

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450009-6

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INTELL. REPORTS
L.T. MALCOLM CALLANAN

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ITALY - 47

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

LT. MALCOLM CALLANAN

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

July 19, 1944
Intelligence
Report


TO: Colonel Buxton
FROM: Secretariat
SUBJECT: Intelligence Papers, Fifth Army Detachment

DATE: 8 April 1944

Attached is a series of intelligence papers which have come in from Lt. Callahan, who is OSS Intelligence Officer with the Fifth Army Detachment.

I understand that General Magruder has a separate set of these reports and will do whatever is necessary to have them processed and distributed through the customary intelligence channels.

A. W. Sulloway
A. W. Sulloway



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
 APO 777, U.S. ARMY

Malcolm W. Callanan
 X Intelligence
 X Reports
 X Callanan

14 March 1944

SUBJECT : Italian Fleet Incident

TO : Director Strategic Services
 General MAGRUDER
 Colonel RODRIGO

1. The following supplements information contained in attached cables.

2. The Italian Fleet incident was caused by a United Nations News item which appeared on Friday, March 3 and was reproduced in the Stars and Stripes Saturday morning. The first Axis mention came Friday night in the form of a flash over Radio Rome at 8 P.M. This Section first heard Saturday night that a very serious view was being taken by the Italian Government. In discussion with MO (Mr. WARNER) and SO (Capt. PACATTE) an estimate was made of the potential damage which could be done by this announcement in German-occupied Italy and on neutral countries.

3. Sunday, Monday and Tuesday men covered the Government and its agencies in Salerno, the Navy at Taranto and the political parties in Naples. Fortunately, the coverage was possible in line with normal duties. MO covered Axis and neutral reaction.

Malcolm W. Callanan
 MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
 1st Lt. AUS
 Intelligence Officer

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SECRET**REPORT ON ITALIAN FLEET****PART ONE****Italian Government**

When the Marshal heard the news which had been much distorted he pounded the table and said he would resign. This statement, since denied, got around Naples and eventually was used in German broadcasts. A Council of Ministers was called and the note prepared which was given to the Italian Government Press Bureau. This was the note handed to General McFarlane and to FWS for dissemination, requesting fuller information.

By Tuesday the Marshal and his Staff (most of whom were in various stages of emotion) had calmed considerably. McFarlane assured them that he himself had known nothing prior to the press notice.

Since then the Government has received official replies which when sent to the fleet calmed all groups in Allied-occupied Italy.

Confidentially the Council of Ministers informed CSE that they were suspicious that the move was connected with Anglo-Turkish diplomacy. The Italian Fleet would sail through the Dardanelles thus provoking Turkey to a breach of neutrality or war against the Allies.

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SECRETPART TWONaples and Political Groups

On Sunday, March 5, Sforza of the Action Party, Longobardi of the Socialists and Galvi of the Liberals were interviewed and their first reaction was anger and surprise. Tuesday the Giunta held a meeting to discuss the question. Since it was then well-known that a mistake had been made, the parties practically confined themselves to a criticism of the Badoglio Government. All groups, however, including Democrats and Communists, agreed that the fleet should be used, particularly by Russia, but only under Italian colors.

The reaction of the people was a few days late and very considerably affected by the Radio Rome broadcasts, which didn't begin to play up the affair until Monday. The statement in the newspaper, *Risorgimento*, that "the Government has not received any official notification, and it has learned of the supposed transfer only through the press and radio" was taken seriously by those people who reflected on it. It was on this statement, rather than any questions of the fleet which seemed to be largely the result of misunderstanding, that most of the unfavorable reaction was based. Following the Churchill speech this seemed like a contradictory rebuff to Badoglio.

Today the problem has joined the host of complaints the population of the Naples area have against the Allies.

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SECRETPART THREEItalian Navy Italian

One member of Operations was in Taranto on Sunday, the 5th, and talked with Admirals Sansone and Calosi. They were very angry and talked of resigning. Individual officers and men were threatening scuttling and even mutiny. The scuttling threat was confirmed by Lt. Mathieu who was in Taranto this past Sunday, March 12, and he went on ships which had been prepared for scuttling.

The official reply by the Allies had been forwarded to the Fleet by the Minister of the Navy and the atmosphere had calmed. Even a week ago, the Admirals stated officially that they welcomed the chance to fight with the Russians, but always under their own flag and with their own crews. This was granted by the Allied note.

Admiral Calosi, chief of Naval Intelligence said confidentially, that there was a suspicion that the request was a Russian move to make certain that no post-war Italian strength in the Mediterranean existed. As a reflection of how strong is the fear of eventual Communism among such officers, he also stated that it might possibly be a Russian effort to weaken the Italian government by taking away their fleet and thus paving the way for Italian Communism. He had no suspicions of possible British influence behind the misunderstanding.

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SECRETPART FOURNews and Reporting Italy

As indicated in attached cables, there was a strong reaction in Northern Italy.

The Axis radio first mentioned the question in a newflash at 8 p.m. the first night (March 3rd). The next broadcasts were more or less simply restatements of the news item from United Nations News Service. Gradually, on March 4th, such typical tricks as "Stockholm reports discussion completed on fleet transfer" were inserted. By 10 p.m. the night of the 4th Radio Rome in German to the soldiers had reached such propoganda as "with the help of the Anglo-Americans Bohemian has been let loose on the oldest cultural ocean, the Mediterranean." Since then the fleet "partition" has been a favorite propoganda theme on all Axis radios, including Rumanian.

The OSS clandestine station in Rome sent a depressed cable 9 March with an unsolicited reaction (which this particular station rarely does). The last sentence was "but Churchill speech, the uncertainty of meaning of third of fleet to Russia, the lack of encouragement from the Allies is forcing men to acquiesce to enemy."

The British controlled Italian station in Rome gave what may be a reaction requested by AOC through SIS and SIM. "The worst possible impression was made by news of partition of fleet and eventual bombardment of Rome."

OSS MC stationed with this Detachment have been working closely with this Section on answering propaganda.

Malcolm W. Callahan
MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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Colonel H. P. BURMAN, Files.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

NR. 745 YANKEE
TO: DONOVAN AND MAGRUDER
FROM: CALLANAN
INFORMATION COPY TO GLAVIN

MARCH 8, 1944
SENT 0745, WILLIFORD

SITUATION CONCERNING PLETT IS CALMER. BADOGLIO TOLD
MATHIEU THAT HE WOULD WAIT FOR AN OFFICIAL REPLY. POLITICAL
COMMITTEE HOLDING INDIGNANT MEETING MOSTLY DIRECTED AT
BADOGLIO. GENERAL MACPARKLAND WAS ALSO UNINFORMED. WILL
FOUCH THE REST.

PARAPHRASE

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EXTRA PRIORITY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

NR. 716 YANKEE
TO: DONOVAN AND MAGRUDER, WASHINGTON
FROM: GALLANAN
INFO COPY: CLAYTON, ALGIERA
6 MARCH 1944
1200 GMT, MONTI

DISCUSSION OF ITALIAN NAVY CAUSED ALARM AMONG GOVERNMENT,
POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE PEOPLE. MARSHAL BADOGLIO GIVES
THE IMPRESSION OFFICIALLY THAT HE WAS UNINFORMED. SPORZA
AND COMMUNISTS SAY THAT ITALY AS A COBELLIGERENT SHOULD
BE CONSULTED. BUT THEY APPROVE OF DEAL. POSSIBLY THE
AFFAIR IS DUE TO A NEWS SLIP OR HIGH POLITICS, BUT IT IS
EXCELLENT PROPAGANDA MATERIAL FOR THE GERMANS.

PARAPHRASE.

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Italy 146147
x Intelligence
x Report
x Callanan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APC 777, U.S. ARMY

17 March 1944

SUBJECT : Strategic Intelligence Extracts N°1

TO : Director of Strategic Services
Brigadier General MAGRUDER
Colonel RODRIGO

1. The following information is extracted from reports which daily pass through this section. They are selected from both OSS and outside sources.

2. These extracts are an attempt to meet one of the new obligations which will be assumed by this section in the reorganization of OSS Italy. This concerns the intelligence servicing of rear or strategic echelons, not only by the individual branches, but by the Detachment as a whole.

3. If approved, Washington branch heads will be added to distribution. Also suggested is a copy which will be shown to the American AOC representatives in Italy.

M. W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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OSS AAI Agent Radio

It is reported in ROME that Germans feel the front south of ROME now well established. They intend to hold the present line until another landing. No landing is expected in Italy, but one is almost certain in Western Europe. When this occurs they expect to withdraw to the La Spezia - Rimini line.

The chief problems in Italy are supplying the front and the lack of spare parts for vehicles. This may cause the Germans to withdraw sooner than they anticipate.

It is reported that an Italian naval officer is to proceed to Spain and attempt to make arrangements for the escape of the warships now interned there.

Work on the aircraft carrier "Roma" in Genova harbor has been suspended.

The firm Aeronautica Italia is said to have produced 100 planes of the fighter type "G-55" since the end of January. In the future the plant is expected to make parts for "Fokke-Wulf" planes.

Outside Intelligence Reports

Night of 10/11 March first raid by Italian Fascist torpedo planes. This was made on Anzio harbor and consisted of 6 SM 79's. Pilot shot down (no damage by group reported) states this is only torpedo-bomber groups with Luftwaffe, although two groups are in training at Venezia. (G-2 5th Army 14 M)

Fortifications have been ordered in the Livorno area and all along the Eastern Riviera coast from the French border. (SIF 13 M)

ASS AATY Agent Radio

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Fortifications have been ordered in the Livorno area and all along the Eastern Riviera coast from the French border. (SIM 13 M)

Some German anti-personnel SCHU-MINES 42 have recently been found made of "Masonite". The absence of metal in these mines makes detection by present US equipment difficult. (G-2 5th Army 14 M)

GSS Contacts and Informants

The Radio Station, Milano Liberata, which has again been on the air, encouraging the North Italian strikes is probably broadcasting from Russia. This station was very active for three days just after the 25th of July. Some people say the strikes were organized by Ereoli, the Italian Communist leader, and allege he is in North Italy. Reale, Communist leader for Naples, denies Ereoli is in Italy and says that permission for him to enter was refused by AOC. He says Ereoli is possibly in Istanbul, and the Russian recognition of Badoglio may permit his entry. (Interview. 13 M)

Though the Italian Communists (Tedeschi) have reaffirmed their opposition to the Badoglio Government (as it is now), it appears that the Socialist-Communist parties have been a. strengthened publicly by the move, instead of hurt as first popularly supposed b. will draw closer to the present government.

The negotiations for Russian recognition were carried on between Vyshinski and the Badoglio Government (Reale, Minister for the Interior, Prunas, Foreign Affairs, Naldi and Di Carlo) only after Vashinski's overtures to the Sforza-Croce liberals had failed. Naldi and Di Carlo, neither of whom has an announced official position, were mainly responsible. In a total view of the significance of the negotiations, it must not be forgotten that local politics (Naldi and Di Carlo hate Sforza-Croce worse than they fear Communism) played a part in the success.

Confidentially certain British circles maintain the Russian-Italian negotiations are part of the pressure on Turkey. This appears to be confirmed.

W. C.
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED AIRMILITARY ATTACHY
APO 787, U.S. ARMY

17 March 1944

SUBJECT : Dissemination Procedure
TO : Director of Strategic Services
: General MAGRUDER
: Colonel RODRIGO

1. Attached is a proposed procedure for dissemination of material which passes through this Section.

Kalcolm W. Galianan
KALCOLM W. GALIANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

CC: Colonel REUTERSHAN, Files.

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DISSEMINATION AND COLLECTION PROCEDURES

1. Procedure outlined below regards mainly the function of Intelligence Section Headquarters and the Reporting Board. The obligation of Section Headquarters to subordinate branches is one of servicing and indirect control. As shown in Paragraph Two each Branch has its own collection, preparing and distributing procedure.

2. Subordinate Branches have their own collecting, preparing and dissemination procedure established by Branch Heads in Washington. This procedure would be followed in the field for SI, OF, and R&A Intelligence.

All reports originating in subordinate sections would be sent directly to respective Branch Heads in Washington with a copy in each instance to Intelligence Officer, OSS Italy.

Intelligence Section HQ would, after conferring with local Branch Heads, give additional dissemination, either in extracts or complete. Such dissemination would be to guarantee servicing to non-OSS field units, armies, air, navy, etc., and servicing of other branches is not normally obligated. Thus, within bounds of security, an item submitted by MO Intelligence would be furnished PWR or OSS SI, just as AC Intelligence would receive pertinent information from other OSS Branches as well as from outside agencies such as Armies, PWR, etc. which service this Section.

3. Reporting Board dissemination procedure is outlined in Paragraph 4. This procedure is in addition to regular Branch to Branch head reporting mentioned above. Further, the Intelligence Officer will report in the form of Strategic Extracts to Intelligence Officer, Algier, and Intelligence Officer, Washington.

(see Paragraph C-8).

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REPORTING BOARD PROCEDURES

4.

A. Clandestine Reporting

1) All incoming clandestine radio or interrogation (of agents brought out through OSS facilities) intelligence will go directly to Reporting Board. Information will be screened and coordination and submitted immediately in the form of the regular Intelligence Report.

2) Immediate servicing of any agency or echelon not on distribution of Intelligence Reports will be effected through special radio messages or standing special reporting procedure (this paragraph Section C).

3) Distribution of Intelligence Reports:

Original to GSI, Allied Armies in Italy
 G-2, Fifth Army
 GSI, Eight Army
 American Deputy Commander AAI
 Chief Special Ops AAI
 OSS IX Corps
 OSS 10 Corps
 French SR in Italy
 Italian SIM & British ISLD together
 OSS R. & A., Italy (for target analysis)
 OSS A.P.H.Q.
 (also one agent monitored by OSS Anzio
 for servicing VI Corps direct).

B. Temporary Special Reporting

1) Special directives from non-OSS field units, MAAP, Allied Armies in Italy, 5th Army, VI Corps, Navy, AFHQ (by radio from OSS AFHQ), etc. These requests are handled priority over agent radios and through interrogation groups. Requests from non-combatant outside agencies (ACC, FWB, Railroad Administration) will be given lower priorities than either combatant headquarters or OSS field branches.

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4.

REPORTING BOARD PROCEDURES (continued)

2) Special requests by OSS field units. These requests come from Operations, OE, R&A (on target work), etc., for special intelligence reporting. If practicable, these requests are sent to appropriate agent radio and to all OSS interrogation units. Any pertinent information from non-OSS agencies is also supplied.

3) General strategic requests will be handled partly by Standing Special Reports, Strategic Intelligence Extracts. Other special requests from OSS Branch Heads or strategic commands will be dealt with by the most expeditious means at hand.

4) In all above requests, the formation of special operational missions will be decided by the Approval Board of the Detachment, not by the Intelligence Section.

C. Standing Special Reporting

(This reporting will include the extracting and forwarding of all pertinent information to units concerned. Sources will be local OSS Intelligence, local intelligence from outside agencies, and, in the case of information to lower echelons, intelligence from higher commands).

1) Air Intelligence Extracts, Air battle order, bombardment results, target and traffic intelligence, extracted only from OSS agent radios and, by arrangement, from SIM Italian agent radios.

Original by hand Colonel ORWAY to General BAKER
Copy to A-2 MAAB (by hand R&A Target Section)
Copies to A-2's of TAF, 42nd Bomber Wing, 57th Bomber Wing, Desert Air Force, 15th Air Forces, and 12th Air Support Command.

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(para 4 - C continued)

2) Naval Intelligence Extracts: information on enemy naval activity and coastal defenses from OSS radios only.

At present only to ONI, Naples.
Proposed by hand to Admiral Commanding
Naples Area.
Intelligence Officer Royal Navy, Naples.

3) Operational Intelligence: Information on conditions in German-occupied Italy, curfew hours, travel restrictions, for operations. Obtained from all intelligence passing through Reporting Board, radios, SIM & SR reports, divisional interrogation summaries, etc.

At present to Chief of Operations
Heads of Forward Echelons
Head of Training Area
Two heads of agent chains

Proposed to Chief of SI
Chief of SO
All heads of agent chains

4) Extracts of Intelligence: Information received from higher echelon OSS sources. Information pertinent to Italian operations military extracted to service lower field and OSS commands with intelligence more fully and quickly than could be done by regular Army channels.

G-2 Fifth Army
OSI Eighth Army
OSS II Corps
OSS VI Corps
OSS X Corps
Operations Officer
R. & A., Naples

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(para 4 - C continued)

5) Counter-Intelligence Extracts: When information of CS or CI nature received by Reporting Board from OSS or other field sources it is forwarded only to X-2 Naples who assume responsibility for local and branch dissemination. Information from other sources such as Italian CS or CIO obtained by X-2 directly.

6) Psychological Extracts: Information on morale of Italians and Germans in Northern Italy forwarded to:

MO OSS Italy
F.W.H.

7) Military Government Intelligence:
Information from OSS sources only (radio, interrogation and R & A) on food, financial, transportation conditions in both occupied and free Italy.
Distributed to:

AGC Political
AGC Economic
AMC City Administration
AMC Planning
Railroad Administration

8) Strategic Intelligence Extracts.
Special servicing of higher echelons with strategic intelligence, military, political, economic. Reports sent daily and gathered from OSS and other field headquarters in Italy.

Presently to Director Strategic Services
Intelligence Officer, Washington
Intelligence Officer, Algiers

Proposed to Branch Heads, Washington
American Minister, Allied Advisory
Council.

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5. Plans and personnel are ready to begin reporting for Intelligence "B" (post-combatant). Additional personnel should be added as pressure for direct military intelligence lessens.

Malcolm W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

CC: Colonel REUTERSHAN, Files.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MILITARY AFFAIRS IN ITALY

17 March 1944

SUBJECT : Correction to Fleet Report

TO : Director of Strategic Services
: General MAGRUDER
: Colonel RODRIGO

1. In report on Italian Fleet incident from this section, 14 March 1944, mention is made of "Admiral CALOST". CALOST, who is official head of Naval Intelligence (NIS) is a Capitano di Fregata.

Malcolm W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

16 March 1944

SUBJECT : German Occupied ITALY No. 2

TO : Director of Strategic Services
: General MAGRUDER
: Colonel RODRIGO

1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ROME.

a. The delay in the Allied arrival in ROME has accentuated, rather than diminished, the emphasis placed by Italians on a decision to be taken. The Churchill speech which caused such excitement among the political parties was taken as an indication that not 'till ROME was reached would any decision be made. Badoglio himself is looking to the Rome political parties for members for a new government, not to the local parties. The Socialist LONGOBARDI and the Liberal CALVI who came from ROME for the Nazi Congress have repeatedly stated that the true leaders of their parties are in ROME. TEDESCHI, now the dominant figure in the Communists, emphasizes the importance of the ROME leaders.

b. H.A.A. Washington Report 1112.45, 7 February refers to "plans for the administration of Rome..... apparently have been worked out by the Badoglio Government in agreement with the Allied Control Commission". This was true and such plans were broadcast to Rome in the form of orders from AOC (McFarlane). The fact that this move was met by a complete refusal on the part of the ROSSO CLAVATO would indicate that it was poorly timed. It seems probable, also, that AOC was not at that time receiving adequate intelligence.

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c. General ARMBILINI of his own accord put himself under the Comitato's General BENCIVENGA and BONOMI was automatically accepted as the civil head. ISLD who control SIM radio stated that ARMBILINI complained that as Badoglio representative he had no power, only mistrust. Personally he was respected and was willing to work as an independent figure. (ISLD here are like so many English men independently "leftish" and quite opposed to what they consider is MacFarlane's lack of understanding).

d. The position of MOTTA, picked by Badoglio and ACC as the civil representative, was left unhealed. On 8 March his arrest by the Germans was reported and has since been confirmed.

e. Two apparently unrecognized efforts at forming organizations by Generals SCHION and CARBONI resulted in cables from ACC through Badoglio ordering them to cease all activity. This was done through the British controlled SIM radio and may or may not correspond with the plans of the Comitato.

f. OSB now have documentary evidence of the organization of military intelligence sub-committees to the Rome COMITATO. This intelligence is used by all parties and by agents of all organization in addition to original material, and frequently causes duplication. It is an evidence, however, of the increasingly efficient organization of resistance.

g. Lack of supplies and moral support, plus an unfavorable reaction to the Fleet question has tended to demoralize the Rome resistance. Every day new arrests are made which appear discouraging. It is possible that these arrests actually improve the organizations and harden them into more efficient clandestine units.

2. NORTHERN ITALY

a. The first reports of conflicts between rightist and leftists come from PIEMONTE, such conflicts are inspired by the disunion in Southern Italy. Still and major split, such as in Yugoslavia, does not seem impending.

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b. The main strikes in Milano may have been caused by orders from outside agencies. The strikes are premature both from a point of view of the still uncoordinated resistance organizations. The ANTI GSI also stated that the demonstrations are premature from a military strategic point of view.

c. One of the units encouraging the present outbreaks is the "alandestine" station Milano Alberta. This station says "workers have been asked to take part in a general strike" and "quipers also received an appeal..... the time has come." (FWE Naples state that this station may be a broadcasting from Russia) OSS Milano sent a report on the strikes requesting BBC not to exaggerate the situation. A clarification is being requested.

d. Signor CHININGER now said to be in Bern with residence in Zurich as "Commercial Agent for the Government of Rome", is alleged to be making plans for a refuge for high Fascist officials when defeat comes. This information comes through the Italian Government and may not have received other dissemination. (Reber said CHININGER's presence in Switzerland confirmed by State Department from Berne).

e. It is possible that some large-scale refuge deal is being worked out using the neutrality of the Vatican and the open city character of Rome as cover. The Vatican, though affectively pro-Ally in secret operations in North Italy, is making quite a show of its neutrality. This may be possibly due to a desire not to offend the Germans and thus spare Rome. However, there are indications that the Vatican is trying to get into a favorable bargaining position possibly for reasons of Italian politics or anti-Russian diplomacy.

Max Callanan
 MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
 1st Lt. AUS
 Intelligence Officer

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ADDENDA

1. Mr. REBBI, American head for political control for AOC, stated informally on 14 March, that General BENCIVENGA had disappeared. This information came from a cable from SIM and ISLD (British SIG) which may have been sent to Washington direct by SI Italian, but has not yet been seen by this Section.

Rec'd from ...
MARCUS W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APO 777, U.S. ARMY

Malcolm W. Callanan
1st Lt. AUS

17 March 1944

SUBJECT : Intelligence "B"

TO : Director of Strategic Services
General MAGRUDER
Colonel RODRIGO

1. A new sub-section has been in the process of being formed since early January. This section is dealing with all intelligence collection of post-combatant interest.

2. This section will be handled directly by the Intelligence Officer, with Economic and Political sub-sections. Liaison with Italian "Ricostruzione" bureaus (see Appendix) will be made with officers selected by Intelligence Officer with approval Intelligence Officer, Washington.

3. All political and economic intelligence now collected by SI, Italy, R&A, Italy or other branches in the course of their work, such as, SO, OD, and MC, will be forwarded directly to their respective branch representatives, with a copy in all instances to Intelligence Officer, OSS AAIT.

Malcolm W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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APPENDIX

a. Marshal BADGLIC specifically requested from OSS permission to establish bureaus which would collect political and economic intelligence for an agency which was purely American. These boards will be openly committees to study the reconstruction of Italy, but will prepare reports and deal directly with OSS representatives. It is understood that anyone may be included, from any profession or political party, regardless of the attitude of the Italian Government toward the individual. The selection of the committees, in other words, is entirely in the hands of OSS.

b. Already information on LATI, ITAL-CABLE, EIRE, STEFANI, a submarine weather station in the Arctic, and confidential commitments relative to a government in ROME have been collected. In addition studies are now nearly finished on the exploitation of Sardinia and Sicily, transport problems, merchant marine and air, etc.

Malden W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APO 777, U. S. ARMY

Handwritten notes and signatures in the top right corner.

20 March 1944

SUBJECT : Strategic Intelligence Extracts No 2

TO : Director of Strategic Services
General MAGRUDER
Colonel RODRIGO

1. Attached is second of the Strategic Intelligence Extracts.
2. As previously indicated no detailed tactical information from agent radios (which is ninety per cent of the intelligence traffic) is included.
3. One extra copy of the extracts is made for hand-to-hand distribution among staff of OSS AAI. It is also proposed to make an extra copy for Brig. Gen. LEMNITZER, American Deputy Chief of Staff for General ALEXANDER.

Malcolm W. Callanan
MALCOLM W. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

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SECRETSTRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE EXTRACTS No 2GER AIR AGENT RADIOS

Personnel of Fascist Air Force HQ billeted at
TRADATE (in Lubbary near VARESE).

German air transport command located at BERGAMO.

Airfield, with part of the installations underground,
reported under construction east of CODRIGIO (which is SW
of ULINA).

Outside Intelligence Reports

Three views of Enemy capabilities:

GIW radio from Rome 17 March: "Germans reported studying
possibility of new offensive against beach-head with four
divisions from the east, four from the North-east, and three
from the north. Simultaneously a sea attack with submarines
and mine layers."

1-2 5th Army Report of 18 March cautiously reports:
"(The) defensive preparations, together with his known
dispositions indicate that his most probable line of action
continues to be the defense." Of the Cassino front, "he
continues a stubborn defense of his elaborately prepared
GUSTAV and ADOLF HITLER lines..... Local counterattacks,
for the purpose of restoring penetrations of his defensive
lines, appear to be a distinct capability."

X Corps (British) in report of 15 March state
German offensive potentially derided. (see Appendix).

Performance of "BAZOOKA":

From 62 Vth Army 18 March: Quote "The 60 ton "Tiger
Tank" MK VI can be knocked out by a "Bazooka". This was
demonstrated at Anzio when eight MK VI's attacked a company
of the 45th. The nearest tank was fired on by a "Bazooka"
and the first shot bounced off /sic/ the heavy armour in
front.

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-2-

The second shot tore away part of the tank tread and the crew abandoned it. Later another tank came up and drew away the disabled one. (The Americans had had to retire) This action indicates a) that the Bazooka is no more effective against the new German tanks than the .50 cal. armor piercing machine gun bullet was against the old model tanks b) the Germans must be feeling a material shortage.

Contacts and Informants

The article in the Italia Libera of March 15 on an alleged conversation between Badoglio, Alexander, and Eisenhower seemed timed with the "protest" meeting against Churchill last Sunday, 12 March. An effort was made to paint Alexander cold, hard and sarcastic and Eisenhower more or less conciliatory. The Partito d'Azione is indicating a leaning towards America, despite rumors that it receives money not only from Americans, but English as well.

Despite the fact that TESDESCHI and LONGOBARDI (Communist and Socialist) officially announced their continued opposition to the present government, they gave only lukewarm endorsement to CALACE (Action Party) when he proposed sending a protest telegram to Stalin.

The series of moves sponsored by Socialists, Communists and Partito d'Azione, including a second Sunday meeting (today 19 March) this time at Bari, has widened the split in the COMITATO which press releases try to deny. At the same time the strong Socialist-Communist pact evidenced by frequent joint declarations tends to keep them a little aloof from the Partito d'Azione. In addition the Partito d'Azione is divided, those that favor the leftist merger and those opposed. There will probably be three distinct groups within the Comitato instead of the present two. The Socialist - Communist group with the more radical of the Action, the Sferza-Omedeo part of action with the liberal elements of the Liberal and Labor groups, and the Demo-Christians with the industrial and religious elements of the Liberal and Labor groups.

SECRET**APPENDIX****Strategic Intelligence Extracts No 2**

"The line which has now been reached must be developed defensively forthwith as the main line of resistance. Sufficient depth to form a Main Sector of Resistance will be gained by the employment of fighting patrols and the general improvement of the line'. Thus the 14th Army in an order to its sappers on 6th March. It characterises the change of tune which has followed the third unsuccessful attack to eliminate our beach-head on 29 February. Till then it was imperative to show the world that not only the GUSTAV line be held but also any Allied landing, wherever it might come in could be liquidated. Now that the counter thrusts have proved costly and in vain, and as the threat of the next and greater landing draws nearer, the military plan for the situation needs revising even if Hitler's demands are the same.

"At the same time the approach of "D" day for the attack in the West and the increasingly urgent need to assemble the mobile formations of the French-Italian theatre in an area of readiness must have been a nagging thought in the mind of the Commander in Italy. Eventually he must lose certain of his armored and panzer grenadier divisions; and the realisation at the end of February that even now he had too few of them to finish the job as ordered is now clearly dictating to him a new policy.

"For the moment there is little more for Kennerling to do but wait events. He has enough troops to hold the Annie and the K Army fronts and to keep at least 90th Pz. Gren. and possibly also 29th Pz. Gren. Dive. in reserve and he is taking the opportunity of rationalising the divisional organisation in both Armies.

"It is not a situation to cause immediate alarm from the point of view of defence. Unless, however, reinforcements come from the North and of higher standard than before, or it will be out of the question both to hold the GUSTAV or HITLER lines and to force the beach-head into the sea. And the prospect of further divisions being sent to France may prejudice even simple defence."

(From X Corps Intelligence Summary - 16 March)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

... refer a copy of the
... to the
... Mr. Dunn
... any material which
... the groups mentioned
... letter.

C. A. Bone

C. A. Bone

7/76

Office of **SECRET**

Italy - 14/1/44
X J. J. Higgins
X Reports
X Callinan

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

My dear General Donovan:

I am grateful for your letter of ^{March 27, 1944} March 12, 1944, enclosing a highly interesting memorandum on the military significance of political conditions in Rome. Thank you very much for this useful material.

It is noted that no mention is made of Bordiga, leader of the Italian Communist Party from 1920 to 1924, when he was expelled from that Party because of tactical differences. I wonder if reports are true that he has a powerful, active group in the industrial areas. Likewise, I notice that there is no reference to representatives of the Malatesta Anarchists, who were very powerful before Mussolini's advent; are said to have maintained their organizational contacts even under the fascist regime; and are reputedly the ablest organizers in Italy. Also no reference is made to Lussu in connection with the Partito d'Azione in Rome.

I should be interested to see anything about these groups which may come to you through similar channels, and what part they might be expected to play in Northern Italy.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn
James Clement Dunn,
Director, Office of European Affairs

General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

valuable info
of report
[Signature]

SECRET

12 March 1954

Mr. W. Lee Jahn, Director,
Office of European Affairs,
State Department Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jahn:

I enclose a copy of a memorandum on
the subject of the military significance of politi-
cal operations in Bonn, which, I am sure, will be
of interest to you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director

WJD:ent

SECRET

13 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a report on the military
significance of political developments in
Italy. It is the compilation of various items
of intelligence coming from our units working
behind the lines.

You may find it of interest.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

OS: HAME, INC.
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

21 February 1945

SUBJECT: The Military Significance of Political
Conditions in ROMANIA

TO: Director Strategic Services

The following is a report in four parts on
political conditions in ROMANIA. This is compiled for the
benefit of operational sections of OSS who might deal
with these groups, and is not a statement of political
opinion by this Section.

Due to the fact that most of the men referred
to are in German-occupied territory, the greatest
care must be taken in the use of this material. It should
not be disseminated, even in part, outside the Organiza-
tion. The sources, also, have their information as a
result of cooperation with and confidence in OSS,
and information should not be used, even inside OSS, in
any way which might reveal these sources.

This report contains:

- Part One : Introduction and Organization
of COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE
- Part Two : SADOULIO-MONARCHIST Groups
- Part Three: Other elements
- Part Four : Operational Opportunities

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... to which is much harder
... Southern Italy. The average man
... the political currents and
... Italy will be the decisive
... important to remember that
... military action will be exclusively
... of certain groups to being
... "practical", or to having "forgotten"
... are still in Italy, the
... of any group to the fight against
... relative to the political situation.
... by the average man in each
... will be true of the final conduct

... many resistance organizations in
... political or social, others definitely
... the most important are the six parties
... the groups directed by the BRIGADIE
... organizations like the Church and the
... is, in fact, but will not be decisive.

COMITATO NAZIONALE

... "Action" Committee of the old Fronte
... which has lost its importance.
... referred to, even by party members,
... liberazione or the Comitato del

... is divided into two sub-committees,
... with two representatives from each

... of the Committee is Dr. BONOMI (a mem-
...). He is considered by all
... the white groups and Redoglio elements.

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The job was with [unclear] in Rome and in Italy

The head of the military sub-committee in [unclear]. Other military leaders are actually [unclear] within the committee.

Among the names as shown in Naples:

- MOVIMENTO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO
- PREZIO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO
- MOVIMENTO COMUNISTA ITALIANO
- MOVIMENTO RIFORMISTA ITALIANO
- MOVIMENTO LAVORO

The Comitato Centrale in Rome is a great deal [unclear] than the Neapolitan group. The [unclear] the Comitato and the regional sub-committees [unclear] to be very [unclear], with direction coming from [unclear] sources)

- FRANCESCO
- GIULIO
- FRANCESCO
- (head of military section?)
- FRANCESCO (delegate to Bari)

- FRANCESCO
- FRANCESCO, lastly gen'l
- FRANCESCO
- FRANCESCO, head of military section
- FRANCESCO TIPALDI (delegate to Bari)
- FRANCESCO (military sub-committee)
- FRANCESCO (two brothers)
- FRANCESCO (not real name, military committee)

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Capt. **MUGNINI** (military sub-committee)
Lt. **BRACCINI** (Cassibile?)

Major **PIRELLA** (possibly a baptist, Church influence)
Squadier **FRATELLI** (Observatore Romano, Vatican)
Professor **GRANATA**

Part 1

LA MATA
FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI (military section)

FRATELLI
FRATELLI (?)
FRATELLI (military?)
FRATELLI (now in Naples)

Part 2 (see also PART THREE)

FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI (military sub-committee)
FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI
FRATELLI (milit. demo-Christian?)
(reported by most reliable sources arrested and possibly shot. Two normally reliable sources say he is alive and free.)

FRATELLI
FRATELLI (Conte?)
FRATELLI (delegate to Bari)
FRATELLI (liberal leader in Milan)

SECRET

MANICCO RINI
MILANO
ROMA (cont)
... (1, number of party and back...)

COMITATO AND PARTIES

1. Estimation of strength in Rome varies from 10,000 to 20,000 as the figure for the adherents which are not counted by the six parties of the COMITATO. It is difficult to judge, particularly so in Rome the population may unite in action directed by the COMITATO and necessarily sharing its political views.

2. The COMITATO has good liaison with its Northern Comitati (MILANO COMITATO mentioned as strong, also NAPOLI). In the north resistance seems less political, and more representative of the parties in Rome stating that bands in the North were very well organized, and the parties less so. There are only five parties in the Northern Comitati (the "democrazia del lavoro").

3. The political opinion of the ROMAN COMITATO is generally not to appreciate, since the landing and retarded progress of the Allies have evidently changed the situation. A statement coming from ROMAN stated that these six parties are tremendously influential in ROMAN and the North. He stated that they were against the present King, but would accept the Republic Government temporarily, and he stated that monarchist parties in the North (the "gruppi") were non-existent.

4. A summary of opinions and recent information from both the Italian Government and local political sources indicates important political strife in Rome to be expected. The opinion is that the COMITATO is believed to have lost its former unity. The three strongest parties

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and the only ones with important military elements - the neo-Christian groups are either communist controlled or controlled directly by the SACCOLLO Government) are the Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione, they have declared themselves absolutely unwilling to accept the appointment of their representatives in COME.

The three leader parties are attempting to force a coalition. This opinion is being expressed by the present Italian Government and is conspicuous except that it is confirmed in the other hand there are very few indications that SACCOLLO has aided with the larger groups (especially under his presidency) and only the groups in Northern Italy have undoubtedly accepted the appointment of the Prince, if not the King.

The SACCOLLO's representatives. A discussion of the SACCOLLO's relationship to the SACCOLLO elements is made in Part IV.

The Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione are the best organized and strongest of the three. The Communists have the greatest security (due to their underground organization) and have the only military experience in irregular warfare. The Socialists are the largest party in Northern Italy. The Partito d'Azione has a reputation for having intellectual leadership, having no documents collected, Jews the most important of printed propaganda, both political and religious.

Of the three smaller parties, the Neo-Christian groups are the strongest. They are presently backed by the King, the royal, if not the active membership, and the Catholic church goes. Although the COME head and the Church, are opposed to the appointment of their representatives of this party claim that they would prefer that Victor Emmanuel III be named the end of the war in Europe. The Liberal Party and the Democrazia Cristiana support the King in COME. This is improbable in view of public statements of CROCE AND ORSANO, who have more influence in the North than they do in the South. A representative of the Liberal Party also...

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SECRET

ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

... the Italian Government and the Redcliffe ...
 ... would have to leave Rome, heavy plans ...
 ... military government ...
 ... Italian Government. This group ...
 ... responsibilities. One, to hide ...
 ... from the Germans; two, to defend Rome ...
 ... on hand (Redcliffe stated to understand ...
 ... was done, before his staff ...
 ... a conference against the Germans; three, ...
 ... resistance if Allies failed to come ...
 ... a short time; and four, to maintain civil ...
 ... obligations were stipulated and stressed

... to review the now well-known ...
 ... immediately following the ...
 ... it is important to bear in mind that ...
 ... 13th September and subsequently ...
 ... from the plans of the Italian ...
 ... on Redcliffe, partly accounts ...
 ... which actually took place. It ...
 ... have been three stages of planning.

... government, believed that the Allied ...
 ... would be swift. They also were told by ...
 ... authority that, temporarily, at ...
 ... the Italian authorities. The pro- ...
 ... point of view - invasion and the ...
 ... the Government for organ- ...
 ... military units and failed to secure ...
 ... with one, where in both Army and air ...
 ... (by Redcliffe) was "15th column" ...
 ... the leading committee caused the issuance of ...
 ... is the alleged reason for the failure ...
 ... to resist the German. Events

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There were...
 The second phase...
 The...
 political...
 from the...
 almost...
 caused by...
 in the...
 occupied Italy...
 physically...
 and...
 from both...
 towards...
 non-political and almost par-

is the present one. The Gov-
 receives unofficial, but highly placed,
 will follow a moderate
 outbreaks during the period
 in Italy. In the volatile atmosphere
 opinion seems to change quickly
 to another, and monarchist parties are
 support of the principal Ital-
 retention by the Allies of men
 the present King, (such as Carabinieri),
 of Southern Italy to Italy
 the King and Badoglio into
 or one selected by
 after the war. This current phase is
 towards monarchist control;

... (NAME) ...

... of the left of the year
 were organizational
 recognized
 he had five agents nets,
 and women left behind
 ...

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also in close liaison with the COMITATO and apparently had harmonious relations with them. He was caught a few weeks ago by the Germans and evidently forced to reveal information regarding the organization.

4. Organization of military section.

General ARMELLINI, head for ROME
 General BOCASE, head for North Italy ? (SIM)
 General CARBONE, ex-head for ROME, now in
 disgrace (see part III) (SIM)

General (?) TOMASI
 Colonel RUGGERO, head of Granatieri, shot in Nov.
 Major Santini, (SIM Aeronautica)
 Colonel TOMMASINI, resistance groups
 Major JANNINI, Antonio " "
 Captain MIANI, " "
 TRABUZZI, police Chief for ROME under Fascist,
 now arrested by the Germans.

The military section organized among a) disbanded army units, b) disbanded police units (Carabinieri, Granatieri), and c) police units working for Fascists who were re-mounted on at the last minute, (FAL, Guardia di Finanza, Metropolitan). These groups in ROME numbered a potential of at least 10,000 men armed. Most of these men received regular wages from the Badoglio Government.

Outside of ROME winter, lack of food, and conflicting political views have cut down the Badoglioist military units to a point where they are no longer very effective.

The arrest of BENTIVOLIO and the recent re-orientation of measures in ROME (many of the police units dependent on for support have been moved North and replaced by MILIZIA and GUARDIA REPUBBLICANA) have weakened this official organization. Certainly, several of their ROME police are out. The control of SIM in the organization and the control of BOCALIO in the City has lessened.

SECRET

The Italian Government are holding reports on

1. MILANO has informed the Italian officials
that the Italian military commander for
the interim period and Senator MILANO will be

2. Contact is being made and money given to these
groups. These groups previously were not well
known but an effort is being made to have pro-Communist
groups. The political parties on there are now in
the state.

3. A propaganda campaign is being directed at Allied
forces, and even military units are being warned.
The failure to order political groups in
the country MILANO authority will result in a revolt
and to other military authority.

SECRET

SECRETPART THREESMALL GROUPS

1. In a military sense no smaller organizations are significant. The majority of groups in COME and Northern Italy began inspired only by a hatred of the Germans. Particularly in the North these groups, workers, Army officers, and farmers, have retained to a large extent a non-political attitude. Their leaders, however, the men from whom they will take orders because it is from them or through them they receive supplies, organization and money, are almost all political. It is important, therefore, to realize that, though many bands in the North give themselves one name or another, they will follow the leadership of one of the large groups outlined in Parts ONE and TWO. The information given below will be useful for making contact but is not significant in any estimate of the future of Italian resistance to the Germans.

2. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Vatican and Church-led groups are the most important of these smaller groups. Church groups are to be considered as distinct from the Partito Demo-Cristiano.

a. The Church politically

The Vatican is a neutral State and is anxious to preserve that neutrality for religious and political reasons. The Vatican cannot afford to alienate Catholic groups in Axis or pro-Axis countries, nor can it run the risk of giving the Germans the diplomatic excuse to enter Church lands. Consequently, overt activity in favor of any side, or of any party in Italy, is impossible. The Church is neutral, endorses the Demo-Christian party and the clerical elements of non-fascist parties, but cannot afford to be admitted to open endorsement of either. One is, after all, bound to the party political COMITATO which includes Communists, the other supports a Masonic royal house, whose position is not secure.

SECRET

SECRET

The Church's mobilized activities

Committed morally to oppose such that in un-
derstanding in America the Church has always been eager to
oppose the Axis, it, in doing so, it does not lose the
adherence of a large section of the international com-
munity. Evidently, Allied Diplomacy and particularly
the visit of Spullmann convinced the Vatican that support
of Italian resistance against the Germans was legitimate.
The system of clandestine intelligence and propaganda ac-
tivities in Germany and Poland began in Italy. Today the
majority of the energy in German-occupied Italy were in
aid of the anti resistance organizations.

Organization of Vatican Resistance

The Palatine Guards in the Vatican City were
a number at the beginning of September and in Decem-
ber 1943 strong. (Source: agent).

A colored American officer in hiding in ROME
to escape when the district he was in was to be searched
his house. The Vatican Ethiopian Legation, twenty
visited that house; after the visit twenty-one
black delegates re-entered the safety of the Vatican City.
(Source: agent).

Monsieur MACLIONE, Papal Secretary of State
officially informed the Allies that the Father Superior
of a certain Church abbey was pro-Fascist and dangerous.
This is, of course, the temporal voice of the Church
breaking - a neutral state breaking its neutrality. It
is on this type of dual logic that the Church today can
attract everyone, from anarchists to monarchists.
Fugitives, Communists, Jews, Italian officers, Biaggio's
son, a Soviet, communist leader, the Partito d'Azione and
Roberto Calvi have all found haven and guidance in
the church and convent net-work through North Italy.
(Source: Messenger from ROME).

d. The above examples are to demonstrate that,
in a word, the Vatican is a sure source of aid in fight

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[Faded, illegible text block]

[Faded, illegible text block]

[Faded, illegible text block]

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[Faded, illegible text block]

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... and movements who fight locally, without central
... larger organization. These groups are generally
... elements of the biological or political movements, although
... frequently accept "socialist" and "communist" an-
... titles. Usually, to maintain any considerable
... ally with the larger groups.

The organized fighting groups are the CABBANARI
and the MAFIA. The first are MAFIAI Republicans and have
... organization. It is, therefore, almost impossible
... them, except to say that, excepting the an-
... only maintain groups which are called "Carbonari"
... "Mafiosi" are either local groups who have taken
... because of its connotation or groups organized
... and MICCIOTTI GARIBOLDI. These groups, as yet,
... to be numerous or strong. Politically both
... and GARIBOLDINI are anti-monarchical.

Italian MASOVENIA, which is in contact with
... British or French Masons in Naples, seem to have
... sort of organization throughout Italy; at
... however, it is evident that they are only in a
... to help existing resistance elements or Allied
... in a small way. Safe addresses and certainly
... assistance would be the form of such assistance.
... the Masons in Italy are temporarily stupified.
... as a whole, but the Masons are extremely anti-
... and feel very uncomfortable supporting a Government
... they feel is not whole-heartedly anti-Fascist. The
... have declared themselves no longer clandestine in
... occupied territory, but have not yet made any
... statements of policy.

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PART FOUR

OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

1. Irregular military operations in Northern Italy will soon be possible on a large scale. Unlike the divisions of partisan forces found in Yugoslavia and Greece, resistance groups in Northern Italy are at present relatively united.

2. There is great collaboration among the various military and political groups in the North. The example of the regular Army hiding in the mountains, fed and informed by socialist or communist workers, and financed by industrialists is an encouraging one. At present, Allied Special Operations agencies can work freely with Communist and Badoglio Groups, knowing that resistance organizations will work together.

3. Another advantage is the efficient Church organization and the willingness of the Church to collaborate. Other potential chains for cover and intelligence are labor unions, which are still weak, and the Freemasons.

4. This state of opportunity will not necessarily last. From the most reliable reports, it is apparent that the Italians place great importance on the decisions to be taken when the Allies arrive in ROME. Government sources seem alarmed over the alleged threat of armed opposition to their authorities in ROME. Some of the political parties have indicated that under present circumstances such a threat is real. Others deprecate such reports as exaggerations originating in the excited atmosphere of Naples and propagated with political intention. The most common theme, both in the defensive Government attitude and the attacks by the parties, is the abdication of the present King. The one side argues that the abdication in these times would mean more disunion, the other side claims that, unless the King does abdicate, Italian resistance to the Germans will never be important.

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... information ...
... in the ...
... should be ...
... at present ...
... of these ...
... with ...
... information ...
... effect ...
... investigation ...

SECRET

1944
x [Signature]
x [Signature]
x [Signature]

OBS SPEC. DET. G-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

23 February 1944

TO : Director Strategic Services

The enclosed contains particularly a report explaining the military significance of political developments in ROSS.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a lack of official American policy is hurting the position of all the United Nations in Italy. This lack has encouraged a great deal of political reporting and activity which is done on without proper authority. This has confused the relations of all factions and has failed to impress Allied representatives with the importance of political decisions.

The general impression here is that Allied civil and military are uninformed. Particularly the few American representatives seem unaware of the significance of Italian political movements or of the independent activities of other Allied Nations. This Detachment has received information from Italian groups which it has been asked not to turn over to Allied authorities for fear of indiscreet or unjust action.

It is important that either America adopt a strong policy which will eliminate the "wild-cat" manoeuvres of certain American individuals or agencies or else be so well informed of the political and economic endeavors of the English and Russians that pressure can be exerted to enforce a true United Nations policy.

Malcolm W. Callahan
MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer

SECRET

OSS SPEC. INT.
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

21 February 1944

SUBJECT: The Military Significance of Political
Conditions in ROMANIA

TO : Director Strategic Services

The following is a report in four parts on political conditions in ROMANIA. This is compiled for the benefit of operational sections of OSS who might deal with these groups, and is not a statement of political opinion by this Section.

Due to the fact that most of the men referred to are still in German-occupied territory, the greatest care must be taken in the use of this material. It should not be disseminated, even in part, outside the Organization. The sources, also, gave their information as an expression of cooperation with and confidence in OSS, and this information should not be used, even inside OSS, in a manner which might reveal these sources.

This report contains:

- Part One : Introduction and Organization of COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE
- Part Two : BADOGLIO-MONARCHIST Groups
- Part Three: Other elements
- Part Four : Operational Opportunities

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INTRODUCTION

Political interest in ROSS is much keener than in most areas of Southern Italy. The average man here knows more about the political currents and activities now important to Italy and the decisions made in ROSS. It is also important to remember that any organized irregular military action will be exclusively military. Despite the claims of certain groups to being "purely military", "non-political", or to having "forgotten" the war since the Germans are still in Italy, the conditional cooperation of any group to the fight against the Germans will be relative to the political situation. Such cooperation is usually regretted by the average man in such areas, but nevertheless will be true of the final conduct of the war.

There are many resistance organizations in Italy, some purely political or social, others definitely military. Of these the most important are the six parties of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale and the groups directed by the BALOGGIO. Other organizations like the Church and the "maquis" might be important, but will not be decisive.

COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE

Above is "action" Committee of the old Fronte di Liberazione della Liberazione, which has lost its importance. The Committee is often referred to, even by party members, as the Comitato della Liberazione or the Comitato del Fronte.

The Committee is divided into two sub-committees, one for military, with two representatives from each area.

The head of the Committee is Dr. BONOMI (a member of the Comitato del Lavoro). He is considered by all as the main link between the outside groups and theoglio elements.

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... of the ... with influence in ...

The head of the military sub-committee is General ... Other military leaders are actually ...

Parties are the same to those in ...

- PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO
- PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO
- PARTITO D'AZIONE
- PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO
- PARTITO LIBERALE
- DEMOCRATIA ...

The Committee Centrale in Rome is a great deal ... and very unified than the ... group. The ... between the Committee and the regional sub-committees ... used to be very good, with ... coming from ... (July session)

- PARTITO ...
- ... (head of military section?)
- ... (delegate to Bari)

- ... (GAUPERI)
- ... (see's son?)
- ... (military section)
- ... (delegate to Bari)
- ... (military sub-committee)
- ... (two brothers)
- ... (not real name. Military committee)

SECRET

Gen. ROBERTO (military sub-committee)
Lt. BRACCINI (sub-committee)

Gen. DINO BIANCHI (possibly a member, Central Intelligence)
Ambrogio BIANCHI (Central Intelligence, Italian)
Professor BIANCHI

Sub-Committee

Gen. A. BELLA
FRANCESCO COLANINNI
SANTO MINGOLTA
GIORGIO BIANCHI (military section)

Gen. BIANCHI
Gen. VIGNANO (?)
FRANCESCO (military?)
BIANCHI (not in Naples)

Sub-Committee (see also PART THREE)

Gen. COCCIMARNO
Gen. VITTORIO (military sub-committee)
Gen. BIANCHI " "
Gen. BIANCHI " "
Gen. BIANCHI " "
Gen. BIANCHI " "
Gen. BIANCHI (milit. demo-Christians?)
Gen. BIANCHI (reported by most reliable sources arrested and possibly shot. Two normally reliable sources say he is alive and free.)

Sub-Committee

Gen. ALESSANDRO CASATI (Center)
Gen. ANTONIO CALVI (delegate to Bari)
Avv. Gaetano ARPECANO (liberal leader in Milan)

SECRET

SECRET

ROMA
MILANO
COMITATO
MILANO (see)
MILANO (is member of party and back to)

REPORT ON COMITATO AND PARTIES

a. Estimates of strength in Rome alone vary from 50,000 to 400,000 as the figure for the numerous units are accounted by the six parties of the COMITATO. It is difficult to judge, particularly so in Rome the organization may unite in action directed by the COMITATO without necessarily sharing its political views.

b. The COMITATO has good liaison with its Northern Comitati (MILANO COMITATO mentioned as strong, also (see V)). In the north resistance seems less political, one representative of the parties in Rome stating that bands in the north were very well organized, and the parties less so. There are only five parties in the Northern Comitati (see Venezia del Lavoro).

c. The political opinion of the ROME COMITATO is difficult to appreciate, since the landing and retarded progress of the Allies have evidently changed the situation. A representative coming from ROME stated that those six parties were not only influential in ROME and the North. He stated that they were against the present King, but would support the Badoglio Government temporarily, and he stated that monarchist parties in the North (political groups) were non-existent.

d. A summary of opinions and recent information from the Italian Government and local political groups indicates important political strife in Rome. The opinion is that the COMITATO is believed to have lost its former unity. The three strongest parties

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... the only ones...
... controlled effort...
... Socialists...
... present government...
... and the...
... of all...
... organized...
... and...
... by other...
... cent...
... parties...
... Socialists...
... a...
... will stand...
... captain of the...
... will be... in...

6. The Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Unione are the most organized and strongest of all groups. The Communists have the greatest capacity (due to their cell type organization) and have the only military and air experience in irregular warfare. The Socialists are the most popular party in Northern Italy. The Partito d'Unione has the reputation for having intellectual leaders. This man, judging from documents collected, does the most exact amount of printed propaganda, both political and artistic.

7. Of the three smaller parties, the Democristiana are the strongest. They are presently backed by the Church and have the approval, if not the active membership, of the middle-class church goers. Although the PCI head of the Democristians, and the Church, are opposed to the present King, local representatives of this party claim that their adherents would prefer that Victor Emmanuel remain in office until the end of the war in Europe. The Italian government may the Liberal Party and the Democristians will accept the King in Rome. This is improbable in view of the public statements of CRUCE and CERABONA, who have more influence in the North than they do in the South. The PCI representatives of the Liberal Party also...

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when the committee was signed and the scientific
... they would have to leave ... Italy plans
... military government
... Italian Government. This group
... responsibility. One, to aid
... Germany, two, to defend Rome
... (Badoglio stated to underlined
... too soon, before his staff
... defense against the Germans); three,
... resistance if Allies failed to come
... and four, to maintain civil
... obligations were identified and stressed
... .

... to review the new well-known
... immediately following the
... it is important to bear in mind that
... 25th and 26th September and subsequently
... from the plans of the Italian
... forces on Badoglio partly accounts
... which actually took place. It
... have been three stages of planning.

... government, believed that the Allied
... They also were told by
... temporarily, at
... Italian authorities. The pre-
... invasion and the
... government was organ-
... and failed to secure
... in both Army and Air
... that "with column"
... caused the issuance of
... the alleged reason for the failure
... to resist the Germans. Events

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also in close liaison with the ROSSINI and apparently had
very close relations with them. He was caught in the hands
of the Germans and ultimately forced to reveal information
regarding the organization.

a. Organization of military section.

- General AMALDI, head for ROME
- General AMALDI, head for North Italy? (SIA)
- General AMALDI, assigned for ROME, now in
disgrace (see part III) (SIA)
- General (?) TOMASI
- Colonel ROSSINI, head of (Dronetti, phot. La Nov.
- Major Santini, (Sik Aeronautica)
- Colonel TOMASINI, resistance groups
- Major JACOBI, Antonio
- Captain AMALDI
- TOMASINI, Police Chief for ROME under Fascist,
now arrested by the Germans.

The military section organized among a) disbanded
military units, b) disbanded police units (Carabinieri,
etc.), and c) police units working for fascists who
were recruited on at the last minute, (SIA, Guardia di
Finanza, etc.). These groups in ROME numbered a
total of about 10,000 men armed. Most of these
units were recruited from the Badoglio Government.

Because of ROME winter, lack of food, and con-
flicting political views have cut down the Badoglioist
units to a point where they are no longer very
effective.

The arrest of MONTENAPOLI and the recent re-
treat of the Germans in ROME (many of the police units
moved out of the city have been moved north and replaced
by the SIA and GUARDIA REPUBBLICANA) have weakened this
military organization. Certainly, several of their ROME
units are out. The control of SIA in the organization
and the control of MONTENAPOLI in the City has lessened.

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5. The Italian Government are taking steps to strengthen their position.

a. BADOGLIO has informed the Allies officially that AL CALINI will be Italian Military Commander in the interim period and SCALFARI will be Civil Officer.

b. Contact is being made and money given to non-armistice groups. These groups previously were not well organized, but an effort is being made to have pro-Badoglio sections among the political parties as there are now in Southern Italy.

c. A tremendous campaign is being directed at Allied policy. ACC, AMI and even military units are being warned constantly that the failure to order political groups in SOVI to recognize BADOGLIO authority will result in a revolt dangerous to Allied military security.

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PART THREE

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In a military sense no smaller organizations are important. The majority of groups in COM and North Italy have been inspired only by a hatred of the Germans. Only in the North these groups, workers, Army and farmers, have retained to a large extent a non-political attitude. Their leaders, however, the men whom they will take orders because it is from them that they receive supplies, organization and money, are almost all political. It is important, therefore, to realize that, though many bands in the North give them no name or another, they will follow the leadership of one of the large groups outlined in Parts ONE and TWO. The information given below will be useful for making conclusions but is not significant in any estimate of the future of Italian resistance to the Germans.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Vatican and Church-led groups are the most important of these smaller groups. Church groups are never considered as distinct from the Partito Demo-Cristiano.

The Church Politically

The Vatican is a neutral State and is anxious to preserve that neutrality for religious and political reasons. The Vatican cannot afford to alienate Catholic groups outside of pre-Axis countries, nor can it run the risk of giving the Germans the diplomatic excuse to enter Italy. Consequently, overt activity in favor of any political party in Italy, is impossible. The Church never endorses the Demo-Christian party and the clerical elements of non-royalist parties, but cannot afford to be allied to or an endorsement of either. One is, after all, reminded of the purely political COMITATO which includes Communists, the other su parte a Masonic royal house, whose position is not secure.

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The Church's Role

conditioned... in Europe... of a large... Allied... of... intelligence... in Germany and Poland... with resistance organizations.

Organization of Vatican Resistance

The Vatican Guards in the Vatican City were... in number at the beginning of September... 100 strong (Houder, 1962).

A colored American officer in uniform in Rome... to escape... house. The Vatican Diplomatic Legation, twenty... after the visit... re-entered the safety of the Vatican City.

Monseigneur MAGLIORIE, Papal Secretary of State... the Alliance that the Father Superior... church... the temporal voice of the Church... a neutral state breaking its neutrality. It... type of dual logic that the Church today can... everyone from anarchists to monarchists... Jews, Italian officials, Magliorio's... communist leader, the Partito d'Azione and... have all found haven and guidance in... convent... through North Italy.

d. The above examples are to demonstrate that... the Vatican is a mere source of aid in fight

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... the German. The Vatican's policy political line
... of them forward, and certainly not demonstrated.
... its political policy, with regard to post-war
... of no interest to operations with assistance groups

ITALIAN POLITICAL GROUPS

The main political groups outside of the
... difficult to define as their organization is
... frequently change their names.

a. There is evidently an orthodox branch of the
... and MOVIMENTO COMUNISTA D'ITALIA seems to be
... its publication is the "Bandiera Rossa" and
... is not pro Stalin Russia, rather pro-Lenin.
... possibly the same group are Partito
... rivoluzionario, and Trotskisti Socialisti
... (possibly a sub-division). Their leader appears
... of MATTIOTTI.

b. Another so-called Communist group is the
... CATTOLICI COMUNISTI, in reality a violent
... group. The combination of names is designed
... support of both church and workers, but, so far,
... work. Avvocato RODANO is alleged to be the

c. Christian SOCIALISTI is another group
... appeal to both middle and lower classes. It
... appeal to Italian Protestants. Prof. BRUNI
... It is weaker still than the Cattolici

d. PARTITO REPUBBLICANO INDIPENDENTE led by
... is still small. It may have some connection
... groups. (see CARONATI below)

NON-POLITICAL GROUPS

e. Numerous bands of "patriots" composed

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[Heavily obscured and illegible text]

[Heavily obscured and illegible text]

[Heavily obscured and illegible text]

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5. Whichever decision is made by the Allies and whatever is the reaction of the Italians, the political future should be understood by Allied armies, particularly by OSS. At present, too few Americans are willing to admit the importance of politics in relation to irregular military activity. Of those that see this importance, the majority report and act with political bias. Operations based on a lack of information or misinformation could conceivably harm the Allied effort. This possibility should encourage vigorous, but unbiased investigation of Italian political activity.

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February 1944

**Subject: The Military Significance of Political
Conditions in ROMANIA**

TO : Director Strategic Services

1. The following is a report in four parts on political conditions in ROMANIA. This is compiled for the benefit of operational sections of OSS who might deal with these groups, and is not a statement of political opinion of this Section.

Due to the fact that most of the men referred to are still in German-occupied territory, the greatest care must be taken in the use of this material. It should not be disseminated, even in part, outside the Organization. The sources, also, gave their information as an expression of cooperation with and confidence in OSS. No information should not be used, even inside OSS, in a manner which might reveal these sources.

3. This report contains:

- Part One : Introduction and Organization of COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE
- Part Two : RADICALO-MONARCHIST Groups
- Part Three: Other elements
- Part Four : Operational Opportunities

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SECRETPART ONEINTRODUCTION.

Political interests in ROME is much looser than in most areas of Southern Italy. The average man does not know much about the political currents and policies now important to Italy will be the decisions reached in ROME. It is also important to remember that no organized irregular military action will be exclusively military. Despite the claims of certain groups to being "only military", "non-political", or to having "forgotten politics while the Germans are still in Italy", the unconditional cooperation of any group in the fight against the Germans will be relative to the political situation. This fact is usually regretted by the average man in each area, but nevertheless will be true of the final conduct of all groups.

There are many resistance organizations in Italy, some purely political or social, others definitely military. Of these the most important are the six parties of the COMITATO and the groups directed by the BAIOGLIO Government. Other organizations like the Church and the "partisanari" might be important, but will not be decisive.

COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE

Above is "action" Committee of the old Fronte di Liberazione, which has lost its importance. The Committee is often referred to, even by party members, as the Comitato della Liberazione or the Comitato dei sei partiti.

The Committee is divided into two sub-committees, political and military, with two representatives from each party.

The head of the Committee is Dr. BONCHI (a member of the Direzione del Lavoro). He is considered by all parties, including the outside groups and Baoglio elements,

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TO THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

RE: [Illegible]

The Committee on Intelligence and Security
is composed of the following members:
[Illegible]

Chairman:

- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]

(Name of Agency)

Members:

- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]
- [Illegible]

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Col. MANGINI (military sub-committee)
Lt. BRACCINI (committee)

Others: MORA SCOTTI (possibly a banker; church influence)
Monsignor BOLLINI (Conservatore Romano, Vatican)
Professor GONZALE

At Home Daily

FRANCO LA MALFA
FEDERICO COMEDINI
GIORGIO PENNACCA
VICTORIO BAVIER (military section)

FRANCESCO DE ABERO
GIORGIO (?)
GABRIELI (military?)
GRAYONI (now in Naples)

Securities Daily (see also PART THREE)

PAOLO BUCCINARRO
MIGUEL
DE (?) VITTORIO (military sub-committee)
GABRIELI
GIORGIO
GIORGIO AMENDOLA
GIORGIO CATTO
Lt. BRACCINI (milit. dem.-Christian?)
GIORGIO TOVEDA (reported by most reliable sources arrested and possibly shot. Two normally reliable sources say he is alive and free.)

At Home Daily

Avv. GIULIO CASATI (Conte?)
Avv. ANTONIO CALVI (delegato to Bari)
Avv. GIULIO ANTONIO (liberal leader in Milan)

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COMITATO
COMITATO
COMITATO
COMITATO
COMITATO (in number of party and pages 102)

STRENGTH OF COMITATO AND PARTIES

a. Estimates of strength in Rome also vary from 50,000 to 400,000 as the figure for the numerous units are determined by the six parties of the COMITATO. It is impossible to judge, particularly as in Rome the population may unite in action directed by the COMITATO without necessarily sharing its political views.

b. The COMITATO has good liaison with its Northern Committees (MILANO COMITATO mentioned as strong, also). In the north resistance seems less political, one representative of the parties in Rome stating that bands in the north were very well organized, and the parties less so. There are only five parties in the Northern Committee (no Democrazia del Lavoro).

c. The political opinion of the ROMA COMITATO is not difficult to appreciate, since the leading and retarded aspects of the attack have evidently changed the situation. A report coming from ROMA stated that these six parties are increasingly influential in ROMA and the North. He also stated that they were against the present King, but would accept the Auzonio Government temporarily, and he stated that politically that monarchist parties in the North (and political groups) were non-existent.

d. A summary of opinions and recent information supports the Italian Government and local political movements. The important political strike in Rome. One opinion is that the COMITATO is believed to have lost its former unity. The three strongest parties

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(and the only one with important military elements) and
 neo-Christian groups (the latter controlled or
 controlled directly by the Italian Government) and the
 Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione. They have
 declared themselves absolutely unwilling to accept the
 present government or their replacement. In Rome,
 Mussolini and the three smaller parties are attempting to
 form a union of all forces. This opinion is being
 energetically forwarded by the present Italian Government
 and would be suspicious except that it is occasionally
 by other sources. On the other hand there are very re-
 cent indications that MONTI has sided with the larger
 parties (mainly under his presidency) and with the
 neo-Christians (who in Southern Italy have substantially
 a record of agreement with the King, if not the King)
 and a deal for unity with MONTI's representatives. A dis-
 cussion of the MONTI's relationship to the MONTI's ele-
 ments will be made in Part IV.

e. The Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione
 are, at least in Rome, the best organized and strongest of
 the groups. The Communists have the greatest identity (due
 to their cell type organization) and have the only military
 experience in irregular warfare. The Socialists
 are the most popular party in Northern Italy. The Partito
 d'Azione has the reputation for having intellectual leader-
 ship and, judging from documents collected, does the
 great amount of printed propaganda, both political and
 military.

f. Of the three smaller parties, the Neo-Christi-
 ans are the strongest. They are presently backed by the
 Government and have the approval, if not the active membership,
 of many middle-class church goers. Although the Rome head
 of the Neo-Christians, and the Church, are opposed to the
 present King, local representatives of this party claim that
 most of their adherents would prefer that Victor Emmanuel
 remain in office until the end of the war in Europe. The
 Italian Government, the Liberal Party and the Democrazia
 del Lavoro all accept the King in Rome. This is improbable
 in view of the public statements of CRUCE and GARIBONDI, who
 probably have more influence in the North than they do in
 Naples. The Rome representatives of the Liberal Party also
 refuse that opinion.

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PART TWO

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ITALIAN MILITARY GROUPS

1. When the Armistice was signed and the Badoglio Government knew they would have to leave Rome, last plans were made to leave behind some sort of military government to represent the official Italian Government. This group was directed with several responsibilities. One, to hide all state documents from the Germans; two, to defend Rome with the divisions on hand (Badoglio stated to understand that the invasion came two weeks too soon, before his staff had time to prepare a defense against the Germans); three, to maintain underground resistance if Allies failed to come on Rome within a short time; and four, to maintain civil order. These last two obligations were clarified and increased only recently.

2. It is unimportant to review the now well-known circumstances preceding and immediately following the Armistice. However, it is important to bear in mind that the events of the 8th and 9th September and subsequently are completely different from the plans of the Italian Government. The haste forced on Badoglio partly accounts for the complete confusion which actually took place. It is now evident that there have been three stages of planning.

a. The Italian government, believing that the Allied advance on Rome would be swift, they also were told by some fairly high Allied authority that, temporarily, at least, they would remain the Italian authorities. The premature - from Badoglio's point of view - invasion and the armistice terms prevented the Government from organizing resistance of military units and failed to secure the adherence of most units commanders in both Army and Air Corps. It is claimed (by Badoglio) that "fifth column" knowledge of the pending Armistice caused the issuance of false orders. This is the alleged reason for the failure of many of the high officers to resist the Germans. Events

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of this phase were chaotic and unorganized.

b. The second phase of the Italian resistance was the period of the "unofficial" resistance and political activity. This lack of official recognition from the ACI and EGI, the almost insuperable administrative difficulties created by the war, and the loss brought about a hesitancy in the official military command resistance in occupied Italy. Both Badoglio and the King were physically tired and discouraged, and witnesses of personal attacks from both Northern and Southern Italy. The efforts of the Comando Supremo towards organizing SOE had a completely non-political and almost passive character.

c. The third phase is the present one. The Government constantly receives unofficial, but highly placed, advice that the United Nations will follow a moderate policy for fear of "communists" outbreaks during the period of military activity in Italy. In the volatile atmosphere of Southern Italy popular opinion seems to change quickly from one extreme to another, and monarchist parties are gaining strength. The open support of the principal Italian military leaders, the retention by the Allies of men and units loyal to the present King (such as Carabinieri), and the recent transfer of most of Southern Italy to Italian "control" have all heartened the King and Badoglio into the belief that the present government, or one selected by the Allies to rule Italy after the war. This current phase is marked by a tremendous effort towards monarchist control in Italy.

3. ORGANIZATION OF RADIO "4",

The Badoglio groups as of the 1st of the year were headed by the Colonel MONTENAZZO whose organizational ability, rather than position, made him the recognized head of the resistance movement. He had five agents sets, among many agents who were not men and women left behind by the Government, but simply patriots. MONTENAZZO was

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... of the ...
... by the ...
... the organization ...

Organization of military units

- General ...
- Colonel ...
- Major ...
- Colonel ...
- Major ...
- Captain ...
- YAMBUKINI, Police Chief for ...

The military section organized ...
a) military units, b) disbanded police units ...
could be counted on at the last minute ...
potential of at least 10,000 men armed ...
men received regular wages from the ...

Outside of ...
political views have cut down the ...
military units to a point where they are no longer very ...

The arrest of ... and the recent re-
pressive measures in ... of the police units ...
by ... have weakened this ...
organization. Certainly, several of the ...
and the control of ... in the City has ...

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b. The Italian Government is taking steps to strengthen their position.

c. BARDOLIO has informed the Allied High Commission that ARSIZIOLI will be Italian Military Liaison Officer, Rome in the interim period and BARDOLIO will be Civil Chief.

d. Contact is being made and money given to non-archival groups. These groups previously were not well organized, but an effort is being made to have pro-Bardoglio sections among the political parties as there are now in Southern Italy.

e. A tremendous campaign is being directed at Allied policy. AM, AMI and even military units are being warned constantly that the failure to order political groups in Rome to recognize BARDOLIO authority will result in a result dangerous to Allied military security.

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SECRET**ITALY****OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES**

1. Irregular military operations in Northern Italy will soon be possible on a large scale. Unlike the divisions of partisan forces found in Yugoslavia and Greece, resistance groups in Northern Italy are at present relatively united.

2. There is great collaboration among the various military and political groups in the North. The example of the regular Army hiding in the mountains, fed and inspired by socialist or communist workers, and financed by industrialists is an encouraging one. At present, Allied special operations agencies can work freely with the partisans and Badoglio Groups, knowing that resistance organizations will work together.

3. Another advantage is the efficient Church organization and the willingness of the Church to collaborate. Other potential chains for cover and intelligence are labor unions, which are still weak, and the Freemasons.

4. This state of opportunity will not necessarily last. As the most reliable reports, it is apparent that the Italians place great importance on the decisions to be made when the Allies arrive in Rome. Government sources were alarmed over the alleged threat of armed opposition to the authorities in Rome. Some of the political parties have indicated that under present circumstances such a threat is real. Others depreciate such reports as exaggerations originating in the excited atmosphere of Naples and propagated with political intention. The most common theme, both in the defensive government attitude and the attacks of the parties, is the abdication of the present King. One side argues that the abdication in these times would cause more confusion, the other side claims that, unless the King does abdicate, Italian resistance to the Germans will never be important.

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ONE OFFIC. DET. 0-2
 HEADQUARTERS
 FIFTH ARMY

21 February 1944

SUBJECT : The Military Significance of Political
 Conditions in NCMB

TO : Director Strategic Services

1. The following is a report in four parts on political conditions in ROME. This is compiled for the benefit of operational sections of OSS who might deal with these groups, and is not a statement of political opinion by this Section.

2. Due to the fact that most of the men referred to are still in German-occupied territory, the greatest care must be taken in the use of this material. It should not be disseminated, even in part, outside the Organization. The sources, also, gave their information as an expression of cooperation with and confidence in OSS, and information should not be used, even inside OSS, in a manner which might reveal these sources.

3. OSS R. & A. Naples, has all the information available on political conditions in Southern Italy, which are, therefore, not discussed in this report.

4. This report contains:

Part One : Introduction and Organization
 of COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE
 Part Two : BADOGLIO-MONARCHIST Groups
 Part Three : Other elements

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Part Four : Operational Opportunities.

Malcolm V. Callanan
MALCOLM V. CALLANAN
1st Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer



CC : Colonel GLAVIN
Colonel HEUTERHAN
OSS R. & A.

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SECRET**PART ONE****INTRODUCTION.**

Political interest in ROMM is much keener than in most areas of Southern Italy. The average man seems to know more about the political currents and realizes how important to Italy will be the decisions reached in ROMM. It is also important to remember that no organized irregular military action will be exclusively military. Despite the claims of certain groups to being "only military", "non-political", or to having "forgotten politics while the Germans are still in Italy", the unconditional cooperation of any group to the fight against the Germans will be relative to the political situation. This fact is usually regretted by the average man in each group, but nevertheless will be true of the final conduct of all groups.

There are many resistance organizations in ROMM, some purely political or social, others definitely military. Of these the most important are the six parties of the COMITATO and the groups directed by the MADOLIC Government. Other organizations like the Church and the "Carbonari" might be important, but will not be decisive.

COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE

Above is "action" Committee of the old Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione, which has lost its importance. The Committee is often referred to, even by party members, also as the Comitato della Liberazione or the Comitato dei Sei Partiti.

The Committee is divided into two sub-committees, political and military, with two representatives from each party.

The head of the Committee is Dr. BONOMI (a member of Democrazia del Lavoro). He is considered by all parties, including the outside groups and Madolic elements, as one of the few men with influence in Rome who is truly disinterested.

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The head of the military sub-committee is General BENCIVENGA. Other military leaders are actually more important within the committee.

Parties are the same as those in Naples.

PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO
 PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO
 PARTITO D'AZIONE
 PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO
 PARTITO LIBERALE
 DEMOCRAZIA DEL LAVORO

The Comitato Centrale in Rome is a great deal stronger and more unified than the Neapolitan group. The liaison between the Comitato and the regional sub-committees is supposed to be very good, with direction coming from Rome. (Many sources)

Socialists

PIETRO MENNI
 BRUNO BUZZI
 Ing. ROMITA
 GALLO (head of military section?)
 LONGOBARDIA (delegate to Bari)

Christian Democrats

ALCIDE DE GASPERI
 CARLO GRONCHI, sec'y gen'l
 Avv. STADARO
 Col. ERCOLE CHIRI, head of military section
 Prof. STEFANO SECONDO TIPALDI (delegate to Bari)
 ENRICO NAVARRO (not real name. Military committee)
 Lt. RINALDI (military sub-committee)
 Lt. MBI (two brothers) "
 Capt. ROSSIERI "
 Lt. BRACCINI " (communist?)

others: Don SCOTTI (possibly a backer. Church influence)
 Monsignor SCHEN (Conservatore Romano, Vatican)
 Professor CONNELLA " " ")

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- 4 -

NOTES ON COMITATO AND PARTIES

a. Estimates of strength in Rome alone vary from 50,000 to 400,000 as the figure for the adherents which are represented by the six parties of the COMITATO. It is impossible to judge, particularly as in Rome the population may unite in action directed by the COMITATO without necessarily sharing its political views.

b. The COMITATO has good liaison with its Northern Comitati (MILANO COMITATO mentioned as strong, also GENOVA). In the north resistance seems less political, one representative of the parties in Rome stating that bands in the North were very well organized, and the parties less so. There are only five parties in the Northern Comitati (no Democrazia del Lavoro).

c. The political opinion of the ROME COMITATO is now difficult to appreciate, since the landing and retarded progress of the Allies have evidently changed the situation. A monarchist coming from ROME stated that these six parties are tremendously influential in ROME and the North. He also stated that they were against the present King, but would accept the Badoglio Government temporarily, and he stated emphatically that monarchist parties in the North (as political groups) were non-existent.

d. A summary of opinions and recent information from both the Italian Government and local political representatives indicates important political strife in ROME today. One opinion is that the COMITATO is believed to have lost its former unity. The three strongest parties (and the only ones with important military elements - the Demo-Christian groups are either communist controlled or controlled direct by the BADOGLIO Government) are the Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione, they have declared themselves absolutely unwilling to accept the present government or their representatives in ROME. BONOMI and the three lesser parties are attempting to make a union of all forces. This opinion is being energetically forwarded by the present Italian Government and would be suspicious except that it is confirmed by other sources. On the other hand there are very recent indications that BONOMI has sided with the larger parties

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(mainly under his presidency) and only the Demo-Christians (who in Southern Italy have undoubtedly a secret agreement with the Prince, if not the King) still stand for unity with BADOGLIO's representatives. A discussion of the SCITATO's relationship to the BADOGLIO elements will be made in Part IV.

e. The Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione are, at least in ROME, the best organized and strongest of all groups. The Communists have the greatest security (due to their cell type organization) and have the only military men with experience in irregular warfare. The Socialists are the most popular party in Northern Italy. The Partito d'Azione has the reputation for having intellectual leadership and, judging from documents collected, does the greatest amount of printed propaganda, both political and patriotic.

f. Of the three smaller parties, the Demo-Christians are the strongest. They are presently backed by the Church and have the approval, if not the active membership, of many middle-class church goers. Although the ROME head of the Demo-Christians, and the Church, are opposed to the present King, local representatives of this party claim that most of their adherents would prefer that Victor Emmanuel remain in office until the end of the war in Europe. The Italian government say the Liberal Party and the Democrazia del lavoro will accept the King in ROME. This is improbable in view of the public statements of GROCE and CERABONA, who probably have more influence in the North than they do in Rome. The ROME representative of the Liberal Party also reflects that opinion.

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SECRET**PART TWO****SCHEMATIC**

When the Armistice was signed and the Badoglio government knew they would have to leave Rome, hasty plans were made to leave behind some sort of military government to represent the official Italian Government. This group was directed with several responsibilities. One, to hide all the documents from the Germans; two, to defend Rome and the Civitavecchia on land (Badoglio stated to underlined that the evacuation came two weeks too soon, before his Staff had time to prepare a defense against the Germans); three, to establish an underground resistance if Allies failed to come within a short time; and four, to maintain civil order. These last two obligations were clarified and stressed only recently.

It is important to review the now well-known circumstances preceding and immediately following the Armistice. However, it is important to bear in mind that the events of the 8th and 9th September and subsequently are completely different from the plans of the Italian Government. The facts forced on Badoglio [by the Allies] fully accounts for the complete confusion which actually took place. It is now evident that there have been three layers of planning.

The Italian Government, believing that the Allied advance would be swift. They also were told by some fairly high Allied authority that, temporarily, at least, they could remain the Italian authorities. The premature - from Badoglio's point of view - invasion and the harsh armistice conditions forced the Government from organizing resistance. It was called to secure the adherence of the Italian population to both Army and Air Corps. It is (Badoglio) that "fifth column" knowledge of the cause, the language of calm orders, and the lack of any real reason for the failure of any of the Italian forces to resist the Germans. Events of this phase are uncontrolled.

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b. The second phase came after the Allied entry into Naples. The anti-monarchical character of Neapolitan resistance and political activity; the lack of genuine cooperation from the ACC and AMI, the almost insuperable administrative difficulties caused by the war; all of these brought about a lassitude in the official attitude towards resistance in occupied Italy. Both Badoglio and the King, physically tired and discouraged, and conscious of personal attacks from both Northern and Southern Italy, made their unsuccessful requests to the King and Roosevelt for authority to abdicate. The efforts of the Comando Supremo towards organizing the war had a completely non-political and local positive character.

c. The third phase is the present one. The government constantly receives unofficial, but highly placed, advice that the United Nations will follow a moderate policy for fear of "communists" outbreaks during the period of military activity in Italy. In the volatile atmosphere of Southern Italy popular opinion seems to change quickly from one extreme to another, and monarchist parties are losing strength. The open support of the principal Italian military leaders, the retentions by the Allies of men and units loyal to the present King, (such as Carabinieri), and the recent transfer of most of Southern Italy to Italian "control" have all heartened the King and Badoglio into a belief that the present government, or one selected by it, will rule Italy after the war. This current phase is marked by a tremendous effort towards monarchist control in Rome.

ORGANIZATION OF RADIO "R".

The Badoglio groups as of the 1st of the year were headed by the Colonel MONTAZZANO whose organizational ability, rather than position, made him the recognized head of the resistance movement. He had five agents, men and women, in who were not men and women left behind by the government, but simply patriots. MONTAZZANO was in liaison with the COMITATO and apparently had close relations with them. He was caught a few weeks ago and evidently forced to reveal information of the organization.

... of the early members of the official

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organizations were SIM members, or under the control of SIM. These men concentrated on the administrative, political and military intelligence end.

4. Organization of military section.

General ANDELLINI, head for ROMM
 General ACCAME, head for North Italy ? (SIM)
 General CARSONI, ex-head for ROMM, now in disgrace (see part III) (SIM)
 General (?) TOMASI
 Colonel RUGGERO, head of Granatieri, shot in Nov.
 Major SARTINI, (SIM Aeronautica)
 Colonel TOMMASINI, resistance groups
 Major JANNINI, Antonio " "
 Captain MIANI, " "
 TAMBUINI, Police Chief for ROMM under Fascist, now arrested by the Germans.

The military section organized among a) disbanded military units, b) disbanded police units (Marmosetti, Granatieri), and c) police units working for Fascists who would be counted on at the last minute, (Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Metropolitan). These groups in ROMM were numbered a potential of at least 10,000 men armed. Most of these men received regular wages from the Badoglio Government.

Outside of ROMM winter, lack of food, and conflicting political views have cut down the Badoglioist military units to a point where they are no longer very significant.

The arrest of MONTENAPOLI and the recent repressively measures in ROMM (many of the police units recruited or for support have been moved North and replaced by CARABINIERI and GUARDIA REPUBBLICANA) have weakened this official organization. Certainly, several of their ROMM units are out. The control of SIM in the organization and the control of Badoglio in the City has lessened.

The Italian Government are taking steps to strengthen their position.

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a. BADOGLIO has informed the Allies officially that A. ARFELINI will be Italian Military Commander for ROMS (the interim period) and Senator MODTA will be Civil Chief.

b. SIS are sending in a group to reorganize and perhaps also to do the counter-intelligence necessary to carry out proposed plans of the COMITATO. This group may include Col. ARRIPOGLIO, Major CAMPELLO and Comd. RONZO. (Last two brought alphas from ROMS on different trips in early days). This proposed move stresses the importance of the improvement of the situation in ROMS.

c. Contact is being made and money given to commercial groups. These groups previously were not well organized, but an effort is being made to have pro-Badoglio positions among the political parties as there are now in Northern Italy. (See below Para. 7)

d. ARFELINI and MODTA are being directed to order COMITATO to cease all political activity and recognize their authority.

e. A tremendous campaign is being directed at Allied policy. ACC, AMO and even military units are being warned constantly that the failure to order political groups in ROMS to recognize BADOGLIO authority will result in a revolt dangerous to Allied military security.

Following are some of the men engaged in political activity in ROMS.

Avv. CERPAO, Palazzo CASTANI, probably the richest and most influential.
 MUCIA, Giovanni, Via Appennini 31
 Avv. PATRIANCA, Via S. Sebastiano 1
 Dott. LATINUCCI, Vialeis, Via Cardinal del Duca 22
 Contador VICINI, Fiallo, Ponte San Biagio

General URBANI is alleged to be head of a group composed of local monarchists, but may be true. URBANI was in the Air Corps and is pro-Fascist and pro-Badoglio. He is alleged to be propagandizing for Victor Emmanuel III.

Avv. TOZZI (?) alleged to be for grand-monarchists.

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Professor Don GIORGIO. Working with
achararchical bands and according to a member of BOAS
DC. ITATC, refuses to collaborate with non-monarchical
elements.

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In a military sense no smaller organizations are significant. The majority of groups in Rome and North Italy began, inspired only by a hatred of the Germans. Particularly in the North these groups, workers, Army soldiers, and farmers, have retained to a large extent a non-political attitude. Their leaders, however, the men from whom they will take orders because it is from them or through them they receive supplies, organization and money, are almost all political. It is important, therefore, to realize that, though many bands in the North give themselves one name or another, they will follow the leadership of one of the large groups outlined in Parts ONE and TWO. The information given below will be useful for making contacts, but is not significant in any estimate of the state of Italian resistance to the Germans.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Vatican and Church-led groups are the most important of these smaller groups. Church groups are here considered as distinct from the Partito Demo-Cristiano.

a. The Church politically

The Vatican is a neutral State and is anxious to preserve that neutrality for religious and political reasons. The Vatican cannot afford to alienate Catholic groups in Axis or pro-Axis countries, nor can it run the risk of giving the Germans the diplomatic excuse to enter Church lands. Consequently, overt activity in favor of any side, or of any party in Italy, is impossible. The Church inevitably bridges the Demo-Christian party and the clerical groups of monarchial parties, but cannot afford to be associated with or an enforcement of either. One is, after all, tied to the purely political COMITATO which includes monarchists, the other supports a Masonic royal house, whose position is not secure.

diplomatically, the Vatican insists on its neutrality. Actually, the Church in Italy is actively repressed.

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to realize that, and they follow the leadership of one of the large groups outlined in Parts ONE and TWO. The information given below will be useful for making contacts, but is not significant in any estimate of the nature of Italian resistance to the Germans.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Vatican and Church-led groups are the most important of these smaller groups. Church groups are considered as distinct from the Partito Democristiano.

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b. The Church's pro-Allied activity

Committed morally to oppose much that is un-Christian in Nazism the Church has always been eager to oppose the Axis, if, in doing so, it does not lose the adherence of a large section of its international congregation. Evidently, Allied diplomacy and particularly the visit of Spellmann convinced the Vatican that support of Italian resistance against the Germans was imperative. The system of clandestine intelligence and propaganda so effective in Germany and Poland began in Italy. Today the majority of the clergy in German-occupied Italy work in some way with resistance organizations.

c. Organization of Vatican Resistance

To date no armed resistance groups have been financed by or organized by the Church. Their service has been intelligence and cover only. For example :

The Palatine Guards in the Vatican City were 400 in number at the beginning of September and in December were 300 strong. (Source: agent).

A colored American officer in hiding in ROME had to escape when the district he was in was to be searched house by house. The Vatican Ethiopian Legation, twenty strong, visited that house; After the visit twenty-one black delegates re-entered the safety of the Vatican City. (Source: agent).

Consiglier MASHIONE, Papal Secretary of State officially informed the Allies that the Father Superior of a certain Church abbey was pro-Fascist and dangerous. This is, of course, the temporal voice of the Church speaking, - a central state breaking its neutrality. It is on this type of dual logic that the Church today can aid, as it has, everyone from anarchists to monarchists, escaped prisoners, Jews, Italian officers, Badoglio's son, Roatta, communist leader, the Partito d'Azione and Alcide De Gasperi have all found haven and guidance in the church and convent net-work through North Italy. (Source: messenger from COLT).

d. The above examples are to demonstrate that, operationally, the Vatican is a sure source of aid in fight against the Germans. The Vatican's policy political has probably not been formed, and certainly not demonstrated. It is to be seen its political policy with regard to post-war Italy is of no interest to operations with resistance groups today.

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SECRET**4. SMALL POLITICAL GROUPS**

The small political groups outside of the **UNITARI** are difficult to define as their organization is poor and frequently change their names.

a. There is evidently an orthodox branch of the **COMUNISTI**. The **MOVIMENTO COMUNISTA D'ITALIA** seems to be Trotskyist. Its publication is the "Bandiera Rossa" and its propaganda is not pro Stalin Russia, rather pro-Lenin. Other names for possibly the same group are Partito Socialista Rivoluzionario, and Trotskisti Socialisti (latter probably a popularization). Their leader appears to be the son of **MATTEOTTI**.

b. Another so-called Communist group is the **MOVIMENTO DEI CATTOLICI COMUNISTI**, in reality a violent left-Christian group. The combination of names is designed to win the support of both church and workers, but, so far, the party is weak. **Avvocato RODANO** is alleged to be the leader.

c. The **CRISTIANI SOCIALISTI** is another group designed to appeal to both middle and lower classes. It may possibly appeal to Italian Protestants. **Prof. BRUNI** is the head. It is weaker still than the **Cattolici Comunisti**.

d. The **PARTITO REPUBBLICANO INDIPENDENTE** led by the **On. CONTI** is still small. It may have some connection with **MAZZINI** inspired groups. (see **CARBONARI** below)

5. SMALL NON-POLITICAL GROUPS

There are numerous bands of "patriots" composed of soldiers and peasants who fight locally, without control or any larger organization. These groups are generally members of the **Madaglia** or political elements, although they frequently adopt "accisiati" and "comunisti" as their titles. Usually, to maintain any considerable strength they must ally with the larger groups.

Two organized fighting groups are the **CARBONARI** and **MAZZINI**. The first are **MAZZINI** Republicans and have a better organization. It is, therefore, almost impossible

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to discuss them, except to say that excepting the a encounter many mountain groups which are called "Carbonari". The "Garibaldini" are either local groups who have taken the name because of its connotation or groups organized by STIVINO and RUCIOTTI GARIBALDI. These groups, as yet, do not appear to be numerous or strong. Politically both CARBONARI and GARIBALDINI are anti-anarchical.

Italian MASSONERIA, which is in contact with American, British and French Masons in Naples, seem to have maintained some sort of organization throughout Italy. At present, however, it is evident that they are only in a position to help existing resistance elements or Allied operations in a small way. Safe addresses and certainly financial assistance would be the form of such assistance. Politically, the Masons in Italy are temporarily stumped. The King is a Mason, but the Masons are extremely anti-Fascist and feel very uncomfortable supporting a Government which they feel is not wholeheartedly anti-Fascist. The Masons have declared themselves no longer clandestine in Allied-occupied territory, but have not yet made any statements of policy.

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SECRETPART FOUROPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

1. Irregular military operations in Northern Italy will soon be possible on a large scale. Unlike the divisions of partisan forces found in Yugoslavia and Greece, resistance groups in Northern Italy are at present relatively united.

2. There is great collaboration among the various military and political groups in the North. The example of the regular Army hiding in the mountains, led and informed by socialist or communist workers, and financed by industrialists is an encouraging one. At present, Allied Special Operations agencies can work freely with Communist and Badoglio Groups, knowing that resistance organizations will work together.

3. Another advantage is the efficient Church organization and the willingness of the Church to collaborate. Other potential chains for cover and intelligence are labor unions, which are still weak, and the Freemasons.

4. This state of opportunity will not necessarily last. From the most reliable reports, it is apparent that the Italians place great importance on the decisions to be taken when the Allies arrive in Rome. Government sources were alarmed over the alleged threat of armed opposition to their authorities in Rome. Some of the political parties have indicated that under present circumstances such a threat is real. Others deprecate such reports as exaggerations originating in the excited atmosphere of Naples and propagated with political intention. The most common theme, both in the defensive Government attitude and the attacks by the parties, is the abdication of the present King. One side argues that the abdication in these times would cause more disunion, the other side claims that, unless the King does abdicate, Italian resistance to the Germans will never be important.

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5. Whichever decision is made by the Allies and whatever is the reaction of the Italians, the political future should be understood by Allied armies, particularly by OSS. At present, too few Americans are willing to admit the importance of politics in relation to irregular military activity. Of those that see this importance, the majority report and act with political bias. Operations based on a lack of information or misinformation could conceivably harm the Allied effort. This possibility should encourage vigorous, but unbiased investigation of Italian political activity.

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ADDENDUM

1. General CARBONI. It is reported that he has come out of hiding and is organizing a group. One source reports he has joined LONGO of the Communists, another source that that he has formed a separate group.

2. A General SAROCHI (SOROGHI ?) is reported forming another group apart from either COMITATO or BADOGLIO.

3. According to reliable information 18 February, General BENCIVENGA has been recognized by all parties, including ARMELLINI, as the military head of ROME. This, if true, is very significant, for it would mean that ROME was united politically as well, perhaps against the entry of Victor Emmanuel.

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OSG SFG. DNT. C-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH ARMY

3 February 1944

SUBJECT : Enclosure No. 1

TO : Director Strategic Services

1. Attached documents are from British 10 Corps with 5th Army. Document "Naples and Italian Politics" is from the 10 Corps Intelligence Summary 199 and is an official statement.
2. Document Anglo-Italian Relations was written by British officers assigned to 10 Corps Intelligence Section. This document is entirely unofficial, and was circulated only as the expression of the private opinion of contributing officers. It was particularly requested that no publicity be given the report which would hurt the position of the officers who wrote it.

Malcolm W. Callahan
 MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
 2nd Lt. AUS
 Intelligence Officer



Appendix A to
19/Compt. Int. IG.

NAPLES AND ITALIAN POLITICS

Political situation in Southern ITALY is now falling into what
classical lines. The ageing Marshall, propping up monarchy and
with a background of generals, prelates and drawing room
a revolution has just taken place after tea, perhaps some Bourbon
1943. The Congress of Florence is never far away from the Badoglio
movement. The opposition parties are a little more advanced in period:
front unites all parties under the spiritual guidance of the
social philosopher and historian BENEDETTI CROCE; practical
and lead line of a strong party of returning exiles is the
Foreign Minister Count SFORZA. Under these two respected if
old figures, the party followers are vital and unruly:
they judge an atmosphere of the secrecy and conspiracies
have been forced to live in the last few years; they would
be and again. Meanwhile in the North, a powerful unknown
factory workers are veering, and will probably veer more
towards the open, towards the left. A Kerenskyish situation.

... if one ignored the Allied and German occupation,
... of all native political parties purely relative.
... (called in ITALY the National Front of Liberation)
... in the NAPLES area, and its organization extends all
... in contrast to the BADOLIO government which appears
... at all, and no organized agitators outside
... Popular Front which ran the underground resistance
... and the Germans, organized strikes and sabotage,
... newspapers and posters all over the country.

... National Front is centralized in the National
... cabinet, under whom are the Regional Committees,
... province of German, as well as Allied, occupied
... Committees are made up of representatives of the
... National Front. The organization so far is clear:
... parties; it is when we come to the party
... .

... Provincial Committee is formed, in order of
... Party, which is two-thirds monarchists: its
... was recently offered a seat in a projected cabinet
... next, the 'enfant terrible' of the Committee,
... energetic; the Christian
... RODINO their leader is amiable and
... anti-king and BADOLIO. So do
... The importance of the Communists,
... they appear to be divided into
... and Italian National Communists, a local growth.

... the rank of the National Front is pretty
... important parties outside it, though there
... the Old Soldiers Association (i.e. - Ex-
... the Liberal Party, the Labour Group, and
... .

... in varying degrees though they would be
... a regency with a representative
... and they have been manoeuvring during the last
... that in their
... by their own manoeuvres. So
... the Partito d'Azione
... and compromising manifestoes
... which the BADOLIO government
... led the
... of forming their own private army,
... of this attempt at direct military
... there are behind the

/2A.... /Committee

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one considers the Italians as a collection of beaten people, not to be fed, administered and herded into place so that, as on behalf, the area of operations is reasonably fit for allied forces to fight in, then none of this matters. Given a people who have to conduct the administration the present whatever its repercussions on the Italians, is the easiest because only appear undesirable if one wants the operational of the Italians in the North, if one wants to avoid future between the Italian people and the allied armies, if one is about the state of Europe after the war, or if one has antipathetic feelings about the men, women and children unfortunate live in this country. For our present policy not only in the South but also both here and in the North: it may lead to a where, once the Germans are out of an area, the anti-fascists for a reason to co-operate with us and will actively in order to gain the political power which we are denying we appear to back Badoglio and the monarchy, or any other regime, against Italian public feeling we shall in due not only organized political opposition but individual so that the Italians may symbolise their hatred of the setting at the allied soldiers who they think support it. military administration which takes no account of Italian can do just what we intend to avoid; weaken the basis relations.

There are two ways in which the Italians can fight the Germans. An army, with its organisation, officers, and equipment at the disposal available, can be put in the field again to fight us or to act as muleteers, police, pioneers and general staff. Or the Italian civilians and disbanded soldiers in the field area can form partisan forces on the Yugoslav model. The army in the field does not involve the encouragement of the Italian people to fight alongside us, only the giving of orders to the Italian people, but whether its contribution to our military machine, any greater than it was to the Germans is the turning into an ally, especially an ineffectual ally, of whom we have just beaten is a measure that our policy is as undignified and silly. On the other hand the Italian people is one worth following - the Yugoslavs at least - more than any Germans as does 15 Army Group - and the Italian people fighting as guerillas to free their country is a natural and admirable. But to secure the help of the Italian people as free agents, which is what this is, requires giving them a strong inducement to fight and this is the harder way, by making them feel that the inducement is the same. This is not possible if the Italian people are depressed, from axis propaganda and from the actions of the allies, then by joining us to throw out the Germans will only strengthen the Italian ex-Fascists and their chief political enemies. It is the Italian people that has become disillusioned and incapable because they fear that neither side's victory will help

... In the active guerilla movement in Italy it is necessary that the Italian parties to which the potential guerillas should gain administrative power in the zone that we should liberate the country from the Germans: their orders as well as from the Germans: the Italian people will then feel that by attacking the Germans they will get the type of administration they want. This is the propaganda has led them to expect, but the untruth of this propaganda has caused them to be inactive.

....These considerations

we could convince the Italians that mistakes had indeed been
 committed and not part of our general policy, and also that
 we never meant to abandon them. The Italian people had not
 fully the people when he had spoken, and would be punished
 in the world and a new attempt in driving out the
 as potential guerrilla in the North would be glad to take
 of this is, and although the national temperament would make
 difficult, the way would be open for us to organize and equip
 a partisan movement, strengthened by volunteers from the
 fronts, being even now available in quantity whenever
 our territory, but lacking all enthusiasm which we have been
 on these few days. In the present stage of the Italian
 the guerrilla activity could make every difference; and
 could not find it easy to hold even the Po line if they had
 a partisan force comparable to that of the Yugoslavs.

With the Italians, many of whom are already fighting alongside
 a guerrilla force, wholeheartedly on our side, we shall not only
 be able to organize an Army of patriots, bandits and demobilized
 of the German L of C, but shall be able to play the part
 of a partner to the new Italian democracy. Our present policy
 of keeping civil wars off the roads, but will lead the Italians
 of Europe to interpret our war against the Germans
 as a war, conducted largely at the expense of the people
 of the world, and resulting as far as they are concerned
 in a continuation of German occupying troops, and the
 of a German-infiltrated government. Fortunately this
 will not occur/Inevitably during the short period of our /in
 the government of Italy is still
 the Italian parties confused. If we
 changes in our policy must be
 made. Even though the consequences are not
 of immediate importance.

Handwritten signature

21 November 1943

These considerations arise when our treatment of the Italians is viewed as anything more than a question of minimizing immediate casualties to the armies in the field. It has no discussions however, not only on the rest of Italy, but on all Europe, both immediately and in the future. The anti-Fascists, who are the main opponents of the German Army in every country, will judge by our treatment of Italy how well they themselves are to react when we invade other European lands, whether it be worth throwing all their energy into the battle against the Germans or whether they should save some up for pro-Germans whom we are likely to keep in power. They will be more actively pro-Ally if they see the economic parties getting a fair deal here and are able to believe that we are carrying out the promises of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Conference. And a Europe in which the peoples have genuinely been liberated by the allies, and are rebuilding their own countries, will be a far better place after the war than a continent where unpopular temporary governments are propped up by British and American troops of occupation. For these reasons any sign we now give of treating the Italians as a people who must be encouraged to get out of the mess that their late government got them into will be a great help. The Italians will continue to suffer for years if they so obediently entered, but the individual, however poor and uneducated, may experience, will not be without hope, and if he is allowed to rebuild his villages and towns, and through them his country, he will be less likely to blame their condition on us, and more likely to accept Italy's own responsibility.

In order to put our relations with the Italians on such a footing it is necessary to tighten up discipline as regards looting and requisitioning, while possibly relaxing it in other respects, such as the treatment of elderly or regnant refugees: this would help to reduce the present differences between our behaviour and that of the Germans. In these ways is so noticeably better than ours as to leave a lasting impression on the Italians. The main need is to get rid of those that we truly mean to liberate them. Former fascist and pro-Fascist administrators, who under the old regime were after his fall ran not only the state but all the local government. In each place that we take over the old officials should be replaced by locally elected or locally appointed members of the opposition parties: this need not mean the return to the former officials' local knowledge and experience, which in some form of organisation in almost every village. Military government representatives, instead of continuing to usurp the power of the existing officials, should be seen as the anti-Fascist organisations, would appear to be the main hope of the Italians' attempt to reorganise their own government. The prisoners could not only have to be released from the camps and rehabilitated, and our propaganda would have to be more relatively truthful, but our propaganda would have to be more new and optimistic instead of as present depicting the situation which the Italians do not believe.

It is essential to detail a reversal of the policy laid down; in fact, it is essential to claim to be doing. The difference would be in the intention to carry through a liberal policy. The only directives have to be issued by the heads of the military government, but they would need to be strongly enforced against the former administration's employees, whose instincts would be to take up the threads of government where they had dropped them. Those responsible for the situation at Torre Annunziata, where an anti-Fascist was arrested for having a soviet flag in his office, and at Marigliano, where the mayor was under arrest because Mussolini had put him in jail for subversive activities, should be sent back to the army units from which they came.

.....Once we could

For the present the Italian people are responsible for the present situation. They are not a people of engineers and the kind of people who are usually found in the North, and what is left of the country will be a mass of peasants. Meanwhile they must put up with military occupation and a military government. This they might tolerate more readily if they had the same participation in us, but they are not. They are divided into two main groups: the military and the political. The military are in the German-occupied area, and are impatient with waiting, lack leadership and must have an unfavorable feeling of the Germans, while they all and wonder if the Germans will find what they want in the South, whose main interest is the continuation of their stricken country while we push the Germans out of it. These two are linked, both by sympathy and by organization. The military in the North are the political agitators in the South, but under German rule they fight to get rid of it not because they want an Allied victory for the benefit of the world at large, but because they want to join their countrymen in the South in building a new Italy. Their political organizations are scattered, and do not talk to those in the South. Thus neither group wishes to fight the Germans, and both have the same reactions to what they find as our shortcomings.

Apart from their discontent with the speed of our advance and the general misery and anarchy consequent on the war and the presence of two armies, one disciplined brutal and the other amiably ill-disciplined, the Italians are surprised and upset by our administration. They are helped on our propaganda broadcasts, which presumably appear to them because the news they give is so much less unlikely than that broadcast by the Germans, they expected that we would come to them as liberators, fulfilling all the promises of the Atlantic Charter and not in our own propaganda slogans. But military government in Italy is not conducted by ideologists, (which means people who fight, as they believe, not merely because they are made to), or even if they do, they do so because they are made to, or even if they do so because they are made to. Letting sources occur under almost any administration the more successful if our rule not only for these, but because we are not interested in the democracy we promised ITALY and seem to bear no will to the Fascists. We came to the country with a lot of talk about anti-Fascism, since when we have shown no sign of doing so, the anti-Fascists to administer the country and have been very enthusiastic about letting them out of the jails into the streets. This has naturally depressed the members of the front, and because the front extends throughout the country and an anti-Fascist this depression spreads from top to toe.

Italians cannot understand why we do this. The average administrator, however, is not much interested in Fascism or anti-Fascism, he regards his village or province as a more or less isolated part of an Italian state, and would rather deal with the local Fascists who have knowledge and experience than with the anti-Fascists who may be on the side of light, but we as persons have a little interest and as administrators amateurish. In an isolated village this would not much matter, but since it is a universal problem, the Italians like an Anglo-American seem to keep it in power. Worse still, it looks this way to our concern like a problem, particularly when accompanied by the distrust of anyone who is politically subversive that is characteristic of the Italian people when "ultra-verve" conveys under-mining, or the British

only this happened in North AFRICA, where the maintaining in power of administrators had an extraordinarily dampening effect on the Italian people. By such a method of government, while the Italian people in the occupied zone remain our Allies against the Germans, they are as well as the anti-Fascists in our own territory, with their hearts, loose heart, and very probably weaken their forces to a percentage of indifference.

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OSS 5713, ENCL. 2-2
HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH FLOOR

7 February 1944

SUBJECT : Enclosure No. 2

TO : Director Strategic Services

1. Attached documents are copies of reports prepared for and submitted to X-2 by an OSS Officer. This officer has agreed (with approval of Colonel HENTERSHAN) to head this section's Economic Sub-Section in ROME. He has requested that this position and the submitting of attached and future reports be kept as confidential as possible, both outside and inside OSS.

2. This officer was a very successful business man in Italy for twenty years. This qualifies him particularly well to discuss the economic situation here at present. It is also important to realize that prosperity under Fascism would tend to make a man much more lenient in his judgement of Mussolini and the King, and antagonistic to "uncontrolled" political and labor policies. Despite this reactionary prejudice, the economic analyses seem valid and important.

Malcolm W. Callahan
MALCOLM W. CALLAHAN
2nd Lt. AUS
Intelligence Officer



DEPORTATION OF ITALIAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR, WORKMEN AND SOLDIERS.

In a recent discussion with the officials of the Fascist Government, it was stated by Maresciallo Giovanni Messe (Combined Chief of Staff); that there are 250,000 Italian workmen in Germany who have been there since the start of the war; that Germany placed 410,000 Italian soldiers in concentration camps in France and the Balkans at the time of the Italian armistice; and that, through the intense propaganda program carried on by the Germans, from persuasion or by necessity or fear, 200,000 soldier-prisoners had been put to work in Germany. He estimated that 500,000 Italian prisoners were in the hands of the Allies.

According to General Garte, the Military Commander of Corsica, there are still 230,000 Italian troops in Sardegna. Altogether there are 1,390,000 soldiers and laborers for whom jobs must be found when they are returned to Italy. Of this number, Maresciallo Messe estimates that 600,000 are factory workers, and the balance artisans, farmers, employees and professional men.

Regarding soldiers still in uniform in the liberated part of Italy and Sicily, this figure is believed to be between 250,000 and 300,000 troops. In the part of Italy occupied by the Germans, while reports differ, it appears that there are 50,000 Italian troops under the so-called Republican Government; the rest, through one manner or another, have returned to civil life.

Maresciallo Messe stated that soldiers of all the classes from 1931 to 1932, inclusive, have been discharged if their homes were in Sicily, Calabria, or Apulia. Also, soldiers of these same classes whose homes are in the German-occu-

- 2 -

vised part of Italy are also discharged when they can produce documentary evidence that they have employment.

To facilitate the revival of agriculture, soldiers of the classes from 1912 to 1920, inclusive, whose homes are in Sicily, Calabria or Apulia, receive a three-months' leave, to work in the olive-oil and citrus-fruits industries. Extensions of 3 months can be had without difficulty, at the end of that period; and still further extensions are granted, provided the soldier still has employment. Those soldiers of the 1912 to 1920 classes, inclusive, whose homes are situated in the German-occupied section, are given a leave of absence in the same manner, when they produce documentary evidence that they have employment. A great number of them are employed in clearing away the debris, and in reconstruction. Maresciallo Messe said: The idea of His Excellency (Badoglio) is to help coordinate the needs of Italian economy with the needs of the Allied Forces in docks and ports, etc.

To return to the 230,000 soldiers still in Sardinia, Maresciallo Messe stated that ships were especially needed to bring back those whose homes are located in the liberated territory, in order that they can be rehabilitated. In this way, the machinery will be free to take care of soldiers of other sections, as fast as those sections are cleared of the Germans.

In view of the systematic, wholesale destruction by the Germans, the work of reconstruction will furnish employment for a long time to come to all able-bodied men not needed in other fields.

Twelve years ago, America restricted emigration. For many years, the remittance which Italy received from emigrants amounted to \$118,000,000 yearly. Also, tourist-trade was a big item. These two intangible assets helped Italy to balance the deficit in trade each year, as Italy always imported twice as much as she exported. Italy's exports will never equal her import needs. Due to the dense population, the standard of living in Italy will always remain on a low scale. Any attempt to raise wages above the average scale prevailing before the war, with the resulting increase in cost of food and clothing, will meet with disaster. There are too many people for each job. Italy will not see a higher standard of living than that of 1936, -37, -38, -39, for several years, at least.

Italy needs a strong government for two years after the war ends. This government should be military, so that reconstruction and re-adjustment can be accomplished. Italy should keep the Monarchy; otherwise, when the people have been fed and enter a period of tranquility, they will regret the loss of the Monarchy. The attempt to institute a republic at any time less than two years after the end of the war can only result in chaos. There would be a dozen different parties spring up, all fighting each other, as was the case in France during 1937, -38, -39; and in the end nothing constructive would be accomplished. Italy needs a king. You cannot change the customs, habits and mentality of a country without being patient over a generation or two.

Italy needs peace and order and help.

First of all, Italy needs transportation to bring food to the cities from the interior of the country and from the islands, and more food from America to break down the black market on essentials and bring prices down to a lower level. The provincial and communal government must be turned back to the Italians, since they know best, from long years of experience, what is best for them.

We Americans must study promptly Italy's needs in raw materials, and see that she gets them just as soon as factories can be put in order. A survey of factories should be made, to reveal the requirements for putting them in running order. Where machines are needed, they must be supplied. Heavy metal must be allotted to foundries and factories making farm implements, especially hand tools, and for farm transportation.

Italy, primarily, requires an average of 250,000 tons of cotton yearly. The cotton must be clean just as soon as possible after harvest. The cotton must be free of dirt and seeds. The cotton must be prepared for spinning. The repair of railroads and the production of iron must be supplied. All of the above needs will help in the employment of returning soldiers and in materially bringing the country back to a normal state.

Italy needs a long-term loan of \$5,000,000,000 for 50 years, at interest of 4 or 5%. She needs short-term loans for raw materials. Italy's export trade must be stimulated and revived by every means. Duties must be lowered and this will require a long study on the part of both America and Italy as to production, exports, exchange, etc.

The lira must be strengthened and put on a free exchange gold basis of not more than 20 and preferably 22 1/2 of FR to the dollar. The sooner the adjustment of the exchange rate can be made, the better. If an offer could be made in the context of a fair rate of exchange, together with loans and other helps, it would be possible, by placing a hopeful, clear-cut program before the people and making a formidable appeal, to induce the civilians to give up gold and foreign securities and receive in exchange government certificates to the value of \$80,000,000. A carefully organized program in America for a purse to help Italy would bring in another \$80,000,000. A loan company could be organized among Italian-Americans to loan money to individuals at 5% for the purpose of rebuilding houses. Temporary barracks for soldiers (like the temporary buildings in Washington) could be built in each city.

The day the war ends, a tourist program will be inaugurated. Until the reconstruction of hotels can be accomplished, these temporary houses could be turned over to Italy as hotels for the tourist-trade. The American tourist will want to see Italy before too much reconstruction has occurred; and he would enjoy living and eating, in a rough way, thus imagining that he or she was living the life of a soldier. Liberty ships with soldier bunks could bring tourists on a round-trip basis. 750 tourists could be accommodated on each boat, in addition to the ship's cargo of 10,000 tons. In this way, I believe 200,000 Americans would visit Italy within the first year after the war, and this should bring into the country \$100,000,000, in addition to providing employment for a large amount of hotel, restaurant and transportation labor.

As soon as possible after Fascism is liberated, export buyers from the department stores should visit potteries for earthenware products, and similar products which require a few months to manufacture before shipment can be made. This would employ a substantial amount of labor, and furnish exchange for a product which does not require the importation of raw materials.

Soldiers should be issued handbooks describing Italy's picture galleries and museums, and be encouraged to visit them. A certain number of liberty ships should be sold or loaned to the Italian Government, to start Italy's merchant marine.

To organize a purse in America you need to have artists in liberated Italy working on posters, now. Americans were always trying to collect Italian war posters. Actually, a series of past Italian posters could be stamped and sold by the thousands in America. But new, appealing posters must be gotten out. The support of influential American businessmen must be enlisted, as well as that of our State and Treasury Departments. Italian films such as "Tosca", and all Italian films not devoted to propaganda, should be sent to America. Writers must be enlisted in the campaign. America must help Italy to get back on her feet.

There are many more constructive ideas that would help Italy if they were put into practice.

As an experienced American business man, I believe that Italy can be put back on a prosperous basis; but it will require the brain of real business men who are sincerely friendly to Italy - no professors or politicians.

I quote Dr. Jung (Finance Minister): "Come to the front, America, to bring brotherhood. Life is not worth living, with a war every 20 years."

BLACK MARKET

The price for essential food and clothing is far greater than the ability; hence, the Black Market. Today, on account of the war, black markets exist in every part of the world, and even the most rigid central system only serves to retard their development.

For fear of what the future will bring, for fear of starving and seeing their families suffer, men steal and commit murder. As we find that, in southern Italy, principally in Naples, not only have the wealthier class hoarded food and clothing, but also the small shop keeper, the employee class, and every family which has a few thousand lire in savings. The result has been that prices have reached fantastic heights, and that stocks have complicated the situation in a serious degree.

Transportation is the one great need. I had a two hour conference last Sunday with Guido Jung, Minister of Finance, and I met Dr. Jung:

There must be sufficient bread and meat. Unless these two questions are settled, there is no use trying to fight inflation. People steal, cheat and murder to get something to eat. The people need 300g grams of bread and 100 grams of pasta. When they get that much, the inflation is controllable. Rolling stock is the number two question, and the number three question, or number two if they can get supplies and the rolling stock is put in order. At Margherita di Savoia, 200 kilometers from Barletta in the province of Foggia, there are 250,000 tons of salt, and yet there is a shortage of salt. (More later on Dr. Jung.)

General Sarta, Military Commander of Sardinia, (born in Sardinia), states that there were 1,200,000 animals in the goat and sheep class, 200,000 of which are lambs, ready to be shipped to southern Italy for food, but so far their request for ships had not been met. Also there were thousands of tons of cheese in Sardinia which could be shipped to Spain in exchange for shoes which Spain has available at a low price and which Italy greatly needs. Also in Sardinia there are substantial quantities of goat and sheep hides to be shipped out. He stated that Italy needs ships of small tonnage, even as low as 500 tons, to carry on commerce between the small ports of Sicily, Sardinia and the Mainland. If these were made available, the food situation could be greatly alleviated. In this connection, I learned from Frank Montanari, personal secretary of Badoglio, that on December 3rd, the Italian government wrote to General Smith requesting that eighteen small Italian ships (listing the ships) be employed for the transportation of food from Sardinia to small Italian harbors. I understand this need is being studied, and the Italian Government is being asked to submit a survey showing specifically classes and quantities of goods and materials to be carried, the ports of embarkation and ports of destination, since it is felt that the Allied Command can operate the ships and lines more efficiently than the Italian Government.

It is felt that this problem should be decided one ^{WAY} for the other quickly, so that a better distribution of the goods and materials that Italy has can be made, and surpluses from the islands can reach the congested centers.

It will appear that the greater percentage of the population of Sardinia is trying to live off the Allied armed forces in the island. They use all of their natural

ability to get cigarettes, foodstuffs, and clothing, which they clandestinely sell to buy bread on the black market.

Last Sunday afternoon, I stood at the entrance to the San Carlo Theatre, awaiting some officers who had invited me to the concert. The weather was rainy and cold; Vesuvius was covered with snow, as were the hills around; several children, about the ages of six to ten years, were selling oranges. They were all ragged. Two were without stockings and shoes; one wore an old pair of men's shoes which he kept on by dragging his feet; others wore open summer sandals. This was not unusual, as one sees such conditions on every hand. The point that struck me was, when one held up an orange asking five lire for it. I was in the act of filling my pipe, and when I took out my 5-cent package of tobacco, this seven year old boy dived his hand down in his bucket and held up five oranges for the package of tobacco. He had learned, even at his age, that anything from our P.I. would buy more bread than would three or four times its value in lire. It is a sad situation when young children not only suffer from hunger and cold and filth, but have to, through necessity, exercise the ingenuity of grown-ups, deprived of childhood as we know it to keep from starving.

Ten days ago, restaurants were declared out-of-bounds to members of the Armed Forces. Previously, they were crowded with soldiers. These restaurants paid high prices for their supplies, which are brought into Naples at a high transportation cost. The cost of the rent of a truck to go two hundred kilometers distance from Naples to buy food stuffs runs from 10,000 to 25,000 lire per trip.

It is true that the purchasing power of the Allied forces represents a factor in the present price level, but now that all restaurants are out-of-bounds to members of the Allied forces, their purchasing power can only be felt in the field of non-essentials, which helps, rather ^{than} hinders, the situation.

Dr. Jacca, a director of the Bank of Naples, commented that a private soldier in the American Army purchased a watch that he, himself, could not afford, - the reason being that, since the soldier's monthly ^{pay} was based on dollars, and with the low rate of 200 lire to the dollar, the soldier actually received more lire per month than the bank director. This is, however, temporary. The vital point is the handling of the readjustment, and America must keep in mind that we are fighting to relieve suffering humanity and to reestablish free trade, free exchange of goods, and free exchange throughout the world.

BLACK MARKET LIRE

The present fixed exchange rate of the lire is the greatest preoccupation of the Italian Government. I have discussed this matter with Dr. Jung (Finance Minister), Maresciallo Messe (Combined Chief of Staff), and General Carta (Sardinia Command), as well as bankers and industrialists; and they are all emphatically of the opinion that to raise wages in order to meet the high cost of foods, or to try to place Italy on a higher standard of living than that of 1937-38-39, would be catastrophic. With 45,000,000 people crowded up in a place space the size of New Mexico, with by far the greater percent of them laborers, there are too many for each job. The total production is too small for the population.

Italy has been confronted with this problem for years, and has met it very well with the wage scale of the years preceding the war, together with social insurance, sick benefits, old age pensions, employees long service indemnities, and notice periods indemnities.

One thing is certain:- Italy normally imports twice as much as she exports. It is difficult for anyone to understand the difference in standards and customs found in Italy from those of the U.S.A. Take the shops, for instance, and compare them with stores of the U. S. A. An American grocery store is divided into five separate stores in Italy. The American drug store is divided into nine stores. Tobacco is only sold in a State owned tobacco shop; newspapers and magazines sold only in their shop; perfumes and toilet waters in the perfumer store; rubber-goods in a rubber-goods store; cameras in a camera and binocular shop; candies

in a candy shop; ice cream and soft drinks in a bar; and so on. These millions of small shops represent a living for millions of families where every member of the family is employed. When one of these shops buys an American-made machine, such as a scale, adding machine, typewriter, refrigerator or a cash register, it becomes an event; because, on account of the standard of living in the U.S.A., the first cost is high, and when freight, duty, taxes, and selling expenses are added, the price of the machine often represents a year's net profit. We cannot imagine a store in Italy buying one of these machines when, on account of the lire being worth five times less, the cost of the machine becomes four or five times more.

We can not hope to sell American ^{PRODUCTS} in Italy after the war unless, through long time loans and other helps, the lire can eventually be established on a basis close to that preceding the war.

Today the population of liberated Italy is afraid that the lire will have much less value than at present. Something should be done to change their minds. The amount of lire currency in circulation is insignificant, - too small to be of interest to our enemies -, and yet the black market rate runs from 250 lire to 300 lire to the dollar (other than yellow seal), and 101 to 103 lire for a yellow seal dollar. The sterling black market rate is from 600 to 750 lire. Gold sells for 700 lire per gram, and gold coins at 1000 lire per gram.

It is natural that the Allied Command is preoccupied about the amount of lire in circulation. It is known that the Germans are stamping lire in the only two printing offices that Italy has, (the one in Aquila (Abruzzi) and the other at Udine in Friuli) and the only newspaper mill

... bank notes and government securities is in
... located in German-occupied territory.

Dr. Jung is aware that the Germans are stamping lire
... that the Germans can get no advantage whatsoever if
... to strengthen.

It is reported that the Germans are socializing fac-
... Italy. No doubt in losing the war the Ger-
... would like to foster Communism throughout Europe, to prove
... the world that they fought the war to protect Europe from
... but the Allies would not listen to them.

Dr. Jung stated that the Germans had destroyed not
... every bridge on every highway and railroad, but that rails
... were destroyed at intervals of every five meters, to say
... of their systematic destruction of factories, machines,