

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

26 May 1945

To: Chief, MO
From: Jan F. Libich *J. F. Libich*
SUBJECT: Presentation of MO Material to Military Authorities.

1. Experience has shown that when the aid of the military forces is needed for some MO operation it is often very difficult to explain the point verbally. The meaning of psychological warfare and the targets entered often seem strange to military commanders, and they especially hesitate to contribute the necessary assistance if the task in question would risk the lives of some of their men.
2. For example, AFHQ/Caserta refused at first to allow planes of the 15th Air Force to carry our mailbags and papers into Germany. However, after they had been shown samples of faked German letters and other MO items they became very interested. One General calling others into his office remarked, "See what these devils have now thought of!" They then offered their wholehearted cooperation and the necessary orders were obtained within two hours. From then on everyone was enthusiastic, and even the loss of two planes and several fliers of these special missions did not hamper the zeal of those concerned.
3. It is therefore suggested that a standard explanation of MO as a potential weapon of war be printed and submitted to the military authorities concerned, together with samples of MO material each time a new project is contemplated and the services of the military forces are needed.

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By the end of April 1945, our last target had disappeared, and the liquidation of our Branch began. All the members of MO production were released for reassignment and I, with four other members of MO, embarked in Naples on 11 May 1945 and reported back to MO/Washington in good health and good spirits on 22 May 1945 with the feeling that a good job had been done.

Furthermore, I am more than ever convinced of the effectiveness of MO as a powerful weapon either in war or in peace.

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a much lesser degree in Yugoslavia. Half of the illiterate population would never believe much in the power of the printed word and will not take great risks to bring it to the enemy.

I was led to believe that no other Branch of OSS had agents or representatives inside Germany, and learned only later that SI and X-2 had had contacts in these countries during all this time, and that there would have been a possibility to use one of their agents who had been parachuted or infiltrated into these countries to carry MO material.

The Mailbag Project "Cornflakes" solved part of the infiltration problem and can certainly be used in any future MO operation.

I was particularly surprised at the lack of cooperation that existed between MO and the other Branches of this organization. The reason for this was partly because the Central European Desk of SI and R&A were in different towns (Caserta and Bari), and therefore very little personal contact was available. On the other hand, we received most valuable assistance from the M&D Branch, under Captain Allison in Rome, who produced wonderful faked German forms, cancellation stamps and other items on the shortest notice. It was also a great help to receive regularly from SI/Switzerland a batch of German newspapers--sometimes only eight days old.

Having many social contacts in Rome, some of them dating long before the war, I had an excellent opportunity to get many items of political and economic intelligence that were not only valuable for MO, but for various other branches (SI, Finance, X-2) and seemed to be greatly appreciated by them.

deRothermann and I developed quite a system to collect the right type of intelligence, and were very gratified to get many complimentary letters from various OSS Branches. During the eight months in Rome we submitted more than 80 reports to these Branches, and many of them were reproduced under our code name "Normo" and distributed through the Reporting Board.

We were pleased to see by the violent reactions of the enemy newspapers (article in *Das Schwarze Korps*--German soldiers' paper--"Mitteilungen fur die Truppe") that we really seemed to have worried German propaganda leaders. We were also very gratified to hear from so many German POWs who had seen the paper or our leaflets that they had gotten our material through the mail, and that many of them had hidden on their person the secret membership card of the DND Party. Also the fact that the German Abwehr tried to infiltrate an agent to reach MO (Hackenberg), all of which definitely proves the importance of MO.

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copied in our printshop and mimeographed on the reverse side were subversive leaflets, signed by German soldiers' committees, such as "Bund Deutscher Grenadiere" and others, the cover story being that some disgruntled German soldier got hold of a bunch of these forms in some battalion headquarters and used them to tell his comrades what he thought was wrong with the Nazi system. This method seemed quite successful as various German Army newspapers warned German soldiers not to fall for these "cleverly devised" subversive attempts.

We further started a special production line addressing Austrians, mimeographing and printing Austrian underground papers, leaflets, stickers, instructions, etc.

Zinder was away from Rome most of the time working with the "Sauerkrauts" in Sienna, and later in Florence, so that a tremendous amount of work had to be done by de Rothermann and myself. We had to collect and analyze all available intelligence, interrogate prisoners, plan, write, and edit all items, then to copy-and proofread them, make the layout of the paper, and translate the general idea of the items to the Chief of the Branch.

The greatest difficulty for the whole Branch was the question of distribution. To produce before distribution has been arranged does not seem to me to be the right way to do it. In my opinion, there should first be created as many ways of distribution as possible; all efforts should be concentrated on exploring every possibility. Then the production should be adapted to the available methods of distribution. It means that if you can only reach the troops in the field there is no use writing philosophical editorials; whereas, if you can reach the civilian population you must concentrate on domestic problems that seem more important to them than any military question.

The "Sauerkrauts", while very spectacular, are only needlepricks, as every soldier going through the lines can only take 3 to 4 pounds of MO material with him. He will also try to get rid of the stuff as quickly as possible, since it would give him away as a spy if he were to be found with this material on his person. On the other hand, MO material found either in No-Man's Land or just behind the lines will hardly convince the enemy soldier that it comes from the homeland.

Air drops, even if made black by some device such as "This copy of a German underground paper has been found in an occupied German town" (Pig Iron), will not necessarily make an item black in the eyes of the native population. The best thing to do seems to be infiltration, even in small quantities, for if a hundred items would reach the enemy by mail or were to be pushed under his door they would be more impressive and would be far more likely to have the desired effect than if 10000 were to flutter down from the air like "white" PWB items.

Distribution through partisans in German-occupied countries was successful in France and Northern Italy, but to

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didn't seem to have any means of distribution inside Germany. Our only distribution was through aerial drops to the French maquis and some shipments to partisans in Yugoslavia and Italy. At that time I had already submitted to Mr. Warner the first plan of what later became the "Cornflakes" mailbag project. We also planted copies of our German paper in Spain. The first edition of this paper appeared on 15 June 1944 after we had agreed on the name "Das Neue Deutschland".

In the middle of July, our Branch was moved in different echelons from Algiers to Rome. I was still in Algiers when the news came of the attempt on Hitler's life. I put out three leaflets and had them mimeographed at AFHQ and arranged for distribution so that they were dropped to the French underground within 30 hours after the news of the attempt on Hitler's life had been publicized.

In an editorial for Das Neue Deutschland, written on 8 July and printed on 15 July, I had pointed out that the German General Staff, anticipating that the war would be lost, may try in a short time to get rid of Hitler by assassinating him.

On 20 July 1944, I arrived in Rome by plane from Algiers. Working and printing facilities in general were much better and also at that time another German writer, Mr. Jetteth-ermann, had been transferred to us and from that time on we worked closely together.

Shortly after the attempt on Hitler's life, the first "Sauerkraut" action had been started by Eddie Zinder. German POWs were sent back through the German lines, in German uniforms, with German credentials, to distribute MO material behind the enemy lines. Therefore, it occurred to me that it was a very good opportunity to spread confusion by planting fake German military orders behind the front lines.

By closely studying captured German military documents, I started to produce faked orders, and we achieved very gratifying successes in this new project. We frequently received comments from G-2, French Military Intelligence, PWB, and our own X-2 Branch, proving that these faked orders had been taken for genuine German orders. But what was much more important and gratifying was that the German Army radio, and even Field Marshall Kesselring himself, in a Special Order, had to deny the authenticity of some of these faked documents.

Later, we also started to fake German civilian administrative orders in the economic, financial, administrative and political field; all of them, of course, with a hidden subversive meaning.

We also developed a scheme to take samples of German military forms such as leave passes, promotion forms, travel permits, death record forms, etc. They were accurately re-

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25 May 1945

16. 137

To: MO Branch, OSS/Washington

From: Jan F. Libich

SUBJECT: FIELD REPORT

From 4 June 1944 to 11 May 1945 I worked as a civilian field representative of the MO Branch of OSS. I left Washington on 4 June 1944 by plane, and arrived in Algiers on 6 June 1944 to take up my duties as political advisor, German writer and general ideas man with the MO Branch.

When I arrived there was only one German writer--a young Austrian boy, Eddie Zinder--who had been recruited in North Africa a few months before.

The Chief of the Branch, Mr. Eugene P. Warner, also kept two German POWs in a villa and tried to use them as writers for German material.

Besides some Italian items previously produced, there were a few mimeographed leaflets written by Zinder, stickers and "Wie Lange Nooh" series brilliantly designed by Lt.(jg) Saul Steinberg, and slogans that went with them that were not quite of the same standard.

We started immediately on the production of a German monthly newspaper that was supposedly the mouthpiece of an existent German subversive Peace Party. I was able to convince Mr. Warner that one of the first rules of MO should be that no articles or items first written in English and then translated into German should ever be used, for it was impossible to make any type of translation sound the same as the original, and that no person of a different nationality is ever able to have exactly the same trend of thought or to express himself correctly.

Working conditions in Algiers were very difficult. We were in sun-baked huts, working on converted orange boxes for tables, with one German typewriter. At that time our printing facilities were very limited. It took weeks to get the German "umlauts", but I didn't want the German paper to be printed and released without them. Nevertheless, every OSS man that worked in Algiers at that time will remember the wonderful spirit and the feeling of achieving something that ran through the whole outfit.

I was very disappointed to find that no radio facilities of any kind existed for our Branch, and that we

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum**SECRET****UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT****TO : The Director****FROM : Secretariat****DATE: 6 June 1945****SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Jan V. Libich
(MO/Memo)**

1. Mr. Libich served in Algiers as political adviser, writer and general ideas man on Germany. Published "Das Neue Deutschland" and was the originator of what became the "Cornflakes" mailbag project.

2. Infiltration is suggested as the best means of distributing MO material. Each time a new project is contemplated and the cooperation of the military authorities is needed, a standard explanation of MO as a weapon of war should be printed and submitted to the military authorities concerned together with samples of MO material.

B. P. Karlow
B. P. Karlow
Lieut., USNR
Reports Office

Attachment**SECRET**

WAK



The Director of the Office of Strategic Services -- 3


because the individual was not familiar with the job with which he had been assigned.

5. Under General Order No. 63, Paragraph 3, Section C, the specific difficulties of which he personally became aware. In the assigning of individuals to work with the Chinese on special missions, the Chinese are very "rank conscious" and are very reluctant to work with enlisted men. In my particular case while traveling alone, relying on Chinese modes of transport, I was introduced by my interpreter as a Major. If Chinese officials became aware of any foreigner in the military service as an enlisted man, the scope of his activities would become very limited. Intelligence information would suddenly become scarce, methods of travel would become non-existent, in fact the very subsistence of the individual would be seriously threatened. This is because of a very strict class system in China.

6. All film, both motion picture and still made by the writer from 20 June 1943 to 16 June 1944, was turned over to the Commander U.S. Naval Group, China, as I was under the Command of that activity during that period.

No photographic assignments were completed while under the command of Lt. Col. I. Tolstoy, AUS, Commanding Officer of project "Saddle" from 16 June 1944 to 30 November 1944, after which time the writer returned to the UGA.

Respectfully submitted,


Robert J. Eastman
CSp(P)(RA), USNR
Field Photographic Branch

The Director of the Office of Strategic Services -- 2

transfer to the OS3 Det. 202 in that area.

3. On 15 June 1944 I submitted to the Commander of the U.S. Naval Group, China a detailed report of my activities covering my trip to and from Camp No. 4, Shempa, Suiyan Province, which report also gave a detailed history of the activities of the Camp No. 4 personnel, difficulties encountered, territory covered, Chinese Military Forces reviewed and a general written report of the situation in Northwest China from an economic standpoint. This report was also submitted to Major Wilkinson, Commanding Officer, Branch Hq. Det. 202, Chungking, China, on 16 June 1944.

4. On 19 June 1944 I received orders to report to the Commanding Officer, Branch Hq. Det. 101, Calcutta, India, to assemble a photographic set-up to accompany project "Saddle", to which I had been assigned as group photographer. I gathered together what equipment was available in Calcutta, India then proceeded to Det. 101, Hq., Nazira, Assam, where I joined the Commanding Officer of project "Saddle", Lt. Col. I. Tolstoy, AUS. Together with the other personnel of project "Saddle" we proceeded to Det. 202 Hq., Kunning, China, where we re-assembled all the gear which was to be taken with this project.

On 12 August 1944 I was assigned to Det. 202, Branch Hq., Chungking, China to assist Lt. Col. I. Tolstoy, AUS in the preparation of Intelligence material for project "Saddle", while waiting for this project to get under way. On 5 November I received orders from OSS Hq., Delhi, India to report to OSS Det. 101 Hq., Nazira, Assam for further duty. On 29 November 1944 I received orders from OSS Hq., Delhi, India to report to the Hq. Field Photographic Branch, Washington, D. C. for further duty and leave. I arrived in Washington, D. C. on 11 December 1944. My period of service overseas was twenty and one-half months.

Under General Order No. 63, Paragraph 3, Section B, the conditions in the field that might be improved - the one suggestion is that the Supply Officers might give to the members of Special Projects a little more cooperation in the matter of getting together and transportation of their units, sometimes "hard to get" supplies. I found that the usual attitude was "it's your little red wagon, you push it". Not being familiar with conditions that always exist in each individual location, it is very difficult for a newcomer to arrange for and transport unit supplies. In many cases the individuals took the attitude of, "I'm looking out for yours truly". It was found that sometimes this attitude was taken

16.950

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 March 1945

To: The Director of the Office of Strategic Services

Via: (1) Chief, Field Photographic Branch
(2) Secretariat, OSS

From: Robert J. Eastman, CSp(P)(PA), USNR

Subject: Overseas Returnee, Field Report

1. On 23 March 1943 I left Washington, D. C. on temporary duty orders to report to the Commander, U.S. Navy Group, Chungking, China, such temporary duty to be of indefinite duration. I arrived in Chungking, China on 20 June 1943 and was assigned to the duty of setting up a station film laboratory and processing station, located at the Hq. of the U.S. Naval Group, adjacent to the city of Chungking. In September 1943, I was transferred to the city of Calcutta, India on temporary additional duty to set up a supply system of photographic materials for the field camps and Hq. laboratory in Chungking. The duration of this temporary additional duty was about one month. In October 1943, I returned to Chungking for further transfer to Camp No. 4, U.S. Naval Group activity in Northwest China. I left the city of Chungking on 15 November 1943 for Camp No. 4 for duty of an indefinite duration, under the command of the U.S. Naval Group, China.

Inasmuch as the duties outlined in the above paragraph were completed while on detached duty from the OSS, Field Photographic Branch, and that a complete report has been submitted concerning the activities of the Field Photographic Unit, which was on detached duty with the U.S. Naval Group, China, by the Commanding Officer of the Field Photographic Unit, the writer has no comments to make.

2. On 28 April 1944 I received orders via radio dispatch to report to the Commander, U.S. Naval Group, China, via the first available transportation for further transfer back to the Branch Hq. Det. 202, the OSS activity in Chungking. I left Camp No. 4, the U.S. Naval Group activity, located in Shempe, Suiyan Province, China on 17 May 1944, arriving in the city of Chungking on 12 June 1944, where I reported to the Commander of the U.S. Naval Group, China for further

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

16.750

Field Photo Branch

TO : Director, OSS
Via: Secretariat, OSS
FROM : Chief, Field Photo. Branch, OSS.

DATE: 24 Mar 1945

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Field Report
re: Robert J. Eastman, OSp(P), USNR

Attached report is forwarded for information and files.

John W. English
JOHN W. ENGLISH, Lt., USNR
Executive Officer
Field Photographic Branch, OSS
By direction

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**SECRET****TO :** Acting Director

DATE: 29 May 1945

FROM : Secretariat

x Eastman, Robert J.

SUBJECT: Field report of Robert J. Eastman, OSp(P) USNRx 1st of 1st 1st 1st
x 1st of 1st 1st 1st


1. OSp(P) Eastman outlines his itinerary and describes his duties at Chungking, Calcutta and Kunming.

2. He recommends that Supply officers in the field give members of Special Projects more cooperation in transporting unit supplies. He notes that Chinese are very "rank conscious" and are reluctant to work with enlisted men.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

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5. With reference to the problem of relationship between R&A and SI in the field, steps are presently being taken to improve the situation, which has for sometime been recognized as unsatisfactory. An effort is being made to coordinate the dispatch of intelligence directives by R&A and SI in Washington, and to arrange for closer cooperation between field representatives of SI and R&A in Athens. The problem has been partly one of personalities, and R&A, Washington is presently seeking to replace its representative in Athens with a man who is less afraid to overstep what he may believe to be the limitations of his directive. Actually, in an office as small as Athens, intelligence requests should be farmed out by the Chief, OSS to whatever individuals have the contacts and facilities most nearly capable of producing an adequate result. In a larger office, this function should be controlled by an intelligence officer along the lines indicated by Miss Crosby.
6. Concerning insufficient office help (para. C-2), this situation was only too clearly recognized in Cairo prior to the establishment of the Athens office. The original Young Plan, Jr. allowed for sufficient clerical assistance. However, this Plan was drastically revised by directive from Caserta which was rigidly interpreted by Colonel Aldrich. It was exceedingly difficult to secure permission for other than the absolute minimum of personnel to be dispatched to Athens. Insistence upon the necessity of more clerical help, if the operations of the office were to be run efficiently, was of little avail. As regards Miss Crosby's criticism, I would only say that it was not the Greek Desk which was at fault but a higher policy. The experience in Athens should definitely be a lesson to which proper attention should be paid in the future.
7. Miss Crosby's criticism of the training of SI agents has been repeated from Cairo and Athens on a great many occasions. As has been pointed out, this situation has been altered radically for the better in recent months, and it is to be hoped that future field representatives will reach their posts in a better condition to do the job demanded of them, than were the early samples sent to the field.

S.M.P.
S.B.L.P.

SECRET

16,953
Field Report

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

29 May 1945

L. Russell Brown
To : Chief, SI

FROM : Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr.

SUBJECT : Field Report of Miss Margaret Crosby

1. Miss Crosby's report is of special interest and importance because she has been an exceedingly effective officer in the field, and her judgment is usually calm and well-balanced. She was in Athens all during the strenuous period of the Civil War and did her work well under terribly difficult conditions. It is rather significant that she makes no comment at all upon this in the brief paragraph in her report in which she refers to her activities in Athens (para. A-2).
2. The comment made in para. B-1, concerning the desirability of more frequent contact with Washington, might have been made from almost any field office. The situation was perhaps more acute in Athens than elsewhere because of the strenuous conditions under which the work was performed. An effort was made on the part of the Cairo office to maintain constant touch and to give Athens the feeling of dependable support, which would mean a great deal to a group as isolated as that one was. However, appreciation from Cairo is hardly as satisfactory as appreciation from headquarters in Washington.
3. The unfortunate fact with regard to the entire Greek operation was that, although intelligence coverage was excellent and complete, there was actually very little American interest in the Greek scene. Our Greek Section was in the position of a man all dressed up with no place to go. In Athens and in Cairo, I have had expressed to me many times an acute awareness of this situation on the part of representatives of the Greek Section. Under such circumstances, unusual efforts must be made by headquarters to indicate appreciation on its part of the work which is being done.
4. The concrete suggestions made by Miss Crosby in para. R-1 (A,B,C) are constructive and have been acted upon. The dispatch of news clippings to Athens was begun before Miss Crosby returned. Steps are now being taken to provide more specific information concerning the evaluation of Greek reports.

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4 OR 2

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- slots for special-1 also. The result has been a decrease in efficiency and a general slowing down of the work.
3. Lack of Proper Training for ST Agents
- A constant difficulty for the ST agents is that they receive no adequate training in writing, so that the material was never given the direct ST agents.

Margaret Condy

an agent Condy

SECRET

p.2

is particularly difficult for a small unit such as that in Athens which, because it cannot possibly cover the whole field, is constantly faced with the problem of selection. Ideally of course concrete intelligence directives and comments from our customers are what are most needed. But apart from those, which are difficult if not impossible to obtain, Washington could help the Reports Office Athens in this problem of selection in a number of specific ways such as:

- a. The Greek Desk in Washington could send a check list to Athens indicating which reports from Athens were not disseminated here and why, which had classification and/or evaluation changed and why, etc.
- b. Branches within the organization, specifically R&A and Foreign Nationalities, could be asked to fill out evaluation sheets on a consecutive group of any 25 or 50 Athens reports, indicating which they found useful, useless etc. These evaluation sheets could then be sent to Athens.
- c. Occasionally send to Athens all clippings on Greece from several representative newspapers (New York Times and Washington Post for example) for a given period of ten days or two weeks.

These measures would give Athens some idea of what type of report the organization in Washington finds useful and what can be omitted because of adequate newspaper coverage.

c. Specific Difficulties

1. R & A vs SI

In Athens, the cooperation between R&A and SI definitely impeded efficiency in handling intelligence. There, as probably in other small units in liberated countries, the distinction by type of material has become unreal. The three intelligence men in Athens, one of whom is R&A and two SI, turn in both R&A and SI material which seems logical and right as each one handles the subject matter in which he is most competent. Cooperation, however, is sometimes blocked by fears - perhaps unfounded - that Washington and/or Cairo insist on a strict observance of the distinction between the branches and on due credit to the proper branch. This results in the belief that a question from R&A must be answered by R&A, and one from SI by SI, regardless of who is most competent to handle it. At times there has also been unnecessary duplication because of the fact that R&A pouch material does not clear through the SI reports office. The sensible arrangement in Athens would seem to be to have one intelligence officer (whether he be called Chief SI, R&A, or Reports Officer would be immaterial) through whom all outgoing intelligence and incoming questions cleared.

2. Inefficient office help

The Greek Desk, both in Cairo and later in Athens, has never had enough efficient office help. It has made the error, common perhaps to most academic people, of under-estimating the necessity for trained secretaries, file-clerks, etc., and of using too many of its

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TO: Executive Officer ST
 FROM: Margaret Cheney
 SUBJECT: Field Report

16,953
 Field Report
 20041-274

14 May 45

A. Activities in the Field

1. Cairo, 20 June 44 to 7 Nov. 44

I arrived in Cairo on 26 June 44, having been sent out by the Reporting Board to edit Greek reports in Cairo. The reports officer in Cairo had enough 'editors' at the moment, so loaned me to the Greek Desk in Cairo to do preliminary work on reports before they were sent on to the Reports Office. There I was in charge of processing all the roughed reports from Greece. This involved sorting the material as it came in, deciding which should have priority in handling, which should be killed, checking the maps before they were sent to be reproduced, passing the originals on to translators, checking the translations, and then the assembling and final rough editing of the reports before they were sent on to the Reports Office.

2. Athens, 7 Nov 44 - 27 Jan 45; 5 March - 1 May 45

As reports officer in Athens, my work was much the same as in Cairo plus the responsibility for the final editing and dissemination of the reports. There I also processed the wireless messages from the field and the outgoing intelligence cables.

3. Caserta, 30 Jan - 4 Mar 45

At the time the Greek Desk was transferred to Caserta, I was sent there to help edit Greek reports. On arrival I asked to be relieved and sent home and Caserta agreed. I was still waiting for transportation at the end of February when the decisions on the Greek Desk were reversed. At the request of Cairo, I agreed to return to Athens as Reports Officer for two months.

B. Conditions in the Field that might be Improved

1. Reports

The morale and effectiveness of the Athens Branch could be much improved by greater interest from and more frequent contact with Washington. In Athens we felt that we were working in a vacuum for we never received any comments from Washington as to which of our reports were considered useful or which useless. This lack of comment and directive is

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Office Memorandum •

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
 FROM : W. N. Shephardson
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Miss Margaret Crosby

16, 253
 Field Report
 X Crosby, Margaret
 DATE: 31 May 1945
 V S I
 X ME TOS

1. Attached herewith Field Report from above subject who returned recently from her assignments in Athens, Cairo and Caserta.

2. Attached also are comments on her report written by Mr. S.B.L. Penrose, Divisional Deputy for Europe.

W. N. S.
 W. N. S.

*1 Hold for
 Director
 CSE*

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET
16,953

TO : Director

DATE: 18 June 1945

FROM : Reports Office, Secretariat

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Miss Margaret Crosby
SI/Greece


Field report
Brady May

1. Miss Crosby served in Athens as Reporting Board officer during the "civil war" days from 7 November 1944 until May 1945. She also worked with the SI/Greek Desk in Caserta and previously in Cairo.
2. More frequent contact with Washington should be maintained to increase both efficiency of reporting and morale. The Washington Reporting Board should regularly appraise field reporting and send representative news clippings to afford comparison. Branch distinctions such as between SI and R&A should not be allowed to impair reporting in the field.
3. Mr. Penrose's appraisal^{of} Miss Crosby's criticisms is attached.

S.P.K.

Attachment

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
Major Duncan Lee
Director

Please refer to the report on the Third Area Activities
by Capt. Frillman and write me briefly your estimate.

WJD

16. 950
Field Report
x Frillman
17 June 1945
x ehria
x S/
x 3rd (S) Area

Report sent - 6/18/45



Top ↑

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squares indicate the edges of
camera field

Even No. 1111

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3

FIELD REPORTS

VOL. VI

Name:	Branch	Theater:	Tab:
CARROLL, LT FRANK 15,611	NU	ETO	B
OWEN, CAPT GEORGE H. 15,666	R & A	NATO	C
COFFECK, LT J.D. 15,676	ETO MEDTO	ETO MEDTO	D
HARRIS, MAJOR JOHN R. 15,695	MOU	ETO	E
RAEB, STUART 15,714	MO	ETO	F
HAYES, CAPT JOHN G. 15,718	SI	ETO	G
PRATT, GEORGE O. 15,745	SI	ETO	H
HALL, HOWER 15,760	SI	METO	K
GURASIMOVICH, PHILIP D. 15,764	SI	MEDTO	L
KATFFMAN, RAY 15,765	SI	SEAC	M
CONNELL, LT HARRY G. 15,771	SC	FETO	N
DAIX, CHRIST 15,774	MO	EETO	O
SARACE, HUNTINGTON 15,783	SI	AFRICA	P
WOLF, JOHN 15,792	WOLF (PHOTO)	ETO	Q
HAYWOOD, MAJOR AUBREY 15,790	SI	ETO	R

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	By	Date	Initials	Comments

15:190
Field Report
x Harwood
x S.I.
x ETO

29 November 1944

TO: Director
FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

There is attached Field Report from
Major Aubrey H. Harwood, dated 4 November 1944.

Whitney H. Shepardson
W. H. S.

Attachment

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4 November, 1944.

Report by Major Aubrey E. Harwood on OSS, SI activities.

I was transferred to the SI Branch on the 15 June, 1944, and arrived in London on 30 June, 1944. At that time there was no functioning German Section in the Continental Division of SI, ETO. About 10 July, 1944, the German Section was established as part of the Continental Division and I was appointed Acting Chief.

At that time the following personnel were assigned to the Section:

Henry Hauser who had been engaged in research work.
Sgt. Guttman a Jew who had been tentatively selected as an agent, who was dropped on account of his Jewish characteristics.

Sgt. Schneider who was receiving a W/T course at Milwaukee.
Captain Haensel who was only tentatively assigned and later was transferred to the HQ 3rd Army.

Lt. Bucky who was not in good health and was later returned to the States for that reason.

There were no plans of operation for getting agents into Germany or for obtaining intelligence from Germany in any way, except reports which were being obtained through intelligence services of Allied Governments. Furthermore, no slots were available for the recruiting of personnel for the Section from the American armed forces, and no training staff was available to instruct in the German language.

Under the circumstances it was recognized, and so stated for the record, that the German Section was starting from scratch. It was also recognized that it would have to attempt to function under the limitation upon the recruitment of personnel in the British Isles, referred to later.

About the time the German Section was established Commander Armour, the Chief of the Continental Division of SIS, had approached Colonel Heskell, Chief SI Branch, in regard to the possibility of working out a combined plan for the penetration of Germany. I was instructed to contact Major Gellman, Chief of the German Section, SIS, with a view to developing such a plan.

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Several meetings were held with Major Gallant and members of his staff, including Major Day and also Lt. Col. Brook (training officer) and Lt. Col. Gardner.

It was recognized that the problem was entirely different from the one which the Sussex plan was developed to meet, as in that case the personnel was recruited by the French authorities, the operation was to take place in friendly territory with Reception Committees and safe addresses established in advance. Further more, reception of the Sussex plan was in July, 1943, whereas we were facing an infinitely more difficult problem in July, 1944. At the first meeting of Major Gallant and Colonel Brooks it developed that they had in mind that the necessary personnel might be secured among the German prisoners of war. As an alternative, it was suggested that efforts should be made to obtain personnel from the Allied Governments, especially the Dutch, Belgian (Flemish), French (Alsacian) and also from among the German refugees in England, particularly so-called pioneer group which numbered around 100,000 men.

After several meetings and considerable discussion checking back with Colonel Maskell and others and learning that it was the consensus of opinion that prisoners of war were not desirable, a plan was finally drawn up to be known as the Kent plan. It contemplated the recruiting of 10 teams by both the British and ourselves, each team to consist of observer and W/T operator. Provision was also made for training the observer in the use of Klaxon in that proved practical. The personnel were to be secured from the 3 sources mentioned, namely Allied Governments, German refugees in Britain and prisoners of war, the latter sources being considered the last resort. The plan contemplated joint training facilities and a period of 3-4 months for recruiting and training. It was tentatively discussed at Staff with Colonel Ford, the Head of G-2 Section and was tentatively approved, having received the tentative approval of Colonel Maskell and Commander Armour. At about this time the attempt was made upon Hitler's life and it seemed quite possible that the Nazi regime might be overthrown in Germany. Due perhaps in part to this situation and to other complications and considerations Commander Cohen finally advised Colonel Bruce that AIA had decided not to go ahead with the program.

Some of the other considerations which apparently influenced AIA were the following:

a. Upon discussing the tentative program with the Heads of the other Sections in the Continental Division they found that these Section Heads were opposed to requesting personnel from the Allied agencies for the reason that personnel previously made available had suffered very high casualties. They did not believe they would be sympathetic to the idea.

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SECRETSubject: German Documents

b. They seemed convinced that the chances of getting agents into Germany were not very bright and that any man who was dropped in that country would have no chance of survival unless he was sure of being sheltered by friends who would feed him out of their rations. They were of the opinion that the counterfeiting of the German documents was a tremendously difficult undertaking, and as to some of them, such as ration tickets, a practical impossibility.

c. They felt that taking the war situation as it was and the prospect of revolution in Germany together with the time required to develop the program, that time could be spent to better advantage in other ways.

d. In addition to the recognized difficulties in obtaining the necessary personnel, it was also recognized that neither we nor the British had available officers suited to conduct a training course, nor did we have the physical facilities needed.

Reference was made above to the limitation upon recruiting activities of OSS in the United Kingdom. It seemed difficult however, to determine just what the limitation was and how it originated. In one of my conversations with Major Gallen I casually asked him what his understanding regarding this was. He said that before OSS entered the British Isles an agreement had been reached between the State Department and the British Foreign Office providing that no independent operations would be conducted by OSS out of Great Britain without the consent of the corresponding British authorities, with the proviso that in the event of any differences of opinion the matter might be taken to the Supreme Allied Command. This being the agreement about which IIS seemed to be in no doubt, it seemed to call for active collaboration with the British as occurred in the case of the Sussex plan. I found however, a certain reluctance to putting the cards on the table with our British counterparts, and a general feeling which seemed to be one of suspicion towards our dealings with the other Allied agencies in general.

My own experience with Major Gallen and the other officers of IIS was extremely satisfactory, and I found them most co-operative and prepared at all times to meet us fully half way on everything in a very friendly and helpful spirit.

Following the British decision not to proceed under the Kent plan other possible sources of obtaining personnel for the German Section were investigated, bearing in mind that no slots were available in order to recruit personnel from the American armed forces. The following proposals were submitted in writing:

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a. That a survey be made of all personnel in OSS ETO to ascertain those who had a knowledge of the German language and who had lived in Germany, with a view to making available some qualified persons. This information was obtained by examining all personnel records covering military, naval, WAAO and civilian personnel and was submitted along with the written suggestion. No action was taken.

b. Following conferences with Shaeff, with G-2 Etouza and with Colonel Gill, Provost Marshal, the necessary procedure for screening, selecting and transferring German prisoners of war to OSS was worked out and a proposal submitted in writing that this be undertaken by OSS having in mind not only the needs of the SI Branch, but also MO, X-2 and possibly RAA. It was ascertained that Lt. Col. Hochschild was in a position with a large staff of interrogators to co-operate with us in this attempt and that his brother Major Hochschild was in our X-2 Branch. Colonel Gill, Provost Marshal was most co-operative and assured me of his full support. The general feeling at this time was however, against the use of German prisoners of war as agents for the penetration of Germany.

c. The Heads of each of the Sections in the Continental Division dealing with the allied intelligence agencies were requested to proceed independently on behalf of the German Section and endeavour to have these Allied agencies make available to us personnel qualified to serve as agents in Germany. The results were negative.

Around 1 August, 1944, or shortly thereafter I was advised that I had been selected to accompany the OSS Forward Echelon to St. Pair sur Mer and I completed arrangements to proceed to France on the appointed date. On the eve of the morning of departure however, I was advised that it had been decided that SI would not have a representative with the Forward Echelon. A day or two later I was advised that Lt. Col. Vladia Kosarski, who had recently arrived from Cairo, where he had been in charge of SI, had been informed that he would be in charge of the German Section ETO and he assumed his duties and relieved me. Shortly afterwards arrangements were made for me to go to France accompanied by Mr. Edward W. Erne to act as a Forward Echelon to the German Section and especially to endeavour to recruit from all available sources suitable personnel for the penetration of Germany. It was understood that the German Section was interested in personnel who could be infiltrated through the lines after brief training, to obtain immediate tactical intelligence, also in suitable personnel to be parachuted behind the lines as well as any qualified persons who might serve in the post-war period. In other words, in addition to those found suitable

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for the most hazardous assignments, persons who would be willing to serve after the Nazi controls began to break down would be of interest as well as those who were particularly qualified for the post-war period. Conferences were held with the top officers of the BCRA here and letters of introduction were secured to Colonel Roulier.

Mr. Erbe and I left London on 24 August, 1944, and took a jeep with us. We landed on the Continent on 30 August, 1944, and proceeded to St. Piere sur Mer having been instructed to return to Lt. Col. Neave, whose HQ had been at Valonge. As he had already proceeded to Paris we continued to Paris and arrived there 31 August, 1944. Contacts were immediately established with Col. Roulier of the BCRA, with Lt. Col. Brunetiere, Chief of the Deutsches Bureau of the FFI, with the G-2 Section of the Ministry of War, with Major Wainburg of the FID, MIS, with Col. Spencer of the Interrogation Division of the Army Air Forces, with Captain Sacks of the First Forces located at Petit Brie and with various other possible sources. Through these various sources a number of prospects were made available and, after 10 days of effort, some bodies were recruited as likely prospects. It had been tentatively understood before leaving London that housing and training facilities for personnel selected would be made available by Colonel Neave.

Around 15 September, 1944, Colonel Maskell held a conference in Paris following a conference with General Donovan, and at that time he stated that all of the emphasis should be on tactical intelligence, particularly on the state of defenses of the Siegfried line, and recruiting should be concentrated upon securing persons who could be infiltrated through the lines.

Lt. Watt of the Labour Section, was to proceed to 3rd Army HQ to work in the neighbourhood of the Saar and Metz and Mr. Erbe was to proceed to 1st Army HQ to work in the general region of the Ardennes forest and Aachen.

At this conference it was stated that it was unlikely that we would have time to screen and select and secure the release of prisoners of war for use as agents in Germany.

My efforts continued in the Paris area and through the sources developed and others a total of around 10 persons were recruited. Some of these were being held in the area operated by the Labour Section at St. Germain. Others who had been working with the FFI or the BCRA were at liberty in Paris. About this time Colonel Neave informed me that recruiting activities must cease as personnel was lacking for proper supervision, training, etc. A place to use the personnel had been selected at St.

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Germain and the 15 bodies were taken there and I proceeded there to take charge and was joined by Mr Erne. In addition we had only two EM who were cooks. No guards were available, although it was pointed out at the time that some of the bodies had just come from prisoner of war cages and we had had no chance to screen them and no X-2 clearances had been secured..

Among the 15 bodies was a Czech known as Nick who had been selected to act as a stool pigeon. At the same time, X-2 was asked to photograph and finger print each of the group and the data they requested was submitted with a view to obtaining security clearance.

At this point the question of security clearance began to come to a head. It was clear that there was no practical way of checking either the stories or the references given by the prisoners of war and all that could be done was to check the card files of the French Securite Militaire and our own files in London. This was purely negative.

Colonel Mocarski arrived in Paris around the middle of September with Dr Adams and the preliminary screening of the 15 bodies was completed. It was tentatively decided to retain 7 and get rid of the other 8. At that time it was explained that the persons selected should for the most part be willing to be parachuted some distance behind the lines as a program would be based upon the theory that the war would last for some months and an effort be made to establish an independent intelligence network in Germany. 8 of the 7 had formerly been at liberty in the Paris area and were allowed to revert to that status, whereas the other two which had come from prisoner of war cages were to remain at St. Germain, it having been decided that the location of the area was to be moved to Epernay. (During the time that the area at St. Germain was operated, none of the 15 men were permitted to leave the grounds at any time).

On 7 October, 1944, personnel selected to operate RI Field Base B at Epernay left St. Germain. It consisted of Major Harwood, Lt. George Rabat to act as temporary administrative officer, a 1st Sgt, a Mess Sgt, 3 cooks, 3 drivers, and a general utility man and office worker, not including P/O Warren who was assigned to Lt Rabat as a driver. Of this group Lt Rabat spoke French fluently, but no German. None of the EM spoke either French or German. I was the only member of the Detachment speaking any German. Later Lt Farrel and Lt Harris reported for duty at Field Base B. Neither spoke any German. Lt Farrel spoke French slightly; Lt Harris not at all.

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Two buildings had been requisitioned at Epervanay and a third one was tentatively reserved after our arrival, as one of the two was not very well suited for the purpose it was to serve. In a matter of a week or ten days, 10 prisoners of war who had been screened by FID were delivered to Field Base B. These were in addition to the two brought from St. Germain, known as Billy and Finn. Likewise Adam was delivered from the HQ 7th Army. No guards had been made available and the problem of guarding the men was acute. On one of my trips to PW enclosure No. 7 at Compigne I met Colonel Palmer who informed me that he had been detailed to making a complete survey and report on the use of German prisoners of war as agents. He informed me that he had ascertained that the British had screened, by interview or examination of prisoner records, approximately 100,000 German prisoners of war. Of these 104 had been tentatively selected and sent to a holding area for observation and further screening. Out of the 104, 16 had been finally selected, this being at the rate of about 1 out of 650.

At Colonel Palmer's request I reviewed our experience with prisoners of war and the problems and the considerations which seemed to be involved, especially with regard to the matter of motivation. It was pointed out that the FID officers or others who were doing the preliminary screening, had very little insight into our requirements, being themselves experts in interrogating prisoners for intelligence only. Also that most of those whom they thought might be of interest to us had been fighting against us up until a few weeks previous to their selection. Also for the most part they were either privates or Pfc with an occasional NCO. I thought that Colonel Palmer had all these considerations very much in mind and he appeared to definitely be of the opinion that, unless a comprehensive program could be developed with suitable and adequate personnel for selecting, screening, and training prisoners of war (including suitable guards when needed), he did not believe they should be used.

About 20 October, 1944, Lt. Col. Morearski visited Field Base B, and stated at that time that following conferences with Colonel Palmer and Colonel Bruce it seemed reasonably certain that adequate guards would be made available and that we would proceed to work with prisoners of war. It was intended to use one of the houses to quarter the prisoners of war where they would be under guard and where the screening would take place. Those finally selected and approved by security would be moved to the main establishment. A third location would house agent personnel other than German and would provide class room facilities.

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Special Branch, No. 75

Several days later Lt. Kabat, upon returning from a trip to Paris, handed me orders from Colonel Neave stating that he had been advised by wireless of the decision that no German prisoners of war would be used among the personnel for the penetration of Germany and therefore all prisoners of war held at Field Base B should be immediately returned to the nearest prisoner of war enclosure. Pursuant to these instructions I personally delivered the 13 bodies, which we held, to prisoner of war enclosure No. 7 at Campieng and obtained their receipt.

On 25 October, 1944, Captain Macy reported for duty at Field Base B to relieve me, and I proceeded to Paris the following day. On 30 October, 1944, I was directed to proceed to London having made application under date of 26 October, 1944, that I be returned to the United States under the provisions of paragraph 3a of War Department circular 341, Washington, DC, dated 19 August, 1944. I arrived in London on 2 November, 1944.

A.H. Harwood,
Major, AGD.

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Special Branch, No. 75

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9 September 1944

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To: Secretariat

From: Commander John Ford, USNR

Subject: Report of Officer Returning from the Field.

A. The above mentioned officer, Commander John Ford, USNR, Branch Chief of Field Photographic Section, left Washington by air April 5, 1944, for the United Kingdom, arriving in London on the evening of April 6. I made a routine investigation of conditions there and found them very satisfactory. Field Photographic was in perfect accord and working in close personal contact with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Barry Wilson, his Chief of Staff, who were happy to enjoy their fullest confidence. Also, they were completing a picture for Air Chief Marshall Shelte Douglas, Head of Coastal Command.

We immediately put in a plan to photograph every O.S.S. activity in the ETO. Work was immediately started when an order came through from SHAEP commanding me to take charge of the sea borne photography for the United Nations. By direction of Colonel Bruce and Commander Armour we called our men in from the field and started to work. I was in charge of U. S. Navy, U. S. Coast Guard, British, Dutch, Polish, and French camera installations. Not having sufficient men to place on British ships, I enlisted the aid of a very dear friend, Lt. Col. George Stevens, famous Hollywood Motion Picture Director, who volunteered to cover their activities for me. This he did subsequently and did a splendid job with his outfit and continued with us from D-Day until D plus 8.

We placed fixed cameras on a great many landing crafts. This was a highly technical procedure that could only have been done by technicians of superior order, such as are enlisted with the O.S.S. in the Photographic Branch. We also placed fixed cameras on tanks. Later, this work turned out to be most successful and was probably the best film shot during the invasion of the beaches. Two men, Chief Petty Officer Danmore and Specialist Second Class Belmont were flown over from Washington to assist in this work. The credit for this job is due to the efforts of Lt. Mark Armistead, USNR, O.S.S., who did a strenuous job with his men covering the entire embarkation count by working 24 hours a day for six days. Lt. Armistead can now be too highly praised for his superb job.

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After the men were assigned, I held separate meetings with the Navy, Coast Guard, Army, Canadian, British, and the different national camera groups. We ran pictures, blackboard sketches, and I gave a talk on O.S.S. camera methods; each talk averaging about an hour and a half. They were told primarily that they should show their own particular groups at War. They were highly enthusiastic, welcomed the chats, and were anxious for more. The results of these indoctrination lectures were most satisfactory. The photographic results of the sea borne invasion have been acclaimed by the Public Relations Offices of the Navy and the other United Nations Public Relations Offices as superb.

I went on the invasion on a U.S.S. destroyer, which I knew would be one of the first to hit the beach and where I would be in a position to get around and contact the other men. The landing was rather soft, as I had figured. We suffered no casualties of a serious nature. Only one of our men, John Flynn, Sp2/c, USMP, was blown in the water, lost his camera and gear, but being a superb swimmer managed to swim to another destroyer. I went on the beach and true to my expectations found that the majority of my own outfit had disobeyed orders and had gone upon the beach with the invading troops. I summarily kicked them all back on their ships and then disobeyed orders myself and went forward to the taking of Grandcamp. This was excused because I was studying infiltration methods which might later be used by O.S.S.

After returning to my ship the days were quiet, but the nights were hell. The Germans had a new type of flare which stays suspended by some sort of heat repulsion from 12 to 15 minutes. During this time we were on constant alert and sleep was impossible. I sent numerous messages to General Donovan over the ship's telephone to his cruiser, but was never answered, so I gave up. Hazel and Ollie Boering were not there so we were on our own. We had many mishaps and adventures, but these naturally have not part in this record.

I then joined Lt. Armstrong and Chief Petty Officer Moreno, who were with Commander John Bellamy, PT Squadron, where I was most graciously received and with whom we stayed for five days and photographed some very remarkable photography at night with action against German E-boats - in and around Cherbourg.

Upon returning to London we found the rocket-propelled robot bomb in full operation. Several of the boys' lodgings had been destroyed - fortunately during the day while they were at the office. Many of the bombs were lighting in the district

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where the boys lived. This time they were coming over in fives, so I moved most of the outfit to Danham in the country. At this time, 2 plus 18, I withdrew Field Photographic from the invasion coast back to England and assigned them to Lt. Comdr. Spencer, who is doing the "K. Coverage. We started work at Peterborough and I am positive they are going to do a fine job. I then returned to the United States.

In the above mentioned, I cannot recommend too highly the work done by Lt. Comdr. Frederick Spencer, who did a magnificent job of staff work in preparing the entire United Nations and in accordance with the wishes of the U. S. Navy High Command and British Public Relations Office, I recommended him for the Legion of Merit, which I am sorry to say our Board of Awards has to ignore.

The work of Field Photographic in the United Kingdom is progressing favorably. They are at present working on a complete photographic report of O.S.S. activities in the United Kingdom. This I am sure will come out a thoroughly satisfying photographic document.

C. "What are conditions in the field that might be improved?"
I think that O.S.S. in general does remarkably well in the field under the capable leadership of Colonel David Bruce. They are thoroughly equipped, mentally and physically prepared, and about 80% by some miracle of fate, they seem to have transportation, which is the main problem in France.

D. "What specific difficulties are being encountered in the field of which I became personally aware?"

I want to mention in paragraph one that I with a group of six others attached ourselves to the 9th Air Force and returned to Warboys on a secret mission for Colonel Bruce. We didn't run into any specific difficulties. We were heartily welcomed and the men are still there doing a fine job.

This completes my report.

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JOHN FORD
Commander, USNR

cc: Col. Bruce

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Field Report
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 20 December 1944

TO : General Donovan
FROM : Secretariat
SUBJECT: Field Report by Mr. Huntington Harris

1. Attached is a report from Mr. Huntington Harris, who served with the SI branch, at first under cover in Portuguese East Africa, and later openly as chief of OSS in British West Africa. This report contains not only specific recommendations for OSS but also far-reaching suggestions regarding the relations of SI to other government agencies in peace as well as war.

2. Concerning the internal organization of OSS Mr. Harris makes the following statements:

a. That although relations between OSS/Washington and the field are closer than is the case with most government agencies, on certain occasions it would be highly desirable to permit every field agent to communicate directly with the Director.

b. Security should be tightened, and to do this it is recommended that:

(1) No one who is not directly concerned should have cognizance of operational matters.

(2) Operational information should be kept only in the operating unit except by explicit instruction of the Director.

(3) Each operating division should have its own cryptographic personnel.

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c. Civilians who act as agents should be awarded a suitable citation (naval or military) for services rendered during the war.

3. With respect to OSS relations with the State Department Mr. Harris suggests that complete autonomy of the agent in the field is necessary. The agent must be responsible to his superiors in SI only (with the direction of the organization responsible to the Secretary of State in peacetime and to JCS in wartime.)

4. Mr. Harris also feels that a central planning committee staffed and operated under the joint direction of the State, War and Navy Departments should be set up in Washington. Through this committee all non-operational intelligence should be channelled. The committee should be responsible for formulating programs setting forth intelligence needs and for pooling of information in Washington and the field.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

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Field report
X Hennen, Huntington
X Africa X SI

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - Huntington Harris

DATE: 1 December 1944

There is attached a field report submitted
by Huntington Harris, on field conditions in
Portuguese East Africa and British West Africa.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

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30 November 1944

To: Executive Officer, SI, (For submission to
Chief, SI, and Director, OSS)

From: Huntington Harris

Subject: Report on Field Conditions in Portuguese East
Africa and British West Africa

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Huntington Harris
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I. WHERE STATIONED: Subject was sent to Lourenco Marques, Portuguese East Africa, in November 1942 and remained at that post until May 1944. He was under cover of another government agency. From Lourenco Marques he was transferred to Acra, British West Africa, where he held the open position of Chief, OSS Mission, West Africa.

II. WORK UNDERTAKEN: Subject had an open charter to engage in whatever espionage and counter-espionage seemed in the best interests of the United States. The objectives of SI in Lourenco Marques defined themselves as follows:

- a. To collect all possible strategic information about Portuguese East Africa.
- b. To discover the nature of enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa.
- c. To do whatever seemed politic and expedient to counter enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa.

III. WORK DONE: Working in cooperation with an SI agent in Portuguese East Africa, an SI representative in the Union of South Africa, and with the British SIS and SOE representatives in both the Union and Portuguese East Africa, the following was done:

- a. Much of the available strategic information concerning

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Portuguese East Africa was secure.

b. Much was discovered about enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa and the Union of South Africa.

c. Steps were taken which have resulted in the effective destruction of the enemy organization in Portuguese East Africa.

d. The usual work of the covering agency was carried on.

e. In Accra, British West Africa, the usual liaison and administrative work of that office was carried on.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: From his experience in the field, this agent feels that the following recommendations are in order:

a. Relations with the State Department

(1) It is assumed that much S. activity in the present and future depends upon a clear working arrangement with the State Department. However, effective SI operations require complete autonomy for the agent in the field. This means that the agent must have entire privacy of communications with his superiors within the SI organization and that the agent must be responsible only to these superiors. Exception to this arrangement would be made only in those rare cases where, whether through failure of some secret operation or gross violation of the law of the country, the agent has become patently useless or harmful and the State Department representation, as ranking government official, must intervene.

(2) The complete autonomy of the field agent is needed, in the experience of this agent, because of the essential nature of the Foreign Service and the professional point of view of its personnel. Foreign Service officers are essentially symbolic figures; they must not (and finally often cannot) think or act outside of their prescribed boundaries; and

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these boundaries are traced to describe the dignity and rights of the United States rather than their entire interests. There is little room in this conception either for SI or for the kind of security within the State Department at home or abroad which is essential to secret operations. This agent can cite cases where an unsympathetic Foreign Service Officer, under existing arrangements, could and did wreck important operations.

(3) Assuming the need for an autonomous SI organization and admitting the necessity of full integration of all information gathered by whatever source in the field, the direction of the organization should be made responsible to the Secretary of State (but only to him) in peacetime and to the JCS in wartime or whenever the situation seems to warrant. Such an arrangement would avoid wasteful and harmful disputes on jurisdiction in the field between the State Department representatives and SI agents and assure complete integration of foreign intelligence in Washington.

b. Relations with other Government Agencies Abroad

(1) In the experience of this agent, there is a great deal of duplication of effort in the collection of information among various agencies abroad, even though the interests of organizations other than State and OES are particular rather than general and all-embracing. Some of this is unavoidable, but to assure most effective use of all information, whether secret or open, a central pooling of all such information should be established in Washington.

(2) A central depository and planning committee should be organized in Washington to which every item of foreign intelligence (opera-

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tional information only excepted) should be sent and by which intelligence needs would be formulated. It should also arrange for pooling of information in the field wherever possible. It should be staffed and operated with the most rigorous security and placed under the joint direction of State, War and Navy.

c. Internal Organization of OSS

(1) While relations between Washington and the field, in the experience of this agent, are closer in this organization than they are in State, War and Navy, they could and should be much closer. The reason for this is that the agent usually works without precise precedent and in highly particular and sometimes dangerous situations. Very formal relations of the sort that appear to govern the field personnel of State, War and Navy are inadequate to efficient SI activity. One way of tightening the connection and improving the confidence between Washington and the field would be to allow every field agent of the organization the right to communicate directly by letter or cable with the Director. It would be understood that no abuse of this privilege would be allowed.

(2) The internal security of OSS should be improved to such an extent that absolutely no one who is not directly concerned with operations should have any knowledge of them. In the experience of this agent, it is definitely harmful to the efficiency of people in the field to learn that matters which he treats with the greatest circumspection are semi-public within the organization. To the end of greater security within the organization, the following should be done:

(a) Back operating division should have its own cryptographic personnel under its own orders.

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(b) No operational information should be seen or kept anywhere but within the operating unit excepting on explicit instruction of the direction.

(3) If the feelings of this agent are any guide, some arrangement should be made in behalf of under cover civilian agents to the end that they can identify themselves as having been closely concerned with the war in their own way. Such agents get none of the benefits of military service and can get many of its hardships. At the same time they have no very honorable way of describing their activities during the war and probably will suffer in consequence of the lack. It is suggested that one way of remedying this lack would be by conferring some suitably minor military or naval decoration upon those agents of this class who are considered deserving. The citation would simply be for services rendered during the war; there would be no specification of the kind of activity undertaken, its auspices, or its time and place.

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30 November 1944

To: **Home Office Officer, SI, (for submission to Chief, SI, and Director, OSS)**

From: **Sebastian Harris**

Subject: **Report on Field Conditions in Portuguese East Africa and British East Africa**

I. WHERE STATIONED: Subject was sent to Lourenco Marques, Portuguese East Africa, in November 1942 and remained at that post until May 1944. He was under cover of another government agency. From Lourenco Marques he was transferred to Accra, British West Africa, where he held the open position of Chief, OSS Mission, West Africa.

II. WORK UNDERTAKEN: Subject had an open charter to engage in whatever espionage and counter-espionage seemed in the best interests of the United States. The objectives of SI in Lourenco Marques defined themselves as follows:

- a. To collect all possible strategic information about Portuguese East Africa.
- b. To discover the nature of enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa.
- c. To do whatever seemed politic and expedient to counter enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa.

III. WORK DONE: Working in co-operation with an SI agent in Portuguese East Africa, an SI representative in the Union of South Africa, and with the British SI and OSS representatives in both the Union and Portuguese East Africa, the following was done:

- a. Much of the available strategic information concerning

SECRET

-3-
SECRET

Portuguese East Africa was covered.

b. Much was discovered about enemy activity in Portuguese East Africa and the Union of South Africa.

c. Steps were taken which have resulted in the effective destruction of the enemy organization in Portuguese East Africa.

d. The usual work of the covering agency was carried on.

e. In Accra, British West Africa, the usual liaison and administrative work of that office was carried on.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: From his experience in the field, this agent feels that the following recommendations are in order:

a. Relations with the State Department

(1) It is assumed that much SI activity in the present and future depends upon a clear working arrangement with the State Department. However, effective SI operations require complete autonomy for the agent in the field. This means that the agent must have entire privacy of communications with his superiors within the SI organization and that the agent must be responsible only to those superiors. Exception to this arrangement would be made only in those rare cases where, whether through failure of some secret operation or gross violation of the law of the country, the agent has become patently useless or harmful and the State Department representative, as ranking government official, must intervene.

(2) The complete autonomy of the field agent is needed, in the experience of this agent, because of the essential nature of the Foreign Service and the professional point of view of its personnel. Foreign Service officers are essentially symbols; figured; they must act (and finally often cannot) within set bounds of their prescribed boundaries; and

SECRET

-1-

SECRET

these boundaries are traced to describe the dignity and rights of the United States rather than their entire interests. There is little room in this conception either for SI or for the kind of security within the State Department at home or abroad which is essential to secret operations. This agent can cite cases where an unsympathetic Foreign Service Officer, under existing arrangements, could and did wreck important operations.

(3) Assuming the need for an autonomous SI organization and admitting the necessity of full integration of all information gathered by whatever source in the field, the direction of the organization should be made responsible to the Secretary of State (but only to him) in peacetime and to the JCS in wartime or whenever the situation seems to warrant. Such an arrangement would avoid wasteful and harmful disputes on jurisdiction in the field between the State Department representatives and SI agents and assure complete integration of foreign intelligence in Washington.

b. Relations with other Government Agencies Abroad

(1) In the experience of this agent, there is a great deal of duplication of effort in the collection of information among various agencies abroad, even though the interests of organizations other than State and JCS are particular rather than general and all-embracing. Some of this is unavoidable, but to assure most effective use of all information, whether secret or open, a central pooling of all such information should be established in Washington.

(2) A central depository and planning committee should be organized in Washington to which every item of foreign intelligence (opera-

SECRET

-4-

SECRET

tional information only accepted) should be sent and by which intelligence needs would be formulated. It should also arrange for pooling of information in the field wherever possible. It should be staffed and operated with the most rigorous security and placed under the joint direction of State, War and Navy.

c. Internal Organization of OSS

(1) While relations between Washington and the field, in the experience of this agent, are closer in this organization than they are in State, War and Navy, they could and should be much closer. The reason for this is that the agent usually works without precise precedent and in highly particular and sometimes dangerous situations. Very formal relations of the sort that appear to govern the field personnel of State, War and Navy are inadequate to efficient SI activity. One way of tightening the connection and improving the confidence between Washington and the field would be to allow every field agent of the organization the right to communicate directly by letter or cable with the Director. It would be understood that no abuse of this privilege would be allowed.

(2) The internal security of OSS should be improved to such an extent that absolutely no one who is not directly concerned with operations should have any knowledge of them. In the experience of this agent, it is definitely harmful to the efficiency of people in the field to learn that matters which he treats with the greatest circumspection are semi-public within the organization. To the end of greater security within the organization the following should be done:

(a) Each operating division should have its own cryptographic personnel under its own orders.

SECRET

-4-

SECRET

(b) To operational information should be seen or kept anywhere but within the operating unit excepting on explicit instruction of the direction.

(3) If the feelings of this agent are any guide, some arrangement should be made in behalf of under cover civilian agents to the end that they can identify themselves as having been closely concerned with the war in their own way. Such agents get none of the benefits of military service and can get none of its hardships. At the same time they have no very honorable way of describing their activities during the war and probably will suffer in consequence of the lack. It is suggested that one way of remedying this lack would be by conferring some suitably minor military or naval decoration upon those agents of this class who are considered deserving. The citation would simply be for services rendered during the war; there would be no specification of the kind of activity undertaken, its scope, or its time and place.

SECRET



Date: 12/12/44

To: Mr. John O'Gara

Re: Attached - Field Reports of
Mr. Christ Brix and Major J.P.
Harris

Please speak to me about the
attached.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

of

SECRET

*Dec 14/44
Mr. Harris Col Buxton
discuss the
of the on "alcohol with
of Mann now island he
following through
making the papers
G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director*

12/12/44

11/2/44
FROM: David Williamson

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Field Report 15774
X Chief Clerk

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SECRETARIAT SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. Mark				<i>Wm</i>	OSS <i>See also Field Report 15695</i>
2. Scrivener	2153			<i>SS</i>	<i>X Harris of P.</i>
3. Chance				<i>W.C.</i>	
4. Check	2011 Q			<i>Kitt</i>	
5. ONE REPORTS OFFICER	227 Admin.				Herewith report from Mr. Briz who has terminated his services with OSS. Mr. Briz is the editor of two newspapers in the Midwest, one of which is in the Danish language. <i>DAVID WILLIAMSON</i>
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
No Officer Designations are separate sheet.

SECRET

13,774
Field Report
x Brix, Christ

Chicago, October 30, 1944.

x H.O.

Mr. David Williamson, Chief
 European and Mediterranean Operations,
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Williamson:

As per your request, I am herewith submitting my report.

I thoroughly enjoyed the conversation with you after my return from the ESO, and with our talk in mind, I have made a sincere effort to give you as complete a picture as possible. My position regarding future plans for OSS operations has, since our talk, been changed by our great misfortune - the loss of our son, Lt. Viggo Brix, USAAF, who was killed in action over Italy while on his 34th mission. It was a terrible blow to us, and to me a challenge to make myself available to the country for which my son now has made the supreme sacrifice.

With my "Impressions and Opinions" I hope to have made a worthwhile contribution toward the future protection of our country.

This material is naturally placed at your full disposal.

I have, at your suggestion, written to Mr. Frederick Shoninger in London requesting him to forward a copy of my paper "Consolidation Operations in Denmark" to you.

May I express my deep appreciation of the opportunity to serve as a member of the Office of Strategic Services.

Most sincerely,

Christ Brix

Christ Brix
 1240 Armitage Ave.
 Chicago 47, Ill.

13,774
Field Report
 x Brix, Christ

Chicago, October 30, 1944.

x M O

Mr. David Williamson, Chief
 European and Mediterranean Operations,
 Office of Strategic Services
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Williamson:

As per your request, I am herewith submitting my report.

I thoroughly enjoyed the conversation with you after my return from the ETO, and with our talk in mind, I have made a sincere effort to give you as complete a picture as possible. My position regarding future plans for OCS operations has, since our talk, been changed by our great misfortune - the loss of our son, Lt. Viggo Brix, USAAF, who was killed in action over Italy while on his 34th mission. It was a terrible blow to us, and to me a challenge to make myself available to the country for which my son now has made the supreme sacrifice.

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Most sincerely,

Christ Brix

Christ Brix
 2203 Aradings Ave.
 Chicago 47, Ill.

R E P O R T

by

CHRIST BRUX

Covering my activities as a member of Office of Strategic Services during the period of April 23-Oct. 10, 1944.

* * *

At the instigation of Mr. Walter Kelly of Chicago, and after several interviews and the submission of the required personal information, I attended "Area 5" from April 23-26, after which final arrangements were made with Mr. Samuel Scrivener, Jr.

Attended "Area F" from May 8-June 17, 1944. Was "alerted" June 14th and left New York on June 22 on board the "Queen Elizabeth" arriving in London by train from Glasgow on June 29, 1944.

Reported to MD headquarters on June 30 and was assigned to Mr. Frederick Shoeninger with instructions to establish a Scandinavian section.

After consultations with Mr. Rae Smith I prepared a plan for specific MD operations in Denmark and Norway in full coordination with the current overall campaign for the establishment of German Soldiers' and Workers' Committees directed toward the breaking down of German morale and the formation of groups to oppose and fight the Nazi regime.

As part of this plan I produced leaflets directed at:

-German soldiers in Denmark and Norway purporting to come from Soldiers' Committees in Germany urging the soldiers to form their own committees, throw out their Nazi officers, stop fighting and prepare for the reconstruction of Germany.

-German workers purporting to come from established Soldiers' Committees in Denmark and Norway urging the workers to organize, openly or underground, to hinder production and demand cessation of hostilities in order to save what was left and spare family and home.

-Danish and Norwegian workers in Germany for distribution of leaflets inside Germany, and to foster organized resistance among the

BRIY-2

foreign workers.

-German Social-Democrats through a purported plea from Danish and Norwegian Socialists to take the leadership in organizing the German workers.

-The Danish farmers. A series of conversations between a city mechanic and a typical farmer, who like other Danish farmers have made good money on selling food to the Germans, and who misunderstand the saboteur and the necessity for resistance against the Germans.

-The four separate resistance groups in Norway with appeal to consolidate the home front and to resume active and militant resistance against the Germans and the Quisling government.

-A certain German garrison in Denmark purporting to come from another German garrison in Denmark, who had actually revolted against their transfer to the Russian front, urging that they too should organize and demand the truth about the retreat in the East.

-Norwegian Quislings in the form of poison pen letters.

Wrote a paper on "Consolidation Operations in Denmark" for the immediate post-war period.

Transferred August 29 and became a member of "MO Intelligence, Research and Planning Section".

Wrote a daily news summary and commentary, which was forwarded to our Paris office.

Did some writing for one of our German papers.

Took part in the reading out and channeling of all available intelligence material. Analysis of captured enemy documents and mail. Formulation of ideas for "black" use in newspapers, radio, leaflets, stickers and cartoons. Specific research on request of other departments.

This section also maintained a monitoring unit of three members.

Left London on October 4, 1944 for return to U. S. and reported in Washington on October 10-11, 1944.

BRIL-3

IMPRESSIONS and OPINIONS

Being personal experiences, observations and the consensus of numerous conversations and discussions with co-workers in the ITO.

* * *

Equipment - Military equipment is plentiful. Uniform is worn only when on special missions or when assigned to a Combat Team. More civilian clothes are necessary.

Arrival - A written or printed schedule of "firsts", such as police registration, ration regulations, living quarters, etc. should be handed each new arrival.

Living Expenses - In order to cover actual living expenses in England, it is necessary to allow \$100-\$150 monthly in addition to the regular subsistence pay, which differs in accordance with the base pay.

Classification - The handling of new personnel is done in a very haphazard way. Too often men are placed in the wrong pew, and excellent talent wasted away in unimportant routine work. Such methods have proved very disheartening to many of our men, and has materially reduced our effectiveness.

Organizational Defects - It struck me, as well as many others, that the London office was suffering from lack of aggressive attitude and coordinated planning, and speaking frankly - with malice toward none, the sole responsibility for this defection lies with Mr. Rae Smith and his advisors, Mr. Howard Baldwin and Mr. Frederick Shoninger, primarily exponents of advertising and selling, who lacks the proper psychological approach to war geared propaganda.

It was wrong to expect that Mr. Smith, whose past and future was and will be a shade British, should be able to present a typical American approach to psychological warfare. This is no reflection upon Mr.

BRII-4

Smith's patriotism, which cannot be questioned, but with this apparent attitude, it can rightly be stated, that our offensive never really got under way, and the result is, that we are playing second and third fiddle to the British. This is unfair to intelligent and capable Americans who often were stymied in their progressive attitude. Proposals were shoved aside, not with reason and superior arguments, but with remarks like: "We have done it this way for four years, why should we change now?" or "We have to live with the Germans after the war, when you go home!" Such atmosphere is not conducive to spirited production.

The London office was overstaffed wasting valuable men and breaking the morale of the entire organization. Surplus personnel should have been returned or, if possible, placed with other OSS units.

The staff lacked up-to-date information on current directives to guide their work.

Procedure within the various groups failed through lack of conferences to make for coordination of individual efforts. From my own experience, as member of the Intelligence, Research and Planning Section, I found that our daily conference, I believe the only one in the whole MD organization, was extremely useful in sifting material and ideas, preventing someone from going off in the wrong direction, and hearing reports on accepted and rejected material. This section rapidly became one of the most productive units. Its director was Mr. Wm. Burke Miller, now doing radio work in Paris.

Disrespected appointments, unanswered memorandums and a general waste of time did much to make the word "Frustration" the one most often heard in the London office.

To attempt any judgment of the individual members of the London office as to their value and effectiveness would be a most unfair and

BSIX-5

impossible task, since many men were not given an opportunity to show their worth.

Operations - While I am not familiar with all the activities in London, I would like to give favorable mention to our groups working on radio station "Soldatensender" and the newspaper "Nachrichten für die Truppe", where excellent and effective work is being performed. Also in the interrogation of German war prisoners and intelligence contacts with the 8th and 9th U. S. Army Air Corps.

* * *

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O S S - PRESENT and FUTURE ACTIVITIES

* * *

In addition to the present war activities of the OSS must in natural sequence be considered a second phase, that of the occupation period, and a third phase of possible peace time operations.

War Operations - The final evaluation of OSS activities as a war agency cannot as yet be written, but it will be an honorable one, because our military leaders have already acclaimed its tremendous value in the war against our enemies.

Occupation Operations - Its second phase of operations, occupation activity, started with the Italian campaign, where OSS Combat Teams preceded AMG administrative groups and took over and operated civilian agencies. A new task is now approaching as more and more German territory fall to the Allied armies.

Peace Operations - The American people no doubt is determined to do everything in its power to prevent all possible aggression in the future. The sacrifices of human lives will bring home to our people, as never before, the urgent necessity of instituting vigilant measures for the maintenance of peace and the full protection of our national freedom and independence.

We cannot permit that the slightest threat to our nation's interests be allowed to develop into a danger on the scale of the present conflict.

We must prepare now to insure our national safety in the future.

We must realize:

That the Nazi and all racial ideologies must be uprooted and constructive and peaceful conceptions of international relations put

BRIK-7

in its place.

That the desire of conquered nations for revenge must be watched and turned to human understanding or be crushed.

That recurring frictions among nations must be watched and eliminated.

That political developments and alliances must be watched for sinister purposes detrimental to peace.

That we shall need a well trained and intelligent world listening post, an agency capable of detecting danger in any sort of cloak and capable of activities designed to prevent such danger from becoming serious friction and developing into armed aggression.

Because of its background, its specific training in the analysis, control and direction of an objective, because of the valuable experience it is gaining through the present conflict, and because of its position apart from any and all political influences, The OSS is the logical organization to undertake such work.

Its actions must be guided by the sole purpose of ruthlessly protecting America's freedom and integrity and world peace; never to become a party to political or commercial conspiracies, but to function creditably and in accordance with democratic conceptions of international justice and peace. Its activities should be considered as two coordinated efforts. First, to observe and report, and next, to initiate preventive action.

I.

To observe and report:

The activities of all possible Nazi and Fascist groups whether openly or underground.

All political parties, their intent and tactics and their leaders

BRII-8

as well as all similar popular movements.

All tendencies within existing and new alliances of groups of powers.

The results and tendencies of all existing and proposed commercial alliances and treaties.

Economic stability and tendencies.

The tendencies in all educational institutions.

The tendencies of literature, stage, film, radio and press.

Military training, equipment and personnel.

II.

Preventive Action.

The nature of preventive action shall be comprised of publicity, lectures, film, exhibits and good-will services to public and commercial groups, and such actions as may be designated by order of the State Department.

Cover for Operations - All activities as an OSS agency must be kept strictly confidential, but in order to insure freedom of movement, a cover must be established for public use. The agency may appear as a press bureau, foreign correspondent, news service, advertising agency or commercial representative.

Relation to Diplomatic Corps - No OSS agency, or its cover, shall officially be known as having any connection whatever with the U. S. Government, nor shall it in any manner have any direct connection with or be known to the U. S. diplomatic representative stationed in the same theatre. Neither can it in case of a crisis or difficulty claim the protection of the U. S. Government.

* * *



SECRET*John D. Brown***OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

15:771

*Field Report**Council, Harry G.**1st*

7 November 1944

*for return to
the original
person in charge***MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, Schools and Training
Chief, Medical Services****FROM: Chief, Secretariat**

It has been requested that the Schools and Training and Medical Services branches submit joint recommendations to the Director on the question of how to implement in Washington the suggestions made by Lt. Council concerning the combating of disease in the field.

It would be appreciated if such joint recommendations could be routed to the Director through the Secretariat.

Charles A. Bane

Charles A. Bane
Lt., USNR
Chief, Secretariat

1st Ind.

SCM/rm

Lt. Col. S. C. Missal, M. C., Chief Surgeon, Medical Services Office, 208 North, OSS, Washington, D. C.

21 November 1944

TO: Chief, Secretariat**FROM: Chief, Schools & Training**

1. The Chief, Schools & Training, and the Chief, Medical Services, have cooperated on a joint program of medical instruction to be given at the various training areas. What is being taught is best shown in the enclosed pamphlet from Major Lestfegol to Col. Beckman. It is felt by both departments that the present program of instruction embodies all the

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suggestions made by Lt. Council and even goes beyond it.

2. This training program may not have been in effect at the time Lt. Council received his training.

3. Request that the inclosed pamphlet be returned to this office since it is the property of Major Lostfogel.

Sylvester C. Missal
 SYLVESTER C. MISSAL
 Lt. Colonel, M. C.
 Chief Surgeon
 Medical Services Office

2nd Ind.

(MSG, Schools & Training Branch, Washington, D.C. 24 November 1944.

TO: Chief, Secretariat.

1. Approved.

For the Chief, Schools & Training:

Philip K. Allen
 PHILIP K. ALLEN
 Major, VA
 Executive for Training

SECRET

SECRET

3rd Ind.

CSG, Schools & Training Branch, Washington, D.C. 24 November 1944.
To: Chief, Secretariat.

1. Approved.

For the Chief, Schools & Training:

PHILIP K. ALLEN
Major, FA
Executive for Training

SECRET

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 August 1944

24/221
15751
Final Report
*James E. Hays***MEMORANDUM**

TO: The Director

THROUGH: Lt. Col. Carl O. Hoffmann

FROM: Lt. Harry G. Council, Jr.

SUBJECT: Report On Return From The Field.

1. My actual duty was the recruiting, training and leading native (Kachin) troops in action against the enemy to harass and disrupt all his movements. With this, my job was also to get information of all enemy concentrations, fortifications, improvements, ammunition dumps, storage houses and to report all movements, and if possible, to identify all enemy units involved.

2. This work in Burma has been developed by resourceful and far sighted officers in charge to a very efficient extent. The combat and intelligence units in the field from OSSU, 101 have all made a fine record for themselves and the parent organization.

The Commanding Officers of OSSU, 101 have taken full advantage of the use of British personnel present in the theater who have a fine working knowledge, through years of experience, of all the territory, people and terrain involved.

The fighting groups of Kachins led by OSSU, 101 officers have cut communications and supply lines so much as to make many, otherwise impossible, victories for allied military forces fighting in Burma.

Three-fifths of all air targets given one wing of the USAF during last spring came from OSSU 101 field units on duty behind the Japanese lines in Burma. The USAF Commanding Officer commented on the accuracy of location and description of the targets and the speed in which the results were reported.

3. The main enemy in the field is disease. Issues head nets. Make the use of repellent, screening and netting a habit. The taking of quinine or atabrine as a prophylactic measure against malaria is fully warranted and should be compulsory.

All men going into the field should be taught hygiene and camp sanitation. It is imperative, repeat, imperative that all personnel going to the field have a working knowledge of First Aid. Many lives

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- 3 -

of Kachin soldiers have been lost due to the lack of this. We lost very few Kachins, but several that we did lose could have been saved if the leaders present had known what to do.

Many men were on the "sick list" a great part of the time because they knew nothing of camp sanitation and so suffered from dysentery.

4. Difficulties encountered:

- a. Sanitation
- b. Malaria control
- c. The unsuitability of the terrain for moving anything that a coolie can't carry.

HARRY G. COUNCIL, JR.
2d Lieut., Infantry

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**15,7105
Field report

x Kaffman Ray

DATE: November 27, 1944

i SEAC

x S I

TO : Director, OCM

FROM : Director, SI

SUBJECT: Ray Kaffman's Report on Field Conditions

✓ Attached is Ray Kaffman's report on field conditions,
February 16 to October 25, 1944. ✓

11/28/44
NAC
Haw
JCS
Mansfield
W. H. Kaffman
Whitney H. Shepardson

CONFIDENTIAL

15,765
Field report

10 November 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Chief, SI

From: Mr. Ray F. Kauffman (SI-SEAC)

Subj: Report on Field Conditions, February 16 to October 25, 1944

A. Personnel Activity in the Field

The writer has been training personnel, organizing field problems, and then conducting agents into enemy territory. He has also had charge of the planning and organizing of four missions, three of which were executed. These missions were carried out on two S/M patrols, the first in July and the second in September. See operational reports (1) Ripley I, (2) Caprice, and (3) Ripley II.

B. Progress of work

The results for the most part were gratifying and considerable information of value, both military and economic, was obtained.

Sixteen Indonesians were captured and brought back to Ceylon; five of these are prospective agents and two have been successfully reintroduced into Sumatra.

Two native canoes were brought back, both of which have been valuable for subsequent operations.

A radio relay station has been established in Sumatra and to date every schedule has been made with the base station at Trinco.

Documents, including personal passes, ship registration papers, small boat certificates of registration, crew and cargo manifests, and many other miscellaneous papers were obtained.

Japanese occupational guilders, clothing and personal effects, were obtained and have proven invaluable for the establishment of cover for agents being introduced into enemy territory.

For full reports on the accomplishments, see operational reports mentioned in "A" above.

- 2 -

C. Conditions in the Field which might be improved

Conditions in the field are good and the machinery is there and well set up for execution of all projects contemplated.

Some mild friction exists among the various branches regarding their prerogative, but the writer does not feel that any handicap has been placed on any individual or group desiring to do a good job of work in the field.

Morale, as in any outfit, is in direct proportion to the amount of work on hand. Therefore, because of a shortage of transportation (see "D" below) there is a normal amount of complaining because several individuals feel that they are not active enough. However, it is obvious that if OSS is to play a major role in SEAC, considerable backlog of men is necessary. Also, new personnel arriving in the field cannot, except in rare instances, expect immediate and exciting action.

D. Specific Difficulties

There are two major difficulties (1) transportation, and (2) good agents.

(1) Transportation is short, particularly for the southern part of the Theater, where S/M must be used. PBY's can be used within their range, but for obvious reasons are a poor substitute for S/M.

MJ has an elaborate program for the use of their own small ships. Although the writer is not fully informed on this program, he feels that its eventual success at this time is questionable. When advance bases, i.e. The Andaman Islands are taken, their program should be extremely effective.

(2) Recruiting of good agents is a difficult problem, because there are not enough of them born. Further, it is extremely difficult to indoctrinate Orientals, who are apathetic, passive, and almost entirely lacking in any strong motivating force such as hatred of the enemy or a nationalistic or patriotic spirit. Therefore, patience and understanding are essential on the part of the Conducting Officer, and personal friendship and trust will go a long way in overcoming their lack of other motives.

The writer suggests that more concentrated effort be made to recruit agents in the occupied countries, and that body-snatching projects be included in all S/M operations wherever possible.

CONFIDENTIAL RFX
R.F.X.

P

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

15,764

Field report
x 5'

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, ONS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Philip D. Gerashevich

DATE: 27 November 1944

a memo
x Gerashevich

There is attached a field report of Philip D. Gerashevich, and the comments on this report submitted by Capt. B. Kurlandson.

Wm. H. L. L.
Philip D. Gerashevich

Attachment

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

15, v4

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : Chief, SI****DATE: November 24, 1944****FROM : D. DeBardleben****SUBJECT: Philip D. Gurashevich and his report on Field Conditions**

I have no comment to make on this report which is without value. It is forwarded only to complete the record.

Mr. Gurashevich is a young man of twenty-one who was recruited by the SE Europe Section, SI, in September 1943. He arrived at Bari in March 1944. At Bari he remained, apparently without duties of any importance, until his return to Washington on November 22, 1944.

Proper authority, in the field, reports that Gurashevich's manner of performance of the duties assigned to him was unsatisfactory. He will be separated from OSS without delay.

D. DeB.
D. DeB.

SECRET

15,764

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, OSI, through Chief of SI

DATE: 24 November 1944

FROM: Philip D. Guraskovich

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

A. What I did in the field:

Most of my time in the field was spent preparing to go on a mission. My activities were therefore mostly connected with schools and training. There were two radio schools that I attended, one in Algiers and the other in Bari. The only other course I had taken was parachute school which was solely under the supervision of the British Army.

A very small part of my activities upon first arriving in Bari was to interview Yugoslav prisoners who had been released when the Allies liberated certain places. These men, of course, were prospects to be recruited for Yugoslav, SI.

B. Achievements in the field:

My parachute and radio training were both completed in Bari. That is, I was released from both schools supposedly prepared for field work.

C. Personal observations and opinion of conditions in the field:

Upon first arriving in the field there may have been certain difficulties that I might have been aware of. But after almost a year, it was certainly obvious that these difficulties were ironed out in due time.

D. Specific difficulties in the field on which I personally became aware:

The same as C. above.

Philip D. Guraskovich
Philip D. Guraskovich

SECRET



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mr. B. Homer Hall

DATE: 18 December 1944

L S I

X in ETO

X in Italy Desk

1. The attached report from Mr. B. Homer Hall contains an account of his activities in Italy. Mr. Hall's trip to the Mediterranean was made for the purpose of establishing a Swiss SI desk in that theater.

2. The tenor of the report is most optimistic. The overall picture is one of cooperation at all levels, between the various units of SI, between OSS and G-2 and between OSS and the Air Forces. An example of the latter can be found in the operation described on pp. 3 and 4.

3. Mr. Hall states that in any but the most exceptional cases he believes it inadvisable to send civilians into Italy.

W. B. Kantack.
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

CAB

USS Form

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

15,760
Field report

PL. H:

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Pwd'd.		
1. <i>Banks</i>				<i>[Signature]</i>	
2. Chief, SI				<i>[Signature]</i>	For your signature
3. Chief, CMB					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

15,760
Field Report
x Hall Home
x SI
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director, OSS
FROM Chief, SI
SUBJECT Field Report - Homer Hall

DATE: 24 November 1944

x NIETO

x Swiss class

There is attached a field report submitted by
Homer Hall on Mission to NIETO.

W. H. Shepherdson

24 November 1944

TO: W. T. M. Beale, Lt., U.S.N.R.
 FROM: E. Homer Hall
 SUBJECT: Mission to MISO

The mission upon which I departed from Washington, D. C., on June 24, 1944, was planned solely for the purpose of establishing an SI, Swiss Desk in MISO.

Upon my arrival in Algiers on June 27, 1944, I found Hdqs. Co. 2677th OSS (Prov.) in a complete state of flux, due to necessary preparations in connection with the regiment's transfer to San Lucia, Italy. Despite the general confusion, I was able to dig up enough Swiss cables from as yet unpacked files to make the discovery that operations as related to Berne, Switzerland, had been overlooked. Not because of neglect, I believe, but largely due to the fact that no single individual had been charged with the duty of activating Swiss information and suggested operations. Information had been passed along to G-2 in a dilatory manner by anyone in French SI who happened to think such and such an item might be valuable, and a few pin-point missions, based in Berne, had been carried out in Italy. Practically all SI duty came to a halt during the transfer of personnel and equipment to Italy. The move was completed on July 10, although office files and equipment continued to trickle in for some two weeks.

After "stealing" a typewriter--which I signed for about three weeks later when the Supply Officer discovered my theft--and without secretarial assistance, an office was set up in conjunction with Captain Montante, Italian SI, and Lt. Hal Parsons, French SI. This set-up proved materially beneficial all around. My debut steps, as I saw them, were:

1. To shorten the routes of communication from Berne via San Lucia to Operations Bases in Siena, other northern points, and Bari. (It had previously taken 10 days for operational plans to reach the activating units, Companies "A" and "B"). By eliminating previous delays and undesirable extra handling, time consumed in the transmittal of information was cut to six days. After my departure it was cut still further.
2. To establish relations with G-2, AFHQ.
3. To establish relations with the Air Force, AFHQ.

SECRET

- 2 -

I found G-2 hungry for intelligence emanating from Switzerland. A shortage of transportation within OSS did not permit regimental headquarters to assign the Swiss Desk a jeep, but G-2 solved that little problem by ordering one of its own officers to make the two and one-half mile trip from AFHQ, Caserta to San Lucia, twice daily for the sole purpose of picking up intelligence items from the Swiss Desk. Before the close of my mission, I paid my departing respects to G-2 and was then informed that intelligence coming from the Swiss Desk, SI, was by far the most important long-distance information it received from any source.

Officers of the Air Force were far more cooperative than I had been led to suspect. Within a short time, Colonel Hull, Chief of MAAF Intelligence, after receiving a frank story of Swiss-Italian OSS operations, agreed to place a squadron at our disposal upon call. Lt. (jg) Robert Wunschope, USNR, who arrived to assist me and later take over the Swiss Desk, subsequently had as many as three and four squadrons placed at his command within three hours of requests.

Upon agreement by all hands, it was decided that SI and SO, Italy, should be correlated with SI and SO, Berno, with the head of the Swiss Desk, 2877th Regt., San Lucia, acting as a sort of "chairman of the board". For the next week or ten days, I practically attached myself to Italian, SI, and, in company with Captain Montante and Major Riosa of that latter Section, went to the field for the purpose of viewing operations as carried on by Captain Max Cerve and Lt. Jimenez, commanding Company "A" and Company "B", respectively. My admiration for the work of these two last named officers, their commands, and the whole picture of Italian SI is unbounded. I reported at length on this matter to Mr. Earl Brennan in an earlier memorandum that was routed through Mr. Whitney Shepardson. Without the assistance of these men, it would have been an exceedingly difficult task to establish a Swiss Desk in Italy. Subsequent reports from Lt. Wunschope, and achievements resulting from the merger of the two Sections, are proof positive that this harmonious relationship is being maintained and that the teams are working like well-oiled machinery, if you'll pardon the cliché.

Following the trip north of Rome I submitted three reports to Washington: (a) General Recommendations; (b) Suggested Plan for Correlation of Swiss-Italian Operations, SI; (c) Suggested Plan for Correlation of Swiss-Operations, SO. With some slight changes these suggestions were accepted, above the signature of Mr. Reginald Foster.

Meanwhile, eight missions to northern Italy, to be led by men selected in Switzerland, were suggested to Berno. The challenge was accepted immediately by Berno and these missions were laid out: Istria, Gorizia, Trentino, Bolzano, Bergamo, Brescia, Southern Piedmont, Val d'Aosta. Several of these pin points were completed before I left the theatre, and the others, together with many additional operations, have since been brought to successful conclusions.

SECRET

- 3 -

From the moment the Swiss Desk became an actual fact, cable traffic soared. From about 15 July, when Berne was informed that the Desk was ready to do business, to about 4 August, more than 380 items of intelligence were received from the field via Berne. Over 95% dealt with SO, bomb targets, bomb damage, train troop movements. Reports on war plant production, etc., comprised 4% of the intelligence. Less than 1% consisted of miscellaneous subjects such as enemy morale, enemy code names, etc. The percentage breakdown by countries shows the following distribution: Italy, 84%, France 30%, Germany 13%, Austria 0.5%, Gibraltar enemy action 0.3%, Poland 0.2%.

Lt. Wauchope, arriving in Italy on July 15, assumed charge of the Swiss Desk on or about August 5. Judging from some 16 pouch reports received from him since that date and word-of-mouth reports from various individuals returning from the field, the Swiss Desk has become one of the most--if not the most important--Desks in the OSS jurisdiction in that Theatre. These highly illuminating reports, now being held by the Swiss Desk, Western European Section, SI, should be read if Lt. Wauchope's commendable activities are to be fully appreciated.

There follows a single example, from among many, initiated since the establishment of the Swiss Desk in Italy:

On September 9 Italian Partisans were badly defeated by the Germans at Cannobio. This was serious as it meant the Partisans had lost control of the Swiss border. On September 22 the Swiss Desk received word from Berne that the Val D'Ossola bands planned the recapture of Cannobio on September 25, but needed air support; they named targets: certain boats on the lake and barracks along the shore line of Maggiorre. Berne asked for reply by noon, September 23. Lt. Wauchope, after consultation with Colonel Rodrigo, presented the request for air support to Colonel Hall, Chief of HMAF Intelligence, who obtained the commanding general's permission to direct HMAF to give the necessary support. Due to foul weather the morning of September 25, HMAF stated that the mission could not be flown. Later the weather cleared, however, and the operation was carried out. The official report from Berne follows: "The bombing was a complete success. Landing stages at Luino were destroyed and six lake steamers damaged at the pier. A large steamer carrying 800 Fascists was sunk in the lake and the Luino branch Gotthard railroad

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- 4 -

line was severed but not seriously. The bombing took place at the same time as the Partisan attack, the recapture of Cannobio being successfully accomplished. The Partisans are now in control of the whole region to a point north of Intra. As a result of this operation, morale has been greatly raised in all of northern Italy. The Partisans are grateful for your immediate response to our cable ..."

This single operation has been reported as successful from several points of view: (a) Cannobio was recaptured and control of the region was wrested from the Germans and Fascists. (b) Morale was raised in northern Italy. (c) OSS prestige was boosted in northern Italy at a time when it was badly needed. (d) OSS care in transmitting all target intelligence to MAF, both by Reports Section disseminations and by SI liaison daily, has paid off in valuable MAF cooperation.

Owing to the fact that my time in the MTO was limited, and that I was there to do a particular job, it was necessary that I keep my nose on my own grindstone. Therefore, other than to note that the morale among enlisted men and lower rank officers was at a low ebb, I am unable to make but one recommendation: It appears to me inadvisable to send civilian males, unless they are in the "scarce category" class or have a sound military background, to the Italian Theatre of Operations. The Italian show, as operated when I was there, was strictly military and "geddamur civilians" were at something of a disadvantage. The Theatre should be left to the military.

There are but three needs for the Swiss Desk, Italy: (1) Assignment of a jeep, or other motor vehicle, directly to the Desk. (2) Assignment of a second or first Lieutenant to assist the Head of the Desk. (3) Assignment of a secretary (female) to steady duty with the Desk. The latter two needs are being taken care of, the first is a matter of a little cooperation from Transportation, Hdq. Co. 1677th Regiment, OSS (Prov.) at San Lucio.

[Signature]
B. H. R.

* Correct spelling: "San Lucio".

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15745

Field report

Pratt

November 30, 1944

To: General William J. Donovan
 From: G. Edward Burton
 Subject: Attached Report-George O. Pratt

I presume Mr. Pratt has seen the exchange of cables between you and Bruce and Armour, relative to mail communications. The attached cables are to the point.

I think also Pratt's comments on transportation and communication should be given to London and Paris.

So far as the comment about enlisted men dealing with German officials is concerned, this can be met, as he suggests, by authorizing them to operate in civilian clothes and under civilian cover. I would think such cover better than any military rank other than that of field rank and I think the Germans would be just as reluctant to deal with a second lieutenant as a corporal in matters which involve collaboration of labor units.

GAB

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15,745
Field report
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 November 1944

TO: Director of Strategic Services
VIA Chief, SI - VIA Executive Officer, SI

FROM: George C. Pratt

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

1. As Chief of Labor Division, SI, ETO, I have been currently engaged in the direction of Labor Division operations in the ETO.

2. The Labor Division has been primarily engaged in work directed toward the penetration of Germany. Several agents have been dispatched. Concurrently reports on a number of intelligence requests have been furnished to the Reports Division in Paris and London and have been disseminated appropriately.

3 & 4. Transportation and communication reports the primary headaches in the field. Often it has taken three days for a cable from London to Paris, four days from Paris to Bern, etc. Mail from London to Paris requires from four days to two weeks. This is apparently gummed up in Army red tape - but it cannot be emphasized too much that the heart of an intelligence service is communications, and unless these are the best possible, an intelligence doesn't exist.

But transportation and communications, though the most important are not the only difficulties. In Paris telephone communication has been lacking and it has been difficult to get clothing supplies for our agent personnel. The handling of mail has been messy. Steps should be taken immediately to authorize the use of some mail address other than "OSS Detachment" not only for Faust agents but also staff personnel. This didn't mean much in London but it is too obvious for staff personnel working up forward near the German lines.

We have to make arrangements also for having some of our experienced men work as civilians. Apparently we can't get thru easily and that fact is having a serious effect on their work. I don't mean that they won't or don't try or that they are temperamental. For example, when one of our men who was a responsible official in Germany but who is now a corporal in the U.S. Army approaches the Germans he knows - they look askance at the fact that the United States

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Report on Field Commission - GOP - 13 Nov 44

only sends a corporal to do this supposedly important job. He would get a lot further if he were an officer. Failing that, he has to be given authority to work as a civilian.

Geo. O. Pratt
George O. Pratt, Chief
Labor Section, SI
ETO

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13 November 1944

TO: Director of Strategic Services
VIA Chief, SI - VIA Executive Officer, SI

FROM: (George G. Probst)

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

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Not telephone lines and communications, though the most important are not the only difficulties. In Paris telephone communication has been broken and it has been difficult to get clothing supplies for our agent personnel. The handling of mail has been messy. Steps should be taken immediately to authorize the use of some still address other than "the Government" not only for secret agents but also staff personnel. This didn't work much in London but it is the obvious for staff personnel working up forward near the German front.

We have to make arrangements also for having some of our experienced men work as civilians. Apparently we can't get them conditions and that lack is having a serious effect on their work. I don't want that they can't or don't try or that they are uncomfortable. For example, when one of our men who was a responsible official in Germany but who is now a corporal in the German army, the German is now - they lack address at the fact that the United States

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2 - Report on Field Conditions - OOF - 13 Nov 44

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given authority to work as a civilian.

George O. Pratt, Chief
Labor Section, SI
ETO

SOI/rat/ea

NOV 14 1944
U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 25 November 1944

TO: Director, OSS

FROM: Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Captain John G. Hayes, Jr.

15-718
Field Report
Hayes, Jr.
1 E 80
1 81

There is attached field report from Captain John G. Hayes, Jr., dated 22 November 1944.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

for summary + comments see
Field report 15,806

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JWA

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

November 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief, SI Branch, Washington, D. C.
Attention: Executive Officer

FROM: John G. Hayes, Jr., Captain AUS

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

1. What the Officer or Civilian Actually Has Been Doing in the field.

Reporting Officer acted as Administrative Officer, SI Branch, London, from September 20, 1943, to October 21, 1944. As such he acted as Adjutant for the Branch. His office prepared all requests for transfer of personnel in or out of the Branch, requested orders for personnel of the Branch, assisted the Chief of the Branch in preparation of T/O and control of same, prepared promotion papers of personnel of the Branch, prepared Morning Reports, Branch Orders, Personnel Reports, arranged transportation for personnel. Section consisted of two officers, four enlisted personnel, and two female civilian stenographers.

The Administrative Office had under it (a) the Supply Section of SI branch, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men; (b) the Cable Desk, consisting of the head of the Cable Desk - two SAC assistants, two civilian assistants, and one enlisted man who acted as courier and helped with filing.

2. The Progress of the Work, as Well as Any Achievements, in His Particular Activity in That Theater.

When the Reporting Officer arrived in London there was no Administrative Section within the SI Branch. The Branch consisted of but six officers, about as many enlisted men, and possibly twenty-five assorted civilians. As of October 24th the Branch consisted

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of approximately one hundred officers, one hundred thirty-nine enlisted personnel, and ninety-six civilians. The Administrative Office, SI Branch had gradually taken over from the Adjutant, OSS London, and the Services Branch OSS, the servicing and administration of the personnel.

3. Conditions in the Field Which Might Be Improved.

Whatever was accomplished by the Administrative Section, SI Branch, was with the assistance of the Adjutant, the Supply Officer, and the Services and Security Branch, OSS London. This Section of the branch did assist in making the Branch a more workable unit as it grew -- could equip and move personnel more rapidly than if we had to depend entirely on other Branches of OSS -- and was in a better position to keep track of scattered personnel and service them than the Adjutant's Office was.

4. Specific Difficulties in the Field of Which He Personally Became Aware.

Difficulties and shortcomings were:

a) Constant shortage of administrative personnel (due to I/O) as the Branch and work grew;

b) The fact that the Branch consisted of Army, Navy, Marine and civilian personnel made administration naturally difficult;

c) With every change at the top of the Branch there were ensuing periods when the chain of command was not always clear and there followed a slowing-up and disorganization at the administrative level;

d) There is a real need in the Branch for a full-time experienced Personnel Officer. The Administrative Section was doing some of the work and Major Cohen was doing a part-time personnel job along with other responsibilities with the result that there was overlapping of jurisdiction, and decisions were not made and proper records were not maintained.

e) There should be an established chain of command between the Administrative Officer and the Executive Officer SI Branch, and all orders and directives to the Administrative Office should come

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from or clear through the Executive Officer. This would save much duplication of work and cancelling of orders.

John T. Hayden, Jr.
J. G. H., Jr.



21 November 1944

15-714
Fried Report
Rabb
M.D.
P.W.D.
E.V.O.

TO: The Director, OSS

From: Stuart W. Rabb, MO

Subject: REPORT ON MO AND PWD ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE

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1. At the request of Mr. Morck, this brief report is prepared in advance of more complete estimates which should now be en route from the ETO. Mr. Frederick Oechaner is now in possession of the Hollander report, a full description of PWD activities in France, and a separate report on the contributions of MO to the Psychological Warfare Division at all levels.

2. At present, MO, like any other regular military organization, is bringing to bear against the enemy in the ETO a cutting edge of apparently small dimensions. However, it is thought by regular Army officers that this cutting edge is no more out of proportion to the main body of the organization than the cutting edge maintained by an Army, for instance. There are three places in which MO is conducting operations against the enemy in Western Europe:

(a) Through its contributions to PWD, particularly to combat teams, in terms of well-trained personnel, MO is conducting an extremely effective "white" propaganda campaign against German troops. OSS-MO has provided all key personnel and most of the bulk of Col. Powell's 12 Army Group PW detachment. This group has done and is doing a highly effective job in all of the accepted media, plus several new ones, and its value has been recognized by Generals Bradley, Sibert, and Patton in signed statements. In addition, Divisional G-2's of combat outfits have gone on record in writing with statements praising PW operations. Contributions to the PWD-SHAEP consolidation teams, although obviously smaller in terms of actual numbers, were surprisingly important. Of the three PWD-SHAEP consolidation teams actually in operation in France, the commanding "officers" of two were OSS men, John Krinsky and Harold Volk.

(b) Although it got a late start, Major Stacy Lloyd's "black" operations outfit, attached to 12 AG PW under Col. Powell has done and is doing an extremely effective job.

(c) The MO "black" base operation in England has continued to function effectively and well, working smoothly in cooperation with the British since several months before D-day. It is understood that this operation is being enlarged and expanded at present.

3. The difficulties under which both PWD and MO have operated have been most numerous. In retrospect, however, it would appear that there are two conditions which tend to handicap operations of this kind. These are: (1) a lack of discipline and complete devotion to duty by individual personnel; and (2) the failure to sell all levels of the military on the value of the MO or PW type of warfare. It is true,

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Unfortunately, that particularly during the early days in France, certain individuals attached to PW sections -- and this includes military personnel as well as civilians -- simply went at the job in a rather romantic manner. Men were sent out on specific missions and in all too many cases, they took advantage of their being at the front to do what they pleased, making excuses later. As Col. Clifford Powell once pointed out, there never were enough men who would, upon assignment, carry out their jobs and report promptly back to their bases. Too many persons wandered around the front playing Psychological Warfare by ear. Eventually, this sort of thing got in the hair of the military and operated against the most important objective in organizing psychological warfare: selling the military on what you are doing and enabling G-2's and G-3's to know and understand what you are doing. There were organizational difficulties, some of which still obtain, which impede full and complete understanding between the regular military and PW. In addition there were the usual personal jealousies and ambitions which hampered relationships internally and with the military. The military, obviously, is best sold by results, but even results unexplained are not enough. Now that the operation is being completely shaken down, liaison with the military is becoming more and more effective.

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4. It must be pointed out that despite its troubled career in the ETO, MO has done what must be recognized as a job of very large proportions. Nor should the personal disappointments of returning tourists prevent one from seeing what has been accomplished. More important, those MO operators who have stayed on the job in Washington, riding out all the storms and vicissitudes of an agency's career and listening to our constant griping, should not be persuaded by the long-aced gentry returning from Europe that the outfit has been a bust in the ETO. True, we probably haven't done as well or as much as we might have done. But MO has done a job -- and a pretty good job. And to anyone familiar with the roadblocks in our path, it ought to rank as a considerable achievement.

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HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
APO 887, U. S. Army
FORWARD

MO Branch - Paris
25 October 1944

SUBJECT: Black Operations - MO, ETO

TO : The Director, OSS
Chief, MO Branch, OSS

FROM : The Commanding Officer - OSS Detachment
Chief, MO Branch - ETO

1. At a PWD SHARP meeting in London October 20, General McClure and his deputies decided that Radio Luxembourg would not broadcast black programs.
2. The MO Branch had, on several occasions, requested time on this transmitter and had filed with PWD SHARP its plans and program ideas.
3. Following General McClure's ruling in London, Comdr. Armour, Major Dibert and Howard Baldwin discussed with Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart and General Brooke of PWE the possibilities of an MO black radio broadcast over British facilities. The decision was finally reached that if MO's radio technicians could work out proper time on the PWE transmitter, time that would in no way conflict with Mr. Dalmer's programs, the MO Branch would move its radio crew from Paris to England, and there become operative.
4. On 23 October Colonel Clifford Powell of P&PW, 12th Army Group and Capt. Patrick Dolan proposed that they attempt to have General McClure cancel his previous ruling so that Radio Luxembourg might be used for black tactical broadcasts between the hours of two and five a.m. At a meeting on 24 October with Colonel Bruce, Colonel Powell, Major Stacy Lloyd and Major John Harris, Capt. Patrick Dolan, F. C. Oechsmar and Howard Baldwin, the possibilities of the MO Branch furnishing certain personnel for this proposed operation were thoroughly discussed. Colonel Bruce stated his case which was that under the plan to reduce the OSS personnel in this Theater to a minimum, he had approved a plan strengthening Major Lloyd's MO field unit, and the return of the MO-Paris personnel to London to explore all possibilities of operating a radio program from the U.K. He was, therefore, opposed to revising that plan in order to participate in the tactical black operation planned by Capt. Dolan.
5. Other reasons for objecting to the plan in spite of its excellence were (a) the MO Branch could not undertake two operations

with its limited, qualified personnel; (b) the MO Branch did not consider the hours available on Radio Luxembourg as adequate; (c) MO Branch was opposed to further attachment of its personnel to PWD SHAEP; and, (d) having entered into preliminary negotiations with PWS in the U.K. the MO Branch felt duty bound to explore every possibility of a radio operation in England before undertaking any other commitments.

6. In all of these negotiations and discussions, due consideration was given to Capt. Dolan for the excellent job he had done in attempting to reopen the question of time on Radio Luxembourg.

7. It was considered doubtful by the OSS officers other than Capt. Dolan that General McClure would, under any circumstances, favor such a program.

(Signed)

Howard Baldwin



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

2 December 1944

To: The Director

From: Chief, MO

Re: Field Reports of Mr. Christ Brix and
Major J. P. Harris

1. I had read subject reports prior to transmitting them to your office. They are relatively mild compared to some of the others submitted by returnees. We are suffering grievous ills, due, I think, to irresponsible estimates of needs arrived at during the early days.

2. At present most of the excess personnel has returned to the States, and I am confident that Major Hollar will straighten out the situation which has been extremely unsatisfactory for a long period.

K. D. Mann
K. D. Mann, Col., AUS
Chief, MO

ET



Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

15-695-
SECRET

TO General Donovan

FROM Secretariat

DATE: 27 November 1944

SUBJECT Field Reports of Mr. Christ Brix and Maj. J. P. Harris

1. Attached are two reports from officers returning from duty with MO/ETO. Mr. Christ Brix has submitted a report which is written in some detail, including observations on the present and future position and responsibilities of OSS, as well as a number of comments and recommendations on conditions in ETO. The report forwarded by Maj. J. P. Harris is confined largely to comments on personnel and practices in MO/ETO.

2. Among the more significant points brought out by these officers are the following:

a. A rather general criticism from both officers of Mr. Mac Smith. Maj. Harris points out that Mr. Smith, while a man of brilliant attainments, lacks the administrative experience necessary for chief of a branch. Mr. Brix states that Mr. Smith's approach towards psychological warfare has been from a distinctly British point of view.

b. Maj. Harris is disturbed by the difficult position in which Mr. Oechauer was placed in his conflicting roles as Chief of all and civilian deputy to the Chief of PWD.

c. Mr. Brix points out that Mr. Howard Baldwin and Mr. Frederick Janninger "lack the proper psychological approach to our twisted propaganda."

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1. Mr. Brix feels that MO/ETO was and has been considerably overstuffed with a resulting break-down of morale. Maj. Harris concurs in this belief but believes that the fault is largely due to the poor recruiting practices in the early days of MO. In this connection he points out that language qualifications are of primary importance in MO recruiting - a matter which he feels has not been sufficiently emphasized. Maj. Harris strongly recommends that no further personnel be sent to the theater except those who have highly specialized talents and for whom it is known that a definite need exists.

2. Mr. Brix observes that those personnel who wear civilian clothes in the theater should be warned to provide themselves with extra clothing. He further suggests that on arrival all personnel be given a written instruction sheet containing information on such matters as police registration, ration regulations and the like. Mr. Brix also observes that in order to cover living expenses in England a sum of \$100.00 to \$150.00 in addition to regular assistance pay is necessary.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

15 November 1944

To: The Director, OSS
 From: Major John P. Harris
 Through: Chief, MO
 SUBJECT: REPORT ON MO-ETO

Field Report 15,695-
x Har. Major J. Harris
x 11.11 x 5.5

The various accomplishments of MO-ETO are too thoroughly covered in the periodic Progress Reports to justify any repetition herein. My purpose shall be to confine myself solely to what in my opinion have been demonstrated weaknesses during the ten months I have been assigned to the Branch.

MO would have had an even better record had it not been for an unfortunate miscasting of its principal characters. Mr. Rae Smith, until 1 October 1944 Chief of MO-ETO, is a man of high character and brilliant attainments. He is, however, primarily an idea man. The need from the first was to have somebody more of the administrative type as Chief of the Branch. On the one hand, this would have saved the idea man from devoting a considerable part of his time in attending conferences and handling routine organizational matters; and on the other, insured quicker and better implementation of the ideas presented.

Mr. Gechener, a man of equally high but different qualifications, was placed by circumstances in a completely impossible situation when he was simultaneously Chief of MO and civilian Deputy to the Chief of WFO. The two positions conflicted with one another, and he was constantly in the situation of having to rule against himself in one capacity or the other.

A further demonstrated weakness was the poor job of recruiting at certain earlier stages of the operation. It wasn't that the individuals selected did not possess abilities, but because of insufficient knowledge of real needs it was demonstrated in one case after another, after the individuals reached the Theater, there was no use whatever for their particular talents. Many of these individuals were held on for considerable periods in the hope that something might develop which would permit a utilization of their abilities. Having nothing to do, however, they naturally became unhappy and created a morale problem which affected not only themselves but their associates.

Another weakness was the failure on the part of all of us to appreciate the need for language qualifications. It is my belief that in an MO operation anywhere at least 90% of the personnel should have fluency in the language of the country toward which their efforts are directed, and that this fluency should be ascertained by thorough tests at the time of recruiting, rather than taking the recruit's personal statement of his ability; for example, to speak, read and write German well.

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MO, through the last year in the ETO, has also suffered from directive trouble. It was held back literally for months through the inability of PWD and various other military agencies to determine exactly what it was to be permitted to do. As it ultimately has worked out, MO now has PWD directives authorizing it to conduct agent operations in the field, to carry on black broadcasts, and to perform all the other functions which are in its natural scope of activity. Had it been given a free hand from the start, however, it would have become operational in its present sense long before it did.

I am of mixed emotions as to the value to OSS of the contribution through MO of some seventy bodies to PWD. It unquestionably has been to the credit of OSS that with few exceptions, as I know from personal observations, the outstanding accomplishments within the PWD organization have been made by MO men. I am of the opinion, however, that had these same talents been utilized in strictly MO operations, and had a green light been given early enough in the game, an even better record would have been made.

Inasmuch as MO is an integral part of the PWD organization and has contributed largely in manpower to it, personal opinions on that organization may be germane to this report. PWD has unquestionably made a valid contribution to the war effort. I believe, however, that it would have done even better had it not had such an over-elaborate organization, and had tried to do its job with the minimum of manpower instead of taking on everybody it could get its hands on, and had it not suffered from the delusion that successful propaganda was only to be measured quantitatively.

For the future of MO-ETO, my recommendations are these:

- (1) That an executive of the type of the present Chief of the Branch be continued in that position.
- (2) That there be immediately recruited and dispatched to London an opposite number to Mr. Sefton Delmar, so that maximum use may be made of the physical facilities for broadcasting which had been made available to MO by PWD.
- (3) That no one further be sent to the Theater except those of exceptional and specialized talents for which there is known to exist a specific job.



427
[Signature]
 Major, AUS

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T.P. ↑

FOR YOUR INFO

Date _____

Chief of Staff Kantak

Don't you think the
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before for the time
being. If so, I think we
can file this (AD)

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

Even No. 1115/

Approved by 115 O.F.G.3

OSS Form 4001
(Rev. 7/27/54)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

DATE 15 Nov 54

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	C. Deering, Jr.	
	J. J. Menigan	
	B. J. Patsell, Jr.	
	B. Thran	
✓	C. A. Bane	
	D. C. Lee	
	J. W. Aschmions	WAK
	W. D. Kestack	
	W. H. Wiley	
	F. F. Paulico	
	A. W. Sullivan	
	J. B. McGowan	
	A. V. Smith, Jr.	
	A. L. Hart	
	R. H. Fugites	
	L. H. Houston	
	G. S. McClelland	
	J. J. McManis	
	J. R. Schooner, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
	Director's Files	
	O. G. C. Files	

Do you think it would be
effective to have all or part
of this photostated for distri-
bution to personnel concerned?

(23695)

15 Nov 54 @ 6.3

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE 13 November 1944

TO General Donovan
 FROM Secretariat
 SUBJECT Field Report of Lt. (Jg) J. D. Coppock, USMC

1. The attached report from Lt. (Jg) J. D. Coppock, recently returned from a tour of duty in ETO and MEDTO, indicates his belief that in both theaters morale is fairly good and that there is no apparent shortage of personnel, supplies or equipment.

2. Lt. Coppock points out, however, that Planning Group documents were used very little. This may be of especial interest to you in connection with your circular of 1 November, copy of which is attached.

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 A summary for files

W. B. Kantack
 W. B. Kantack
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

attachment

TO ↑

SECRET

145

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 November 1944

SECRET
Coppock
x ETO
x MEDO

To: Director, OSS

Through: Secretariat

From: Lt. (jg) J. D. Coppock, USNR, Mediterranean Theater
Office

Subject: Report on duty in ETO and MEDTO

1. I left New York on 22 July 1944, arrived in London 24 July, remained in London until 19 September, proceeded to Caserta on 19 September via Casablanca, Tunis, and Naples, arrived in Caserta 24 September, spent from 24 September to 11 October in Caserta, Rome, Siena, arrived in Paris via Marseilles 18 October, spent 18-16 October in Paris, spent 16-17 October in London, and arrived in Washington 20 October 1944.

2. My principal observation is that, within the scope of present OSS plans and conceptions of function, there are sufficient people in both theaters. Naturally, individual changes will continue to be necessary.

3. I was rather disappointed to discover the small use to which the Planning Group documents were being put. The reasons are diverse but remediable. Unfortunately, reports on activities have never been made with close reference to these plans in spite of requests to that effect. The Planning Group and Planning Staff should be participating currently in shaping the program. Lt. Casey has been sponsoring.

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

2

4. Supplies and equipment seemed to be ample, in general, although specific items were difficult to get. The shortage of motor vehicles in Italy is remedied, at least in part, I understand. Much of the material has to be wheedled out of the army rather than be obtained as a matter of right, however. The need for air lift, especially in MEDTO, has been pointed out many times.

5. Many people in both theaters are discussing long-range plans for OSS or its type of activities. Many people think ^{that the} intelligence organization should be civilian from top to bottom, except where military cover is of peculiar use. Several suggest that a new organization, entirely independent of OSS, should be abuilding right now for the post-war period. Several stated that if OSS as such is going to operate for some time after hostilities, arrangements should be made for wives and perhaps families to go overseas.

6. Morale seemed reasonably good, on the whole; it was probably better in MEDTO than in NTO, perhaps because of the somewhat tighter organization in the former. There is perhaps a little danger of the tighter organization in MEDTO hampering the flexibility which has characterized OSS operations thus far.

J. D. Copeck

Note: I made detailed oral reports to Colonel Glavin after my tour of Italy, to Colonel Richards' Staff and to Commander Hinks' Staff.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*Feldman 15666*
~~**SECRET**~~

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 17 November 1944

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report of Captain George H. Owen, USMCR

1. The attached report from Captain George H. Owen, USMCR, is largely confined to an account of his duties while he was assigned to R&A in MEDTO.

2. Captain Owen points out the value of aerial photographs in connection with SO and SI work but he does not elaborate this point.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

~~**SECRET**~~ P

Field Report 15666
~~SECRET~~
X OCEAN copy
X NATO
X 11 + 4
X 1944-1945

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General William J. Donovan

FROM : Capt. George H. Owen, USMCR *WJO*

SUBJECT: Report made on return to Washington
from duty in NATO

7 November 1944

I left Washington during the first week of December 1943 and reported to Col. Glavin at OSS Algiers. I was assigned to R&A Target Section in Algiers which was at that time headed by Lt. Russell H. Dorr. When Lt. Dorr left Algiers in April 1944, I became head of Target Section for work on France.

The Target Section was working for the Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), joint US and British organization which conducted all special operations against the enemy in France under G3 Special Ops., AFHQ. R&A Target Section participated in all the operational intelligence for SPOC on request of Col. Baker of OSS who was S-2 of SPOC.

Work was based on maps, aerial photograph interpretation and all sources of ground intelligence (OSS and others) and air reconnaissance as well as research material, all regularly received by R&A Algiers for this purpose. All relevant intelligence was processed and indexed and all target possibilities kept on a current card index file.

The main types of targets were rail and road communications, power installations, telecommunications, and ammunition and fuel dumps. Mr. E. W. Schryver who arrived in Algiers in May to assist me had complete charge of power and telecommunication targets, doing all analysis and briefing on these targets. I retained railroads, roads and dumps for my own work.

Our dealings with air force intelligence officers were in the main limited to coordination of special operations with air attacks. This also included preparation of "safe area" maps for the air force.

As an outgrowth of the Target Section's current operational intelligence files and maintenance of aerial photograph library, we gave much of our time to the Reporting Board of OSS Algiers, assisting in editing and checking SI ground intelligence reports for dissemination. This was exclusively operational intelligence work.

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- 2 -


The Target Section provided a liaison with air photo units for all branches of OSS Algiers.

When actual operations by SPOC ceased shortly after the landing in Southern France, it was planned to send me to France for interrogation of the OG and other teams that had been sent in and later, in view of my education in France, I was to proceed to Paris to assist the political reports section there and contribute to whatever other work of a "target" or "special operations" nature that might develop. This was objected to by OSS headquarters in Caserta on the ground that I could be used on central European work.

I went to OSS Bari where SO was considering the possibility of special operations in Central Europe. In Bari, I worked mostly for the Reporting Board. It was also planned to use me on one of the "teams" that were to be sent to European capitals as soon as they fell into Allied hands for political and economic reporting. Before an assignment was decided on, however, orders to return to Washington brought me back.

As for recommendations, I can point out the value of the use of aerial photographs in several activities of OSS (Special Operations, SI operations, and Reporting Board) and the advantages of close relationship between R&A Target Section and Reporting Board in editing military intelligence reports.

*John H. Owen***SECRET**



15-11

TOP SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

SUBJECT: Report from Lt. (j.g.) Frank M. Carroll

DATE: 18 December 1944

Final Report

x Carroll, Frank

1. Attached is a brief report from Lt. (j.g.) Frank M. Carroll, Deputy Chief MU/ETO, outlining his duties while assigned to that theater.

2. Attached also is a report giving a full description of clandestine operations as carried out by the British DEOD(I) in the European Theater. This report includes information on operational and intelligence methods as well as detailed information on all marine equipment employed. The last few pages of this report are devoted to a description of methods of carrying out clandestine operations in the Far East and a comparison with the methods used in the European Theater.

*Base this
Circuit
to prepare
for
ICs.*

Attachment

W. B. Kantack.
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

*name prepared 11/26/44
sh.*

TOP SECRET

15761
Final Report
Carroll, Frank
1st Line Unit
870

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 November 1944

From: Frank M. Carroll, Lt. (jg) USNR,
 Maritime Branch
 To: Director, Office of Strategic Services.
 Subject: Overseas duty report.

1. Arrived in England in late April and proceeded to Dartmouth to co-operate in readying three PT Boats for clandestine operations. These boats were attached to the Maritime Branch under the command of Lt. Comdr. R.R. Guest. Several types of special British navigational apparatus were installed aboard the PTs and the crews were trained in their operation. The crews were also drilled in the intricacies of night operations, ship to shore communications with agents, handling small boats in surf, etc.

2. One successful operation was completed on May 24. A PT approached the shore of Brittany at night and sent a small boat ashore to pick up packets of intelligence from British agents. On May 27 the three PTs were detached from OSS and returned to the navy for regular patrol duties in connection with the invasion.

3. I then obtained orders assigning me to Commander E.A.G. Davis, RMNR, in command of a British flotilla of MGBs and MTBs engaged in clandestine operations in the English Channel. From May 27 to July 10 I acted as Commander Davis' understudy, learning how to co-ordinate intelligence, how to time and plan the steps of a clandestine operation, and how to brief officers and crews. I took part in many British operations to the enemy-occupied coast of Brittany. The purposes of these missions were to:

1. Land British-trained agents.
2. Land arms and equipment for the members of the underground.
3. Pick up agents whose cover had been blown or whose job had been completed.
4. Pick up packets of intelligence reports from agents.
5. Pick up French patriots who were being hunted by the Gestapo.
6. Pick up American and British airmen who had been shot down.
7. Pick up American and British seamen whose ships had been sunk near the French coast.

4. On July 10 the three PTs were again assigned to OSS. My duties included those as squadron operations officer, intelligence officer, planning officer, and liaison officer.

between the PT Squadron, the British Flotilla, and OSS in London. Three clandestine missions were successfully completed, two for SIS and one for OSS. The British jobs entailed picking up agents and intelligence, the American job resulted in the landing of three agents.

5. The PTs were also used for high-speed emergency ferrying of OSS personnel between England, Omaha Beach, Cherbourg, L'Aberwranches and Dieppe, and in taking out agents and Frenchmen whose transportation by normal means might jeopardize security.

6. In late August the American tanks swept into Brittany and cancelled three PT operations which had been authorized, planned, and briefed. From then on our work consisted solely of ferry jobs because neither OSS nor the British contemplated any secret maritime operations within range of the PTs. From mid-July until mid-October a total of approximately twenty ferry trips carrying 150 passengers were completed.

7. By mid-October it became clear that the work of the PTs was through because there were no clandestine jobs planned for the Lowlands or for Denmark, and the weather in the Channel was becoming too rough for ferry work. I then requested transfer back to Washington.

Frank M. Carroll
Frank M. Carroll

ADMIRALTY.

REFERENCE SHEET.

From G.O.D. 3
c/o H.O.I.G. DARTMOUTHTo Chief Maritime Unit,
Office of Strategic
Services

Dated 24th May

1944

GROUP 1. BY MESSAGE 100 1142 R.E.R. Div. 6. 671

Information required, or notified.

Subject:- Lt.(jg) Frank, M. Carroll, U.S.N.R.

With reference to above officer's orders of May 16th

Since working with this unit this officer has made intelligent and sincere efforts to acquaint himself with the methods and equipment of this organization. In these efforts he has shown a quick appreciation and has been most successful but he will have no opportunity to gain actual and practical experience in clandestine operations until after D-Day.

2. It is recommended that Lt. Carroll continue his present duty with S.E.A.S. (I) until at least one month after D-Day, by that time he should have a complete knowledge of every phase of these operations.

COMMANDER, R.E.R.

END/5

HQ AND HQ DETACHMENT,
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
ETOUSA.

27th May, 1944

From: M.U. Branch, OSS Detachment - ETOUSA.
To: Commanding Officer, Naval Command, OSS
Washington, DC.
Via: Naval Personnel Officer, OSS Detachment,
ETOUSA.
Subject: Lt. (jg) Frank M. Carroll, USNR, Descrip-
tion of Duty performed by.

1. Subject officer is assigned to act as OSS representative and liaison officer between the Office of Strategic Services and the D.D.O.D.(I) Operational Branch, S.O.O.3 at Dartmouth, Holford, and wherever their craft may be operating. This duty is to last for a period of approximately one month after D-Day.

2. Subject officer is to assist in the transportation across the English Channel by D.D.O.D.(I) craft of OSS personnel whose crossings have been cleared through OSS H.Q. and D.D.O.D.(I) H.Q. He is to co-operate with British Units in the forwarding of such personnel after their arrival at D.D.O.D.(I) Operational Bases.

3. Subject officer is to act as an observer of D.D.O.D.(I) missions for the purpose of making a report to OSS of the methods and equipment involved in such operations.

Chief, MU Branch, OSS
Detachment, ETOUSA

**O. S. S. DETACHMENT,
Maritime Branch,
London.**

10 July 1944.

Subject: Area 'S'

To: Adjutant.

1. Area 'S' of the Maritime Branch is the base at which the three U.S. Naval PT's now assigned to O.S.S. Detachment for temporary duty, are based.

2. Lieut.(jg) Frank M. Carroll, USNR, is the Officer in Charge. Lieut. Carroll reports directly to the Maritime Branch, London.

3. Now assigned to Lieut. Carroll are Pvt. Winton F. Hendrick, 33636115, and one 3/4 ton Hoeghens Carrier.

**R. A. GUEST.
Lt. Col. USNR.
Chief, MA., ETO.**

**cc: Maj. Gwartwright
Maj. Alcorn
Transportation Officer,
Maj. Starnes.**

C. S. S. Detachment,
Maritime Branch,
LONDON.

26th August 1944.

From: Commanding Officer, Maritime Branch

To: Commanding Officer, One Sub-Branch.

1. [Blank] (s.g.) Frank H. Marshall, Operations Officer,
Maritime Branch, Detachment-Branch is hereby appointed my Deputy.

2. During my absence he is empowered to make all necessary
decisions concerning the Maritime operations of this Branch.

A. A. GUNN,
Lieut. Comdr. RNR.

FIELD REPORTS

VOL. V


15,474 - 15,575

FIELD REPORTS

VOL. V

<u>Name:</u>	<u>Branch:</u>	<u>Theater:</u>	<u>Tab:</u>
MOSIER, LT. RUDOLPH L. 15,474	MO	ETO	A
MAYO, W.M. 15,477	PROCUREMENT & SUPPLY	ETO FETO	B
BLISS, H. HUNTINGTON 15,484	MC, SI, SECURITY	METO	C
LIVINGSTON, W. STANLEY 15,492	SI	ANGOLA	D
BONNER, HENRY S. 15,494	SI	ETO	E
SHEINWOLD, ALFRED 15,514	COMMUNICATIONS	MEDTO, FETO G IBERIAN PEN.	
GASKELL, MAJOR EDWARD P. 15,519	SI	ETO	H
DAILEY, LT. L.R. 15,524	R & D	ETO	J
MINCU, EMIL 15,534	SI	MEDTO	K
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MANDELBAUM, CAPT. DAVID 15,550	R&D	FETO	M
COLEMAN, ARCH 15,554	SI	TURKEY	N
KRAMER, LT. E.R. 15,593	SI	BALKANS	O





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13575
Field Report
October 31, 1944

FACTUAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

by

1st Lieutenant E. R. Krauer, AUS

Member of the American Mission to Serbia

under

Lieutenant-Colonel McDowell

Krauer -
McDowell -
vols ops Ball -
Krauer -

PERIOD SEPTEMBER 4 - 9:

On the night of September 4th, I landed in Franja at Ravna Gora where Colonel McDowell had preceded me. A landing strip, airmen's evacuation base and hospital had been established. Nearby was General Mihailovich's Headquarters.

After four days of getting acclimated and being introduced to the various Chetnik officers, I was ordered by Lt. Colonel McDowell to proceed to the Zap Morava Valley near Krusevac.

PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 9 - 13:

We left Franja on September 9th at 6:30 AM by horseback, but on the 11th, we were attacked by Partisans, and several times had to detour due to German convoys passing through.

There was a party of seven of us -- five bodyguards, Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Pilibich, a former pilot in the Yugoslav army (pre-war), and myself. After several narrow escapes, we arrived at Colonel Kenserovich's Headquarters in the Morava Valley near Krusevac at a little town called Bela Voda.

PERIOD SEPTEMBER 14 - 16:

Partisan activity at this time was not very heavy. Two days before my arrival, the Chetniks had called up their general mobilization, and I

SECRET

- 3 -

was asked by Kesserovich to go with him while he inspected these reserves, and of course we were subjected to a lot of speech-making, etc. I also talked to numerous Serbs--doctors, teachers, lawyers, students, peasants, etc., unrestricted. I had an interpreter who spoke French, and with my limited knowledge of Serbian, I was able to understand the answers to the questions that I put forth.

1.) The Serbs could not understand why the Allies, and particularly the British, had deserted them after they had been the first country to declare guerilla warfare against the Germans, and as a result suffered heavy reprisals. They had been told by the British to organize and remain quiet until ordered to rise up in force. They had been promised supplies and air support but received none. Then the Allied Mission was withdrawn and Tito and the Communists were supported by the Democratic Allies. Allied planes were dropping ammunition nightly for Partisans to kill Serbs.

2.) The Serbs could understand the bombings by Allied planes of military targets, but why was the civilian population in Belgrade subjected to terror bombings particularly on Easter Sunday and the King's birthday? Also why didn't Zagreb receive more than one bombing?

3.) They still think King Peter is a prisoner of the British and demanded his return to Serbia.

4.) They hate Subasic.

5.) They want a plebiscite with secret ballot.

6.) They had a deathly fear of the Russians because they thought that when the Russians occupied Serbia, they would conduct the same terrors as the

SECRET

- 3 -

Partisans were now doing or else turn the government over to the Partisans and permit wholesale plundering.

7.) They want an Allied Commission to police their country until a government can be formed.

8.) The Serbs think of America as their last hope.

9.) They would listen to BBC announce the capture of a territory by the Partisans and then turn the program off because it was not the truth. I know this because I have been in the territories supposedly captured by the Partisans. As a result the Serbs doubted most of the announcements by BBC.

On September 16, I visited a village by the name of Ridgestica where I saw the body of a man, Ryko Pantelica, 56 years old, the Mayor of the Village, who had been tortured to death by the Partisans the night before. His thumb and forefinger had been pulled off and, after being allowed to bleed awhile, he was shot through the back with a dum-dum bullet blowing his stomach out. I have photos of this atrocity. I also sent a report by courier to Lt. Colonel Mollwell.

SEPTEMBER 17:

On the morning of September 17th, the Partisans put in a light attack against some Chetnik villages -- the Chetnik village of Rataj, eight km. NE of Aleksandrovac where there were no German troops and, in fact, there were no German troops in the whole area except in Krucovac and Kraljevo proper. In the meantime, Colonel Kossarovic had asked me exactly what my mission was, and I told him and his officers that it was to evacuate Allied airmen

SECRET

- 4 -

that had been shot down, obtain information of German troop activity and also to obtain any other information available. They asked me if it would be possible for the Allies to prevent this civil war, and stated that they had wanted to concentrate their efforts against the Germans, but every time they attacked or prepared an attack against the Germans, the Partisans would jump on their backs. I sent a note by courier to the local Partisan commander attacking this village, asking for a rendezvous with the idea of stopping this local battle between Yugoslavs because, while this battle was going on, large German columns were passing through the Morava Valley from Priaren to Kruzevac and from there to Nis and Belgrade.

The Partisan commander did not reply, but he told the courier that the Americans had no business becoming interested in the civil war in Serbia, and that they had better get out; and, with that, he had the courier beaten up. He also said that there was no such thing as an American Evacuation Mission in Serbia. However, before I came into Serbia I had been told by our officers at SSS that Tito had been informed of this mission, and had requested the names of all officers so that in case of capture they would be unharmed.

SEPTEMBER 18:

At 8:00 AM in the morning, the Partisans put in a heavy counterattack. The Chetnik commander of the brigade with whom I was, Captain Gordich, asked me whether to counterattack or retreat, and I replied that I was not the commander of his troops and, therefore, could not advise him but was solely here for observation.

In the Chetnik ranks there were weapons of all calibres and makes. Many men went into battle unarmed and waited for a man to get hit and then take up the dropped rifle. A Chetnik soldier seldom had more than 35 or 40

SECRET

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cartridges for his rifle. The majority had no shoes and all were dressed in peasant clothing.

The only reason they fought so stubbornly was to prevent the Communists from occupying their villages. The Chetniks did not adopt the method used by the Partisans of removing the men long distances from their homes to fight; instead they were used for defense of their locality.

That day we retreated north, back across the Morava to Pala Voda.

SEPTEMBER 19 - 23:

I sent a report off of all information that I had gathered up to this time to Colonel McDowell by courier. The report was dated September 18. At noon, Kesserovic's Headquarters packed up and we were on the move because the Partisans were continuing their attack in force. We retreated for two days.

On September 22nd, in a small village eight miles north of Drenova, I saw the bodies of eight men (civilians) who had been tortured to death by knife. The older men had been slashed about the face with a knife and then their skulls bashed in with a rifle butt. One young man who had refused to join the Partisans had been carved up pretty badly by the orders of a Partisan woman who stood by. Photographs of these bodies I also have. Unfortunately these people had been killed two nights before, and I could not get there any sooner, and the bodies had started to decompose.

I also found out from Partisan prisoners that they had specific orders to kill and capture the American officer with the Chetniks. The men that ordered my death were Colonel Ljubo Vuckovic of the Druga Partisan Proleterska Division, and Lieutenant-Colonel Muric of the 4th Proleterska Brigade. He (Muric) is from Crna Gora.

SECRET

- 6 -

Also upon my arrival back at Bela Voda, the peasant at whose hut I had been staying told me that two hours after I had left his place, a Partisan Lieutenant, two women, and nine guards came up to his hut, placed a guard around the hut, and then asked of the whereabouts of the American officer. He even knew the corner of the room that I slept in.

I never had much time to interrogate Partisan prisoners because if I did not get to them within a half-hour after capture, they were executed by knife. Prisoners were killed by both sides. All Partisans, dead or wounded, were relieved of their boots, shoes and serviceable clothing immediately, if they had any.

Ninety percent of the Partisan prisoners were Moslems from Montenegro and the few Serbs that were with them claimed to have been forced into service but escaped with intentions of surrendering at the first opportunity. Some of these were not executed. None of the prisoners I interrogated had ever fought against the Germans in any battle. I also saw some Serbian women who had been impressed.

We were under fire practically all the time by snipers and harassed by treks (patrols). All Partisans that I saw, dead or alive, were not in uniform. They had on peasant clothes and did not even wear the red star insignia. It was difficult for both parties to identify each other in battle and sometimes the Chetniks would place a white handkerchief or rag around their left arms.

The Chetniks called in additional men from other areas and pushed the Partisans back to Aleksandrovac. In the course of this battle, ammunition was running low for the Chetniks, and was running at 8:30, upon coming out of a

SECRET

- 7 -

small village onto a road, I counted fifteen cases of Italian ammunition and mortar shells piled there. I do not know where it came from because I didn't see the vehicle that brought it; however, the Chetniks loaded it up to the firing line.

On the afternoon of the 22nd, we were back in Bela Voda. The courier that had started out to Colonel McDowell with my report dated September 18th, had returned because the route had been cut by the Partisans. I then wrote an additional report dated September 23rd, and dispatched that on the 24th.

I have seen men die because of the lack of medical supplies, and only those with light or superficial wounds could hope to live. Hatred ran so high that I have seen men kick the dead after a battle.

Also in this battle I heard tanks firing but didn't see them; however, I was told by the Chetniks, and later on by peasants, that German tanks had joined in the battle killing both sides.

On September 22nd, I asked the Chetniks if there was a possibility of getting in touch with any German officers because I had been instructed by Colonel McDowell, if possible, to work subversive or black operations. Through some means, the Chetniks arranged a rendezvous with an Austrian officer outside of Krusevac. He told me that if the Americans could guarantee that all Germans who surrendered would be evacuated to Italy, and be placed in American prisons under American custody, and not transferred, as Berlin told them, to the custody of the Russians for labor battalions, that practically the whole German Balkan force would collapse.

SECRET

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He said that if I took three or five German officers and sent them to Italy, and permitted them to write, through the facilities of the Red Cross, to their men in the Balkans, describing their treatment, that that would be proof enough.

I sent a radiogram through the Chetnik radio to Colonel McDowell advising him of this rendezvous and the conversation, also requesting advice and instructions, but I received no reply.

SEPTEMBER 23:

In the morning I sent a note to this German officer by a peasant into Krusevac, telling him that I did not have the authority to accept any of his demands, but could only suggest that all of the troops in that area surrender. He immediately followed up by driving out with a German captain, (a doctor), in an automobile directly to Kesserovich's Headquarters, and I repeated the same thing. They then wanted to give themselves up to me as prisoners immediately, but I couldn't accept them because I had no place to take them, nor means to protect them. The doctor gave the Chetniks some field dressings that he had brought with him.

Late that afternoon, I received a wire from Colonel McDowell ordering me to proceed to Aisarahi Corps near Belgrade, and meet an American officer of our mission by the name of Rayacich, but Kesserovich requested me to obtain permission to remain with him two days because heavy Partisan activity had cut the route from Krusevac to Belgrade, and that he would endeavor to chase these Partisans out of there so that I could pass through. I advised Colonel McDowell of this by wire, but received no reply.

That same day, Colonel Kesserovich also attacked south of the Morava

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and moved his headquarters in that direction, which of course required me to go with him.

SEPTEMBER 26:

Received word from the German Commandant, Major Knei in Krusevac that he wished to become my prisoner.

SEPTEMBER 27:

I sent word back to the Commandant, per his request I would be glad to meet him at Citluk, 8 km. outside of Krusevac. He responded and said that he could not keep the rendezvous until he had further instructions from Belgrade.

At the same time, munitions and gasoline were being snipped out of Krusevac, eastward by glider. Also on the same day, six hundred German parashutists arrived to protect the evacuation of this material. I saw German convoys pass through Partisan and Chetnik territory unmolested.

SEPTEMBER 28:

I saw three gliders and twelve transport planes fly north from Krusevac. The Chetniks advised me that the Germans had been using gliders to relay material from one city to another because the highways were not safe.

SEPTEMBER 29:

I was still waiting for replies from several radiograms to Colonel McDowell for advice and instructions. Later on in the afternoon, I received a cable from him dated September 28, ordering me to report to him personally at once. But Vassovitch and Piliitch said that Draja Mihailovich was either

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near Belgrade or in Bosnia, (they did not know exactly), and both routes to these places had been severed. They said if Mihailovich was in Bosnia, it would be too dangerous and would require about 25 days on horseback.

Today I saw a convoy of 60 vehicles with heavy artillery enter Krusevac from Kraljevo. I stood about 60 feet from this convoy on the edge of the city in the town of Lazarica.

SEPTEMBER 30:

I sent a wire to Colonel McDowell informing him of my situation, and that I was proceeding to the Alsarski Corps tomorrow if the route was at all sure. At 11:00 AM, I received a wire from Colonel McDowell advising me to proceed to Belgrade if the route was sure--otherwise to remain.

OCTOBER 1:

I expected to leave today for Belgrade, but Partisans have cut the route in force at Paracin. The Chetniks asked me today, that if they captured Krusevac and Kraljevo, could they have Allied air support and ammunition against German counterattacks. I did not have authority to answer so I sent a wire to the Colonel to that effect.

At 5:00 PM this afternoon, I was notified that radio contact could not be made with Mihailovich's Headquarters.

OCTOBER 2:

There was nothing to do but wait for some advisement. There was little German activity, but Partisans are reported planning an attack from late. I saw some Russian light tank-guns captured from the Partisans.

Tonight, Piliitch said we would leave in the morning by auto for

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Belgrade.

OCTOBER 3:

Pillitich dressed in civilian clothes, and then lost his nerve because it was reported that Chetniks had attacked Germans in the Belgrade area and were in pitched fight with the Germans and the Partisans. No answer from Colonel McDowell.

OCTOBER 4:

I left this morning to go to Vrnjačka Banja with an escort of 25 Chetniks in a truck, and Pillitich, Captain Gerdie and myself in an automobile.

About a mile from the borders of Krusevac, the car and truck became stuck in the mud, and while a team of oxen was pulling us out, a German convey came up. I put my cap in my pocket and buttoned my raincoat around my collar to hide all insignia. I took my pistol out of its holster and kept it in my hand. The German officers asked who was in the car, and they were told that I was one of the Chetnik commandants, and that we were going to attack a Partisan train. All of the bodyguards had orders to shoot it out with the convey if the Germans opened the car doors. We got away okay, but on route, I passed columns of German infantry and animal-pack trains headed for Kis to fight the Russians. The columns of German infantry were all clad and in most cases their boots and shoes were well worn. It was raining and none of the troops other than officers had raincoats. The animal-pack trains consisted of wagons and horses which had evidently been confiscated from the peasants. These wagons were camouflaged by tree limbs and corn stalks. From the facial characteristics, the troops appeared

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to be White Russians or of other Slavic origin. I saw very few automatic weapons. Most of them were armed with the standard-issue rifle. There were approximately 60 Italian soldiers, barefoot and with ragged clothing. They were evidently prisoners in a labor battalion because they were not armed and carried no equipment. This particular convoy was coming from Prioren and had evidently been in Albania. Also there were some Italians barefooted and ill-clothed.

OCTOBER 5:

I listened to speeches and answered what questions I could on the Allied situation, and listened to Serbian history which is told repeatedly by each person. Upon returning to Krusevac area, I found a message from Colonel McDowell ordering me to report to him personally.

OCTOBER 6:

I sent a wire to the Colonel asking where he was, and that from the last report I had of him, he was believed to be in Bosnia. I informed him again that the route to Belgrade was cut by Partisans and Hungs, and repeated that I was cut off from Bosnia by Partisans and Germans. The Germans blew up the Krusevac airbase today. I saw Chetniks walking about with rifles in the presence of German soldiers.

OCTOBER 7:

No answer from the Colonel. Russians and Partisans were preparing an attack on Belgrade, also on Nis.

I talked to an Englishwoman from Belgrade whose husband was a Serb lawyer, and he had been imprisoned two terms by the Hungs as a hostage.

Many Hun transport planes came over tonight from the south flying north.

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OCTOBER 8:

Tonight I saw three green flares from the railroad yards and two more about one-half mile away. Half an hour later, a plane of unknown identity came over and dropped four delayed-action bombs, and then flew westward. I do not know the damage done, but they were close to me. This was at 9:15 PM.

Kesserovic asked me today that if the Americans wouldn't supply munitions, would they supply shoes for his men? (8,000).

OCTOBER 9:

The Chetniks asked me if I would talk to a group of Serbs in the Hotel Europa in Krusevac, and calm their fears regarding the approaching Russian Army. The Chetniks told me that the Nedio and Chetniks would guarantee my safety against the German garrison. There must have been a group of one thousand people located in two large rooms. One room had an amplifier and loudspeaker in it. I told them that they should remain calm and not to become panic-stricken, nor take to the woods when the Russians arrived because they were well disciplined, and were allies of the Americans and British, and that, unless the Chetniks fired on the Russians, the people had nothing to fear.

About this time, at 6:30 PM, a tank rolled up outside, and the people became apprehensive because they thought it was a German coming in to take me prisoner, but it developed that the Chetniks and Nedio troops had surrounded the tank parking lot, and forbade the Germans to leave, and the Nedio troops drove the tank up outside the hotel for my protection. After speaking to the Serbian people, I was told that a German tank officer would like to speak to me, and he asked me what guarantee I could give towards

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the lives of the German garrison if the towns of Krusevac and Kraljevo capitulated. I told him that there was nothing I could do because this was the Russian theater of war, and that as an Allied officer, I could not interfere. However, if they had surrendered, all that I would have done would have been to notify the nearest Russian troops that the garrisons had surrendered and for them to occupy.

OCTOBER 10:

At 9:00 AM, the Germans sent word that they would confer with officers in Kraljevo, and I saw a German tank leave with a messenger from Krusevac to Kraljevo.

Later in the day, I saw one hundred White-Russian German soldiers leave by horseback for Kraljevo. It was a German plane that had bombed Krusevac, killing seven Chetnik soldiers, because I had the Chetniks dig up an unexploded bomb. I also learned today that Lt. Colonel McDowell was in Bosnia somewhere, and it was impossible to get there from here because Chetniks were fighting Germans in that area.

OCTOBER 11:

Five hundred Germans arrived in Krusevac from Zajacar en route to Saraj with sixty vehicles, tanks and cannon. They were elements of the Prinz Eugen Division from Wis. They had been in a battle with the Russians and of their former strength of 3500, over 2,000 had been killed or wounded when caught in a cross-fire of their own and Russian artillery. From what I saw of these troops, they were men of an approximate age of 35 and over. I was informed by the local Serbs that the majority of these troops had been

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residents of Yugoslavia but were of German nationality or descent. I had several Serbians circulated among these troops asking questions and it was apparent that their morale was low because with the impending rapid approach of the Russians they had no safe place to retreat. These troops were better clad than the troops that I saw coming from Priaren; the artillery and transport seemed to be in good condition, and they had plenty of lubricants and petrol. The Serbian people told me that the attitude of the German soldier towards the local inhabitants was far different than it had been in 1942 because now they were very polite and did nothing whatsoever to offend the residents. At night, the patrols in the city usually numbered one SOO and twenty men. Patrols also carried at least three light machine guns. There was considerable rifle firing at night also, but I do not know who the participants were.

The Germans are preparing a large hospital for the wounded.

OCTOBER 12:

I sent a wire to Colonel McHowell with yesterday's information, and also that the Russians were now 20 km. from here.

After talking to a German officer, he said all Germans in the Balkans would capitulate if American soldiers would come, even if for guard purposes only.

OCTOBER 13:

I realized that I was in a difficult position. I could not get away, and the Russians were but a short distance away, and I had to choose between being captured and killed by the Partisans, being a prisoner of the Germans for the duration of the war, or relying on the mercy of the Russians as an

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ally. So I sent a note to the nearest Russian officer for a rendezvous, explaining that I had German military information that would enable them to take the city of Krusevac without shelling and killing a lot of Serbian women and children. The Serbs were watching me closely as to my reactions to the approach of the Russians.

Quite frankly I was apprehensive, but I didn't dare show it by speech or action, and all that I could see looming up was a court martial for me if I got out of the mess alive.

A German rifle could be bought for 1,000 Dinars, a machine pistol for 3,000 and a case of ammunition for a litre of rakija. However, I saw a pitched battle between the German guards and Chetniks at the railroad yards and airport when the Chetniks tried to steal weapons and ammunition. The Germans had posted sentries to guard the freight cars and some Chetniks would engage these sentries in conversation, while others would attempt to steal the ammunition. These sentries were mostly the White Russian elements of the local German garrison. I do not know why they opened fire on the Chetniks; but a shot was fired, and all present joined in. However, the next day, I saw both Chetnik and German soldiers walking about the streets paying no attention to each other. In this small battle there must have been only about fifty bodies engaged. Four Chetniks and two Germans were killed.

I also saw a truckload of small arms and ammunition leave Krusevac in a Chetnik truck while German soldiers were standing nearby.

The Germans were certainly demoralized. One officer told me that they were tired of propaganda because they heard it from Berlin, London, and Moscow,

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and to them it was all hot air.

At 6:00 PM, I received another wire from the Colonel, ordering me to report to him personally.

OCTOBER 14:

I sent a wire to Colonel McDowell, stating that I would leave in three days, and that, per his orders, I was going to try to make it through Partisan and German lines.

I requested Colonel Kesserevich for three tough men as an escort, and he replied that I would never make it alive. I told him that Colonel McDowell had ordered me for the fourth time now, and if he did not answer my wire, and order me to remain or wait for a safe route, I was going through even if I had to go alone.

A little later, much to my surprise, a Russian officer met me this morning, and informed me that Russian troops had been guided by Chetniks to Janina which is just across on the north side of the Zap Morava River, and that they had creaked around behind the German tank defense lines at Stalac. I gave him the information that I had, and he asked me to meet his Major. Just as we were about to leave Chetnik Headquarters, the German Commandant of Kussovac, Major Knei, another officer, and an interpreter arrived, and Colonel Kesserevich told him in my presence that unless he (the German) surrendered his troops, the Chetniks would attack. Major Knei asked why the Chetniks did not defend him, and Kesserevich said that he had promised Major Knei to fight Partisans and Communists only, but not Russians because they were Allies. Major Knei, the German Commandant of Kussovac, was a man of about 50 years, medium height, very stocky, and wore the Hitler medal. It is a black swastika.

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like on a white background. As I understand from the junior officers, Major Knei was from Berlin. On his shoulder straps he had the numerals 1111. He gave the appearance of being a very strict disciplinarian and was of the Prussian type, but at this time he was exceedingly nervous.

Colonel Kesserevich then told Major Knei that at the Chetnik Headquarters at this moment there were both an American and a Russian officer, and I saw Major Knei's chin shake.

The Russian was not in the room at the time. Instead of that, he was hiding around behind the house with a Chetnik hat and overcoat on over his uniform. Kesserevich told the Major that he would give him 30 minutes to make up his mind. The German officer left the room and got into his car and said he would fight. Colonel Kesserevich was going to make him a prisoner then and there, but I would not permit him to, because any time that I had talked with a German officer, I had been permitted safe custody. I then left the Chetnik Headquarters with the Russian Lieutenant and met the Russian Major, and he told me that he would not shell the town if the Chetniks attacked and took it, and would not permit the Partisans to attack the Chetniks in the back. He also said that the Chetniks could have the German prisoners, but that he wanted the White Russians for him and his troops to do with as he saw fit; whereupon the Chetnik officers present ordered the attack, and captured Brusavec, and then Colonel Kesserevich, the Russian Major and I entered the city followed by Russian troops. The Chetniks had the city in their possession before the Russian entry.

Kesserevich and the Russian Major each made speeches from the balcony to the people, and then shook hands with me before the crowd. Immediately

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after that, the Partisans commenced attacking Chetniks and the Russian Major sent an officer to stop them.

Shortly after that, a Russian General arrived, and he ordered all Chetniks disarmed. I never saw any Chetnik officers after that. This they did in the city square out on the plaza, but permitted the Nedio troops to retain their arms, and then had me placed under armed guard with fixed bayonets. They started to disarm me, but I told them if they took my arms, they were making an Allied officer a prisoner of war. With that, I was permitted to retain them.

I entered a restaurant with a Russian lieutenant under whose custody I had been placed, and two German officers approached me; and one a Colonel Von der Chavallerie, in perfect English, informed me that he had flown down with his pilot (the other officer) from the German General Chief-of-Staff to arrange for the capitulation of Kraljevo, Krusevac, and Kraguevac, and requested me to take their names and notify their families that they were prisoners of the Russians, and he also begged me, if possible, to request the Russians to put him and his pilot, 2nd Lt. Heineman, under my custody, but I told him that was impossible. He had landed that morning in the middle of the battle at the airfield with a small plane, and was captured before they could take off.

After waiting for about two hours in this restaurant, I was told that the General wanted to speak to me. He was evidently a Brigadier General, and I was taken upstairs to a room, and he told me that another general wanted to see me.

Before I was led into this room, where the other general awaited, I was disarmed. In the room were three officers besides the Russian

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(two lieutenant-colonels and a colonel).

One Lieutenant-Colonel could speak a few words of English, and he asked for my identity and what I was doing in Serbia. I told him that I was a member of the Mission to Serbia for the evacuation of airmen, and to get information regarding German troop activities. He also said to the General that it was just like the Americans to try to win by politics instead of fighting.

He was pretty rough in his manner of speaking, and then he and the other higher officers left the room. The last thing he said was, "You are not a prisoner". However, I was still under armed guard. When I was leaving the room, I requested my gun and they pretended not to understand me. A Russian soldier with a bayonet blocked my way to the bed where I thought my gun was. He pointed his bayonet at me, but I walked right by ignoring him, and he evidently was not quite sure of what to do. When I pulled up the mattress of the bed, I found my gun under it.

Then I was led downstairs into the street where I waited under guard for three more hours until dark. During that time, I saw the White Russian prisoners marched by and herded into a lot, and later marched off.

The Russian Brigadier General, who was the most nervous and maniacal type of man I have ever seen, was walking around, shouting orders to everyone. At just about dark, I saw the Russian Lieutenant-Colonel who had interrogated me, and he ordered me into a car with my armed guard to be taken to where I had been living to get my personal effects. I heard shots from the direction where the White Russians had been taken.

Somebody had stolen my raincoat by that time, and my leather jacket. When I got back into the city, there was a weapons carrier and two American

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Ford civilian automobiles. The automobiles had been taken from the Chetniks. I was ordered to drive one of the Fords, and a lieutenant-colonel with a tommy-gun, and a guard with a tommy-gun, got in with me.

The two German officers were loaded into the American weapons carrier, with an armed guard, and a Russian General and several under-officers got into the other Ford.

When I asked the Lieutenant-Colonel where we were going he wouldn't answer me. We left Krusevac in a northeasterly direction, and when the cars broke down on the road several times, they would yell for the American and come back and make us fix them. Finally, both Fords broke down, and we left one in a village where I saw Partisans in civilian clothes, but with a red star on their caps, with arms, patrolling this town. I thought, "This is the end of me if they know I am here". I was prepared to fight it out.

We proceeded and they made me steer the car that was towed behind the weapons carrier. We arrived at a town just outside of Paresin where I was interrogated until 2:30 in the morning by a Russian intelligence officer. I had to tell him the same thing that I told the officers in Krusevac, and I spoke to him through an interpreter in French. He insisted upon knowing where Draja Nikolic and my Colonel were. When I told him I did not know, he called me a liar several times. Also he demanded to know where my radio station was. When I told him I did not have one, he became exceedingly angry. I explained to him the circumstances of the morning, and how the situation had been in Krusevac.

He asked me when and where I went to an espionage school. I told him that I was not a spy, that I had always been in uniform and had never attended

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an espionage school. He told me that I was lying and that he had attended one under British direction in Russia, and that he had the names and dates of graduates of these schools in the world, and that he knew mine also. He then asked me if I had met or seen any Russian agents and, of course, I hadn't, and he replied, "That proves how clever our men are."

He demanded to know what special instructions I had, but I would not tell him anything. He asked me what the Serbs thought of the Russians, and I told him that German propaganda had built up a fear in the people of Russian terrorism, but that I had told the Serbs that the Russians were our Allies and well disciplined. This seemed to please him.

After this interrogation, he sent me off into a room in a hut with seven other Russians, sleeping on the floor around the room, but requested me to leave my musette bag and bed-roll in his room.

OCTOBER 18:

I had hidden my notebook inside my clothing, but had left another one in my shirt pocket in hopes that if I was searched while asleep, they would think the one in my shirt pocket was the only one I had. When I returned to the room where I had been interrogated, I saw that my musette bag and all of my effects had been searched. Also I had a camera in my musette bag with the film in it of various atrocities that had been committed, showing some Chstnik personalities on it.

While I was looking for my shaving equipment, I unloaded the camera, flipped the film out, and stuck in an old film. I went outside to shave, and when I returned, the Russian Major said to me, "I see you have a camera in your bag", because I had left my musette bag open when I went outside. I said, "Yes,

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but it's no good". He said, "What pictures have you been taking?" I told him that I had not taken any pictures because I couldn't get the film to work on the ratchet, and did not think it was worth bothering with. I stated the only reason I was carrying it was because it was United States Government property, and I was accountable for it, but added, "However, you may have the camera if you think you can make it work, and I will tell my officers that I gave it to a Russian ally."

Once again he informed me that I was not a prisoner, so I asked him if there was an American Mission in Bulgaria, and he said no. He asked me how I expected to get in contact with my superiors. I told him if he returned me to Krusevac, they would eventually hear of my whereabouts and would probably send a plane for me, or else they could notify the Russian Mission in Bari. He replied that they had no contact by radio.

He then asked me several times how I would get in touch with my Colonel, and I told him that I did not know where he was, and therefore could not get in touch with him. This he disbelieved very much.

Shortly after that, I was taken down to the road and loaded in an American truck with the two German officers, and nine guards. Ten minutes after that, I was taken out of there and put into a captured German scout car with a different Russian Lieutenant Colonel, the two German prisoners, and a Russian driver.

Before leaving, the Russian General came over to me and asked me where my radio station was, and I told him again that I did not have one. With that, he poked his finger on my chest and said, "You're lying to me." I answered by

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saying that he could prove that through his officers in Krusevac; and when I asked him where they were taking me, he refused to answer. He also said there was not an American Mission in Bulgaria. I told him that I had heard there was such a mission from an announcement by BBC.

Again he said, "You are not a prisoner, but we have to be very careful because you might be a German spy in an American uniform." He also informed us that some Chetniks had attacked Russian troops at Varvarin, and also in the Belgrade area.

Another Russian Colonel asked for my carbine as a gift because I wouldn't need it anymore.

The two Hun officers, the Russian Lieutenant-Colonel and I left in a northeasterly direction. En route we were sideswiped by a truck driven by a Russian soldier. The Colonel got out of our car and while the Russian soldier stood at a salute, he beat him unconscious with his tommygun, and then clobbered him in the face. He took his tommygun and beat our driver over the head, putting a gash in his head. We then proceeded on our way, and the first inkling I had of my whereabouts was when the Russian Colonel tapped me on the shoulder and said, "You are now leaving Yugoslavia and entering Bulgaria." The car broke down, and we hitchhiked a ride into Vidin in an American truck. The majority of vehicles were American, and I counted eighty heavy Russian tanks, also convoys moving westward.

We arrived there at 4:00 PM. I was placed in a room with the Huns. This time, I was their guard, and they were taken out singly for interrogation.

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The German Lieutenant Colonel told me that the night before he had been interrogated in relays and had not been allowed to sleep, and the German pilot had been forced to sleep on a chair. They had not been fed, and neither had I, up to this time.

I was removed from this house and slept at a command office where two Bulgar laborers were sleeping on the floor, and I had a dirty, old, iron bed.

Previous to that, they took me down to a mess hall and fed me some rice and cold gravy with a bucket of weak tea.

OCTOBER 16:

About 8:30 AM, two Russian Majors came to see me. One spoke English fairly well, and after making the same inquiries as all the others, they told me there was no mission in Bulgaria. Therefore, they would send a radiogram to Moscow to notify the American Legation that I was here.

I asked them to contact the Russian Mission in Italy. They said they had no contact. They also said they had no planes flying to Italy.

I then asked them if there was any chance of getting to Istanbul, and they answered no. They said I must wait until they received a reply from Moscow. They again told me that I was not a prisoner, and when I asked them if I had the freedom of the town, they said it might be dangerous because of possible Bulgarian provocateurs for retaliation of U.S. bombings at Sofia.

They asked me to tell them about U. S. reconnaissance schools, and I told them they were no different from the Russian as far as I knew, and that ours were for aerial photography. He said, "I never thought an

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American officer had nerve enough to be in these countries by himself," and asked me if I wasn't afraid for my life. I was--but I told him the Russians had been brave at Stalingrad.

I asked for a Russian soldier as an escort, and for them to give him a paper showing my identity in case I was stopped on the streets. From this time on my meals were served at the Generals' mess.

OCTOBER 17:

In the morning I was notified that a Russian Lieutenant Colonel would call for me with an automobile. A Russian Lieutenant called for me, and took me to a house where I was given a big glass of Vodka, and a Russian Major, a driver and I were put into a jeep. A Russian Lieutenant Colonel, a Russian Major and a Russian WAC with a Russian driver, were in another car--a civilian car.

It can be noted here that all Russian officers from Major on up, have a Russian WAC.

Again upon inquiry, they wouldn't inform me as to our destination. However, en route, I saw milestones indicating that we were headed for Sofia. We changed vehicles several times, and I was finally brought to the Russian Legation in Sofia.

After sitting in the reception room for two hours, still not knowing what was going on, a Russian WAC walked by and said to me in perfect English, "Hello, American," and told me that I would not be lonesome in this town because there were many British and Americans there; and when I asked what they were--prisoners or airmen--she wouldn't answer, but just

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said they were British and American officers.

An hour later, I was taken into the office of another Russian Lieutenant Colonel and he informed me that they would telephone the American Mission to come and get me. He then ordered a meal for me.

I arrived at the American Mission villa at about 10:45 PM.

I can say the younger Russian officers were the most cordial to me, and respected America, but not the others.

The Russians were intensely proud of their manufacturing ability and their factories, and scorned the peasant and agricultural countries of the Balkans. The Russian army lived off of the land like a swarm of locusts, and the short time that I was in Bulgaria, I was told that the "black market" was increasing rapidly. The short time that I was in Bulgaria, I was unable to see the exact system used by the Russians in gathering food and other supplies, but I was told by a Bulgarian school teacher that food was very scarce and difficult to get, particularly potatoes, cabbage, and other locally grown produce. The inhabitants of Vidin were forced to wait for their bread delivery until late in the afternoon after all bread had been baked for the Russian garrison and Russian convoys passing through. Some days it was impossible to even obtain bread. In my conversation with a Russian major, he apologized for the quality of the food they had to feed me at the Generals' mess because up to that time the Russians had not bothered to transport their own food. When I was fed the Russian soldier's ration, it consisted of large quantities of weak tea, boiled rice, gravy, and a small chunk of meat with coarse black bread. However, this major told me that the Russians intended to bring their own.

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supplies in as soon as possible. A Bulgar, a former student at the American University, Sofia, told me that the Russians were paid by the Bulgarian Government in local currency because the Russians would not permit the ruble to be exchanged in Bulgaria by the soldiers.

A Bulgar school teacher told me that the Russians were well-behaved until they started drinking, and then they would shoot off firearms and out loose. All schools in Vidin were closed because the buildings were used for barracks and hospitals. There were quite a few cases of typhus in the hospitals.

General Hall, of the American Mission, told me that they had been informed two days before of my presence with the Russian troops, and had been expecting me at any time.

OCTOBER 18:

About three in the afternoon, an American plane arrived with supplies for the American Mission, and arrived in Bari at about 6:15 PM. After reporting to SAS, I went out to the American hospital and got some sleeping powders for the first complete night's sleep in seven weeks.

OCTOBER 20:

On the morning of October 20, I was advised by the officers at Bari that it would not be safe for me to stay in that vicinity, and that I should leave for Caserta. The reason I was advised that it would be unsafe for me to remain in Bari was due to the fact that the Partisans had guaranteed the safety of the lives of the officers with the American Mission to Barbie, but in the field had sent a death warrant and orders to kill me, an American officer. Also the Partisans in Bari were becoming

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
more demanding in their requests from the Allies and cases were suspected if not already known of attacks having been committed against Allied officers with the blame being placed on local Italians. During my short stay in Bari, I remained armed.

I arrived at Caserta in the afternoon.


1st Lieutenant M. R. Kramer, AUS

SECRET





Even No. 111st

12 square is 1/2 of f. 6.3