

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ON MAY 19, 1958, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON RECENT INCIDENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA, LEBANON, AND ELSEWHERE.

Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with your invitation of May 16, I am appearing in behalf of the Department of State to discuss with the Committee in Executive Session the recent incidents in Lebanon, South America and elsewhere. I would say first that the Department is grateful to the Committee for this opportunity, both to provide whatever information it can, and especially to have the benefit of the Committee's wisdom in matters which are of pressing importance to our country. It is my purpose to reply frankly to any questions about which information is immediately available to me. Where I do not have it, effort will be made to supply it promptly.

We all share, I believe, your distress over the indignities suffered by the Vice President of the United States in Peru and Venezuela during the course of his recent tour of eight South American countries. As you know, his tour was incident to the Vice President's attendance at the inauguration of President Frondizi of our sister Republic of the Argentine at Buenos Aires.

It should be said that the purpose of the Vice President's tour was to promote better understanding and good will between this country and our southern neighbors. They had been kind enough to extend invitations, in most instances quite insistent invitations. The Vice President's acceptance was in accordance with practice of long standing to exchange visits of prominent personalities between our countries. It reflected among other things a desire to demonstrate the importance and value this country attaches to close and friendly relations with our sister republics to the south. It was based on an awareness of the importance of first-hand exchanges of views with government officials and other opinion leaders. The Vice President, with tireless energy, successfully made similar trips to Southeast Asia and to Africa and Central America. These trips have gained political advantages of considerable importance to us.

In discussing this subject perhaps you will agree that we should examine the manner in which it fits into the general pattern of world affairs. At present our country is involved in a highly competitive situation. There continues a world-wide wave of nationalism. This has found expression in the creation since the war of some twenty new nations. In other areas additional countries are in the formative stage. In still other areas the old order is in process of change. This fermentation often provokes conflicts and offers opportunity both for constructive effort as well as exploitation by political opportunists. There is evident a world-wide ground swell of desire for a better life. This often generates intense resentments, envy and even hatreds. There is the inevitable distrust by the have-nots of those who have. There is also the implacable crusade of the

ideologists

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/16 : CIA-RDP60-00321R000400110042-0
Ideologists intent on destroying the capitalist system of free enterprise and individual democratic liberties. They are determined to replace it by applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the promotion of the totalitarian state. The Soviet Union not without success blends this effort of international communism with skillful promotion of old fashioned Russian expansionism.

Soviet-Communist Efforts to Foster Anti-Americanism

The Soviet regime and the world Communist movement since their inception have constantly sought to exploit--in Marxist language--"contradictions" or differences both between "leading imperialist powers" and between "imperialist" and "colonial" or underdeveloped countries. The dominant theme in these provocative efforts since World War II has been anti-Americanism.

Under the leadership of the Soviet Union the world Communist movement has made energetic efforts to organize and exploit hostile sentiments toward the United States. American "ruling circles" are depicted in Communist propaganda as the dominant imperialist force in the world, everywhere seeking to oppress smaller nations and to undermine the influence of other "imperialist" countries--notably France and the Netherlands but also including the United Kingdom--in order to extend the domination of American capital. The anti-American orientation of the world Communist movement was clearly evidenced in the November 1957 Moscow "Declaration" of twelve Communist parties and "Peace Manifesto" signed by 65 Communist parties which singled out the United States as the main threat to "peace" and called for united action to fight for "peace," i.e., the interests of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Government itself has directly used its propaganda and diplomatic apparatus to foster anti-American sentiments. In areas such as Latin America, where the United States represents the leading outside influence, Soviet efforts have long concentrated on channeling local resentments into resentment against the United States. In South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, where other Western countries are prominently involved, the Soviet line has been that the United States is the principal enemy of the local countries, sometimes using other Western powers as its "tools" but always seeking to supplant their positions. Similarly, the Soviet Government has persistently sought to turn French, British or Italian opinion, as the case may be, against the United States.

In regard to recent manifestations of anti-American sentiments in South America, Algeria, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Burma, the anti-American content in Soviet propaganda directed at these areas has been at a high level for a considerable period of time. There was no marked step-up in Moscow's propaganda immediately prior to the events in these areas, either in the degree of attention to the United States or in the violence of its charges, although in several cases Soviet propaganda media has sought to exploit these events after they occurred to the discredit of the United States.

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There is no evidence at present of a Soviet effort to effect a coordinated world-wide demonstration of anti-Americanism coinciding with Vice President Nixon's visit to Latin America. While there is evidence of direct Communist complicity in several of the recent anti-American incidents--in South America, Indonesia and Burma--the circumstances leading up to these incidents occurred more or less independently of Moscow's will. Thus, the coincidence of these outbreaks, so far as their timing is concerned, would seem to be largely accidental. However, all of the recent incidents are related in that there has been a conscious, continuous effort by the Soviet Union to exploit and exacerbate potential or actual misunderstandings in these areas about the United States. These incidents, particularly those in which there was direct Communist involvement, demonstrate the scope and intensity of Soviet long-term efforts to discredit the United States.

Security Measures

Those of you who personally have had experience with mob action and group violence need no reminder that the element of surprise frequently plays an important role. Not so long ago in our own capital of Washington we witnessed a savage attempt on the life of our President then in residence at Blair House. We also shared the indignation of the Congress over the dastardly shooting in the House of Representatives of several of its distinguished members. We were aware of the possibility of such dangers. Our security measures were believed adequate. Yet even in our solidly established system grave incidents like those were possible. How much more so is it true in those countries where freshly established governments have not had time or others have been unable for various reasons to develop adequate security organizations. The recent deplorable assassination of the President of our sister Republic of Guatemala is a tragic case in point.

South America

Problems and issues in Latin America were known and the Vice President was briefed on them. There was nothing in the past history of U.S.-Latin American relations to indicate the possibility of substantial violence against our representatives. In addition, innate Latin American courtesy and their respect for the guest relationship of persons coming to their homes or country were taken into consideration. After Lima and the embarrassment which the incidents there had caused to both the Government and most Peruvians, it was felt that the governments and public opinion in the remaining countries would do their utmost to prevent similar embarrassments. As the tour progressed, and particularly after Peru, the increasing amount of communist-inspired and directed tactics was known and reported and the increasing possibility of trouble in Venezuela was understood. It was also understood by the governments concerned.

Prior

Prior to Lima, it was not even deemed necessary to seek any specific assurances of adequate security. After Lima, the assurances given by the Ecuadoran, Colombian and Venezuelan governments appeared adequate, as they proved to be in Ecuador and Colombia. It seems evident that the trouble in Caracas was caused by the intensive exploitation by Communist and other anti-American elements of grievances against our policies and the failure to take adequate measures to prevent demonstrations and activities of which the Government was fully forewarned by its own security people and by reports from our Embassies and investigative agencies.

I think it is important to emphasize that while there has been a known resentment in Latin America over certain issues, and that protests concerning them could be expected, this is the first time that minority groups have been able to exploit these issues to incite actual violence against an important American representative. This is something new in Latin America and therefore it was not expected.

There is considerable evidence that the demonstrations in the various countries visited by the Vice President followed a pattern and were Communist-inspired and staged. Slogans on the banners carried by students and others were similar. "Little Rock," "Guatemala," "Yankee Imperialism," "Wall Street Agents," "McCarthyism," "Colonialism," "Nixon Go Home" were among those repeated. The tactics were much the same, with young students urged on by older persons leading the activities. Intelligence reports from Latin American capitals also support the conclusion of a leading Communist role in the demonstrations.

There is no indication of unusual efforts by Radio Moscow to step up its exploitation of anti-American sentiments immediately prior to or during the Vice President's trip. Although Soviet commentaries carried the normal type of anti-American statements and Soviet bloc propaganda output to Latin America increased somewhat--a normal occurrence during any major event--the demonstrations and scattered violence were not excessively stressed during Mr. Nixon's trip. Moscow Radio warned its Latin audiences of the "exploitative" motives of the Vice President's trip, designed to counter the "discontent over U. S. policies." The majority of the commentaries relied to a great extent on quotations from American newspapers and stressed that even the U. S. press "has been forced to admit" that the anti-U. S. demonstrations are not the intrigues of Communists, but the result of U. S. "discriminatory" economic policy toward Latin America. Without attacking the Vice President personally, the Moscow propaganda machine asserted that "Nixon's fiasco was actually the fiasco of U. S. policy toward Latin America."

On May 15,

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On May 15, according to FBIS, Radio Moscow began in earnest to exploit the anti-American incidents during the Nixon tour. However, Radio Moscow directed no commentaries at Latin American audiences, the target of most of Moscow's comments prior to the Caracas events. In these latest efforts, Moscow is attempting to exploit the incidents to foster anti-Americanism in other areas of the world.

Uruguay

We knew, took into account and reported to the Vice President before his departure, the following matters: information concerning Uruguayan resentment of U.S. economic policies, particularly the countervailing duty on wool tops; the fact that the Soviet bloc diplomatic missions in Uruguay have been active in many sectors of Uruguay; the fact that recent approaches have been made to Uruguay by the Soviets for increased economic intercourse; and finally that there was a possibility of student antipathy or even anti-U.S. demonstrations at the University.

There was no indication that violence would ensue, and there was none. The Vice President was able by debating with the students to win them over, and his visit to the University ended with a resounding ovation and acclaim for his forthrightness in standing up to the students in friendly discussion.

Argentina

The political situation in Argentina and the circumstances surrounding the Frondizi Government were explained in briefings to the Vice President. The delicate political situation caused by the coming into power of a new Government, the activities outside of Argentina by Peron, and the fact that the Communist Party in Argentina had become the largest in the hemisphere were all included in the briefings and fully discussed. There were rumors that pro-Peron or other groups might stage demonstrations in opposition to the Vice President. The economic difficulties facing President Frondizi, the difficulties with economic problems which might involve the United States were discussed before the Vice President left and were discussed by him with Argentine leaders in that country.

There was no indication that any violence could be expected, nor did any occur. On the contrary, the reception accorded to the Vice President in Argentina was extremely friendly.

The minor incidents in connection with the late arrival of the swearing-in ceremonies of President Frondizi in which there were scattered boos for Mr. Nixon were highlighted in the United States press but were given little importance in Buenos Aires.

Paraguay

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Paraguay

Vice President Nixon was aware that in Paraguay there might be some attempt at demonstrations or in other countries on the question of a visit to the present Paraguayan Government. Recent attempts by opposition groups to overthrow the Stroessner regime had been the subject of intelligence and Embassy reports several weeks before the Vice President departed. These facts were included in briefings, as were matters regarding anti-Paraguayan acts involving the Provisional Government of Argentina which was in power prior to Frondizi's inauguration. The warm reception given to the Vice President in Paraguay was anticipated and there were no untoward incidents to mar the visit.

Bolivia

The tense political situation which has existed in Bolivia in recent months and which broke out into disturbances in the mining areas in March, involving mainly the two factions of the governing MNR Party, were also included in briefings of the Vice President. Bolivia's difficult economic situation, the part which the United States is playing in helping to solve Bolivia's problems; the difficulties involving the mine owners of the expropriated mines (including U.S. owners) and the Bolivian Government, were well known. The existence of communist and Trotskyite groups in Bolivia and the dangers which the Vice President's party might possibly encounter in passing through the narrow streets of La Paz were explained in briefings with the Vice President and to the Secret Service. The potential of communists to incite anti-U.S. actions in Bolivia was considered but not deemed sufficiently strong to cause any change in plans.

There was no violence in Bolivia, and the hostile demonstrations were negligible. The fact that there was no violence there was a factor in considerations concerning the rest of the tour.

Peru

Dissatisfaction in Peru over the US restrictions and tariffs on certain basic agricultural commodities exported by Peru is of long standing. More recently, threatened restrictions on lead, zinc and copper had led to bitter criticism. This was further inflamed by the report of the United States Tariff Commission on lead and zinc. Recent strikes, demonstrations and lawless acts in various parts of Peru, for which the communists were in a large measure responsible, had been reported by Embassy and intelligence sources and were part of briefings held on Peru. The fact that there had been increased lawlessness within Peru in recent months was also known and considered. The status of the University of San Marcos as an autonomous university, proud of its independence and heritage, was also known. There was, however, nothing in intelligence reports to indicate the real possibility of violence in Peru. Demonstrations were considered possible. The fact that

anti-ITS

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anti-US demonstrations of the nature which occurred have not heretofore been known in Lima and the historic ability of the Peruvian Government to contend with lawlessness were important factors taken into consideration in making decisions on the visit to Peru. Peru's record of close association and ties with the United States is historical.

At the time of the Peruvian visit, mounting evidence of the possibility of student demonstrations was known.

The anti-US demonstrations were the result of a small minority, estimated between 30 and 40 persons, obviously communist led and inspired. They did not represent the attitude of Peruvians, much less that of the Peruvian Government. The demonstrations seemed to snowball once they were incited, and there is no evidence that large mass demonstrations were planned.

Ecuador

Intelligence reports received prior to the arrival of the Vice President in Ecuador showed that the communists had undertaken considerable planning and as of May 9 their activities had been limited to fly sheets and wall paintings. It had been expected that anti-Nixon demonstrations might include throwing of water and fruit. Elaborate plans to embarrass the Vice President during his visit to the Central University failed to materialize because the visit was cancelled.

Other communist plans in Ecuador by students were said to include:

1. Presentation of what would appear to be an honorary diploma, but actually would portray imperialist domination of Ecuador.
2. A receiving line to turn its back on Mr. Nixon upon his arrival.
3. A communist student leader to read a list of United States acts of intervention in Latin America during the past 50 years.
4. Students to walk out on Mr. Nixon if there had been any attempt to quiet communist speakers.

Intelligence reports indicated that other plans which did not materialize because of the Ecuadoran Government's excellent security efforts and apparent poor communist organization included shouting squads along Mr. Nixon's travel route, throwing of water and rotten fruit and display of derisive signs. Pedro Saad, Secretary General of the Communist Party in Ecuador, ordered no violence (according to reports) but he hoped a riot would occur at the football game.

Mr. Nixon's

Mr. Nixon's planned meeting with communist and other labor leaders was cancelled. This cancellation was due in part to the Embassy's decision that such a meeting would not be productive and might give communist leaders a propaganda weapon. Communist plans to challenge Mr. Nixon to meet labor leaders publicly in communist-controlled quarters did not materialize.

Two important factors in the failure of any demonstrations in Ecuador are believed to be the excellent security measures adopted by the Ecuadoran Government and the fact that Ecuadorans made an attempt to counteract the incidents in Peru. In any event, the reception in Ecuador was cordial.

Colombia

During the past ten years Colombia has been the scene of much violence, including the famed "Bogotazo" of 1948. Deaths are reported to have totaled some 200,000 in Colombia during this period, due to guerrilla activities and other political violence. The political situation in Bogota prior to the start of Vice President Nixon's tour was a confused one. Elections were scheduled for May 4 but no candidate had been chosen one week before the elections. The nomination by both the Conservative and Liberal Parties of Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo produced a profound effect and gave civilian groups high hopes for political stability. Lleras' nomination, however, evoked a reaction in certain circles. During the last days of April General Rejas Pinilla moved to the Caribbean from Europe and there was an attempted coup by sympathizers of Rejas on May 2. Details of this attempt were reported to the Vice President in Buenos Aires and elsewhere en route and the political implications and chances of political turmoil in Colombia were fully explained.

A rumor that an attempt might be made to assassinate the Vice President was reported to Embassy Bogota prior to the Vice President's arrival. Rumors of possible student and communist demonstrations were also reported. A detailed report dated May 10 from reliable sources concerning communist and communist-front groups' attempts to organize student demonstrations was recorded and the Vice President's party informed. This report included plans to distribute leaflets; plans to demonstrate at wreath-laying ceremonies; alleged plans to throw tomatoes, eggs, etc., and to "duplicate the Lima student incident." There were meetings of communists to arrange for these demonstrations and there was some talk of having weapons and a possible assassination attempt. This information was relayed to the Nixon party. It was stated that communists would play an insignificant part and that the greatest danger came from the followers of ex-dictator Rejas Pinilla in order to discredit the present Government.

The assassination

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The assassination talk was assessed as being largely bravado. It was concluded that it was not probable that serious incidents would occur because the Colombian Government was aware of the possible dangers and was well prepared to meet any trouble.

The reports in Colombia centered largely on Colombia's own political turbulence and on rumors which arose following the incidents in Lima. The failure of an attempted coup on May 2 and the subsequent election of President Lleras Camargo on May 4, as scheduled, helped dissipate concern over any serious trouble in Colombia. None occurred. Consideration nevertheless was given to the cumulative chain reaction which seemed to be building up as the tour progressed. This fact was assessed, along with the assurances given by the Colombian authorities. It was decided that there was a possibility of demonstrations but that the Colombian authorities were prepared to keep them under control. The few minor demonstrations were completely overshadowed by the friendly reception accorded the Vice President. This reception was particularly warm and friendly in the workers' and poorer districts where some thought trouble might have been anticipated.

Venezuela

From the very start it had been anticipated that there might be more danger of disturbances in Venezuela than in any other place. This was made known to the Secret Service officers accompanying the Vice President prior to the party's departure from the U.S. and it was also made known to the Vice President. The unsettled political situation in Venezuela which has existed since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez regime in January had been the subject of many reports. The rapid return of the communists to Venezuela from exile and their intense activity in labor, student and other civilian sectors following the overthrow of Perez Jimenez were reported and considered in planning the visit. In February a report was received from non-communist labor leaders that the communists were back in force in Venezuela and working very assiduously in the labor field. The prominent role played by communists in organizing opposition to the Perez Jimenez regime and the communists' efforts to discredit the United States were well known. The many facets of Venezuelan political difficulties, including the delicate balance between the civilian and military power in Venezuela were also known.

The Venezuelan criticism of U.S. voluntary restrictions on petroleum imports; the inflammability of this issue in Venezuela; the protest by many Venezuelans and particularly leftist groups against the issuance by the United States of visas to ex-President Perez Jimenez and his security chief, Pedro Estrada, were reported to the Nixon party both before and during the trip.

The agitation

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The agitation of university students on the visa issue, as well as their criticism of the United States for allegedly supporting the Batista regime in Cuba, were also fully reported and taken into consideration in deciding on the visit to Venezuela and the question of a visit to the University.

On April 22 prior to the departure of the Vice President, a report was received that there might be demonstrations at the University of Caracas.

As Vice President Nixon's tour progressed, and particularly after the events in Lima, increased reports concerning the possibility of serious disturbances at the University in Caracas fomented by the Communists were received. The Embassy consulted with the Venezuelan Government Junta and the Junta recommended that the Vice President cancel his proposed visit to the University. The Vice President agreed to do this and requested that the Venezuelan Government make public the fact that disturbances might be anticipated.

A report that rumors were being received of a possible assassination attempt at Caracas against the Vice President was sent ahead to the Nixon party by telegram on May 9.

By May 11, rather complete reports concerning preparations being made by students and others in Venezuela for anti-U.S. demonstrations were being received and forwarded on a regular basis to the Nixon party and, through the Embassy, to the Venezuelan Government. Details of these preparations and renewed recommendations that the Vice President not visit the University of Caracas were accompanied by assurances from the Venezuelan Government that it was aware of these plans and was prepared to accord full protection.

On May 13 a report was received that the Minister of Education had received assurances from all political parties, including the communists, that they would avoid acts of violence during the Vice President's visit to Caracas.

Three reports of possible assassination attempts were forwarded to the Vice President, and the matter was made public by the Secret Service on the eve of the Vice President's departure from Colombia for Caracas.

On May 10 an intelligence report commented that it believed the student manifestations would be limited to a strong verbal harassment without resort to physical violence, but that this could not be guaranteed. In a telephone conversation with the Department on May 13, Ambassador Sparks reported that the University visit had been cancelled and that while difficulties in Caracas might be anticipated, the Government was taking security measures.

In view

In view of the total of the foregoing information, it was recognized that demonstrations might occur in Venezuela. The cumulative effect of the demonstrations in Lima among the students was discussed and considered in planning for the visit to Caracas. It was also considered that the events in Lima might cause the Venezuelan Government to take more precautions in order to avoid similar demonstrations. On the basis of assurances by the Venezuelan Government of its security measures, violence in Caracas was not anticipated. The intensity of the demonstrations which followed and the failure of the Venezuelan security forces to act effectively were not foreseen.

Lebanon

We do not believe that the subversive activities now going on in Lebanon in an effort to overthrow the regime of President Chamoun and the destruction of the USIS library in Tripoli and the USIS reading room in Beirut are part of a coordinated Communist effort connected with the attacks on Vice President Nixon in South America and the developments in Algeria.

The principal source of instigation for the troubles in Lebanon are extremist nationalist elements inside and outside Lebanon aided and abetted by violent propaganda from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus. This is supplemented by arms and armed men infiltrating from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. The purpose of this attack is to overthrow the pro-Western regime of President Chamoun. We have no doubt that Communist elements in Lebanon are helping to fan the flames of this insurrection, as it would seem most unnatural for them not to seize upon this opportunity to create trouble for the United States and for a country friendly to the United States. We are inclined to believe that the troubles in Lebanon, although they are doubtless being exploited by the Communists, arise out of developments primarily concerning the Near Eastern Arab world and are not directly connected with the situation in Algeria or recent events in South America.

The USIS installations were burned by the extremist mobs, perhaps with Communist participation, because they were easily accessible symbols of the principal Western power and the nation which symbolizes the political principles to which the present Lebanese Government has given its support. The Arab extremist nationalists oppose what they consider to be U. S. efforts to line up the Arab world on the U. S. side in the East-West struggle. The Soviet Union through inflammatory broadcasts in the Arabic language is attempting to exacerbate the situation in Lebanon.

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There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is attempting also to influence Cairo and Damascus in their propaganda and other activity directed against the present Government of Lebanon.

The earliest available Soviet broadcast on the Lebanese crisis (May 12 in Arabic) consisted of a news account of events and a direct comment that "it is difficult for anyone to deny that the foreign policy imposed on Lebanon by the Eisenhower Doctrine has brought forth dangerous and destructive consequences." An Arabic broadcast of May 14 declared that the United States seems ready to interfere in Lebanon's "internal affairs" and charged that the "colonialists," whose alleged practice is that of describing popular movements as Communist, are seeking to intervene in Lebanon. The broadcast added that the Lebanese people will give "an appropriate answer to the American colonialists." On May 15 Radio Moscow charged the United States, according to the AP, with open interference in Lebanon's internal affairs and asserted that the Lebanese authorities were "planning to use these American weapons to fight the anti-imperialist popular movement."

ALGERIA

There is no indication that the recent developments in Algeria have been in any way related to other simultaneous disturbances in the world. Nor is there any indication that the Algerian incidents were directly Communist-inspired.

The Algerian explosion is an expression of the intensity of feelings on the part of the French, particularly those in Algeria, on this neuralgic issue. There has always been a possibility, of which we were long aware, that the French settlers in Algeria might try to take matters in their own hands, if they suspected that the French Government might change its policy on Algeria.

A series of circumstances combined to favor the events which occurred last Tuesday. There was an absence of governmental authority, given the cabinet crisis and the absence of Minister Lacoste from Algiers. The French settlers feared, moreover, that the designated French Prime Minister, Pierre Pflimlin, might negotiate with the Algerian rebels. They therefore decided to hold massive protest demonstrations to discourage Pflimlin's investiture.

The demonstrators

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The demonstrators were estimated at around 50,000 and, **incited** by extremist elements, soon got out of hand. In addition to ransacking our USIS offices, the mobs finally took over the local government building, the Ministry for Algeria. It was at that point that the military came upon the scene and took over control, setting up a Committee of Public Safety.

It is, of course, possible that this coup was planned well in advance and not the sudden result of unpremeditated mob action. If so, it was planned by French settlers and certain French military elements -- neither of whom, to our knowledge, have any sympathies with the Communists. That these events occurred on May 13 was due to the fact that it was the day that Pflimlin was scheduled to come up for Parliamentary investiture.

The ransacking

- 14 -

The ransacking of the USIS library was only an offshoot of the larger action by the mobs. The library is centrally-located on the ground floor along one of the main streets of Algiers. Certain elements among the French settlers have felt that we were not solidly behind France's insistence on maintaining Algeria as an integral part of France. It is likely that in the mood they were in at that time, some of the demonstrators were incited by extremist elements to wreck the USIS premises. There have been no indications that these elements were Communist or Communist-inspired.

The Soviet propaganda line in regard to Algeria is designed to excite anti-US sentiments among the French. Moscow has consistently alleged that the U. S. sought to oust France from North Africa and to install itself there militarily, politically and economically. Sahara oil is said to inflame U. S. desires and North African bases to play an important role in U. S. strategic designs. Such moves as the supplying of arms by the U. S. to Tunisia and the good offices mission were said to have the aims of increasing U. S. domination over the area. According to Radio Moscow, the U. S. "intends to supersede France in North Africa as in Indo-China." Moscow has simultaneously attempted to create hostility to the U. S. among Algerian Arabs by charging that the U. S. was attempting to supplant France as the colonial master. There has been, however, no marked intensification of anti-American propaganda in connection with the Algerian coup.

BURMA

According to a preliminary check of Soviet bloc propaganda output, there has been no unusual propaganda activity on the part of the USSR or Communist China in connection with the incident which took place before the U. S. Embassy in Rangoon on May 12. According to the Embassy report, about 100 persons paused for 3 or 4 minutes before the chancery while parading in formation along the street returning from a nearby meeting of the Communist-front World Peace Congress. The crowd stopped only long enough to leave some placards bearing slogans against SEATO and against nuclear weapons, including one in English reading, "American war mongers -- don't interfere in our internal affairs". Local press treatment of the incident was entirely perfunctory.

INDONESIA

Since the Indonesian rebellion in February, Soviet propaganda in close consort with that of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) has

portrayed

portrayed the issue to Indonesians as one between patriotic defense of Indonesian nationalism and sovereignty on the one hand, and foreign-inspired imperialism on the other. The U. S. is identified as the major inspirer of the "separatists" and is charged with intervening by military aid to the rebels.

The increasing trend of the propaganda toward pinpointing the U. S. as the major force of intervention is seen in the Soviet Government's statement of May 14 in which it charged:

"....in a number of instances weapons have been and are being delivered to the rebels directly from the U. S. ... a number of U. S. leaders, Secretary of State Dulles among them, unequivocally called for the setting up of a new government in Indonesia In the light of the events taking place in Indonesia, it is difficult to assess such statements otherwise than as direct incitement to the overthrow of the legitimate Indonesian Government."

The PKI has consistently echoed the main lines of Soviet propaganda against the U. S., relating them specifically to the internal scene. The overall goal has been to identify the U. S. as the real national enemy behind the rebels, and the PKI as the foremost patriotic party. Taking advantage of the momentum generated by Premier Djuanda's April 30 statement and Sukarno's May 2 speech charging intervention and taking the U. S. to task, Indonesian Communists have initiated threats of direct action against U. S. interests. PKI Secretary General Aidit in a May 1 telegram to the U. S. Embassy threatened action against U. S. economic interests in Indonesia if U. S. arms to rebels were not stopped. In a speech published May 6 Aidit threatened that the PKI would launch a campaign for taking over U. S. enterprises in Indonesia as was done with the Dutch unless the U. S. stopped arms to the rebels.

A Communist-dominated "Mass Movement to Oppose Foreign Intervention" was organized on May 7 (probably a crystallization of an "anti-foreign intervention group" formed on May 4 by Communist unions, youth and student front groups) and called for a mass rally on May 16 in front of the U. S. Embassy to protest U. S. intervention. The rally was subsequently postponed to May 20. The group may be identical with an "anti-Foreign Intervention Movement" which on May 9 reportedly cabled 20 international organizations throughout the world asking for "solidarity" in condemning foreign intervention in Indonesia.

JAPAN

There occurred recently a massive but peaceful manifestation, reportedly involving some forty thousand persons, before our Embassy in Tokyo. This was a protest against continued testing of nuclear weapons. This is an active popular issue in Japan resulting from wartime experience as a target of atomic weapons. In this case there is no clearcut evidence of Communist direction. It is an issue agitated by the USSR on a worldwide basis. There is continuous effort by Communists to exploit the issue locally against the United States.

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State--FD, Wash., D.C.