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 29/2/57

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

INFORMATION OF PRIORITY IMPORTANCE REQUIRED FROM NORTH AFRICA

This office considered that with Mr. Williamson going to Tangier to assist Col. Eddy in coordinating our intelligence efforts in North Africa, it would be of great value to the armed services to have Mr. Williamson become familiar with the major lacunae in the information possessed by G-2 and ONI on that area. It was felt that there were undoubtedly a number of items of major importance still missing and that without in any way increasing the tempo, Mr. Williamson, making use of existing facilities, might obtain some of the answers within a short time.

Major Goodwin, Acting Chief of the Western European Section of G-2, was told of Mr. Williamson's assignment to Tangier and it was explained to him how Mr. Williamson would have access to all our sources and facilities in North Africa and would be in a position to focus their efforts. Major Goodwin indicated that there were a number of items of information of primary importance which he thought Mr. Williamson ought to endeavor to obtain. However, a few days before Mr. Williamson's departure, Major Goodwin stated to Mr. Williamson and myself that because of instructions from his superior officer he was unable to furnish us any questions.

Mr. Hugh Wilson then had a conversation with Major Gen. Strong who agreed that it was desirable that Mr. Wilson be furnished a limited number of questions of priority importance and made a note to remind himself to issue the necessary directive. The writer checked with Major Goodwin daily thereafter up to the time of Mr. Williamson's departure to see if Major Goodwin received any change in the original instruction. For some unknown reason the prohibition was never lifted.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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With regard to the intelligence requirements of ONI in North Africa, we were visited shortly before Mr. Williamson's departure by Lt. (j.g.) Hoskinson who was to proceed to Tangier as assistant naval attache under Lt. Col. Eddy. We discussed at length the situation in that area with particular respect to existing intelligence facilities, and how they function. Since Lt. Hoskinson appeared to have a very good grasp of the Navy's requirements and since he would be placed in intimate association with Mr. Williamson there seemed to be no necessity for pressing ONI to furnish Mr. Williamson directly with any questionnaire.

In connection with the whole problem of what our existing intelligence facilities in North Africa can most usefully do in the very immediate future, it should be pointed out that Tangier headquarters are in good contact with the Theater Commander in London and perhaps it is more important to service the priority intelligence requirements which may be received from London. However, the writer does not know to what extent London is calling on the Tangier headquarters for information of an urgent nature.

I. D. Shapiro
I. D. Shapiro

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 19, 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

Subject: French North Africa

Attached are three memoranda, two in French and one in English, prepared by Paul Guérin, and two covering memoranda by Mr. Villard, dated October 9, 1943, which the latter gave me for transmittal and possible interest to you.

The two memoranda in French, although dated October 1941, are still of considerable interest, particularly the one concerning the French fleet. Mr. Villard is a collaborator on this memorandum Charles Lévis-Miravalx, who is a French Naval flyer, who served in the capacity as Assistant Air Attache until the removal of General Weygand, and recently with the Canadian Ferry Command ferrying planes to Britain.

I know well both Guérin and Lévis-Miravalx. Guérin's father, a most important official of the French Moroccan railroad, has arrived in Lisbon and is expected in New York shortly. He knows North Africa, particularly Morocco, as few people do.

Lévis-Miravalx is at present in New York and coming to Washington for a few days. He should be kept in mind in connection with the present North African situation. You will remember he was anxious to form a Lafayette Squadron and fight for the Americans. There is now a possibility he may join the Fighting French. He is an outstanding fellow, good pilot, knows North Africa and carries a name which means much in France. If it were possible, he might be a very useful addition to the United States fighting forces operating in the near future.

Francis B. Sanford
Captain, USAF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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~~AIRMAIL MESSAGE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF~~
~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY~~

TO DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM AMEMB, BEIRUT (100-100000) (P)
SUBJECT: [Illegible] (U)
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States in the event that reinforcements were offered to any territorial or naval demands on the part of Germany. The following points are mentioned as the basis for a possible American proposal:

- (1) The United States Government would use all the diplomatic means in its power to guarantee at the end of the present conflict the maintenance of French sovereignty over the existing French territories in Europe and in Africa;
- (2) The United States would immediately use its good offices to bring about the return to the authority of the French Government the territories and armed forces which have placed themselves under the direction of General de Gaulle;
- (3) The United States Government would propose to bring to North or West Africa, to the French fleet, and to the other territories of the French Empire, in accordance with the danger which might threaten, immediate and effective assistance in the form of arms shipments, supplies, maritime transport, and certain aviation and naval forces.

This memorandum concludes by stating that the exact amount of assistance required would be a matter for discussion by experts, but that it was essential for the Government to know immediately the minimum assistance on which it could count. The timing of such conversations would be exceedingly important in view of present developments in Russia, and in order to take advantage of any British offensive in Libya.

The naval and military study discussed in some detail the present status of the French fleet, showing that its potential power is equal to approximately one-third of the United States. Means of land and aerial defense of North Africa and Madagascar, and a conclusion is reached that owing to the preoccupation of British forces elsewhere only American aid would be effective.

Certain

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Certain technical suggestions are made, as well as the following recommendations:

1. That the United States should immediately make an estimate of the forces which it would be prepared to send to North Africa in the event of need;
2. That such an estimate should be sufficient to insure successful French resistance;
3. That priority of supplies for such a critical period should be given to North Africa, as is now being done in the case of Russia.

NE:HSVillard/GC

MEMORANDUM

The growing importance which the United States Government attaches to the situation in North Africa and French West Africa, as well as the uncertain and dangerous state of British-French relations, brings up the question of finding out whether the United States Government should not soon undertake the initiative of declaring to the French Government its desire that the status quo be maintained and to explain its intentions in the event the French Government should find itself obliged to refuse a German demand concerning the utilization of North Africa, French West Africa, and the French Fleet, which has its natural bases there.

The Government of the United States is the only one in a position to make such a declaration and to draw from it the maximum advantage resulting therefrom for the cause of the Allies. In effect, an exchange of Franco-British views might lead to anything, considering the actual conditions. The various unsatisfactorily-concluded conversations between the British Government and that of Marshal Petain since the Franco-British armistice, are vitiated from their beginning by the method, obstruction, and even violent resentment which motivated the two parties.

Head of the French Government that it is the duty of the French people that they will not... Given to us, however, the limited resources in the French Empire, the... are convinced that Britain... position to give them, the... and... they are convinced that... will never... obtain on the Continent... victory... France. They... they... take the... they... They refuse to go through... they... submit and wait. Finally, in the light of... they... a diminished France... led by the men who... defeat possible.

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use of the French Fleet or North or West Africa against England, and therefore against the United States.

The reasons which can arouse the United States Government to take such steps are numerous. They are of a political and strategic order.

It appears that one of the essential goals of the United States during this war should be to cause to disappear and then to prevent all German penetration of the African Continent. The zone which is the most important and the most exposed is naturally the one which extends from Tangier to the Suez Canal and from Tangier to Dakar.

It is useless to emphasize the dangers, already well-known to the General Staff of the Navy and the American Army, which would occur if the Germans should directly or indirectly control French West Africa or North Africa. These dangers would be directed at the conduct of the war in general and the United States herself. However it is important to point out that a preventive occupation of Dakar would not completely resolve the question of protection of the United States and South America, nor would it even slightly solve the problem of pursuit of hostilities against Germany. German control of the Straits of Gibraltar and possession of Casablanca would, in effect, singularly diminish guarantees of security for the South Atlantic traffic which one could hope to get out of the possession of Dakar.

In spite of these considerations, one could perhaps draw back in front of the sacrifices and difficulties necessary to obtain control of Libya, or the burden entailed in defense against Germany of Egypt and North Africa. One would perhaps be tempted to establish the Anglo-Saxon line of resistance in Africa to the south of the Sahara. This would be to forget the fact that the Sahara plays the role of an ocean, and that if it were to be considered an obstacle for the Germans at present, it would be one of equal force for the Allies in the future. To abandon the North-African island which stretches between the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Sahara, would be to perhaps abandon forever all possibility of acting effectively against

German domination in Europe. It is not from Lake Chad, and Kenya that one can get any idea of German armies in the Balkans.

To abandon North Africa is also to lose testable strategic advantages involved, it is to lose neutrality, at least in her own favor, in the eyes of the Allies. The first and most obvious (and most important) advantage is well known, and it is not the possession of naval and air bases from which the important relations which exist between the Allies and the use of the French fleet in the Mediterranean. How can one hope that this fleet will be used by the Allies, if not to defend the North African coast? one not believe the use of the fleet will be based absolutely on the political position of the Allies and French in Africa? The relations between the Allies and French in Africa are indissolubly linked. The relations between the Allies and American in Africa are also indissolubly linked.

In addition, it is the possession of the French and British in Africa which is the basis of the political and military relations between the Allies and the Axis powers. The possession of the French and British in Africa is the basis of the political and military relations between the Allies and the Axis powers.

It is also the possession of the French and British in Africa which is the basis of the political and military relations between the Allies and the Axis powers.

If in addition to the possession of the French and British in Africa, the Allies have the ability to conduct operations in the southern countries of Europe, it will be possible to conduct operations in the southern countries of Europe.

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in the regions of Europe where the hostility of the population to the conqueror and the difficulties of communication would not permit the Germans to use to the fullest their advantages.

Possession of the North African coast is not less essential if one does not want to, or cannot be contented with, a blockade of the Continent, in the hope that German forces will slowly crumble.

Germany would find in North Africa and in West Africa food resources, oils, iron of excellent quality, and especially non-ferrous metals, which are for Germany the most valuable of merchandise. North Africa in the hands of the German would naturally result in Italian-German domination of the Mediterranean and the possibility of developing on this ocean an African-European coast trade which would relieve the problem of transport, which is so hard to solve for the Germans. If one envisages a long war of attrition, or if one goes ahead to an active aerial and military invasion on the Continent, North Africa has a fundamental importance. On North Africa depends the fate of the Mediterranean and maybe of the war itself.

To the strategic usefulness must be added a considerable political interest.

One of the essential problems of American foreign policy is to have at the end of this war, on the European and African shores of the Atlantic, powerful enough friendly and ally states so that one day their territories will not be a grave menace on the edges of an ocean whose value as a strategic obstacle diminishes daily. This policy cannot hope to succeed unless there exists between the United States and the allied states a sound and good understanding. This therefore postulates the post-war reestablishment of good Franco-English relations on a sound basis.

It is evident that these relations cannot be renewed unless France and England do not find themselves, at the end of the war, divided and hostile against each other because of colonial rivalries or of regret over lost territories. One is therefore led to believe that the Government of the United States should guarantee the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the French Empire, and most particularly,

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the African Empire, in order to establish for the future one of the essential conditions conducive to the development of their own general interests.

North Africa is the heart of the French Empire. She alone has a sufficiently numerous white population to be considered by France as a part of the Mother Country. She alone can be a base for a French Government without its being considered a government of exiles. This consideration is of extreme importance to the French, who are peasants and closely bound to their own land. The question is to know which French Government can in the course of this war establish itself in North Africa and there play a useful part. It does not seem possible to believe that if, with the aid of Britain, the Government of General de Gaulle succeeded in coming to North Africa, the French people would give their entire support to its establishment. At least in present circumstances, this establishment would necessitate armed intervention and would take on the character of a foreign invasion.

In order to keep the moral unity which is indispensable to the Mother Country and to her Empire, it would be advisable, if possible, that it were the actual French Government or its representatives which, under the threat of a German threat, and an exclusively German threat, should make of North Africa a land of hope towards which the hearts of all Frenchmen from the Mother Country should turn with an unanimous lift.

In order to reach this goal, it is indispensable to have United States intervention between France and England. But the interests of the Government of the United States go even further. If one considers the ensemble of Atlantic Europe at the end of this war, one perceives several hypotheses.

England was the only Anglo-Saxon state which was absolutely belligerent; she will be victorious and weakened; her relations with France will be bad. The memory of painful disagreements will not fade away directly; no matter what be the desire of the French Government at that moment, and its desire for better understanding, that Government will have to consider the feeling of a part of the country. It is

equally to be feared that England will not spontaneously grant France the means of recovering her power. Thus, the United States will be faced with two weakened and disunited countries:

In a second case, one can imagine that the United States and England fought together, and that the United States did not bring up at the opportune time the guarantees and promises of aid to France. In that case relations between the Anglo-Saxon world and France will surely be less good than necessary to establish a durable peace in Europe.

On the other hand, if the United States came in in time to guarantee France the reestablishment of her power and to avoid a new Franco-English incident about North Africa, the United States will have founded a solid base for an indispensable continental friendship. On the morrow of this war a victorious but weakened England will not be able to reorganize Europe by herself. By reason of her geographic, historical, and political position, France must play an important part in the formulation of European peace, as well as in the establishment of an Atlantic security zone for the United States.

The shape, goal, and time of the American action merit particular attention.

It is advisable to consider first of all the necessity of prolonging the state of war as long as possible because of the extremely difficult position of the French Government, and because of the extent of eventual American aid, which cannot be held out indefinitely with time. The American propositions should not take on the form of negotiations, and even more so not the form of an ultimatum. They would at no time give the impression that the United States Government awaits an immediate answer, nor a counterpart of its declarations. Since this counterpart cannot be anything but a repudiation of agreements already made by the French Government not to turn over the French fleet, and not to allow an invasion of a territory of the Empire, there is no need in following the assurances already given. It appears

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essential, on the other hand, that the French Government should be exactly and rapidly informed of the intentions of the United States Government, in case France should resist Germany.

This unilateral step could thus be presented in the following form:

The Government of the United States believes that it is necessary to inform the French Government of the group of principles which it (the United States Government) would agree to uphold and the political action it would take in case circumstances forced the French Government to refuse, in one way or another, the German Government the use or the cooperation of the French Fleet and of the territories in North Africa and West Africa.

American propositions under the above plan would seem to have to stress the following points:

- (1). The United States Government undertakes to use all the diplomatic means in its power to guarantee, at the end of the present conflict, the maintenance of French sovereignty over those territories in Europe and Africa where she now has sway.
- (2). In such a case the United States would use its good offices immediately so that the group of territories and troops which are under the authority of General de Gaulle shall return to the rule of the French Government.
- (3). The United States Government would agree to bring to North Africa, West Africa, to the French Fleet, and to the other territories of the French Empire, in the order of their urgent need, an effective and immediate aid such as shipments of arms, reprovisioning, means of maritime transportation, as well as the use of certain formations of its navy and air corps.

The Government of the United States believes that the exact extent of aid to be brought to France in such

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circumstances should be precisely determined by conversations among experts. But the Government does not ignore the following: on the one hand the difficulties of such conversations, on the other the necessity of the French Government for finding out, in urgent circumstances, the minimum aid which could be given. The American Government intends from this moment to point out to the French Government that the latter can, under present understandings, count on the following aid...

The effect that the American Government can hope to realize from a similar declaration depends in large measure upon the time at which this is to be made. All the news coming from France and North Africa tends to point out that the morale of the guiding elements of the Vichy Government which are the least favorable to collaboration with Germany are going through a dangerous crisis. The reverses suffered by the Russian armies, the extreme difficulties involved in maintaining a land front in Eastern Europe which will be sufficiently active--all these do not fail to make a bad impression on soldiers such as Marshal Petain and General Weygand. Also, it should be remembered that as time passes the powers of decision of the French Government diminish. The men who are the most favorably inclined towards the Anglo-Saxon cause are little by little being separated from positions where their counsel could favorably influence the policy of the United States. The American declaration must be made without delay, before all the consequences of the Russian defeat have been completely realized, and before Germany has had time to prepare a new offensive towards the Mediterranean or the Near East.

In this respect one would doubtless be tempted to make the American declarations coincide with an English offensive in Libya. However, this coincidence would only make for difficulties. If this is a victorious offensive, the French Government, still ignorant of the guarantees which the United States Government would make, would be more anxious than happy about the matter. The American declaration would

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than appear to be not a spontaneous initiative in good faith, but rather a procedure suggested by London to calm the uneasiness of the French before going on to the separation of the Mother Country from the Empire. If on the other hand the English offensive were to fail, the importance of the American declaration would be greatly diminished and its effects at least uncertain. Everything points to a recommendation for prompt action.

October 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM

L'importance croissante qu'attache le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis à la situation de l'Afrique du Nord et de l'Afrique Occidentale Française, ainsi que l'état incertain et dangereux des relations Franco-Britanniques, pose la question de savoir si le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ne doit pas prendre à brève échéance l'initiative de déclarer au Gouvernement Français son désir de voir le statu quo se maintenir et de lui exposer ses intentions au cas où le Gouvernement Français se trouverait dans la nécessité de refuser une demande Allemande visant à l'utilisation de l'Afrique du Nord, de l'Afrique Occidentale Française et de la flotte française qui y trouve ses bases naturelles.

Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis est seul en mesure de faire une pareille déclaration et d'en retirer le maximum des avantages qui pourraient en résulter pour la cause des alliés. En effet, les échanges de vue Franco-Britanniques ne peuvent aboutir dans les conditions actuelles. Les conversations diverses qui ont eu lieu depuis l'armistice Franco-Allemand entre le Gouvernement Britannique et celui du Maréchal Pétain, et dont aucune n'a abouti à des résultats satisfaisants, ont viciées dès l'origine par la méfiance, les préventions et parfois même le violent ressentiment qui animent les deux partis.

Les chefs du Gouvernement Français ont cru l'Angleterre perdue au moment de l'armistice. Aujourd'hui encore, connaissant les ressources limitées et les charges immenses de l'Empire Britannique ils sont convaincus que ce dernier n'est pas en mesure de leur apporter, en cas de besoin, l'aide substantielle et immédiate qui leur serait nécessaire. Bien plus, ils sont persuadés que l'Angleterre ne sera jamais capable d'obtenir à elle seule une décision par les armes sur le Continent qui délivrerait la France. Dans ces conditions, ils craignent de subir une seconde fois le sort de pays récemment vaincus et envahis. Ils se refusent à une autre défaite, ils préfèrent subir et attendre. Ils soupçonnent par ailleurs, à tort ou à raison, le Gouvernement Britannique de certains desseins préjudiciables à l'Empire Français. Ils craignent enfin, dans l'hypothèse encore improbable à leurs yeux d'une victoire Britannique, de voir une France diminuée conduite à nouveau par les armes, qui ont rendu possible sa défaite.

Les soupçons et les craintes du Gouvernement Britannique ne sont en aucune manière infondés. Ils ont des raisons et sources et sont fondés et justifiés. Les raisons et sources de ces soupçons et craintes sont les suivantes :

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A ces obstacles s'ajoute un état de fait qui aggrave les difficultés des relations Franco-Britanniques et l'incertitude de leur interprétation. Les deux gouvernements n'échangent guère leurs vues qu'à Madrid par l'intermédiaire de leurs Ambassades respectives. Les entretiens eux-mêmes ne sont rien moins qu'algébres dans une capitale où le degré de contrôle politique de l'Allemagne est très grand. Les diplomates des deux pays ne constituent pas un élément favorable au développement d'un échange de vues confiant. La difficulté des communications s'oppose à ce que ces contacts aient lieu à Washington. Au surplus l'atmosphère de conversations directes y serait la même.

L'expérience et le bon sens s'unissent donc pour prouver l'inefficacité actuelle de conversations Franco-Britanniques. Par contre l'état des relations Franco-Américaines autorise de plus grandes espérances. Ces relations sont meilleures, elles sont continues, elles peuvent être secrètes et directes. La présence active du Gouvernement du Maréchal Pétain par les Etats-Unis, leur heureuse intervention à des moments particulièrement difficiles des relations Franco-Britanniques, enfin le début du ravitaillement de l'Afrique du Nord, ont contribué à les maintenir et à les développer. Par ailleurs, le Maréchal Pétain comme le Général Weygand et beaucoup de membres de leur entourage, sentent que les Etats-Unis acquerront au cours et à la fin de cette guerre une influence de plus en plus profonde dans les relations internationales. Leur espoir et leur attente se tournent donc vers une puissance que nulles rivalités n'ont opposées à la France dans le passé.

Toute initiative Américaine, toute promesse d'appui éventuel dans le présent, toute garantie pour l'avenir de la France et de son Empire, ne peuvent manquer, dans ces conditions, de revêtir pour le Gouvernement Français une importance extrême et peut-être déterminante.

Tel est l'ensemble des raisons qui permettent de croire que le Gouvernement Américain est seul en position d'engager avec le Maréchal Pétain et le Général Weygand, des conversations qui auraient pour objet d'étudier l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement Français résisterait à des demandes Allemandes, directes ou indirectes, tendant à utiliser la flotte française ou l'Afrique du Nord ou l'Occidentale contre l'Angleterre et par là même contre les Etats-Unis.

Les raisons qui peuvent inciter le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis à prendre une telle initiative sont nombreuses. Elles sont d'ordre stratégique et politique.

Il semble qu'un des buts essentiels des Etats-Unis pendant cette guerre doive être de faire disparaître puis de prévenir toute pénétration Allemande sur le Continent Africain. La zone la plus importante et la plus exposée est naturellement celle qui s'étend de Tanger au Canal de Suez et de Tanger à Dakar.

Il est inutile d'insister sur les dangers bien connus de l'Etat-Major de la Marine et de l'Armée Américaine que constituerait, pour la conduite de la guerre en général et pour les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes, le contrôle direct ou indirect de l'Allemagne sur l'Afrique du Nord ou Occidentale Française. Mais il importe de souligner qu'une occupation préventive de Dakar ne résoudrait ni entièrement le problème de la protection des Etats-Unis et de l'Atlantique Sud ni à aucun degré celui de la poursuite des hostilités contre l'Allemagne. Le contrôle par l'Allemagne du détroit de Gibraltar et la possession de Casablanca diminueraient en effet singulièrement les garanties de sécurité du trafic Sud-Atlantique que l'on peut espérer retirer de la possession de Dakar.

Malgré ces considérations on pourrait peut-être reculer devant les difficultés et les sacrifices nécessaires pour obtenir le contrôle de la Libye, devant les charges de la défense de l'Egypte et de l'Afrique du Nord contre l'Allemagne. On serait peut-être tenté d'établir la ligne de résistance Anglo-Saxonne en Afrique au Sud des déserts Sahariens. Ce serait oublier que le Sahara joue le rôle d'un Océan et que s'il devait constituer un obstacle dans le présent pour les Allemands, il en serait un de force égale pour les alliés dans l'avenir. Abandonner l'île Nord-Africaine qui s'étend entre la Méditerranée, l'Atlantique et la Sahara, c'est abandonner peut-être à jamais toute possibilité d'agir efficacement contre la domination Allemande en Europe. Ce n'est pas de Dakar, de Brazzaville, du Lac Tchad ou de Kenya que l'on peut agir contre l'Italie et les armées Germaniques dans les Balkans.

Abandonner l'Afrique du Nord, c'est aussi se priver des incontestables avantages stratégiques que présente, même la neutralité présente, tout au moins sa rentrée éventuelle dans le camp des alliés. Le premier, et le plus évident, est la possession de bases maritimes et d'aériennes de Bizerte à Dakar. Cet avantage est bien connu mais il n'est pas inutile d'indiquer la relation primordiale qui existe entre les bases Nord-Africaines et l'efficacité de la flotte Française dans certaines zones. Quant à l'aspect de cette flotte se joignant au large des îles et de l'est pour défendre le territoire Nord-Africain et à appuyer sur eux. Comment ne pas penser que son esprit d'initiative ne serait pas absolument

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Un des problèmes essentiels de la politique extérieure des Etats-Unis est de posséder à la fin de cette guerre sur les rives Européennes et Africaines de l'Atlantique des états amis et alliés suffisamment puissants pour que leurs territoires ne constituent pas un jour une menace grave au bord d'un Océan dont la valeur d'obstacle stratégique diminue chaque jour. Cette politique ne peut avoir des chances de réussite que s'il existe une bonne entente entre les états alliés des Etats-Unis. Elle postule donc le rétablissement après guerre sur des bases solides de bonnes relations Franco-Anglaises.

Il est évident que ces relations ne pourront reprendre que si la France et l'Angleterre ne se retrouvent pas à la fin de la guerre divisées et hostiles l'une à l'autre par suite de rivalités coloniales ou du regret de territoires perdus. On est donc amené à penser que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis doit garantir le maintien de l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Français et tout particulièrement de l'Empire Africain, afin d'établir pour l'avenir une des conditions essentielles favorables au développement de ses propres intérêts généraux.

Or, l'Afrique du Nord est le coeur de l'Empire Français, elle seule a une population blanche assez nombreuse pour être considérée par la France comme une partie de la Métropole. Elle seule peut servir de base à un Gouvernement Français sans que ce dernier puisse être qualifié de Gouvernement d'exilés, considération qui, aux yeux des Français paysans et attachés à leur terre a une importance extrême. La question est de savoir quel Gouvernement Français peut s'établir au cours de cette guerre en Afrique du Nord et y jouer un rôle utile. Il ne paraît pas possible de croire que si le Gouvernement du Général de Gaulle réussissait à venir en Afrique du Nord avec un soldat Britannique, le peuple Français donnerait son entière adhésion à son établissement qui, tout au moins dans les circonstances présentes, nécessiterait une intervention armée et revêtirait le caractère d'une invasion étrangère.

Il est donc indispensable de la Métropole et de son Empire il comprendrait, en toute chose, que ce soit le Gouvernement actuel de la France ou ses représentants qui, sous une bannière Allemande et exclusivement Allemande fasse de l'Afrique du Nord cette terre d'exil vers laquelle se tournerait un élan unanime du peuple de tous les Français Métropolitains.

Pour aboutir à ce résultat, l'intervention des Etats-Unis contre la France et l'Angleterre est indispensable. Les intérêts du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis sont plus larges. Si l'on considère l'importance de l'Afrique Atlantique à la fin de cette guerre et surtout plusieurs

L'Angleterre a été le seul état Anglo-Saxon absolument belligerant, elle se trouvera victorieuse et affaiblie, ses relations avec la France seront mauvaises, le souvenir de discordes pénibles ne s'effacera pas de sitôt et quelque soit à ce moment le Gouvernement de la France et son désir de rapprochement il devra tenir compte de l'état d'esprit d'une partie du Pays. Il est à craindre également que l'Angleterre n'accorde pas spontanément à la France les moyens de reconstituer sa puissance. Les Etats-Unis trouveront donc devant eux deux pays affaiblis et désunis.

Dans un deuxième cas, on peut imaginer que les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre ont combattu ensemble et que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas apporté en temps utile les garanties et les promesses d'aide à la France. En ce cas les relations du monde Anglo-Saxon et de la France seront certainement moins bonnes qu'il ne sera nécessaire pour l'établissement d'une paix durable en Europe.

Par contre si les Etats-Unis sont intervenus en temps pour garantir à la France la reconstitution de sa puissance et pour éviter un nouvel incident Franco-Anglais à propos de l'Afrique du Nord, ils auront une base solide pour une amitié continentale inébranlable, car au lendemain de cette guerre l'Angleterre victorieuse mais certainement affaiblie ne peut reconstruire l'Europe à elle seule. Par sa puissance géographique, historique et politique, la France jouera un rôle important dans l'élaboration d'une Europe nouvelle comme dans l'établissement d'une sécurité Atlantique pour les Etats-Unis.

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la forme, l'objet et le moment de l'intervention par le Gouvernement Américain d'une attention particulière.

Il convient de tenir compte d'abord de ne pas prolonger le statu quo le plus longtemps possible en raison de la position géographique du Gouvernement Français et de l'importance de l'Afrique du Nord qui ne peut être abandonnée avec la temps. Les propositions doivent avoir pour but de permettre à la France de se défendre plus facilement et de reconstruire sa puissance. Les Etats-Unis, en intervenant, doivent éviter de revêtir le rôle d'un simple médiateur. Ils doivent être en mesure de garantir à la France la sécurité de son territoire et de lui permettre de reconstruire sa puissance.

