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[illegible]

[illegible] the following message which we have received.

[illegible] Roosevelt, President of the United States, Washington, D.C.

[illegible] the symbol of the [illegible] Indian people, by [illegible] by black and [illegible] the [illegible] and which [illegible] the broad and [illegible] [illegible] by the great American nation in the [illegible] trial.

[illegible] people, Mr. President, appreciate the [illegible] have spoken in their regard and [illegible] for their aid. They [illegible] the [illegible] birth, or the [illegible] people of the United States."

[illegible] text of this message is attached.

William J. Donovan
Director

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[illegible]

[illegible] DI ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTE
DELLE STATI UNITI, [illegible]

"NELLA RICORRENZA [illegible] DI COLORO PER LA
PARTICOLARMENTE [illegible], [illegible] RIVOLUZIONE
IL PROGRESSO E GARE [illegible] DELLA [illegible]

"EL NOME DI GEORGE [illegible] DI [illegible]
MINORE REGIONE [illegible] STATI UNITI,
DOVE CHIAMATI E RICHIAMATI DAL MAGNANIMO [illegible]
E [illegible] DI [illegible] CON [illegible] LA [illegible]
DELLA LOTTA E [illegible] SOLIDARIETÀ DEI STRANIERI [illegible]
ATTUALI, DOLOROSO RICORDO DALLA NOBILE [illegible]
AMERICANA.

"IL POPOLO ITALIANO DI E QUATTO, [illegible]
[illegible] CON LA PAROLA DA LEI DETTE NEI SUOI CONFRONTI [illegible] LA
[illegible] POSSANTUGLIATE A SUO PAESE E DA DI POTER [illegible]
PER LA SUA RIMASCITA E LA' AMICIZIA DEL GRANDE [illegible]
E POPOLO DELLE STATI UNITI."

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Form 19 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 12, 1944

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM CASERTA

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES IN 22552

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION) SI

(FOR INFORMATION) DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, X-2, MEDTO.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—87669-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#7344. 622 to 198. (Translation).

Bonomi message to President.

"His Excellency Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

"On the occasion of Columbus Day, it is particularly gratifying to me, Mr. President, to extend to you the cordial and ardent good wishes of the New Italy.

"The name of Columbus is the concrete symbol of the bonds which unite Italy and the United States, bonds which are today made firmer and more enduring by blood shed together in the fight against our common enemy, and which find glorious renewal in the broad and spontaneous solidarity demonstrated by the great American nation in the present hour of trial.

"The Italian people, Mr. President, appreciate the cordial words which you have spoken in their regard and the steps which you have announced for their aid. They know that they can depend, in this their rebirth, on the friendship of the great free people of the United States."

TOR: 10/12/44 1:32 AM

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE OCTOBER 18 1944 | 14 22/52

FROM CARMATA | PRIORITY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES | SECRET

ACTION: SI

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WOOD, MACRUDER, BIGELOW, W-2

SECRET

FTJ/41 622 TO 100

IGNORI MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT. VERIFY TRANSMISSION BY STATE:

"SCOLL/CUZA FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTE DEGLI STATE UNITI, WASHINGTON, D. C.

"NELLA RICORRENZA DEL GIORNO DI COLOMBO, ME È PARTICOLARMENTE GRADITO, SIGNOR PRESIDENTE, RIVOLGERLE IL FERVIDO E CALDO VOTO AUGURALE DELLA NUOVA ITALIA.

"IL NOME DI COLOMBO È IL SIMBOLO CONCRETO DEI VINCOLI SECOLARI CHE UNISCONO L'ITALIA AGLI STATI UNITI, OGGI CEMENTATI E RINSALDATI DAL SANGUE SPARSO IN COMUNE CONTRO LO STESSO NEMICO E CHE TROVANO LUMINOSA CONFERMA NELLA LARGA E SPONTANEA SOLIDARIETÀ DIMOSTRATACI NELLE ATTUALI DOLOROSE VICENDE DALLA NOBILE NAZIONE NORD AMERICANA.

"IL POPOLO ITALIANO LE È GRATO, SIGNOR PRESIDENTE, DELLE CORDIALI PAROLE DA LEI DETTE NEI SUOI CONFRONTI, DELLE MISURE PREANNUNCIATE A SUO FAVORE E SA DI POTER CONTARE PER LA SUA RINASCITA SULL'AMICITIA DEL GRANDE E LIBERO POPOLO DEGLI STATI UNITI."

SECRET

FILE COPY

TOP: 19/10/44 11:30AM

TELETAR-AUTOGRAPHIC REGISTER CO., HOBOKEN, N. J.

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NAPOLI CONTRO IL TERRORE NAZISTA

(8 Settembre - 1° Ottobre 1943)

È la più interessante e acuta esposizione degli avvenimenti svoltisi in Napoli tra l'8 Settembre e il 1° Ottobre 1943, anche con riguardo ai problemi, economici e militari, della città. Sullo sfondo del quadro spicca il racconto delle QUATTRO GLORIOSE GIORNATE della insurrezione antitedesca, su taluni dei cui episodi le APPENDICI contengono apposite RELAZIONI DI PATRIOTTI. Interessantissimi gli elenchi dei combattenti, con cui s' chiude il volume.

CASA EDITRICE MACHIA - NAPOLI

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Dott. GENNARO CAPOZZI

Venti giorni di terrore

SOMMARIO

La fossa di Katin :: Dal 25 luglio all'8 settembre :: I venti giorni di terrore :: I tre giorni di epopea :: La mia prigionia :: Inno all'avvenire ::

NAPOLI
TIPOGRAFIA "LA FLORIDIANA"
Via F. S. Correra, 243 - Tel. 34-616
1943

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Italy 15,022

FRANCESCO MATRONE

LA CACCIATA DEI TEDESCHI DA SCAFATI



PONTE SUL FIUME SARNO

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SECRET

30 August 1954

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

I would appreciate it very much if you would hand the attached memorandum to the President.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.

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SECRET

[illegible] August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Transmitted herewith is a letter addressed to you by Ivanoe Bonomi, Prime Minister of Italy, dated [illegible] July 1944, which was brought to this country [illegible] by a member of this organization.

[illegible] had enclosing a document entitled "Documents Dealing With Armistice Negotiations" which [illegible] prepared for you by the Italian Government and the following booklets:

[illegible] No. [illegible] contro il Fascismo Militare

[illegible] Venti Giorni di Dittatura

[illegible] La Cronista del Tedeschi [illegible]

Respectfully

C. Dwight Dorton
Acting Director

SECRET

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. Putzell

DATE: 8 August 1944

FROM : W. B. Kantack

SUBJECT: Memorandum for the President

1. The attached materials, which were brought to this country by Mr. Scamporino at the request of Premier Bonomi of Italy, seem to call for a simple memorandum of transmittal to the President, a draft of which is submitted herewith.

2. Since the enclosed report is stated to be a secret and personal matter, it is not believed that any summary of, or reference to, its contents would be in order. Moreover it appears doubtful that any of the points in Mr. Brennan's explanatory memorandum to the Director should be included in the memorandum of transmittal to the President.

3. In connection with these papers, a number of points may require clarification:

a. location of the original of Bonomi's letter;

b. sufficiency of classification of Bonomi's letter and report;

c. propriety of indications that these materials have been handled by OSS, such as the re-typing of report by Italian Section SI, with the words, "Submitted through Italian Section, SI, Office of Strategic Services," appearing on the cover.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachments

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To	Room No.	Date	Initials	Comments
[illegible]	1218			
[illegible]	[illegible]			
Master OSS	[illegible]			

[illegible] be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
[illegible] under each comment.
[illegible] be used in To column.
[illegible] (check mark insufficient) before further routing;
[illegible] taken should be indicated in Comments column.
[illegible] should always be returned to Registry.
[illegible] see separate sheet.

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Italy 65102

Standard Form No. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director, OSS,
Through: Chief, SI.

DATE: July 31, 1944

FROM : Earl Brennan

SECRET

SUBJECT: Communication and Report from Italian Government

I transmit herewith a letter addressed to the President of the United States from Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi, of the Italian Government, a personal and secret report for the President of the United States from Prime Minister Bonomi, and three pamphlets for transmittal to the President of the United States, entitled as follows:

Napoli Contro Il Terrore Nazista
Venti Giorni Di Terrore
La Cacciata Dei Tedeschi Da Scafati

This material has been brought to the United States by the hand of Mr. Vincent Scamporino, Chief of the Italian Section in the Mediterranean Theater. The letter to the President from the Prime Minister is a consequence of communications which were previously exchanged between the President and Marshal Pietro Badoglio. The first of these communications was a letter to the President from the Marshal which was brought to this country from Italy by the hand of General William J. Donovan. Mr. Scamporino and members of my staff in the field have been in constant touch with high ranking officials of the Italian Government. Because of this and following a reply by the President to Badoglio's original message the Marshal addressed a second letter to the President of the United States which was brought to this country by Major John A. Ricca of my staff and subsequently delivered to the President.

Early in May 1944 the President sent a reply to Marshal Badoglio which I quote as follows:

"Your letter of April 3, 1944, informing me that a new government would shortly be formed, reached me just as the first announcement came that a new cabinet comprising representatives of the leading Italian parties had, in fact, been constituted. This is indeed welcome news to the Government and the people of the United States, who earnestly hope that this step will serve to unite the spiritual and physical forces of the nation in the struggle against our common enemy.

"You ask that this event be accompanied by a re-examination of the armistice terms. Any revision of the terms, of course, could come about only after consultation with the military authorities and as a result of concerted

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SECRET

action among the Allied Governments. The matter is, however, receiving my full consideration. The American people are not insensible to the peculiar moral tragedy of Italy's situation, nor am I insensible to the grave difficulties which beset the Italian Government.

"May I meanwhile speak again with that frankness which my countrymen and yours prefer? Now that Italy has moved in the direction of truly democratic government, public opinion in the United States is watching earnestly for clear evidence that the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invader from their soil and contribute to that common victory which Italy's defection under Fascism rendered so much costlier. I know that all Italian patriots share the feeling of the peoples of the United Nations that it is for the Italians themselves to prove that they do not seek spurious rehabilitation through external acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts. Every sign that Italy has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibilities and has aligned herself in deed and spirit with those who fight for the triumph of humanity will, I am sure, be received with genuine sympathy by the peoples of all the United Nations."

The final sentence of the message quoted above was interpreted by the Italian Government as an indication that the President of the United States would be pleased to receive from the Government of Italy evidence that Italy is herself shouldering the responsibility and sharing the fight to drive Fascism and Axis armies out of the country.

In consequence of this the attached report of the Italian Government was prepared for submission to the President.

The letter to the President makes reference to the report and indicates that it is Prime Minister Bonomi's wish that it be treated by the President as a personal and most secret message.

Attached hereto for your files you will also find a photostatic copy of the letter to the President, a translation of the letter, a copy of the report of the Italian Government, and an extra copy of each of the three pamphlets mentioned above.

E.B.

Attachments as described above

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The Director, OSS,
Through: Chief, SI.

July 13, 1944

Carl Bradman

SECRET

Transmission and Report from Italian Government.

I transmit herewith a letter addressed to the President of the United States from Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi, of the Italian Government, a personal and secret report for the President of the United States from Prime Minister Bonomi, and three pamphlets for transmittal to the President of the United States, entitled as follows:

Napoli Centro Di Tenrero Mondiale
Venti Mesi Di Terrore
La Carolata Del Tedeschi Da Scafati

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"You ask that this event be accompanied by a reexamination of the armistice terms. Any revision of the terms, of course, could come about only after consultation with the military authorities and as a result of concerted

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SECRET

The Minister, OSS, #2 July 31, 1944

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May I accordingly speak again with that frankness which my country and you expect? For that Italy has moved in the direction of truly democratic government, public opinion in the United States is watching earnestly for clear evidence that the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invader from their soil and contribute to that common victory which Italy's participation under Fascism rendered so much costlier. I know that all Italian patriots share the feeling of the peoples of the United Nations that it is for the Italians themselves to prove that they do not seek spurious rehabilitation through internal acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts. Every sign that Italy has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibilities and has aligned herself in deed and spirit with those who fight for the triumph of humanity will, I am sure, be received with genuine sympathy by the peoples of all the United Nations."

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Attached hereto for your files you will also find a photostatic copy of the letter to the President, a translation of the letter, a copy of the report of the Italian Government, and an extra copy of each of the three pamphlets mentioned above.

E.H.

Attachments as described above

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Italy 15022

SECRET

Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri

Salerno, 2 July 1944

Mr. President,

Ever since the very first days of my advent to the government it has been my intention to contact you directly, to express, above all, the vivid and profound sense of solidarity and admiration with which Italian democracy, living once again today after so many years of silence, follows your activity and your work.

If I do so at this time, though a few weeks have elapsed since the formation of the new government, I am hoping that you will be so kind as to attribute it both to my reluctance to deprive you of some of your time, more precious now than ever, and to my desire to wait for a propitious occasion, which presents itself only today, permitting me to write directly to you in a more lengthy manner than could be accomplished by a mere telegram.

You know that today my government is composed exclusively of men absolutely free from any fascist contamination, of the most authorized and representative exponents of the six Italian political parties, that is, of men with deep conviction and profound sincerity, all of whom are capable of bringing Italy back to the road of her best liberal and democratic traditions, for which, in fact, they have lived and suffered for twenty years.

All these men are counting a great deal upon your support and assistance. They are all perfectly aware of the fact that no one can be more disinterestedly close to them in this, our effort of material and spiritual reconstruction and elevation of the country, than the President of the great and free North American Republic.

They turn, therefore, to you, with great faith and great hope.

I do not wish to tell you that the conditions given to Italy at the time of the Armistice were unjust. I simply want to mention to you that almost a year after the Armistice, and with an Italy so transformed, these still prevailing conditions are becoming progressively graver and therefore more unjust.

Why is it that, on the one hand, we are not allowed to participate with our own forces in the liberation of our national territory from German oppression as we would like to do, as we could do and as would be morally necessary for us to do; and why, on the other hand, is that free development of our democratic life, the very condition of our salvation, denied us with excessive controls, excessive interference and excessive burden of occupation.

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In these last few days, with the help of my old friend Marshal Badoglio, I have prepared a summary in the form of a document which I am forwarding to you by a personal and secret means. This document points out the greatest difficulties, the stumbling blocks and the gravest obstacles which we have found in our path during these eight months of co-belligerency. It is an elaborate document based upon data and material for the most part official but nevertheless unpublished.

I trust you will be able to peruse it and have it studied by your subordinates in a more thorough manner. Above all, I trust that you will be able to find in it, the incentive and the inspiration for a gesture and an initiative of human generosity which would give, to the new Italian democracy, the feeling that fascism is as dead internationally as it is dead in the hearts of the Italians, and which would finally allow us that determination and that impetus, devoid of humiliation and impotence, which we need so much in order to meet, with greater energy, the difficult tasks that await us.

The enthusiasm with which the North American troops have been received in Rome has certainly conveyed to you, more than any affirmation on my part, the spirit and fervor with which a people of 45 million souls looks to the United States and to its President. The Italian people have undergone indescribable sufferings and will continue to suffer. However, they are a sane, honest and solid people to whom credit can be given. Their activity and industriousness will be necessary to the reconstruction of Europe. Every aid and assistance which will be given them in this dark hour will certainly be a constructive deed towards the free world of tomorrow.

I repeat, Mr. President, that the free men who today govern Italy look to you with great faith and great hope.

In conclusion, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what admiration we follow, in these days, the gigantic effort directed by you which has brought North American troops to French soil and with what complete solidarity, Mr. President, we send you our most cordial and warm best wishes.

I beg you to believe in my sincerest sentiments.

/s/ Ivanoe Bonomi

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A Sua Eccellenza

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America

Washington, D.C.

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I l P r e s i d e n t e
d e l S e n a t o d e l R e g n o d i S i c i l i a

Palermo, li 2 [illegible] 1944

Signor Presidente,

Desiderava sin dai primi giorni del mio avvento al potere mettermi in diretto contatto con Lei per dirle sopratutto il mio e profondo senso di solidarietà e di ammirazione con la democrazia italiana, che oggi rivive dopo tanti anni di eclissi, seguendo la sua politica e la sua opera.

Se la Sicilia soltanto ora è lieta di qualche avvenimento dalla Repubblica del vero Governo, Ella, Signor Presidente, sin nella sua lontananza e partecipa sin anche quei momenti del suo tempo oggi più che mai preziosi, sia al desiderio di attendere una decisione precisa, che ogni istante si è presentata, che si consolidano di conseguenza direttamente in termini più rispettivi che non in un semplice telegramma.

Ella sa che il mio devoto e oggi compiuto entusiasmo di uomini assolutamente pari da ogni contaminazione fascista, degli esponenti più autorizzati e rappresentativi dei sei partiti politici italiani, uomini cioè che intendono tutti, con profonda convinzione e profonda sincerità, riportare l'Italia sulla via maestra delle sue migliori tradizioni liberali e democratiche e per tutto ciò hanno infatti per vent'anni vissuto e sofferto.

Sua Eccellenza
Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America

Washington, D.C.

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Confido che Ella possa scorrerlo rapidamente e farlo esami= nare dai Suoi uffici in modo piu' approfondito. Confido soprattut= to ch'Ella possa trovarvi lo spunto e l'ispirazione per un gesto e una iniziativa di umana generosita' che dia alla nuova democra= zia italiana la sensazione che il fascismo e' anche internazio= nalmente morto come e' morto nel cuore degli Italiani e ci consen= ta finalmente quella spinta e quell'avvio, fuor dall'umiliazione e dall'impotenza, di cui abbiamo bisogno per affrontare con maggior energia i duri compiti che ci attendono.

L'entusiasmo con cui le truppe Nordamericane sono state accolte a Roma Le hanno certamente detto piu' di ogni altra mia affermazione con quale animo e con quale fervore un popolo di 45 milioni di uomini guarda verso gli Stati Uniti ed il suo Presidente. Il popolo italiano ha indicibilmente sofferto e soffrira' ancora, ma e' un popolo sano, onesto e solido, cui si puo' far credito. La sua atti= vita' ed operosita' saranno necessarie alla ricostruzione europea. Ogni aiuto ed assistenza che gli saranno dati in quest'ora grigia sono certamente un atto costruttivo verso il libero mondo di domm= ni.

Io Le ripeto, Signor Presidente, che gli uomini liberi che sono oggi al Governo d'Italia, guardano verso di Lei con molta fede e molta speranza.

Ed è, concludendo, superfluo io Le dica con quanta ammirazione noi seguiamo in questi giorni il gigantesco sforzo da Lei diretto che ha portato le truppe Nordamericane sul territorio francese e

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con quale completa solidarietà le inviamo, Signor Presidente, i nostri più cordiali e caldi voti augurali.

La prego di gradire i miei sentimenti migliori.

Dirett. Sandri

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ITALY

DEVELOPMENTS DATING FROM ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

(Official Italian Government Report for the President of the United States.)

12 June 1944

Prepared in English by the Italian Government.

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SECRET

[illegible]

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5. Civilian Population " 7

5. Navy and Air Force " 13

6. [illegible] " 23

7. [illegible] " 17

[illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] All democratically minded persons and parties in the world agree with the high and noble ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter. The essentially evil of the Axis Powers has sought of keeping the people of their nations and world under the dictatorship of Nazi and Fascist power to stamp out the rebellion.

Before the overthrow of Fascism in Italy on July 25, 1943 and long before the formulation of the Atlantic Charter there were numerous persons in and out of Italy who sought to bring it and to remove dictatorships. Many of these were executed, many went to prison, many remained in their native country, many fled in exile even to the United States where they continued their battle against Fascism. Some of these Italian exiles are now in the present Italian government and are working arduously for the reconstruction of Italy.

In addition to the Atlantic Charter, many later statements and proclamations were made by the leaders of the Allied Powers which encouraged the Italian people to believe they would be treated with mercy if they would throw off the Fascist yoke. In his radio address of February 12, 1943 President Roosevelt stated:

> "In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty, barbaric leaders."

On July 17, 1943 during the invasion of Sicily a message was broadcast to the Italian people from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in which it was stated:

> "The sole hope for Italy's survival lies in honorable capitulation to the overwhelming power of the military forces of the United Nations. [illegible] All your interests and all your traditions have been betrayed by Nazi Germany and your own false and corrupt leaders; it is only by destroying both that a reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy a respected place in the family of European nations. The time has now come for you, the Italian people, to demonstrate your own self-respect and your own determination for a restoration of national dignity, security, and peace. The time has come for you to decide whether Italians shall die for Mussolini and Hitler - or live for Italy and for civilization."

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[illegible] Italian people [illegible]

[illegible] Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower, [illegible] on July 30, 1943, broadcast the following message:

> "[illegible] the Italian people and the [illegible] dare, [illegible] themselves or [illegible], [illegible] Hitler and throwing [illegible] to the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] people from [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible]

2. The first act of the new government constituted under the Vice-Roy of Marshal Badoglio after the fall of Fascism was to shelve and dissolve the Fascist Grand Council in order to prevent the Fascist leaders from rebuilding control of the movements by a vote of the Council. Several plots hatched by German partisans were discovered and immediately crushed out. The new government dissolved Fascism including the Fascist Party, the Fascist Grand Council, the Fascist Chamber of the Fasci and Corporations and the Fascist Militia. It proceeded to arrest all the principal Fascist leaders and it removed from office fifty provincial prefects (head of provinces) and put in their places trusted officials. It also removed from office the Fascists who held the top positions in governmental and semi-governmental agencies.

The foremost desire of the new government was to bring about a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment. Missions were dispatched to Lisbon and Madrid where on August 4th and 5th, 1943, they contacted Allied representatives. They pointed out the danger of a German occupation of Italy. They gave full and detailed information on the strength and disposition of German forces, and warned the Allies that these forces were constantly increasing. They stressed the fact that time was short and that this first contact should be considered by the Allies as an earnest and sincere endeavor to bring about as speedily as possible the conditions necessary for Italy's getting out of the war.

On August 13, 1943 our representative at Tangiers, Signor Berio, was given by the local British Consul General, Cancellara, the following message:

> "The following message is sent by the governments of Great Britain and of the United States of America. It is necessary that Marshal Badoglio understand that we cannot negotiate but require unconditional surrender. This means that the Italian government must place itself at the disposal of the two Allied governments which would later advise it of their terms. Call Signor Berio's attention to the fact that the two heads of the two governments have clearly expressed their desire that Italy have a respected place in the new Europe as soon as the conflict is over and Gen. Eisenhower has already assured that the Italian prisoners in Tunisia and Sicily shall be released on condition

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that the same thing will be done to all those [illegible]."

Consequently General Castellano was sent to Lisbon to confer with the Allied Military Authorities arriving on August 16, 1943. In that interim as a result of the persistent lack of an government (which had incurred the rabid hatred of Hitler) the Germans had been moving into Italy many divisions of troops. The new government could do practically nothing to counteract the Germans for the reason that Marshal Badoglio as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Nation had dispersed almost all the Italian divisions outside of Italy, so that 36 divisions were beyond the territory of the Italian mainland and only 12 reduced and badly armed ones were in the Italian homeground.

On August 19 negotiations were started with General Castellano at great personal risks to all those involved. In negotiating for the armistice the Italian representatives offered not only a surrender of their country's armed forces, but asked that they be permitted to fight in coordination with the Allied invasion of the Italian mainland so that the German army could be driven out of Italy with the least possible delay. It was pointed out that unless this were done Italy would become a battleground and it would then be much more difficult to drive the Germans out of the country. Speaking about this to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943 Prime Minister Churchill said that General Castellano,

> "... did not oppose these (military) terms, drastic though they were, but he replied that the purpose of his visit was to discuss how Italy could join the United Nations in the war against Germany. He also asked how the terms could be executed in the face of German opposition. The British and American officers replied that they were empowered to discuss only unconditional surrender."

The Allied representatives were also informed that unless Marshal Badoglio were given a few days advance notice of the date of the publication of the armistice he would not be able to give the proper and necessary orders to his armed forces to resist and even fight the German forces. The Marshal could not give orders too far in advance of such a date for fear of a leak that would give the Germans a pretext for seizing the country. Marshal Badoglio was not

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advised that the armistice was going to be announced in a few weeks a few hours before 6:30 p.m. o'clock on September 8, 1943, was less at which he was ordered by the Allied High Command to announce it to the Italian people. Badoglio, of course, did not give him or that time enough to leave the necessary orders to his troops and brought about the now well-known disastrous consequences to Italy and to his military forces located on other fronts. In speaking of this phase of the matter to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill stated:

> "We did not doubt the sincerity of the army and of his government, but we were not able to reveal our military plans for the invasion of Italy, or, as it and our hopes, the liberation of Italy. The real difficulty was that the Italians were powerless until we landed in strength, and we could not give them the date."

But in spite of all the difficulties that the time presented, a great deal was done to aid the Allied forces on their landings and subsequent battles to oust the Germans. Without regard to its own personal safety and though it meant the refusal of help probably desired for the defense of Rome, the new government advised against the landing of an American division of parachute troops at Rome, as had been planned by the Allied Command, for the reason that the Germans had subsequently taken control of all airfields. The Italian authorities concentrated all available forces for the protection of Rome. As a result of the fighting done by these troops during several days after the proclamation of the Armistice the Germans were kept from occupying the city and were compelled to maintain outside the perimeter a large number of troops, including one armored and one paratroop division, which otherwise could have been used to resist the Allied landings at Salerno. In his speech of September 21, 1943, Prime Minister Churchill said:

> "We would have done more had it been possible to help this unhappy Government who were beset on every side by insoluble problems and who have since acted towards us to the best of their ability with both courage and good faith."

The Italian government accepted the armistice terms although it knew full well it would mean the continuation of

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hostilities on Italian soil. Until assumed obligation it was willing to assure because it desired above all to contribute to the destruction of German tyranny.

THAT WHICH HAPPENED

3. The armistice was signed and now the whole of Italy had become a battle-ground. Let us examine the obligations that Italy assumed by virtue of the armistice. According to its strict terms Italy was to surrender its armed forces on land, sea and air and to permit occupation of its territory for Allied military operations. All this it has done completely, fully and willingly. Although not required by the Armistice terms and although the Italian government had no means of communication with its troops scattered in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and other territories, nevertheless most of these troops spontaneously fought the Germans wherever and however they could. This was fully recognized by Prime Minister Churchill, speaking to the House of Commons on September 21, 1943:

> "... The Italian forces and population have everywhere shown themselves unfriendly or actively hostile to the Germans. They have everywhere shown themselves anxious to obey, as far as in their power, the orders of the King of Italy's new government. Every effort has been made, both by that Government and its forces to comply with the armistice conditions. Fighting has taken place at many points between the Italians and the German intruders. There is no doubt whatever on which side the sympathy, hopes and efforts of the Italian Nation now lie. In Sardinia, for instance, which a little while ago was considered a major prize in itself, four Italian divisions have driven out the German garrison.... The French have landed in Corsica and aided by the Italian garrison and all the Frenchmen and Corsicans, are actively attacking the Germans... The fight in Zante harbour was conducted by Italian destroyers and a British submarine, all of whom united in shelling the Germans and driving them out of the place."

But also on the Italian mainland the comparatively few Italian troops left there fought as long as they could against overwhelmingly stronger and better armed German forces. For instance:

1. At Torino the TORINO division under General

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[illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible]

7. In the region north of [illegible] the 1[illegible] division crossed the [illegible] to withdraw they fought their way to the [illegible] very painfully fought [illegible].

8. At Anzio Picnic all Italian [illegible] under the leadership of [illegible] fought [illegible] and [illegible] as breaking the siege and reached the [illegible] are still fighting.

9. Italian troops for the defense of [illegible] every from the city for several days, fighting [illegible] hard in the [illegible] and [illegible] at [illegible] Italian casualties were very high.

10. Many German forces were [illegible] and Central Italy by the presence of Italian [illegible] threatened and disrupted their lines of communication, and by the open hostilities of the Italian peninsula.

11. Many local [illegible] and [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] and numerous [illegible] were turned over immediately to the Allies and were initially protected by Italian [illegible] against the Germans. Two Italian divisions and other [illegible] assisted in the Allied military operations in Italy [illegible] contingents of the Italian Air Force aided in the [illegible] [illegible]. All were facilitated the landing of more [illegible] and materiel on the [illegible] as was [illegible].

12. In the [illegible] pursuants the [illegible] vigorously fought from the very first moment. [illegible] Allied troops, participating with them in the first phase of advance toward the Gruppo line until [illegible] to cease fighting by the Allied High Command.

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[illegible]

[illegible] "in the opinion of the [illegible] Italians." In this region [illegible] can only succeed in [illegible] the German [illegible] to turn against [illegible] for the purpose of [illegible] along the Adriatic coast. It is to be hoped that Allied landings will be made shortly. By doing so, many divisions will get the [illegible] of an early retreat to the northern [illegible] and are still fighting at this moment, although [illegible] can be [illegible] by the Italian Government. [illegible]

1. The FERRARA division, [illegible] and [illegible] divisions, and other [illegible], including the ROMA Cavalry Regiment, [illegible] the Germans in Greece and later joined the [illegible] partisans. Some 2000 Alpine troops, [illegible] in the MONTENEGRO Group fought their way to the mountains of Spirit where they are still [illegible] the Germans.
2. The PUGLIA, FIRENZE and [illegible] divisions fought against the Germans in Albania. Later the [illegible] of the FIRENZE, part of the [illegible] division and the MONTEBARO Cavalry Regiment retreated to the mountains where they continued to fight.
3. The [illegible], PUGLIA and [illegible] divisions and various minor contingents fought the Germans in Herzegovina and Montenegro. The [illegible] of the PUGLIA and part of the [illegible] later fought their way to the mountains where they joined the partisan forces of Marshal Tito.
4. The ACQUI division defended Cattaro and Dalmatia for fifteen days against overwhelming forces. The Italian garrison did not receive any supplies and naval and air support, in spite of repeated requests by the Italian High Command to be permitted to send Italian ships and aircraft to help them. But even it was already too late and the Allied Military Mission authorized the sending of a few Italian airplanes and torpedo-boats. The Italian garrison fought to the last. The few survivors, including the Commander, General Gentile, were all executed by the Germans.
5. The [illegible] division at Cattaro and the [illegible] at Spalato, which unsupported and not receiving any supplies, fought the Germans as long as they could and many officers were later executed. Part of these divisions and also of the [illegible] and [illegible] divisions succeeded in reaching the mountains where they joined Tito's forces.

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[illegible]

All of the foregoing statements were done by the local commanders, and their image as their own initiative and responsibility. We seem legend doubt that the Italian people are strongly and passionately resolved to drive the invaders from their soil.

Later the Allied Command ordered that all operational activities in the Italian peninsula by Italian troops were to cease until the concerns of war orders.

4. No less important is the part played by the civilian population of Italy in driving the German air of several cities in the south and in resisting them in the north, where for many months civilian villages and even comparatively large cities like Genoa and Turin, had to bear a few, but the German army through the evacuation efforts of their officers.

The bomb flashing that was done by the civilian population of Naples and its surrounding will go down in history as one of the most glorious contributions made by the Italian people in their resolution "to drive the invader from their soil". One should bear in mind that these people had been subjected to about 120 air bombardments by the Allied Air Force, one of these taking place after the signing of the armistice. Nevertheless, in spite of all the suffering and terror that this population had undergone it rose as one man to drive the hated German from its soil when the moment of liberation was at hand. Let us not forget also, that a civilian population under international law has no right to engage

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in conflict with or against either side, as the case might, and by doing so it took its life into its own hands.

The press of the world has already reported how the men, women and children of Naples fought the Nazis for five days, violently, and to the death, with whatever weapons they could lay their hands on in order to liberate their city. Even acts as heroic as by the German tanks by hand grenades and improvised explosives not only proves the undaunted heroism of these unfettered civilians, but also caused such havoc and confusion among the German forces that they fled from the city. This precipitous flight prevented the Germans from carrying out their nefarious plans of wholesale destruction of the city to render it uninhabitable for the Allied troops. And they did such a thorough job of it that when the Allied troops entered Naples there was not a German soldier remaining in the city, and the Allied troops were greeted and welcomed at 11:00 A.M. on October 1, 1943 by two Italian patriots who had gone beyond the limits of the city to meet them.

Many of the citizens were killed and wounded in this struggle, the details of which are vividly and accurately told in two booklets which are enclosed, namely: "Napoli Contro Il Terrore Nazista" by Corrado Barbagallo, one of Italy's outstanding historians, and "Venti Giorni Di Terrore" by Dott. Gennaro Capasso.

Enclosed also is a booklet entitled "La Cassata dei Tedeschi da Scafati" by Francesco Matrone, an inhabitant of Scafati, which is a small industrial city on the river Sarno between Naples and Salerno. It describes in what manner a courageous band of citizens aided the Allied troops in preventing the Germans from blowing up an important highway bridge and in driving them out of their city. May we refer only to the written testimonial of a British officer which appears on page 26 of the booklet:

> "This note is to say that the following people assisted the British troops during the battle of Scafati, 29 September 1943. They were very helpful indeed in guiding the troops down side streets and alleyways under fire in the town which helped to outwit the Germans."

This spontaneous and valorous aid by the civilians of

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[illegible] by the Germans the last week of the night of September 23 and 24 [illegible] by the Allies, Genoa [illegible] Allied troops made contact [illegible] the population of the Republic was encouraged to [illegible]

[illegible] resistance to German occupation was [illegible] also in the Middle [illegible] Germans attacked in many [illegible] by these improvised [illegible] private [illegible] is truly remarkable.

It must also be mentioned that fighting on such a large scale by civilians in large cities has not been [illegible] as far in any part of Western Europe during the present war.

1. At Turin the civilian population and especially the industrial workers [illegible] on German troops attacking the city and resisted their advance through sheer heroism, fighting from house to house. Casualties were very high on both sides.
2. In all Lombardy, but especially at Milan and Pavia, civilians fired on the retreating German troops and forced them to engage in combat before leaving the city.
3. Throughout the Po Valley region, civilians fired on German troops, with heavy casualties on both sides.
4. In Venetia, especially in Venice, Treviso and Gorizia the civilian population took arms from military depots and opposed German occupation.
5. At Leghorn (in the Tuscan region) the whole population fought the Germans. When reinforcements arrived the Germans stormed the town and in revenge destroyed it completely with a heavy bombardment.
6. At Montecatini (Tuscany) a band of civilians who had attacked German troops were killed to the last man after prolonged combat.

These are only a few of the many episodes of civilian defiance and bravery which took place in the days immediately following the proclamation of the Armistice. Others will be known later when, after the liberation of Italy, people from the countless villages and towns who desperately resisted the Germans in those epic days and later joined the patriotic bands in the mountains will be able to give a full account of that entirely new chapter.

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5. A very important contribution to the Allied cause was that made by the Italian Fleet, which not only faithfully executed the terms of the Armistice but went quite beyond that by becoming an active co-belligerent of the Allied Fleet. Practically the whole of the Italian Fleet followed the footsteps of the Royal Government. From its first days it fought and is still fighting the Germans. Even the gunboat ELTORE which at the time of the publication of the Armistice was in a Japanese port, succeeded in escaping from the Inland sea of Japan to Ceylon - an unprecedented feat which clearly showed an unflinching determination to fight the common enemy.

In his interview of September 13, 1943 Gen. Eisenhower stated:

> "If the conditions of the armistice gave to the Allies nothing more of an effective nature beyond the control of the Italian Fleet, this fact alone justifies it... Only light naval forces are now needed in the Mediterranean."

This was recognized frankly by Prime Minister Churchill (House of Commons, September 21, 1943):

> "Practically the whole of the Italian Navy and many many merchant ships and many submarines have under conditions of great risk strictly executed the conditions of the Armistice and made their way to Malta or other ports under British control. This event has decisively altered the naval balances of the world."

There was no obligation under the Armistice for our Navy to render combat or escort services to the Allies, but this was willingly and spontaneously done from the very first moment by the Italian Navy.

For instance:

> 1. There were encounters between the Italian Navy and the Germans in the Tyrrhenian Sea in which the 35,000 ton battleship ROMA was lost. German losses were also very severe in these encounters.
> 2. Near Gorgona Island Italian patrol boats attacked a group of German torpedo-boats inflicting upon them severe losses and damage.
> 3. In the waters of Porto Ferraio the Italian corvettes POLLA, APE and COMMANDO attacked German units which were forced to escape.

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4. [illegible] (Sicilian) the Italian [illegible] allowed a group of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 5. Italian fighters took part in the fight to [illegible] Germany.
5. At Pontine a [illegible] German factory fired on [illegible] and [illegible].

On September 11, 1943 two Ju 52 planes were still left on the Italian Air Force. These immediately took part in evacuating German troops retreating from the Salerno peninsula, and later on September 17, Italian bombers attacked German naval units at Porto di Brindisi.

From September 15 up to the fall of Corfu and Cephalonia the Italian air force made a gallant attempt to assist the Italian garrison there. Fighters and pursuit planes engaged in strafing enemy personnel bombing actions. Thirty German planes were destroyed in combat and some Italian personnel killed during these actions.

ACCEPTANCE OF ARMISTICE TERMS

6. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the time of the Quebec Conference in the document supplementary to the clauses of the short armistice of September 3, 1943 had stated that:

> "The conditions of the Armistice do not contemplate the active assistance by Italy in the fight against the Germans. Their coordination in favour of Italy will depend upon the aid given by the Government and people of Italy to the United Nations against Germany during the rest of the war."

The Italian Government had faith that the importance of the Italian contribution to the cause of freedom would be fully appreciated by Allied leaders. Not only had Prime Minister Churchill made open acknowledgement of it in his speech of September 21, 1943 quoted above, but Marshal Badoglio had received from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill the following letter dated September 11, 1943:

> "Marshal,
> It has fallen to you in the hour of your country's agony to take the first firm step to win peace and freedom for the Italian people and to win back for Italy an honourable place in the civilisation of Europe....The German terror in Italy will not last long. They will be extirpated from your land and you, by helping in this great

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> Rome as liberators, will find [illegible] more than the important and big general friends of your country from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged. Take your chance now and, strike hard and strike home. Take full in your hands, all will come well. We'll forget [illegible] your [illegible] and [illegible] in the great world movement towards liberty, justice and peace."

To this message General Badoglio has largely responded.

> "All that which is possible in [illegible] will be done with this same spirit and with that same unanimity that we displayed together on the fields of battle in Italy and France during the last great war..."

He also gave assurance that the Italian people

> "who long, at the price of extreme sacrifices, for the arrival of liberty and peace with justice, shall not fail to do their duty courageously - their fullest duty on this occasion. We shall not be lacking in faith and we shall march together with you, our American and British friends."

"We're not asking or expecting for the time being the fulfillment of the promises contained in the Quebec document as to the modification of the armistice terms in proportion to the aid already given by the Italian Government and people to the United Nations against Germany, on the other hand the Italian Government hoped there would not be an aggravation of the armistice terms.

On September 29 Marshal Badoglio went to Malta intending to submit to Gen. Eisenhower plans as to the best use to be made of Italian resources for the prosecution of the fight against Germany. He also expected to sign the political, economic and financial clauses of the armistice in pursuance to Article 12 of the Armistice of September 3 which provided:

"Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a future date." At Malta Marshal Badoglio was presented instead with a wholly different supplemental document containing not only 'conditions of a political, economical and financial nature' but military conditions as well, many of them much harsher than those of the original military armistice of September 3rd. The reason he was given for the presentation of this new document was that "it is convenient that the terms of a military nature and the main other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature should... be contained in one document' but this was

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stated to be primarily predicated on the personal attitude of the Generalissimo of September 3, 1943.

At only one time did Marshal Badoglio [illegible] which did not appear in the minutes of September 3rd were inserted in the new document.

Marshal Badoglio felt that he was not bound, in view of [illegible], by one of the final provisions of Surrender and to accept this unfortunate supplemental clause, felt he necessary to give it in order to prove that any failure whatsoever to cooperate with Allied Control Commission would be used against him. However, he objected to the clause "unconditionally" which he considered "exceedingly injurious to the good name of the new Italy and prejudicial, in my opinion, to the common cause which I most fully intended and do intend to uphold with every means at my disposal." General Eisenhower undertook to represent to the Allied Governments Marshal Badoglio's viewpoint.

When presenting the new unconditional armistice terms to Marshal Badoglio at Malta, General Eisenhower also urged the Italian Government formally to declare war on Germany. As it has already been shown the Italian Armed Forces and civilian population had not waited for this suggestion to start fighting the Germans. However, the Italian Government felt that in view of its precarious situation and limited control over so small a portion of the national territory an early declaration of war was inopportune.

Bitu, of course, was again asking the Italian Government to go beyond the exact terms of the Armistice and do a positive act against the German State. As a result of the Malta Conference the Italian Government declared war on Germany on October 13, 1943.

Following upon his remonstrances to General Eisenhower, on October 17, 1943 Marshal Badoglio was informed by General Taylor of the Allied Military Mission

> "that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the document containing the long Armistice terms which you declared. A supplementary document in the form of a Protocol embodying these amendments is being forwarded to me by General Eisenhower and immediately upon receipt I will communicate it to Your Excellency for signature."

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On November 3, 1943 General Castellano was informed, with the Italian Armistice only two weeks old, that Italy, [illegible] and unconditionally, will [illegible] in the war against Germany [illegible] put in a different order. Moreover the office is not required and [illegible] conditioned upon the assistance in Italy of a new naval supplemental agreement specifically [illegible] the burden and obligations already assumed by Italy as [illegible] 1943 in the agreement between the Italian Navy Minister and Admiral Cunningham and the Navy Department-[illegible] Admiral Cunningham.

Marshal Badoglio will again concentrate on a further approximation of the terms of the Armistice and the new naval supplemental agreement was signed by Admiral Ie Cuoco on November 17, 1943. As the army was learned, Badoglio asked for reconsideration of this document on the basis of a modification proposed by Italy but to date no action has yet been taken on this.

On November 17, 1943 General Badoglio wrote to President Roosevelt a letter in which he said:

> "The instrument signed on my account by General Castellano on the 29th of September did not contain any clause that mentioned surrender on the part of Italy. As you know, the clauses were mainly military. I was told that that additional clauses, but only of non-military nature, would be presented to me later. The 29th of September, then, we had already loyally carried out all the armistice conditions and when the phase of actual collaboration had already begun with the full approval of the Military Mission, I was obliged to sign at Malta the additional clauses which claimed for the second the conditions of the armistice signed on September 3rd and which contained the title "unconditional surrender by Italy".
>
> Following my representations, Gen. [illegible] to represent to the Allied governments the [illegible] my disagreement and to propose to them [illegible] various phases mentioned, [illegible] the map Italy and practically [illegible] common sense which I must firmly [illegible] to uphold with every sense of [illegible]
>
> [illegible] and in spite of [illegible] and free communication to [illegible] more given to my [illegible] expressed, but only [illegible] did not wait in the first [illegible] with the secret clauses. The first [illegible] question was discussed fully and [illegible] Commission had admired the Courtesy [illegible] mutually agreed upon.

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[illegible] I have been prepared [illegible] the [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] by the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible]

[illegible] the Government of Italy [illegible] the Allied Nations."

Now Italy's new role in the war, which is right enough, has not been signed in pursuance of the Armistice terms of [illegible] nor of other agreements with the Allied Powers, but was a unilateral decision of the Italian government following the spectacular rising of the people and armed forces of the country after the publication of the armistice on September 8, 1943.

So the Allied Control Commission, as we under the mandate to supervise the execution of the terms, has not been in agreement to help Italy in her new role in the war, a role - let us stress it once more - that was not contemplated in the Armistice and could hardly be reconciled with the provisions of that document. In fact the supplemental Armistice terms had been devised as a method of paralyzing an enemy by depriving him of any possibility of turning the Allied forces. However, now that Italy had become an actual co-belligerent in the common fight against Germany, the Armistice and its supplements in the manner they were applied became a paralyzing and restrictive device, preventing Italy in a thousand ways from exerting "an effective instrument of war against Germany" and hampering the Italian Government, in spite of its efforts and good will, in its attempts "to produce tangible results" and "to prove its value to the United Nations".

Gen. Eisenhower had already stated in his letter to General Ambrosio of September 29, 1943: "It is fully recognized by the Governments on whose behalf I am acting that these [Armistice] terms are in some respects superseded by subsequent events and that several of the clauses have become obsolescent or have already been put into abeyance. It is understood that the terms both of this document (the Armistice of September 29) and of the Short Military Armistice of September 3rd may be modified from time to time if

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military necessity by the [illegible] of the Italian government, indicates that it [illegible].

Several of these militarisms, which military necessity and the [illegible] of Italian administration during the previous two months indicated as clearly mistaken, the A.M.G. set up. The new head of the new agency was really a Portuguese [illegible] who did not tend to strengthen the Italian Government's prestige in Rome and abroad and to encourage the Italian people. (It is this [illegible] had been in really only a "[illegible] Military Mission".) In the Italian language, in any case, the word "control" does not suggest guidance and co-operation toward a common end, but rather suggests, therefore, that there was a limitation instead of encouragement to greater effort.

As the A.M.G.'s authority to control from the Armistice, the A.C.C. started to apply the same in the [illegible] way. That was intended to be merely a special of military and economic activities but soon became increasing interference in all details of Italian life, even in the political field. A political division of A.C.C. was immediately formed. The various sub-commissions of A.C.C. [illegible] not only to control but to do things of their own often at cross-purposes with each other. It is a well-known fact that bureaucratic agencies have a tendency to expand in order to justify their existence and importance. This coming on top of regulations made by military authorities, practically independent of A.C.C., and by A.M.G. officials, rendered impossible any initiative by the Italian government to marshal the energetic forces of the nation to intensify the war efforts against Germany. Even in the provinces under Italian administration any minor Allied official could block and offset measures adopted by the highest Italian authorities.

Though the best relationship and co-operation always existed between the Chief Commissioner (at first General Joyce and later Gen. Macfarlane) and Marshal Badoglio and though some of the A.M.G. personnel were efficient, able, approaching their [illegible] task in the right spirit, others were inexperienced in and unacquainted with the nature of their job. Others loved themselves

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[illegible] military [illegible] allies of peace is a [illegible] quality in the [illegible] of a modern civilization of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] were not created by Fascist [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of the Italian [illegible] habits and traditions [illegible] [illegible] years and the [illegible] were [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] history. [illegible] to blame the Italian people as being lazy, [illegible] and [illegible], while the whole world [illegible], as evidenced in the United States, that Italian ingenuity and industry were contributed everywhere to be an [illegible] of the human race.

The danger of all this and its disastrous consequences for Italy and for the Allied cause were clearly recognized by [illegible] Advisory Council for Italy which as early as last January recommended restitution to the Italian Government of the provinces under A.M.G. As a result of this recommendation, A.M.G. commenced to narrow the scope of AMGOT activity and on February 11, 1944, the Italian Government resumed authority over the liberated provinces, thereby now over Naples and the important region around it which is still under A.M.G.

Reformation of Italian authority over the "occupied territory" was however made subject to terms and conditions so restrictive in character that in actual practice the Italian Government was still deprived of any real authority. In addition to rights reserved on account of military exigencies, Allied authorities reserved, among others, the following rights which Marshal Badoglio was compelled to accept without any of the amendments he proposed having been accepted:

> "7. Any material in the 'Occupied Territory' previously requisitioned by the AMG may only be removed by the Italian Government with the consent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief."
> "8. The right to requisition private and public property and services."
> "9. The right to recover the whole or any part of the 'Occupied Territory' at any time or take such steps or exercise such other powers in any part of such territory as may from time to time be deemed necessary for the prosecution of the war."

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"(vi) The right to import and export and to control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the Allied Forces may determine.

"(vii) The right to assign to such operations and import and export such military and other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war.

It might be mentioned that the Allied authorities have the right to execute any of these powers, and to exercise them without first consulting the Italian Government.

"(viii) All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied troops or other personnel within the 'Occupied Territory' will be reimbursable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation."

In this connection it might be pointed out that while the armistice terms do not provide that the costs of occupation and of military operations in Italy be charged to the Italian Government, there is a clause prescribing that Italy shall furnish to the United Nations all Italian currency they may request and that it shall redeem with Italian money all currency emitted in Italian territory by the United Nations during occupation. The whole situation, which so seriously hampers Italian efforts toward economic recovery and greater participation in the war, should be re-examined in the light of subsequent events and of Italian co-operation with the United Nations.

The Italian Government was also asked to pass and publish before the date of restoration of the occupied provinces, several decrees and proclamations the text of which was dictated by Allied authorities. They included:

a) "A decree stabilizing wage rates, maximum prices and charges for services; maximum quantities of grain to be held by anyone, as existing at the date of restoration and pending the future policy being agreed upon between us."

b) "A Decree ... providing for the establishment of Allied Military Courts to try offences entailing any hostile act against the Allied Forces and empowering any member of the Allied Forces to arrest any Italian person than such member had reasonable

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[illegible]

[illegible] Italian [illegible] Italian [illegible] Italian [

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[illegible]

[illegible] and be expelled from Italy. The Germans, but which also forced the [illegible] and to expatriate their families. The members of their [illegible] to Germany, [illegible] a single transport on October 16, 1943 by the Italian government, and highly publicized events [illegible] to be [illegible] all attributable [illegible] to the Royal Government and the U.S. Western Powers [illegible].

[illegible] All the officers now in the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [illegible] fully escaped from [illegible] during the Nazis [illegible] at great risk to their lives and [illegible] to leave behind their families. Great deal they have [illegible] no deterioration. The member of the diplomatic service [illegible] from France after working [illegible] Germany, [illegible] from Belgium, a third from Denmark - all [illegible] the German [illegible] who were in [illegible] and [illegible]. Flights of this kind from German-occupied territories show clearly the anti-German feeling of the Italian people, in all its social classes including the Diplomatic Corps. Another diplomat, [illegible], was [illegible] by the Germans for participating in activities against them.

In spite of all these happenings the Italian Government was cut off from any communication with the outside world. Not only were the communications direct with its representatives abroad cut off, but the messages sent through the Allied authorities took weeks before they arrived at their destination and in many cases were arbitrarily held up or changed or even lost. Under these conditions the field was left wide open to Fascist propaganda especially in neutral countries like Argentina and Spain where our activities could have been of great help to the Allied cause in view of the presence there of large Italian colonies. The revival of the Stefani press agency, so indispensable to enlighten the Italian at home and especially abroad on what was happening was prohibited by F.W.B. in accord with the A.C.C. On the other hand the Fascist propaganda aided by Germany had been very active from the very first days after the armistice and took advantage of the slightest opportunity

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to [illegible] and disorder [illegible] in all its aspirations and relations with the Allied Governments, [illegible] to [illegible] Italy by signing the Armistice. [illegible] of the relations with the Allied [illegible] the Italian Government [illegible] to prevent the flight to the Italian [illegible] [illegible] the Italian Foreign Ministry [illegible] and with [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible] a large part of the Fascist authorities [illegible] [illegible] could have [illegible] also done.

Not only the requests of the Italian Government to establish direct contact with its own representatives have been refused, but when the Italian Government [illegible] of resuming radio [illegible] with Italy, suggested last February the establishment of a regular service between Bari and Bari radio stations, the offer was turned down by A.C.C. on security grounds, though some responsible and security-proof contact could have been easily worked out.

Following a request by British representatives, on March 24th the Italian Ambassador in Spain was instructed by us to deliver to the Allies all wireless telegraph sets and radio-goniometers belonging to the Italian Embassy and Consulates in Spain. This apparatus had been previously sealed and entrusted to the Ambassador upon his personal responsibility and nothing had justified in the meantime doubts about his security. The same happened in Portugal and in other neutral countries. With the actual transfer of both codes and wireless sets the Italian Government went once more beyond the Armistice provisions, as it was pointed out at the time to the A.C.C., this continued feeling of distrust, six months after the Armistice, was truly disappointing.

It must be stressed in this connection that all information of a military nature in our hands both in Italy and abroad was freely put at the disposal of the Allies. At the risk of their lives and though subjected by the Germans to the most terrible reprisals on their families in Northern Italy, Italian intelligence officers in neutral countries rendered invaluable services to the Allies by giving them

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[illegible] and [illegible] Italian [illegible] and they have of [illegible] have been [illegible] the Italian [illegible]

In spite of this British [illegible] the Italian Government [illegible] continued requests for the recall of many of the officials in neutral countries according to the particular desire of the local Allied intelligence organizations, though in many cases no evidence of wrongdoing was given and which it felt on the contrary that these people could be very useful to the Allied cause. However the Italian Government always complied fully with these requests in evidence of its genuine desire to cooperate. The repatriation of our officials abroad is delayed for many months and eventually when they are permitted to return to Italy they are routed to Algiers where they are detained indefinitely and subjected to humiliating investigations as if they were enemy suspects. The former Italian Vice Consul at Tangiers, a regular career diplomat, who had been recalled to Italy, went to Gibraltar on his way home at the end of April. He has not been heard of since, nor was the Italian Government asked of what had prompted Allied authorities to take this unprecedented step. It should be pointed out that he had a regular British visa and therefore was entitled to the same protection that even ex-enemy diplomats could enjoy in similar circumstances. These incidents become known in other countries and result in great harm to our interest and to the Allied cause since they induce undecided people to go to the side of the Fascists.

In this regard the transit of our officials to and from abroad becomes increasingly more difficult which has been continued.

The Allied authorities insist on financing our missions in neutral countries but in many cases financing could be arranged by authorizing the freezing of Italian assets in these countries which were removed and the practice discontinued of requisitioning realizations by Italian emigrants, paying the amount in Allied lires and keeping the foreign currency. While Italian interests in every way of Italian assets abroad may have refused instead to always

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[illegible] Italian diplomatic interest in [illegible] and consulate [illegible] by the Allies. These elements are in a very great right [illegible] of [illegible] to the local [illegible] and to the Allied [illegible], notwithstanding threats of all kinds by the Fascist and German authorities.

In spite of all our efforts it has not been possible so far to obtain the British concession asked by Turkey in order to grant a visa to Italian diplomatic and other officials in Rumania and Bulgaria who are in imminent danger of being seized and to the Soviet and the Germans because of their loyalty to the Royal Government and to the Allied cause.

There is also a definite tendency to use the disposal of Italian vessels chartered as a source of exercising there so the strictest control and interference not in the interest of the common cause.

A typical instance of the way in which undue pressure is brought to bear on our representatives abroad was the action of the British Embassy in Lisbon concerning some Italian merchant ships in Portuguese ports. The use of ships of the Italian Merchant Navy was regulated by the Agreement between Adm. De Courcen and Adm. Cunningham, effected in a British Memorandum of November 19, 1943. Contrary to the provisions of this agreement, the British Embassy in Lisbon prevailed upon our representatives in Portugal, to place British crews on board the Italian tankers Cagliari and Argola at Cabo Verde. This was accomplished by holding up and not delivering to our representatives our instructions against such substitution of crews. Our representative in Lisbon had loyally co-operated in overcoming the obstacles placed by the Portuguese Government who at first did not want to release these ships because of claims it said it had against Italy and we had to satisfy these claims before the Portuguese Government would release them to us. The fact that Italian merchant ships are taking part in the common fight with crews and under a flag other than Italian, contrary to the terms stated in the De Courcen-Cunningham agreement is detrimental to the morale of the Italian Merchant Navy, the crews of which are particularly idle today but

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[illegible] Italian [illegible] in Italian [illegible] the [illegible] of the Italian [illegible] are [illegible] [illegible] Allied [illegible] have not been [illegible] [illegible].

We have [illegible] activities of the LATI and AIA [illegible] Italian airlines [illegible] Southern Italy and Spain and Portugal. This would represent a valuable addition to the existing Allied air transport network in the Mediterranean. Allied control over these lines could have been easily arranged. By resuming operations valuable field rights, equipment and personnel both in Spain and Portugal, at present forced to be idle, would have been used to save strained Allied air transport facilities in the Mediterranean. It could have made an important contribution to the common cause. In response to our continued efforts, which were always met with delay, we were recently told that this material should be put at the disposal of the Mediterranean Air Transport Service at Gibraltar. This we connected to do, though it meant making a most inadequate use of our possibilities as most of the equipment and the field rights cannot be transferred to Gibraltar. It is to be feared that the Germans, through their Fascist friends, will try to get control of and use these facilities. The best solution would have been to resume operations between Italy and the Spanish peninsula under Allied control. By facilitating more frequent contacts between our government and the Spanish peninsula would have enabled us to frustrate Germans efforts to utilize Italian economical resources in Spain.

It would have been to the advancement of the Allied cause to have enabled us quickly and under proper safeguards to have removed from the Allied black list those Italian citizens and firms that had no business relations with the enemy or with Northern Italy. It happens that by pursuing such a restrictive policy against us the Italian firms and the citizens remaining faithful to the Italian government have been boycotted by the Germans and the Fascists but not removed from the Allied black list. Thus they find themselves in a position much inferior to those who collaborate with the Germans in the economical field.

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This is not only a moral injustice but it prevents our government from taking a stand which would be favorable to the Allied cause in Argentina. Thus the Italian colony in Argentina is numerically the largest contribution of the Germans in countries like Spain where our interests are very considerable and would have been of great value in important contribution to the common cause.

For many months we have been asking permission to send a new Ambassador to Argentina where for a long time we have had only a Chargé d'Affaires. A new Ambassador would handle our affairs in a manner so much more favorable to the Allied cause in Argentina where there is a very large and powerful Italian colony but which got to divided and disunited because of lack of proper guidance.

After our repeated requests had existed for almost for several months, in February last the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed by the A.M.G. that repatriation of all former service officials and employees captured or interned in the course of this war, would take place in the near future. Though we are in great need of such personnel, up to now not one such employee has been permitted to return to Italy.

9. Among those who have suffered from the consequences of Fascist errors are many Italians who at the beginning of the war were living in various Allied countries. Through no fault of their own, but because of the mere fact that they were Italian citizens, though very often they lived abroad because they had opposed Fascism without however becoming politically prominent, they were interned. These internees were unmentionable during the first days but later the United States Government recognizing the virtue and loyalty of these Italian nationals restored them to full and equal rights with a few and very minor exceptions. This act of faith in our people was greatly appreciated in all of Italy. But in other countries things were much different. Not only are large numbers kept in internment camps but in Egypt, contrary to international law, properties of Italian internees have been confiscated or sold at auction. Here then six months have elapsed

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[illegible] Italian Government first requested [illegible] of its nationals [illegible] and their [illegible] interests against Italian property in [illegible] but [illegible] was not been [illegible].

[illegible] Away [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] a [illegible] and [illegible] of diplomatic [illegible] have been [illegible] and difficult, as a result many [illegible] are [illegible].

Efforts by the Italian government to obtain information through [illegible] as to the number and condition of Italian civil internees in the Italian Empire and some information here of the [illegible] have been [illegible] in Australia. Repatriation [illegible] were [illegible] the Italian government interest where this is [illegible] of the repatriate problem. For in the Italian government is a problem to [illegible] to their [illegible] information [illegible] the treatment accorded to their relatives, who for years now have been languishing in concentration camps. Hence all fascist propaganda is exploited by spreading all kinds of reports which the Italian government cannot contradict by making known the real facts.

Among Italian internees there are also women, children, old people, invalids and even many [illegible]. The period of these repatriation was pending at the time of the Armistice in pursuance of agreements reached under international law. As a result of the armistice repatriation was suspended and they are still interned.

There are today sufficient facts on hand to warrant a thorough re-examination of the overall question of Italian civil internees in Allied countries. It would be desirable and advisable to have the internees assume their share in that total collaboration which the Italian people offer to the United Nations.

There are in the various concentration camp people who since the armistice have been able to forward applications for voluntary enrollment to fight the common enemy. There are

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officers and crews of Italian merchant ships interned in the United States and in other neutral areas where war was declared, these could be used to man Allied ships at a time when the United Nations are so short of such personnel. The experience of Italian merchant marine personnel is recognized all over the world. There are officials of the State Railways and other semi-governmental agencies whose work would be particularly useful in this moment to increase Italian war efforts. There are banking employees, professors and many technicians whose activity is also indispensable and would substantially aid the common cause.

The enthusiasm of all these people at the news of Italian declaration of war on Germany, gradually cooled down when nothing was done to employ them. The Italian government is anxious to cooperate to the fullest extent in finding a just solution to these problems and hopes that the pleas will not continue to fall on deaf ears.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

[illegible]. Not only in its administrative functions is the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled and limited, but also Italian efforts to ameliorate the relations between the Italian government and the United Nations are not looked upon with favor by the A.C.C., even when the purpose was that of creating an atmosphere more helpful in the prosecution of the common cause.

On December 17, 1943 Marshal Badoglio wrote a letter to Gen. Dykes, then Deputy President of A.C.C., that the Council of Ministers had unanimously passed a resolution of adherence by Italy to the Atlantic Charter. Recognizing that the Atlantic Charter was not a treaty but a declaration of principles Marshal Badoglio desired to make known Italy's decision to the American and English governments and asked for instructions on the procedure his government would have to follow in order to declare its adherence to the principles so nobly expressed in the Charter. No answer has yet been received to that letter.

On the occasion of the first meeting in Italy of the

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Advisory Council for Italy. It is in a branch of the Foreign Interests Council created by a December 2, 1943 order of General Jacob L. Devers [illegible]. I report again that on your last [illegible] continuation proposal to Italy by Allied military [illegible] should be known [illegible] that the military [illegible] only [illegible] Italian affairs would [illegible] in the same city which is the seat of the Italian government and would begin its [illegible] from its headquarters. It is on this assuming by [illegible] that I say I would be more than pleased to join if you would use your good offices and your influence to permit the attendance [illegible] whenever this you would consider proper of an Italian member. Personally I believe that the capacity of 'observer' would be sufficient for the present time."

Having received no favorable reply [illegible] Roberts on February 10, 1943 wrote again to the Deputy President of A.C.C., Gen. General Wooderland, asking again that Italy be represented in the Advisory Council for Italy which, he said, "Whatever its activities, concerns itself exclusively with Italian affairs and as such would be strengthened by our participation, and in such participation would bring about some changes in the policies of the Council I hold that such changes would be only for the better in that they would enlarge the purposes and constitution, among them being our contribution towards the pacification of the Mediterranean peoples, and which would be to our mutual good."

To until today no decision has been received on the question of permitting Italy to participate in some form in the "Advisory Council for Italy".

On February 8, 1944 the Italian government requested the American representative of the Political Section of A.C.C. to transmit a letter addressed to Mr. Carter Goodrich, President of the International Labor Office and the U.S.A. representative of that organization, containing the official application by the Italian government to be readmitted to the I.L.O. of which Italy was one of the founders but which Fascism had caused it to abandon. No answer has been yet received.

If according to the declarations of the Moscow Conference it is desired to destroy the Fascist structure within the country, it is equally necessary to repair all the harm that the errors of Fascism have created in the international field. It is essential

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that Italy break the chains of isolation that had separated Italy from better nations and take again her proper role in those international organizations which prepare the making of a better world in which shall triumph the "four freedoms".

The Italian people joyfully share President Roosevelt's statement of January 1st, 1944 that: "In this as in the previous war men are conscious of the supreme necessity of planning what is to come after - and of carrying forward into peace the common effort which will have brought victory in the war. They have come to see that the maintenance and safeguarding of peace is the most vital single necessity in the lives of each and all of us."

All these events and many more show how unsatisfactory have been the relations between the Italian government and the Allied government through the intermediary of the A.C.C. and how their common interests were not served.

Not only our requests for the re-establishment of direct relations, in whatever form, between the Italian government and the American and English governments were not granted, but when there was concluded between Italy and the U.S.S.R. an accord for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, Marshal Badoglio received from Gen. MacFarlane the following Memorandum, dated March 15, 1944:

> "I have been instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander as President of the Allied Control Commission to inform you that the Italian Government is not entitled to enter into any arrangement with any foreign power, whether allied or neutral, without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander, which should be sought through the Control Commission. Quite apart from any inherent rights established by the Armistice Agreements with Italy, the Commander-in-Chief of occupying Forces enjoys a general right on grounds of military security to control relations between the Italian Government and all other countries."

This unprecedented statement, more than six months after the Armistice, instead of being that modification of the Armistice terms in proportion to the cooperation given by the Italian government so often requested contained a wholly new demand, aggravating the Armistice terms, since for the first time there is mentioned "a general right on

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[illegible] of military security to [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]ment and all other [illegible]

to this blank note [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible], expressing the hope of overcoming all the difficulties and of
[illegible]ging about at last a more [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] between
Italy and the Allied Powers [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of
[illegible] Marshal Badoglio [illegible]

"I do not believe at all, my dear General, that the conditions of the armistice are in any way [illegible] maintain anything that resembles the spirit of [illegible] arrangement with neutral or Allied Powers. And yet so I believe that the general sense of the [illegible] Commander on grounds of military security the [illegible] any interference on your part which [illegible] security are definite and indisputable facts.

We are faced then, as always, by an [illegible] [illegible] bitterly aggravation of the conditions of the [illegible] or, in its most favorable aspect, with an [illegible] always more restrictive and less liberal of its [illegible]. All this is not justified either by my [illegible] nor by that of my government towards the Allied Powers, nor in particular by the recent initiative of the [illegible] which caused you to write your [illegible]. This is and remains an initiative of friendly [illegible] Italy which I could not, and if I could, [illegible] declined. Now I would like to tell you [illegible] that this system and these methods [illegible] [illegible] valent to a slow and progressive process of [illegible]. The Allied Administration does not in [illegible] [illegible] to the mere supervision of administrative and [illegible] activities, but intervenes in the most minute particulars of the life of the country and takes decisions in the most categorical and mandatory manner. This is in fact I and my Government are reduced simply to the level of mere instruments and executors of the Allied decisions, yet at the same time maintaining before the world all the responsibilities of acts and deeds in whose formulation we have had no part whatever.

No government, no matter how formed, can maintain itself for long under these progressively [illegible] above all, stable institutions. And in particular would be a more obscure and above board position. I shall not say a better state of things, that the Allied Administration, if it really wants to prevent the country, should decide to govern it directly and not through an intermediary.

I do not believe - even though there are moments when I have my doubts - that this is that you really want. Then, I would like to say to you, my dear General, with the greatest of loyalty and friendship, that, in order

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[illegible] it would be [illegible] that the Allies [illegible] the German [illegible] rather than that is really [illegible] reactionary.

You know, for example, that the word "co-belligerent" is [illegible] an empty word for it [illegible] materially [illegible] relations. You know that many of the clauses of the armistice of the 3rd and 19th of September should be considered null, because because they have been fully executed or because they are materially impossible of execution, or substituted by other agreements etc.

Now I ask myself and I ask you - if this would not be an opportune moment, as I firmly believe it is, for us and for all that Italy deserves to be established by a new act in which all the clauses which have become void were eliminated and which would define in a more precise manner our state of co-belligerency in the light of our most loyal collaboration for the past six months; in other words bring up to date the Italian international situation so that it conforms to the real facts of today.

I do not believe that I am asking for the impossible.

Among other things for many months now many of the exiles of South America have expressed the desire that their relations with Italy could soon become normal, which would have helped in defining the position of Italian citizens there interned and subjected to all manner of restrictions since they are still considered enemy aliens. It has been impossible up to now to realize this goal on account of the restrictive attitude of the Allied Control Commission.

If it is desired to improve relations between Italy and the United Nations after more than eight months of co-belligerency it would seem necessary to permit her to re-establish such relations direct rather than through the channels of A.C.C., and by following the precept so realistically adopted by Russia, which not has won the sympathy of all of the Italian people, who are waiting anxiously for a similar gesture of good-will from the United States and the other United Nations.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AS A MEANS OF INCREASING ITALIAN WAR EFFORT

One of the prerequisites of increasing the Italian war effort obviously consists in healing and re-organizing the economy of the country, which was upset by the war and by the events that have taken place since the armistice. It is impossible to meet the necessities when of the economic life of the nation is disorganized. Following are some of the consequences brought on by Allied occupation that have

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[illegible] they have [illegible] a [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] currency and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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of [illegible] lires in only three months from January 1st to [illegible] 1944. Neither the [illegible] for [illegible] January [illegible] sold amounted to [illegible] lires the total of [illegible] notes of the same class of [illegible]. Imports of [illegible] service, of [illegible] current accounts and of [illegible] Service Bonds show also an increase as compared to [illegible]. The most conservative economic policy has been followed and through the "Banca d'Italia" private banks are strictly controlled in order that they should not make available any funds whatsoever for speculation of a speculative character or which might lead to hoarding. Every cent and financial help is devoted exclusively to foster production.

All this goes to show that also in the financial field Italy "has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibility". But inflation, featured by the present rate of exchange, is making the burden so increasingly heavier that Italian efforts are to a great extent nullified. At an early stage of the war the United States found out that inflation and unrestricted rise in price levels were a menace to the Nation's war effort. In his Budget message to Congress of January 6, 1943 President Roosevelt stated: "Economic stabilization for all groups - not for just the other fellow - is the only policy consistent with the requirements of total war.... Under war conditions a rise in profits, wages, and farm incomes unfortunately does not increase the supply of goods for civilians; it merely invites the bidding up of prices of scarce commodities". This is exactly what is taking place in Italy. Though the Italian Government has done all it could to prevent a rise in profits, wages and farm incomes, their efforts were of little or no avail in view of the present rate of exchange which gives to the purchasing power of the Allied Forces a monetary value which continually upsets the economy of the country.

Allied Forces are at present supplied with an excessive amount of lires. In spending their money they pay it out on the basis of what one Dollar has meant to them all their life and not on the basis of what 100 Lires have meant to the Italians. In Naples, still under Allied control, inflation is at its worst on account of the presence of so many Allied troops. If the rate of

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[illegible] were reduced to [illegible] of the live, this could not lessen the real purchasing power of Allied troops, but would simply lower the level of prices by being only from Allied troops as almost solely for "stocking up prices of peace conditions". This has already happened in North Africa upon the exit of Americans of the front has removed. Soldiers became suddenly aware that they should not throw their money away and bought as bargains. Everyone became suddenly aware that the market could liquidate but they not were were ready to sell.

At present, however, the middle and lower classes of liberated Italy, except for the comparatively few individuals (mostly shopkeepers and restaurant owners) who dabble in black market and other obscure activities, "are getting it in the neck" - as was pointed out some time ago by an impartial witness to an American member of A.C.C. - "When they have been reduced to misery one shall have destroyed those intellectual and moral values that take much longer to rebuild than the industrial districts of the city and those other sections that have been singled out by the bombs. It is a very serious situation and some people with whom I talked, frankly admitted that it made them nearly regret the past with all its drawbacks; this is a dangerous state of mind that is apt to grow should not something be done to the contrary."

The situation is rendered even more difficult because the Allied authorities have blocked almost all the available merchandise. This makes impossible the exchange of consumers' goods which is so necessary in the re-establishment of the country's economy and for the best utilization of the existent resources, and this would make it less necessary to import goods across the seas. The blocking of merchandise prevents the stabilization of prices in relation to changed monetary conditions and facilitates in this way the expansion of the black market. Only by permitting a greater autonomy of action to the Italian government shall it be possible to ameliorate this dangerous state of affairs.

The situation is becoming such that on April 22, 1944 it was broadcasted by P.W.B. (the Allied agency managing all press, radio and other similar activities) that "the anti-fascist Committee of

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Sardinia adopted a separate monetary system for Sardinia. This is due to the fact that in Sardinia (notwithstanding the presence of about 200,000 Italian soldiers) out of a total population of about 1,000,000 inhabitants) prices are on the average one-third to one-half of what they are on the mainland. In Sardinia there are only about 10,000 Allied soldiers, all of the Air Force.

In view of the coming liberation of Rome and other parts of Germany-occupied Italy, where prices are still on the average one-half or less of what they are in Liberated Italy, it is considered urgent that the rate of exchange be fixed at 50 Lire = 1 U. S. Dollar.

On September 29, 1943 during the discussion of the additional armistice conditions, Gen. B. Smith, Chief of Gen. Eisenhower's Staff, told Marshal Badoglio that after Italy would have declared war on Germany and would have thus become a co-belligerent, the rate of exchange between Lire, U. S. Dollar and British Pound would be revised. In his reply to the letter of September 23, 1943 in which the King of Italy had also asked for a revision of the exchange rate, President Roosevelt wrote: "Consideration is now being given in consultation with our Allies to the exchange rate for the Lira."

Though the present rate of exchange was severely criticized by financial experts both in the United States and Great Britain, no practical steps have been taken so far to implement Gen. Smith's promises.

12. Nothing of what is said above is meant to underrate the importance of the other elements of the economic situation, especially the scarcity of food and essential commodities, lack and disruption of all transport, unrestricted requisitioning of industrial plants, ports, material and means of transportation.

The food problem is of primary importance also in regard to inflation. When the Italian population will be in a position actually to rely on a ration of essential foodstuffs sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for livelihood and only when this ration can be obtained without recourse to the black market will the pressure relax that now is being exerted, especially by the population

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of the civilian population, in spite of their efforts to secure economic food-stuffs such as bread, butter, etc., due to the inflating prices all around.

The provisions adopted by the Allied authorities to find solution of the food problem do not always produce the results desired. For example, it happened that contrary to all assurances that potatoes that were shipped for sowing were free from any contagious disease. In Sicily the planting of these potatoes resulted in a loss of 75 to 90% of the crop on account of the prevalence of this disease. Then to this direct loss of crop must be added the future losses brought about by the fact that for several years the infected ground cannot be used for potato plantings. The seed potatoes to be shipped to Italy should be subjected to a rigorous pathological examination before shipping in accordance to the practice followed in the past in pursuance to international agreements which required the issuance of a certificate of immunity from infection by competent authorities.

The re-opening of commercial fishing which would powerfully contribute to ease the food problem, has been obstructed by the fact that the Allied authorities require the issuance of two certificates, one by the Naval Office for permission to enter the port and docking of the boats, the other by the local Allied authorities giving permission to do the fishing. To facilitate the business of fishing the second certificate should be abolished since the fishing licenses have always been issued by the Italian government through the Royal Port Authorities. Permission should also be granted to do night fishing with underwater illumination, within military limits of security, along the coasts of southern Italy, of Sicily and Sardinia. This type of fishing brings the biggest catches and would employ a large number of sailors. For this purpose it would be necessary for the Allied authorities to release a number of motor fishing boats which have been requisitioned by them. These, however, are only comparatively minor details. The situation as a whole is accurately described in the following letter by Mr. T. J. Wrigley which appeared in the May 13, 1944 issue of The New Statesman and Nation.

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[illegible]

[illegible] the people in this area [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible] change will be [illegible] on [illegible] own [illegible] life. [illegible] is [illegible] quite beyond the reach of those who [illegible] it [illegible]. Even the means of [illegible] are hard to come by. The [illegible] of [illegible] calling themselves [illegible] are [illegible] [illegible] to be [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] is to survive, and [illegible] the terrible competition for our [illegible] and the [illegible] of [illegible] for our [illegible] [illegible] I say that the black market is a [illegible] until the [illegible] are [illegible].

Strong measures are necessary to improve the situation. Among the most urgent are: 1. Control of prices of necessities with an extension of the rationing system [illegible] [illegible]. 2. Improvement of transport and [illegible] [illegible], and with this of the distribution of food. 3. Curtailment of allied spending, whether official or unofficial, in [illegible] for the civil population, and a reduction in the exchange rate of the lira. 4. An increase [illegible] wages. 5. A new attack on food hoarding, which goes hand-in-hand with the black market.

Only when these measures have been taken can the black market be checked. Of course [illegible] proceeds that this is easy nor the Italian government can do this without our help, but it is very necessary to do something and to do it soon. Not only is the situation serious for the Italians, but it is serious for our cause, if liberation is to mean the black market, inflation, and worse still, hunger."

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[illegible] requisitioned by [illegible] in housing or leasing [illegible] houses, public buildings and industrial plants are very often [illegible] with thousands of [illegible] and [illegible] is very important of the immediate consequences for the economic life. There are many instances which refer to private [illegible] requisitioned, stripped in order to [illegible] the [illegible] in [illegible] belongings - particularly linen and tables - have been taken away without even [illegible] to the legitimate owners.

The Allied authorities often have refused to issue receipts [illegible] the property that was being requisitioned and in many occasions [illegible] to the property owner would ask for one. These [illegible] are essential to the property owner when he eventually [illegible] his claim for indemnity and payment for damages by the [illegible] government.

The Italian government has to face increasing requests by [illegible] ministries for office space and housing at Salerno, the seat [illegible] government. These offices are so necessary for the proper [illegible] of its public offices, without which it is impossible [illegible] the war program of the country. The Allied Control [illegible] has many times been asked to cease locating in Salerno [illegible] Allied offices or troops and to transfer elsewhere certain offices or headquarters in order to allow the Italian government [illegible] use of more vitally-needed office and housing space so that it might better organize the administration of its country's affairs. But [illegible] have these requests gone unheeded but the Allied authorities have refused to turn over to the Soviet Diplomatic Representative the only villa available in Salerno suitable for that purpose. Even Marshal Badoglio, on May 6, 1944, personally wrote to Gen. MacFarlane in this regard and despite the goodwill of the latter nothing was [illegible].

The Italian government has many times asked that the offices [illegible] the records be returned to it so that the prefects and [illegible] local officers could properly handle their public affairs [illegible] capitals of the Provinces, but these requests have also been [illegible].

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[illegible]

[illegible] industrial progress of the nation have been destroyed or lost by the ravages of war and by lack of maintenance. In order to aid the rehabilitation of the economic life of the nation it is necessary that the buildings of these industries be freed of requisition and that the materials used in the reconstruction should be replenished.

In spite of instructions by the Allied High Command, looting, often considerable, has been done and still is being done by occupying troops and officers to palaces and monuments of high artistic value and to the previous objects having sentimental, such as the royal palaces at Naples and at Caserta, the museum of Fine Arts at Naples, just to name a few striking cases. The Italian people are justly jealous of their artistic inheritance and damage done by Allied troops is very much resented especially when the people deal with a little more good-will and attention many incidents could be avoided. It is absolutely necessary that these deplorable occurrences should not happen in Rome, Florence, Siena, Assisi, etc., not only Italy but the whole world become the poorer for it. Representations were made by the Italian government to set up a mixed commission to prevent these incidents, but nothing has been done so far and it is to be feared that troops will continue to behave as they have done so far.

4. To re-establish the economic life of the country it is indispensable that the systems of communication and transport be restored at least partially. The Allied Military Authorities merely for the housing of troops have taken over railway stations, postal and telegraphic buildings and other edifices in which are situated services and equipment of great value. This has caused in various cases (Toronto, Bari, Palermo, Foggia, to cite some important

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[illegible] plant equipment. It is [illegible] to assume [illegible] and to place [illegible] in the hands of the [illegible], as military needs permit, but it seems [illegible] by the use of a little consideration. When the [illegible] postal, telegraph and telephone plants are not being utilized [illegible] greatest expense to the injury of the common interests. [illegible] the Cables Radiocommunications and Telecommunications [illegible] used by military Allied authorities or are [illegible] [illegible] permission to do so, the Italian administration [illegible] have utilized them like it always has done with its [illegible] personnel and its own equipment on the basis of four channels [illegible] giving to the Allied Public [illegible] that are here and at the same time reserving [illegible] the use of the remaining two.

[illegible] Allied Military authorities do not permit the Italian [illegible] specialized in Telegraph and Telephone work to come near [illegible] installations of that plant equipment. It thus happens that [illegible] running into and for that reason many lines and con- [illegible] to [illegible] positions, like the one in Campobasso and Foggia, [illegible] out of service for many months. With the use of proper con- [illegible] circumstances it would be possible to employ this specialized [illegible] the times of operations. This would make for a [illegible] use of the communications system even for war [illegible].

[illegible] public complaints about the postal and telegraphic [illegible] and this has rendered it more difficult to re-establish [illegible] of the economic life of the country. The greatest [illegible] seems to lie in the slowness of the Allied censorship [illegible] certain Provinces seem to want to censure even [illegible] correspondence of the Italian government and one can [illegible] consequences of such delays.

[illegible] transportation situation is very serious in all of [illegible] Italy. The means used, both railroad and highway, [illegible] inadequate to meet the needs of the people. Such insufficiency [illegible] any attempt at re-establishing the economic system.

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[illegible] such a system of control and militarization [illegible] Allied condition at Naples that is therefore [illegible] and complicated here the results [illegible] possible [illegible] of civilian railway traffic. The Italian government has [illegible] that the administration of the railways in liberated [illegible] be restored to its jurisdiction - all the railroads south of a [illegible] Leghorn, Rimini, Ancona, Bologna, Ferrara, [illegible] Italian Administration and duty and the responsibility of satisfying the needs of the Allied Military Authorities and of assuring [illegible] regularity of a minimum service for passengers and [illegible] trains for civilian use. For example the lack of salt [illegible] causes popular discontent. At Margherita di Savoia [illegible] there is available a deposit of 150,000 tons of salt [illegible] enough to supply the needs of the people of Southern [illegible] available distribution of a sufficient quantity of [illegible] necessity a certain number of railroad cars should [illegible] at the disposal of the Italian Civil Authorities.

[illegible] to supplement railway transportation, in [illegible] Allied authorities of all transport means, taken by [illegible] trucks, buses, motorcars, etc., the requisitioning of [illegible] arbitrary as it too often has happened, but to [illegible] and planned discipline. The highly important [illegible] of food-stuffs has been seriously impeded in all the [illegible] of trucks. To avoid sending of too many [illegible] from the outside the Italian government has requested [illegible] bringing in of tires and repair parts in order [illegible] many trucks that are idle for lack of repairs [illegible] should be released from requisition some garages [illegible] Allied Authorities after having made a collection of all the [illegible] out of service could repair and put in service at least [illegible] of them by using parts from others.

The Italian government has also repeatedly asked, but with[illegible] so far, for the re-establishment of regular sea communications between the Italian mainland and at least our two major [illegible] and Sardinia. These two islands, with a total population [illegible] 5 million people, are at present completely cut off

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[illegible] and economic life of the country [illegible]
[illegible] considerable efforts. Italian shipping is [illegible]
[illegible] the maximum [illegible] is a great asset [illegible]
[illegible] to our power. The Italian government, which is [illegible]
[illegible] to pay dues to the German [illegible] including [illegible]
[illegible] used by Germans and forwarded overseas. The ports [illegible]
[illegible] in these circumstances, are [illegible]
[illegible] will in terms for the [illegible] not [illegible]
[illegible] to carried out in small harbours [illegible]
[illegible] military conditions) but this requires [illegible]
[illegible].

[illegible] would also be need if [illegible]
[illegible] to be released. Release of 10 Italian ships, all [illegible]
[illegible] on November 3rd, 1943, was denied on January [illegible]
[illegible] of Staff of Allied Force Headquarters after [illegible]
[illegible] Allied Shipping Authorities. The Italian Govern[illegible]
[illegible] that all the motor boats less than 100 tons [illegible]
[illegible] coastal traffic in order to transport the products [illegible]
[illegible] consuming public, such as, oil, wine, fire wood, [illegible]
[illegible], cheese, etc. To relieve the situation [illegible]
[illegible] the construction of 64 motorboats [illegible]
[illegible] amounting in all to a gross tonnage of 10,000 [illegible]
[illegible] will in the docks. For this purpose a [illegible]
[illegible] requirement of 1800 tons of plates, 5000 [illegible]
[illegible] cubic meters of pine lumber, [illegible]
[illegible], chains and motors. These requests were [illegible]
[illegible] only granted. The period of [illegible] would have enabled the hauling from Syracuse to [illegible] of asphalt so sorely needed for resurfacing [illegible] highways.

[illegible] of coastal traffic it would be a matter [illegible] Authorities would not take any action involving [illegible] operations, which need to be subsidised [illegible] owing to an agreement with the Ministry [illegible] occupation controlled by the Italians.

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[illegible] Military authorities generally prohibit [illegible] troops damage industrial plants [illegible] mechanical workshop, steel of which they will [illegible] [illegible] also when the actual parts of the troops [illegible] only a small percentage of the plant but destroy the [illegible] conditions. They also follow the important practice of [illegible] undamaged or only partially damaged plants machinery [illegible] without the slightest consideration as to the [illegible] removal on the existing or easily obtainable [illegible] of such plants.

[illegible] by occupying officials, who in most cases [illegible] the language, and who are unacquainted with that part [illegible] and are not concerned about the upkeep or improvement [illegible], is bound not only to prevent economic recovery but [illegible] eventually what industrial equipment was left by the Germans.

The occupancy by Allied Military Authorities of the industrial [illegible] their being put back to work. It is necessary that the [illegible] be first released, at least as to those whose owners can [illegible] put them back in working order. In pursuing it might [illegible] that Allied P.W.B. authorities have partially requisitioned [illegible] of the world-famous editor, Luterna, thus stopping [illegible] of Benedetto Croce's works which should be put urgently [illegible] in order to contribute to the formation of a democratic [illegible] opinion. It is especially important that those [illegible] be released that work for the railroads that are [illegible] repairing their lines and stationary plants, to repair [illegible] put back into working order their yards which [illegible] damaged or are in process of deteriorating. It is [illegible] to release the Naval Yards. Very often Allied troops do not [illegible] officers of the company to have access to their offices [illegible] and records they need for legal or fiscal [illegible].

[illegible] metallurgical establishments and factories could [illegible] the [illegible] coal count on the furnishing of coal, iron

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[illegible] at most. The requisitioning of these materials is very important, particularly to the railroads and naval yards.

By allocating monthly about 50,000 tons of such items [illegible] would be released, for example, twenty 40,000 tons of [illegible], [illegible],000 tons of line, and 120,000 square meters of station glass. [illegible] would certainly be no destruction of plants and equipment and in most of cases no damage, and then only after consultation with the Italian authorities, and as has been done with [illegible] informing them about it.

It is known also that the allied troops out from in the [illegible] and requisition methods without disrupting the Italian [illegible] authorities, and in that way avoid these doing irreparable [illegible] the forest resources of the country and to the production [illegible]. Allied soldiers very often make abusive use of firearms, [illegible], in peril the life of the people and trespassing on [illegible] property. For example, in the territory of Vico del Gargano [illegible] allied soldiers go hunting deer, a hunt that is forbidden by [illegible] law, and shooting willy-nilly in the forests called [illegible], putting in danger the people who are working there in the [illegible] of charcoal on behalf of the Allied authorities themselves. [illegible] do not even abstain from shooting at domestic animals now in [illegible] of inhabited homes.

If we want to revive the economic life of the country and [illegible] contribute to the war effort it is necessary to cease the requisitioning of machinery and its removal from the plants, and the requisitioning of prime materials in the plants or of the products [illegible] been partly finished. Many times these products are put to [illegible] use by the Allied Military Authorities, are allowed [illegible] or become destroyed - while the industries of liberated [illegible] have so much need of them. The Allied authorities have [illegible] requisitioned all the paper that was stored in the paper factory [illegible] (about 15,000 quintals). This paper had already [illegible] to the Italian public administrations who are so [illegible] in need of it. For example, the Finance Administration has [illegible] in which to print the forms for the collection of the [illegible] the Railroad Administration has not enough paper with

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[illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]

The paralyzing effects of such practices and of the constant interference by the Allied military [illegible] attempts by the Italian government to recover our assets, [illegible] as grounds reversing. Not one Italian has [illegible] as long as the whole economic life of the country is [illegible] to the most paralyzing and [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

14. It is apparent that the industrial war production of liberated Italy is hinted by all the distractions and difficulties that have been discussed above. On account of the widespread destruction wrought by Allied bombardments and then by the Germans in their retreat and later by the paralyzing policies of the A.M.G., the Italian government has been able to do very little to revive and increase industrial war production in Southern Italy.

To bring about a revival of such industrial production it is first necessary to put at the disposal of the Italian Ministry [illegible], who has made repeated requests on this score but all in vain, the raw materials and the resources of parts and machinery exclusively Italian ownership that are to be found scattered and wasted in all the various plants and factory buildings that are now used for the housing of Allied troops.

Even the industries that work for the Navy could be made to increase their production in a short time if the Allied Commission would give the permissions so often requested. The Italian Navy has a particular interest in the reopening of those industrial plants and of those that are under its direct management. In conditions are now it is impossible to provide for the normal repairs and maintenance of the fleet. As a result there is a constant increase in the number of ships that have to remain idle on account of the length of wait for repairs.

For these purposes it is necessary that the naval arsenal at Taranto, the shipyards of Leri in the same city and the industries of Brindisi were permitted to work at least at half their capacity for the repairing of Italian war ships. To meet

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the lack of materials and machinery the industrial [illegible] and factories should be re-opened; the piles of materials [illegible] should be uncovered and secure materials and machinery that have been owned to the allied, and by them to [illegible] or that have even been stolen by other private [illegible], should be immediately recovered.

It must be pointed out in this connection that the Italian [illegible] could give a greater contribution to the common war efforts if only it had means of preventing deterioration of machinery [illegible], or better still if it were given the opportunity [illegible] in order docks and other port facilities, navy yards, [illegible] workshops, depositi, warehouses, barracks, hospitals, etc. [illegible] authorities are constantly asking for greater facilities [illegible] in field.

It would also be necessary to salvage all units which [illegible] sunk, to finish construction of the great dry-dock at [illegible], to put in working condition cement factories, to collect [illegible] metal scrap, to furnish fuel and electricity enough to [illegible] of metal goods, importing all necessary machines [illegible], to make available means of transportation in order to carry [illegible] from [illegible], to increase production of bituminous materials [illegible] in all possible ways transfer of goods from one [illegible] to another.

[illegible] there are several thousand sailors who cannot [illegible] because of lack of clothes and especially of shoes and [illegible] increasingly difficult. For this reason [illegible] necessary to also temporarily normal enlistments and, [illegible], even normal substitutions in personnel.

[illegible] situation is of course limiting the contribution [illegible] the common fight. In order to satisfy [illegible] it is indispensable:

[illegible] release and to put in working conditions the [illegible] the "Manifattura Cotoniera Meridionali" at [illegible] which not only would take care of all the requirements [illegible] but would provide work for about 3000 men who

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are now unemployed;

- to establish at Taranto a mine factory for the Navy, importing the little machinery needed to this purpose.

By means of such measures and by the assignment of some Allied machinery and war materials, liberated Italy could rapidly succeed to a considerable extent its war production. In this way highly skilled man-power at present available in large numbers in Southern Italy could be properly used.

Greater possibilities for the development of war production exist in Central and Northern Italy. It is almost impossible to make at present any accurate estimate, as much will depend on destruction and reforms already done or to be carried out by the Germans. It will also obviously depend on the development of war operations.

However it is sure that, as far as skilled labor and the will of the world nation to co-operate in the fight against Germany are concerned, Italy can become a great and industrious arsenal of war production.

If, after more than eight months of fighting against the German enemy, Italy were also admitted to benefit from the Lend-Lease program, the problem of Italian war production would rapidly reach a favorable solution.

ADMINISTRATION

12. The minute control exercised by A.C.C. causes many inconveniences even in the administrative field. The situation is made even more difficult by the fact that while the greater part of the liberated territory is governed directly by the Italian Government subject to interferences practised by A.C.C., there are several very important regions like Naples which are governed directly by A.M.G. The A.M.G. authorities on account of their unfamiliarity with Italian administrative organization on many occasions adopt policies and measures exactly contrary to those in vogue in the other provinces.

This disparity of administration and this disregard for the traditional Italian administrative practices gives rise to

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[illegible]

[illegible] Let us consider a few of the more important ones. The Allied authorities have supplanted in the territories under their control many agencies and institutions of fundamental importance to the Italian administrative system, such as the Provincial Committees (Councils which are normally the old provincial Chambers of Commerce, and in their place have set up new offices, in Sicily for example, that find no counterpart in the administrative system in force in the other provinces of the mainland.

It would have been a far better practice to have consulted with the Italian government before adopting an administrative policy that could collide with the settled administrative practice in the mainland uniformity rather than confusion prevail.

In some provinces like in Sicily in Cosenza, Messina and [illegible] the Allied authorities have removed from office many Prefects (Heads of Provinces) and put in their place local persons and functionaries of low grade and with very little administrative experience or capacity. It would be a better procedure considering the importance of the office and the delicacy of the functions that the Allied authorities would first consult with the Ministry of the Interior before deciding on an appointment, discharge or transfer of any Prefect within the territory under their control. On the other hand the Italian government cannot remove any Prefect or other functionary in the "Occupied territory" without the consent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, a consent difficult to obtain and often long delayed.

The Allied authorities in territories by them controlled [illegible] appointments to public offices and given promotions in the administration carried out well as discharges without regard

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to the civil service requirements. Now it happens that the Allied government finds it so difficult now to regulate these appointments and changes which have caused confusion in the classifications of services as the payrolls to the injury of the interests of many categories of employees. In this regard, it has been insinuated but with little success:

- that the Allied authorities make a inquiry for the personnel they need in the territories by those specialized in the particular ministry involved and who very often have a surplus of personnel.

- that in case of immediate necessity non-civil service personnel be employed on a temporary basis beginning with the lowest grade.

- that the Allied authorities refrain from giving promotions to state or administrative employees and only in very particular cases promote an employee only to the grade immediately superior to the one held.

- that the A.M.G. consult at least with the Ministry involved before making any changes in matters of personnel.

The personnel working for A.M.G. in territories directly under its jurisdiction very often receives wages higher than those employed by the Italian government. It thus happens that a great clamor is raised by these less favored employees who insist that their wages be raised to the higher level. It would be a better policy to have consultations on the pay state employees should receive even though they are working in territory administered by A.M.G.

The Allied Forces have absolute power to arrest Italian citizens without according them even the most rudimentary guarantees of personal rights. Many complaints have been received from Italian citizens who have been arrested and kept in jail for long periods sometimes running into months without any charge being brought against them. It would seem that the Allied authorities would do well in these matters of personal liberties adopt the procedure set up by the Italian government under the Law-Decree of January 8, 1944, the provisions of which are based on democratic

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[illegible] that assignment [illegible] as a [illegible] and every sphere of the [illegible]

It has also happened that Italian officers and civilians have been arrested by the Allied Military Authorities [illegible] for various months in concentration [illegible] by reason being given and without even interrogation [illegible] military tribunal. For example, General Bellomo was arrested on January 26, 1946 and has been detained until [illegible] without having [illegible]. The case which Colonel Iacopino was arrested in Cerignola [illegible] have always been under Italian jurisdiction, although it [illegible] that Col. Iacopino was not guilty and though the charges against him were later withdrawn, he is still detained in [illegible] of the intervention on his behalf by the highest A.C.C. officials. [illegible] Late on May 25, 1946 the A.C.C. used their exceptional [illegible] territory under the Italian government to set up in Lecce [illegible] General Court, composed of three Allied judges and empowered [illegible] pass sentences of death in the case of 15 Italians [illegible] attempting to overthrow with violence the security and [illegible] of the Italian State and with associating and giving aid [illegible]. Though there is enough law in the Italian statute [illegible] not in such cases the severest penalties, A.C.C. did [illegible] Italian Courts try these cases, in which only Italian [illegible] involved also lived in territory restored to the Italian [illegible]. The Italian people, who remember only too well the Fascist [illegible], are disturbed by such departures from ordinary procedure, [illegible] would later intervene if judgments were not satisfactory.

[illegible] another important field in which A.C.C. intervention is [illegible] betterment of conditions is in that of education. [illegible] lack of teachers, books and even schoolhouses (many [illegible] occupied by Allied Military Authorities) it makes [illegible] difficult when A.C.C. and A.C.C. authorities adopt [illegible] different from those of the Italian government concerning [illegible] length of terms, textbooks, progress and examinations, [illegible] in the face of hot lunches and clothing to the less [illegible] situation. This disparity of treatment causes dissatisfaction

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[illegible] leaders and members and is [illegible] to [illegible].

It would be [illegible] to add to the [illegible] of the [illegible] of interference indulged in by A.M.G. and A.M.G. but continue confusion and did not make for good administration. [illegible] affairs but we believe that the [illegible] Italian people are sufficient to show changes should be made for the betterment of the administration of public affairs.

PART THREE - [illegible]

[illegible] It has already been indicated how difficult it was [illegible] for the Italian government to marshal its forces for the purpose of [illegible] its contribution to the war effort since September 8, 1943, particularly in its attempts to combat by means of the radio and press the propaganda emanated by the Fascists and Germans in occupied Italy and in neutral countries.

At the Malta Conference on September 29, 1943 Marshal [illegible] forth the difficulties his government was facing in [illegible] to clarify the position before the Italian people and [illegible] necessary this had become. In particular Marshal Badoglio [illegible] that the radio station at Bari be put at the disposal of the [illegible] government. Gen. Eisenhower answered in these words:

> "[illegible] this matter my staff will give you whatever aid may be needed."

Notwithstanding these assurances and the undoubted good [illegible] understanding of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, [illegible] in the field have been handled altogether differently. [illegible] moment the Allied authorities of P.W.B. assumed [illegible] direct control of Radio Bari. All the programs [illegible] theoretically should have been the mouthpiece [illegible] government were prepared by a group of writers who [illegible] the immediate direction of Major Crawlaes of the [illegible] head of the Radio Section of P.W.B. All of the official [illegible] of the Italian government and the statements of [illegible] were subjected to the scrutiny of the aforesaid Major [illegible] who either deleted or delayed their broadcasting.

[illegible] of the time of Radio Bari was used up by no less than

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[illegible] radiocasts daily at [illegible] programs [illegible] [illegible], and though the technical quality [illegible] was so distributed as to have been tuneable.

The language and style with the dialogue [illegible] were so poor in language and content and showed such a lack of [illegible] Italian psychology as well as to what was the real [illegible] in occupied Italy that we learned from various sources that the influence of Radio Bari in occupied Italy was of no consequence if not actually harmful.

While the control practiced by P.W.B. in the administration of the use of the radio did not improve the standard of the program, the interference on the technical side brought about [illegible] consequences. Instead of increasing the transmitting power of Radio Bari the persons in charge engaged in making [illegible] experiments with the result that the operating efficiency of the station was lowered. Had they made liberal use of Italian technicians familiar with the technical peculiarities of the mechanism of the station would have improved a great deal. Consequently the voice of Radio Bari could be heard clearly only in a radius of 20 [illegible] kilometers. This is what was happening to Radio Bari in territory administered by the Italian government, which radio was supposed to be the mouthpiece of the government. As regards Radio Rome and Radio Naples no collaboration on the part of the Italian authorities was permitted and these stations do not [illegible] the official communiques of the Italian government.

We must not wonder, therefore, why it was impossible [illegible] conditions for the Italian government to promulgate a [illegible] propaganda so greatly needed by the population still in territory occupied by the Germans in order that they may have been [illegible] greater contribution to the common cause.

[illegible] was the situation in regard to the press. [illegible] circular of Oct. 29, 1943 Marshal Badoglio had [illegible] complete control of the press, P.W.B. at first and [illegible] through the personnel of P.W.B. exercised such [illegible] control over the press even in territory restored to the Italian government that it might just as well have managed it direct.

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[illegible] authority the government [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and going as far as entering the printing [illegible] [illegible] will decide in the lifetime of the press. [illegible] official communications of the Italian government and the statements of its officials were arbitrarily delayed and published by P.W.B.

Among the secret instructions that were being applied at [illegible] by the head of the press section of P.W.B., the 5th Army of the British Army, were the following:

a) "To ensure a post-war, but a present-day, assumption of Italian representative opinion.
b) To disallow any political party to state the conditions under which the Italian people should continue the war against Germany."

All these things are not consistent with the Moscow Declaration [illegible], with the practices of a free democratic country and also did not better the interests of the common fight against Germany. In addition to this Allied Military Censorship is applied in such a way [illegible] partial freedom of political opinion.

Lt. Col. Moore, acting upon instructions, also forbade any [illegible] to re-establish the functioning of the semi-official press agency "Stefani". This caused incalculable harm in view of the fact that the results aided by the Germans made use of the name "Stefani" [illegible] and in neutral countries. The Italian government not being [illegible] to counteract it was forced to leave a free field to the [illegible] inflicted considerable harm by their unchecked propaganda [illegible] Italy [illegible] were so in those countries where large numbers of Italian emigrants are located.

The head of the cinema section of P.W.B. is a high ranking [illegible] of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. From the first moment he began the requisitioning of the films not only of German but also of Italian production under the most disputable pretexts (for instance, that one or more of the cast were enemy or even neutral [illegible], even though their role in the film was secondary). Cinema [illegible] equipment and material were requisitioned on a [illegible] scale, movie houses everywhere and without regard to the [illegible] of the population are requisitioned. For instance

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[illegible] the Italian [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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It must be remembered, then, that the Allied Control Commission's task of bringing peace, liberty, and as far as possible prosperity, to occupied territories must always be subservient to the task of ensuring that in Italy nothing obstructs, the overriding purpose, the war effort. Thus, the shipment of food supplies must be subservient to the shipment of munitions; the freedom of labour to negotiate or strike must be subservient to the war needs of industry; the liberty of the press must be subservient to military security.

The President of the Allied Control Commission is, ex-officio and as long as the war lasts, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies. He is in fact, as long as the war lasts in Italy, must have the decisive word on all policy. The Executive Head, or Chief Commissioner, of the A.C.C. is Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane who stands in the same relation to General Alexander as do the Commanders of the Fifth Army and the Eighth Army. Naturally, his responsibilities become ever greater as the armies move forward and more territory comes within the scope of the Allied Control Commission.

The Allied Control Commission falls naturally into three main sections, although these sections are by no means watertight compartments, the personnel being interchangeable and the whole controlled by General Mason MacFarlane. First is the 'spearhead' group of Allied Military Government, which follows closely on the heels of - sometimes with - the fighting troops, and whose main tasks are the speedy restoration of supplies, the establishment of local government, the immediate needs of refugees and the sick or wounded, and the temporary rehabilitation of shattered areas. Second, and merging into the first, is the direct rule of Allied Military Government, assisted by Italian local government, under more settled conditions, the executive power still being held by the Allies while every effort is made to pave the way for a transfer to Italian hands. Third and last, the 'advisory' stage at which territory has been handed over to the Italian Government, Allied officers nevertheless remaining - though in very small numbers - to assist the Italian Government and to ensure adherence to the terms of the Armistice.

This grouping is of course dependent on the course of events. Whether more, or less, territory is handed over to the Italian Government, and whether direct Allied Military Government lasts for a long or a short time in any given area, must depend upon conditions in Italy itself, and upon the measure of support given by the Italian population in the prosecution of the war effort and the maintenance of law and order.

By the nature of its duties the Allied Control Commission must, obviously, cover the whole field of Government, whether in a direct or advisory capacity. For this purpose the Headquarters staff is grouped into 25 sub-commissions, covering such questions as Public Health, Public Safety, Law, Food, Transport, Labour, Finance, Education etc. For the purpose of control, Italy is divided into Regions; thus Sicily is Region I, Sardinia Region II, Calabria Region VII, and so on. Each Region is supervised by a Commissioner responsible to General MacFarlane, and each Region carries a staff of expert advisers drawn from the Sub-commissions at Headquarters.

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[illegible]

[illegible] Allied military [illegible] the United Nations [illegible] and extent of [illegible]

[illegible] has the [illegible] remembered that the organization and military have [illegible] be been extent must be [illegible]. The attempt to [illegible] declaration and freedom to a conquered people while [illegible] in their country [illegible] in history. [illegible] considered that [illegible] Military government [illegible] for the duration of the war, and that [illegible] when in Sicily, Calabria and Campania up to October 13, 1943, [illegible] that date the Badoglio Government declared war on Germany and Italy was [illegible] a "co-belligerent". In the words of Churchill, Italy was [illegible] to be given the opportunity, in spite of the fact that she had entered and [illegible] the United Nations (and at a time when it was conceivable that she could have [illegible] the balance against Hitler's defeat) to "work her passage home".

The Allied Control Commission was established to [illegible] that opportunity possible. Part of the job, [illegible] to allow the Italians to play [illegible] in the effort to rule [illegible] Italy - through the press, through free assembly, through the formation of labour [illegible], and through the [illegible] of an Italian Government based on the truly representative [illegible] of the population. The extent to which these [illegible] of democracy could not [illegible] prevented by the necessities of war. While the war rages in Italy, elections and parties are out of the question, and it is clearly impossible to achieve any final solution of institutional problems until the voice of all Italy is free.

Nevertheless, even with such inevitable limitations, much has been achieved. Throughout Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy, local government, the basis of all democracy, is getting into its stride. Labour unions, both industrial and agricultural, have been set up with power to hold meetings and conduct negotiations. Schools and Universities, cleared of fascist teachers and teachers, are beginning to function normally. The Italian Government has been broadened to include representatives of the six parties included in the Committee of Liberation. The political picture is therefore one of a people finding their way - and their own way - towards the freedom and democratic self-government which they lost 22 years ago.

The economic and humanitarian picture cannot, under war conditions, be altogether a happy one. Although the United Nations has brought no less than 100,000 tons of grain per month into Italy for Italian civilians alone - and Southern Italy should be self-sufficient in grain - the Black Market, condoned and encouraged by Italians themselves, has prevented full supplies from reaching the whole Italian people. Nevertheless there has been no starvation - and no conditions comparable with those of Greece or

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[illegible] - in Southern Italy, and the general high level of public health shows that food conditions are, if not luxurious, at least adequate. With the suppression of the Black Market these conditions are improving and will improve. The inflation of the currency, an inevitable factor in the invasion of any country by large armed forces, has been followed by a corresponding increase in wages; and energetic steps have been taken to prevent further inflation. In the field of relief and welfare, over 50,000 Italian refugees, and nearly the same number of other nationalities have been cared for; among other things, 90,000 parcels have been distributed, and epidemics have been successfully arrested or avoided by vaccination, inoculation and disinfestation. Sicily now presents a picture of life as nearly approaching normal conditions as war will permit, and southern Italy is nearing the same standard.

The Allied Control Commission is not in Italy, however, for purely philanthropic ends: it is here because the United Nations are winning the war and because Italy declared war against them; it is here to see that justice is done and that those responsible for fascism and war do not escape. It is here, too, to temper justice with mercy, because that is the intention and desire of the United Nations. In that task it associates itself with all those Italians who have refused to support fascism and who are prepared to work for a world in which honesty, tolerance and justice shall prevail."

ITALIAN WAR PRISONERS

12. In his message of July 30, 1943 to the Italian people, Gen. [illegible] stated:

> "Your sons will return to their normal life and to their productive avocations, and, provided all British and Allied prisoners now in your hands are restored safely to us and not taken away to Germany, the hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners captured by us in Tunisia and Sicily will return to the countless Italian homes who long for them."

After the Armistice was signed, the Italian Government [illegible] to the best of its abilities within limits established [illegible] Allies, to the clause providing for the liberation of Allied [illegible] of war. The Italian people, in spite of German and Fascist [illegible] attempting anyone doing so, gave unfailing assistance of [illegible], food and clothing to Allied prisoners trying to escape to [illegible]. In this way not only countless soldiers and junior officers were able to reach the Allied lines, but even the highest [illegible] officers, as [illegible] Gen. O'Connor, Lt. Gen. Neame and Air Marshal [illegible] escape was only made possible through Italian assistance.

[illegible] were formed for armed bands in Northern Italy and to this

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[illegible] day are living in the mountains three feet and [illegible] [illegible] made by the military population to [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]

On November 9, 1943, on the occasion of the signing of [illegible] of mutual assistance among the United Nations, President [illegible] mentioned among other things that the Italian Nation have [illegible] preparations to aid and humanitarian assistance for the [illegible] of war prisoners. The Italian government through [illegible] of the difficulties that arose in the implementation [illegible] of Gen. Eisenhower and the declaration of President [illegible], concerned itself from the very beginning with the task [illegible] about a mutual utilization of the Italian war prisoners [illegible] against Germany. Italian prisoners in Allied [illegible] totaled 15,500 officers and about 410,000 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

Proposals along these lines were formulated by the Italian government as early as October 3, 1943 to the Allied Military Mission. [illegible] were repeated on October 11 and October 26 by the Italian High [illegible] Since then they have been repeated on countless occasions, [illegible] results. In addition discussions between Provost Marshal [illegible], General McNarney and General Cannera, then a prisoner [illegible] United States, were going on in Washington in November 1943 on [illegible] which was being studied a project for the military organization [illegible] Italian P.O.W. either for their use in auxiliary services in [illegible] their preparation to do combat service on the Italian [illegible] According to advices transmitted by General Cannera, this [illegible] received the approval in form of the American authorities [illegible] amended into a general plan which was to be submitted [illegible] the Italian government and the government of Great [illegible] that the plan could be applied to the prisoners of war also [illegible] not only of the U.S. but also the British Commonwealth.

However, in January 1944 the Allies presented a project [illegible] and employment of the prisoners of war totally [illegible] was not discussed at Washington. The Allies for

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[illegible] and juridical [illegible] in [illegible] that the status of prisoners of war be maintained but [illegible] that the Italian government [illegible] the rights contained in the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 in reference to war. Article 2 of the Proposal provided that the Italian troops [illegible], at the absolute discretion of the governments of Great Britain, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, Canada [illegible] enrolled as volunteers in regular service in units or formations organized on a military basis, or, on the other hand, be employed under the command not only of North Africa or Great Britain but [illegible] other of the United Nations in whatever part of the world, in whatever capacity which would be considered in furtherance of the common cause by way of the aforesaid governments.

The Italian government on its own account was obliged to take into account the reaction of public opinion of the people [illegible] Italy as well as of occupied Italy. The people in [illegible] sections of Italy would have severely criticized the [illegible] government to the serious injury of the common cause had [illegible] such a proposal according to the terms of which Italian soldiers who would be required to work for the common cause [illegible] to the extent of fighting in the front lines would [illegible] carrying the stigma of Prisoners of War. Certainly the Italian government could not conscientiously agree to such proposals notwithstanding its deep desire to make use of these prisoners [illegible] the earliest moment in the fight against Germany. In this regard the Italian government proposed that,

> "a small mixed Commission of Italian, English and American membership be immediately formed to study the question which appeared to be too complicated and which touched so heavily and directly all the Italian nation and which could not be resolved by a procedure of too great haste. Such commission should have the duty to continue discussions on the basis of the plans made at Washington between the American military authorities and General Cassera with the object of arriving at an agreement as soon as possible."

These Italian proposals have not yet brought any concrete [illegible] in the meantime various of the governments have utilized the Italian P.O.W. according to their own devices without even

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[illegible] the status of prisoners [illegible] Italian government [illegible] the Italian government learned from the Sept 15, 1943 issue [illegible] that the U.S. War Department announced that [illegible] Italian prisoners of war [illegible] 50,000 are located in the U.S., any volunteers in the U.S. Army, [illegible] will be used as [illegible] labor, [illegible] but are [illegible] [illegible] the General Headquarters of Public Security, General Pinochet, chief Italian P.O.W. in India, that as [illegible] of the use of Italian prisoners [illegible] was signed between the Indian Nations and the Italian government. [illegible] General Pinochet to make this fact known to the Italian [illegible], and to make a propaganda tour for this purpose through the various prison camps in India. This General Pinochet did in good faith without knowledge that he had been ill-informed.

10. One of the aspects of the P.O.W. problem that has caused great concern to the Italian government is that which has to do with the Italian P.O.W. in Jewish hands.

The Italian government was surprised to have discovered that Italian P.O.W. captured by American and British troops in North Africa had been turned over to the French authorities under the Committee of Liberation of Algiers. Such treatment - which had serious effects on the morale of those prisoners who instead of finding themselves freed discovered that they were transferred to another Power - finds no support in international law customs. [illegible] that French units were interspersed among the Anglo-American forces cannot be used as justification for the capturing nation has no right to transfer prisoners even to an ally. The proof of this principle is found so well illustrated in the vigorous protest letter of August 1943 by the British government regarding the alleged transfer of English prisoners in Italian hands to Germany [illegible] transfer the British government claimed was illegal.

Beyond that, the existence of an armistice between Italy [illegible] allied Powers should have, in the light of Article 75 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, induced them to consult officially with the Italian government, which would not have hesitated to [illegible] its position in view of the existence of a

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[illegible] to of [illegible]

But, apart from the political consideration of the question, the treatment these prisoners received from the French raises serious problems. The Italian government continued to receive from various sources detailed reports on the inhuman treatment accorded our prisoners in many instances.

These reports principally showed the following:

1) Corporal punishment
2) Insufficiency of dress and shoes
3) Insufficiency of food
4) Ill-treatment, morally as well as physically
5) Widespread illnesses and lack of medical care
6) Complete absence of organizations of assistance as required by the International conventions.

All these are infractions of the conventions of war on [illegible]. Here are a few typical instances taken at random from the thousands of cases registered in our files:

On June 24, 1943 in the French Camp of "La Cagna" (Tunisia) on account of the flight of an Italian prisoner during the night a group of 100 prisoners was punished. This group was compelled to sit under the sun from 8:30 until 7 P.M. and obligated to alternate a position of 40 minutes standing and 20 minutes sitting. Besides the whole group during the entire day was deprived of its meals, [illegible] of the escaped prisoner because he could not give the dog-tag number of the escaped prisoner was beaten with a raw-hide [illegible] in the presence of the Commander of the Camp. On that day two of the group of 100 were felled by sun-stroke.

During the same month, June 1943, at the "L'Ariana" Camp (Tunisia) an Italian doctor was forced to perform a surgical operation by using a Gillette razor blade because the French would [illegible] the sick prisoner to go to a hospital.

During this early period the food was below elementary requirements. Just a little tea was given for breakfast and for the other two meals a few fava beans and some carrots. In some [illegible] in Tunisia it became the meals amounted to giving one carrot a day to every three persons. Even spiritual assistance was hampered and the military chaplains were forbidden to explain the

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[illegible] the enemy Dunk.

But even later the situation [illegible] were kept more at random from our files.

On March 17, 1944, near [illegible] 21 miles [illegible] there 26 Italian P.O.W. [illegible] the labor group, Corporal Ferridiano, complained about the [illegible] food. In response he was insulted and threatened with [illegible] and his companions returned to their living quarters and refused to work.

[illegible] P.M. on the same day there appeared the punitive police [illegible] by a master Sergeant with six French soldiers carrying [illegible]. The purpose to terrorize the prisoners first entered [illegible] barrack direction. Then he forced them to throw over their soldiers their field pack and sacks into the courtyard. During [illegible] this the French soldiers stole all the personal belongings [illegible] the prisoners (such as cigarettes, soap, etc., which they had [illegible] given by other prisoners still in American hands). In the courtyard they were tortured, insulted, beaten, must open and [illegible] to march around on their knees with the field pack on their [illegible]. The one treated the worst was Corporal Ferridiano who after [illegible] rest was not yet able to do any work. The soldiers [illegible] were injured with the bayonet.

[illegible] on lands administered by a French Captain, [illegible] Italian [illegible] work for more than two months. At first [illegible] 37 in number but now they are only 11 for 6 have escaped. [illegible] subjected these prisoners to the most inhuman [illegible]. He forced them to work from sunrise to sunset and fed [illegible] a starvation level. They would not be able to live were [illegible] food given them by their countrymen who live [illegible] in violation of his discipline - natural [illegible] his humanity - Scotto placed them in a prison [illegible] consisting of a large cement barrel having a small opening for [illegible] to [illegible] only given. All the attempts made by these [illegible] to confer with the French authorities have come to naught.

These and numerous other incidents in our files show [illegible] the very first moment of their capture violations were [illegible] of the preamble of the Geneva Convention of July 29,

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[illegible] as well as the provisions of articles [illegible] and [illegible]. And during their state of captivity no heed has been given to the regulations [illegible] in Article 10 as follows, [illegible] on food, 12 on dress, 13 on [illegible], 14 on spiritual [illegible], 15 on financial matters [illegible], 17, 19, 20 and 10 on working conditions, 21 on salaries, [illegible] on complaints and representations of the P.O.W.

An investigation reveals to be apparent that the German P.O.W. were treated much better than the Italians. The Italian government vitally concerned about the situation made every [illegible] to [illegible] diplomatic to bring the matter to the foregoing and expose the facts in the light of day. Among the many attempts made for that purpose were many requests made by General Castellano, Head of the Italian Military Mission at Algiers, for permission to visit the camps, but his requests were hardly answered on December 13, 1943. Then he [illegible] to wait until January 16, 1944 for advice on the conditions of his visit which, he was told, could not take place until after [illegible] 1, 1944. Even the representatives of the Protecting Power of [illegible] interests in North Africa complained that they too were not [illegible] visit the camps of Italian P.O.W. in French hands.

[illegible] the foregoing it can be seen that although more [illegible] have elapsed from the signing of the Armistice the [illegible] Italian War Prisoners has not yet been solved nor [illegible] serious attention. Notwithstanding the promises [illegible] prisoners that have been repatriated have remained only [illegible] kind. The Italian people find it hard to understand [illegible] even as far as bringing back to liberated [illegible] for the common cause groups of Italian P.O.W. keeping [illegible] in the condition of prisoners and maintaining in prison [illegible] those P.O.W. who come from the German occupied region [illegible] liberty on parole only to those who come from Sicily.

[illegible] it necessary to arrive at an agreement [illegible] government and the Allied governments on the [illegible] of the Italian P.O.W. and on the best use that [illegible] in the interest of the common cause, and

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[illegible] necessary to organize a [illegible] of [illegible] the organization of [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] in Italy against the Germans. [illegible] [illegible] a large number of [illegible] [illegible] years of experience in [illegible] [illegible] are, early and organize that are [illegible] [illegible] 1943 many units could be formed and [illegible] [illegible] Italy. This should be done immediately [illegible] and spirit of [illegible] [illegible] destroyed in [illegible]. Then, to keep 150,000 Italian soldiers in [illegible] prevent the Allies from using their most [illegible] efforts in view of the Quebec Conversations. [illegible] was on many occasions stated the position [illegible] to utilize these prisoners at the earliest [illegible] free soldiers willing to fight for the triumph [illegible] cause, and in this it feels sure it is in property [illegible] of the Italian people.

MOSCOW DECLARATION ON ITALY

[illegible] herein how Italy has complied with the [illegible] declaration on Italy. We shall consider the [illegible] declaration in their order.

> "[illegible] essential that the Italian Government [illegible] be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections [illegible] Italian people who have always opposed [illegible]".

[illegible] been accomplished to a point even beyond the ex[illegible] most hopeful persons in and out of Italy. In the [illegible] reorganized all the recognized anti-fascist [illegible] Socialist, Neo-Christian (the old Partito [illegible] Popolare), Partito Liberale of the great world[illegible] Democrazia del Lavoro of Prime [illegible] Partito d'Azione that is an off-spring [illegible] Bonomi. Each party has several ministerial [illegible] portfolios. In order to introduce into the [illegible] of high calibre and international anti-[illegible] ministers without portfolio were appointed.

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[illegible] Italian Communist Party, Italian [illegible] (Communist Party in Italy), Giulio Pieraccini (Socialist Party) and Pietro Nenni, a Socialist and the revived Socialist Party. This wholly representative committee not only has received the full support of the people in liberated Italy but has also been given the full collaboration of the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as expressed in the following telegram lately received:

> "The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy has decided to give its full collaboration to the Italian Government. It requests that it be recognized as an ally of the Italian Government and that it be given sufficient aid to conduct the war on behalf of the common cause."

> "2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be ensured in full measure to the Italian people; they shall be entitled to form anti-fascist political groups."

In relation to this point in much earlier to the later Italian [illegible] this declaration to the effect that for long as military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff". Nevertheless such [illegible] was done by the Italian government on its own initiative between July 25, 1943 and September 8, the date of the publication of the Armistice. It should be remembered that all of these personal liberties are provided for and protected in the Italian Constitution of 1848, and were respected by all the Italian governments until the Fascist regime destroyed them by passing laws that violated the Constitution. All these liberties are at present enjoyed by the people in liberated Italy except insofar as they have been [illegible], limited or controlled either directly by the Allied authorities [illegible] their request in view of the continuance of military operations in Italy. On January 20, 1944 the Italian government passed a law-decree abolishing all Fascist racial laws

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[illegible] of the Junta and all the rights and privileges enjoyed by all other Italian citizens whether living in Italy or abroad.

"b. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime must be suppressed."

"c. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from administration and from institutions and organizations of public character."

Immediately after assuming power the government abolished Fascist Grand Council, the Fascist National [illegible] of the Fasci and Corporations (that had been substituted for the Chamber of Deputies) and the Fascist Militia.

On December 26, 1943 the Italian government issued a Decree-Law [illegible] all persons holding public or semi-public offices or positions in local or state or semi-governmental agencies or in any private agency vested with a public interest who had taken active part in the Fascist Party or having been a "squadrista, [illegible], gerarca or sciarpa littorio" subject to removal from his or her office or position. On April 12, 1944 a special [illegible] was created to administer the above law of "defascistization" of governmental agencies. On April 19, 1944 in pursuance of all the decree-laws that had been passed for the suppression of the Fascist organizations in the nation a "High Commissioner for the Suppression of Fascism from the National Life" was created and Tito [illegible] was named as High Commissioner. Tamburini attempted Mussolini's life and had spent eighteen years in prison for having [illegible] failed to assassinate him. But the most sweeping and [illegible] decree-law has just recently been passed on May 26, 1944 providing for the punishment of Fascist crimes and illegal acts. Count [illegible], Minister Without Portfolio, has been charged by the [illegible] with the responsibility of seeing that this law is properly and justly enforced. The principal and most noted persons that this law provides are:

a. those who promoted or directed the insurrection known as the March on Rome of October 28, 1922 - Punishment: life imprisonment or death according to circumstances.

b. those who organized Fascist armed bands who promoted or directed the commission of grave acts of violence or injury to persons or organizations - Punishment: 5

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[illegible]

[illegible] 15 years [illegible] political rights for life.

[illegible] Some [illegible] of the [illegible] of January [illegible] and [illegible] the later contributed by [illegible] to the maintenance of [illegible] 7 to 15 years imprisonment and the [illegible] of all political rights for life.

[illegible] that is not only [illegible] but also [illegible] the application is indisputable proof that the Italian people are determined to eradicate from their national life the evils of [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] all political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and reported [illegible].

[illegible] assuming power on July 25, 1943 the Badoglio Government released many of these prisoners through the Ministry of Justice. [illegible] men like Ugo Sacchi, leader of the Socialist Party [illegible] presently in Roma and Antonio Pesenti, a member of the Communist Party who holds the position of Undersecretary of Finance in the present government. Tito Zanibonti, above mentioned, now holds [illegible] position of Commissioner of Aid to Italian Refugees. There can [illegible] that upon getting full control of Italian territory the Italian government will immediately release all such prisoners and [illegible] who were responsible for their incarceration under the [illegible] regime.

"6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created."

Prior to Fascism all local communities enjoyed a large [illegible] of local autonomous government. The Cities and Communes [illegible] their own Mayors and Councils and the Provincial Councils were also elected by the people of the province. The major federal [illegible] was the Provincial Prefect who was a career civil and represented the interests of the central national government. Because [illegible] absolute control of the local governments the [illegible] abolished all this structure of local self-[illegible] by substituting the system of hierarchical appointments. [illegible] time while there is A.G.G. control no system of [illegible] self-government can be set up. There is no doubt

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[illegible] that a [illegible] exists of [illegible] in the [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible] of thousands.

The following is a list of localities in which other new reported German Italian, patriot bands and Italian Partisan groups:

[illegible] - Valley Vermenagna and Valley Gesso - Borgo Valley Grotto, Garaglia, Ellero and [illegible]

Valdieserta - Lake Maggiore - Stella - Ossola - Anglia

Valley Strona - Cusano - Borgosesia Vercelli (Major Galleani, Commander of this band died while fighting the Germans in the south of Vercelli)

[illegible] - Bergamasche Alps - Valley Brembia

[illegible] - Mount Grappa (recently the band was attacked by a German force of 2500 men)

[illegible] - Bolzanese Apennines

[illegible] - Mount San Violino - Cingoli - Jesi-Ancona

[illegible] - Mount Falterona

In all of Northern Italy there exist "regional commands" that are [illegible] with the Italian Supreme Command located in Liberated Italy. In all the principal centers there are "Military Committees of Liberation". Although all possible aid is sent these resistance groups by the Allied authorities as well as by the Italian Command yet these fighting men are mainly supplied by the Italian patriotic [illegible] in that area. Then in addition to these small or large [illegible] bands there are the millions of patriotic Italians who fight the HATE-FAS IST enemy however and wherever they can.

I shall give an example of the fighting that was done [illegible] bands in the area of the Provinces of Cuneo during the [illegible] during German mopping up operations against these [illegible]

[illegible] the months of January and February a strong force [illegible] troops were sent in this area to clean out the [illegible] a great amount of sabotage. The SS troops [illegible] because the bands were clever enough to retire [illegible] in the mountains. Towards the end of February the [illegible] their task of mopping up with a much larger

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[illegible] of March [illegible] kept [illegible]. [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible]. After five [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] of March the Germans launched an organized and [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] to these groups in the valleys north of the [illegible] area. This time they employed about 10,000 men. [illegible] the course of the fighting that ensued the following events occurred:

1. March 15 - contemporaneous [illegible] commanders in the valleys of Pesio, Ellero, Grusaglia and Casotto - the band of Valley Grusaglia after indecisive fighting withdrew.

   March 16 - after indecisive fighting against greatly superior numbers the band of Valley Casotto withdrew at [illegible].

   March 18 - the bands of these two Valleys (Grusaglia and Casotto) after the events of the preceding days united their forces and attacked the Germans in the high valley of Casotto and began driving them towards the town of Paraparato. In the meantime the Germans from the south occupy Ormea. The valleys of Ellero and Pesio are blocked while the Italian patriots momentarily await an enemy attack.

   March 23 - The German Command providing liberty proposes conditions of surrender to the bands of the Ellero and Pesio valleys. The proposal is refused.

   March 25 - The Germans make a second proposal of surrender and this is also refused by the patriots.

   March 26 - The band of the Ellero valley is attacked, withstands the blow and withdraws safely. The band in the valley of Pesio is still blocked.

   March 30 - The band of the Pesio valley organizes itself in the mountain, remains blocked but the enemy does not attack in force. In two patrol encounters 14 Nazis are wounded and only one patriot.

   April 7 - Large German forces attack the Pesio valleys.

These operations against the bands of the Cuneese beginning [illegible] January 1944 necessitated on the part of the Germans the employment of a large volume of troops over a long period of time. Yet they achieved no appreciable results for the Italian bands taking advantage of the terrain have known how to attack when suitable and to retreat and withdraw after having inflicted considerable losses. Thus after the cycle of operations by the Germans had spent

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[illegible]

[illegible] these bands [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] line of [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible].

Following are the [illegible] recently received from the [illegible] of the Marche [illegible] Kra a [illegible] and [illegible] operations:

> "Everywhere there are [illegible] battles against superior German and Italian forces. Our [illegible] [illegible] land that the enemies, [illegible] all the [illegible] of the Marches are [illegible] [illegible] right, while soldiers, [illegible] and [illegible] children are [illegible] bodies of dead dead, [illegible].
> I have by miracle [illegible] from the cemetery of [illegible]. [illegible] German people have instituted an [illegible] terror, but [illegible] can tell what they are doing."

Following is a translation of a document found on the person of a German prisoner, clearly indicating that there is no [illegible] the German forces anywhere in occupied Italy:

FIRST MOUNTAIN DIVISION

From the Division Headquarters
March 30, 1944

[illegible] BELGIAN [illegible]

[illegible] March 23 anti-German elements organized in the centre of [illegible] ambuscade against a column of German police as the [illegible] after having thrown three tubes of nitro-glycerine they [illegible] with automatic pistols and machine guns from the roofs, [illegible] and the small windows of the centers. During the fray [illegible] were killed and 38 others were wounded. In other [illegible] city, particularly in the regions of the periphery, there were other isolated attacks made with hand grenades and pistols [illegible] against isolated German vehicles. In reprisal it has been [illegible] that for every German killed 10 Belgian nationals would be massacred. Already 350 people have been executed.

[illegible] confirmed that lately there has been an increase in the activities of enemy bands. Originally their activities were limited to attacks against isolated German vehicles.

[illegible] partisan and sabotage activities are practically going on all over Italy.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

4. The measures of punitive nature such as imposed by municipal authorities [illegible] civilian population. The behaviour of the civilian population, [illegible] to the area of the highways to the north, must be [illegible] the strictest penalties [illegible] the local military authority, [illegible] the section, [illegible] and up all the directional road blocks. Deportation of [illegible] women and acts of incendiarism on the part of the civilian population should be communicated by the most rapid means to the information section of this division. In such cases the division officials will act with the greatest severity.

5. As a defence against probability of attack formations on march and the personnel of each vehicle must have their weapons always loaded and always warmed. Drivers of included vehicles should carry also, as many hand grenades as possible.

6. Attention is called again to the permanent order to the effect that soldiers who leave their barracks must go fully armed at all times.

7. The commanding officers of all ranks must constantly combat the typical blind faith of the German soldier in the civilian population of a foreign country. Into the mind of every man there must be implanted by constant repetition the idea that every civilian is a potential agent or saboteur who will take advantage of trustful [illegible] the German soldier to do him harm.

By order of the Division Commander.
Signed: Prehl

From other sources of information we know that the greatest part of the patriots refused the offer of amnesty that ended at [illegible] of the 24th day of May, that there are continued attacks against the buildings occupied by the Fascists and Nazis, the [illegible] residences have to be protected by armed guards, and that [illegible] of the Fascist hierarchs are being killed, among them lately [illegible] the Fascist Minister of the Navy.

The organized and unorganized resistance and fighting that [illegible] is still being done by the Italian people in the German occupied part of Italy has by now received world-wide and [illegible] military recognition. In his recent statement U.S. [illegible] in Germany praised the acts of sabotage done

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[illegible] the Italian patriots on, [illegible] to prevent the outbreaks be carried out [illegible] and operations.

On May 17, [illegible] Italian patriots [illegible] that the headquarters of General Alexander

On the same day the General Headquarters of General Alexander issued the following communique on the activities of the Italian patriots:

> "A battalion of Alpine troops of the FOLGORE Division has joined with a group of American anti-Nazis and has large formed a strong stronghold that harasses German bases in the Vittorio Veneto region. Other groups of patriots control the area between Lake Como and the Swiss border."

On May 23 the General Headquarters of General Alexander issued the following communique:

> "Patriots of the first and second brigades GARIBALDI control vast areas and many inhabited localities in Piedmont, in the Emilia, in Tuscany, and in the Marche."

In fact the Headquarters of General Alexander now issues a bulletin on the activities of the Italian Front of Patriot Liberation.

The bulletin of May 20 stated that at least 6 German divisions were held in northern Italy by the activities of the Italian Front of Liberation, which may happen at any moment, prevent from using these 6 Divisions against the Anglo-American Fifth and Eighth Armies."

The recent offensive for the taking of Rome has been a hard and bloody one. Who can say what the outcome would have been if the 20 German divisions had been hurled against the Allied forces at a critical moment during the numerous attacks to stop the tide of Allied victory?

In addition to the constant warfare that the Italian patriots in Northern Italy have waged against the German invader they have not hesitated to cripple the German and Fascist war machine by means of the SIMONI. Undaunted by all the threats

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[illegible] when they were imprisoned and [illegible] in concentration
[illegible] and [illegible] other [illegible] population in [illegible]
[illegible] Italy. In this [illegible] let us quote from the [illegible]
[illegible] "Sharp Temper" of August 26, 1944:

"The general strike lasted [illegible] to hours. It involved not
only the industrial workers of the great cities of Milan, Turin,
and Genoa, but also those in small industries in the provinces.
[illegible] from the streets of Milan came the sound of [illegible] as
[illegible] passed as if by magic. Operators stopped their machinery,
[illegible] transportation facilities, and office employees walked out.
[illegible] and managers cooperated. The workers then silently
[illegible] the factories and, obeying the orders of the organizers,
[illegible] to their homes."

[illegible] the Swiss paper "Bovero" of Bellinzona adds:

"The strikers were a dense scheerend and greatly alarmed
[illegible] the experiment proved formidable and since it succeeded,
[illegible] workers are ready to obey any orders against their
[illegible] measure when the moment arrives."

In conclusion let us add that workers in Italy is the German
[illegible] hated and detested like in Northern Italy. The Italian
[illegible] these parts cannot forget that periodically for centuries
[illegible] and their lands laid waste by these Teutonic
[illegible] last her part of Northern Italy was invaded and
[illegible] the German army. Many fathers and brothers still living
[illegible] the wounds they received at the hands of the Germans
[illegible] his traditional hatred and the great love that the
[illegible] feels for his country drives him relentlessly
[illegible] sacrifices may be needed in order to "drive the
[illegible] out."

It must also be stressed that while armed resistance to the
[illegible] sabotage activities were so prominent in occupied Italy,
[illegible] regime not a single sabotage attempt has occurred
[illegible] enormous amount of Allied material and equipment is
[illegible] throughout Southern Italy.

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[illegible]

[illegible] after the publication of the Armistice the Italian Air Force consisted of the following:

115 fighter and fighter planes
90 transport and other planes
50 hydroplanes
20 planes of miscellaneous types

335 total

The land organization and services were still in disorder, existing conditions in the provinces of Naples and the islands of Sicilia, but in the other regions they had been destroyed. Some of the industrial plants are located in occupied and [illegible] Italy (which has been) under German domination.

Yet with the meager means at hand the Italian Air Force [illegible] the following services from September 8, 1943 to [illegible] 1, [illegible] as its contribution in the war against Germany:

Hours of flight	14,500
Number of missions	9,000
Bombs dropped, lbs.	10,000
Rounds fired	100,000
Supplies air-flown to fighting troops, kg.	150,000
Shipwrecked and wounded picked up	119
Mail and material flown kg.	900,000
Passengers transported	9,500
Miles of flights	2,000,000

In the course of the foregoing activities, subject to [illegible] control and limitations by the ACC, the Italian Air Force also performed the following military operations:

1. Heavy and anti-personnel bombardments, machine gunning and reconnaissance in the Italian peninsula (western zone). In Normandy over 100 military vehicles were destroyed by the Air Force.

2. Anti-submarine escort and search of ship-wrecked men in the Ionian and Adriatic seas.

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[illegible]

In [illegible] of war [illegible] in the [illegible] in [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the Balkans and Greek Aegean.

In these operations the air force [illegible] the following losses from September 8, 1943 to April 25, 1944:

Dead - 89 men
Lost - 25 men

The work of the Italian Air Force was praised highly by Lieut. Air Marshal Foster, head of the Subcommission of the Air Forces of the ACC, in a message issued by him when he left Italy in March 1944. The London Times of April 25, 1944 published an article describing and praising the results accomplished by the Italian Air Force against all odds and difficulties. In his answer to the House of Commons on March 24, 1944 Prime Minister said in this regard:

> "The Italian Air Force that remained faithful has fought so well that I am making particular efforts to furnish it with better planes of British construction."

It might be well to emphasize that in all of the foregoing [illegible] services rendered, Italian equipment exclusively has [illegible].

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE

[illegible] The activities of the Italian Air Force have been limited and [illegible] strictly subject to the minute control of the ACC and [illegible] allied air authorities. In particular, the ACC has limited [illegible] the Italians the area over which the air force is permitted [illegible] military operations. All operations have had to [illegible] submitted to the Head of the Sub-commission of Auto-[illegible] the A.M. Thus what was expected to be only a control

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[illegible] demand by the AFS to give the Italian [illegible] [illegible] the Germans were completely shattered in [illegible] from their own air force located in the Italian [illegible] In all the fighting the use of Italian bombing planes [illegible] dive bombing missions, and has experimented with a few [illegible] the use of radio communication between land stations or [illegible] stations and planes in flight.

[illegible] planes that have been used in these operations are of [illegible] and on account of lack of repairs and spare [illegible] parts is very doubtful. Since the 8th of [illegible], because of the lack of airplane factories in [illegible] Italy we no material aid has been given us by the [illegible] and, they have been kept alive by the patient and rational [illegible] and parts recovered from Sicily, Sardinia and [illegible]. Even these have now become exhausted as now [illegible] and are necessary that aid be received from [illegible]. The most pressing of needs are planes and new [illegible]. [illegible] Italian air force has within its ranks a large mass [illegible] and [illegible] of high professional abilities and [illegible] be very capable of using and maintaining at a high rate of [illegible] all planes and equipment.

[illegible] the Italian air personnel actually available at this [illegible] specialists, mechanics and supervisory) a total [illegible] could be manned on the basis of 60% for pursuit, [illegible] 10% for sea planes. If at least 500 aviation [illegible] could be released and integrated in [illegible] equal to additional 500 planes could be kept [illegible] a total of 1,600 planes. The planes of the [illegible] found safety in Southern Italy after the [illegible] are now reduced to 250. The Italian [illegible] today are lying about idle and for nothing [illegible] given a chance to right and strike their [illegible] the enlargement of the ocean victory.

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ITALIAN NAVAL [illegible]

[illegible] The important contribution that the Italian Navy has made to the war against the common enemy has been in other recognition by the highest Allied authorities that it might make [illegible] mention in more in detail. We refer to the speeches of Prime Minister Churchill on February 22, 1944 and on March 24, 1944, and to the statement of Admiral John Cunningham, Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Area, on May 18, 1944. Therefore we shall confine ourselves here to the principal items.

Immediately after the events that succeeded the publication of the Armistice the Italian Naval Forces stood as follows:

5 Battleships (one of which was damaged)
9 Cruisers
11 Destroyers
40 Torpedo boats and corvettes
37 Submarines
90 MAS and light torpedo boats
Auxiliary and small boats

All of these units had to be transferred, in pursuance to the terms of the Armistice, some (the large battle units) to Allied bases, some to the bases in Liberated Italy such as Brindisi, La Maddalena and other ports that had been [illegible] by Italian troops against the Germans. Thus, too, the Italian Navy had under its control the important arsenal at Taranto and the efficient territorial organization and many other services in Southern Italy and in Sardinia.

During the period commencing September 8, 1943 and ending [illegible] the Italian Navy performed the following services on behalf of the Allies:

A. 350 war missions employing 432 units covering a total of 130,021 miles.

B. 142 transfer movements covering a total of 119,160 miles.

C. 108 units transported Italian troops and material, covering a total of 28,410 miles and transporting [illegible],212 men.

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[illegible]

4. [illegible]

5. [illegible]

6. [illegible]

The total movements made by units of the Italian Navy from September 8, 1943 to April 30, 1944 amount to 1,[illegible] in number, covering a total distance of [illegible] miles. In the course of these activities the following military operations were performed:

1. Actions of shelling of the eastern coast of the Adriatic;

2. Patrolling along the coasts of the Adriatic sea for the purpose of intercepting, sinking and protecting the landings in Dalmatia;

3. Rescue of Italian and Allied military personnel from Albania and Greece;

4. Numerous minelays by submarines and small transport boats for the transportation of Italian and Allied secret service and sabotage personnel in various localities. In the performance of these services several units were lost;

5. Trips by submarines and destroyers for the furnishing of supplies to troops on the Aegean Islands;

6. Actions by destroyers and torpedo-boats for carrying out German naval forces and patrolling Italian positions, particularly in the Ionian Islands, Sardinia and Corsica. In these actions several units were lost.

During the period beginning September 8, 1943 and ending April 30, 1944 in all its operations the Italian Navy has suffered the following losses:

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1 [illegible] of 35,000 tons (Doria)
4 [illegible]
5 Torpedo-boats
1 Corvette
1 [illegible]
1 Auxiliary cruiser
14 Small Torpedo-boats

During the same period 749 men were killed, 6,459 were injured, 761 were wounded. The percentage of losses in proportion to the total personnel employed amounted to 20%.

Although for security reasons we do not have the figures of the total personnel of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, we are in a position to say on belief that the operations of the Italian Navy represent a high proportion of the total of the Fleet's operations. This, of course, permitted the Allies to release a large number of their ships to serving on the [illegible] fronts.

But even outside the Mediterranean the work of the Italian Navy has become important, as was recognized by Prime Minister Churchill in his speech of May 24th. These activities have consisted chiefly of doing escorting work by fast cruisers based [illegible] for the purpose of intercepting German commerce raiders [illegible] a group of submarines is stationed at Bermuda and another group with its own auxiliary ship is located at Colombo, India.

The personnel of the Italian Navy from September 8, 1943 to March 31, 1944 have performed 350 items of repairs to Allied [illegible] total tonnage of 900,000 on 130 units [illegible] in dry-[illegible] amounting 140,000 man days of labor. On these repairs [illegible] additional 1,000 or more highly skilled [illegible]

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[illegible] Although the Italian [illegible] are rather [illegible], the Italian Navy could have been in good shape [illegible] the German cause but it has preferred to [illegible] the Allies are no longer in an [illegible] position [illegible] and with the fighting spirit [illegible] from the [illegible] [illegible] in fair shape and ready. The [illegible] [illegible] in her dock damaged by a German bomb [illegible] [illegible] repair work is started, as far the Allies have [illegible] [illegible], it will be some difficult and costly to put these ships in serviceable condition later on because of [illegible] [illegible] and harm to the electrical system. The three battleships of 27,000 tons are so fitted with reduced personnel and [illegible] fighting spirits removed from the seacocks, the Littorio [illegible] are ready for action as ships. The cruiser [illegible] [illegible] tons [illegible]. These five battleships are thus not actually [illegible]. Their personnel is insufficient and the equipment [illegible] deteriorating. Later on it will be more difficult for [illegible] them in fighting condition materially but it will [illegible] harder to re-train the personnel needed. So far the [illegible] have given no heed to the numerous requests [illegible] the Italian government to put all these ships in fighting [illegible] to man them with a full complement, so that Italy [illegible] this additional contribution to the war effort against the common enemy.

The personnel of the Italian Navy has been reduced to [illegible] officers and 74,065 men. Of this number 29,000 are on board ships and 1,000 form a regiment that has been fighting on the Cassino front and has taken part in the offensive for the liberation of Rome. Because the requests of the Italian government have not been granted by the Allied authorities we have had to discharge an additional 500 officers and 10,000 men, all of them are highly trained and anxious to fight against the

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[illegible] Italy [illegible] and [illegible] Italy [illegible] Southern Italy there was [illegible] while many [illegible] in Northern Italy [illegible] Southern Italy by crossing the lines of great personal risk. There are no [illegible] against the full utilization of this highly trained group of men. If the 5 divisions were put in serviceable condition a large number of these men could keep themselves in training [illegible] are desirous of fighting the common enemy. It is up to the Allied authorities to permit them to do so.

THE ITALIAN ARMY

WHAT IT HAS DONE

[illegible] Immediately after the publication of the Armistice the strength of the Italian Army on the mainland of liberated Italy and the islands was as follows:

- 5 Mobile divisions
- 12 Divisions for coastal protection
- A variety of minor units
- Services and supplies and military organization, still functioning efficiently in Puglia and Sardinia, seriously disorganized in Calabria, totally disappeared in Sicily and the Campania.
- The total in men of the above forces was 430,000, almost half of which was in Sardinia.

These units were in possession of a scarce amount of transportation facilities and were armed with equipment unsuitable for modern warfare. Notwithstanding such handicaps these troops, as has already been related elsewhere, attacked the German forces immediately and continued to fight alongside the Allied troops until the 25th of September 1943, at which time the Allied Military Mission issued an order coming from a superior authority that the Italian troops were not to participate in any more fighting on the Italian mainland until further orders.

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[illegible]

[illegible] to enter the south Roman [illegible]

[illegible] in battle area of the highest order [illegible]

[illegible] by General Mark Clark on September 24, 1943 to

[illegible] comment in which he said:

> "I want to congratulate the officers and men [illegible] overall on the success of their attack last night on Monte Maggio and on hill [illegible]. This action demonstrated the determination of the Italian soldier to fight hard and bravely for Roman Italy. The determined will of the Italian soldiers to liberate their native soil from the Hun yoke until final victory by fighting over hard and difficult terrain can well be an example to all the other peoples of Europe who are groaning under the Hun yoke."

[illegible] all the requests of the Italian government (which [illegible] later on in this study) for persuasion to [illegible] rehabilitation through the armed forces to the war [illegible] the most just unheeded. In fact the AGO de- [illegible] Italian troops to be sent to the front lines [illegible] 11,000 men. This limited number has been [illegible] by the Allied authorities despite the repeated [illegible] Italian government that it be increased.

[illegible] of the necessity of retention of troops the [illegible] Italian Corps of Liberation now number about [illegible] first troops and 7,000 of paratroops of the [illegible] This contingent of troops has had an active part [illegible] the taking of Rome but not to the ex- [illegible] would have wanted and that had been [illegible] by General Alexander. It has been [illegible] entirely from Italian materials.

[illegible] said that the Italian government furnish also

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[illegible]

The greatest part of this units of Kipsis has already been liquidated.

There are Italian military forces who fulfill units in all kinds of services, from engineers to machine and engineers and groups of laborers. All these troops are rendering valuable services and a large part of them are located in the military operational zones directly behind the front lines (including the Italo beach-head) where they have fully given their contribution in numerous losses in lives. If these remaining troops could be counted as belonging to the Italian Corps of Liberation, in the same manner that other military dressed directly against their war and frontline troops, the actual number of combatant troops would be more than double the number that undoubtedly belong to the Italian Corps of Liberation.

There are also 16,000 Italian soldiers who defend the Italian forces in meaning of anti-aircraft batteries.

The Italian troops have rendered the following services of military value to the common Cause, all of these services having been performed exclusively with Italian equipment and material having the almost total lack of materials.

1. 700 km of highways for motor traffic have been repaired and maintained.

2. About 10 km of new highways constructed.

3. Repaired and put into operation the plant and equipment of the railroad stations of Foggia, Terroli and Taranto; of the warehouse, of the station at S. Nicola and the naval workshops of Taranto at Taranto.

4. Repaired and put in working condition the railroad tracks and switching yards on the rail lines Calabro-Lucane, the freight and passenger yards, of the line Catanzaro Marina and Catanzaro City, and the S. Antonio-Cosenza line.

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[illegible] brigade [illegible]

[illegible] Italian units [illegible] the military [illegible] that was [illegible] after the armistice. [illegible] at [illegible] [illegible] supplied by the [illegible] made in the closest collaboration with the [illegible] have often expressed their highest appreciation [illegible] Italian organizations, for instance:

1. Up to date 21 secret information missions have been sent into the German-occupied zone and 25 reconnaissance missions in the same zone to the north of Italian territory.

2. 23 air-drop supply fields have been organized in the enemy-occupied territory during 21 supply drops were made during a total weight of 57 tons.

[illegible] occupied Italy this secret service organization [illegible] collecting information and per[illegible] [illegible] many persons belonging to the Italian [illegible] organized and directed the bands of Italian [illegible].

The foregoing is only a brief resume of what contribution [illegible] was been permitted to make to "drive the in[illegible]." That it wanted to and could have done [illegible] that find ample proof in our records and files [illegible] in the following section IV.

ITALIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE BALKANS

[illegible] Italy was related, Italian troops in the Balkans [illegible] demobilized after the Armistice was published [illegible] Germans. For several weeks the [illegible] Italian divisions almost all mobile [illegible] Balkan territory, and not in communication [illegible] to a large extent with the Italian govern[illegible] [illegible] various minor autonomous groups. The [illegible] troops were completely gone and no

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supplies were sent to them by the Allies. Later on the Italian government was authorized to re-establish communications with these troops, but although regular contacts have been established with the PINEROLO division that is fighting with the forces of TITO, great difficulties have been encountered in establishing contacts with the small groups that are still fighting in isolated parts of the Balkans.

We shall relate here only facts supported by evidence that come from information which we know to be absolutely reliable; therefore it can be inferred that this is only a very small part of the actual fighting that has gone on.

1. A large part of the PINEROLO division, the AOSTA cavalry regiment and elements from the CASALE and FORLI divisions, who had withdrawn to the mountains of Thessaly in Greece, fought the Germans until October 14, 1943 when the Communist organization ELAS treacherously disarmed them in spite of the protests from the British Military Mission. The Alpine group MANFREDONI of 2,000 men is still fighting in the mountains of Epirus.

2. In Albania remnants from the FIRENZE and MESSINERO divisions and from other minor units are still fighting the Germans in the mountains where they were joined by Albanian patriots.

3. The most important fighting by Italian troops in the Balkans has taken place in Jugo-Slavia. After many combats in which our troops fought the Germans alone or in cooperation with the partisans of TITO, the Italian forces were reorganized in December, 1943 into the new all-Italian GARIBALDI division which is a regular unit of TITO's army. The GARIBALDI division is still fighting in Montenegro and has repulsed the sixth German offensive. Clashes with German and "Chetnik" troops have been very

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[illegible] among the most important being those of [illegible], Plevza, Jabuka, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], Kotina, and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the GARIBALDI.

b. In addition to this air-station division, other Italian units, including the MATTEOTTI building [illegible] [illegible] the partisan cause. According to a statement made by General TITO in his interview with a "[illegible]" [illegible] [illegible] early in May 1944, over 60,000 Italian soldiers are fighting at present in Yugoslavia on the side of the partisans. Italian losses have been very heavy in this [illegible].

[illegible] purpose of assisting the land operations and [illegible] Italian and partisan troops, units of the Italian [illegible] have been into action, engaging in bombing missions, [illegible] [illegible] bombing, reconnaissance, and carrying [illegible]. [illegible] almost every day during the first months [illegible] during the winter months on account of bad [illegible] [illegible] with the coming of spring Italian [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] and the German air and naval bases in Yugoslavia and Albania, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and [illegible] frequently engaging in aerial combats.

[illegible] supplies of munitions, food and clothing, almost always alone, to the partisan groups, particularly in Montenegro, and ferrying back the [illegible]. This is being done under difficult landing [illegible] at the airport of Bari.

[illegible] the Italian fleet and submarines have done very [illegible] the Adriatic in support of TITO's forces. Injured [illegible] are brought to Italy for rest and in Italy

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[illegible] are [illegible] and helped in the Italian operations [illegible]

The courage and the fighting qualities of the Italian troops in Jugo-Slavia have been praised [illegible] by the Allied military [illegible] and by [illegible] [illegible] every day [illegible] October 5, 1944 the Allied radio broadcast official [illegible] to their efforts. For instance,

[illegible] January 3, 1944 London said "The Jugo-Slav radio has announced that during the fighting this week-end in the [illegible] of Bosnia, Italian groups accompanying the Army of Liberation have taken from the enemy thirty small [illegible] Reference is made to the 3rd brigade of [illegible] Garibaldi".

[illegible] January 7, 1944 Moscow radio: "In Jugo-Slavia in the area [illegible] foreign Italian troops in the past few days detachment [illegible] [illegible] of Jorasse and captured a large amount of [illegible]"

[illegible] 23, 1944 London BBC: "According to information from [illegible] sources, in Jugo-Slavia Italian units have launched a [illegible] attack against German positions 20 km east of [illegible]. The battle continues."

[illegible] 25, 1944 London BBC: "Subsequ[illegible] dispatches from the [illegible] headquarters of the Jugo-Slavian Army of Liberation [illegible] that fighting with the Jugo-Slav Army is a full [illegible] division and other smaller groups."

[illegible] April 22, 1944 Marshal TITO sends a message of congratulations and thanks to the Italian division GARIBALDI [illegible] the heroic fighting done by it against the Germans.

[illegible] 1944 London BBC: "The head of the Military [illegible] of Marshal Tito at London, General Velimirovic, said that the Italian division GARIBALDI has reached a good [illegible] of training and constitutes a high-grade combatant [illegible]."

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The Italian troops [redacted] in the order of the Armistice immediately joined with the Allied troops in the [redacted] fight to drive the Germans from Italian territory. During [redacted] days this voluntary aid was asked for and gladly [redacted] by the Allied Command. However, on September 21, 1943, General Eisenhower, head of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian government, verbally communicated an order that he had received from a superior authority that Italian troops were no longer to participate in front-line fighting until further orders. Immediately General Badoglio protested against this decision and on September 22nd he sent a telegram to the Allied Commander-in-chief declaring that the Italian troops wanted to continue fight against the Germans. No response was ever received to this telegram.

On September 29 at the Malta Conference Marshal Badoglio spontaneously offered to utilize all the armed strength and resources of the Italian nation to fight alongside of the Allied forces against the Germans. He particularly offered the parachute division "Nembo" and two infantry divisions then located in Sardinia. But the offer, as shown by the proceedings of the Conference, was turned down by Gen. Alexander who remarked that "the plans for the campaign in Italy have already been definitely prepared in all their details and thus the participation of Italian troops cannot be considered." Although General [illegible] stated at the time: "I am sure General Alexander can [illegible] matter in such a way so that we can arrive at effective [illegible] cooperation. I see no difficulty in permitting Italian [illegible] to cooperate with the first troops to arrive there." [illegible] participation in active fighting against the Germans [illegible] through no fault of our own and in spite [illegible] and repeated efforts, as will be shown later.

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To supplement this [illegible] on October 10, the day [illegible] Contarbarbo, there was [illegible] to keep Eisenhower [illegible] to his Chief of Staff by the Italian High Command a memorandum which Italian authorities were given an opportunity to present at Malta, containing the following proposals of military collaboration: the utilization in the immediate future of seven Italian divisions and of a substantial corps of about 50,000 men, [illegible] in the near future. This would be done exclusively with [illegible] material, and the Allies were fully aware to furnish the means [illegible] to the Italian contingent. The Italian Chiefs in Sardinia [illegible] and to give their permission to receive men and material [illegible] and Calabria. No direct answer was ever received.

On October 3, 1943 an offer was sent to the head of the [illegible] Military Mission to utilize the Italian Prisoners of War [illegible] formation of several large fighting units. This offer [illegible] on October 11, and 16, 1943 by the Italian Supreme [illegible] and has been repeated times, although further steps than [illegible] no positive action has been taken.

A few days later on October 6, 1943 Marshal Badoglio and [illegible] Allied [illegible] who, in principle, declared himself in favor [illegible] active participation by Italian troops in military operations. No concrete steps were taken by the Allied authorities [illegible] conditioning and use of the Italian troops in furtherance of this declaration.

On October 10, 1943 the Italian Supreme Command offered [illegible] first assault Troop Battalion (Arditi), who are particularly trained in sabotage warfare, with the understanding that the [illegible] would provide the air transportation. The answer was in [illegible]

[illegible] October 12, at the time of Italy's formal declaration of [illegible], Marshal Badoglio again wrote to Gen. Eisenhower [illegible]

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[illegible] Italy has declared war on Germany, it is in [illegible] that this be done then a more friendly partner [illegible] is necessary that you take into consideration [illegible] regards to this we may be placed in a position to [illegible] the greatest possible collaboration by the forces under your control. We have written us that the eventual [illegible] of the conditions of the armistice would [illegible] upon the action taken by the Italian Government, [illegible] do not help us I shall be able to give [illegible] more than ever-will."

[illegible] report in that telegram made the following estimate:

"Three troops very useful on account of mountainous [illegible] are [illegible] one, - a total of four divisions, [illegible] transported from Sicilia. The transporting would [illegible] be done by the Allies since they have requisitioned [illegible] ships.

[illegible] divisions could be made ready if we could be given [illegible] our material located in Sicily and Tunisia.

[illegible] Italian prisoners and volunteers there could be [illegible] large units willing to fight for the liberation [illegible] country.

"This is a great hope" - concludes the Marshal - "to [illegible] our blood for the liberation of our country."

[illegible] days later, on October 14, writing to Gen. [illegible] Roosevelt said:

"[illegible] would help us as I have indicated in my letter of [illegible] days ago, you shall see that our efforts will [illegible] and be of great aid to our common cause."

[illegible] October 17 Gen. Taylor informed the Italian [illegible]

"[illegible] it is not our plan to use in military [illegible] other Italian troops outside of the motorized [illegible].

[illegible] to use 10 Italian divisions for the defense [illegible] of communication in the peninsula and the islands, [illegible] for the anti-aircraft and coastal defenses and [illegible] for engineering work. The Italian air-forces [illegible] used only in the Balkans."

[illegible] to our communications was very discouraging.

[illegible], assuring the Allied Command of our fullest [illegible] than we limits indicated by them and reiterating [illegible] greater aid, stressing the fact that in

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[illegible] there [illegible] the [illegible]
[illegible] the Germans.

On October 24, 1943 the Italian High Command [illegible]
[illegible] through the offices of the Italian Embassy [illegible]
the Canadian Ambassador of the possibility [illegible]
of some one Alpine unit [illegible] to engage [illegible]
[illegible] the Allied Groups in Italy and [illegible]
[illegible] lend itself to [illegible] [illegible].

On October 28, 1943 the Italian Supreme Command [illegible]
[illegible] Military Mission at Algiers to offer to the Allied
[illegible] to transfer from Sardinia three divisions of Infantry,
[illegible] of Paratroops, 3 divisions of Coastal Infantry, 1
[illegible] group, Grenadiers, and other minor units - all
[illegible] troops to be used in the battle against the Germans.
[illegible] the answer was in the negative.

On October 30 1943, Eisenhower authorized the readiness of
[illegible] Italian division to fight alongside the Allied troops. The
[illegible] of furnishing and preparing was immediately begun by the
[illegible] Command, who informed the Allied authorities that the
division selected was the LEGNANO. The readiness of this
division has progressed almost to completion in the matter of
training, armament and equipment from exclusive Italian resources.
By a series of communications, some oral and some in writing,
the utilization of this division was so obstructed by the
Allied Military Authorities, even to the point of resorting to
the requisitioning of its draft-animals, that in the end it
[illegible] no longer be prepared for effective military service. A
few days later General Alexander declared that the Italian
[illegible] division would have to be limited to the motorized corps
[illegible] prepared and to a corps of Alpine troops instead of a
[illegible]. The Italian government immediately and again insisted
that Gen. Eisenhower authorize a much larger participation.

On October 28 1943, Eisenhower answered Badoglio's letter
of October 12:

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"I am very sympathetic to the proposition which you have put forward.

"Temporary limitations rule out, for some time to come, a number of your proposals which would be very desirable.

"Once we advance further North in Italy the need for trained mountain troops will become quite acute. The release of Italian mountain troops is a thing which we hope to be able to take full advantage of their assistance in the idea acute.

"The occupation of Rome will undoubtedly necessitate the employment of certain Italian troops."

On November 27, 1943 the new Italian Chief of Staff, Marshal Badoglio, in explaining his program to the Allied Military Mission, indicated the great possibilities of the Italian Army and its needs in personnel and material. No direct answer has ever been received to the proposals.

On January 1st, 1944 the Italian Command insisted again that the troops of the NEMBO division be utilized in conjunction with the Corps that had entered the front lines just a few days before. It was not until the middle of May, 1944 that the 2.3F division was transferred by the Allied Military Mission from Sardinia to the Italian mainland. It was assigned to the Italian Corps of Liberation merely for the purpose of allowing rotation of front-line troops, but with the definite order that at no time must the Corps exceed the maximum fighting strength of 14,100 men as was fixed by an order of the AMG on April 1, 1944.

From these repeated refusals the Italian government drew the inevitable conclusion that while the Allied governments insisted on evidence of greater Italian participation in the war, the Allied Military Authorities were clearly against allowing the Italian armed forces to participate in military operations.

The Italian Army not only did not receive any aid in arms or material for the preparation of combat units but in many cases even the Italian arms which had been gotten together with great difficulty for the arming of its own units were taken away

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[illegible] Allied military authorities and sent to Italy [illegible] countries, besides blocking the use of arms and [illegible] the Allied authorities have requisitioned [illegible] of material, arms and equipment, among which are the following:

[illegible] of 81 and pieces of smaller calibre,

[illegible] portable arms,

[illegible] 000,000 rounds for portable arms,

[illegible] of accessories for underwater arms,

[illegible] particularly crippling, since it made impossible the prepa[illegible] of the projected large army units, and requested by the Allies [illegible] to [illegible] 1943 and one for units in April, 1944. Moreover [illegible] Italians not were anxious to fight the Germans were humiliated not [illegible] taking of their arms away from them but by putting them to [illegible] maintenance of ships and repairers of roads. For [illegible] of civilian manpower was available.

[illegible] case is that which happened in Corsica. The [illegible] contribution made by the Italian troops in [illegible] can be demonstrated not only by the [illegible] Minister Churchill, already quoted, by [illegible] press, as the events were happening, [illegible] witnessed by French generals to the [illegible] commanding our troops in Corsica, by the evi[illegible] superiority of the Italian units and means used [illegible] in proportion to those employed at the [illegible] operations by the Allies and the French, but [illegible] of Italian dead which in all reached [illegible] thousand men.

[illegible] our Italian divisions, which fought for the [illegible] Corsica, it was asked that upon their leaving for

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[illegible] they have in the [illegible] under the main [illegible] French army including a large part of their Italian [illegible] equipment and artillery. In conversations on this subject it was said that this would result [illegible] transportation of material and obviate the [illegible] of [illegible] is certain. It was promised by General [illegible] Minister [illegible] Gen. Bonomi's special envoy to Carolina, that the [illegible] would be replaced with other equipment that would be [illegible] in Italy. This up to now has not been done. A large number of Italian troops varying from five to ten thousand men has never [illegible] continued to render services in Corsica from that [illegible] until now on work of clearing the fields of mines, the building of roads and on other important but [illegible]

The same thing happened to the Italian troops in the Aegean Islands. The [illegible] division and the remnants of the division [illegible] and other [illegible] units after having fought hard and well against the Germans were transferred to Palestine in November and December of 1943 by Allied order. General Belladelli was ordered by the Italian Supreme Command to re-organize these troops into the one division CONDO and in conversations had with General Wilson it was understood that they were to be used as a fighting unit. Instead an order was received from the ACC that this division was to be used for labor services. The Italian authorities protested and insisted that it be used for fighting purposes, but their requests were ignored.

The Allied authorities are constantly making demands upon the Italian Command for troops to perform auxiliary services, such as [illegible] repairs, longshoremen, etc. These requests obstruct the orderly plans of preparing the minimum quota of fighting troops allocated by the ACC and it cuts down the margins needed for the organization of other divisions. The work of road [illegible] and ship unloading, etc. are undoubtedly of great value,

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[illegible]

[illegible] Italian volunteers [illegible] connected to [illegible] by the Allied authorities despite [illegible] they would [illegible] release the morale and spirit of the people. In many cases they were persons who had [illegible] and [illegible] after having [illegible] the German occupation.

The efforts of Colonel Fenulla concerning the [illegible] to bring it from Algiers to Sicily at the Italian [illegible] to be sent to Naples. This legion is anti-Fascist and [illegible] in character for it fought the Germans forces at [illegible] in 1940 and after the fall of Fascism many of their [illegible] joined the GARIBALDI BRIGADE [illegible] the finest [illegible] of the Risorgimento and would have contributed the best [illegible] the past work for the liberation of Italy and the [illegible]. Colonel Fenulla's offer so far has not been [illegible] though these Italian soldiers, who were already fighting the Germans in 1940, were asking only for the chance to [illegible] on behalf of their country's freedom.

The Italian government has repeatedly asked that it be authorized to send a larger number of troops to participate in the [illegible] for the taking of Rome in pursuance to the promise made last July by General Eisenhower. The answer of the AGC was that, insofar as the Italian Army was concerned it would be allowed to send the fixed number of 14,100 of troops and not one more. The Italian Air Force had prepared a battalion of assault troops (arditi) and offered it to the Allied authorities on May 10, 1944 but the answer was again in the negative. The

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[redacted]

Italian spread [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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1. Subcommittee Minutes, Aug. 24, 1942.
2. Historical summary, Aug. 13, 1942.
3. Analysis of Gen. MacArthur's message of Aug. 5.
4. Gen. MacArthur's message transmitting message Stiver to Guinzburg, Aug. 11.
5. Subcommittee Minutes, Aug. 12.
6. Gen. MacArthur's message of Aug. 5.
7. Subcommittee Minutes, July 29.
8. Subcommittee Minutes, July 28.
9. Subcommittee Minutes, July 24.
10. Subcommittee Minutes, July 23.
11. Subcommittee Minutes, July 17.
12. Taylor's explanatory comments on revised plan, July 16.
13. O. S. S. Plan, with Appendices.
14. Subcommittee Minutes, July 13.
15. Subcommittee Minutes, July 9.
16. Subcommittee Minutes, July 8.
17. Hayden's memo of July 4, with attached revised plan.
18. Solbert's reply to WJD's comments on his plan, June 23.
19. Minutes of JPWC meeting, June 18, attended by Buxton and Hayden
20. Letter, June 10, WJD to Solbert, commenting on MIS plan.
21. Taylor's comments on Solbert's plan, June 9.
22. JPWC Paper No. 15, May 18.

MATERIAL IN THIS FOLDER ARE:

a. MIS (Solbert) Plan, June 3.

b. Dennis McEvoy's FIS plan, in back of white folder marked "Japan"

c. Robert Aura Smith's plan - in folder with Crow's and Hayden's comments.

NOTE FOLDER "JPWC MEETINGS" - particularly May 14 minutes of Special Committee appointed to consider Japan Plan.

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July 21, 1953

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Secretary, Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee

Subject: O.S.S. Plan for Organization of Independent Intelligence Courses in the Far East "Pacific Project".

1. The enclosure is a revised proposal of the Chairman on this subject. The original plan was sent to the Joint Intelligence Committee and it has been given consents to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was published as J.C.S. 1[illegible]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at their first meeting, June 17, 1953, referred the proposal to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for comment and recommendation to be considered through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The J.P.W.C. at its 73rd meeting, July 6, 1953 considered this proposal "Pacific Plan" and agreed that, because the project was originally created by the J.I.C., and because the subject is outside of the jurisdiction of the J.P.W.C., the proposal be forwarded to the J.I.C. with the request that report be made to the Joint Staff Planners.

3. It is suggested that consideration be given to passage on this subject which was exchanged between the J.C.S., S-3 and General Hillwell.

A. E. Anthony,
Secretary.

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