

PLAN FOR NORTH AFRICA

**SECRET**

105 007  
2-111  
7962-244-1  
7962-244-1

AFRICA, N. PLAN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

C.S.S. 8009  
Africa 8111  
Africa Hall 8396

**SECRET**

September 30, 1942. ✓

Memorandum for - The Director,  
Office of Strategic Services.

- Reference:
- (a) Director, O.S.S. Secret Memorandum of August 24, 1942, addressed to Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. J.C.S. 8009
  - (b) Director, O.S.S. Secret Memorandum of August 27, 1942, addressed to Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Africa 8111
  - (c) Secret Memorandum on Psychological Warfare for North Africa dated September 8, 1942. Africa 8396

1. In order that you may be brought up to date, as far as information available to the Joint Security Control is concerned, the following recommendations which you have made in references (a), (b), and (c), are being carried out:-

(a) Establishment of a staff covering the Middle East Situation on a factual planning basis.

(b) Establishment of a staff for an attack on Norway on a factual planning basis.

(c) The continuance of economic assistance to North Africa in accordance with the Murphy-Weygand Agreement.

(d) A proclamation has been prepared for issue by the President concerning the area of the special operation. Arrangements have been made for repeated broadcasting of the full text of this Presidential Proclamation. The preliminary draft has been cleared by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

(e) Arrangements are in the Operation Plan for dissemination from American planes of leaflets bearing the full text of the Presidential Proclamation, as well as other literature.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**


September 30, 1942.

Page 2.


Memorandum for - The Director,  
Office of Strategic Services.

-----  
(f) Special broadcast facilities for handling  
the area of special operations have been established  
in London.

(g) Continued pay and pensions of those who join  
the cause of the United Nations are guaranteed under  
the Armistice Plan which has been drawn up. The pre-  
liminary draft of this has been cleared by the Joint  
U. S. Chiefs of Staff.



GEO. V. STRONG,  
Major General, U.S.A.,  
Member, Joint Security Control.



GEORGE C. DYER,  
Captain, U.S.N.,  
Member, Joint Security Control.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE

33  
SPAKE

September 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR NORTH AFRICA

The Situation

Proposals have been made to the United States Government by a group of French patriots in North Africa that this group with United States support should seize power at a given moment, establish a separate provisional French government, invite in American armed forces and cooperate with them in making war upon Axis forces.

These proposals have been made repeatedly through Robert Murphy, Counselor of Embassy at Vichy, stationed at Algiers, and Colonel William A. Eddy. The group which has made these offers consists of both military and civilian authorities working with officers of the French General Staff and with the knowledge and approval of General Andre Giraud, and they assume will put himself at the head of the movement at the proper moment. General Giraud has designated



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SUBJECTS

-2-

Generals Mast and Bethouard to work with Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy.

An enumeration of the forces which the leaders of the patriot movement feel they can count upon as available for their attempt to seize power has already been fully presented. The offer of the patriot group has an important bearing on any American plans for military operations in North Africa for the following reasons:

1. If the group successfully executed its plan for seizing power, American forces arriving in Africa would encounter no resistance and our moral position would be so strong that hostile reactions from the Vichy Government or the French fleet would be extremely unlikely.

2. Even if the attempt failed, its occurrence on the eve of an American landing would be comparable in effect to a large-scale fifth column operation dividing enemy opinion, undermining the will-to-resist of substantial enemy groups and creating so much confusion and diversion of effort that effective resistance could be difficult.

3. The success of the results of the movement as

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-3-

a whole it can be safely assumed that, barring disclosure of the whole plan before an American expedition was under way, small groups of insurgents would be able to act as reception committees for American forces at many points.

Utilization of the friendly French forces at our disposal in North Africa does not necessitate basing our military plans for the region wholly upon their plans for an internal coup d'etat but does imply taking such plans into account to the following extent:

A. Not to plan for landing operations in North Africa before the earliest date on which the patriots feel they could be ready to move. The members of the group believe that resumption of hostilities in Metropolitan France - their ultimate goal - will be possible in March or April, 1943, and that earlier action may be possible in North Africa, particularly if an act of provocation by the Axis occurs and if substantial aid and support of the United States is forthcoming.

DEPT OF STATE

B. To authorize the American representatives, Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy, with whom the patriots are already in contact, to inform the leaders of the movement that the United States Government approves their plans, accepts their conditions (listed below) and will, at the proper time, if reasonable assurances of the successful execution of their plan can be furnished, supply full-scale military assistance. The conditions stated by the leaders of the patriot movement are as follows:

(a) The recognition of the integrity of this French territory;

(b) The recognition, at least at the initial stage of the military operations, of the French High Command in that area;

The establishment of a separate

French Government for French

regions developed by Metro-

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

-5-

(d) American assurances regarding the economic supply of this area which is largely non-industrial;

(e) The financing of the operation by the French using gold of the Government of France now stored in French Africa which they would seize;

(f) Guarantees regarding the continued circulation in the area of the present French currencies;

(g) Substantial American military support which would be regarded as an auxiliary to the French forces cooperating with the United States and which would be provided on a large enough scale to guarantee the success of the operation regardless of any unforeseen contingencies;

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

(h) An intensive propaganda effort, including the distribution of an anonymous "Yellow Book", accompanied by official declarations timed immediately prior to American intervention;

(i) The seizure and control by the French group of key airports, radio stations, telegraph offices and rail facilities, as well as immobilization of hostile officials.

C. To assist the patriot leaders to organize their activities by providing them with money and small arms.

To prevent American representatives in contact with the French from giving them until further notice to the date upon which American military information about American military operations might compromise the security of the French. Plans for preservation of documents, preparations and deception of American intentions have been prepared or



OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

E. When American representatives in North Africa have reported that the patriot leaders are in a position to execute their plan with reasonable assurance of success to inform them of the date on which American forces will arrive and to ask them to time their movement to commence prior to that at a date to be fixed by the American military authorities.

F. To send small advance units of specialists in American uniforms by plane or other means to assist the patriot leaders in the accomplishment of their coup d'etat.

In addition to the measures listed above it will be necessary to provide some psychological warfare support. This should be envisaged as direct or indirect assistance to the French patriots rather than as purely American psychological warfare. The principal objective of American psychological warfare--the softening of the target for military attack--will have been attained by the aid and encouragement given to the French group the activities of which will produce results comparable--though on a much larger scale--to the Nazi fifth column which have given such remarkable assistance to German military operations on many occasions.

American psychological warfare service will be called upon under this plan to give direct assistance to the

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC SERVICE

8

French group in aiding them to prepare and disseminate their own propaganda and will provide indirect assistance by informing the French people of their character and quality, of the unqualified nature of our support, of our good faith with respect to the integrity of the French empire, and of the sound reason for the action of the patriots and our intervention. This psychological warfare support will be important not only in French North Africa but in metropolitan France, Spain and Portugal and Spanish Morocco in order to avert or hinder hostile reactions.

G. That during the preparation of the movement the present policy of economic aid to North Africa be continued or slightly augmented to prevent a deterioration of pro-American sentiment which would be harmful to the success of the movement, and that instructions to this end be sent to the State Department and the Board of Economic Warfare.

Recommendations

1. That the Psychological Warfare preparation for an American landing in French North Africa be assured by accepting the offer of patriotic French military and civilian elements to attempt to seize power in advance of our landing and to invite our forces to land as allies; and to this end:

(a) That Robert D. Murphy, now counselor of embassy at Vichy, who has actively participated in the operations of OSS in North Africa be authorized to inform the leaders of the French patriot movement with whom he is in contact that the American government accepts their offer and the conditions attached to it and will provide the military assistance called for when there is reasonable assurance that their plan for seizure of power can be successfully put into execution upon short notice.

(b) That Mr. Murphy be designated as a representative of the Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of coordinating the plans of the French military leaders with our military plans for the region when and as he shall be instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that pending such instructions he keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed of the progress of the French separatist movement and that he be authorized to furnish, with the assistance of Col. William A. Edgar, U. S. Naval Attache in Tangiers, such advice, support and assistance to the Separatist leaders in their plans as they require and he considers appropriate.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-10-

(c) That the Office of Strategic Services through Colonel Eddy and other agents in North Africa and in liaison with Mr. Murphy, be authorized to supply the Separatist group in North Africa with small arms and other equipment and with such funds as they may reasonably require, these funds to be taken from sums already allocated and available to the Office of Strategic Services for such purposes.

(d) That Lieutenant Colonel William A. Eddy be designated as senior military officer in the area, promoted to the rank of full Colonel, and under the advice and direction of Mr. Murphy to continue his present activities or give such additional assistance to French patriot groups as the following:

- (i) To maintain liaison with such French leaders as have set up friendly organized groups;
- (ii) To act as liaison officer on military and naval questions;
- (iii) To arrange and provide for arms and equipment for these groups;

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-11-

- (iv) To continue his supervision of clandestine radio communications;
- (v) To enter into arrangements for wireless communications between our stations in Tangier and Gibraltar or between Tangier and our convoys;
- (vi) To designate an assistant at Gibraltar for the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting divisions;
- (vii) To recommend for aid and assistance to the assaulting commanders, one of our agents from Algiers and one from Morocco to be available for each attacking party;
- (ix) To recommend at Algiers and Morocco representatives who would take charge in the event that anything should happen to the officers now in command in those places, or to the Director at Tangier.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-12-

(s) That the Office of Strategic Services be instructed under conditions of the strictest security to prepare propaganda material for the leaders of the Separatists, including an anonymous Yellow Book of German violations of the armistice agreement, to store this material at suitable points and to make recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its delivery or distribution by American planes or other military means when the separatist movement begins.

2. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when their own plans are ready, and assuming that satisfactory reports on the organization of the Separatist movement have been received, inform Mr. Murphy of the date of an American landing in North Africa and instruct him as to the date on which he may communicate this information to the Separatist leaders and the date on which it is desired that the movement should begin.

3. That the President be requested to prepare a proclamation to be issued in Washington a short time after the beginning of the movement in North Africa. (A suggested draft is attached as Appendix A.)

OPENING OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

-13-

4. That it be suggested to the President to prepare and have recorded in advance a talk to the French people to be delivered at a suitable moment in his own voice and in French, this talk to be informal in nature, and containing all the essential facts about the Separatist movement in North Africa and our intervention together with the reasons for both and a solemn pledge that North Africa will be restored to France.

5. That the following propaganda measures be carried out simultaneously in both North Africa and France:

(a) Radio broadcasts beginning with the first overt move of the Separatists and giving as much information about the progress of the movement as is compatible with security, announcing the beginning of the movement and the invitation from its leaders to our forces. Directives to the OWI should be issued a short time in advance instructing them to word the news reports of the beginnings of the movement in such a manner as to convey the impression that it was inspired by an imminent Axis threat and to present the action of the insurgents -- who should be termed loyalists.

OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE ATTACHE

-14-

Authorities, or simply the French Military Authorities -- as precautionary measures on the part of legitimate authority against subversive elements.

(b) Repeated broadcasting of the full text of the presidential proclamation in French translation immediately upon release which should be timed to bring it to the average listener in North Africa and France a few hours after he has heard the manifesto of the French Separatists.

(c) Dissemination from American planes of leaflets bearing the full text of the presidential proclamation. This should be done on a wide scale over North Africa and over Unoccupied as well as Occupied France.

(d) Repeated broadcasting of complete text of the President's talk which should follow the proclamation by about 24 hours.

(e) Dissemination by plane of leaflets bearing full text of the President's radio talk.

(f) Agents of OSS in cooperation with the British SOE should organize patriotic demonstrations wherever possible in unoccupied France.



~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT~~

-15-

(g) Intensive utilization of the Presidential proclamation and talk in broadcasts to Spain and Portugal.

(h) Col. Eddy to supply French separatist leaders with texts of Presidential Proclamation and talk for dissemination over any local radio stations they may control

(Special Note

If this plan is approved the OSS will undertake for reasons of security to prepare in advance all the propaganda material called for above.)

6. That the Secretary of State be requested to instruct our minister in Lisbon and our Ambassador in Madrid to give solemn pledge to the governments of Portugal and Spain to respect their territory wherever situated.

7. Coincident with our landing the American representative in Morocco should be instructed to wait upon the Sultan and to present him with a message from the President of the United States explaining our intentions and confirming again the friendship of the U. S. for his regime and the Moroccan people.

-16-

2. The Commander of the American expeditionary force to North Africa should be provided with suggestions and recommendations for psychological warfare measures to be carried on on the spot under his direction and in cooperation with the friendly French authorities. Such suggestions are being prepared by OSS and a preliminary outline is attached as Appendix B.



OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

**APPENDIX A****SUGGESTED PROCLAMATION****(Subject to Revision by State Department)**

German and Italian designs upon French North-Africa have been apparent since the Armistice of June, 1940 and have lately been the cause of increasing concern to the Government of the United States.

It is known that the Government of Vichy has shared the concern of the United States Government over the fate of French North Africa, but the monstrous instrument of blackmail which the enemy possesses in the form of nearly two million French prisoners of war has rendered it impossible for the Vichy Government to assure the defense of French overseas territory.

Consequently, the most loyal and representative elements of the French army of North Africa, learning that an Axis aggression was imminent, have felt impelled to take the necessary steps to avert the so-called fifth column activities which customarily usher in totalitarian invasion and at the same time to appeal to the United States for military assistance against the armed forces of the enemy.

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT

-2-

Both self-interest and the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples which have never ceased to consider one another as allies, make it impossible to reject this appeal.

I have authorized the use of American armed forces in cooperation with French forces so that the security of French Africa and friendly ties which bind the population of that region and the American Nation may be maintained. Already American armed forces have landed on African soil and joined their French comrades in organizing the defense of the region. These are only the first advance elements of a mighty army equipped with the deadliest and most modern weapons of war.

I have ordered that the means provided by the United States at the request of the military authorities of North Africa include whatever military aid and support may be required to drive the Axis forces from North Africa, and ultimately prepare with our French Allies the liberation of the continent of Europe. There will be no American retreat or withdrawal until these objectives have been attained.

-3-

As part of the military assistance which the United States will provide for French North Africa, I have ordered that prompt and efficacious measures be taken on a vast scale to assure the material welfare and needs of the civilian population of French Africa.

I make this proclamation in the certainty that the liberation of France has begun and that the day is not long distant when Frenchmen everywhere will again be able to raise their heads as a free people, relieved of the execrable yoke of their brutal oppressors. At the same time I repeat the solemn pledge of the Government of the United States, already given, not only itself to respect but to assure that all other powers respect the integrity and sovereignty of the French Empire.



OFFICE OF SPECIAL SERVICES

APPENDIX BPSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUPPORTING PLAN FOR NORTH AFRICA

(Preliminary Outline)

**OBJECTIVES:**

1. To assure the goodwill, confidence and support of the French and native population during the initial stages of an American military occupation.
2. To combat panic and confusion.
3. To prevent or neutralize efforts of Axis agents and pro-Axis Frenchmen to create trouble.
4. To break down the will to resist of any French military units which may attempt to oppose an American occupation by force.

**DISCUSSION:**

From the psychological point of view first few days will be critical - population will be unsettled and opinion will be fluid. Very slight occurrences may suffice to convert attitudes of hostility into attitudes of friendship and vice versa. After a few days such attitudes will tend to crystallize and psychological factors will be more difficult to manipulate both for us and for the enemy.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

-2-

During the initial period the population will be more receptive to American propaganda than at any future time but probable disruption of communications will handicap the dissemination of propaganda.

More important than formal propaganda in influencing local attitudes will be the appearance and behavior of American forces, the content and tone of proclamations and orders issued by the American task force Commander, his reactions to situations that arise and the steps taken to assure the safety and material welfare of the civilian population.

No rigid plan could be drafted in advance to meet every psychological contingency which may arise. For this reason it would be desirable to attach to the staff of the task force Commander a psychological warfare advisor. The following plan is merely intended to establish a general pattern and to suggest possible ways of achieving the effects desired.

#### I. ACTS OF COMMAND.

1. The task Commander should bring with him French and English texts of a proclamation to the people of North Africa signed by President Roosevelt and published



OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

simultaneously in Washington and North Africa. (See Appendix A)

2. The task force Commander should issue a proclamation signed by himself. (See Appendix B)

3. Depending on the circumstances of the landing, the task force Commander or a member of his staff representing him should make certain ceremonial visits and appearances. (See Annex C).

4. Emergency distribution of free food, cigarettes, soap and other necessities should start functioning immediately upon the arrival of American forces in a given locality and should continue for several days. Sanitary and hospital units for the civilian population should start functioning as soon as possible. (See Annex D)

## II. PROPAGANDA.

1. The task force should include a military propaganda unit equipped with mobile radio transmitters, printing equipment, mobile motion-picture units, loudspeakers, etc. (See Annex E)

2. Large supplies of leaflets, pamphlets and posters should be prepared in advance to be available for immediate distribution. (See Annex F)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

3. The Presidential proclamation should be recorded in French in the President's own voice and played over loudspeakers and the radio repeatedly.
4. Initial propaganda efforts should be confined to widest possible dissemination of the proclamation of the President and the task force Commander.
5. Distribution of propaganda leaflets - initially the texts of the proclamations - by plane should commence at the earliest possible moment and be carried out on a very wide scale. Small symbolic packets of cigarettes or food might be dropped at the same time in selected localities.  
(see Annex G)
6. Officers of the propaganda unit should contact local radio stations wherever the authorities are friendly and keep them supplied with French translations of American news and propaganda. Where radio stations are in hostile hands attempts should be made to seize them and operate them under American control as soon as possible.  
(see Annex H)
7. Food, cigarettes, soap and all other supplies intended for the civilian population should carry propaganda slogans and emblems on wrappers or labels. (see Annex I)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

8. Propaganda slogans in ~~French~~ should be painted or chalked on military vehicles, headquarters and barracks walls, etc. (see Annex J)

9. The themes of American propaganda in the first few days should be based wholly on the proclamations. These should be explained and dramatized but not expanded. Every effort, however, should be made to supply American and world news to the press and radio. This news should be obtained from recordings or stenographic transcriptions of official U. S. shortwave programs to North Africa. A special plan of long-range propaganda support should exist. (see Annex K)

### III. COUNTER\*PROPAGANDA

1. In case of resistance steps should be taken as promptly as possible to neutralize enemy radio and press propaganda by jamming, aerial bombing and other means. (see Annex L)

2. American counter-espionage services should be instructed to report on rumors so that appropriate counter-measures can be taken directly or in conjunction with friendly French authorities.

~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

#### IV. MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS AND BEHAVIOR OF TROOPS.

1. Inasmuch as the appearance and attitude of American troops can be an important factor in determining the reactions of the civilian and military elements with which they come in contact, it is important that soldiers and officers receive specific instructions as to the impression which the command wishes to make upon the minds of the civilian and military elements with which our forces will be in contact and the various ways in which this can be done. (see Annex M)

2. Parades, exercises, military bands and other demonstrations can be used for psychological warfare with telling effect. (see Annex N)



SECRET

The Annexes to Appendix B are in course of preparation.

**SECRET**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 14, 1942

*Approved 8/11/42  
Operations  
of C.S.  
2009  
Special Section*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

Subject: O.S.S. Secret Letters of August 24, 1942  
and August 27, 1942.

1. Transmitted herewith are two memoranda,\* both dated September 11, 1942, which indicate the action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposals submitted to them by you in your secret letters noted above.

*A. H. Onthank*

A. H. Onthank,  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

*\* Letter of Camp 27 -  
J.C.S. 8009  
Suggestion  
to discuss matter  
operational  
to capture*

**SECRET**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

September 11, 1942.

Memorandum for - Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services.

Your letter of August 27 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with memorandum enclosed, was referred to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and their action was communicated to you by despatch dated 9 September and sent to London, England, for your guidance.

In confirmation, the action taken on the several proposals is set forth below. The paragraph numberings are the same as contained in your memorandum of 27 August.

1. The acquisition of 40,000,000 francs. This project was approved with the proviso that the Supreme Commander and the Local Commanders should control the disbursements after arrival in the area.
2. With regards to provision for radio communication between O.S.S. stations on one hand, and convoys on the other, in order to transmit last minute intelligence. These stations should be under the control of the Theatre Commander. Effective steps shall be taken to have codes currently used reviewed by military agencies and codes changed at sufficiently brief intervals to ensure against compromising operations.
3. Regarding the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerrilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting division. This project is approved subject to the understanding that these are stores under the control of the O.S.S. and that the supplying of guerrilla groups is approved by the Supreme and Local Commanders in each case.
4. To bring back to Washington a hydrographer experienced in the area of the special operation. This project is approved.
5. The setting up of a powerful broadcasting station for crossroads broadcasts. The British should be urged to complete this station. It is highly desirable that it be ready for operation in and after D day.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

**SECRET**

Page 2.

September 11, 1942.

Memorandum for - Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services.

6. The proposal to have local leaders select and send out influential persons of their choice who could be used to broadcast to officers and civilians prior to or at the moment of attack. This project must be under the control of the Supreme Commander. It would appear to be a much better plan if the broadcasts were carried out from on board ship at each locality where a landing was in progress. Local Leaders from local ports could be "captured" and then required to broadcast.

7. Regarding staff talks between Americans and the leaders of the Separatist movement. This scheme is disapproved as the danger of information leaking out by staff talks with Separatists appears too great.

8. Regarding promises to be made by the Theatre Commander of payment of salaries and pensions of all Army and Navy officers who join the revolt against the established government and open warfare against the Axis. This proposal is disapproved because such a promise would eventually lead to complications.

9. Regarding the preparation of leaflets and posters for distribution upon arrival of American forces. The preparation of leaflets should be under the control of the Supreme and Local Commanders.

10. With regards to withdrawing of agents for the aid and assistance of the assaulting commanders. This program is approved and is desired by the Army Task Force Commander.

11. The proposal to have (a) available at the O.S.S. London office a representative of O.S.S. on the psychological warfare side to be at the disposition of the Theatre Commander and (b) available for the commander of the assaulting troops a representative of the O.S.S. who is a member of the Subcommittee of Psychological Warfare. Proposal (a) is approved subject to the wishes of the Supreme Commander. Proposal (b) is approved but further details are requested as to the identity of the individual representing the Subcommittee of Psychological Warfare.



*W. J. Donovan*  
Colonel, U.S.A.,  
Member Joint Security Control.

*G. V. Strong*  
GEO. V. STRONG,  
Major General, U.S.A.,  
Member Joint Security Control.

Africa 8/11

**SECRET** *x Operations*  
*x Administration*  
*x J.E.S.*  
August 27, 1942 *x Saddy*

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

I am enclosing a memorandum which undertakes to show those things which both "outside and inside" should be done or which we should be prepared to do in the coming operations.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

August 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Subject to the approval of The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. We are acquiring 40,000,000 francs in native currency - Tangerine, Arabian and Moroccan - to be held at various points as a reserve to finance the expenses of guerilla or other extraordinary action. We are buying up this reserve inconspicuously in small sums against our pledge to place free dollars in the United States available to certain beneficiaries in each case. These transactions are not reported, even in code.

2. Detailed arrangements should be made for wireless communications between our stations at Tangier and Gibraltar, on the one hand, and convoys, on the other, in order to transmit last minute intelligence regarding troop movements, defense measures being taken by Germany or by Vichy or by Spain.



-2-

3. Arrangements should be made with the Governor at Gibraltar for the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting divisions.

4. We are bringing back to Washington from Tangier a hydrographer whom we have had there. He has been captain of the Tug Boat and Salvage Company operating on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, whose beaches and ports are well known to him. His services will be made available at such time and in such manner as may be desired.

5. We should impress upon the British the necessity of setting up a powerful broadcasting station at Gibraltar to broadcast in French, Spanish and Arabic to North Africa. This station has been partially installed, but is not yet ready to operate because the British erred in obtaining wrong equipment. Such a station is essential because the reception from stations in this country is too uncertain and too indistinct to be relied upon. If this station cannot be arranged for, then we must perfect arrangements with the B.B.C. to use their channels.

-3-

6. We have already taken up with Mr. Murphy at Algiers a proposal to have the French leaders select and send out the most influential person of their choice, who could be used to broadcast in French to the officers and civilians in North Africa prior to or at the moment of attack. There is needed a name that will carry weight with the people who live in the territory - a name that has not been impaired by identification with the B.B.C.-de Gaulist programs.

7. In the event that staff talks would be desired between the Americans and the leaders of the French separatist movement, this can be arranged through Mr. R. D. Murphy who should be here within the next few days.

8. We are preparing for submission and approval a promise to be made by our theatre commander to the French high commander in North Africa concerning payment of salaries and pensions of all French army and navy officers who join the revolt against the Vichy Government and open warfare against the Axis.

9. We are preparing to submit suggestions for

leaflets and posters to be distributed in French, Arabic and Spanish announcing the arrival of the American forces, the revolt of the French army and people of North Africa, and the assurance of foods, medicines and necessities. Also, there should be determined what, if any, pledge of respect for the territory and neutrality should be given to the Spanish and French.

10. We here are strongly of the opinion that for aid and assistance to the assault commanders we should withdraw at an early date one of our agents from Algiers and one from Morocco to be available for each attacking party. I have talked with Colonel Eddy about this and asked him for his recommendations.

(a) For GYMNAST he recommends Vice-Consul Frederick P. Culbert, control officer at Casablanca, graduate of the Naval Academy, class of 1916. He resigned from the Navy in the early twenties and for many years was a business executive in France and Germany. It is recommended that he be given the rank of Commander in the Naval Reserve.



-5-

(b) For TORCH it is recommended that Captain John Crawford Knox, a reserve officer and now Vice-Consul and control officer at Algiers, be withdrawn. He is a graduate of St. Cyr and served in the French Army as a commissioned officer for many years. He is our principal organizer in Algiers and has many friends inside the French Army and the French secret service. It is recommended that he be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve for this assignment.

I urge also that there be designated at Algiers and Morocco certain of our agents to take charge in the event that anything should happen to the above named officers or to the director at Tangier.

(a) To this end, upon Colonel Eady's recommendation, we submit the name of Captain David W. King, U. S. Army Reserve, who has handled the detailed organization work in French Morocco. I recommend that he be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve for this assignment.

-6-

(b) For Algiers there is recommended Vice-Consul Lelan L. Rounds, control officer at Oran, who has the full confidence of the leaders of the French Separatist Movement, of the British and Polish Intelligence, and who knows personally our agents and sympathizers in the Province of Oran. Mr. Rounds was a captain in the U. S. Army in the last war, but resigned from service. I recommend that he be commissioned with the rank of Major.

The remaining control officers who should also be given Army or Navy rank in order to enable them to act as liaison officers upon the arrival of Allied troops, are recommended as follows:

(a) Captain W. Stafford Reid, control officer and Vice-Consul at Casablanca. It is recommended that he be given promotion to the rank of Major.

(b) The following should be given the rank of Captain in the Army or Lieutenant Senior Grade in the Navy: John W. Boyd, Algiers; Ridgeway B. Knight, Oran; Vice-Consul Utter, and Vice-

-7-

Consul Woodruff, both at Tunis.

Those control officers are men of maturity and experience, especially selected for the work that they have been doing. By remaining on the inactive list or by resigning their commissions, they have missed the automatic promotion they would otherwise have received long ago. It is felt that only by having them definitely placed in the Army and Navy can we take full advantage of their experience and their military contacts.

I recommend that in order to make his position secure, Colonel Eddy should be given the rank of full Colonel. We plan to locate a Deputy Director at Gibraltar to take over in any emergency. This Deputy would have control of all our radio stations which communicate simultaneously with Tangier and Gibraltar.

11. It is proposed to have (a) available at our London office a representative of OSS on the psychological warfare side, to be at the disposition of the Theatre Commander; and (b) available for the commander of the assaulting troops a representative of the OSS, who is a member of the *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Psychologische Kriegsführung*, lived in France



-8-

in Africa twelve years, speaks French with great facility and who is recognized as an authority on propaganda.

William J. Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*African* VIII  
*operations*  
*Inside Africa*  
*J. C. S.*  
*x Eddy*

**SECRET**

August 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

From: W. A. Eddy

- A. Preparations for inside action to take place at D date and H. R.
  - I. Leaflets and posters to be distributed in French, Arabic, and Spanish announcing the arrival of the American forces, the revolt of the French Army and people of North Africa, the assurance of food, medicins and necessities of life for the Moors, the pledge of respect for Spanish territory and neutrality (if that is part of the plan), etc.
  - II. Detailed arrangements for wireless communications between our stations at Tangier and Gibraltar on one hand and the convoys on the other, to transmit last minute intelligence regarding troupp movements, defense measures being taken by the Germans or by Vichy or by Spain, changes of the political situation, etc.
  - III. Preparations to continue supplies of materials to guerilla groups after the arrival of the troops, including the earmarking of stores and small boats for this traffic,

-2-

to be maintained independently of major operations. This particular item can be probably handled best in the field by direct arrangements with the Governor of Gibraltar.

IV. Final arrangements to kill all members of the German and Italian Armistice Commission in Morocco and in Algeria the moment the landing takes place. In addition to members of the commission, this should include all known agents of German and Italian nationality but not Axis agents of other nationalities who should only be imprisoned. This assassination program to be carried out entirely by French agents, who are already detailed for the job in Morocco, and to be accompanied by definite publicity to the effect that these German and Italian officers have been killed in the course of the public French revolt against Axis domination. In other words, it should appear that they are the victims not of an S.O. plan, but of a French movement and reprisal against shooting of hostages by the Germans and other acts of German terror.

V. The immediate acquisition of at least 40,000,000 franks in native currency, Tangerine, Arabian, and Moroccan, to be held at various points as a reserve to finance the expenses of guerrilla action. The building up of this reserve is very important as it must be done inconspicuously



-3-

by the purchase of 12,000,000 francs at a time in different places. Dollar drafts cannot be sent into the territory where the transactions of every bank are closely scrutinized by enemy agents. No large sum of money can now be placed to my credit or to that of Mr. R. D. Murphy without arousing suspicion. Arrangements have, therefore, been made to acquire these funds locally, without written receipt, against our pledge to place free dollar in the United States, available to the beneficiaries of agents named in each case. I should add that Mr. Murphy and I have talked this matter over in Algeria and in Tangier, and we are in complete agreement that the procedure suggested is the best and that time is precious. May I, therefore, remind you of your promise to instruct Col. Rehm to open a credit of \$200,000 which he will hold on my behalf. I shall not risk even coded messages on this subject, but shall send by airmail, diplomatic pouch, details regarding the identifications and addresses of the individuals in this country to whom the various dollar credits are to be paid. We shall in each case have acquired the francs first. Upon receipt of the identification, Mr. Rehm should write to the person and bank described

-4-

inviting them to present themselves for identification, after which he should pay them the amount of dollars stated in my letter

✓ VI. Send to Washington, Karl Clopet, hydrographer in my office in Tangier. Clopet was for eight years, captain of the Tug Boat and Salvage Co. operating on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, every detail of whose beaches and ports he knows thoroughly. General Patton has asked for his services here. I would suggest that I keep him on our O.S.S. payroll and have him report to you in Washington, to be assigned to duty as it is directed.

B. Preparation for outside action to be taken in Washington or London.

✓ I. After consultation with Mr. R. D. Murphy, who will arrive in this country in a day or two, arrangements should be urged for Staff talks to take place between the Americans and the leaders of the French Separatists Movement.

II. Arrangements should be made to promise the French High Command in North Africa a payment of salaries

-5-

and pensions of all French Army and Navy officers who join in a revolt against the Vichy government and in open warfare against the Axis.

III. The highest military diplomatic and political influences should be brought to bear to exclude British as well as Free French from landing on French territory in North Africa. If this proves impossible, there must at least be a promise by the highest American authority that the British troops included in the campaign are there only for the purpose of fighting the Germans and Italians, and are really in transit to their ultimate destination of Tripoli, Libya, and Sicily. In any case, the essential point is the assurance to the French that there will be no occupation and annexation of French territory by the British, otherwise we will certainly forfeit the benefit of general cooperation by the French Army.

✓ IV. A powerful broadcasting station at Gibraltar should be put into operation, ready to broadcast in French, Spanish, and Arabic to North Africa. Such a station, long planned, is now partially installed, but is not ready to operate because of blunders by the British in sending the



-6-

equipment. Reception from North American stations  
is uncertain and too indistinct to be relied on. Fail-  
ure of completion of a station at Gibraltar, the channels  
must be used. I have opened negotiations with  
at Algiers to have the French leaders select  
the most influential person of their choice  
to broadcast in French to the officers  
of North Africa. We need not only a voice  
with a name that will carry weight with the  
people in the territory, a name that is not  
the result of the BBC de Gaullist programs.

-6-

wrong equipment. Reception from North American stations is too uncertain and too indistinct to be relied on. Failing the completion of a station at Gibraltar, the channels of the BBC must be used. I have opened negotiations with Mr. Murphy at Algiers to have the French leaders select and send out the most influential person of their choice who could be used to broadcast in French to the officers and civilians in North Africa. We need not only a voice on the air, but a name that will carry weight with the people who live in the territory, a name that is not tarred with the brush of the BEC de Gaullist programs.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

From: W. A. Eddy

To confirm our conversation of this morning the following recommendation is made regarding military and naval rank to be given to our men in North Africa who are to cooperate with Torch and Gymnast. These promotions should be made at once so that the rank may be available for use in any emergency, including some which we may not anticipate should the enemy take the initiative force. With regard to the control officers now living in the territory as Vice-Consuls, there would be no publicity locally for the time being regarding the promotion or the commission given. Officers on the inactive list of the Army Reserve should remain inactive until the need arises for them to act in a military or naval capacity. In the case of the two officers who are to be withdrawn to join the expeditions, they should be given the rank and wear the uniform from the day they join the Staff of the campaign Commander. The officers at Tunisia and at Gibraltar,

-2-

where United States Naval establishments already exist, should assume their rank as soon as they arrive at their post.

I. The O.S.S. in North Africa to center at Tangier with a director in charge with the rank of Colonel. A deputy director to be located at Gibraltar to take over in case Tangier should be occupied and cut off. This deputy would also have control of all our radio stations which communicate simultaneously with Tangier and Gibraltar. The deputy will also, in the meantime, assist the director at Tangier in procuring supplies from Gibraltar and in traveling frequently between Gibraltar and Tangier for the closest possible liaison. It is suggested that Major R. P. Heppner would be an excellent man for this assignment. In the event of his appointment, the assistant to Colonel Guenther in London might well be found in Captain Canfield whose experience in North Africa and in S.O. in Washington qualify him to be especially useful.

II. Each of the expeditions should have on board ship a representative of O.S.S. thoroughly familiar with



-3-

our preparations and our agents in North Africa.

For Gymnast I would recommend the Vice-Consul, Frederick P. Culbert, control officer at Casablanca, graduate of the Naval Academy, class of 1916. He resigned from the Navy early in the twenties, and for many years, was a business executive in France and Germany. In every way a very able man for this particular job. He should be given the rank of Commander in the Naval Reserve.

For Torch, I recommend Captain John Crawford Knox, USAR, Vice-Consul and Control officer in Algiers. Knox is a graduate of St. Cyr and served in the French Army as a commissioned officer for several years. He is our principal organizer in Algiera and has many friends inside the French Army and the French Secret Service. I recommend his promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. for this assignment.

III. Both in Algiera and in Morocco there should be a principal O.S.S. officer competent to take charge should anything happen to the officer on board ship or to the director at Tangier and Morocco. I recommend Captain David W. King, USAR who has been more than any

-4-

other man responsible for the development of our work in French Morocco. He should be promoted to the rank of Lt. Col. in the Reserve for this assignment.

For Algeria, I recommend Vice-Consul Lelan L. Roums, Control officer at Oran, who has the full confidence of the leaders of the French Separatists Movement, of the British and Polish intelligence, and who knows personally our agents and sympathizers in the province of Oran. Mr. Roums was a Captain in the U. S. Army in the last war, but subsequently resigned from the service. I would recommend that he be commissioned with the rank of Major.

IV. The remaining Control officers should also be given Army and Navy rank to be in a position to act as liaison officers upon the arrival of Allied troops. Those with the most valuable military experience have already been named above with the exception of Captain W. Stafford Reid, Control officer and Vice-Consul at Casablanca. I recommend his promotion to the rank of Major. The remaining Control officers should be given the rank of Captain in the Army or Lieutenant Senior Grade in the Navy: John W. Boyd, Algiers; Ridgeway B. Knight, Oran; Vice-Consul Utter, and Vice-Consul Woodruff,

-5-

both in Tunis.

The request for the ranks indicated will be quite reasonable. It is really necessary that the Control officers are men of maturity and experience who were selected for the special work they had been doing for the past year. By remaining on the inactive list or by resigning their commissions, they have missed the automatic promotion which they would otherwise have received long ago. Furthermore, to take full advantage of their experience and of their military contacts, this recommendation is made urgently as well as respectfully.

**COPY**

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington**

September 14, 1942

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.**

**Subject: O.S.S. Secret Letters of August 24, 1942  
and August 27, 1942.**

1. Transmitted herewith are two memoranda, both dated September 11, 1942, which indicate the action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposals submitted to them by you in your secret letters noted above.

/s/ A. H. Onthank,

A. H. Onthank,  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.

*Follow up on  
Green*



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

September 11, 1942.

Memorandum for - Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services.

Your memorandum of August 24 addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which you set forth your conception of a series of options was considered by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and a brief of their decision on the separate points raised was contained in their cable of September 9, sent to you at London, England.

In confirmation, their decisions on the individual points raised are briefed herein for your guidance. The paragraph numberings are the same as contained in your memorandum of 24 August.

1. That we should set up a staff whose mission would be the studying of our entry into the Middle East. This is approved in principle and the Chiefs of Staff have directed that a plan along these lines be adopted.
2. The establishment of an economic mission (a) to give immediate assistance and (b) to survey general agricultural problems in Syria. This is underway.
3. That the O.S.S. operations should enter into working operations with the British S.O.E. to arrange for forays against shipping. This is disapproved; a matter of British cognizance.
4. That economic assistance under the Murphy-Weygand Agreement should be continued to North Africa. Approved, providing there is no change in the present tempo.
5. That similar assistance should be sent to West Africa. Such a proposal is disapproved as it would result in a change of tempo which is objectionable at this time.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

Page 2.

Memorandum for -- Colonel William J. Donovan,  
Director, Office of Strategic Services.


-----

6. The Red Cross relief for children now in preparation in France should be supported. Recommended that present arrangements be continued, but no change in present tempo.


7. Negotiations should be entered into for economic aid to Spain. Continue present negotiations but do not change the tempo.

8. That a staff should be set up to seriously study the problem of the North Atlantic and an attack through Norway. This is already being done.

The Joint Security Control desire to call your attention to the highly secret nature of the information contained in subparagraphs 1 and 8 and request that it be not further transmitted.



GEO. V. STRONG,  
Major General, U.S.A.,  
Member Joint Security Control.



GEORGE G. DYER,  
Captain, U.S.N.,  
Member Joint Security Control.



100-8001

August 24, 1942  
Operations  
Administration  
Telecommunications

August 24, 1942

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

Here is a memorandum of my conception of setting up a series of options, any one of which or all of which the German might consider we intend to exercise.

I recognize that there may be other and better plans, but I offer this as a provocative to thinking about it.

It is apparent today that in any field there cannot be concealment of activity, whether that activity is carried on by one man or a thousand men. The only way to obtain concealment of intention is by a series of feints every one of which has substance.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

August 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM

The following suggestions are based upon the principle that in the preparation for operations against an enemy the best means of obtaining security is through dissimulation and deception.

Accepting this principle, there should be some form of military activity in various theatres, while in others, including that where the actual attack is to be made, there should be evidence of economic aid and assistance.

(1) This could be carried out if we would set up now a staff whose mission would be the study of our entry into the Middle East. To be really effective in influencing the mind of the German, it would be necessary to have that job done "on the level". It would be a serious study for the purpose of carrying on operations.

(2) An economic mission (a) to give immediate assistance and (b) to survey the general agricultural prob-



-2-

Men should be sent to Syria and as an incident of this work there should be representatives sent in to organize centers of resistance.

(3) Our S. O. operations should enter into working arrangements with the British S. O. E. to be based on Malta to arrange for forays against Italian shipping in the Bay of Naples and the Bay of Taranto, with possible raids into Sicily and Sardinia.

(4) Economic assistance under the Murphy-Weyand Agreement should be continued into North Africa.

(5) Similar assistance should be sent to West Africa.

(6) The Red Cross Relief for children now in preparation for France should be supported.

(7) Negotiations should be entered into for economic aid to Spain.

(8) A staff should be set up to seriously study the problem of the North Atlantic and an attack through Norway (to hold attention here raids might be organized).

Of course all of this is predicated upon the assumption that our job would be done seriously and in the belief that that particular task is to be put through.