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS
by
ARTHUR COX

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, OSS
Through Chief, SI

DATE: 23 June 1945

FROM Arthur Cox amc

SUBJECT Report on Field Conditions

A. What I Did in the Field

1. Service with Communications Branch

In early December 1943, I flew from Miami via the southern route to Cairo where transportation was arranged for me to proceed to Istanbul, Turkey, under the cover of Assistant Military Attache. I was in Istanbul from late December until early May, where I worked as Communications Officer in cryptography, code and training of agents. I also assisted in the SI training for the clandestine penetration of Rumania and Bulgaria. In May, I returned to Cairo, where I continued to work for Communications Branch until the middle of August. In early August, I was assigned to a combat intelligence team to go in with one of the early waves in the invasion of Southern France, but six weeks in the hospital with typhoid fever and an appendicitis operation made a change of assignment necessary. When I had recuperated, I was sent to Bari, Italy, where I spent two weeks assisting in the training of German and Hungarian POW's who were to be used on SI penetration teams.

2. Transfer to SI Branch and Subsequent Experience

In September 1944, I was transferred to the Yugoslav Section, SI Branch, where I was to assist Captain Orman Suker, who at the time was Chief of Yugoslav-SI. My work with the Section in Bari was primarily involved with becoming familiar with the various teams in the field and

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the operations to which they had been assigned. I also did general administrative work and liaison with the Reports Office on cabled intelligence reports coming in from the field. In early October, when Headquarters-Italy was established in Caserta, I was sent to Headquarters to become liaison officer for the Yugoslav Section. From October until 1 January, I was responsible for liaison with various other branches of Headquarters and with agencies at AFHQ, including G-2, G-3, G-5, AMG, UNRRA, American Political Advisers Office, FEA, FWN, CIC, SILO, MAAF, 15th Air Force and Balkan Air Force.

January 1, at about the time Captain Suker was to be sent into Belgrade as Administrative Officer, I became Chief of the Yugoslav Section. At that time, I became responsible for the briefing of all teams entering the field, for the direction of all intelligence by cable and pouch and for all administrative liaison. From this time until early June, when the Yugoslav operation was virtually completed, I made three trips into the field and to Belgrade for the purpose of making contacts with the team members and giving them first-hand briefing. I did considerable liaison with the three Air Forces operating over Yugoslavia, for the purpose of establishing targets and correlating the ground intelligence sent by our teams with the photographic intelligence of the Air Forces.

I was also responsible for the movement of teams to areas which would give the most favorable coverage of strategic and tactical military operations in Yugoslavia and of enemy movement. I also processed and

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briefed five new teams which were sent to various corps headquarters. Considerable time was spent with members of the Reports Office, both the military and political and economic sections, for the purpose of clarifying intelligence reports cabled from the field. I was also responsible for liaison with all branches outside of SI with particular reference to R & A, X-2, MO, Communications and the Services Branches. I kept constant liaison with the Service and Supply Officer who was located at Company B in Bari, and with the 15th Air Force liaison officer, also in Bari. There was considerable work involved with the latter organization in arranging for the evacuation of fliers who had been shot down or who had bailed out in Yugoslavia and had been picked up by our field missions. Our teams in the field were responsible for the evacuation of over 2,000 Allied fliers.

As the military situation diminished there was an increasing amount of liaison with Mr. Offie and other members of the staff of the American Political Adviser's Office. When the American Embassy was to be established in Belgrade, our Headquarters Office gave all possible assistance in briefing the Embassy staff in aiding their entrance into the country. I took some trips in Italy and made contacts with various Yugoslav representatives in Rome and Florence and also arranged some contacts in the Vatican.

The Yugoslav Section was responsible for the de-briefing of all field teams as they were evacuated from the country. Each team wrote an exhaustive report of its mission and had interviews with members of the reports staff, X-2, R&A, the American Political Adviser's Office,

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ranking officers in G-2, and the Mediterranean Allied Air Force. Constant liaison was maintained with all of the British agencies working in Yugoslavia including the 37th Military Mission, ISLD, IS-9, and British counter intelligence units. I wrote weekly reports for G-2 on our activities and the regular semi-monthly OSS reports in addition to the SI reports which were continually being written for other agencies. On 6 June 1945, I left Italy to return to the United States.

B. Difficulties Encountered and Recommendations for Improvement

1. Closer Liaison Among Branches

I found that there was very inadequate liaison among the various branches of OSS, particularly SO and SI. Very few of the personnel in the various branches were adequately aware of the scope of operations of the other branches and duplication and confusion was often inevitable. Particularly in the case of SI and SO operations, it appeared to me that a much closer coordination of activities would have greatly improved our work in the country. When Colonel Huntington became Commanding Officer in late September, all SO activities were discontinued; but prior to that time there was considerable overlapping and confusion as all of the field members were doing virtually the same kind of work. For future operations under conditions similar to those in Yugoslavia, such as might be expected in Communist China, I would suggest that SO and SI now work jointly under a single command both in the field and at the base. It might be valuable for a program to be established where inter-branch meetings were held with each branch selecting a representative to give a general talk outlining the duties, functions, operations and

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over-all policy of the branch so that the other branches might become better informed as to what was being done. This sort of coordination, even on a very general level, might be very valuable.

2. Chain of Command

One of the difficulties in the administration of operations in Yugoslavia was the rather nebulous and disorganized chain of command. At various times members of field missions had as many as five superior officers cabling them varied and different directions. Yugoslavia was unusual in the respect that for a time Colonel Huntington was Commanding Officer virtually independent of the Regiment reporting directly to the Director. However, when Colonel Huntington left the Chief SI, the Chief Balkan Division, the Chief Yugoslav Section, the Chief of the Belgrade City Mission and the Reports Officer often were sending cables to the field teams. Some of these cables were not cleared through a single channel and were very confusing to the men in the field. The situation was considerably improved when the Yugoslav Section was made responsible directly to the Chief SI and the Commanding Officer of the Belgrade Mission, at the same time reported to the Chief SI, narrowing the command down to two with a single channel. I would recommend that under similar circumstances in the future, if communications made it feasible, the command should be established either at the field Headquarters or at the base.

3. Selection of Personnel

During the early days of planning for operations in Yugoslavia, most of the recruiting was done on a language basis. Unfortunately officers with a Yugoslav heritage who had an inevitable bias, were not

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well suited for a country such as Yugoslavia where a Civil War was in progress at the same time as the fight with the Germans. Although most of the officers of Yugoslav descent performed valuable service in the country, most of them reported with a definite political bias and their partial evaluation made it very difficult for the Reports Office to determine the true situation sometimes. I feel that far too much emphasis was put on the language factor in recruiting for Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslav translators were often inadequate, the impartial reporting of American officers who knew nothing about the country prior to the war were usually more valuable. I think that men should be very carefully screened for political ideologies and theories before being sent into controversial areas where their reporting might be inaccurate and where their presence might create unrest.

4. The Mihailovich Incident

One of the factors which was responsible for creating a great lack of cooperation from the Partisans was our mission to Mihailovich. Although there was no question of the value of getting reports from all areas and all points of view in a country, I think our mission to Mihailovich was possibly not expedient since it served as a definite block with relations with Partisan army corps. And it probably decreased the amount of intelligence received from Tito's armies by about half. From the time the team entered Mihailovich's area, the Partisans were always very suspicious of any operations which we attempted in Partisan areas. There were many other factors, of course, which led to Partisan lack of cooperation but this incident more than any other, I believe, made our relations difficult.

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5. Training and Briefing of Teams

Most of the first teams sent into Yugoslavia were virtually untrained and unbriefed for their missions which was a very unfortunate situation -- one that improved as our organization gained experience. Many of the officers were recruited in the field in Egypt or Italy from other Army units, given brief Communications training and a general outline of the job to be done and then were dropped into the country. As a result many of the officers no matter how competent they may have been were unable to do as valuable a job as might have been possible if they had had adequate training and briefing. This situation was somewhat remedied by intelligence direction through cables and by trips of the headquarters staff into the country. Those men who did receive training in the Areas in Washington found that their training was not adequate since it was not specific enough. I would recommend as a result of our experience in Yugoslavia that men going into the field be trained solely for the specific job which they are expected to perform. They could be trained as a complete team unit, commanding officer, interpreter, radio operator, and any other personnel all together. Before entering the country they should be briefed not only by the SI Branch, but by all other branches who might be interested in their mission. This briefing should be continuous after their entrance into the country not only by cable but by trips back to the base, where possible, every two or three months. All of the field men in Yugoslavia expressed the belief that they might have done a much more valuable job if they could have come to Caserta once or twice. This interchange should be

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reciprocal with the Headquarters staff also making frequent trips into the field where possible.

6. Necessary Authority to be Delegated to Field Missions

Although all of our OSS missions in Yugoslavia were considered the official American representatives to Yugoslavia by the Yugoslavs none of them had the authority to act and speak as official representatives. This was a definite drawback as both the British and Russian missions were delegated such authority. In the future if OSS can obtain such authority from the Army or the State Department, I am sure it would be a definite contribution in the interests of the United States' relations with the country in question.

7. British Domination in Yugoslavia

Since Britain was given the responsibility for military aid and assistance to Yugoslavia at Cairo and Teheran, it was inevitable that the British liaison officers should have a more favorable position in Yugoslavia than would our officers. Although most of the supplies dropped to the Yugoslav forces were made in America, since they were dropped by British officers and at British request, our officers were not able to capitalize on any of the aid given to Yugoslavia. There was no give and take between the officers and the Yugoslav staffs as we had no material aid to sell ourselves with. In other words, we could not buy intelligence through our assistance to the country. However, our officers were able to do a rather remarkable job merely on the grounds that they were to aid in fighting the Germans. Since the Balkan Air

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Force was responsible for most air operations over Yugoslavia, and since the British missions had direct radio communication with this air force they were able to give much better support to air targets requested by the Partisan corps. We were able to work out a close liaison with the 15th Air Force, but since they were a strategic air force their raids were limited to certain strategic targets in Northern Yugoslavia and our men were unable to obtain much tactical assistance to the Partisan armies.

8. Clandestine Intelligence

Since the organization has not been able to obtain any specific policy from the State Department committing us to commence clandestine operations in Yugoslavia we have not been able to capitalize on certain operations to penetrate the country. There are 5,000 Yugoslav refugees who have been under American control on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia since the Italian campaign who might prove to be valuable sources of possible clandestine penetration or safe addresses. There are also refugees who have recently left the country now in Southern Austria and Northern Italy who are not sympathetic to the present government. Some of these sources have already been tapped by OSS officers and reports are being made now on possibilities for their future use. Any clandestine work from within the country will have to be commenced at once if it is to work at all since the Yugoslav government will soon be so well organized that we will no longer be able to capitalize on the present fluid situation. The Ozna, which is a Yugoslav secret police, has already become very strong in various cities such as Belgrade

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and Zagreb. At the present time, a list of personalities and safe addresses is being drawn up as a result of reports made by men who have recently come out of the field.

Arthur Cox

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17.180
210 Pages
K Swan -

15 July 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson

FROM : The Director

I feel that on disputed questions such as the report of Donovan, that we ought to get the other point of view. Out of it we can learn something. I am inclined to your view "that there is some justification for each of the conflicting opinions".

WJD

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17,181
Field Agent
x Wickham
x SI x China

Offi . Memorandum • UNITED STATES ~~GOVERNMENT~~

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 10 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: ~~Major John A. Wickham~~ SI/China

From October 1944 to January 1945 Major Wickham served as Chief, SI China. His suggestions and criticisms are taken up in detail in Mr. Shepardson's covering memorandum.

S.P.K.

Attachments

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17,181

MEMORANDUM

25 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report from Major John A. Wickham dated 19 June 1945

1. Subject report is transmitted herewith.

2. It appears to this Branch that the significant parts of Major Wickham's report are all concerned with evils resulting from the improper selection and training of field personnel for China. It is our belief and hope that since the period with which Major Wickham is familiar both the personnel selected and the training given them has improved materially and, therefore the evils of which he speaks are now less acute.

3. Commenting specifically with respect to the principal paragraphs of the report in the order in which they appear therein:

(i) Paragraph (a), concerning per diem in the China Theater, seems to us to be a matter of significance. It is suggested that this be called to the attention of the Strategic Services Officer, CT.

(ii) Paragraphs (b) and (c). See paragraph 2 above of this memorandum.

(iii) Paragraph (d). There is, of course, no particular reliance now placed on "handouts" by General Tai Li. MATTS is now entirely an OSS organization and there is no longer any question of simply taking "handouts" from A-2, 14th Air Force.

4. As to Major Wickham's final proposal that a Research Society staffed by educated Chinese be organized where legitimate research activities would be a cover for intelligence collection as a "hobby", the proposal is stated in such general terms, it is difficult to see what precisely Major Wickham has in mind for implementation. We are undertaking, however, to forward to the Chief of SI, CT, a copy of this report, and Dr. Henry, who is recommended therein to be organizer of this Research Society, is scheduled to depart for China early in July.

William H. Jackson
Chief, SI Branch

Attachment

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12,181

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

19 June 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, OSS

THRU : Chief, SI

FROM : John A. Wickham

SUBJECT : Field Report of Major John A. Wickham, Chief, SI, China Theatre, 6 October 1944 - 15 January 1945.

1. My Mission, duties and the problems encountered have been detailed at length in my reports for the months of October, November and December 1944, and of January 1945 which are incorporated by reference in this report. Moreover, upon this submission, I am leaving for an assignment with the Civil Affairs Division. Accordingly, this report will be confined to a few brief recommendations.

2. Recommendations:

(a) Men on SI field assignments in the China Theatre receive per diem at the rate of $7 per day. They are able to obtain food and lodging for a few cents a day and thus can save the greater part of their allowance. This has resulted in making some SI men on headquarters assignments restless to get into the field so as to save more money, and has greatly impaired their efficiency.

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In addition, this state of affairs has induced men in the field to connive to stay there for the longest possible time, irrespective of whether conditions warranted such extended field service. Money-saving has become their chief motive.

The correction of these unwholesome conditions would be best accomplished by the careful selection of SI personnel with proper motives. But this is difficult. Moreover, motives change with circumstances. It would be preferable to make field allowance conform to actual field expenses so as to eliminate the "profit" motive altogether.

(b) Other agencies customarily impute the shortcomings of OSS heads of missions and of branches to those under them. This has been true in the China Theatre and has and is now interfering with OSS accomplishments there. It has been my observation that OSS very frequently (particularly in the field) entrusts its most important work to inept persons. This was the situation in the China Theatre both when I arrived and when I left. The motives with which such selections have been made have been consistently bad and, unless corrected, OSS will never make more than a mediocre record in the China Theatre.

(c) Men who dislike the Chinese should be promptly eliminated from the OSS contingent in the China Theatre. It appeared to me, while I was there, that this applied to the majority. The Chinese will not confide in men who dislike them and without winning

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the confidence of the Chinese, no intelligence of any consequence can be gathered in the Theatre.

(d) Intelligence must be sought from the Chinese without Army or government connections. The current reliance upon "handouts" from General Tai L. (Saco) and from Army Headquarters (ACFRTS) is destined to produce mostly grief for our forces. It would be far better to train unbiased informant service organizers and send them undercover throughout China to gather intelligence on an independent basis.

This can be readily accomplished through the organization of a Research Society staffed by educated Chinese of the sort referred to who could carry on legitimate research work and gather intelligence as a "hobby". Such an organization should be headed by an American trained in intelligence work who can win the confidence and cooperation of the Chinese. Dr. Henry, who is currently working with the Schools and Training Branch, appears ideally fitted for such an assignment. The groundwork for such an organization was laid by me during my tour of duty in China. Several educated Chinese are anxious to give their full time to such a venture. It is my belief that we should take advantage with the Chinese at hand here to gather intelligence in China. I shall be glad to elaborate further upon this if any interest is shown.

k. These are but a few of the suggestions which I had hoped to offer to a sympathetic audience.

SECRET

John A. Wickham
Major, AGC

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OSS Form 2202

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

17181 Field Report Wickham

FROM: #ESI

Accession No. ....

Date Rec'd SA ....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.	1037	AUG 1		MM	
2. Chief SI	121	AUG 1 1945	AUG 2 1945	MW	
3. Director OSS	Adm Bldg			ESE	
4. Kasty		AUG 2 1945		MM	Hold for Genl Donovan ESE
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
Return to FESI					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in To column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For officer designations see separate sheet.

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Field Dir
Wickham

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

1 August 1945

To : Director, OSS

Via : Chief, SI

From : Far East Div., SI

Subject: Field Report from Major John Wickham

Forwarded herewith are the comments of the Chief, SI, China Theater, on the report submitted by Major John A. Wickham, former Chief, SI, China Theater, on his return to this country.

Lt. Col. Helliwell asks that, in view of the fact that Major Wickham's report was forwarded to you, his (Lt. Col. Helliwell's) comments also be forwarded to you.

Turner McBaine
Turner McBaine
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Div. Dep., Far East, SI

Att.

To Director OSS
From Chief. SI.
Subject. Lt Col. Helliwell's letter attached.

1) Subject letter forwarded with considerable satisfaction
2) Major Wickham has left OSS
3) Nobody got particularly [illegible] he kept telling everybody that Jack McCloy was a great friend of his.
4) There are many other reports from disgruntled [illegible] who must get a similar "one-two" of this kind

to pass the answering of this C.O.s in Distant Theaters WJF

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NS Form 2202

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 12646-710

Date Rec'd NA JUL 17 1945

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
[illegible]	[illegible]				12646-631 attached for reference.
[illegible]		JUL 19	JUL 20		
[illegible]		JUL 31			
[illegible]		JUL 26			
[illegible] SD		JUL 26			STG RE par. D of memorandum dated [illegible] you wish [illegible] letters or do you want us to do so?
McCormack	4G				
Director JSS					
ZCSI	109/2				
Col					please send to 9 [illegible]

[illegible] should be [illegible] to correspond with number in To column.
Line should be drawn across sheet under last entry.
Officer initials should be [illegible] in To column.
Each officer should initial [illegible] and indicate date further routing.
Routing sequence or action taken should be indicated in remarks column.
Locked safes should always be returned to registry.
No officer designation and separate check.

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17.181
Field report

REGISTRY NO.

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATER
APO 627

SI Branch
10 July 1945

Subject: Field Report from Major John Wickham

To : Chief, Japan-China Section, FEEI, Washington, D. C.

1. Copy of field report of Major Wickham received by this office has been examined with considerable care. In the opinion of this office the recommendations of Major Wickham are the recommendations and comments of a disgruntled individual who did not perform his duty properly in this theater and should be so regarded.

2. With specific reference to Par. 2m of the report, the undersigned is unaware of any single instance in which OSS personnel have gone to the field in order to make $7 per diem. My experience has been that the OSS personnel who have gone to the field are going out there motivated by devotion to duty and not from any personal motive. I seriously question whether any same individual would risk capture by the Japanese for the princely sum of $7 per day.

3. With reference to Par. 2n, so far as SI is concerned the field installations which were in existence on Major Wickham's departure from this theater are still in existence with the same personnel heading them. Without exception these personnel have turned in an outstanding job, the main difference being that they are for once getting a certain amount of direction and support from their branch headquarters. These self same individuals are now contributing approximately 45 per cent of all the intelligence produced by all agencies in the China Theater as opposed to less than 10 per cent when Major Wickham was in charge of the branch.

4. With reference to Par. 2q the undersigned is well aware that most Americans are not passionately in love with the Chinese. To say, however, that the majority of OSS personnel in the theater have an active dislike for the Chinese would be a gross falsehood, and the record of highly successful relations with the Chinese in all areas speaks for itself.

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5. With reference to Par. 2[illegible], the "current reliance" upon handouts from General Tai Li and from Army Headquarters is a situation that has not existed since 25 January. Over 80 per cent of OSS intelligence is produced from OSS sources, intelligence is evaluated by OSS, is worked up and distributed by OSS and is generally an OSS product, as contra distinguished from the practice prior to 25 January of taking information from any source, slapping a cover sheet on it and distributing it as "intelligence".

6. With further reference to Par. 2[illegible], there is no such thing as "unbiased informant service organizers" in China. Major Wickham made an abortive effort to form a "research society" staffed by "educated Chinese", and the end product of such service was the expenditure of a large amount of money in return for which intelligence of the most unreliable and useless sort was received.

7. I do not take personal offense at this memorandum. However, I feel very strongly that Major Wickham's memorandum casts entirely unwarranted aspersions upon officers and enlisted men of OSS who have worked loyally and with the utmost devotion to the organization.

8. In view of the fact that Major Wickham's memorandum was forwarded to the Director of the OSS, it is requested that this letter also be forwarded to the Director for his information and that this office be advised that such action has been taken.

For the Strategic Services Officer:

PAUL L. E. HELLIWELL
Lt. Colonel, F. A.
Chief, [illegible], OSS, CT

Distribution
2-Registry
1-OSS, APO 879

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 12646-619

Date Rec'd SA 2/5/65

Lt. Col. Leigh

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Rel'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.					Delivered by hand.
Neil Lane					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
The space in front should be used for To column.
Original documents should be used in To column.
Each officer should record each initial(ing) before further routing.
Action items or action lines should be indicated in Comments column.
Incoming mail should always be returned to Registry.
The original routing and incoming sheet.

SECRET

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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 12646-62

Date Rec'd SA .....

Lee 6/21

	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.			JUN 22		Forward
2. 115		JUN 22			
3.					
4. 1051		JUN 23			
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					

File

Each action should be numbered in correspondence with number in To column.
Each action should be shown opposite which makes each comment.
Line should be drawn opposite each comment.
Comments should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action taken or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Action taken or action taken should be recorded in Registry.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
Continuation comments use separate sheet.

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MEMORANDUM 21 June 1945

TO: Chief, SI, OSS, GF

FROM: Japan-China Sec., FEXI

SUBJECT: Field report from Major John A. Wickham dated 19 June 1945

Attached for your information and files is a copy of subject report together with a copy of our covering memorandum to the Director.

Duncan G. Lee, Maj. AUS
Chief, Japan-China Sec.,
Far East Division, SI

Attachments (2)
cc: Col. Kappner, Chungking (with attachment)
DGL:mm

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MEMORANDUM

21 June 1945

TO: Director, OSS

THRU: Chief, SI

FROM: Japan-China Sec., FEBI

SUBJECT: Field Report from Major John A. Wickham dated 19 June 1945

1. Subject report is transmitted herewith.

2. It appears to this Section that the significant parts of Maj. Wickham's report are all concerned with evils resulting from the improper selection and training of field personnel for China. It is our belief and hope that since the period with which Maj. Wickham is familiar both the personnel selected and the training given them has improved materially, and, therefore, the evils of which he speaks are now less acute.

3. Commenting specifically with respect to the principal paragraphs of the report in the order in which they appear therein:

(i) Paragraph (a), concerning per diem in the China Theater seems to us to be a matter of significance. It is suggested that this be called to the attention of the Strategic Services Officer, CA.

(ii) Paragraphs (b) and (c). See paragraph 2 above of this memorandum.

(iii) Paragraph (d). There is, of course, no particular reliance now placed on "handouts" by General Tai Li. AGWRTS is now entirely an OSS organization and there is no longer any question of simply taking "handouts" from A-2, 14th Air Force.

4. As to Major Wickham's final proposal that a Research Society staffed by educated Chinese be organized where legitimate research activities would be a cover for intelligence collection as a "hobby", the proposal is stated in such general terms, it is difficult to see what precisely Major Wickham has in mind for implementation. We are undertaking, however, to forward to the Chief, of SI, CA, a copy of this report, and Mr. Barry, who is recommended therein to be organizer of this Research Society, is scheduled to depart for China early in July.

Duncan C. Lee, Maj. AUS
Chief, Japan-China Sec.
Far East Division

Attachment

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17181

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19 June 1945

12846-121

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS

THRU: Chief, SI

FROM: John A. Wickham

SUBJECT: Field report of Major John A. Wickham, Chief, SI, China Theater, 6 October 1944 - 15 January 1945.

1. My mission, duties and the problems encountered have been detailed at length in my reports for the months of October, November and December 1944, and of January 1945 which are incorporated by reference in this report. Moreover, upon this notification I am leaving for an assignment with the Civil Affairs Division. Accordingly, this report will be confined to a few brief recommendations.

2. Recommendations.

(a) Men on SI field assignments in the China Theater receive per diem at the rate of $7 per day. They are able to obtain food and lodging for a few cents a day and thus can save the greater part of their allowance. This has resulted in men who have SI men on headquarters assignments rushing to get into the field so as to save more money, and has greatly impaired their efficiency. In addition, this effort of officers has induced men in the field to continue to stay there for the longest possible time, irrespective of whether conditions warranted such extended field service. Money-saving has become their chief motive.

The correction of these unhealthy conditions would be best accomplished by the careful selection of SI personnel with proper motives. But this is difficult. Moreover, motives change with circumstances. It would be preferable to make field allowance uniform to actual field expenses so as to eliminate the "profit" motive altogether.

(b) Office operation customarily lagging the shortcomings of OSS heads of stations and of personnel in their under them. This has been true in the China Theater and has caused us many embarrassing and costly accomplishments there. It has been my observation that the very frequently (particularly in the field) outweighs the most important work in high priority. This was the situation in the China Theater with which I arrived and which I left. The manner with which such situations have been made have been complicated, and such, unless corrected, OSS will never make more than a mediocre record in the China Theater.

(c) That the double the Chinese should be promptly eliminated from the OSS personnel in the China Theater. It appeared to me, while I was there, that this [illegible] the Chinese [illegible] the double them and [illegible] the confidence of the [illegible] Intelligence of any consequence can be produced in the Theater.

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(d) Intelligence must be sought from the Chinese without Army or government connections. The current reliance upon "handouts" from General Tai Li (Saco) and from Army Headquarters (AGFRTS) is continued to produce mostly grief for our forces. It would be far better to train unbiased informant service organizers and send them undercover throughout China to gather intelligence on an independent basis.

This can be readily accomplished through the organization of a Research Society staffed by educated Chinese of the sort referred to who could carry on legitimate research work and gather intelligence as a "hobby". Such an organization should be headed by an American trained in intelligence work who can win the confidence and cooperation of the Chinese. Dr. Emery, who is currently working with the Schools and Training Branch, appears ideally fitted for such an assignment. The groundwork for such an organization was laid by me during my tour of duty in China. Several educated Chinese are anxious to give their full time to such a venture. It is my belief that we should take counsel with the Chinese as to how best to [illegible] INTELLIGENCE IN CHINA. I SHALL BE GLAD TO [illegible]

3. These are but a few of the suggestions which I had hoped to make to a sympathetic audience.

John A. Wickman
Major, AUS

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Outside edges of green [illegible] indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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Top ↑

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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FIELD REPORTS

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17,544
Field Report
X Handling X S.I.
X Rome

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA 9/2/45

Action	Rec'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
[illegible]		WBK	
Agent Office			TO Mrs Rennie
[illegible]			
Director, OSS			

[illegible]

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17,514

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Director, OSS

DATE: 14 September 1945

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Field Report of John H. Hanscking

This report defines Mr. Hanscking's assignment clearly.

The minor criticisms contained in the report draw attention to the fact that the Reports Section was established late in OSS operations in Berne. In consequence, certain difficulties were naturally experienced in the initial stages. The work of the section was performed in a highly satisfactory manner. The result was that the reports were systematically prepared and regularly and swiftly transmitted from Berne to other theatre offices and to Washington.

The establishment of a Registry in Berne would have been of particular assistance to the Reports Section. This was not established prior to the arrival of the Reports staff and shortage of personnel never permitted its organization.

Mr. Hanscking's complete background in Germany, his broad experience, his perfect command of German and his training in the handling of reports were much needed in Berne and were of the greatest service to SI Branch.

Whitney H. Shepardson,
Chief, SI.

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17,544
Field Rep

MEMORANDUM

13 September 1945.

To: Director, OSS

From: John H. Marsching

Subject: on Field Conditions

1. The writer of this report was assigned as German expert to the Reports Section, SI, OSS, Berne, Switzerland.

He was responsible , re reports on Germany:

A. For translation
B. For editing and processing
C. For distribution
D. For the keeping of appropriate research files and references.

These duties and activities were performed in Berne, Switzerland, from 15 March 1945 to 7 August 1945.

2. The conditions in the field were satisfactory on the whole.

3. Under specific difficulties the following were encountered:

a). The lack of proper datings of the reports sent in i.e. the actual period of time during which the reported facts were observed, the date of the writing of the report, the date of the reception of the report by the operations section. This information could not always be determined from the text of the report. It seemed almost as if the agents were afraid to set down dates in case it might incriminate them if discovered or captured. This situation showed some improvement toward the end of the hostilities.

b). Some of the individuals and sections collecting information were inclined at times to ignore the Reports Section by making direct cable and written reports. In some instances copies of cables and summary reports on specific completed operations were not submitted, either for information or filing, to the Reports Section.

c). The orderly arrangement of the facts contained in many reports was missing which, however, was understandable and excusable when taking into consideration the difficulties under which information was gathered.

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d). Not all the duties specified, such as, the translation of lengthy reports, the keeping of appropriate research files and references could be fully carried out, because the necessary clerical assistance was not supplied.

At the height of activities hundreds of reports flowed in. Physically it took the full time of one person to screen all those reports, translate in full or summarize them, edit, process and type them with six or more carbon copies, and have them ready for prompt distribution with a minimum loss of time. In such periods of stress a translator and a stenographer-typist should have been made available.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12,025
Field Report
X Parenti, A.
X SI
X ETO

MEMORANDUM 18 September 1945

TO: The Director

FROM: Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Aurelius J. Parenti
SI/ETO and SAT/ETO

1. Lt. Parenti an officer rated "superior" by SI for his service in ETO candidly describes the factors which lowered morale and weakened the position and effectiveness of OSS in the theater.

2. He charges that security especially in forward areas was inadequately maintained and that constant reorganization and lack of a fixed organizational policy resulted in confusion. Lt. Parenti further states that close inter-branch cooperation was lacking, that planning and operations were unnecessarily delayed by sheer inertia and finally that despite shortages OSS facilities were misused.

File

O. T. Pleasants
D. T. Pleasants
Reports Office

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd Ex. 9/11/45.....

	Date Rec.	Date Rel'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
		SEP 11 1945		
Agent Liaison Unit Dep				
Director OSS				

[illegible]

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17,528

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4 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: CHIEF, S.I.

SUBJECT: Field Report by Aurelius J. Parenti

The author of the attached Field Report, Lt. (jg.) Aurelius J. Parenti, Merchant Marine but carried as a civilian on OSS rosters, is given a rating of "superior" by Lt. Colonel Justin O'Brien and other officers with whom he worked. He is a quiet, thoughtful, courageous individual who developed a slightly frustrated complex upon contact with OSS in ETO. Parenti was by no means alone in his sense of inferiority. Toward the end of operations in ETO many were afflicted, due to the fact, according to their own reasoning, they were not allowed to perform the duties for which they were employed or for which they deemed themselves best fitted.

I present this brief characterization because of the numerous criticisms Parenti has placed in this report. Most of the sins and omissions with which Parenti expresses dissatisfaction are of minor nature, occurring in all wars, all armies, corps and divisions down to squad units.

Attachment

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28 August 1945

TO: General William J. Donovan

FROM: Aurelius J. Parenti

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. RECRUITMENT

In November 1943, I was serving as Radioman with the Merchant Marine. A request for volunteers for foreign duty of a hazardous nature, originated by OSS and transmitted to my headquarters in Seattle, Washington, by Marshal Dimck, then head of the WSA, was brought to my attention. I inquired as to the qualifications and was informed that radiomen with language qualifications were acceptable. Regarding the specific nature of the assignment, I was told no more than that there was a certain amount of danger involved. On that meager basis, I accepted the offer and in due course arrived at the office of the WSA in New York, there to be interviewed by two gentlemen in civilian clothes, one a philological examiner, who tested and approved my French, and the other a man whom I afterwards identified as an Army Captain in OSS Headquarters in London. Both men declined not only to tell me under whose auspices the project was formulated, but also to leave their names for future reference. Although the project was discussed in the most nebulous of terms, I gathered that the underground activities in enemy-held territory was in question. I was issued a special passport and whisked off in a motorboat to a ship lying at anchor in the estuary. On 20 December 1943, we sailed for England, via Liverpool. I reached London and the WSA office on 19 January 1944.

I was kept sequestered in the Russell Square district and ultimately exposed to interviews in Welbeck House by various members of OSS who tested my French, questioned me regarding my motivation and inquired as to my proficiency in W/T. After several weeks of this the curtain was rung down on the show by the announcement that such a quantity of French recruits was available that it was no longer necessary to consider employing American volunteers. When I was on the point of returning to the States, Mr. Fred Ostheimer, who had piloted me much of the way through the Welbeck phase and who had coached me in OSS methods and techniques, visited me and another W.S.A. recruit and asked us if we should care to stay on with OSS in a status slightly different from that previously planned. We agreed and Mr. Ostheimer arranged to have us transferred to OSS from WSA, our status with WSA thenceforward to be inactive. The time was February 1944.

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2. CHRONOLOGY OF ACTIVITIES - DUTIES

a. February - April 1944.

Continued training in photography and microphotography with Field Photo Branch.
Worked on translations (French and Italian) for Reports Division.
To ease bottleneck in Microfilm Reports Department, worked nightshift for 5 weeks developing and printing, cutting, editing and splicing films for Recordak reels.
Did a survey of communications facilities for Lt. Col. DeVries as a guide for the drawing up of missions.

b. March to October 1944

Assigned to the then Major, now Lt. Colonel Justin O'Brien, at the French Desk. Duties as follows:
Microfilming of personnel files of Proust and Sussex agents.
Processing and filing of reports coming from agents in field.
Moved to Area "C" with Lt. Douglas Alden as Assistant Briefing Officer. Collaborated in briefing, equipping and dispatching teams to the field and in taking care of personal aspects of agents' affairs.
Also in London intermittently, gathered material for briefing.

c. August - September

Proust and Sussex teams repatriated. Worked with Alden in settling agents' affairs; return of equipment, outfitting with clothes, relations with DGER, baggage, communications, agents' return to France or North Africa.

d. October

Liquidation of Proust and Sussex affairs in London office. Captain Alden was in Paris at this time.

As the work seemed to be petering out, I was amenable to Captain Sara Miles's suggestion that I join SAF French. Toward the end of November I arrived in Paris as Assistant Chief, SAF, SFO. Among my duties was that

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of being of assistance to the Poissy and St. Germain Schools. Since SI regarded those schools as operating under its aegis and did not look favorably on the intrusion of S&T, the situation was difficult. The imperative need of the moment was for training aids and so with the help of MIRS and the AG Depot in Paris, MITU at Le Vesinet, and SHAEF, I gathered and distributed charts, diagrams, maps, photographs, O/P reports and other training aids. I also foraged in Paris book shops for dictionaries, etc.

Commander Cassady called upon me to do an emergency tutoring job on the No-Name (since called Luxe I) team. It was planned to drop them on the periphery of the advancing German bulge and to allow them to be overrun. So, in the ill concealed hideout on the Avenue Quentin Bauchart, the team and I had morning and afternoon sessions for 8 days and we managed to cover security, personal protective techniques, codes and ciphers, reporting, and map reading, at least to the extent of minimum essentials.

The dropping of enemy parachutists in the environs of Paris prompted the suggestion that the Paris region was a less circumspect choice as a training area than the UK. When it appeared that the schools would be transferred to the UK, I was recalled by Captain Shine to London. While there, I had the following responsibilities:

a. Procurement and dissemination of training aids: films, reports, foreign journals, charts, medals, photographs, OWI publications.

b. Supervision of area security. Area security was systematized and improved within and without.

c. Working out and conducting the "PW Cage Penetration Scheme": Agents preparing for field drops were sent out to the enemy camp at Moreton-in-Marsh where they were received and treated as enemy prisoners.

d. February - July 1945

As SOE expanded I felt there was a greater need for me in Captain Alden's office and transferred back to SI to begin work with the Agent Processing Office.

My work there consisted in giving as much help as possible to Captain Alden in an overworked and understaffed office. At the outset I set up a Garden file system. Following is a list of my activities:

1. Conducting and accompanying agents

- to parts of exit and advanced bases, eg, Dijon, where I accompanied Caporal and Gauloise teams.
- to Parachute School. There I attended courses [illegible] charges and earned my First Class Parachutist wings.

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- to and from RVPS.
- on medical and dental trips.
- in procurement of British papers.
- in procurement of civilian clothing.

2. Personal affairs of agents

1. Supervising all movements, mail and communications.
2. Innoculations; medical and dental treatment.
3. Relations with X-2.
4. Coordinating the agents' movements with their desks, with S&T Branch, with R&D, and BACH.
5. Arrangements with Foreign Services: BI, BCRA, DGER.
6. Liaison work between desks and DIP.
7. Equipping and dispatching of agents. In these, properly the responsibility of the desks, we occasionally engaged during emergencies.
8. Incidental work on the Dutch Desk, the responsibility of Captain Alden.

As teams were recovered, "deprocessing" came into existence and occupied much of my time. During and after the time agents were being detached from OSS and/or repatriated, liquidation of desk affairs was called for; I drew up definitive files on Dutch Desk missions and agents.

When Major Beau arrived to assume responsibility for liquidation, I worked with him on such snags as arrangements with the BI or the 7th Army Agent, Rene Andrée, brought to the UK to be fitted with an artificial limb and to all intents and purposes abandoned by the Americans.

In early July I was recruited by Major O'Brien for Far Eastern work - as a Conducting Officer in China. On 19 July 1945, I left London for Prestwick, Scotland, whence I was flown to the states. On 22 July I arrived in Washington.

3. CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD THAT MIGHT BE IMPROVED.

I have observed a number of aspects of OSS activities abroad in which deficiencies and often outright errors were inherent. Some of these were the subject of frequent discussions by members of the OSS; others were brought to light in my relations with the British, Dutch, and French offices and agents.

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POOR SECURITY

It is a sad fact that the closer one was to the front, the worse became the security of the organization. The Paris area was perhaps the worse in this respect. Half-hearted security checks on French civilian personnel, a questionable choice of location for headquarters, the fact that no successful "hide-out" was ever established, the easy identification of OSS vehicles, the freedom with which strangers wandered unescorted around the building, all indicate that security in the Paris region was never crystallized nor implemented. Between the disordered situation in foreign territory and the meticulous security at home base, the contrast was incorrruous.

Not until late in the game, was a system set up for pooling and allocating secure filing cabinets for classified materials.

MACS

The constant reorganization, changes of command, shifting of responsibility and physical displacements were a source of disorder and irritation. Rarely were the reasons advanced for shifting offices and juggling administrative staffs important enough to compensate for the resulting struggles at adaptation to the newly imposed order. In a number of cases our policy towards some matters of moment seemed to be lacking. For example, on any floor in 71 Grosvenor one could find an extreme divergence of views regarding the advisability or the extent of working with the British; some officers or officers were committed to a policy of almost anglophobiac obstructionism; others were desirous of maintaining amicable relations. In a situation which demanded a certain amount of collaboration with an even dependency upon the British, it is unfortunate that personal whims were not disciplined to political directives. Much ill will was created by the careless mention of anti-British sentiments in the presence of British secretaries, and that ill will may have bred or aggravated distrust by the British.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL ANIMOSITIES

Although the organization of branches facilitated vertical (inter-branch) operations, horizontal (inter-branch) penetration was often difficult and unpleasant. General Eisenhower's plea for "working teams" seemed not to have been seriously heeded in OSS, MTO. Differences arose out of self-aggrandisement, pettiness, and sheer unconcern for the problems of other branches.

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INERTIA

I found it difficult to recognize valid excuses for many examples of tardiness in cases of vital importance. "Relax; this is the Army" cannot be an effective soporific to conscientious members of an effective intelligence organization, which must always devise short-cuts in order to compete with an enemy as intelligent and resourceful as was ours.

1. Plans for penetration of Germany were made at least a year too late to make any grand scale contribution of a sort commensurate with the resources of OSS. Advantage was not taken of the excellent opportunity afforded by the conscription of French labor into Germany.

   In fact, both the French and German penetrations came too late. Much of the blame for the tardiness of the German venture is laid to the exodus in August - September 1944, on the group who "thought the war was over.

2. An accumulation of foreign luggage and clothing collected in Washington for use in the field was not shipped abroad until its usefulness had dwindled alarmingly. R&D demonstrated lack of either ingenuity or authority in not exploiting foreign sources until Belgium had been won back. Most of the Proust and Sussex teams had their choice either of taking a stock piece of brand new luggage so compromising that it was called a "see copies" or of securing luggage in the field. Likewise with foreign equipment; a stock item of issue to teams was the "Arta" watch, a completely new device of unknown aspect doubtless on file with the Gestapo.

3. SHAEF orders took much too long to out. When secret orders were available they were a boon.

4. In its policy towards agents, OSS vacillated between coddling and severity. Careless recruitment was partly responsible for "sour" agents, but the lack of inspection, careful supervision and, in general, control of agents after recruitment, bred its share of ills.

INSOLENCE

For a small minority of OSS personnel, service afield was a junket. At a time when a shortage of cars at the motor pool was hampering operations. It was maddening to discover that an officer had ordered a car

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17,327

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 September

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Finance Branch

SUBJECT: Comments on attached report of returning Officer.

1. Having carefully read attached report from Major Joseph D. Croll USMCR, recently returned from IBT where he served as Chief for the Special Funds Division, South East Asia Command, I wish to comment on said report as follows:

2. (a) Major Croll refers to the setting up and placing in operation of the new Finance Branch bookkeeping system which became standardized in all theatres and proved highly successful.

(b) He especially calls attention to the excellent cooperation extended to the Finance Branch by the British in SEAC.

(c) As has been referred to in almost all reports from Finance Branch Chiefs in the Field, Major Croll points out that the operations of this Branch were handicapped by lack of advance information on future operations. This, based on comments by Major Croll and others, appears to have been due to either oversight or security over-consciousness. The result was that it was often difficult for the Finance Branch to have available the necessary funds in diversified currencies when unexpectedly required. However, as the Major points out, in his theater (and the same was true of all theaters) the Finance Branch was able to meet these emergency

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demands.

(d) Major Croll recommends the standardized auditing of the books in his theater. This need was recognized more than one year ago and was met by the appointment of special auditors for all theaters as soon as qualified men could be secured and sent to the Field.

(e) The value of the Board of Review is referred to in the report and recommendation made that where such a Board is abolished, some similar Committee be appointed to act in its place. This recommendation is approved by Washington.

(f) In regard to Major Croll's reference to the transfer of various accounts from unvouchered funds to vouchered funds, this transition was first recognized as being possible by the Special Funds Branch Chief in MMDTO and steps were taken as rapidly as possible to arrange for the necessary transfers in all theaters. In many cases the change required much time and detailed work and the process was decidedly handicapped by the lack of trained men representing the Fiscal, or vouchered funds, Division in the Field. Lt. Woodring cooperated with the then Special Funds Branch in endeavoring to correct this personnel shortage.

(g) Major Croll recommends that funds made available for, and expended on, separate operations in the Field, should be justified by the results from each independent activity. This, rather than by the overall accomplishments of the theater itself. This is, of course, a sound recommendation but often difficult to accomplish in advance since the future success in any operation is necessarily

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uncertain until terminated. However, former operations and their success or failure, should be used as a basis for authorized expenditures for contemplated future operations. Probably, a truer picture is obtained by weighing the complete achievements of any one theater against the overall cost of the theater.

FOR THE CHIEF, FINANCE BRANCH

JOHN W. WILLIAMS
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

Approved
W. H. Palm

Enc.--1

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

28 August 1945

TO: The Director

VIA: Chief, Finance Branch

SUBJECT: Report of Returning Officer.

In compliance with General Order Number 63 issued 18 August 1944, the following report is submitted by Major Joseph D. Croll, USMCR (formerly Chief of Special Funds SEAC) to the Director through the Chief of the Finance Branch:

1. Reporting Officer arrived in New Delhi 31 March 1944. On 1 April 1944 this officer took over all cash, currencies, etc. from Col. Harry L. Burns, who had taken over the functions of Special Funds along with his other duties. On 1 April 1944 the accounts were changed from single entry bookkeeping to the present double entry bookkeeping system. There were also a number of other changes that had to be made. At that time nearly all advances of those going to the Far East were transferred to the New Delhi Office while, in fact, most of these advances were for 101 or 20%. The advances were finally transferred to their proper theaters. Also, a number of individuals had received large advances from Washington to finance their own operations. These advances were finally accounted for to the Special Funds Officer, SEAC, and the balances of cash turned in to him and Washington notified. From there on out all advances of any kind were made by the Special Funds Officer in the field and accounting of these advances was made to him.

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2. The duties of the Chief, Special Funds Office, SEAC were the same as any other theater: the financing of field operations, paying of agents, securing proper currencies for operations, etc. Also, the upkeep and maintenance of Headquarters in Kandy and the various camps in Ceylon as well as the New Delhi Office; and certain expenses in Calcutta also were paid by SEAC.

3. From a special funds point of view the British were most cooperative in securing for OSS SEAC Jap Occupational Burma Rupees and Jap Occupational Straits Dollars. There was a long delay in the British securing for us BAHTS (Ticals). They had been made by De La Rue in England from the original plates held by De La Rue. However, the overprint (serial number, date, signature of treasurer), which had formerly always been overprinted in Thailand, was not printed on those notes. Therefore, this overprint had to be made in India. The British did not have old ten Baht notes from which to copy the serial numbers, dates, etc. We were able to secure some samples of ten Baht notes and forwarded these to the British. Approximately six weeks after this a fairly large amount of Bahts were turned over to OSS SEAC. From that time forward SEAC received the amount of Bahts requested. The British were extremely averse to give these Bahts to any organization except clandestine forces. They refused to let OSS send any over to the Air Corps. There were a number of reasons for this: a) slush (counterfeit money) is extremely "hot" at the best and the fewer who use it the better, b) the British were afraid that the British Government might have to reimburse the Thai Government for all Bahts printed even though they were said to have had permission from the Thais, c) the British

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felt particularly responsible for Baht as they through De La Rue had the safekeeping of all Baht plates and were acting in a fiduciary capacity.

4. Difficulties encountered in the field: In certain instances the Special Funds Officer was not given sufficient time to procure certain currencies needed for operations. This presumably was not due to the emergency of the operation, but carelessness in not notifying in time the Special Funds Officer to have the said currency available. In all cases the operations were not held up, but it was necessary to have the currencies specially flown down from India. The British were most helpful in regard to this.

5. Conditions in the field that might be improved:

a) A field audit system should be set up. As in any [illegible] an outside audit should be made periodically. The books of SEAC [illegible] audited up to 1 June 1945. This is contemplated however in the near [illegible].

b) The Board of Review having gone out of existence, somewhat similar boards should be set up in the theaters to help the Strategic Services officers. In addition to this, the Special Funds Officers should forward to Washington a detailed account of all expenditures that would have formerly been submitted to the Board of Review for recommendation.

c) The majority of expenses in the IB Theater can be paid out of vouchered funds. At present a very small percentage is thus paid. There are sufficient Special Funds personnel, officers and men, in the IB Theater so that these Special Funds personnel could possibly spend considerable time on vouchered funds, which have great need of assistance. In fact, certain personnel could possibly devote their complete time to vouchered funds.

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d) It all "boils down" to this: The Strategic Services Officers have very large sums of money at their disposal and this can be "dynamite" to them as well as OSS. The Strategic Services Officers should be reminded of this responsibility, particularly now that the Board of Review has gone out of existence (see paragraph "b"). The Theater Commanders should be notified that expenses of a project must be justified by the accomplishment of that project and not by the overall accomplishments of that theater. When any project is under consideration the expenses of that project should be estimated and the expenses of said project should be compared with the hoped for results.

Joseph D. Croll
JOSEPH D. CROLL,
Major, USMCR.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17,516
Field Report
X Callison, S.A.
X ETO X SI

17 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: S. A. Callison
SI/ETO

1. In this report Mr. Callison dwells on underlying weaknesses which he attributes not only to OSS but also to New Deal agencies in general. They include failure to delegate clear-cut authority to subordinate commanders, the tendency to branch out into unrelated fields and to grow too rapidly along over-complicated bureaucratic lines.

2. In his covering memo Mr. Shepardson speaks highly of Mr. Callison and notes that he would be of value in a post-war intelligence agency.

D. T. Pleasants

D. T. Pleasants
Reports Office

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17,516
Field Report

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director OSS

DATE: 5 September 1945

FROM : Chief SI

SUBJECT: Attached report from S. A. Callison

Dr. Callison was MID liaison with SI branch from 1941 until the end of 1943, at which time he became Evaluations Procedures Officer, attached to SI but responsible for liaison with R. and A. experts in the examination and evaluation of SI material. He achieved results of substantial value to OSS in this latter capacity, and is entitled to commendation for these results. It was always the opinion of Foster, O'Gara, and myself, however, that he could have multiplied his value if he had taken a few (Ferdinand-like) bulls by the horns.

Early in 1945 he was sent to London, to be "Recorder" of an Intelligence Objectives Unit, approved both here and there. He was to work with Hugh Wilson, who had been designated as Intelligence Officer. This, however, did not pan out, and Dr. Callison became restless, not disturbingly so, but just restless. He was then returned to SI London with a more clearly defined job to do, and his restlessness moderated.

In preparation for Germany, in Germany itself, he began to find himself, and was conspicuously productive, as time went on. It was therefore regrettable when he felt obliged to return here (by previous arrangement) on 28 July to become Dean of Wesleyan College, commencing 1 August.

In passing through Washington, en route to his new post, he spoke at a presentation meeting concerning conditions in Germany, and was given high marks for one of the best presentations. I heard it, and fully agree with the praise given.

Dr. Callison's report is shrewd, mostly true, and fundamentally constructive. It has a tendency, however, to make observations by striking phrases; and while this tendency brings attention, it also overmaps itself. For example, on page one of this report he speaks of OSS weaknesses as traceable to New Deal philosophies.

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This comment is extraneous, and (to me at least) it makes no sense. Nevertheless what he says next has a lot to commend it.

In Section II, I do not agree with points 1 and 2. I agree with point 3.

In Section III I agree with points 1 and 2. I question whether point 3 is well taken, or whether, instead, the Wiesbaden organization only required a little more time in which to "jell". Results since Callisen left indicate that the latter was the real need. Point 4 is settled, in terms of Callisen's second alternative. Point 5 seems sound, but "SHAEF" (or "USFET") does not agree.

May I say in conclusion that Callisen's work with DSS was definitely valuable, that he deserves a letter of commendation from you for his background, application, motivation and results. He is a provocative fellow (which is good) and it is largely because he is provocative that I have been stirred up to put the excellent Callisen on the scales, and weigh his contribution.

Mr. Callisen is without any doubt one of the men whose services should be sought by any permanent American intelligence agency.

W. H. S.

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OSS Form 2248

FORM: 5155

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 11069-828

Date Rec'd SA AUG 29 1945

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Rel'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	
[illegible]				[illegible]	
[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]	

Each [illegible] should be [illegible] as correspond[illegible] matter in to column.
A [illegible] be down [illegible] each [illegible] [illegible].
Letters [illegible] should be used in to column.
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] before further routing.
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] column.
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible].
For [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] sheet.

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17,516
Field Report
11069-8

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 August 1945

TO: Chief, SI

THROUGH: Mr. S. B. L. Penrose

FROM: Gerald F. Else, Captain, USMCR

The attached field report, by Dr. S. A. Gallisar, seems to me one of the meatiest and most significant field reports we have had. I recommend that it be forwarded complete to the Director.

Gerald F. Else
Captain, USMCR

GFE:fsh

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1106-828

SECRET

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Sterling A. Callison

THROUGH: Chief, SI and the Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

I. Duties and activities in the field.

1. London - 19 January 1945 to 10 April 1945.

Formulating plans for SI post-war activities in Germany. During this phase the fundamental objectives, especially as regards political matters, were worked over. (See S-013-406)

2. Luxembourg - 10 April to 30 May.

This period was one of continued planning of field trips into all parts of Germany and conferences in Paris and Maastricht regarding SI post-war activities in Germany.

3. Stockholm - 30 May to 19 July.

During this period the writer continued to work on SI planning for Germany specializing on the German Communist party and the problems involved in the Russian zone. Along these lines a short study was prepared for the field "p-points" (See L-09-707) The "p-points" operating in Bremen, Cassel and Munich were visited by him and briefed regarding political problems.

II. Conditions in the field that might be improved.

OSS has always been hampered by three major weaknesses which can be traced to fundamental philosophies underlying the [illegible].

1. The lack of clear cut and clearly designated [illegible] delegated to the subordinate commanders. The words "advice [illegible]" appear all too often in OSS directives setting up [illegible], and because it has been most difficult to secure the [illegible] effort which is necessary for a highly efficient intelligence organization. As results could be overlooked in war time; they may be fatal in peace time.

2. The feeling that if one organization or man was not doing a good job a second organization or man should take on the functions of the first, rather than insisting upon the efficient accomplishment of the designated task. But the first organization or man should supervised and eliminated. But the first organization and overlapping. Following this chief issue arising numbers duplication

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line OSS has branched out into activities unrelated to intelligence which it was unfitted to attempt successfully, has spread its efforts too widely and has retained too many incompetent persons who had no real function. The cut in the budget may well be a blessing in disguise since it will necessitate a concentration of effort on more limited objectives.

3. The tendency to grow too rapidly along overly complicated and bureaucratic lines. An intelligence organization must be intimate, elastic, well integrated, personalized and stable in order to secure the best results. OSS has been none of these things in Washington since late in 1943 and has seldom been so in the field. Only in Switzerland which fortunately was completely isolated for a long period was the ideal approached and here some of the most brilliant results were obtained.

Many if not all the conditions in the field, which are not of purely local significance and hence could be improved by Washington, can be traced to one or more of the above fundamental weaknesses. The results accomplished by OSS in the past, many of them certainly extraordinary and of great importance to the war effort - have been accomplished because of the devotion, initiative and ability of certain individuals despite the handicaps placed upon them by the organization itself.

III. Specific difficulties of which he personally became aware.

1. What is urgently needed in Wiesbaden is an able executive officer to the Chief of the German Mission. The Chief - so far at least - has not been able to devote much time to Wiesbaden and if he is to be in Berlin his absence will be even more keenly felt. His executive should be a man who knows intelligence, who knows the OSS organization and who knows Germany. The present incumbent has none of these qualifications.

2. A number of people in R & A and SI at Wiesbaden feel that R & A should concentrate on research, analysis and dissemination while leaving the procurement of all positive intelligence both overt and covert to SI. In post war intelligence activities it becomes increasingly difficult to separate overt and covert intelligence activities since the covert inevitably grows out of the overt work. Furthermore, the type of reports to be disseminated in most instances take on the nature of an R & A study rather than the scraps of intelligence turned out by SI during the war.

3. The entire establishment at Wiesbaden is at present too large and cumbersome. Again the budget cut will take care of part of the problem, but it can only be hoped that some excellent minor staff members will not be eliminated. Among these the writer particularly wishes to commend Mr. David Eudkin of SI whose work on the German Communist party has been outstanding and who because of his retiring disposition may be given scant consideration.

4. All those peripheral missions (Swiss, Dutch, Belgian and Swedish) which are to operate more or less directly on Germany should be placed under the direction of the German Mission. If this is not considered practical then the German Mission should be given a controlling voice in their operations

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insofar as they are directed against Germany.

5. The making of public opinion polls in Germany has been forbidden by SHAEF. Yet the OSS German Mission has been requested from time to time to discover what the opinion of the German people is regarding certain actions of the Allied Military Government. As a result OSS in Wiesbaden has continued to ask isolated individuals their opinions and pass these on. The results are vicious and meaningless and will continue to be so unless OSS or some other intelligence agency is permitted to set up and conduct scientific public opinion polls. Such polls properly conducted would be the greatest single contribution to overt intelligence in the American zone.

Those difficulties confronting the OSS mission in Germany which cannot be laid to the three inherent weaknesses of OSS as a whole can be traced to three other factors.

1. The lack of a competent German Desk, especially in SI, until late in the war.

2. The shift in priority, necessitated by changing events, from Germany as the number one SI target in Europe.

3. The utter confusion prevailing in SHAEF and USGCC which made it most difficult for OSS Germany to make and execute any concrete plans for gathering intelligence in the American zone.

With few exceptions the personnel now attached to the SI German Mission represents one of the best, most experienced and devoted organizations so far brought together in the field. It is a pleasure to point out that Commander Wimmer, Lt. Commander Helms and Capt. Kositzke have been and are doing a magnificent job under very trying and difficult circumstances. Judgement is reserved in the case of Major Van der Graent simply because SI operations have not yet fully gotten under way.

It is felt by the writer that if the German Mission can be cut to reasonable proportions, stabilized and its branches properly coordinated it should begin to produce excellent results within the next few months.

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STERLING A. CALLISON

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MEMORANDUM:

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Sterling A. Callison

THROUGH: Chief, SI and the Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

I. Duties and activities in the field.

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Formulating phase for SI post-war activities in Germany. During this phase the fundamental objectives, especially as regards political matters, were worked over. (See [illegible])

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3. Stockholm - 30 May to 10 July.

During this period the writer continued to work on SI planning for Germany specializing on the German Communist party and the problems involved in the Russian Zone. Along these lines a short study was prepared for the field "Bulletin" (See [illegible]). The "Bulletin" operating in Bremen, Hessen and Munich were visited by him and briefed regarding political problems.

II. Conditions in the field that stand in [illegible].

OSS has always been hampered by three major weaknesses which can be traced to fundamental philosophies underlying the New Deal.

1. The lack of clear cut and clearly designated authority delegated to the subordinate commanders. The result "confusion and overlapping" appears all too often in the documents covering my activities in previous, and makes it has been most difficult to secure the integrated effort which is necessary for a highly efficient intelligence organization. The results would be overlooked in war time they may be fatal in peace time.

2. The feeling that if one organization or one man was not doing a good job a second organization or one should take on the functions of the first, rather than bringing upon the officials responsible for the designated [illegible]. But the first organization or man [illegible] was not eliminated, thus causing numerous duplication and overlapping. Following this

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line OSS has [illegible] out into [illegible] agencies to [illegible] which it was entitled to attempt successfully, has spread [illegible] efforts too widely and has retained too many incompetent persons [illegible] and in real function. The cut in the budget may well be a blessing in disguise since it will necessitate a concentration of effort on more limited objectives.

2. The tendency to grow too rapidly along overly complicated and bureaucratic lines. An intelligence organization must be intimate, elastic, well integrated, personalized and stable in order to secure the best results. OSS has been none of these things in Washington since late in 1942 and has seldom been so in the field. Only in Switzerland which fortunately was completely isolated for a long period was the ideal approached and here some of the most brilliant results were obtained.

Many if not all the conditions in the field, which are not of purely local significance and hence could be improved by Washington, may be traced to one or more of the above fundamental weaknesses. The results accomplished by OSS in the past - many of them certainly excellent and of great importance to the war effort - have been accomplished because of the devotion, initiative and ability of certain individuals despite the handicaps placed upon them by the organization itself.

III. <u>Specific difficulties of which he personally became aware.</u>

1. What is urgently needed in Wiesbaden is an able executive officer to the Chief of the German Mission. The Chief - so far at least - has not been able to devote much time to Wiesbaden and if he is to be in charge his absence will be even more keenly felt. His executive should be a man who knows intelligence, who knows the OSS organization and who knows Germany. The present incumbent has none of these qualifications.

2. A number of people in X & A and XI at Wiesbaden feel that X & A should concentrate on research, analysis and dissemination while leaving the procurement of all positive intelligence both overt and covert to XI. In past war intelligence activities it became increasingly difficult to separate overt and covert intelligence activities since the covert frequently grew out of the overt work. Furthermore, the type of reports to be disseminated in most instances take on the nature of an X & A study rather than the scraps of intelligence turned out by XI during the war.

3. The entire establishment at Wiesbaden is at present too large and unwieldy. Again the budget cut will take care of part of the problem, but it can only be hoped that some excellent minor staff members will not be eliminated. Among these the writer particularly wishes to commend Mr. Harold Sullivan of XI who was on the German Communist party and has been outstanding and the business of his retiring disposition may be given some consideration.

4. All these government elements (Army, Navy, Bright and Swedish) which are to operate more or less directly on Germany should be placed under the direction of the German Mission. If this is not considered practical then the German Mission should be given a controlling voice in their operations

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[illegible] against Germany.

[illegible] Allied opinion polls in Germany has been forbidden by [illegible] Russian has been requested from time to time to [illegible] of the German people in regarding certain actions [illegible] of the Allied military government. [illegible] result OSS in Wiesbaden has continued to use isolated individuals their opi[illegible] and pass these on. The results are dubious and misleading and will continue to be so unless OSS or some other intelligence agency is permitted to set up and conduct scientific public opinion polls. Such polls properly conducted would be the greatest single contribution to overt intelligence in the American zone.

Three difficulties confronting the OSS mission in Germany which can not be laid to the three inherent weaknesses of OSS as a whole can be traced to three other factors.

1. The lack of a competent German desk, especially in XX, until late in the war.

2. The shift in priority, occasioned by changing events, from Germany as the senior and XX target in Europe.

3. The utter confusion prevailing in SHAEF and [illegible] which made it most difficult for OSS Germany to make and execute any concrete plans for gathering intelligence in the American zone.

With the exception the personnel now attached to the XX German Mission represents one of the best, most experienced and devoted organizations ever brought together in the field. It is a pleasure to point out that Germany, its humanity [illegible] and dogs, doctors have been and are doing a magnificent job under very trying and difficult circumstances. Judgment is reserved in the case of Major [illegible] for doubt simply because XX operations have not yet fully gotten under way.

It is felt by the writer that if the German Mission can be set in reasonable proportions, stabilized and its business properly conducted it should begin to produce excellent results within the next few months.

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[illegible]

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line OSS has branched out into activities unrelated to intelligence which it was unfitted to attempt successfully, has spread its efforts too widely and has retained too many incompetent persons who had no real function. The cut in the budget may well be a blessing in disguise since it will necessitate a concentration of effort on more limited objectives.

5. The tendency to grow too rapidly along overly complicated and bureaucratic lines. An intelligence organization must be intimate, elastic, well integrated, personalized and stable in order to secure the best results. OSS has been none of these things in Washington since late in 1941 and has seldom been so in the field. Only in Britishland which fortunately was completely isolated for a long period was the ideal approached and here some of the most brilliant results were obtained.

Many if not all the conditions in the field, which are not of purely local significance and hence could be improved by Washington, may be traced to one or more of the above fundamental weaknesses. The results accomplished by OSS in the past - many of them certainly outstanding and of great importance to the war effort - have been accomplished because of the devotion, initiative and ability of certain individuals despite the handicaps placed upon them by the organization itself.

III. Possible difficulties of which he personally became aware.

1. What is urgently needed in Washington is an able executive officer to the Chief of the Secret Service. The Chief - so far at least - has not been able to devote much time to Washington and if he is to be in Berlin his absence will be even more keenly felt. His executive should be a man who knows intelligence, who knows the OSS organization and who knows Germany. The present incumbent has none of these qualifications.

2. A number of people in X A A and SI at Washington feel that X A A should concentrate on research, analysis and dissemination while leaving the procurement of all positive intelligence both overt and covert to SI. In practice intelligence activities is becoming increasingly difficult to separate overt and covert intelligence activities since the covert inevitably grows out of the overt work. Furthermore, the type of reports to be disseminated in wartime take on the nature of an X A A study rather than the merger of intelligence turned out by SI during the war.

3. The office establishment at Washington is at present too large and cumbersome. Again the budget cut will take care of part of the problem, but it can only be hoped that more excellent minor staff members will not be eliminated. Among these the writer particularly wishes to commend Mr. David Infield of SI whose work on the German Scientific party has been outstanding and the business of his retiring disposition may be given much consideration.

4. All these peripheral stations (Cairo, Rome, Brigan and Madrid) which are to operate more or less directly on Germany should be placed under the direction of the German Station. If this is not considered practicable then the German Station should be given a controlling voice in their operations

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hamper as they are directed against Germany.

3. The taking of public opinion polls in Germany has been forbidden by [illegible]. Yet the OSS German Mission has been requested from time to time to discover what the opinion of the German people is regarding certain actions of the Allied Military Government. As a result OSS in Wiesbaden has continued to ask isolated individuals their opinions and pass these on. The results are dubious and meaningless and will continue to be so unless OSS or some other intelligence agency is permitted to set up and conduct scientific public opinion polls. Such polls properly conducted would be the greatest single contribution to overt intelligence in the American zone.

These difficulties confronting the OSS mission in Germany which cannot be laid to the three inherent weaknesses of OSS as a whole can be traced to three other factors.

1. The lack of a competent German desk, especially in XI, until late in the war.

2. The shift in priority, necessitated by changing events, from Germany as the number one XI target in Europe.

3. The other confusion prevailing in SHAEF and ETOUSA which made it most difficult for OSS Germany to make and execute any concrete plans for gathering intelligence in the American zone.

With few exceptions the personnel now attached to the XI German Mission represents one of the most experienced and devoted organizations so far brought together in the field. It is a pleasure to point out that Commander Wisner, Lt. Commander Bruce and Capt. Hamilton have been and are doing a magnificent job under very trying and difficult circumstances. Judgment is reserved in the case of Major Tom for Arnold simply because XI operations have not yet fully gotten under way.

It is felt by the writer that if the German Mission can be set to reasonable proportions, stabilized and its branches properly coordinated it should begin to produce excellent results within the next few months.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17,515
Field Report
x Special Funds
x Soliday, Donald M
x Medto

17 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Donald M. Soliday
Special Funds/Medto

1. Capt. Soliday, Special Funds Officer for AAI/OSS and later for Company D, recounts his activities in clearing up the confusion in accounting procedures in the theater and submits recommendations for future activities. He suggests a field audit system (this has now been established), a legal representative for every theater (this is also in effect), full dissemination of Board of Review directives, orders, etc., and the establishment of a publication for briefing operational teams on accounting for and handling funds.

II. In a covering note approved by Col. Rehm, Col. Williams disapproves a Special Funds publication on security grounds and points out that it is a Board of Review function to disseminate its own data.

O. T. Pleasants
O. T. Pleasants
Reports Office

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17,515
Field Report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

10 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Finance Branch

SUBJECT: Comments on Attached Report

1. Paragraphs 1 through 17 of attached report from Captain Soliday cover in the main his various assignments and duties and therefore, with the exception of paragraph 6, require no comment. The Captain is quite correct in his statement that the Special Funds Branch records at Caserta were not in good shape when he arrived in Italy. This was due to the fact that there was no Finance Officer or enlisted man available in the theater to handle Special Funds in Italy during the early period of our operations with the 5th Army, and until Lt. Soliday was transferred in the Field to OSS, only Sgt. Jacobson had been available to send on from Algiers in December 1943.

2. In paragraph 17, (a) through (e), Captain Soliday offers several valuable suggestions. This Officer, as have others, recommends that a Field Audit System be established. As noted in the comments on Major Croll's report, this necessity was recognized early in 1944 and met by the securing and sending to the Field audit teams as rapidly as was possible. The difficulty in obtaining slots and efficient men for this work was responsible for some delay.

3. Captain Soliday recommends that each theater be supplied with a legal representative. This need was also appreciated in 1944 and qualified officers sent to all theaters by the General Counsel as soon as

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available. The suggestion that the Boards of Review in the various theaters be supplied with all orders, rules, etc., is also sound. It would appear that the parent Board of Review in Washington should be responsible for the Boards in each theater. They should know best what data is required.

4. The reference to the shortage of personnel in (d), is a repetition of almost all reports submitted. This shortage of trained personnel in the theaters was corrected with all possible speed as soon as recognized. A shortage of slots, difficulty in obtaining the high class type person required, the lengthy period of training necessary, and transportation facilities all hamstrung the speedy correction of this situation. In some instances the theater was to blame in not notifying Washington of its future needs until the last minute.

5. In (e), it is recommended that some publication with instructions on the usage of Special Funds be given to operational team members when funds were advanced for Field missions. Since it does not seem advisable to have such instructions in writing shuffled about in outside theaters for obvious security reasons, it would appear proper that a careful and thorough verbal briefing, if correctly handled would take care of this situation without a written publication.

6. In his final two paragraphs, Captain Holiday recognizes the cooperation he received both in the Field and in Washington, and states that he would be glad to accept another overseas assignment.

FOR THE CHIEF, FINANCE BRANCH

JOHN W. WILLIAMS
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

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17,515

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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5 September 1945

TO: The Director, Office of Strategic Services
(Thru: Chief, Finance Branch)

SUBJECT: Report of Returning Personnel.

1. In compliance with General Order Number 63, issued 18 August 1944, below is submitted report of Captain Donald M. Soliday, recently Special Funds Officer, Company "D", 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional).

2. Subject officer was recruited in the field from the First Armored Division on 10 March 1944 by Captain D. C. Crockett, Special Funds Officer, MMDTO, through the Chief Finance Officer, AFHQ.

3. Reporting officer was assigned to Special Funds Office, Headquarters, 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional), Algiers, for period March 14-28, 1944, for indoctrination and instruction, pending proposed assignment elsewhere. Instruction received from Captain F. C. Whitlow and Lt. Peter Siebel was of the highest order and was as thorough and complete as the limited time would allow. The Algiers Special Funds Office consisted at that time of Captain D. C. Crockett, Chief, (who was absent on business during my entire stay), Captain F. C. Whitlow, Lt. Peter Siebel, Lt. Santo Candito, Sergeant Gene Sorisi, and Sergeant Armand Petyant. No actual duties were performed at this station by subject officer.

4. Subject officer departed Algiers on March 28, 1944, to assume duty as Special Funds Officer, Office of Strategic Services - Allied Forces in Italy, with headquarters at Caserta, Italy. Captain D. C. Crockett was awaiting my arrival at Caserta and devoted several days time to my further instruction. My full responsibility and accountability as Special Funds Officer, OSS-AAII took effect as of April 1, 1944. The office staff consisted of T/Sgt. Henry C. Jacobsen, clerk-bookkeeper, and myself.

5. The functions of the OSS-AAII Special Funds Officer were primarily the financing of field operations and the paying of local expenditures for the upkeep and maintenance of Headquarters and the many various sub-detachments, as well as the maintaining of a proper and adequate bookkeeping system. The period from April 1, 1944, to July 1, 1944, in the history of OSS-AAII was one of upheaval and change, which affected the entire Italian operation, including the systems and requirements of the Special Funds Section. The changes made were a decided improvement and created a much healthier, and less susceptible to criticism, organization throughout. The commanding officers under which the reporting officer worked were Colonel Rowlerstam and Colonel Carter,

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5 September 1945

The Director

during period referred to in this paragraph, who were completely cooperative in practically every instance.

6. As of April 1, 1944, the Special Funds Office at OSS-AAII (Caserta) had a large number of old outstanding, poorly and inadequately described, advances of both operational and personal types, many of which were not authorized properly by competent authorities. Records, generally, had not been well kept and there was extremely loose control over the spending of government funds. This situation had been brought about by the inefficient handling of government funds by improperly trained, and disinterested personnel prior to the arrival in the Italian theater of a regular Special Funds Clerk, when the wrongs were rapidly righted. The combined efforts of the Theater Special Funds Officer, the Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional), the Commanding Officer OSS-AAII, the various Section Chiefs (SO, SI, X-2, MO, etc.) and the Special Funds Officer, OSS-AAII, with the assistance of directives from OSS Washington, brought about a very drastic improvement in the rigidity of control of OSS unvouchered funds.

7. The dissolution of OSS-AAII occurred on or about July 1, 1944, shortly after the fall of Rome, when part of OSS-AAII established itself in the Eternal City, while the remaining section, the larger majority, moved north to Siena, Italy to establish a new Headquarters. T/Sgt. E. G. Jacobson remained in Rome, along with Captain A. J. DeCicco recently arrival from Algiers, to represent Special Funds Section, and was detached from my office. The Siena setup was known as Company "D", 2677th Regiment OSS (Provisional) and the Special Funds Office consisted of two people, Sergeant Dante Sorini, who was attached to me at this time, as clerk-bookkeeper, and myself. The commanding officer of Company "D" during my entire stay at Company "D" was Lt. Col. Wm. G. Suhling, who was completely cooperative at all times.

8. The duties of the Special Funds personnel at Company "D", 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov.) were particularly the financing of operational teams (both American and Italian personnel), the financing, and monetary supervision of all of Company "D"'s forward detachments, the counseling of the commanding officer in all things financial, and the preparation and keeping of adequate financial records.

9. The financing of operational teams going into the field constituted the greater portion of the work and, by far, the largest expenditure of funds. Company "D" was charged exclusively with the handling of all Italian operations, whether by land, sea or air, and with the organizing and supplying of Italian Partisan Units. We also assumed financial control of all Italian - Operational Group (Co. "A", 1671st Special Reconn. Bn.) operational teams.

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The Director

10. The physical setup of Company "D" was peculiar insofar as territory was concerned, since our establishments rambled over a goodly portion of occupied Italy, creating a great degree of incompactness, and thus rendering the job of financial control much more difficult and indirect. We had sub-headquarters with both the American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army, each with several advanced sub-sub-detachments, training and holding areas at Brindisi (which later on moved north to a more convenient location), other schools and areas between Rome and Florence, while the actual command and central headquarters was located at Siena, Italy, though later moving up to Florence. Despite the disadvantage of distance, clear concise, accurate, and adequate records of all finances were maintained at each headquarters or detachment by a designated responsible officer, who periodically rendered an accounting for all funds advanced to the Special Funds Officer, Company "D" for approval by the Commanding Officer, Company "D", who had been deputized by the S.S.O. with the necessary authority.

11. On or about January 2, 1945, the Company "D" Headquarters, with all personnel moved further north into occupied Italy, finally settling down at Florence, where the headquarters remained until the end of the European war, and the eventual dissolution of Company "D". This timely move brought about an almost entire improvement in the situation mentioned in the preceding paragraph, since we were then located at a more centralized spot for all local activities, following the moving of practically all of our rear establishments.

12. About the first of January, 1945, the Fifteenth Army Group (consisting principally of the American Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army) was organized in the vicinity of Florence and Company "D" 227th Regiment OSS (Prov.) was attached to them for intelligence service and remained with them for the duration. This attachment proved to be a great factor in our ability to do the great amount of good work done by OSS in the final stages of the Italian Campaign, since we were then able to better sell our services to people who actually had need for them and who understood and appreciated OSS.

13. The reporting officer was scheduled to return to the USA about March 1, 1945, on rotation, and Lt. (jg) R. L. Covington arrived at Company "D" as my replacement. However, after about two weeks of indecision and discussion, the Commanding Officer of Company "D" decided to retain me in the field to continue work, and plans for my return home were cancelled. This decision was reached because of the "stage of the game" and my intimate knowledge of current problems and characters. Lt. Covington was relieved and returned to regimental control, though this decision was in no way a reflection on Lt. Covington, or his ability, since his brief services with Company "D" were of a superior nature.

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5 September 1945

The Director

14. About April 15, 1945, Lt. Santo Candito was transferred to the Special Funds Office, Company "D" from the Theater Special Funds Office, Caserta, for duty to assist with the ever increasing work. He remained in the Company as my assistant until June 1, 1945, at which time he assumed my accountability and responsibility as Special Funds Officer upon my release and reassignment to Regimental Headquarters. In my humble opinion, the services of Lt. Candito were not quite satisfactory; he was too inclined to "take short cuts".

15. The final stages of the Special Funds Office, Company "D", included the debriefing of all Italian operational teams. This was quite a thorough and involved procedure, from which much experience and background was gained by all concerned. It was not a simple task, but, rather, one that required a great deal of organizing and hard work. The preliminary planning for the debriefing exercises was done exclusively by Company "D" personnel, though, prior to the actual start of the debriefing, assistance was requested, and received, from Regimental Headquarters. Three complete debriefing teams, each consisting of three or more persons, one of which was a Special Funds Officer, were organized and put to work at Company "D" Headquarters immediately after the final big push started in Italy, and these teams continued functioning until all Italian operational teams had been gone over and satisfactorily completed. Special Funds Section was represented by Captain D. C. Crockett, Captain A. J. DeCicco, Lt. S. Candito and the reporting officer; Captain Crockett functioned more or less as roving advisor and regimental contact, while the latter three actually sat in on all agent conferences and disbursed the necessary funds to settle the accounts. Needless to say, Special Funds regulations were complied with throughout the entire procedure and complete and full records were kept on all decisions and actions taken; the files being retained in the MEDT Special Funds Office, Caserta.

16. Reporting officer was relieved of duty with Company "D" as 7th Regiment OSS (Provisional) as of June 1, 1945, and proceeded to D.S.A. via Caserta.

17. Reference General Order Number 43, paragraph 3 (c) (d):

a. A field audit system on a fairly large scale should be instituted at once. An auditor should inspect all books not less than once every three or four months; this for the benefit of the Special Funds Officer in the field as much as for the Washington Headquarters. (My books were not audited in fifteen months as Special Funds Officer in the field, though understand there is an auditor now, or about to, working on them.)

b. Each theater should have a well informed legal representative on hand at all times. There are many occasions when his services are much in demand.

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c. If the Board of Review is to be appreciated abroad, suggest dissemination of all orders, rules, regulations, etc. to those men representing the Board of Review in the field. Experience proved that their lack of knowledge of these things almost made the Board of Review's [illegible]ions ridiculous.

d. There has been a definite shortage of Special Funds enlisted personnel available to field offices. Requested almost constantly from July, 1944 to June, 1945 for changing of my clerk, who was grossly inefficient, for another, but no action was ever taken nor was any satisfaction given. Was told by Captain Crockett, "Keep him or work alone."; the latter was impractical. In fact, most of the time we could have easily kept two Special Funds clerks busy in my office.

e. In a few instances, operational teams composed of American personnel, both SO and OG, have been inclined to be a bit careless in their handling of, and accounting for, operational funds advanced for field missions. Could not some publication be issued giving some more or less definite instructions and advice to team members; this to supplement oral instructions given by the local Special Funds Officer. This would be a real help to conscientious officers who want to keep the best possible records.

18. In completing this report, my thanks are given to all who aided and assisted me, whether in Washington, Caserta, or my own office. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to do my assigned duties, and it is hoped that my services were entirely satisfactory.

19. Request is made for another overseas assignment in a similar capacity with Special Funds Division at an early date.

DONALD M. SOLIDAY,
Captain, Inf.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

171,514
Field Report
x SI x ETO
x Lord, Walter

15 September 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director

FROM: Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Walter Lord
SI/ETO and Secretariat/London

Mr. Lord a member first of the SI Reporting Board and later of the Secretariat in ETO analyzes those factors which he believes marred the full effectiveness of OSS in ETO. He stresses particularly the over-emphasis of branch delineation and the consequent jealousies which arose. Criticism is also directed to the imposition of unnecessary organizational superstructure, improper use of available resources, and great over-emphasis on personal privilege.

Hold this for me

D. T. Pleasants
D. T. Pleasants
Reports Office

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17,514
Field Report

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 24 August 1945

TO Director, OSS
THRU : Chief, Secretariat
FROM Walter Lord

SUBJECT Report on Returning from Overseas

1. On 28 July 1944 I reported for duty at OSS, London, and was assigned to the Reports Division of the SI Branch as an Assistant Reports Officer. About 20 September 1944 I moved forward to Paris, where I served as Assistant to the Chief, SI Reports Division. On 1 December 1944 I was transferred back to London and assigned to the Secretariat. I remained so assigned first as Reports Officer and later as Chief until 7 July 1945, when I returned to Washington for a Far East assignment.

2. The above tour of duty had a two-fold beneficial effect in the writing of a report such as this. First, my position in the SI Reports Division gave me an intimate, first-hand view of OSS's activities in the intelligence field, which in the last analysis I believe comprised the organization's most important function in the MTO. Secondly, seven months in the Secretariat offered an unparalleled opportunity to watch OSS's operations as a whole.

3. The conclusions reached are set forth below. They cover only the period 1 December 1944 to 1 July 1945, since it was during that time alone that I was able to get a real view of overall OSS activities. It should further be emphasized that in every case these conclusions not only represent purely personal opinions, but also may often be invalidated by my ignorance of some underlying factor governing the situation.

4. In retrospect, my strongest reaction is a feeling of satisfaction that the efforts exerted by OSS/MTO bore considerable fruit and contributed materially to the Allied success. This satisfaction is tempered by a belief that the OSS contributions could have been still greater had not the organization's efforts been marred by at least four important factors. These factors included too strong a delineation between Branches in the conduct of activities, frequent imposition of needless organizational superstructure, improper use of available resources, and a great over-emphasis on personal privilege.

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this need was often abused and made a convenient vehicle for getting away with all sorts of favors. Aloof and apart from the rest of the organization, X-2 went its own mysterious way. As a consequence the other Branches lost not only in morale but often saw their own efforts hampered by the existence of gaps which a little cooperation from X-2 could have filled. Three examples of this situation will illustrate my point. First, although X-2 frequently received items of positive intelligence from its various CE sources, no satisfactory arrangement was ever worked out for transmitting such information to SI. Secondly, X-2 offered little or no apparent cooperation to R&A in the development of the latter's biographical file on European personalities, despite X-2' access to an enormous amount of biographical data. Third, X-2 failed to cooperate adequately when efforts were made in the winter of 1944 to develop jointly with SO a Counter-Sabotage Unit.

(c) Medical Services - SI relationship on Medical Intelligence.

The embarkation of the Medical Services Branch into the intelligence field early in 1945 provided another outstanding illustration of the dangers resulting from an overemphasis on the Branch break-down. Due to either unwillingness or inability to coordinate their activities in this respect with the SI Reports Division, which was the only office with professional experience in the handling and processing of intelligence, the proper editing, evaluation, and dissemination of the information procured was greatly impaired. SI on the other hand could have used to great advantage the knowledge, ability, experience, and contacts of Medical Services' experts on certain intelligence the latter independently received. Ultimately a sort of compromise relationship was worked out whereby SI would do the processing but all medical intelligence would first be referred to Medical Services for comment and editing. This was a great improvement to the situation, but it was not made until a good deal of confusion and waste had already been caused.

6. The frequent imposition of needless organizational superstructure was the second main factor which I believe hampered the success of OSS operations in MTO. In an effort to compensate for the overemphasis on Branch structure and the resulting lack of close working relationships between Branches, any number of middle-man coordinating units were set up. But

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what was really needed was closer, direct centralized control from the Executive, and the effect of these half-hearted superimpositions rather than making for greater efficiency and integration was simply to put another block between the already harassed Executive level and the people deep in the Branches who were doing the actual production. The following four examples are given to illustrate this situation:

(a) Plans and Operations Staff.

In the late fall of 1944 in an effort to gear the overall efforts of the organization for the attack against Germany itself, the Plans and Operations Staff (OPSAF) was created to coordinate the activities of SI, X-2, R&A, SO, and MO. Excellent perhaps in conception and theory, so strong was the position of the Branches, however, that OPSAF was given no authority to direct or give orders and so was unable to make effective any of its decisions. The result was that it became purely a recommending group whose members had no other functions and who carried no authority, but through whom everything had to pass as if by ritual before being carried out. This only served to slow the pace of operations without contributing anything. Under these circumstances, the Branches quickly resorted to every subterfuge to act, and subvert the Staff in carrying out their plans and projects. Any value that the Staff might have had in a recommending capacity was consequently soon lost as well. The situation was aggravated by the fact that some of the most talented younger officers in the organization were on the Staff and therefore lost to the operating branches at a time when their services were desperately needed.

(b) Field Detachment Section.

In an effort to coordinate the activities and servicing of the various OSS Field Detachments and Missions, a Field Detachment Section (FIDES) was created in the late autumn of 1944 with headquarters at Paris. The various Missions and Detachments at Eindhoven, Brussels, Toulouse, [illegible], and with the 12th A. G., 6th A. G., 3rd, 7th, and 9th Armies were then made administratively and operationally responsible to FIDES. This superstructure instead of making the servicing and handling of the Detachments more efficient resulted in unprecedented confusion. Where the Detachments had once been able to go directly to the appropriate officer for orders, supplies, transport, communications, and operational directives, now everything had to be channeled through FIDES with a resulting loss of time and waste of labor, and without a compensating gain in overall or-

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derliness or efficiency. Instead of a valid coordinating body FIDES became just another channel that the people responsible for action had to go through to get things done.

(c) Personnel Section.

At the beginning of 1945 a central Personnel Section (PERSO) was created to direct the disposition of the organization's personnel in such a way as to insure the best possible use of the personnel available, to formulate common policies for the administration of personnel, and to work out a program for personnel redeployment and reassignment following the end of hostilities. This was a badly needed institution, but from its very inception it carried no real authority in a realm where the Branch in the last analysis was always sovereign. Playing no real role, PERSO resorted to a time-honored bureaucratic alternative for maintaining existence: it dedicated itself to a function where everything had to be passed through it, even if only files were kept and charts made. PERSO thus became just one more channel between the Executive and the people doing the work. In fulfilling this role it did succeed, however, in developing a large staff of officers who could have been better used in the operating end of the organization.

(d) Secretariat.

In a further effort to cure some of the administrative headaches which I believe resulted in the last analysis from the exaggerated emphasis on independent branch structure, a greatly expanded Secretariat was developed for OSS, London, around the end of 1944. The Secretariat's functions and personnel were expanded to include supervision over the issuance of orders and directives, control over the mechanics of pouch transmissions, and handling the transmission of inter-office correspondence. Since all these duties in HQ had always been in the province of the Adjutant and Services and since the new arrangements did not specifically deprive those offices of these duties, the result was simply to superimpose another administrative agency upon an already existing structure. This superimposition created jealousy, confusion, and duplication without noticeably alleviating any of the troubles it was intended to cure. The Secretariat furthermore was greatly hampered by these new responsibilities in the consummation of its regular duties for the Commanding Officer. In an effort to fulfill them all a large staff was built up which at a time of general overall personnel shortage could not help but appear extravagant.

7. The improper use of available resources was a third factor impairing the success of OSS/MTC activities. At a time when personnel, money, equipment, and even space were often desperately needed for important operations against the enemy, it

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seemed almost heartbreaking that in the same organization and within easy reach many of the things needed were present but hopelessly committed to innumerable nonproductive enterprises. No one was blind to their existence; it was in fact all the more exasperating to know that they were there but were untouchable simply because they were usually pet Branch preserves and to get them would necessitate cutting across some inviolate and sacrosanct Branch line. It was in short the same old story. To illustrate this situation of plenty in the midst of poverty is all too easy. A half dozen examples will suffice:

(a) SO's Airedale and Cross Project.

In the midst of the final drive through Germany SO launched two projects to support the Allied advance, which called for the dispatch behind enemy lines on sabotage and coup de main operations of scores of agents recruited from Basques (Airedale Project) and the Free Germany Committee of the West (Cross Project). However valuable a role these projects might have played under the circumstances in which they were conceived, the war ended so abruptly that with the shortened budget already looming on the horizon and with the necessity of developing post-hostilities activities on a large scale, it seemed a serious waste to continue engaging and training this personnel. Nevertheless, preparations for launching these projects continued for many weeks after the end of the war, although it was never clear exactly against whom they were to be directed. Despite, however, what appeared to be a game delaying action by SO in defense of this preserve (their last one in Western Europe) some sort of precedent was set when by direction of the Commanding Officer they were finally ordered dissolved early in July 1945.

(b) X-2 Art Unit.

Another example of a nonproductive use of resources, money, and manpower can be found in the X-2 Art Unit. Originally conceived to carry on X-2 activities by making use of the facilities of international art dealers and by ferreting out whatever German espionage activities might be involved in these circles, the Art Unit came nowhere near justifying the effort and expense put into it. Had the organization limitless resources it would admittedly have been nice to include the Art Unit's work as a phase of its activity, but such was not the case, and with things as tight as they were the Unit was generally recognized as a waste.

(c) R&A Oxford Unit.

Among these less productive efforts of OSS/WDC, the R&A

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Oxford Unit ranks high. Consisting of a group of experts working at Oxford microfilming pictures of the British Admiralty Photographic Library, their work by 1945 apparently consisted of rephotographing scenes that could be taken by any U. S. Consul, could be lifted from most National Geographic Magazines, and frequently could be purchased in any U. S. drug store.

(d) SI KITTEN and HANSEL Projects.

When it appeared German-occupied Scandanavia would be liberated sometime before the rest of the enemy in Western Europe had capitulated, SI developed two missions for dispatch to Oslo and Copenhagen, called respectively KITTEN and HANSEL. These missions were to work into enemy territory from their newly liberated headquarters in much the same way as MELANIE and ESPINETTE, the OSS bases at Eindhoven and Brussels. Later X-2, R&A, and Communications personnel were added to fill out these KITTEN and HANSEL projects, but they continued to remain predominantly SI enterprises. Both plans were basically well-conceived, but before an opportunity came to put either into effect, the war situation had changed drastically; the whole of Germany was overrun and enemy-occupied Scandanavia did not fall to the Allies until everything else had been taken. Under these changed circumstances the best course would have been to call off both KITTEN and HANSEL and save for other hard-pressed activities the expense and resources that would otherwise go into these projects. The situation now called instead for two or three specialists to be sent into each country with the Embassy when it reopened. But although the basic purpose no longer existed, the Branch machinery, like the mills of the Gods, ground slowly but so inexorably that both missions were dispatched exactly as conceived when it was assumed the enemy would still be holding out in Germany itself. It was only in July that the situation was finally rectified and sufficient clearance from on high obtained for the Commanding Officer to order the withdrawal of both missions.

(e) MO Activities.

So Branch made greater use of expensive, specialized personnel and facilities than MO, and I believe for the amount put into it the results achieved last winter and spring, consisting mainly of the HOCKEYTIME, BEDFORD, PANCAKE, and CAPRICORN projects, were not justified. There is, furthermore, as far as I know, no real indication that the few black radio and newspaper projects which were developed ever had any noticeable effect on the German people. Yet MO used not only money but monopolized various expert German-speaking personnel who were desperately needed when SI was putting on its great German penetration drive early in 1945. It is true that an arrangement was made

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whereby MO German-speaking personnel were made available to SI, but as far as I know this arrangement was never very effective or all-embracing and the MO, London, operations continued without let-up. In the emergency that existed the real solution would have been to suspend the Branch's activities entirely for a while. The contribution that this personnel would then have made if assigned to the development of secret intelligence plans and projects would have outweighed by far their usefulness in conjuring up subtle radio programs which few Germans listened to and caused no appreciable effect even when heard.

(f) Field Photo Documentation Project.

As valuable as Field Photo's contributions undeniably were in their IPDP project, their European Coastline project, and their training films, little usefulness could result from the time, labor, and expense put in on their Documentation Project of OSS/ETO activities. The only arguments counterbalancing the questionable vanity of the whole scheme lay in the films' possible historical and educational value. Personnel who saw these films being made of day to day situations with which they were thoroughly acquainted will vouch for the misleading conceptions embodied in them. Any historical or educational value was thereby negated, and the making of these pictures became merely a silly waste of time by most capable personnel whose high talents could easily have been used elsewhere.

(g) War Diary.

Like the Field Photo documentation films, the War Diary could have been of educational and historical use but from the Diaries I saw definitely was not. Instead the project monopolized the services of about 60 excellently qualified personnel and who during the hard-pressed winter and spring of 1945 were urgently needed on immediate operational projects. The War Diary's potential usefulness was nullified by the fact that the writers, however enthusiastic, had for the most part no direct first-hand acquaintance with their field. As a result they were forced to rely almost entirely on files, and it goes without saying that not only does the size of a file not necessarily reflect the importance of an issue, but many vital decisions, underlying reasons, and basic policies are never put down on paper. The only way to cover things with the proper perspective and correct emphasis is to have it done by some one thoroughly acquainted with the scene. This was done in the case of the Special Funds Diary, which was written by the Branch Chief, and the result is superb. The SO Diary likewise was done by a group thoroughly acquainted with the Branch. Most of the other Diaries, however, are naive creations, usually missing fire

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on the real story at hand, and having all the weaknesses that necessarily follow when an outsider is looking in - an outsider in fact who usually hadn't even begun looking in until the party was all over.

8. A considerable over-emphasis on personal privilege provided a fourth factor limiting the contributions of OSS/ETO. Like most of the other ills I believe this one too stemmed from the problem of Branch dominance. This was so because the culprits were those self-centered members of Branches who were so dedicated to the principle that the Branch can do no wrong that, like Louis XIV, they tended to think "L'etat est moi" and attribute to themselves the independence from executive control and authority that they had so often seen given the Branch. The Executive realized the free rein enjoyed by these individuals but usually was helpless to do anything about it, being frustrated by the same fundamental concepts which gave the Branches their dominant role and backed them and their personnel up whenever an issue of final authority arose. The resulting absence of central and impartial supervision often made individuals' behavior subject only to their discretion and personal sense of responsibility. Events proved that these were extremely tenuous ties in a Theater of War, where money and facilities were plentiful and the restraining effect of convention and executive control very small. Illustrations of the situation are innumerable; a few examples of the type of abuses prevalent will suffice:

(a) Misuse of cars and the OSS plane for private purposes;

(b) Unjustified travel to London and Paris for purely personal reasons;

(c) Misuse of the cross-channel phone for personal purposes;

(d) Misuse of cable facilities for personal purposes;

(e) Abuse of the pouch privilege;

(f) Overly ostentatious billets and living quarters;

(g) Special hotel accommodations arranged for ordinary personnel by cable and telephone despite adequate billeting facilities used by the rest of ETO personnel.

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The existence of these specific abuses (bad enough in themselves) made for more general (and even worse) evils which further limited the effectiveness of the organization. For one thing, this situation encouraged the continued presence of a number of individuals who had frequently high rank but no job and spent their time lounging around reaping the benefits of the personal privileges thus allowed them. Again, the situation provoked the ire of Army officials, who were often quite aware of what was going on, and thereby hampered the organization in its dealings with the Theater. Furthermore, it was a situation which could not help but have a bad effect on the morale of the vast majority of OSS personnel, who were plugging along always unselfishly and sometimes in considerable danger.

9. In outlining the above factors and their bad effects I do not want to obscure the splendid achievements of OSS/ETO. The point in bringing them out is simply to emphasize that still more could have been achieved had it not been for these elements, all of which I think basically stemmed from the faulty but fundamental organizational concept which centered around the sanctity of the Branch structure. The fact should always be kept in mind, however, that the good far outweighed the evil. If Branch insularity was dominant, it should also be remembered that CD, R&D, and the SI Each Section set a new high in illustrating how different Branches could work together in the closest harmony. Again, if needless superstructure was prevalent, it should be remembered that when there was an element of direct Executive control and participation, as in the case of the Board of Review, valuable results were achieved. If Branches misused their facilities in some connections, it should be remembered that on other occasions they did an amazing job; for example: SI's dispatch of over 100 agent teams to Germany between December and VE Day; R&A's excellent weekly periodical, "The European Political Report"; Field Photo's IPDF project of photographing ports, communication lines, bridges, and other strategic points throughout Western Europe; the hundreds of tons of supplies dropped by SO to Scandanavian Resistance; X-2's splendid coverage of enemy espionage efforts in France; the ever efficient and careful handling of finances by Special Funds; and the expertly professional job of Communications in handling problems ranging from routine Message Center traffic to numerous special agent circuits.

10. Finally, if there were factors which called for correction, it was not the fault of the Executive that solutions were hard to find. In London Colonel Forgan, Captain Armour, and Lt. Colonel Gross provided tremendously able leadership. Wise,

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energetic, and foresighted, they all seemed to appreciate the problems at hand, did their best to solve them, but in the long run were helpless; for always in the background was the fundamental concept of Branch dominance. The apparent acceptance by Washington of this philosophy defeated the best efforts of this capable executive staff to produce a truly integrated effort. It was in fact a basic philosophy which no human being could beat, embodying as it did the strangely contradictory thesis that the parts of an organization are greater than the whole.

Walter Lord

Walter Lord

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[redacted]

Field Rept.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

x Alden
x SF
x ETO

TO : The Director

DATE: 6 September 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT : Returnee Report: Capt. Douglas W. Alden SI/ETO

1. Capt. Alden who served as briefing and despatching officer for Sussex agents and later for the Dutch, German, Belgian and French desks of SI emphasizes the following weaknesses in operations in ETO:

a. Lack of adequate airlift.

b. Failure to utilize fully J&E equipment.

c. Inadequate numbers of personnel at the training area.

d. Inadequate facilities for S&T areas.

2. The Branch Chief's covering memo, beyond describing above criticisms as "accurate", makes no comment on Capt. Alden's recommendations.

Everts Ziegler
Capt., CAC
Reports Office

[redacted]

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27 August 1945

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Chief, S.I.

SUBJECT: Field Report of Captain Douglas W. Alden

1. Captain Alden's field report, though brief for the amount of time and work it covers, is very accurate. He tends to be overly modest in describing his own work.

2. I believe that everyone who worked with Captain Alden in both London and Paris recognized that he is a very serious and very efficient officer. He showed exceptional initiative in develop[illegible] new techniques and systematizing procedures. I know in [illegible] Mr. George Pratt, Head of the Division of Intelligence Procurement (DIP) thought very highly of Captain Alden's work because he spoke to me of it several times.

3. Captain Alden is scheduled to take over the work of Lt. Col. O'Brien at [illegible] Building and he has expressed his willingness to do so. Both Mr. Penrose and Cmdr. Tate approved of his assuming this new position. There is not anyone I can think of who is better qualified to make a good job of it.

4. Capt. Alden is now on leave and should return to Washington on [illegible] September 1945. Col. O'Brien will see him before then and [illegible] to some of the special work and will be here during the first [illegible] in Washington to guide him through the "Q" building.

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he had discovered that there was no one there with the necessary experience to prepare and despatch agents. Therefore I was sent back to London to set up an agent program exclusively for Melanie Mission. On my arrival in London, I discovered that SI had decided to put me in charge of the preparation of all agents at that time being sent from the continent and not otherwise assigned to existing desks (that is to say, I did not originally concern myself with Labor Desk or Polish Desk agents, the only two desks which at that time had an agent program in London). At that time Sainette Mission and German desk/ Paris were sending agents to the UK for training and despatch. Later on the French Desk/Paris also began sending agents. With the creation of DIP my functions became a part of that organization. At that time I was called Chief Conducting Officer. I was in other words the "Desk" for all of these miscellaneous agents arriving from the continent for training and despatch in the UK. Because all facilities for training and despatching SI agents in the UK had been deactivated, it was necessary to begin from zero in setting up an agent program. At that period Schools and Training had become a separate branch, but practically without facilities and instructors. To complicate the situation further, the Chief of S&T was hospitalized in Paris. It was therefore some time, in my opinion at least three months, before an adequate agent program was set up, although of course, superhuman efforts were made by S&T to cope with the problem from the very start.

4. In late February of this year, the long needed expansion of DIP finally took place. Up to that time as I have said, I had been functioning as the Dutch, German, Belgian and French Desks without interfering in the agent programs of the Labor and Polish desks. With the reorganization of DIP I was designated as Agent Processing Officer to supervise the preparation of all DIP agents. Simultaneously with this move, French, Belgian and German desks were set up. There never was a separate Dutch desk, so I continued to function as the Dutch Desk, in addition to my other duties. My primary duty was then to coordinate the agent programs of all the desks. I therefore perfected the pattern of preparation which I had already been following myself and instructed the new desks in the method of procedure. Gradually as the desks came to know better how our system worked, they needed less guidance from me. In the last months of DIP activities, my functions boiled down essentially to the following:

a. Clearance with the British for new agent material arriving from the continent.

b. Processing of arriving agents, ie, security checking in the Royal Victoria Patriotic School, medical and personal checks and assignment to an area.

c. All liaison between DIP and S&T.

d. Supervision of the desks in the preparation of the agent processing form which they were obliged to keep to show the progress of the agents preparation.

e. Clearance of British for departure of agents on mission.

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The above enumeration of duties does not cover of course, the numerous functions which I had prior to the expansion of DIP. Before that time I had not only the functions enumerated above, but also the problem of cover stories, equipment, packing, briefing and despatching, in other words, everything the desks, the DIP Supply Officer, and the DIP Operation Officer subsequently did.

5. In regard to my association in the Sussex Plan, I have only praise for the excellent manner in which all this work was done and for my colleagues. I have always felt that the Sussex Plan was admirably conceived and carried out. What happened is, of course, history and it would be superfluous to add anything to the existing record.

6. As for DIP, I consider it extremely unfortunate that it should have been obliged to start from scratch. After the experience of the Sussex Plan, it would have been logical that all of the knowledge gained and all the facilities set up should have been applied to the program for the penetration of Germany. When I returned to London on November 15, 1944, there was almost nothing left of the elaborate SI facilities that I had known formerly. There was a small radio school, Milwaukee, originally set up by the Labor Desk and at that time newly attached to IMT. The Labor Desk likewise had the excellent Bach section for cover stories, a section which was later detached from Labor Desk and made a separate desk under DIP. R&D had a considerable amount of supplies, but not altogether adequate. Other than the Radio School, there was no training area for SI agents, no training program, and no instructors. I shall not attempt to sketch the development of DIP, but wish to emphasize the enormous difficulties under which we struggled. S&T was the first to rally and in a month or so had an excellent training program going at Area F, newly obtained from SO. On the other hand I personally had only one qualified assistant, although occasionally other unqualified officers were attached to my office for "heavy" work. For weeks my day ran from 0900 to 2400 hours. With my one qualified assistant in the hospital, the task became even more burdensome. I point out these difficulties not as a criticism, but as an explanation for the inadequacies of the agent training program from March to February. I realize that during that time every effort was being made by DIP to obtain qualified personnel and that the result of their attempts was the subsequent expansion of the division. Since I was not close enough to administrative matters to know why we did not secure adequate and qualified personnel, I naturally tend to place the blame in higher realms. I am sure that Mr. George Pratt and Major Hans Wolfe were doing all they could. I have the highest respect for them and their work. Along with the expansion in personnel, there was a crying need for more areas. Because of my experience in the Sussex Plan, I naturally thought in terms of a training area and a briefing area. Although DIP did all in could to obtain a briefing area, there was actually none in operation until late April of this year. This meant that all of our briefing up to that time was most inadequate. In short, DIP and S&T would have been in much better shape if they had possessed in December, let us say, the facilities and personnel which they came finally to possess in April and May of this year.

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7. In June 1945, I went to Paris once more to coordinate recovery of agents, their return to the UK for deprocessing and their final liquidation on the continent. I was engaged in this work until my departure from Paris on July 13. At that time the liquidation was nearly complete.

8. In closing I wish to reiterate some of the major failings of the program for the penetration of Germany, even though I realize that these points have been brought out by others.

a. The failure to provide adequate airlifts. In spite of the difficulties which we encountered in preparing teams, we actually did have teams ready to go in December. At that time the air forces would not fly over their targets.

b. The failure to utilize J&E equipment on a greater scale. It was proved subsequently that the W/T set was unreliable in a blind drop. If, in the beginning, more teams could have been sent out with only J&E equipment (since there were not enough trained W/T operators) or if later the W/T teams had been given J&E as an emergency device, I am convinced that the showing of the OSS in Germany would have been different. I say this fully realizing the difficulties which Commander Simpson encountered in expanding the use of J&E.

Douglas W. Alden

Douglas W. Alden
Captain, AC

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Field Report
Y Bn Th, Walke

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN

Whereas I concur in some measure with Lt. Comdr. McBaine's analysis of why SI accomplishments in SEAC were limited by the straight-jacket of Col. Coughlin's orthodoxy, I cannot read this sole difficulty in Lt. Col. Booth's report. On the contrary, I can only draw from the irrational statement of details and the report as a whole the clear-cut conclusion that Col. Booth was of questionable suitability to be in charge of SI activities in this or any theater.

If I remember correctly, Col. Booth was misunderstood and his methods failed to elicit appreciation from his superiors in Tangier, in Spain, and in London. His job with the Army in France appears to have been somewhat more successful but here again the report of his activities disclosed a defensive tone. Moreover, I considered his ideas generally digressive and unsound.

My impressions of Col. Booth, primarily from hearsay and from impressions gleaned from his reports and correspondence, are that he would have difficulty in being "understood" and appreciated in any situation. I was most surprised, in view of past records, when I learned of his assignment to duty in SEAC.

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Field Rep

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director OSS
Through: General Magruder (MMIS)
FROM : Chief SI

DATE: 5 September 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report of Lt. Col. Waller Booth

Attached herewith is field report Lt. Col. Waller Booth dated 21 August 1945.

Lt. Col. Booth occupied a key position in OSS SEAC. His work did not succeed to his liking. His report analyses the reasons why. These reasons are fundamental.

Because of the above facts I have requested Comdr. McMahon, Divisional Deputy Far East SI, to comment on the report; also Lt. Co.. Hutchesson, Chief South East Asia Section FESI. I agree with the comments of the above two officers.

Also I am taking the somewhat unusual steps of routing this report through General Magruder, on the thought that we may have more comments to add concerning problems and areas with which he is particularly familiar.

W. H. E.

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ANNEX I

Form No. 4005

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ROUTING SHEET

To be prepared by the first TSCO who receives a TOP SECRET document.

DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
[illegible]	ACCESSION NO.: SIPS-704
[illegible] DATE: 14 Aug 45	ACCESSION DATE: 14 Aug 45
[illegible] NO. COPIES: [illegible] ATTACHMENT: N	OFFICE OR BRANCH: SI
	LOGGED BY: [illegible]

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Receipt to	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
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[illegible]	[illegible]	14-8	10 30	[illegible]	14-8	10 30
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	8/14	1705
[illegible]	[illegible]	17-8	09 00	[illegible]	[illegible]	10 40
TSCO	Capt Pugliese	[illegible]	1100	[illegible]	[illegible]	1245
SI	[illegible]	[illegible]	1900	[illegible]	[illegible]	1620
Signature Officer	[illegible]	[illegible]	1715	CSO	[illegible]	1040
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2						
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7						

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES
INDIA BURMA THEATER

A.P.O. 885,
16 May 1945.

FOR AMERICAN EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Instructions for Thailand Operations.

TO : Commanding Officer, Office of Strategic Services, India Burma Theater, A.P.O. 432.

1. a. The mission of O.S.S. operations in Thailand in implementing United States policy to provide aid to resistance forces in Thailand, consistent with other Theater commitments, and within the resources available, will be as follows:

(1) Secure a continuous flow of intelligence, especially information about enemy lines of communication and movements in and through Thailand.

(2) Carry out subversive and sabotage activities, especially such activities as interfere with enemy lines of communication and movements in and through Thailand; but every precaution will be taken to avoid precipitating premature Jap seizure of Thailand or seriously jeopardizing operations under (1).

(3) Organize and train Thai resistance forces.

(4) Supply arms, ammunition and other supplies to the Thai Army and other resistance forces for purposes indicated in (1) and (2) above.

b. In carrying out the foregoing mission, the following factors will be observed:

(1) The distinct American character of activities in Thailand will be preserved and no impression will be given that American and British clandestine organizations are integrated. Cooperation and coordination of American and British clandestine operations will be emphasized.

(2) It will be made clear to the Thai that these operations carry no American commitment to furnish military assistance beyond supplies and personnel incident to clandestine operation

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(3) Close and friendly relations with "Ruth" and his colleagues, and with other friendly Thai, will be maintained.

(4) These operations will be designed to enhance United States influence in Thailand and to strengthen American efforts to establish Thai independence.

(5) Statements regarding American political policy will not be made except after clearance with the Theater Commander.

(6) Clandestine activities in Malaya which in any way bear on Thailand, including military and political intelligence affecting especially the peninsula, will be continued, but American activities in Malaya must not be associated in native opinion with British politics toward Southeast Asia or Malaya. | Stress to Malay Ops.

2. Material, supplies and equipment for the above mission will be obtained through normal Theater channels without interfering with operations of greater importance in the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). Should any items not be obtainable through normal Theater channels, they may be requisitioned or purchased by O.S.S. under procedures approved by the Theater Commander. Air lift will be furnished under arrangements made with appropriate agencies of S.E.A.C. through normal channels or as directed by the Theater Commander.

3. This mission will be accomplished by O.S.S. personnel now available or by replacements already authorized by the Theater Commander. Requests for minimum increases in military operational personnel will be given consideration. There will be no increase in staff personnel.

4. American clandestine operations must be coordinated and approved by "P" Division or appropriate authority for S.A.C.S.E.A. In the normal case the Liaison Officer, U.S.T., I.S.T. at Headquarters S.A.C.S.E.A. will clear clandestine operations on behalf of the Theater Commander. Should S.A.C.S.E.A. or "P" Division oppose an American operation, full report will be made immediately to the Theater Commander and action suspended pending further instructions.

5. Copies of all reports emanating from this mission will be submitted to the Theater Commander and to the Liaison Officer, U.S.T., I.S.T., at Headquarters, S.A.C.S.E.A. O.S.S. will maintain at India Burma Theater Headquarters a liaison officer fully informed on all clandestine activities and operations.

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6. All clandestine operations will be coordinated before implementation with the Liaison Officer, U.S.F., I.B.T., Headquarters, S.A.C.S.E.A. No personnel of American clandestine organizations of this Theater will operate in Indo-China nor will they assist other clandestine organizations in any such operation.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL SULTAN:

FRANK MILANI,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

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NORTHERN AIR SERVICE, INC.

Memorandum No. .....

Date Rec'd 8A .....

To	Room No.	Date Received	Date Sent	Officer's Initials	Comments
	1037		AUG 20	7145	[illegible]
Chg. 3		AUG 20 [illegible]			

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

28 August 1945

To : Chief, SI

From : Far East Div., SI

Subject: Intelligence in India-Burma Theater

It became apparent here soon after Col. Coughlin went to Kandy that HQ would develop the same weakness and failure that characterized LCL, i.e., that while their tactical intelligence was good, strategic intelligence was virtually lacking.

This was due to the rigidity of mind and lack of breadth of Col. Coughlin and those immediately around him. Despite frequent and continued urgings to the contrary, they clung to their Regular Army conceptions, and everywhere sought to reduce SI to nothing but the staff functions of a G-2, turning all operations over to a G-3, etc. They carried this to the extreme where (a) they ignored the orders of OSS Washington and not only did not pattern their organization on that of Washington but transferred SI personnel to other tasks without asking or even notifying Washington, (b) they ignored the orders of the Theater Commander to give intelligence first priority in Thailand, and substituted as first priority the training of guerrillas. (See Annexes I and VII)

This in turn discouraged Washington from properly supporting intelligence activities in Col. Coughlin's theater.

It has seemed to us that Col. Coughlin has failed to grasp the original contribution of OSS. If Col. Coughlin's ideas were to prevail completely, the Army might as well take over the work. There would be no need for an additional organization such as OSS.

James McBride
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Div. Dep., Far East, SI

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd SA AUG 23 1945

Lt. Col. A. D. Hutcheson

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Date Fwd'd	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. 1077			AUG 29 1945		2 file copies to world [illegible]
2. Chief					ATTACHED HEREWITH IS SITS NO. 704 (A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT).
3. Chief S.I.		NOV 30 1945 SEP 5 1945		WHS	
4. Director					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) in Comments column.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be attached to Registry.
For Director Designations see separate sheet.

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Chief, SI

FROM: Chief SSRC Section, FEBI

DATE: 23 August 1945

SUBJECT: Attached Field Report of Lt. Col. Waller Booth

1. First of all since the war is now over this report will probably be viewed in a different light. However, it will serve as a guide to any similar operations in the future, and in that capacity it can be of definite use.

2. The recommendations implied in Col. Booth's report are definitely of merit, and if the function of SI (Strategic Intelligence) were to be fulfilled on any given mission there would have to be many changes in the present type of field organization in SSRC. These changes would be along the lines of permitting trained SI personnel to carry out their functions and not shifting them to other functions.

3. Since the war is ended little action will be required in this case; however, if post-hostilities intelligence is desired there are trained SI personnel in the field at present capable of producing it if they are instructed and properly organized to do so.

4. In view of the report of Lt. Col. Booth [illegible] has thrown further light upon a situation which has been felt [illegible] in Washington for quite some time, i.e. a lack of organized strategic intelligence work in the field - whereas the Theater Commander, [illegible] intelligence activities which he (as a function) was the first priority. In Washington attaches have repeatedly made requests for this type of information, which has not been forthcoming in as substantial a volume as it could have been by any means. Thus if the subject report will again call this situation to the attention of those interested, it will have served a useful purpose.

[signature]

A. P. Kirkham, Lt. Col. AUS
Chief, South East Asia Sec.
For Ch. Div., SI

Note:- This entire report has to be classified "Top Secret" since one of Lt. Booth's recommendations is to classified and cannot be downgraded according to the "Top Secret" General Order.

Note No. 2:- The above "Note" comment has been reversed by Mrs. Gilbert who says that this entire report can be classified as "Secret" provided it is noted herein that ATTACHED MEMO-RANDUM IS STILL TOP SECRET (A TOP SECRET DOCUMENT).

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21 August 1945

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Lt. Col. Waller Booth Jr.

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

It is my opinion, based on my experience as Chief SI IBT from 9 April 1945 to 3 August 1945, that the position of the SI Branch in that Theater left much to be desired.

I consider that one factor in my own lack of success was the failure on the part of FESI Washington to understand the SI situation in the IBT and the scope that would be accorded the SI Chief. It had been my understanding in Washington before going to the Far East that as Chief of SI for the IBT I would have authority to carry out the plans which had been discussed with the Chiefs of the SI Branch in Washington and with General Donovan. It was my belief that I was to be responsible solely to Col. Coughlin. This was not the case. Comdr. Taylor's divergent ideas are brought out in Annex III.

Also, the necessity for a Chief to direct and coordinate the theater-wide activities of SI was obviated by the deactivation of Det. Ment 101 and the AFU. Further the SI Branch was well down the line in the scale of importance to Detachment 404, and the five months that I spent in the Theater saw one continual, and not too successful, struggle by SI to put the Branch in what we considered was its proper perspective.

Upon my return to Kandy in late July after being absent on a mission of several weeks' duration, I found that the situation, from an intelligence point of view, was at its lowest ebb. I believe that Major Reeda's letter to me, shown as Annex II, describes it accurately and clearly.

In addition to Maj. Reeda's letter I am attaching five other annexes which I believe will give a picture of the objective assigned to 404, SI's attempts at contribution, and the results. I regret that I could not locate my copy of 26/A to the ISO as this stressed intelligence and the annexed T/O's provided for, at each of the ten proposed bases, a Battalion Intelligence Officer, three Company Intelligence Officers, a Reports Section, a Photo Section, and an Intelligence Training Section at each Base. In Annex III, the intelligence phase was purposely underemphasized in the belief that, if the operational plan were accepted, the intelligence plan would automatically be included.

The set-up of Detachment 404 was unsatisfactory from my point of view. Col. Coughlin inherited a Planning Board which became actually an advisory

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C
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P
Y

DETACHMENT 404
BRANCH ESTABLISHMENT
SOUTH EAST ASIA
APO 432

ANNEX II

Dear Col:

Expected to see you in Calcutta. I have written you a couple of letters which the front office would not let go out as they said you'd be along in a few days

There has been rather a complete change in the picture in Kandy. SI no longer has any control whatsoever of its personnel or anything at all to say about operations or the intelligence personnel to go on them. I was told not long ago SI was following a policy in Siam which was not the same as the Detachment policy. This was because I was visiting Y and selling intelligence to the leaders of the teams. Also the Col. told them Good Will, Intelligence, then Operations in that order of priority were the objectives of their trip in. This has changed. The last teams have been told no intelligence activities. Survey what intelligence possibilities are in your area but do not develop them. This is apparently because of Greenlee's advice that Betty and Ruth want to handle the intelligence, plus the desire on the part of many to avoid being just an intelligence organization. The picture now is - SI handles the intelligence coming from the field only. We see no signals on policy or instructions. Teams are made up without the advice or recommendation of anyone from SI. Maj. Scofields reports directly to Coughlin and Moscrip. We do not keep in the operational picture at all. We are free to send signals to the field after clearing Taylor. As a matter of fact a copy goes to Taylor. We send nothing out without going through Taylor, we can not contact operations without first going through Taylor. Our personnel are handled as a pool under control of Moscrip and we have nothing to say as to where our people go or what they do. In fact Taylor said it had been proposed that no more intelligence briefing be given any parties going into Siam.

These are the same people, some in different jobs but still close to the ear of power, who apparently have a rather sharp knife out for you. Why I am not sure, but the knife is out and being used to your detriment in the usual sly OSS underhanded way.

Coughlin is trying to make a "O" set-up with Taylor as O-2. SI can not move without Taylor's O.K. and Taylor doesn't move without Corm's advice. The anti-British feeling is quite strong, perhaps with reason, perhaps not.

Frankly I'm about fed up and ready to either go home or ask for a transfer to a more sensible organization. Coughlin is O.K. but his ideas do not fit with the Branch set-up and the people in Washington as Branches.

I don't know how you feel, but there no longer seems to be any reason for a Lt. Comdr. a Lt. Col. and a Maj. all supposedly in the executive place in the intelligence set-up where there is left the job of Reports Board and keeping track of O.S.

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I would like to get T.D. in China to look the place over and see if there is a place for me to fit in. If not I'd like also to see a couple of Generals I know quite well up there and see what cooks with them. If nothing develops I'm willing to go home any time. My training has been intelligence in several of its phases but I'm interested in getting this war over not divining the post-war political situation when the policy is not even disclosed.

/s/ Bill Reeda

* Maj. Scofield was sent by SI to Camp Y as SI personnel officer in connection with the FREEDOM operation.

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HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INDIA BURMA THEATER

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: Penetration of Thailand in Accordance with Directive of the Theater Commander to Strategic Services Officer, ISP

TO : Strategic Services Officer

PROBLEM

1. The problem involved is to penetrate Thailand in the most effective way possible both with regard to secret operations and secret intelligence and yet remain within the limits of the directive issued by the Theater Commander, dated 18 May 1945, and to support this penetration.

DISCUSSION

2. I have submitted to you maps, diagrams, and T/O's in this connection. In order to avoid any confusion, allow me to say that I did not consider this an operational plan in itself but a goal at which to aim. It was not intended to displace or supersede any activities in which our organization has engaged in Thailand, but to supplement them in an effort to secure a penetration to the determined point. Further, the ideas embodied were not those of any one person.

3. The map which I submitted was drawn by Colonel Dickey, and he suggested the locations for the various battalion bases. The information is not considered final by him and should be checked locally before definite decisions are made.

The communications chart was drawn after consultation with Colonel Dickey, but, before a definite system of communication is decided upon, an expert in authority in his branch should be consulted again.

The T/O's which were drawn up were based on operations which Colonel Dickey, his officers commanding in the field, and my own experience throughout the three and one-half years that I have spent out here.

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Nothing rigid was intended; doubtless many changes will have to be made due to capabilities of personnel as well as local conditions in the area involved.

4. There were some errors in copying when the T/O's were typed up and some important details were not covered.

The problem of medical aid is something which will have to be worked out. I am informed by Col. [illegible] that some medical officers could be expected from the [illegible], possibly we could make some available from our present medical personnel, and Colonel Wilkinson has suggested an attempt at recruitment in the Theater. We have a few aid men, and possibly orderlies and aid men could be trained from among our enlisted personnel.

No indication of the number and type of arms was given, nor was other equipment requirements estimated. I am attaching one sheet showing projected fire power and further estimating special equipment needs.

5. It is essential that it be kept in mind that an overall operation such as that suggested [illegible] would have to be developed with an eye to two and perhaps three phases:

a. Training, Preparation and Development of Intelligence [illegible]. During this [illegible] will be [illegible] necessary. [illegible] The military organization will [illegible] only if and when [illegible] [illegible]

b. [illegible] As the first phase will be static, [illegible] [illegible]

c. [illegible] [illegible] third phase would [illegible] It is conceivable, in the [illegible]

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case of an invasion, that some of our battalions would be overrun, in which [illegible] would serve as field detachments with the organized troops who had overrun them.

5. The possibilities of our approximating the optimum as set forth in the various tables and charts submitted to you depend upon:

a. The approval of Ruh and his associates in the Army, underground, [illegible] acquainted with every phase of our planning. This does not mean that they should be given false hopes. They should be requested to be our partners, and as such brought to realize, as thoroughly as we ourselves do, that no matter how much we may desire to do certain things there are limitations upon our ability to carry out our ideas.

b. The situation in Thailand. This is a very serious consideration and [illegible] at the moment. It would seem that there is danger of the Thais jumping the gun and either revolting too soon or bringing the Japanese down on their necks. In addition to the fact that if one of these actions were precipitated it would be impossible for us to carry out our plans, it is gravely doubtful that an uprising upon the part of the Thais alone would be successful. This point should be strongly emphasized when approval of our plans is requested from inside.

c. Personnel available. The [illegible] personnel involved appears at first glance to be [illegible], but a large percentage of the personnel requirements can be filled immediately if a reorganization of our needs in the PTT is made. If we no longer will introduce agents into the country from bases outside, recruiting and training officers will be freed for missions, and, as we decrease our establishment outside, personnel of all types can be reassigned. Attached is an annex showing the proportion of personnel available to that which will be required under the P/O presented. Further, according to Col. Sidney, it is likely that Thai Army personnel can be provided in numbers superior to those which is indicated.

d. Equipment and supplies. We have a sufficient quantity of arms on hand. The major difficulty, according to Sidney, will be confronted by the fact that all the food necessary for underground personnel can be provided within the country. Further, I do not believe that it will be necessary to furnish uniforms for the guerillas, though I did not discuss this with Col. Sidney. Uniforms were not furnished in the Philippines, and the lack did not seem to impair the efficiency of the underground there.

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e. Lift. This is one of the most serious problems which confronts us [redacted] one upon which depends our calculations. It is possible that we may be able to deliver some equipment by submarine, but by and large it is air transport upon which we are dependent.

f. British Situation in Thailand. Our directive states that we can not integrate our activities with those of the British but says that we must cooperate with the latter. This feature has been a matter apparently of some concern to the Thais who do not understand our relationship with our Allies. The British have important plans for Thailand, which, if carried out, will complement and strengthen our own efforts. I feel that it would be valuable to attempt to present, if not a united, at least a cooperative front to the Thais.

CONCLUSION

7. To recapitulate, it would appear that we have a sufficient "green light" from the Theater Commander, almost enough personnel, and adequate arms and equipment to go ahead. The features lacking are sanction from inside Thailand, stability in the political relationship between the Thais and the Japanese, and the certainty of sufficient lift.

8. It would appear that the chronological procedure to be followed, after synchronization with Force 136, would be: (a) to indicate to Seth and his associates that our plans are in cooperation and coordination with those of the British and to request the former's approval and assistance in carrying them out, and (b) as soon as possible after the above is accomplished, to begin introducing personnel and equipment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. In view of the foregoing, the following recommendations are made.

a. That a separate detachment be organized with the special mission of carrying out the offensive operational phases envisaged in general in the suggestions to date and a CO appointed.

b. That there be drawn up immediately basic operational plans for carrying out the desired objectives.

c. That a summary of these plans be shown to and discussed with the British with the idea of coordination of effort and avoidance of duplication.

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d. That the OS of the detachment with Col. Dickey, who understands and approves our ideas, be dispatched to Julia to confer with Ruth and his conferees and with them, and the OSS representatives there, come to an agreement and understanding on all essentials. (Force 136 representative is a full colonel who has been to Julia on an exploratory mission and will soon be returning. If it is agreeable to the British, I would recommend that our representatives accompany him on his return.)

WALLER B. BOOTH, JR.
Lt. Col., Inf.
Chief, SI/INT

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ESTIMATED FIRE POWER
CENTRAL BDE.

	9 mm SMG	45 Cal. Pistols	Carbines	Rifles	MG	LMGs	Bazookas	60 mm Mortars	81mm Mortars
HQ.	10	11	10						
HQ. Co.	140	10	87	18	20	3	6		3
Co. A	120	12	86	88	77	3	12	3	
Co. B	120	12	86	88	77	3	12	3	
Co. C	120	12	86	88	77	3	12	3	
Support Co.	16	1	14		20			0	3
Demol. Team	24								
TOTAL	740	18	180	176	254	12	42	15	6

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CENTRAL BATTALION



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ATTALION



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INTEGRATED FIRE POWER
REGULAR BDE.

	6 mm SR	45 mm. Mortars	Carbines	Rifles	AR	LMG	Bazookas	60mm Mortars	81mm Mortars
HQ.	10P	10	10						
HQ. Co.	17S	10	8R	12	27	8	6		1
Co. A	204	10	24	20	20	4	12	1	
Co. B	204	10	24	20	20	4	12	1	
Co. C	204	10	24	20	20	8	12	1	
Support Co.	71F	1	20		20			2	2
Transl. Team	14		7		7				
TOTAL	900	70	100	100	100	16	48	16	4

TOTAL INTEGRATED FIRE POWER

Central Installations	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	24	64	20	10
Regular Installations	70P	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	100	[illegible]	[illegible]	40
TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	50

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REGULAR BATTALION



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(REGULAR BATTALION)



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ANNEX II

Personnel Required		Personnel Available	
12	Majors - Sqdrn	8	(2 inside)
12	Majors or Capts. - T.O.E	10	(1 inside) (2 of the 10 are Lts. but are qualified)
19	Captains - Issue	12	(that)
69	Capts. or Lts. - Sq. Ops	88	(89 that plus 11 from 101)
36	Lts. - Sq. Ops	10	
12	Lts. - Adjs.	6	
12	NCOs - Supply	7	
12	Med. Offs.	0	
36	Radio Ops. & Instrs.	26	(16 that)
14	GI Instructors	10	
4	Photographers	4	(that)
8	Reports Lists.	8	(1 inside)
20	Clerks	20	
Total 250		Total 195	

* Taking into consideration an personnel which has not yet left the U. S.

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ANNEX III

ESTIMATED SPECIAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Central [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Regular [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TOTALS	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible]

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ANNEX IV 17447

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23 June 1945

SUBJECT: S.I. Operations in ISC

TO: Lt. Commander Edward J. Taylor

1. I understand now what you meant about the situation in Rangoon. The set-up was arranged to receive and process intelligence, but it's permanent and has been established. I had not visualized the complete collapse of such a basic fundamental set-up, consequently, did not completely share your concern completely.

2. I saw Mandelbaum for a short talk and Baker is here now. The former seemed to have been well briefed and to have a definite plan of campaign. I believe that he and Baker will bring about a distinct change for the better. However, to do the job that you outlined as the State Department desire in this theater, will take a great deal more than we have got available.

3. A clear-cut directive from the Department would be helpful. I think that I understand what you had in mind and to accomplish it will require the utmost skill and subtlety, and certain rigid decisions must be made as to the scope of our activities. We have stated, for instance, that our efforts in Rangoon are directed entirely toward the defeat of the enemy. There is danger, therefore, of grave complications should we appear to thwart our avowed intentions.

4. I have given this subject a great deal of thought and I have come to the conclusion that it should departmentalize as soon as possible. By definite line of demarcation and by great tact, the subject of military intelligence and the handling of political and economic, and the two departments should complement and supplement each other while we are striving at the two objectives simultaneously, but they should be able to separate when the time arises and pursue their diverse functions.

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5. At the moment we have not got the personnel to set up a political SI department. To my knowledge, we have no men in this theater who have had experience in developing the type of organization that is requisite unless Ripley were made available. It takes a clever operator indeed to do that sort of thing, but we have seen in our organization; to wit, Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Pratt, Mr. and Mrs. W. H. White, Jack Forrester, Justin Locke and others. Possibly these are too well known by now, but others must have been developed, and I believe that we should request Washington to recruit them for this theater against the time when civilians can again come out. Presumably the State Department will be on the ground first and full use should be made of this as well as other official and commercial cover. Meanwhile, the possibility of attaching OSS Vice Consuls in India and Ceylon could be explored. Our organization can [illegible] training to Foreign Service career officers; in fact one of our chains was operated by a secretary of the Legation and beautifully done.

6. The scope of our military intelligence activity I believe to be tremendous and I think that the priority given it is right and just. I don't consider this great operation upon which we have embarked as merely a thing of the moment, but as an opportunity to contribute an invaluable lesson to our military posterity. I know that you are not entirely satisfied with our beginnings, nor am I, but it may not be too late to rectify our mistakes and make up for time lost.

7. It has been a matter of much regret to me that I have not been able to inspire confidence, in you, Colonel Coughlin and others, in my ideas and ability. It is disappointing for the thing that I had to offer was experience. I have had a very catholic experience and if this is not going to be used to the limit, I have failed in my purpose in coming out here. However, if I have failed, it is my fault. One contributing factor, I believe, is that over the last three and a half years my actions, based on my experience, have become somewhat instinctive and I am not in the habit of analyzing and explaining the reasons for my beliefs and behavior.

8. As things now stand, I believe the post of Chief of SI for the theater to be superfluous. The Intelligence officer should assume that function and be in the line of command. Lynch is perfectly capable of running SI at his command.

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Marshalltown, I am sure, can manage the Kok branch at Rangoon as long as necessary; and Kuhn can swing Singapore.

9. There, then, can I be useful in our over-all plans from an intelligence point of view? I believe in Siam or vicinity until such time as we have a base set up that is sound from top to bottom. The Rangoon situation was an eye-opener. We simply can't afford to take chances. We need someone there who understands intelligence procurement. Later, if possible, I would like to supervise personally the intelligence operations in our various guerilla units in Burma.

10. I am afraid that Colonel Coughlin will oppose these ideas. I fear that he lacks confidence in my judgment, tact and ability. To offset this, I can only refer my record prior to my arrival in this theater. I earnestly request you to give this matter serious thought in the hope that you will see fit to make supplemental recommendations to Colonel Coughlin.

WBR

WALLACE B. DONOVAN, JR.
Lt. Col., Inf.
Chief SI/IRT

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ANNEX V 17,447

HEADQUARTERS
Office of Strategic Services
India Burma Theater
APO 432

SECRET

23 July 1945

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Monthly Reports

TO : Major Reeia

1. It appears to me that the best way to avoid duplication between the SI and Opero monthly reports would be to confine the SI reports as regards operations to listing the intelligence obtained from operations and the contributions to OSS operations which the Branch has made during the month. This would normally include:

a. Personnel furnished

b. Instructions and briefing supplied

c Directions to field agents through Opero

2. As an example, SI should not list Siren results other than as intelligence produced as an SI achievement but should state what action SI has taken during the month to obtain better results from Siren, and leave it to Opero to report on Siren as a whole.

3. Duplication between SI and Reports Section reports does not seem to me to require correction.

E. L. TAYLOR
Lt. Commander, USNR
Intelligence Officer

cc: Colonel Coughlin
Mr. Beefield
Major Waserip

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HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INDIA BURMA THEATER

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20 July 1945

SUBJECT: Monthly Reports - Dr. Scofield's Comments

TO : Intelligence Officer

We assume that the monthly report serves two purposes, (1) summarizes our activities for the Strategic Services Officer, and (2) keeps the Washington SI Branch informed as to the progress being made by SI in carrying out the overall strategic plans as set forth in the memorandum from General Donovan.

Dr. Scofield's statements are misleading and seem to me to be unfair. The Reports Board is one section of the SI Branch, both here and in Washington. The Reports Board, Washington, has asked Mr. Lloyd George to submit a monthly report direct to them. Therefore, his report is for the Reports Board, Washington, through the Chief of SI. The SI monthly report summarizes the activities of the Board as one of the functions of SI Branch. The SI Branch was given two missions, (1) to collect military and other intelligence, etc., and (2) processing and evaluating this intelligence. These missions were specifically called for in reference to Thailand, Burma, Andamans, Nicobars, Malaya, and Sumatra. The Branch in Washington should be informed of the progress we are making. It is further directed that, in order that we may be kept fully informed, Branch and field reports summarize each month the progress of all activities undertaken in implementation of this document.

Suggested changes. If the Operations Office makes sufficient copies of their operational report so that the Branch in Washington receives the proper number of copies, SI can merely refer to the Operations Office report as a summary of our activities in carrying out the SI mission. Apparently the Branch in Washington receives a copy of our report but not necessary copies of the Operations Office report and other Branch reports. Therefore I believe that a summary of operations is essential. That summary should include those operations where SI personnel are actively engaged in collecting information.

WM. REEDA, JR.
Major Cavalry
Branch Head, SI/404

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17 July 1945

SUBJECT: Monthly Reports

TO : Lt. Comdr. Edmond L. Taylor
Intelligence Officer

1. After reading the various Detachment and Theater Reports for June, I commented to Colonel Coughlin as follows:

"Both the Detachment and Theater Reports from the SI Branch were complete duplications of the reports from the Operations Office and the Reports Board, and contained no additional items. It would seem there must be matters of a purely SI nature to be reported; e.g., alterations in the training program at Camp X."

2. On the margin of my memorandum Colonel Coughlin has penned, "Attention Taylor - investigate and recommend correction."

CARLETON F. SCOFIELD
Strategic Planning Officer

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Officer, the subjects in regard to which he should be consulted or informed, and the correct channels to follow:

a. One of the duties of the Intelligence Officer is to advise the Strategic Services Officer on intelligence policy and to make recommendations in regard to operational or policy decisions from the point of view of the Intelligence branches. Obviously, this requires that the Intelligence Officer be himself informed as to the views, needs and problems of the branch heads. It will always be assumed by the Strategic Services Officer that the recommendations of the Intelligence Officer represent the agreed views of the Intelligence branches unless it is specifically indicated that there are dissenting opinions or that there has not been opportunity for discussion. When there is a disagreement between the Intelligence Officer and one or more of the branch heads the Strategic Services Officer may wish, in some cases, to have the dissenter develop his point of view more fully, in other cases, he may not. If the Strategic Services Officer consults directly with a Branch head, he assumes that the views expressed by that branch head have the approval of the Intelligence Officer, unless the contrary is specifically stated, and he also assumes that the Intelligence Officer will be fully informed of the conversation by the branch head. It follows from this that:

(1) The Intelligence Officer should determine the views of the Intelligence Branch heads before advising the Strategic Services Officer and should keep the branch heads informed of the latter's decisions and instructions insofar as it affects them.

(2) Branch Heads should clear when possible with the Intelligence Officer before seeking an interview with the Strategic Services Officer.

(3) They should inform the Intelligence Officer of instructions, requests, and suggestions they have received from the Strategic Services Officer.

b. Another responsibility of the Intelligence Officer is high-level liaison on intelligence subjects with United States or Allied authorities. In practice it has been found more convenient to handle such liaison through a special assistant or the planning officers, or through the branch heads themselves. It is the desire of the Intelligence Officer to encourage the branches to develop

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their own liaison, but branch heads should consult with the Intelligence Officer, whenever possible, before discussing important policy matters with authorities outside this headquarters, and in any case should report to him on such conversations - in writing, when the subject matter is especially important and tricky.

c. It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Officer to supervise the work of the three intelligence branches. This supervision is viewed by the Strategic Services Officer as covering all phases of branch activity, including administrative questions, but is very general in character. The Intelligence Officer has the power to make recommendations on matters affecting the general efficiency of the branches - such as assignments of key personnel - either to the Strategic Services Officer or to the branch heads directly. The Intelligence Officer has no power to enforce his recommendations on branch chiefs, but it is clearly the duty of the latter either to accept the recommendation or to indicate clearly his disagreement so that the case can be referred to the Strategic Services Officer. Likewise, the Intelligence Officer should be informed and given an opportunity to make recommendations in regard to any action which affects the general efficiency of a branch.

d. The responsibility and authority of the Intelligence Officer are most clear-cut with regard to coordination of intelligence activities. He is held responsible by the Strategic Services Officer for making sure that every activity of each of the three intelligence branches is properly coordinated with (a) general policy; (b) operational requirements as interpreted by the Operations Officer; (c) the activities of the other two intelligence branches.

Within the intelligence branches, the policies and decisions of the Intelligence Officer on problems of coordination are final, subject to approval by the Strategic Services Officer, which of course involves a right of appeal by branch heads in regard to any decision of the Intelligence Officer with which they disagree.

To make sure that the Intelligence Officer can effectively exercise his coordinating powers, an instruction has been issued by the Strategic Services Officer that all contact of the intelligence branches with the operations office shall be filtered through the Intelligence Officer. In a less formalized manner, the same principle should apply

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so relations between the intelligence branches and the Special Assistant or the Planning Officer whenever any specific problem is dealt with.

Obviously, it is not intended that a branch head should obtain the approval of the Intelligence Officer every time he sets foot in the operations office, nor will a detailed report be required on every conversation. If the principle is perfectly clear that the Intelligence Officer is responsible for coordination and the branch head is responsible to the Intelligence Officer for giving him the opportunity to coordinate, then common sense will indicate what matters the Intelligence Officer should be consulted about.

The following, however, may not be sufficiently realized:

(1) Coordination is facilitated and valuable time may be saved if the Intelligence Officer is consulted at the draft or project stage, rather than handed the finished product for review.

(2) The Intelligence Officer is interested in the minute details as well as the broader aspects of coordination, whenever the details concern inter-branch or inter-division relations. It is only by constantly pointing out and correcting minor examples of faulty coordination that real team-play can be achieved. Further, it has recently become apparent that a major policy in regard to the briefing of field parties has been seriously contravened by the emphasis on certain detailed instructions which were not objectionable in themselves.

6. It is recognized that the procedures and principles laid [illegible] this memorandum are general and leave some [illegible] unclarified. As far as the Intelligence Officer is [illegible] the cooperativeness of branch heads will be judged [illegible] spirit in which they carry out these principles. [illegible] procedural regulations laid down will not be [illegible] proof of cooperation nor argumentative-ness as [illegible] non-cooperation.

/s/ E. L. TAYLOR

E. L. TAYLOR
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Intelligence Officer

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MEMORANDUM

25 July 1945

TO: All Concerned

FROM: Colonel John G. Coughlin

The following statement of the reasons for OSS participation in the SIREN operation and the duties of the American teams operating in Thailand has been approved for use in the briefing of these teams. It is distributed for the information of and guidance of all personnel having responsibilities in connection with the recruiting or training of team members.

1. American Mission. American support of the Thai Underground movement is motivated by the fact that Thailand, the only independent country in South East Asia at the present time, is actively engaged in organizing an underground resistance movement against the Japs. The SIREN operation is a concrete expression of American friendship and good will toward the Thai people and is also a concrete demonstration by the Thai Underground of their desire to work with and assist our side against the Jap. In addition, Thailand will necessarily be one of the principal enemy escape routes, and an opportunity will be presented to inflict losses upon the enemy and to obtain valuable intelligence during that retreat.

2. Organization of the Thai Underground. A powerful Thai named Ruth is in command of the entire underground movement. His real identity is a closely guarded secret. No action of any kind may be taken without his approval. This applies to supply drops, arming of guerrillas, and any type of military action.

Organization of the movement in particular areas varies. Generally there is an area chief in charge of all guerrilla activities and the work of the American team comes under his direction. In addition, there is a Thai intelligence agent who is responsible for securing all intelligence in the area. He is already operating a network for that purpose. It is of prime importance that the American team develop the closest possible working relationships with both the area chief and the intelligence agent.

It should be understood that the members of the American team remain under command of this Detachment, orders being issued by the Commanding Officer through the Operations Office, and all cases in which the leader is in doubt as to proper action are to be referred immediately to this Headquarters. The American leader of each team has absolute and final authority over the members of his team, but the area chief of the guerrilla movement alone has authority over the guerrilla personnel.

3. Functions of the OSS Team. Each American team

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has four principal responsibilities:

(a) Guerrillas. The principal job of each team is the training of one or, in some cases, two battalions of guerrillas. The training is primarily in weapons, military tactics, and military intelligence. This training is carried on under the direction of the area guerrilla chief. After the training program is completed, the American team leader will act as military advisor to the local chief. Members of the American team may undertake command functions with respect to military operations only if so requested by the local chief. It should be understood that the local guerrilla chief has no authority to commence military operations of any kind without approval by Ruth.

(b) Intelligence. No member of the American team acts as a general intelligence officer for the area. The Thai intelligence agent on the ground has already set up an intelligence network and he will continue to direct and operate this. The American team may advise him or assist him in any manner if the agent so desires. Intelligence activity of the American team, unless otherwise agreed with the Thai agent, should be principally directed to the support of guerrilla activities under the chief by training Thai personnel in military intelligence objectives and methods. In addition, the leader of each team has been requested to furnish a report, after one month's observation, of the efficiency of intelligence handling in the area, with recommendations for any possible improvements. In the usual case this report will be prepared in cooperation with the Thai intelligence agent. The American team is not, under any circumstances, to set up an independent intelligence network unless authorized by the local guerrilla chief and intelligence agent and by Ruth.

(c) Supply. The American team acts as the supply channel for the arming of the guerrilla personnel in his area and after the infiltration of an American team no supplies will be dropped into that area unless approved by the team leader. No clothing or personal equipment is to be furnished to the guerrillas, and no equipment or supplies of any kind are to be delivered to the Thai army. No arms are to be distributed without approval of Ruth except for training purposes. Special supply requirements of the local guerrilla chief and intelligence agent will be handled through the American team leader.

(d) Communication. The American team has, in each case, its own communications equipment and arrangements with this Headquarters. In addition the Thai intelligence agent has a similar setup. Most groups find it preferable to use only one of these channels for regular communication to Headquarters. Such an arrangement is satisfactory, but both channels should be used occasionally in order to keep them available for escape purposes or in case of damage to one set.

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2 Aug, 1945.

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Sal Paul

You have no idea how sorry I am that you have decided to return to the States. I cannot say that I blame you but I do regret your having made this decision.

I enjoyed working under your supervision so much – I felt that you were a person who would get action when your field action was called for – realize the hardships and situations that you encountered – and know it must be heartbreaking to try to accomplish anything under those conditions.

I wanted to thank you for the confidence you have shown in my work. I shall miss you very much. I hope your next assignment will be a happier one.

Sincerely, Charles Pelaez

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AVEX [redacted] ZX

17,447

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8 August, 1945.

[illegible]

Your final conversation in the small hours of the other morning left me encouraged to think that you were at least swung toward the course of intelligence operation that I advocate. I am so certain that it is the right one that I am going to attempt to put on paper some of the thoughts that I have, apparently not articulately enough, been trying to express for some days past.

There are three things especially that I hope that you will do:

1. Fight for FREEDOM.

We must convince [illegible] that the idea of increasing a maximum of [illegible] 60 men now, holding the remainder out until D-Day, is a poor one. His basic reasoning appears to be that local security will not stand more than that number of foreigners. I am sure that he can be brought to realize that 5 or 6 strangers at a base is just as much a jeopardy to local security as 15 or 20. On the other hand, the advantages, to us and to him, of the immediate introduction of our full strength are threefold:

a. Greater physical security for the bases through increased firepower.

b. Acceleration of training of all types, organization of supply, perfection of communications, and the development of intelligence networks. Upon the latter depends the security of the base, in the training phase, and the maximum success of operations in the action phase.

c. The invaluable experience which our men will receive.

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The only hope that we can have of being organized and ready to function is to have everybody trained and on the spot. If we wait until D-Day, once again it will be too late.

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2. Give intelligence high priority.

I believe that all teams should understand that well developed intelligence networks are essential to security and operations. Further, I think that the CI and the IO of each team should be acquainted with the details of our original plan. They should be given as broad and lofty a vision as possible, in the form of a goal to shoot at. Intelligence consciousness; tactical, strategic, political and economic; all this should be preached to the IO.

The objection has been raised that the above policy would tend to upset agents already in the areas, this I believe to be a fallacy. I doubt that there is a single agent who would not be delighted to obtain the assistance that an intelligence base, fully staffed and equipped, would give him. The situation must be handled tactfully but it is my experience that more good will can be created by a program of mutual assistance than by one of "laissez-faire".

3. Departmentalize SI.

Have Dillon, or Ed himself, set up an SI department in which a program is projected for long range intelligence. The saturation system was never intended by me to supplant what we already had but to augment it. We were obtaining much of the cream; my ambition was to get it all, and the milk too. This can be done only by saturation. If we get intelligence personnel in everywhere, and functioning, inevitably contacts will develop which will remain of value to the long range department.

I realize that what happens at 40 is no longer any of my affair but I shall continue to be interested. I also, you the greatest success that any SSU has had. If you ever find the time I hope that you will bang off a letter to me on your old typewriter. When I talk other your wife I am going to ask her to give you permission to miss a day.

My regards to Hilkie. What do you think of making Bill Cc of FRBMUOA and have him maintain personal contact by 1b or similar?

All the best,

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Top ↑

Outside edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Exp. No. roll

Exposure is 1/50 of f.6.3

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Top ↑

Outside edges of green cards define the edges of the coverage field

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f/6.3]

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Top ↑

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 of f.5

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Top ↑

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

[Exp. No. 1111]

[Frame 11. 165 of 63]

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Top ↑

Outside Edges of green card indicate the edges of the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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of black and white propaganda is as follows: Black propaganda is any propaganda that is supposed to have as its source a resistence group within the enemy territory. White propaganda, on the other hand, is propaganda dropped at the enemy which is known to be initiated on our side of the line. The OSS-PWB agreement has been working since February very successfully and compl te liaison with PWB has been kept in mind at all times with the mutual aid of both parties concerned.

This completes the picture of morale operations in the North African theater of operations which I respectfully submit to you.

Charles Peck, Jr.
2nd Lt. T. C.

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supplies needed from the states and if a record was set up by higher priority, such requisitions were honored by Washington and returned to us, a greater maximum efficiency could be accomplished.

It is a pleasure for me to state that perfect relationships exist between the M O branch and the higher officials in command. Both Col. Gamble, the operations officer, and Col. Glabin, the commanding officer, have a high regard and respect for the workings of the M O section and both, at all times, are willing to give their energy and authority towards the successful completion of one of our campaigns. This has proved a great asset to us as with both these men in accord with our plans maximum efficiency is gained in expediting all ideas from their initiation to their performance.

We do not have a clear picture of what is being taught at the schools in the states. We have been giving the programs and the names of the courses but do not know exactly what the program of training entails. I would suggest that a detailed report be submitted to Mr. Warner, giving exactly the functions and work of the schools in the training department in regard to training of personnel for overseas. On the return of that report Mr. Warner would be able to voice his opinion of the necessity of these courses.

It is our opinion that the M O personnel coming over from the states have no conception of the lack of material we must work with in the creation of ideas. It should be made clear to them at school that all we have in the way of equipment to work with at the present time is a man's brain and his two hands; that stencils are cut by hand; that leaflets must be printed by local printers under adverse conditions; that supplies must be procured from many channels, sometimes tedious and mean. If this was put over to the student in an M O school and at the completion of the course he was forced, through his own initiative to create an M O camp ism through nothing more than the aforementioned head and hands, he will be prepared to do a better job himself and count less on the services that will be available to him.

In conclusion I may state that in my opinion M O in North Africa has become a hard-hitting team of men and women determined to do the job. When one bears in mind that on February 12 of this year there was absolutely no M O in North Africa and then four months later one sees the results of team work of the individuals connected with our branch, one can't help but realize the fine job that has been done. I may, at this point, bring out the OSS-PWB agreement for the North African theater. The agreement is as follows: That OSS M O is to handle all black propaganda and PWB is to handle all white propaganda. The definition

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Mr. Williamson

FROM : Lt. Peck

DATE: 31 May 1944

SUBJECT: M O Report

The following is a report submitted by Lt. Charles Peck on the activities of the M O Branch in the North African Theater of Operations.

To start with, the physical set up of the branch at this time is as follows:

In North Africa one-half of one Nissen Hut is devoted exclusively to M O operations. This hut has a partition which divides it completely from the other section, giving complete security to all M O material. In this hut all M O personnel in Algiers work. There is also another hut - a large safe, guarded by a duty officer 24 hours a day, seven days a week, giving complete security to all M O documents and material at all times.

In Italy at the present time Villa Maria, M O villa, has been turned over to OSS A I I as an officers' club and all personnel originally billetted here has been moved to Algiers. All equipment to be used for dissemination in Italy has been moved to the castle at Caserta and put in the hands of Gifford Proctor who is the M O representative in Italy at this time. In Bari M O maintains a small apartment and also a desk in the SBS Building down town. At the present time the Bari office is in a state of flux with M O Algiers making an earnest effort to staff the point completely as soon as possible.

There has been some talk about placing an M O officer at Bastia in Corsica to help in the dissemination of M O material into France. The personnel is as follows:

Heading the branch at Algiers at the present time is Mr. Gene Warmer, Chief of M O. It is Mr. Warner's job to lay down the policies of the M O staff in the North African theater; to hand out assignments and missions of the M O staff and to keep the overall work moving towards its final dissemination.

Under Mr. Warner is Capt. Wm. Dewart, Deputy Chief of the branch. Capt. Dewart at this time is handling the administrative work for the North African theater and also is senior officer in charge of Army personnel attached to the branch.

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First Lieutenant Jack D[illegible] is on temporary duty with the branch from Services, pending final approval of transfer by Mr. Warner. Lt. Daniels claims to hav editorial ability which, at the present time, is being examined by the chief of the branch.

Head of the Art Department is Ensign Saul Steinberg, on temporary duty from Chungking. Ensign Steinberg is charged with the responsibility and creation of all forms of art used in any of the M O campaigns. He has already successfully completed many illustrations which have been used against the enemy.

Staff Sgt. Walter Weisbacker is being used as an editorial writer [illegible] also as a creative idea man in future campaigns. Sgt. Ogle [illegible] being held for the French show because of his excellent understanding with the French situation. He reads and writes French fluently and has had practical experience in the M O T which has just come down from Naples.

Cpl. Harry Brizzee and Cpl. John Clemente have both been of great use during the Italian show because of their knowledge of Italian policies, psychology and religion. Both speak, read and write Italian fluently and are now being helpful in the production of materials to be used in the forthcoming French show.

Private Barbara Lauwers (WAC) has proved a great asset to the organization. Private Lauwers is multilingual. She speaks, reads, and writes English, French, German, Czech, Polish, Serbian, and Croatian. Miss Lauwers' greatest contribution to the branch was the definite understanding of the German psychology which enabled her to present for future use many ideas which would never have been thought of by American-thinking personnel.

Rounding out the staff at Algiers at the present time is a Viennese civilian, whose name I do not know, who is proving a great asset to the branch by a statement from Mr. Warner.

With the exception of Capt. Dewart and Private Lauwers, all other personnel mentioned above have had field experience in Italy.

Also in the field [illegible] were three PWB men whose names are Capt. [illegible] Lee, and Sgt. John Bloor. [illegible] Army, Sgt. Richard [illegible] at the present time are still in Italy but are [illegible] to leave for Africa shortly. It was necessary for M[illegible] to clear them specially from PWB to leave from one theater to another.

At Caserta remains Jeffers Proctor as the S O representative in Italy. In Bari is M[illegible] Bowman who has proved a great asset in that he has established connections with Tito in Yugoslavia for future S O operations [illegible] already sending [illegible] into

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that country for dissemination.

Mr. Jarovich, attached to M O Bari has been released by Mr. Warner and a Sergeant, whose name I do not know, completes the Bari staff at the present time.

Capt. Tom D Fielding, recently arrived from the U.S., has been sent to Bari by Mr. Warner to strengthen the situation there. It is hoped it would be advisable to clarify the channels of command in the North African theater of operations. Headquarters for OSS in North Africa is at Algiers. The Commanding Officer of this detachment is Col. Glancy, (Glaum) who is directly responsible to Headquarters in Natusa for all OSS activities. Beneath him in North Africa is Col. Gamble, operations officer, through whom Mr. Warner has to clear for any future operation.

It is interesting to note that the war theater looks down on this policy. In the European theater M O does not fall under the S O officer, but we have found, through practical experience, that this chain of command red tape and recommendations job faster because liaison between M O and operations executes the flow of matter at to the enemy.

In Italy Mr. Gifford Proctor takes his orders from Gene Warner but at the same time has to clear through Col. Carter, who is commanding officer of the OSS detachment in that country. Col. Carter, on the other hand, has to clear with the commanding officer of the Allied Armies in Italy. This is merely channel form and does not harper our operations.

In Bari Major Fournier takes his orders from Gene Warner too and clears with Commander Ira Green, who is commanding officer of the Bari installation. Commander Green, in turn, clears with the commanding officer of the Special Balkan Section for operation into the Italian country. Both Commander Green and Col. Carter take their orders from Col. Gladden back in Algiers. Although this seems like a complicated routine it works very well, as through long conference and planning coordination has reached the epitomy of efficiency.

Transportation offers no problem for personnel. Like all other operational requests for transportation are submitted through the branch chief of operations officer and executive officer and then turned over to the adjutant for publication.

Because services are working at full capacity it takes no longer than 48 hours to clear a man from Algiers to Bari on a mission.

Last week the 82 of 77 men the regiment which gives

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us now the power to cut our own wants without consulting Netusa headquarters. This power is good within our theater and will now cut the time to less than a day for issuing orders of travel. Any operational supply needed by M O personnel is furnished on requisition from the operational supply officer. Regulation supplies are furnished on requisition from the supply officer of the 26th 77 regiment. Supplies are handled efficiently and a request takes no time at all to be filled. Under the new operational supply set up operational supplies within the theater can be issued within 48 hours. Operational supplies to the U.S. are handled through the operational supply officer and according to their priority urgency are issued within thirty days or sooner. Thus M O can be completely maintained within the theater, except for certain special equipment which can only be gotten from the U.S.

The next point to bring up is to try and describe how M O ideas finally end up as M O campaigns in enemy territories. A typical example will be given A group of M O hit upon the idea of starting a campaign called "Wie Longe Nacht". This campaign, in English, means "How much longer". Each leaflet had an idea which tied up with "How much longer will we believe that Germany is impregnable from bombing" or "How much longer will we believe that the Russians are mad men." Accompanying these slogans is an illustration that tied up with the particular slogan. So far this work is done by the Art Department and the Editorial and Planning group within the M O branch. Now that the idea is formulated it is given over to such people as Bruzzee and Clemente, who are familiar with the Italian picture, with instructions to find a printing shop, secure the shop, and have these pieces of propaganda printed in sufficient quantity for dissemination. When this is done the finished packages are given the Deputy Chief, Capt. Dewart for dissemination. Capt. Dewart then checks with the operations officer and finds out what proportionate share of container space will be allotted to M O on the future mission. As an example we will say that 20 percent of the container space in a future operation will be given to M O. M O picks a package and hands it over to the operations officer. The operations officer, in turn, places it in a container along with other materials from other groups and sees that the container is put upon an aircraft, then goes over enemy territory and at the pin point previously arranged drops the container to a resistence group. The resistence group takes out all the equipment in the container plus the M O propaganda and then disseminates the propaganda from the interior and an M O operation is completed. This policy has been in effect for the last few months and has proven very successful inasmuch as the time element is cut to the minimum. However, we have found one drawback which, at the present time, is being remedied. We have found that the resistence groups in the interior cannot devote a proper amount of time to the dissemination

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of leaflets, stickers and poison pen notes because of the higher priority of other branches on the Services. As we had depended on these agents to do our work we also had realized these agents had not been recruited for M O work but for S I or S O work and, therefore, could allocate what time was left to an M O mission. As a result of this M O is now in the process of recruiting campaign teams to local French civilians to be dropped in the interior attached to these resistence groups and responsible solely for the dissemination of M O material. In this way the theater will be of greater accuracy in the work that is being done. These will take the part of the so-called campaign teams which are on paper for the North African theater of operation but have never been put in practice. We have had a successful completion of many missions coming to us in the form of letters and wires received from the resistence groups that their complete missions were attained, meaning that the proportionate share of M O material also reached its destination.

Mr. Warner takes great pride in this fact as to this date M O in North Africa is the only branch that has actively produced M O campaigns in this war. From this experience and the experience of the team of M O personnel in Italy we have in readiness at this time a well-rounded and versed group which can jump in and do morale operations work on a minute's notice. This team at the present time is keeping busy in Algiers preparing for the future.

In regard to the future a greater overall picture for M O is desired. We hope within the near present time to have at Bari in Italy, at Bastia in Corsica, and at Rome, Italy, complete teams of men fully versed in coverage of M O. From all these points and from the operational viewpoint the whole Mediterranean theater will be well covered by our branch. Our greatest needs at the present time are in personnel. Stymied by a bad T O we find only two spots for enlisted personnel. To successfully work we need a greater number of enlisted men. As a remedy for this we suggest as many civilians be sent in the theater as possible. Also we need all the civilians we can get. We don't feel you should lessen the qualifications of overseas duty as a badly placed civilian presents quite a problem to us. Our wants at the present time are mainly German thinking and writing personnel. We also need a better liaison with M O Washington in the procurement of M O supplies at a quicker pace. In the past we have found that months may elapse between the requisition and the final shipment and the campaign plan, which is dependent on this shipment, completely out of date.

We are able at all times, because of the fine set up in Algiers, to keep the pulse of advance and some campaigns must be so timed as to be prepared no more than 20 days after the original initiation. Dependent on these 20 days may be some

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