

FAR EAST

December 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: ASSIGNMENTS TO THE FAR EAST

In connection with assignments to the Far East, it might be advisable to contact the International Harvester Company, the International Telephone & Telegraph Company and the American oil companies operating there. There are, however, no American oil men now in Vladivostok.

The I.T. & T. had a very high-class man for many years in Japan and the Phillipines, but John Wiley does not remember his name. We could get it through Colonel Sosthenes Behn.

The I.T. & T. also had and probably still has in its employ an ex-Foreign Service officer named Charles Russell, who has certain ability. Wiley knows him and thinks that he would be good for certain purposes in any area controlled by the British. He is an Old School Tie type, but is not tough enough for general contact work.

David Bruce

DKB:EG

Mr. George Atcheson, Jr.
Division of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Thank you for your letter of November 15 and for sending me a copy of the review prepared by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs on the situation in the Far East, covering the weekly period ending November 13, 1941.

William J. Donovan

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100420003-5

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FE

November 15, 1941


NOV 17 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Colonel Donovan:

By direction of the Secretary of State, I take pleasure in sending to you, for your strictly confidential information, a copy of a review prepared by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs for the Secretary in regard to the situation in the Far East for the weekly period ending November 13, 1941.

Sincerely yours,


George Acheson, Jr.
Assistant Chief
Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Enclosure:

Review for the week ending
November 13, 1941.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Apex Building,
Washington, D.C.

Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

COL NEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

November 13, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

S
Mr. Secretary

The Situation in the Far East
General Summary

Announcement was made on November 7 that this Government was "giving consideration to the question" of withdrawing American marine detachments from China -- an announcement which the Japanese press interpreted as preparation by the United States for a possible further deterioration in relations with Japan.

Saburo Kurusu, whose journey to the United States was described by a Japanese Government spokesman as a token of "Japan's earnest desire to come to a conclusion in the Washington negotiations", was expected to arrive by Clipper at San Francisco on November 15. Japanese comment on Mr. Kurusu's journey had a note of anxiety, little hope being held out that he would be able to obtain what Japan wanted. Japanese pessimism in this respect was seemingly increased by recent developments including the announcement with regard to the possible withdrawal of American marines from China, the announcement of a
billion

-2-

billion dollar Lend-Lease loan by the United States to the U.S.S.R., and statements by the President, the Under Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy setting forth this Government's attitude towards Japanese policies in the Far East. The British Prime Minister's statement of November 10 that in case of an American-Japanese war a British declaration of war against Japan would follow "within the hour" was characterized by the Japanese press as a direct challenge to Japan and an attempt to use the Japanese-American conversations for British ends.

The Japanese Government protested against the cancellation on October 29 in Panama under a law enacted some months ago of all business permits held by Japanese residents--a step which Japan purportedly regarded as having been taken by Panama at the instance of the United States. The Shanghai Municipal Council in cooperation with the authorities of the French concession established maximum wholesale and retail prices for imported rice in a move to allay wide-spread public unrest.

Reports from Hanoi indicated that Japanese forces in French Indochina were believed to total approximately 51,000 of which 31,000 were in the south and 20,000 in Tonking. There were reports of continued Japanese troop movements in Manchuria and of unusual Japanese troop concentrations in Formosa.

One.

-3-

One. Announcement concerning possible withdrawal of American Marines in China.

Announcement was made at the White House on November 7 that this Government was "giving consideration to the question of withdrawal of the American marine detachments now maintained ashore in China ^{at} Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai". No official explanation of the announcement was given. The Japanese press for the most part interpreted the announcement as preparation by the United States against the possibility of a further deterioration in Japanese-American relations and as a warning to Japan of the consequences likely to follow a failure of Mr. Kurihara's journey.

Two. Japanese-American relations.

Saburo Kurihara, whose journey was described by a Japanese Government spokesman as a token of "Japan's honest desire to come to a conclusion in the Washington negotiations", was en route to the United States by clipper after a two-day delay at Midway Island due to engine trouble and unfavorable weather. He was expected to reach San Francisco on November 15. Mr. Kurihara was reported to have indicated that he felt that there was "not much hope" for the success of his mission, and it was understood that he felt that he would be unable to offer the United States sufficient concessions.

Recent

-4-

Recent developments affecting the Far Eastern situation seemingly had a discouraging effect upon any hopes which the Japanese Government or people may have had that this Government's position with regard to the Far Eastern situation might be easily modified. These developments included: (1) the announcement by the President on November 7 with regard to a possible withdrawal of the American marines from China; (2) the announcement on November 6 of a billion dollar lend-lease loan by the United States to the U.S.S.R.; (3) statements by responsible American officials (among them the President, the Under Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy) indicative of this Government's attitude toward Japan's policies in the Far East; (4) the British Prime Minister's statement on November 10 that if the United States should become involved in war with Japan "a British declaration would follow within the hour"; and (5) a statement reported to have been made by the Chinese Government spokesman that the United States, Great Britain, China and the Netherlands had reached an agreement with regard "to Japan's next move in the Pacific".

There was a note of anxiety in Japanese comment on the Kuzasu journey, little hope being held out that Mr. Kuzasu would be able to obtain what Japan wanted. The

Japanese

-5-

Japanese press which had earlier in the week practically ceased its criticism of American Far Eastern policy resumed its attack with renewed intensity following Mr. Churchill's statement just referred to. The Japanese people were described as "burning with anger" at this statement which was regarded as a direct challenge to Japan and an indication of closer American-British collaboration. The Japanese press stated that the British Prime Minister was seeking to use the Japanese-American conversations for British ends. A Japanese journalist addressed a large audience at Tokyo on November 11 and according to the Japanese press poured "fire and brimstone" on the "attitude of the United States toward Japan", asserting that the obstacles in the path of Japanese-American conversations lay in the insistence of the United States upon a return to conditions prevailing before the "Manchurian affair".

Three. Japanese-Panama Relations.

According to a statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on November 8, the Japanese Minister at Panama was notified on October 28 that all business permits held by Japanese residents in Panama would be cancelled on October 29. (This action was apparently taken under a law of Panama prohibiting members of a race not permitted to immigrate to Panama from engaging in business there.) The

Foreign

-6-

Foreign Office's statement asserted that Japan "for the sake of all Asiatic peoples" could not remain indifferent to this measure. The statement also indicated that Japan regarded the measure as having been adopted by Panama at the instance of the United States in order to remove Japanese residents from areas near the Panama Canal.

Four. Treasury announcement of new regulations governing trade and remittances between United States and China.

The Secretary of the Treasury on November 12 announced the putting into effect of important amendments to general licenses controlling trade between the United States and China and remittances from the United States to China. These changes were worked out in collaboration with the Chinese Government and with the British Government (which expects to put into effect shortly a similar arrangement governing trade and remittances between China and the British Empire) and they have as their object the strengthening of the foreign exchange position of China and the enabling of China to exercise effective exchange control not only in "free" China but in the occupied areas. Under the new arrangement all trade between the United States and China must be cleared through the Stabilization Board of China, or through approved, cooperating banks. Exports
from

-7-

from China to the United States may not enter through the United States customs unless there is evidence that the exchange accruing from such exports has been made available to appointed banks in China, and no exports destined for China may be cleared through the United States customs unless there is evidence that the importation into China is being financed through foreign exchange obtained from an appointed bank.

Five. Price control at Shanghai.

Under the authority of a bylaw recently approved by the Consular Body in Shanghai, the Shanghai Municipal Council, in cooperation with the authorities of the French Concession, established on November 10 maximum wholesale and retail prices for imported rice in a move to check extensive profiteering and hoarding of rice and to allay widespread public unrest. The maximum amount which consumers are to be permitted to buy will be fixed periodically by the Council. This move showed some initial success as prices of rice and wheat flours registered immediately substantial declines. However, prices of other staple commodities rose the following day due, according to the Consulate General at Shanghai, to the skepticism on the part of hoarders and operators of the ultimate success of the control measures.

Six.

-3-

Six. Arrangement with regard to funds for American official establishments in Japan and Japanese official establishments in the United States.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo reported on November 12 that the reciprocal arrangement which has been under negotiation for three months and to which this Government has agreed, providing for the release of funds for the payment of the expenses of American official personnel and establishments in Japan and for the expenses of Japanese official personnel and establishments in the United States, was satisfactory to Japan. On November 11 a general license which would permit the handling of such transactions for American official personnel and establishments in Japan was issued to the National City Bank of New York in Tokyo. On November 11 also a general unfreezing order which would permit American official establishments in Japan to receive such funds was published in the official gazette in Tokyo.

Seven. Chinese aviation cadets in the United States.

According to a press despatch from Phoenix, Arizona, the first contingent of young Chinese aviation cadets sent to the United States for instruction arrived there on November 5.

Eight. Withdrawal of Japanese nationals from British territory in the Far East, from the Philippine Islands and from the Netherlands East Indies.

The

-9-

The American Consul General at Rangoon reported that the Japanese vessel, Mai Maru, which called at Rangoon on November 9 en route to Japan, had on board Japanese nationals from India and other British territory in the Far East and that it took on board forty Japanese nationals at Rangoon. According to a press despatch from Tokyo five hundred Japanese nationals left the Philippine Islands for Japan on November 8. 1500 Japanese left Batavia November 10.

Nine. Military situation in China.

American consular officers in Manchuria reported continued but not large-scale Japanese troop movements, and further development of Japanese military establishments and supply depots at Harbin. Extensive reconnaissance operations by Japanese patrols along the eastern border of Manchuria were reported but the reports were not confirmed. There was likewise no confirmation of a report from a foreign official source of troop movements from Dairen northward on November 2.

According to Japanese reports in Hankow, Japanese forces concentrated in the Singyang area in Southern Honan, struck northward along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and occupied Chenyang and Junan, Honan Province.

Ten. Japanese concentrations in Formosa.

The Vice Consul in Formosa reported that unusual numbers

-10-

numbers of Japanese troops were being billeted there and that extensive military training activities were being carried out.

Eleven. Developments relating to Indochina.

Japan's special ambassador to French Indochina, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, arrived at Hanoi on November 8 with about eighty members of his mission. Fifty additional members of the Yokeyama Special Economic Mission also reached Hanoi at the same time.

The Consul at Hanoi reported on November 9 that according to estimates from military sources Japanese forces in Indochina totaled approximately 51,000 of which 31,000 were in the south and 20,000 in Tonking.

The American Consul at Kunming reported on November 3 that according to reliable reports the Chinese military authorities in Yunnan were seriously concerned over the possibility of a Japanese attack against their Province from Indochina; that Central Government troops were being sent to the southeastern border and that General He Ying-chin, Minister of War, had again gone to Yunnan. According to a report of November 10 from the Consul General at Rangoon military and other authorities there believed that the Japanese would make a move on Kunming from Indochina with a view to cutting the Burma Road but that at least two months

-11-

months would be required to prepare for such an attack.

The American Consul at Hanoi on November 4 reported that recent developments had given strength to his suggestion that the Japanese might have given publicity to their request for quarters for 50,000 troops in Tonkin in order to create an impression that a Japanese attack against China from Indochina was contemplated while the Japanese in fact were planning activities in the south.

FE:Bacon:LJH

FINAL REPORT OF EDGAR ANSEL MOWBRER TO COLONEL
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN, COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
CONCERNING A MISSION TO THE FAR EAST IN THE
AUTUMN OF 1941.

With the permission of Colonel Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy and owner of The Chicago Daily News, I severed my connection with that newspaper for a period of three months, and started preparing myself for a trip to the Far East. It was understood that, although furnished with credentials from the United States Government, I was to show these only when necessary and pass currently as a newspaper correspondent. In the course of my travel I divulged my character as Colonel Donovan's representative to only about a half dozen persons, exclusively British and American, some of whom, like British Minister Duff Cooper, had heard of my trip in advance and promised cooperation.

1. Before leaving this country, as previously reported, I went for one day to New York in order to make essential contact with the Netherland's Publicity people and to do some research in the Woodrow Wilson Library. In addition, I read several books, mostly at the recommendation of Mr. Carter of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and provided myself with the best available maps.

I planned to take a Clipper from San Francisco September 9. But though I left Washington September 7, due to circumstances beyond my control I did not get away from San Francisco until September 20, and actually reached Manila only on October 2. As I cleared Manila

for the United States on the homeward flight November 14, the actual period of my stay in the Far East was just six weeks.

2. Although curious as to the detail of each of the places I visited, I tried always to see individual cities and countries as part of a single whole - the Far East Potential War Area or the Region of Japanese Menace, a vast section of the globe stretching from Kamchatka in the north to the southern tip of Australia and from Pearl Harbor in the east to Burma in the west; now could even this delimitation necessarily be considered water tight, for Burma impinges on India and the British Indian command of General Wavell has authority over Persia and may well be compelled to give a hand to Russia as far away as the Caucasus. The way one theater of operations, actual or potential, now follows one another, right around the world, is a striking corroboration of the old Geneva dictum that, in the present era, aggression is indeed "indivisible."

3. In the course of my travels in the Far East, I visited the following places: Manila (going and coming), Singapore (twice), Batavia, Surabaya, and Bandoeng in Java, Bangkok, Rangoon and Toungoo in Burma, Kunming and Chungking in China, and Hongkong.

My tasks as I understood them, were: to visit and size up the countries of Southeastern Asia, both in detail and as a whole; to reach some opinion as to the most advantageous setup there for the Coordinator of Information; to look into the need for and possibilities of the dissemination of American information in the several countries visited; finally, on the basis of everything else, to set down any conclusion reached as to Japanese intentions and possibilities in the near

future. The last three points have been covered in separate memoranda. Here I shall confine myself to an account of what I did, heard, and saw.

4. Leaving Manila to be discussed toward the end of this report, I shall begin with Singapore. There I had hoped to come into immediate contact with Mr. Duff Cooper, and to benefit by the promised cooperation with him, as his task in a large way was similar to mine in a small way. But when I reached Singapore October 4, I found that Duff Cooper had gone on a visit to India and, therefore, determined to spend some of the time he would be away in visiting Java and to return only in time to meet him. Accordingly, I stayed in Singapore from October 4 to October 10 and again from October 19 to October 24. My first preoccupation was to make contact with the various British Propaganda Agencies with headquarters in that city. In the absence of Mr. Duff Cooper I made contact with Sir George Sansom, head of the so-called Organization X, which works in the area as part, or rather under cover, of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Sir George is a great specialist on Japan and a high power intelligence. In 1940 he was attached to the British Embassy in Tokio and was one of those British Officials who after the French collapse in the debacle at Dunkerque, lived with packed suitcases, expecting at any moment to receive from the Japanese Government an ultimatum for Britain to turn over its entire Far Eastern possessions to Japan or else! At that time Sir George thinks the Japs would have had little or no difficulty in seizing all of the British

and Dutch possessions in the area. For although some defence might have been made, the proper means for defense were entirely lacking. Instead, as he put it, the Japs missed the boat and now will never obtain even by the hardest fighting what they might then have had for little more than an ultimatum. (I shall reserve Sir George's views on the Japanese situation for a later section of this.)

From Sir George I obtained a description of the British Secret Propaganda setup in the Far East, included as an annex to a special memorandum. Through him I also came in contact with Valentine Killery, head of the normal establishment of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Associated with Mr. Killery is Mr. Galvin, an Australian economic expert whose views on Japan were helpful to me in forming my own opinion. Sir George's immediate assistant is Mr. G. E. Sayers. From Mr. R. H. Scott, representative of the British Ministry of Information in the Far East, I obtained two memoranda concerning the operations of his department in the area and the prospects for American radio propaganda, as he sees them.

Duff Cooper's chief tasks in Singapore were apparently two: first, to coordinate available information and the diffusion of propaganda; second, to bring about a simplification of the military administration in the region. Duff told me that on October 2 he wired to London a recommendation advising that something be setup in Singapore on the lines of the Political War Executive in London, with the Ministry of Information; the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the Foreign Office represented,

to take full charge of what he calls "non-violent warfare." Up to October 20, the date of our conversation, he had had no answer from London. He intended completing his visit to India and Burma by visits to Australia and Hongkong. Then, having inspected all the important places in the area, he wanted to send his final report or himself take his report to London.

Sir George Sansom, Mr. Valentine Killery, and Mr. R. H. Scott, all promised to welcome representatives of the American Coordinator of Information and to give them the fullest possible cooperation.

5. For defense purposes, the Straits settlement with Singapore, the Malay States both federated and unfederated, Burma and Hongkong as well, are considered by the British to form one unit. For the moment, I shall confine myself to Singapore and the Malay States and consider the state of the defenses up to October 24. On this point I consulted Colonel Brink, American Army observer; Commander Creighton of the American Navy; the American Consul General, Mr. Patton; several American aviator instructors; three prominent American newspaper men; the Chief British Army Commanders and the Intellectual Warfare people mentioned above, several Australian soldiers and newspaper men; a representative of the Free French; Mr. Guy Wind, a traveling British agent attached to the British Embassy in Chungking, but actually on constant mission throughout the entire area; I paid two visits to the great Naval Base at Singapore; had a long talk with the Commander-In-Chief China Station Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton and was twice the guest of Rear Admiral J. A. Spooner, actual Commander

of the British Naval establishments in Malaya. From what I gathered, military preparations in and around Singapore were far more advanced than they were a few months ago and were making continual progress. Admiral Spooner arrived from Great Britain, where he had taken part in actual fighting only last summer, but brought with him a sense of urgency that had been lacking in this region. Since he came, things around the Naval Base, had, I was told, begun to hum. Admiral Spooner himself said that by January if not earlier, when several British capital ships would begin to arrive, the base would be in a position to furnish all needed support.

Singapore itself is defended primarily by the air forces, with long-range coastal defense guns and Army gunners from Great Britain. Once a sufficient, powerful squadron is stationed in the area, the sea approaches should be practically invulnerable. Even Commander Creighton, American Naval observer, who is somewhat of an isolationist and fears a war with Japan, admitted that things were "very much better." Contiguous to Singapore Island is the province of Johore, whose defenses are largely in charge of an Australian division of some eighteen thousand men under Major General Gordon Bennett. Like many Australians, this general is somewhat contemptuous of the British, whom he thinks soft and lacking in initiative. According to Colonel Brink, American Army observer, who has personally inspected the British land defenses in the entire Malay Peninsula, the Australians were really doing a splendid job. Stripped to the waist and burned black as Malays (except

only those few blondes to whom a tropical sun will never mean anything but blisters), they had literally hacked their defenses out of the jungle. Hard work had kept away some of the inevitable boredom, but from all the Australian camps and areas was rising a single cry, "Give us war or give us women." The authorities were doing their best for them by granting frequent home leave though Australia is some three thousand miles distance.

Incidentally, the Australians feel and conduct themselves as the fighting cocks of the district. To some extent they are undoubtedly justified. Their high morale and their obvious will to war contrast strikingly with the indifference and narrow selfishness of many of the British inhabitants of Singapore, noticeably the rich tin and rubber magnates, but it was reported that on one occasion the Australians over-reached themselves. A party of them picked a quarrel with some Argyll Highlanders, from one of the four British regular battalions in garrison, and were severely thrashed. Nothing did more to raise British prestige.

An Australian air field on the Island of Singapore itself which I visited seemed to me a model of foresight and efficiency. The planes were exclusively American.

The military situation of Singapore and Malaya is somewhat as follows: 1. Malaya dominates almost all the trade routes between Europe, South Africa, and the Middle East on one side and Australia and the Far East on the other. 2. Malaya is a vital link between the air commissions in the single area. 3. Malaya is the only prepared base for protecting the sea and air communications. 4. Malaya is essential to the

defense of India, Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, and Australia. 5. Is the key to the entire Far East as far north as Shanghai. 6. Is a leading source of rubber and tin essential to the United States. 7. Is the proper starting point (with Manila) for an eventual recovery of Indo China and occupied China. (This analysis I obtained largely from Colonel Brink, U.S.A. and found entirely acceptable).

Malaya and Singapore seem a natural fortress, anyway. The road from Thailand is long and full of snakes. The water on the east coast is shallow with few anchorages; the west coast, if defended by warships, is hardly vulnerable to naval attack from Japan, and Singapore itself seems to have been made almost impregnable from the sea. It is to be expected that in case of Japanese occupation of Thailand, the British would take over the entire Kra Isthmus, thus keeping the valuable tin out of Japanese hands at the same time. The British claimed that once a sufficient number of British war ships had reached Singapore, the defenses on land and water would be sufficiently strong. Naturally the air men were crying for more planes, some of which might come from Australia, but most of which they obviously expected from the United States. But the chief weakness in the British Far Eastern setup, if there was one, lay apparently in that complicated crisscrossing of commands, which Duff Cooper had been trying to eliminate. There were in Singapore itself no less than seven or eight authorities some of them independent of the others.

Here is a list: Commander-in-Chief of the Far East, Air Vice Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. 2. Commander-

in-Chief China Station" ("all the waters, from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the American"). Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton (successor appointed I have since heard). 3. (Under 1) Lieutenant-General Percival, Commander of the troops in Malaya. 4. (Under 2) Rear-Admiral J. A. Spooner, Commander of the Naval Establishments in Malaya. 5. (Under 1) Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, Commander of the Far Eastern Air Force. 6. Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath, Commander of the Indian Army Corps. 7. Major General Gordon Bennett, Commander of the Australian Imperial Forces, - in reality one division of about eighteen thousand men. 8. Major General Keith Symmonds, Commander of Singapore. In addition, there was the Governor of Straits Settlement, His Excellency Sir Thomas Shelton Thomas, (he invited me to luncheon at Government House, with the constrained manner of a British patriot consciously "doing his bit.") K.C.M.G., who is also in theory Commander in Singapore.

Few of these Admirals, Generals, and other Commanders spoke well of each other and none of them spoke well of Brooke-Popham. Admiral Layton went so far as to refer to him continually as "Brooke Pop-Off" - in reference to his numerous trips about the area - and "Old Popcorn." This is a point-of-view that seemed to be shared by our own Admiral Hart in Manila. Generally, the Air Vice Marshal is reproached with being a feeble old dodderer. Only two or three of the persons I met had a good word to say for Brooke and they admitted that he was "too old." Admiral Spooner insisted, however, that Brooke-Popham's job was "purely

10

preparatory" and that "when the balloon goes up," actual command would pass to some one else. General Wavell was thought to be trying to regain control over Burma from Brooke-Popham. On the other hand, I heard two Army men refer to Admiral Layton as "that old fool." My own impression of the Admiral was that of an aggressive fighting fellow, a fine man on the bridge but with no great sense of politics, a matter in which he persists in meddling. Duff Cooper and Lady Diana were also not popular in Singapore. Some people referred to Duff Cooper as "Fluff Goofy" and at a time British Service people had sent away their women, Lady Diana's mere presence, however gracious, was felt as an affront, and people criticized her occupying, in the all too few passenger planes, a place that might have been filled by some one "doing a job." I suppose it is, however, to be expected that in case of real war the British would be able to improvise some sort of effective unity if it had not already been achieved.

The Malay Peninsula is inhabited by a very mixed lot - Malays, Chinese, and Indians with only a few British. The Chinese are very belligerent and the rich ones are contributing a good deal to General Chiang Kai-shek's campaign fund. The Malays, though not pro-British, are at least passive, and might prove susceptible to an American news broadcast in Malay language. The Indians were reported to be anti-British. The British themselves, in such places as Singapore, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur, seemed singularly tepid in spirit and deserving of all the criticism they had received from American journalists. The chief task of the rich ones seemed to be preventing the local income tax from being

raised above 8% maximum, and the "Straits Times" is their organ for doing this. It was avowed by one of them in my presence that "when the war starts" (meaning the war with Japan) "everything will be different." Apparently he had never heard that Britain was at war with Germany.

All things considered, my impression of the Straits Settlements and Malaya was better than I had been led to expect.

6. The first impression of Java was far more peaceful than that of Singapore. Monkeys in groups of three and four crossed a paved road outside Batavia just ahead of me and there is nothing like a group of monkeys holding hands to give a peaceful note to a landscape. One sees next to no military in the streets of Batavia, Semarang, or Djokjakarta; to see much of the local soldiery one has to go to the Army center at Bandoeng. In Surabaya, the Naval Base, sailors were of course plentiful, some of them aviators. Underneath the surface, however, as one soon comes to notice, the Dutch Indies give a more resolute picture of war will and military alertness than the British at Singapore. At least such was my impression. I was delayed somewhat in my work by the death of the Commanding General, which meant time-out for two or three days. In my nine days stay in the Island I did, however, manage to have talks with his Excellency Governor-General Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenburgh - Stackhouwer at his summer place up in the mountains; with the new Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands

East Indies forces, General Ter Poorten; with Admiral Helfrich, Commanding the Dutch Naval forces in the Far East; with the head of the Economics Department, Van Moulik, who gained merited fame by refusing the Japanese demands for oil, etc; with A.H.J. Lovink, Adviser for East Asiatic Affairs to the Governor-General, whom I found singularly well informed on the subject of Japan; with American Consul General Fouts, who knows his way about the Islands; with Commander Slosson, U.S.N.; with Dutch and American newspaper men; with the independent Nationalist leader Dewantara; with a rather pro-Dutch Javanese Nationalist (or Indonesian) leader, Hadji August Salim.

I went over the Naval Base at Surabaya and saw some of the Army base and an Army airfield at Bandoeng. Above all I talked with as many of the people as possible, both Dutch and Javanese, in order to judge the firmness of their resolution to defend themselves if attacked. So far as I could gather the situation is somewhat as follows: The Dutchmen in the Indies are a very independent lot, though not particularly warlike when left alone. But the unprovoked attack on Holland shook them profoundly and made them conscious of their responsibility as the only remaining nucleus of Dutch independence. So long as the Japanese, for whom the Dutch have no great respect, confined this aggression to China, the men of Batavia viewed it almost with complacency. But when the Japanese took over all of Indo China, considered a pistol aimed at Java, the Netherlands Dutch went fighting mad. Both General Ter Poorten and

Admiral Helfrich expressed their regret that Japanese transports had not been sunk without warning at the time of the complete occupation of Indo-China. Obviously, left to themselves, the Dutch, with only the British and Australians to back them up, could never take the offensive against Japan. The Dutch Commanders particularly regretted the lack of public political commitment with Great Britain and Australia for coming defense. The military plans for such coming defense had been made but the British were stubbornly refusing to say aloud that an attack on Singapore, the Dutch Indies, or Australia would be a casus belli for all three. Some of the Dutch flying officers - not unlike certain American officers whom I have talked with - seemed over-impressed with German military efficiency, but all of them were willing and eager to fight to the extent that their resources permit. If the United States were in the fight, we could, I feel, count on the Dutch Indies to back us completely in any campaign we might map out. Admiral Helfrich asked humorously for four days' warning so that he could have his submarines lying off Japanese ports "Ven de balloon goes oop." The Netherlands Indies forces, I was told, consisted of some eight thousand Dutch regulars, about ten thousand Dutch Indies volunteers, and nearly a hundred thousand native troops, largely from the Island of Amboina, which is supposed to provide a tougher breed of man than the other islands. General Ter Poorten defined the Army role as purely defensive - protecting Java and the Naval and Air Bases in the other islands

from invasion. The air people complained of lack of sufficient planes, both bombers and fighters, and regretted that their "program" for air defense could not be completed before the end of 1942. But all seemed ready to fight.

The American military instructors of the Dutch flyers complained of too great recklessness on the part of their pupils.

From the Indonesian Nationalists Dewantara and Hadji August Salim, from some other Javanese, from the American newspaper men and the American Consul General, I obtained some notion of the Javanese Nationalist Movement. This is extremely complex and the details have no bearing on the present report. So far as possible I endeavored to obtain a reply to the question, what would the Indonesian Nationalists do in case the Netherland Indies went to war with Japan? My informants were almost unanimous in giving the following answer. The Indonesians would support the Netherland Indies Government steadily, but without enthusiasm, in its war effort up to the point of a possible Japanese victory. At this point without hesitation but also without enthusiasm they would go over to the victor, trusting for the best! Interesting is the fact that the Nationalists are divided among themselves, not only into narrow, personal and party groups, but also on the great issue of adherence to tradition or rupture of it. Dewantara for instance is closely associated with the schools at Djokjakarta where the ancient Javanese dancing, puppet plays, batik painting and silver working are all kept alive. Salim on the other hand believes that all that "old stuff"

simply plays into the hands of the Dutch regime by keeping the Javanese hopelessly medieval and inefficient (Ghandi, he says, is a great asset not to the Indians, but to the British!). Salim's ideal is Mustapha Kemal who broke with tradition in Turkey and modernized the Turks more or less against their will. He thinks that what the Javanese need is a jolt in the pit of the stomach - something to snap them out of their old ways.

It would seem very difficult for men like Dewantara and Hadja August Salim to merge their conflicting views into one anti-Dutch action. The Dutch themselves do not anticipate trouble though they admitted that "after the war", great concessions must be made to the Javanese Nationalists.....

An American news broadcast in Malay might help us.

7. Thailand is a fascinating little country of golden temples, river life and handsome diminutive people. The political regime seems compounded of a great deal of Chiang Kai-shek, a dash of Hitler, and much loose talk of democracy. The Thais are attractive and most foreigners like them. Premier Peabun (spelled Bipul) adequately expressed the contradictory tendencies in the little kingdom when on the one hand he stressed tradition ("A good Buddhist is a good patriot") and on the other he attempted to force upon the Thais attendance at the Buddhist Temples(wats) and to put the women into hats, stockings and gloves, which seemed hardly adapted to the climate.

During my stay in Bangkok, October 24 to 27, I saw the American Minister with the diplomatic Consular Officials; the British Minister; the Thai Foreign Minister,

Nai Direck; His Highness Prince Varnvidya Varavarn, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Council of Ministers; Mr. Gilchrist of the British Ministry of Information; numerous American business men, one American newspaper man; two Thai newspaper men, numerous Thai citizens, and so on. Particularly helpful were Mr. Chapman of the American Legation and the Military Attache, Major Jackson.

The Thais are traditionally friendly to the United States, but in the last few years have drifted away from American influence, in part perhaps because of the extraordinary attitude of Mr. Grant, the American Minister who preceded Mr. Willys Peck. Conceivably, also withholding the military airplanes the Thais had bought, also had something to do with this. In any case, it is very late to bring about much alteration in this situation. Notable to me was the fact that the Thai banks, though eager to obtain Japanese yens and Straits dollars, had no use for United States dollars or Netherland East Indies guilders.

The questions I put to myself were as follows: How do the Thais stand politically? Will they try to defend their country against Japanese invasion? Would they welcome British protection? Could they defend themselves successfully if they try?

The Americans in Bangkok said that the Thais were fundamentally pro-Japanese. Japanese influence had been steadily rising in the country. The number of Japanese in Thailand, though stated by the Foreign Minister,

17

Nai Direck, not to exceed a few hundred was believed by the Americans to be at least ten thousand and possibly more. Two Japanese who registered in the Orient Hotel in Bangkok while I was living there naively answered the question "ultimate destination?" by writing, "here". The pro-Japanese feeling apparently reached its climax some months ago when Thailand acquired a portion of French Cambodia, after a brief military campaign and through "Japanese mediation". At that time the Thai and the Japanese flags floated together on top of the public buildings. Since this time the Thais have begun to suspect that the Japs were not disinterested in their mediation and have acquired a creeping fear of them. A Thai architect who had been educated in Paris broke down after a few drinks and tearfully said to a British official, "You must protect us or we are lost". Yet the Thai Foreign Minister, Nai Direck, could give me no plausible explanation of why his Government had recently lent forty-five million ticals to the local branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. He said that otherwise the bank would have failed, but was unable to explain why that should have bothered the Thais. People in Bangkok suspected that the Japs already had a lien on this year's rice crop, but admitted that the British could prevent this by withholding the Indian-made gunny sacks which are apparently indispensable if the rice is "to breathe" during shipment. Japan is also said to have influence in the Thai Army and among the politicians, many of whom had allegedly been bought outright. My impression entirely bore out the views of Carlos P. Romulo, the editor of the Philippines Herald,

who on October 7 printed several reasons for his belief in a coming Japanese attack on Thailand. Romulo cited numerous small Japanese undertakings which added up into a pretty conceivable threat. Among others he cited the subsidizing of four Thai newspapers, the opening of a Japanese propaganda office in Bangkok and an attempt to secure landing fields and Naval Bases. Despite this, my impression was that the present Government desperately hoped to remain neutral.

But if Japan does attack will the Thais defend themselves? I think the bulk of the Army will - if ordered to do so. The Army is not particularly numerous or efficient, perhaps not much better than the Thai Navy. The air force, though reputed courageous, is equipped with antiquated planes. None the less the country could put up a considerable defense if it tried to do so. My impression was that unfortunately a Japanese attack would split the governing classes wide open. Many of the present Ministers would be for resistance, but other important persons would be for coming to terms with the Japs as soon as possible. Their argument would be that since Thailand could not hope successfully to resist Japan, better capitulate gracefully without receiving much harm. In other words, better be an Oriental Denmark than a New Norway.

Among the possible "Quislings" in Bangkok three were mentioned: Colonel Prayura Bhamaramontre, Acting for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of Education and Director of the Yuvachon (or Youth

Movement) which looks much like a "Hitler Jugend"; Nai Vanich Pananonda, Director General of the Department of Commerce and the Minister of Economics and Special Envoy attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; His Highness Prince Varnvidya Varavarn, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Council of Ministers. I talked with his Highness and a more shifty customer I never met. Obviously, if the Thais were sure of American and British assistance it would be harder for them to capitulate without serious resistance. Major General Gordon Bennett, commanding the Australian division at Singapore, told Vincent Sheean that in his opinion the British should immediately send one hundred thousand men from England and take Thailand bodily. Short of full support in advance the Thais will, in my opinion, put up a "token" defense, meanwhile shouting lustily for foreign aid. This is better than inviting the Japanese to come in and take over. But unless such aid be forthcoming, the defense will hardly be long sustained. Therefore I can see no adequate reason for supplying Thailand with any war material destined more than likely to fall into Japanese hands.

8. During forty-eight hours in Rangoon, Burma, I managed to call upon the Governor Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Major Hewitt of the Burma Government, the American Consul Mr. Brady and many others. I interviewed two Burmese journalists, two American business men, Mr. R. C. Chen of the Chinese Defense Supply Corporation, went with his American Assistant Mr. Matteson, to visit the Rangoon docks and go-downs, and looked over the half-built General Motors Assembly Plant. I

also spent considerable time with Mr. Lowe of the Chinese Ministry of Information.

Burma was interesting as throwing light on three points. The first was the situation of the Burma Road, to which I shall return in a later section of this report; the second, the political and military conditions prevailing in Burma itself; and the third, the situation of the First Group of American Volunteer Aviators under Colonel Chennault at Toungoo, 150 miles to the north of Rangoon.

To me the situation of Burma seemed as bad as possible. The Burmese have become largely self-governing, but despite that, have no gratitude for the British and dislike the Chinese. The country is a theocracy, ruled, that is, by yellow-robed Buddhist monks who provide the cogs of the political machine that has brought to power the present Premier U Saw. These monks consider themselves terribly oppressed by the British and they have been worked upon by Japanese propagandists who have stressed their common Buddhism. Their loyalty to Great Britain is certainly slight; Governor Dorman-Smith said that in case the Japanese invaded Burma the bulk of the population would rise on behalf of the invaders! And the native army, though largely drawn from the (non-Burmese) hills peoples, is not considered dependable.

The defenses of this rather large country consisted, at the time of my visit, of three brigades of good troops, one squadron of pursuit planes and one squadron of bombers. The Governor hoped that in case of Japanese attack the American Volunteer Aviators at Toungoo would take part in the defense. There was much talk of first-class

Australian "Jungle fighters" all ready in position out on the border next to Indo China, but I did not see any signs of them and was inclined to believe that this was, at best, an anticipation. Some British forces in the extreme northeast corner of the country were trying to make contact with the Chinese operating across the border, and the Chinese had promised assistance in case the Japanese attacked. But the lazy Burmese dislike the industrious Chinese almost as much as they dislike the British and clapped a 2% transit tax on American Lend-Lease goods for China. When the British under American protest sought to have this removed they were able to do so only by paying it to Burma themselves. The Governor explained that he had had Premier U Saw invited to London in order to impress him with British strength and win him over, but was doubtful of success. In vain the British have insisted on the barbarous nature of the Japanese. The Burmese newspaper men who called upon me told me frankly that they knew the Japanese must be good people simply because the English said they were bad people. No wonder the British seemed so jumpy and police examinations were so stringent!

Against a Japanese attack from Indo China alone the British forces might be able to make some headway, but if the Japs took over Thailand as well, they could, in the words of the Governor, "spill over the border in fifty places at once." He pointed out that it took four brigades of British troops six months to put down a minor Burmese rebellion in 1936 and feared that if the population rallied to the side of the Jap invaders,

22

the situation could be critical. He would, he said, welcome a regular American broadcast in Burmese.

All in all, this seemed anything but a reassuring situation.

October 30 I took the evening train to Toungoo, some 150 miles to the north of Rangoon and was met at the station there by Mr. Joseph Alsop, well-known Washington columnist, who had left the Navy service to become the "secretary" of Colonel Chennault, of the First Group of American Volunteer Aviators. I spent most of that night talking with Alsop and hearing from him the conditions prevailing in the camp. On the surface these were not so bad. Most of the American volunteers, who are extremely well-paid, seemed in good health and in high spirits. But really conditions were not satisfactory. Some ten had "deserted" after reaching Toungoo either because they "had not expected the services to be dangerous" or because they "wished to get out of their military obligation in the United States anyway." And that was not the worst. Colonel Chennault complained not only of the absence of competent staff officers, of spare parts and of supplies in general, as well as of the "over-age character" of the cartridges (1933) furnished for his guns, but also of the P.40's themselves. He would, he explained, be ready to take two or three squadrons into action on or after December 1, but he warned that neither in their numbers nor in the quality of their planes were these squadrons a match for the Japanese fighting forces. The latter he said fly "O" planes

23

far superior in climbing power and ceiling to the P.40's. The Colonel regretted that the P.43's and P.48's on order for the Chinese Government had not already arrived. Coming from a man of Chennault's dogged courage and determination to succeed, such complaints betrayed an underlying pessimism. (American regular Army officers in Chungking were inclined to attribute this atmosphere to the fact that the pilots were "just mercenaries.") I am inclined to believe rather that Colonel Chennault, being familiar with the Orient, feared less a defeat for himself and his boys than the effect of a defeat for America in the first battle with Japan. For however the American Administration may view the Volunteers, the entire Far East looks on them as the vanguard of the American Army and is eagerly looking forward to the result of the first conflict with the Japs.

Clearly, even if all were for the best, the pilots and planes in Toungoo were far too few to guarantee protection of the traffic on the Burma Road, to say nothing of supporting Chinese land defence of the whole Province of Yunnan. I was not surprised when in Chungking some days later I found General John Magruder, head of the American Military Mission, more worried about the Volunteer Aviators than about almost anything else.

9. Leaving Toungoo about noon November 2 - British General Wavell had just flown over the field on a tour of inspection - the C.N.A.C. regular DC 3 from Rangoon brought me to Lashio near the edge of Burma, about one-thirty, and set me down in Kunming an hour or so before dark. The hotels were crowded but I managed to find

14

sleeping quarters in the guest-house kept by the Bank of China. The next morning, before flying on to Chungking, I visited the American Consulate and picked up a little local data, and had breakfast with the Kungming tin tycoon, Y. T. Miao, mining engineer from the University of Minnesota. I had met Miao in Kunming in 1938 and he was cordial and curious, chiefly about what America was really going to do. I noticed that he had evolved from a more provincial Yunnanese to a national viewpoint, a phenomenon that was explained to me by the fact that whereas he was formerly the favorite of the governor, Lung, recently H.H. Kung had managed to obtain that honor for his own candidate, leaving Miao a poor second, but broadening his loyalty. Interesting was the fact that Miao took me to breakfast, not in his own house, which had been bombed, but to the house of the Mayor, his friend, to which the servants obtained entrance only by scaling a second-floor balcony with a five foot ladder. All of which did not prevent the French-trained cook from serving a full dress meal in about twenty minutes.

A few hours later, flying at about 17,000 feet over a protecting cloud bank, half frozen and giddy, I reached the familiar airport by the river at Chungking. I was back after three and a half years.

From the low shore of the Yangtse river, the towering houses of Chungking show little damage. Close examination, however, reveals the terrific destruction caused by multiple, practically unresisted bombardments. Not a section intact, and many quarters have been completely blasted. It was cold as winter and remained so; practically no house was heated.

Water is from the roofs (rain) or drawn from the stinking Chialing river. Yet, "by a miracle," as one Chinese doctor said, there had been no severe epidemics and the chief diseases were endemic malaria and mild bronchitis.

Thanks to an advance appeal, I managed to get a room in the Chialing House, the only half possible hotel. Its windows are largely replaced by oiled paper, its walls and floors and bed sheets are unpleasantly stained; there was heat in but one room and the toilets made one wish to dispense with bodily functions altogether. But about the Chialing House, as about all Chungking, there was an air of one who had surmounted a difficult trial successfully.

I remained nine days in Chungking and during this time managed to see any number of people. I had a quarter of an hour with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was invited to dinner by Madame, had one luncheon with Foreign Minister Quo Tai-chi, another with the ex-Foreign Minister Wang Ching-hui, and a third with the War Minister and Chiang's right-hand man, Ho Yin-chin. I breakfasted several times with Li Yu-yin, a personal friend of the Generalissimo and a big shot in the Kuomintang; dined with "General" Wu Te-chen (almost all prominent Chinese are generals whether they have anything to do with the army or not.) secretary of the Kuomintang, ex-mayor of Hongkong; talked several times with the Minister of Information and his Assistant Hollington Tong. I called upon the economist "General" Ho Hao-jo, vice president of the National Economic Council and secretary of the Kuomintang Youth Movement;

and with Ku Meng-yan, the Rector of the National University, who talked to me of currency reform and the need for internal reform. I had special conversations with Dr. Loo Chi-teh, head of the Chief Military hospital at Chungking; with Robert Lin, head of the Chinese Army Medical service; with P. Y. Yin of the International Peace Campaign. I spent two and one-half hours listening to Wang Pun-son, who calls himself "Head of the International Relations," and is really the Japanese specialist in the Chinese Intelligence Service. In the course of a surreptitious nocturnal visit, "General" Chow En-lai, Communist leader and representative of the Eighth Route Army in Chungking, described the truly terrific pressure to which Chinese Communist and other critics of the present government are now subjected.

Catholic Bishop Yu-pin tried to explain why the Government refrained from land reform during the present struggle and defended the policy of refusing to "fight two wars at once, one without and another within."

But this was not the half of it. I spent hours listening to our able Naval Attache, Lieutenant Colonel James McHugh; had luncheon with Ambassador Clarence Gauss (intolerant of the Chinese, and anti-British; the American newspaper men at Chungking laughingly spoke of an effort to de-gauss the Ambassador), and dined with the British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clarke Kerr who is extremely popular with the Chinese. I was twice with Owen Lattimore, American adviser to the Generalissimo; talked with the American Military Attache, Colonel Meyer, saw a good deal of American and British newspaper correspondents, exchanged impressions with the Soviet

Ambassador and the Soviet Military Attache, and gave as much time as possible to keeping company with my personal friend, General John Magruder and the other members of the American Military Mission in Chungking.

Compared with 1938, the time of my last visit, the situation of China had much improved. Despite terrific hardships and suffering without end, the Chinese Armies are probably more numerous and more formidable than they have been at any time. There is a small so-called pro-German clique, but it is not really pro-German so much as afraid that Germany will win the war. I heard of no considerable group that wanted peace or understanding with the Japanese. It is safe to say that the success of T. V. Soong and the China Defense Supply Corporation in the United States, the visit of Laughlin Currie and other American officials to China, the appointment of Owen Lattimore and of the American Military Mission, the inclusion of China under Lend-Lease and the steady arrival of material at Rangoon - these have had a most beneficial effect upon Chinese morale. For with the British also taking more interest in Chinese resistance, the Chinese have come to feel themselves a full-fledged ally of the democracies, an important part of the democratic front and entitled to full consideration from its other partners. It is hard to dispute this thesis, for if Singapore is the Key to the democratic defenses in the Far East, fat flabby ponderous China is certainly the anchor. I would not give much for the future of Singapore if China went.

Yet the prevailing Chinese state of mind has certain disadvantages. Just because they are now full allies the Chinese expect help just as the British and the French did in 1917.

The Chinese now feel that it is time that the Yanks took a hand. They know that the British and Russians are hard pressed in other parts of the world, but they just can't figure out why the United States doesn't immediately attack Japan. The battle of Ichang was not lost by China; it was broken off at the point of victory because the Generalissimo figured that a Japanese attack on the Russians was imminent, and hoped to get Ichang without fighting for it. This does not mean that Chinese armies are losing their confidence; quite the contrary: the success at Changsha has raised their confidence to a higher pitch than ever. They just feel that somebody else ought to jump in the ring with them and do some of the fighting!

Hence the importance of the American Military Mission of General John Magruder. So far as one could judge, the first contacts of all the members of the Mission were highly favorable. Magruder himself had come to feel that China could really be helped, that something could perhaps be salvaged from the otherwise utterly worthless Chinese Air Force and that except for the Burma Road difficulty (of which more later), China was really in pretty good shape. Major Soderholm, the Ordnance specialist, had been admitted to the hitherto secret underground Chinese arsenals, had found the

workmanship excellent and the morale high. With sufficient raw materials, the Chinese could, he thought, supply all their needs in small arms. The American Officers even dared to think that with some encouragement and instruction the Chinese could be persuaded to use their old (and new) artillery, instead of hiding it away in order to escape capture by the Japs, as in the past. In short the members of the Military Mission seemed to feel that at the appropriate moment, if properly coached and seconded, the Chinese armies could be counted on for effective offensive action.

Major Mendelson took me to visit the Chief Military Hospital in Chungking. Several hundred wounded and sick men (ten of them authentic gas patients) were being cared for by twenty-three so-called doctors, of whom only five had had authentic medical training. The pharmacy almost empty, the equipment meager beyond description. Major Mendelson declared the existence of a hospital under such conditions, a miracle. Many other people would have despaired under such circumstances. Thousands of wounded Chinese soldiers needlessly die for lack of transport and immediate medical treatment, but there are only six thousand properly trained doctors in all China for a population estimated at over four hundred million. Of these 6,000, only 1200 are with the Army Medical services. The others cannot afford it, for the rate of pay, two to ten United States dollars a month, is such that they cannot hope to maintain their families on it. Those who do volunteer are heroes. The majority remain behind to enjoy more lucrative

private practice, and Robert Lin of the Army Medical Service here for one or two million dollars more.

Here, as in every other field, the crushing weight of Chinese incompetence is sustained by a handful of self-sacrificing men who are determined to free and rejuvenate their country at any cost. The discovery of some of these people was perhaps the most agreeable feature of my visit. Incidentally, most of them profess admiration for T. V. Soong.

In the course of a recent visit to the front, the Generalissimo is reported to have exclaimed, "My generals are too fat, my soldiers too thin!" This is hardly surprising when one learns that the average weight of the Chinese private from Szechwan is one hundred and fifteen pounds.

Disquieting stories are current in Chungking concerning profiteering and speculation and food-squandering by merchants and large landowners. The widow of a former prominent citizen of Szechwan was named as the chief speculator. There has been considerable hoarding of rice. And the big country landlords are described as callous to the call of patriotism. Yet Government officials maintain that once they triple the present rice tax (tax in kind), there will be plenty left for the country as well as for both the army and the cities. The Generalissimo is sharply taken to task by many, for his failure to curb speculation or institute land reform immediately. The "Soong Dynasty" and especially H. H. Kung, the Finance Minister and his

wife, are made responsible for the unsocial conditions prevailing in China.

On the other hand, wages of labor in the cities are high. A chair porter in Chungking often makes over 500 Mexican dollars a month, while army doctors earn half that amount and college professors distinctly less.

The truth seemed to be, under present circumstances the more a Chinese is patriotic, the less well he is likely to be living. While the town merchants, the country landlords and some of the "big shots" live lavishly, the intellectuals, specialists and professional men are the real victims.

Obviously, deficient transportation and deficient care of roads and motor vehicles are responsible for many of China's troubles, such as the excessive mortality of soldiers wounded in battle. And this problem now centers in the question of how to increase the traffic along the Burma road, to the consideration of which I am devoting a subsequent section of this report.

Overshadowing any problem of traffic, though inseparably linked with it, is the new Japanese threat against Yunnan Province, the city of Kunming and the Burma road itself. Yunnan is in part mountainous, in part jungle--difficult at all times. The Chinese claim that on the ground they are equal to the task. But against eight or ten aggressive Japanese divisions disposed to suffer heavy losses to gain their ends, and supported massively from the air, the Chinese might be powerless. Everyone in Chungking, foreign or Chinese, felt that to defend the Burma road and prevent the

Japanese from advancing even as far along the (destroyed?) French railroad as Mengtze (with its air field and valuable tin mines), the Chinese definitely needed air support. This could be furnished by the First Group of American Volunteer Aviators, but only if reinforced to a strength of two to three hundred mixed fighters and bombers. An alternative, according to the officers of the American Military Mission, would be entire American army air squadrons, moved in bodily from Manila. The officers expressed amazement that the authorities in Washington did not see that "Manila would be better defended by army air squadrons in China actually shooting down Jap planes and killing Japs, than by inert planes on the ground at Clark Field and elsewhere." Be that as it may, all the people I met believed that the Chinese, after being buoyed up by the hope of help, would collapse and might fall apart if the Japanese managed to cut the Burma road by bombing or occupation, or to capture Chungking by another route. Many contended that the collapse of China could mean the defeat of Russia, the ultimate fall of Singapore and conceivably the loss of the war.

Next in order of importance among China's problems is the price and currency inflation. Not being a technician, I went no further than trying to ascertain whether under any circumstances currency troubles could be fatal to China's war effort. Rector Ku of the National University thought they might but he was the only one. Every other authority, Chinese and foreign alike, believed that the Chinese agricultural economy was in last analysis "currency proof," and that China

could, if it had to, get along on a barter system.

A final cause of friction--one taken very seriously by the American newspaper colony in Chungking,-- is the wretched dissension between the National Government (Kuomintang Party) and the Communists. The war partnership between the two was never anything more than a marriage de raison. They were united in nothing but detestation of the Japanese. Yet for a time cooperation was successful. Both groups fought--though thanks to writers like Edgar Snow, Major Carleton and Anna Louise Strong, the communists probably obtained more credit than they deserved. But disputes were frequent and the violent quarrel over the Fourth (Communist) Route Army (accused by the Generalissimo of using its position more for making Chinese communists than for killing Japanese soldiers) brought matters to a head.

Chiang's soldiers disarmed and arrested the Fourth Route Army, throwing some into concentration camps (called Labor Camps). For some time, not only the "regular" Chinese Secret Police under Tai-ii (ironically called the Chinese Himmler) but the Kuomintang Party Police have been making arrests. Camps are said to exist in a dozen places and to be filled not only with communists and with students desirous of reaching the communist stronghold at Yen-an, but with representatives of the so-called "Middle Parties" between the communists and the Kuomintang, and with persons guilty merely of criticizing the government.

Outside the "communist area," communism is forbidden in free China. The party sheet in Chungking continues to appear but without its subtitle--"Organ of the Communist Party." November 7, though the Generalissimo

himself attended the communist celebration in the Russian Embassy, Chinese communists were forbidden to assemble and celebrate anywhere. "General" Chow En-lai, communist leader, is still allowed to live in Chang-kung as representative of the Eighth Route Army (whose headquarters is next to Tai-ling's police headquarters), and as such may communicate with his friends in Yenan by radio. But he has not seen the Generalissimo for months, and his letters remain unanswered.

The communist forces in Shensi are completely isolated. To the north and south are "national armies" (including the 50,000 picked men Chiang has been keeping around Sian to prevent a communist putsch; to the west are the anti-communist Moslem troops and to the east are the Japanese, less of an obstacle than the three Chinese armies. For the communist guerrillas often penetrate the Jap forces clear to the sea. American newspapermen, who formerly came and went almost as they pleased are now prevented from visiting Yenan.

Chiang's treatment of "his" communists is his business, but aside from the facts that they did fight well, that they advocate land reform, which is China's greatest social need, and that they are not true communists at all, persecution of them during the war could have unhappy results. For without a doubt, they have both prestige and following throughout the country. Chiang's professed intention of maintaining the Kuomintang as a monopoly party even after the war is upsetting many young people who would otherwise be

ardent patriots. Distrust of the "Mao dynasty" is not loud but deep among some intellectuals.

Personally the Generalissimo seemed in finer form than when I last saw him three and a half years ago at Hankow. He spoke clearly and laughed freely; he had grown in intellectual stature through trial. Lattimore told me Chiang is thinking much of the final settlement and, at long last, will plump for democracy against totalitarianism.

Mei-ling, his wife, was pretty and gracious as ever, and put on a charming dinner party for five Americans. She sent Christmas greetings to T. V. Soong and his wife, which rather surprised me, as relations have not been so friendly between despotic Chiang and high-handed T. V., who has bawled out his brother-in-law as no other living Chinese could dare. But T. V.'s success in Washington has been so great that his prestige has risen accordingly in this altogether unique family, without which China would hardly have continued fighting, or indeed started.

10. Chungking is a center of resistance. November 8, I reluctantly left the Chinese capital with the feeling that I was returning to a lower emotional as well as physical level. Five or six hours high above the clouds and the C.N.A.C. plane landed in Hongkong an hour after dusk, with three thunder storms shattering the night horizon like some terrific bombardment.

A clean bed in a beautiful house high on The Peak above the harbor was welcome. So were clean linen, clean streets and western civilization. Yet Hongkong

is no longer the amply self-sufficed, anti-Chinese place it was in my last visit. The territory has been fortified; there are several thousand soldiers and a Home Guard. A naval air base is said to be under construction. And everything speaks of offensive rather than flight. The obstacle to successful defense is an excess population--two million, mostly Chinese, in a small area--hence lack of food and eventually lack of water, which comes only from Heaven and is collected in vulnerable reservoirs.

The harbor was full of ships, the town itself thriving. I visited the American Consul General, Mr. Addison Souther, an old acquaintance, and from him--as well as from several British businessmen--obtained confirmation of the story that Hongkong's prosperity was actually increasing. Imports and exports are greater than they were in 1937 when the Japs started the "China Incident." The reason? Exclusively, the smuggling in and out of China.

This smuggling is organized in Hongkong and carried out largely under the leadership of a former Chinese river pirate. Formerly it took a route to the east of Hongkong, thence by portage and water up into central China. Today the route is elsewhere, but the quantity is even greater. Blockade running serves to enable China to obtain, by importation, many necessary things that could not otherwise be obtained at all, and from the sale of its export, extremely useful foreign exchange to prop the currency and provide further imports.

The chief suspect, that of Sun, is mentioned by an Indian-born Britisher, P. E. Witham, "an adviser to the Chinese Government," with whom I had two talks. An American representative, because of charges helping China might find means of completing the smuggling even further, and would, Mr. Witham thought, refuse to accept "Shanghai tea," the proceeds from which don-atively go to world war victims and the fallen, or even the Japanese, who are Muslims. Witham maintains, Japanese too be suspected and there is smuggling it and exporting it as Chinese goods. I do not know how they circumvent the Arab blockade order, but Witham says they do.

Many in Hongkong said that the last days of Free Shanghai were near. But on the whole the British still seemed relatively unworried, the sword hanging over them and some were still confident that Japan "would never dare" attack Britain or the United States. This was not the view of Sun-fu, the son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

P. E. Witham, having been born in Indian Assam, almost contiguous to China and Burma, knows a great deal about the Burma and other Chinese roads, and he was full of suggestions. In Hongkong also was J. K. Bousfield, Far Eastern representative of the Asiatic Petroleum Company (Shell), which originated the idea of the Burma pipeline. So this is perhaps the appropriate moment to discuss the Burma road and the necessity of keeping an artery to China open if China is to survive.

11. More than most other countries, China is self-

efficient. But there are severe limitations on this. There are needs which, especially in wartime, must be filled if the country is to continue to fight at any level of efficiency.

China absolutely needs raw materials for its industry, partly "bomb-proof" war industries--small arms factories, etc., which could double or triple their output if the requisite supplies were forthcoming. China needs machinery of all sorts and kinds. China must import all of its motor transport and--what is far worse--the gasoline to move it, if the war is not to bog down completely. China needs medical supplies and drugs and surgical instruments, if an even higher percentage of the sick and wounded are not to die. China is also obtaining war material--artillery among it, from the United States. And doubtless there are dozens of other things which China must import. General John Magruder told me that ninety (90) percent of the utility of his Military Mission to China would depend upon keeping some adequate channel into China open.

What are the existing channels?

A. The more or less uncertain but ever renewed routes of blockade runners (called "smugglers", but inaccurately for they are engaged in running merchandise in and out of their own country through a foreign blockade) which center around Hongkong and the south (with some assistance from the Shanghai people). The amount of goods coming into China by these routes is considerable; it could and should be increased. But

this is ticklish work. The chief "Smugglers' Den" lies not many miles from a Japanese naval center. The merchandise must be of a nature to break down to a single coolie's load--not very big and not over a hundred pounds. Obviously, therefore, numerous sorts of things the Chinese need can not well be smuggled into the country. Artillery, for instance, is far too precious to be risked. So are airplane parts, etc. Smuggling alone, however widespread, cannot solve China's problem.

B. There is the old caravan route (or track) from Lanchow to Soviet Turkestan. This track is open most of the year to motor traffic, and all of the year (I believe) to camels. But Russia itself is at best a totally inadequate source of what China must have. The haul is so terrifically long and gasoline consumption so great, that this road can hardly provide more than a steady trickle.

C. There is the Burma Road, 726 miles long, from Lashio (or Bhamo) in British Burma to Kunming in China, a daring highway scraped out of terrific mountains, crossing broad fast flowing rivers all running at right-angles to the main direction, constantly caving in, constantly in need of repair, but somehow always more or less open to traffic. At the Burma end, this road is connected with Rangoon and the open sea by road, by rail, and by the navigable Irrawaddy River. At Kunming the highway fans out into three or four directions leading to the various parts of China.

The Burma road is today the principal artery for China. Its theoretical capacity is fairly large. Its actual capacity, under Chinese management, is far less—distinctly less than enough to handle the planned volume of American Lend-lease supplies to China, to say nothing of large quantities of privately purchased merchandise.

My personal experience of the road problem was slight. In the company of Mr. Matteson, American assistant to Mr. R. C. Chen of the China National Defense Corporation, I wandered over the docks at Rangoon, noting the go-downs bursting with the Lend-lease merchandise, and the overflow lying outside under the rain, identifying a ship tied to the pier and unable to unload for lack of space. I was given several sets of figures as to merchandise actually moving, one of which, provided by Asiatic petroleum men who counted the trucks on the road actually reaching Kunming and Chungking, was as follows:

Trucks Reaching Kunming				Reaching Chungking			
Month ending	number	tonnage	average p.day	number	tonnage	average p. day	
June 17	5016	15,562	167	543	1329	15	
July 17	4670	14,678	156	592	1776	20	
Aug. 17	4190	13,039	135	852	2556	28	
Sept. 17	4784	14,428	154	696	2088	22	
Oct. 17	5113	15,339	170	417	1251	14	

These cargoes are net: excluding gas the figures would be about 75% of above.

I heard all sorts of stories, for the Burma Road has become an Asiatic obsession. At Chungking everyone, and not least the Americans, talked of the vital necessity of expanding traffic along this road. I know Chiang Kai-shek sent his Gestapo leader, Tai-li over the road, personally to investigate charges of wholesale obstructionism and corruption. At Kunning, Mr. Y. T. Miao, the tin magnate, insisted that the Yunnan provincial government was no longer an "obstacle" and that General Yu (assisted by the American, Captain Wilson) was doing a good job on traffic control. My colleague and friend, Leland Stowe, went over the entire road in a station wagon about the middle of October, and had plenty to say on the subject, most of it bad. Whether the new plan of a part Chinese, part American administration of the road will be successful or whether China will eventually come to complete American management, can be left to the experts, all of whom are now fully aware that the problem of the Burma Road is the problem of Chinese defense itself, and conceivably of China's ability to carry on the war in the future.

For the same reason, it is taken as axiomatic in the Far East, that somehow, by one method or another, British, Americans and Chinese will prevent the Japanese from cutting or otherwise closing the road, and bringing about a Chinese collapse.

What struck me most was the relatively little attention being given to investigating fundamental means of lightening the load on the Burma Road. Several such means exist, on the ground or on paper.

Those that came to my attention were:

a) The Burma Railroad. This is being rushed under the supervision of Tseng Yang-fu, a Pittsburgh-trained Chinese engineer. From Kunming, the line follows the Burma Road westward for about a third of its length, then ducks southwestward, passing south of Shuili, reaches the Burma frontier at Karlong and turns westward to Lashio where it connects with the Burmese line. Tseng Yang-fu told me he hopes to have this whole line open by the spring of 1943, or at the latest in the summer. The construction is a terrific task--"every tie laid costs a life," the Chinese say. But once completed it will more or less solve the problem of supplying China--if China can wait that long. A criticism often heard is that by choosing the shorter southern route, the constructors have made the railroad even more vulnerable to Japanese bombing or capture than the Burma Road itself.

b) The Hsiakwan--Chengtu Road. This is an alternate to the eastern half of the Burma Road. From a point southeast of Hsiakwan on the Burma Road it branches off, curving slowly northward, passes the Yangtse Rive, reaches an old track and follows it northward through Hweili and Sichang to Luku, bends northeast to Chukentang, Loshan and then northward to Chengtu, from which there is a fair road to Chungking and another northward to Sian and Lanchow. Nobody seemed to know very much about this road, but Lieutenant Colonel McHugh thought it susceptible of much greater development.

c) The above-ground oil Pipe Line suggested by the Shell people and planned to follow the Burma road from Phano on the Irrawaddy River. There are obviously great difficulties to be overcome and few have the knowledge to judge whether the scheme is practical. But as about sixty percent of the present traffic on the Burma Road is gasoline and oil transportation, a pipe line, if possible, would free an enormous amount of space for other types of goods. I believe the scheme is at present being examined on the ground by a pipeline expert. It would be a pity if prejudice and considerations of postwar trade should be allowed to interfere with objective consideration.

d) Another suggestion for lightening the Road traffic is the establishment of a regular air freight line from Rangoon (or better still, from Lashio) to Kunming. One of the Pawley Brothers, who assemble aircraft for China, insists the scheme is feasible and economical and thought perhaps it was going to be tried. I believe the China Defense Supply very much wants such a line. But the necessary freight planes were still lacking when I talked to Mr. Pawley in Rangoon.

e) A new road from China to India, far to the north of the Burma Road and "forever" out of reach of the Japanese, is being talked of. In Chungking, General Magruder thought the scheme "impractical." But British from India, like Arthur Moore, the editor of the Calcutta Statesman, and P. E. Witham who was born and brought up in Assam, have quite another idea of it.

There is a caravan route thousands of years old from Sadiya in Assam (the head of the railroad) to Tatsienlu in Sikiang, from which it is only a step to Chengtu. And Mr. Witham is prepared to show anyone at least three practical routes from Assam to China.

The present is certainly not a plea for anything; at most, for greater zeal in trying to get something going as a useful supplement to the Burma Road and the blockade running, and a possible insurance against the stoppage of these last. In case of general war in the Far East, especially, the Japanese would certainly try to make their blockade of China effective and China's main lifeline impassable.

12. I was in Manila October 2-4 and again November 12-14. In those periods I had two visits with Admiral Thomas Hart and with High Commissioner Sayre, one with General Mac Arthur, commanding the Philippine- (American?) forces, one with President Quezon; I dined with Carlos P. Romulo, the enterprising Philippine editor, and listened to several American businessmen and to the veteran newspaper correspondent Walter Robb.

I made no great effort to ascertain the state of Philippine defenses, but rather concentrated on the states of mind of these people. All the Americans agreed as to the fundamental loyalty of the Filipinos, though Admiral Hart insisted that we must never forget that economically and in what might be called their "ethnic affinity", the Filipinos are closer to the Japs than they are to us. He seemed disappointed in his effort to break the social ice in his relations with them.

President Quizon admitted--"though not for publication for I cannot admit that I subscribe to the platform of my recent political adversary"--that what he wanted after 1946 was a membership in the (still non-existent) American Commonwealth of Nations. He offered full co-operation in all sorts of ways, militarily and by lending his broadcasting stations, and if requested, his propagandists. For he knows, and I learned, that Filipinos have great prestige in the Far East as an Asiatic people who have won their independence. Javanese, Malay, Thai, Annamites, Burmese, might very conceivably accept from Filipinos anti-Japanese propaganda stuff; they would suspect coming from British or Americans. And Admiral Kimmel told me when I saw him a few days later at Pearl Harbor, that the Filipinos in Hawaii are terrifying the Japanese there by threats of throat-cutting when war starts.

Admiral Hart is considered in Batavia and Singapore as a very cautious, perhaps ultra-cautious person. He is in any case no great friend of the British. At our second meeting he expressed to me his disapproval of any American speeches that could be regarded by the Japanese as "provocative", since he thinks "they only get the Japs' back up." I suggested that in 1940 Singapore was perhaps saved by big words. But the Admiral considered that time was on our side and that we ought to postpone the "probably inevitable" struggle as long as possible. The position of a full admiral in an advanced zone with few ships at his command is obviously unenviable.

High Commissioner Sayre was extremely courteous and in true State Department fashion, hid his opinions and betrayed no secrets.

General Douglas MacArthur was extremely communicative. He expressed his satisfaction with the state of preparation of his army, thought that the position was rapidly becoming favorable to us, outlined his view of the fundamental untrustworthiness and anti-democratic slant of the men of Vichy, including Petain, whom he knows personally from the last war, and in general allowed his really brilliant mind to illumine everything he discussed. But as he chiefly spoke of the position of Japan, I shall reserve his views on this subject for the following section.

Leaving Manila November 11, I reached San Francisco November 18 and Washington the following day.

13. In the course of six weeks in the Far East, I must have listened to at least fifty different opinions about Japan, its fundamental motives, its long-range ambitions, its relations to Germany, its internal situation, its strength, capacity and degree of resolution, its immediate intentions. On the basis of these, I have, elsewhere drawn up my own notion. But any report would be incomplete without a summary of the more important of the views expressed to me. Some of my informants, like Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, admitted that they did not know what the Japs would do next (November 8, in Chungking, at a time the Chinese publicists were sure that an attack on Yunnan was imminent). Only one specialist, a Chinese, thought that the United States could avoid an ultimate tussle with the Nipponese, and

then only if we remained so tough that in the end the Japanese absorption, rather than face the fire of war with China, the United States, Britain, Russia and the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously, would turn and eating itself to death,--in other words, that there would be a revolution within Japan rather than a war outside Japan.

Of the many views I heard, four have stood out most. These were expressed by General Mac Arthur at Manila; by A.H.J. Lovink, A vice on Far Eastern Affairs to the Governor-General, at Batavia; by Sir George Sanson, reputed the greatest living British expert on Japanese matters, at Singapore; and by Wang Pui-son, head of the Japanese Section of the Chinese Intelligence Service at Chungking.

Follows a brief summary of all of these four, in the order in which I heard them.

General Douglas Mac Arthur paced the floor of his headquarters in Manila with long strides, tossed his head in a manner reminiscent of John Barrymore, and spoke:

Japan has maneuvered itself into a hopeless and inextricable position, he said. Japanese ambition is beyond the nation's strength. Partnership with the Axis is against Japan's real interests. But Japan has got itself into an impossible hole.

While Japan is under complete military domination internally and is inspired by the firm resolve to dominate the entire Far East, the nation failed to add to its first-class fleet anything but a shoddy one-to-two billion dollar Army which has completely broken down and shown

its worthlessness in China. Japanese military conquests were even more anti-rated than those of France and Britain. The position of the Japanese forces in China is inextricable.

Japan failed to move in the summer of 1940 when it might have had the area (exclusive of the Philippines) for the taking.

At last last, three major Powers, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia decided to resist Japanese aggression and effectively annulled the means of so doing. Russia is not going to save in and quit somewhere, in front of Moscow or behind Moscow, the incomparable German offensive is going to bog down. If Japan is waiting for complete Russian collapse, Japan will wait forever.

Against the pressure of the economic blockade, the economic and psychological relief afforded by the seizure of Indo China, "where the French are just not fit to spit on," is not enough.

Therefore the Japs are in a fix. If they relinquish aggression they admit failure - something they just cannot stomach. If they persist in aggression they risk defeat at the hands of three Major Powers. Defeat for Japan means reduction to a third-class country and loss of all possessions.

Logically the rulers should change sides and get out of China, conceivably succeeding in keeping Indo China in the process, for "the democracies can always be successfully blandished." But the Japanese have no logic as we know it. The militarists risk their own position and their own heads if they admit failure. And if the generals in Tokyo did admit it, the armies

in the field would not obey them. Therefore the practical certainty of legible ahead. America must make no concessions, particularly never allowing the Japs to remain in Indo China, and tighten up our policy. We have nothing to fear for we have got them on the run. Their only success has been in serving Adolf Hitler and here they have gained a great victory. Never before did a weak Power succeed in tying up such great land and sea and air forces that could better be used elsewhere. "One might almost argue," the General mused as though talking to himself, "that the United States would be justified in breaking the deadlock by an ultimatum to Japan: Give up your plunder and go back where you started from, or fight now..."

Mynheer Lovink sat in Batavia with a pile of Japanese schoolbooks before him. He showed them to me: illustrations and texts for little Nipponese full of the glorification of war and bloodshed. Degenerate Hitler stuff. Without a single decent human feeling. Japan's religious mission to rule the world. If Occidentals (and Orientals as well) do not accept this mission which they must know in their hearts is right, it shows they are insincere.

"These people," he said, "can never turn back. They must persevere to a horrible and bloody end—or conquer. They are canny; but they are timid; they missed the boat in 1940 from stupidity. They are wretched colonizers and fundamentally incompetent. But tied to Hitler they are fearfully dangerous. For they have so impregnated Japan with their own bloody philosophy and will to rule, that the country

will follow them wherever they choose to lead. It is for us to choose the appropriate moment for the struggle but we can no longer fool ourselves: the fight is inevitable!"

With Sir George Sanson, head of the British secret propaganda organization at Singapore, I had at least half a dozen long talks. The following is a summary of all of them.

The Japanese degeneracy is similar to the German. Both are due fundamentally to the breakdown of a precise moral system. Morally the Japanese armies in China have practiced horrors they dare not admit to the Japanese in Japan. It is almost impossible to see how the soldiers in China can ever be returned to their homes.

If one sought to foresee Japanese action, by a process of elimination three major probabilities would present themselves:

The Japanese could accept the American terms, relinquish their conquests, change sides, and be rewarded with commercial concessions and great prosperity.

Or they might stop now, keep what they have, wait until the end of the war and then be in a position to try to consolidate their position with either side.

Or they might complete their preparations for further aggression and wait until the vicissitudes of the struggle offered an opportunity for a new snatch and then take it, regardless of the risks. In this case the most likely move would be an attack on Russia.

"will follow them wherever they choose to lead. It is for us to choose the appropriate means for the struggle but we can no longer fool ourselves: the fight is inevitable!"

With Sir George Hanson, head of the British secret propaganda organization at Singapore, I had at least half a dozen long talks. The following is a summary of all of them.

The Japanese mentality is similar to the Germans. Both are due fundamentally to the breakdown of a previous moral system. Morally the Japanese allies in China have practiced horrors they dare not admit to the Japanese in Japan. It is almost impossible to see how the soldiers in China can ever be returned to their homes.

If one sought to foresee Japanese action, by a process of elimination three major probabilities would present themselves:

The Japanese could accept the American terms, relinquish their conquests, change sides, and be rewarded with commercial concessions and great prosperity.

Or they might stop now, keep what they have, wait until the end of the war and then be in a position to try to consolidate their position with either side.

Or they might complete their preparations for further aggression and wait until the vicissitudes of the struggle offered an opportunity for a new scratch and then take it, regardless of the risks. In this case the most likely move would be an attack on Russia.

but at the time (October, just after the arrival of the Tojo Cabinet), Sir George thought that the Japs had not yet made up their mind what to do.

He was not at all sure a Japanese invasion of Thailand would mean war between Japan and Britain unless America wanted it and took the lead, and questioned whether Britain would lift a hand for Vladivostok (Buff Cooper was sure Britain would fight for either!) Britain had not even given a pledge that an attack on a Dutch island would be a casus belli.

The important thing to know is, however, that the economic sanctions are weighing most heavily upon the Japanese and that they can hardly wait more than a few months more.

In view of all this, three attitudes seem open to the democratic front (AND with Russia).

We might concentrate on gaining more time while preventing further aggression by bluffing with threat of war. (This is the largely British-made policy that was being followed at the time.)

We might ignore Jap threats, cease negotiating, strip our Pacific forces to a strict defensive and accept war only when Japan steps over a previously defined but never published line.

Or we might give Japan an ultimatum: pipe down or fight. (Sir George had been for the first but was beginning to be tempted by the third course.)

In the meantime, Sir George insisted that China be given greater psychological consideration.

Wong Pun-son, who called himself "Head of the International Relations, Chungking," had an office and

living quarters in a sort of hut high on the side of the bluff overlooking the Chukchi River. As well as his military activities, that few of the foreigners had ever heard of him and even Lieutenant Colonel James McHugh, in my judgment the best informed American in Chumukin, had never met him (I was able to arrange for a meeting, which I have described.).

This fat Chinese man, who bursts from a sort of plain blue uniform and speaks no European language, spent half his life in Japan and has direct access to the Generalissimo, and takes his advice in practically all matters affecting relations with Japan. Through an interpreter, ex-Congress Dr. Ho Feng-shan, I listened to this Japanese expert for two and a half hours.

Japan, he believed, was ruled by an unholy alliance between the old anti-imperial clan, the Army, and the new masters of heavy industry, who got them started as smugglers in Manchuria. These people have already ruined light industry and shipping in Japan and they must expand or burst. Through their need of expansion, they have come completely under the influence of Germany. Conservatives in Japan are quite without influence or feeling. The Germans overthrew the Kooze Cabinet as too mild. The Germans had their "agent," Kurusu, sent to the United States to gain time and to check up on the "moderate" Nomura. The present Japanese rulers would do anything the Germans want except perhaps attack the United States. But the Germans have not and do not want them to attack the United States. They wanted them to attack Russia. Out of German desire and Japanese reluctance has come a compromise: The

Japs have massed 30 divisions on the Manchurian border thus preventing the Russian forces there from going to Europe. They have agreed to wait until the Japanese Army can make contact with the German army over the corpse of Russia. If Russia in Europe has collapsed, America, in Jap eyes, will not move to defend an already beaten nation. Japan will scatter the remainder of the Russian Siberian forces and make contact with Hitler. Then and then only Japan can turn south and finish off the British, who will be engaged in the Near and Middle East anyway, undeterred by fear of war with the United States.

Meanwhile, the mustering of Japanese forces in Indo China is possibly a bluff intended to draw Chinese troops southward where they cannot assist the Russians, while British and Americans will be restrained by prudence from trying to save Vladivostok. With Russia out, Japan with full German support, will try to take mastery of the region away from Britain and finish with China.

The economic sanctions are pressing harder on heavy industry in Japan than upon the people, but the long strain is becoming so unbearable that the moment is propitious for democratic propaganda within Japan, not in favor of the anachronistic Conservatives, but openly in favor of democracy. Wang Pun-son agreed with the British and Dutch experts that in aiming southward, the Japs will not be looking for empty regions to colonize, such as Borneo or New Guinea, but seeking, in addition,

to vital raw materials, to obtain large subject populations as both slaves and consumers. In other words, the Japs will be imitating Hitler in seeking a Lebensraum (vital space) wherein a high industrialized master people at the center exploits masses of agrarian serfs at the periphery.

14. Finally, I would wish to set down a few conclusions based on my own superficial but extensive contacts with the Far Eastern Area.

For present purposes, the entire gigantic space between Alaska and Hawaii on the east and Australia, Burma and the western borders of China in the other direction, constitute one vast zone that might be called the Area of Japanese Danger. Positions in this area are closely interdependent: Vladivostok could protect China, and China in turn protects both Siberia and Burma. Jap occupation of Thailand threatens to short-circuit Singapore. The fall of Singapore might mean the loss of the war. Russian bombers at Vladivostok and American bombers and submarines at Manila might make Singapore invulnerable, etc., etc. Any concession to Japan in this area makes the refusal of more concessions far more difficult.

Malay and the Dutch Indies are in addition fairly essential to the American economic machinery. Unless and until other adequate sources of rubber and tin are found, the loss of these countries to a hostile Power would be something of a calamity. China provides wolfram. Surrender of the British and Dutch possessions to Japan might well make the Philippines unobtainable for us. And the Philippines are an invaluable source of chromium, etc.

Successful Japanese incursion into Southeast Asia might well result in the partial isolation of Australia. Already Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton was bothered over the probable appearance in the South Pacific of Japanese commerce raiders operating from Japanese ports. Occupation of Cam Ranh and Saigon has brought them much nearer and enabled them partially to by-pass the Philippines. Occupation of Java or Singapore or Sumatra could well make them master of the Indian Ocean. Anyone who has felt on the spot the immense worth of Australian fighters, Australian supplies and Australian morale can judge what a calamity Australia's isolation, even partial, might be.

The size of the American war investment in the Area is astonishing. Quantities of war material, notably airplanes, are found all the way from Australia northward to the Burma Road. The Dutch have been supplied with motor torpedoboats and some artillery as well. Throughout the entire region, American naval and army officers are present in considerable numbers; they are observers, instructors, judges of Lend-Lease necessities, and other less obvious things. Far Eastern Intelligence is pooling British, Dutch and American information and, with some help from China, seems to be working excellently.

In China itself, the investment is far greater. The Volunteer Aviators being groomed to go into action over the Burma Road and the American Military Mission of General John Magruder are rivals in importance. The latter's chief tasks--helping China in its transportation,

its aviation, its obtaining raw materials for armaments, etc., procurement of war material for the rearmament of Chinese fighting units (notably the mountain howitzers) and instruction in the use of the material, may transform the Chinese armies from an exclusively defensive into a mildly offensive force. In case of war with Japan, the Chinese airfields could hardly be overlooked by American forces. But in addition, the United States is gradually assuming responsibility for the increased efficiency of the Burma Road, is helping to get Malacca under control in the west Kunnan region, is represented through the Red Cross and in general is treating China as the valuable ally that it is.

Finally, under the present arrangement, British battleships in the Far East are assuming partial responsibility for the safety of Hawaii, California and Panama.

In the United States, war with Japan seems to be regarded as an inescapable fatality. Such is not the view in the Far East--at least not for the present. It is confidently assumed out there by most students of Japanese affairs that though the Japanese rulers cannot tear themselves loose from Germany if they would, they will not undertake any military adventures that might bring them into war with three major Powers. So long as the Russians have not been "liquidated" by Hitler, most people out there were pretty sure that Japan would do nothing to provoke a major war. If it be true that the chief Japanese fear are the Russian bombers at Vladivostok, then the United States has,

without making the slightest concession to the Japs,
more weeks and months in which to complete our own
preparations in Manila while the British rush further
warships to Singapore. For so long as Russia holds,
time is really on our side.

Washington, December 3, 1941

F.B.I.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

November 21, 1941

112

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Aper Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I do not know whether you have seen the attached article which appeared in the November 22, 1941 issue of Collier's.

Obviously, the statement pertaining to your relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is inaccurate in view of the fact that the Bureau does not possess any information concerning you. While I know that you will not pay any attention to matters of this kind, I wanted you to see the article, with the thought that possibly through your contacts you might be able to ascertain the basis for it.

I have taken the liberty of writing to Thomas H. Beck, Editorial Director, asking for the source of this information and pointing out that the statement is entirely inaccurate.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, is written below the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosure

NOVEMBER 22, 1941 ISSUE OF GILLESPIE'S

...we would not have had
believe that things are not getting done
with ruffles and flourishes in Washing-
ton. We have just paid a couple of
courtesy calls at the Navy and War
Departments, observing censorship at
each stage. The most interesting
experience came when I went
to the War Department with the intention of
seeing the Army and the Navy. In the
War Department I found that the
Navy almost invariably deletes ev-
erything in it having to do with the
Army, on the theory that it isn't im-
portant anyway. A nice rivalry is thus
kept alive at the expense of the reader
of the manuscript—provided there is
any manuscript left and that, in its
emboweled condition, it ultimately
gets printed. We were discussing this
in the State Department where purely
national affairs are regarded as com-
pletely paltry to begin with. They told
us that when Colonel Bill Donovan
was brought to Washington to be Mr.
Roosevelt's co-ordinator of intelli-
gence, the Navy suggested that the
colonel be made a major general.
The Army suggested that he be made
an admiral. The colonel insisted that
he be left alone, certainly not pro-
moted by either side. Anyway we've
just been looking into the situation,
asking an F.B.I. man whether all
F.B.I. information was immediately
relayed to the colonel, to be sifted and
transmitted to the President. "Car-
donovan, having
except what he
..."

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

August 1, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
1647 - 30th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Personal and
Confidential

Dear Bill:

There is a story current in Washington, in which I frankly do not place much credence, but I wanted to pass it on to you in order that you would be informed as to the facts in the situation to which it pertains. It is rumored that Leon G. Turrou will be engaged by you to become associated with your organization. The rumor states that Turrou has made representations portraying himself as a master investigator, as an authority on espionage, counter-espionage and other intelligence operations, and has succeeded in obtaining assurances from someone speaking in behalf of you that he would be tendered an appointment to a responsible position.

I don't know whether Turrou and his activities have ever come to your attention, but I did want you to know that he is one of the very few former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who was dismissed from the service with prejudice. Mr. Turrou was in the service of the FBI from April 1, 1929, to June 20, 1938, on which latter date he was dismissed with prejudice. This action was taken after Turrou had deliberately sold confidential information relating to espionage and counterespionage operations to a newspaper publisher. Investigation of Turrou's activities in connection with this matter convinced me that he was absolutely and completely untrustworthy and consequently he was dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, a considerable

- 2 -

amount of political pressure was developed in an effort to have this dismissal removed, but the facts against Turrou were so overwhelming that Departmental authorities have consistently declined to alter the dismissal.

I have learned that recently Turrou endeavored to secure an appointment with both the Military and Naval Intelligence Divisions and that both of these agencies declined to utilize his services in any capacity whatsoever.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of a high-ranking official, is written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and appears to be a single name, possibly "Edgar".

7-11-41 3019
Kavanaugh, William
Ruske

November 6, 1941

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I was interested in reading the
memorandum you sent me regarding the
Norwegian Steamship Luske.

Thank you for sending it to me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

CC

CC: Captain Roosevelt with file. ✓

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

November 4, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I thought you might be interested in the attached memorandum regarding the investigation of the Norwegian Steamship Busko and its crew and expeditionary party which were located in the vicinity of Greenland in September by a United States Coast Guard cutter.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

November 4, 1941

MEMORANDUM

Re: SS BUSKO

The following is submitted with reference to the investigation of the above-named Norwegian steamship which was located by a United States Coast Guard cutter near Greenland on September 12, 1941, after which the boat and members of the crew and expeditionary party were escorted to Boston Harbor, Boston, Massachusetts. This information was secured as a result of the interrogation of the members of the crew and the expeditionary party.

For a number of years the Norwegian and Danish governments have sent expeditionary parties to Greenland to secure weather information of value for these countries, and the expeditionary members who went to Greenland also secured skins for commercial purposes.

During the fall of 1940, the Norwegian government established the Norwegian-Spitsbergen and Arctic Sea Exploration Bureau (Norges Svalbard Og Ishavs Undersokelser), a bureau in the Norwegian Department of Commerce, the headquarters being in Oslo, Norway. Adolf Hoel, a professor at the University of Oslo, was appointed the Director of that organization, due to his number of years of experience in the areas in question. The purpose of the bureau was to have available information about the Arctic region, principally for the Norwegian government, although it was admitted by the leader of the expeditionary party on the SS Busko, who will be named hereinafter, that unquestionably this information would be available to Germany if desired.

During the past winter there was appointed by the Norwegian government a committee, independent of the above-named bureau, to handle the interests of the Norwegian government in the Arctic region, the same being composed of Professor Adolf Hoel, Professor Karl Marstrander, and Dr. Gustav Smedal. The leader of the Busko expeditionary party admitted that one function of the committee was to furnish the German authorities with information as to conditions in the Arctic.

The leader of this expedition, Hallvard Ophuus Devold, age 44, a native of Norway, was employed by the above-named bureau of which Professor Hoel was Director. Devold has stated that about April or May, 1941, the three-party committee mentioned above requested him to prepare figures regarding the cost of an expedition of twenty men

- 2 -

and equipment into East Greenland, the figures to be based upon a scale previously set up by the Norwegian government. Devold stated there is some regulation or law in Norway providing for such expeditionary parties to be equipped for a period of two years, even though they may actually return prior to the expiration of that period.

Devold explained that according to a Danish-Norwegian agreement, individuals cannot personally own land in East Greenland, and any hunting in that area must be through the operations of a certain company, which operations are in East Greenland between 72 and 76½ degrees latitude. Devold stated that over a period of years this company has set up fifteen stations considered as the main points from which expeditionary parties work in Greenland, in addition to which there are between 150 and 160 huts which have been established throughout this area in Greenland, for utilization by the individuals on the expeditionary parties who find themselves considerably removed from their hunting station.

Devold denied any German connections of members of the above-named committee, although he admitted rumors have been afloat in Oslo that Professor Hoel was sympathetic to the Nazi regime, inasmuch as prior to the occupation of Norway by Germany, Hoel had been sympathetic to the Norwegian National Socialist Party. Devold stated he believed Hoel was a member of that party about 1933, although due to a subsequent split in the party Hoel severed his relationship with the party. Devold also remarked that the German authorities in Oslo had considered Professor Marstrander as their representative on the committee, although it is Devold's personal opinion that Marstrander is not sympathetic to the Nazi regime and in no way has aided that regime through his activities on this particular committee.

Devold stated that he personally was but a secretary of the above-named bureau, and in that capacity furnished information regarding the proposed expedition to Greenland. The proposal covered equipment and supplies for twenty men and two radio broadcasting stations, one at Mackenzie Bay and the other at Peter's Bay, Greenland. Devold stated that this committee submitted the proposed expedition report to the German authorities at Oslo, and after considerable negotiations the Germans, although at first refusing to authorize the expedition, finally agreed, about the first of August, 1941, to permit an expeditionary party to go to Greenland in order to replace the seven men the company then had in Greenland.

- 3 -

Devold indicated that the Norwegian government advised that 140,000 kroner were available for this expedition. Included in the equipment which was to be taken on this boat, through permission of the German authorities, were ten rifles, six shotguns, ten thousand rifle cartridges and three thousand shotgun cartridges.

The Steamship Busko was chartered for the expeditionary party from Elling Aarseth and Company of Aalesund, Norway. The members of the crew were secured by the boat company, while the members of the expeditionary party were secured through contacts by Devold with several old trappers known to him. In all, there were nine members of the crew and eleven members of the expeditionary party, including Mr. Devold, the leader of that party, and an individual named Jacob Rytter Bradley, mention of whom will be made hereinafter. Devold stated that when the Germans authorized this expedition they deleted that portion of the plans dealing with radio stations, and accordingly no radio equipment was secured by him for the expedition.

Devold met Captain Elias Hessen, Master of the SS Busko, at Aalesund, Norway, on August 13, 1941, and thereupon took charge of the expedition and began loading the supplies upon the boat, the vessel departing from that port on August 19, 1941, after which it was necessary to stop at various other ports to secure additional supplies and other members of the expeditionary party. At each port it was necessary to clear with a German naval officer.

Devold states that about August 27, 1941, while at Harstead, Norway, he received a telephone call from Professor Hoel, above named, advising him it would be necessary to take aboard the vessel, to accompany this expedition, a German agent for the purpose of meteorology, this agent being a Norwegian named Bradley. Devold claims Professor Hoel, during the telephonic conversation, appeared to be quite disappointed over the necessity of taking this German agent on the expedition, since all indications were originally that the expedition would be in behalf of the Norwegian government and would be the same type of expedition as had been made on numerous occasions prior thereto.

The Steamship Busko departed from Harstead, Norway, August 28, 1941, arriving that same day at Laukvik, Norway, where the ship was met by a German Gestapo agent. This German agent, together with

- 4 -

another Gestapo agent, brought Jacob Rytter Bradley aboard the vessel at Laukvik, and in addition brought several boxes containing radio gear and meteorological instruments, as well as four drums of gasoline. The SS Busko then sailed on the morning of August 29, 1941, from Laukvik for Northeast Greenland.

Bradley, a native of Norway, now 26 years of age, advised that he had joined the Norwegian National Socialist Party about seven years ago, and that thereafter he had been engaged in organizational work for that party until about October, 1940, being a leader of a group of young men. However, he said he was replaced by the Germans with another individual whom it was easier for them to handle.

Bradley claims that during August of this year a German agent who had previously seen him at meetings of the Norwegian National Socialist Party, approached him and told him of the need for an individual to operate a meteorological station in Greenland, and the agent told Bradley he wanted him to consider the position. Bradley thereafter discussed the matter with a higher German agent in Norway, and arrangements were made for him to receive certain training in radio transmission work and meteorological work. Bradley claimed the impression was left with him by these German agents that he was to dispatch this meteorological information for consumption by the Norwegian government, although he admitted that he then realized the Germans could of course use the same. Bradley commented that while the members of the crew and expeditionary party on the Steamship Busko during the voyage did not have much to say to him, he realized they were not pleased with having him aboard the vessel.

The voyage from Laukvik, Norway to Greenland was uneventful, however the captain of the vessel stated he did not want to accept the radio equipment when it was placed aboard the boat at Laukvik. The captain indicated, however, that the German agents had left a very definite impression with him that his family might be harmed if he did not comply with the desire of the German authorities to take Bradley and this equipment. The captain's remarks in this regard have been corroborated by other members of the crew. Some members of the crew remarked that there was some talk among them during the voyage of throwing the equipment overboard, although they felt to do so might result in harm to their families.

- 5 -

On September 3, 1941, the SS Busko dropped anchor at Peter's Bay, Greenland, and at this point Bradley and two trappers disembarked with their equipment and supplies. Bradley indicated in the interview with him at Boston that he had been instructed by the Germans to broadcast his information from Greenland at four different times a day; that the Germans would expect to receive his first broadcast about eight to ten days after his arrival in Greenland, and they would notify him of the receipt of the broadcast through certain comment at the end of a news broadcast from a Norwegian broadcasting station.

In addition to information about weather conditions, Bradley admitted he was to furnish data about patrol boats, planes, etc., which he realized would be of interest to the Germans from a military standpoint. He said the Germans told him if he sighted a patrol boat which might be in a position to discover him, he should advise them through his broadcasts and they would endeavor to come over by plane and pick him up.

Bradley and the two trappers, all of whom were left at Peter's Bay, explained that it was necessary to do certain repair work on the hut in which they were to stay, in addition to putting away the supplies, provisions and equipment. Accordingly it was about the 12th or 13th of September before he got the generator going. While it has been previously stated that the SS Busko was located on September 12 by a United States Coast Guard cutter, it was necessary for the United States government representatives to pick up various members of this party at several points in Greenland, and accordingly Bradley and the two trappers were not located and taken into protective custody until September 14.

According to information furnished by Bradley, he had started the motor which was to generate power for the radio transmitter about September 13, and had thought he would try to send some messages the following day, however he did not send any messages over this radio transmitter prior to his apprehension.

The United States Government representatives upon seizing Bradley also seized his equipment and burned the masts which were to be used in the radio transmission work. The equipment upon examination was found to be very good, and was new, the tubes and other parts reflecting no indication that the equipment had ever been used.

- 6 -

Hearings by the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Boston of these twenty-one individuals who were members of the crew and expeditionary party aboard the SS Busko, were completed on October 14, 1941. Admission into the United States was denied to those individuals, due to the fact that they were not in possession of unexpired immigration visas and other proper documents. The Steamship Busko is being held in the custody of the United States Navy at Boston.

A number of the individuals in this crew and expeditionary party were young men who remarked they had left on the trip in order to get away from Norway and the real possibility of being drafted into the German work army for service in behalf of the Germans on the European Continent.

One member of the crew commented that during July, 1941, he had been aboard the two thousand ton Norwegian Steamship "Lysaker" which had put in at Stettin, a coastal town in Germany, with a cargo of fish. The ship was in port five weeks under Nazi supervision. Finally the ship was unloaded and then took on about five hundred tons of sugar consigned to Stavanger, Norway. This crew member stated that this quantity of sugar had been previously taken away from Norway by the Germans and then reshipped to Norway in order to make the Norwegians believe the Germans were sending them this sugar, which of course was not a true statement of fact.

This crew member also stated that the Germans take all the good flour from Norway and replace it with flour which is so poor that the Norwegians can hardly eat it; furthermore the Germans take all the meat from Norway so that there is no meat whatsoever for the Norwegians to use. He claimed this procedure had been followed by the Germans ever since they invaded Norway.

Another of the crew members remarked that he had had six months compulsory military training in the armed forces of his country some fifteen years previously, and upon the invasion of Norway by the Germans he had volunteered his services to the Norwegian government in an endeavor to help resist this invasion, however he was not accepted since the Norwegian government did not have equipment for a volunteer army.

November 19, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Many thanks for the material that you have been sending. I was certainly glad to have the Japanese report and the Irish report. I want you to know that all of these things are most helpful.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Handwritten: May 7 '41
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK****November 17, 1941****To: Colonel Donovan****From: Colonel Buxton****Subject: Cooperation with the FBI**

To date we have cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation by turning over to them the following information:

1. Article on the Nazi Movement in Spain by Jaime Miravittes, former Propaganda Minister of the Catalonian Autonomous Government under the Spanish Republic
2. Report on Hermann von Griemeisen, former German agent who is now in Bermuda, on his way to this country.
3. Diary of Denyse Clairouin
4. Report on the Franco delegation which arrived in this country en route for Peru
5. Memorandum re German cables sent to refugees in this country demanding aid for relatives still in Europe
6. The names of half a dozen individuals whose further investigation by the FBI was deemed advisable.
7. Report on Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Catty
8. Report on Maria Markan, Opera star

Also put them in touch with Czechs + Poles.

Taken from The Hour Number 118 November 1, 1941

COPY

MARIA MARKAN, OPERA STAR AND NAZI "FAVORITE" IN N.Y.

The career of Miss Maria Markan, Metropolitan Opera Star who just arrived in the United States is such that her activities in this country will bear watching.

Born in Iceland, a famous singer in Scandinavia, Maria Markan was discovered for Germany several years ago by Professor Paul Burekhardt, well-known "geologist" whose expeditions into Iceland and Greenland provided the Third Reich with valuable military information. Burekhardt met Miss Markan in Iceland. At the time he was acting as a representative of the Foreign Department of the Nazi SS. He carried with him personal letters of identification from Gestapo chief Himmler. Money from Himmler came to him regularly through a bank in Copenhagen. His main work was organizing secret radio stations in Iceland and Greenland.

Miss Markan became closely associated with Nazi agent Burekhardt. She is credited with having arranged a meeting between him and Gudmundur Einarsson, key Quisling in Iceland. Her services were soon held in high regard by Berlin.

With Einarsson, Miss Markan traveled to Germany in 1938. They stayed as guests at Heinrich Himmler's home at the Falkensee in Bavaria. Through Himmler, the opera star met Hermann Goering and his wife. She became an intimate friend of Emmy Sonnemann-Goering. The field-marshal helped Miss Markan arrange contracts with the opera houses in Hamburg and Berlin.

Later, Miss Markan went to Oslo, Norway, where she became well acquainted with Quisling and his underlings. All the time she was traveling, she kept in close touch with Dr. Paul Burekhardt.

At present Maria Markan is residing in New York City. Supposedly she is awaiting the opening of the opera season. It might, however, be interesting to know whether or not Miss Markan still maintains her Fifth Column contacts.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

September 24, 1941

file

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated September 15, 1941, with which you forwarded to me a letter you had received under date of September 11, 1941 from Mr. Theodore Wood.

Please be assured I am most appreciative of your interest and courtesy in bringing this matter to my attention and that it will receive appropriate attention.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

OK
Wood, Lister
x Gohmert
September 13, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Here is a letter I received from Mr.
Theodore Wood. I thought you might want to
make use of it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Enclosure

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

THEODORE WOOD 261 Fifth Avenue New York

September 11, 1941

Col. Wm. J. Donovan
Washington
D. C.

Dear Sir:

Rudolph Walter Gerhardt, a German born man, approximately 30 years old, formerly employed in a New York office of an American manufacturer of rayon yarn, is now employed in the Glenn Martin Airplane factory in Baltimore, in the shipping department.

Knowing that prior to his getting his position in Baltimore his attitude was all sympathetic to the Nazi, military operations, I believe it is advisable for someone to check up on him in his present position. He may be perfectly innocent of any wrong intent but it seems strange to me that this type of workman should be permitted to hold the kind of job in a war industry that he now has.

I am an under official in the rayon company who formerly employed Gerhardt.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Theodore Wood

3.82 - 3022 ✓
3024 ✓
3023 ✓
3030 ✓
3183

December 16, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Many thanks for the material
that you have been sending me. I want
you to know that all of these things
are most helpful.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC
F.B.I. - 3022
2029
3023
2030
2183

158 WOH

December 11, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Many thanks for your letter of
December 9th regarding the situation
in Portugal concerning transit visas.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

1176

FBI

December 13, 1941

Lieut. Commander Maurice S. Sheehy
United States Naval Air Station
Jacksonville, Florida

My dear Commander Sheehy:

Thank you for your note.

I am sending it on to F.B.I. I

gr agree with you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

IN REPLY
REFER TO.....

Address
Commanding Officer
Naval Air Station

UNITED STATES NAVAL AIR STATION
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

Chaplain's Office
December 10, 1941.

Colonel William Donovan
Co-Ordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

The author of the enclosed publication should be investigated. His insidious attacks upon our government have stamped him as the number one Facist of this country. I think it is time to crack down upon him.

Knowing your past record as I do, I know that you will not pull your punches in dealing with such treacherous publications as Social Justice and the Tablet. If you should need any help from ecclesiastical sources, please command me.

Sincerely yours,

Maurice S. Sherry
Maurice S. SHERRY,
Lieut. Comdr., ChC, USNR.

MS/jt

Office 50 Broadway (Suite 1811) New York Phone: WHitchall 4-3671
(Anything herein may be quoted if proper credit is given)

The New York Times
Getting Senile?

In an editorial published in the TIMES Oct. 15th entitled "Our Italian Friends" the Italian Government was criticized for stopping telephone communications between Herbert Matthews, Times Rome Correspondent, and its N. Y. office. It is quite unpopular for anyone to defend Italy these days but in the interest of honest journalism the following facts should be publicized:

When the TIMES conveys the impression that it has been unfairly treated in Italy, it is not stating the facts. All American correspondents have been very well-treated in Italy in contrast to the way they have been treated in Germany and other European countries, but also in contrast with the way Italian newspaper correspondents are treated in New York.

There is on record the arraignment of the correspondent of the GIORNALE D'ITALIA for all-night parking of an automobile and that journalist's admonishment by the magistrate that if the journalist's superior, Virginio Gayda, had been before the court, the magistrate would have given him six months in jail. In this case the sentence was suspended because of extenuating circumstances, but the admonishment received considerable publicity.

Another case is that of Italian journalists who are legal residents here, although Italian subjects. Some of them are criticized by American journalists because the latter do not like Fascism. Some Italian journalists here have not received their press cards for 1941 which are issued by the Police Dept. On making protest, they could receive no information. It is understood the blame lies with Lester Stone, one of the Mayor's secretaries, who hates Italy so badly that he has even boycotted spaghetti and "pizza" at Don Matteo's on Mulberry Street, of which he was previously very fond.

Herbert Matthews of the TIMES has been pretty fair and enlightening but one in a while he pulls a "boner" like the "Delano" affair. But in spite of that the TIMES gets furious when the Italian Government retaliates. The TIMES editor ought to know that if Herbert Matthews had been stationed in Berlin and had made statements about Hitler or Goering, similar to those he has made about Mussolini, Matthews would not just have been ejected from Berlin. Some wild Nazi would have quietly shot him.

Are We Headed
for the Rocks?

The Hon. Peter B. Olney writes the New York Herald Tribune that although he supports the President's foreign policy he believes such policy has come into irreconcilable conflict with his domestic policy. People want to have their cake and eat it, and they ignore what happened in Italy in 1920 and 1921. Let's look at the record: A wave of strikes in Italy, seizure of factories, government stymied. The fascist groups that had been rather harmless received an impetus from somewhere, and money too, and the first thing you knew some heads began to be cracked by the Squadristi. The industrialists and bankers supported the Fascists when the Government would not, and eventually Mussolini was called to power. Then he began inaugurating legislation that prevented the workers from organizing but he gave them a substitute, the guilds and the Corporative State. Like it or not, all labor troubles disappeared and Capital and Labor had to get together and agree on policy, or the Government would step in. Now, we are having some trouble and John L. Lewis, who was the President's friend and supporter, is his mortal enemy. Lewis has defied the President on the question of the "captive mines" and there will have to be a showdown soon. We may have a repetition here of what Mussolini did in Italy. To those people who rave against Fascism in Italy, all we want to say is, that Fascism is nothing new, a simple centralization of power that works today just like it did in the days of Caesar or Napoleon. We just hope that when we have to have government control of industry in order to accelerate the defense program, we will have as competent men as Mussolini had when he centralized all power in his Grand Council. Whether we like it or not, that is Fascism, and I am afraid we have it in part and shall have it completely as the days roll on.

Iokes.....
Contradiction

Secretary of the Interior Harold Iokes is a fiery warrior; in fact, so fiery he wants to put on a suit-of-armor and carry a two-handed sword to fight the enemies of our country. In ancient times when warriors had their faces covered, they carried shields with marks on them so that they could be distinguished from enemies. So Harold heard about an agency that furnished coats-of-arms for the sum of \$2.00 so he sent the two bucks and got what was supposed to be the Iokes coat-of-arms. But someone told Harold his family did not have a coat-of-arms so he sued the agency for fraud and the papers were full of it some weeks ago. Now, if Harold really had searched back for

British forebears and the U.S. flag is an adaptation of the Washington arm. Even Franklin Roosevelt has one and is not ashamed of it. So naturally, Harold wanted one too. I wrote Harold that as Minister of the Interior he ought to do what his colleagues in Europe do, and start a heraldic bureau in his Department and charge one tax for the registration of authentic arms. The Government might gain as much as a million a year in new and unexpected taxes, or the interest on 50 millions in bonds...not to be sneezed at! Harold had one of his esquires write me that the Chief thought it was not in the province of the Department. So you see Harold does not get his coat-of-arms and the Government loses a million a year. His nobility went the way of the famous Park Stamps.

Never mind, Harold, when Britain wins the war, she will ennoble you, Fiorello La Guardia, Henry Morgenthau, William Averill Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Sol Bloom, et alia, while the Most Noble Order of the Garter will be reserved for the higher ups. Think of it, one day we will see Harold addressed as: The Right Honorable Viscount Iokes, C.B., C.B.E., V.O. Wow! We are already consumed with jealousy!

Cruel Judges Harm Democracy

A few weeks ago a Federal Judge sentenced a young play-girl who boasted about being a G-Woman, gave out some checks that "bounced back" and soon got in trouble with the Federal Authorities. Some G-Men got in trouble with her and it is said they were dismissed. The judge reprimanded the young women, went back into her life of "glamour" and then sent her to the reformatory for a year-and-a-day. The judge is a product of East Side politics which has profited by the very conditions he now condemns. In fact that very system made him a judge. He belongs to a racial group that has been persecuted and hounded. Yet, when he might have placed this young woman on parole, he sends her away to a reformatory where her education in delinquency may be improved to such an extent that she will become a full-fledged criminal before she leaves, ready to avenge the wrong done her by Society and our form of Justice! I wonder what Al Smith has to say to this offspring of a protege of his, particularly when he is praying in the Sanctuary of St. Patrick's?

Subway Smokers Active in N.Y.

Writers to the newspapers are beginning to stress the nuisance and the danger caused by people who carry lighted cigarettes in the subways. Many of the offenders are young women who stick their noses up at anyone who reminds them it is against the law. Indeed, one of them sneered at me when I told her I might go so far as to arrest her. I complained to the Police Department and they said they were going to do something about it. It will probably take a rousing good fire in the subway, hundreds of people suffocated and injured, before someone takes the initiative and commissions good citizens as honorary members of the Police Force with the right to arrest offenders. What about it Commissioner Valentine?

Use of Police Where needed:

A woman named Mildred Focht wrote to the SUN and complained that the Police Department can furnish twenty policemen to guard the Duke of Windsor but none to police upper New York. Well, that's like placing the handsomest and most statuesque policemen at prominent crossings while the ones that are sent to sections that need protection are so fat they could not run after a tortoise with any hope of catching up. Apart from furnishing policemen to districts that need them, Commissioner Valentine should make the policemen exercise and go on a diet so they will weight the required amount as shown by the official weight tables. Then some of them that are now affected by brain fag or auto-intoxication might help to stop the crime wave in Harlem.

Harlem a Symbol of Neglect

The wave of crime in and around Harlem, N.Y. City, is nothing new. There has been crime all over New York but it is only publicized once in a while. Long ago, this writer complained that there were not enough policemen in Yorkville west of Park Avenue, but nothing was done. It takes a couple of murders and rapes to start something, and it has. But that is like using salve to cure syphilis. The remedy must go deeper. It lies in: (1) better conditions and employment for negroes and other races in Harlem (2) educating them how to live in modern houses and not destroy them, so that they will be welcome tenants in public or private housing projects (3) co-operation between welfare and religious denominations to provide a form of birth control that will not offend the Law or Religion, so as to prevent a high birthrate amongst people who cannot afford to have many children (4) putting up the bars to people who migrate from distant points in order to get on New York Relief. The City Administration might now consider the appointment of something more than "paper" committees to look into this question.

L. C.

December 4, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Many thanks for your letter
of December 5th relative to French
ships in United States ports.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

7B21031

1032

1030

December 5, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Thank you very much for your
letter of December 3rd containing information
relative to the new agreement between
the Peruvian Chancellery and the Chinese
Legation.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC

FBI 1007
1008

FBI

November 27, 1941.

Dear Edgar:

Many thanks for sending me the memorandum about volunteers in the French forces who have been deported into the Sahara desert.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC

November 22, 1941

Dear Edgart:

I appreciate your prompt attention to our request for information regarding the Allied Arms Corporation and Mr. William Rogers Herod of the International General Electric Company.

We will look forward to receiving the information on Mr. Toru Matsumoto.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC

Memos on these above subjects forwarded to Mr. Snow 11-25-41

RECEIVED
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

November 17, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL DELIVERY

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

On November 15, 1941, Mr. David Snow of your office asked to be furnished with all available information concerning the Allied Arms Corporation, Mr. William Rogers Herod of the International General Electric Company, and Mr. Toru Matsumoto, General Secretary of the Japanese Students' Christian Association of North America.

Separate memoranda on the Allied Arms Corporation and Mr. William Rogers Herod are being submitted herewith, information concerning Mr. Toru Matsumoto will be furnished in the near future.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

INTERCEPTS

FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION

October 31, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Edgar:

Thank you very much for your letter of
October 29th and the photostatic copies of the
intercepts. They are very interesting.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
X Norwegian

November 6, 1941

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I was interested in reading the
memorandum you sent me regarding the
Norwegian Steamship Busko.

Thank you for sending it to me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

CC

CC: Captain Roosevelt with file.

✓
7 B
x *Switzerland*

November 10, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for your letter of the 6th,
enclosing copy of summary and digest of the
weekly bulletins allegedly issued by the Swiss
Office for the Development of trade.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

October 17, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have been advised by Assistant Director P. E. Foxworth with respect to the letter forwarded to him by Colonel G. Edward Burton under date of September 29, 1941, including a form which itemizes types of information in which your office is interested.

In accordance with your desires, arrangements will be made so that in the interviews which representatives of this Bureau conduct, both at Miami, Florida, and Brownsville, Texas, with persons entering the United States from Latin America and South America, information along the lines in which you are interested will be developed. Such information as is obtained will, of course, be furnished you as it becomes available.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Edgar", with a large loop at the end.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



*Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.*

September 22, 1941

*Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.*

Dear Bill:

In reply to your letter of September 16, 1941, I would be very glad indeed to have your suggestions as to the lines of inquiry in which you would be interested so far as the Miami and Brownsville matters are concerned. I have designated Assistant Director P. E. Foxworth to discuss this matter with Colonel G. Edward Burton, and Mr. Foxworth will be glad to see Colonel Burton at any time it is convenient.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Edgar Hoover, is written below the word "Sincerely,". The signature is in cursive and appears to read "J. Edgar Hoover".

2B8
x Burton
September 16, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for your note on the Miami matter. I think it would be helpful if we could suggest to you certain lines of inquiry in which we would be interested; also, it ~~might~~ be that your questions might open up subjects that would be desirable for us to follow at a later date.

With all this in mind, I would appreciate very much if Colonel G. Edward Burton of our office could meet with someone from your organization to take advantage of your kind offer of assistance.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

September 15, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Room 247
State Department Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In answer to your inquiry of
September 9, 1941, we are interviewing persons
entering the United States at Miami, Florida,
and Brownsville, Texas.

The purpose of our interviews is
primarily to obtain information relating to sub-
versive activities and other matters affecting
the national defense and the Latin American
Countries. In the event we can be of any
assistance to you in this matter, I shall be
very glad to instruct my Special Agents to ob-
tain any information that you desire from the
incoming passengers and see that this information
is promptly relayed to you.

Please do not hesitate to let me know
if we can be of any assistance to you in this
matter.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar

W. J. Donovan
10/2/41
September 9, 1941

Dear Edgar:

I received the suggestion from General Sherman Miles about passengers coming into Miami and Brownsville. I wonder if you are doing anything about this. As I explained to you, we wish to talk with people from abroad only on questions bearing on military information they may have. In doing this, however, I don't want in any way to interfere with what you may be doing. Therefore, before attempting anything along this line, I wanted to take it up with you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 9, 1941

My dear General Miles:

Thank you very much for the suggestion contained in your letter of September 5th.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Brigadier General Sherman Miles
War Department
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

**WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON**

MID 569.3

September 5, 1941.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Apex Building,
6th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Herewith is a suggestion that may be of interest
to you.

A copy has been sent to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.

Sincerely yours,


SHERMAN MILES,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MID 569.3

September 3, 1943.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Apex Building,
6th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Herewith is a suggestion that may be of interest
to you.

A copy has been sent to the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.

Sincerely yours,

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply
refer to:
Serial No. 1493.

FDS/wc

August 20, 1941.

Subject: Coverage of Miami and Brownsville ports of entry.

To: The A. C. of S., G-2
War Department
Washington, D.C.

From a survey by Pan American Airways made recently, the average weekly arrivals for the past five (5) months at Miami and Brownsville are as follows:

Miami - 1085 passengers from South America, Cuba and Nassau, which includes through passengers from Europe via South America.

Brownsville - 112 passengers from South America, Central America and Mexico, which includes passengers from Europe via Mexico.

It is believed that much useful information might be obtained from covering the arrival of Pan American Airways passengers at these two ports of entry.

FREDERICK D. SHARP,
Lieut. Col., G.S.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 23, 1941

Memorandum for
Capt in Roosevelt

You might be interested in this, although it is something that was covered in a State Department cable from Morris in Berlin on October 13, cable No. 3764. The letter from Mr. Hoover has been acknowledged.

JRM

letter from J.E. Hoover with copy of memo to effect that Hitler has designated 3 army officers to succeed him in case of his death.

3/2

October 23, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for your letter of the 17th,
enclosing a memorandum regarding for Hitler's
successors.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



*Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.*

October 17, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I thought you might be interested in the attached copy of a memorandum of information which I have received from a confidential source to the effect that Hitler has designated three Army officers to succeed him as ruler of the Nazis in the event Hitler meets sudden death.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, is written in ink below the typed name.

Enclosure

October 15, 1941

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I am very glad to have the memorandum which you sent with your letter of October 10th. I was particularly interested in the comment regarding my alleged connection with the Russian Catholic story.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

October 10, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I am furnishing you herewith a copy of a memorandum of information of a confidential character received from a source close to the German Embassy with reference to the current European situation. I thought this information might be of interest to you in your present work.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "J. Edgar Hoover", is written below the word "Sincerely,".

Enclosure

October 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM

Information of a confidential character has been received from a source close to the German Embassy with reference to the current European situation.

In directing attention to the recent speech of Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the German individual remarked that this speech is a prediction as to the final destruction of the Russian military forces through the new drive undertaken by Germany. He stated, as he has done on previous occasions, that whether Moscow is taken is not as important, the primary object of the Germans being to encircle the Russian Armies and administer a decisive defeat to them.

The German individual called attention to his prior remarks that the German Army would proceed in their southern drive on Russia to the Don River and Rostov and thence to the Caucasus, whereby the Russian oil supply would be cut off unless oil could be furnished Russia through ships plying on the Caspian Sea. He commented that with the entire Ukraine in Germany's possession it was like having the heart of Russia in the hands of Germany due to the wealth of necessary war materials found in the Ukraine.

He stated that the road to Crimea had been cut off by the Germans and the Nazi drive was going forward toward Sebastopol, the naval base on the Black Sea. The German individual commented upon the probability of Germany's using a great number of ships to ferry across the Black Sea in order that troops might be landed on the southern side of the Caucasus, there to join other parts of the German Army located in the northern part of the Caucasus, in which region the German individual believes some one thousand Russian troops are stationed. He made reference to General Wavell's Army in Iran made up mostly of some six hundred thousand Indian troops and remarked that weather conditions would permit the German Army to keep pressing forward in spite of Wavell's forces.

It is the opinion of the German individual that after this German drive Russia may completely capitulate or there may be an internal revolution due to the Russian "scorched earth policy" which, in the

- 2 -

opinion of the German, will react unfavorably to Russia. He said that the Russian people will find that they have very little food to carry them through the winter in view of this policy and when their defeated Army returns home, in all probability there will be internal strife leading to an overthrow of the Stalin regime.

In commenting upon the present activities of Finland, the German remarked that although the United States had previously during the war held Finland in high esteem, this country was now finding fault with Finland since she was endeavoring to regain from the Russians that which they had taken from her, adding that Finland had not yet recaptured all of the land which she had previously during this war lent to Russia. He said that Hogland Island had been strongly fortified by the Russians since the previous conflict with Finland and hence this territory was still in Russian hands and Finland now feels a right to continue fighting until it has absolute security from further interference from Russia. He said that the occupation of Iceland by the United States was analogous to the present defense activities of Finland and it is his opinion that regardless of any action on the part of Great Britain or the United States, Finland will continue fighting with Germany in this war.

With reference to current rumors of internal disturbances within Italy, the German stated that he had recently been advised by an Italian conspirator that there are no internal disturbances in Italy. Premier Mussolini still being very popular with the Italian people. He said that if this had not been true, it would have been impossible for Mussolini to have dispatched an expeditionary force to join the Germans in their battle in Russia. The Italian advised the German that the defeat of Greece by Germany had a tonic effect upon the military and civilian populations of Italy though it is true that restrictions on food and other necessities in Italy are quite severe. He added, however, that the Italian populace has shown a rather good spirit and a willingness to cooperate in these restrictions.

The German individual, referring to the letter written by the Polish Ambassador to the Secretary of State, Honorable Cordell Hull, praising the Russians for having released Polish prisoners in Russia in order that they might fight with the Russian Army, discussed this matter with reference to the question of complete religious freedom. The German commented that Colonel William J. Donovan had attempted to make great religious propaganda out of this letter though he had completely failed since the Catholic Church and Catholic individuals in the United States could not suddenly turn to Russian atheism.

- 3 -

In commenting upon the press dispatches relating to a letter from the President of the United States to Joseph Stalin, allegedly intercepted by the Germans, the German remarked that he could fully understand how urgent it was for the United States to keep Russia engaged in fighting Hitler but he, the German individual, wondered what would happen after Russia is defeated, remarking: "No one can tell me that your President is going to wilfully provoke a war with Germany" since, first, he is "politically too ahead"; second, regardless of any promises made to Prime Minister Churchill, he "is not the type that would wilfully see Americans boys slaughtered on an expedition that has no goal or victory in sight unless the war is to last some ten, fifteen or twenty years, and then there will be no victor—all will be vanquished"; and third, "the President full well knows that unless a sufficiently large expeditionary force is sent over, they could be of little consequence as a determining factor for a defeat of Germany". As he has previously stated, the German individual remarked that the United States does not have sufficient tonnage to transport such an expeditionary force and furthermore, there would be no place where such an Army could be landed on the continent in order to take an offensive position against Germany.

The German individual remarked that while Winston Churchill might have his faults, he was keeping England engaged with a strong enough army and that island was well enough fortified so that if the Battle of England should ever commence, the British will be able to give a good account of themselves. He said that the caliber of the British was shown by their ability to weather the German air attacks upon England, particularly London, remarking that ordinarily the attack administered to London would have caused any other nation to have capitulated.

In commenting further upon the Russian situation, the German stated that the railroad to Murmansk had been covered by the Germans and accordingly, no supplies or materials could come to Leningrad from Murmansk. Furthermore, he said two railroad arteries between Moscow and Krakow and Rostov have been covered and a similar line between Rostov and Moscow has been cut in two by the German armed forces; hence, it is impossible to ship supplies to Moscow from the Ukraine via these railroad lines. He expressed surprise as to how the three million soldiers and civilians were able to hold out in Leningrad, adding that they could not hold out forever.

- 4 -

He admitted that the German General Staff had miscalculated on the morale of the Russians, having been of the opinion that after the Russians were defeated decisively in two or three battles they would give up, which had not been the case as the Russians had been putting up a stubborn fight. He said that Stalin had seen that his commissars would carry out the death penalty upon anyone retreating unless the Russian General Staff agreed that such a retreat was best for military reasons. The German individual commented that the Communist ideology is probably on a par with that of the Nazis since both dictators have had the advantage of training the youth and instilling in them the spirit of Communism or Nazism, respectively, resulting in the production of good soldiers.

He further remarked that it must be admitted the Russians have repeatedly determined the places where attacks were to be made by the Germans and have thereupon prepared themselves for counterattacks. However, he said that the leadership of the Russian General Staff in tactical warfare was no match for the German General Staff.

To a query as to the seriousness of the uprisings in Yugoslavia, the German stated that while these disturbances were somewhat serious, there was no sabotage or any rebellious movement since the defeat of Yugoslavia. He explained the rumors by saying that the swift movement of the German Army through Yugoslavia had resulted in leaving some Army contingents hidden in the mountain regions for policing purposes and now these German soldiers are "mopping up" on the stragglers left behind from the previous conflict when Germany passed through Yugoslavia.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

October 16, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building, 7th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

With regard to your letter of October 13, 1941, enclosing an anonymous communication pertaining to Hans Hannau, I want you to know that this Bureau has received numerous complaints on this individual from various sections of the country where he has been seen photographing numerous objects, particularly landscape views.

Hannau claims to be connected with the Trace Service and American Views, Incorporated, New York City. He entered the United States on June 9, 1939, and claims to have been formerly Chief of Police at Vienna, Austria.

Although considerable information has been obtained, this investigation is still continuing in order that I may be advised of the activities of this individual.

There is returned herewith the communication which you enclosed with your letter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Edgar Hoover".

Enclosure

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Yet at times he has a lot of money and his South American friends are more than wealthy they come to the Cromwell to visit him a fashionable hotel on the Ocean front - All his contacts are Germans - he is in touch with Germany by mail - says he gets requests for money for his father and Mother and goes around to other Germans here and collects money to send them via South American mail.

He is a Roman Catholic -

His wife, is at present, tho they have two very small children, posing as a model in New York City - a rather s. name procedure.

Suggest this is a key Nazi agent - since while he claims to be broke and has no money and needs a job he at times has large sums for travelling to N Y City and his photographic equipment goes into thousands of dollars -

Furthermore, please bear in mind that Miss Steinack, the official social hostess of the Cromwell Hotel, is the sister-in-law of an important Pan American official and she was overheard telling Hannau a lot of plans the Pan American Airways has for future handling of airplanes

Not for one minute does the writer suspect Miss Steinack - she is just being used by this man as a blind and does not realize the situation.

The officials of Everglades City - just plain cracker type of poor people - even had their suspicions aroused by his photographing the water front there and phoned the FBI but Miss Steinack reassured the FBI that everything was O K She made statement Hannau had an "assignment" for those and other locations -

A patriot.

Gentlemen:

One Hans Hannau, official Photographer for the Cromwell Hotel, Miami Beach, made a trip ten days ago over a period of four days with his photographic supplies and cameras and took many pictures of water fronts -

at Everglades City, 70 miles from here, is aroused so much suspicion that the officials of that City phoned the F B I in Miami and told them of what he was doing -

He used the car belonging to the Hostess of the Cromwell Hotel, a Miss Agnes Steinack. (She went along), as she also went along to New York with this man early this summer and they contacted many people and as always the conversations were in German - Mrs. Steinack is not German and does not understand the language and in opinion of many Hannau uses her as a blind to take his pictures and interview certain Germans in N Y City -

This man claims to be a refugee from Vienna; states he was Police Commissioner and had to flee; he has valuable camera equipment in his dark room on a dimly side street in Miami Beach - during the hurricane he was much disturbed and his equipment which he valued at \$3000 had to be moved and it was midnight before it was all placed in safety -

His contacts are all Germans from South America and New York City -

He states he is broke -and had to have a job; has been in this country one year and taken his first papers

✓
Anonymous letter
x Harnish
x TAT

October 12, 1941

Dear Edgar:

Here is something I received in the
mail today. I thought you might want to look at
it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Attachment

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

Anonymous

Gentlemen:

One Hans Hannau, official Photographer for the Cromwell Hotel, Miami Beach, made a trip ten days ago over a period of four days with his photographic supplies and cameras and took many pictures of water fronts -

At Everglades City, 70 miles from here, he aroused so much suspicion that the officials of that City phoned the F.B.I. in Miami and told them of what he was doing -

He used the car belonging to the Hostess of the Cromwell Hotel, a Miss Agnes Steinack, she went along, as she also went along to New York with this man early this summer and they contacted many people and as always the conversations were in German - Mrs. Steinack is not German and does not understand the language and in opinion of many Hannau uses her as a blind to take his pictures and interview certain Germans in New York City.

This man claims to be a refugee from Vienna; states he was Police Commissioner and had to flee; he has valuable camera equipment in his dark room on a side street in Miami Beach - during the hurricane he was much disturbed and his equipment which he valued at \$3000 had to be moved and it was midnight before it was all placed in safety -

His contacts are all Germans from South America and New York City -

He states he is broke - and had to have a job; has been in this country one year and taken his first papers.

Yet at times he has a lot of money and his South American friends are more than wealthy they come to the Cromwell to visit him a fashionable Hotel on the Ocean front. All his contacts are Germans - he is in touch with Germany by mail - says he gets requests for money for his father and mother and goes around to other Germans here and collects monies to send them via South American mail.

He is a Roman Catholic.

His wife, is at present, tho they have two very small children, posing as a model in New York City - a rather strange procedure.

Suggest this is a key Nazi agent - since while he claims to be broke and has no money and needs a job he at times has large sums for travelling to New York City and his photographic equipment goes into thousands of dollars.

Furthermore, please bear in mind that Miss Steinack, the official social hostess of the Crowell Hotel, is the sister-in-law of an important Pan American official and she was overheard telling Hannau a lot of plans the Pan American Airways has for future handling of airplanes.

Not for one minute does the writer suspect Miss Steinack, she is just being used by this man as a blind and does not realize the situation.

The officials of Everglades City - just plain cracker type poor people - even had their suspicions aroused by his photographing the water front there and phoned the F.B.I. but Miss Steinack reassured the F.B.I. that everything was O K. She made statement Hannau had an "assignment" for those and other locations.

A patriot.

October 13, 1941

Dear Edgar:

I have the maps referred to in your letter of October 7 and I am glad to make them available to you. We have had copies made for your records.

I thought you should know, also, that I have had these maps or sketches examined by some of our experts here. They advise me that the maps are of little value and that better ones are available on the public shelves of the Division of Orientalia at the Library of Congress which show the rail lines, shipbuilding yards, wharves, and industrial plants of the Kobe - Osaka area more completely and more accurately. We find that one or two items on one or two of the enclosed maps may give some information more recent than that otherwise available. In other words, we do not consider the maps of any great significance and, as a matter of fact, the same applies to the reports.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

October 7, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Seventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Recently this Bureau was furnished with a report regarding "Confidential Information Concerning the Japanese Empire" by the British authorities.

At the time this report was furnished certain maps that are necessary to the report were photographed in quarter sections. However, at the time of the developing it was found that the photographic copies of these maps were not readable.

I am now in receipt of information to the effect that these maps were furnished to your office several weeks ago and it will be appreciated if you will make them available for re-photographing in order that the original information furnished by the British authorities will be fully understood.

Your early attention in this matter will be sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely,

Edgar

*Jim -
let us do this*

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 16, 1941

✓ 127
482
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

It has come to the attention of this Bureau from an outside confidential and reliable source that a serious rice riot occurred in Yokkaichi in Mie Prefecture on September 15th or 16th, during which many were hurt. Trouble of this sort is reported to be an almost daily occurrence throughout the country, and this may have been one of the reasons why the Anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was quietly celebrated.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, in dark ink.

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

October 12, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:


Thank you very much for your note on the
Rice riot.

We will want to make use of this in a
study we are now making of the Pacific situation.

I am anxious to have a talk with you
and hope we can get together this week.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*Commander*

VICTOR L. BICHORN, D.S.C.
36 Ackley Avenue
Malverne, N. Y.

Adjutant & Quartermaster

ROBERT S. MACCORMACK, D.S.C.
302 Autumn Avenue
Brooklyn, N. Y.

Service Officer

ERWIN MARKS, D.S.C.
275 East 94th Street
Brooklyn, N. Y.

181

Nov. 10, 1941.

Col. William J. Donovan,

NOV 13 1941

Dear Sir:

I feel duty bound to advise you that your name was used unintentionally without proper authority from you, as a member of an honorary committee of the Selective Service Boys Smoke Fund, Inc. A membership Corporation formed by six members of our organization.

The Selective Service Boys Smoke Fund, Inc. is no longer functioning and your name is not now being used.

I humbly apologize for not having questioned the authority of the committee to use your name on this committee and hasten to assure you that no discredit was brought to you through the use of your name.

Humbly yours,

Victor L. Bichorn

Commander

PS: This is the Smoke Fund I mentioned when last I saw you. This letter was written you in order to satisfy Mr. Mathias Correa who received a complaint that someone called and said they were calling for one of the members of the committee. We really did a nice job on this, too bad it ended this way. My best personal regards.

W.C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

September 26, 1941

Handwritten notes:
✓
+ [unclear]
+ [unclear]
+ [unclear]

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Reference is made to Mr. Murphy's telephone call to Mr. E. A. Tamm of this Bureau, in which Mr. Murphy of your office advised that an organization known as the Selective Service Boys' Smoke Fund, Inc., was using your name without authorization, and indicated that you desired the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a discreet inquiry into this matter.

For your information, the Selective Service Boys' Smoke Fund, Inc., was organized by certain members of the Legion of Valor and incorporated under the laws of the state of New York for the express purpose of soliciting funds to purchase tobacco for free distribution to the soldiers stationed in the various army camps throughout the country. An investigation disclosed that your name appeared as a member of the Military-Naval Committee, together with the names of other prominent men of this country, on the letterhead of the stationery used by this organization. Further investigation disclosed the organization was using these names without authorization, and it was determined through the officials of the organization that one of their number had been assigned the task of writing letters requesting authorization to use the names of the persons appearing on their letterhead, and had failed to do so.


Mr. Victor Eichorn, director of the organization, stated that he regrets most deeply that such authorization had not been previously obtained, and promised that a letter of apology would be directed to each of the men whose names were so used. He stated that in view of the unfortunate circumstances surrounding this affair, the present corporate name of the organization would

- 2 -
Colonel William J. Donovan

be abandoned and a new one adopted in order that there would be no future misunderstanding as to the purpose and good intent of the Selective Service Boys' Smoke Fund, Inc.

I wish to assure you of my desire to give heartiest cooperation in all matters of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,



October 24, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I was very glad to have the memorandum which came with your letter of the 18th, having to do with the attitude of various people in Germany regarding the present status of the war. This information is very interesting and useful.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



*Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.*

October 18, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Perhaps the attached copy of a memorandum of information which I have received from a confidential source, the same originating from Europe, may be of interest to you with reference to the attitude of various people in Germany regarding the present status of the war.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, is written in dark ink. The signature is stylized, with a large, prominent loop at the end.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

October 18, 1941

Information has been received from a confidential source, originating from abroad, with reference to conditions in Europe, particularly the morale of the Nazis. The source of this information is considered reliable.

It is said that during the last week of August pessimism and a depressed spirit were spreading throughout all of the districts in Berlin due to the inability of the Nazis to bring hostilities to a successful and decisive conclusion. The results of the Nazi campaign in Russia have been very disappointing to the people in Berlin. Civil servants had received orders to report in Moscow on a date in July 1941, indicating that the Germans would have possession of Moscow by that time. A heavy hunt has been made in German military circles for those responsible for this inaccurate information. Nevertheless, the Germans are confident, despite the necessity of a winter campaign in Russia, that they can eventually bring the war against Russia to a successful conclusion, however, only at a great cost and the consequent undermining of the last chances of overcoming the Anglo-American block elsewhere.

From this source it is reported that all question of invading England has now been abandoned as a practical political move. Throughout Germany everyone is at work making equipment for the winter campaign against Russia.

The German Naval Command is anxious regarding the Atlantic situation which is looked upon as presently unsuccessful. Raeder has stated that nothing further can be achieved unless there are Portuguese bases available to the Germans.

The German generals in the Russian campaign have requested their government to concentrate all aircraft produced on the eastern front. It is said that through an official German report, which was intercepted by secret agents of a neutral government, only second and third line aircraft are available to the German military staff on the eastern front, since Hitler considers it necessary to make available all modern aircraft production for the new air offensive on the western front which will commence as soon as sufficient aircraft and crews are available. This decision of Hitler has been very disappointing to his generals in the eastern campaign, Hitler having taken the view that through the use of second line aircraft with the best of tanks, there should be sufficient equipment for his army to handle Russia.

Memorandum

2

It is reported that Hitler recently gave orders for the plans to attack Turkey to be revised and brought up to date. However, other than these new orders, no knowledge appears available in Berlin regarding Hitler's intentions with reference to such a campaign in Turkey, though Hitler's orders are regarded as being significant.

It is also said that there is in Germany wide spread discontent due to the war time restrictions and economy, the same having resulted in general grumbling that the war must stop.

It is commented that the breach between Chancellor Hitler and Marshal Hermann Goering, which is continually widening, is not predicated upon political differences, but rather is conditioned by Goering's lack of interest in the war and his determination to spend his time enjoying a life of luxury. Other Nazi leaders seem to have this same desire. It is reported that Goering travels about Germany in a luxurious private train with three guards of honor on purely private business. Occasionally he stops at stations of the Luftwaffe to confer decorations upon some soldiers, on the occasion of which stops he frequently receives the air officers in his dressing gown, which procedure is greatly resented. It seems that other Nazi leaders are equally irresponsible as Goering, except the secret service organization, which is still efficient and greatly respected for that reason.

Observers in Germany are said to believe that Hitler's chief support is now within the Prussian military staff, such support being founded upon purely patriotic reasons, rather than political reasons. He is said to lean more and more upon his army and less upon the Nazi party. It is stated that it is considered possible that the new thirtieth of June liquidation will occur when the German army considers itself sufficiently powerful to force Hitler to rid himself of the politicians. In that event it is possible that there might be a clean sweep of everyone except Hitler. It is thought by some that Hitler may be leaning toward this possibility, in view of his absolute dependence upon his generals.

It is the opinion of the Germans with reference to Leningrad, Russia that through starvation and diseases this winter, the German problem will be solved. However, the orders to the German army are to completely destroy Leningrad even if that city surrenders, to leave not one stone unturned, since Hitler believes this procedure necessary. Due to the slowness of the campaign in Russia, it is reported that

Memorandum

Hitler has given drastic orders regarding the prosecution of the campaign, which has resulted in many cruelties and unnecessarily high casualties. These increased cruelties and casualties are said to be disliked among the German people at home.

The comment is made that the Turkish situation appears very dangerous, since the Germans may be contemplating using the Bulgarian army for an attack upon Turkey with a view to diverting British supplies to Russia, as well as to gain further strategic advantages in the middle east and cut off the Caucasus. It is believed, however, that such a campaign in the winter would encounter great difficulties.

*7/28 ✓
From [unclear]*

November 4, 1941

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice

Dear Edgar:

I was glad to have the memorandum enclosed
with your letter of October 31st. I find this very
interesting and useful.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

*Sent Capt. Roove Ct.
See cord - 7BD. 383.*

✓
788.
✓ Affair

October 10, 1941

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

This will acknowledge with thanks, your
letter of October 4, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

WH/edj

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



100-10711-16-100001

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 4, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

As of possible interest to you, I am submitting the following information which has been received at this Bureau from a strictly confidential foreign source:

"We learn from friends who have just left the Ivory Coast, that there are Germans in plain clothes in that Colony, and passing through it en route to Liberia. On June 27th, while at BOBO DIOULASO, our informants were in their hotel conversing with a French officer, when he asked them to lower their voices as there were Germans at the next table, who could overhear.

"On July 15th, our informants were travelling by train to Abidjan, when they observed three Germans. These were together in the dining car. At Abidjan station a woman was waiting to meet them; she spoke to them in German and the party left the station together. When our informants expressed surprise at the presence of Germans in the Colony, they were told that these were merely passing through on their way to Liberia.


"Our informants know of 25 Germans who were thus travelling through the Ivory Coast on their way to Liberia, during June and July."

In view of the nature of this information, no further inquiry in the matter is being contemplated by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 7, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Please accept my thanks for your letter of September 30, 1941, concerning Mrs. Lydia Bodrero Bourbon del Monte Maria di San Faustine.

You may be assured that the matter has been carefully noted and is receiving appropriate consideration.

I trust you will not hesitate to refer to me any additional data you deem of interest to the activities of the FBI.

Sincerely,

788 ✓
+ San Faustino
+ Mary, N.Y. 10014

September 30, 1941

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I have received the following information. I don't know whether or not it will be of value to you.

"As a matter of record only, it may be of interest to your office to know that an American woman, Mrs. Lydia Bodrero Bourbon del Monte Maria di San Faustino, is the wife of an Italian who is head of the radio propaganda section of the Italian Ministry of Popular Culture. Her husband, Ranieri Bourbon del Monte Maria, Prince di San Faustino, is himself the son of an American woman. The broadcasts arranged by his office are directed against North America and the British Empire, and are unusually offensive in character.

"The Prince's wife was formerly married to Valentine Everit Macy, Jr., of New York City. She is presently living in Rome."

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

September 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM

As a matter of record only, it may be of interest to your office to know that an American woman, Mrs. Lydia Bodrero Bourbon del Monte Maria di San Faustine, is the wife of an Italian who is head of the radio propaganda section of the Italian Ministry of Popular Culture. Her husband, Ranieri Bourbon del Monte Maria, Prince di San Faustino, is himself the son of an American woman. The broadcasts arranged by his office are directed against North America and the British Empire, and are unusually offensive in character.

The Prince's wife was formerly married to Valentine Everit Macy, Jr., of New York City. She is presently living in Rome.

7B8-
X 100D

October 1, 1941

Dear Edgar:

I am very pleased to have your letter of September 30. Just the other day I was stating that if some arrangement could be made under your direction to have the police of the country made familiar with the problems that might arise, it would be very helpful in the whole program of civilian defense. I might have known that you would have anticipated my thought and I am delighted that this has been worked out.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

September 30, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Aper Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I thought you might like to know that following conferences between Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and me the Department of Justice announced that plans are now being completed for conducting courses of training for the police of the nation in order to assist them in knowing and performing their duties in the Civilian Defense Program.

These "FBI Civilian Defense Courses for Police" conducted with the official approval of the Director of Civilian Defense will be held in fifty-five key cities of the United States and our Territorial Possessions by instructors of this Bureau who have been specially selected. The benefits of the observations made by the officials of this Bureau who spent several months in 1940 and 1941 in England studying the methods being employed there during actual war-time conditions will, of course, be made available through the courses.

The program of training which this Bureau has prepared and which has been approved by Mayor LaGuardia as Director of Civilian Defense will deal with such law enforcement matters as problems of personnel selection, recruitment and training; organization of police department emergency duties; planning communication systems and methods; conveying troops; conveying military mechanized units; providing maximum protection for police personnel and property; guard and patrol work; protecting restricted and vulnerable points and places; air raid precaution functions of police; enforcing blackout requirements and laws controlling noise; duties in connection with grounded enemy aircraft

Many thanks for sending me the photostatic copies of intercepts from the British Imperial Censorship, which were transmitted with your letter of September 11. These will be of great interest.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
September 11, 1941

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

G. E. Hoover
Thane

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Room 247
State Department Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Transmitted herewith are photostatic copies of a
number of intercepts from the British Imperial Censorship,
which it is thought may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. Hoover

Enclosures

✓
738
+ Personal
+ Dooley
September 16, 1941

Mr. J. William Dooley
5744th Street
Troy, New York

My dear Mr. Dooley:

I am very much interested in your letter. Unfortunately, our work does not call for the use of investigators. It is our task to coordinate information that has been already gathered, and is being gathered, by other departments of the government. This we will use in making reports to the President and his Cabinet.

I would suggest, therefore, that you might submit your application to the FBI.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

Troy New York
57 Fourth Street
Sept 13th 1941

Hon. William J. Donovan
Co. ordinator of Defense
Washington D. C.

Dear Colonel

I trust you will please pardon the liberty I am taking in forwarding these communications to you. But knowing you as I do and being familiar with your attitude I know I will not be misunderstood.

For some considerable time I have been contemplating writing you to offer my services to the Government, I feel that long years of experience and practical knowledge have equipped and qualified me to act in certain capacities.

I have been connected with Cuban Government as a confidential man to President Machado during his tenure in office, at various periods I have done considerable work for the Canadian Government.

I have on many occasions worked as an undercover man for a number of our chief Executives in the various States, I was connected with District Atty. Burton Fitts of A. in the capacity of confidential agent.

Colonel. Donovan (2)

During the last War I worked under the late William J. Flynn in the Post and Administration and was personally responsible for many exposures including the New York Central Payroll padding case in which I secured thirty one. Lastly, I had before the Hon. Judge Fay at Albany.

At Buffalo I was responsible for the exposure of the Express Robberies and secured the witnesses in the cases of the New York Central Detectives under Inspector Harold B. Smith, Maloney and the others connected, who were all convicted.

During the past twenty five years I have made and maintained contact with Public Officials, Politicians, Mobsters from California to Maine and from Cuba to Canada, I have intimately known and associated with probably a million criminals of all descriptions from the Pickpocket to the Bank Robber.

I know the majority of people in every large city in this country, Cuba and Canada who live by their wits, Politicians and Public Officials who can be fixed.

Please don't think this is an exaggerated statement or that I am conceited. I have merely set forth the facts in order that you determine

Colonel Donovan (3)

that the knowledge I have acquired may be of any use to my country at this trying time.

Please allow me to assure you that I am motivated by a desire to aid or assist in any manner possible the policy laid down by our President whom I've known, admired and respected since his tenure in Albany as a State Senator.

I often forward him bits of information on various situations that may be useful and during this period of strife and turmoil I would consider no sacrifice to great to make.

I know of no one who is better qualified than yourself to determine whether my training as an investigator and undercover ^{agent} would enable me to fit somewhere that I might be of service.

I feel that with your vast knowledge and experience you could build an organization that would spell absolute protection against subversive activity and I am sorry beyond measure that the United States Senate failed to take cognizance of that fact.

With best wishes for your success
I am sincerely yours
J. William Dooley
57 4th Ave New York

FBI 13, 1943
x Buchanan Legat

24 November 1943

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In the absence of General Donovan, I should like to thank you for the information supplied with your letter of November 23, 1943, concerning Dr. Leopold Bestermann.

The data contained in the memorandum is of great interest to us and we are grateful to you for having furnished it to us.

Very truly yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

BANE:PETERSON

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

November 23 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

There are attached copies of a memorandum setting forth information relative to Dr. Leopold Bestermann, prepared by an individual who was formerly an official in Austria under Schuschnigg, which was furnished to this Bureau by a confidential source. It is believed that this memorandum contains data which may be of interest to you and it is therefore being furnished for your information.

Copies of the attached memorandum are also being forwarded to Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, and the Military and Naval Intelligence Services.

Sincerely yours,

Attachment

*Attachment sent to
Gen. Donovan and
Gen. McDough.
12/1/1943
CAB*

F.B.I. - 13,008

X Bestermann, Leopold

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

November 16 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I am in receipt of your letter dated October 28, 1943,
regarding data furnished by Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke Splane.

With reference to information developed regarding the
individuals mentioned by Mrs. Splane, this Bureau is only in-
terested in material developed pertaining to its responsibility
in the Western Hemisphere.

Sincerely,

CONFIDENTIAL

(25) FB 112 763

28 October 1943

x Splane, E. D. S. S. S. S.
x B. S. S. S. S. S.
x S. S. S. S. S.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you very much for your
letter of October 26th inclosing copies
of memorandum containing data furnished
by Mrs. Elisabeth Van Dyke Splane.

Should you desire it, we shall
be pleased to furnish you any further in-
formation which we may be able to obtain
concerning the individuals listed by Mrs.
Splane.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

W. J. Putzell: Birchard

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 26 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

For your information, there are attached copies of a memorandum containing data furnished by Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke Splane, Lone Pine Road, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.

The only available information in the Bureau's files regarding any of these individuals is a reference to Herman Wild in which it is stated that an individual by that name is presently a member of the German Army.

The Military Intelligence Service has also been furnished with copies of this memorandum.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, is written in ink. The signature is stylized and appears to read "Edgar".

Enclosure

FBI 10/23
CONFIDENTIAL
X Splane & Lyabitt
X Allen Conant
X Let

23 October 1943

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

I thank you very much for your
letter of October 22, 1943, passing along to
us the information given to your Detroit
Field Division by Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke
Splane. This type of information is of great
value to us, and we are always pleased to
receive it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General W. J. Donovan

DATE 20 October 1943

FROM Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Draft of letter to J. Edgar Hoover, October 14, 1943.
(received by me October 19, 1943)

1. Draft as referred to me is approved.
2. I have removed carbon copy of J. Edgar Hoover's letter to you, containing names of anti-Nazis in Europe.
3. Copies will be made for:
 - a. Algiers
 - b. Biographical Records
 - c. X-2
 - d. Our files.

WHS
W. H. S.

SECRET

FBI -12783
X Splane, Elizabeth
CONFIDENTIAL
X Axis
y list
14 October 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Whitney Shepardson

I have received the attached letter from Mr. John Edgar Hoover, passing along certain information gained by the Detroit Field Division of his Bureau, as furnished by Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke Splane. I think it will be of use to you.

William J. Donovan
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
October 12 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

FR 1 12 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Recently the Detroit Field Division of this Bureau was visited by Mrs. Elizabeth Van Dyke Splane, Lone Pine Road, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. Mrs. Splane received a considerable amount of her education in Europe and because of her personal taste spent a great deal of time there, altogether about twelve years, between 1922 and 1923 and from 1935 to May, 1941. She is a member of an old Detroit family. Her sole purpose in calling at our office was to furnish the names of certain individuals in Axis occupied territory whom she believes can be relied upon for assistance to the Allies in the event of an invasion of Europe. Her knowledge of these individuals was gained during her stay in Europe. A list of these individuals together with her comments is set forth below with the exception of a few names obviously lacking in sufficient identifying data.

1. "Mrs. Andre (Margaret Edmonds) Farcas
39 Rue Marignan, Marseilles (last address)
She is British, married to newspaperman in Marseilles. Husband originally a Rumanian. Family still in Rumania. Farcas and wife both strongly anti-Nazi.
2. "Mme. Pichel
Des E'trangers
2 Rue Racine, Paris
Landlady. Very pro-American; anti-Nazi.
3. "Baron Robert von Hochstetter
Braunsplatz, Vienna
In German Army, has equivalent of captaincy; anti-Nazi.
4. "Paul Henry Hartmann
Hohenbergstrass, Vienna
Available at Hartmann Surgical Supply in Vienna. Was wounded in Barcelona, Spain; very anti-Nazi.
5. "Count Alex von Beroldingen
Kurfurstendamm - 42, Berlin
Brother-in-law, Baron von Neurath, runs in high circles, very anti-Nazi.


Page 2

6. "Heinz Eckhart (bachelor)
Brother of owner of E & B Brewery, Detroit; in secret service of German Air Force. Likes women and drinking, lives in Munich, speaks French, smattering English. Has friend, Herman Wild.
Receives mail at: Thea D'Uklansky
Tengstrasse, 22, 3rd floor
Munich, Germany
and
Martina Siebold
Theresian Strasse - 47 - 48
Munich, Germany
7. "Frank L. von Muralt
Furstenstrasse - 23, Munich
In German Army, speaks English, very anti-Nazi.
8. "Dr. _____ Krumen
Elizabetsstrasse, Vienna
Attorney, in with big Nazis, but is strongly anti-Nazi.
9. "Blahsloar Konkai
Kutna Hora, Czechoslovakia
His firm makes chocolates; very anti-Nazi; mother American, speaks English, German, French and Italian.
10. "Afredo Neuhardt
Piaristengasse - 26 - Vienna
Engineer; had connections with archduke
Works for Rotterberg Co., Berghoffstrasse - 40, Dusseldorf
11. "Adolfo Graziana (No relative of General Graziana)
Villa Castiglione - 49
Bologna
Very very anti-Fascist.
12. "Victorio Bartoluzzi
1 Piazza Duca Degliabruzzi
Trieste, Italy
Works in shipyards, high official; very anti-Fascist; part English, speaks English.
13. " _____ Thonae (also works in above shipyards)
Is a close friend of Bartoluzzi; very anti-Fascist
14. "Nino Brandello
Bia Fossano - 8
Cuneo, Italy (near Toledo)
Pro-American and English

Page 1

15. "Walter Krauss and Herbert Tischler
Albergo de la citta, Trieste
Both anti-Nazi.
16. "Baron Marco d'Albordi
Fuime, Italy
American citizen; probably ex-racketeer; hates Duce; knows all people
of any consequence; very anti-Fascist; his sister pro-Fascist.
17. "Count Tripcovitch
Trieste
Owns lots of ships; very anti-Fascist.
18. "Captain S. Daorai
Dhonburi, Baukok, Thailand
Captain in Siamese Navy; very pro-English; hates Japan and Germany.
19. "Captain (?) Adriano Voglino
Via Ale Martiere Fascisti
Rome
Italian Army; anti-Fascist; speaks English."

Sincerely,



FCI - 12611
Sept 25 1943
120 1011
CONFIDENTIAL

2 October 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence,
I am replying to your letter of September 25, 1943, in connection with the German Singing Societies in the Eastern United States.

We have been unable to find in our files much information regarding these societies and their connection with those in Germany. However, copies of the information which we do have are attached hereto for your information.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Inclosure

F.J. Putzell: Birchard

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. Gotthard E. Seyfarth of New York City is one of those German Americans recently attacked by Friedrich W. Foerster, T. H. Totens and Rex Stout. A report of this case was issued by our Foreign Nationalities Branch on August 27, a copy of which was sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Additional information on Dr. Seyfarth and his connections with the Singing Societies is to be found in the pamphlet published by Foerster and Totens entitled, "Would You Sign This Letter?".

The attached exhibits illustrate the connections between:

- A.) Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Cherverbaende in Ausland,
- B.) Deutscher Saengerbund
- C.) Nord Oestlicher Saengerbund fuer Nord Amerika
- D.) Arion Singing Society of Brooklyn

C. and D. were formed when the all including Singing societies in the Eastern U.S. split up.

Not much could be found throwing any light of any directives the American societies may receive from the Reichsmusikkammer and the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP, but as both C and D are functioning under the direction of A and B, and both are under the Ministry of Propaganda, the connections are self-evident.

Special attention is called to a book: Nazi Conquest through German Culture by Ralph Frederic Bischoff, published 1942 by the Harvard University Press, in which the relationship between Nazism and the penetration of German societies into America is very well illustrated. The book refers on different places to the "Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland and the singing societies."

The Newspapers for-and books in which material re the above have been found are as follows:

Voelkische Musikerziehung, Monatschrift fuer die gesamte Musikerziehung (Nazi)
Musikpflege, paper fuer mixed choires and folksmusic
Deutsche Saengerbund Zeitung, Editor: Dr. F. J. Evans (a weekly)
subsidiaries: Saenger Gau Zeitungen
Deutsches Saengerbund Jahrbuch, since 1926, information about the
development of the Bund
Hesses Musik Kalender, Hesse Verlag, Germany, 1941.
Kultur, Wirtschaft and Recht fuer Musik, Verlag Parrhysius, Berlin, 1934.
R.R.N.

Relationships between Singing Societies.

9/20/48.

1.) Ministry of Propaganda and Reichsmusikamt.↓
Reichskulturkammer.↓
Reichsmusikkammer.↓
a) Deutscher Sängerbund.

Joseph Goebbels,

Department of Music: Dr. Drewes

Leader: Dr. Strauss.

Maintains in each of the 42 Gau Germany is divided
a Landeskulturwalter, who in reality is a representa-
tive of the Ministry of Propaganda.

Leader: Dr. Raabe

has 7 different departments, of which are of interest
800,000 members, including all German Men-choirs.Leader: Oberbürgermeister Albert Heister, Horne i.W.
Member of Reichstag, born 1/14/1895 at Sied-
linghausen; Business Manager: Bruno Plonka,
Berlin.Bund founded in 1862, had (in 1926) 5300 singing
societies, and was divided in 22 districts and all
societies in foreign countries were included.b) Reichsverband fuer Chorwesen und Volksmusik.

Leader: Stein

attached to the Zentralverband der Kammer fuer
Chorwesen and the Reichsverband der Gemischten
Chore Deutschlands. 450,000 members. Leader of
the latter: Dr. Limbach, Berlin. This organization
(b) includes all Men-choirs, all singing societies
inside Germany and in all foreign countries.2.) Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP:

Reichsleiter: Bohle, Ernst Wilhelm

a) Verband Reichsdeutscher Vereine im Ausland, Berlin, Lenne St. 5

b) Bund der Auslandsdeutschen (registered association) Leader: Wolfgang Roemer, Berlin W.50

c) Deutsches Auslands Institut

Leader: Professor Csaki

d) Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland

Leader: H.P. Gericke, Berlin

↓
Musikabteilung: Terramore, office Berlin 48, (registered association)

Deutscher Musik Institut fuer Auslaender, Charlottenburg 2, Leader: Prof. Geo. Schuenemann

From: Dr. Calv. B. Hoover's Office

To: Lt.Colonel Oliver J. Sands Jr.

Re: Possible connections between 2 German singing societies in Western U.S.
and 2 singing organizations in Germany.

7. To establish the positive impact of the connection between

- A.) Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Chorverbände im Ausland.
- B.) Deutscher Sängerbund
- C.) Nord Oestlicher Sängerbund fuer Nord Amerika
- D.) Arion Singing Society of Brooklyn

~~the estimated evidence in relation to the above issues:~~

C. and D. were formed when the all including Singing societies in the Eastern U.S. split up.

Not much could be found throwing any light of any directives the American societies may receive from the Reichsmusikkammer and the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP, but as both C and D are functioning under the direction of A and B, and both are under the Ministry of Propaganda, the connections are self-evident.

Special attention is called to a book: Nazi Conquest through German Culture by Ralph Frederic Bishoff, published 1942 by the Harvard University Press, in which the relationship between Nazism and the penetration of German societies into America is very well illustrated. The book refers on different places to the "Volksbund fuer das Deutscheum in Ausland and the singing societies."

5 The Newspapers for-and books in which material re the above have been found
are as follows:

are as follows:
 Voelkische Musikersziehung, Monatschrift fuer die gesamte Musikersziehung (Hess)
 Musikpflege, paper fuer mixed choirs and folk music
 Deutsche Saengerbund Zeitung, Editor: Dr. P.J. Krens (a weekly)
 subsidaries: Saenger Gau Zeitungen
 Deutsches Saengerbund Jahrbuch, since 1928, information about the
 development of the Bund
 Hesses Musik Kalender, Hesse Verlag, Germany, 1941.
 Kultur, Wirtschaft and Recht fuer Musik, Verlag Parrhysius, Berlin, 1944.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General John Magruder
FROM: William L. Langer
SUBJECT: Request from J. Edgar Hoover

DATE: 30 September 1949

I am sending you a little additional material in reply to the request of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.

Most of this we obtained from the Foreign Nationalities Branch. As you know, the R&A Branch has never concerned itself with domestic personalities or organizations and would not normally have any information on topics of this sort.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES



INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Harold C. Deutsch
FROM: DeWitt C. Poole
SUBJECT: Request from J. Edgar Hoover.

DATE: Sept. 25, 1943

Dr. Gotthard E. Seyfarth of New York City is one of those German Americans recently attacked by Friedrich W. Foerster, T. H. Peters and Rex Stout. A report (No. 146) of this case was issued by the Foreign Nationalities Branch on August 27th and was sent to the FBI in the course of its regular dissemination. There is additional information on Dr. Seyfarth and his connections with the Singing Societies to be found in the pamphlet published by Foerster and Peters entitled "Would You Sign This Letter?".

We have no further material in our files concerning Dr. Seyfarth or the various German societies mentioned in the letter from Mr. Hoover.

The material forwarded by you is being returned herewith.

KCP

Enclosures

Date 15 March 1943To: General Macruder *K*

The attached letter of September 11, 1943, from J. Edgar Hoover to General Donovan requesting information about Dr. Gotthard E. Seyfarth is submitted for your information and for the preparation of a draft of reply for the Acting Director's signature.

Please return the enclosure with the draft of reply.

E.J.P., Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Secretariat

(9199)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Information has been received that Dr. Gotthard E. Seyfarth of New York City, who is actively connected with various German singing societies in the Eastern United States, particularly the Nord Oestlichen Saengerbund von Amerika and the Arion Singing Society of Brooklyn, New York, has performed certain liaison services between these German singing societies and the Deutscher Saengerbund and its alleged subsidiary, the Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Chorverbaende im Ausland.

According to this information, the Deutscher Saengerbund and consequently its affiliate, the Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Chorverbaende im Ausland, were reorganized under the National Socialist regime in Germany by the German Ministry of Propaganda and People's Enlightenment for propaganda purposes.

It will be appreciated if you will furnish me with any information in your possession or available to you concerning the Deutscher Saengerbund or the Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Chorverbaende im Ausland, or any information of possible interest in connection with the investigation of this matter presently being conducted by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

September 20th, 1943.

From: Dr. Calv. B. Hoover's Office

To: Lt. Colonel Oliver J. Sands Jr.

Re: Possible connections between 2 German singing societies in Eastern U.S. and 2 singing organizations in Germany.

1.) To get the best possible picture of the connections between:

- A.) Zentrale fuer die Deutschen Chorverbände im Ausland,
- B.) Deutscher Saengerbund
- C.) Nord Oestlicher Saengerbund fuer Nord Amerika
- D.) Arion Singing Society of Brooklyn

the attached exhibits in relation to above may be used.

2.) C. and D. were formed when the all including Singing societies in the Eastern U.S. split up.

3.) Not much could be found throwing any light of any directives the American societies may receive from the Reichsmusikkammer and the Auslandsorganization of the NSDAP, but as both C and D are functioning under the direction of A and B, and both are under the Ministry of Propaganda, the connections are self-evident.

4.) Special attention is called to a book: Nazi Conquest through German Culture by Ralph Frederic Bishoff, published 1942 by the Harvard University Press, in which the relationship between Nazism and the penetration of German societies into America is very well illustrated. The book refers on different places to the "Volksbund fuer das Deutschtum im Ausland and the singing societies."

5.) The Newspapers for-and books in which material re the above have been found are as follows:

- Voelkische Musikerziehung, Monatsschrift fuer die gesamte Musikerziehung (Nazi)
- Musikpflege, paper fuer mixed choires and folk music
- Deutsche Saengerbund Zeitung, Editor: Dr. F. J. Evens (a weekly)
- subsidaries: Saenger Gau Zeitungen
- Deutsches Saengerbund Jahrbuch, since 1926, information about the development of the Bund
- Hesses Musik Kalender, Hesse Verlag, Germany, 1941.
- Kultur, Wirtschaft and Recht fuer Musik, Verlag Parrhysius, Berlin, 1934.

R.R.N.

F B I - N. P. 6
✓ Naz. Post.
X Ordensburg Schule
✓ Germany -

9 November 1943

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

On September 18 we sent you certain information concerning "Ordensburg", in reply to a letter from you of September 9.

In further reference to this matter, we would like to call to your attention a most interesting article of approximately eight columns in length on this subject, published on page 4 of the August 4, 1943 (issue 392-3) edition of the FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG.

Very sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

OJS:IH

FBI 12576
1947
x Ordensburg
CONFIDENTIAL
x German

September 15, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence, I am replying to your letter of September 9th. You will find attached a memorandum from our Research and Analysis Branch with respect to NSDAP. It was the opinion of the staff members who were consulted on this matter that the article, "Ordensburg" which you sent us was the ablest and most authoritative work on this subject that had come to their attention. The attached notes may be of some help in throwing additional light on the subject.

Very sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

JRF:mmm

CONFIDENTIAL

J. EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

SEP - 9 1940

12, 3 86
FBI
Nov 9 1940
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

For your information and assistance I am enclosing a memorandum incorporating certain information concerning the Ordensburg or Ordensburg schools operated in Germany by the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party or Nazi Party).

This information was procured from a highly confidential informant who, for many years, was an active member and leader of the National Socialist German Workers Party in Germany and who maintained this connection up until at least 1940. Information made available to this Bureau by this confidential source in the past has proved reliable and accurate.

It will be appreciated if you will make available to me any additional information concerning the Ordensburg which is in your possession or available to you.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar

Enclosure

September 3, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence I am replying to your letter of September 2nd. A careful search of all possible files fails to reveal any information with respect to the Deutsche Ehren Legion. Regretting our inability to be of service in this matter, I am,

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

JRF:mm

8 Sept 1945

Col. Forgan -

We have searched
all possible files of OSS,
and no information on this
organization is available.

Sands

Date 6 September

To: General Macruder

The attached letter to General Donovan from J. Edgar Hoover, dated September 2, 1943, is forwarded for your information and for the preparation of a draft of reply for the signature of the Acting Director.

Please return the attachment with your draft of reply.

E.J.P., Jr.
E.J.P., Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL *X*

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

During the course of certain pending investigations being conducted by this Bureau, correspondence of various subjects has been noted with the Deutsche Ehren Legion (German Honor Legion), Erfurt, Thuringen, Germany.

The files of this Bureau fail to contain any information concerning this organization and consequently it will be appreciated if you will make available to me any information in your possession regarding this group.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Edgar Hoover, is written below the closing. The signature is in cursive and appears to read "Edgar".

F.B.I. 11/7/41
Mr. Nathan W. G.
Propaganda Dept.
Soviet Union

20 July 43

11/7/41

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence I should like to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 16th enclosing the list of items desired by our Far East Division. In checking with this Division I am told that it will not be necessary to put you to the bother of obtaining Exhibit B-6, at least at this time. If at a later date they should feel that it is important for them to have it, we will take the liberty of asking you to obtain it for us. In accordance with your request, the original documents will be returned to you as soon as the Far East Division has had an opportunity to study them.

In closing I should like to thank you again for your kindness in supplying this material to us. I am sure it will be of very real interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

JEF:ma

CONFIDENTIAL

F.B.I. 11-771
Mr. Hoover
10 July 43

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

I am returning herewith the index of articles found in the apartment of Walker Grey Matheson which you kindly sent to General Donovan with your letter of June 21st.

The Far East Division of our Research and Analysis Branch has gone over the exhibits carefully, and I am enclosing a list of items which we would be very much interested in obtaining.

I assure you that your cooperation and helpfulness in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

Very truly yours,

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

Enclosures - 2

CONFIDENTIAL

JUL 9 1943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel J. M. Forgan
FROM: William L. Langer
DATE: July 9, 1943
SUBJECT: Contents from the Apartment of Convicted Japanese
Propaganda Agent

Dr. C. F. Remer, Chief of our Far East Division, has prepared the attached list of items which his Division would like to examine. We hope arrangements can be made to have them loaned to us by the F.B.I.

I am returning the file to you herewith.



William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ITEMS DESIRED BY FAR EAST DIVISION,

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH,

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

EXHIBIT B-2

2 pamphlets entitled "Bulletin of the Southern Sea Association", Volume 4, # 3 and # 8, dated March, 1941 and August, 1941 respectively.

1 booklet entitled "Local Government in Japan" by SHINZO KIRUGKI.

1 pamphlet entitled "School Education in Manchukuo".

1 pamphlet entitled "Opium Administration in Manchukuo", Series 3, Volume 3, # 1.

1 pamphlet entitled "Manchukuo's Policy for the Eradication of Opium Smoking" dated 1939.

EXHIBIT B-3

1 one page article from a magazine entitled "Step Sons of the Gaijins" by Nishimori Hakkai.

EXHIBIT C-1

1 pamphlet entitled "A General View of the Present Religious Situation in Japan", Bureau of Religions, Department of Education.

EXHIBIT C-2

A book entitled "A Brief Sketch of the Kwantung Government".

EXHIBIT C-4

1 three page mimeographed article entitled "Army Leaders Assisted by Many Able Men in Middle Ranks", by Setsuo Sugawara.

1 magazine entitled "Radio Tokyo", dated February, 1941, published by Nippon Hoso Kyokai, the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan.

Page 2.

EXHIBIT D-1

Map of the five Fuji Lakes and Hakone District, Japan, showing railroads, trails, motor roads, mountains, etc.

Motor road map of the Izu Peninsula, Japan.

EXHIBIT D-3

Manuscript of subject's book entitled "The White Russians of Manchoukou".

Miscellaneous news clippings regarding White Russians.

Manuscript of subject's article "I Spy".

Manuscript of subject's article "Spying".

Paper entitled "Substitute Industries Make Rapid Strides in Recent Years", by Isumi Taniguchi.

Paper entitled "Japanese Cultural Activities Toward Countries of South Seas", by Setsuichi Aoki.

EXHIBIT D-5

Manuscript of a series of six articles written by Bunroku Yeshieka, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi.

Manuscript entitled "Memo on the White Russians of Manchuria" with scrap notes and news clippings attached.

EXHIBIT D-6

Excerpt from the magazine "Manchuria" dated October 1, 1940, entitled Ando Hsien: the Future Home of the White Russians" by Taro Itoda.

EXHIBIT D-8

Pamphlet entitled "Japanese Abroad" published October, 1940, by the Japanese Abroad Publishing Company, Tokyo.

page 3.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXHIBIT D-10

Pamphlet entitled "Harbin" issued by General Directorate of Railways,
South Manchuria Railway Company.

6/23/43

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's temporary absence from the country I am acknowledging with sincere thanks your letter of June 21st attaching photostatic copy of an index of items formerly in possession of Walker Grey Matheson.

I am asking Brigadier General Magruder, Deputy Director for all our intelligence branches, to examine the index and I am sure he will find the articles of interest.

I will return the index as promptly as possible together with General Magruder's indication of further interest in examining the material involved.

With sincere thanks for your helpfulness, I am,

Very Respectfully yours

COPY FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER

G. EDWARD BUXTON

GEB FS

Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

During the investigation of Walker Gray Matheson, who has been sentenced to serve seven years in a Federal penitentiary for acting as a propaganda agent for the Japanese Government without prior notification to the Secretary of State, Matheson's apartment in Washington, D. C. was searched by Bureau Agents, and a considerable quantity of documentary evidence was seized. This material, consisting of manuscripts, books, transcripts of radio broadcasts, newspaper articles and related items, was used by Matheson in the preparation of articles he wrote to be included in the "Living Age" magazine and, undoubtedly, formed the basis for other propaganda work he did on behalf of the Japanese Government.

For this reason, it occurs to me that the evidence we seized might be of interest to your organization, and I am enclosing a photostatic copy of an index of the items seized. It is suggested that you may desire to have this index reviewed, and should you feel that some or all of the articles listed might be of value to you, and you will so advise me, I shall be glad to make them available to you.

In any event, will you please return the photostatic copy of the index I have enclosed so that it may be referred to other Government agencies which might also be interested in this material.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature, likely of John Edgar Hoover, is written in dark ink. The signature is stylized, with a prominent 'J' and 'H'.

Enclosure

20 July 45

Colonel J. Edward Paxton:

1. Attached is a suggested reply to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.

2. The documents have been turned over to RFA with the request that the originals be returned to Mr. Hoover as soon as they have served their purpose.

JRF
For the Deputy Director

J. R. FORGAN, Colonel, G. S. C.
Assistant Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

10400

FBI 11/7/61
x Matheson, W.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
x Propaganda Dept
x Index
x Japanese Gov.

20 July 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence, I should like to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 16th enclosing the list of items desired by our Far East Division. In checking with this Division, I am told that it will not be necessary to put you to the bother of obtaining Exhibit B-6, at least at this time.

If at a later date the Division should feel that it is important to have it, we will take the liberty of asking you to obtain it for us.

In accordance with your request, the original documents will be returned to you as soon as the Far East Division has had an opportunity to study them.

In closing, I should like to thank you again for your kindness in supplying this material to us. I am sure it will be of very real interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

JRF:em

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

20 July 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In General Donovan's absence, I should like to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 16th enclosing the list of items desired by our Far East Division. In checking with this Division, I am told that it will not be necessary to put you to the bother of obtaining Exhibit B-8, at least at this time.

If at a later date the Division should feel that it is important to have it, we will take the liberty of asking you to obtain it for us.

In accordance with your request, the original documents will be returned to you as soon as the Far East Division has had an opportunity to study them.

In closing, I should like to thank you again for your kindness in supplying this material to us. I am sure it will be of very real interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

JRF:mmm

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 17 July 1943To: General Magruder

I have been instructed to
hand to you the attached
letter from Mr. Hoover for
the preparation of a reply
for Col. Huxton's signature.

Mrs. O'Donnell has in her
possession all the items
listed in this letter.

*Reel 22
W. O. H.*

E. J. P. Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
JUL 16 1943

PERSONAL AND MOST CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and M Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In response to my letter addressed to you on June 21, 1943 enclosing a list of articles found in the apartment of Walker Gray Matheson and suggesting that some of the literature referred to in the list might be of interest to your organization, Brigadier General John Magruder, Deputy Director, Intelligence Service, wrote me on July 10, 1943, enclosing a list of items desired by your Far Eastern Division.

Photostatic copies of the following exhibits are enclosed:

Exhibit C-4

One three-page mimeographed article entitled "Army Leaders Assisted by Many Able Men in Middle Ranks", by Setsuo Sugawara.

Exhibit D-1

Map of the five Fuji Lakes and Hakone District, Japan, showing railroads, trails, motor roads, mountains, etc.
Mot or road map of the Izu Peninsula, Japan.

Exhibit D-3

Manuscript of subject's book entitled "The White Russians of Manchoukuo".

Miscellaneous news clippings regarding White Russians.

Manuscript of subject's article "I Spy".

Manuscript of subject's article "Spying".

- 2 -

Paper entitled "Substitute Industries Make Rapid Strides in Recent Years", by Izumi Taniguchi.

Paper entitled "Japanese Cultural Activities Toward Countries of South Seas", by Setsuichi Aoki.

Exhibit D-5

Manuscript of a series of six articles written by Junroku Yoshioka, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi.

Manuscript entitled "Memo on the White Russians of Manchuria" with scrap notes and news clippings attached.

Exhibit D-6

Excerpt from the magazine "Manchuria" dated October 1, 1940, entitled "Ando Msien: The Future Home of the White Russians" by Taro Itoda.

The original exhibits are being transmitted with this letter as listed below:

Exhibit B-2

Two pamphlets entitled "Bulletin of the Southern Sea Association", Volume 4, #3 and #8, dated March, 1941 and August, 1941, respectively.

One booklet entitled "Local Government in Japan" by Shinzo Kiruchi.

One pamphlet entitled "School Education in Manchoukou".

One pamphlet entitled "Opium Administration in Manchoukou", Series 3, Volume 3, #1.

One pamphlet entitled "Manchoukou's Policy for the Eradication of Opium Smoking", dated 1939.

- 3 -

Exhibit C-1

One pamphlet entitled "A General View of the Present Religious Situation in Japan," Bureau of Religions, Department of Education.

Exhibit C-2

One book entitled "A Brief Sketch of the Kwantung Government."

Exhibit D-9

Pamphlet entitled "Japanese Abroad" published October, 1940, by the Japanese Abroad Publishing Company, Tokyo.


Exhibit D-10

Pamphlet entitled "Harbin" issued by General Directorate of Railways, South Manchuria Railway Company.

It would be appreciated if you would have the originals returned to me as soon as they have served your purposes, as it is anticipated they will have to be returned to Matheson eventually.

Exhibit B-6, a one-page article from a magazine entitled "Step Sons of the Gaimusho" by Nashunoskike Hekkai, was made available to the Office of Naval Intelligence in New York City by the New York Field Division of this Bureau some time ago. If you feel that this item is of particular interest and will so advise me, I will communicate with the New York Field Division and arrange to have it sent to Washington and transmitted to you.

Sincerely yours,



Enclosures