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ROLL #64

Even No. 11111

[Expansion is 125 @ f.6.3]

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[Even No. 11111 @ f.6.3]

J. I. C

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ROLL #64

Exp. No. 10111
[Exp. No. 15 1/2 @ f.6.3]

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ROLL #64

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ROLL #64

Joint Intell Sub Com. 11,514

* Additional
* Representative

May 14, 1943

SUBJECT: OSS Appointee as a Member of Joint Intelligence Subcommittee.

TO: Brigadier General John R. Deane
Secretary, Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C.

1. In reply to your letter of May 8, 1943, on the above subject, I have appointed as additional member to the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee Dr. Richard Hartshorne. Dr. Hartshorne is a civilian but holds a position in Civil Service in grade equivalent to that of the field grade in the Army. He is qualified in every respect to make valuable contributions as a member of the Subcommittee.

2. Dr. Hartshorne at the moment is on a short leave but will be available for duty immediately upon his return. The chairman of the Subcommittee has been informed of this appointment.

William J. Donovan
Director

JHS:AM
cc: Secretary, JIC
R & A
Dr. Hartshorne
Mr. Kason

Joint Intel Sub. Com. 11,514

x additional

x Representative

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

8 May, 1943.

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Augmentation Personnel for
Joint Intelligence Subcommittee.

The Joint Intelligence Committee has approved a request to increase the personnel of the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee by one ground officer, one air officer and one O.S.S. representative.

It is requested that you furnish the additional O.S.S. representative for the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee. The representative that you designate should hold a grade equivalent to that of field grade in the Army.

John R. Deane

JOHN R. DEANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

*copy to Langley
for comment*



RESTRICTED

x Representative

RESTRICTEDCOPY NO 4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Provision of additional personnel for the Subcommittee.

References: (A) J.C.S. 202/7, April 24, 1943, War Planning Agencies.
(B) J.I.C. 94/M, May 3, 1943, Coordination between the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee and the Joint War Plans Committee.

1. The provisions of J.C.S. 202/7 regarding the Joint Intelligence Committee and its subordinate staff and regarding the Joint War Plans Committee are non-controversial. In anticipation of their adoption by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the former Joint Strategic Committee has already been reorganized as the Joint War Plans Committee, as described in J.I.C. 94/M.

2. J.C.S. 202/7, Enclosure "A", Appendix "B", Annex "E", paragraph 5 (d), provides that the Joint War Plans Committee shall "employ the services of the Joint Intelligence Committee in connection with the preparation of war plans and studies, and in estimating the capabilities of the enemy."

3. J.C.S. 202/7, Enclosure "A", Appendix "B", Annex "G", paragraph 7 (b), provides that the Joint Intelligence Committee shall "maintain close liaison with the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee in order to make readily available its services in connection with the preparation of studies and war plans."

4. J.C.S. 202/7, Enclosure "A", Appendix "B", Annex "G", paragraph 8, provides that "the Joint Intelligence Committee will be assisted by a permanent staff consisting of members detailed from the respective organizations of the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, functioning as a committee under the chairmanship of the senior Army or Navy member."

5. The volume of urgent requests already received from the Joint War Planning Committee indicates a considerable increase in the activity and usefulness of the Subcommittee. Existing Subcommittee personnel is inadequate to handle anticipated requests expeditiously.

RESTRICTED

6. The Subcommittee recommends:

a. That the Subcommittee be provided with additional personnel
as follows:

One ground officer

One air officer

One G.S.S. representative.

b. That the personnel provided be of field grade or the equivalent.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD, III,

Secretary.

J.C. meeting 4.21.43
 & maps -
 * Magruder
 * Latin America

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: June 5, 1943

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: William J. Donovan, Brig. Gen.
 FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
 SUBJECT: Meeting of the JIC, 4 June 1943

The agenda for the meeting included the reading of a paper on The Western Axis Oil Position and one on General Policies for JCS Organization. No discussion of consequence arose from these papers.

I then made a statement regarding errors in OSS maps, which had been somewhat dramatized by the Chairman at the previous meeting. I reserved my remarks to the facts contained in the accompanying memorandum prepared by Dr. Richard Hartshorne.

The real business took place informally when General Strong, Admiral Train, Mr. Berle, and I remained after the formal meeting. I was included not as an honor guest, but as the principal victim. Occasion was taken at this time to bring out certain activities of the OSS "disturbing" to the other members.

Admiral Train mentioned that a letter was read at the Mexican border addressed to Major James of R&A, which was being brought to him by one Rojas (Roxas). Admiral Train stated that Rojas was a probable Communist and on the Navy blacklist. He questioned, however, the propriety of what appeared to be Major James' contact with agents in the Western Hemisphere. I knew nothing of this particular activity, but, in the ensuing discussion, had occasion to defend the logic of our engaging in certain types of activity in the Western Hemisphere, specifically because of the responsibility we have in the preparation of strategic surveys the world over and the importance of Latin America in the PW picture.

General Strong produced a form questionnaire which had been furnished him by "a man in the Budget

-2-

Bureau," where request had been made for authority for its printing. This form had previously been shown me by Mr. John D. Wilson, and had been prepared by a joint committee, of which OSS is a member, interested in interviewing aliens after their arrival and settlement in the U. S. I was not completely familiar with this committee, but expressed the opinion to General Strong that it was wholly authorized and not intended to duplicate the Joint Interrogation Committee, consisting of Army, Navy, State, and FBI; that the form contained information by which the aliens could be located for interviewing along particular lines. I stated that I would obtain further information about the matter. General Strong suggested that it was another irksome formality to which aliens were submitted, and suggested that all the information requested was contained in existing forms and could appropriately be obtained therefrom.

Mr. Berle mentioned having information regarding the activities of two individuals in Buenos Aires which appeared to be out of keeping with our agreement to use Buenos Aires merely as a base for certain types of contact with other foreign countries. He mentioned having brought this matter to the attention of Mr. Hugh Wilson.

This evoked a statement from General Strong to the effect that he was informed by the JCS that the authorization of the OSS to operate in this hemisphere was restricted to two points: (1) post office boxes, so to speak, in Buenos Aires and in Santiago--that this authorization did not imply intelligence activities in these areas; (2) authorization at the request of the CIAA to take moving pictures in Brazil. This, he added, in his own peculiar style, did not authorize intelligence activities of any other nature in Brazil.


Mr. Berle then mentioned to the group that the State Department was in receipt of information to the effect that OSS contemplated instructing the Brazilians in PW operations, including an overseas secret service. He questioned the advisability of this activity.

Mr. Berle then brought up the general question of the political implications of certain recruitment of

-3-

foreign nationals without reference to the State Department, mentioning specifically the case of Pacciardi and an unnamed contact with King Zog of Albania.

In so far as I knew of any of these various incidents, I defended them to the limit of my knowledge. However, the general atmosphere of the encounter was that OSS was verging on anything from open disregard of jurisdictional limitations to irresponsibility. The encounter was not violent, but savored more of the desire of victims of a hot Washington day wanting to vent their discomfort on the OSS through the junior member of the august JIC.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.,
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

Attachment

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General John Magruder

DATE: 4 June 1945

FROM: Richard Hartshorne

SUBJECT: JIC Criticism of OSS Maps.

Mr. Mason and I have just discussed what procedure might be most effective in presenting our answer. He found that he will not be able to get in touch with you before the meeting and asked me to transmit what we thought. His suggestion, with which I agree, is that it would be best to state that the OSS has completed its detailed report on the maps which it wishes to turn over to the Working Committee for their appraisal. But in the meantime there are a few particularly significant points to which we would like to call the attention of the JIC. These should be not the ultimate conclusions but the best debatable points in order to avoid getting into argument before the Working Committee has filed its report. We suggest the following points might be effectively mentioned:

I should like to mention a few points which our own investigation has brought out.

1. Comparison of the map of air facilities made by the Air Movements Branch was based on all the information at hand one month after the map was made. Major Bolling confirms the statement in Captain Douglas's memorandum that so far as they can judge the disagreements appear to be based on this difference. He quoted Captain Douglas as saying the map was a good job as of the date printed on the map.

2. The figures given by the Engineers of the Board of Rivers and Harbors on Italian port capacities were likewise not available at the time the port facilities map was made. In view of the uncertainties in making estimates of port capacities in enemy territory there is more agreement than might have been expected. A recent I.S.I.S. report on Sicily, independent of either OSS or the Board estimates, shows closer agreement with OSS than with the Board.

3. The examination by the Military Intelligence Service of the maps of China and Southeastern Asia was based on a misunderstanding of the purpose for which the map was made. The agency requesting the map originally (now the Joint War Planning Committee) tells us that the map has proven

- 2 -

extremely valuable for the purpose for which they wanted it. That the map was not intended to be complete, or strictly accurate in its details was specifically indicated on the face of the map, in the form of a Reliability Code, which the examiners overlooked.

4. The disagreements in measurements of distances shown on the map of airline and sailing distances are insignificant to the purpose of the map, with the exception of three specific errors, which must be admitted and which were due to a hasty deadline, therefore not being checked as normally done. In particular the disagreements with the measurements made by the Air Movements Branch result from the fact that they used a less accurate method of measurements than that used by OSS. Presumably they concluded that the more accurate method was not necessary for the purpose.

Richard Hartshorne

JIC 11/124
X WAR Dept
X Planning Bd
X Blakeney
X Opie
X Locker

April 9, 1948

SECRET

Colonel Charles C. Blakeney
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Blakeney:

In accordance with the request expressed in your letter of April 7, 1948, I hereby detail Lieutenant Colonel E. E. Locker, A.U.S., O-500003, as liaison officer between the Office of Strategic Services and the Secret War Department Planning Board, of which you are President.

I also comply with the request expressed in the second paragraph of your letter with respect to Colonel Locker's having funds available from the Office of Strategic Services on detail to a secret mission.

I would like it to be understood that, if the necessity arises, Colonel Locker may be recalled for OSS duty.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON**

J.I.C. 11/124

- x War Dept
- x Planning Board
- x Blakney, C.G.
- x Opie, J.W.
- x Locker, R.E.

April 7, 1943

Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Donovan:

In connection with certain secret operations which you discussed recently with Commander J. W. Opie, U.S.N., it will be greatly appreciated if it were possible for you to assign Lt. Col. R. E. Locker, A.U.S., O-399333, as liaison between the Office of Strategic Services and the Secret War Department Planning Board, of which I am President.

It would be an immeasurable contribution from O.S.S. if it were possible for Col. Locker to be detailed to a secret mission with funds available from O.S.S. for this duty, in order that it would be unnecessary, at any time while he is on this duty, to request travel orders from the War Department.

OK
11/17

Sincerely,

Charles C. Blakney
CHARLES C. BLAKNEY,
Colonel, U.S.C.
President, Planning Board.



SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 9, 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Lieutenant Brady
FROM: C. Clements

Would you please ask the General to sign the original and four carbons, returning all copies to this office?

cc.

OK -
Z.C.O.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: General Donovan
 FROM: Lt. Colonel Looker
 SUBJECT: SPECIAL OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF


DATE: April 1, 1943

In connection with the project we discussed on March 30th, with which Commander Opie and Colonel Blakeney were concerned, I have just been enjoined by Colonel Blakeney not to put any of the actual elements of the project upon paper. It is necessary, therefore, to let stand my verbal report to you.

Following your instructions, I have talked to Colonel Huntington, who has fully outlined to me the co-operation which SO will give the project if desired. I am passing this on verbally to Colonel Blakeney.

Colonel Huntington is of the opinion that it would be a mistake for OSS to take any part in the project except by SO cooperation -- which, of course, can be of the greatest assistance to the project. At this stage of the project set-up, at least, I concur with him.

If, however, there appears to be a breakdown in the project, either as to plan or operations, I will report to you immediately.


SECRET

J.I.C. 10.3.85
y Germany
y Gliders
x Africa
x Political Situation

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: February 8, 1943

TO: Colonel Donovan

FROM: E. S. Mason *esm*

SUBJECT: REPORTS PREPARED FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

I am attaching a couple of memos prepared recently for the Joint Intelligence Committee. The one on "German Glider Experience" was prepared at the request of Colonel Milling. The report on "The Probable Development of the Political Situation in North Africa" was prepared in connection with a request from the Joint Intelligence Committee for a review of this situation. *Intelligence*

J. g. e. 10.285
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REPORT ON GERMAN GLIDER EXPERIENCE AND PRESENT POSITION

SUMMARY

1. General: The Germans have been outstanding in development and production of gliders, in training pilots and in making operational use of such craft. Gliders have been employed on a significant scale by the Germans for: (a) spearheading a blitz invasion, as in the Crete campaign, and (b) behind-the-lines transport of troops and equipment, as in the African campaign. Information is scarce on the present German glider position, but the following considerations may help in formulating a judgment as to what future use the Germans can be expected to make of this craft.

2. Types: There are two major operational types of German gliders now in use: (a) the D.F.S. 230 used for troop transport, with a capacity of ten men, including pilot, and a maximum load of 2,000 pounds; and (b) the Go. 242 used chiefly for freight transport, with a maximum load of 5,500 pounds, but capable of carrying twenty-three equipped men. In addition, lighter training models have long been used and there has been considerable experiment with larger operational types, including a motor glider.

3. Strength: Estimates of current G.A.F. glider strength vary. It seems likely that total operational

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strength is about 2,000 transport types, divided equally between the D.F.S. 250 and the Go. 242. This represents a simultaneous transport capacity of about 10,000 men and 5.5 million pounds of freight (assuming adequate towing capacity, and fighter protection where necessary.)

4. Production: The only available estimate of current glider output indicates a monthly production of the D.F.S. 250 between 75 and 100. This is only slightly higher than the estimate for one year ago. There is no evidence to indicate that glider production has been increased at the expense of general aircraft production. American experience indicates, however, that glider production can be stepped up tremendously from one month to the next if it is desired.

5. Losses: Judging from German experience at fronts, gliders have a very high wastage rate under combat conditions because of their vulnerability to attack and to crash damage. It seems likely that their accident rate is also relatively high when used for training or behind-the-line-transport purposes.

6. Supply of trained pilots: Glider pilot training has been extensive in Germany for ten years, so it may be assumed that the G.A.F. has available a substantial number of trained pilots. It is reported that most G.A.F. power pilots can "double" on the glider because of their early training in this craft. This fact accounts for

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much of the glider training activity in Germany. In addition, a pool of manpower below the combat aircraft standards of physical condition are available for glider work in all air forces.

7. Limiting factors on glider use: Apart from the number of gliders and pilots available for use, glider operations are limited by: (a) the number of planes available to tow them, (b) the number of fighter planes available to furnish protection in combat use, and (c) the ability to soften up landing points if gliders are to be used for invasion. Thus far, gliders have usually been towed by the Ju. 52 transport. The present G.A.F. position on Ju. 52's is very tight, with probably less than 1,000 available. Similarly, the F.A.F. fighter strength at present would not appear to warrant an extensive use of gliders for offensive combat purposes. It seems likely that glider use will be confined largely to behind-the-lines transport of troops and equipment for the immediate future.

I. DESCRIPTION AND GENERAL USE OF GLIDERS

For many years before the outbreak of war in 1939, Germany had been developing and experimenting with glider techniques and production. Gliding was encouraged as a sport, and potential pilots were trained by gliding and soaring clubs. By 1939 Germany was far ahead of all other nations in this

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field and since then has utilized gliders for the transport of both men and equipment. Troop and freight carrying gliders are now well past the experimental stage; they have been standardized and produced in large numbers.

Gliders increase the carrying capacity of the transport planes used to tow them. In fact, parachute troops transport some of their heavier equipment by glider. In carrying men and equipment by air, the advantages of the glider over the airplane are: (1) its low landing speed, 35-40 m.p.h., which permits landing in very small areas, and (2) its silent approach over an objective. The glider also has several advantages over the parachute, including: (1) spot landings close to the target, (2) concentrated fire power -- a glider lands men and equipment together, while they must be dropped separately when using parachutes, and (3) immediate action -- a glider crew can go into action within two minutes of landing.

Several glider types have been tried; trainer types are 2-4 seaters; operational types are of the following categories:

1. Gliders of 40-45 foot wing span with a capacity probably about eight men fully equipped.
2. Gliders of 60-70 foot wing span, with a capacity of ten men fully armed, plus one or two machine guns. The D.F.S. 230 falls into this class.
3. Gliders of about 80 foot wing span, with a capacity of twenty-five equipped men plus several machine guns. The Co. 249 falls into this class.

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field and since then has utilized gliders for the transport of both men and equipment. Troop and freight carrying gliders are now well past the experimental stage; they have been standardized and produced in large numbers.

✓ Gliders increase the carrying capacity of the transport planes used to tow them. In fact, parachute troops transport some of their heavier equipment by glider. In carrying men and equipment by air, the advantages of the glider over the airplane are: (1) its low landing speed, 25-40 m.p.h., which permits landing in very small areas, and (2) its silent approach over an objective. The glider also has several advantages over the parachute, including: (1) spot landings close to the target, (2) concentrated fire power -- a glider lands men and equipment together, while they must be dropped separately when using parachutes, and (3) immediate action -- a glider crew can go into action within two minutes of landing.

Several glider types have been tried: trainer types are 2-4 centers; operational types are of the following categories:

1. Gliders of 40-45 foot wing span with a capacity probably about eight men fully equipped.
2. Gliders of 60-70 foot wing span, with a capacity of ten men fully armed, plus one or two machine guns. The D.P.S. 230 falls into this class.
3. Gliders of about 80 foot wing span, with a capacity of twenty-five equipped men plus several machine guns. The Co. 248 falls into this class.

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4. Gliders of 150-175 wing span and over, with a capacity of about fifty men, or several field guns, or a light tank. Gliders with a span of 175 feet were photographed at Horschburg and Hegenburg. The Horschburg glider, an experimental type, is of this class as is the heavy glider XKA. The former can carry 40-50 men or a nine-ton tank; the latter accommodates sixty men. Reports have been received of the Goliath, a twin-fuselage type with a wing span of 270 feet. The load is 140 men but 5 Ju. 88's would be required to tow it. A new development has been reported -- the glider tank, which is said to be a combination tank and glider with a crew of three men.

Most German gliders have steel fuselages covered with fabric and wooden wings. Gliders over 150 feet, however, are probably all metal and built only at factories designed to build aircraft. Operational gliders have wheeled underwings for take-offs which are jettisoned after the glider gets into the air. Skids are fitted for landing.

At present there are two glider models in general use; the D.F.S. 250 (Deutscher Versuchsmotor für Besatzflug) and the Go. 242 (Gotha) a twin-beam model. The former is used to transport troops and was so used in the invasion of Czech, while the latter is primarily a freight glider. The D.F.S. 250 has a wing span of 75 feet, and normally carries ten men including the pilot plus six rifles. In addition, three of these gliders between them carry one heavy machine gun, one light machine gun, and portable wireless equipment. They are also fitted with navigation and landing lights for

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night operations. Although the D.F.S. 230 has been used for carrying freight it is limited both in volume and load (2,500 pounds). Therefore, the Germans developed a new type of glider, the Go. 242, to be used primarily as a freight glider although it can carry twenty-one men and two pilots. The wing span is 79 feet and its maximum load is 5,500 pounds. The freight storage space is 20 ft. x 7 ft. x 8 ft. The larger gliders have been seen and reported within Germany, but they have not yet been encountered in operational use.

Although Germany is experimenting with powered gliders, gliders are usually towed by transport aircraft. Most frequently used is the Ju. 52, which usually tows only one glider though it can tow up to three small ones at a time at 120 m.p.h. for 700 miles. It would probably take two Ju. 52's to tow gliders with a 175-foot wing span, and three for the largest types in use. It is the general opinion of the glider pilots that it is not practicable for operational purposes to tow more than one glider at a time. However, bombers and fighters have been reported to have towed gliders, namely the F.W. 200, the Ju. 87, and the He. 100. In training flights He. 40's and He. 120's are used as towing craft, the latter being an army cooperation type, and the former probably a trainer.

Photographic reconnaissance has established the existence of powered versions of the Go. 242 glider. Two

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distinct types have been identified, one fitted with air-cooled radial engines and the other with in-line engines. It is now known what engine models are used, but the British Air Ministry has made estimates of weight and performance on the assumption that the radial-engine version has BMW 133 engines (260 h.p. at 8,000 ft.) and that the in-line engine used is the Argus As. 410 (300 h.p. at 8,500 ft.). With a BMW 133 the Go. 242 could reach a speed of 180 m.p.h. with a load of 4,500, but the range would be only 500 miles. The take-off and landing performance would be good. With an Argus As. 410 engine, a speed of 160 m.p.h. could be attained, and the range would be 800 miles with a load of 5,500 pounds. However, the Argus As. 410 engine yields poor take-off and climb characteristics. There is no evidence that powered gliders have been used operationally.

II. GLIDER TRAINING

Glider practice has been observed since 1939 at many C.A.F. airbases, including even occupied Belgian airports. Such training is frequently conducted in conjunction with transport and parachute schools. Eight-seater gliders are used for training, but twelve and twenty-five seater models are being developed.

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✓ In July 1942, the War Department estimated that 12,000-16,000 glider and parachute troops were being trained each year, including glider pilots. It was also reported that practically all German power pilots are also glider pilots, since they receive their preliminary training in gliders.

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III. GLIDER OPERATIONS OF THE GENERAL AIR FORCE

Gliders were first used operationally by the G.A.F., in the capture of Fort Eben Emael on the Albert Canal in Belgium in the spring of 1940. The type used was small, probably the 40 - 45 foot variety with a capacity of eight men. Later in 1940 references were made by prisoners of war to a larger type capable of carrying ten or eleven men, undoubtedly the D.F.S. 230. Gliders were not used in large numbers, however, until the attack on Crete a year later.

The model used in the Crete campaign was the D.F.S. 230. After British defenses at Suda Bay and Gortcha had been subjected to an intense attack by bombers, dive-bombers, and fighters, the gliders came in to land troops on these airfields. The Ju. 52 was used as the towing aircraft, each towing one glider. Since gliders are extremely vulnerable, they were escorted by fighters and dive-bombers. The glider force was provided by a Stora Regiment, in all about eighty gliders carrying five companies (750 men). The Ju. 52's were provided by a Luftwaffe Squadron. The glider troops and the parachute troops were to capture the airfields and parts of Suda Bay, Gortcha, and Heraklion in preparation for the arrival of air and sea borne troops. (The parachute troops arrived either with or immediately after the glider troops). Of the five companies transported by gliders, one was landed on the Akrotiri Peninsula, one at Gortcha, and three at Suda Bay. The gliders were landed as near as possible

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to British positions, whereas the paratroopers were landed well away in order to give them time to collect their equipment and organize into groups. At Salerno and Anzio the mission of the gliders was successful but the landings on Abetona failed because their parachutists' egress failed to appear. Only one use of gliders was employed in the initial phase of each attack. The surviving glider troops then joined with paratroops and air-land troops for the subsequent stages of the attack.

Following the use of gliders in the attack on Crete, glider tactics were further developed. However, such developments have been prevented by great secrecy. There were indications after the campaign that the Special Air Service was being expanded to a division. Experiments with large glider troops carrying gliders are being carried out at Blandford, Long Marston, West Woodbury, Hinton, and Blandford, Dorset, and Swindon. By September 1943, gliders were developed which could carry sixty equipped men. Freight carrying gliders, especially the G. 12, were developed and were used to carry supplies, fuel, and maintenance troops to the African Army during 1943. New special purpose gliders are being designed, of varying sizes, for carrying light tanks, trucks, or motor-cycles.

V. G. 12

In the beginning of 1939, Germany had six firms engaged in glider production. There was some military production of gliders at the outbreak of war, but it was not organized on a large scale until after they were successfully used operationally in the Spring of 1940, in Belgium. For the next few months

production remained low while new models were being developed and tested. By the beginning of 1941, production of gliders, primarily the Henschel Hs 130, had reached glider proportions. At this time glider production was concentrated at Gomborn, Austria and Poland. After the attack on Czechoslovakia further increased so that by the end of 1941, approximately 4000 gliders were produced in Germany and Austria, more than 1000 of which were exported to Italy. The gliders were used for transport purposes, particularly for the transport of troops and supplies to the front. The gliders were used for transport purposes, particularly for the transport of troops and supplies to the front. The gliders were used for transport purposes, particularly for the transport of troops and supplies to the front.

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SECRET

engaged in glider production

Germany (Thuringia)
Haller Werke A.G., Prague
(near Berlin)

Germany, Göttingen, Göttingen, Göttingen

Major Glider Factories
Haller Werke, Frankfurt am Main
Haller Werke, Göttingen, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen, Göttingen

Factories of Major Glider Types
Haller Werke, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen
Haller Werke, Göttingen

V. GIDER TYPES

Giders are extremely vulnerable to air attack and require
flight cover. The loss rate of giders and glider troops was
high in the battle of Gode. The percent of the glider troops who
had not been casualties, of which three-quarters were dead.
This does not mean, of course, that a corresponding number of
giders were lost, since most of the glider troops must have been
killed in the last fighting after a successful landing. On the
other hand, a number of giders crash-landed with no injury to the
crew. There were very few crash-landings. In one glider three of the

SECRET

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occupants were killed and four injured, leaving only three ready for action. In another, four of the occupants were killed and the heavy machine gun was broken in the crash. In a third case the tow rope snapped before the glider arrived at its destination. On landing the glider broke its back and the wings fell off, but the crew were only mildly shaken. It shrouded several gliders before unhooked over the sea, and only eleven out of fifteen arrived over the target. Due to the absence of air support several gliders were shot down as they landed. A number were destroyed in the air by A.A. fire. One exploded in mid-air as the result of a shot hit on the ammunition store.

A number of S.A.S. M2 and Co. M2 gliders were recently captured by the Germans in North Africa.

V. EQUIPMENT

Only a few gliders were used in the attack on Fort Eben Ezer in 1940, but after the fall of Belgium the glider training program was stopped up. In January 1941, the 1st Assault Regiment (Comanchement 1) was created, comprising partly of glider-borne units. The corresponding landing unit of the SP's, -- the 1st Air Landing Army (Comanchement 1) -- was probably created at the same time. These were the forces used in the Greek campaign. The 1st Assault Regiment was an experimental unit.

The estimates of S.A.S. glider strength are conflicting. There were reports in the spring of 1941, that 600 gliders were

SECRET

constructed in England. Only 73-63 were used in the aircraft on
 tests, however. By October of that year the Air Ministry believed
 the C.A.F. had 2,400 gliders of the 18-12 motor type. On the
 other hand, the IRI estimated that only 1,400 C.A.F. 18-12s, the
 principal glider of this type, had been produced up to this time
 and the estimated the standard C.A.F. 18-12 strength in the spring of 1941
 at 700. In the first quarter of 1942, there were reports of glider
 activity in the Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Italy. These
 were undoubtedly used to supply troops and supplies to the Italian
 army. The source reported the destruction of six gliders down in
 the Eastern Mediterranean with gliders, another gave the figure of
 200 large gliders, and capacity of loading 200 tons. A third reported
 the landing of 1,200 parachuting gliders in South Italy. All
 were an undeniably significant.

Analysis of all the available intelligence would indicate
 that part of the 600 gliders reported in early 1941 were training
 under the military units. Military glider strength was estimated
 later and figure had gone to 700 in the fall of 1941. In view of
 the IRI production total up to this time, a loss of about 600
 gliders is expected in the current year. General military glider
 strength is probably 1,400, majority of which will be C.A.F. 18-12.
 A 7% of this total are engaged in training and experimental work,
 the rest in constructing troops and supplies on the Mediterranean
 and Southern Italy. These heavy soldiers has been placed on air ship.

J. J. E. 10.385
x Gernahly
x Ghder
x Africa hoit
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SECTION III x Political Situation



North African situa-
than from pressure
the following groups:

and military leaders who are
support of the present govern-
the European underground
movement, and thus create political and military difficulties
in the prosecution of the war.

(1) Idealists who feel that even a temporary alliance
with reactionary elements in Europe undermines the crusade of
the United Nations against Fascism.

(2) British officials who have deplored the controll-
ing influence of the United States in French North Africa.

In the future political development in North Africa,
the internal local strife will play only an insignificant role.
The number of Leftists and de Gaulleists actively opposed to
the Giroud regime is too small to create serious disturbances.
Intrigues among the conservative elements will not be tolerated
by the Giroud government receives, as is likely, the support
of the United Nations command. Native demands for reform

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would probably not be granted by the military command as long as North Africa is an active war theater. Thus the pressure from the local tensions is not likely to affect the political situation.

Since the Conference of Casablanca adverse comment on the North African situation in British newspapers has declined considerably and it is likely that the British government will not permit the revival of a campaign of criticism, even if American radio and newspaper commentators continue to criticize. The influence of the latter as well as that of the idealists is probably too small to force any changes in the North African government.

The main pressure for changes in the North African government will come from United Nations leaders, who believe that the prosecution of the war on the continent will be avoided by:

(a) the removal of officials too closely associated in fact or in the public mind with Vichy.

(b) some kind of cooperation between de Gaulle and Giraud.

Developments during the last few days indicate that this pressure is likely to lead to the following results in the near future:

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(a) The removal of some minor officials of Vichy tendencies from the North African government.

(b) The abrogation of some Vichy laws against labor unions, freedom of assembly and speech; laws restricting the rights of Jews. The release of the confiscated property of the Jews presents, however, such a difficult legal and economic problem that some time will elapse before a solution is arrived at.

(c) The release of all political prisoners. The fate of Spanish loyalists after release is uncertain. It has been suggested that they will be deported to Mexico.

(d) The establishment of a close liaison on military and economic matters between de Gaulle and Giraud through the appointment of important liaison officers at Algiers and London.

Further changes in the near future are unlikely.

(a) The present military situation in North Africa is not favorable enough to the United Nations either to force change upon the North African government or to risk the disturbances which such changes might create.

(b) A unification of the Giraud government with the de Gaulle movement at the present moment might not be desirable from the point of view of the United Nations. In the past de Gaulle has been autocratic and independent in his

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relations with the British and American governments. Recently he has courted Russia and acquired a leftist reputation. At present doubts regarding his loyal cooperation with either Great Britain or the United States remain. Giraud's political beliefs and temperament make him also not a very desirable leader of a United French movement. Thus a postponement of unification until the existing doubts have been removed or a more acceptable leader has appeared could be desirable from the United Nations' point of view.

(c) The political differences between the de Gaulle movement and Giraud's government have become too pronounced to permit a rapid unification. Giraud will be unable to purge his administration to the satisfaction of the de Gaulleists, and the latter strength in the de Gaulle movement is too pronounced to be acceptable to the majority of the North African personnel. A gradual evolution towards the center must probably precede unification.

Consequently, unless a pronounced disaffection among the underground movements in Europe is noticeable or Russian policy and propaganda exploits too successfully the North African situation, only minor changes in personnel and legislation in North Africa can be expected in the near future.

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FACTORS ON THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

<u>Available for Military Service</u>	
% of European Population of	ca 120,000
1,400,000	212,000
% of Native Population of	
17,000,000	340,000
Total	572,000

Summary

(1) No exact figures on the total number of troops in North Africa before the occupation are available. Estimates vary between 80,000 and 150,000, but the best authorities mention 110,000 or 120,000 men. It is not clear if these figures include navy and AA personnel, however the latter in Tunisia, where about 15,000 men were stationed, might equal the additional navy and AA personnel.

(2) The estimate of 6% of the European population available for military service is conservative. This figure seems justified by the fact that the European group includes about 200,000 Italians and 120,000 Spaniards and that many of the Frenchmen held important positions in the commercial and transport services, whose efficiency would be greatly undermined by the mobilization of key personnel. However, the French population as a whole is a select group, many other Frenchmen return to France and the proportion of children is relatively low.

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(3) The estimate of 25 of the native population seems justified by the fact that North Africa is primarily an agricultural country, where small nature farms predominate. Though much idle labor probably exists, social customs, low physical standards, ingrained attitudes towards Europeans, and the non-military attitude of a large proportion of the population limit seriously the possibility of a larger recruitment. Even for the estimated scale of recruitment careful planning of the method of payment, of military fanfare, and of the relations with native chiefs seems indicated.

(4) The total of 572,000 seems justified in spite of the fact that France obtained during the World War 1914-1918 only 200,500 troops from North Africa. (Tunisia 90,400, Algeria 177,000, Morocco 34,500.) The latter figure does not include the number of troops recruited for local purposes and the increases in population as well as the more extended control of France over the area, especially in Morocco, seem to point to the correctness of the higher figure.

II. The Quality of the North African Troops.

The large percentage of non-Europeans in the North African army lowers the value of the troops in modern mechanized warfare. However, under proper leadership and in familiar terrain these troops can be of very great value.

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(1) Trained Troops

(a) The Regular Army. The 120,000 men in North Africa have been reported well trained, but badly equipped. Their morale has been reported low before the occupation, but probably will return to a high standard if armed with modern equipment and given some changes in command.

The number of non-Europeans in the North African army is not available, but it can be estimated at about 40,000 men or 33%. This percentage is based on the known fact that about 70% of the Tunisian army was composed of natives, but for Morocco this proportion is much too high and should therefore be reduced to about 33%. Doubts have been expressed regarding the value of these troops under conditions of mechanized warfare.

(b) Enlisted Manpower. The annual recruitment in North Africa before 1939 was about the following:

		<u>Moors</u>	<u>Frenchmen</u>
Algeria	1936	17,699	6,555
Tunisia	Average 1934-36	6,047	626
Morocco	Estimate	<u>8,000</u>	<u>8,000</u>
Total		31,726	9,181

In theory the last 16 classes should be available for service and furnish about 300,000 natives. Doubts, recalcitrance, and doubts regarding the validity of the Moroccan

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estimate over a 10 year period make it advisable to reduce this estimate to 250,000 trained natives.

All Frenchmen were liable to military service before the war and it can be assumed that practically all of the estimated 112,000 Europeans have received some military training in the past.

(2) Remaining Native Manpower. The quality of native troops varies greatly from region to region.

(a) The mountain tribes of Morocco and the desert tribes have in the past furnished the best fighting troops. They are brave, loyal to their officers, and resourceful in their own environment. No information is available on their fighting ability with mechanized equipment. The total population of these tribes is about 3,000,000.

(b) The Kabyle mountains in Algeria, the Souss valley in southern Morocco and the Cherb in the North furnish the best workers in North Africa. Men from these areas could be usefully conscripted into labor battalions. The total population of these areas is about 3,000,000.

(c) The remaining 11,000,000 of the native population consists above all of town dwellers and small agriculturists, who have shown in the past no great adaptability to military life. Recruits from this group can only be taken on a carefully selective basis.

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APPENDIX

French West AfricaI. Number of Men Available for Military Service

Regular troops	50,000
5% of the European Population of 30,000	1,500
2% of the Native Population of 10,000,000	295,000
Total	<u>347,500</u>

The total of 347,500 is probably an optimistic estimate, but seems justified by the following reports:

(a) Governor-General Boisson stated on February 5, 1943 that West Africa is able to contribute 100,000 trained troops in the near future and has in reserve 200,000 men, who have received some military training, but lack officers and equipment.

(b) The U. S. Consul at Dakar estimated the number of men who had received military training in July 1943 as 100,000 men.

(c) During the World War 1914-1918 160,000 men were mobilized in West Africa 140,000 of these were sent to France. The increase in population since 1914 and the better control of France over the area make it possible that the

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number of recruits can be doubled at the present time. (The French in 1939 expected to obtain about 1,000,000 men in case of war). It should be emphasized, however, that the mobilization of over 160,000 men between 1914 and 1918 created serious economic disturbances.

II. The Quality of West African Troops.

West African troops are almost entirely native troops, officered by Frenchmen. The native Senegalese is an excellent soldier, but he is not easily trained nor is he very apt in the handling of modern equipment. In his own environment he is brave and efficient and endures hardships easily. His value as a soldier in northern climates is less and both his morale and efficiency would fall to a low level under mechanized or air attack.

JIC 10,239
x Sound
x Experiments
x OSS Representation

January 30, 1943

Colonel Charles C. Blakeney, G.S.C.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Intelligence Committee
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Blakeney:

Your letter of January 28 is before me concerning the work of the Planning Board of which you are Chairman.

I appreciate your suggestion that this office provide a representative to serve with your Committee in its investigation of military uses of high intensity and tactical deceptive sound.

The member of this Organization best qualified for such representation is Mr. Stanley P. Lovell, Director of our Research and Development Branch. Mr. Lovell is also our sole liaison with the C.S.R.D.

I suggest that a preliminary conversation between you and Mr. Lovell would quickly determine whether or not he might be able to be helpful.

If you will communicate with him, he will be glad to call on you.

Appreciating your suggestion of collaboration, I am,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

copy for Mr. Stanley P. Lovell

JIC 10,239
x Sound.
x experiments
x DSS representation

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

28 January 1943

Mr. William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

As the chairman of a planning board for the investigation of military uses of high intensity and tactical deceptive sound, it has been my privilege to report some of the activities of this committee. It now appears that some of the projects which that committee has been working on may usefully fall within the field of the Office of Strategic Services. In consequence, it would appear advisable to have representation from the Office of Strategic Services on such committee.

In conversation with Commander P. K. McDowell, U.S.N., it has been determined that a Mr. Hollowell was approached on the subject and might be available for such committee meetings. In any event, it would appear advisable to have O.S.S. representation. I would appreciate your views on the subject.

Charles C. Blakney
CHARLES C. BLAKNEY
Colonel, U.S.C.

copy to Lovell 1/30



PC.
Not returned

SECRET

J. IC 5201M 990315

Discontinued
 Cryptanalysis
 Budget Bureau

February 27, 1944

Mr. C. W. Brown

Mr. Commander W. E. Vandervilt

Mr. Cryptanalysis Services

With reference to Lt. Col. Lawrence Lamm's memo
dated of February 25, 1944, to you about information
being furnished to the Bureau of the Budget relative to GDS
being engaged in cryptanalytic work in foreign offices I would
like to submit the following:

1. The information upon which Mr. Wayne Guy's
memorandum to the President was based was not furnished
by the Budget and Finance Agency or any of the GDS
representatives.

2. The date of the memorandum to the President
from Mr. Wayne Guy was September 1, 1943.

3. A copy of the memorandum from Mr. Guy to the
President was received recently through the office of
Mr. William Hall in the Bureau of the Budget after the
President had directed that no copies or use GDS was
shall be made in connection with the foreign stations.
It is of importance that neither Mr. Hall or Mr. Clayton
either of the Bureau of the Budget have recently asked
about Lamm's GDS work engaged in cryptanalytic and
how was secured but we were not conducting such
operations even in foreign stations.

4. This represents another instance where representa-
tives of the Bureau of the Budget have conducted in-
quiries to us without the knowledge of the Budget and
Finance Agency which makes it impossible for us to
control the accuracy or quantity of information given
to them in the Budget representation. I believe this
will be a serious situation in view of the provisions
of the Espionage Laws. I think the Budget Bureau
should get a better idea of the nature of the work
done in the Bureau of the Budget.

5. I am in agreement with Colonel Lamm that any
individual furnishing sensitive information to the Bureau
of the Budget should be discharged.

Very truly yours,
Colonel Lamm, Lt. Woodring

JIC 5/1/4 990 B
x Discontinuance
x Cryptanalysis
x Budget, Bur. of.

FEBRUARY 25, 1958

Memorandum to: **Commander Vandenberg**
From: **Lt. Colonel Loren**

SECRET

I have just received a copy of a memorandum dated February 25 from Mr. G. J. [unclear] referring to a memorandum from Mr. Wayne [unclear] Assistant Director of the Office of the [unclear], to the President, stating that the [unclear] was engaged in cryptographic activities in [unclear] offices with the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would suggest that this information get into [unclear] files in a [unclear] manner. I think steps should be taken immediately to prevent this [unclear] from [unclear] and [unclear] and [unclear] for [unclear] to [unclear] from [unclear] in [unclear] with this office.

all

cc [unclear] [unclear]
Mr. G. J. [unclear]

SECRET



JIC 52/1/14 9987B

SECRET

x Discontinue
x Cryptanalysis
x Budget, Bureau of.

Jim

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

February 24, 1945

FROM: C. W. Barnes *CB*

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

I have been advised by Budget Bureau representatives that Mr. Wayne Coy, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, by memorandum dated September 1, 1942, notified the President that:

"I have advised the Federal agencies concerned to discontinue all cryptanalysis activities as recently directed by you following a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of Censorship has transferred its cryptanalysis work to the Navy; the Federal Communications Commission is prepared to drop plans to employ cryptanalysts that were under consideration; and the Office of Strategic Services reports that it has no cryptanalysis services except in certain foreign offices. These latter are maintained with the knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"Though we have checked several other Federal agencies, none report the employment of coding experts. Responsibility for cryptanalysis will accordingly be vested in but three agencies; namely, the Army, Navy, and F. B. I."

The above is called to your attention in the event the information had not been previously made available to you.

J. I. C. 52/1/M. 9968A

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

x Communications
x Dissemination
x J. C. S.


January 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Dissemination of communications --
intercept intelligence.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at their 50th meeting of January 19, 1942, considered the above subject with reference to obtaining such information by the Office of Strategic Services and felt that this is within the province of the Army and Navy representatives of the Planning Group of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. Their authority for access to this information is contained in paragraph 9 (d) of J.C.S. 155/4/D. In this connection, the War and Navy Departments have been directed to bring this paragraph to the attention of relevant agencies under their respective jurisdictions.



FORREST B. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

copy to Col. Outback



original in JIC Folder - 52/1/M.

JIC 52/1/M 9952
X Intercepts
X Dissemination
X Communications
X Stroug, Jan

January 8, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan
John Magruder, Brigadier General

Discussion at meeting of JIC on January 7 regarding release of intercept materials to OSS.

During the meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on January 7, 1943, consideration was given to JIC 52 7/M, which deals with the dissemination of communications—intercept intelligence—and which requested the JIC to revise the memorandum of the 23rd of October in a way necessary to bring it into consonance with the provisions of JCS 155/4/D.

In taking up the paper, the Chairman called to the attention of the Committee Paragraphs 9 (b) and (c), JCS 155/4/D, which only partially state the intelligence activities included only those necessary for the planning and execution of psychological warfare, with the implied suggestion that intercept material contained little or no information bearing upon the subject.

I then called to his attention that the directive to the OSS involved wider intelligence functions than he had presented, and specifically referred to the items in Paragraphs 2 (b) and 2 (c) and (d), which clearly indicate our interest in any information dealing with the four factors, namely, political, psychological, sociological, and economic. This being so, I expressed the belief that some of this information unquestionably appeared in the material listed in Paragraph 2 (b) of the Draft of a Memorandum for the President. I expressed the view that the OSS should appear as the recipient of the particular information with which it is concerned under those categories.

The Chairman then repeated some of his previous comments to the effect that very little of this type of information occurred in the intercepts and that the

-2-

dissemination of such material as did occur therein was provided for under the general provisions of Paragraph 2 (c). He quickly abandoned the argument that the OSS was charged with almost negligible intelligence functions, and reverted to the argument that the intercept material had to be handled with extreme caution because of the danger to security occasioned by too wide-spread dissemination of such material. The Chairman went into considerable length in stressing the danger of dissemination of intercept material and mentioned several instances in which this type of information had been handled without regard for security.

Being familiar with the handling of intercept material, I admitted the necessity of extreme security in its dissemination. I agreed to the principle that it should be disseminated only in a specially processed form, but argued that the OSS could perform its mission as contained in our directive only by having available all the information bearing on the factors with which we deal. I stressed the point that this was in keeping with the directive, which provides for complete and free interchange of information required in the execution of our mission. I reminded the Chairman that this was the spirit in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had referred JIC 52/1/M for reconsideration.

Despite the merits of the case, it was obvious that the Chairman was intent on adhering to the original recommendation of the JIC. It was equally obvious that the majority of the Committee would take this position, particularly since the Navy representative read a letter from Admiral King to the Acting Director of OMI in which it was stated that Admiral King would not agree to any augmentation in the dissemination of intercept material.

At this time, the State Department representative proposed that the Committee adopt the following action, quoted herewith:

The U. S. Joint Intelligence Committee is of the opinion that for the time being there should be no change in the text of JPS 75 as outlined in Enclosures A and B of that

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paper, inasmuch as the Joint Intelligence Committee believes that the interests of the Office of Strategic Services as laid down in JPS 155/4/D are served by Paragraph 2(a) of Enclosure B of JPS 76.

"The Joint Intelligence Committee has taken cognizance of the preoccupation expressed by the Office of Strategic Services as set out in Enclosure B of JPS 76 and its decision has been taken without prejudice to a reopening of this matter if, as and when experience may indicate that the preoccupation of the Office of Strategic Services are justified."

While I expressed my objections to this resolution, I did not record a dissent, having in mind the longer range point of view of being able to reconstruct harmonious relations with the Armed Services and of increasing actually our flow of information. A legalistic attitude toward this particular problem, I am convinced, would be inadvisable.

I regret to say that the atmosphere within the Committee was unsympathetic with the OSO position, and that agreement with the Chairman's refusal to modify the previous action was a foregone conclusion. The tone and spirit of the directive itself were not accepted by the Chairman of the Committee. Despite the directive of the JIC, it seems evident that many of our differences can still not be resolved on the lower level but will have to be decided in a higher echelon of authority.

JMAFV

JIC 52/1/M 9958

x Intercepts
 x Dissemination
 x Communications
 x Strong Gen.

Colonel William J. Donovan

January 8, 1948

John Magruder, Brigadier General

Discussion at meeting of JIC on January 7 regarding
 release of intercept materials to OSS.

During the meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee on January 7, 1948, consideration was given to JIC 52/1/M, which deals with the dissemination of communications--intercept intelligence--and which requested the JIC to revise the memorandum of the 23rd of October in a way necessary to bring it into consonance with the provisions of JCS 156/4/A.

In taking up the paper, the Chairman called to the attention of the Committee Paragraphs 9 (b) and (c), JCS 156/4/D, which only partially state the intelligence functions of OSS. He gave the impression that such activities included only those necessary for the planning and execution of psychological warfare, with the implied suggestion that intercept material contained little or no information bearing upon the subject.

I then called to his attention that the directive to the OSS involved wider intelligence functions than he had presented, and specifically read to the Committee Paragraphs 2 (b) and 3 (g) and (h), which clearly indicate our interest in any information dealing with the four factors, namely, political, psychological, sociological, and economic. This being so, I expressed the belief that some of this information unquestionably appeared in the material listed in Paragraph 2 (b) of the "Draft of a Memorandum for the President." I expressed the view that the OSS should appear as the recipient of the particular information with which it is concerned under these categories.

The Chairman then repeated many of his previous arguments to the effect that very little of this type of information occurred in the intercepts and that the

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dissemination of such material as did occur therein was provided for under the general provisions of Paragraph 2 (c). He quickly abandoned the argument that the OSS was charged with almost negligible intelligence functions, and reverted to the argument that the intercept material had to be handled with extreme caution because of the danger to security occasioned by too wide-spread dissemination of such material. The Chairman went into considerable length in stressing the danger of dissemination of intercept material and mentioned several instances in which this type of information had been handled without regard for security.

Being familiar with the handling of intercept material, I admitted the necessity of extreme security in its dissemination. I agreed to the principle that it should be disseminated only in a specially processed form, but argued that the OSS could perform its mission as contained in our directive only by having available all the information bearing on the factors with which we deal. I stressed the point that this was in keeping with the directive, which provides for complete and free interchange of information required in the execution of our mission. I reminded the Chairman that this was the spirit in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had referred JIC 52/1/M for reconsideration.

Despite the merits of the case, it was obvious that the Chairman was intent on adhering to the original recommendation of the JIC. It was equally obvious that the majority of the Committee would take this position, particularly since the Navy representative read a letter from Admiral King to the Acting Director of ONI in which it was stated that Admiral King would not agree to any augmentation in the dissemination of intercept material.

At this time, the State Department representative proposed that the Committee adopt the following action, quoted verbatim:

"The U. S. Joint Intelligence Committee is of the opinion that for the time being there should be no change in the text of JPS 52 as outlined in Enclosures A and B of that

paper, inasmuch as the Joint Intelligence Committee believes that the interests of the Office of Strategic Services as laid down in JPS 155/A/D are served by Paragraph 2(e) of Enclosure B of JPS 76.

"The Joint Intelligence Committee has taken cognizance of the preoccupation expressed by the Office of Strategic Services as set out in Enclosure E of JPS 76 and its decision has been taken without prejudice to a reopening of this matter if, as and when circumstances may indicate that the preoccupation of the Office of Strategic Services are justified."

While I expressed my objections to this resolution, I did not record a dissent, having in mind the longer range point of view of being able to reestablish harmonious relations with the Armed Services and of increasing actually our flow of information. A legalistic attitude toward this particular problem, I am convinced, would be inadvisable.

I regret to say that the atmosphere within the Committee was unpropitious with the OSS position, and that agreement with the Chairman's refusal to modify the previous action was a foregone conclusion. The tone and spirit of the directive itself were not accepted by the Chairman of the Committee. Despite the fact that differences can still not be composed on the lower level but will have to be decided in a higher echelon of authority.

25/7

JISC Meeting 9/10/44
 X Mason Edw. S.
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: December 24, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
 FROM: Edward S. Mason
 SUBJECT: JISC Meeting - Wednesday, December 23.

Owing to the continued absence in the hospital of the new JISC Chairman, Colonel Nutsteiner, JIC work has been rather in abeyance during the last couple of weeks. At the meeting yesterday, however, a good deal of unfinished business was discussed:

1. The section of the large paper on Japanese Economic Capabilities dealing with non-metallic minerals was discussed and, with the minor amendments, approved.

2. Attention is being given in various quarters to Axis Intentions in Regard to Chemical Warfare. The British JIC estimate of this subject has been received and distributed. The general in charge of chemical warfare in the American Army has asked for a JIC evaluation of this subject. This matter was put in the hands of myself and the BEW representative.

3. The CIC paper on Blockade-Busting between Germany and Japan has been the subject of some criticism by MIA. Colonel Bratton of MIA recommends to General Strong that the paper be withdrawn pending the completion of a study on this subject now under his direction. Since most of the MIA criticism is not relevant to the subject at issue, the JISC decided, after changing its paper in minor respects, to present it to the Top Committee.

4. Three papers have been received from the British JIC:

- a. The Japanese Tanker Position.
- b. Japanese Strength During the Winter of 1942-1943.
- c. Capabilities of Soviet Forces to Defend Southern Canada.

5. Two papers have been submitted by the BEW as proposed JIC papers, one on Italian Electric Power Plants, and the other on Supply Problems in French West Africa. These papers are now being considered by various JIC members for discussion next week.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: Dec. 24, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan
 FROM: E. S. Mason
 SUBJECT: Page 2.

6. The paper on German Military Casualties, prepared in this office, has not yet come up for discussion. MIS has established a considerable unit under a Brigadier General to work on the subject of casualties. It is my understanding that they will, in the near future, submit an estimate of German casualties in which our report is included as an appendix. The whole matter will then come up for discussion before the JIC.

7. On the question of the British paper on Limitations in German Strategy in 1943, it was decided that rather than attempt to get a combined paper the American JIC would prepare its own estimate. In that connection it was suggested that the paper on German Economic Resources in 1943, now in preparation, be used as a basis.

8. A Sub-Committee, with myself as chairman, was set up to consider the Japanese Economic Problem, with special reference to casualties. It was decided to take advantage of the presence in Washington of Lord Reesford to attempt a combined American and British evaluation of this question.

E. S. M.

E. S. Mason

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