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GERMAN PLAN

EXPOSE

ON THE READINESS OF A POWERFUL GERMAN GROUP TO  
BE ARE AND ASSIST ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AGAINST NAZI GERMANY

**TOP SECRET**

Istanbul

12 January 1944

## Memorandum re German Plans

For many months we have been in contact with Herman [redacted], descendant of a well-known German family, whose name is unquestionably well-known to you. He holds an important position in the German Wehrmacht and has many contacts throughout German industrial and military circles.

He has made two trips to Istanbul during the past six months both in the hope that he might contact some American well known to him in whom he might confide his broad program. The particular person he has wanted to see is Alexander Kirk, whom he knew intimately in Germany up until the time of his departure. This matter was referred immediately to Mr. Kirk, but he showed little interest at the time. Herman returned to Berlin disappointed at his lack of interest, but hopeful that Mr. Kirk might change his position.

The matter has also been referred to General Tindall. We were of the opinion that it is more a military than a diplomatic affair. The General, like ourselves, feels the proposition is one that should be thoroughly explored, and at the moment we cannot judge its merits until the principles upon which Herman represents, and details of the plans are revealed to us. At the moment we are daily expecting a message from Mr. Kirk signifying his willingness to meet with Herman or designating someone to meet him in his place. A reply from Mr. Kirk is expected on Friday, the 14th. We frankly doubt the wisdom, for security reasons, of Mr. Kirk's coming to Turkey. In the event Kirk refuses to come we have thought of suggesting Hugh Wilson in his stead, and may decide to make the suggestion to him.

Referring to the German file, the first document dated December 29, 1943, is a copy of a letter which was sent by our negotiator to General Tindall. As I indicated previously, we kept him thoroughly informed and he is doing all he can to help us, and if everything goes well, Herman will come down here within 30 days time to meet either Mr. Kirk, someone he nominates, or Hugh Wilson, if it works out that way. Any judgment on continued negotiations will of course be based upon revelations he makes at this meeting.

In considering the "expose" itself (and I again call to your attention the fact that the wording of this document is that of one of our foreign collaborators based upon conversations with Herman), the first two paragraphs are devoted to a description of background and standing of the group. In general, we believe

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these statements to be true.

We should like to comment paragraph by paragraph on the statements made under the heading "Conditions of collaborations with the Allies":

Paragraph 1: In all of our dealings with the enemy agents, military defeat and unconditional surrender have been the primary basis of discussion.

Paragraph 2: We do not feel it necessary in the informal negotiations to discuss German sympathies with the Anglo-Saxons. The only bearing on the subject in our opinion is their willingness to negotiate with us regardless of the reasons.

Paragraph 3: While stated as a condition, it is clearly realized that the continuance of an unbroken Eastern Front is a factor entirely beyond our control, and this paragraph merely expresses a hope rather than a condition.

Paragraph 4: As the matter is explained in detail, it is the belief of the group that an all-out effort on both sides is a necessity, otherwise the movement could be easily crushed.

Paragraph 5: The comments on number 4 apply to this one as well.

Paragraph 6: Worded otherwise, this is intended to imply a preliminary understanding to be arrived at with Mr. Kirk as to the sincerity and the scope of the endeavor, rather than any formal agreement.

Merkan seems to feel that only through contact with someone he knows intimately can a basis of mutual confidence be arrived at. This he feels is a necessary preliminary to the dispatch of an officer or a group of officers who will carry to the Allies the full plan for the intended cooperation.

Paragraph 7: This paragraph does not have much bearing on the situation, it merely states what is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 in a different way.

Paragraph 8: This appears to us to be a little visionary and rather unimportant, although some advanced thought should be given to the setting up of some local authority during Allied occupation.

Paragraph 9: The fear of communism is of course predominant among this group and in no little way responsible for their determination to collaborate. On the other hand they are not anti-

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Russian and would not object to Russian participation at some point along the way.

Paragraph 10: This paragraph is again irrelevant to the actual carrying out of the military aspects of the plan.

Paragraph 11: This paragraph concerns their own internal organization, although probably it will be easier for us to keep in touch with a Headquarters in Austria than in Germany proper.

In drawing this memorandum to a conclusion, as I have indicated in my letter and above, it is most difficult to judge the possibilities of the success of such a plan, but we are convinced it should be brought to the attention of high authorities before proceeding further. None of us of course, are able to pass judgment on it until we have much greater knowledge of the extent of the program as well as the responsibility and integrity of those behind it. It is needless to say of course that we have pledged ourselves to the utmost security at this stage although we have pointed out that as the plan develops necessarily means a great many individuals for whose security we have no control will have to give the matter consideration. We are unable to give this project our endorsement until it is known about it, but do feel that it is important that it be brought to your attention.

Possibly before this reaches you, some word will have been received regarding Mr. Kirk's attitude, which we will send on. If he is unwilling to come, I wish you would give me your ideas on the availability of Mr. Wilson so that we can suggest his name as an alternate.

Additional documents in the dossier include a summary memorandum by our negotiator and a copy of the letter written by Herman to Mr. Kirk to which we are now awaiting an answer.

*P. C. ...*

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Germany 19733  
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## E X P O S E

ON THE READINESS OF A POWERFUL GERMAN GROUP TO  
PREPARE AND ASSIST ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AGAINST NAZI GERMANY

**NOTE :** This exposé defines the attitude and plans of an extreme - influential group of the German opposition inside Germany on the subject of hastening the victory of the Allies and the abolition of Nazism. It has been prepared on the basis of frequent and searching conversations and discussions with a leading representative of this group about the political future of a free democratic Germany cleansed radically of Nazism, and about the maximum contribution that can be made immediately by determined German patriots toward making this Germany a secure reality. The exposé is to reproduce clearly and concisely the views and intentions of this group of responsible democratic Germans within Germany.

## BACKGROUND AND STANDING OF THE GERMAN OPPOSITIONAL GROUP

Apart from the Nazi Party hierarchy and its subordinate organs and functionaries, there are left in Germany two elements vested with political power: the officers corps of the Wehrmacht, and the upper ranks of the Civil Service, which, in their ministerial grades at least, represent a fairly closely-knit network of officials interconnected by personal acquaintances, official association, often long-standing friendship. Within the overlapping spheres of high officialdom and professional army circles, three categories of people can be distinguished:

- 1) Politically non-descript specialists who are absorbed altogether in their service duties, being either too vague or too cautious to express their views or engage in political activity. They constitute the majority, especially among the professional officers.

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- 2) Confirmed National Socialists
- 3) Decided and conscious opponents of Nazism

The third category is again divided in two wings, of which one favours an "Eastern" pro-Russian orientation, the other a "Western", pro-Anglo-Saxon trend. The former is considerably stronger than the latter, particularly in the Wehrmacht; in Luftwaffe circles it rules supreme. The driving force behind the Eastern wing is the strong and traditional conviction of a community of interests between the two mutually complementary powers, Germany and Russia, which led to the historical cooperation between Prussia and the Russian monarchy, and between the German Republic and Soviet Russia in the Rapallo period (1924), when the Reichswehr and the Red Army concluded a far-reaching understanding regarding military collaboration and reciprocal training facilities. Historical bonds of this character are reinforced by the deep impression wrought by the power and resilience of the Red Army and the competence of its command. Among the Eastern wing the foundation of the German Officers' League at Moscow has evoked a powerful echo, the more so, as the leaders of the League are recognized in the Wehrmacht as officers of outstanding ability and personal integrity (by the standards of their caste). This group has for a long time been in direct communication, including regular wireless contact, with the Soviet Government, until a breach of security on the Russian side led to the arrest and execution of many high-placed officers and civil servants early in 1943.

The Western group of the opposition, though numerically weaker, is represented by many key men in the military and civil service hierarchies, including officers of all ranks, and key members of the OKW. Furthermore, it is in close

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touch with the Catholic bishops, the Protestant Confessional Church, leading circles of the former labour unions and workmen's organizations, as well as influential men of industry and intellectuals. It is this group which is seeking to establish a practical basis for effectual collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon Allies.

### CONDITIONS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ALLIES

The following are the future material factors and present political arguments which form the logical prerequisites of a successful collaboration between this Western Group of the German democratic opposition, and the Allies.

- 1) Unequivocal military defeat and occupation of Germany is regarded by the members of the group as a moral and political necessity for the future of the nation.
- 2) The Group is convinced of the justification of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, and realizes the untimeliness of any discussion of peace terms before this surrender has been accomplished. Their Anglo-Saxon sympathies result from a conviction of the fundamental unity of aims regarding the future organization of human relations which exists between them and the responsible statesmen on the Allied side, and the realization that in view of the natural convergence of interests between post-Nazi Germany and the other democratic nations there must of necessity result a fruitful collaboration between them. The democratic Germans see in this unity of purpose a far safer guarantee of a status of equality and dignity after the War.

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than any formal assurances by the Allies at the present time could give them, provided any such assurances were forthcoming.

3) An important condition for the success of the plan outlined in the following points is the continuance of an unbroken Eastern front, and simultaneously its approach to within a menacing proximity of the German borders, such as the line from TILSIT to DRESDEN. Such a situation would justify before the national consciousness radical decisions in the West as the only means of forestalling the overpowering threat from the East.

4) The Group is ready to realize a planned military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale, provided that exploitation of the military information, resources, and authority at the Group's disposal is combined with an all-out military effort by the Allies in such a manner as to make prompt and decisive success on a broad front a practical certainty. This victory over Hitler, followed by Allied occupation of all Germany in the shortest possible time, would at one stroke so transform the political situation as to set free the real voice of Germany, which would acclaim the action of the Group as a bold act of true patriotism, comparable to the Teurogen Convention concluded by the Prussian General Yorck with the Russians in 1812.

5) Should, however, the invasion of Western Europe be embarked upon in the same style as the attack upon the Italian mainland, any assistance by the Group would not only fail to settle the issue of the War, but would in addition help to

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create a new "stab-in-the-back" legend, as well as compromise before the nation, and render ineffectual for the future, the patriots who made the attempt. There is no doubt that half-measures would damage the cause rather than promote it, and the Group is not prepared to lend a hand in any collaboration with limited aims.

6) If it is decided to create the second front in the West by an unsparring all-out effort, and follow it up with overwhelming force to the goal of total occupation of Germany, the Group is ready to support the Allied effort with all its strength and all the important resources at its disposal. To this end it would after proper agreement and preparation be ready to despatch a high officer to a specified Allied territory by plane as their fully empowered, informed, and equipped plenipotentiary charged with coordinating the plans of collaboration with the Allied High Command.

7) The readiness of a sufficient number of intact units of the Wehrmacht to follow up the orders given under the Group's operational plan, and cooperate with the Allies, could only be counted upon with a sufficient degree of certainty if the above conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise there would be a grave danger that the orders and operations agreed upon by the commanders and staffs belonging to the Group would at the decisive moment fail to materialize for lack of support, or be executed only with great friction.

8) The Group would see to it that simultaneous with the Allied landing a provisional anti-Nazi Government would be formed which would take over all responsibilities resulting from the collaboration with the Allies.

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political upheaval that would accompany it. The composition of this provisional Government would be determined in advance.

9) The Group, which comprises personages belonging to the most diverse liberal and democratic parties and schools of thought, regards the possibility of a bolshevization of Germany through the rise of a national communism as the deadliest imminent danger to Germany and the European family of nations. It is determined to counter this threat by all possible means, and to prevent, in particular, the conclusion of the War through the victory of the Red Army, followed by a Russian occupation of Germany before the arrival of the Anglo-Saxon armies. On the other hand, no cleft must be allowed to develop between the future democratic Government and the masses of German laborers. A non-communist democratic home policy will only be possible in conjunction with a whole-hearted policy of collaboration with Russia, designed to eliminate all hostility or friction with that power. In this way, it should be possible not to antagonize the strong pro-Russian circles, but to rally them in a common-constitutive effort to bring them over. Finally, what must be avoided is either the development of a situation which would lead to a democratic Government open to the reproach of neglecting the interests above national interests, or the formation of a Government the forces of which would be too weak to carry out its policy.

10) The envisaged democratic Government should be based on the principle of universal suffrage, and should be elected by the German people in a free and secret ballot.

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seek the cooperation of personally unimpeachable independent communists.

- 11) The initial HQ of the democratic counter-Government would under the postulated circumstances best be South Germany, perhaps Austria. It would be advisable not to subject the civilian population of this territorial base to indiscriminate air attack, since experience teaches that bombed-out populations are so exhausted and absorbed by the effort of providing for their bare survival and subsistence that they are out of play as far as revolutionary action is concerned.

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Dec 30, 1949

**REPORT on an Offer of Collaboration with the Allies  
made by an Oppositional Group of the German  
High Command and Civil Service**

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Through the agency of two prominent members of the German Freedom Movement (cf. our reports Nos. 6 of September 8, 1943), KASSELIA and HYACINTH, we have for several months been in communication with an influential group of German anti-Nazi staff officers and high officials (associated loosely with other liberal elements, and exponents of Labour), who in order to save Germany from complete annihilation are determined to work together, and collaborate with the Allies, for the defeat and destruction of the Nazi Regime. The Group is not ready to act as an Allied agent, but is interested only in full and carefully prepared collaboration with the express goal of immediate and decisive military success, total defeat of Nazism, and Anglo-American occupation of Germany. In view of the key positions held by most of the members of the Group in the High Command, General Staff, army commands, and in various Ministries, the Group commands tremendous executive power when acting by a preconcerted plan. The enclosed exposé contains full information regarding the standing and potential of the Group. The Group is acting abroad through an authorized delegate, whom we call HERMANN. HERMANN is a member of an ancient and famous family belonging to Prussian landed nobility; formerly a well-known lawyer, he is now attached to the German High Command as expert for international questions. There cannot be the slightest doubt of his pro-Allied sympathies. He has been selected for the mission of contacting the Anglo-Saxon Allies on the strength of his excellent personal relations with high-placed Allied politicians and prominent Press representatives. Among these are Alexander Kirk, Field-Marshal Smuts, and Dorothy Thompson. HERMANN and his associates are most emphatic in their desire to deal with the Allies only through the agency of one of these trusted friends, who know and are able to appreciate their background, motives, and

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resources, thus incidentally saving them elaborate organizations, and in whose strict discretion they have absolute confidence. Their insistence upon this point is caused by the outcome of previous overtures on the part of the German opposition via official Allied channels, during which flagrant breaches of security occurred which proved fatal to key men of the organizations concerned.

The magnitude of the promise held out by the proposed collaboration can hardly be overstated. No limited intelligence effort and no scheme of partial assistance by German staff members (to which this Group will not lend a hand) can offer even a remotely comparable chance of ending the War in the West at one stroke, and save perhaps many hundred thousand lives of Allied soldiers and civilians in occupied countries. From their first-hand knowledge of German defence preparations in the West, the Group are convinced that only the deployment by the Allies of a crushing superiority on a wide front offers any chance of overcoming the German defense. If the Allied High Command shares this conviction, and intends to employ all available strength in men and material, the great stake makes the utilization of such far-reaching assistance from the enemy camp even more imperative. We have spared no effort for months to help this chance to materialize. We are positive that HERMANN and his associates, including NACHOLIA and NYACINTH, are absolutely reliable and sincere German patriots, and that their combined resources in planned and coordinated action are such that their assistance would make the success of an Allied invasion of Western Europe a foregone conclusion, provided the Allied attack were made with all available strength on a wide sector of the European coastline. (cf. our report No. 231 of Dec. 23 ). The Group is in complete agreement with the Allies regarding the political necessity of unconditional surrender and complete occupation of Germany, and even welcomes the latter in preference to occupation by the Red Army and for its salutary effect on national psychology.

The negotiations with HERMANN have developed so far that during his last stay at Istanbul he expected to meet Alexander KIRK with a plenipotentiary of the Allied General Staff. We could not arrange for this in the time given; nor could HERMANN's readiness to fly to Cairo for a conference there be followed up for technical reasons. The American military attaché at Ankara, General Tynal, advised against HERMANN's flight for considerations of security, because the unusual preparations it would involve could not be made in complete secrecy at such short notice. For our legitimation in the

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absence of specific powers or credentials, we arranged a meeting between Gen. Tyndal and HERMANN before he had to return to Germany, during which Gen. Tyndal became acquainted with the outlines of the proposed scheme.

In view of the magnitude of the issue at stake, and the pressure of time at this stage of Allied invasion preparations, we urgently recommend that a meeting be arranged in time for HERMANN's next stay in January, which should be fully prepared in advance, and attended by Alexander Kirk and a high Allied representative with powers from the Allied General Staff and from the supreme authorities of the United Nations. A conference of the Allied representatives immediately concerned should be held in preparation of this meeting. In addition, we opine that no time should be lost in informing directly President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and General Donovan, short-circuiting normal procedure.



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Istanbul, 1943

Dear Mr. Kirk,

May I in this way send you my best greetings and wishes and my most sincere compliments. Perhaps it would be best to explain first why I have stated quite definitely that I would be unable to see anybody before having seen you. You will realize that any discussion on the ways and means to end this war and to begin peace require an enormous amount of confidence on the part of both participants: on your side because the credentials I could produce would necessarily be incomplete as they can only receive their value from and through action; on my side for reasons of security as well as of policy. - From my point of view any partner to such discussions must be able to visualize what life in my country is like, and he must have the discretion required to use anything I might say in a manner which will not be harmful to myself and to fundamental, permanent interests of peace. Therefore I must be sure of talking to somebody whose personal loyalty is beyond doubt and whose political judgment is up to the complex and tangled situation prevailing in my country and in several other countries of continental Europe. Obviously such qualifications demand at least personal acquaintance between those who are responsible for the conduct of the discussion, and personally I do not know of any American in this part of the world who would fulfil these qualifications but for you. I trust that you will understand this position and that you will excuse any inconvenience to which you may have been put in consequence.

Any discussion would have to start with an appreciation of the military and political situation. I am under the impression that all exhortations by the President and Mr. Churchill to the contrary notwithstanding, some people expect an early termination of the war in Europe. I would be interested to get your opinion on this point, which is fundamental to the possibilities of cooperation: if a speedy end were in sight cooperation would become much easier technically and much more difficult politically.

On the other hand I might be able to give you an account of the German political scene. You who know Central Europe and totalitarian states in general would thereby be enabled to gauge the value of my credentials, although nobody can be exact on this point ante eventum. Such a report would furthermore show you the possibilities and limits of any military or political assistance we can render to our common cause. I am afraid that to somebody who has never lived in a totalitarian country the limits of such assistance are not understandable, while he will have great difficulties in even recognizing its chances.

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The political-post-armistice world would have to be touched as far at least as it constitutes part of the diagnosis of the present situation. You will understand that the example of Italy has had the most damping effect on all thought of internal change and it would have to be made clear by what means a repetition will be prevented.

Once these questions of the diagnosis of the present situation have been disposed of, the main point of cooperation arises. This must be followed into its military and political possibilities. You will realize that some of purpose on the political side is a condition of military cooperation. As to the military cooperation, only such cooperation is feasible as will turn the tide in one stroke. This will require the patience to wait and wait until effective military power on a very considerable scale can be employed, such in fact, as will undoubtedly overwhelm once our assistance is added.

As I see it that would be the ground to be covered and I suppose that we would agree fairly quickly. This is not a question of policy but of technique and is beyond my competence. But we would have to agree to means to contact the technicians on both sides.

The place for any discussions can be arranged. I can leave Istanbul next time I come for 48 hours completely in your hands as to this point, rely on me to see that the arrangements made will keep the situation at home, I will be able to come here at the earliest middle of February, at the latest middle of April.

Please accept my best wishes for Xmas and the New

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Once these questions of the diagnosis of the present situation have been disposed of, the main point of cooperation arises. This must be followed into its military and its political possibilities. You will realize that some unity of purpose on the political side is a condition of effective military cooperation. As to the military cooperation, I am of the opinion that for military as well as political reasons only such cooperation is feasible as will turn the tables with one stroke. This will require the patience to wait and wait and wait until effective military power on a very considerable scale can be employed, such in fact, as will undoubtedly prove overwhelming once our assistance is added.

As I see it that would be the ground to be covered and I suppose that we would agree fairly quickly. The remainder is not a question of policy but of technique and is therefore beyond my competence. But we would have to agree on ways and means to contact the technicians on both sides.

The place for any discussions can be arranged by you. I can leave Istanbul next time I come for 48 hours. I am completely in your hands as to this point, relying on you to see that the arrangements made will keep the risk down.-- As to the time: I believe that, if I hurry up with my work at home, I will be able to come here at the earliest by the middle of February, at the latest middle of April.

Please accept my best wishes for Xmas and the New Year.

*German* *Germany* 13753  
*Germany*  
*Plan*

December 10, 1945

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Sir,

This is to introduce the enclosed memorandum, which has been prepared by HERMANN's friends who contacted the negotiations between HERMANN and myself during his recent stay, and who know intimately, and share, his plans and political aims. In this memorandum they wish to give a concise statement of the background, motives, and potential value to the Allies, as well as to democratic post-war Germany and the rest of the world, of the influential group of which HERMANN is the authorized emissary. It has been prepared in the light of the recent conversations held indirectly between HERMANN and myself, and between yourself and HERMANN, and may serve as an explanatory comment to HERMANN's letter to KIEK, which is also appended, and which is not fully intelligible without such a brief on the facts.

I think it may be useful at this point to sketch briefly the manner in which contact was sought and established, and the reservations on the German side which prompted them to proceed as they did. HERMANN has been sent abroad as the emissary of a number of German anti-Nazi staff officers and high officials (associated loosely with other liberal elements and exponents of Labour), who are determined to work together for the defeat of the Nazi regime as the only way to save Germany from complete annihilation. They are fully risking their lives and the lives of their families in the effort to widen and consolidate their organization, which in view of the heavy persecutions held by most of their members in the SS, the Army, and Civil Administration constitute tremendous executive power when acting by a prearranged plan. HERMANN has been chosen for the mission of contacting the Anglo-Soviet Allies because of his excellent

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personal relations to high-placed Allied politicians and prominent press people, who know and are able to appreciate his background and associations, save his elaborate credentials, and in whose absolute discretion he can have confidence. Among his trusted friends are Alexander Kirk, Field-Marshal Smuts, and Dorothy Thompson. His extreme caution is easily understood if it is realized that during previous overtures through official Allied channels several flagrant breaches of security occurred which jeopardized the entire organization and caused the execution of an important member for high treason. I know the details of these occurrences, and fully appreciate the refusal of the Group to deal with anyone but persons of tried discretion, who are known to them or recommended by their trusted friends. The Group is fully aware that their trusted Allied contacts are not necessarily in a position to make decisions or discuss terms; but they are confident that they will be able not only to get them through to the authorities who are competent to handle their sensitive proposals, but also to impress forcibly upon these authorities the fact that several hundred of the most valuable war and peace allies of the Anglo-American powers left in key positions in Germany have their heads in the noose along with their families, and that a happy-go-lucky attitude in dealing with the matter is inappropriate.

As it turned out, it unfortunately proved impossible to secure for HERRMAN safe passage to Cairo within the time at his disposal, let alone arrange for a meeting here with responsible Allied personages introduced by Alexander Kirk or another of HERRMAN's trusted acquaintances. I myself could see the nature of my position, and in the absence

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of specific powers or credentials, not to an officially recognized Allied negotiator, but at least I succeeded in conducting informal indirect discussions with him through our common friends, dissuading him from breaking off contact and inducing him to agree to a meeting with you (as a personage of official standing and personal competence and integrity) which would serve to legitimize the contact.

I now wish to state my own personal attitude in this vitally important matter. At this time, when plans for the decisive attack against Germany are probably near completion, there is no time to be lost in fully informing President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and General Donovan, Chief of the IS, avoiding the delay entailed in normal official procedure. Written reports are quite inadequate to the occasion. A conference should be arranged with at least one of these personages during which the full extent and nature of the proposed scheme may be fully reported upon, and all arrangements for a decisive meeting with the German plenipotentiaries not later than January 1944 may be made. I cannot state emphatically enough my conviction that absolutely no effort should be spared to bring the scheme to fruition in the shortest possible time. No limited intelligence effort and no scheme of partial assistance by German staff members can offer even a remotely appreciable chance of ending the war in the West at one stroke, and save perhaps many hundred thousand lives. I believe that none who is informed of this unique chance, which we have seen hard at work to help to materialize, can shoulder the responsibility for not having done all in his power to forward this knowledge with all possible caution and dispatch to the Supreme Authorities in charge of the conduct of the war.

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
The existing parallel scheme involving the cooperation of Germany's present Allies and for approval and may be combined with the present project to heighten its prospects of success.

I am preparing an account of the scheme in a covering report on the enclosed memorandum and on HEIMANN's letter to Alexander Kirk, but we are not decided where best to direct this report. I am probably correct in assuming that you, Sir, will be reporting on the matter on your own account, enclosing the same documents. Since the matter involves no delay or confusion of competence, I hope you will agree with me that the official steps we take in the matter had best be coordinated. To this end, I should greatly welcome an opportunity to meet you personally, or failing this, to have your written advice on how to proceed.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION  
Cairo, January 10, 1944.

Personal and Confidential

Dear General Tindall:

I have been away from Cairo for a few days and upon my return I found your letter of December 19th. I do not believe that any harm has resulted from the delay as the individual whose message you sent me is apparently returning to Turkey only in February or later.

I am enclosing my reply to this message which I am making on my own responsibility without consulting with anyone and I shall be glad if you will deliver it. My decision is not based on any doubt as to the sincerity of the person in question but solely on my conviction that the war must end by the military defeat of the German armed forces and not by any dickering on our part with factions within Germany which might entail greater present risks and more serious eventual complications for the United Nations than the problematical advantages would justify. Unconditional surrender is and should remain our slogan and, from my knowledge of the Germans, I fear that any talk with factions within the country will create the impression that we would be satisfied with something short of that requisite.

With best wishes, believe me

Yours very truly,

*A. Kurb*

*Minister*

Brigadier General Richard D. Tindall,  
Military Attaché,  
American Embassy,  
Ankara, Turkey.





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION  
Cairo, January 10, 1944.

Personal and Confidential

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With best wishes, believe me

Very truly,

*I would always be glad to see you & that I do not see that any good purpose could be served by dicker-  
ing now as it is my firm conviction that nothing short of the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces will terminate the war in Europe.*

*W. Averell*  
*Minister*

Instant  
5 February 1944

Mr. General Hermann  
Washington

Dear Bill:

I am replying to your letter of January 22, regarding the Hermann matter, in order to bring you fully up to date. Very little has developed in this matter since my memorandum to you of January 12. Kirk, in a very non-committal manner, said he would see Hermann although he admitted that anything would come of it and, quite logically, stressed his desire to avoid the impression that the American side would consider anything other than unconditional surrender. Indirectly we have sent word to Hermann of this decision on Kirk's part, with the furthered info that we doubted such a matter could be arranged with comarity; that we did not think any further meetings were worth while unless Hermann was prepared to submit tentative plans that would assist in bringing about military defeat and unconditional surrender. He raised the question as to whether or not he would negotiate with another spokesman for America. In that connection, we suggested Hugh Wilson as a possible substitute. No further word has been received from Hermann, although he representative here is inclined to feel that he may attempt to establish contact with American agents in Stockholm, Bern, or Lisbon.

With all of your conclusions I am completely in accord, although I get the impression here from talking with Hermann's local associates that this is a sincere effort on Hermann's part to bring about the complete military defeat of Germany, and that it is clearly understood by him that America must be a partner to any final negotiations.

Please feel assured that in my own conversations I have shown nothing but a firm attitude towards this subject. I have clearly indicated that the interests I represent have neither the authorization nor the desire to discuss any political matters, and that unless Hermann is ready to disclose some concrete plan to be considered on its own merits, we have no desire to see him again.

In any further communications from Hermann on this subject, we will follow your instructions regarding references to this matter. We shall also make every effort to see that no "leak" takes place through any of our contacts. We have no desire whatsoever to get into high level negotiations and do our best at all times to keep all matters strictly confidential which we have received.

The changes are you may hear from me by wire which I will prepare the content of this letter, but I want to get it off to you as quickly as possible.

Yours very truly,

Leaning Buchanan

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE February 9, 1944

FROM

HEADQUARTERS, STR. SER.

OF  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

11-2378

FOR ACTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRET

SECRETARIAT *Schepman, Serrano*  
*Magruder* *Bull*  
*Spicer*

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

**SECRET**

114. Re: Memorandum for General Donovan, personally.  
Transmitted to Washington and London.

1. Before your letter arrived, we concluded a simple oral agreement written up in the form of a memorandum on the 3rd of February. There is nothing in the letter or spirit of the agreement which is not completely in accord with the recommendations which came from you today. We are punching a copy of the agreement to Washington, together with a detailed explanation of the whole proposition. It is necessary for us to recruit immediately two very capable American-born fellows who can speak German, one for SI and one for SO, together with a wireless operator for dispatch as liaison with this group. Alderson has not yet replied to my inquiry as to whether there are any such persons there who could be recruited for this work. Letter with complete details follows.

2. There is nothing new to report in regard to the German affair. I am in complete accord with the reserved position recommended in your letter. You may be quite certain that I have been extremely cautious and reserved when speaking directly. Everything in the memo which you received can be attributed to our foreign negotiators, I made no such claims.

3. We are going ahead with negotiations with Hungarian Chiefs of Staff on a most cautious basis. I am punching to Washington notes on my own and only meeting, together with memorandum which was distributed to London. Our conversations were about subversive and military subjects exclusively. The British are causing confusion by obviously stimulating political subjects about which we exhibit no interest or concern. In connection with this we are also in contact with Russian front negotiations which are just beginning to get underway.

**TRUE COPY**

**SECRET**

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU RETURN THIS COPY TO THE SECRETARIAT BY THE EARLIEST DATE WHICH YOU CAN

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL ORIGINATOR

PAGE 2

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

**SECRET**

4. You can get an eye witness account in Washington from O'Connor who has been present throughout.

5. In reference to Hatis, apparently he still performs the duties of a courier only. He knows nothing about our organization or our plans which might be embarrassing if revealed. The memorandum which he is delivering to Gombally about proposed collaboration is nothing more than a summary of methods this group should employ if they desire collaboration, and if the Nazis get hold of it, no damage would be done. I might say while on this subject, that though I really trust my British associate, the fact that the Foreign Office interferes in negotiations of this kind conducted by the British has been responsible for the denials for political excursions by the Hungarians and consequently nothing. Our proposals are for subversive collaboration exclusively. I am not unduly optimistic.

COPY

Time 2/6/44 1:53 pm

ACTION

**SECRET**

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE February 24, 1946

ROUTINE  
DISPATCH

FROM WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
DISTRIBUTION

IN-3098

FOR INFORMATION

FOR ACTION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

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INFO. 000 to 100.

There is a possibility that Herman will make another visit to Istanbul to get in touch with us, about the middle of next month. He has been cautioned to come to Istanbul only if ready to confer on positive plans to effect a military victory over the Nazi Army, with consequent unconditional surrender. He has been told that no discussions would be held on post-war or political questions, or on fears of occupation by the Soviets. In addition he has been informed that no official representative of the United States will confer with him. Since we should be prepared for conferences with him if he does come, I am requesting that you forward me a letter (granting me authority to confer with Herman himself or with representatives of his group. This authority should be framed to encompass talks on a restricted basis only, as stated above. Since Germany is not included in my present directive, a letter of this type will provide me with credentials for such a meeting. The following is for your information: Lovrenchen is associated with this movement. He has been recalled to Berlin, as I notified you before, and left the 10th of February. No dispatch was made to him just before he left. In this message we indicated that we would enable him to see you. It is taken for granted that fear that others in Germany's movement might be compromised influenced Lovrenchen's decision to go back to Berlin. He is still of prospective value to us while he is in Berlin. My visit to Cairo will last from the 28th of February to the following Saturday, the 4th of March.

**SECRET**

TIME 9/24/46 1101 P.M.

IT IS FORWARDED BY THE SECRETARIAT WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARIAT

**SECRET**

February 28, 1944.

**TOP**

To: General William J. Donovan

From: Dr. Carl Brandt

Subject: Herman Plan

Upon your request I am giving hereafter my critical evaluation of the Herman plan with which I became familiar today after perusal of the document you handed to me. As a background for what follows I want to mention that according to my continuous analysis of the economic situation inside the continental fortress I am convinced that the resources at the disposal of the enemy are despite progressive bombing still large enough for carrying on the battle until the fall of 1948 and that, consequently, with the undiminished strength of the enemy's ground forces it is the greatest probability that far in excess of 500,000 American boys will have died in battle before the fortress will fall by military assault and only. Moreover, I deem it probable that in that case a prostrate and battered continent may ultimately fall into a definitely pro-Russian orientation.

#### NATURE OF THE PLAN

In my appraisal the plan represents the offer by the most respectable revolutionary group inside Germany, lodged in vital strategic positions, to assist the efforts of the Anglo-American Allies at breaching the fortress from the outside by a judicial and discriminative parolization of resistance from the inside with the exclusive purpose to accomplish thereby Anglo-American occupation leaving Russian forces aside.

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THE IMPITS OF THE PLAN**TOP SECRET**

If the Anglo-American forces have to shoot it out with the German Army to the last, there are two major alternative courses of events:

1) If all goes extremely well, the war will end either in the Fall of 1944 or, much more likely, by the Spring or Summer of 1946. However, Northern Europe and Germany will in all likelihood be devastated to such an extent that by the immeasurable moral and social erosion and the material destruction alone one of the key positions of the Western world will be lost. It is already perceptible that the incessant bombing and obliteration of metropolitan areas creates huge masses of a proletariat not only in Germany but also adjacent countries will potentially lean toward a Soviet society which offers the immense opportunity for Russia to utilize passively this tendency against Anglo-American interests. What is much worse than this deterioration under the impact of the battering of the Fortress, Hitler's Gestapo, which in due time will reach a strength exceeding 3,000,000 of the most brutal killers the world has ever seen, will inevitably have proceeded to "liquidate" systematically all and every German who by their moral stamina and personality could possibly be the nucleus of a rehabilitated future Germany which would fit into the fabric of a strong but peaceful ~~Western~~ Western World. Thus even if the American losses in lives should be relatively small, the Continent would probably be lost when it is won.

2) If, on the other hand, all does not go well, with the invasion, one or several huge beachheads with all the troops and material invested will be thrown into the sea with the natural resources of the resistance by the German Army. In this case, the war would be protracted, but by gradual deterioration of the material resources and the moral ~~condition~~ condition

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of the substance of all the people who still own a remnant of modest means of livelihood would proceed until the point of the inevitable surrender of the Army. In this slow process the political and social grade of the German people would shift like the cargo on a vessel in a hurricane. All the people who are the victims of the Nazis as well as their active collaborators will gawk under the leadership of their generals (particularly the Russo-ophile wing) grab the opportunity of taking revenge against the naturally hated Allies who annihilated all their cities by forming an independent sovereign Soviet Republic with an army and seeking admission as a member in the Soviet Union.

In view of these alternative courses for exclusively military assault the Horman Plan offers to short-circuit the war to the necessary end, namely the defeat of the German Army and the complete military occupation of all of Germany as well as the liberation of all German-occupied territory west of a further advanced Russian front. It sets no conditions but with a cool realism begins with the acceptance of the inevitability of the military defeat, in fact it recognizes the necessity of the defeat of the German Army and the destruction of its power for the sake of a survival of Germany. The authors of the Plan visualize correctly that the vicious circle of the lust for expensive conquest inherent in this institution with its overwhelming potential power and its penetration into the political and economic fields must be broken by its conspicuous defeat.

The real test that this plan does definitely not represent a slick ruse maneuvered by imperialists in the General Staff or Nazi chieftains lies in the absence of any such military conditions as any plan by

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...the genuineness and sincerity of the efforts presented by the document I have read.

THE GROUP BEHIND THE PLAN

The origin and psychology of this group of whose existence I have been well aware and whose activity toward tangible ends began in the Autumn of 1930 dates back toward the years of agony in the latter part of World War I. The members of this group carry on in the tradition of many splendid men, particularly among the young generation of 1914 which fought as soldiers and young officers in the trenches of the First World War and from the profound and tragic experience derived the conviction of the necessity and the possibility of freeing Germany for the sake of Western civilization from the insane ambitions of the aggressive imperialists in the Army, the heavy industries and among the ranks of the Junkers. Most of them are men of an alert intelligence and a deep understanding of the moral foundation of the West and all of them comprise the English-speaking world most definitely under that concept. Their members are not belonging to any special class, social stratum or profession, but are found among labor leaders as well as the intellectuals, among conservatives and socialists, Catholics and Protestants, businessmen and civil servants. What unites these people is the thorough grasp of the historical tragedy of their nation and their last desperate effort to prevent at the very risk of their and their entire families' lives the annihilation of all that to them means Germany and the heritage of generations. Since all of them stand ultimately - even those who never attend Church or profess adherence to it - on the ground of Christian ethics and thereby are tied into the West, they also want to prevent that

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either by trying to avert defeat or after defeat Germany will  
 have the Russian orbit. These men are culturally as much at home in  
 England, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden or in general in Western Europe  
 as they are in Germany, while Russia means to them exactly as much as  
 Japan or China does to the people in Iowa. Thus these people have for  
 the last twenty years been widely scattered but genuine parts of the  
 warp and woof of the German nation. The dire peril and real agony of  
 eleven years of tyranny and more than four years of war have screened  
 and sifted them out, hardened them and driven them into subtle clandestine  
 organizations. I am unable to write down a list of names, because I have  
 not had many occasions to lift the veil of their secrecy and do not know  
 any more who among their ranks was lost by death or other change. In  
 fact, it has always been one of the chief principles of protection within  
 this group that one person never knew more than a few trusted members  
 of the whole group, which I strongly urge to respect because it is the  
 only conceivable way of avoiding the mass liquidation of all of them  
 whenever, by accident or carelessness, or resourcefulness of the Gestapo,  
 some identities are revealed. But I am thoroughly convinced that this  
 highly secret and strategically located group is incomparably more worthy  
 of full consideration than any other so-called underground movement,  
 because it is neither tainted with left-wing radical conformism nor  
 with any particle of transformed Nazi ideologies, but in contrast  
 represents, as all democratic groups, people of widely differing shades  
 of political ideas which they are united in the last essential convictions.

#### ALTERNATIVES TO THE HEIMAN PLAN

In an attempt to determine the practical value of the Plan, it is  
 imperative to check on potential alternative courses of action. In trying  
 to review such alternatives, the only one that I can possibly think of

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might be as follows: The Allies could take the initiative to approach certain members of the German General Staff who are known to represent merely professional military leadership and thought and of whom one could expect that like Ludendorff in August 1918 they would try to terminate hostilities before or at the moment when the complete deterioration of the battle position of the German Army becomes inevitable. Such negotiations could naturally be started in many places, such as London, Stockholm or Switzerland or elsewhere at any moment. The weakness would lie in the fact that the only strategy in such talks would consist of using threats and presenting in consecutive stages one ultimatum after the other. In order to make it tempting at all to lay down arms, the Allies would inevitably be bound to offer or to grant upon demand from the German side certain conditions. I venture to imagine the conditions which alone would, in my opinion, persuade any such members of the German General Staff to consider or accept surrender. Such conditions would be the unilateral Anglo-American occupation of all of Germany and the guarantee that Russian armies would be kept by Anglo-American troops as well as written American and British commitment be kept outside the German borders. Moreover, the German General Staff would want to have a binding commitment that Anglo-American Military Government would under no circumstances abuse its absolute power of policing for a period of "blood-letting", an idea unfortunately so dear to the heart of American columnists, magazine editors as (Fortune, Life, Time) which has been very effectively publicized throughout Germany. It is obvious that any such plan would suffer from the deadly constructive weakness that its very conception involves treachery against our great ally, the Russian people and therefore must remain still-born. On the

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German side the practically impossible plan has still much greater weaknesses due to the fact that one has to deal with a formally but not truly uniform group in which the West gangsters have too tight a grip on those personalities who could possibly arrive at a sensible agreement with the Allies. Moreover, since military expediency would be the exclusive consideration for accepting surrender the only possible timing would be so late that little would be won for either side.

Discarding this only conceivable alternative as impracticable and non-profitable, the Herman Plan appears so much the more ingenious.

Hence it is my considered opinion that this plan deserves to be given most serious and immediate full consideration for political decision and forthright action:

- 1) as the only existing and very last chance to soften the Fortress progressively from the inside as the invasion is proceeding from the West,
- 2) as the only available and valid assurance that the high risk of the loss of hundreds of thousands of American lives and extreme delays of the final decision can be reduced to a bearable limit,
- 3) as the only practicable and politically permissible way to keep Russia out of Central Europe,
- 4) as the exclusive opportunity of having a reliable as the occupation is accomplished a strong and reliable framework of German personnel inside the country which not only guarantees successful operation of military government, but at the same time represents a victorious new leadership in Germany which has defeated the Nazis, broken the German Army and established vital cooperation with the American and British people.

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If such consideration as recommended should be given this plan, it is by no means certain yet that its execution will have any real effect upon the course of military events. Being a plan for action, its value of realization must be tested at first thoroughly and with the greatest dispatch. If after that it should still be considered as practicable, everything will nevertheless depend on the competence of carrying it out on the German as well as the Allied side. Thus it is far from a sure-fire method for successful invasion and requires to be tackled with courage and full realization of the ~~disparagement~~ jeopardy and risk to the very end.

If it should ultimately fail the full justification for the undertaking must lie in the fact that the responsible statesmen have done the humanly possible in trying to realize the opportunity for saving their peoples the otherwise inevitable tragic sacrifices.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROCEEDURE

Once the decision has been reached to pursue the plan, it will be necessary to test and get assurance as to the following points:

- 1) the strength and strategic distribution of the group inside the Fortress,
- 2) the military resources including all the primary and secondary resources under its reach or command.

It will not be possible nor is it advisable to attempt to obtain complete information concerning 1) and 2) for blue-prints, diagrams or to get any records in detail. The contact man should, however, give the correct proportions and range of their forces. If the few key personalities which they reveal should have the proper weight and caliber and deserve the confidence their word must be trusted because it is they who put the lives of a large and immensely valuable group of people at stake at any moment. In fact it is my impression that the quality of not more than two or three leading men should be considered as sufficient guarantee because if it is not the compilation of any number of names will in reality not add an iota of additional security.

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- 3) the question must be posed how the group contemplates to meet and avert the chief jeopardy to the plan, namely,
- a) the collapse of the Eastern German front by weakening of the divisions and the equipment there and the possibly resulting vicious assault by the Russian armies,
  - b) the collapse of the Eastern German front upon the initiative of the Russophile group inside the General Staff and the officer corps to play the same game as the Herman group but by collaboration with the Russians instead of with the Allies,
  - c) the sudden simultaneous abandonment of resistance on all fronts, including the Russian one, after a sudden show-down inside the General Staff under the impact of a spontaneous palace revolution.

Not all these questions can possibly be answered to full satisfaction, yet the nature of the answers will indicate how realistic the leaders of the group are or at least if they should not have contemplated such eventualities the questions will force them to close the last holes in their plans.

- 4) the question should be posed how the group plans to prohibit the sudden liquidation of all potential cooperating men by Hissler,
- 5) the question should be posed what security measures are contemplated to prohibit the Gestapo from getting behind the agreements of action between the Allied General Staff and the Herman group and the exploitation of such knowledge by the German Army without making wholesale arrests of members of the group for the sake of getting more and more information and giving the Herman group more rope.

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- 6) Does the group contemplate and is it determined to eliminate the key figures inside SS or regular Army officer corps or otherwise who jeopardize the entire plan either as prophylaxis or when and if the threat becomes imminent? If they do not, what are the reasons for refraining from premeditating such protective action?
- 7) What sort of major paralyzing or assisting actions are contemplated? (this question should be posed without any additional suggestive questions in order to check how elaborate and specific the plans of the group have already become.)

CONCLUSION

Supposed that all these questions should be answered to the satisfaction of our Chiefs of Staff, it would be my recommendation that one should establish without delay secure headquarters for the liaison officers of the group, dispatch to them the necessary liaison officers on our side and start to work out with them the complete strategy for the key actions which the Herman group is committed to engineer and manage inside the Fortress. As the machinery begins to work, it would be advisable to start with certain limited and cautious test actions in various expedient theaters of war which are inconspicuous for the Gestapo but sufficiently clear-cut to find out whether the machine works or, if it does not, to spot the defects. In general, it is my conviction that even if one sets the plan fully into motion, there is no need whatsoever to endanger our military operations by it. I would recommend that no major tactical operation should ever be based completely on the assumption that the Herman group can safely deliver what is committed to it. On the contrary, the invading generals should in all cases operate under the assumption that the assisting Herman group action will fail but should

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be prepared to exploit in full any opportunity created by the group's  
actions.

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MAILED FEB 14

The attached pouch letters from  
Londonland were referred to in  
reply to Mr. Goston asking  
to recruit two suitable  
individuals. Mr. Goston has  
done preliminary work toward  
this end, the results of which  
are also attached.

We will be very glad to carry  
through on this unless, for  
some reason, you do not wish  
him to do so.

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JP

Office of the Executive Officer

(S)

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Charles S. Cheston

FROM : Alan H. Saults, Major, ADS

SUBJECT : Asst from Harfarland for  
German Speaking SI Officer

DATE: 29 February 1944

Attached herewith file of cables and letters covering Packy's request for a German speaking SI Officer. His specifications may be outlined as follows:

"Two officers required. Must have full knowledge of German language. Preferable to have had executive experience or some type of specialized training before entering the Army. Should be at least 40 years of age. Since the assignment calls for undercover work, civilians will be satisfactory. Men will be dropped by parachute. Suggested that they have knowledge of area DD VISTAGE (Sic). One officer to be for SI, one for SO. Also necessary to furnish German speaking wireless operator for dispatch of liaison. Algiers has been requested to advise Packy if they have anyone available."

The Message Center has been requested to clear up the garble but as yet, they do not have definite word concerning it.

After a thorough examination of all available German speaking SI officers, we feel that the best man for this job is 2nd Lt. Nicholas Doman. His complete record is in the file but for your convenience, I will briefly outline his qualifications and experience.

He was originally attached to SO but is at present with MO. This Branch is willing for him to be transferred to SI.

Lt. Doman is SI. He has an excellent education, having attended the University of Budapest and the University of Colorado. He was commissioned from the ranks. He has good knowledge of Order of Battle and of radio transmission. He understands he is capable of sending and receiving approximately 15 to 20 words per minute.

**TOP SECRET**

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Lt. Doman is fluent in Hungarian, French, German and Italian. He is fair in some of the Balkan tongues. At present, his parents are in Hungary although he does not know their exact whereabouts.

Since coming to this country, he has been a college professor and lecturer. He is willing to undertake a hazardous mission.

While he is not quite as old as Packy's specifications require, we can find no one who seems to approximate so closely the other qualifications outlined as being necessary for the completion of the job he has in mind.

The capabilities of this officer have been thoroughly discussed with Dave Williamson. It was suggested at one time that Lt. Doman should be sent to Packy for work with MO in Hungary. He has certain drawbacks. His judgment and discretion are somewhat open to question. His parents are now in Hungary. He is somewhat biased politically. For these reasons, Packy rejected him for the Hungarian mission. ?

Dave Williamson thinks that he might be a good bet for the mission under consideration which calls for an assignment in Austria.

After considering all angles of this situation, we still feel that he is the best man on the horizon to recommend to Packy. If you agree to this, Packy should be informed that this is the same man who was brought to his attention on a previous occasion in regard to the mission mentioned above.

Will you please advise me concerning your reaction to this suggestion.

A. M. B.

*amb.*

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Two officers required. Must have full knowledge of German language. Preferable to have had executive experience in some type of specialized training before entering the Army. Should be at least 40 years of age. Since the assignment calls for undercover work, civilians will be satisfactory. Men will be dropped by parachute. Suggested that they have knowledge of area DD VISYAGE (Sic). One officer to be for SI, one for SO. Also necessary to furnish German speaking wireless operator for dispatch of liaison. Algiers has been requested to advise Pasky if they have anyone available.

**TOP SECRET**

Date 20 Feb

TO: WAFS

Remarks:

talked with agt re recruits  
 for Pashy  
 He suggests considering Saurey  
 and name of <sup>(other)</sup> the Sparrow  
 project does not materialize  
 also suggests as possibility  
 Eric Carmichael - says he has  
 Jewish appearance.

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 2/18/44

TO: Mr. Cheston

FROM: Major Willie

SUBJECT: German speaking operators.

1. The best and most available German speaking operator we now have is Pvt. Peter Sals who is a good soldier. He will be graduating from C Comp on March 4 and his present code speed is 16-11, but I am asking them to work as hard and especially to bring him well up before he graduates. He should be over 20 w.p.m. by then. He has lived 17 years in Germany and also attended Columbia University. He is not at present alerted for any theater, nor have we asked for orders on him, and I have given instructions not to do so until I hear further from you.
2. The next best speaker of German who can speak it fluently is Pvt. E. W. Moss, now at M Area. He is a good soldier and a good radio technician, but only a fair operator and possibly may never make a top notch one. He will be graduating March 25. Also, in his case, we have not asked for any theater approval as yet and he is not alerted.
3. There are 8 other top notch operators but their German ability is frankly high school and college stuff and I don't think should be counted on. At best it could probably be considered only fair. All of these 8 are alerted for overseas. I don't think we should change their assignments now.
4. 20 new and very good operators arrived at area M yesterday. Many of these have language qualifications. I am having the language qualified ones all screened for real German speaking ability and we will probably pick up two or three out of that lot.
5. In any event, I think we can say to you that when you call on us for a German operator if it is within the next two or three weeks, we should certainly be able to supply one.

CONFIDENTIAL *Gene*

P.S. Would the man continue to be on  
 Communter's T.O. in the theater to which  
 he'd be going, or under a Communter's office  
 in the field?

Captain James E. Jones  
in the field...  
has given the...  
on a...  
language...  
to...  
to that you would not wish to...

1st Lieutenant Franklin W. Jones

Lieutenant Jones is...  
 disiplin... He has a fair proficiency...  
 Jones has been...  
 over... Recently Mr. Shaper...  
 Jones to an overseas position...  
 that a definite commitment was made...  
 Lt. Jones was... to the effect...

Major Adolph Schmidt

At present Major Schmidt is in Aenra but could be...  
 detailed for temporary duty in Istanbul. We have not been...  
 able to examine his language qualifications as yet but believe...  
 to be proficient in German. He is able, intelligent, has...  
 a good knowledge of OSO organization and procedure, having...  
 been with the organization since the summer of 1942.

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Major Russell G. D'Onch.

Major D'Onch is on duty in London. He has a good knowledge of German, having lived in Hamburg for several years. If the assignment in Istanbul is sufficiently important to warrant his being detached from his present duties, arrangements could undoubtedly be concluded to that end.

2nd Lieutenant Raymond Brittenham.

Lt. Brittenham is also in London. I am led to believe that he has a good knowledge of German. At present, his duties in London are quite important and it may be that Major Madex would not wish to acquiesce in his transfer even on a temporary basis.

The above names have been selected from a list of about fifteen which resulted in a screening of about three-fourths of the Officer personnel in GI. Should none of the men mentioned above be deemed suitable for the assignment, I can complete the check of qualifications of GI Officers within an additional twenty-four hours on the chance of unearthing other prospects.

In passing, it might be mentioned that Captain Carlson is now assigned to X-2 and is stationed in London. He was formerly with GI but was loaned to X-2 some months ago. I am given to understand that he has excellent qualifications in every respect and that he has a splendid knowledge of the German language. It may be that you would wish to consider his assignment to Istanbul.

Captain Lifschultz, who is mentioned above, has a brother to whom he introduced me yesterday. The brother is 2nd Lt. Charles A. Lifschultz and has just been assigned to Camp Ritchie, Maryland. He is very anxious to be transferred to OSS and believes that there will be no objection raised if his transfer is requested. He speaks excellent German but has had no great experience in foreign travel. Both Captains Lifschultz and his brother are rather Jewish in appearance although this may present no difficulty for the assignment in prospect. They are both extremely intelligent and eager to do a job.

A. M. S.

*Ambs*

**SECRET**

See next page



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I have just learned that Captain G. Edward  
Borst, who is at present attached to the Western Europe  
Section of MI is also proficient in German. He has several  
other language qualifications and is thoroughly familiar  
with MI work. He is scheduled to leave for London within  
the next month but, if it seems desirable, he could go to  
Istanbul first and spend whatever time is necessary in that  
city.

A.M.S.

SECRET

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

German 13,733  
 V. H. ...  
**TOP SECRET**

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General W. J. Donovan  
 FROM: Hugh H. Wilson  
 SUBJECT: German Project

DATE: 12 March, 1944

This is the first time I have been able to study your papers both from Istanbul and from Mr. Brand.

I am deeply impressed with the possibilities of this matter. To my mind, it all hinges on one fact -- namely, is there genuinely in existence such a group in Germany as Herman asserts.

To ascertain this it would seem to me that one immediate preliminary step is essential, namely, to ascertain here who and what Herman is in Germany. Also, an appreciation of his character and capabilities.

When this is done and if he is a serious person, then the ground should be thoroughly explored with him. As I told you last night, I think Col. Truman Smith would be the most competent man to pass on the military personalities involved. I believe, as well, you should find somebody competent to pass on the civilian personalities and suggest consideration of Raymond Geist, for many years Consul General in Berlin.

Particular attention should be paid, in any examination, to how the members of this group are able to consult under Gestapo surveillance and how they have been able to maintain unified views and consultation. This phase of the question seems so difficult to me as to throw an element of doubt on the whole proposal.

I would go into this matter in more detail but realize that you are writing your letter today and want to get this before you urgently.

*W. H. Wilson*

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Germany 19783  
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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

**TOP**

**TO: General Donovan**  
**FROM: Whitney H. Stephenson**  
**SUBJECT: Notes on Bureau Files**

**DATE: 8 March 1944**

Pursuant to your request I make the following observations.

(1) I have not had time to read the basic document with any care at all. (2) I have read with care, however, the evaluation placed upon it by K.D. and assuming his premises to be accurately based upon the plan itself, I consider the evaluation to be both sound and shrewd.

You asked for any knowledge which I may have on K.D. himself. I have not seen him for many years, perhaps ten in all. I saw him when he first arrived in New York in about 1935. If my memory is right he was first attached to the New School for Social Research and I sat in some consequent conferences with him then and gained a very great respect for his knowledge, good judgment, common sense and complete hostility toward the Nazi government and its ideas.

He afterward went to the Food Research Institute connected with Leland Stanford University and I have never heard any word except in praise of him and his abilities and his anti-Nazi convictions. He is, as you know, one of the

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outstanding agricultural economists of the world, but in addition **TOP SECRET**  
he has a broad background of general economics and an experience  
in statecraft based in part on official and quasi-official  
positions which he held in the German government prior to his  
coming to the United States.

I have never met the author of the basic memorandum. I  
have been told that he has had for many years a responsible  
(and at the same time influential) post in the German Foreign  
Office. I have been told by informed people in confidence on  
two or three private occasions that this man is one of the  
most influential individuals of the anti-Nazi group of high  
placed German officials and that he has relationship with other  
influential individuals in Germany who are thought to constitute  
a strong anti-Nazi wing which has neither been liquidated nor  
suppressed.

This individual was wellknown to Philip Lothian and  
before the war visited Lothian with a few other German friends  
at Hickling, Lothian's home. It was this visit and an examina-  
tion of the pre-war situation which took place at that time (perhaps  
in 1937) which is the only factual basis I know for charges  
against Lothian that he was at one time an appeaser. Coupled,  
of course, with this factual matter is the circumstance that  
Lothian was a close friend of the Astors, as you know and was  
almost always at Clivedon for weekends.

Lothian and friends of his had a very high opinion of

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The integrity and bona fides of subject and in conversation with other friends of Lothian (who were very well versed in foreign affairs) I have heard the same opinion expressed.

The subject has a brother who came to this country possibly in 1916 and from such people as I have mentioned above (including Lothian) brought letters of introduction to me and my wife. We saw him two or three times. He engaged himself to a rather bizarre Philadelphia architect for some schooling in American architecture. He then proposed to go to some Latin American country from which he hoped to return to the United States with a permanent quota visa. In connection with <sup>this</sup> matter, however, he told me one story when he sought my advice. He told Philip Lothian another and after we had compared notes, I felt obliged to report to Sumner Welles that I had seen something in a social way of this brother of the subject. On that occasion I learned that he had told the Department of State still another story concerning his prospective trip.

You will perhaps recall that at about that time another single German individual, Adm von Trott came here. He must be now about forty years of age. He arrived here just before the war broke out or during its "phony" phase, and he was then very much interested in the possibility of bringing the war to an end before it began. I have at home, locked up, a memorandum which von Trott gave me at that time which set forth his ideas concerning the kind of "peace" which might avert a

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Mr. I mention this matter because of the fact that I have since heard that Adam von Trott has a very important post in the German Foreign Office for a man of his age and that von Trott is a member of the group which I have referred to above and also that he is a friend of the author of the basic document.

*WNT*

**TOP SECRET**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**  
**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**STATEMENT BY [Name] ON [Topic]**

[Name], [Title], [Department]

[Text of statement]

**STATEMENT BY [Name] ON [Topic]**

**SECRET**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**SECRET**

Was in the Nixon and Hoover offices

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1. As to the reported conspiracy...

I have known only Harman von Holst, but I did know as a young man Edmund von Holst. In 1926 or thereabouts he was about 30; consequently he would now be a couple of years over 60, or the other way 50. He was the great-nephew of the Field Marshal who won the battle of Sedan at the close of the first campaign which decided the Franco-Prussian war of '70-'71. He was a member of the Field Marshal's staff, and since the latter had no children, we knew his house and his estate in Alsace.

R

Von Holst came to me in a Parisian office as an introducer of an Austrian Jew, formerly the active head of the Austrian Finance Ministry, and in 1926 (I believe) the top Austrian in the League of Nations Bank. Von Holst asked me for an introduction to Debschitz, whom he wanted to make economic studies for the Reichsbank. Since the Reichsbank made no economic studies of any importance, I introduced him to the Austrian Staatsbank, where he had good work along that line. He visited there for a couple of years or so, and then went back to his estate in Alsace. But I think I



The above is a copy of the original  
document and is being provided for your information.  
I would like to see a copy of the original  
document and would like to see a copy of the  
original document and would like to see a copy of  
the original document.

- (1) The plan would, I would have a copy of the  
original document and would like to see a copy of  
the original document. (In this connection  
the British J. J. C. proposed a year  
in the House of Commons, might "include the British  
Parliamentary" as a result of a number of  
years ago).
- (2) If the plan would, it would have a copy of  
the original document and would like to see a copy of  
the original document. (In this connection  
the British J. J. C. proposed a year  
in the House of Commons, might "include the British  
Parliamentary" as a result of a number of  
years ago).

(c) If the American accepted the plan, I would attempt to get at least one indication that an advance indication of there and then the invasion is to take place, and in some cases that my plans according to my own best advantage.

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(d) If all went well either way, I would have my plan and perhaps my own skin.

2. As to the plan.

I realize I am impugning in some respect the good faith of the leaders behind the plan. I don't impugn the leader, for my impressions of him are that he is a high-minded and patriotic person.

But the advantages are so obvious to the framers of the plan, aside from the obvious risks, that the question of good faith has got to be taken into account. It is hard to say, but that the obvious risks are so great that the plan would scarcely have got as far as it has presently has without the backing support of very powerful quarters. I think we should consider a few other points of view.

(a) The plan is clearly at the cost of Russia. In light of our only military and aerial resources knowledge in the far East...

b. To do an increase in size of a lens  
and remove dust. Use the same good - point angle.

c. The technique of compliance is most difficult  
and dangerous.

d. It does give solid evidence of future  
of defect by a shot in the back. This is the best  
strategy for another war. Metal glass lenses.

S. M.

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **APR 2, 1941**

FROM

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**SECRET-11. XAPPA. Action: Washington. In connection with our #2173-2175 Information: London.**

We have received an additional report by way of Breakers, according to which GFD has been placed "sur Disposition" and given a naval promotion. The following have lately been placed under arrest: Major General of the well-known German diplomat, now deceased; Klop, who was once Consul-General in New York, probably for not keeping his mouth shut; Scherfberg, who did liaison work with the OKW; and Helmut von Nolte, a man close to Breakers, and advisor to OKW on International Law, who prior to the war, often visited London. The probability is that Kaltenbrunner will draw on the Abwehr to create a new MI service, for the purpose of maintaining an independent organization the Foreign Service division of the Reichsmilitar, which is chiefly concerned with political and Counterespionage matters. The Foreign Office and Himmler's service have lately been finding as a result of certain mistakes that each has made in granting exit visas, particularly in the case of Mrs. Vermehren. The latter is in part due to the activities of our GFD, whose security is thereby to some extent affected. It seems that the Foreign Office accorded the lady an exit visa for a journey to Turkey. In an attempt to break off her journey, the German military in Sofia closed the border between Turkey and Bulgaria to her. However, Helmut Vermehren, unbeknown to them, secured permission through the Foreign Office to go by courier plane and thus reached her destination. As a result of this incident, the Foreign Office came in for some sharp criticism from the Schutzstaffel. Subsequently, a number of high-ranking agents in Argentina declined to come home after the break in relations occurred, and the joke was on the Schutzstaffel, as the Foreign Office gleefully pointed out. Nevertheless, Breakers's information states that a knife has been declared, and that Ribbentrop's and Himmler's mutual fear of Lorenz's mounting influence has now caused an improvement in their relations. The following is Gortler's analysis of the political setup in Germany. On the one hand, though Goering and Himmler are still faithful to Hitler, each is hopefully counting on the possibility of inheriting his mantle of power. In contrast with this attitude, Goebbels and Lorenz are

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 3

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fully aware that they are dependent solely on their relationship to Hitler for their authority and that, should the latter go, they would count for nothing as neither could possibly hope to succeed him. It is not because of any partiality to England or the US that Hitler is pursuing a policy of so-called Eastern orientation but because of purely selfish reasons. He is especially interested in matters relating to Japan, such as the samurai tradition, and so forth. It was on his initiative that the Japanese were declared to be Aryans. Hitler is looking forward to the possibility of leading Germany into a Japanese-German attack on Russia, which would form part of a compromise peace settlement with the Western powers, and which would have their blessing.

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*Neck -  
Urban hypothesis of Bismarck*

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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**TON: 3/8/44 0:56 PM**

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Braudr

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
630 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.**

**SECRET**  
**TOP**

9 March, 1944.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Enclosed you will find the requested memorandum on the Hermann Plan. I have here written it out just as I had prepared it in pencil prior to our conversation yesterday. In the light of that conversation, I might have omitted Point No. 4, inasmuch as you had stated it as your intention to disclose the matter to the Russians, but I thought it better to give you the memorandum complete, in any case.

Very truly yours,  
*Irving H. Sherman*  
Irving H. Sherman.

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**TOP SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
630 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

**SECRET**  
**TOP**

9 March, 1944.

**██████████**

**TO:** Brigadier General William J. Donovan  
**FROM:** Irving H. Shorson  
**SUBJECT:** The Hermann Plan

As per your request, I give you herewith my comments on the Hermann Plan, as well as some comments on Doctor Karl Brandt's evaluation of said plan:

1 - The Plan is only as good as the individuals behind it. We know only of Hermann. We can guess who some of his associates are from his former associations. We are given some description of the kind of people in the outline of the Plan. They include the groups where anti-Nazi elements can be found, but this element is not likely, by itself, to be able to stage a successful revolution without very substantial military assistance, both from the Army and the National Socialist Party. It is only in the last groups that real force rests. In short, we should know much more about the personalities involved before coming to definitive conclusions.

2 - The Plan should be studied in the light of its possibly being "phony" or a "plant" to split the Allies from Russia. In the light of this, the Plan, which is very strongly directed against Russia, is well prepared and arouses suspicion, for the following reasons:

(a) It warns against the pro-Russian elements in Germany.

(b) It tempts the Western Powers with unconditional surrender, complete military occupation and an easy invasion from the West.

(c) It seeks negotiations only with Alexander Kirk (an official American), General Smuts (in effect, an official Britisher), which negotiations would be readily construed as official and compromising. (Dorothy Thompson is suggested to make the Plan look innocent. They know she could never be chosen. One wonders whether a plan which suggests her in this kind of role could be serious).

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- (d) They ask for absolutely no assurances for the future. (This is not like the Germans. They are not the kind to volunteer a free hand for nothing. Anti-Harris are still good Germans).
  - (e) Hermann, for a civil servant, travels to Turkey surprisingly easy. He even offers to go to Cairo.
- 3 - The Germans under this Plan having nothing to lose. If it is "phony" and "leaks", it would split the Allies; if successful, it would keep the Russians out of Germany, which they undoubtedly prefer.
  - 4 - The only safe procedure, if any negotiations are pursued, is to take the Russians completely into our confidence.

As regards Doctor Karl Brandt's evaluation of the Plan, I should like to state the following: His observations are substantially sound and well worth noting. However, some comments may be in order.

- 1 - Doctor Brandt's recommendation of the Plan is as anti-Russian as the Plan itself. He reasons that all alternatives to the Plan result in situations favorable only to Russia.
- 2 - Doctor Brandt says that we have nothing to lose by attempting the Plan. If we pursued the Plan as proposed and it "leaked", we could conceivably lose everything.
- 3 - Doctor Brandt says that there are no alternatives to the Hermann Plan; therefore it should be attempted. Even if this were so, which I do not believe, it does not necessarily follow that the Plan must be pursued at the present time or as presented.
- 4 - Brandt gives the impression that he knows the people behind the Plan. Aside from a very few individuals, I doubt that this can be so. Brandt left in 1933. The kind of people with whom Hermann and Brandt associated prior to that time cannot stage a successful revolution. The power has gone into very different hands and Brandt cannot know whether, or how many, of those people are included.

IR

Irving H. Sherman

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Germany 1973  
**SECRET**

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**TOP**

**INTEROFFICE MEMO**

**TO:** General William L. Long  
**FROM:** William L. Long  
**SUBJECT:** [REDACTED]

**DATE:** 10 March 1960

I read the subject plan and its various attachments in your office yesterday afternoon. Since it raises a number of questions of very wide scope one really ought to have it at hand before attempting any criticism of it. Nevertheless, I would like to set down a few points which occur to me. They are only a few because I think many of the questions that would occur to any reader of the plan are very effectively dealt with in the memorandum from Hans Wende.

- (1) The aim of the whole matter would be, of course, to determine the size and nature of the organization in Germany supposedly backing this plan. I have just re-read the study made by our staff last December on the "German and Austrian Underground Movements" (RMA #992, 1). Members of our staff had not at that time and have not up to the present discovered any evidence to support the contention that there is a fairly large, well organized and influential opposition group such as the German plan suggests. There is some slight evidence for the existence of a basically military opposition organization said to be headed by a general of high rank. This claims to have a following of diplomats, judges, big industrialists and even a lot of big lawyers. Its orientation is anti-Communist and its main objective a united united Germany. Possibly this is the same group supposedly represented by Germany, respectively. I find it extremely difficult to believe that such an opposition organization exists or, if it does, that this opposition is in a sufficiently strong position to give orders and have them carried out. Without entering into a lot of detail, I am of the opinion that whether one is born in Germany until the fact remains colleagues and that in such colleagues is probable in the immediate future unless the grades are collected collectively. It is at least conceivable that under such

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Mr. General Donovan from Langer

**TOP**

15 March 1944

circumstances an opposition group like the one described might succeed in seizing power though it is also conceivable that the military disintegration may take place piece-meal with various generals making separate arrangements with their enemies.

(2)

It goes almost without saying that certain elements or groups in Germany must be thinking in terms of surrender to the British and Americans in order to avoid being overrun by the Bolshevik armies. It is certainly true that for a very long time the upper and middle classes in Germany have been divided between those of western orientation and those of eastern orientation. By and large, I should say that dislike and distrust of Russia outweighed hostility to the Anglo-Saxon world, though recent intelligence would seem to indicate that the middle classes which were the chief supporters of the western orientation have been come in a measure Bolshevized through heavy losses by air bombardment. I should rather expect, though, that the larger landholders and the military caste would still lean toward the west rather than toward the east because the west would hold some promise of revival and independent action while the domination of Russia on the continent would mean indefinite subordination to a great military power. My own feeling is that the Anglo-American forces can still count on some measure of sympathy and support and that they could even strengthen their hold if they were able to offer the Germans something more promising than abject and complete surrender.

(3)

Coming back to the Hermann plan, it is clear that the main objective of its supporters is to hold a pretty generous line against the Russians in the east and to enlist the British and Americans in the defense of Germany against the Bolsheviks. This is a well-worn theme which by this time has become pretty much hackneyed. It seems to me that it would be a very grave mistake to enter upon any such plan without full knowledge and agreement from the Russians. There is no

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15 March 1944

#3, General Donovan from Langer

denying the fact that they are the greatest land power in Europe and that there is nothing either the British or the Americans can do to alter that fact. My own conviction is that the present Russian government is prepared to play ball but is equally prepared and determined to execute a volte-face if the British and Americans do not play fair. In this connection, I am convinced that from every point of view they have much greater possibilities of independent action than have the western powers.

(4)

I do not believe that the Hermann group is strong enough to really make a substantial contribution. As a matter of fact, this group itself states that it can be of no service unless the western powers make an all-out effort which would lead to victory. It may be that after a successful invasion of western Europe a group of this type could emerge and serve a very useful purpose in reducing the length of the campaign and the loss of life, but it seems to me that it would do this in any event and in its own interests so that there is no sense in our obligating ourselves. Certainly it would be a vast mistake for any military commander to count upon such inside aid and to modify his plans accordingly. The whole thing appears to me to involve a great deal of risk for us without any commensurate gain.

(5)

My recommendations would be:

- (a) To keep the wires open and find out as much as possible about the constitution and prospects of this group;
- (b) To inform the Russian government that we have been approached in this way but do not propose to commit ourselves excepting in agreement with the Allied powers;
- (c) If agreeable to Russia and Britain, to give such

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**TOP**

Special Operations Group Report 15 March 1944

aid and comfort as may be possible to the group with a view to using it later as a nucleus for a post-War Government;

(ii) To lay all military plans as though this group did not exist.

*William S. Langford*  
William S. Langford  
Director, Branch of  
Research and Analysis

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
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At. General Donovan from Langer

15 March 1944

aid and comfort as may be possible to the group with a view to using it later as a nucleus for a post-Nazi government;

- (d) To lay all military plans as though this group did not exist.

  
William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of  
Research and Analysis

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
19 March 1944

*Germany 137330  
Hermann Plan  
Oppenheimer*

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM: Captain F. E. O.

SUBJECT: Hermann Plan

After reading the expose re Hermann Plan, I wish to make the following observations.

A. GENERAL

The plan proposes conditions of collaboration with the Allies. It stands to reason that any plan which would save human lives and hasten the victory of the Allies must be given most careful consideration and should be followed up, provided

- a. We do not disclose in our negotiations with the Hermann group our own plans, and
- b. We do not rely on the assistance promised by the Hermann group in formulating our plans.

B. BACKGROUND - RUSSIAN AND ALGO-SAXON ORIENTATION IN GERMANY

The political background of Germany to-day is rather well-analyzed, but the following points could be made more clear:

- a. Germany is torn between the Western and Eastern (Asiatic) civilizations. This split permeates the whole of Germany and dates back to long before the Nazi Regime. Hitler was not able to overcome this cleavage. According to the expose, the only "decided and conspicuous" opponents of Nazism are divided into a

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- 2 -

a western (pro-Anglo-Saxon) and an eastern (pro-Russian) wing. It is overlooked, however, that the split between western and eastern orientation is noticeable in the whole Nazi party and in all Nazi organizations. Even in the highest ranks of the Nazi officials, there were (and I believe there are still to-day) men who favor alliance with Russia. The "German friends of Russia" expect of course that once an alliance is concluded Germany, with her greater efficiency, will be able to absorb Russia. This orientation is based mainly on the theory that Germany, having lost its chance to build an overseas empire, must seek compensation for its expansionist tendencies in Russia with her unlimited resources. I may, in this respect, refer to Professor (General) Haushofer, well known here as a Geo-Politician, whose basic theory is that whoever dominates the "Heartland" (Europe and Asia) controls the world--the "Heartland" being the greatest unified island on this globe.

b. It is, of course, difficult to tell how important in the Wehrmacht is the Russian oriented group as compared with the pro-Anglo-Saxon group, but I dare to question the correctness of the statement that "In the Wehrmacht, the pro-Russian orientation is stronger than the western, and in the Luftwaffe the former is supreme." This is a new development which must have been caused by the amazing success of the Russian Army and the Russian Air Force. During the last war, the German officer rated the Russian soldier very low indeed. Compared with the western front, the war in Russia after Tannenberg was looked upon as a place of relaxation. When this writer was east of Tarnopol in the autumn of 1917, the Russian Army was no match whatsoever for the German Army. I do not wish to imply that the statement in the expose is wrong; I have no means to check its truth. In any case, the Russian orientation of the German Army and Air Force is a highly significant point which requires most careful consideration.

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...the cooperation between German industry and Russia was very intimate during the following nine years up to the rise of Hitler.

d. In addition to the Wehrmacht and Nazi officials, one could find to-day Russian-oriented persons among the SA, the labor class, the "have-nots", and in particular among the politically most active group--the youth. To the young people, Russia seems to promise more than the Anglo-Saxon world.

e. The exposé emphasized that, apart from the Nazi party, there are left in Germany two elements vested with political power--the Officers' Corps and the upper ranks of the civil service. I doubt whether this statement is quite correct. Neither officers of the Wehrmacht nor the upper ranks of the civil service are really politically minded, and, except for a very few, none have any political influence. On the other hand, the exposé does not mention the leaders in Finance and Industry (D-Banks, I. G. Farben, potash syndicate, et cetera). They surely still exercise a certain influence on developments in Germany. This latter group sympathizes with the United States and England.

f. As a result of the continuous advance of the Russian Armies and the threat to Germany proper from the East, the gap between eastern and western orientation will undoubtedly have widened much more than we realize over here. In fact, Germany to-day might believe that

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there is only one of two courses to escape complete annihilation:

either negotiate with Russia to prevent an American-British invasion,

or appeal to the British-American forces to occupy Germany in order to prevent a Russian invasion.

The first course is confirmed by the expose in the following unequivocal manner:

"Among the Eastern wing the foundation of the German Officers' League at Moscow has evoked a powerful echo, the more so, as the leaders of the League are recognized in the Wehrmacht as officers of outstanding ability and personal integrity by the standards of their caste. This group has for a long time been in direct communication, including regular wireless contact, with the Soviet Government, until a breach of security on the Russian side led to the arrest and execution of many high-placed officers and civil servants early in 1943."

The importance of this statement cannot be exaggerated. The alternate course is adopted by the Hermann group with which we deal hereafter.

### C. STANDING OF THE HERMANN GROUP

The expose defines it as "an extremely influential group of the German opposition inside Germany." No names are mentioned, nor is any evidence given in support of this statement. Judging by the spokesman of the group who was sent to Turkey, this writer believes that the western group is genuine, serious, and reliable in its sympathy for the Anglo-Saxon Allies. Hermann represents intellectuals, industrialists, members of the lib-

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... civil serv-  
 ... placed workmen,  
 ... It is  
 ... with members of  
 ... On the other hand, the weakness of the Her-  
 ... group consists of their very loose organization and  
 ... of their lack of active political momentum as well as  
 ... their lack of integration with the masses. Bruning, with  
 ... his high ethics and ideals, is powerless against Von Rib-  
 ... bantrop, the expert in intrigues and treachery. Although  
 ... I do not question the sincerity and loyalty of the Hermann  
 ... group, I don't really have confidence in their ability to  
 ... carry out their plans. This uncertainty, however, should  
 ... not prevent us from continuing discussions and negotiations  
 ... in order to gain additional information. At present, very  
 ... little if anything is known about their intended strategy  
 ... and plans of operation.

#### D. SUBSTANCE OF THE PLAN

The plan itself contains only two positive points:

- a. It accepts military defeat and occupation by as well as surrender to the American-British Allies, motivated by the fear of a Russian invasion.
- b. The expose mentions the Tilsit-Lemberg Line as the point where the Russian advance must be stopped as an important condition for the success of the plan.

This would mean that the part to be occupied by British-American troops would include not only all of Germany but also a great part of Poland east of Warsaw. Although I have at present no means to check, it is believed that this line coincides more or less with the boundary line

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agreed upon between Germany and Russia in 1940. This shows clearly the intention of the Hermann group to keep the Russian Army far away from the original German border. In fact, Dr. Brandt calls this plan "the only practical and permissible way to keep Russia out of Central Europe." This is one point which has to be kept in mind. The plan is intended to be and must also be interpreted to be Anti-Russian.

The plan is completely silent as to the method by which assistance can be rendered to the Allies; how opposition in Germany against any intended cooperation with the Allies can be crushed; how a premature betrayal of the plan can be prevented; or how a provisional free democratic government can be established in Germany or Austria against the armed and violent opposition of the Nazi regime.

Apart from this negative aspect, the plan is rather vague as to the course to be followed in order to get more widespread support in Germany. It is stated that, "the envisaged democratic government should operate at home with a very strong left wing and lean heavily on the Social Democrats and organized labor, even, if necessary, seek the cooperation of personally unimpeachable independent communists." When Hitler came to power, the Social Democrats and labor were well organized but were swept away in no time without offering the slightest resistance. Social democrats have been suppressed for ten years; labor is no longer organized except in the Labor Front. Is there any reason to believe that to-day these groups will show the courage and determination and aggressiveness necessary to defeat the brutal Nazi regime? Moreover, does the author understand "personally unimpeachable independent Communists" to mean Germans who are capitalist and anti-Russian? Without the support of Russian circles, the plan does not seem to be feasible.

In view of the foregoing, I feel that the following representative of the group has not yet been

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hard thinking about the proposed plan or has not yet disclosed his ideas in spite of "the frequent and searching conversations and discussions" which took place.

#### B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION

Though the plan is still very immature, I suggest giving it most careful consideration. We can only benefit from maintaining contact with the group for the following reasons:

- a. We gain additional valuable information
- b. We should do from here whatever might increase the differences inside Germany and thus strengthen the opposition to the regime. If we encourage the Anti-Nazi forces, we weaken the power of the Nazi Armies to resist the Allies.
- c. We might obtain assistance and cooperation which would save lives and hasten victory.

The following course of action is recommended: In view of the revelation referred to under "C" concerning the German Officers' League in Moscow and the fact that the plan might and will be construed as anti-Russian in character, I would submit the plan to Russia and would ask for information about the German Officers' League.

I would immediately resume the contact with the German group to get enlightenment on the following questions:

1. Who is their key man in the Ministry of Transportation (Reichs-Eisenbahn; the communication system; the Wehrmacht; in the Luftwaffe (Milch, who as is known because Aryanized through Goering?); in the Labor Front; in

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in the Nazi party, in the Police, in Finance and Industry?

2. Who are the candidates for the provisional government?

3. What would be the best beachhead for invasion in France, Holland, Belgium, and Norway?

4. What measures are contemplated to

a. prevent a betrayal of the plan for collaboration, and

b. to smash any opposition by the Nazi party, the Nazi government and the Wehrmacht to the establishment of a new provisional government and to any kind of cooperation with the Allies?

5. What are the chances for a unilateral German-Russian understanding, and what means are being considered to prevent such an action.

6. How many divisions would be shifted from western Europe to the eastern front to facilitate an invasion by the Allies in the West?

7. What contacts have been made with people in France, Belgium, and Holland to insure cooperation in case of Allied invasion?

8. What would be the best measures for obtaining inside Germany more support for the plan?

9. What aerodromes would members of the group be able to occupy to insure safe landing of Allied Troops?

10. Which radio stations could be occupied by the Hermann group?

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11. To what extent could the group destroy refineries, power plants, and other installations as a signal for the invasion?

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 24, 1944

**TOP SECRET**

To: General Donovan  
From: Wallace R. Deuel  
Subject: Hermann Plan

1. Regarding the political aspects of the plan, I concur in Dr. Langer's views, without, however, being quite as pessimistic as he is as to the possibility that the Group might be able to accomplish something of great value to us. Also, I subscribe to his recommendations.
2. In addition to the points Dr. Langer makes in this connection, these other points may be relevant:
  - (a) Any form and any degree of cooperation with us by the Group would contribute toward the rise of a new "stab in the back" myth, with all the tragic consequences that would entail.
  - (b) The kind of a deal here proposed, which would leave the Soviets out in the cold, might well cause a violent reaction, among the masses of the German people, in favor of Russia and against the Western Allies, which in not too long a time might throw the Reich into the arms of the Russians.
  - (c) Even if the Group's plans should work out up to and including the engineering of a defection in the West, the "Eastern" element might be able to seize control of the situation. This element, as the Plan itself states, is "considerably stronger" than the Group.
  - (d) The members of the Group are, of course, German nationalists who in the long run undoubtedly would seek to establish a German hegemony in Europe.
  - (e) Even assuming both the goodwill and the security of the Group, the fact that the Group has been in touch with us with an essentially anti-Russian proposal will almost certainly come to the Soviets' knowledge, with quite possibly disastrous consequences.
3. For the rest, I know Hermann extremely well. He and his wife are among the closest and dearest friends Mary and I have ever had. The most useful comment I can make on the plan therefore derives from my friendship with him.

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There can be no question as to Hermann's courage, his good faith, the closeness of his ties with the sorts of people he says he represents, or his intelligence. I am as sure as I am of anything in this world that no kind and no degree of intimidation could induce him to make the kind of representations he is here quoted as making, if he knew or even suspected them to be false. Also, it would be difficult for anyone to use him as an unwitting pawn in a deception; he knows too much and is too intelligent.

5. The one major reservation I might suggest is this: that both he and his principals may overestimate their ability to deliver and/or underestimate the ability of the Nazis to prevent them from delivering. It is my own belief that Hermann and the Group have made precisely this miscalculation.
6. To explain the assurance with which I speak of Hermann's intelligence, integrity and courage, I may append the following brief account of my friendship with him:

He looked me up when I first went to Berlin for Col. Knox in 1934, and introduced himself as an old friend of Edgar Snow's and Dorothy Thompson's. I satisfied myself as well as I could of his good faith before I had much to do with him, but in the course of a few months found that my caution had been unnecessary, and he Freya, his wife, and Mary and I became very close friends.

Parenthetically, Hermann is approximately my age (I am 38) and so is Freya. They have two children. The first, who must now be about 5 or 6 years old, is named Casper (spelling not guaranteed). The second child has been born since I left Germany, and I'm not sure of either its age or its sex.

Hermann was always anti-Nazi, and made little secret of it; so much so that I used to worry about his safety. He always said, though, when I cautioned him, that life wouldn't be worth living if he had to repress all his feelings, and that besides, all his ancestors for hundreds of years back had always guessed wrong on revolutions, and there was no use his trying to do anything about it now.

Notwithstanding his sentiments, he was once urged to accept a high commission in the SS. The SS was then trying to recruit as many as possible of the most intelligent of the younger aristocrats. Hermann

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Hermann maintained this attitude after the outbreak of the war. When the war began, he was practicing law in Berlin, specializing, as I recall it, in cases of international law and conflicts of law. He shared offices just inside the Brandenburg Gate with a lawyer named Lovenhahn who had practiced for a time in this country and whom I knew slightly also. Soon after the outbreak of the war, Hermann went into the legal section of either the High Command or the General Staff, I forget which, to advise on questions of international law. His chief was Brauchitsch. (Incidentally, Franz von Halder is Casper's godfather).

Hermann and I continued to see each other about once a week, at his insistence and although it would have meant the end of him if it had become known that he was seeing me at all. The blackout facilitated our rendezvous, but it was damnably dangerous for him all the same.

He used to tell me a good deal of what was going on in the High Command: plans for the future, current operations and the disaffection of certain elements. Most of this information I could never use, but it helped me to an extraordinary degree just to know it.

At that time, and up to my departure from Germany in October, 1940, Hermann had little or no faith in the possibility that an effective opposition existed or could be created among the sorts of people described

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6. (con) as not constituting the Group. The generals in particular, he said, were terrified of Hitler and Himmler, and were neither able nor willing to attempt any measures aimed at the regime. Thus, when the very highest-ranking generals called on Hitler, they were instructed by one of the Chancellor's adjutants to stand in a line literally as well as figuratively; to stand in a geometrically perfect straight line, with their toes along the same crack or line in the floor, because any other posture annoyed Hitler. Again, the Gestapo controlled and edited the news reports which were the only ones the highest-ranking generals ever saw, except for the daily newspapers--and they were usually too busy to read even those.

The only way the outside world's news could get to the General Staff and the High Command was by radio, because the generals did have their own radio digest reports of foreign broadcasts. Hermann asked me when I came home to try to do whatever was possible to improve American broadcasts to Germany, with this in mind.

These are petty details, but typical of a vast number of facts pointing toward the same conclusion.

The most that the generals dared try to do to block the big offensive against France and the Low Countries in 1940 was to fake some weather reports to try to discourage the opening of the attack.

Another cause for the weakness of the opposition, Hermann used to say, was the conviction the members then shared that there was no alternative; that it would be impossible to talk sense to either Chamberlain or the French.

Moreover, the Gestapo controlled field intelligence and communications of even the highest echelons in the armed services.

When I told Hermann I was coming home, he asked me to introduce him to Alexander Kirk, then charge d'affaires in Berlin, and to some one other Embassy officer of outstanding discretion and intelligence. I chose George Kennan for this. Hermann thereafter kept in touch with both Alexander and George, I believe.

Alexander tended at that time to be most skeptical regarding the possibility that the opposition could do anything effective.

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6. (con) When I left Germany, Hermann said he would try to communicate with me but that I should not try to get in touch with him. He also suggested that I get in touch with a brother of his then living near Philadelphia, but I never did this.

I have received two letters from Hermann since my return to this country. One he sent from Italy, where he had gone on a trip; this was before Pearl Harbor. The second came a few months ago from Stockholm. Both were signed by false names, but there was no question that they came from him. Both letters were purely personal. I thought there might be some hidden message in the second, and had our people go over it, but they found nothing. I don't know whether Hermann knew of my connection with you. Both letters were addressed to me at the paper, but obviously that proves nothing.

7. If you wish to check the individuals among the group whose identities may become known to you, I suggest that Major General Arthur W. Vanaman, USAAF, would be good on the military, and, on the civilians, Alexander Kirk himself, or James Riddleberger or Henry P. Leverich of the Central European Division of the State Department, or George F. Kennan, now, I believe, in Lisbon. I don't think either Truman Smith or Raymond Geist would serve this particular purpose notably well.

8. One other point regarding Hermann's good faith: When I came home on leave after the Polish campaign, he asked me to deliver a message to Lord Lothian, whom he knew, to the effect that he (Hermann) and others like him were still doing what they could to try to save Germany, although this was not very much. I delivered this message. I also delivered a personal message to the South African Minister to be forwarded to Hermann's relatives in South Africa.

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*Germany - 13, 23, 31  
in Hermann's office  
P. ...*

*EW*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 30 March 1944

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney K. Shephardson

SUBJECT:

With regard to the attached memorandum from Mrs. Rado, Mr. Macfarland made the following comments: "This is one of our regular agents. He is very competent, very capable, forceful and helpful. He receives no pay - is a voluntary worker."

I notice the name of Wilbrandt as a man in Switzerland whom Mrs. Rado thinks is a good man. Should we not send this name over to 110 just in case he is not in contact with him already?

*W.K.S.*

*Ok  
W.K.S.  
L. W.H.S.  
M. H. ...  
...*

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William Donovan

DATE: 16 March 1944

FROM: E. C. Sade

E.C.S.

SUBJECT:

Brandt spoke of a friend of his through whom he would work in Istanbul. I am quite sure that this is the same man through whom McF. is already working. Brandt and this man have a mutual friend in Switzerland and Brandt thought of establishing a possible contact from Turkey to Switzerland.

The friend of Brandt in Turkey is Alexander Rilatov, Ph.D. He is professor of Philosophy, Sociology, and Economics at the University of Istanbul since 1934. He is 59 years old, Protestant, his family belonged to the Prussian nobility, has an unusually liberal-democratic tradition.

He has a younger brother to whom he is very devoted and who serves in the German army.

He had a distinguished career in the German army during the last war. After the war he became very interested in economics and politics. He was a Left Winger in the Social Democratic party right after the war. He was appointed chief economic adviser to the Ministry of Economics. He remained there until 1928. From then until 1933 he was employed by the Verein DEUTSCHER MASCHINENFABRIKANTEN (Association of German Machine Manufacturers) as economic counsellor. In this position he developed an activity far beyond the scope of a position seen to allow. He organized scientific research in an endeavor to prove the necessity of revising the economic system of Germany, especially the trade policy of its government. He fought vigorously against the high German tariff on iron as well as its high grain tariffs. He fought against cartels whenever they developed into tools of pressure groups trying to exploit a monopoly position for their selfish interests.

Being known as a militant liberal Democrat he was suspect to the Nazis and when Hitler came to power he lost his position in the Association of German Machine Manufacturers. His house was searched many times.

He accepted a position as professor in Istanbul and emigrated to Turkey. In 1941 Rilatov was invited to join the

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German Project  
R. H. ...  
Petersen, van

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 8 March 1944

TO: General Board

FROM: W. G. ...

SUBJECT:

I have reason to believe that Dr. Parland's key man in the KORNHORN-  
Project (he calls him Magellan) is the close friend Dr. Brandt  
talked about. His name is van Kooxew. I'll send you his biography.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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April 1944

Mr. Shepard Morgan  
The Planning Group

Dear Shepard:

I am asking you to have the Planning Group  
examine this paper before I send it to the Joint  
 Chiefs. I am anxious to get it in before I leave  
 the country, so if they have any comments that they  
 think should be included, I would like to receive  
 them by Thursday afternoon in San Francisco.

My only feeling is that we should get this  
 information to Russia and to Britain in order by  
 that reconnaissance to see if they have likewise  
 been dealt with.

Sincerely,



William J. Donovan  
Director



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Hermann Plan

1. I am attaching to this a copy of the proposal handed to our people in Istanbul several weeks ago by a member of the group known as Hermann. Hermann is the name of a member of the Prussian landed nobility, a well-known lawyer, who, at the time of the delivery of the paper, was attached to the German High Command as an expert on international questions.
2. At that time, I directed our representative to enter into no talks but to keep open the channel of communication.
3. A short time ago, further overtures were made and a meeting was requested for some time in the coming month.
4. Since this request has come in, Hermann, who was an intimate friend and former law partner of the Chief

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of German intelligence in Istanbul has been arrested and is still in custody. We are not yet advised what member of the group may take his place; however, it seemed that we had come to such a point that the matter should be presented to you and for submitting recommendations and asking for instructions.

5. The Standing of the Hermann Group. I am personally acquainted with certain members of this group and know them to be sympathetic to the British and to the Americans. I am assured by those competent to know that members of this group can be found among the intellectuals, the industrials, members of the liberal professions and the higher level of workmen. Its weakness lies in its loose organization, its lack of integration with the great mass of the people, and its failure of proof as to any political strength or ability to carry out the plan.

6. The plan itself pivots upon two conditions;

- a. It accepts military defeat and occupation by as well as surrender to the American British Allies, motivated by the fear of a Russian invasion, and
- b. The expose mentions the Tilsit-Lemberg Line as the point where the Russian advance must be stopped as an important condition for the success of the plan.

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This would mean that the part to be occupied by British-American troops would include not only all of Germany but also a great part of Poland. This would seem to show the intention of the Hermann Group to keep the Russian Army far away from the original German border. The only fair interpretation, then, is to consider it as an anti-Russian proposal.

7. That this is the true interpretation is borne out by the statement made in the proposal as to Russian and Anglo-Saxon orientation in Germany. In pointing out that Germany is torn between the western and eastern civilizations, the writer of the paper merely repeats what one finds stated so often in Germany. This split is said to date back beyond the Nazi regime and permeates the whole of Germany including the Nazi organizations themselves. It is said that to-day Russian oriented persons can be found in the labor class and in the youth of all classes.

8. As a result of the continuous advance of the Russian allies and the threat to Germany proper in the East, the gap between eastern and western orientation may be widened much more than we realize here.

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9. It will be noted in the paper that the founders of the German Officers' League at Moscow are recognized as men of outstanding ability and personal integrity as judged by the standards of their caste. The Hermann Group, seeing only one of two alternatives:

- a. To negotiate with Russia to prevent an American-British invasion, or
- b. To appeal to the American-British forces to prevent a Russian invasion,

seeks to adopt the second alternative.

10. The plan, however, is completely silent as to the method by which assistance can be rendered to the Allies; how a premature betrayal of the plan can be prevented; or how a provisional democratic government can be established in Germany or Austria against the opposition of the Nazi regime.

11. In view of the fact, that this proposal is aimed against Russia, it seems to me that it is our duty to call the matter to the attention both of Great Britain and of Russia--as a matter of fairness. Further, as a matter of wisdom, it might be a means of ascertaining whether or not any propositions have been made by the pro-Russian group. In any case, it appears to be indicated

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that we should make the disclosure of this paper.

12. It is therefore recommended that the proposed plan be turned over to both the British and the Russians; and, if to do this on a higher level would seem to give it too much significance, that the turnover could be made to the organizations in both countries corresponding to OSS as incident to the nature of the work of these organizations.

William J. Donovan  
Director

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**EXPOSE**

**ON THE REALNESS OF A POWERFUL GERMAN GROUP TO  
PREPARE AND ASSIST ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AGAINST NAZI GERMANY**

**NOTE:** This expose defines the attitude and plans of an extremely influential group of the German opposition inside Germany on the subject of hastening the victory of the Allies and the abolition of Nazism. It has been prepared on the basis of frequent and searching conversations and discussions with a leading representative of this group about the political future of a free democratic Germany cleansed radically of Nazism, and about the maximum contribution that can be made immediately by determined German patriots toward making this Germany a secure reality.

The expose is to reproduce clearly and concisely the views and intentions of this group of responsible democratic Germans within Germany.

**BACKGROUND AND STANDING OF THE GERMAN OPPOSITIONAL GROUP**

Apart from the Nazi Party hierarchy and its subordinate organs and functionaries, there are left in Germany two elements vested with political power: the officers corps of the Wehrmacht, and the upper ranks of the Civil Service, which, in their ministerial grades at least, represent a fairly closely-knit network of officials interconnected by personal acquaintance, official association, often long-standing friendship. Within the overlapping spheres of high officialdom and professional army circles, three

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categories of people can be distinguished:

- 1) Politically non-descript specialists who are absorbed altogether in their service duties, being either too vague or too cautious to express their views or engage in political activity. They constitute the majority, especially among the professional officers.
- 2) Confirmed National Socialists.
- 3) Decided and conscious opponents of Nazism.

The third category is again divided in two wings, of which one favours an "Eastern" pro-Russian orientation, the other a "Western", pro-Anglo-Saxon trend. The former is considerably stronger than the latter, particularly in the Wehrmacht; in Luftwaffe circles it rules supreme. The driving force behind the Eastern wing is the strong and traditional conviction of a community of interests between the two mutually complementary powers, Germany and Russia, which led to the historical cooperation between Prussia and the Russian monarchy, and between the German Republic and Soviet Russia in the Rapallo period (1924), when the Reichswehr and the Red Army concluded a far-reaching understanding regarding military collaboration and reciprocal training facilities. Historical bonds of this character are reinforced by the deep impression wrought by the power and resilience of the Red Army and the competence of its command. Among the Eastern wing the founda-

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tion of the German Officers' League at Moscow has evoked a powerful echo, the more so, as the leaders of the league are recognized in the Wehrmacht as officers of outstanding ability and personal integrity by the standards of their caste. This group has for a long time been in direct communication, including regular wireless contact, with the Soviet Government, until a breach of security on the Russian side led to the arrest and execution of many high-placed officers and civil servants early in 1943.

The Western group of the opposition, though numerically weaker, is represented by many key men in the military and civil service hierarchies, including officers of all ranks, and key members of the O.E.G. Furthermore it is in close touch with the Catholic bishops, the Protestant Confessional Church, leading circles of the former labour unions and workmen's organizations, as well as influential men of industry and intellectuals. It is this group which is seeking to establish a practical basis for effectual collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon Allies.

#### CONDITIONS OF COLLABORATION WITH THE ALLIES

The following are the future material factors and present political arguments which form the logical prerequisites of a successful collaboration between this Western Group of the German democratic

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oppression and the Allies.

- 1) Unequivocal military defeat and occupation of Germany is regarded by the members of the group as a moral and political necessity for the future of the nation.
- 2) The Group is convinced of the justification of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, and realizes the untimeliness of any discussion of peace terms before this surrender has been accomplished. Their Anglo-Saxon sympathies result from a conviction of the fundamental unity of aims regarding the future organization of human relations which exists between them and the responsible statesmen on the Allied side, and the realization that in view of the natural convergence of interests between post-Nazi Germany and the other democratic nations there must of necessity result a fruitful collaboration between them. The democratic Germans see in this unity of purpose a far safer guarantee of a status of equality and dignity after the War than any formal assurances by the Allies at the present time could give them, provided any such assurances were

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forthcoming.

- 3) An important condition for the success of the plan outlined in the following points is the continuance of an unbroken Eastern front, and simultaneously its approach to within a menacing proximity of the German borders, such as the line from TILSIT to LEMBERG. Such a situation would justify before the national consciousness radical decisions in the West as the only means of forestalling the over-powering threat from the East.
- 4) The Group is ready to realize a planned military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale, provided that exploitation of the military information, resources, and authority at the Group's disposal is combined with an all-out military effort by the Allies in such a manner as to make prompt and decisive success on a broad front a practical certainty. This victory over Hitler, followed by Allied occupation of all Germany in the shortest possible time, would at one stroke so transform the political situation as to set free the real voice of Germany, which would acclaim the action of the Group as a bold act of true patriotism, comparable to the Taurigen Convention concluded by the

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Prussian General Yorck with the Russians in 1812.

5) Should, however, the invasion of Western Europe be embarked upon the same style as the attack upon the Italian mainland, any assistance by the Group would not only fail to settle the issue of the War, but would in addition help to create a new "stab-in-the-back" legend, as well as compromise before the nation, and render ineffectual for the future, the patriots who made the attempt. There is no doubt that half-measures would damage the cause rather than promote it, and the Group is not prepared to lend a hand in any collaboration with limited aims.

6) If it is decided to create the second front in the West by an unsparring all-out effort, and follow it up with overwhelming force to the goal of total occupation of Germany, the Group is ready to support the Allied effort with all its strength and all the important resources at its disposal. To this end it would after proper agreement and preparation be ready to despatch a high officer to a specified Allied territory by plane as their fully empowered, informed, and equipped plenipotentiary charged with coordinat-

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ing the plans of collaboration with the Allied High Command.

7) The readiness of a sufficient number of intact units of the Wehrmacht to follow up the orders given under the Group's operational plan, and cooperate with the Allies, could only be counted upon with a sufficient degree of certainty if the above conditions are fulfilled. Otherwise there would be a grave danger that the orders and operations agreed upon by the commanders and staffs belonging to the Group would at the decisive moment fail to materialize for lack of support, or be executed only with great friction.

8) The Group would see to it that simultaneously with the Allied landing a provisional anti-Nazi Government would be formed which would take over all non-military tasks resulting from the collaboration with the Allies and the political upheaval that would accompany it. The composition of this provisional Government would be determined in advance.

9) The Group, which comprises personages belonging to the most diverse liberal and democratic parties and schools of thought, regards the possibility of a bolshevication of Germany through the rise of a national communism as the deadliest imminent

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danger to Germany and the European family of nations. It is determined to counter this threat by all possible means, and to prevent, in particular, the conclusion of the War through the victory of the Red Army, followed by a Russian occupation of Germany before the arrival of the Anglo-Saxon armies. On the other hand, no cleft must be allowed to develop between the future democratic Government and the masses of German labour. A non-communist democratic home policy will only be possible in conjunction with a whole-hearted policy of collaboration with Russia, designed to eliminate all hostility or friction with that power. In this way it should be sought not to antagonize the strong pro-Russian circles in Germany, but to rally them in a common constructive effort and win them over. Finally, what must be avoided at all cost is the development of a situation which would lay a democratic Government open to the reproach of placing foreign interests above national concerns, and unify against this Government the forces of nationalism, communism, and Russophobia.

10) The envisaged democratic Government, in order to steal the

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the thunder of left radicalism, should operate at home with a very strong left wing, and lean heavily on the Social Democrats and organized labour, even, if necessary, seek the cooperation of personally unimpeachable independent communists.

11) The initial HQ of the democratic counter-Government would under the postulated circumstances best be South Germany, perhaps Austria. It would be advisable not to subject the civilian population of this territorial basis to indiscriminate air attack, since experience teaches that bombed-out populations are exhausted and absorbed by the effort of providing for their bare survival and subsistence that they are out of play as far as revolutionary action is concerned.

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**TOP SECRET****REPORT on an Offer of Collaboration with the Allies made by an Oppositional Group of the German High Command and Civil Service**

Through the agency of two prominent members of the German Freedom Movement (cf. our reports Nos. 6 of September 8, 1943), MAGNOLIA and HYACINTH, we have for several months been in communication with an influential group of German anti-Nazi staff officers and high officials (associated loosely with other liberal elements, and exponents of Labour), who in order to save Germany from complete annihilation are determined to work together, and collaborate with the Allies, for the defeat and destruction of the Nazi regime. The Group is not ready to act as an Allied agent, but is interested only in full and carefully prepared collaboration with the express goal of immediate and decisive military success, total defeat of Nazism, and Anglo-American occupation of Germany. In view of the key positions held by most of the members of the Group in the High Command, General Staff, army commands, and in various Ministries, the Group commands tremendous executive power when acting by a preconcerted plan. The enclosed expose contains full information regarding the standing and potential of the Group. The Group is acting abroad through an authorized delegate, whom we call HERMANN. HERMANN is a member of an ancient and famous family belonging to Prussian landed nobility; formerly a well-known lawyer, he is now attached to the German High Command as expert for international questions. There cannot be the slightest doubt of his pro-Allied sympathies. He has been selected for the mission of contacting the Anglo-Saxon Allies on the strength of his excellent personal relations with high-placed Allied politicians and prominent Press representatives. Among these are Alexander Kirk, Field-Marshal Smuts, and Dorothy Thompson. HERMANN and his associates are most emphatic in their desire to deal with the Allies only through the agency of one of these trusted friends, who know and are able to appreciate their background, motives, and resources, thus incidentally saving them elaborate credentials, and in whose strict discretion they have absolute confidence. Their insistence upon this point is caused by the outcome of previous overtures on the part of the German opposition via official Allied channel, during which flagrant

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breaches of security occurred which proved fatal to key men of the organizations concerned.

The magnitude of the promise held out by the proposed collaboration can hardly be overrated. No limited intelligence effort and no scheme of partial assistance by German staff members (to which this Group will not lend a hand) can offer even a remotely comparable chance of ending the War in the West at one stroke, and save perhaps many hundred thousand lives of American soldiers and civilians in occupied countries. From their first-hand knowledge of German defense preparations in the West, the Group are convinced that only the deployment by the Allies of a crushing superiority on a wide front offers any chance of overcoming the German defense. If the Allied High Command shares this conviction, and intends to employ all available strength in men and material, the great stake makes the utilization of such far-reaching assistance from the enemy camp even more imperative. We have spared no effort for months to help this chance to materialize. We are positive that HERMANN and his associates, including MAGNOLIA and HYACINTH, are absolutely reliable and sincere German patriots, and that their combined resources in planned and coordinated action are such that their assistance would make the success of an Allied invasion of Western Europe a foregone conclusion, provided the Allied attack were made with all available strength on a wide sector of the European coastline. (cf. our report No. 231 of Dec. 23). The Group is in complete agreement with the Allies regarding the political necessity of unconditional surrender and complete occupation of Germany, and even welcomes the latter in preference to occupation by the Red Army and for its salutary effect on national psychology.

The negotiations with HERMANN have developed so far that during his last stay at Istanbul he expected to meet Alexander KIRK with a plenipotentiary of the Allied General Staff. He could not arrange for this in the time given; nor could HERMANN's readiness to fly to Cairo for a conference there be followed up for technical reasons. The American military attaché at Ankara, General Tyndal, advised against HERMANN's flight for considerations of security, because the unusual preparations

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It would involve could not be made in complete secrecy at such short notice. For our legitimization in the absence of specific powers or credentials, we arranged a meeting between Gen. Tyn-dal and [REDACTED] before he had to return to Germany, during which Gen. Tyn-dal became acquainted with the outlines of the proposed [REDACTED].

In view of the magnitude of the issues at stake, and the pressure of time at this stage of Allied invasion preparations, we urgently recommend that a meeting be arranged in time for [REDACTED]'s next stay in January, which should be fully prepared in advance, and attended by Alexander Kirk and a high Allied representative with powers from the Allied General Staff and from the supreme authorities of the United Nations. A conference of the Allied representatives immediately concerned should be held in preparation of this meeting. In addition, we opine that no time should be lost in informing directly President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and General Donovan, short-circuiting normal procedure.

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Istanbul, 1943

Dear Mr. Kirk,

May I in this way send you my best greetings and wishes and my most sincere compliments. Perhaps it would be best to explain first why I have stated quite definitely that I would be unable to see anybody before having seen you. You will realize that any discussion on the ways and means to end this war and to begin peace require an enormous amount of confidence on the part of both participants: on your side because the credentials I could produce would necessarily be incomplete and they can only receive their value from and through action; on my side for reasons of security as well as of policy. - From my point of view any partner to such discussions must be able to visualize what life in my country is like, and he must have the discretion required to use anything I might say in a manner which will not be harmful to myself and to fundamental, permanent interests of peace. Therefore I must be sure of talking to somebody whose personal loyalty is beyond doubt and whose political judgment is up to the complex and tangled situation prevailing in my country and in several other countries of continental Europe. Obviously such qualifications demand at least personal acquaintance between those who are responsible for the conduct of the discussion, and personally I do not know of any American in this part of the world who would fulfil these qualifications but for you. I trust that you will understand this position and that you will excuse any inconvenience to which you may have been put in consequence.

Any discussion would have to start with an appreciation of the military and political situation. I am under the impression that all exhortations by the President and Mr. Churchill to the contrary notwithstanding, some people expect an early termination of the war in Europe. I would be interested to get your opinion on this point, which is fundamental to the possibilities of cooperation: if a speedy end were in sight cooperation would become much easier technically and much more difficult politically.

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On the other hand I might be able to give you an account of the German political scene. You who know Central Europe and totalitarian states in general would thereby be enabled to gauge the value of my credentials, although nobody can be exact on this point ante eventum. Such a report would furthermore show you the possibilities and limits of any military or political assistance we can render to our common cause. I am afraid that to somebody who has never lived in a totalitarian country the limits of such assistance are not understandable, while he will have great difficulties in even recognizing its chances.

The political-post-armistice world would have to be touched as far at least as it constitutes part of the diagnosis of the present situation. You will understand that the example of Italy has had the most damping effect on all thought of internal change and it would have to be made clear by what means a repetition will be prevented.

Once these questions of the diagnosis of the present situation have been disposed of, the main point of cooperation arises. This must be followed into its military and its political possibilities. You will realize that some unity of purpose on the political side is a condition of effective military cooperation. As to the military cooperation, I am of the opinion that for military as well as political reasons only such cooperation is feasible as will turn the tables with one stroke. This will require the patience to wait and wait and wait until effective military power on a very considerable scale can be employed, such in fact, as will undoubtedly prove overwhelming once our assistance is added.

As I see it that would be the ground to be covered and I suppose that we would agree fairly quickly. The remainder is not a question of policy but of technique and is therefore beyond my competence. But we would have to agree on ways and means to contact the technicians on both sides.

The place for any discussions can be arranged by you. I can leave Istanbul next time I come for 48 hours. I am completely in your hands as to this point, relying on you to see that the arrangements made will keep the risk down. As to the time: I believe that, if I hurry up with my work at home, I will be able to come here at the earliest by the middle of February, at the latest middle of April.

Please accept my best wishes for Xmas and the New Year.

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December 29, 1943

Sir,

This is to introduce the enclosed memorandum, which has been prepared by Hermann's friends who conducted the negotiations between Hermann and myself during his recent stay, and who know intimately, and share, his plans and political aims. In this memorandum they wish to give a concise statement of the background, motives, and potential value to the Allies, as well as to democratic post-war Germany and the rest of the World, of the influential group of which Hermann is the authorized emissary. It has been prepared in the light of the recent conversations held indirectly between Hermann and myself, and between yourself and Hermann, and may serve as an explanatory comment to Hermann's letter to Kirk, which is also appended, and which is not fully intelligible without such a brief on the facts.

I think it may be useful at this point to sketch briefly the manner in which contact was sought and established, and the reservations on the German side which prompted them

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to proceed as they did. Hermann has been sent abroad as the emissary of a number of German anti-Nazi staff officers and high official (associated loosely with other liberal elements and exponents of Labour), who are determined to work together for the defeat of the Nazi regime as the only way to save Germany from complete annihilation. They are daily risking their lives and the lives of their families in the effort to widen and consolidate their organization, which in view of the key positions held by most of their members in the GS, the Army and Civil administration commands tremendous executive power when acting by a preconcerted plan. Hermann has been chosen for the mission of contacting the Anglo-Saxon Allies because of his excellent personal relations to high-placed Allied politicians and prominent press people, who know and are able to appreciate his background and associations, save him elaborate credentials, and in whose absolute discretion he can have confidence. Among his trusted friends are Alexander Kirk, Field Marshall Smuts, and Dorothy Thompson. His extreme caution is easily understood if it is realized that during previous overtures through official Allied channels several flagrant breaches of security occurred which jeopardized

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the entire organization and caused the execution of an important member for high treason. I know the details of these occurrences, and fully appreciate the refusal of the Group to deal with anyone but persons of tried discretion, who are known to them or recommended by their trusted friends. The Group is fully aware that their trusted Allied contacts are not necessarily in a position to make decisions or discuss terms; but they are confident that they will be able not only to put them through to the authorities who are competent to handle their momentous proposals, but also to impress forcibly upon these authorities the fact that several hundred of the most valuable war and peace allies of the Anglo-Saxon powers left in key positions in Germany have their heads in the noose along with their families, and that a happy-go-lucky attitude in dealing with the matter is inappropriate.

As it turned out, it unfortunately proved impossible to secure for Hermann safe passage to Cairo within the time at his disposal, let alone arrange for a meeting here with responsible Allied personages introduced by Alexander Kirk or another of Hermann's trusted acquaintances. I myself could from the nature of my position, and in the absence

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of specific powers or credentials, not be an officially acceptable Allied negotiator; but at least I succeeded in conducting informal indirect discussions with him through our common friends, dissuading him from breaking off all contact and inducing him to agree to a meeting with you (as a personage of official standing and personal competence and integrity) which would serve to legitimize the contact.

I now wish to state my own personal attitude in this vitally important matter. At this time, when plans for the decisive attack against Germany are probably near completion, there is no time to be lost in fully informing President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and General Donovan, Chief of the IS, avoiding the delay entailed in normal official procedure. Written reports are quite inadequate to the occasion. A conference should be arranged with at least one of these personages during which the full extent and moment of the proposed scheme may be fully reported upon, and all arrangements for a decisive meeting with the German plenipotentiaries not later than January 1944 may be made. I cannot state emphatically enough my conviction that absolutely no effort should be spared to

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5

bring the scheme to fruition in the shortest possible time. No limited intelligence effort and no scheme of partial assistance by German staff members can offer even a remotely comparable chance of ending the War in the West at one stroke, and save perhaps many hundred thousand lives. I believe that no one who is informed of this unique chance, which we have been hard at work to help to materialize, can shoulder the responsibility for not having done all in his power to forward this knowledge with all possible caution and despatch to the supreme authorities in charge of the conduct of the War. Far-reaching parallel schemes involving the cooperation of Germany's present Allies are far advanced and may be combined with the present project to heighten its prospects of success.

I am preparing an account of the scheme in a covering report on the enclosed memorandum and on Hermann's letter to Alexander Kirk, but we are not decided where best to direct this report. I am probably correct in assuming that you, Sir, will be reporting on the matter on your own account, enclosing the same documents. Since the matter brooks no delay or confusion of competences, I

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I hope you will agree with me that the official steps we take in this matter had best be coordinated. To this end, I should greatly welcome an opportunity to meet you personally, or failing this, to have your written advice on how to proceed.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant

**TOP SECRET**

OFFICE OF PLANNING SERVICES PLANNING GROUP

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## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Director, Strategic Services  
 FROM: Acting Chairman, SS Planning Group  
 SUBJECT: Hermann Plan

DATE: 3 April 1944

1. Papers relating to this plan were considered at a meeting of the Planning Group this morning, 3 April, 1944, together with your draft of a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 3 April 1944. The Planning Group had the advantage of discussion with Mr. MacFarland in order to clear up with him certain points of fact.

2. Responsive to your request for comment, the following is submitted:

a. The Group feels that if any submission is to be made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is undesirable to make submission in present form, since (a) several of the accompanying papers are not self-explanatory, in some instances containing neither the name of the addressee or the name of the writer; and (b) dates of certain of these attendant papers do not appear. It becomes difficult, therefore, to see these papers in their relationship to each other. Indeed, in spite of the background of the Planning Group, it was necessary to ask Mr. MacFarland to identify several of the papers.

b. The dossier contains a letter addressed to Mr. Kirk, which Mr. MacFarland has stated was signed by Hermann. This letter, and various references to Mr. Kirk in other papers, indicates very great knowledge on his part of the plan and of discussions connected with it than is the case. Mr. Kirk was personally unwilling to play any part in it and did not wish his name to appear in this matter in any shape or form. To carry out his wishes and to protect him from any possible misunderstandings of his position, by the Department of State and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is felt by the Planning Group that every reference of any kind of description to Mr. Kirk should be omitted.

**TOP SECRET**

3. It is recommended that the plan be not transmitted to the Joint Chiefs at this time because,

a. A careful study of the plan indicates that there is no action of a military character which the Joint Chiefs could take upon it.

b. If the Group should be employed further, or exploited further by OSS, any discussion of this matter might impair such exploitation.

c. The Planning Group feels, and Mr. MacFarland confirms, that these discussions are tenuous in making the statement of the situation rendered more precise before being brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs.

d. Note being taken of the fact that the expose and attendant papers are premised upon feelings of the Russians and hostility toward them, and the preparation of plans whereby Germany might be occupied by the "Anglo-Saxons" with the Russians being held away from Germany on a military line, Tilsit-Lene, the Planning Group feels that this paper would be unacceptable to the Russians in the extreme and might cause damage to the group in the hands of the Russians without producing thereby any military benefit.

5. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. MacFarland be instructed to continue his enterprise on an exploratory and informal basis and that he be given the mission to concentrate upon the possibility of using the Hermann connections in some way as to assist the invasion effort without any regard whatsoever for any further consideration such as the future of Europe or the future of Germany. That, in particular, he be instructed to play upon this group as a possible instrument of double agents or in any way coldly calculated to promote the success of the invasion, without any regard whatsoever for the German individuals involved, their safety, personal relations to them, or the ultimate effect upon Germany once the invasion has succeeded. The Group feels that this is a proper and authorized function of OSS which can be carried on without reference either to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the Department of State. If successful, these two agencies of government can be notified of results when the job is done.

*Whitney Shepardson*  
Whitney Shepardson  
Acting Chairman

B R E A K E R S

A MILITARY COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPTED ON 20 JULY  
1944 BY ELEMENTS OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND  
DIRECTED AGAINST THE LIFE OF ADOLF HITLER.

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **June 12, 1944**

FROM

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**#1707. BREAKERS\*. Action: London; Information: Washington;**  
to 109 with reference to #1703 from  
Washington.

After receiving Washington's cable #1703, we realize  
that our cables #3780 and #3787 should have been labeled for  
your notice. If you should deem it advisable to utilize the  
material contained in the Breakers cables in your conversations  
with Zulu, I see no reason why you should not do so. I have  
not revealed the contents of these cables to Zulu at this end,  
and at this extremely tentative phase of this somewhat indefinite  
matter, I do not feel that I should now, particularly, since  
Zulu here does not give us any information of their activists  
operations within the Reich.

Inserted by Message Center.

**SECRET**

TIME: **6/12/44 9:48 PM**

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**#707. BREAKERS\*. Actions: London; Information: Washington;**  
to 109 with reference to #1703 from  
Washington,

After receiving Washington's cable #1703, we realize that our cables #3780 and #3787 should have been labeled for your notice. If you should deem it advisable to utilize the material contained in the Breakers cables in your conversations with Zulu, I see no reason why you should not do so. I have not revealed the contents of these cables to Zulu at this end, and at this extremely tentative phase of this somewhat indefinite matter, I do not feel that I should now, particularly, since Zulu here does not give us any information of their activists operations within the Reich.

\* Inserted by Message Center.

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DATE **JULY 12, 1944**

FROM **BERN, SWITZERLAND**

TO **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

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**SECRET**

#4085. BREAKERS. To Garib and Jackpot.

There is a possibility that a dramatic event may take place up north, if BREAKERS courier is to be trusted. We expect a complete account this evening. However, it is not only possible but probable that any news will be suppressed by violence if necessary. Henceforth 512 will be known as Culber. He has gone north for discussions with Tucky and others. This goes along with your #1788 but we believe 800 connection was also with ZULU. O, mentioned in the last sentence of my #4000 is in hiding. The Chief of Police in Berlin, Holldorf, will henceforth be designated as Bobeat, and Rialer will be the new name for General Fromm.

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TOR: 7/13/44 1:20AM

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*F. J. S.*

DATE July 13, 1944

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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**SECRET**

4110-4114. BREAKERS. With reference to our #4085.

A courier from Breakers, who came here a short time ago, advises that the Soviet victories have given new vigor to the Breakers movement. The success of the Allied landing in Normandy and the local developments reported below have also contributed to the impetus of this movement:

1. Breakers have gained a new member in Risler. He holds a responsible command over the reserve from the Berlin region.

2. The headquarters of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht have been shifted to Sosson (in the vicinity of Berlin) from East Prussia. As a consequence, it is in the vicinity of Berlin that Eta, Zeta and additional generals who are supposedly in the opposition are chiefly concentrated at this time.\*

\*Refer also to the declaration by Prime Minister Churchill yesterday, in which he stated that it would be better if the people of Germany were themselves to oust the Nazi regime. With respect to this, please consult the flash which I am transmitting this evening. I am not making any forecasts regarding the prospects of success for the Breakers program, as reported. Without any doubt, the Gestapo is keeping its eye on developments and it is possible that the Gestapo may get rid of the leaders. Moreover, it is quite probable that the military men, whose action is indispensable to the achievement of those ends, will lack the "intestinal fortitude" to act, just as they have earlier. Furthermore, I am not unaware of the strength of the idea that Germany's defeat must be connected with the original program of the Fuehrer and the Nazi clique. Nevertheless, the moral consequence of a display of bravery in taking steps toward setting their own affairs to rights would be valuable to Germany's

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subsequent status in the Europe that will exist after the war. In the face of all this, however, I am of the opinion that we are warranted in issuing now a general declaration regarding Germany along the lines stated in my flash and in the preceding portions of this message.

ACTION COPY

\*A substantial portion of the text is garbled. A verification and repeat has been requested.

TO: 7/11/44 0158 a.m.

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DATE 17 July 1954  
TO ETH S. TIZENLID

REC'D 20 JUL 54, 11:54 AM (6:22 PM)

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FINSP. INDIAIGNH. From 154 and Carib

Action: 110 Bern  
Information: London  
(#56317)

Is there any connection between the term "Boarcat Group" appearing in your #4111-12 and "Bobcat" appearing in your #40117? Please clarify.

*The same*

**SECRET**

17 JUL 1954 11:54 AM  
BY: [Signature] FOR: [Signature]  
DETAILS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 21, 1944

REC'D 7/21/44 3:09 p.m.

TO BERN, SWITZERLAND

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#1849. IRAKIS. Carib and 154 to 110. With reference to your #4085 and #4111-12.

Is there not some tie-up between the events that happened on the 20th of this month and the above cables?

**SECRET**

TUE 7/21/44 11:40 P.M.

WAX FLU WIS JDW

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUL 21, 1944

REC'D 7/21/44 6:50 PM

TO BASEL, SWITZERLAND

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**SECRET**

1087. 2000000. 154 and Camb to 110.

With reference to our #1740: Does 105 receive information copies of every BREAKERS message we get in Washington? Reference your #111-51. Tell us more about Luben, and confirm. Considering recent happenings, further particulars would be very helpful.

\*

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2001 7/21/44 2115 AM FILE COPY FAX 2115 WLD JEM/8

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INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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DATE JULY 21, 1944

FROM

NRN, SWITZERLAND

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#4194-4195. BREAKERS. With reference to your #1782.

BREAKERS were aware of BOO's trips to Stockholm, but they were surprised at your mention of his meeting with Kollantay which they may have been for purposes of camouflage. They have information that he was in contact with Zulu in Stockholm.

Zulu here has been told of the most recent BREAKERS developments. This seemed to be the wisest plan in view of the fact that several persons already knew Liber had left and I see no reason why you should not notify Zulu in London if you think this advisable. In the future do you want me to send a copy to London of the BREAKERS cables for 105?

**SECRET**

TOP 7/22/44 3102

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DATE July 21, 1944

FROM Bern, Switzerland

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**SECRET**

#4203. BREAKERS.

After consulting my file regret to observe confusion in the former use of Bearent in your #1665 and my #1888. This old identification is dead. Kindly confirm fact that from now on Bearent is H referred to in my #4085 and my #4110 paragraph 3.

**SECRET**

TO: 7/22/44 3102 AM

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 22, 1944

FROM S.R.

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#4199-4200-01-02. BREAKERS. Action: Washington. Information: London. ✓

Apparently BREAKERS are breaking. In all probability the movement is the one explained in my #4110 and earlier BREAKERS communications. It was planned that certain men in the inner circles, such as Thata, our 3432, would be at the meeting when the bomb went off because the only chance for planting the bomb was in conjunction with a conference attended by many of the chief military leaders. One of the members of the group was Stauffenberg who served as liaison between the older officers on active duty at General Headquarters and the younger group, formerly headed by HM, see our 2307. Stauffenberg, in addition, acted as councillor to Loster and G, referred to in my #4085, who in the future shall be designated as Leper. Leper (sic) was involved in all these proceedings and we have established close contact locally with our 670 who at the present time is the contact man here.

The outcome of the revolt at present rests with the Reserve Army "Heimwehr" and their willingness to follow Hitler as their chief or whether they will stick to their old commanders some of whom, as pointed out in my #4110, appear to be involved in the plot. Naturally, the blood purge will be unmerciful.

One of the disheartening facts seems to be that BREAKERS do not have adequate radio facilities at their command. However, it has come to our attention that a report from Reuter's states that a message dispatched by the rebels from Frankfurt-Am-Main this morning was interrupted.

However, a thorough perusal of the Goering-Hitler statements would apparently infer that the rebellion was not put down.

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**SECRET**

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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down at once. If the opposition find it possible to maintain their stand in any region of Germany, we may possibly consider action along lines as indicated below: (1) Some word from the President. In this connection refer to my #4010-14 and my flash dated the 13th of this month. (2) Air raids on the Nazi stronghold in the region of Berchtesgaden. Although the immediate military effectiveness of such action would be unimportant, it is possible that the psychological reaction would be great. Naturally, any break in the communication channels between the region of Berchtesgaden and the rest of the country would be especially valuable. (3) Providing the rebellion gains any momentum, some announcement to the effect that any German town which sides with the opposition would not be attacked whereas Gestapo centers and Nazi strongholds would be bombed unsparingly. (4) Large-scale dissemination of pamphlets from the air.

ACTION COPY

TON: 7/22/44 10:00 a.m.

**FILE COPY**

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 22, 1944

FROM USTRATIC, LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

XXX PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
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FOR ACTION

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FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT,  
MAGRUDER, X-8

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#38494. MEMBERS. \* Re Born #4109-4202.

This given General Dotta with limited background material available here. For clear understanding also in light possible air and morale operations will require info contained in #4110, in #3438, and #4065. Please send these priority.

*Let me see this*

SECRET

Indicator inserted by Washington Message Center.  
TOR: 7/22/44 12100

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~~RESTRICTED~~

22 July 1944.

King Cross Tully,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear General:

I think the President will be  
interested in reading the attached report  
from our German representative. Will you  
please hand it to him?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,  
Director.

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22 July 1944.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a report from our representative in  
 Bern received by way of radio-telephone: 7/21 # 180

\*GERMANY

"No very clear picture of the situation in Germany can yet be pieced together from the information reaching here. There is no information as yet from arrivals from Germany, and the radio material is available to you as quickly as it is to us. The developments did not come as a great surprise, except to the extent that there were reasons to doubt whether any high officers of the German Army, who had remained in positions of power after the successive purges, would have the courage to act. As reported to you, many high German officers realized, however, that the time was growing short within which the anti-Nazi forces in Germany could act to rid the country of Hitler and the Gestapo, if this was to be accomplished prior to Germany's collapse. These officers considered that Hitler's military conduct of the war was a catastrophe, and that the only hope of saving anything from the wreckage was to remove Hitler. These persons hoped that they could make some sort of a deal with the West, along the lines of the Italian pattern, and thus be in a better position to restrict the extent of Russian occupation of German territory.

"The evidence seems to indicate that possibly the [Lynch] was staged prematurely, probably because the action of the Gestapo forced the hand of those who were plotting to remove Hitler. Rundstedt's removal and then, more important still, the recent

*W. H. Hall & Marshall*

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removal of von Falkenhausen in Belgium, indicate that the Gestapo was fearful of a military coup. Certain other persons who were probably to participate in the plot were also forced to run to cover before it took place. I do not believe the report circulating here that the story of the attempt on Hitler's life was fabricated or exaggerated in order to justify a thoroughgoing purge of the Army. If Hitler desired to make a purge, he would not wait for any such excuse. His statement, and those of Goering and Doenitz are hard to explain on any such theory. These statements would have the disturbing effect on German morale to have been planted merely for the purpose of facilitating the arrest of certain generals. Further, we had ample advance warning that a plot was in the wind to discredit rumors that it was merely a Gestapo concession. In fact, I believe that what has just taken place in Germany represents the one and only major attempt during the past eleven years to overthrow the Hitler government. No Putsch in Germany is possible without strong military backing. The Gestapo are numerous, determined and ruthless. The SS military formations in Germany could probably be counted on fully by Himmler. To meet these forces, the German generals opposing Hitler would need initially to secure the backing of several OKW divisions strategically located. Only if they could succeed in seizing and holding for a time certain strategic points could the revolt have any chance of success. As yet, we have no evidence that they have succeeded in this. If they had, it would have seemed likely that certain powerful radio stations would be in the hands of the rebels, and we would be getting news of developments. Apparently, certain Nazi stations are off the air. Whether this means they are being fought over, or whether there are other explanations, we do not know. Whatever may be the result of the Putsch, the moral effect on Germany and on the Army will be very serious. I do not believe that the Army will for long accept and fight effectively under SS leadership. Of course, certain Nazi-minded generals, such as Rommel and Guderian

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any to call to hold their troops for a time, I  
 doubt whether von Kluge is an out-and-out Nazi,  
 despite his apparent pledge of loyalty today. He  
 certainly was not such some years ago. While it  
 is too early to indulge in many predictions, I think  
 it is safe to say that even if, as seems to be the case,  
 revolt is being or has been suppressed in a Gestapo  
 purge of leading generals, the Army's morale will re-  
 ceive a severe shock from which, in its critical  
 situation, it will be difficult for it to recover.  
 There is no doubt that there is a real crisis in  
 the High Command, with men like Zeitzler and Keitel  
 both apparently involved, and this can hardly be  
 hidden from the men at the front. Further, Army cir-  
 cles have always had great respect for Beck, and if  
 he has been executed, as reported, this will be a  
 great shock to the rank and file of the OKW officers.  
 It is particularly significant that Hitler apparently  
 found no outstanding general to address to the Army  
 the same type of appeal which Goering made to the  
 air force and Donitz made to the navy, and that he  
 was not able even to give the name of the general  
 from the East Front who he stated in his last night's  
 speech was to be second to Guderian, who replaces the  
 diplomatically ill Zeitzler. Outside of the opposition  
 group which was responsible for this attempt, I do not  
 believe that any other group exists in Germany which  
 would have any chance of staging active armed opposi-  
 tion. If this attempt has failed, the Germans will  
 probably have to wait for the complete military col-  
 lapse of Germany to rid themselves of the Nazis, and  
 the next group to attempt this might be the Communists,  
 probably aided by a disorganized returning German army  
 and the foreign workers and prisoners, if there is  
 any lapse of time between the military collapse and  
 the Allied occupation. Certainly what Hitler refers  
 to as the Wehrmacht is the only military organization  
 now stationed in Germany which is powerful enough to  
 stage an action against the IS forces, and if Himmler's  
 command of the Wehrmacht becomes effective, any possi-  
 bility of revolt will be largely removed.

William J. Donovan,  
 Director

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20 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following report was received via radio-  
teletype from our representative in Bern:

Geneva, November 1944 - 7/21/44

No very clear picture of the situation in Germany  
can yet be pieced together from the information  
reaching here. There is no information as yet  
from arrivals from Germany, and the radio material  
is available to you as quickly as it is to us. The  
overall picture did not come as a great surprise,  
except to the extent that there were reasons to  
doubt whether any high officers of the German Army,  
who had remained in positions of power after the  
successive purges, could have the courage to act.  
As reported to you, many high German Officers realized,  
however, that the clock was growing short within which  
the anti-Nazi forces in Germany could act to rid  
the country of Hitler and the Gestapo, if this was  
to be accomplished prior to Germany's collapse.  
These officers considered that Hitler's military  
conduct of the war was a catastrophe, and that the  
only hope of saving anything from the wreckage was  
to remove Hitler. These persons hoped that they  
could make some sort of a deal with the West, along  
the lines of the Italian pattern, and thus be in a  
better position at least to restrict the extent of  
Russian occupation of German territory.

The evidence seems to indicate that possible the  
attempt was staged prematurely probably because the  
action of the Gestapo forced the hand of those who  
were plotting to remove Hitler. Lindstedt's removal

and then, more important still, the recent removal of von Falkenhausen in Belgium, indicate that the Gestapo was fearful of a military coup. Certain other persons who were probably to participate in the plot were also forced to run to cover before it took place. I do not believe the report circulating here that the story of the attempt on Hitler's life was fabricated or exaggerated in order to justify a thoroughgoing purge of the Army. If Hitler desired to make a purge, he would not wait for any such excuse. His statement, and those of Goering and Goebbels are hard to explain on any such theory. These statements would have too disturbing an effect on German morale to have been planted merely for the purpose of facilitating the arrest of certain Generals. Further, we had ample advance warning that a plot was in the wind to discredit rumors that it was merely a Gestapo connection. In fact, I believe that what has just taken place in Germany represents the one and only major attempt during the past eleven years to overthrow the Hitler government.

No change in Germany is possible without strong military backing. The Gestapo are numerous, determined, and ruthless. The US military formations in Germany could probably be counted on fully by Hitler. To meet these forces, the German generals opposing Hitler would need initially to secure the backing of several SS divisions strategically located. Only if they could succeed in gaining and holding for a time certain strategic points could the revolt have any chance of success. As yet, we have no evidence that they have succeeded in this. If they had, it would have seemed likely that certain powerful radio stations would be in the hands of the revolutionaries, and we would be getting news of developments. Apparently, certain Nazi stations are off the air. Whether this means they are being fought over, or whether there are other explanations, we do not know. Whatever may be the result of the Kehlitz, the moral effect on Germany and on the Army will be very serious.

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1.

1. I do not believe that the Army will for long accept and fight effectively under SS leadership. Of course, certain Nazi-minded generals, such as Rommel and Guderian, may be able to hold their troops for a time. I doubt whether von Kluge is an out-and-out Nazi, despite his apparent pledge of loyalty today. He certainly was not such some years ago. While it is too early to indulge in many predictions, I think it is safe to say that even if, as seems to be the case, revolt is being or has been suppressed in a Gestapo purge of leading generals, the Army's morale will receive a severe shock from which, in its original situation, it will be difficult for it to recover. There is no doubt there is a real crisis in the High Command, with men like Zeitzler and Keitel both apparently involved, and this can hardly be hidden from the men at the front. Further, Army circles have always had great respect for Beck, and if he has been executed, as reported, this will be a great check to the rank and file of the OEW officers.

2. It is particularly significant that Hitler apparently found no outstanding general to address to the Army the same type of appeal which Goering made to the Air Force and Doenitz made to the Navy, and that he was not able even to give the name of the general from the East Front who he stated in his last night's speech was to be second to Guderian, who replaces the diplomatically ill Zeitzler. Outside of the opposition group which was responsible for this failure, I do not believe that any other group exists in Germany which would have any chance of staging active armed opposition. If this attempt has failed, the Germans will probably have to wait for the complete military collapse of Germany to rid themselves of the Nazis, and the next group to attempt this might be the Communists, probably aided by a disorganized returning German army and the foreign workers and prisoners, if there is any lapse of time between the military collapse and the Allied occupation.

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Certainly what Hitler refers to as the Hitler Youth  
is the only military organization now discussed in  
Germany which is powerful enough to stage an action  
against the SS forces, and if Hitler's command of  
the Wehrmacht becomes effective, and possibility of  
rebell will be largely removed.

William J. Donovan  
Director

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Germany 148

22 July 1944

**SOCIALISM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL**

You have already received from us a report of the German Coup d' Etat. However, I thought it might be of some interest to you to read the estimate of the situation prepared by our representative in Bern. You will recall that during the past several months he has sent us reports containing material which bore upon the activity of the anti-Hitler group of officers.

*Phone Nathan-Tel 7/21/44 # 180*

**SUMMARY**

No very clear picture of the situation in Germany can yet be pieced together from the information here. There is no information as yet from arrivals from Germany, and the radio material is available to you as quickly as it is to us. The developments did not come as a great surprise, except to the extent that there were reasons to doubt whether any high officers of the German Army, who had remained in positions of power after the successive purges, would have the courage to act. As reported to you, many high German officers realized, however, that the time was growing short within which the anti-Nazi forces in Germany could act to rid the country of Hitler and the Gestapo, if this was to be accomplished prior to Germany's collapse. These officers considered that Hitler's military

*W. F. D. H. Hull*

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Content of the war was a catastrophe, and that the only hope of saving anything from the wreckage was to remove Hitler. These persons hoped that they could make some sort of a deal with the West, along the lines of the Italian pattern, and thus be in a better position at least to restrict the extent of Russian occupation of German territory.

The evidence seems to indicate that possibly the Gostape was staged prematurely, probably because the action of the Gostape forced the hand of those who were plotting to remove Hitler. Goebbels' removal and those who were important still, the recent removal of van Dilsen in Belgium, indicates that the Gostape was probably a military coup. Certain other persons who were probably to participate in the plot were also forced to run to cover before it took place. I do not believe the report circulating here that the attempt of the attempt on Hitler's life was fabricated or exaggerated in order to justify a thorough-going purge of the Army. If Hitler desired to make a purge, he would not wait for any such excuse. His statement, and those of Goering and Goebbels would have been planted merely for the purpose of facilitating the arrest of certain generals. Further, we had ample advance warning that a plot was in the mind to discredit persons that we had just taken place in Germany represents the one and only major attempt during the past eleven years to overthrow the Hitler government.

It is possible without strong military backing. The Gostape are numerous, decentralized, and scattered. The SS military formations in Germany could probably be counted on fully by Hitler. To meet these forces, the German generals opposing Hitler would need initially to secure the backing of several divisions strategically located. Only if they could succeed in winning and holding for a time certain strategic points could the revolt have any chance of success, and yet, we have no evidence that they have succeeded in this. If they had, it would have seemed

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likely that certain powerful radio stations would be in the hands of the revolt, and we would be getting news of developments. Apparently, certain Nazi stations are off the air. Whether this means they are being fought over, or whether there are other explanations, we do not know. Whatever may be the result of the Putsch, the moral effect on Germany and on the Army will be very serious.

I do not believe that the Army will for long accept and fight effectively under SS leadership. Of course, certain Nazi-minded generals, such as Rommel and Guderian, may be able to hold their troops for a time. I doubt whether von Kluge is an out-and-out Nazi, despite his apparent pledge of loyalty today. He certainly was not such some years ago. While it is too early to indulge in many predictions, I think it is safe to say that even if, as seems to be the case, revolt is being or has been suppressed in a Gestapo purge of leading generals, the Army's morale will receive a severe shock from which, in its critical situation, it will be difficult for it to recover. There is no doubt that there is a real crisis in the High Command, with men like Zeitzler and Keitel both apparently involved, and this can hardly be hidden from the men at the front. Further, Army circles have always had great respect for Beck, and if he has been executed, as reported, this will be a great shock to the rank and file of the OKW officers.

It is particularly significant that Hitler apparently found no outstanding general to address to the Army the same type of appeal which Goering made to the air force and Doenitz made to the Navy, and that he was not able even to give the name of the general from the East Front who he stated in his last night's speech was to be second to Guderian, who replaces the diplomatically ill Zeitzler. Outside of the opposition group which was responsible for this Putsch, I do not believe that any other group exists in Germany which would have any chance of staging a

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armed expedition. If this attempt has failed, the  
 Germans will probably have to wait for the complete  
 military collapse of Germany to rid themselves of  
 the Nazis, and the next group to attempt this might  
 be the Communists, probably aided by a disorganized  
 retreating German army and the foreign workers and  
 prisoners, if there is any lapse of time between  
 the military collapse and the Allied occupation.  
 Certainly what Hitler refers to as the Heimwehr  
 is the only military organization now stationed in  
 Germany which is powerful enough to stage an action  
 against the US forces, and if Himmler's command of  
 the Heimwehr becomes effective, any possibility  
 of revolt will be largely removed.

William J. Donovan  
 Director

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22 July 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The military coup d'etat attempted on 20 July 1944 by strong elements of the German High Command appears to have been the outgrowth of political preparations of at least six months' duration. For your information, I have prepared a factual presentation summarizing the data on this subject which has been cabled to us from our representative in Bern.

Since it is possible to infer from the statements of Hitler and Goering that the rebellion was not put down at once, I have also included certain possible lines of action suggested for consideration by our Bern representative in the event that the opposition may be able to maintain a stand in any region of Germany.

**1. Composition and Aim:**

Two emissaries of the conspiring group first

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approached the OSS representative in Bern in January 1944. The group was then described as composed of various intellectuals from certain military and government circles gathered into a loose organization. The membership was said to be somewhat divided as to a course of action, some holding that Hitler and his cohorts should be made to shoulder all responsibility to the bitter end; while others favored an overthrow of Hitler and the organization of a new government before the fighting stops, which might negotiate peace. The conspiring elements were united in their preference for a western rather than an eastern orientation of German policy. In general, they were characterized by their associates as well-educated and influential but not rightist individuals; such characteristics may have been designed for Anglo-American consumption. The group as a whole apparently maintained its foreign contacts through the Comaris organization.

The following were said by the emisarion in February and April 1944 to be among the members of the group: General Jostia Dist, one of the two leaders of

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The group, former chief of the German General Staff, who retired "at his own request" in 1938. General Beck, General Fritsch, and General Fromm (mentioned later as a member of this group) dominated the Reichswehr Ministry until 1938.

Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, co-leader of the group, a former Mayor of Leipzig, and one-time Nazi representative to business circles in the United States.

Admiral-General Hans Oster, former right-hand man to Canaris, who was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 and later released but kept under surveillance and was officially discharged by Keitel in early 1944.

General-General Franz Ritter von Halder, a strong figure in Catholic circles, anti-Soviet, reported ousted in 1942, although thought under consideration by the Nazis for an important new post in late June 1944.

General Thoma (probably General Georg Thomas, Chief of War Economy and Armaments in the OKW).

Hans Lammers, socialist leader and former Minister of the Interior in Bonn, a former anti-Nazi who say

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have made some sort of peace with the Nazis.

In early April the group's emissaries again approached the OSS representative, bearing a declaration said to represent the views of General Deak and Harry Guedler. This message stated that, with Germany's position coming to a head and the end of the war in Europe definitely in sight, the group was willing and ready to take steps to end the Nazis and eliminate Hitler (see report to White House Map Room, dated 12 April 1944). The group claimed to be the only one with personal access to Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, with enough arms to accomplish its purpose, and with enough power in the army to make a jump feasible. Such action, however, would be contingent upon assurances from Britain and the United States that, once the Nazis had been crushed, negotiations would then be carried out solely with the Western Powers and under no circumstances with the USSR. The essential reservation of the group's planners was stressed, but also its willingness to cooperate with any available elements of the left except for the Communists. The group expressed its anxiety to keep Central Europe from coming under Soviet domination.

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If negotiations were to be made primarily to the Soviet Union, the negotiations would have to be carried on by another group. Both Schweacht commanders in the West as well as Lindstedt and Falkenhansen, the declaration maintained, would be ready to assist Allied landings once the Nazis were removed from power.

To these overtures the OSS representative said little beyond expressing his strong conviction that the United States would never act without previous consultation with the USSR. He reported at that time that he had doubts as to the group's chances of success, since he said that both Beck and Goerdler had been publicly mentioned as potential leaders of a group, and since it could be taken for granted that the Gestapo was aware of this group. The representative thought that Gestapo had not stopped in either because it planned to wait until the group's plans had been more nearly perfected, or because the Gestapo too wished to have "an anchor in the West".

In early May the two emissaries forwarded to the OSS representative a further communication from the group.

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... to include important  
 ... Falkenhausen, Hau-  
 ... (see report to White House  
 ...). These Generals were all re-  
 ... Anglo-American units to enter Germany  
 ... Allies would agree to allow them to  
 ... the eastern front.

A set plan of action was outlined in the May com-  
 ... The plan called for the landing of three Al-  
 ... divisions in the Berlin area with the help  
 ... Army commanders; major amphibious landings at or  
 ... and Hamburg; the isolation of Hitler and high  
 ... officials in Obersalzberg by trustworthy German units  
 ... in the Munich region; and Allied landings on the  
 ... coast, though these in their early stages were thought  
 ... difficult to plan as Rommel could not be counted upon for co-  
 ... operation. In the communication the group reaffirmed its  
 ... belief that Germany had lost the war, that the last hope of  
 ... preventing the spread of Communism in Germany would be an  
 ... Anglo-American occupation of the greatest possible portion  
 ... of the Reich, and that the only means of accomplishing this

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The membership was said by this time to include important new members: Generals von Rundstedt, Falkenhausen, Heusinger, Zettler, and Ulbricht (see report to White House Map Room, dated 14 May 1944). These Generals were all reported ready to assist Anglo-American units to enter Germany provided the Western Allies would agree to allow them to continue the war on the eastern front.

A new plan of action was outlined in the May communication. The plan called for the landing of three Allied parachute divisions in the Berlin area with the help of local Army commanders; major amphibious landings at or near Bremen and Hamburg; the isolation of Hitler and high staff officials in Obersalsberg by trustworthy German units posted in the Havelth region; and Allied landings on the French coast, though these in their early stages were thought difficult to plan. A channel could not be counted upon for cooperation. In the communication the group reaffirmed its belief that Germany had lost the war, that the last hope of preventing the spread of Communism in Germany would be an Anglo-American occupation of the greatest possible portion of the Reich, and that the only means of accomplishing this

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would be to help the Anglo-American forces to enter Germany before military collapse in the East.

The ten categories at this time expressed the opinion that the group's province with regard to the execution of the GMR was unrealistic; they regarded the plan for speedy American and British occupation of Germany as the core of the proposal. One of the categories admitted a lack of confidence in the political courage of the German generals, on the basis of past experience, and remarked that the Allies might do well to ignore their propositions if an early victory and speedy occupation of Germany appeared certain. The GSB representative reported his own doubts as to whether the group would possess the necessary determination to act effectively at the appropriate time.

In early July a courier arrived in Bern bearing a communication displaying new confidence in the strength of the group (see report to White House Map Room, dated 18 July 1944). This message reported that the movement had gained new vigor from the Soviet victories in the East,

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from the Allied landings in the West, and from certain developments in Germany. Colonel-General Fritz Fromm, Chief of the Home Command, who controlled the regular army within Germany, was said to have joined the group. Further strength was said to have been acquired by the alleged transfer of OKW headquarters from East Prussia to a locality near Berlin and the resultant proximity to Berlin of General Olbricht, Chief of the General Army Office, Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of Staff, and other generals supposed to be in the opposition. Cooperation was also claimed from a group of anti-Hitler elements headed by Wolff Graf Helldorf, Berlin chief of police and an old time Nazi. The message said that the group's plan of action called for an ordered retreat from the West and the dispatch of all crack divisions to defend the eastern front. Efforts would be made to convince the generals to wage a final struggle against Russia.

On 12 July the OKW representative reported that a dramatic event might take place up north, if the inter-

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which brought by the group's courier could be trusted, and warned that any news would be suppressed by violence, if necessary. This was the last word received before the news of the attempted coup.

## 2. Nazi Propaganda

By the first week in July it became amply clear that the National Socialist Government was aware of impending revolt in high military circles. In his funeral oration for General Dietl (2 July) Hitler extolled those who devoted themselves to the German cause with fanaticism as opposed to the lukewarm supporters of the war effort. On 7 July when the break through in the East began and the western beachhead loomed as a firmly established threat, Goebbels wrote an editorial in Das Reich pointing out that the home front was the critical area in the German war effort and that all power should be given to "the fanatics". This article constituted a marked departure from the earlier propaganda line, which emphasized the participation of all Germans in the conduct of the war.

These official statements were harbingers of the

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Party's intention to seize all power in the state, including that over the military establishment. On 19 July news leaked out to Stockholm that Heinrich Himmler would shortly be named to a post of first importance in the German High Command. Himmler's powers, it was said, would include complete control over all military appointments both in the field and in the Home Command. As this report was received, telephone communications between Stockholm and Berlin were cut (1600, 19 July). The report therefore antedates the jump of 20 July.

### 3. ~~The Army's View~~

To the Army leadership the acquisition of such powers by Himmler clearly would be regarded as the end of their political power, domestic and international, which rested on their control of the armed forces. It may be assumed that the High Command felt its international bargaining strength to lie in its armies in the field. This was weakened by enemy action and also by the removal of General von Rundstedt and the presence of Rommel on the Western front. The High Command's domestic strength, on

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the other hand, realized in General Fromm's own person, in the armies in the field approached defeat the importance of the home army would increase. Only through control of the home army could Germany's military leadership eliminate the Nazis without exposing itself to social revolution.

It is therefore believed that the proposed appointment of Himmler (subsequently announced in Hitler's speech after the ~~1934~~) precipitated the military conspiracy into premature action. The actual attempt upon Hitler's life, hastily organized as it was, had to be made before the appointment of Himmler could take place.

We have just received from the OSS representative in Bern the following dispatch, dated 21 July, containing his estimate of the situation:

"The group of that appears to have been the result of the planning and organization outlined in my earlier communications. It had been intended that certain men in the inner circles of the conspiracy, such as General Henning, would be at the meeting when the bomb went off because the only chance for planting the bomb was in conjunction with a conference attended by many of the chief military leaders. One of the members of the group was Hans Fein-

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• 11 •

being who served as liaison between the elder officers on active duty at General Headquarters and the younger group, formerly headed by Helmut von Helldorf, Stauffenberg, in addition, acted as counsellor to Goebbels.

"The outcome of the revolt at present rests with the Reserve Army 'Heinrich' and their willingness to follow Himmler as their chief or whether they will stick to their old commanders some of whom appear to be involved in the plot. Naturally, the blood purge will be unmerciful.

"One of the disheartening facts seems to be that the participants in the revolt do not have adequate radio facilities at their command. However, it has come to our attention that a report from Berlin states that a message dispatched by the rebels from Frankfurt-am-Main this morning was intercepted.

"However, a thorough perusal of the Goering-Hitler statements would lead to the inference that the rebellion was not put down at once."

#### 4. Suggested Lines of Action.

In the event that the opposition does find it possible to maintain a stand in any region of Germany, it has been suggested by our representative in Bern that the Allied Government might wish to consider the following possible lines of action:

"(1) Some word from the President to counter Goebbels' line about the Allies' plan for con-

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plete annihilation of the German people. This would encourage the anti-Nazi groups.

"(2) Air raids on the Nazi stronghold in the region of Danzig. Although the immediate military effectiveness of such action would be unimportant, it is possible that the psychological reaction would be great. Naturally, any break in the communication channels between the region of Danzig and the rest of the country would be especially valuable.

"(3) Providing the rebellion gains any momentum, some announcement to the effect that any German town which sides with the opposition would not be attacked whereas Gestapo centers and Nazi strongholds would be bombed unapologetically.

"(4) Large-scale dissemination of pamphlets from the air."

William J. Donovan  
Director

P.M. Since writing the foregoing I have received a further dispatch from Bern which reads as follows:

"Up to 1:00 P.M. today (22 July 1944) the Nazi Legation had not had any news from the Foreign Office, not even the customary "aprecht verboten". This is the Nazi term for instructions on how to lie. There are positive signs that if a revolt did get under way, several Nazi officers at this end would abandon the sinking ship."

W.J.D.

SECRET

*Handwritten:*  
14-00000  
~~Germany~~  
A copy of the  
N. P. a.  
~~SECRET~~

24 July 1944

**Mr. James C. Dunn, Director,  
Office of Foreign Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.**

**Dear Jimmie:**

I attach a memorandum for the Secretary of State which I thought you would be kind enough to hand to him. I believe he will find it of interest.

**Sincerely,**

**William J. Donovan,  
Director.**

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22 July 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

The military coup d'etat attempted on 20 July 1944 by strong elements of the German High Command appears to have been the outgrowth of political preparations of at least six months' duration. For your information, I have prepared a factual presentation summarizing the data on this subject which has been obtained to us from our representative in Bern.

Since it is possible to infer from the statements of Hitler and Goering that the rebellion was not put down at once, I have also included certain possible lines of action suggested for consideration by our Bern representative in the event that the opposition may be able to maintain a stand in any region of Germany.

**1. Summary and Findings**

The members of the conspiring group first

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approached the OSS representative in Bern in January 1944. The group was then described as composed of various intellectuals from certain military and government circles gathered into a loose organization. The membership was said to be somewhat divided as to a course of action, some holding that Hitler and his cohorts should be made to shoulder all responsibility to the bitter end; while others favored an overthrow of Hitler and the organization of a new government before the fighting stops, which might negotiate peace. The conspiring elements were united in their preference for a western rather than an eastern orientation of German policy. In general, they were characterized by their emissaries as well-educated and influential but not rightist individuals; such characterization may have been designed for Anglo-American consumption. The group as a whole apparently maintained its foreign contacts through the Casaris organization.

The following were said by the emissaries in February and April 1944 to be among the members of the group:

**General Ludwig Beck**, one of the two leaders of

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the group, former chief of the German General Staff, who resigned "at his own request" in 1935. General Beck, General Frick, and General Fromm (mentioned later as a member of this group) dominated the Reichswehr Ministry until 1938.

Carl Friederich Goerdeler, co-leader of the group, a former Mayor of Leipzig, and one-time Nazi representative to business circles in the United States.

Brigadier-General Hans Oster, former right-hand man to Canaris, who was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 and later released but kept under surveillance and was officially discharged by Keitel in early 1944.

Colonel-General Erwin Ritter von Halden, a strong figure in Catholic circles, anti-Soviet, reported ousted in 1942, although thought under consideration by the Nazis for an important new post in late June 1944.

General Thomas (probably General Georg Thomas, Chief of War Economy and Armaments in the OKW).

Hans Lohse, socialist leader and former Minister of the Interior in Kesse, a former anti-Nazi who may

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have made some sort of peace with the Nazis.

In early April the group's emissaries again approached the USSR representative, bearing a declaration said to represent the views of General Beck and Herr Goerdler. This message stated that, with Germany's position coming to a head and the end of the war in Europe definitely in sight, the group was willing and ready to take steps to oust the Nazis and eliminate Hitler (see report dated 12 April 1944). The group claimed to be the only one with personal access to Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, with enough arms to accomplish its purpose, and with enough power in the army to make a coup feasible. Such action, however, would be contingent upon assurances from Britain and the United States that, once the Nazis had been overthrown, negotiations would then be carried out solely with the Western Powers and under no circumstances with the USSR. The essential conviction of the group's planners was stressed, but also its willingness to cooperate with any available elements of the Left except for the Communists. The group expressed its anxiety to keep Central Europe from coming under Soviet domination. If capitulation were to be made primarily to

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the French Union, the negotiations would have to be carried on by another group. Such Wehrmacht commanders in the West as von Junckhoff and Polchowhausen, the declaration maintained, would be ready to assist Allied landings once the Nazis were removed from power.

In those overtures the OSS representative said little beyond expressing his strong conviction that the United States would never act without previous consultation with the USSR. He reported at that time that he had doubts as to the group's chances of success, since he said that both Koch and Goerdler had been publicly mentioned as potential leaders of a group, and since it could be taken for granted that the Gestapo was aware of this group. The representative thought that Gestapo had not stepped in either because it planned to wait until the group's plans had been more nearly perfected, or because the Gestapo too wished to have "an anchor in the West".

In early May the two emissaries forwarded to the OSS representative a further communication from the group. Its membership was said by this time to include important

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the members Generals von Rundstedt, Falkenhausen, Heusinger, Zellerbach, and Olbricht (see report dated 16 May 1944). These Generals were all reported ready to assist Anglo-American units to enter Germany provided the Western Allies would agree to allow them to continue the war on the eastern front.

A new plan of action was outlined in the May communication. The plan called for the landing of three Allied parachute divisions in the Berlin area with the help of local Army commanders; major amphibious landings at or near Bremen and Hamburg; the isolation of Hitler and high Nazi officials in Obersiebenbrunn by trustworthy German units posted in the Munich region; and Allied landings on the French coast, though these in their early stages were thought difficult to plan as Rommel could not be counted upon for cooperation. In the communication the group reaffirmed its belief that Germany had lost the war, that the last hope of preventing the spread of Communism in Germany would be an Anglo-American occupation of the greatest possible portion of the Reich, and that the only means of accomplishing this would be to help the Anglo-American forces to enter Germany before

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military collapse in the East.

The two emissaries at this time expressed the opinion that the group's proviso with regard to the exclusion of the DMR was unrealistic; they regarded the plan for speedy American and British occupation of Germany as the core of the proposal. One of the emissaries admitted a lack of confidence in the political courage of the German generals, on the basis of past experience, and remarked that the Allies might be well to ignore their propositions if an early victory and speedy occupation of Germany appeared certain. The OSS representative reported his own doubts as to whether the group would possess the necessary determination to act effectively at the appropriate time.

In early July a courier arrived in Bern bearing a communication displaying new confidence in the strength of the group (see report dated 19 July 1944). This message reported that the movement had gained new vigor from the Soviet victories in the East, from the Allied landings in the West, and from certain developments in Germany. Colonel-General Fritz Fromm, Chief of the Home Command, who controlled the regular army within Germany,

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was said to have joined the group. Further strength was said to have been acquired by the alleged transfer of OKW headquarters from East Prussia to a locality near Berlin and the resultant proximity to Berlin of General Olbricht, Chief of the General Army Office, Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of Staff, and other generals supposed to be in the opposition. Cooperation was also claimed from a group of anti-Hitler elements headed by Wolff Graf Helldorf, Berlin chief of police and an old time Nazi. The message said that the group's plan of action called for an ordered retreat from the West and the dispatch of all crack divisions to defend the eastern front. Efforts would be made to convince the generals to wage a final struggle against Marxism.

On 12 July the OAS representative reported that a dramatic event might take place up north, if the information brought by the group's courier could be trusted, and warned that any news would be suppressed by violence, if necessary. This was the last word received before the news of the attempted ~~1944~~.

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**SECRET****2. Anti-Sovietism**

By the first week in July it became amply clear that the National Socialist Government was aware of impending revolt in high military circles. In his funeral oration for General Dietl (2 July) Hitler entolled those who devoted themselves to the German cause with fanaticism as opposed to the lukewarm supporters of the war effort. On 7 July when the break through in the East began and the western beachhead loomed as a firmly established threat, Goebbels wrote an editorial in Das Reich pointing out that the home front was the critical area in the German war effort and that all power should be given to "the fanatics". This article constituted a marked departure from the earlier propaganda line, which emphasized the participation of all Germans in the conduct of the war.

These official statements were harbingers of the Nazi intention to seize all power in the state, including the military establishment. On 17 July 1941 the German High Command issued a directive which stated that the German High Command would shortly be taking over the military operations in the German High

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Command. Hitler's powers, it was said, would include complete control over all military appointments both in the field and in the Home Command. As this report was received, telephone communications between Stockholm and Berlin were cut (1655, 19 July). The report therefore antedates the issue of 20 July.

### 3. The Significance

To the Army leadership the acquisition of such powers by Hitler clearly would be regarded as the end of their political power, domestic and international, which rested on their control of the armed forces. It may be assumed that the High Command felt its international bargaining strength to lie in its armies in the field. This was weakened by enemy action and also by the removal of General von Rundstedt and the presence of Rommel on the Western front. The High Command's domestic strength, on the other hand, resided in General Fromm's home forces. As the armies in the field approached defeat the importance of the home army would increase. Only through control of the home army could Germany's military leadership eliminate

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the Nazis without exposing itself to social revolution.

It is therefore believed that the proposed appointment of Himmler (subsequently announced in Hitler's speech after the 20th) precipitated the military conspirators into premature action. The actual attempt upon Hitler's life, hastily organized as it was, had to be made before the appointment of Himmler could take place.

We have just received from the OSS representative in Bern the following dispatch, dated 21 July, containing his estimate of the situation:

"The coup d'etat appears to have been the result of the planning and organization outlined in my earlier communications. It had been intended that certain men in the inner circles of the conspiracy, such as General Henning, would be at the meeting when the bomb went off because the only chance for planting the bomb was in conjunction with a conference attended by many of the chief military leaders. One of the members of the group was Stauffenberg who acted as liaison between the older officers on active duty at General Headquarters and the younger group, formerly headed by Helmut von Halbe. Stauffenberg, in addition, acted as councillor to Goerdler.

"The outcome of the revolt at present rests with the Reserve Army 'Palmbucher' and their willingness to follow Himmler as their chief or whether they will stick to their old commanders

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some of them appear to be involved in the plot. Primarily, the blood purge will be successful.

Some of the disconcerting facts seem to be that the participants in the revolt do not have adequate radio facilities at their command. However, it has come to our attention that a report from Hunter's station that a message dispatched by the rebels from Luxembourg-in-Bain into Germany was interrupted.

However, a thorough perusal of the findings of the students would lead to the inference that the rebellion has not put down at once.

**4. ANNOUNCED LINE OF ACTION**

In the event that the opposition does find it possible to maintain a stand in any region of Germany, it has been suggested by our representative in Bonn that the Allied Government might wish to consider the following possible lines of action:

- “(1) Some word from the President to counter Goebbels' line about the Allies' plan for complete annihilation of the German people. This would encourage the anti-Nazi groups.
- “(2) Air raids on the last stronghold in the region of Barchteggaden. Although the complete military effectiveness of such action would be uncertain, it is possible that the psychological reaction would be great. Ideally, any line to the communication channels between the region of Barchteggaden and the rest of the

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country would be especially suitable.

"(3) Providing the rebellion with any weapons, and equipment to the effect that any German town which sides with the revolution would not be attacked unless the towns centers and East strongholds would be bombed separately.

"(4) Large-scale dissemination of pamphlets from the air."

William J. Donovan  
Director

P.S. Since writing the foregoing I have received a further dispatch from Bern which reads as follows:

"By 11:00 P.M. today (12 July 1944) the East Legation had not had any news from the Foreign Office, not even the customary "speech reading". This is the East term for insurrection on her to life. There are positive signs that if a revolt did get under way, several East officers at this end would abandon the existing ship."

W.J.D.

**SECRET**

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20 July 1944

Miss Grace Tully,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will  
be interested in the attached memorandum.  
Will you please hand it to him?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

RESTRICTED

24 July 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

The following report was received from our  
Berlin representative over radiotelephone:

Berlin Radio #181

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Until news trustworthy persons arrive from Germany, we will not know the full story of what took place, but it seems clear now that any prospects of an armed military revolt growing out of the ~~German~~ against Hitler have been crushed. I am inclined to believe that the ~~German~~ probably had a good deal of prior information about some of the persons involved, and were ready to strike and to strike hard. Hitler was probably glad to have an opportunity to do this before the retreating German armies were themselves on German soil, as it is far easier to deal with the ~~German~~ than it would be to deal with the troops from the defeats in the East, West, and South. In any event, a good deal of benefit to the Allied cause can result, as this attempt at revolt should help to undermine the will of the German Army to keep up the struggle. Obviously, an attempt is being made in Germany to play down the importance of those who were alleged to be in the plot, and therefore our testing should be just the opposite. The personality of Beck gives us a good opportunity. He was a man of the highest military attainment, who enjoyed great respect from his colleagues, and who at the same time from previous days refused to play along with Hitler's wild program of military conquest. I think, too, is a figure who can be used, as no one believes the story of his illness. Beck's position is

White House 7/24/46

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24 July 1946

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The following report was received from our German representative over radiotelephone:

*Bern Radies 181*

**SUMMARY**

"Until some trustworthy persons arrive from Germany, we will not know the full story of what took place, but it seems clear now that any prospects of an armed military revolt growing out of the ~~struggle~~ struggle against Hitler have been crushed. I am inclined to believe that the Gestapo probably had a good deal of prior information about some of the persons involved, and were ready to strike and to strike hard. Himmler was probably glad to have an opportunity to do this before the re-creating German armies were themselves on German soil, as it is far easier to deal with the ~~highlanders~~ highlanders than it would be to deal with the troops fresh from the defeats in the East, West, and South. But, in any event, a good deal of benefit to the Allied cause can result, as this attempt at revolt should help to undermine the will of the German Army to keep up the struggle. Obviously, an attempt is being made in Germany to play down the importance of those who were alleged to be in the plot, and therefore our tactics should be just the opposite. The personality of Beck gives us a good opportunity. He was a man of the highest military attainment, who enjoyed great respect from his colleagues, and who at the same time from previous days refused to play along with Hitler's wild program of military conquest. I believe, too, is a figure who can be used, as no one believes the story of his illness. Keitel's position is

*also to get Staff & Marshall*

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still obscure, but I am inclined to doubt the story that he was implicated in the plot. Apparently Himmler, too, had nothing to do with it, and, according to excellent reports, he is undergoing a serious eye operation at Breslau. This attempt to overthrow Hitler was largely engineered by men who desired a western orientation of German policy, even though apparently they received no encouragement from the West, and acted on their own initiative entirely. The next attempt to overthrow the Hitler regime from the inside is likely to come from an eastern oriented group, possibly after a part of East Prussia is occupied and a German government in a Reichstag is installed there. It is probable that the failure of Beck and his friends will still further increase the influence of the Nazis in Germany and somewhat decrease the influence of the West. Russia has throughout played a more realistic policy in dealing with the internal German situation than has either the United States or England, and it is possible that, from now on, the Reichstag Committee will increase in importance and have a larger scope of action. This is a development we should not underestimate, particularly now that the western-oriented dissident group in Germany, in and outside of the army, has received a serious, if not a fatal setback.

William J. Donovan  
Director

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21 July 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

The following report was received from our source  
in Berlin on 21 July 1944:

Until some trustworthy persons arrive from Germany, we will not know the full story of what took place, but it seems clear now that any prospects of an armed military revolt growing out of the opposition against Hitler have been crushed. I am inclined to believe that the Gestapo probably had a good deal of prior information about some of the persons involved, and were ready to strike hard. Himmler was probably glad to have an opportunity to do this before the retreating German armies were themselves on German soil, as it is far easier to deal with the traitors at home than it would be to deal with the traitors from the fronts in the East. West, and North. But, in any event, a good deal of benefit to the Allied cause can result, as this attempt at revolt should help to undermine the will of the German Army to keep up the struggle. Obviously, an attempt is being made in Germany to play down the importance of those who were alleged to be in the plot, and therefore our tactics should be just the opposite. The personality of Goebbels was a good opportunity. He was a man of the highest literary attainment, who enjoyed great respect from his colleagues, and who at the same time for several days refused to play along with Hitler's wild

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program of military conquest. Keitel, too, is a figure who can be used, as no one believes the story of his illness. Keitel's position is still obscure, but I am inclined to doubt the story that he was implicated in the plot. Apparently Mannstein, too, had nothing to do with it, as according to excellent reports, he is undergoing a serious eye operation at Breslau. This attempt to overthrow Hitler was largely engineered by men who desired a western orientation of German policy, even though apparently they received no encouragement from the West, and acted on their own initiative entirely. The next attempt to overthrow the Hitler regime from the inside is likely to come from an eastern oriented group, possibly after a part of East Prussia is occupied and a German government a la Seydlitz is installed there. It is probably that the failure of Beck and his friends will still further increase the influence Russia in Germany and somewhat decrease the influence of the West. Russia has throughout played a more realistic policy in dealing with the internal German situation than has either the United States or England, and it is possible that, from now on the Seydlitz Committee will increase in importance and have a larger scope of action. This is a development we should not underestimate, particularly now that the western-oriented dissident group in Germany, in and outside of the army, has received a serious, if not a fatal setback.

William J. Donovan,  
Director

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RESTRICTED  
11/20/51  
Germany

21 July 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

The following report was received from our  
German representative over radiotelephone:

Radio Lcd 181

**GENERAL**

Until some trustworthy persons arrive from Germany, we will not know the full story of what took place, but it seems clear now that any prospects of an armed military revolt growing out of the Putsch against Hitler have been crushed. I am inclined to believe that the Gestapo probably had a good deal of prior information about some of the persons involved, and were ready to strike and to strike hard. Himmler was probably glad to have an opportunity to do this before the retreating German armies were themselves on German soil, as it is far easier to deal with the Haidnerei than it would be to deal with the troops fresh from the defeats in the East, West, and South. But, in any event, a good deal of benefit to the Allied cause can result, as this attempt at revolt should help to undermine the will of the German Army to keep up the struggle. Obviously, an attempt is being made in Germany to play down the importance of those who were alleged to be in the plot, and therefore our tactics should be just the opposite. The personality of Beck gives us a good opportunity. He was a man of the highest military attainment, who enjoyed great respect from his colleagues, and who at the same time from pre-war days refused to play along with Hitler's wild

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program of military equipment. Zeitzler, too, is a figure who can be used, as no one believes the story of his illness. Keitel's position is still obscure, but I am inclined to doubt the story that he was implicated in the plot. Apparently Hagemann, too, had nothing to do with it, as according to excellent reports, he is undergoing a serious eye operation at Breslau. This attempt to overthrow Hitler was largely engineered by men who desired a western orientation of German policy, even though apparently they received no encouragement from the West, and acted on their own initiative entirely. The next attempt to overthrow the Hitler regime from the inside is likely to come from an eastern oriented group, possibly after a part of East Prussia is occupied and a German government ala Seydlitz is installed there. It is probably that the failure of Beck and his friends will still further increase the influence of Russia in Germany and somewhat decrease the influence of the West. Russia has throughout played a more realistic policy in dealing with the internal German situation than has either the United States or England, and it is possible that, from now on, the Seydlitz Committee will increase in importance and have a larger scope of action. This is a development we should not underestimate, particularly now that the western-oriented dissident group in Germany, in and outside of the army, has received a serious, if not a fatal setback."

William J. Donovan  
Director.

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 23, 1944

FROM USRL 712, LONDON

XXX	PRIORITY
	ROUTINE
	DEFERRED
IN 15361	

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

**DISTRIBUTION**FOR ACTION  
SIMPSON (1-2)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON (3) X-2 (7)	FOR INFORMATION SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON (4-5) (6)
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**TOP SECRET****RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**

#62559. 109 and 154 from Tiflis. Paraphrase to Bern, #637-18.  
 Re: Bern-Washington #4109-4202  
 Bern-London #707  
 Bern-London #047-040

9 This afternoon we received from Broadway letter describing their 1942 relations with our G70. Broadway reports that they heard from Switzerland that on July 13 an interesting statement regarding a German movement obtained from G70 was telegraphed by 110 to Washington. Broadway also states people connected with this movement sent Lawyer Strassmann to Stockholm. Dansey knew Strassmann before was when he made good impression. Letter contains request for paraphrase of report by G70 to 110. This request, together with Bern-Washington #4109, raises question of making available BREAKERS material to Broadway. Unless you have some reason to contrary, we will make BREAKERS material available to Broadway immediately, requesting from them similar information from their sources. We have already requested (see our #89406) certain BREAKERS cables for SHAEF. Priority handling essential.

FOR: July 23, 1944, 2:10 PM

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

REC'D 7/22/44 6:23 PM

DATE July 22, 1944

TO UNRAVE, LONDON

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

QJF 13898

DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION

COOPERATION TO ORIGINATOR

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAORUDR, K-2

UNCLASSIFIED

**TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET**

077024. UNRAVE. To 105 from 154 and Carib, with reference to your #62494.

The following are the messages you request: (Here were inserted the text of Bern-Washington cables #4110-4114, #4085, #3423-3431 and #3432-3433.) Assuming that you have not received the above cables from Bern, please advise how you obtained identifying numbers.

**SECRET**

WAX FLH VTB JDW:AH

REC'D 7/22/44 9:53 PM

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INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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[The following text is a highly degraded and illegible document, possibly a list or report, with significant noise and artifacts. The text is oriented vertically and appears to be a list of items or names, though the specific words are unrecognizable due to the quality of the scan. There are some faint markings and what appears to be a checkmark or signature in the lower portion of the document.]

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JULY 23, 1944

FROM

UNCLAS, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTING  
CHIEF OF BUREAU

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, X-2

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PRIORITY

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III 15404

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**SECRET**

#62574. BULGARIANS. To 154 from Tiflis.

We want dates of following cables from Bern to you  
4110, 4111, 4112, 4113, 4114, 4085, 3423, 3424, 3425, 3426, 3427,  
3428, 3429, 3430, 3431, 3432, and 3433. What dissemination have  
these messages been given?

*Let me see  
These messages  
refer to documents*

**SECRET**

TOP: 7/23/44

10102

**FILE COPY**

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE	JULY 25, 1944	PRIORITY
FROM	ESTRAVIC, LONDON	ROUTINE
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	DEFERRED
DISTRIBUTION		IN: 15480
FOR ACTIONS	HEREIN	FOR INFORMATION
		DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGNUS, SI, X-2.

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**SECRET**

6226-7. BREAKERS. Action: 110, Bern (1083);  
Information: Washington.

We wish to extend our congratulations on the fine scoop you scored with your Breakers information. We secured the data contained in your 4110 and your related wires to Washington only following our requests for them. The resulting loss of time caused us difficulty at this end. In the future, please be sure to send us information copies of every dissemination of intelligence.

\* Indicator inserted by Message Center.

**SECRET**

Time: 7/25/44

4:40 PM

**FILE COPY**

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 23, 1944

RECD July 23, 1944 4:47 PM

TO: WASHINGTON, LONDON

PRIORITY  
 ROUTINE  
 DEFERRED

FROM:

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 13909

RECEIVED FROM TO 200000000

FOR INFORMATION:

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARY GENERAL, X-8

**SECRET**

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

40744. BRITAINS. P171a from 184, with reference to your #62874.

Cables in question dated as follows: 3483-3431 (dated May 16);

40127-4000, May 18; #4088, July 19; #4110-4114, July 19. Second

question in message will be answered Monday.



**SECRET**

WELFARE/1001

1001 7/21/44 5:00 PM

**FILE COPY**

INITIALS OF "UNLEADING" OFFICER

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OFFICIAL OFFICER'S FROM THE SECRETARIAT



# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: APR 23, 1944

FROM:

BORN, STEPHEN

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO:

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN 15458

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

LONDON

*Done AWS*

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,  
SHEPARDSON, X-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

BREAKERS. From 110.  
Action: 105, London, with reference to your #809.  
Information: Jackpot, Washington.

1. The Breakers series of cables contains the background of the attempted assassination of Hitler. Some of these wires were sent to Washington only, but I take it for granted that Washington informed you of them. In addition, I am treating various aspects of this affair in my daily phone reports from Born, which I recommend that Washington repeat to you as far as they believe you will be interested in them. In the future, every wire dealing with this matter will be duplicated to you.

2. The heart of the scheme was either to isolate or do away with the Penner and his staff and gain control over the Heimathaus through Ita and Riesler. The latter were participating in the plot, with the support of Theta and Zeta at General Headquarters. Various key people in the former 659 group were giving their assistance. In case their attempt proved successful, Laper and Tucky were to take over control. (By 110 Laper is the same as Lester.) The Berlin situation was to be held by Bearcat. It is my opinion—but I am unable to prove it—that the Gestapo had been tipped off in advance from the inside and acted with too much speed for the plotters when the attempt to kill Hitler with the bomb proved unsuccessful. Perhaps the courage of a number of plotters failed them at that time. (By 110 for 105: If you do not have all of the foregoing code names, kindly arrange to secure them from Washington.)

3. There is no reliable information here regarding any developments in the situation. I think that the majority of the newspaper accounts originating here and at Stockholm are simply rumors. Since the people in the plot seemingly failed to control a radio station at any time, I am inclined to believe that the affair never reached the proportions of a grave military revolution. However, I think that the general position adopted by our radio and news-

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**SECRET**

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

RECEIVED

**SECRET**

papers is right, for psychological factors, in emphasizing the affair. This is especially true with respect to stressing the eminence of the army leaders who were killed or removed, by the admissions of official Nazi sources.

4. It is likely that Labor was deeply involved in the plot. We will be able to learn what happened if Labor should be lucky enough to make his escape. I am in continuous contact with his associate, 670, but the latter does not possess any inside information. This is also the case with respect to the Nazi Legation here, even including General Horn, who has just come here to serve as Military Attache.

5. I am very eager to find out if Zulu had any advance notice of the plot, perhaps via 700. I refer to this in connection with the official German claim that a foreign country had played a role in the matter. This raised the possibility, if Zulu is not made the object of attacks on this ground, that they may try to involve me because of my dealings with 670 and Labor. However, unless the persons seized make revelations or some other people prepared memoranda, no evidence should be in existence against me.

With reference to #1261 from Washington, please refer to our #4095. 512 is Labor.

**ACTION**

**SECRET**

FORM 7/26/44 205P PH

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TOP SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION OF A TOP SECRET NATURE.

Account No: 100-100000  
Office or Branch: [illegible]  
Signed by: [illegible]

This document is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET material while it is in transit. On receipt of this document you accept that you are liable, according to TOP SECRET regulations, for the safekeeping of the material, and that you are responsible for its security and control. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to receive it, and you are required to have the information which is being conveyed with the safekeeping of this document by the person to whom it is being sent.

Received from the [illegible] Courier Receipt No. [illegible]

RECEIVED			DELIVERED		
SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME
[illegible]	2/13		[illegible]	2/13	
[illegible]	2/16	10:00	[illegible]	2/16	

This document is the property of the [illegible] and is loaned to you for your use only. It is not to be distributed outside the [illegible] unless authorized by the [illegible].

TOP SECRET

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JULY 24 1944

FROM USRAVIC LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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DISTRIBUTION

IN 15470

FOR ACTION

(1-0)  
SHEPARDSON

FOR INFORMATION

(3) DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, X-2,  
MAGRUDER. (7) (4-5) (8)

**RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER** **TOP SECRET**

**BREKERS.** 184 from Tiflis.

Breakers material has now been pieced together, including missing cables reported from Washington. I went over entire story yesterday with both General Betts and Winant. Betts believed that this matter, especially any military action, such as bombing Borchtesgador, was for decision at level higher than SHAEP. Leaflet campaign had already been initiated. Ambassador suggested we defer making breakers available to Broadway until after his conference with P.M. last night. He and we were concerned about possible Russian repercussions based on lack of true and complete story of our relations which are, of course, above reproach. To avoid any danger repetition last winter's Cairo story, we agreed that in some way true facts should be conveyed to Russians, and he is cabling State Department in this connection.

At conference this morning, Winant fully in agreement with us here to make breaker material available to Broadway. We are accordingly transmitting data with letter conveying our understanding we would receive reciprocal treatment. Now that intelligence available to Broadway and ourselves on combined basis, SO can work with SOE should opportunities operational activities present themselves.

Advise whether Breakers material is being considered in Washington at Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combined Chiefs of Staff or Inter-Governmental level. Betts indicated yesterday he did not believe Eisenhower had received earlier Breakers material through War Department or Combined Chiefs of Staff.

**TOP SECRET**

FOR: 7/24/44 2:54 P.M.

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CO.Y 3

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

SECRET 7/25/54 1500 PW

SECRET, 1500

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RECORD

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

**DISTRIBUTION**

OUT 14012

SECRET INFORMATION  
DIRECTOR, SECRETARIES, MAINTENANCE,  
3-4

**TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET**

SECRET. MESSAGE. 2111z from UK. In reference to your #62574.  
All were disseminated to Joint Chiefs, Joint Intelligence  
Group, Sec of State, Fletcher Warren and White House map room.  
Summary report including #4017 is being disseminated to same  
contacts plus President and General Marshall.

**SECRET**

SECRET 7/25/54 1500 PW

**SECRET**

PROPERTY OF THE ARMY OFFICE

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# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 24, 1944

FROM Bern, Switzerland

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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IN 15498

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

LONDON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, SI, K-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

**SECRET**

#160-61. BREAKERS.

For Jackpot and 105 in reference to your #817-819.

1. Provided Washington approves, I have no reason to oppose your handling Breakers as suggested.
2. I originally preferred not to have this information go to Zulu, because of his attitude as described in our #181 and #505. Realize that Broadway (see your #198) rather changed their position but #12 endeavored to establish contact with Zulu through us as soon as the Breakers movement started to grow. London rejected this when #21 offered it to them, although I made it obvious that I was eager to have their assistance in deciding upon such a tentative case.
3. I would be grateful for any particulars on the developments resulting from relationship with 670. This may have been through our 476 who had a contact like this before we entered the war.
4. Schacht's arrest as reported appears to be quite possible, since he and Lubar were great friends. On the other hand, Neurath was not at all popular with Breakers, so that if he really was arrested, it was not because he was concerned directly but because of the general purge.

TON: 7/24/44 11:31 PM

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RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

DATE: 11/11/50

REF: 1420

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

FROM: [illegible] FROM CARS AND 154 TO 104

ACTION: [illegible] INFORMATION: [illegible]

ON SUBJECT THAT HEREIN YOU SEND AN INFORMATION COPY  
OF [illegible] [illegible] CABLE. IN ORDER TO COMPLETE  
[illegible] AND INFORMATION REGARDING [illegible], [illegible]  
[illegible] TO [illegible] [illegible], WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE COPIES OF  
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] AND [illegible], AND [illegible] [illegible]

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: 1/13/48 TIME: 11:00 AM SUBJECT: OUT 10071

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: DEB, BETHLEHEM

C BUILDING DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

CONFIRMATION: SI

INTERNATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESUME/INT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

FROM: BETHLEHEM FROM CARIB AND 134 TO 109. ACTION: LONDON (100071); INFORMATION: DEB.



WE SUGGEST THAT HEREOFORTH YOU SEND AN INFORMATION COPY TO US OF EVERY OUTGOING BETHLEHEM CABLE. IN ORDER TO COMPLETE OUR RECORDS AND INFORMATION REGARDING BETHLEHEM, REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO DEB #10071, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE COPIES OF YOUR OUTGOING MESSAGES (017-619 AND #100, AND DEB #100 DEB 303).

CONFIRMATION

SECRET

DATE: 1/13/48 TIME: 11:00 AM

FROM: DEB, BETHLEHEM SUBJECT: FILE COPY



# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **JULY 15, 1944**

FROM

**ZERV**

TO

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

**DISTRIBUTION**

**IN 15609**

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

**LONDON**

**DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WAGRUDEK,  
SI, X-2**

**RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**

**1944-5. BREAKERS. ACTION: London;  
INFORMATION: Washington**  
In reference to your #779.

**SECRET**

The following additional information is from 667.

1. The important synthetic gasoline plants at Lauterecken are supplied with raw materials by the furnaces at Kirn on the Nahe. New Flak batteries installed on the Idarwald Hills protect the area. In the near future I expect to receive a report on the production at Lauterecken.
2. At Bretten, 20 kilometers east of Karlsruhe, there is a large air field.
3. At Hechingen, 20 kilometers southwest of Tubingen there are some new ammunition plants.
4. At Wimpfen on Neckar the building of flat bottom boats is being rushed. Please refer to our cable #4222-4224 to Washington. Wamer is Gebre and Lunter is Hauptmann Stehle.

**FOR: 7/26/44 12:26 AM**

**SECRET**

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 25, 1944

FROM

SECRET

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DEFERRED

IN 15604

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

11

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDEF,  
X-2RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER44221-1214. BREAKERS. ACTION: Washington  
INFORMATION: London

SECRET

1. Following is with reference to the last sentence of London-Washington #055, the first sentence of your #1857 and the last sentence of your #1861. I prefer to postpone giving additional particulars. (For reasons of security I am giving certain numbered persons new names. Although I am aware that this creates confusion, the situation is such that I wish to exercise the utmost discretion.) Subject has passed every test and I am confident of his reliability.

2. The Gestapo is now certain that 659 organization members were employed in the BREAKERS matter and this will speed liquidation and assimilation with SD. We have received trustworthy information to the effect that not long ago Schellenberg furnished the Chief of Swiss SI, Masson, with the names of the entire membership of 659 in Switzerland with the idea of having them expelled. However, we think it unlikely the Swiss will take any action despite the fact that Masson plays ball with Schellenberg.

3. It is our understanding that Lunter was seized before the coup. This man worked in close conjunction with Loper and was aware of the BREAKERS plans. Wauer, another member of the BREAKERS group who was associated with the 659 organization, received advance information of his impending arrest and disappeared from the scene.

4. On looking back over certain of my notes, I realize that before the capture my BREAKERS associates had advised me concerning Stumppenberg as I indicated in my #4199 but at that time we did not realize the part he would play.

TCR: 7/26/44 12:27 AM

FILE COPY

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1957  
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The third... was... in... the... of... the...  
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[Illegible text block containing several lines of garbled characters, possibly representing a header or introductory text.]

[Large illegible text block, possibly the main body of a document or a list of items, rendered as a dense field of noise.]

TO THE DIRECTOR, CIA

RE: THE ABOVE-NAMED SUBJECT

The first paragraph of the report  
 states that the subject was seen  
 in the area of the [redacted] building  
 on [redacted] street, [redacted] city, on  
 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]  
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 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

11/27/44

The above information was obtained from a  
 source who has provided reliable information  
 in the past and is being provided for  
 your information. It is noted that the  
 information is unclassified and is being  
 provided to you in accordance with the  
 provisions of the Freedom of Information  
 Act.

FOR

RECEIVED



A special broadcast night will be arranged  
 to German soldiers and workers giving directions how  
 each one of them could contribute to bringing about peace  
 by challenging orders, staying away from work, etc.

A special broadcast night will be arranged to German soldiers and workers giving directions how each one of them could contribute to bringing about peace by challenging orders, staying away from work, etc.

A special broadcast night will be arranged to German soldiers and workers giving directions how each one of them could contribute to bringing about peace by challenging orders, staying away from work, etc.

A special broadcast night will be arranged to German soldiers and workers giving directions how each one of them could contribute to bringing about peace by challenging orders, staying away from work, etc.

SECRET

RESTRICTED

ing down to their families, etc. So far, Russian propaganda has been particularly acute in making use of this opportunity. In this connection, the recent appeals of the committee, Freies Deutschland, to the German people, especially to the German soldiers and workers are outstanding examples. Up to now, we have had nothing as effective to offer. If this situation continues, the result may be that the Germans in their plight will turn increasingly to Russia, or to the committee Freies Deutschland, for leadership. This development is counteracted by the fact that Russian troops will probably be the first to reach German territory, thus opening up the possibility of establishing the first center for anti-Nazi activities upon German soil, possible under the auspices of the Freies Deutschland committee.

"I have just heard tonight from a good source that Berger, Hitler's co-worker, who was the only one who was immediately killed at the time of the attack on Hitler, was Hitler's double. Possibly Stauffenberg, who probably did not know Hitler well, made a mistake.

"General Guderian has not always been in Hitler's favor. In December 1941, he was ordered to make a tank attack at Tula, near Moscow. He argued against it on account of the cold. The Fuehrer ordered him to proceed. He did, and, in a few days, reported back to Hitler that all his tanks were frozen and what should he do next. Hitler did not show any sense of humor, and Guderian was out of a job for more than a year.

"There is what purports to be a statement from an anti-Nazi Prussian official, which just came to me: German soldiers on leave from the front state that morale in the East is about ready to collapse. The fighting morale has been so weakened that bloody altercations have taken place at different sectors

RESTRICTED

of the front. For this reason, special commands, called "El Destacamento de Comandos" have been formed. These special units are composed of men within command of the most faithful groups are maintained by the command and are. The captured groups are then transferred to the command units. The report continues that the higher level commands are already moving with their families to sparsely populated districts along the Austrian frontier. The operation believes that many units may flee to Spain when circumstances permit. Diplomatic baggage is being sent to Spain every day. So far, diplomats are taking large packing cases, and countless valuables have already been shipped from the front to that country. In south Germany, the population has been ordered not to have any conversations with soldiers on leave from the front, as their pessimistic stories are not to be believed. The Gestapo say that they tell things from their nervousness which are detrimental to the unity of the people."

William J. Donovan  
Director

RESTRICTED

SECRET

10 July 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Since forwarding to you per report dated 28 July  
on the subject of the plot, we have received additional  
information from our representative in Berlin which I believe  
will be of interest to you.

A reporter dated 21 July sets forth his estimate  
of the situation as of that date:

The newspaper report appears to have  
been the result of the planning and organi-  
zation outlined in my earlier communications.  
It has been indicated that certain men in  
the inner circles of the conspiracy, such  
as General Henninger, would be at the  
meeting when the bomb went off because  
they were en route for planning the bomb  
was a conjunction with a conference  
attended by many of the chief military  
leaders. One of the members of the group  
was identified who served as liaison  
between the older officers on active duty  
at General Headquarters and the younger  
group, formerly headed by Colonel von Helldorf.  
In addition, one of the members  
is identified.

The outcome of the revolt will depend  
entirely on the reserve army "leaders"  
and their willingness to follow Himmler or  
their chief or whether they will stick to  
their old commanders some of whom appear to  
be involved in the plot. Subsequently, the  
blood purge will be unsuccessful.

SECRET

SECRET

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A further document dated 30 July contains the following additional information on the plot:

"The core of the plot was either the... of the army... chief... through... chief of the... chief of the... Both... and... were... in the plot and were supported... of the... and... (with his removal... on 30 July). Various... were also... (It was through... that the... had... of... with the outside.)

"In case the... proved... the leaders... to take over... the situation in... to be handled... in early July... the... to prove... the... in... of... the... the... against... failed.

"Since the people in the plot... failed to control... as inclined to believe that the... of a... revolution."

On 30 July in another... in... as follows:

"Up to... today (30 July)... had not... any...

SECRET

**SECRET**

to receive letters, but even the customary  
acknowledgment, this is the first time  
in our history we have to do. There  
are several signs that if a revolt did  
occur, it would have several local offices at  
the end which would stand the sinking ship.

**William J. Donovan  
Director**

**SECRET**