

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 26, 1944

FROM

OSMAVIC, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, PACHUDER, X-2.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

#63407. BREAKERS. From Tiflis to 154 and 109; information: Bern. (#833) In reference to Bern-London #866-7.

As yet Winant has not wired the State Department about the Russian aspect of Breakers. He will not do so, in the light of 110's views. Therefore, we will leave in Washington's hands, any decision about the advisability of making a report to the Russians.

SI told that WGD cabled London not to inform Russians without his prior approval

ESP 7/27

SECRET

TIME 7/26/44 4:56 p.m.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JULY 26, 1944

FROM

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TO

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, SI, X-2.

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063417. MILAKENS. For 110 from Tiflis. In reference to 061-8 and 060-1 Born to London. Action: Born 063-5; Information: 164 in Washington.

1. On the 21st of this month Broadway was notified by 681 that on July 10 612 had departed from Switzerland for Germany without notification and that 670 had also left. Broadway informed us today that up until the 21st they had not heard anything from Zulu 681 for a considerable length of time. The same Zulu message indicated that you had notified 681 of the existence of your Bern-Washington 41101 and that you had received this information from 670 under the condition that the British would have access to it and that you advised 681 to instruct Broadway to procure the report from us. There is no evidence that Broadway secured any information from 670.

2. Broadway turned over some rather old information to us from Swiss sources in regard to a vague plan like Breakers in which a few of the same personnel are concerned. So far Broadway has not agreed to turn over all of their raw intelligence reports from Switzerland in regard to the activist movements, but we trust that they will agree to a mutual exchange of material.

SECRET

* Indicator inserted by Washington Message Center.

REF: 7/26/44 41-2 .71

FILE

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL SECRETARIAT

REC'D 7/16/44 (12) 71

NOV 24 1944

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TO: THE DIRECTOR

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, INCOMER, X-2

BT

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SECRET. MEMORANDUM. Subject: ID. With reference to your 2010-101 message message to London.

Regarding the above message, all your BEAUXIS communications have been turned over to State Department, complete, as soon as received. Your job have all involved merely the transfer acceptance of intelligence regarding the Centre of London to find some way out. You have done no bargaining of any kind. You are aware of all these facts and there is no mention on the record. It is possible that the little XING may have little chance but I do not feel that this will occur. Instead of 7 there will probably be 10 Bear Coats.

SECRET

MAX TCF THE THE
 OFFICE OF "RESEARCH" OFFICER
 THE CASE
 THE SECRETARY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **JULY 26, 1944**

FROM

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TO

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SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, X-2.

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#4242. ENIGMA. 109 and Jackpot.
This message has not been transmitted to London.

I am worried about the course of action pursued as shown in London #825-7. Please refer to my cable #866-7 which was forwarded to both Washington and London. I tried discreetly to state in that cable that it is my belief grave misunderstandings will arise if, in such delicate affairs, contacts must be handled by a number of people and finally reach the Department of State through Winant. Incidents may be created where none existed before and comparatively uninvolved matters may become distorted.

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London's message 62864, IN 19479

221 7/27/44 12:45 a.m.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 26, 1944

FROM

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TO

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, X-2.

SECRET

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#4242. BREAKERS. 109 and Jackpot.
This message has not been transmitted to London.

I am worried about the course of action pursued as shown in London #225-7. Please refer to my cable #236-2 which was forwarded to both Washington and London. I tried desperately to state in that cable that it is my belief grave misunderstandings will arise if, in such delicate affairs, contacts must be handled by a number of people and finally reach the Department of State through Evans. Incidents may be created where none existed before and comparatively uninvolved matters may become distorted.

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* London's message 62869, IN 1949

FOR: 7/27/44 11:45 a.m.

SECRET
IT IS FORWARDED TO YOU BY THE SECRETARIAT WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 27, 1944

FROM

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TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MACRUDEP, MEDTO,
SI, X-2.

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#34674. Toulmin to 109 and 154. With reference to your #37924 and #38164.

I have given careful thought to the proposals you made in the above mentioned messages. The situation requires a man who is thoroughly grounded in the intelligence field, and I feel that Winner is so qualified. He already is on very good terms with the Turks and the British. Simon has had little experience on intelligence work and the chief of the mission does not necessarily have to be an older man. With a staff of about 25 people, Winner will have no difficulty handling the administrative duties as he is well suited for this type of work. Simon would like to work with Gamble and is not too eager to go to Istanbul. I hope that you will concur in my opinions on this matter.

SECRET

TCM: 7/27/44 10:04 AM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: 2/27/44

RECD: 1/27/44 6:18 PM

TO: WASHINGTON, LONDON

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, X-2

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WASAKS, WASHINGTON, 154 and Carl to 105 in reference to your 2/27/44.

1. Re in General Ludwig Beck.

2. Transmission of memorandum of Bern-Washington #2718-22, dated April 7.

3. O.A. Gruppenfuhrer Heider, Police President in Berlin since 1935. All we know of group is in #4112-12.

4. 21 July: Indications that the Gestapo was watching developments and began repressive measures, thus forcing WSAKERS' hand prematurely. Army will probably cement SS control. WSAKERS is believed to be the only group able to stage a putsch before complete military collapse of Germany.

22 July: This putsch probably crushed by Gestapo; its failure may mean that more attempts will be made by a group oriented toward Russia.

24 July: Goebbels in now emphasizing limited scope of putsch, probably to counteract the somewhat alarming effect of original broadcast by Hitler, Goering and Hess. Plot probably had wider basis than the SSist staff. Our propaganda could be effective on following lines: putsch had wide Army and some civilian support; important people joined because they believed further sacrifice useless; now is the time to strike by sabotage, strikes, etc. In order to save Germany by overthrowing Hitler. Disciplinary Gatostruckungs Kommando formed to replace Dr. Frau. Pruss.

25 July: Indication of Nazi salute in Army indicates Hitler's delusion of Army disaffection, also growing SS authority and increased control over Army. Reports from Germany indicate Wehrmacht disaffection toward Hitler in order to split Allies and to salvage Army. Wehrmacht disaffection is not consistent to total disarmament of Germany.

WASAKS - 154

WASAKS - 105

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 2367

THE ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Description

The study analyzes the background of the attempt, the groups behind it and its consequences for the morale of the troops, the home front, and the post hostilities period.

27 July 1944

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 21 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

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FAIRER CP DOCUMENTS

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SECRETSummary and Conclusions

1. The attempt on Hitler's life was caused by the threatened annihilation of the field armies on the battlefield and the subordination of the Home (Reserve) Army to Hitler and the SS. The announcement, made one day before the attempt, that Hitler would assume command of the Home Army forced the conspirators' hand.

2. Differences in strategy between the Army and Hitler, and the growing friction between the SS and the Army, had renewed the antagonism between the Army and the Party which was outwardly overcome by the purge of Rohm in 1934.

3. There is no reason to believe that an attempt on Hitler's life was made, all the more so since it is certain that circles connected with Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck had approached the Allies to negotiate a separate peace.

4. Though the Nazis attribute the plot to a few generals only, some retired, and some active in the command of the Home Army, it is likely that the plot had ramifications among civilians.

5. The plotting group was drawn from those members of the German Officers' Corps who favored a Western Orientation; the plot expressed the desire of the German masses for peace, but did not represent a positive political

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program for post-war Germany.

6. No matter how narrow the basis of the plot may have been, it will be used by the Nazis for a large-scale purge of opposition leaders in the armed forces, industry, and the civil service.

7. The purge is likely to be successful to the degree that it deprives the potential opposition of its leadership and leaves to chance the emergence of a new leadership. This leadership may not emerge before actual military defeat.

8. Nazi controls over the field and home armies likely will be tightened to such an extent that the Army will become, in practice, a Party affiliate.

Field commanders probably will continue to fight under the new leadership though they may liberally interpret military necessity compelling surrender. While the uplifting effects upon the morale of the soldiers will be merely temporary, the morale of the officer corps may deteriorate. As yet, however, there are no indications that the fighting spirit has been impaired.

9. The full concentration of powers over the home front in the hands of Nazis may lead to a radical simplification of the administrative machinery, possibly even to the substitution of the Party Kreisleiter and Gauleiter for mayors, rural councillors and provincial presidents. The Economic

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Groups may be abolished and power over production may be vested exclusively in the Spear Committees. The nationalization of the means of production is unlikely.

10. The collapse of Germany may be retarded and the future formation of a centralized non-Nazi government for the purpose of surrendering, made difficult by the coup and the purge.

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SECRET**THE ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES****I. THE BACKGROUND****A. Principles for the Evaluation of German Morale**

An understanding of the political significance of the latest attempt on Hitler's life may be aided greatly by a recapitulation of principles for the evaluation of German morale. These principles have been evolved in a series of papers¹ and may be summarized as follows:

1. The ruling group in Germany is made up of four segments: Party hierarchy, Army leadership, industrial and financial leaders, and high civil servants.
2. In the course of the war, the political power of the industrial leadership and of the civil servants has diminished to such a degree that they can assert themselves only by attempting to influence either Party or Army.
3. Therefore, the Party and Army leaderships are the politically important factors of the ruling group.
4. Though the Army leadership is permeated by reliable Nazis, it still preserves an identity of its own.
5. Since the ruling group itself must make the political decisions its morale is determined by its own evaluation of the total political situation.
6. The morale of the subordinate strata is not conditioned by their thinking and feelings but rather by the institutional controls of Nazi society which compel the subordinate strata

1. THE NAZI STRATA IN NAZI GERMANY. Ed Weekly 23 July 1943.

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to work and fight no matter what may be their attitudes toward war and Nazism.

7. There is no potentially powerful revolutionary movement from below, although underground organizations of considerable strength do exist. These can become active only if a coup d'etat paves the way for the destruction of the Nazi controls.

8. Such a coup could not be expected before the invasion. It can come only if the Army leadership fears the loss of the German Army, which it needs as the instrument for domestic control and political bargaining with foreign powers.

B. Party and Army

The retention of the generals' control over the Army is the key to the understanding of the plot. Without an army which is independent of the Nazi Party, the Army leadership and its allies -- industrialists, bankers, Junkers, and high civil servants -- cannot possibly play a role during the collapse and the post-war period. The Army leadership cannot count again upon a Social Democratic leadership which would entrust demobilization and reorganization of the Army to the old Officers' Corps, encourage the establishment of a Free Corps, and protect the Wehrmacht from parliamentary control. If the generals lose Army control this time, they will be unable to exert any influence upon domestic developments or foreign policy.

It may be objected that these expectations of the generals are utterly without foundation, in view of the declared policy of the United Nations to destroy the German Army and

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to immobilize Germany. It is true that the United Nations have stated formally this to be their policy. But there is little doubt that the German generals hope and will continue to hope¹ until the opposite is clearly demonstrated to them, that they can create differences between the USSR and the Western Powers and thereby retain at least the remnants of their instrument. With regard to the USSR, they see some hope in the Free Germany Committee and the German Officers' Union. They also may remember Stalin's statement of 21 October 1942, when he said that he desired only the destruction of the "Hitlerite army." The Army undoubtedly will continue to hope to bring about some understanding between Germany and the Western Powers against "the danger of Bolshevism," which it will present as the major danger to Europe.

Futile as these hopes may turn out to be, it is likely they influence and determine the outlook of the generals, just as they shaped the policies of Hindenburg, Gröner, Seeckt, Reishardt, and Schleicher in the fateful days of 1918 and 1919.

The antagonism between Army and Party is of long standing. It first manifested itself on 30 June 1934, when Hitler purged Röhm and his group, which desired, broadly speaking, to transform the Army into an affiliate of the Party. On 30 June 1934, therefore, the Party was purged in order to maintain the organizational autonomy of the Army. In 1944

1. See also OGD Source #34017, 25 July 1944.

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The Army was purged in order to save the Party. If Hitler had not purged the Party in 1934, the Army would have become a Party formation; but if he had tried to do so, the Officers' Corps would have tried to overthrow him even then. Thus 1934 was the decisive year for the Nazi Party, a year that sealed the fate of Nazism as a revolutionary movement.

But the same purge that preserved the Army's organizational independence led to its political decline. The purge was not confined to Röhm and his followers, but also included the two generals who had done most to preserve the army under the Weimar Republic -- von Schleicher and von Bredow. The Army leadership accepted this development and thereby subordinated itself to National Socialism. Step by step the influence of the conservative Officers' Corps was undermined, and subservient Army leaders took charge.

While this change tended to subordinate the Army politically, a new antagonism arose over the question of strategy. This difference was clearly brought out in a speech by Colonel General Ludwig Beck delivered in 1938 on the 125th anniversary celebration of the Military Academy.¹

"It is the imperative demand that military questions should be treated back in their inner coherence to their origins in systematic intellectual labor, penetrating the problem step by step. That demand must be fulfilled, today more than ever before, by every one who desires to lead. Only its fulfillment can give the necessary basis for the responsibility, independence and initiative of the leader.

1. Quoted from H. Hoffmeyer, The German Army, Washington, 1944.

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"Such systematic thought must be carefully learned and exercised. To that end above all these years at the Academy are meant to contribute. Nothing could be more dangerous than to follow sudden inspirations, however intelligent or brilliant they may appear, without pursuing them to the logical conclusions, or to indulge in wishful thinking, however sincere our purposes. We need officers capable of systematically following the path of logical argument with disciplined intellect to its conclusion, strong enough in character and nerve, to execute what the intellect dictates.

"The coup d'oeil, the so-called lightning-like grasp of a momentary situation, formerly so highly praised, can certainly continue to be of importance in many situations in land warfare. In general, however, it must be considered of less importance, at least in the higher regions of leadership, than an understanding of the situation matured out of an intellectual penetration endeavoring to exhaust all possibilities...."

This speech reveals, perhaps better than the history of the various campaigns, the profound differences in the strategic approach of the conservative generals and of Hitler. It is undoubtedly Hitler's strategy on the Eastern Front that has led to the annihilation of the German field army. This must have created an ever-growing antagonism between the Party and the generals, exemplified by the retirement of many leading generals (see appendix I) and supported by a huge number of intelligence reports (see also below page 7).

The attempt on Hitler's life can be understood best if it is assumed that the Army leadership is primarily concerned with the preservation of the Army as its instrument. Such a situation now prevails. The field army is exposed to annihilation on the battlefield. Every general officer likely

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It is realized since 6 June 1944 that nothing can prevent military defeat.

All that will remain to the army leadership is the Home (Reserve) Army. Just the New York Times published on 23 July, one day before the attempted assassination, the statement that Himmler was to be appointed dictator of the Home Front and head of the Reserve Army, with the power to appoint and dismiss generals. Such a measure, which was decided upon long before the attempt on Hitler and thus was well known to the army officers, threatened to deprive the Army leadership of its control of the Home Army, consequently leaving the leadership without any bargaining power.

It is against this background -- threatened annihilation of the field army in battle and loss of control of the Home Army by subordination to the SS -- that the attempted coup may be analyzed.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTEMPT

A. Friction between the SS and the Army

The impending transfer of the Home Army to Himmler explains the timing of the attempt. Indications of this are contained in Hitler's speech of 2 July 1944, delivered at the funeral of General Dietl, and Goebbels' article in Das Reich of 7 July, in which it was stated that the only danger to the East was the SS in the home front. There were many more signs

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of the growing antagonism between the Party and the SS and the Army, apart from the basic strategic differences. The Army allegedly had tried to establish "security posts" in bombed towns throughout Germany in order to counteract SS domination;¹ General von Falkenhausen and Colonel General Friedrich Dollmann were replaced by SS officers,² and the SS and SA apparently were designed to play the lion's part in Hitler's "People's war" at the hour of military defeat.³

Mounting instances of acute friction and counteraction between Army and SS commanders end, not infrequently, with the recall or the death of Army generals.⁴ The reckless employment of SS troops, attributed to Army generals, particularly to Rundstedt,⁵ was said to have resulted in demands by the SS for a greater, if not the dominant, share in military leadership.⁶ Distrust by the SS of Army officers and demands for their dismissal were grounded in instances of defection among Army generals.

The ~~same~~ also coincided with what appears to be the collapse of a German plan of defense, apparently a slow withdrawal from the East and firm resistance in the West, with the West maintaining strategic priority for the time being. Dittmer indicated that this strategy has been revised owing to the "unexpectedly rapid Soviet advance," so that to some extent the center of gravity thus once more will be

- 1. OIA 200755, 19 July 1944.
- 2. OIA 200756, 19 July 1944.
- 3. OIA 200757, 19 July 1944.
- 4. OIA 200758, 19 July 1944.
- 5. OIA 200759, 19 July 1944.

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shifted to the East. According to secret reports,¹ a number of divisions from the strategic reserves have now been sent East, and more are promised.

It is quite possible that this recent change in strategy was unacceptable to those Army circles which have retained sufficient independence of judgment to recognize the handwriting on the wall.

Their action may be motivated by recognition that further sacrifice of troops entailed in this strategy would end in the complete destruction of German manpower, and of the German armies in particular. But it was the impending appointment of Himmler as dictator of the home front that forced the conspirators' hand.

B. The Peace Feelers of the East Group

It is also known that a group of Army generals attempted to establish contact with the Allies in order to negotiate a separate peace. It was clear, even at that time, that this peace feeler was made either with the connivance of the SS Security Service or that the Security Service was at least acquainted with it,² and allowed the generals to approach the Allies in order to get full knowledge of all the ramifications of the plot. It also may have been the threatened exposure of their activities which compelled the plotters to act. This is likely in view of the fact that Gundermann's statement to the foreign press seems to imply that General Beck was shot before the attempt on Hitler was made.³

1. ~~SECRET~~ 10 July 1944.

2. ~~SECRET~~ 10 July 1944.

3. The Germans asserted, however, on 27 July 1944, that Beck committed suicide. (See below). ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

3. The Identity of the Plotters

It is much more difficult to determine the identity of the plotters and their backers. The Nazi spokesmen endeavored to create the impression that "only a small clique of inconspicuous officers"¹ had made the attempt. Goering² narrows it down to "a miserable clique of former generals who had to be ousted...because of a leadership as cowardly as it was incompetent."

Very soon, however, emphasis was shifted from retired to active generals. The statement from Berlin to the European press admitted that active officers "holding important positions in the reserve"³ were not only concerned in, but had actually inspired, the plot. Colonel General Heinz Guderian, the new Chief of Staff, finally laid the responsibility to a "few officers, some of them on the retired list,"⁴ thereby admitting the majority were active officers. Goebbels finally laid responsibility⁵ for the leadership of the plot on a colonel general, retired many years ago (apparently Beck) and another colonel general removed from the Eastern Front because of cowardice.⁶

1. ~~SECRET~~ to Hitler, 21 July 1944.

2. ~~SECRET~~ Daily Report, 21 July 1944, p. OCA 3.

3. ~~SECRET~~ Daily Report, 22 July 1944, p. OCA 6.

4. ~~SECRET~~ Daily Report, 21 July 1944.

5. ~~SECRET~~ Daily Report, 27 July 1944.

6. ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ Public identified today (27 July 1944) the following conspirators:

Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck is said to have committed suicide.

Col. Gen. Ulrich Hoyer is awaiting trial. Hoyer, who was Chief of Staff to Field Marshal v. Rundstedt, was retired in 1941.

General Heinrich Giebert, Chief of the General Army office was court-martialed and shot.

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The reasons for this change in emphasis are not hard to discover. The death or execution of active officers could not be hidden and had to be justified. As a consequence, their participation in the plot had to be established. According to Gorman statements, therefore, the plot was confined exclusively to officers, namely, retired generals and members of the Home Command.

If Beitzler really was among the plotters, he may have been planted there by the Nazis.¹ This would explain his temporary dismissal. To the list of those who were probably purged may be added the name of General Georg Thomas, Chief of the War Economy and Armament Office of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Up to the time of Speer's ascendancy, Thomas was the key controller of the Nazi economy. Since 1942 he has continually lost power to Speer and his Armament Office was incorporated into the Speer Ministry, while Thomas himself has been made subject to Speer's orders. Thomas is the outstanding liaison officer between the Army and the leading industrialists.

Appendix I gives a list of the leading German generals who have been retired since 1938. Appendix II contains the names of the major officers in the Home Command. There is little doubt that General Beck participated in the preparation of the Plan, although it is doubtful that he plotted the

Plan (see also 19504, 14 July 1944, differs from this interpretation.

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assassination of Hitler. Deputy Press Chief Suendermann's speech to the Foreign Press¹ seems to imply that he was shot before the attempt was made.

There is no hint in German statements that civilians were in any way involved in the Putsch and the attempted assassination. And yet this appears likely. The aim of the Putsch was not only the assassination of Hitler, but also the assumption of governmental powers by the plotters in order to surrender to the Western Powers. If this is assumed to be true -- and available intelligence supports this conclusion² -- civilians must have participated in the preparation of the Putsch. Without the active cooperation of leading civil servants, and possibly of industrialists, the generals could not have assumed control of the huge governmental machinery that is necessary to install a new national government. The fact that the Germans have not admitted the participation of civilians may mean either they are not cognizant of this (which is doubtful), or they are reluctant to admit the extent of the opposition to the regime. In addition, by mentioning only generals in connection with the plot, the Nazis made it possible to shift the burden of the defeat on the Eastern Front from Hitler's strategy to treason by Army officers. This point will be elaborated later.

1. ~~SECRET~~ Report, 21 July 1944, p. CCXV 5.
2. ~~SECRET~~ Report, 21 July 1944.

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D. The Political Character of the Conspiratorial Group

The members of the conspiratorial group did not represent a positive political program for Germany save on one point: surrender to the Western powers in order to save the Army. They clearly counted upon what they consider "natural affinity" between Germany and Western culture and society, fear of Russia, in spite of all declarations to the contrary, and aversion to a German revolution which may spread and infect Europe. The group thus "gambled on what they conceived to be latent intentions of the Western Powers and the 'hidden' antagonism between the Western Powers...." The group was "favorably disposed to the military occupation of Germany by the Western Powers."¹

The group was probably drawn from those favoring the so-called Western Orientation of German foreign policy,² which was formulated most clearly by the late General Max Hoffmann³ as against those favoring an Eastern Orientation (the late von Seeckt, von Brockdorff-Rantzau, von Kuhlmann, and a large number of active generals).

But apart from its hope to sell itself to the West for what it believes to be the ultimately necessary war against the USSR, the group represented nothing except bankrupt generals, nationalist intellectuals, and (possibly) nationalistic Social Democrats and civil servants. This

1. All quotations from The Morale of the German Ruling Class, 21 April 1944, pp. 11-12.
 2. The German Ruling Class, 21 July 1944.
 3. For details see The First German Committee and the German People, Oct. 8 August 1943, pp. 13-14.

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It is also implied that the group would not have found backing if it had succeeded in its future. The desire for peace is believed to be so intense in Germany that any group, no matter how compromised, would have found almost universal acclaim if it succeeded in ending the war, though its power would have vanished rapidly once peace was declared. The extermination of the group thus does not impede the political regeneration of Germany.

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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATTEMPT

A. The Issue of Opposition Leaders

No matter how narrow the basis of the plot may have been, there is little doubt that it will be the occasion for a large-scale purge of generals, former political leaders, and possibly of industrialists, bankers and high civil servants. One statement in the Goebbels speech of 26 July 1944 indicates that there is to be a wholesale purge. Goebbels, when reporting his instructions to the Commander of the Berlin Guard Battalion, Major Heiser, added: "Immediately after the end of my speech officers and soldiers take up their machine pistols and rifles to get them ready to settle accounts."

Intensified attempts to exterminate the active or potential opposition were reported for some weeks prior to the attempt. These purges, of course, never were publicized. The generals' plot provides the opportunity of carrying out large-scale purges which could not possibly be hidden from the German people, but which can now not only be brought into the open but even given a convincing and rational justification.

Though it is likely that the purge will affect equally the numbers of the Western and Eastern orientation within the Officers' Corps, the influence of the Easterners undoubtedly will increase. This is due to two factors. The Eastern

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 July 1944.
 2. Paraphrased by the author.

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orientation has many more adherents, especially in view of the influence of the late General von Seeckt. Besides, in the Free Germany Committee and the German Officers' Union, the Easterners already possess a rather strong organization abroad, staffed with well-known officers (see appendix III). This fact, together with the possible rise of Communist movements in the post-hostilities period (see below), is likely to cause an Eastern orientation of important strata in the German people unless the post-hostilities policy of the USSR is held primarily responsible for the deprivations of Germany.

To some extent, the pattern of 30 June 1934 likely will be repeated. The 1934 pattern means that the Nazi leadership will publicly admit only a very limited purge while it actually will attempt to exterminate all those who could possibly organize resistance. The purge by no means will necessarily be confined to army officers and the potential revolutionary opposition.

There are, of course, very good reasons why the Nazi leadership cannot possibly admit that the plot has broad ramifications. To do so would be to admit the instability of the regime, and thus, while Germany is enduring one military defeat after another, to invite mutinies and desertion. The tightness of domestic controls will prevent the people from learning the extent of the purge (years passed before the seriousness of the 1906 purge was known in Germany -- if it is known even now).

1. There are already reports of the execution of Rohacht, von Haeuth, and members of the Stauffenberg family.

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Each local incident of the purge thus can remain isolated and justifiable, and the picture presented by the Nazis (a plot confined to a few) may thus be believed.

B. The Success of the Purge

Was opposition, actual and potential, now been purged effectively? This question cannot be answered with certainty, since two major factors are unknown: The strength of the opposition and the extent of the purge. But it is safe to assume that the rise of a new opposition within the Army leadership has been made much more difficult, while the joining of industrialists and high bureaucrats is now unlikely in view of the fear that the purge is likely to create among this group. Even those who have considered joining a Putzsch are now likely to submit declarations of loyalty. They will probably avoid even the slightest indication of a conspiratorial spirit.

On the other hand, it is impossible to annihilate the potential opposition without crippling the Army, state, and industrial machines in so doing. There can be no doubt that the High Officer Corps and many high civil servants and industrialists are overwhelmingly conservative, though their great majority is non-political in the sense that it merely obeys the orders of a duly constituted central authority. Had the coup been successful, the bulk of the High Officer Corps, civil servants and industrialists would have been likely to follow the new leadership. As the situation now stands, this potential reservoir of opposition has been deprived of a

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leadership which alone would have been capable of transforming oppositional feelings into concerted action.

At the same time, it must be kept in mind that without a previously successful army coup, no successful revolution from below could have been expected.

C. The Effects on Army Morale

The outcome of the coup and purge is the tightening of Nazi controls over the armed forces, which probably will now lose their identity and become, so to speak, an affiliate of the Nazi Party. Symbolic of this is the imposition of the Nazi salute on the armed forces. The Reserve Army seems destined to be thoroughly Nazified. It was, in the Wehrkreise (corps areas), commanded by older and often re-activated generals who were strongly imbued with the traditional spirit of conservatism and constituted the most powerfully entrenched army bureaucracy. They likely are to be removed and probably will be replaced by the Higher SS and Police Leaders whose jurisdiction tallies with that of the Wehrkreise.

What will the reaction of the remaining officers be? It is most likely that they will continue to fight -- with the one reservation mentioned below.

There are a number of reasons for this:

The first is inherent in the pattern of army organization and in the army tradition. Rebellion of the army against civil authority is, of course, the exception. Very few officers have the courage to risk their lives in this way; the great

1. Tables and Plans in Order of Battle of the German Army, February 1944 (GIB), pp. 85-89.

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majority fight as long as a central authority exists and orders it to fight. The central authority not only exists but is not outwardly stronger than before. Considerations of pure self-interest must not be forgotten. German officers have increasingly become civil servants eager for promotion and anxious for pensions.

The second question is whether field commanders will surrender with their army units before the military situation compels them to do so. This appears unlikely. This view is based on the case of General Hoffmeister, recently captured by the Russian army. It seems clear that Hoffmeister had either some kind of contact with the Free Germany Committee and the German Officers' Union at Moscow or was acquainted previously with the aims of the Moscow organization. It is evident from his broadcast to the German army in the East that he was genuinely critical of Hitler's strategy and was in complete opposition to his leadership. And yet his broadcast reveals clearly that in spite of his probable contact with the Seydlitz group, and in spite of his opposition to the personal strategy of Hitler, he fought until the military situation compelled his surrender. Military honor and tradition, thus will make it unlikely that generals will surrender except under military necessity.

But the coup and the purge are most likely to influence their estimate as to what "military necessity" is. Prior to the coup, the generals fought bitterly because the whole army leadership appeared united in the determination to fight to

1. New York Times, 20 July 1944.

SECRET

the finish. Now it is being demonstrated to them that Germany's outstanding military leaders -- whose patriotism, experience, and skill are beyond doubt -- have abandoned hope and have admitted that nothing, save a miracle, can avert complete military disaster for Germany. They say now come to believe that their own contribution to the fight matters little, and they say now interpret the term "military necessity" rather liberally and surrender without putting up a last-ditch fight.

It is difficult to judge whether the morale of the Army has been adversely affected, or will be impaired within the near future. The common soldier may actually experience a certain upswing. He may even believe that the defeat in the East was due to treason rather than faulty German strategy and Russian superiority. If this is his reaction, then he will be compelled to revise his views if he is ordered to withdraw further.

In the Officers' Corps, the number of Nazis among the junior officers is very high, but is fairly small in the upper ranks. The coup and purge unquestionably will impair morale. The uncertainty about the ramifications of the plot is likely to create distrust among the Officers' Corps; fear of denunciation will grow, and initiative will be further crippled because responsible commanders will shrink from any strategic and tactical decision not approved by the Party, lest it be attributed to a treasonable spirit.

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There are, however, no indications as yet that the fighting spirit has been impaired, though the Nazis tend to create this impression. Lt. Gen. Dittmar's talk attributes the defeat in the East at least partly to treason. "We are," he said, "far from wanting to deduce the development of the situation in the East ¹only² from detrimental influences exerted by the traitors... For that their circle was too small and its impact on the whole organization of the army not great enough." The dilemma of Nazi propaganda is clearly revealed here. Part of the blame for the defeats is shifted from Hitler's strategy to the plotters, but the whole responsibility cannot be attributed to them without admitting wide and deep ramifications of the plot.

D. Consequences for the Home Front

The direct consequence of the abortive coup is the full concentration of all powers in the hands of the triumvirate of Himmler, Göring, and Goebbels as manifested by Hitler's edict of 26 July 1944. Further labor mobilization will deprive the civilian population of even the barest conveniences, will make it impossible to replace even the most primitive objects destroyed by air warfare. Many administrative offices are likely to be closed, the Economic Council may be dissolved, and

1. NBC Daily Report 26 July 1944, p. H 4.
2. Emphasis supplied.
3. Text in New York Times, 26 July 1944.

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SECRET

sole responsibility for war production may be given to Speer's Committee and Hinge. This is probable in view of the praise which Goebbels heaped on Speer. The ascendancy of the Gauleiter over the traditional administrative agencies may culminate in the complete abolition of many administrative bodies. It is likely that Krause will become mayors and Lamotte, and such offices as that of the provincial presidents may be replaced simply by the Gau administration.

Though Goring and Goebbels appear to share power with Himmler, they are, in reality, his subordinates and it will be their duty merely to implement his decisions on policy.

Will Himmler aim at nationalization of the means of production? Will he try to institute a system of National Communism in order to stimulate production? This appears unlikely. Himmler and the SS long since have ceased to attack industrialists. The Speer organization and the Goring combine are permeated with SS leaders who have close links with business. Robert Lay referred to the plotters as "German counts," "criminal members of the nobility" and to the "reaction" but made no mention of industrialists and bankers. Besides, it would be disastrous to undertake a large-scale program of economic reorganization at a time when every ounce of manufactured war material counts. All that can be expected, therefore, is a radical elimination of many administrative control agencies.

Time, 27 July 1944.
 The New York Times, 27 July 1944, pp. 1-11.
 Daily Report, 25 July 1944, pp. 3/4.

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large-scale expropriations can only be expected as a last desperate attempt to organize a levée en masse for which the enthusiastic approval of the worker would be needed.

2. The Pattern of German Collapse

The coup and purge are likely to change the pattern of collapse. This aspect exceeds the scope of this paper and therefore will be treated very briefly:

It has heretofore been assumed¹ that fighting is not likely to take place on German soil because generals leading a successful Mutiny would depose the Nazi leadership and sue for peace. This now appears less likely. It can now be assumed that the Nazi leadership is committed to a fight to the finish and will not hesitate to make Germany a battlefield. But it is doubtful whether this will be possible.

It is questionable that the Nazi leadership will be successful in achieving its three major tasks:

- To prepare and execute an orderly retreat;
- To keep the masses of workers from striking;
- To prevent the surrender of army corps commanders with their armies once this state of the war is reached.

Tentatively, the following development may be envisaged when German territory is invaded in the West and East, or if in the East, large-scale invasions are made on German territory, strikes are likely to break out.

I. The Process of German Collapse R & A No. 7477, 4 December 1943.

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It is doubtful that they can be suppressed. These strikes may not be revolutionary, but merely defeatist. The armies will try either to hurry home or, if obstacles exist, surrender without centralized command. There will then be no central authority unless the Nazi government itself surrenders and Germany will be in a state of chaos.

The consequences of the abortive coup may well be the rise of National Bolshevik movements in the post-hostilities period. The problem which the Nationalist movement faced in 1918 and 1919 will arise again. To the genuine Nationalist youth in Germany, the solution of the problem after the defeat of National Socialism will be very different from what it was after 1918. The Nationalist groups may point to the enormous internal and external strength of the USSR. They may attribute this strength to the fact that the bourgeoisie has been eliminated in Russia and that, while the Nazis talk about the People's community, the Russians have established it by the extermination of their own industrialists, bankers, Junkers and middle classes. These groups, therefore, may attempt to ally themselves with the German working classes, hoping to swing them in a Nationalistic direction. They may strive to bring about a reconciliation of Nationalism and Communism and orient their policy towards an understanding with Russia, hoping that with Russia's backing Germany can be restored to the position of a great power.

1. For details see The First German Republic and the German People, R & A, 6 August 1943, pp. 6-13.

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INDEX I

Leading German Generals Retired Since 1938¹

<u>Name</u>	<u>Year Retired</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Year Retired</u>
Becher, Paul	1944	v. Bockell, Günther	1941
v. Basse, Hans	1944	v. Brauer, Karl	1942
v. Blomberg, Werner	1938	v. Bittkammer, Alfred	1942
Blumentritt	(?)	Babens, Friedrich	1943
v. Boek, Fedor	1942	v. Baudstedt, Gerd	1944
Bock (O.D. Inf.)	1933	Boeff, Richard	1943
Bracht, Georg	1942	Bohler-Artide Hubert	1943
v. Brauchitsch, Walther	1941	Bohntawind, Rudolf	1942
Brauh, Ernst	1944	v.d. Bohlenburg, Adolf	1944
Cochhausen, Friedrich	1942	Schwandtner, Maximilian	(?)
v. Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels,	1942	Helmskold, Carl	(?)
Prinz	1942	v. Sponck, Hans	1942
Fahrbacher, Wilhelm	1941	Stegemeier, Albrecht	1942
v. Falckhausen, Isidor	1944	Strass, Adolf	1943
Fassmann, Ernst	1942	Strassburg, Alfred	1942
Frohn, Fritz	1944	Ullrich, Wilhelm	1942
Geyer, Hermann	1942	v. Volland-Pookel von,	1942
Geyr v. Schweppenburg, Leo	1944	Wassendorf, Edmund	1943
v. Greiff, Kurt	1942	Wagner, Alfred	1944
Halder, Franz	1942	Weyer, Peter	1944
Hain, Hans	1942	v. Wietzenhain, Gustav	1942
Kappner, Reich	1942	v. Witzleben, Helm	1942
Kawisch, Leonard	1944	Wulfsberg, Erich	1942
v. Kipfer, David	1944		
v. Kuehler, Zuer	1944		
v. Lamb, Wilhelm	1942		
List, Wilhelm	1942		
Loedke, Erich	1942		
v. Luegensen, Bernhard	1944		
v. Lustig, Erich	1944		
v. Maestuffel, Oscar	1944		
Martisch	(?)		
Mets, Hermann	1942		
Mitt, Alfried	1942		
v. Nebelschuetz, Günther	1944		
v. Nidermayer, Oscar	1942		
Reinold, Irwin	1943		
Ritter, Hans	1942		
Ritter, Paul	1942		
Ritter, Hans	1942		

¹ Includes every retired full general or higher ranking general officer, but only a few outstanding officers of lower grade. General-Lieutenants or General-Majors

APPENDIX II

Chief Officers of the Home Reserve Command

Col. Gen. Fritz Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the
Replacement Training Army

subordinated are:

Gen. of Inf. Friedrich Olbricht, Chief of General Army Office

Gen. of Eng. Walter Kuntze, Chief of Training in the Repl. Tr. Army

Gen. of Art. Emil Leeb, Chief of Army Ordnance (brother of G.F. Marshal
Wilh. v. Leeb)

Gen. of Art. Osterkamp, Chief of Army Administration Office

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SECRET

**Appendix XII. HIGHER OFFICERS IN THE GERMAN OFFICERS' UNION
AND/OR THE FREE GERMAN COMMITTEE**

# Bueker, Rudolf (GLt)	# v. Lustrow, Kurt Juergen
x Buchner, Bernhard (Maj)	# Michaelis.....(GMaj)
x Buchli, Gerhard (LCol)	# Mueller, Ludwig (LtGen-18.AC, act'g 4th Army)
x Brett, Alfred (LCol)	# Mueller-Bualow.....(GMaj)
# Conrad, Alexander (GMaj)	# Schmidt, Hans (GMaj)
x v. Daniels-Spaengen, Maximilian (LtGen)	x v. Seydlitz, Walter (Gen.d.Art)
# Engel.....(GMaj)	x Steidel, Luitpold (Col)
# v. Erdmannsdorff, Gottfried (MGen)	# v. Steinkeller, Friedr. Carl (GMaj)
x v. Frankenberg & Proschlitz (Maj)	# Traut, Hans (GLt)
# Gahr (GMaj)	# Trowitz.....(GMaj)
# Gollwitzer, Friedrich (GLt)	# Voelckers, Paul (GMaj)
# Hoffmeister, Edmund (GLt)	
x v. Hues, Hans Guenther (Col)	
# Klemm, Hans (GMaj)	
x Korbes, Dr. Otto (GMaj)	
x Kuer, Walter (Col)	
x Lettmann, Martin (GArt)	
x v. Luedtke, Arno (GLt)	
x Lissmann, Louis (LCol)	
# Members of Union.	
# Signers of Appeal of 25 July.	

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 28, 1944

REC'D 7/28/44 7:00 PM

TO USZLAVIC, LONDON

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 1-362

COPIES TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SIMPARDSON, PRATT,
SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

05807. To Bruce only from 109, with reference to Bern-London
correspondence. ACTION: London INFORMATION: Bern
#2714-6 from Bern of April 6, 1944, that Bern did not feel that
there was any possibility of our helping HUKARNS, but instead
said most emphatically that we would inform the Russians of any
action we might take.

We will by no means let the Russians see the HUKARNS
correspondence. It can be easily seen, especially from cable
#2714-6 from Bern of April 6, 1944, that Bern did not feel that
there was any possibility of our helping HUKARNS, but instead
said most emphatically that we would inform the Russians of any
action we might take.

This is precisely the answer I gave through English channels
when, about a year ago, a group much like the HUKARNS, or possibly
the HUKARNS themselves, said they were ready to help us in the
West as a means of keeping Russia out. Simultaneously, it was
reported that a similar group was inclined towards the Soviet. I
took up this proposition with the British, and we concluded that
it would be wiser not to inform the Soviet, (1) because it might
arouse their suspicions of us rather than impress them with our
desire to be helpful, and (2) because there was some evidence
that the eastern-oriented group had already approached them with
their proposals.

I think events have already demonstrated the advisability
of avoiding involvement in this matter, and I consider that, if
the German battle it out inside Germany without help from us, it
will be of more benefit to humanity.

With reference to the type of information you mention in
your #124-7, I think it unsafe to use Vinant to bring it to
State's attention. This is only doing what Washington does anyway,
and increases the probability of leakage, as Vinant will present
his report to State through their channels, which may not handle

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS REQUESTED TO COPY ON REPLYING THIS CABLE
WITHOUT MENTIONING FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

TO: USIA/VID, LCR/VID

DATE: 7/26/44

TRANSMIT

This specific type of information as carefully as the channels that we have specially set up. The practice of taking this material to Harrit has also brought unfavorable comment from 170.

I wish strongly to emphasize that this is Washington's job, which we are doing by keeping those government agencies informed which have a legitimate interest.

FD: 7/26/44 11:48 PM

WSD

SECRET

BY INFORMATION TO GET AS INFORMATION THIS CASE
CURRENT ADMINISTRATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form of (Secretariat)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE July 28, 1944

FROM IERN

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

IN-15877

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION:

LONDON

FOR INFORMATION:

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, X-3, 81.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#P84-85. BREAKING. In reference to your #P14-35. Action London. Information Washington.

We do not know what gave SWID the impression that G70 had left here because this is an erroneous report. G70 did not specify that HILARIO data was to be made available to SWID. G12 and G20 signified to us that they were agreeable to making SWID contact if the latter wished it but SWID never carried this through.

In your #P17-19 you made the statement that HURMDWAY explained to you their contacts with our G70 in the year 1942. We have not been able to secure confirmation of this from G70. The 3rd item in my #P60-61 was dispatched simply to track this down because in 1942 our #76 was in touch with G70 and with SWID.

With reference to your #P17, to date we have no inside data on hand concerning the arrests following the Hitler affair and our information on this matter is from the radio and newspaper which you also have access to. We trust we will have some authoritative data in the near future.

SECRET

FOR: 7/29/44 12136 P. 4

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CARBON WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: APR 10, 1944

REC'D 7:00 AM

TO

DIR, BERN

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

OPS 14363

DISTRIBUTION

COOPERATION TO OPERATOR:

FOR INFORMATION:

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, STAFF
SECRETARIAT, HEADQUARTERS

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

AF81-4. To Bruce only from 109, with reference to Bern-London.
BREAKERS #2714-4. Actions London (#58507) Information
Bern.

We will be no means let the Russians see the BREAKERS correspondence. It can be easily seen, especially from cable #2714-4 from Bern of April 6, 1944, that Bern did not feel that there was any possibility of our helping BREAKERS, but instead said emphatically that we would inform the Russians of any action we might take.

This is precisely the answer I gave through Turkish Channels when, about a year ago, a group much like the BREAKERS, or possibly the BREAKERS themselves, said they were ready to help us in the West as a means of keeping Russia out. Simultaneously, it was reported that similar group was inclined towards the Soviet. I took up this proposition with the British, and we concluded that it would be wiser not to inform the Soviet, (1) because it might arouse their suspicions of us rather than impress them with our desire to be helpful, and (2) because there was some evidence that the eastern-oriented group had already approached them with proposals.

I think events have already demonstrated the advisability of avoiding involvement in this matter, and I consider that, if the Germans battle it out inside Germany without help from us, it will be of more benefit to humanity.

With reference to the type of information you mention in your #177-7, I think it unsafe to use Vincent to bring it to State's attention. This is only doing what Washington does anyway, and increases the probability of leakage, as Vincent will present his report.

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS CABLE
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT TO SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUN 11 1964

~~FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

TO:

TRANSMIT

to state through their channels, which may not handle this specific type of information as carefully as the channels that we have specially set up. The practice of taking this material to Soviet has also brought unfavorable comment from 110.

I wish strongly to emphasize that this is Washington's job, which we are doing by keeping those government agencies informed which have a legitimate interest.

TOD: 7/28/44 1148 P:1

SECRET

IT IS PROHIBITED TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CASE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JULY 29, 1944

REC'D

7/29/44 10:10 PM

TO

HEAD, AVIATION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 14422

DISTRIBUTION

REPRODUCTION TO ORIGINATOR:

FOR INFORMATION:

SIMPSON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

URGENT. BREAKERS. Glavin for Huntington.

You advised LHO of a valuable contract prior to his departure for Switzerland. Request that you send us cabled identification of this individual and his background at once.

SECRET

TIME: 7/29/44 10:10 PM

MAX PLANCK INST BERLIN

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS PROHIBITED TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARY

Germany, 1943

SECRET

10 July 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

The following is a message received by radio telephone from our High Representative:

"The replacement of the old military salute by the Nazi salute for the entire German Army is the most significant development of the past twenty-four hours, as affecting the German internal situation. It is significant of two things: 1) that Hitler is in no sense giving in to the Army, but is taking the offensive against any possible dissident members of the Army, and that he is determined to ascertain and dare to test out the extent of the personal loyalty to him in the Army; 2) following the appointment of Himmler as head of the Reichswehr, the decision with regard to introducing the Hitler salute is further evidence of the growing supremacy of the SS over the Army, and its practical control in the field. It is a daring move, which may have far-reaching consequences if the accumulated information we have as to friction between the Army and the SS, particularly in cross back of the line, is correct.

"The following report is typical of the type of information which is coming out of Germany these days: 'Nazi circles in Munich claim that the Wehrmacht is giving ground in Russia but retreating fiercely in the West because it is believed in Germany that there are grave differences of opinion between the Anglo-Germans on the one hand and the Russians on the other, particularly regarding the question of the future disarmament of Germany. It is believed that the Anglo-Germans wish the total disarmament of Germany, where the Russians do not wish this. The latter, on the contrary, would leave Germany a skeleton army, possibly in the hope that that army would become an adjunct of the Red Army. The Wehrmacht, which above all clings to the hope that it will not disappear, is apparently willing to facilitate a rapid Russian victory, so that the Russians, by entering first into Germany, would be in a position to impose the Russian formula as regards the future of the Wehrmacht.'

SECRET

SECRET

* 2 *

The recent plot to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime recalls an earlier approach which was made to one of our representatives in Istanbul. At the time it was clear that our relations with the Russians would not permit negotiation with such a contact. However, the incident is of historical interest at this moment as it now appears that the approach which was made by a well known lawyer, then attached to the German High Command as an expert on international questions, was in all probability a manifestation of the movement described in the memorandum to you dated 23 July 1944. A dispatch from our representative in Bern dated 31 July and quoted in our memorandum to you states that this man, to whom we have given the code designation Hermann, acted as the head of the younger group of officers at General Headquarters who participated in the conspiracy.

The proposal in essence set forth the willingness of this group (then known as the Hermann Group) to accept military defeat and occupation by the Allies in order to prevent a Russian invasion of Germany. An essential condition to the foregoing was the establishment of a line against the Russians based on Luxembourg-Flait. The group expressed its readiness to undertake military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale with a view toward ending Hitler and putting the way as speedily as possible for the Anglo-Americans

SECRET

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occupation of Germany. On the most important point of how this cooperation could be effected the plan was silent.

I directed our representative in Istanbul to enter into no negotiations with Hermann but to keep open the channel of contact. The American Military Attache was apprised of this contact and of the outlines of the proposal. Although subsequent to the delivery of the group's proposal to our representative in Istanbul further overtures were made and a meeting was requested, this meeting could not take place due to the arrest of Hermann who, so far as we know, has remained in custody.

William J. Donovan
Director

~~SECRET~~
copy of [unclear]
[unclear]

31 July 1941

Mr. James G. Dunn, Director
Office of Foreign Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jimmie:

Will you please see that the
Secretary of State gets the enclosed memo-
randum?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director

1 Encl. 1 Memo to Secs.
7-31/41

SECRET

SECRET

29 July 1944

Director, Office

14, 858
Handwritten notes and scribbles

~~MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY~~

The following is a message received by radio telephone from our Bern representative:

"The replacement of the old military salute by the Nazi salute for the entire German Army is the most significant development of the past twenty-four hours, as affecting the German internal situation. It is significant of two things: 1) that Hitler is in no sense giving in to the Army, but is taking the offensive against any possible dissident members of the OKW, and that he is determined to ascertain and dare to test out the extent of the personal loyalty to him in the OKW; 2) following the appointment of Himmler as head of the Heintueber, the decision with regard to introducing the Hitler salute is further evidence of the growing supremacy of the SS over the Army, and its practical control in the field. It is a daring move, which may have far-reaching consequences if the accumulated information we have as to friction between the OKW and the SS, particularly in areas back of the line, is correct.

"The following report is typical of the type of information which is coming out of Germany these days: 'Nazi circles in Munich claim that the Wehrmacht is giving ground in Russia but resisting fiercely in the West because it is believed in Germany that there are grave differences of opinion between the Anglo-Saxons on the one hand and the Russians on the other, particularly regarding the question of the future disarmament of Germany. It is believed that the Anglo-Saxons wish the total disarmament of Germany, where the Russians do not wish this. The latter, on the contrary, would leave Germany a skeleton army, possibly in the hope that that army would become an adjunct of the Red Army. The Wehrmacht, which above all clings to the hope that it will not disappear, is apparently willing to facilitate a rapid Russian victory, so that the Russians, by entering first into Germany, would be in a position to impose the Russian formula as regards the future of the Wehrmacht.'"

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

The recent plot to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime recalls an earlier approach which was made to one of our representatives in Istanbul. At the time it was clear that our relations with the Russians would not permit negotiation with such a contact. However, the incident is of historical interest at this moment as it now appears that the approach which was made by a well known lawyer, then attached to the German High Command as an expert on international questions, was in all probability a manifestation of the movement described in the memorandum to you dated 23 July 1944. A despatch from our representative in Bonn dated 21 July and quoted in our memorandum to you states that this man, to whom we have given the code designation Hermann, acted as the head of the younger group of officers at General Headquarters who participated in the conspiracy.

The proposal in essence set forth the willingness of this group (then known as the Hermann Group) to accept military defeat and occupation by the Allies in order to prevent a Russian invasion of Germany. An essential condition to the foregoing was the establishment of a line against the Russians based on Lemberg-Slobo. The group expressed its readiness to undertake military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale with a view toward ousting Hitler and paving the way as speedily as possible for the Anglo-American

SECRET

- 3 -

occupation of Germany. On the most important point of how this occupation could be effected the plan was silent.

I directed our representative in Istanbul to enter into no negotiations with Hermann but to keep open the channel of contact. The American Military Attache was apprised of this contact and of the outlines of the proposal. Although subsequent to the delivery of the group's proposal to our representative in Istanbul further overtures were made and a meeting was requested, this meeting could not take place due to the arrest of Hermann who, so far as we know, has remained in custody.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET
X camp detail

(cc to Hall + Marshall)

29 July 1964.

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the
attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

SECRET

7/19/44
SECRET
X copy of text
with individual

29 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The recent plot to assassinate Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime (about which I have sent you several reports) recalls an earlier approach which was made to one of our representatives in Istanbul. (You will remember that an approach was also made in Sweden, concerning which I wrote you on 20 March 1944.)

The approach in Istanbul was made at a time when it was clear that our relations with the Russians would not permit negotiation with such a contact, especially since the plan advanced involved an attempt to permit Anglo-Saxon occupation to the exclusion of Russia. However, the incident is of historical interest at this moment as it now appears that the approach which was made by a well known lawyer, then attached to the German High Command as an expert on international relations, was in all probability a manifestation of the movement des-

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

mentioned in the memorandum to you dated 21 July 1944. A dispatch from our representative in Bern dated 21 July and quoted in our memorandum to you states that this man, to whom we have given the code designation Hermann, acted as the head of the younger group of officers at General Headquarters who participated in the conspiracy.

The proposal in essence set forth the willingness of this group (then known as the Hermann Group) to accept military defeat and occupation by the Allies in order to prevent a Russian invasion of Germany. An essential condition to the foregoing was the establishment of a line against the Russians based on Leuburg-Filsit. The group expressed its readiness to undertake military cooperation with the Allies on the largest possible scale with a view toward ousting Hitler as quickly as possible for the Anglo-American occupation of Germany. On the most important point of how this cooperation could be effected the plan was silent.

I directed our representative in Istanbul to enter into no negotiations with Hermann but to keep open the channel of contact. The American Military Attache

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

was apprised of this contact and of the outline of the proposal. Although subsequent to the delivery of the group's proposal to our representative in Istanbul further overtures were made and a meeting was requested, this meeting could not take place due to the arrest of Hermann who, so far as we know, has remained in custody.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

SECRET

1 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

There follows a report on developments in Germany which you might find of interest:

"The German Minister in Lisbon was questioned by Calazar for an explanation of the recent developments in Germany. The German Minister told him that the German Army has split into two factions, one of which is controlled by the Nazi Party and the other by the Monarchists. He said that this difference of opinion has been evidenced by violence among the top officers and men of the Army, both on the Russian and Normandy fronts, as well as the internal uprisings in Germany which are still not fully suppressed."

William J. Donovan
Director

cc: Mr. Fletcher Warren

SECRET

14, 85
RESTRICTED

1 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following report was received via radio-
 telephone from our representative in Bern: 7-18-6 7/18/44

GERMANY

*Here are some reports which we have received re-
 garding the background of the German putsch against
 Hitler. Unfortunately, however, the information is
 scanty and for the most part still lies in the field
 of rumor.

*1. When Himmler was appointed Minister of the In-
 terior about a year ago, he is said to have given Hitler
 a list of over 50,000 names of high army officers, state
 officials, university professors, industrialists, finan-
 ciers, authors, newspaper reporters, and actors, as well
 as a few SS functionaries. There was really nothing
 against these people; nevertheless, Himmler's Gestapo
 had discovered that their political attitude was such that
 in case of an unfavorable development of the war, they
 would sympathize with a possible military revolt. Himmler
 had started the list after Stalingrad and presented it to
 Hitler when he was made Minister of the Interior, request-
 ing at the same time that he be given a free hand in
 handling of these people. They were all to be arrested
 the moment they should become a danger to the Nazis. It
 is considered quite possible that the attempt on Hitler's
 life has now been used as a pretext for taking action
 against some of the persons on this list. Who exactly
 is involved, we do not know. There are rumors around
 that the famous Professor Kauerbruch is among them. How-
 ever, it is interesting to note that in the last number
 of the German illustrated propaganda weekly, Signal, which

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

-2-

is circulated here, several pages were devoted to publicizing Sauerbruch, who remains as one of the German professional men of international reputation who can travel abroad freely and has indirectly been used for propaganda purposes by the Hitler regime. However, when last here in Switzerland, as I advised you, he made a number of speeches which were possibly not wholly to the liking of Himmler & Co. There are also rumors that Scheidt and von Neurath were imprisoned. The latter rumor may relate to the son, who was German Consul-General in Laganac, but who recently returned to Germany.

"2. The attempt against Hitler failed because the secret was not well kept. The Gestapo was informed and, while it did not know the details, it had a general idea of the plot and of the date fixed. This explains the rapid intervention of Himmler and the early arrest of some of the plotters. The circle of the plotters was too heterogeneous to permit the secrecy to be strictly kept. The fact that the coup was too much advertised prevented many generals from associating themselves with it and Generals such as Rundstedt and von Falkenhausen were not directly compromised, contrary to what is reported, as they did not have sufficient confidence in the ability of the persons concerned to take effective action. Of the active generals, it was probably General Fromm who was most deeply concerned. The Moscow Committee had no connection whatever with the plot, because the plotters were planning to overthrow Hitler in the hope of working out a peace of compromise with the West, whereas Seydlitz is playing exclusively the Russian game. It is reported that Seydlitz, when approached some months ago by friends of General Beck, refused to have anything to do with their plan, stating that, if Germany falls, she should fall on the side of the stronger party, that is, on the Russian side. Subsequently, it is reported, strict orders were given to the German Communists and to the underground Communist movement not to make any move and not to support a move which, according to Moscow's viewpoint, was des-

RESTRICTED

-3-

ting to fail. Consequently, the Communist organizations in Germany have not been affected by the failure of the plot, and there have been no serious arrests or executions in their ranks. Seydlitz' plan, approved by Moscow, is quite different. It is based on the formation in East Prussia of a Seydlitz government backed by a German army controlled from Moscow and formed out of deserters and prisoners in Germany. After that, the Red Army, plus the Seydlitz army, will together invade Germany, and the Seydlitz army will take over the civil administration as the advance progresses, attempting to bring about a popular revolutionary movement - that is to say, a revolution from below and not from above, as was planned by Beck and his colleagues.

"I want to emphasize that the two reports above are both unconfirmed, and I pass them on, but cannot confirm them."

William J. Donovan
Director

RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

SECRET

DATE

Updated

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

PRIORITY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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IN-16900

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, SHEPARDSON,
FRAPP, ISGRUBER

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#4305-7. BREAKERS: 110 to 1170. Revision, Washington. Information: 1004 only, London. With reference to your #10014 of last month and my #4870 point the course which future developments will take.

The above messages would seem to indicate that this business has been fully and competently settled. I am in complete accord with the plan and policy that you outline, and also agree that we should be forced to allow the Germans to fight it out within the country with the help from us.

I am, however, sorry to say that I have neither seen nor heard anything which might indicate that Russia will follow the same procedure, and I believe that the second item in my flesh of the 20th of last month and my #4870 point the course which future developments will take.

In the meantime, we should at least keep away from any action which might unduly jeopardize any who might still take part in anti-Nazi action of Western oriented tendency, even if we do not identify ourselves with them in any way.

I was for this reason stunned by the broadcast over BBC on the night of the 20th, in which they abused Bearcat and pictured him as a vicious anti-Nazi, and identified him as being among the un-disclosed leaders in the plot against Hitler. I am not in a position to apologize for Bearcat, and it may turn out later on that we shall want to investigate his history, but it still seems poor propaganda to give the participants in the plot a bad name and very unwise to reveal names until they are betrayed by German sources. I also think that unless Bearcat has already been taken, he may be abetting those who get away. I am certain that labor felt that the help Bearcat furnished was one of the essential parts of the BREAKERS action. I would like to know where the BBC got this information and what reasons they could have had for using it in the way they did.

7:11 8/2/44 1:23 a.m.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 3, 1944

REC'D 8/3/44 6:48 PM

TO

DIR, AID INFO

PRIORITY

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FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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COMPARISON TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

RELEASABLE

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MANILA, PHILIPPINES

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#53734. BREAKERS. Clavin for Huntington. In reference to our #52934.

In our above cable we only requested that you forward the background and identification of the person under discussion to us. We did not ask for contact with the man. Kindly forward the desired information by wire or inform us where the information is located at this end.

VAL. 1944 154 711

2001 8/3/44 11:23 PM

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REC'D 7/3/44 6:29 p.m.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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3 9-1476

OFFICE INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

ATTN: MEMBERS

Action: Bern #1913.
Information: London,
Carib and 150 to 110.

SECRET

1. In connection with your cable #864-5 to London, please send us some personal history information on [redacted].

2. In connection with your cable #874-5 to London, we would like more information about the person referred to [redacted].

SECRET

7/3/44 11:00 a.m.

WAS 116 30/11

REVALS OF "WILKINSON" OFFICE

TO BE KEPT IN CONFIDENTIALITY THE CLASS
IS TO BE KEPT IN CONFIDENTIALITY FROM THE SECRETARIAT

POSTAL SERVICES

August 1, 1950

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POSTAL SERVICE INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT

SECRET

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When you receive this post card filled to India, please send it to the
 Director, Secretariat, New Delhi.

If you receive this post card filled to India, we will be most grateful
 if you send it to the Director, Secretariat, New Delhi.

SECRET

OFFICIALS OF THE SECRETARIAT

POSTAL SERVICE INFORMATION THE CARD
 IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 3, 1944

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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IN-16368

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT,
MAGRUDER, X-2

~~SECRET~~

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#4300. BREAKERS. Action: Washington. Information: London.
With reference to our #4080. - *Shaw to 4/15/44*

The Nazi DNB has now announced that 1,000,000* marks
has been offered for information which will lead to the apprehen-
sion of Dr. Karl Goerdeler, involved in the plot against Hitler,
and who has since vanished.

*In newspaper
Magruder*

✓

Received as HILLION
TOR: 8/4/44 1:30 a.m.

SECRET

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SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MEMBERS GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

FROM : H. A. KIMMEL

SUBJECT: BRANDES AND KAPPA MATERIAL

DATE: 4 AUGUST, 1944

BECAUSE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH INDICATE THAT LONDON ACTION RE (BRANDES) TO BRANDES AND KAPPA MATERIAL HAS LED TO DUPLICATION AND SERIOUS JEREMONY TO SECURITY, MAY I AGAIN CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO LONDON CABLE NO. 6452A . WE ARE TODAY ADVISED THAT LONDON DISTRIBUTED A SUMMARY OF KAPPA MATERIAL TO THE FOLLOWING IN LONDON: WINANT, GENERAL BETTS, GENERAL MC CLURE, PHILIPPS, SIR CLAUDE DANSEY, SO LONDON; 1-2 LONDON.

IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO NOTE THAT SIR LAUDE DANSEY HAS BEEN DECLINED TO DISCREDIT BOTH THE MATERIAL AND THE SOURCE.

APPARENTLY AS A RESULT OF WINANT'S HAVING PRESENTED THIS INFORMATION TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OR POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF BRITISH ACTION THROUGH MALPAE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WE WERE TODAY CALLED UPON BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR INFORMATION IN REGARD TO GERMAN-ENGLISH NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION OF BELL DEALINGS BASED ON KAPPA INFORMATION. THESE INQUIRIES CAME TO US FROM AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD NOT RECEIVED KAPPA OR BRANDES MATERIAL FROM US AND WAS UNAWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAD ALREADY PRESENTED TO BERKE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE A RESUME OF CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS

SECRET

**From the Files of the Director
Please Return**

SECRET

- 2 -

INTERCOMMUNIST CABLE WAS ONE WHICH RECEIVED MOST RESTRICTED DIS-
SEMINATION TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCE. IT SHOULD ALSO
BE NOTED THAT A CABLE FROM THE LONDON EMBASSY TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT GIVING THEM A SUMMARY OF THIS INFORMATION CAME TO THEM
IN CLEAR TEXT. THE INDIVIDUALS RECEIVING IT AT STATE THEREFORE,
HAVING NO INDICATION THAT IT WAS SECRET, TELEPHONED ITS CONTENTS
TO OSS.

THE RESULT HAS BEEN A DUPLICATION OF ACTION ON THE PART OF
BANK PEOPLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE OBVIOUS SERIOUS
JEOPARDY TO THE SECURITY OF OUR SOURCE.

FOR YOUR APPROVAL, I SUGGEST THAT A CABLE OUTLINING THIS
SITUATION BE SENT TO LONDON TO EMPHASIZE THE REASONS WHY ACTION
ON BEHARRS AND RAFFA CABLES MUST BE CONFINED TO OSS WASHINGTON.

WAK

**From the Files of the Director
Please Return**

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Kintal

10 August 1944

Lt. Putnell

In connection with your memorandum of 4 August 1944 to General Donovan entitled, "Breakers andappa Material" I should like to call your attention to the last two paragraphs of cable # 58407 to London, dated 28 July 1944 (Out - 14368).

F. J. Putnell, Jr.
Lt. (j.g.) USA
Assistant Executive Officer

**From the Files of the Director
Please Return**

SECRET

FORM 8-44
Office of Strategic Services

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 5, 1944

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

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IN 16476

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

LONDON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAORUDER,
SHEPARDEON, X-2

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SECRET

#920. BREAKERS. From 110 to 105. Referring to London-Bern
#852. ACTION: London
INFORMATION: Washington

Please be advised that we are giving particular attention to all German records pertaining to the Far East situation. We are fully aware of the importance of the records referred to in the above message, and have been making preparations for speedy action, but have been unable to conclude to what extent the channels we have been relying upon have been destroyed by the roundup of the Breakers after the putsch.

TOR: 8/5/44 10140 AM

RRF

SECRET

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Form of Dispatch

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 5, 1944

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
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TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN 1653?

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FOR INFORMATION

FOR ACTION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON,
X-2

SI

~~RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER~~ SECRET

#4361. HEADLERS. Action: Washington. Information: London.

It would seem that the net is being pulled tighter around the HEADLERS group, in view of the information that the Nazis have posted a reward for Arthur Hebe following a like report on Goerdeler. We know a good deal about Hebe. He is an old Gestapo officer and Liber had been in touch with him for more than 10 years. Hebe was a clever but rather routine official to whom the methods of the Gestapo had sometimes been shocking. This accusation that he was involved in the Hitler plot would seem to prove that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

SECRET

TO: 8/5/44 11:54 PM

FILE 177

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE AUGUST 5, 1964

FROM OSTRAVIC, LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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IN 16519

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

RRHN

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, TAGRUDEK,
SI, X-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#65787-7 BREAKERS. Action: Born #857-858.
Information: Washington.
For 110 from 105, information 109 along
in connection with your #4305-7.

SECRET

1. This information came to me by way of General McClure of FID, who had received paraphrased parts of your BREAKERS messages without the source. FID now says that they placed the wrong interpretation on the recommendation in your Flash of July 22 to Washington and made the mistake of including Bearcat's name in proposal to the British Broadcasting Company for broadcast. In the future, there will be no more mention of him or of other individuals whose names have not already been made public.

2. FID regrets this misinterpretation and request that we stress to you the high importance in which they hold your information and the fact that they wish you to continue sending them your suggestions for purposes of propaganda.

SECRET

ON: 8/5/64 3:26 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE	August 7, 1944	PRIORITY	
FROM	SECRETARIAT	ROUTINE	
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	DEFERRED	
DISTRIBUTION		TR-10044	
FOR ACTION		FOR INFORMATION	
SI		DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, 7-2, WASHINGTON	

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

71370-9. BRUASHE. With reference to your 71933.

I am sorry that I do not possess any additional information regarding anor. However, I will try to obtain it for you. I cannot comprehend your request for more particulars about the first person discussed in our 7044-015 to London since it was my understanding that you possessed complete information about 670 and, in addition, had a great deal of information about 512. Is it possible for you to let me know precisely what you require, bearing in mind that at this time I would rather delay wiring about 512. The report today of the action taken by Army tribunal against Colonel Hamel (who you will remember took over after 659 was ousted) is of especial interest, since he was one of 512's and 670's principal contact men.

YML: 8/8/44 0:36 a.m.

FILE COPY

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET

X [unclear]
X [unclear]
X [unclear]
cc [unclear] Hall
[unclear]

7 August 1947

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

I think the President will be interested
in the attached memorandum. Will you please hand it
to him?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Clayton G. Cheston
Acting Director

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7 August 1944

X Copy d'Etat
X Heilmann
X Hitler
CC also to Hull
Marschall

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Our representative in Bern has just forwarded to us the following report which relates to earlier memoranda from this office to you on the recent attempt on Hitler's life:

The posting of a reward for Arthur Hebe following the posting of a similar reward on Dr. Karl Goerdler, former Mayor of Leipzig, is taken to indicate that the net is being pulled tighter around the opposition group responsible for the coup d'Etat of 23 July 1944.

Hebe is an old Gestapo officer. He has been considered a clever but rather routine official to whom the methods of the Gestapo have sometimes been shocking. It is reported that, for the past ten years, he has maintained contact with one of the Germans who served as emissary for the German opposition group mentioned in the OSS reports of 23 and 25 July 1944 on "The German Coup d'Etat". This association that Hebe was involved in the Hitler plot is interpreted as proof that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

A report of early July 1944 stated that a group associated with Wolff Graf von Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, had joined the opposition group described in previous OSS reports. Helldorf's group was described as being composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements

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SECRET

working separately from the Gestapo. The implications contained in this description, namely that elements in the Gestapo might be involved in the plot against Hitler, appear to be borne out by the present report.

Charles G. Cheston
Acting Director

SECRET

Handwritten notes:
K. [unclear]
K. [unclear]
K. [unclear]
CC of [unclear] FOR [unclear]
Hull

7 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL

Our representative in Bern has just forwarded to us the following report which relates to earlier memoranda from this office to you on the recent attempt on Hitler's life:

The posting of a reward for Arthur Hebe following the posting of a similar reward on Dr. Karl Corbiller, former Mayor of Leipzig, is taken to indicate that the net is being pulled tighter around the opposition group responsible for the coup d'etat of 20 July 1944.

Hebe is an old Gestapo officer. He has been considered a clever but rather routine official in whom the methods of the Gestapo have sometimes been shocking. It is reported that, for the past ten years, he has maintained contact with one of the Germans who served as emissary for the German opposition group mentioned in the OSS reports of 22 and 25 July 1944 on "The German Coup d'Etat". This association that Hebe was involved in the Hitler plot is interpreted as proof that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

A report of early July 1944 stated that a group associated with Wolff Graf von Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, had joined the opposition group described in previous OSS reports. Helldorf's group was described as being composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements

SECRET

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contained in this description, namely that elements
in the Gestapo might be involved in the plot against
Hitler, seems to be borne out by the present report.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

SECRET

8 August 1944

RECEIVED
AUG 11 1944
L. H. HARRIS
ACT FOR
MAY 1944

Mr. James C. Dunn, Director
Office of Foreign Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dunn:

I am enclosing herewith a memorandum
for the Secretary of State which has to do with
the continued sound-up of that group which re-
cently made an attempt on Hitler's life.

I would appreciate it if you will bring
this memorandum to the attention of Mr. Hall.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston,
Acting Director.

Incl. 1. Memo 8-7-44.

~~Primary SECRET~~
x Coup d'Etat
A. Weisler
A. Hertz

7 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

CC-1 PDR
Maxwell

Our representative in Bern has just forwarded to me the following report which relates to earlier memoranda from this office to you on the recent attempt on Hitler's life:

The posting of a reward for Arthur Nebe following the posting of a similar reward on Dr. Karl Goerdler, former Mayor of Leipzig, is taken to indicate that the net is being pulled tighter around the opposition group responsible for the coup d'Etat of 20 July 1944.

Nebe is an old Gestapo officer. He has been considered a clever but rather routine official to whom the methods of the Gestapo have sometimes been shocking. It is reported that, for the past ten years, he has maintained contact with one of the Germans who served as emissary for the German opposition group mentioned in the OSS reports of 22 and 25 July 1944 on "The German Coup d'Etat". This accusation that Nebe was involved in the Hitler plot is interpreted as proof that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

A report of early July 1944 stated that a group associated with Wolff Graf von Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, had joined the opposition group described in previous OSS reports. Helldorf's group was described as being composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements

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... separately from the Centago. The indication
contained in this description, namely that elements
in the Centago might be involved in the plot against
Killing, seems to be borne out by the present report.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

cc: Mr. Fletcher Warren

SECRET

SECRET

NY 100-117158
[Handwritten marks]

9 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICIALS OF AUSTRIAN BUREAU

A report reaching the OSS representative in Bern states that the Nazis have posted a reward for Arthur Kuhn, following a like report on Gumbel. This is taken to indicate that the mob is being pulled tighter around the opposition group responsible for the assassination of 30 July 1944.

Kuhn is an old Gestapo officer. He has been considered a slaver but neither realizes official to whom the methods of the Gestapo have sometimes been shocking. It is reported that, for the past few years, he has maintained contact with one of the Germans who served as secretary for the German opposition group mentioned in the OSS reports of 25 and 26 July 1944 on "The German Coup d'Etat". This connection that Kuhn was involved in the Hitler plot is interpreted as proof that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

Hitler's assassin - A report of early July 1944 stated that a group associated with Wolff Graf von Helldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, had joined the opposition group described in previous OSS reports (see reports of 10 and 20 July 1944). Helldorf's group was described as being composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements working separately from the Gestapo. The implications contained in this description, a story that elements in the Gestapo might be involved in the plot against Hitler, seems to be born out by the present report.

On 1 August 1944, a broadcast by Goebbels named Dr. Karl Gumbel, former Mayor of Leipzig, as having had a hand in the plot to assassinate Hitler, and announced an award of 1,000,000 RM for information leading to his arrest.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 8, 1944

FROM

USTRAVICK LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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FOR ACTION:

FOR INFORMATION:

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHDC
X-2, SI

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943

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SECRET

#859. KAPPA and MUMBERT, (#66217 to Washington).

1. Because of the critical importance at this time of BREAKERS and KAPPA intelligence, it is imperative that Washington and Horn send us copies of all messages of these series.

2. This request is supported by SAINT, who declares that only London was in a position to process the July 7 KAPPA cable on Caliph, which was sent to Algiers.

TOR: 8/8/44 4:05 PM

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH



DATE August 8, 1944

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(FOR INFORMATION)

LONDON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER, 61, X-2

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SECRET

#935-937. BREAKERS.* ACTION: London INFORMATION: Washington
In connection with your #857-858.

1. Would appreciate your telling General McClure and FWD that I shall be delighted to give any assistance I can. I recommend the rift between the Schutzstaffel and the Army be widened as an effective propaganda line. Himmler and the Gestapo took advantage of the Putsch to finish off the job, begun years before, of destroying the power of the Reichswehr and making the Schutzstaffel supreme. This began prior to the war, when the Gestapo framed Generals Fritsch and Blomberg and later on managed to dispose of every military officer who did not think along the prescribed lines. If I were to make a prediction, I would say that the next Chief of Staff will in all likelihood be SS General (so-called) Sepp Dietrich. The latest signs of this trend are the decree against the Army salute and Himmler's appointment as commander of the domestic army. One objective of the Schutzstaffel is to get the Army entirely under its thumb when the latter comes home, so that in the final death throes the SS will have an army which, if need be, it will be able to turn against the German population itself. Reports which we have received here show that the rift between the Schutzstaffel and the Army is getting to be more and more threatening and that we should be able to help demoralize the German resistance by emphasizing this rift. We refer you to our Washington flash last night.

2. We have evidence that the Nazis are also locking up generals suspected of favoring the eastern and Seydlitz policy, though the Putsch was conceived by generals favoring peace in the west.

3. If possible, would you let me have the source of the UBT report about the reward posted for Arthur Mebe, in which connection see my cable #4361. Perhaps this is a clue to what happened to some of the people in Breakers.

* Indicator inserted by Washington Message Center.

FORM 8/9/44 10/00/44 PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

FILE COPY

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 21 August 1944

TO : Brigadier General William J. Donovan

FROM : W. A. Kimbel

SUBJECT: Breakers Cable No. 935-39, IN 16787

Attached herewith is one copy of a report entitled: "Rift Between the Geheimstaffel and the German Army", prepared in this office from Breakers Cable no. 935-39, IN 16787.

WAK
W. A. Kimbel

SECRET

SECRETRIFT BETWEEN THE SCHUTZSTAFFEL AND THE GERMAN ARMY

Himmler and the Gestapo took advantage of the attempt against Hitler's life to complete the task, begun years before, of destroying the power of the Reichswehr and making the Schutzstaffel supreme. This began prior to the war, when the Gestapo framed General Fritsch* and Field Marshal Blomberg**, and later managed to dispose of every military chief who did not think along the prescribed lines. In the opinion of the OSS field representative, the next Chief of Staff will be, in all likelihood, SS General (so-called) Hepp Dietrich. The latest signs of this trend are the decree against the Army salute and Himmler's appointment as Commander of the Home Army. One objective of the Schutzstaffel is to get complete control of the Army when the latter comes home as the, in the final struggle, the SS will have an army which, if necessary, can be turned against the German population itself. Reports show that the rift between the Schutzstaffel and the Army is becoming more threatening, and that we should be able to help demoralize the German resistance by emphasizing this rift.

There is evidence that, although the Fritsch was conceived by generals favoring peace in the west, the Nazis are locking up also generals suspected of favoring the eastern and Seydlitz policy.

*General Werner von Fritsch fled "under mysterious circumstances" during the siege of Warsaw in 1939. He was considered the backbone of the group of dissident generals, and was suspected of having close relations with von Schleicher, the Chief of the General Staff who was liquidated in the blood purge of 1934.

**Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, former Minister of War, retired to Gappi in 1938. It is said that, after marrying his secretary, he was requested to resign. A Stockholm newspaper reported recently that General Blomberg was believed to be on the point of playing the German Riddle.

ENIGMA NO. 231-27, IN 15767

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: August 9, 1944
TO:

REG'D 8/9/44 6130

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FROM: HEAD, SWITZERLAND

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OUT 15208

INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

BI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#1936. Breakers. From 154 and Carib to 110.. Referring to the 2nd paragraph of our #1913 and your #4378.

Please be advised that we have been able to secure here, the information referred to in the above message.

SECRET

200: 8/10/44 12:30 P.M.

WAK P.M. WITH THE
INITIALS OF "LEADING" OFFICER

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU REPRODUCE THIS CALL
WITHOUT A DELAY FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form of (Service)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

August 9, 1944

DATE

FROM

HERN

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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LOND XI

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, 'AGRUDIN',
K-2, 31.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943

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SECRET

#942. KAPPA AND BREAKERS. Action: London; Information: Washington. In reference to your #859.

In accordance with orders received from Washington, all Kappa material, with the exception of a very few special items, have been forwarded to London. None of it has been dispatched to Algiers from this end. For a number of weeks, all Breakers material, with the exception of flashes, which we believe are repeated to you by Washington when they are of interest to you, has been forwarded to London.

TO: F/10/44 1213P A.M.

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE Undated

FROM BERJ, SWITZERLAND

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TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN-16743

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FOR INFORMATION:

DIRECTOR, SPECIAL TARIFF, ENGRINDER, BUREAU, FT., FTDT, X-7.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#4394-5. Action: Washington; Information: All Lora London.

Report received by 472-K-1 from a French source he considers excellent, states that the German Army took measures toward assuming power in Paris simultaneous with the attempt by the Wehrmacht against Hitler, and the proposed assumption of power in the German capital. Informant said he observed events which took place at a Gestapo headquarters on the Avenue Du Bois and claims that about 30 soldiers seized Gestapo members to take them to Fresnes. Gestapo Chief Inochen and his aide were seized on the Rue des Saussaies. They were attacked, bound and taken to Fresnes. An SS division on its way to Normandy was sent instead to Paris to reestablish order. General Vomstualpnagel attempted suicide; the bullet cut the optic nerve and blinded him but failed to kill him.

SECRET

TO: 8/9/44 12:30 a.m.

FILE COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 10, 1944

REC'D August 11, 1944 6:18 PM

TO SECRETARY, STATE

PRIORITY
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 15453

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(FOR INFORMATION)

SHEPARDSON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, X-2

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

101704. BREAKERS. 105 from Carib and 154.

Send us copy of your #082 to Bern, necessary for understanding of Bern's #020 to you.

SECRET

FILE
WHS JDM
INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 10, 1940

FROM Bern, Switzerland

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY
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IN 16927

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SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, HAGRUDER, X-2.

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SECRET

#4433-35. BREAKERS. Action: Washington; Information: London

620 considers the killing of Von Haeften and York Von Wartenburg especially important, since both these young Breakers members were described to me as being useful men for future work. Following the arrest a few months ago of Moltke, Von Wartenburg handled the liaison work with the civilian Breakers members including labor leaders. Von Haeften has a brother in Foreign Office and is supposed to have strong contacts with the Church movement. Consequently, it is feared that the Gestapo is aware of the resistance elements within the Labor Party, the Church movement and Administration. The elimination of the top AEM/HR control is made complete by the arrest of Hanson and 670 will become a refugee shortly since he was completely dependent on Hanson.

At the instigation of the Swiss officials, Nazi authorities recalled Engelbrechten, Geneva AEM/HR man, a few days ago on a charge of being involved in the activities of some Gestapo agents. Heisener, head AEM/HR man here, has just come back from a short visit to Berlin and it appears probable that he will be willing to work under the Gestapo and Schollenberg; although he continues his contact with 502 and 670.

The following information is confidential. A nucleus of a secret anti-Nazi group is being established here which will include men like 502, 670, 838 and Schoenfeld, 474's colleague in the Church activities. Under a carefully disguised cover I may possibly offer this group some financial assistance, because of its intelligence activist potentialities.

TOP: 8/11/46 12:46 AM

SECRET

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Brigadier General William J. Donovan

DATE: 12 August, 1944

FROM : W. A. Kibbel

SUBJECT: "Further Information on German Opposition Groups:
Abwehr Activities in Switzerland"

Attached herewith is a report entitled "Further Information
on German Opposition Groups: Abwehr Activities in Switzerland".

W. A. Kibbel
W. A. Kibbel

File

SECRET**FRENCH DEPARTMENT OF GERMAN OPPOSITION GROUPS;
ABWEHR ACTIVITIES IN SWITZERLAND**

The killing of von Haerten(1) and York von Wartenberg(2) is considered evidence that the Gestapo is aware of the resistance elements within the Labor Party, the Church movement and the Administration. After the arrest of Holtke, early in the summer of 1944, von Wartenberg handled the foreign liaison work for the civilian members of the opposition group, including the labor leaders. Von Haerten had a brother in the Foreign Office, and is believed to have had close contacts with the Church movement and the Administration.

The elimination of the top Abwehr control is thought to have been completed by the arrest of Hansen(3).

In the first week of August 1944, Engelbrochten, an Abwehr man in Geneva, was reported to have been recalled by the Nazi authorities, at the instigation of the Swiss officials who accused Engelbrochten of being involved in the activities of several Gestapo agents. Meisner(4), chief of the Abwehr organization in Bern, returned early in August 1944 from a short visit in Berlin. It appears that he will be willing to work under Schellenberg and the Gestapo.

1. Von Haerten may be identical with Reserve Lieutenant von Hagen, reported by the New York Times of 9 August 1944 to be among the eight men charged for participation in the plot against Hitler.
2. Reserve Lieutenant Count York von Wartenberg, also included in the above report.
3. Colonel Hansen, Acting Director of the Abwehr under Kaltenbrunner.
4. Naval Commander Meisner, Consul General at the German Legation in Bern and a member of the Abwehr organization there.

CABLE HQ. 4413-35, 28 1944

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: 11, 1944

IN 16047

FROM: WASHINGTON

TO: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

□ BUILDING DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: LONDON

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, INSIGNER, DIGELCH, WEDTO, ETO,

1-2, 31.

SECRET

**FROM: ACTION: LONDON,
INFORMATION: WASHINGTON.**

A FRENCH SOURCE OF LONG STANDING HAS SENT 049 A REPORT WHICH SAYS THAT GERMAN TROOPS IN FRANCE ARE RECEIVING LEAFLETS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ANTI-HITLER REBELLION HAS NEVER PUT DOWN AND THAT ITS LEADERS ARE STILL CONTROLLING IT. THE SIGNATURE, "THE FOUR PRINCES" IS REPORTED TO BE ON THIS LEAFLET.

Summary

SECRET

REF: 11/44 - 1010711

FILE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 11, 1944

FROM

NRN

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TO

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IN 17046

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SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAORUDER, X-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

14443-46. BREAKERS. Action: Washington;
Information: London.

We have received the following information from our courier who has just returned from Berlin. While he was there, he saw our 512 who is presently in hiding. He reports that a grave break occurred among the conspirators at the very last minute before the putsch. 512, Goerdeler, Beck and some of the others involved, were in favor of the western solution, while many of the Breakers generals, Stauffenberg included, desired to conclude a peace with the Russians. (The attitude of these generals evidently had undergone a recent change, as Breakers, before the end, never informed us of this.)

The conspiracy was known by both Rommel and Kluge, however, the former maintained that only if Goebbels, Himmler and Hitler were done away with, would he collaborate. At present, Rommel is in the Reich and is seriously sick. At the time of the conspiracy, Kluge stated that on the western front, he would be able to hold out for only 21 days; Rommel maintained that the time was even less than that. 512 sent us a suggestion that in the west, Kluge hold the keys to the entire situation in his hands and that if we could pick a suitable German Officer from those we have captured, who could be dispatched to Kluge, we might now find him disposed to cooperate with us in the hope that this move would permit the Western powers to occupy portions of the Reich sooner.

The following are additional names of those taken into custody and of those who were killed: All of Stauffenberg's children, his wife, his brother and wife were killed. Oster was killed. The following were imprisoned: Schacht, Heurath, Pupils, the former Prussian Minister of Finance, Heildorf, and our 800. All of these taken prisoner are listed.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PAGE 2

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF. NO.

RECEIVED

SECRET

This portion from 110. While we cannot positively substantiate the names hereinabove mentioned, it is our opinion that they come from a source sufficiently reliable to justify your broadcasting the information concerning the killing of the Stauffenberg family over the radio. We have been informed that General Stauffenberg came from loyal Catholic stock and that he had a big family. The incarceration of Schacht and Neurath and the killing of Oster might be mentioned, however, do not mention GDD in these broadcasts.

Our messenger came out of the German capital with news that all that is necessary now is for us to shake hard and the entire structure will collapse. All information advises that the Army is outraged and shocked and that a real reason exists for the driving of a deep wedge between the SS and the Army.

COPY

TCM: 8/12/44

615 AM

ACTION

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 15, 1944

REC'D 8/16/44 6:31 P.M.

TO: BRIT, SHERMAN

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FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

BT

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDEK, X-2.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#1955. Breakers. Jackpot as a farewell gesture to 110. In reference to your #4443-46 Breakers.

Do you give any credence personally to the declaration made by 512 in regard to the serious last minute break in regard to the East vs. West solution? How was it possible for such an enormous conspiracy to make so much progress without an unvarying and unified attitude in support of either solution, perhaps the Eastern to the uncompromising exclusion of the alternative? Please cable your views priority.

Rec'd by 4192.4
at 7:22

SECRET

END: 8/17/44 3:05 A.M.

WAX WHB JDW ROP

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRETARIAT

13 7/22

DATE: 10 AUG 1950 82944

TO: Mr. Putzell
FROM: Committee on Dissemination of Intelligence
SUBJECT: Attached Dissemination.

JH
OSS

The attached dissemination, a further report on the German coup d'etat, is forwarded for your information. This document includes the material contained in the former report which you are holding. The distribution is noted on the attached copy.

Attachment.

SECRET

TH



SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SPECIAL DELIVERY 6/17

State (Harran)
Joint Chiefs
W. H. Map Room

17 August 1944

THE GERMAN COUP D'ETAT (Continued)

The following, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to reports dated 25 July and 8 August, concerning the German conspiratorial group which on 20 July attempted a ~~coup~~ putsch against Hitler. One of the group's two ~~members~~ members referred to in previous reports left for Germany shortly before 20 July and took part in the final deliberations preceding the attempted ~~putsch~~ putsch. From his place of hiding, he has forwarded the following report via courier to the OSS representative:

A serious break occurred among the conspirators at the eleventh hour. A number of the Generals, as well as Colonel von Stauffenberg, advanced the idea that peace should be concluded with the Soviets, while Goerdler and Beck and the emissary cling to their original view that an arrangement should be worked out with the Western Allies to the exclusion of the Soviets.

OSD BERN COMMENT: These Generals must have undergone a recent change of attitude, as the OSS representative had not been informed of any such change of position on their part prior to the putsch.

Both Kessel and von Kluge were aware of the conspiracy. Kessel insisted that he could only collaborate with the conspirators provided Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler were liquidated. Shortly before the putsch was attempted, von Kluge said that he would be able to hold out on the Western front for about three weeks, while Kessel maintained that it would not be possible to do so for as long as that. Kessel at present is seriously ill in Germany.

The emissary believed that von Kluge holds the key to the situation and thinks that von Kluge would be ready to cooperate with the Western Allies in order to facilitate a more rapid occupation of Germany, if a suitable officer among the Anglo-American war prisoners were sent him as intermediary.

The emissary reports that the following additional persons have been killed since the putsch attempt: Major General Hans Oster (a member of the conspiratorial group and former top-ranking Army leader) and all of von Stauffenberg's

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

children, his wife, brother, and brother's wife. The following, in reports, are kept shackled in prison: Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank; Constantin von Neurath, president of the Cabinet Council, former Foreign Minister and former Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; Johannes Popitz, until recently Prussian State Minister and Minister of Finance, offices which he has held since 1933; and Wolf Graf von Helldorf, police president of Berlin.

OSB PERSON COMMENT: The OSB representative comments that while he is not able positively to confirm the fate or the names of these persons, he believes the information to be trustworthy in view of the source's previous record for reliability.

The messenger who brought the report from the saissary also brought reports that the Army is deeply outraged and shocked by the events which have occurred since 20 July, and says that it is only necessary now for the Allies to strike hard and the entire German structure will collapse.

Among the further consequences of the events of 20 July, the OSB representative reports that top Abwehr control has been affected. A decisive step in this direction was the recent arrest of Colonel Hansen, acting director of the Abwehr under Kaltenbrunner. During the first week in August, Abwehr operative in Geneva, was reportedly recalled by the Nazis at the insistence of Swiss officials who claimed he was involved in Gestapo activities. Commander Heiser, German Consul General and Abwehr head in Bern, returned to Bern early in August after a brief visit in Berlin, and indicated his willingness now to work under the Gestapo and Schellenberg, head of one of the Security Service departments. As a part of the Abwehr purge, the Nazis have also recalled Count Ferdinand Auerperg, an Austrian with the rank of Colonel, who nominally held the post of assistant air attaché in the Bern Legation but actually was an Abwehr man.

The killing of Werner Haefliger and York von Wartenberg shortly after the coup attempt may well indicate that the Gestapo has obtained information regarding opposition elements within the German Labor Party, the German Church movement and Church administration. Von Wartenberg, the OSB representative reports, served as liaison between the leaders of the conspiratorial group and the principal civilian adherents of the group including labor leaders. Von Haefliger, whose brother Hans Gustav is in the Foreign Office, is believed to have established good contacts with the Church movement.

(OSB Official Dispatches, Bern, 10 and 11 August)

CASID NO. 4431-32 (8/11); 4433-35 (8/10); 4443-46 (8/11).

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 12, 1944

FROM

USRAVIA, LONDON

PRIORITY

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TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IN-17036

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FOR ACTION

BERN

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAORUDR,
K-2, SI.**SECRET**RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

X #67027. Breakers. Action: Bern (#867-870). Referring to Bern-London #P60-1, paragraph 3, and your 6035-7, paragraph 2. Information: Washington.

1. The following is a condensed version of Broadway's analysis of the intelligence received from Stockholm with regard to Leftist opposition group, which includes SIS 70, "workers, intellectuals, and members of the Wehrmacht, not including Generals". Duplicate SPP-339 sent to Washington by coach.

2. One of the leaders is reported to be 670, with Vonarum and POC taking part. A provisional Socialist Government was their avowed aim.

3. "670 organization", according to British analysis, tried to make a deal with Western Allies for a modification of the unconditional surrender stipulation. The suggestion of 670, that an Allied air attack be made on Hitler's headquarters in Augsburg was rejected by a 3 to 2 vote.

4. According to the British, the true spokesman of this wing group is possibly Strassman who was a colleague of Loper in 1939, and was active in the same circles as Hanson and 670.

5. It is reported concerning the Conservative and Catholic affiliations of this Leftist opposition that, although it was never conclusively stated that Hanson was anti-Nazi, an unnamed official of the 659 set-up was in close connection with 670. Oster was also a member of this opposition group. The conclusion drawn by this analysis is that the anti-Nazi of 659, may perhaps be in connection between the left wing opposition group, and the conservatives.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

Telegram, London

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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6. Additional British information on Seydlitz and Loper is as follows: It is stated that Loper received a communication from Seydlitz in October 1943 which informed him that grave reverses on the Russian front would precede a revolt in the Reich. The British also state that there is very little known of the scope or means of Seydlitz' contacts with the opposition within the Reich.

ACTION COPY

REF: 9/12/44 P. 146 R. 1.

SECRET

FILE 1001

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 14, 1944

FROM USTHAVIC, LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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DISTRIBUTION

IN 17254

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

BURN

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
SI, X-2.

SECRET

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#67427.* **BREAKERS.** Action: Bern #857; In reference to your #935-20. Information: Washington.

1. DNB, 3rd of August, was the source of the information used by HEC for the broadcast on Hebe. DNB carried the news that he was missing after the 24th of July.

2. Your #4443-46 was of the utmost interest to us at this end.

*Delayed by garble.

SECRET

TON: 8/15/44 3:33

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 14, 1944

REC'D August 14, 1944 4:50 PM

TO SECRETARY, AID AND

PRIORITY
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 15833

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CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON
R-4

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

JOHNS. BRIDGERS.

Our message received from Bern should be sent on to

SECRET

FILE 1-1

Copy to [unclear] from Bern, 13 17044.

See [unclear] file in

BJP:FO

INITIALS OF "HANDLING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT DISSEMINATING THEM TO THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 14, 1944

REC'D August 14, 1944 4:50 PM

TO SECRET, ALGERIA

PRIORITY
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FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
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OUT 15553

INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER,
K-8

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#55364. BREAKERS.

Our #55357e received from Bern should be sent on to 109.

SECRET

FILE

SECRET #55357e from Bern, 13 17000.

8/14/44 7:54 PM

EJD:PG

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE AUGUST 18, 1944
FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

PRIORITY _____
ROUTINE _____
DEFERRED _____

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION IN-17203

FOR ACTION

LONDON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAURUDER, X-2,
SI

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#000-B. BREAKERS. Action: London)
Information: Washington.

I found your #867-70 highly interesting but not a sufficiently full picture of the matter as I understand it. 670 is not qualified to be a leader and never acted as such. He is a useful envoy although greatly inhibited. He may be led to more determined action, however, because of his current indignation over his friends' execution. The unnamed official of the 689 organization you refer to is probably 512. He was the courageous man of action, and always dominated 670 here. 512 worked directly with the generals, Tocky in particular, and also with the Loper group, as Breakers always told me that without Wehrmacht leadership, action was impossible. Only when Oster and 659 were eliminated did Hansen become prominent. 650 is very highly regarded but Von Gramm is not taken very seriously.

In reference to paragraph 6, refer to your #307 and my #841. I surmised that at that time Zulu perhaps did not want to take us into their confidence. This may account for their refusal, last October, to communicate this message to us.

SECRET

FORM 8/25/44 1485 A.E.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE AUGUST 18, 1944

PRIORITY
ROUTING
SERIALIZED

FROM SAC, ALEXANDRIA

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION

IN 17560

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MAGNUM, SI, X-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#48044. Demoran to Buxton and Cheston.

Your 055654 on BREAKERS please have sent from me to

Install.

Done by Magnus
8/19

SECRET

FORM

8/18/44 7:50

IT IS FORWARDED TO COLLECTOR. REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT APPROVATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 10, 1944

FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

IN-17098

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAORUWER, X-8

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#4832-4. **INFORMERS.** To Jackpot, wishing him a pleasant journey. In reference to your #1055.

I interpret the situation in the following way: some little time prior to the putsch, some type of union existed between the eastern and western oriented factions. Both groups had identical immediate goals, the destruction of the Hitler gang. I believe that S12 was not aware of this move until he arrived at headquarters. The foregoing is only a guess but I call to your attention the opening paragraph of Breakers #3423-51, describing the reaction S12 received when he returned the messenger with the information that there was no possibility at all of making a deal with the west on the basis of allowing the Nazis to maintain the Eastern Front. In addition, refer to the answer which S12 received. It is entirely probable that Breakers decided at that point to collaborate with the east oriented faction. Even though the identities of several generals involved were furnished to me in advance, the fact that participants who were just as prominent (possibly those who were east-ern oriented) were not mentioned makes me think that S12 had no knowledge of this development before he returned.

This appears to be the most probable answer to your query rather than any change in the policy or mentality of Besky-Loper and their group.

TON: 8/10/44 4110 a.m.

IT IS FOR THE USE OF THE SECRETARIAT TO REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT FURTHER ACTION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

5-31 0 2704

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 20, 1944		PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
FROM LESTRAVIEO, LONDON		
TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES		IN: 17050
DISTRIBUTION		
(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)	
DIRECTOR	SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, III, X-8	

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

263084. To Duxton, Cheston, Putzoll from 100.

SECRET

It is important that the information contained in the second paragraph of Bern cable #4443-45 ^{attached} be sent to Marshall, and the President as coming from us abroad.

Information already sent through regular channels. Gen. Magruder called to ask if it would get to Gen. Marshall. We were told it would.

Gen. Magruder says that dissemination has already been made as requested.

TORI 8/20/44 0100 PM

FILE COPY

SECRET

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE: August 20, 1944

FROM:

OS/IV.II, 1010-11

TO:

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

11-17842

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIR CTOR



S.I., SUCH TARGET, THROUGHOUT, X-2.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

167094, REACTING, to Weston, Cheston, Magender, from 100.

Are you aware of the fact that the secret messages we gave Angle on Devolova material were delivered by him to WALLACE? This again points up the fact that we must do our own delivery of material to our Allies.

Ans P

TAB: R/20/44 1120 p.m.

SECRET

IT IS REQUESTED TO COPY AND DISSEMINATE THIS CASE
IMMEDIATELY AND HOLD IT WITH THE APPROPRIATE

Form of Standard

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE Unclated		PRIORITY
FROM		ROUTINE
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	DEFERRED
	DISTRIBUTION	11-11118
(FOR ACTION)		(FOR INFORMATION)
FI		DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, CHAIR, MEMBERS, STAFF, TOP, 1-2.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37760-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

4463P-4643, From 110.

Our number 271 has been given the material in our cable 4523-26 to Washington. In his cable 281136, dated the 28th of last month, of which we received an information copy, and in his flash to the Office of Air Information, dated the 2nd of August, 678 quoted from the national edition of *Bohle* and mentioned reports that the national socialists were planning to liquidate all foreign workers in the Reich. In cable 42702, dated the 5th of this month, Y. Cordell Hull requested more information regarding this. The legation answered in their cable 5113, dated the 5th of this month.

Our 271 was the original source of both the story in the national edition and 678's flash. He has or let us have the information given below, which I forward with reserve pending a check on 271 by you and London and additional check on him by us. Nevertheless, I believe the source sufficiently authenticated to justify forwarding his story. 271 had not received more than brief, occasional communications from his friends in Berlin since his departure here in 1941. However, in the 11th of last month, these friends sent him a secret courier bearing a lengthy report and a usual form of moral Hellmuth Lilius, who was subsequently executed, according to this report, "under the order of my old superior of Jews, there was a conference in Hitler's headquarters at Wachenstein. Present were Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Goerdel, Geyr, Weitzel, and several other officers. The decision was reached at this meeting to not arrange its for the extermination of alien workers in the event that the war stay, British, and Russian troops were not further near. The workers were placed in a prison at the direction of Kaltenbrunner and Himmler. The first of these groups, called

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

PAGE 2

FROM: Bern

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

SECRET

"Very Dangerous" was to have the honor of being exterminated before the others. It seems that they were to be dispatched, starting at once, the whole 2,000,000 of them. In order to provide a legitimate excuse for this massacre, it was agreed that the 2,000,000 who were to be liquidated first would be taken from one work camp to another and on the way would be shot down by Luftwaffe troops in the pretext that they had attempted to revolt or escape. In this same report received by OSI, there was also the statement that a number of the Wehrmacht generals, such as Von Rundstedt, Halder, Von See, Werner, Von Salsleben, as well as General Kdo, OSI's closest friend, had declined to associate themselves with this war murder. It was because of this that some of them later took part in the attack on the Fuehrer which was forehadowed in the report.

In their report to OSI, General Halder and his friends requested that he contact the allies and warn them of what was to come, urging them to disseminate to the German people about it and suggesting that prominent referees, political leaders and men of letters such as Professor Baeumer, Bruning, Thomas Mann,irth, and others, make an appeal. General Von Salsleben, an army officer, was also mentioned by the report, who said that it might be possible to persuade him to turn his army in the next moment. The writers of the report, however, had no love for the Germans and wanted nothing to do with General Seydlitz's Committee.

The contents of this report were given by OSI to his friends Professor Baeumer and Alfred Laban of the National Union. I saw the former a short time ago; he confirmed this and vouched for it. There is nothing impossible about the plan, as set forth by the report. However, although I have to cast my vote on OSI's word faith, before I accept his evidence I would like to have more proof that he is acting in all sincerity.

SECRET

FILE COPY

SECRET

TO: P/25/44 10412 D.S.

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FORM 8-64 (Rev. 8-22-64)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 24, 1944

FROM

BERN

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 18204

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

LONDON

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDFR,
BERN, ~~NO~~ MEDTO, X-2 51

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-51863-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#1031-32. Action: London; Information: Washington.

Breakers
The information which follows is with reference to newspaper reports and to your #88 (sic) concerning the apprehension of Goerdeler. An item which may be worthy of note is the fact that ~~von~~ Meissner, who is the Chief Intelligence Officer at the Nazi Legation in Bern, was in Freiburg Baden around the 13th of this month, he discovered from local Gestapo headquarters that they were abandoning their search for Goerdeler. However, at this time they did not claim that Goerdeler had been arrested. This information is wholly unverified, but we have no definite cause to disbelieve it.

A reliable Breakers courier, who was in Bern around the 10th of last month stated that the secret weapon V-2 would be ready to be put into operation at the beginning of next month. It is unfortunate, but this piece of information did not reach us until now. The above is in reply to your #R48 with reference to said weapon.

FILE COPY

SECRET

TIME 8/25/44 12:40 AM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 24, 1944

FROM

BERN

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 18204

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

LONDON:

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
BENNETT, WFO, MEDTO, X-2 51

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#1031-32. Action: London; Information: Washington.

Breakdown
The information which follows in with reference to newspaper reports and to your #88 (sic) concerning the apprehension of Goerdeler. An item which may be worthy of note is the fact that when Moissner, who is the Chief Intelligence Officer at the Nazi Legation in Bern, was in Freiburg Baden around the 13th of this month, he discovered from local Gestapo headquarters that they were abandoning their search for Goerdeler. However, at this time they did not claim that Goerdeler had been arrested. This information is wholly unverified, but we have no definite cause to disbelieve it.

A reliable Breakers courier, who was in Bern around the 10th of last month stated that the secret weapon V-2 would be ready to be put into operation at the beginning of next month. It is unfortunate, but this piece of information did not reach us until now. The above is in reply to your #848 with reference to said weapon.

FILE COPY

SECRET

TIME: 8/25/44 12:40 AM

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE AUGUST 25, 1953

IN 19177

FROM WETNAVIC, LONDON

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

ACTION: 81

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, HAGBERGER, BIGLOW, ETC., X-R.

Breakers

~~SECRET~~

70144

1. SUMMARY ON AFTERMATH GERMAN GENERALS REVOLT SDP-384,
 THE FOLLOWING FROM NEUTRAL JOURNALIST BERLIN:
- A. ON 29 JULY, 363 OFFICERS ETC CIVILIANS SHOT.
 - B. 1,200 OFFICERS ARRESTED.
 - C. UP TO 1 AUGUST TOTAL OF 760 PERSONS SHOT IMPLICATION ASSASSINATION.

SECRET

1953/8/25/53 JLN HL FILE COPY

Form 88 (Rev. 1-25-60)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE	UNDATED	PRIORITY
FROM	BERN, SWITZERLAND	ROUTINE
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	DEFERRED
DISTRIBUTION		IN 18800
FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION	
SI	DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, X-8	

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#4673. BREAKERS. Action: Washington. Information: London.

Not long ago, a Breakers courier contacted 670 and said that ~~mergers~~ was still going on, although naturally slowed down by executions and arrests in addition to the fact that evidently the Gestapo have found a lengthy list of the names of those individuals scheduled to assume the top posts in the new Tucky Loper regime. He verifies the arrest of 800. It is thought that he is in serious danger of being liquidated; however, probably will be held for Loper's trial.

*Downloaded to process
E. P.
4/26*

SECRET

TON: 0/22/46 10:48 PM

FILE COPY

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Form of Message

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 25, 1944

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 18293

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

BARI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, BRUDER,
SI, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-42848-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#987-988. ~~BERN~~ Bari, via Algiers.
Information: Washington, London.
110 to Joyce and Chapin.

SECRET

A short time ago, Turtle was arrested, which in all likelihood makes the first location suggested out of the question. I am making arrangements about the location which was proposed in our cable #909-10.

For quite a while we have been getting reports indicating that Glora, who is thought to be a convinced anti-Nazi, might prove useful as an ally at the right time. Kolor, a Bavarian Catholic, is one of his most intimate collaborators. A violent opponent of the Nazis and connected with the Breakers movement, Kolor might be used to get in touch with Glora. Within a few weeks, we might be able to get in touch with Glora. Within a few weeks, we might be able to get in touch with him through 670 and 502, but perhaps you can contact him directly. The utmost discretion must be used in the affair, and scrupulous protection afforded to every name involved.

* Indicator inserted by Washington Messure Center.

FOR: 8/25/44 10:42 PM

SECRET

FILE COPY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

15 AUGUST 1944

0800 8/29/44 6:20PM

OUT 1627

TO: SAC, ALABAMA

PRIORITY

FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

COMMUNIST
INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, X-2

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

BTM. BREAKERS. MATHEWS FROM RHYTHM.

SECRET

IDENTIFY THE FIRST THREE PEOPLE MENTIONED IN BERN-D 4987-88
TO YOU. WE DO NOT HAVE THESE NAMES.

TIME 8/29/44 10:05PM

INITIALS: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 22, 1944 REC'D August 22, 1944 6:31 PM

TO STRATCOM, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

OUT 16638

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MACRUDER, SI, WFAPF

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#66144. 109 from Orlston and Kibel.

Kibel talked with Berle as result your cable about release
by Berle of data to Halifax. Although Kibel avoided specific
allusion to cable, Berle said he thoroughly appreciated value of
material and care with which it had to be handled to protect source.
Possibly three incidents mentioned our #61934 to London may furnish
alternative explanation of how material reached British.

X

SECRET

0/22/44 3:43 PM

FILE COPY

050

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS REQUESTED TO COPY OR REFERENCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 8, 1944

REC'D September 8, 1944 6:46 PM

TO Bern, Switzerland

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 17:04

DISTRIBUTION

FOR INFORMATION TO ORIGINATOR:

FOR INFORMATION:

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, BERN, CH, X-8

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#1027. BERNESE. To 110 from Rhythm, with reference to Bern-117, Bern-117-008.

Please identify the first 3 names mentioned in your above message. We suppose that the second of these persons is identical with the first person mentioned in the final sentence of #1059-1000 Bern-London. Is this assumption correct?

SECRET

FILE COPY

DATE FILED: 9/11/44

INITIALS OF "RELEASE"

IT IS PROHIBITED TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE **October 9, 1944**

REC'D **October 9, 1944 11:45 PM**

TO

DIR. STRATEGIC

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT 17109

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

SE

DIR. OTOR, SECRETARY, SAUNDERS, 1-9

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-42814

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

NOTE. STRATEGIC. To 110 from Myiam, with reference to Bern-41, on 10/7-8/44.

Please identify the first 4 names mentioned in your above message. We suppose that the second of these persons is identical with the first person mentioned in the final sentence of #1089-1-80 Bern-London. Is this assumption correct?

SECRET

ONE COPY

FOR FILE (RELEASING) OFFICE

INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFICE OR RELEASING OFFICE: THIS CASE IS NOT TO BE RELEASED FROM THE SECRETARIAT

FORM 1 (1-15-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE ^{Undated}		PRIORITY
FROM BERN, SWITZERLAND		ROUTINE
TO		DEFERRED
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES		IN 20119
DISTRIBUTION		
FOR ACTION	FOR INFORMATION	
SI	DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, SACRUDER, X-2.	

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37097-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#4736-3f. BRU AK RE. Action: Washington. Information: London.

This report has been submitted by source 403. According to Hoefding (sic) Bercin, an economist whose son is with FBI in London, on the 7th of this month Dr. Schacht, Count Von Rismarck of Potsdam, Count Von Schulenburg, the former Russian ambassador, and Dr. Milinski, who is a close relative of members of the Frump Bohlen family, were out on trial before the same court as Goerdeler. This next report has been furnished by 476. A reliable friend of 476 who has just arrived from the south of Germany maintains that the revolt against Hitler took place in the East Prussia headquarters. This observer goes on to say that it is thought that the former Reichswehr Minister, Dr. Gessler, who was seized after the July uprising for his alleged part in the plot, will soon be out to death. It is also thought that a similar sentence will be carried out for Pomps, the Prussian Minister of Finance. Although he evidently had no connection with the plot to overthrow Hitler, General Valder has been placed under arrest. A large proportion of the men who had been leaders among the Catholics and the Socialists in Bavaria were taken into custody during the month of August. Among this group was a high percentage of the former representatives of the Bavarian Parliament who were affiliated with the Socialist and liberal Catholic parties. There is a strong anti-Prussian sentiment among the people of Bavaria. This source is emphatic in urging that our propaganda should be aimed to create dissension among the SS troops by pointing out that those of their number who are innocent of war crimes need not fear that they will suffer from reprisal measures, but only those who are guilty will be forced to pay for their participation in such acts.

MO -
Talker
in 46
M

TO: 1/14/44 11:22 p.m.

SECRET

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SECRET

14808
Planning
Completion
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 15 September 1944

FROM : W. A. Kishel

SUBJECT:

Report from State Dept.

W. A. Kishel to G. I. ...
General Donovan,

The attached case to us from Spain, as having been presented to them by a German official having some connection with Breakers. We also present the background of those personalities mentioned, concerning whom we have a previous record.

This report may serve to emphasize the far-sighted intelligence developed by OSS. No dissemination is being given to this material, pending your decision as to how it may be best utilized.

W. A. Kishel
W. A. Kishel

SECRET

SECRET

R-140B

Translation

The Events of July 20, 1944

The following information must not be used as propaganda. It must be placed only at the disposal of such persons who will promise that the names followed by an X will remain secret, as the fate of these persons is still uncertain, and they would run the risk of being exposed to reprisal action by the Nazi terror if their names were to be linked in a general way with the attempt against Hitler.

On July 16, I was notified through Stauffenberg's closest military collaborator, Colonel Hansen (?) H, that I was to leave for Berlin immediately. I was given to understand that the action against the Nazis was to be effected within the next few days, perhaps even before my arrival in Berlin. I was told that if I did not arrive in Berlin on time, I was to act on my own initiative, following up any action indicated by Stauffenberg and Hansen.

I arrived in Berlin the afternoon of July 19. I telephoned the OKM in the Bendlerstrasse and was told to hold myself in readiness for the following day and to call again early in the morning. I returned home, and that same evening I was interrogated by some friends on the political and military situation. The following morning, I called Stauffenberg's aide, as pre-arranged, and was informed by the secretary that a message had been left for me and that I was to come to the Bendlerstrasse toward 6 p.m. that evening.

When I arrived at the appointed time, the iron gates of the main entrance were closed and the guard had been reinforced. The command of the guard had been transferred to a young captain who had been notified of my arrival and who

SECRET

SECRET

with him in the leg without asking any questions. On my way to see
 Stauffenberg, I met Colonel Jager K at the main entrance to the second floor.
 Colonel Jager was awarded the Knight's Cross after Stalingrad and belonged to
 our group. At this time, however, I found him in a situation which, to me, was
 almost incomprehensible. He was standing in front of the entrance without his
 hat and uniform. Behind him, to the right and the left, were two armed soldiers.
 In front of him, to one side, there was an "Kerenturabannfuhrer" holding his
 baton in his hand and pointing a pistol. At first glance I did not realize at
 whom he was pointing it. After the radio broadcast announcing the failure of
 the attempt against Hitler, I was already convinced that everything had gone
 wrong. But from the manner of Jager's greetings to me, I noticed very quickly
 that he, as well as the Wehrmacht, was master of the situation.

After I had talked to him (Jager) for a moment, Stauffenberg's aide, First
 Lieutenant van Hafften, arrived. He talked for a while about the situation and
 told me that Colonel Hansen had not yet arrived at the rendezvous and that I was
 to wait for him. I went into Stauffenberg's outer office where Major Count von
 Schuerin K received me with these words: "How lucky that you arrived in time.
 Hansen is not here yet. He must wait. The situation will not be completely
 cleared up for twenty-four hours." He left, and Stauffenberg entered the room
 at the same moment. He greeted me rapidly and rather gravely. At the same in-
 stant, his secretary called him to the telephone. "Minister Speer wishes ur-
 gently to speak to Count von Stauffenberg." Stauffenberg answered himself and
 walked into General Fromm's outer office.

In the interim, Count Schuerin had returned and given me a general outline
 of the situation. According to him, the attempt had not succeeded completely,
 but it seemed that Hitler was seriously hurt and at least in danger of losing

SECRET

SECRET

his life. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to seize radio facilities and, in this way, the Nazis were still in possession of the most powerful instrument. However, it was necessary to proceed, as retreat was no longer possible. Orders to establish a state of siege had been issued. Beck was determined to go ahead and had already assigned the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht to v. Wittichen. Fromm was not raising any objections, but agreed completely (however, Fromm had never been a member of the opposition).

On the whole, I had the impression that the matter was taking its course and would develop for better or for worse. At this moment, moreover, it seemed a favorable circumstance that incoming information appeared to indicate that the Wehrmacht in the Reich and the occupied territories were ranging themselves against the Nazis.

To accomplish my task, I had to wait for Colonel Hausen, with whom it was impossible to get in touch. Stauffenberg and his officers were very busy (I was the only civilian on the spot). I had every opportunity to observe the course of events. Stauffenberg was constantly on the telephone speaking to the commanding officers in the Reich and the occupied territories. He had the necessary contacts and was confirming that the instructions he had sent by wire for the establishment of a state of siege (Ausnahmestand-state of emergency) had actually been received.

Meanwhile, Beck and Wittichen had exchanged views in Fromm's office. Soon after, Wittichen, accompanied by his aide, left the building to take over the Command of the Wehrmacht at Headquarters. Little by little the chiefs of service and the GHI guards arrived to confer with Fromm. Suddenly, the news came from a military source that contrary orders had been issued by the Fuhrer's Head-
quarters. The Fuhrer's answer by telephone that these contrary orders had not

been "materialized" (achieved), that the Wehrmacht was in complete control under
 the command of Field Marshal Halder, and that the nation was in the greatest
 danger. In such a case of grave peril it was the duty of soldiers to act and to
 crush any opposition which might manifest itself. All radio stations and all
 information centers were to be seized immediately. The only center of command
 in the Reich was to be the Chief of the Reserve Army, to whom all other military
 units were to be subordinated. General Olbricht spoke similarly to the outlying
 parts.

The orders issued were followed to the letter by the chiefs of the Reserve
 Army, but little by little, and with increasing frequency, news arrived concern-
 ing contrary orders issued by the Fuhrer's Headquarters and a mounting uncer-
 tainty made itself felt among the chiefs of local commands in the Reich. Ever-
 theless, Stauffenberg, Olbricht and his officers carried on. I was under the
 impression that our undertaking was not going too badly as, at any rate, the
 administrative machinery had been put into action, and even if civil war should
 break out, we had the cooperation of the majority of commands.

After a certain length of time, von Moltke came to tell me that there was
 still no way of establishing contact with Hauser. I was obliged to return home
 and was to try to reach Hauser early the following morning at his office, as
 contact with him had to be established at all costs. With this hope and with
 the conviction that matters would develop favorably for us in the end, I left
 the GIB toward eleven o'clock, leaving instructions that I was to be summoned
 by telephone the following morning. I had considered paying a visit to Minister
 Pappe, but on the way I gave up this idea, as it was already very late and re-
 turned home. This was fortunate, as Pappe's daughter informed us the next day

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that he had been arrested that same night.

When I awoke again, I heard the radio announce a message by Hitler. I could not believe my ears and was convinced that the Nazis were using a double. I was unable to contact the GOK by telephone and remained sitting at my radio until the following morning.

In the meantime, I heard the speeches of Hitler, Goering, and Dornitz, and I got a clear idea of how our affairs were progressing. In spite of that, I tried early the next morning to telephone Hausen and Stauffenberg. There was no longer any way of reaching Hausen even for official business. In the twenty-second, I received a telephone message that Hausen had gone on a trip. I concluded from that that he had either been arrested or was being followed. Stauffenberg and Haffner had also taken a trip. As yet I had no idea that they were already dead. The message that was given to me by telephone by his secretary disturbed me to such a point that I did not even mention my name, and I tried to get information about the situation from other friends. As cautiously as possible, I telephoned several people from a post office and was only able to determine that most of our friends did not answer or "had gone on a trip". Saturday afternoon I managed to meet a friend of the Foreign Office who was in a position to give me information on the development of events after my departure from the Bendlerstrasse.

Gibrecht and Stauffenberg, being undeterred by the contrary orders issued by Hitler's (the Führer's) Supreme Headquarters, continued preparation of measures intended to set up a state of siege. In the meantime, it had been learned by radio announcements that Hitler was only slightly wounded and still alive. This circumstance made many people waver and provoked a reaction even among officers of the Wehrmacht's High Command, Army High Command. Several of-

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planned, Colonel von der Heyde at the head, burst into Stauffenberg's anteroom and realized the need of finally that they had come to their Fuhrer. "The Fuhrer is still alive; he will be Supreme Commander as long as he lives." Stauffenberg had deceived them by announcing to them the death of Hitler. They would never have taken part in the "putsch" against the Fuhrer, instigated by Stauffenberg and the "Hitler" Club. They demanded the immediate arrest of all of the leaders of the conspiracy. At the same time, machine guns were brought out. At this point, Fromm also must have returned and used the same arguments against Stauffenberg. A shot rang out; Stauffenberg was hit in the back. That was the signal to attack the others. Gibrick, Stauffenberg, and von Haefen were immediately put to death, all the others arrested and led away. I have learned nothing of their final fate. It is virtually a certainty that they were shot at once. In any case, Beck certainly took his own life.

After the plot had been thus nipped in the bud at the OKW by officers faithful to Hitler, it was easy for the Nazis--that is to say, Himmler--to slide matters into their own hands. All that was needed was a housecleaning. That night and the following day, arrests were carried out on a vast scale. In my opinion, almost all those who were under suspicion of belonging to the opposition in any form were caught in the net.

That evening I read Goebbels' message in the press. It was entirely possible that Stauffenberg had in his pocket the draft of a ministerial list. This would explain the arrest of Dapitz, who, personally, had not taken any part in the action. But that was also true that all the leaders of the opposition were arrested and usually shot without delay. I intend to make a special note of the connections between the opposition and the personalities who handled the af-

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Goebbels' account of the events of the twelfth are partly correct. In the afternoon of July 30, the Military Commander of Berlin, General von Hase, was informed by General Olbricht that the attempt on Hitler's life would occur that very day and that he should make the necessary preparations at Berlin to take possession of the official government headquarters. General von Hase called together the officers of the Guards of the regiment under his command and issued instructions. Among these military leaders was Major Ruser, a Nazi who promptly notified Goebbels by telephone that he had been given the unusual order to occupy Official Headquarters on the pretext that Hitler was dead. Goebbels advised Ruser to conduct himself as if he were a participant in the plot. Goebbels then contacted the Fuhrer's General Headquarters and informed them of the measures taken at Berlin. From that time on he was in a position to take counter-measures based on Hitler's personal order. A detachment of the regiment quartered at Desbrietz School received the order to occupy the headquarters of the Commanding Officer of the city, but this had already been done by a certain battalion of the Guards. From his balcony, von Hase saw the arrival of new troops and at first believed that they were reinforcements being sent to him. However, these troops promptly surrounded the others, and Hase was invited by a lieutenant to leave the balcony and enter into the house.

A short time later, Hase received a call from Goebbels to come to see him. Hase, not having an overall picture of the situation, went to Goebbels' house. The latter was not himself certain that the counter-measures by Hitler's General Headquarters would succeed. He offered Hase some wine, and while they drank and chatted together, neither knew which would be the prisoner of the other. An aide of Goebbels entered, whispered something to him, and Goebbels then declared that General von Hase was his prisoner. The General, a sturdy

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person known as an abdicator, made an attempt to resist and let himself be arrested. Glase which was kept on his family in the G. O. Headquarters. I have not discovered what became of them.

In my opinion, the Wehrmacht could continue its activities against the Nazis despite Stauffenberg's failure.

For a long time Field Marshal von Kluge has belonged to the opposition party of generals. He was not involved in the actual preparations of Stauffenberg's plot, although would have thrown in his lot with them had Hitler been killed. In fact, von Kluge, after the attempt on Hitler's life, also took the necessary measures in order to assure the control of state affairs as far as his powers and duties were concerned. Accordingly, he permitted the SD to occupy the head office of the Gestapo at Paris. Unfortunately, a teletype machine in the cellar of the Gestapo building was overlooked which enabled the Nazis locked in there to contact their central office at Berlin. Apparently, Kluge, after having seen that the affair would not succeed and that events were not going well, once again placed himself on Hitler's side. In spite of this, there is no doubt that he sympathizes with the opposition and that he might rejoin and continue the aims of the Wehrmacht, provided that he is handled skillfully and influenced in a clever and diplomatic manner. On the Allies' side, he should be encouraged to withdraw from the War. At present, there is as yet no way of knowing what persons in our circle at Berlin are still alive or free to contact Kluge. Of necessity, influence should be brought to bear upon Kluge by reminding him of March 1943, and that it was with his consent and under his authority that an attempt was prepared against Hitler and even executed but failed as the bomb did not explode. At present there is no way of evaluating the opportunities and possibilities of affecting this contact with Kluge.

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Through an appropriate use of NBO propaganda in Germany, a very considerable influence can be exerted. This would be to broadcast an eulogy of Stauffenberg which would result in reestablishing the influence of those of the opposition still remaining in Berlin.

As far as the military plans of Hitler are concerned, it may be said that he has none. His only demand is that each soldier fight until death, wherever he may be. The Germanian plans can only be those which General Headquarters had at the time when he accepted his position; i.e., shortening of the front and the establishment of a new line of defense on the Weichsel (Vistula). But the rapid Russian advances make it too late for the execution of such a plan. Beck himself judged as very dubious the ability to hold a new front line on the Weichsel (Vistula) since the Russians had already advanced too far.

In the opposition there exist today persons belonging to all the former parties of the Right, including Social Democrats such as Ministers Gumbert and Papke, the former Oberbürgermeister Goerdeler, the Secretary of State Plank, and Harhoff. I would like to emphasize this point and can speak for these people. For many years, I have personally known the circles comprising the leaders of the opposition. The above mentioned persons are only a few examples.

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14, 838

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 Washington, D. C.

- Beck.** General Ludwig von Beck, one of the leaders of the opposition group. Committed suicide after the 20 July plot.
- Fromm.** General Fritz Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the replacement training Army. Member of the opposition group. A report received on 2 September 1944 stated that he was being held in custody, but was not yet executed.
- Goerdeler.** Dr. Karl Goerdeler, former Mayor of Leipzig and one of the leaders of the opposition group. A report from Berlin on 11 September 1944 states that he was sentenced by the People's Tribunal and hanged.
- Goerler.** General Heinz Goerler was reported on 21 July 1944 to have replaced General Zeitzler as Chief of the General Staff, after Zeitzler had been retired "for reasons of health".
- von Haase.** Presumably Lieutenant General Paul von Haase. An official German report monitored by the F.C.C. on 5 August 1944 states that he was held under arrest by the Court of Honor. A later report stated that he had been hanged.
- von Haeflgen.** Ober Lieutenant of the Reserve Werner von Haeflgen was officially reported shot on 20 July 1944. His brother, Hans Gustav von Haeflgen of the Foreign Office, was reported on 3 September 1944 to have been tried in secret and hanged.
- Hansen.** This may be the Colonel Hansen who became Acting Director of the Abwehr under Kaltenbrunner, after Canaris was ousted. He was one of the principal contact men for Gasevins and Westjen. He was placed under arrest by the Court of Honor, according to a DSB broadcast monitored by the F.C.C. on 5 August 1944. See also: Hansen.
- Hansen.** This may be the Colonel of the General Staff Hansen reported to have been placed under arrest by the Court of Honor, according to the broadcast mentioned above.
- von der Heyde.** This may be Major von der Heyde, Commander-in-Chief of the sixth Parachute Regiment.
- Leber.** Dr. Leber, former Socialist member of the Reichstag (1924, 1928, 1930 - 1933); imprisoned 1933 to February 1937.

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LORENZ. Dr. Wilhelm Lorenz, Minister of the Interior for Hesse 1929 - 1933, member of the underground, allegedly scheduled by the upper group to become Vice-Chancellor. Sentenced to death by the People's Tribunal on 11 September 1944.

WILHELM. Believed to be Herr Otto who is, or has been, Director of the Deutsche Luftwaffe.

OLBRICHT. Brigadier General Friedrich Olbricht, German Air Force, a member of the opposition group. Court martialled on 20 July 1944, according to an official German broadcast monitored by the P.C.C. on 4 August 1944.

POPITZ. Hermann E. J. Popitz, former Minister of Finance for Prussia. Reported on 11 August 1944 to have been imprisoned after the failure of the 20 July plot.

SCHMIDT. Dr. Hjalmar Schmidt, former head of the Reichsbank, reported under arrest on 24 July 1944.

SPEER. Dr. Albert Speer, Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production and Chief of the Four-Year Plan.

STAUFFENBERG. Colonel Graf Claus von Stauffenberg served as liaison between the elder officers on active duty at General Headquarters and the younger group formerly headed by Helmut von Moltke (former advisor to OKW on International Law). He was killed during the plot of 20 July, and his whole family is reported to have been put to death.

VON MITSLEBEN. Field Marshal Erwin von Mitsleben, retired. An official German report states that he was found guilty of treason in the plot of 20 July, was sentenced to death and hanged, according to the New York Times of 8 September 1944.

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1944
Donovan
Breakers

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.

18 September 1944

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
FROM: W. A. Kinbel
SUBJECT: Breakers Report

Attached herewith is a Breakers Report entitled:
"Further Arrests Connected with the Plot against Hitler".

W. A. Kinbel
W. A. Kinbel

9/22

Hand P

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to Kinbel
to Kinbel

Attachment

1944

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D. C.**

18 September 1944

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
FROM: W. A. Kinzel
SUBJECT: Breakers Report

Attached herewith is a Breakers Report entitled:
"Further Arrests Connected with the Plot against Hitler".

W. A. Kinzel
W. A. Kinzel

7/22
Next P
SECRET
to
W. A. Kinzel

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.**INFORMANTS CONNECTED WITH THE PLOT AGAINST HITLER**

The OSS representative in Bern has received a report stating that the People's Court, which sentenced Goerdeler, brought to trial on 7 September the following persons: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former head of the Reichsbank, Count von Bismarck of Potsdam, Count von Schulenburg, former German Ambassador to Russia, and Freiherr Pilo von Wilnowski, identified as a close relative of members of the Krupp-Zehlen family.

A reliable informant who reached Bern in mid-September 1944, coming from Weimar, made the following statements:

It is thought that Dr. Gessler, former Reichs Minister for Defense, will soon be put to death. He was seized soon after the July uprising for his alleged part in the plot. It is thought also that Popitz, former Prussian Minister of Finance, will be executed. Although he evidently had no connection with the plot, General Halder has been placed under arrest.

Most of the former leaders of the Socialists and Catholics in Bavaria were taken into custody in August 1944. This group included the majority of the former representatives of the Bavarian Parliament who were affiliated with the Socialist and Liberal Catholic Parties. There is strong anti-Prussian sentiment among the people of Bavaria.

This informant also stated that the revolt against Hitler took place at the Nazi Headquarters in East Prussia.

The same informant urges strongly that Allied propaganda should aim at creating dissention among the SS troops by pointing out that those of their number who are innocent of war crimes need not fear reprisal measures, and that only the guilty will be forced to atone for their part in such crimes.

Received "Dr. Wilinski".

Case No. 4736-10, IS 20119 from Bern
15 September 1944

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

7/11/44

DATE September 18, 1944

FROM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SERVICES

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#4750-50... 476 to 110.

The material below, on the... was furnished by a friend of... diplomat in close contact with... from Germany.

1. The attack on the... took place at... in East Prussia.
2. Marshal von... was... the... was executed.
3. Marshal von... did not... of honor which expelled officers from the Army, and placed under arrest.
4. Von Brauns... army recently... in the... a result... in the... A great... of... were executed.
5. ... letter... the... will... the... against...

Dissemination handled by Maguire 11/23/44

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,
X-2

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#2054. BREAKERS. From Rhyth to 110.

Is the friend of 478 referred to in your #4736-38 identical with the source of information in your #3750-52?

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TOP 9/22/44 001307

WAR PLM JDW RCP/wtab
INITIALS OF "RELAYING" OFFICER

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DATE September 30, 1944

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FOR INFORMATION

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-58862-1

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#79024. ~~KAPPA~~ actions item #1069. Information #4754 Paris. ✓

Security considerations suggest it may be inadvisable for Paris attempt processing breakers and KAPPA material. 154 and 5415 accordingly recommend all continue sending call to these categories only Washington and London.

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SEP 30 1944

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FOR INFORMATION
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4798-4800. ~~URGENT~~ From 476 to 110. Referring to London #999

A new plan for the overthrow of Hitler was described by a messenger sent to Pfeiffer, who was mentioned in the above reference message, by friends in Germany. The opposition group is made up of prominent right-wing SS people, some members of the General Staff, among them Guderian, some Commanders of the Landespolizei and the Reichswehr, some Army leaders from the front, among them Model, and some Commanders of the Luftwaffe. The purpose of the opposition is to do away with Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Goering and other important leaders of the Nazi Party. If the coup proves successful, the opposition plans to continue the war temporarily and at the same time to instigate negotiations concerning terms of unconditional surrender. The process will be similar to that followed by Badoglio after the capture of Il Duce. One of the most important new features of this scheme is the cooperation between the Army and SS elements toward the overthrow of the Fuehrer. Himmler is aware of the dissatisfaction with Hitler among the SS, and is concerned about it. Hitler and Himmler were unsuccessful in an attempt to negotiate with the Russians, but feel there is still a chance. This intelligence was received by Pfeiffer through the same channel which furnished intelligence ahead of time concerning the mutch of July 20th. However, it is with complete reserve that I report the foregoing.

SECRET

TCR 10/6/44 1135 AM

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DATE: October 25, 1944

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DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, NAIRIDER, X-2

10-25-44 10-25-44

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✓ 98. HIRSHBERG. From Carib. Action: 110 Born
Information: London (P77487).

Legation Stockholm reports that according to rumors there
Lester not executed but kept in jail as private prisoner of
war.

Handwritten initials/signature

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10/25/44 1:20 PM

PLN JHO/WHO JH
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9. <i>[Reference]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Date]</i>	<i>[Time]</i>	<i>[Initials]</i>	<i>[Office]</i>
10. <i>[Reference]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Date]</i>	<i>[Time]</i>	<i>[Initials]</i>	<i>[Office]</i>
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#1689. Berne-Washington.
#4449. Berne-London.

TOP SECRET

476 reports from reliable sources. Zulu also advised by 476.

1. Hoyaluth Holtke condemned to death. View important role he played in Breakers circles, this will be serious loss. 476 suggesting to Zulu possibility considering some delaying action view fact Holtke's mother British or South African. While hope rather tenuous, our experience here that if some stir is created, Germans at this stage may consider person more valuable alive than dead.

2. State Secretary Plank, son of famous physicist, was condemned to death, but Dahms intervened on ground he had participated in concluding certain agreements with Japanese and that his execution would offend Jap dignity. Sentence commuted and Plank sent concentration camp.

3. Gersten Moyer, one of leading men Confessional Church, condemned 6 years penitentiary.

4. Same source who direct from important circles Berlin states deepest disappointment Germany at failure Ardennes offensive on which Germans had built highest hopes of taking Antwerp.

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4. [Name]		<i>[Signature]</i>	2/1	11:00	<i>[Initials]</i>	2/1	11:00

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BERN, SWITZERLAND

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X-2 (7-0)

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TOP

- #1039. Bern-Washington. From 110.
- #1039. Bern-London.
- #1039. Bern-Paris.

GIE has just escaped from Germany on last express train running from Berlin on papers prepared by G and D London (see gratulations to London, particularly on Gaholmstaatssoe Police identification disk, which was particularly useful). He has been in hiding in Berlin since he left the Bendlerstrasse 1030 hours July 20, 1 hour before the plotters were arrested. His friends' fate and 6 months hiding have shattered his nerves and it may take a few days to piece together his story, which will send soonest possible.

For 104. See #1700 It might have good psychological effect if you could give any encouraging reaction regarding manuscript.

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operator can not be identified.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DATE 26 January 1945

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

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- #4030. Bern-Washington. From 110.
- #4030. Bern-London.
- #4030. Bern-Paris.

GID has just escaped from Germany on last express train running from Berlin on papers prepared by C and D London (congratulations to London, particularly on Geholststratz-Polizei identification disk, which was particularly useful). He has been in hiding in Berlin since he left the Bendlerstrasse at 1030 hours July 20, 4 months before the plotters were arrested. His friends' fate and 6 months hiding have shattered his nerves and it may take a few days to piece together his story, which will send soonest possible.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION

DATE 25 JANUARY 1945 REC'D 1945 25 Jan 45

TO: HON. EUGENE W. BROWN

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FROM: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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FOR INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

ENT. DIVISION, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, No. 2

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Robert

2747. 110 from Choston and 154.

Please replace our 2717 (OUR 1991) with following: delighted to hear 412 safe. Please tell him that manuscript already proved of greatest value and being further studied. You are authorized to pay him one thousand dollars for valuable intelligence obtained from it. As you can appreciate believe it inappropriate to make arrangements with publisher to have it published now. When security and official reasons permit he will of course be at liberty to arrange for publication. Looking forward to receipt of full story. Congratulations.

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25 JAN 45 25 Jan 45

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 20 January 1945

1971

FROM Bernag (via radiotelephone)

REC

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

TO

DEFERRED

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

L. A. Alford

Director, Secretariat, Magruder, Bigelow, Sheppardson, Langer, Neale, Oathout, Morgan, Munn

RECEIVED IN PLAIN TEXT

RESTRICTED

MEMO

1. We are now receiving some information which I believe is authentic with regard to the background of the July 20 plot against Hitler and the reasons for its failure.

It was primarily a plot by military men, directed along military lines. Its success depended upon the movement of troops and the seizure of certain strategic objectives, particularly in the Berlin area. The plan looked efficient on paper, but in actual practice it failed to take into account the police aspects of the problem and the need for speed and timing. It overlooked the fact that, in Nazi Germany, it was more important to seize and eliminate a few key men than to take possession of a fortress with a regiment of troops. Of course, the failure to kill Hitler was an almost fatal blow for the plotters; but they had hoped that they could cut Hitler's means of communication with the outside world for sufficient time so that they could act as though he were dead, even though the bomb itself was not effective. However, here again there was a failure, and the general who was supposed to blow up the communications center at Hitler's headquarters lost his nerve and did not act.

Apparently shortly before July 20 another attempt on Hitler's life had been planned by the same group. One failed early in July because Hitler left the place in Munich where the plot was to be staged. A second attempt a few days before July 20 also failed, because the general who was to place the bomb had a nervous collapse. He later was among those who were hung. The younger officers, particularly Stauffenberg, had the nerve to proceed, but by the time July 20 came the nerves of all the participants had reached or passed the breaking point, and there was no clear directing hand. Stauffenberg was too young and too fearful, and the older generals, while not lacking in courage, lacked energy and decision.

Another of the prime reasons for the failure was the fundamental divergence of views as to Germany's future course among the plotters. The younger and more active men for the most part favored a pro-Russian alliance and believed that they had, through contact with the Royalists and

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FORM NO. 371

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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...then, some hope that the Wehrmacht would not be completely dispersed and destroyed, and that Germany might get a reasonable peace. The above are more conservative participants in the plot still locked in the Western zone, although their position had been weakened because they had received no encouragement or help from either America or England. That, if their plot was successful and they formed a new government, the attitude toward Germany would be in any way altered.

2. A recent arrival from Germany gives us the impression that many Germans are tending to turn to Russia rather than to the West, because they feel that Russia has an economic need for Germany and is interested in having the German factories work, even though they work almost solely for Russia. To the Germans, this is a better prospect than complete unemployment and lack of raw materials. These Germans feel that both England and America view the western German industrial area as competitive and have no interest in rehabilitating it. With the intensive bombing of this area, in addition to the failure of the Russians to bomb upper Silesia, and various plans for the destruction of the German industrial area, such as the Morgenthau plan, have strengthened this impression in Germany.

The Germans realize that the Russians will be hard to please, but at least they feel that they will be taken care of and will give some direction to German economic life. They feel that the English know so much about what they want as far as Germany is concerned, and that there is less hope of a rehabilitation of German economic life in the German areas occupied by the Anglo-Americans.

Here is a summary of an article which recently appeared in the *Zeitung der Arbeiter* about the Austrian resistance movement. There are increasing numbers of people who have decided to work actively for the liberation of Austria, despite their natural skepticism after all their experiences since 1918. During this war, the Germans have had essentially to fight revolutionary agitation among workers, intellectuals, and officers in Austria. The repressive measures of the Gestapo have been brutal and ferocious, but they had no more success than in the rest of occupied Europe. For more than a year partisan groups have been operating in mountainous regions in Tyrol and Carinthia, but they have no great strength and are insufficiently armed. They are living in difficult circumstances and cannot think of risking a pitched battle. They nevertheless continue to hamper the activities of the Wehrmacht through constant sabotage, and were and were troops, mostly Jewish, and required to catch these partisans. The military activity of these groups is decreasing as they are

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NOV 1944

Office of Strategic Services

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REPORT

...informed in the meantime, but they also carry an editorial
 ...that it is extremely important that
 ...the arrival of Anglo-American or Russian
 ...a provisional government
 ...of Austria during a difficult
 ...Apparently this objective has
 ...The abolition of the
 ...The Government, the Vaterland
 ...and the legislation, some of them have abandoned the idea of a
 ...have, according to a recent report, actually
 ...establishing a national government
 ...in Vienna on September 14. This provisional government has an
 ...of five members and four committees of fifteen members
 ...with military affairs, the second with
 ...and food supply, the third with information, and the
 ...with national education. The essential task of this provisional
 ...will be primarily to unify military and political relations
 ...with the Soviet, French, and Anglo-American allies, and
 ...the existence of an independent and democratic
 ...

It is interestingly hard to define the structure of this state
 ...and uncovering to build on the defeat of the
 ...in Central Europe
 ...can be drawn from the discussion
 ...definitely discarded the
 ...under a Habsburg
 ...of the south German
 ...toward Hungary is very reserved. They
 ...as is known from the efforts
 ...and
 ...with Austria, both organized
 ...a close political and economic
 ...with Poland and
 ...with Hungary in
 ...the Czechs access to the
 ...perhaps international.
 ...The main plan for a future state. The main
 ...the existence of an Austria
 ...of Germany and
 ...will have, to
 ...the struggle against the Third Reich,
 ...by the
 ...of the conference of Moscow.

THE CITY

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27 January 1945

Mr. Cheston:

Attached for your signature are memoranda addressed to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Bern cable #4077, of 25 January, dealing with information supplied by a member of the conspiratorial group behind the 20 July putach, who has escaped to Switzerland.

For General Magruder


J. S. D.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

421344

SECRET

January 27, 1945

27 January 1945

* Copy to
* Hester
* Grover

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

I believe the President will be interested in seeing the enclosed memorandum, the intelligence in which was forwarded by our representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Chaston
Acting Director

Enclosure.

SECRET

14858

27 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following communication has been received from the OSS representative in Bern:

One of the two emigrés of the conspiratorial group behind the 20 July putsch who was previously reported arrested by the Nazis has escaped to Switzerland, and has supplied further information on the divergence of opinion which developed among the conspirators as previously reported in a memorandum dated 17 August 1944.

Source declares that Colonel von Stauffenberg, who made the attempt on Hitler's life, had planned to conclude a peace with the Soviets, if the putsch were successful and proposed to announce the establishment of a "workers and peasants" regime in Germany. The old-line Generals did not agree with this plan and continued to favor a peace arrangement with the Eastern Allies to the exclusion of the Soviets. They did not oppose von Stauffenberg, however, since he was the only one willing to risk his life and was the only person in a position

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- 2 -

to place the bomb. They hoped that they would be able later to direct developments along more conservative lines.

The GIB representative comments that:

The present situation on the Eastern Front and the general trend of the situation in Germany indicate that an east-west solution of the war may now be more attractive to Germany. It is not impossible that Germany will maintain stubborn resistance in the East even though the Soviets have pressed deep into the Reich, unless some means is found to break the resistance of Wehrmacht forces opposing the British and Americans.

A subtle, psychological approach may help the Anglo-American military forces. The following points might be suggested to high Wehrmacht circles:

(1) Unconditional surrender unalterably remains the Allied policy, but German military leaders must, in the face of inevitable and rapidly approaching military defeat, consider the future of their country.

(2) In both the East and the West Germany faces the choice of making each German city an Aachen, Warsaw, or Budapest, or of facilitating the entry of Allied armies and the orderly transfer of authority to occupation forces under condi-

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lines which would spare unnecessary destruction, facilitate the distribution of food and raw materials and a resumption of economic life, and make possible the orderly evacuation of prisoners and foreign workers.

(3) Wehrmacht officers who contribute to such a constructive policy, assuming they are not marked as war criminals, would be treated with consideration due their rank and according to the services which they render in the liquidation of the Nazi regime and the forces which have supported it.

An affirmative program along these lines, the OES representative believes, may help to drive a wedge in the German army before the effects of the Soviet successes in the East create chaos in Germany. Even though the USSR probably does not wish to see a Bolshevized Germany, many Germans appear to believe that a Bolshevized Germany would facilitate an understanding with the USSR. They seem to be working in this direction, aided by current military developments, by the distress incident to the slowly creeping paralysis of German transport, by the suffering resulting from air bombardment, and by the presence in Germany of large numbers of undernourished and desperate prisoners of war, foreign workers and bombed-out peoples.

Charles S. Chertan
Acting Director

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14, 838

27 January 1945

**MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**

The following communication has been received from the OSS representative in Bern:

One of the two emissaries of the conspiratorial group behind the 20 July plot who was previously reported arrested by the Nazis has escaped to Switzerland, and has supplied further information on the divergence of opinion which developed among the conspirators as previously reported in a memorandum dated 17 August 1944.

Source declares that Colonel von Stauffenberg, who made the attempt on Hitler's life, had planned to conclude a peace with the Soviets, if the plot was successful and proposed to announce the establishment of a "workers and peasants" regime in Germany. The old-line Generals did not agree with this plan and continued to favor a peace arrangement with the Western Allies to the exclusion of the Soviets. They did not oppose von Stauffenberg, however, since he was the only one willing to risk his life and was the only person in a position to place the bomb. They hoped that they would be able later to direct developments along more conservative lines.

The OSS representative comments that:

The present situation on the Eastern Front and the general trend

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of the situation in Germany indicates that an eastern solution of the war may now be more attractive to Germany. It is not impossible that Germany will maintain stubborn resistance in the West even though the Soviets have pressed deep into the Reich, unless some means is found to break the resistance of Wehrmacht forces opposing the British and Americans.

A subtle, psychological approach may help the Anglo-American military forces. The following points might be suggested to high Wehrmacht circles:

(1) Unconditional surrender unalterably remains the Allied policy, but German military leaders must, in the face of inevitable and rapidly approaching military defeat, consider the future of their country.

(2) In both the East and the West Germany faces the choice of making each German city an Aachen, Bormae, or Budapest, or of facilitating the entry of Allied armies and the orderly transfer of authority to occupation forces under conditions which would spare unnecessary destruction, facilitate the distribution of food and raw materials and a resumption of economic life, and make possible the orderly evacuation of prisoners and foreign workers.

(3) Wehrmacht officers who contribute to such a constructive policy, assuming they are not serving as war criminals, would be treated with consideration and their rank and according to the

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services which they render in the liquidation of the Nazi regime and the forces which have supported it.

In affirmative programs along these lines, the OSS representative believes, any help to give a nudge in the German way before the effects of the Soviet successes in the East create chaos in Germany. Even though the USSR probably does not wish to see a Bolshevized Germany, many Germans appear to believe that a Bolshevized Germany would facilitate an understanding with the USSR. They seem to be working in this direction, aided by current military developments, by the distress incident to the slowly creeping paralysis of German transport, by the suffering resulting from air bombardment, and by the presence in Germany of large numbers of undernourished and desperate prisoners of war, foreign workers, and bombed-out peoples.

Charles S. Cheaton
Acting Director

Born Cable #4377 - 1/24/45.

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14,858

27 January 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Dear Mr. Dunn:

I believe the Secretary will be interested in seeing the enclosed memorandum, the intelligence in which was forwarded by our representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosure.

SECRET

27 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following communication has been received from the OSS representative in Bern:

One of the two emissaries of the conspiratorial group behind the 20 July plot who was previously reported arrested by the Swiss has escaped to Switzerland, and has supplied further information on the divergence of opinion which developed among the conspirators as previously reported in a memorandum dated 17 August 1944.

Source declares that Colonel von Stauffenberg, who made the attempt on Hitler's life, had planned to conclude a peace with the Soviets. If the plot had been successful and proposed to announce the establishment of a "workers and peasants" regime in Germany. The old-line Generals did not agree with this plan and continued to favor a peace arrangement with the Western Allies to the exclusion of the Soviets. They did not oppose von Stauffenberg, however, since he was the only one willing to risk his life and was the only person in a position to place the bomb. They hoped that they would be able later to direct developments along more conservative lines.

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The GIB representative comments that:

The present situation on the Eastern Front and the general trend of the situation in Germany indicate that an eastern solution of the war may not be more attractive to Germany. It is not impossible that Germany will maintain stubborn resistance in the East even though the Soviets have pressed deep into the Reich, unless some means is found to break the resistance of Wehrmacht forces opposing the British and Americans.

A subtle, psychological approach may help the Anglo-American military forces. The following points might be suggested to high Wehrmacht circles:

(1) Unconditional surrender unalterably remains the Allied policy, but German military leaders must, in the face of inevitable and rapidly approaching military defeat, consider the future of their country.

(2) In both the East and the West Germany faces the choice of making each German city an Lachan, Warsaw, or Budapest, or of facilitating the entry of Allied armies and the orderly transfer of authority to occupation forces under conditions which would spare unnecessary destruction, facilitate the distribution of food and raw materials and a resumption of economic life, and make possible the orderly evacuation of prisoners and foreign civilians.

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(3) Wehrmacht officers who contribute to such a constructive policy, assuming they are not marked as war criminals, would be treated with consideration due their rank and according to the services which they render in the liquidation of the Nazi regime and the forces which have supported it.

An affirmative program along these lines, the OSS representative believes, may help to drive a wedge in the German army before the effects of the Soviet successes in the East create chaos in Germany. Even though the USSR probably does not wish to see a Bolshevized Germany, many Germans appear to believe that a Bolshevized Germany would facilitate an understanding with the USSR. They seem to be working in this direction, aided by current military developments, by the distress incident to the slowly creeping paralysis of German transport, by the suffering resulting from air bombardment, and by the presence in Germany of large numbers of undernourished and desperate prisoners of war, foreign workers, and bombed-out peoples.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Item Cable #A071 - 1/25/45.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 21 JUL 45

FROM

DIR. WASHINGTON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

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DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 0300

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

SI

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, WASHINGTON,
RIGELON, PLAN. SECTION, X-2

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14077. Action: Washington. Information: Paris (#4327) and London (#4007).

Handwritten signature

One item of news brought by 512 was that Stauffenberg who was the active element in July putsch had planned eastern solution if putsch successful and proposed initiate declaration of workers and peasants regime in Germany. Old line generals who participated in plot while not agreeing with this solution, did not oppose Stauffenberg as he was only one willing to risk his neck and also was only man who had facilities for placing bomb. Former hoped they could control developments later in more conservative sense.

Situation on Eastern Front and general drift of German situation leads us to conclude that eastern solution now more attractive to Germans, as well as harmonizing with march of events. Not impossible we may find Germany maintaining stubborn resistance in west while Russians are deep in Germany, unless we find way of breaking resistance of 'old-maid' forces opposing us in west. Subtlety and psychology may help our military forces.

Endeavoring: explore possibilities of secret line to Mandates and already have a line to Kesselring via contact who is seeing 470 tomorrow before proceeding to Italy to see Kesselring. Could anything along following lines be given discreetly to cut cuts who have contacts in high German circles? (1) Unconditional surrender remains unaltered policy but provide for German military leaders to face in future of own country in face of inevitable and rapidly approaching military defeat. (2) In both west and east Germany faces the choice of making each German city an Amsterdam, Warsaw or Budapest, or of facilitating entry of the Allied forces and orderly transfer of authority to forces of occupation under conditions which would (a) spare unnecessary destruction, (b) facilitate distribution of food and raw materials so as to render possible

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

REF. NO. 4077

TO DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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an earlier resumption of economic life and, (c) render possible orderly evacuation of prisoners and foreign workers. (5) Officers of Wehrmacht who contribute to such constructive policy, assuming war criminals not involved, would be treated with consideration due their rank and in relation to the services they thus render in facilitating liquidation of the Nazi regime and those forces which have supported it.

This is merely rough outline of ideas, but some affirmative program along some such lines may help to drive a wedge into German Army and to facilitate American and British occupation of at least Western Germany before effects of Russian successes in east create situation of complete chaos throughout Germany. Even though Russia may not, and probably does not, desire to see a divided Germany, many Germans believe this would facilitate an understanding with Russia and are working in this direction aided by events, by the distress incident to the slowly creeping paralysis in German transportation and the suffering resulting from air bombardments and the presence in Germany of millions of unaccounted and desperate prisoners of war, foreign workers and bombed out population.

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FORM 8000 28 Jun 45

IF IN PENALTY TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARY

2/1/45

Mr. Sullivan:

Copies of the attached are being sent, over Gen. Magruder's signature, to Fletcher Warren (State Dept.), Gen. Marshall, G-2, J-2, and DIT. This procedure is being followed at this time because all former memoranda on this subject were sent to these persons in this manner.

J. B. D.
Ina Holtzschetter

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1 February 1945

Mr. Cheston:

Attached for your signature is a memorandum addressed to the President, based on Bern cable #4377 (BREAKERS), of 28 January, and summarizing new authoritative information on the 20 July German coup d'etat.

For General Magruder

J. B. D. 24

Ina Magruder, Capt. G-2.
Special Director, G-2 Intelligence Service

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U.S. GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 February 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Miss Tully:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed memorandum, which contains information transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosure.

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1 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The enclosed memorandum summarizes new authoritative information on the 20 July German coup d'etat, obtained from one of the active participants in the plot, and the reasons which he has given for the failure of the putsch.

The 20 July coup appears to have failed primarily because:

(a) The conspirators were unnerved by two previous failures.

(b) General Fellgiebel failed to destroy communications at Hitler's East Prussia headquarters, and thus allowed word to get out that the bomb explosion had not killed Hitler before the plotters in the German War Ministry could seize power.

(c) The defection of Major Romer at the eleventh hour tipped off Dr. Goebbels to the conspiracy.

(d) The plotters, planning the coup along strictly military lines, failed to plan adequately to deal with the efficient Nazi police. They elected to seize buildings rather than key Nazi individuals, and failed to arrange for military forces to reach Berlin in time.

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(c) By July the plotters had come to a disagreement as to which of the Allies they should surrender to and as to the orientation of the proposed new government. The younger, active leaders like Colonel von Stauffenberg favored a pro-Soviet policy. The older and more conservative figures wanted to turn to the Western Allies. The younger men were encouraged to a Soviet orientation by a feeling that Allied policy gave no hope for Germany's future and, as a result of alleged assurances from the Free Germany Committee in Moscow that Germany would receive a just peace from the Soviets and the Wehrmacht would not be wholly disbanded.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 February 1945

THE GERMAN COUP D'ETAT (Continued)

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated 22 July 1944 and subsequent memoranda concerning the "German Coup d'Etat" of 20 July 1944. The source for this information is a member and former emissary of the conspiratorial group who had a prominent part in the plot, and who has recently escaped to Switzerland. He apparently is the only one of the active plotters to reach safety.

The 20 July coup was the third attempt by the conspirators to kill Hitler and seize power. The first attempt was made on 6 July in Munich. It failed when Hitler suddenly and unexpectedly departed from the city. A second attempt was made on 16 July in East Prussia. It failed when Major General Hellmuth Stieff ~~later executed~~ lost his nerve and failed to place the bomb. The conspirators' military forces had already begun their march on Berlin, before the news of this failure had been received. This troop movement was afterward explained away as

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"sacrifice". The plotters felt, however, that this explanation could not be used again without arousing suspicion. On 20 July, therefore, the troops were set in motion only after the bomb had actually exploded, and consequently these forces did not reach the conspirators' headquarters in the War Ministry on Bendlerstrasse in time.

By 20 July the nerves of von Stauffenberg and the other participants had reached or passed the breaking point. There was no clear directing hand. The younger officers who had the nerve to proceed, like von Stauffenberg, were too young and inexperienced. The older officers, though courageous, lacked energy and decision. Some, like General Erich Fellgiebel later reported executed, Inspector General of the German Army Signal Corps, failed to carry out their part. Fellgiebel was supposed to destroy the Central Information Office and all communication installations at the East Prussia headquarters where the bomb was placed. The plan was to isolate Hitler and his staff in these headquarters so that even if Hitler were not killed, he would not be able to publicize the fact until the plotters had gained full control. The defection of Major Renner at the last minute also contributed to the failure of the coup.

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When Lauer received orders from the plotters at the Bendlerstrasse to march the troops at his disposal, he reported first to Gumbel and then disclosed the plot to the Nazis.

When von Stauffenberg reached the Berlin airport, after planting the bomb, he telephoned the conspirators at the Bendlerstrasse that everything was all right and told them to go ahead. General Friedrich Olbricht, Chief of the General Army Office later court-martialed and shot, and in action the military forces. When von Stauffenberg arrived at the War Ministry, he admitted uncertainty as to whether Hitler was dead, to which Colonel General Ludwig Beck (who later committed suicide) replied, "For us, he is dead." About this time Marshal Keitel, unaware that Olbricht and others were in the plot, telegraphed to the War Ministry and to all military commanders that Hitler was alive.

Source was saved from arrest by the fact that he had already left with a message from Beck to Wolf Graf Helldorf, head of the Berlin police later reported executed, and SS and Police General Arthur Hobe (also unknown), at Police headquarters. Source passed through the troops under cover, which he thought were on their way to seize the Bendlerstrasse for the

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plotters, but were actually en route to arrest the plotters at the Bendlerstrasse. Source first learned of the fiasco while he was with Helldorf. He also learned then that Kade had been asked to send his SS police officials to East Prussia to begin an investigation of the bombing.

Helldorf and those others who were not caught at the Bendlerstrasse then tried in vain to establish alibis for themselves. Source could not even try that because his presence in Berlin was unauthorized. He found refuge in Berlin where he stayed in virtual solitary isolation until he managed to escape by using false identification papers. He was not arrested by the Nazis as previous reports from the conspiratorial group had indicated. Source believes that Dr. Carl Friedrich Goerdler, co-leader with General Beck of the conspiratorial group, is still alive. Goerdler, he says, was sent out of Berlin by von Stauffenberg a few days before 20 July. Goerdler was subsequently arrested by the Nazis. Other reliable reports have indicated that the Nazis were keeping Goerdler for future use.

In general, source indicates that the plot failed for the following reasons:

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After the success of the arrival in Berlin on 11 July, the plans had been made along strictly military lines and the political aspects were largely neglected. The plotters relied upon the occupation of government buildings rather than making plans to arrest key Nazi individuals. When the plans for the use of the military were executed too slowly, counter-measures by the Nazi police wrecked the whole program.

Another important reason for the failure was the last-minute divergence of views among the plotters. Von Stauffenberg and his younger immediate collaborators reached a decision in favor of an Eastern solution which would involve opening the fronts at once to the USSR without even trying to negotiate with the Soviets. Von Stauffenberg alleged to his fellow conspirators that he had been in touch with General von Seydlitz and the Free Germany Committee in Moscow. He said he had obtained assurances from von Seydlitz, through Madame Kollontay, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, that Germany could receive a fair peace and that the Wehrmacht would not be completely dissolved. Frott as well as ~~another~~ had tried to contact the British in Stockholm, and having received no encouragement, had also come to favor an Eastern solution and gave his support to von Stauffenberg.

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As a result, the plotters disagreed as to the composition of the government they planned to set up. The conservative, Western-oriented group of older men favored a government headed by Borchers and General Beck. The younger, pro-Soviet faction, while willing to have Beck as Chief of State, wanted a leftist premier like Hans Louschaer, a prominent Socialist and former Minister of the Interior in Weimar, or preferably Dr. Julius Leber, a former right-wing Social Democrat Deputy. It would seem highly unlikely that either Louschaer or Leber could have proved acceptable to the Soviets.

The younger men like von Stauffenberg constituted the dynamic force in the plot. The older men, though disagreeing on policy, cooperated, on the theory that anything was better than Hitler. The younger men like von Stauffenberg and Trott saw both the American policy, or lack of policy, as hope for Germany's future, and therefore were prepared to take their chances with the USSR.

Source (reference only) states for Germany. He says that the Germans expect a hard but realistic policy from the USSR. They believe that the Soviets will need Germany's economic resources and will permit Eastern Germany to work, though it may

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only be for Soviet benefit. On the other hand, they feel that the Western Powers are not interested in seeing any economic life rebuilt in Germany. Hence the Germans feel little hope for a Germany under American or British occupation.

A prominent and well-placed German industrialist, according to British intelligence reports, states that "thinking Germans are amazed and disappointed by the ineptness of Allied propaganda", which they feel is playing directly into Goebbels' hands and stiffening the will to resist of the average German, thus prolonging the war.⁷

Source believes that the conditions in Germany which American and British occupying forces will have to meet will seem so intolerable to persons accustomed to the Western way of life and Western culture, that it will be next to impossible, from the point of view of morale and living conditions alone, to maintain occupying forces in Germany. The Soviets are hardened to such things, source comments. In any event, he adds, the cities in the "Red Zone", with the exception of Berlin, will have suffered less destruction from bombing than the other German cities.

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