

September 20, 1957

EDAC Working Group I, International Export Control Systems

MINUTES

2:00 p. m., Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1957
Room 1207 Maiatico

Attendance

MDAC

Mr. Wight, Chairman
Mr. Tucker

ICA

Miss Baldwin

CIA

Mr. [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

State

Mr. Nelson
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Strong
Mrs. Rado

Commerce

Mr. Tollin

Defense

Mr. Carmody

Miss Rector, MDAC, Committee Secretary

Agenda

- Note a: Redefinition of Military Fuel Thickeners, ML Item 4b.
(Ref. POLTO A-52, 8/14; WG I M-129)
- Note b: Instrument Landing Systems for Prague.
- Note c: SKF Bearings, Item 1601.
(Ref. Stockholm Desp. 233, 8/22; WG I M-133)
- Note d: Special Task Group on Bearings Review of IL 1601/2601/3601.
(Ref. WG I M-126) 25X6A
- Note e: [REDACTED] to Poland, Item 1305.
(Ref. WG I M-132)
- 25X6A
Note f: [REDACTED] for Redefinition of Items Relating to Electronic Aviation
Equipment, Items 1501, 1509, 1517.
(Ref. WG I M-126; WG I D-1501.1)
- 25X6A
1. [REDACTED] for Poland, Item 1820.
(Ref. POLTO 484, 9/3/57)
2. Criteria for Controls.
3. Defense Memorandum on Thermo-Nuclear Concept.
(Ref. WG I D-78)
4. Austrian Phosphor-Bronze Blanks to Poland, Item 1650(d).
(Ref. Vienna Embtel 738, 9/12/57)

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Note a: Redefinition of Military Fuel Thickeners, ML Item 4b.
(Ref. POLTO A-52, 8/14; WG I M-129)

The Defense member promised to submit a report on this subject during the coming week.

Note b: Instrument Landing Systems for Prague.

The Defense member reported that he expected to have a report by next week on the new case involving ILS for Prague. The Chairman noted that Defense had been provided with the only copy of the Treasury memorandum on this case, and requested its return in order that it might be reproduced and copies given to the other members.

Note c: SKF Bearings, Item 1601.
(Ref. Stockholm Desp. 233, 8/22; WG I M-133)

The Chairman called the attention of the Defense member to the fact that the technical report which he had promised to submit to complete the record in this case had not yet been received.

Note d: Special Task Group on Bearings Review of IL 1601/2601/3601.
(Ref. WG I M-126)

The Chairman requested the Defense member to make a report at the Group's next meeting with respect to the status of the bearings review.

Note e: ██████████ to Poland, Item 1305.
(Ref. WGI M-132) 25X6A

The Chairman called the attention of the Defense and Commerce members to the fact that the technical report to complete the record in this case had not yet been received.

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Note f: ██████████ Proposals for Redefinition of Items Relating to Electronic Aviation Equipment, Items 1501, 1509, 1517.
(Ref. WG I M-126; WG I D-1501.1)

The Chairman requested the Commerce member to make a report at the Group's next meeting with respect to the status of the Technical Task Group's review of this matter. The State member reported that the ██████████ had been informed that we hoped to have our information by the middle of September.

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1. █████ Tires for Poland, Item 1820.
(Ref. POLTO 484, 9/3/57)

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Decision

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The USDEL would be authorized to make no objection to the █████ proposal to export to Poland 600 tires, valued at \$24,472.

Discussion

The Defense member reported that after careful consideration of this case, technicians in the Transportation Corps and the Ordnance Corps, and their superiors, could find no particular justification for objection to the shipment of the tires in question, in view of our Polish policy and statements in the █████ COCOM document that the tires will not be transshipped and will be used in the Polish civilian economy on commercial vehicles.

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The State member felt the case came within the policy for Poland, concurred in the findings of Defense, and recommended approval. The ICA member agreed.

With respect to this particular case, the Commerce member stated that since both State and Defense had indicated that the USDEL should be authorized not to object, he would not be prone to interpose objection. However, we were approaching the point where we should have more information and he thought that from now on we should ask the country which came in with the exception request to present more cogent information as to how the case meets the criteria for Poland.

The Chairman recommended that the case be approved on the basis of the information given that the tires were to be used in the civilian economy of Poland, that they could be so used as had been ascertained in the previous case, and in light of the fact that tires are a very expendable item and that 600 could be used up very quickly. With respect to the Commerce member's suggestion that more concrete evidence be obtained as to the reasonableness and necessity for use in the civilian economy, the Chairman thought that each case had to be dealt with on its merits and that such information should be requested only in cases where it seemed really relevant and important.

2. Criteria for Controls.

- A. WG I D-76/1b (Defense Memo of 9/4/57); WG I D-76/1c (CIA Memo of 9/6/57).

Decision

The Defense member was advised that it was the opinion of the other members of WG I that CIA should not be asked to reappraise its studies until such time as policy

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guidance is received that the existing criteria may be changed or that the CIA studies should be re-reviewed in anticipation of a possible agreement to change the criteria.

B. WG I D-77 (MDAC Member's background memo analyzing development of criteria).

Decision

The members expressed their appreciation to the MDAC staff member for the preparation of this useful background document. The Chairman invited any member who might wish to do so to submit memoranda commenting on or amplifying the contents of this document.

Discussion

The CIA member referred to the statement on page 8 of WG I D-77, reading "CIA, in its Intelligence Review, . . . analyzes the criteria . . . and concludes that the most useful achievement and objective of a trade control program is to inflict political and moral stigma on the Sino-Soviet bloc." He noted that CIA did not really analyze the criteria, nor did they conclude that the most important achievement of a trade control program should be exploitation of the political or moral stigma attached to trade controls. Rather, he believed that what CIA wanted to say was that this was an achievement of the program which had not been fully exploited because it was a by-product rather than a declared objective of the trade control program.

The Chairman said he thought the CIA comments on the political achievement of the trade control program went to the very essence of the whole concept because it was stated throughout the first part of the CIA paper that the program had only a slight or negligible effect from a military security point of view.

The Commerce member advised that Commerce had not had the document long enough to give it considered analysis. In their preliminary analysis they had found it a very interesting paper.

The State member advised that he too had not had time to give the paper intensive study. It seemed a worthwhile document and focused attention on some very important points through the years in economic defense. He felt that it pretty well coincided with State's own interpretation of the criteria and the term "war potential".

C. WG I D-77A(Chairman's draft memorandum on COCOM Listing Criteria).

Decision

This paper was distributed by the Chairman to the members for WG I consideration at its next meeting. However, preliminary discussion indicated that

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the members believed that WG I activity in this particular area might be duplicative of work being undertaken simultaneously in the EC and therefore would want a directive from the EC to do so before giving serious or lengthy study to such matters in WG I.

3. Defense Memorandum on Thermo-Nuclear Concept.
(Ref. WG I D-78)

Decision

The Defense member was given the following advice:

25X6 (a) With respect to the first recommendation made by Defense in the referenced document, that the other WG I members believed it would be premature to approach ██████████ regarding its thermo-nuclear concept until the U. S. had completed its general review of the strategic trade control program and determined what its policy will be.

(b) With respect to the second recommendation made by Defense in the referenced document, that the other WG I members believed it seemed to be inconsistent with NSC 5704/2, Annex A, page 7, to propose to NATO that it consider the thermo-nuclear concept for the purpose of advising COCOM regarding the military aspect of such a concept relative to strategic trade controls.

(c) That the other WG I members would urge the Department of Defense to make a study of the implications of the thermo-nuclear concept on the trade control program, indicating what items would be covered by such a concept.

Discussion

The State member advised that State felt that the Defense proposal in the subject document was very similar to the Defense proposal presented in WG I several weeks ago at the time the Group was discussing copper wire and ██████████. He 25X1A2g referred to the comments he had made then (see WG I M-129) that the timing was premature because we were in the midst of making our own review of the lists and would be considering various strategic trade control concepts which might be applied in the future. State had therefore felt that the Defense proposal was unacceptable and still felt the same way regarding both proposals made by Defense in the document now before the Group. ██████████ 25X1X7

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With respect to the second Defense recommendation, the attention of the Defense member was directed to NSC 5704/2, Annex A, page 7, and he was informed that this recommendation seemed to be irreconcilable with the policy decision that NSC would not be asked to make any special review of the trade control question at this time.

The Commerce member referred to comments he had made when the Defense member had previously proposed that the thermo-nuclear concept be discussed with the UK, at which time he had suggested that it would behoove primarily responsible agencies within the U.S. Government to decide what we would think would be the substance of the thermo-nuclear concept and then determine the extent to which we had valid counteracting arguments. He recalled that the Chairman had remarked that he thought part of this would be involved in one of the special interest studies which Defense was to make. The Chairman noted that the special interest studies had not as yet been transmitted by Defense.

The Chairman reported that the general feeling in MDAC was very similar to the views expressed by the Commerce member, and also that Admiral DeLany, after his discussions with [REDACTED] 1955, which was when this concept was first mentioned, had requested Defense and AEC to make a study and to prepare a list of items those agencies would think would be controlled if we should adopt this concept. No response had been received to this request. It was MDAC's feeling that we should determine our own thinking on what the concept would include and whether we could agree with it, or what alternatives we would propose, before any approach was made to [REDACTED] who might already be fully prepared. He would think it preferable to try to delay rather than instigate proposals on the part of any other governments until such time as our own views were agreed and the U.S. could take the initiative in making its own proposals.

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The CIA member noted that this was a very complicated problem. It was not a matter of the narrow thermo-nuclear concept. We should be thinking in terms of the modern weapons system. This was somewhat broader and took into account not only atomic and hydrogen bombs, but also other form of warfare, such as chemical and biological warfare, which were equally as effective in some cases as thermo-nuclear warfare. There was also the question of missiles. CIA had taken some of these things into consideration in its intelligence contributions but of course did not use this as the solely limiting factor.

The Commerce member referred to the point made by an AEC representative at one of the Group's meetings (WG I M-121) that the U.S. decision to participate in the International Atomic Energy Agency might have a fundamental impact on our controls. This needed to be studied to see how it might cause our efforts to be redirected. The Chairman noted that AEC was to make a study of the relation of the security trade control program to IAEA.

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4. Austrian Phosphor-Bronze Blanks to Poland, Item 1650 (d).
(Ref. [REDACTED] 9/12/57)
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Decision

Embassy Vienna would be informed that the phosphor-bronze blanks it wished to export to Poland were finished products which were not covered by IL 1650(d), as the Austrians had believed they were, and therefore were not under control to the bloc.

Discussion

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The Commerce member reported that a quick review of [REDACTED] made by BFC and BDSA, in which he believed a Defense technician had also participated, indicated that the phosphor-bronze blanks were a finished product and did not appear to be covered by IL 1650.

Distribution

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