

ITALY P. W.
PSYCH. WARFARE

J. W.

A rough draft,
needing further
work. Too wordy.
Hope it can do as
a starter
Boyd Reynolds.

SECRET

C. EXAMINATION OF THE ENEMY SITUATION -- ITALY

(1) History of enemy psychological warfare

Fascist use of psychological warfare began in the confusion of party struggles and quasi-civil warfare in which the party was born. Italy was on the victorious side but had suffered terribly in military casualties and in economic welfare, and felt that she was being treated as a defeated nation. Highly lurid propaganda tactics were devised, combining P. T. Barnum showmanship with the devices developed in all countries in "Win the War" campaigns, 1915-1918, to win support for Mussolini. These efforts were at first made chiefly for home use, but after 1924-1925 were directed at Italian "colonials" abroad and at foreign opinion.

From the start, Fascists put psychological considerations ahead of all others. Instead of doing a thing for its own sake and then lauding or excusing it as might be, they consistently planned psychological effects desired, then visualized appropriate acts upon which propaganda to get those effects could be based, and then carried out those acts for the sake of the effects. Of course events frequently came along over which they had no such

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control; when that happened Fascist psychologists frequently looked silly. But over-all their technique helped greatly to create the illusion of dynamism in their movement, the inoculation of which has in the past been one of our enemies' chief over-all triumphs in the field of psychological warfare against their own peoples and against us.

(2) Survey of the enemy problem

(a) Summary of the situation

When hostilities began the Fascist leadership faced the problem of persuading a very non-belligerent population, still bearing hurts from the last war, inflation, the depression, Ethiopia, Spain, and over-taxation to fight in alliance with the most feared and hated nation in Europe, for territories few wanted that badly. Added to these problems was the graver one, from the point of view of Fascist leaders, that Italy was wearying of Fascism itself.

The survival of Britain, the terrible costs of the Greek, Russian, and Libyan wars, and the entry of the United States into the war have

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further encumbered Fascist psychologists. Their efforts have been directed at belittling the enemies, at exalting Axis invincibility, and at making promises, now reiterated over eighteen years, of better times when these glorious tasks have been achieved.

(b) Effect desired

The main tasks of Italian psychological warfare are to prevent internal disintegration, and by working through Italian colonials chiefly in the Western Hemisphere to give what help it can to German efforts there.

Radio broadcasts are the chief means employed in reaching outside Italy, although contact with subversive elements is also maintained as means allow.

(3) Appraisal of enemy strengths and weaknesses

(a) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation

1. Fascism's 20-year record is both its strength and its weakness. Whatever the facts, it succeeded in convincing a substantial part of Italy's population that it had overcome bolshevism, anarchy, and foreign disdain. It also impressed foreigners

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with that view of the situation. In these triumphs of propaganda it exploited Italian defeatism, 1919-1923, and succeeded in curtaining off many of its own weaknesses. The technique was to center attention by pyrotechnical displays upon what it wanted seen, hiding all other matters in obscurity, and of hypnotizing such spectators as it could.

Of value from the start were strong sentimental affections for Italy found among American and British tourists and residents, the glorious reflections of the Roman Empire and the Italian Renaissance, Catholic respect for the Italian head of the Church (exploitable after 1929), and the peculiar ties of emigrant Italians to Italy. These were played upon in every fashion, most effects being aimed simultaneously at the domestic and the foreign audiences. Mussolini was political boss of a tourists' resort for which he was public relations man, and he made each function supplement the other:

(a) to prove that Italians were clean and efficient

(b) to prove that Italians were bellicose

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and formidable but chivalrous and benign

- (c) to prove that Italy was mistreated and deserved, nay, would win with flaming sword (but economically), her just rights
- (d) to prove that Fascism was better than democracy.

(It should be noted that all of these are defense covers against Italian self-appraisal and foreign attitudes.)

Events since 1939 have simply demolished these basic propaganda drives, creating that weakness which comes from false propaganda unmasked.

2. Weakness in face of counter-measures through psychological warfare.

- a. All skeptical, shrewd Italians (who prize shrewd skepticism) are open now to a propaganda which compliments them for having taken Fascism with a grain of salt all along. Not one thing Fascist propaganda said for eighteen years is so.
- b. Discontent with a visibly worsening material situation.

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- c. Distrust of all leadership.
- d. Distrust of all allies.
- e. Fear of all enemies.
- f. Weariness with Fascismo.

3. Strengths or assets

- a. Fear of how much worse things will be when Fascism is gone.
- b. Fear of Italy becoming a battleground.
- c. Fear of German vengeance for any defection.
- d. The power of the police system.
- e. Idealistic nationalism which can yet serve Mussolini if conditions so develop as to enliven it on his behalf.
- f. The influence of church leaders against rocking the boat.
- g. The integration of the personal interests of leaders in government, the armed forces, the professions, and in business, with the interests of the Party.

(b) Strength and weakness in the organizational set up

- 1. The strength in the Fascist set-up for psychological warfare has been chiefly the strength of Mussolini

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himself as publicity man, editor, mouthpiece, stage designer, plot-writer, and chief actor. Its chief weakness has been in the same histrionic approach to affairs, by which actual military operations, for example, have been staged for psychological effect without making sure the enemy would play the part of beaten slave, as in the attack on Greece.

As a man above all conscious of publicity values, Mussolini has seen to it that a great effort has gone into creation for his use of a mechanism for psychological warfare, with a proportionately large budget.

a. Intelligence activities

1. The Ministry of Popular Culture (i.e. Propaganda) has intelligence sections which draw information on social, political, cultural, and economic conditions at home and abroad from its own agents, as well as from the intelligence sections of army, navy, and air force. It also monitors foreign broadcasts, keeps track of Italian organizations and personalities abroad, and

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supervises the actions and pronouncements of such as it controls by various mechanisms.

- ii. Army, navy, and air forces have their respective intelligence sections, performing according to their means all normal functions of such sections, but serving also the Ministry of Popular Culture and being served by it.
- iii. Foreign Ministry intelligence work is under the ministerial direction of Ciano, and hence of Mussolini. It has functioned closely at all times both on the intelligence side and the policy side, with the Ministry of Popular Culture.
- iv. The Ovra or secret police has worked above all in Italy but through the CAO (Centro Americano di Operazioni) and parallel sections for work abroad has kept data upon Fascists and anti-Fascists and influential foreigners for many years. Now integrated with and subordinated to the Gestapo, it is scarcely an independent instrument for psychological warfare.
- v. The Fascist Party abroad, integrated with

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the Ministry of Popular Culture, has organized Fasci, whose members have in turn taken the lead in gathering data and in promoting all activities designed to further the Duce's interests. It is subdivided into elements which work on intellectuals, on laborers, on veterans, and so forth, to enlist their support of Fascismo and to use them as sources of information.

b. Operational activities

1. The propaganda ministry has in the past spent all it could get from a poor country and from gifts or genteel blackmail abroad. The total has been lower than the Nazi total expenditure, not because the Fascist will and imagination were weak but because the country is poor. Junkets to Italy were subsidized, "culture centers" set up to disseminate propaganda and enlist sympathizers, films were made (not very successfully), and radio work was carried on, especially directed at the Balkans and the Moslem

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peoples on the one side, and Italian "colonials" on the other. In Imperial Italian Africa special bureaus functioned to keep up the morale of colonists and to control and win over native elements.

- ii. The Ministries of the armed forces have doubtlessly tried their best to keep up home morale, troop morale, and undermine the morale and fighting efficiency of Greeks and British, but whatever they spent or tried to do hasn't worked so very well.
- iii. The operations of the Italian police, to judge from impressions received by reading all reports on Greece, have been singularly ineffective in controlling local irreconcilables. How well they have done their job on the home population is unclear, except that it was apparently felt Gestapo help was imperative.
- iv. The Foreign Ministry set up large staffs of extra diplomatic agents at consulates and embassies, on Nazi pattern, for operational

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as well as intelligence work. Some of the tasks may have been done effectively, although in general that is not fully apparent.

- v. The Party, considering the huge numbers of Italians and second generation emigrants, did a singularly poor job in enlisting fervent Fascists abroad. The core of true Fascists which did come to exist in the overseas Fasci must, however, be taken seriously, at least as probable recruits for Nazi agencies' work.

2. Weakness

The greatest weakness in the whole imposing pattern of bureaus for this purpose and organizations for that one, is that too few of the human beings engaged in doing the actual work care very much that it be done fast and efficiently. Partly that attitude stems from quiet contempt for Fascism, partly from indifference, and partly from an attitude toward time and grinding accurate detail work which defies correction. Graft and nepotism have

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placed incompetents in office and discouraged competent men. But as long as the welfare of Italy seems to them to bound up in the welfare of Fascism, there is a certain amount of service to be obtained from good workers. So far they have been shown no way to bring honor and advantage to Italy by ceasing to serve Fascism.

P.W.

August 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: Hugh R. Wilson

FROM: W. J. D.

I am advised that the attached memorandum comes from a certain important member of the Italian underground movement. It might well be worth examining. Would you see what can be done about it?

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SECRET

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Edmond L. Taylor
TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum on Italy

DATE: August 10, 1942

This report seems to me one of the most brilliant and useful studies of the kind that I have ever seen.

I should think that the first part and a few excerpts from the suggestions in regard to propaganda, might safely be communicated to the OWI and would be valuable to them, but naturally, the question of security should be carefully weighed.

E.L.T.

attachment

TO: *Col. Donovan*

You may care to
examine the attached
material which I am
sending to Sd. Taylor.
Will you then pass it
on to him?

[Signature]

FROM: JOHN C. WILEY


MOST SECRET

July 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR EDMOND L. TAYLOR:

Attached herewith are two documents just received, via a most reliable contact, from "one of the most distinguished members of the Italian underground now in the United States." They have been examined in this office and it is believed that they are of first importance. They check in many respects with secret and reliable information. They seem to clarify the present-day situation among political groups within Italy and also to explain the problems of conducting revolutionary warfare against the Fascist regime.

These are the only copies we have. You may wish to circulate them among the members of our committee. Because of the extremely confidential nature of the material, I hesitate to make individual copies for the committee members.


John C. Wiley.

CONFIDENTIAL

LOS ANGELES, Cal. 7/25/1942

RE : AN OPINION ON POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN ITALY

1) - In view of activities in which Italy became engaged supporters of the United Nations, four main divisions should be taken into account among Italians :

A) A relatively small group of Fascists who constitute a powerful political and economic machine and rule the country. Their main strength derives today from an efficient and well organized police and from German support.

B) A large mass of people who had adjusted themselves without too much difficulty to the Fascist regime but resent today the pro-German policies of the present rulers. They probably constitute the majority of politically-minded Italians. They belong to the upper classes as well as to the bourgeoisie and to certain sections of the working classes.

C) A relatively small minority of antifascists recruited from every social group. With the term antifascists are indicated those who have opposed consistently the Fascist regime or those who, although having been at times attracted by fascist ideologies, promises and interests, have later on definitely broken with the regime.

D) The rest of the nation including millions of politically uneducated people who, under favorable circumstances, may riot and revolt but most of the time simply follow those who are in power.

Neither the first nor the last group will be taken into account in what follows.

- As far as I know, the antifascists (group C) are not numerous in Italy but also they are not a negligible minority as it is shown by the figures indicating those who have been arrested for political reasons by the fascist

movement. There was one occasion in which, as I was told, as many as 60,000 political prisoners were in jail at the same time.

Small organizations exist among Italian antifascists. They are far from including all the antifascists but it is through them that has been carried out what little agitation has existed in Italy during the last fifteen or seventeen years against the regime.

The largest antifascist organization is probably the one which is connected with the Comintern. Italian communists have always had more funds than other antifascist groups for their underground organization in Italy.

In the second place, numerically, come the "democratic" groups which have developed in various parts of the country either autonomously or under the influence of exiles not belonging to the pre-fascist political parties. These groups are inspired by a rather vague liberal-socialist or liberal-catholic ideology. They are not well connected with each other.

In the third place are the groups which represent the survival of pre-fascist political movements (syndicalist, anarchist) or of pre-fascist political parties (socialist, republican, "popolare", etc.). Some of these groups were fairly active until ten years ago. Through death and desertion they are now very small and are composed of people who are becoming physically and mentally too old.

It would be dangerous to have illusions about the size and capacity to act of Italian ~~antifascism~~ organized antifascism. It is practically non-existent in certain districts of the south. It is also nearly non-existent at least two thirds of the in ~~most~~ rural areas. In a medium-sized city (100,000 to 300,000 inh.) a group of 30 to 50 organized antifascists in each of the two main tendencies (communist and democratic) can be considered a large group. Only in the half-dozen of Italian big cities and in some highly developed industrial or

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agricultural areas (north-western Lombardy, central Piedmont, Bologna, etc.) or in districts with a large non-Italian population, one can find larger groups. I never heard of organized groups or series of groups in one locality including more than 250 to 300 people.

Organized antifascism in Italy should be reckoned at any given moment more in thousands of members than in tens of thousands.

There is little that organized antifascism has been and is able to achieve on its own means. Practically every Italian antifascist who left the country went abroad with the hope to find outside the help which he thought to be indispensable in order to achieve something within the country. The inability of political exiles to satisfy the need for achievements keenly felt by those who stayed behind became often resentment against the exiles.

There are probably two main reasons for the failure of Italian antifascists to achieve more than they did achieve: lack of funds and the control exercised by an all-powerful and efficient police.

Reporters who came back recently have stressed the increasing dissatisfaction among Italians. Many have concluded that these dissatisfied Italians will become antifascists. Conversations which I had with refugees (who reflect at least to a large extent the attitudes of those who stayed behind), occasional letters from Italy, contacts with Italian acquaintances in New York and Washington who had not broken with the Fascist oligarchy, interviews with non-Italians who arrived here recently after having spent several years in Italy, led me to the conclusion that the deduction was not correct.

Most responsible Italians (with the term responsible I indicate those who are able to think politically) had been absorbed into the Fascist system secondary if the absorption had taken place enthusiastically, reluctantly or with indifference. Sooner or later they had come to believe that

reaction had done some good to the country. Most of them still believe and share in the typically-Fascist feeling of contempt for liberal and democratic institutions. They have a grudge against the occidental democracies (France, the British Commonwealth and the United States) which they consider responsible, through their control over a large part of the world's wealth, for Italy's economic and political difficulties.

At the same time, most of these responsible Italians hate Germany and the Axis policies of the Mussolini-Giano group. They fear Nazism and feel, it seems, contempt for Italy's present leaders.

The difference between the group B and the group C is that the first wants today a change within the present set-up; while the second wants a change outside the Fascist regime. What I may call anti-Axis Italians (group B) cannot be influenced by Italian antifascists whom they dislike today as much as they disliked them before the Axis came into existence. I am under the impression that conversions from B to C are not numerous.

As far as I know, there is little or no organized opposition to Axis policies in the group B. The anti-Axis elements represent a large mass of individuals who are unable to express a collective personality. Mutual distrust and, more important, the control exercised by the Fascist and the Nazi police are strong enough to prevent contacts and the establishment of organizations.

I have been acquainted in the past with the cases of one important businessman in Milan, of a leading intellectual, of two generals (now in the retired list) who, besides the similar activities of a few lukewarm Party leaders, tried to create their own organization among friends and sympathizers. All these attempts failed before anything constructive could be achieved.

There are officers in the armed forces who dislike the Axis and would like to see Fascism to come to an accord with the United Nations. They can do yet in that direction. The same is true for other groups of the group B: for the big businessmen of the north, for the landowners, for the intellectuals who bowed to Fascism, for the small businessmen, for the "middle" and tenants of the more advanced agricultural regions, for the skilled workers, etc.

In the group B there is a nearly complete lack of the political passion which inspires those who belong to the group C. This may perhaps explain why there is a lack of people willing to risk imprisonment in order to carry out an organized opposition.

Believe the distinction between antifascist Italians and anti-Axis Italians is important. The two groups cannot be approached in the same way and cannot be approached by the same people. An exile will be trusted by an antifascist but not by an anti-Axis Italian. Reasonings and promises which appeal to antifascists will have the opposite effect on anti-Axis Italians, and vice-versa.

One may find among the antifascists people who are willing to engage in sabotage. No such possibility I must believe to exist among the anti-Axis people who on the other hand may be willing, in certain cases, to engage in information activities and who certainly can help in bringing about the political disintegration of the regime.

Those who think in terms not only of winning the war but also of winning peace, should take into serious consideration the division in Italy between antifascists and anti-Axis elements and they should try to have some clear ideas about the relative strength and the aims of the two groups.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALLO² AMEMB, Tel. - 25/7/1942**RE : ANTI-ALIS ACTIVITIES IN ITALY**

(Please read first the other enclosed report)

1) - It is the opinion of the writer that no action aiming at influencing events in Italy can give tangible results unless the following conditions are realized :

- a) Each action must be part of a comprehensive, long-range plan including different kinds of activities.
- b) The execution of the plan to be entrusted in the hands of able people.
- c) Failures - which are bound to be numerous - to be disregarded.
- d) Abundant financial and other means to be provided.
- e) Secrecy to be well kept.

2) - It is also the opinion of the writer that actions, in order to be successful, must be carried out by groups or organizations, that the main problem is either to develop existing organizations or to create new ones. The individual agent or operator may know little or nothing of the organization to which he belongs, but his usefulness will be determined by him being a clog which fits into a large and smooth-running machine.

3) - The various types of activities can be grouped under three headings:

- a) Publicity (radio and printed matter).
- b) Military operations (commando raids).
- c) Underground work (establishment of an organized opposition, information ^{direct action} and sabotage).

4) - Publicity is already being carried out. Unfortunately with a lamentable lack of coordination and with a remarkable lack of effectiveness.

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As far as I know, there are at present radio programs from the United States, London, and from Cairo, all directed to Italy and in Italy. I believe, is being done through "black" stations. Because of the fact that most Italian programs on short or medium waves are effective only for Italians who wish to risk imprisonment in order to hear from the outside world, usually turn to French programs which are satisfactory for French people but often produce a deplorable effect on the Italian audience. Considering the low level of Italian education from Allied official sources, it is probably a good thing that Italians are able to catch them.

In the radio programs, I would take the liberty of making the following observations:

1. Only of straight news, chiefly news concerning Italy itself. This can be done only if what is written, said and rumored in Italy is rapidly available to the script writers.

2. Intelligent comments, very briefly.

3. Few ideas. Italians have been cut off from sources of ideas for nearly twenty years. Those who make the effort to listen are people who can appreciate intelligent ideas.

4. Good coordination between American, British and Cairo radio stations to follow similar policies.

5. To have French programs which do not conflict with what is said in Italian.

6. That sections of the Italian audience should be influenced. So far "official" radios seem to have followed a general policy of trying to please everyone: the King and the republican, the Pope and the atheist, the capitalist and the worker, the nationalist and the internationalist. The result seems to be that no one is satisfied and the Allies give the impression of lacking directive ideas. A group of objective, intelligent people (possibly not Italians but able to understand the working of the Italian mind) should be asked to determine what sections of the Italian nation can be more useful to the Allied effort and what should be stressed to them over and over again.

7. To mind the difference between groups B and C of the Italian nation (see the other report).

- Reduce expenses and energy which now go into the operation of the "official" radio and concentrate in the "black" radio stations which should be at work day and night.

The writer favors a large distribution of printed leaflets dropped by airplane. In order to be effective this distribution must be regular. It would be desirable if at regular intervals an airplane (which can remain so high that it runs little risk) would drop quantities of leaflets in each of the six or seven politically and economically important Italian districts. For the preparation of the leaflet one should follow the suggestions made for the radio. The occasional, badly-written, leaflet makes people laugh. The regular one, containing news, comments and ideas makes people think. The leaflets should be written and signed by Italians or by people of Italian origin.

5) - An occasional commando raid annoys the people. A repetition of commando raids makes impression. People of Italian origin should participate in each commando raid and their participation should be publicized by leaving behind printed material. A commando raid should be evaluated not only on the basis of military results but also on the basis of psychological results. For this reason there could be a series of commando raids on points of little military value and therefore not strongly guarded.

6) - Underground work. As mentioned in the enclosed report, there are in Italy small underground groups, organized by antifascists (section C of the Italian population). Their possibilities for action (organization, propaganda, sabotage) are extremely reduced. Among their difficulties are three which could be obviated through contacts with the outside world: lack of funds, lack of material for the execution of acts of sabotage, lack of proper training in underground work.

that, in most urgently required in the establishment of contact between the underground groups in Italy and the outside. In my opinion this contact can be established ^{effectively} only through exiles who are already personally acquainted with some underground worker in Italy. Anyone else will be disappointed.

There were several thousands of Italian political exiles, most of them in France. Those who can engage in the work of contact are very few, for the reasons. a) Only a very small minority of exiles had had the will and the opportunity of cooperating from the outside with the underground work in Italy. b) Most of this small minority have been lost through the occupation of France.

Exiles whose main occupation was the cooperation with the underground work in Italy belonged chiefly to the Communist Party and to Giustizia e Libertà. Occasionally members of the former Socialist and Republican parties tried, sometimes successfully, to establish contacts with the anti-fascists in Italy. Most exiles were either completely cut off from Italy or their contact were through personal correspondence or some occasional visit of Italian friends.

(not to be confused with local Italian anti-fascists)
 c) - I do not know how many Italian political exiles are at present in the United States. Maybe a hundred, probably less, ^{perhaps} maybe more. Those who had "specialized" in cooperation with the Italian underground (with the exception of the Communists ^{and the Anarchists} who represent a separate ^a problem) can be counted on the fingers.

There are also in the United States several hundreds of Italian refugees. ^(?) Perhaps 30 or 40 among them belonged to the section C of the Italian population and are willing to cooperate in antifascist activities.

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among the exiles whom I knew, had contacts with the Italian underground : Messrs. G....., F....., P..... (occasionally and only with former members of his own political party), G..... (?) and a few others. Among the refugees : Messrs. M....., Z....., G....., etc. Then there are probably a few anarchists whom, chiefly through Switzerland, were in constant touch with some of their friends in Italy. Other exiles, like Messrs. S..... and A....., were in constant touch with personalities of the pre-fascist regime who had remained in Italy, but neither they nor these personalities had anything to do with the underground movement.

6 B - Concerning the exiles one must ^{take} into consideration the fact that most of them (as a matter of fact the best of them) are unwilling to serve as individual "agents". Whatever they do, they would like to do it as representatives of a group possessing a certain political ideology. A difference in past traditions and in ideology makes it difficult to obtain a real cooperation among the various groups.

Not counting the Communists and the Anarchists, only two groups of exiles are represented in the United States who had contacts with the underground movement in Italy: those who at one time or another were connected with Giustizia e Libertà and the Republicans. The five or six people in these two groups who have cooperated with the Italian underground may do something (and this is by no means certain) if they are asked to act as Italians following a certain ideological tendency and not as "agents" of a foreign Power.

The same "political" difficulty is much less important for the refugees.

MC-B.

I doubt it that one can obtain the cooperation of the Anarchists.

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Then there are a few exiles who state that they have contacts with groups of the Italian underground or with such organizations (now existing more in name than in fact) as the Massoneria, the Mafia, the Camorra, a statement which I personally doubt, very much. The only thing to do is to try them out. At the utmost this would involve the loss of a few thousand dollars.

Italian Americans can be of very little use in establishing contact with the Italian underground groups. Usually they have been away too long from Italy. But one may find a few willing to go (which does not mean that they will achieve anything).

On this problem the fundamental facts to be kept in mind are: 1) Italian exiles here are a handful; 2) those who could establish contacts in Italy are even less and have a "political" problem which is only fair to them to take in due consideration; 3) of the people who may go, many several will do nothing.

The search for elements who can establish contact with organized antifascism in Italy should be carried out in France. What results it would give it is difficult to say.

7) - Considering the difficulty of moving inside Italy and the lack of cooperation between the general public and the antifascists, the problem of establishing regular contacts with the Italian underground seems to me to be one of extreme difficulty.

There would be of course the possibility of landing in Italy someone who has been, who is not in contact with the underground but who has friends or relatives who would give him shelter, food and protection. And then leave it to him to find the underground groups. A job of that kind is much more difficult than it seems and requires people of ^{possessing} high qualities.

I am unable to indicate anyone who was not connected with Italian nationalist activities and who would be willing to go.

6) - Sabotage against industrial plants, means of transportation, etc., could be carried out in certain districts of Italy by parachutists not connected with people living in the country but possessing a geographic knowledge of the area in which they would operate. For an Italian to go to Italy under these conditions means almost certain death. I do not think that it is possible to find ^{many} Italians who would accept willingly the certainty of a death which is not even an "honorable" one.

In various Nazi-occupied countries parachutists of local origin may find a good deal of cooperation among the inhabitants and are able to obtain a measure of protection. In Italy, at present, the general public, in the cities and in the countryside, will not cooperate with parachutists and in the most favorable cases could not remain free more than a few hours. The Italian general public may resent the presence of the Germans but is still far from wanting to engage in activities favorable to the Allies.

7) - I believe that due attention should be paid to the problem of contacts with those Italians who are anti-Axis but not necessarily antifascists (see group B in the other report).

Anti-Axis Italians are mostly inside the Fascist political machine. They would not engage in "direct action" or in sabotage. But probably they could be used for information and for starting or accelerating a process of disintegration in Italy's political structure.

Theoretically, it should be easier to establish contacts with the anti-Axis Italians than with the antifascists. In this field one may find contact people who could enter Italy legally. Contact men for the group B

not to be recruited among the exiles nor by Italian antifascists abroad and their supporters. They should be recruited among the groups of Italian and Italian Americans whose mental attitude is similar to that of the B people, namely: those who for one reason or the other are against a German victory; who have had or still have any pro-Fascist sympathies; who desire a change in the present Fascist set-up in Italy but not the complete destruction of the Fascist political, economic and social structures which is the aim of the antifascists.

Contact men recruited in this group are, as is group B in Italy, unreliable from a democratic point of view. ^{usually} Often they are "appeasers" and favor a solution of compromise which would leave the Axis in possession of much that it now controls. Because of their fundamental unreliability, contact men for the group A should be chosen among those who, having in the Allied countries financial interests or a family, would be afraid of double-crossing too much their Allied employees.

I am of the opinion that contact-men for the group B can be recruited in the United States chiefly among:

- 1. Italian or Italian American businessmen who had maintained business and personal relations with Italy, had given money to the Fascist party, had been in good standing with the Fascist leaders and are personally acquainted with some of them.
- 2. Newspapermen, intellectuals and pseudo-intellectuals who in this country had worked for the Fascist propaganda and who are also acquainted with personalities of the Fascist regime.

I would suggest that in order to find this type of contact men, one should approach:

- 1. Italian American "prominenti coloniali" who have been frequently to Italy and have been in constant touch here with Fascist representatives: Mr. C. ... and his group in New York, Mr. E. Patria and his group in San Francisco.

2. Editors of the many Italian-language newspapers who had followed a

pro-Fascist line before Dec. 7th.

- Teachers in American colleges and universities: Mr. P. at Columbia, V. in Philadelphia, Pa., at the University of Wisconsin, A. at the University of California, etc. etc.
- Leading members of the Ordine ~~dei~~ ~~Fidati~~ ~~d'Italia~~ (Mons. Forte, Corri, Scala, Alessandrini, Palloria, Corri, Malatesta, etc.)
- Leading members of former Italian or Italian American Chambers of Commerce
- Leading members of Italian American Catholic organizations (Mons. Arouse, Mons. Di Silvestro, etc.). (An intelligent member of the clergy sent over could do a good deal of useful work.)
- Leading members of other organizations as the War Savings Committee for Italian Americans (one was organized in New York, another one in Boston, more are being organized elsewhere), the former Italian World War Veterans, the Independent Order Sons of Italy, the Federation of Democratic Clubs, etc. etc.

One should also try to find out what could be obtained ^{through} similar organizations in Latin America.

My acquaintances in this ~~field~~ field unfortunately are few in spite of the effort made to maintain certain contacts. I would not be able to indicate more than two or three names of people who would at least go to countries in Europe not yet occupied by the Nazis and from there would try to establish contacts with Italians belonging to the group B.

(B) - It is to be understood that the people who have been mentioned would not engage in activities concerning Italy. They can only help in finding individuals willing to go.

Contact men with the Italian group B should try to play on the rivalries existing within the Fascist Party and on the dissatisfaction which has become evident among several groups which used to support enthusiastically the Fascist regime. They should stress the personal and general advances which would be the retribution given by the Allies to the Italians willing to put obstacles to the German war effort in Italy.

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72) - I am of opinion that whatever action is adopted in relation to Italy, it should be based on a complete, frank, accord between American and British authorities. If the Americans and the British act independently, their activities will be largely neutralized and the Italians will become more and more convinced that the occidental democracies are hopelessly divided, weak and unable to protect the European nations from a Russian aggression in case of a victory of the United Nations.

73) - It is evident to me that as long as decisions can be taken only after a large number of officials, civilian and military, have been consulted, little or nothing of practical value can be achieved.

If the British and the American authorities believe that the Italian problem should receive serious attention, they should establish a body invested with wide powers, with abundant means and capable of taking rapid decisions.

At the head could be, for instance, a Committee of four people (one British and one American civilian members, and one British and one American military members).

From the Committee would depend:

1) Propaganda division, with three sections: official radio
clandestine radio
printed propaganda
(the sections could be entrusted to carefully chosen Italians)

2) Military division (for commando raids)

3) "Underground" division, with two sections: contacts with antifascist groups
contacts with anti-Axis Italians.

It is my opinion that in case the American and British authorities consider the Italian problem unimportant, whatever activities are now being

[illegible]