



~~Mr. [Name]~~
~~[Address]~~

23 June, 1944.

My dear General Donovan,

It was very kind of you to send through Lieutenant Leonard Wilson, U.S.N.R. of your Department the very interesting statistical maps and charts, and also the Gazetteer for use in my Map Room. These maps have been found most useful. Please accept my warm thanks.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

Leitchat. Churchill

Brigadier General William J. Donovan.

Enclosure

Inter-Service Topographical Dept.
Manchester College,
Oxford.

I.S.T.D./7287/44.

To: Lieut. Leonard Wilson,

From: Robert H. Elwell, R.N.I.

Subject: Exchange of maps,

Date: 6th May, 1944.

RESTRICTED

It is my pleasure to inform you that full approval has been granted for the mutual exchange of maps and plans produced by I.S.T.D. and O.S.S. on the Far East.

Instructions that you be supplied with 2 copies of each I.S.T.D. plan produced on the Far East have already been issued. We, for our part, shall try to make the exchange retroactive; I hope that you can do likewise, but since we already have some O.S.S. maps here it would perhaps be more suitable to discuss these and other arrangements when I am in London next week.

By the end of this ^{month} and monthly thereafter, our section will put out a list of plans in preparation which, I think, will be of interest to you and which I shall see that you receive.

I know this exchange will please you and I hope it proves satisfactory to all concerned.

To: Lieut. Leonard Wilson,
Office of Strategic Services,
51, Grosvenor St.,
London. W.1.

IR
LA

Figure 3

Figure 3

C
O
P
Y

OSS DETACHMENT
APO 887
U. S. ARMY

R E S T R I C T E D

10 May 1944

Mr. Robert N. Elwell
Inter-Service Topographical Department
Manchester College
Oxford, England

REF: I.S.T.D./7207/44

Dear Mr. Elwell,

I received your memorandum of the 8th of May with reference to an exchange of maps between Map Division, O.S.S., and the Far East Section, I.S.T.D.

We will be pleased to supply you with two copies of each map that we produce dealing with the Far East for two copies of each Far East plan produced by I.S.T.D. The Map Division is anxious to cooperate with you in making any transfer of information collected by the two agencies, and as soon as we can remove the maps you request from our files, we will deliver them to you.

I wish to thank you for your whole-hearted cooperation and sincere efforts in establishing stronger ties between our two agencies.

Yours very truly,

Leonard S. Wilson, Lt. (jg) USNR
Chief, Map Division O₄ Speat, RAA
London

LSW:mms

Copy to Mr. Chandler Morse
Mr. Arthur Robinson
Mr. Foster

Figure 2

20 June 1944

SECRET

MAP PRODUCTION PROCEDURES BETWEEN OFFICE OF
STRATEGIC SERVICES (MAP DIVISION OUTPOST) LONDON
AND THE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY SURVEY, WAR OFFICE

In order to expedite the production of maps necessary for the prosecution of the War and to avoid the possibility of overlapping between the Directorate of Military Survey's production of tactical and operational topographic maps and the Office of Strategic Services Map Division's production of intelligence and/or planning maps, it is hereby agreed that:

1. The Directorate of Military Survey is always willing to assist O.S.S. Map Division Outpost London by providing stocks of published maps or map reproduction material which can be used by O.S.S. London as a basis for the construction of maps to be used in the illustrations of reports requested by the O.S.S. and its associated planning agencies.
2. To avoid overlapping between the Directorate of Military Survey and the O.S.S. Map Division Outpost London in the production of basic maps (and hence to avoid possible confusion to map users) and also in order that O.S.S. may avail themselves of the Directorate of Military Survey's potential assistance, O.S.S. London will inform the Director of Military Survey through Survey 2(a) of the requirements for such basic maps before undertaking any new work of this nature.
3. In the normal way O.S.S. London will inform Director of Military Survey, Survey 2(a) of such requirements through a weekly list of work to be undertaken by O.S.S. London Map Division Outpost (such list to be all-inclusive except for the exclusion of American classes of "Secret" and "Top Secret" security). In cases of urgent work known to be particularly within the sphere of the Directorate of Military Survey (e.g. Town Plans) O.S.S. London would take direct telephone contact with the Director of Military Survey, Survey 2(a).

(*) Such exclusion to be exercised at the discretion of O.S.S.

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SO Branch, R & A Branch

20 May 1944

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum
TO : Colonel D. K. E. Bruce

1. The attached memorandum is for your consideration, approval and transmittal to General Donovan.

Chandler Morse
Chief, R & A Branch

Joseph F. Haskell
Co., GSC
Chief, SO Branch

Figure 4

MINISTRY - HOME SECURITY,
HOME OFFICE BUILDING,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

1st August, 1944.

Dear Sir,

The Minister of Home Security has considered the suggestion made in your letter of the 23rd July, that the Camouflage Directorate of this Ministry should undertake the construction of three or four models for the Map Division of the Officers of Strategic Services, and that five or six members of the Map Division should be attached for instruction to the staff of the Directorate, working essentially on the models to be constructed for the Officers of Strategic Services.

The Minister is glad to agree to these proposals, but I ought to make it clear that the work in the Design Section of the Ministry's Camouflage Directorate will cease as soon as further camouflage of factories is decided to be unnecessary. It should then be possible, if the need for further model-making continues, for the Design Section staff and premises to be taken over by

/yourselves

84303.

Figure 7

yourseleves, if such a course
commended itself to you.

I would suggest that the
details of the arrangement should
be concerted between yourself and
Wing Commander Cave-Browne-Cave,
the Director of Camouflage.

Yours faithfully,

(signed) E. Turnbull.

The Colonel G.S.O. Commanding,
O.S.S. Detachment,
A.P.O. 887,
United States Army.

SPECIAL FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Block II, Montagu Mansions
London, W.1.

4 August 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Mr. Chandler Morse,
Chief, R & A.

1. Over the past week members of your Map Division have worked long hours under pressure to turn out finely detailed maps and an excellent master map of the major waterway systems of Brittany and the primary and secondary road crossings thereof.

2. This work has been and still is of great use to us in the current successful campaign in Brittany and I would be grateful if you would express our thanks and appreciation to the men and women who have worked so unselfishly on this project.

Joseph F. Haskell
JOSEPH F. HASKELL
Colonel, 380

Figure 9

HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ETOUSA

SI BRANCH

LONDON
5 September 1944

SUBJECT: Special Services Rendered by R&A Branch on the Night of
2 September

TO : Mr. Chandler Morse,
Chief, R&A Branch

I wish to commend the special services rendered by members of the Cartographic Section of the Map Division - Pvt. Thomas R. Smith, Mrs Betty Bazeley, Miss Virginia Robinson, Miss Betay Orr, Miss Tessa Reynolds - and of your Geography Division - Lt. J. Sarlis, Cpl. Waterson - on the night of 2 September, in connection with an urgent request for military information.

It was only through the cooperation that we received from the R&A Branch and the Photostat Unit operated by the Reproduction Section that we were able to service the high priority request received from the 12th Army Group.

It is needless for me to tell you how much this cooperation is appreciated.

for
John Haskell,
Colonel Inf.,
Chief, SI Branch



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
London, September 3, 1944.

Dear Lieutenant Wilson:

I enclose, in accordance with our telephone conversation of today, a copy of Dr. Toyne's letter to Mr. Bucknall, regarding an exchange of maps with your Agency.

We are informing Dr. Toyne that you will get in touch with him direct and work out a satisfactory arrangement for such an exchange.

Very truly yours,

Stephen C. Brown
Stephen C. Brown
Third Secretary of Embassy

Lieutenant (j.g.) L. L. Wilson, U.S.N.,
Office of Strategic Services,
51 Grosvenor Street,
London, E.C. 4.

Figure 11

COPY

Foreign Office Research Dept.
Old Stationery Office,
Princes Street, S.W.1.
September 4th, 1944.

Dear Mr. Bucknell,

I have been in touch with Lieutenant Wilson and his colleagues in the London Section, at 51 Grosvenor Street, of the Map department of the Office of Strategic Services, and I think there would be much to be gained on both sides, by an arrangement for a regular exchange of maps between them and the Research department of the Foreign Office. I am therefore writing now to ask if you would very kindly help us to put such an exchange into operation, on the precedent of the existing arrangement between yourself, Admiral Stark's staff, the State Department and the Foreign Office. As you know, under that arrangement we send to you three copies of Foreign Office Research Department memoranda, and you transmit one to Admiral Stark's office. I suggest that we should now send you three copies of some of our maps, one for your own files at the Embassy and two for transmission to the London map section of the Office of Strategic Services. The reverse transmission, from O.S.S. to us, could be made through you in the same way, if you thought this convenient.

If you approve of this proposal, perhaps you would communicate with Lieutenant Wilson of O.S.S. - or, alternatively if this would give you trouble, I could write to him myself - and we could get the exchange going.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Arnold J. Toynbee

Howard Bucknell Jr. Esq.,
American Embassy,
W.1.

Figure 1E

COPY

OSS DETACHMENT
APO 887
U.S. ARMY.

9th September, 1944

Mr. Stephen Brown,
3rd Secretary,
American Embassy,
London.

Dear Mr. Brown,

I am in receipt of the copy of the letter sent by Arnold J. Toynbee of the Foreign Office Research Department regarding the exchange of maps between his agency and the Map Division, Research and Analysis Branch, OSS, London. This is in agreement with the preliminary discussion held between Mr. Toynbee and myself except for the inclusion of an additional copy for the State Department files. This addition is entirely satisfactory to us if it is in accord with your wishes.

We will be pleased to make available to the Foreign Office Research Department copies of all maps prepared by OSS Map Division, London and Washington in exchange for two copies of all maps prepared by Mr. Toynbee's agency. We will be pleased to transmit the maps through the Embassy in any manner satisfactory to you.

Yours very truly,

Leonard S. Wilson, Lt. USMA
Chief, Map Division Outpost,
R & A, OSS, London.

LSW/dmr

Figure 13



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
London, September 14, 1944.

Dear Lieutenant Wilson:

With reference to your letter of September 9, 1944, regarding an exchange of maps with the Foreign Office Research Department, the Embassy will undertake to forward to the Foreign Office two copies of maps prepared by your Agency and to forward to you two copies of maps prepared by Dr. Toynebe's Agency. You should transmit to the Embassy three copies of your maps, two for the Foreign Office and one for the Embassy files; and a similar arrangement will be made with Dr. Toynebe.

This, I think, is in accordance with the proposal made by Dr. Toynebe in his letter of September 4 to Mr. Bucknell and we are notifying Dr. Toynebe that you have agreed to that arrangement.

Very truly yours,

Stephen C. Brown
Stephen C. Brown
Third Secretary of Embassy

Lieutenant (i.v) L.L. Wilson, U.S.N.R.,
Office of Strategic Services,
51 Grosvenor Street,
London, W. 1.

FIGURE 14



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
London, September 19, 1944.

Dear Lieutenant Wilson:

With reference to my letter of September 14, 1944, regarding the exchange of maps between your office and the Foreign Office, I confirm our telephone conversation of today in which I agreed that you need send to the Embassy only the two copies of each map for transmission to the Foreign Office.

If any of these maps should appear to be of special value to us we will request copies for our files.

We would also appreciate receiving a list of the maps which you have prepared if one is available.

Very truly yours,

Stephen C. Brown
Third Secretary of Embassy

Lt. (J.P.) L. L. Wilson, U.S.P.R.,
Office of Strategic Services,
51 Grosvenor Street,
London, W. 1.

Figure 15

C
O
P
Y

12 September, 1944

SECRET**PROCEDURES FOR JOINT PROJECT
OF FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC BRANCH
AND MAP DIVISION, NSA**

As a result of an experimental flight made 11 September, it is proposed that Field Photographic Branch and Map Division, Research and Analysis Branch, embark on a joint project involving the taking of motion pictures of the entire coastline of Europe.

Purpose. The purpose of this mission is to photograph the coast line of Europe for the purpose of insuring adequate coverage for the preparation of future JANIS reports, Strategic Surveys, and ONI monographs. The main difficulties in the preparations for the invasion of Europe resided in the complete lack of information for that strip of the Continent lying between low tide areas covered by the Hydrographic Charts and the land surfaces covered by the normal military maps. Since these beachheads are the most significant areas in the planning of a campaign, it is essential for the future protection of the United States that this gap in our records be filled. This can be done most easily while the U.S. has Air Force missions flying daily over the several countries of Europe, and it is proposed that work begin immediately on the preparation of film which could serve the dual purpose of a complete aerial reconnaissance and supply the kind of strategic photographs which were so sadly lacking in the past few years. While the response to General Donovan's radio plea for photographs was good, the type of material obtained was far from satisfactory, and with the availability of crew and planes such a record should be made.

Specifications. Based on the experimental flight previously mentioned, it is proposed that a camera crew or crews of Field Photographic together with map experts from the Map Division jointly prepare a film of the coast line taken from an altitude of 500 feet at a distance of three-quarters mile off shore. This film would then be edited by Field Photographic and in cooperation with the Cartography Section, Map Division, adequate mapping location would be incorporated in the film. Field Photographic would maintain the negative files and the distribution of all motion pictures while the Map Information Section of the Map Division would be charged with the responsibility of cataloging and supplying the paper enlargements made from the film. Such a record could be used in the revision of all Intelligence handbooks prepared by the Army and Navy and OAS and would form an impressive record of the physical landscapes to be encountered.

Figure 16

PROCEDURES FOR JOINT PROJECT
OF FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC BRANCH
AND MAP DIVISION, R&A

Page 2

12 September 1944

SECRET

Such landscapes would not change over a period of fifty years to any appreciable extent, and the man-made or cultural part of the landscape could be checked at future times when it was deemed necessary by SI or R&A field men.

Equipment. It is estimated that one airplane of the type most commonly found in any given area when equipped with a crew and two Mitchell motion picture cameras can cover approximately 900 miles of coast per flying day. This crew together with a map expert would engage in the photographic work while the combined resources of the Field Photographic Branch and the Map Division would be available for final editing, location, indexing, map cataloging.

Copy to: General Donovan
Chandler Morse
Arthur H. Robinson
Commander Spencer

LSW:mas

O
P
YMINISTRY OF HOME SECURITY
DIRECTORATE OF CAMOUFLAGE
REGENT HOTEL, LEAMINGTON SPA

Tel: Leamington Spa 2190

22 August 1944

Dear Wilson,

Mr. Iarrie has reported to me the arrangements made when you saw him on Saturday, 19th instant. These were as follows:-

1. The Director of Camouflage to remain in charge of the Rink buildings, and provide adequate accommodation therein for the U.S. model-making party.
2. Lieutenant Rueff to take charge of model-making as from 1st September inclusive for a period of 90 days and longer if found necessary.

Lieutenant Rueff has notified me that he desires the transfer to his model-making party of the officers whose names and salary rates are set forth below?

	Salary rate	Bonus
Mr. G.J. Shelley	£550 per annum	£49.11. 0 per annum
Mr. D. Shelving	450 de	49.11. 0 de
Mr. L. C. Duffy	500 de	49.11. 0 de
Mr. A. C. Shipman	500 de	49.11. 0 de
Mr. E. Schilsky	500 de	49.11. 0 de
Mr. G. Sealy	450 de	49.11. 0 de
Miss H. Y. Chappel	5 per week	15. 6 per week
Miss M. D. Fennessey	5 de	15. 6 de

Mr. Shelving and Mr. Sealy would have been entitled to an increase of salary to £500 per annum as from 1st October, 1944.

The case of Mr. Shelley presents some slight difficulty, because it is possible that if Ministry of Home Security were prepared to continue his employment while working with you, he might derive some benefit after being released from your work. I am very doubtful whether this course could be taken, but I should like to refer the matter to Headquarters for definite decision. May it, therefore, be arranged that Shelley is transferred to you with the other officers as from 1st September, unless before that date we have obtained approval from the Ministry of Home Security that he should be retained in their service and lent to you. It is, of course, clear that whichever arrangement is made, his services will be entirely at your disposal as from 1st September.

Yours sincerely,

/S/ T. R. G. -B. -CAVE

Figure 17

Commodation

BUREAU
MILITAIR GEZAG

*(Dutch name
of the Military Authority)*

LONDON, a.w.: September 27th, 1944

Arlington House,
Arlington Street,
Tel.: Regent 2141

No.: E/549


Dear Sir,

Through the good offices of Lt. Wilson I was presented with a large relief map of the Continental and English coasts adjacent the North Sea and the English Channel.

I appreciate this gift very much, and it certainly will, in due time, get a place in the Netherlands War Museum, also as a reminder of the help and collaboration your service has always given to my staff.

Thanking you on behalf of the Netherlands Government, I remain, Sir,

Yours very sincerely,



H. J. Kruls,
Major-General,
Chief of Staff, Netherlands
Military Administration.

To Brigadier-General
William J. Donovan,
O.S.S. Det. (Rear), A.P.O. 413,
U.S.A. Army.

JFE/ah

FIG-18

ju 4

London. 5th October, 1944.

KABINET DER KONINGIN

Dear Sir,

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands has commanded me to convey to you her most sincere thanks for the exceedingly interesting relief map, and to express her appreciation of this splendid gift, the more so as she would like to consider it a proof of the excellent relations between the Office of Strategic Services and her own people.

Until the map can be hung in a fitting place in Holland, Her Majesty desires that it shall be housed in the Netherlands Ministry for War, where it will assuredly receive interested attention.

Yours truly,

W. J. Donovan
Principal Secretary to
Her Majesty the Queen.

Brigadier-General W. J. Donovan.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY SURVEY, WAR OFFICE AND OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (MAP DIVISION OUTPOST) LONDON

1. Inasmuch as the Directorate of Military Survey and the Map Division of the Office of Strategic Services both have field parties on the Continent and since they are liable to work in different zones of authority, especially in Germany, it is advisable in the interests of complete co-ordination to keep each other informed of the maps published by sources other than the Directorate of Military Survey and the Map Division, Office of Strategic Services.

2. Recognizing that the Directorate of Military Survey is charged with the responsibility for mapping in the European Theatre of Operations, among other places, and so that a minimum of confusion may exist, both agree to the following:

(a) The primary responsibility for seeing over all official map producing agencies within areas of Directorate of Military Survey responsibility for mapping will rest with the Directorate of Military Survey and its representatives with Field Formations.

(b) That the Office of Strategic Services will inform the Directorate of Military Survey of all teams which they have working within the Directorate of Military Survey area of responsibility.

(c) In return the Directorate of Military Survey will inform O.S.S. of the name and address of D. Survey's representative in the area concerned so that the O.S.S. representative can make contact with him from the outset of his work.

(d) That the O.S.S. representatives will prefer to D. Survey's representative any maps, plans, etc. which they may purchase, find or acquire. Such maps will be used by Field Formations for any immediate operational requirements and all then be returned to the Directorate of Military Survey (Svy 2(b)) for eventual retention. When such maps are received by Svy 2(b) they will automatically be notified on the weekly Map Library accession list, of which copies are being passed to O.S.S. O.S.S. will then have the opportunity of requesting Svy 2(b) to supply them with brevid copies as required of any items.

(e) Svy 2(b) will undertake to supply direct to O.S.S. copies of any maps they receive which are over and above their own (Svy 2(b)) requirements.

Figure 20

18 SEPTEMBER 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

CARTOGRAPHY SECTION REQUESTERS






FIGURE 21





COPY

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division
Displaced Persons Branch

BHAEF/G-5/DP/2701

27 July 1944

Mr. Henry Sterling, Chief,
Topographic Intelligence Section,
Office of Strategic Services,
51 Grosvenor Street, London.

Dear Mr. Sterling,

This is to acknowledge receipt of 12 copies of each of six maps of the frontiers of the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany. These maps are excellent and provide precisely the kind of cartographic detail required by this Branch and the Country Units concerned in planning for the control of homeward bound displaced persons.

Please extend my appreciation to Lt. Leonard Wilson and the members of his Cartographic Section for their part in preparing these maps.

A. N. MOFFIT, JR.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer
Displaced Persons Branch

Figure 24

UNITED STATES FLEET

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
78 GROSVENOR SQUARE
LONDON, W.1

AMS/PLM

refer
to file
Serial 6884

AUG 23 1944

Dear Colonel Bruce:

We understand that your Map Section is now equipped to produce scale models. If necessary information is available, I have to request that you ask that Section to produce for us a model of the port of Brest to a scale of approximately 1:100. This model will be for the use of Commander, U. S. Base, France, and Lorient, Brest. It should have waterfront and harbor installations in detail, as well as important municipal structures and the buildings of the Naval Academy. Details of the town and inland topographical contours will be satisfactory if indicated in general terms.

We have had excellent cooperation from the map division, Office of Strategic Services, in their production of special charts, blow-ups, etc., for actual use.

Very sincerely yours,

J. G. Wilson
J. G. WILSON,
BY DIRECTOR.

Colonel AG D. K. E. Bruce,
Office of Strategic Services,
78 Grosvenor Street,
London, W. 1

Please refer
to file:

F15
Serial 10016

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER TWELFTH FLEET
FLEET POST OFFICE,
NEW YORK.

OCT 20 1944

Dear General Donovan:

I understand that Lieutenant Leonard S. Wilson is being detached as Head of Map Section in this Theater, and I am taking this opportunity to let you know of what great service his Section has been to this Command. He has cooperated with the officers on my Staff and been able to meet requests for work which could not have been otherwise dealt with. His knowledge of his field has made him invaluable as a consultant about matters connected with maps and charts.

May I ask you to convey to his immediate superiors our appreciation of the cooperation and help which we have received from Lieutenant Wilson?

Very sincerely yours,

H. K. Stark
H. K. STARK

Brigadier General William Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and D Streets, N.W.,
Washington 25,
D.C.

3 copies sent to:
Capt Davis
Lt Langer
Lt. Wilson

Please refer
to No. 1

UNITED STATES FLEET
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
IN CHIEF OF STAFF
LONDON, W.1

2 September 1944.

Dear Mr. Morse:

I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation for the services rendered by Lieut. (jg) R.J. Voskuil, USNR., in connection with the War Room.

Lieutenant Voskuil was extremely helpful in providing charts of the Mariana and Marshall Islands in the Pacific, obtained most of the town plans of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas and the large channel map for our War Room.

It is felt that work such as that performed by Lieutenant Voskuil is deserving of a word of praise.

Tully Sidelley
TULLY SIDELLEY,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Intelligence Officer.

Mr. Chandler Morse,
Office of Strategic Services,
68 Brook Street,
London, W.1.

FILED

UNITED

IONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
EUROPEAN REGIONAL OFFICE

Telephone :
LANGHAM 3090

11, PORTLAND PLACE,

LONDON, W.1.

Reference.....

Your Ref.....


30th August, 1944.

Dear Mr. Morse,

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of 26th August, offering us not only the loan of maps but also the actual services of your draughtsmen. This was considerably more than we had hoped for but we are delighted to have the possibility of asking Lt. Wilson for such help when and if our own cartographer becomes overwhelmed. In the meanwhile we shall, as you suggest, call Lt. Wilson direct.

Once again, very many thanks for your most generous offer.

Yours sincerely,



Chandler Morse, Esq.,
Director of Research and Analysis,
Office of Strategic Services,
51 Grosvenor Street, W.1.

ENCLOSURE

HEADQUARTERS
NINTH AIR FORCE (REAR)

AFO 696
US ARMY

8 June 1944

TO:
Lt. Leonard Wilson,
Map Section, R & A Branch,
OSS,
London.

SUBJECT: Procurement of Maps for
Ninth Air Force

1. It is requested that OSS Map Section, R & A Branch, provide us with maps to be used in Ninth Air Force operations.
2. It is further requested that these maps be delivered periodically to the Ninth Air Force courier, 45 Grosvenor Square, for delivery to Colonel Ulius L. Anoss, Headquarters, Ninth Air Force (Rear).



ULIUS L. ANOSS
Colonel A.C.
Deputy Chief of Staff -
Executive Liaison Section

ENCLOSURE

COPY

9 February 1944

Brigadier Eric Sachs
Political Intelligence Department
Bush House
Aldwych, London - W.C.2.

Dear Brigadier Sachs:

The Map Division of R & A, London, is in the process of being organized, and yesterday through the courtesy of Dr. Reynolds of our staff, Lt. (JG) Wilson called upon Messrs. Pitt and Large of your staff and entered into preliminary discussions regarding exchange of map services.

In the opinion of these gentlemen, it will be mutually beneficial to have a complete exchange of maps between the Office of Strategic Services and the Political Intelligence Department. Mr. Large was of the opinion that it would be practicable to have the normal printing of PID maps increased by approximately 20 copies which would be delivered to the Map Division of OSS as soon as they were printed and prior to the publication of the Handbooks which they illustrate. In exchange for this, the Office of Strategic Services would be willing to supply your organization with any number of copies of the approximately 3,000 maps which we have constructed. These would be made available to you immediately upon their delivery to London, regardless of the publication date of the reports which they illustrate.

This arrangement meets with my entire approval and I wish to formalize this agreement for map service both in information and in the construction of maps at this time.

Yours very truly,

Oran Hinton, Acting Director
Branch of Research and Analysis
Office of Strategic Services
LONDON

LSW:vap

Figure 30

COPY

Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square, W. 1.

5th April 1944

Chandler Morse, Esq.
Director,
Research & Analysis Branch
Office of Strategic Services.

Dear Morse,

Dr. Hassall here has been discussing with Lieut. Wilson, Chief of your Map Division, the exchange between us of maps etc. which are produced for our respective publications. It is proposed that we should send you 10 copies of any maps which we should have occasion to print and 5 copies of any photostats (Other than maps prepared for the PWE/MEW handbooks of which you already receive copies). In exchange we should like 2 copies of any similar maps produced by you (including outline maps).

Apart from those reproduced, we collect a much larger number in printed publications etc. for which there is no immediate need for reproduction. Hassall proposes to inform Wilson, as a matter of routine, of any new acquisitions and to lend them for copying if desired. If you decide to copy, we should be grateful for a couple of prints for our files if you can spare them.

I am glad to hear you have arrived safely and hope to renew our acquaintance soon.

Yours sincerely,

/signed/ O. L. Lawrence.

Figure 31

THE AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY

BROADWAY AT 150TH STREET

NEW YORK 11, N. Y.



August 7, 1944

Dear Lieutenant Wilson:

I thank you for your letter of July 29 suggesting that it might be mutually beneficial to the Office of Strategic Services, the Royal Geographical Society, and the American Geographical Society if duplicate films of the maps held by the two societies were exchanged. ~~It would be very~~ ^{It would be very} happy to give permission for the making of a duplicate of the inter film of our collection for delivery to the Royal Geographical Society, and shall look forward to receiving a copy of the Royal Geographical Society's material.

You must be having an interesting time over there. We all at the AGS send you our best wishes.

Sincerely yours,


John K. Wright

Director

Lt. Leonard E. Wilson, Capt
Camp Detachment #102, 47, London
Camp Detachment
The 8888th Central Postal Directory
The 8888th Central Postal Directory
The 8888th Central Postal Directory

AGS

File Received



51 GROSVENOR STREET

FIRST FLOOR


Scale 8 feet to 1 inch



FLOOR: 00

51 GROSVENOR STREET SECOND FLOOR

Scale 8 feet to 1 inch



51 GROSVENOR STREET THIRD FLOOR

Scale 1/4" = 1'-0"





Figure 37



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Chief, Map Division, etc.



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5





Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5

Chief, Cartography Section.



Head draftsman, Drafting Unit, Cartography Section.





Drafting Unit, Cartography Section.




Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5

Compilation Unit.



Compilation Unit.




Compilation Unit.





Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5




Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5

Completion Unit.



Chief, Map Information Section.



Map Collection Unit, Map Information Section



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5

Map Collection Unit, Map Information Section



Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410004-5


Map Collection Unit, Map Information Section



Map Collection Unit, Map Information Section.




Map Collection Unit, Map Information Section.



OSS Map Collection, Map Information Section.




OSS Map Collection, Map Information Section.



Request Unit, Map Information Sect. 1.



○ Cataloging Unit, Map Information Section. ○



Distribution Unit, Map Information Section.



030 Form 202

FROM

File

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

(S217)

Field report

Accession No. 1.6713-98A


Date Rec'd. SA... 9-1-44


To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. C-1					
2. O-5		SEP 4 1944	9/2	RAP	<i>See this is done at once.</i>
3. C-1				<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>Report prepared & distributed</i>
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

SECRET





SECRET

XV. RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to orders of the Director, I departed from New Delhi, India on 10 August 1944, and reported at OCS Headquarters in Washington on 14 August 1944.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

XIV. CONDITIONS TO BE IMPROVED

1. Personnel

It is absolutely essential that highly trained personnel be used throughout the China-Burma-India Theater. This personnel should preferably be men with investigative or legal experience, so far as civilians are concerned. The same general experience should also apply to military personnel. It should be borne in mind that X-2 personnel will also be in contact with high-type officers and civilians of the British and Indian Intelligence Services, and should therefore certainly be on par with officers of other agencies. It is also important that ample X-2 personnel be located throughout India, as it is a large country, but three-fifths the size of the United States, and with a native population of four hundred million. This, together with the large military operations in progress, requires that adequate and highly trained personnel be dispatched at the earliest possible moment.

2. Stenographic and Clerical Personnel

Up until the time of my departure from India on 11 August 1944, no stenographic or clerical personnel had arrived. This was a most serious handicap, and should be rectified at once. Sufficient stenographic and clerical help should be sent into the field as soon as possible, so that a steady flow of information can be maintained, but most important, to handle the work right in the field.

3. Equipment

No office equipment or barter goods had arrived in India for X-2 up to the time of my departure. It was necessary to borrow or purchase from outside sources necessary equipment. This handicapped the work severely. Immediate steps should be taken to get equipment into the field at once.

-24-

SECRET

was openly discussed and ridiculed by American and British Intelligence Officers in Calcutta. I refused to conduct any X-2 activities through or in connection with that office, and informed Colonel Coughlin, giving him my reasons. Certain employees of the office were under suspicion, as well as certain outsiders who were on friendly terms with our personnel. Recruiting was loosely done without any regard whatsoever for security. The local Burmese, Chinese, and other elements in Calcutta commonly talked about getting a job in the "American Secret Service" with good pay. How many enemy agents or pro-Japanese were enlisted with OSS by the Calcutta office is now a question. X-2 is now endeavoring to determine how many, if any, enemy agents or sympathizers were recruited.

5. Conferences with Colonel John G. Coughlin

I had two personal conferences with Colonel Coughlin while in India, both in Calcutta. The first was on 19 April 1944. Colonel Coughlin introduced a plan to place Major John Kains in charge of all OSS activities in the Calcutta area, including X-2 operations. I could not agree to this plan, and informed Colonel Coughlin that the only basis upon which I would agree to any such plan would be on a complete house-cleaning of the Calcutta Office, "from top to bottom". My attitude on this point was orthodox, but I could not conventionally permit X-2 operations to be jeopardized by the then existing situation of the Calcutta Office.

The second conference was on 28 April 1944, at which time I discussed with Colonel Coughlin and Major Kains in complete detail the reasons for my refusal to work through the Calcutta Office. Last unfortunately, this conference ended in a misunderstanding between Colonel Coughlin and myself, which I deeply regret. I have the highest personal regard for Colonel Coughlin, and nothing in this report is in any way intended to be critical of him.

6. Unauthorized Disclosure of X-2 Investigation

Another serious matter encountered in Calcutta was the situation where one of the military personnel of the Calcutta office was known to be associating with a woman suspected of being an enemy agent. This soldier was warned by either Major Kains or some other person of the Calcutta office to stop seeing the woman as she was under investigation by X-2. This warning was given to the soldier concerned, even though Major Kains was cautioned not to divulge to anyone that this woman was under investigation. Independent investigation was being conducted by Major Kains and others of the Calcutta office as to the activities of the woman under suspicion. The disclosure of this investigation to the soldier involved, and probably to others, was interfered with the proper

XIII. SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

1. General

During the period I was building the foundation of the X-2 structure throughout India, Ceylon, and Burma, matters progressed most satisfactorily. It was not until I arrived in Calcutta on 30 March 1944, that I first encountered difficulties. To put it briefly and bluntly, I found the OSS Office at Calcutta something to be avoided. The office was then under the charge of Major John Reiss. While I was at New Delhi, the Theater Provost Marshal had advised me of the unsavory reputation and situation in the OSS Office at Calcutta. I received similar reports from certain high British sources, as well as from other American officers. The Theater Provost Marshal turned over to us the complete file on the subject.

2. Lesle and Company

The file of the Theater Provost Marshal disclosed, among other things, that certain employees of OSS in Calcutta had, with certain outsiders, formed a company known as Lesle and Company. The former OSS employees who are part owners of this company are Mrs. Lesle H. C. Ottaway and Lieutenant Colonel (now Colonel) George N. Richmond (Japanese Army), also known as Wally Richmond.

Lesle and Company was supposedly conducting a business as engineers, contractors, and purchasers. They did business with the United States Army and with the British and Indian Armies, as well as with OSS. The activities of this company and the individuals who operated it were viewed with suspicion by the Theater Provost Marshal. Due to the fact that certain OSS personnel were connected with the company, the Theater Provost Marshal curtailed investigation.

It has since been ascertained from a highly reliable and secret source that the British authorities have conducted an investigation of the affairs of the company, and that as a result of what has been uncovered, prosecutive action is contemplated against certain persons connected with the company.

3. Parties at OSS Headquarters, Calcutta

Parties of a questionable nature were being held at the OSS Headquarters, located at 140 Regent Estate, Tollygunge, Calcutta. OSS was being subjected to much criticism and ridicule by other intelligence agencies in Calcutta, both British and American. Persons who attended these parties, particularly certain of the women, had questionable and suspicious backgrounds.

4. Poor Security, Calcutta Office

The security of the Calcutta Office was deplorable. It

SECRET

XII. PORTUGUESE GOA

1. General

Portuguese Goa is approximately 225 miles south of Bombay (see Theater Map). Up to the present time, no X-2 personnel have gone into this area. British Intelligence authorities who were contacted in connection with the situation in Goa stated that they have the area well covered, and that there has been no unusual activity in Goa which would indicate that enemy agents are operating there. It is recommended, however, that one X-2 agent should be sent into Goa for a short period, from time to time, under appropriate cover, so as to determine first-hand exactly what the situation is. It is not known at this time whether there are any enemy clandestine radio-sets operating in Goa which could communicate with Kabul in Afghanistan or other points, and the British authorities contacted did not make any admissions in this connection. The matter should be pursued further.

SECRET

SECRET

XI. NORTHERN BURMA

1. General

X-2 operations in Northern Burma have not, up to the time of writing of this report, been instituted. On 19 and 20 March 1944, I visited General Stillwell's Forward Headquarters at Maingwan in Northern Burma, and consulted with his Chief of Staff, Colonel Cannon, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Stillwell (who is the General's son). I discussed with both of these officers the matter of protecting their operations against enemy espionage agents who were active within their sphere of operations. These officers were emphatic in their opinions that enemy agents were operating in those areas in which they were conducting military operations.

I discussed with them the feasibility of attaching to their Headquarters SGI Field Units, which could be used for the purpose of locating suspected or known enemy agents in the area in which military operations were being conducted. No definite commitments were made by me, as at the time, I fully realized that it would first be necessary to procure personnel and train them before they would be of any use in the field. It was contemplated at the time to recruit and train personnel for these units, in order to have them ready for the field at the end of the monsoon period, about the middle of September, 1944. To date, it has not been possible for X-2 to provide these units, due to the lack of both officers and enlisted personnel.

SECRET

While not of an X-2 nature, in order to be of assistance in every way possible to Lieutenant Colonel Heppner, I prepared a detailed outline on the following plans, which was turned over to Major Farr, Executive Officer:

- (1) Defense and Protection Against Air-raids
- (2) Defense and Protection Against Gas Attack.
- (3) Defense Against Ground Attack.
- (4) Fire Protection Plan.
- (5) Blackout Plan.
- (6) Post Protection and Security Plan.

It is understood that these various plans are now being formulated at Detachment 404.

SECRET

X. CEYLON

1. General

On 4 March 1944, I called on the following British officers at Colombo, Ceylon: (see Theater Map, Area 6)

Colonel H. H. Johnson
Director of Military Intelligence

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Ayre and
Major Jeffrey Patterson,
both of British Intelligence

It was apparent that these officers had been expecting me and had obviously been advised by General Cawthorn of my impending visit. They expressed their desire to cooperate and assist in every way possible. I then called on Mr. Robert Buhl in the United States Consulate, and advised him of our contemplated operations in Ceylon. Mr. Buhl expressed his appreciation for the call and also his desire to cooperate in every way possible.

I next proceeded to Kandy, and at the Headquarters, SEAC, called on Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. I explained and described to General Wedemeyer our mission, and also informed him that we were coordinating our activities with both British and American Intelligence agencies concerned.

Contact was then made with Captain Garnons-Williams, Royal Navy, of "P" Division, who is now located at the Forward Headquarters, SEAC, Kandy, Ceylon. I explained to him that the purpose of my visit to Ceylon was to arrange for and establish authority for X-2 to operate in Ceylon, similar to what had been done in India. I informed him that I had contacted the officers previously mentioned, and that they all had assented and agreed to X-2 operations. He then laughingly replied that in that case it would not be necessary to have another written agreement, as had been the case in India. I told him that inasmuch as we all understood each other, and as everyone concerned was in agreement, I did not see any necessity for another written agreement. He then advised me that it would be satisfactory for X-2 to proceed with its operations in Ceylon. This was on 5 May 1944.

2. Detachment 404

While at OSS Headquarters, Detachment 404, at Kandy, I gave talks to certain of the military and civilian personnel on the general operations of X-2, and also on security, particularly with regard to safeguarding military information.

IX. LADRAN1. General

On 3 May 1944, I visited the city of Ladrán (see Theater Map, Area 4), accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lagers, of the Provost Marshall's Office. I conferred with Colonel Hesse, Commanding Officer of the American Headquarters in Ladrán, regarding the matter of security against espionage and sabotage. Ladrán is a major port on the east coast of India, and is now being used by the American forces. It will be necessary for X-2 to include the area of Ladrán in future operations.

VIII. NEW DELHI

1. General

New Delhi is the capital of India (see Theater Map, Area 5). Located there are the Headquarters of the United States Army Forces for China, Burma, and India. The possibility exists that enemy agents may be operating in New Delhi, particularly in the American Army Headquarters, so as to obtain information regarding American military operations in the Theater. This may be done by various methods, either through obtaining direct employment in the Headquarters, or by obtaining information from individuals employed at the Headquarters. Both the Counter-Intelligence Corps and the Provost Marshal are fully cognizant of the situation, and have taken steps to meet it.

2. Intelligence Bureau, Home Department Government of India

Very close and extremely friendly relationship was established with Sir Denis Pidditch, Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Home Department Government of India, and his Deputy Director, Mr. W. H. F. Jenkins, as well as with other officials and members of this organization. This Bureau compares with our own FBI, quite naturally, X-2 being new in the area, it could not be expected that the Intelligence Bureau would turn over all its files to X-2 intact. But it is believed that in time, and if properly handled, considerable valuable information can be obtained from the Intelligence Bureau which will be of considerable assistance to X-2 in its operations. The men with whom I worked in this organization are police officers of the very highest caliber. They are men of high personal standards, and are most desirous of assisting X-2 in India. Full and complete cooperation can be expected from this organization in the future.

VII. BANGALORE

1. Hindustan Aircraft Factory

Located at Bangalore is the Hindustan Aircraft Factory, which is affiliated with the Curtiss-Wright Aircraft Company (see Theater Map, Area 4). The Hindustan Aircraft Factory was originally intended to produce aircraft for the British and Indian air forces. Efforts to establish aircraft production failed miserably, and it was necessary to change the entire program and operations of the plant from an aircraft manufacturing plant to the manufacturing and repairing of parts for aircraft and repairing damaged aircraft. This factory was never able to actually get underway in producing its own airplanes. This may have been a subtle method of sabotage or part of the program of "civil disobedience", or just due to incompetent and inferior labor. There has been no definite evidence as to what was the actual cause. It is reported that at this plant, there are approximately two hundred and fifty technical experts, most of whom are Americans. It is not known whether the citizenship of these technical representatives has ever been checked. The possibility exists that enemy agents in the guise of technical representatives or airplane mechanics, and holding themselves out as Americans, could obtain employment at this factory as a "cover" for their activities.

2. Bangalore U. S. A. F. Air Depot

Adjacent to the Hindustan Aircraft Factory is the Bangalore Air Depot, which is a supply base of the U. S. Army Air Forces in India. This is a large depot, and there is considerable air traffic. It appears to be adequately protected and there has been no definite indication of any enemy espionage activity in this area.

SECRET

easily be using these commercial organizations as "fronts" for their activities. X-2 operations in the Bombay area include investigation of these groups to determine their true activities.

4. Possible Leakages of Military Information

It has been learned from reliable sources that the prices of foodstuffs and commodities in the Bombay markets will usually rise just prior to the time a convoy arrives. This indicates that there is a possible leakage of military information. The convoys upon reaching port must at times necessarily make purchases to replenish their supplies for the outgoing voyage, and troops arriving also consume a certain amount of foodstuffs and commodities while in or near the city. While the information is used for this purpose, the same information could be transmitted to the enemy for future military operations against Allied troops. Another factor to be considered with regard to Bombay and also other major cities in India is houses of prostitution which are frequented by troops. The British authorities seem to feel that leakage of information from this source is not as large as might be suspected, but the possibility nevertheless exists in Bombay with regard to certain establishments now operating there.

SECRET

VI. BOMBAY

1. General

Bombay is a port of disembarkation for a large number of American troops, and also supplies (see Theater Map, Area 3). Large convoys enter Bombay Harbor frequently, and it is extremely simple for enemy agents operating along the waterfront to determine the number of vessels arriving in port and the approximate number of troops and supplies arriving. It is also possible for enemy agents to identify the specific units arriving in the Theater through this port.

With regard to the protection of the port of Bombay, it is contemplated that X-2 will conduct an independent survey of the port area in conjunction and in coordination with the local authorities, for the purpose of recommending appropriate counter-espionage and counter-sabotage measures.

The British maintain an intelligence organization in Bombay, both military and civilian. There is also a small detachment of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, which works under the direction of the American Military Observer.

2. Explosion in the Port of Bombay.

In the spring of this year, an explosion occurred in Bombay Harbor, which was a major catastrophe. A large number of loaded ships were destroyed as were tremendous quantities of war supplies and equipment. The actual loss of life has never been actually determined. Warehouses in the vicinity of the docks were leveled flat, and block after block of the area adjacent to the docks were also completely leveled. After this occurred, the usual investigation was made. It was ascertained from reliable sources in Bombay that few of the safeguards which were set forth in the recommendations made in connection with the Calcutta port survey had been in effect in Bombay. As a matter of actual fact, the Security Officer for the Port of Bombay had looked over the Calcutta survey report a few days before the Bombay explosion, and had made comments to the effect that such protective measures and precautions were not necessary. This statement was made at a security conference in Calcutta. It is understood that a new Security Officer has now been placed in charge of the Port of Bombay.

3. Foreign Elements in Bombay

It was ascertained at Bombay that there is quite a sizable European element which has increased since the outbreak of the war. This is particularly the case with regard to the Swiss. There has also been an increase in the Chinese Colony. These individuals of various nationalities for the most part are connected with European business concerns, and could

SECRET

V. KARACHI

1. General

Karachi is a major air installation of the United States Army Air Forces (see Theater Map, Area 2). It is no doubt the largest air-base in India, and all air traffic coming into and leaving India clears through Karachi. Also located at Karachi are certain United States Air Forces tactical units. Enemy agents operating in the general area could ascertain information regarding American Air Forces operations. This is especially true with regard to units of the XX Bomber Command arriving in India en route to their stations in India and China.

Karachi is also an important seaport, and there is considerable military traffic. Contact has been made with British and American Intelligence Agencies at Karachi, and permanent X-2 personnel will soon, if not already, be on duty at this point. It is to be noted that another reason why Karachi is of importance is its proximity to Afghanistan. Enemy agents operating in Karachi could transmit, through radio or by courier, information to Kabul, which in turn could find its way into enemy hands.

-11-

SECRET

all personnel in the dock area has also been put into effect. Major John Pettie, B-2 to General Heaven, Colonel Gleave, and Captain Waters, of the Provost Marshal's Office, all expressed their appreciation for OSS assistance and cooperation in this important matter.

4. China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC)

Information received from various sources is to the effect that employees of the China National Aviation Corporation may possibly be engaged in espionage activities for the enemy. There are numerous Chinese in this organization who may be used as couriers to transmit information from India into China, from which point it could be transmitted into occupied China. It is planned that X-2 will cover this matter in the near future.

SECRET

There are numerous Allied intelligence agencies operating in Calcutta. These are British, Indian, and American, both military and civilian. Extensive X-2 operations in this area are absolutely essential and should be conducted on a large scale due to the heavy military activity throughout the area.

2. Port of Calcutta

The American Army activities in the Calcutta area are conducted by Headquarters Base Section Number 2, U. S., Brigadier General Cheves in Command. I called on General Cheves upon my arrival in Calcutta and explained my mission. He was gratified to learn of our contemplated operations in his area. It is understood that approximately ninety percent of the supplies and equipment for the Allied forces in India, Burma, and China are unloaded at the Port of Calcutta. Because of the vital nature of this area, there is no doubt that enemy agents are operating there extensively. These agents, by observation and by questioning civilians and troops, can ascertain the nature of the cargoes unloaded, and perhaps the ultimate destination. Information elicited from ship captains, members of the crew, coolies, and stevedores who unload the ships would also furnish enemy agents with the quantities and types of supplies arriving in Calcutta. The supplies and equipment unloaded at Calcutta are temporarily stored in the general vicinity and are subject to danger of destruction by sabotage. There has also been considerable theft and pilferage, and large quantities of vital supplies have been stolen. The protection of these docks, depots, and warehouses is the responsibility of the Provost Marshal General. It is understood that there are approximately fourteen thousand native guards employed in the Calcutta area. Recently, a battalion of American military police has been placed on duty at the King George Docks in Calcutta, which are the docks used mainly by the American Army. Since the arrival of this battalion, there has been a substantial decrease in the amount of thievery and pilferage.

3. Survey of Port of Calcutta

While in Calcutta, I was requested by General Cheves' Headquarters to collaborate with Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Close in conducting a survey of the Port of Calcutta, particularly the King George Docks. On 6 April 1944, I contacted Lieutenant Colonel N. L. Hewson, British Army, who is Port Security Officer for the Calcutta District. Colonel Hewson, who was formerly with Scotland Yard, was most cooperative, and a survey was made of the entire dock area, for the purpose of determining what protective measures should be put into effect to prevent sabotage and espionage. I worked closely with Colonel Close and Captain Waters, of the Provost Marshal's Office, and submitted to them my recommendations, some of which have now been put into effect. As a result of the survey, there are now three fireboats operating in the Calcutta Harbor, which also do general patrolling. A battalion of Military Police has been placed on duty in the dock area, and an identification system for the identification of

IV. CALCUTTA

1. General.

Calcutta is the second largest city in the British Empire (see Theater Map, Area 1B). It is located in the State of Bengal. This State has a population of approximately sixty-six million. It is estimated that one out of every five natives in Calcutta is pro-Japanese. There are quite a number of problems in the Calcutta area from a counter-intelligence standpoint. Generally, these are as follows:

- a. The large increase in the Chinese population throughout the area.
- b. The great number of pro-Japanese Indians, among which is a certain element of Japanese-inspired Fifth-Columbists, known as "JIPC".
- c. Indian resentment due to Americans operating Indian railroads.
- d. Security of the port and docks against espionage and sabotage.
- e. Native fortune-tellers who accept troops for the purpose of telling their fortunes, thereby obtaining military information.

There are many Indians in Bengal, particularly in Calcutta, who are definitely pro-Japanese, and not so long ago, one of the Indians running for public office came out and openly professed his loyalty to those Indians who were fighting in the Japanese-Indian Army. The population of Calcutta generally appears apathetic to the war, and would no doubt accept the Japanese if it should happen that they would be in control. The Japanese are spreading propaganda among the native population, calling their attention to the "future Anglo-American domination of India".

Propaganda is also being disseminated that Americans are going to ultimately take over and operate the Indian railroads for fifteen years, thereby putting the Indian railroad workers out of jobs. The fact that American troops are also operating certain Indian railroads more efficiently is also a cause for a certain amount of resentment.

Another situation which has caused unfriendly feeling on the part of certain elements of the Indian population has been the taking over by the American forces of certain jute-mills. This resulted in many of the Indians losing their employment in these mills.

The Provost Marshal is to some extent in a better position than the Counter-Intelligence Corps, due to the fact that personnel is not so much of a problem, although they can always use additional men. Recently, additional Military Police have arrived in the Theater, and most of the important areas are being covered more thoroughly. While all roads near military installations appear to be adequately patrolled, it is still possible for enemy agents, refugees, or tribesmen from the surrounding areas and countries to infiltrate into India through the jungle and through foot-paths which are not presently covered. The British and American military authorities are taking steps to remedy this situation by effecting some means of border security control, so as to control the entrance and movement of persons coming into India, particularly from Burma.

9. Enemy Transmitter Stations

Information received from Major J. M. Lachensie, of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, Headquarters, USAF, CBI, was to the effect that there are possibly enemy radio stations operating in the vicinity of Tinokla, Imphal, and Calcutta. Major Lachensie has requested X-2 to assist him in locating these enemy transmitter stations. The latter is being taken up.

10. Enemy Decoy Beams

Further information received from Major Lachensie is that the enemy is believed to be operating a decoy beam for the purpose of drawing allied aircraft off the regular radio beam while in flight. In cloudy or rainy weather, this decoy beam, it is alleged, has caused American aircraft to crash into mountains or other obstructions which are in line with the decoy beam. Major Lachensie has requested X-2 to assist by furnishing D-ring equipment to be used in the location of these enemy-beam transmitters. Action is being taken in this matter.

Tinukia, and throughout other sections of Assam. Over this railroad are transported American and British troops and the bulk of supplies and equipment for the American, British, and Indian forces operating in the China-Burma-India Theater. There are numerous military installations throughout Assam near the railroad line, and most of the traffic over the road is of a military nature. It is quite a simple matter for "train-watchers" to obtain complete information as to the nature of military traffic passing over the line. The railroad stations are as a rule poorly guarded, and no effort is made to keep the stations and surrounding areas clear of unauthorized persons during the time troop-trains pass through. Sabotage along the line could be accomplished very easily, and there have already occurred a number of instances of apparent sabotage. There has also been a certain amount of pilfering of military supplies stored at the various railroad stations. This situation has been reported to the various intelligence officers of both British and American Headquarters in the area concerned, as well as to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAF, CBI, and to the G-2 of Headquarters Base Section Number 2, S. O. S., Calcutta. The above comments with regard to conditions on the Bengal and Assam Railroad are made as a result of observations while traveling over certain areas.

B. The Provost Marshal and Counter-Intelligence Corps

In those sections of Assam in which are located American military installations, there is usually on duty a detachment of Military Police operating under the Provost Marshal General of the Theater, and also personnel of the Counter-Intelligence Corps.

The Provost Marshal has two divisions. One consists of Military Police usually formed into battalions, companies, or detachments, and the other division is the Criminal Investigation Division. The Military Police continue their operations to the patrolling of roads and the guarding of important areas and facilities. They also control traffic, both vehicular and pedestrian, in the vicinity of the particular post, camp, or station in the area. The Criminal Investigation Division investigates violations such as smuggling, stealing, and crimes committed by military personnel. From time to time, however, they do obtain information on persons suspected of engaging in espionage or other subversive activities, and liaison has been established with the Theater Provost Marshal for the purpose of obtaining any information of an espionage nature which they may acquire during the course of their normal operations.

The Counter-Intelligence Corps of the American Army is concerned principally with the protection of the Army itself against sabotage, espionage, and fifth-column activities. This organization has been seriously handicapped in its operations, due to the lack of personnel. X-2 has been doing everything possible to assist the Counter-Intelligence Corps to cope with its problems. A most friendly relationship has been established, and there is a free exchange of information where it is of mutual benefit and interest.

into India. In this connection, it is pointed out that Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, is a center of Japanese activities, and that it is possible to radio information from Kabul to Tokyo. It is understood from British sources that the British are covering Kabul so far as counter-espionage operations against the Japanese are concerned.

4. Tibetans in Assam

At certain times of the year, Tibetans come into India from Tibet. This is usually after the monsoon period ends. They enter India as merchants and engage mainly in selling various types of curios and articles which they make themselves. As yet, there has been no real indication that Tibetans are engaged in any pro-Japanese activity. It is possible, however, for these Tibetans to secure military information during their travels, and upon their return to Tibet, to get it into enemy channels by one means or another. Both the military and civilian police authorities are aware of this situation and are endeavoring to keep it under control.

5. Assam Rifles - Border Patrol

At the outbreak of the war, the Government of Assam organized its own regiment of troops for the purpose of patrolling the Assam border. This force consisted of approximately three battalions of native troops. The original function of this regiment was border patrol, but later as the Japanese advanced into Burma and then over into India, the Assam Rifles came into actual contact with the enemy forces, and developed into a regular combat infantry regiment. This regiment has an excellent record as a combat organization. However, it continues its patrol of the border and endeavors to control and prevent individuals from infiltrating into Assam from the Naga Hills and from other sections where infiltration would not be too difficult.

6. Naga Hills

The Naga Hills, which are located along the Assam-Burma border, contain various foot-paths and routes into Assam, many of which run through the jungle. The Nagas and other natives are constantly traveling into Assam over these foot-paths, which wind through the Naga Hills, and it is by no means impossible that some of them could be working for the enemy as active enemy agents, or acting as go-betweens for agents in Assam and Burma. A most suitable area for transferring intelligence is that from which some Nagas trade in the Chindwin area, and some in the Ledo area. The possibility also exists that the Bengal and Assam Railroad, which operates from Calcutta into Assam, could be sabotaged by enemy agents infiltrating through the Naga Hills. The British and American authorities in the area are fully aware of this situation, and it is understood that patrols are being placed at numerous points so that there will be a control over Naga and other native traffic.

7. Bengal and Assam Railroad

The Bengal and Assam Railroad operates from Calcutta to

III. ASSAM

1. General

Assam is a very vital area so far as X-2 operations in India are concerned (see Theater Map attached, Area 1A). This area is especially important in that there are numerous installations of the U. S. Army Air Forces located throughout Assam, as well as large supply depots, base hospitals, and other military installations. In addition, OSB Detachment 101 is located at Nazira, Assam. The Headquarters of Detachment 101, together with the training areas, are located in an area of approximately forty square miles on various tea estates in the general vicinity of Nazira. The Naga Hills are close by. One of the main reasons why the Assam area is so important is that in the northeast section of Assam, there are concentrated large air-fields and supply depots which are required to supply General Stilwell's forces in Northern Burma and also the American forces in China. Any interference with our lines of communication by direct enemy action, sabotage, espionage, or fifth-column activities, could seriously affect General Stilwell's campaign in Northern Burma, and our operations in China. Enemy agents operating in this area are therefore a serious threat to our successful military operations in the China-Burma-India Theater. There is a tendency on the part of some to minimize this danger, but the threat remains nevertheless.

2. Chinese in Assam

Since the outbreak of the war, there has been a tremendous influx of Chinese into Assam. Prior to the war, there were approximately twenty Chinese in Assam, and now there are approximately two thousand. Many of these have opened various types of businesses, such as restaurants and tea-rooms, near American air-bases and other military installations. These places are frequented mainly by American troops. The Chinese throughout the area are definitely a problem so far as the British are concerned, and it is understood that steps have now been taken to effect a registration of all Chinese in India. The British have previously attempted to maintain a complete registration, but the system employed has not been completely efficient. The Chinese who enter the country through regular means are photographed and fingerprinted at the time of their entry, but it is believed that many have entered the country through devious methods. The possibility exists that certain of these Chinese may be engaged in espionage activities for the enemy.

3. Afghans in Assam

Another group which may possibly be engaged in espionage, particularly in Assam, are Afghans from Afghanistan. A number of these come into India from time to time and engage in money-lending activities. It may be that these activities are nothing more than a "front", as some of their business is conducted with natives living in the vicinity of American and British posts, camps, and stations. The British are now endeavoring to effect tighter control over the activities of Afghans coming

SECRET

4. American officers contacted throughout the country, the officers of the Counter-Intelligence Corps, and the Provost Marshal General, were pleased to know of our operations, and it was their unanimous opinion that X-2 would serve a most useful mission in the China-Burma-India Theater.

5. At New Delhi, I called on Mr. George Merrill, Chief of the State Department Mission, and reviewed with him generally contemplated CE operations in India. Mr. Merrill was most cordial, and assured me of his cooperation and also the cooperation of his representatives located in the various American Consulates throughout India.

6. The specific areas covered, listed in the order of their importance (see Theater Map attached) were as follows: (1A) Assam (1B) Calcutta (2) Karachi (3) Bombay (4) Bangalore (5) New Delhi (6) Ceylon. It is in these general areas that American installations and interests are located and concentrated. The protection of these American installations and American military activities in the Communications Zone from espionage and sabotage is essential to the success of our campaign against the enemy in the combat zones of Northern Burma and China. X-2 therefore is now engaged in an important counter-espionage mission, protecting American military operations in the China-Burma-India Theater.

SECRET

11. X-2 OPERATIONS IN INDIA

1. I arrived in New Delhi, India, on 7 February 1944. Immediately after arrival, negotiations were begun with Captain G. H. Carsons-Williams, Royal Navy, of "P" Division, Headquarters Southeast Asia Command, Major General W. J. Cawthorn, Director of Military Intelligence, India Command, and Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Home Department of the Government of India. After extensive negotiations which were coordinated with Brigadier General Vernon Evans, GSO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters U. S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater, and Colonel Harry I. T. Crosswell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the India-American Counter-Espionage Agreement was consummated and signed by General Cawthorn and myself on 28 February 1944.

2. From the outset, during the preliminary negotiations, there was a certain degree of resistance to the establishment of American counter-espionage operations in India, on the part of General Cawthorn. During the course of the negotiations, he raised the point, "How would you like it if we came to your country to establish a counter-espionage system throughout the United States?" I replied, "That is exactly what you did." I then gave him specific instances where I had worked with British Agents on espionage and sabotage matters, while I was with FBI prior to the entry of the United States into the war. Apparently as a result of this reply, he altered his attitude and recognized in X-2 the right to protect American installations and interests throughout India. The words, "installations and interests" were intentionally put into the Agreement. By "American installations", it was intended to include all posts, camps, and stations of all American armed forces, both Army and Navy, throughout India. The word "interests" was intended to include all other organizations of the United States Government, whether quasi-military, civilian, or any other agency, department, or office of the United States which might be presently operating or established in India. The interpretation and meaning of these terms was discussed during the preliminary negotiations with the officials heretofore mentioned.

3. All strategic areas throughout India were visited, and contact was established with American, British, and Indian intelligence agencies, both military and civilian. Arrangements were made for liaison and flow of intelligence, and sources of information were also contacted and established. The results were most gratifying. General Cawthorn, who originally was reputed to be not exactly cooperative with Americans, made a complete turn-about face. I found him to be extremely cooperative and helpful. All British Military Intelligence Officers with whom I came in contact throughout India and Ceylon did everything possible to cooperate. When I arrived at the various posts, camps, stations, and cities, I found that in most instances, the officer contacted had received prior instructions from General Cawthorn to extend to me every facility and assistance.

SECRET

I. FOREWORD

1. For the first time in the history of the United States, there has been established and put into operation throughout India an American counter-espionage organization, operating on a nationwide scale, for the protection of American installations and interests in the China, Burma, India Theater. The groundwork for a similar organization has been established in Dayton.

2. This objective was accomplished by the X-2 branch of OSS.

3. From a counter-intelligence point of view, the primary mission of X-2 in the China, Burma and India Theater is to assist the Commanding General of the Theater in the successful prosecution of the military campaign against the enemy. The main objective of X-2 therefore, is the prevention of enemy espionage, by putting into effect adequate counter-intelligence measures to counter all enemy and unfriendly espionage activities which interfere with or affect our military operations directed against the enemy. X-2 operations can therefore be put into three general categories:

a. Those dealing with counter-espionage activities necessary to deal effectively against enemy and unfriendly espionage as it may affect current military operations, i.e., operations in the combat zones.

b. Coverage in areas occupied by allied forces and in which enemy or unfriendly agents operate in our rear, or along the lines of our communications, i.e., communications zones.

c. Coverage of enemy counter-intelligence activities in areas occupied by the enemy which are necessary to protect other OSS operations in those enemy-occupied areas.

4. The types of counter-espionage measures put into effect consequently depend upon the area in which operations are being conducted and the particular situation at hand.

5. In establishing the groundwork for X-2 operations in the China, Burma, India Theater, the above general coverage was planned and contemplated.

SECRET

SECRET

	<u>Page</u>
IX. MADAGASCAR	16
1. General	16
X. CEYLON	17 - 18
1. General	17
2. Detachment 404	17
XI. NORTHERN BURMA	19
1. General	19
XII. PORTUGUESE GOA	20
1. General	20
XIII. SPECIALIZED DEFICIENCIES ENCOUNTERED	21 - 23
1. General	21
2. Lease and Company	21
3. Parties at OSS Headquarters, Calcutta	21
4. Poor Security, Calcutta Office	21
5. Conferences with Colonel John G. Conghlin	22
6. Unauthorized Disclosure of X-2 Investigation	22
7. Report on Calcutta Situation	23
XIV. CONDITIONS TO BE IMPROVED	24
1. Personnel	24
2. Stenographic and Clerical Personnel	24
3. Equipment	24
XV. RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES	25

SECRET

INDEX

	<u>Page</u>
I. FOREWORD	1
II. X-2 OPERATIONS IN INDIA	2 - 3
III. ASSAM	4 - 7
1. General	4
2. Chinese in Assam	4
3. Afghans in Assam	4
4. Tibetans in Assam	5
5. Assam Rifles - Border Patrol	5
6. Naga Hills	5
7. Bengal and Assam Railroad	5
8. The Provost Marshal and Counter-Intelligence Corps	6
9. Enemy Transmitter Stations	7
10. Enemy Decoy Beams	7
IV. CALCUTTA	8 - 10
1. General	8
2. Port of Calcutta	9
3. Survey of Port of Calcutta	9
4. China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC)	10
V. KARACHI	11
1. General	11
VI. BOMBAY	12 - 13
1. General	12
2. Explosion in the Port of Bombay	12
3. Foreign Elements in Bombay	12
4. Possible Leaks of Military Information	13
VII. BANGALORE	14
1. Hindustan Aircraft Factory	14
2. Bangalore U. S. Air Force Depot	14
VIII. NEW DELHI	15
1. General	15
2. Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India	15