Survey of East-West Trade



Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951

EIGHTH REPORT TO CONGRESS

Last Half of 1955





LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am submitting herewith, for the period July through December 1955, the eighth semiannual report on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act), the administration of which is one of my responsibilities.

The present report is primarily a factual description of the volume, commodity composition, and geographic pattern of East-West trade in 1955, together with a review of the Sino-Soviet bloc's efforts to expand its economic relations with the less developed countries.

During the preparation of this report, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations held extensive hearings on East-West trade controls and related aspects of the Battle Act. The hearings were focused on the revision of the controls which became effective in August, 1954, and which was reported in previous Battle Act reports. The Subcommittee's report was published on July 18, 1956. Its findings and recommendations are currently being studied and will be the subject of comment in my next report to Congress.

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JOHN B. HOLLISTER, Director, International Cooperation Administration.

OCTOBER 10, 1956.

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CHAPTER I

PATTERNS OF TRADE

Trade Volume

Total trade (exports and imports) between the free world and the Sino-Soviet bloc¹ amounted to \$4.46 billion in 1955, as shown below and in Figure I, compared with \$3.6 billion in 1954, an increase of 24 percent:

TOTAL FREE WORLD TRADE WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC-1954 and 1955

(In millions of	United	States	dollars)	
-----------------	--------	--------	----------	--

	Total Sino-	European	Communist
	Soviet Bloc	Soviet Bloc	China
1955 (preliminary)	4, 461. 4	3, 646. 0	805. 8
1954	3, 599. 8	2, 923. 4	669. 4

Exports to the bloc rose from \$1.76 billion in 1954 to an estimated \$2.03 billion in 1955, a 15 percent increase (Figure II). Imports from the bloc moved upward from \$1.83 billion in 1954 to an estimated \$2.43 billion in 1955, or by 32 percent. The rise of free world exports to the bloc was not, therefore, as large as the increase in imports from the bloc, a reversal of the situation in 1954.

The expansion of free world exports to the bloc was due substantially to increased exports to the European satellite countries, with shipments to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland providing the largest gain. Free world imports advanced from almost all the bloc countries, with imports from the U. S. S. R. showing the greatest absolute increase, followed by Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The progressive rise in free world trade with the bloc was paralleled by an increase in trade within the free world community. The sustained growth of economic activity in the United States and Western Europe, and the continued general improvement in economic conditions throughout the world, were the principal reasons for the accelerated trade development. The bloc's share of free world trade underwent only a fractional percentage change, increasing from about 2.3 percent in 1954 to approximately 2.6 percent in 1955. Afghanistan, Egypt, Finland, Hong Kong, Iceland, Iran,

¹ The Sino-Soviet bloc comprises the U. S. S. R., the European satellites, Communist China (including Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and Tibet), North Korea, Outer Mongolia, and North Vietnam.



FIGURE II FREE WORLD EXPORTS TO THE BLOC-1954 AND 1955

[In millions of United States dollars]

	Total Bloc	European satellites	U. S. S. R.	Communist China
1955: First half Second half (preliminary)	938. 0 1, 094. 7	549. 3 599. 6	242, 5 328, 2	146. 2 166. 9
	2, 032. 7	1, 148. 9	570. 7	313.1
1954: First half Second half	891.5 872.7	417. 4 479. 3	336.7 • 236.8	137. 4 156. 6
	1, 764. 2	896.7	573. 5	294.0

FREE WORLD IMPORTS FROM THE BLOC-1954 AND 1955 [In millions of United States dollars]

	Total Bloc	European satellites	U. S. S. R.	Communist China
1955: First half Second half (preliminary)	1, 095. 2 1, 333. 5	595. 7 686. 9	255. 5 388. 3	240. 4 252. 3
	1 2, 428. 7	1, 282. 6	643.8	2 492. 7
1954: First half Second half	806. 3 1, 029. 3	433. 7 519. 0	193. 3 307. 2	175. 4 200. 0
	1 1, 835. 6	952. 7	500. 5	375.4

¹ Outer Mongolia and North Korea are included in total Soviet bloc, but not in geographic areas. Values for the years 1964-55, in millions of dollars are: 7.0 and 9.6. ² Free world imports from Communist China are inflated to some extent by double counting of shipments reexported from Hong Kong.

Source: U. S. Department of Commerce.

Turkey, and Yugoslavia, however, in 1955 carried on more than 10 percent of their foreign trade with the bloc.

Sino-Soviet bloc trade in 1955 remained at about the same proportion as in 1954—roughly 80 percent intrabloc and 20 percent with the free world. Communist China, as a single country of the bloc, had a similar distribution of trade. The development of Sino-Soviet bloc trade was reviewed in Chapters I and III of *Soviet Deterrents to Increased Foreign Trade*, the Seventh Semiannual Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) Report which covered the first half of 1955.

At the end of the 1946-55 decade, the total volume of trade conducted among the "centrally planned" or Communist economies was more than 2.5 times higher than before World War II, while their trade with the rest of the world was less than half its prewar level, according to the United Nations *World Economic Survey*, 1955. The most significant expansion in foreign trade was in the Soviet Union, where the total volume in 1954 was more than four times as large as before the war. The greatly increased trade among the bloc countries has been part of a general process of integration within the area as a whole. The most decisive influence in this integration has been the establishment and development of a separate, virtually self-contained, trading area.

Western European Bloc Trade

Western Europe was the major nonbloc trading area in the foreign commerce of the European Soviet bloc during the entire postwar decade. The most striking postwar development in the commodity pattern of trade of the Eastern European countries has been the increase in their exports of machinery and equipment. In contrast, exports of foodstuffs from most of these countries have declined, compared with the prewar period.

The trade of the European Soviet bloc with Western Europe continued to expand in 1955 at approximately the same rate as in 1954. But in 1955 the actual increase was higher in Western European imports from Eastern Europe, a movement that was directly contrary to the situation the year before when Western European exports to Eastern Europe were larger. In addition to the traditional commodities that the European Soviet bloc exported to Western Europe wheat and other foodstuffs, coal, petroleum, and timber—increasing quantities of manufactured goods, including machinery and equipment, were delivered to a number of Western European markets. There were also substantial sales of pig iron and cotton to the West.

The exceptionally large imports of butter and meat into the Eastern European countries from Western Europe which occurred in 1954 were greatly reduced in 1955. Imports of grain continued, however, and

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in two cases (Communist East Germany and Poland) were expected to continue in spite of the good 1955 harvest. The total of Eastern European imports from Western Europe continued to grow rapidly, partly because of a substantial increase in deliveries of machinery and equipment. Other major imports were chemicals, crude wool, copper wire, and rubber.

The Western European countries which showed the biggest gains in trade turnover with the Sino-Soviet bloc on an absolute basis in 1955 were the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. The Federal Republic of Germany's trade increased by \$154 million, the United Kingdom's by \$147 million, and France's by \$70 million.

Leading commodities by value in the export trade of the Federal Republic of Germany were the following: chemicals, \$44.2 million; iron and steel products, \$17.4 million; ships (marine and coastwise), \$16.3 million; copper wire, \$12.7 million; and non-electrical machinery, \$10.7 million. The value of these commodities, which comprised nonembargoed items, does not, however, include trade with Communist East Germany.

In the United Kingdom's export trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, the principal commodities by value were: uncovered wire and cables of copper, \$28.8 million; reexports of crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed), \$20.5 million; wool tops, \$20.1 million; reexports of sheep and lambs wool (raw), \$14 million; and textile machinery and accessories, \$12.9 million (all nonembargoed items).

Principal commodities by value in France's export trade were: wheat (soft), \$29.9 million; iron and steel semis and finished steel products, \$30.4 million; chemicals, \$11.5 million; wheat flour, \$8.9 million; meat of cattle, \$7.4 million; and beet sugar (unrefined), \$5.3 million (all nonembargoed items).

Finland and Austria also showed significant trade increases of \$35 million and \$37 million, respectively. Yugoslavia's swelled by over \$58 million, a fivefold spurt that was generated by the restoration of political and economic relations between the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia, the principles of which were contained in the Belgrade declaration of June 2, 1955. Denmark's trade with the bloc, however, decreased by \$27 million or about 25 percent.

COCOM Trade With the Bloc

The overall trade of the 15 COCOM² countries with the Sino-Soviet bloc (see Appendix E, Table 2) went up from \$1.8 billion in 1954 to nearly \$2.3 billion in 1955, or by slightly more than \$486 million. COCOM exports to the bloc were about \$150 million higher

² The Coordinating Committee in Paris where the following countries meet to adjust and coordinate their strategic trade controls: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 in 1955 than in the previous year, rising from \$835 million in 1954 to above \$985 million in 1955.

Communist China's Trade With the Free World

The trade of Communist China with the free world increased in 1955, with transactions totaling \$805.8 million compared with \$669.4 million in 1954. The 16 countries that constitute the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (see Appendix E for list of OEEC members) accounted for 28 percent of this trade, and Japan for about 14 percent.

Communist China's exports to the non-Communist countries in 1955 were valued at approximately \$493 million,³ a rise of \$117 million over 1954. Exports from nonbloc countries to Communist China amounted to about \$313 million in 1955, compared with \$294 million in 1954, \$287 million in 1953, and \$273 million in 1952.

In 1955 the value of direct Western European exports to Communist China went up by nearly 25 percent over 1954, but this increase was more than offset by a decline in exports from Hong Kong. Since exports from Hong Kong consisted largely of transshipments of Western European products, these statistics reflect primarily changes in the methods of shipment rather than in levels of trade. Japan's exports to Communist China, after showing a sharp increase in the second half of 1954, remained at the same level throughout 1955.

Industrial goods were the major items exported to Communist China from Western Europe, Japan, and Hong Kong. Chemical products, including fertilizers, dyes, drugs, and industrial chemicals, accounted for the largest proportion of the total shipments; exports of textile fibers and fabrics, metals and manufactures, also composed significantly large percentages of the total.

Exports to Communist China from Asia (excluding Japan and Hong Kong), Oceania, and the Near East, on the other hand, consisted largely of agricultural products. Raw cotton constituted the bulk of exports from Pakistan and Egypt, while exports from Ceylon consisted chiefly of crude rubber. Rice was Burma's principal export (see pp 29-30), while Indonesia and Malaya supplied mainly copra and coconut oil; Australia, wool and wool tops; and India, gunny bags and raw cotton.

Communist China's exports to the non-Communist countries, in the order of percentage of total, were foodstuffs (including rice, other cereals, vegetable oils for food use, eggs, fruits, vegetables, pulses, and tea); oilseeds and other agricultural raw materials (textile fibers, essential oils, skins and pelts, tung oil, and miscellaneous crude materials); and a variety of miscellaneous goods (mainly ores, minerals, and products of light industry).

⁹ This figure includes Hong Kong Imports of \$167 million, much of which was reexported and recorded a second time as imports from Communist China.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 U. S.-European Soviet Bloc Trade

United States exports to the European Soviet bloc in 1955 were valued at \$7.3 million, a rise of 18 percent compared with the \$6.1 million export total in 1954 (see Appendix E, Table 4b). The 1954 and 1955 totals included, however, \$4.7 million of food grains, insecticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany under the President's Flood Relief Program for the Danube Basin. United States exports to the U. S. S. R. and its European satellites, exclusive of these gift shipments, had an aggregate value of \$5.7 million for the year 1955, approximately 100 percent more than the total of \$2.9 million for 1954. These export levels were considerably below the 1947 and 1948 totals, when United States shipments to the European bloc totaled, respectively, \$339.9 million and \$123.2 million.

Of the principal commodities exported by the United States to the U. S. S. R. and its European satellites in recent years, wool rags constituted the major export item for the year 1955, representing some 30 percent of total exports. Corn (not seed corn) accounted for about 20 percent. Hides and skins and inedible tallow followed in that order.

United States imports from the European Soviet bloc totaled \$55.5 million in 1955, increasing 31 percent over 1954 imports of \$42.4 million. The major items imported in 1955 included \$19.8 million of canned specialty hams, bacon, and sausage casings; \$8.4 million of furs and manufactures; \$6.5 million of benzene; \$2.3 million of fertilizers and materials; \$2.0 million of photographic goods; \$1.7 million of glass products; and \$1.3 million of bristles.

On November 3, 1955, the Department of Commerce announced that it was considering establishment of a roster of selected nonstrategic goods which could be exported to the European Soviet bloc under general license (i. e., not requiring individual validated licenses).⁴ This proposed relaxation was designed to promote the aim urged by President Eisenhower at the Summit Conference at Geneva in July: "To create conditions which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world."

The U.S. and the Communist China Trade Embargo

As outlined in previous Battle Act reports, the United States imposed a total embargo on exports to North Korea immediately following the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. Exports to Communist China and Manchuria were placed under a total embargo on December 3, 1950, with the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean War. The embargo has been rigidly enforced and is still

[•] The list of some 700 items in over 57 general commodity categories was released on April 26, 1956. This simplification in licensing procedure in respect to the European Soviet bloc only will be discussed in the Ninth Battle Act Report, which will review East-West trade developments during the first half of 1956.

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in effect. Imports from Communist China and North Korea are also prohibited unless licensed by the Treasury Department; and no licenses are issued for imports from these areas.

There have been no United States commercial exports to Communist China or North Korea since the institution of the export ban, except for shipments of two passenger cars to China with a total value of \$6,000 for the use of a diplomatic mission of a friendly foreign country, and for the export of \$2,530 of magazines and other generally available publications to China. In the third quarter of 1955, the Department of Commerce approved export applications to Communist China for the shipment of a passenger car valued at \$1,000 and of automotive replacement parts valued at \$60, both for the use of diplomatic missions of friendly countries. The shipment of magazines and other unclassified publications was made in the fourth quarter of 1955, under a general license system which permits exports of unclassified scientific and educational information to all destinations.

Latin American-Bloc Trade

Latin America's total trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 reached a new high level estimated at approximately \$340 million, an increase of about 34 percent over the \$254 million reached in 1954. Aggregate annual trade between the United States and Latin America is 20 times larger, however, totaling about \$7 billion.

Argentina and Brazil continued in 1955 as the main Latin American trade partners with the bloc countries. Trade between the bloc and Argentina, which had accumulated a large credit balance with the Soviet Union, amounted to \$193 million in 1955. The value of Brazil's trade with the bloc was \$85 million, an increase of \$42 million or about a 100 percent advance over 1954. Uruguay, which ranked third in Latin American-bloc trade exchange in 1954, was displaced in 1955 by Cuba as a result of an increase in U. S. S. R. purchases of Cuban sugar.

Latin American exports to the bloc in 1955 rose to an estimated \$169 million compared with \$142 million in 1954, an increase of 20 percent. Most of this expansion represented the increase in exports by Cuba and Brazil. The shipment by Cuba of 500,000 tons of sugar to the U. S. S. R. valued at \$37.4 million as well as increased exports of Brazilian goods, especially coffee, were offset in part by a drop of \$13.3 million in Uruguay's exports to the bloc. This decline of about 50 percent in Uruguay's exports was due to a substantial reduction in purchases by the Soviet Union.

Latin American imports from the bloc climbed to \$171 million in 1955, an increase of 53 percent above the 1954 level of \$112 million. In 1955 most Latin American countries increased their purchases within the bloc area. Of particular significance were expanded

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imports by Argentina—\$120 million in 1955 as against \$83 million in 1954; and by Brazil—\$38 million in 1955 compared with \$19 million in 1954. A large proportion of these imports consisted of manufactured products and industrial raw materials.

Although Latin American trade with the bloc countries in 1955 accounted for only 2 percent of that area's trade with the world, the same share as in the previous year, the importance of the bloc's trade rose for individual countries. Such trade in 1955 represented 9 percent of Argentina's and 3 percent of Brazil's, Cuba's, and Uruguay's total foreign trade, respectively. In 1954 the proportions were Argentina, 8 percent; Brazil, 1.3 percent; and Cuba about 1 percent. Uruguay's bloc trade, on the other hand, declined from 5 percent of its entire world trade in 1954 to 3 percent in 1955.

Miscellaneous Trade

Australia did almost \$18 million less trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 than in 1954, a decline of 25 percent. This decline was due mainly to a sag in exports to the U. S. S. R. which followed the deterioration in political relations between the two countries, produced by the dramatic disclosure in April, 1954, that the Soviet Embassy in Canberra was operating a spy network.

Japan's and Turkey's trade with the bloc went up, respectively, by \$56 million and \$60 million. Chapter IV of this report surveys bloc trade with the less developed areas of the world.

Trade Agreements

About 65 percent of the trade of the Sino-Soviet bloc with the free world in 1955 was carried on with countries with which it had bilateral trade agreements. A total of 174 trade and payments agreements were in effect last year between the bloc and the free world (see Appendix D). In addition, there were five agreements signed in 1955 which were not to become effective until 1956. Of the aggregate 179 agreements,⁵ 29 established a formal basis for trade where only informal commercial and barter arrangements had existed previously. Only six of the new pacts were concluded with Western European countries, most of which have had trade agreements with bloc nations since the early postwar period. The remainder were concluded with less developed countries, 13 in the Near East, 8 in Southeast Asia, and 2 in Latin America.

^b The agreements include all East-West government-to-government trade and/or payments agreements, as well as semiofficial agreements, which covered trade during some part of 1955. The majority of the semi official agreements were concluded with the East German trade administration by special trading agencies of free world countries not recognizing the Communist regime; in practice, these agreements do not differ substantially from government-to-government agreements. Most of the trade agreements establish quantity or value quotas which, while not binding, are indicative of the level of trade in given commodities for which a government is prepared to issue import or export licenses. The quotas may usually be increased or otherwise revised following consultation of the contracting parties.

On this side of the Iron Curtain, Yugoslavia was very active in the trade agreement field, concluding a total of eight agreements. It fully restored its economic ties with all the European Soviet bloc countries, terminated in 1948 following the break with the Cominform. The preliminary \$194 million credit agreement concluded between Yugoslavia and the U. S. S. R. on September 1, 1955, was Belgrade's most noteworthy arrangement. Yugoslavia, under this agreement, obtained credits amounting to an estimated \$110 million for the construction of fertilizer and connected plants, the reconstruction of three small mines, and other designated projects; \$54 million for the purchase of coal, oil, and cotton in the Soviet Union; and \$30 million in gold or equivalent foreign currency for the Yugoslav National Bank. All credits were reported to be for 10 years with interest payments of 2 percent. In November, Poland granted a \$20 million credit to Yugoslavia to cover delivery of food processing and mining equipment, and rolling stock.

Greece concluded 7 agreements with the European Soviet bloc countries, running Yugoslavia a close second; Turkey, Iceland, and Argentina each made 6 agreements, and Colombia 1. Burma concluded five new pacts with bloc countries and renewed a 1954 agreement with Communist China. Both the Sudan and Syria signed four. New agreements concluded by the Sudan and Colombia were the first that these countries had negotiated with the bloc.

Among the more outstanding agreements reached was that between the U. S. S. R. and Austria, following the conclusion of the peace treaty. Bulgaria signed four new accords, the largest number of any bloc country. Communist North Vietnam's new agreement with France was its first official trade arrangement with the free world.

The number and the scope of all these trade agreements show the intent and advance of the bloc's trade program.

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CHAPTER II

THE PERIOD OF TRADE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES

The Geneva Meetings

The Seventh Battle Act Report (pp. 1-2) summarized the unsuccessful efforts made by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at the Summit Conference in Geneva in July, 1955, and at the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the Swiss city during October-November, to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the progressive elimination of barriers which interfered with peaceful trade. The U. S. S. R. negotiators, as pointed out, expressed a willingness at the autumn meeting to discuss only the removal of free world controls on strategic goods. No positive response was made by the Soviet delegation when the Western representatives offered to consider sympathetically any proposals which the former might present which would contribute to the mutually beneficial development of peaceful trade. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France proposed that the Soviet Union lessen the difficulties for Western traders to visit and reside in the U.S.S.R.; that the U.S.S.R. give more adequate protection to Western industrial property rights, including patents; and that the U. S. S. R. make available more production and trade statistics. The Western delegates emphasized that the strategic export controls covered only a small portion of trade, and that wide opportunities for peaceful commerce were freely available to the U.S.S.R., provided Moscow discarded its policy of self-sufficiency.

In a positive and conciliatory move on October 31 to promote peaceful trade, Secretary of State Dulles announced that the United States Government would "progressively" simplify certain operating procedures in exports to the European Soviet bloc (see p. 6). In a statement made two weeks later, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov refused to address himself to the problem of expanding peaceful trade and instead called for the elimination of the West's strategic trade controls. He said:

"* * * lately various measures of discriminative nature have been and are practised in the trade with the Soviet Union and some other

states on the part of some Western states and on the part of the United States of America foremost.

"The removal of this discrimination and of the barriers and obstacles set up lately on the path of international trade is useful and advantageous for both sides, both for East and West.

"Without the elimination of these barriers the contacts between East and West cannot normally develop."

Farm Delegations Visit U. S.

Contacts between the free world and the European Soviet bloc increased during the last half of 1955. The desire expressed at the Summit Conference for greater contacts between peoples of the East and West brought about a number of exchanges of delegations. The Soviet Union also encouraged visits of private citizens, although its own nationals sent abroad continued to be controlled delegations rather than individuals exercising the right to travel freely. The Soviet change in attitude toward the admission of both delegations and individuals to the U. S. S. R. resulted in an increase in the number of United States private citizens as well as public officials permitted to enter the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government, to a certain extent, used the exchange program as a vehicle for stimulating trade with the United States. For example, a 12-man delegation, headed by Acting Agriculture Minister Vladimir A. Matskevich, visited the United States in August, studying farming techniques, especially corn-hog production. The Soviet agriculturists showed a warm interest in buying large selfpropelled wheat harvesters, wheel-type tractors of all sizes, and hay balers. During its stay in the United States the delegation purchased 15 bulls to improve commercial breeds of cattle in the U. S. S. R.

Late in November a second group of five Soviet agricultural experts led by Ilia Emelianov, Deputy Director of the Scientific and Technical Operations Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, came to the United States to purchase a reported \$1 million worth of hybrid seed corn and the machinery to plant, cultivate, and harvest it. The president of a midwestern hybrid corn company, who had visited the Soviet Union and Rumania earlier, extended the invitation to the Soviet specialists.

Rumania was the first Soviet satellite to send a trade delegation to the United States. A three-man group, including Deputy Minister of Agriculture Dr. Virgil Gligor, arrived in New York on November 27 for a month's visit, at the invitation of the same company that had invited the second Soviet team. The purpose of the Rumanian mission was precisely that of the second Soviet group—the purchase of hybrid seed corn and machinery. The delegation announced on its arrival that Rumania desired to resume trade with the United

States and was prepared to spend \$500,000 to \$1 million in cash for seed corn and 10 sets of farm equipment. Assurances were given that additional purchases would be made if the seed and machinery proved satisfactory.

Soviet Trade and U.S. Senators

Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, in an interview on September 12 with five United States Senators, said that the U. S. S. R. wanted to import United States machinery and agricultural products. He implied Moscow would offer manganese and other strategic materials in exchange for American goods, and thought an expansion of Soviet-United States trade would promote better relations between the two countries. With Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin nodding vigorous approval, Mr. Khrushchev denounced United States strategic trade controls and urged that they be abolished. Then he boldly and bluntly asserted: "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes as a means of promoting better relations between our countries." The political and economic purposes inherent in Soviet trade policy were described and analyzed in Chapter III of the Seventh Battle Act Report.

ECE Trade Meeting

From September 26 to October 14, while the "Geneva spirit" of conciliation was still fresh, representatives of 26 countries met in Geneva at the fourth session of the Committee on the Development of Trade of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) to discuss obstacles to the growth of East-West trade. Eighteen Western European countries, the U. S. S. R., and its European satellites sent delegations. The United States and Canada also participated. In addition to the country delegations, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), which was established in January, 1949, to broaden "economic cooperation" between the U. S. S. R. and the Eastern European bloc countries, sent its Secretary-General, A. A. Pavlov of the Soviet Union, to establish an informal relationship with the ECE Secretariat.

The Committee discussed the items on its agenda in an atmosphere which was harmonious. In addition to a general discussion of the magnitude of trade between the East and West, the possibilities of further expansion in this trade, and trade relationships between particular countries, the Committee also considered specific problems affecting the enlargement of trade between East and West, as for example, arrangements for the settlement of trading accounts.

During the meeting 120 bilateral trade talks took place, but these were generally restrained and unproductive. At these talks trade

experts exchanged specific lists of commodities in which they were prepared to deal.

In the course of the deliberations of the Committee, the Soviet bloc countries reiterated the charge that the major barrier to trade expansion was discrimination in Western commercial practices. One example cited by the bloc countries of a discriminatory practice was the Western trade liberalization program, which was asserted to be a violation of the most-favored-nation principle because its benefits are not extended to all countries. Strategic trade controls were not mentioned directly, but were referred to by most Eastern European delegates as "noncommercial" policies which limited exports by Western countries. The bloc countries stated that these policies destroyed the mutual confidence necessary for world trade and violated the mostfavored-nation principle. However, their expressions of these views were generally brief and presented in a manner which was in keeping with the harmonious atmosphere of the conference.

None of the deterrents to increased peaceful trade between the West and the Soviet bloc was eliminated as a consequence of the Committee's deliberations, since the Committee has no power to alter the trade policies of governments. The major result of the meeting was possibly an improvement in the psychological climate relating to East-West trade problems and policies.

The Soviet bloc delegates were generally in favor of a further expansion of trade between the West and the bloc, and stressed the possibilities which they believed existed for an increased exchange of commodities. Several Western countries also expressed interest in greater trade with the Soviet bloc. Gunnar Myrdal, Executive-Secretary of the ECE, described the results of the meeting as "not spectacular," but cautiously predicted a continued slow increase in trade between the Soviet bloc and the rest of Europe.

CHAPTER III

TRADE FAIRS IN SINO-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Number, Cost, and Areas of Focus

For a combination of trade, political, and propaganda reasons, the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 participated in 149 trade fairs and exhibitions in 41 countries, exceeding, as indicated below, its total participation in the four preceding years:

SUMMARY OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS AND EXHIBITIONS-1951-55

Year	Number tries in bloc exh	which	fairs and exhibitions in which	vidual
	Free World	Bloc	bloe par- ticipated	bloc exhibits
1951	6 13 21 23 32	2 2 2 3 9	8 20 58 60 149	20 92 120 125 288

In 1954 the bloc had displayed its wares at 60 fairs in 26 countries, at an estimated cost of \$10 million. Expenditures in 1955 were about \$38 million, nearly four times the amount spent the previous year.¹ An impressive feature of this significant broadening and more systematic bloc participation in fairs was the substantial increase in the number of exhibits, from 125 in 1954 to 288 in 1955, or a rise of about 130 percent.

Although Western Europe is the major trading area in the free world for the bloc, the financial outlays by the bloc in 1955 for trade fairs in Western Europe were somewhat less than for fairs in the less developed countries of Asia and the Near East, where the bloc is expending an ascending proportion of its trade energies and resources (see Fig. III). To the accompaniment of heavy radio, newspaper, and magazine publicity, costly and frequently lavish exhibits were

¹ The \$38 million and \$10 million estimates are based on equivalent expenditures by the United States for trade fair participation.

presented in 16 of the newly developing countries, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, and Syria. More money was spent by the bloc on trade fairs in India than in any other non-Communist country. The bloc also participated extensively in fairs in Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Austria, The Netherlands, and Sweden; and on a smaller but yet noteworthy scale in Argentina, Iceland, and French Morocco. There were reports in December that the bloc would expand its participation in trade fairs in 1956, and that its exhibits would be larger, better planned, and more impressive than in previous years.

FIGURE III

SINO-SOVIET BI	LOC PARTICIPATION	IN TRADE FAIRS,	Exhibitions, or Specialty
SH	IOWS OUTSIDE THE	COMMUNIST BLO	c During 1955

Location of fairs, exhibitions or specialty shows		Sino-Soviet bloc participation 1							
	Num- ber	U. S. S. R.	Czecho- slovakia		Hun- gary	Po- land	Ru- mania	Bul- garia	Com- munist China
Argentina	1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 9			X X X X	X X X X	x		x	
French Morocco Germany (Federal Re- public) Great Britain Greace	2 16 4 1	x		X X X	X X X	X X X			x
India India Indonesia Italy	1 10 2 11 2	x x x	X X X X X X X X	X X X	X X X X	X X X	X X	x x	X X X
Lebanon Netherlands Pakistan Portugal	1 9 3 1	X X X	X X	x	x	x			а
Sweden Switzerland Syria Fibet	2 4 2 1	X X X	X X X	X X X X X	X X X X X X X X X X	X X		x	x,
Funisia Furkey United States Yugoslavia	1 1 1 8	x	X X X	x	X X X	x x 	x	X	

¹ Country checked includes participation in at least one trade fair, exhibition, or specialty show, but not necessarily participation in all fairs held in country.

Motives

Chapter I of the Sixth Battle Act Report describing "Moscow's Economic Arm," traced the development of the Soviet bloc's use of trade fairs since 1952, when it first began to use exhibits as a vehicle in the less developed lands, and concluded that the purposes of this technique "were far broader than commodity sales promotion."

The instrument was, in brief, an all-purpose trade, political, and propaganda weapon.

As the foreign economic policies and programs of the Sino-Soviet bloc evolved, and especially with the increase in the U. S. S. R.'s capabilities and its greater availability of capital goods for export, trade fairs became an instrument to "normalize and expand" trade relations. In addition, they became a technique to implement the overall foreign economic policy of the bloc, and formed an integral part of an apparent coordinated program that included trade agreements, barter deals for farm surpluses, credits for the purchase of capital equipment by the less developed countries, and the establishment of resident trade representatives.

There were indications in 1955 that the commercial policy of the bloc countries at trade fairs was becoming more flexible and that they were inclined to deviate from earlier trade practices to insure the business success of their participation. In previous years there were cases where bloc exhibitors were generally unable or reluctant to provide information on prices, specifications, delivery schedules, replacement parts, local agents, and distributors. It was frequently apparent, moreover, that they were not prepared to manufacture for export many of the products that were exhibited. In 1955, however, some substantial contracts and trade agreements were concluded at trade fairs, and when it was not possible to sign commercial pacts, the foundation was laid for future negotiations. There were reports that some European satellites prepared sales plans of exportable goods so that they could take on-the-spot orders. In a number of instances, items on display were offered to the host countries either for sale or as a gift.

Propaganda continued to be one of the primary purposes behind the bloc's sprouting participation in trade fairs in 1955. Pamphlets were distributed at fairs and speeches were made by bloc officials urging the Soviet version of "peaceful coexistence," "relaxation of world tensions," "reunification of East and West Germany," and the "removal of trade embargoes." The size of the bloc's pavilions, and the number and variety of the products displayed, were designed to impress the visitors and to spread before them the technical skills and the economic strength and progress achieved under Communism; and thus enhance the attractiveness of Communism and the prestige of the bloc.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Participation

The U. S. S. R. sent major exhibits of its industrial products to 18 foreign countries in 1955, with some two-thirds of these exhibits going to countries outside the bloc. The Soviet Union participated in 11 more trade fairs in 1955 than in 1954. To the surprise of the host countries the U. S. S. R. withdrew from 11 important fairs last

year. Although no specific reasons were given, these withdrawals may have been due to Soviet reluctance to compete with the United States, which is increasing its trade fair participation, or to the unwillingness or inability of the sponsors of the fair to allocate sufficient space for the large, consolidated-type Soviet exhibit.

The Soviet Union had an impressive display at the Geneva atomsfor-peace conference during the summer. Peaceful uses of atomic energy exhibits were conspicuous features at trade fairs held in 1955.

Among the prominent trade fair developments in 1955 were the emergence of Communist China as an important exhibitor and the leading role of Czechoslovakia and Communist East Germany. The number of fairs in which Communist China participated rose from 3 in 1954 to 24 in 1955. Czechoslovakia in 1955 was the most active Soviet bloc exponent of utilizing fairs for trade promotion, participating in 30 throughout the world. Poland was also an active exhibitor. Czechoslovakia and the other bloc countries concentrated their efforts primarily on fairs held in the less developed nations where they desired to improve their economic and political relations.

Participation in international trade fairs was one of the main promotional activities of the foreign trade policy of East Germany. During 1955, East Germany exhibited at major trade fairs in 16 countries outside the Communist bloc. East German officials were loud in their statements about successful exploitation of expositions. It must be conceded that East Germany made propaganda and commercial gains. Proof of this gain was the gold medal awarded to East Germany at the Damascus Fair (Syria) for the "excellent layout of the pavilion" and the reaction of West German manufacturers who expressed regret that their government was not taking a comparable advantage of trade fair opportunities.

Some Representative Trade Fairs

The bloc exhibitions that were staged with the most fanfare in the non-Communist countries in 1955 were those in New Delhi (India) and Buenos Aires (Argentina). The Indian Industries Fair in New Delhi was held in November-December, and drew an estimated attendance of 3 million. At this fair the Soviet Union made a vigorous effort to promote the sale of its industrial equipment in what it considered a high priority market and to show what it was capable of producing. It exhibited machine tools, textile machinery, trucks, tractors, bicycles, optical goods, printing machinery, and other products. Czechoslovakia displayed a variety of engineering products and oil well drilling equipment. The bloc exhibits were visibly designed to appeal to government and business executives interested in sources of supply for their industrial expansion programs. Czechoslovak representatives claimed that \$7 million in orders were obtained. The Soviet press also reported that a number of business transactions

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 were concluded for the sale of machine tools, tractors, and drilling rigs.

The Soviet pavilion at the New Delhi exhibition occupied 2,000 square meters in addition to an open area covering 2,500 square meters. To give the display some additional atmosphere and to attract the general public, the Soviet Union introduced several noncommercial features, such as an illuminated panel of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric station, a large plant on the Volga River, then still under construction; a working model of a blast furnace similar to the unit to be erected in India by Soviet technicians as part of the wellpublicized Bhilai steel mill project; and a television camera in operation.

Twelve Czech export organizations displayed over \$2 million worth of goods, with emphasis on engineering products and aircraft, at the industrial exhibit in Bombay, India, in February. Official Indian reaction to the Czechoslovak exhibit was very favorable, according to press reports.

The size and lavishness of Soviet and other bloc country exhibits, as well as the wide publicity they received, could easily have conveyed the impression that the bloc was a major factor in India's foreign trade. But in fact, the entire bloc accounted for only 1.7 percent of India's imports and 2.1 percent of its exports in 1955.

The Buenos Aires Fair opened on May 21, and lasted 40 days. The special Soviet display, which was the first exhibit of Russian products ever presented in Latin America, consisted of a wide variety of industrial goods. Some 2.3 million persons, including large numbers of people from neighboring Latin American countries, reportedly attended the exhibit. The express purpose of the display, which occupied 20,000 square meters of space, was to acquaint the Argentine business community with Soviet industrial equipment available for import into that country. There was some indication, too, that the Argentine Government was similarly interested in stimulating confidence and interest in Soviet production machinery. In this manner, it hoped to support its own formal undertaking made in August, 1953, to encourage the import of Soviet machinery in its drive to develop several domestic industries.

The Soviet exhibit at the Zagreb Fair (Yugoslavia) which was shown following the reconciliation with the Tito Government, was planned and executed on an elaborate scale. The U. S. S. R. exhibited the best models of its heavy industrial equipment—turbogenerators, diesel engines, mining and electrical equipment, trucks, and tractors. For the benefit of the general public, the Soviet exhibitors displayed a mobile television installation.

At the Canadian International Trade Fair held in Toronto during May and June, Czechoslovakia was the only bloc country represented and was the leading foreign exhibitor, taking more than 10 percent of the 212,000 square feet rented to foreign participants. *The New*

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York Times, commenting on the Djakarta Fair (Indonesia) held in August, observed that the Czechoslovak exhibit was not only impressive but was also three times larger than the United States display.

Although Poland's activity in free world trade fairs was on a substantially smaller scale than that of Czechoslovakia, the Polish authorities effectively used the 1955 Poznan Fair (Poland) to promote trade with the free world countries. Fifteen free world and eight bloc countries participated in the fair, which took place from July 3 to July 24. The Polish exhibit was the largest, followed by that of the U. S. S. R. Polish trade fair officials claimed that the participating countries had signed trade contracts worth \$115 million.

Sparing neither money nor enterprise, East Germany was moderately successful in reestablishing the Leipzig Fair (East Germany) as the major European international exposition and as a center for trade between East and West. Each succeeding fair in Leipzig, following the resumption of the Spring and Fall expositions, attracted more exhibitors from East and West and more foreign visitors. Elaborate preparations were made for the 1956 fairs, which exposition officials hoped would set new attendance records and bring a larger number of entries, particularly from such less developed countries as India and Egypt.

It became evident in 1955 that the bloc's trade fair program was having a positive economic impact, and was contributing to, and improving the prospects of, bloc trade expansion. The trade fair device assisted the bloc in furthering and strengthening its commercial and political relations with many countries, especially with the less developed communities. As an important and useful arm of bloc diplomacy, the technique was employed as a means of attaining world influence and leadership.

The U.S. Trade Fair Program

The trade fair field was not the bloc's exclusive or even dominant preserve in 1955. The United States Government's international trade fair program, which is receiving the cooperation of private industry, is increasing both in extent and effectiveness. The purpose of the program, to quote President Eisenhower, is "to tell adequately the story of our free enterprise system and to provide effective international trade promotion cooperation."

The first fair in which the United States participated under the new Government program was the Bangkok Constitutional Fair (Thailand), held December 7–16, 1954. From the Bangkok Fair to January 1, 1956, the United States participated in 27 fairs in Asia, Europe, the Near East, and Latin America.²

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^a For additional details about this program, see the first six Quarterly Reports on the President's Emergency Fund for Participation in International Affairs, covering activities from August, 1954-December 31, 1955; and "U. S. Exhibits Win Acclaim at International Trade Fairs." Foreign Commerce Weekly, January 9, 1956.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

Marx and His Apostles

A less developed country has been defined by Dr. Eugene Staley, Senior Economist at the Stanford Research Institute, as one "characterized (1) by mass poverty which is chronic and not the result of some temporary misfortune, and (2) by obsolete methods of production and social organization, which means that the poverty is not entirely due to poor natural resources and hence could presumably be lessened by methods already proved in other countries."¹ By this definition the less developed group includes nearly all the countries of Asia and Africa, most of Latin America, and some of Europe. The total population of these less developed nations is approximately 1.6 billion, or about two-thirds of the world's population of 2.4 billion, according to Dr. Staley. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the description of the extension of "ruble diplomacy" is confined to the less developed countries of the Near East, South Asia, and Latin America.²

In his writings, Karl Marx did not give a major role to the less developed areas in his analysis and prediction of the inevitable, fateful, and mortal revolutionary conflict between capital and labor. Marx thought that this crucial struggle would take place in the mature industrial societies and that the "backward" areas only reflected the economic evolution of capitalist countries. It remained for Marx's apostles, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung, to see the immense importance of the less developed regions and to focus attention on them both in theory and in action.

Bases of Trade Drive

The Sino-Soviet bloc economic planners apparently believe that the bloc now possesses the four essential internal conditions which

¹ Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954, p. 13.

² For a more detailed account of these activities, see *Soviet Technical Assistance*, Staff Study No. 7, July 12, 1956, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs, 84th Congress, 2d session, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1956.

will enable it successfully to penetrate the vital areas of Asia, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America, where the drama of world diplomacy is now unfolding. These conditions are sufficient economic resources, cultural bases, technical personnel, and internal order and stability.

The U. S. S. R. has gradually been attaining the first condition, an adequate economic base, and at present its industrial production is exceeded only by the United States. Industrial output increased in all Communist countries in 1955, gross production in the Soviet Union rising by 12 percent, according to the United Nations World Economic Survey, 1955, and the Economic Survey of Europe in 1955, the latter report prepared by the U. N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The composition of industrial production in the U. S. S. R. showed a 16 percent increase in the output of producer goods and a 9 percent increase in that of consumer goods. Goals were exceeded for such producer goods as electrical, transport, and heavy engineering equipment, as well as oil, electric power, chemicals, and motor vehicles. The gross output of consumer goods was approximately that planned, but overfulfillments included such important items as textiles, footwear, dairy products, and vegetable oil. There were, however, deficiencies in the Soviet economy, with the production of railroad rolling stock, pig iron, sulphuric acid, and other commodities lagging behind announced goals.

Agricultural production recovered significantly in most of the bloc countries. The 1955 grain harvest in the Soviet Union as a whole was 22 percent higher than that of 1954, which was a bad crop year. Contributing to the rise in production in the Soviet bloc nations were improved weather conditions and more favorable policies toward agriculture, including substantial increases in supply of fertilizers, farm machinery, equipment and building materials, reduced taxation and delivery quotas, higher government prices for farm produce, and an increasing supply of industrial consumer goods to the rural areas.

In addition to enlarging its economic resources, the Soviet Union increased its skilled manpower supply by expanding its training of engineers and other technicians who became available for service in the less developed countries as well as for employment on the home front. With full and unhampered control over these growing resources, the U. S. S. R. can probably export machinery, raw materials, and skilled technicians in substantial quantity to the free world without undue strain on the achievement of internal economic investment targets.

Some Aspects of the Trade Push

Historically, the rulers of Russia have nurtured the hope and dream of securing a firm foothold in the Near East and South Asia. The Communist rulers are no exception. Their tactics are to exploit such domestic conditions in the less developed areas as surging nationalism

and aspirations for independence, widespread poverty and social discontent, and other factors in "the revolution of rising expectations." These problems and Communist tactics present many, complex, and formidable issues to the free world.

The broad aim of the bloc in 1955 was to extend, in the less developed countries, the areas of the Communist bloc's political, economic, and cultural influence. The ultimate aim remains the same to bring the entire world under Communist domination and control. An intensified trade offensive, reinforced by vigorous diplomacy and propaganda, was the principal feature of this 1955 campaign in the less developed nations. The process was attraction, penetration, and attempts to extend the area of bloc domination, using trade, credits, technical assistance, and trade fairs as weapons. At the same time, in an effort to sow dissension and division in the West, political tensions, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, were exploited, and various countries were urged to adopt or adhere to neutral positions.

Primary production accounts for about four-fifths of the total commodity output of the less developed countries. Rice, rubber, cotton, sugar, jute, grain, and other raw materials produced by these countries, were in surplus supply and could not be readily sold in free world markets. This situation encouraged barter with the Soviet bloc, with primary commodities from less developed areas being exchanged for Soviet bloc industrial products, including complete factories. It remains to be seen whether this pattern of exchange will be of continuing benefit to the less developed nations.

Although the quantities of commodities involved were usually small by world standards, they were important to individual countries like Burma, Egypt, and Afghanistan. Trade agreements concluded with these countries and also with India, Indonesia, and Syria called for deliveries of complete industrial units by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland. This new development in bloc trade, which could have a considerable impact on world commerce, was attributed to general Communist policy considerations, the bloc nations' growing need for primary commodities and their expanding output of capital goods, the demand of less developed countries for capital equipment, and the agricultural surpluses that were accumulating in exporting countries. These large surpluses, which caused depressed and fluctuating prices, made these countries receptive to trade overtures by the bloc. In some cases, the bloc offered to pay premium prices for the commodities the less developed countries had difficulty in selling in Western markets.

Trade Agreements and Credits

Trade and payments agreements were principally responsible for the volume and pattern of trade between the Sino-Soviet bloc and

countries outside the Communist area, as outlined in Chapter I. Of the 174 trade agreements in effect at the end of 1955, a total of 67 were between the bloc and the less developed countries in the Near East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Six of these pacts—U. S. S. R.-Burma; Czechoslovakia-Ceylon; Poland-Burma; Poland-Paraguay; and Communist China with Egypt, and Syria—were concluded during the second half of the year. During the same six-month period, Syria signed new agreements with the U. S. S. R., East Germany, and Poland; and Ceylon made an accord with Poland, all of which were to come into force in 1956. In the Near East, Egypt had the most trade agreements—7; and in South and Southeast Asia, India led with 8, followed by Indonesia with 7. The bloc countries appeared, in general, to have provided goods of acceptable quality and to have fulfilled the terms of trade contracts.

Perhaps the most dramatic aspect of bloc economic diplomacy has been its extension of the Soviet version of "economic and technical . assistance" on a substantial and increasing scale. None of the bloc assistance included grants except for small contributions to the United Nations technical assistance programs. While some credits were granted prior to 1955, the U. S. S. R. and Czechoslovakia expanded their programs materially last year, concentrating their efforts in the less developed countries. Total credits covered by agreements concluded during 1955 with such countries amounted to nearly \$600 million, the preponderant portion of which went to Yugoslavia, Egypt, Afghanistan, and India. The Soviet Union accounted for over two-thirds of the total credits, the terms of which involved interest rates as low as 22½ percent, extended repayment periods, and in some cases compensation in local currency or products.

The Soviet bloc boycotted the United Nations technical assistance programs until the summer of 1953, on the grounds that they were designed to make the less developed countries "raw material appendages" of the United States and other Western powers. On July 15, 1953, the Soviet Government announced that it would contribute 4 million rubles (equivalent to \$1 million at the official exchange rate) to the U. N. technical assistance fund. The contribution was officially pledged at the technical assistance pledging conference four months later. At this conference Poland pledged \$75,000, Byelorussia \$50,000, and the Ukraine \$125,000, while Czechoslovakia announced that it would participate in 1954.

These actions indicated that the new policy was a concerted move on the part of the entire Soviet bloc, and coincided significantly with developing bloc emphasis on trade and technical assistance to the less developed countries. The motives generally ascribed to this development included recognition by the U. S. S. R. of the adverse propaganda effects of its nonparticipation; the intention of using the United Nations for further extension of Communist influence into

less developed countries through sending Soviet technicians abroad and granting scholarships in Soviet universities; and the aim of making the less developed nations more receptive to the conclusion of trade agreements and obtaining raw materials from them.

Trade and Propaganda Themes

The bloc's efforts to penetrate the less developed areas were accompanied by honeyed declarations by Soviet Communist Party Chief Khrushchev and his associates that the bloc's relations with these countries rested on the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for the rights of small peoples, noninterference in the internal affairs of states, nonaggression, and mutual advantage. The main inducements in these protestations of friendship and common interest were expanded international economic cooperation, the prospect of a vast market in the bloc, the lure of rapid industrialization and economic development, and the attainment of national independence and social progress. Assurances were given that Soviet technical assistance programs were "disinterested," meaning businesslike with no political strings attached; while the programs of the United States were, Soviet statements declared, contingent upon support of American "aggressive militarism." These statements portrayed "capitalist firms" as trying to flood every market with their own goods in contrast to the bloc's policy of exporting to them only the products that were difficult to produce domestically. Bloc officials emphasized that their loan terms were more favorable than those of the free world countries and would not subordinate the less developed areas as would the conditions imposed by the capitalist countries.

In their trade, technical assistance, and propaganda programs, the bloc countries concentrated to some extent on "monument" or display projects (such as paving the streets of Kabul), which had a special psychological appeal to the recipient countries. The bloc also expedited the conclusion of agreements, and technicians usually arrived to start work on a project within a month or so after assistance was accepted. Technical services not only helped to promote the sales of bloc equipment but also extended and strengthened the bloc's influence. To date, evidence suggests that the recipients of bloc assistance are satisfied with the quality of work and rate of progress, and the neutral and "uncommitted" nations do not appear to view the bloc's current economic and technical aid as a serious threat to their independence.

Moves in the Near East

In 1955 the entire Sino-Soviet bloc focused its efforts on the Near East. The offensive, which has extended into North Africa, has embraced trade, military assistance, economic and technical aid, and

cultural exchanges. With a population of over 100 million, the Near East produces 20 percent of the world's output of crude oils and natural gasoline, and its proved crude petroleum reserves are about two-thirds of the world's total. It is an area in ferment and one of great and growing economic, political, and strategic importance. The unsettled political situation and the rising tide of Arab nationalism present tempting opportunities for Communist exploitation and maneuvering.

Total trade between the bloc and the Near East and Africa showed a marked rise of \$85 million in 1955, and the upward trend is expected to continue. There was a conspicuous shift in Near East trade from the free world to the bloc during 1954–55. Trade between the area and North America and Western Europe declined during this period. Difficulties in marketing major staple crops were responsible in some degree for the shift in trade patterns and the increase in barter agreements (surplus products for machinery) with the Communist world, according to the U. N. survey, *Economic Development in the Middle East*, 1954 and 1955. Unable to find profitable markets for their products in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada, the Middle East countries redirected their commerce to the bloc.

Like other Near East countries (with the exception of Israel), Turkey and Iran, both members of the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact, steadily developed trade with the bloc. Turkey's trade turnover with the bloc went up by \$60 million in 1955, a pronounced increase. Between 1953–55, Turkey's imports from the bloc countries more than trebled in percentage of its total import trade, rising from 5.5 percent to 18.3 percent. Turkey, whose exports to the bloc are uncontrolled items (mainly tobacco, cotton, feeding stuff for animals, and nuts), in 1955 shipped a total of \$68.6 million worth of goods to the bloc compared with \$55.1 million in 1954. Exports to the bloc rose from 16.5 percent of Turkey's total world exports in 1954 to 21.8 percent in 1955.

Israel demonstrated no apparent desire to reorient its trade toward the bloc, preferring to expand trade with Finland, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Syria, on the other hand, showed an eagerness to do business with the bloc, concluding a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in November calling for the delivery of Syrian cotton, dried fruits, oil-bearing seeds, tobacco, artificial silks, and other products in return for industrial machinery, farm implements, trucks, and other items.

Guns-for-Cotton

Egypt became the focal point of Sino-Soviet bloc interest and activity in 1955. The bloc was encouraged in these operations by Egyptian Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser, who stated on several occa-

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sions that Egypt would accept trade, economic aid, and technical assistance from Communist countries if it were in the national interest.

Egypt's trade with the bloc increased by almost \$59 million in 1955, the bloc purchasing about 27 percent of Egypt's total exports. During the period 1953-55, Egypt doubled its percentage of total exports to the bloc. The seven trade agreements that Egypt had concluded by the end of 1955 with the bloc countries were partly responsible for this trade expansion. Communist China shared increasingly in the enlarged trade, a development that reportedly stemmed from the talks between Premier Nasser and Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 1955.

Cotton is the mainstay of Egypt's economy. It is by far the largest source of the country's national income and foreign exchange. Traditionally, exports of raw cotton account for over 80 percent of Egypt's total exports. World cotton markets in mid-1955 were uncasy and depressed by huge surpluses, and there were fears in Cairo that cotton prices would drop lower. Taking advantage of the free world's cotton surplus and Egypt's anxieties, and determined to establish a bridgehead on the Nile, the bloc countries concluded agreements with Egypt for cotton and rice in exchange for industrial products and armaments.

In mid-July, 1955, Egypt signed a trade and payments agreement with Czechoslovakia. On August 22 a three-year trade pact was concluded with Communist China. A cotton-for-petroleum transaction was negotiated with the U. S. S. R., and in November a trade agreement was signed with East Germany. As a result of the various agreements, the bloc's share of Egyptian cotton exports which had averaged about 13 percent from 1946 to 1954, increased to 21 percent in the first half of 1955 and to 40 percent in the second half of the year. Some bloc countries allegedly paid more than world prices for Egypt's long staple cotton.

In September, Premier Nasser, who a month before had received an invitation to visit the U. S. S. R., announced that he had accepted a Soviet-sponsored deal for a reported \$100 million to \$250 million worth of Czechoslovak arms, with payment to be made in cotton. Prior to the official disclosure of the barter arrangement, which had been rumored for several weeks, Egyptian officials had declared that if their country could not obtain arms from the West, Egypt had no alternative but to accept Soviet arms offers. On October 20 the Soviet steamship *Stalingrad* arrived at Alexandria with the first consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia. The consignment consisted of 133 crates, and was believed to be the first shipment of arms from any Communist country to an Arab nation.

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Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 The "B & K" Tour of South Asia

In November and December, Premier Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev made a triumphal "goodwill" tour through India, Burma, and Afghanistan. The month-long journey, which began from Moscow on November 17, was regarded in the Soviet Union as a massive stride toward the fulfillment of the ambition of generations of Russian leaders to establish spheres of influence in South Asia. The ostensible purpose of the pilgrimage was to return the earlier visits to Moscow by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burmese Premier U Nu; but the real aim was to consolidate neutral Asian nations to offset the Western-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), through strengthening "friendship" and promoting trade. Attempts to link India, Burma, and Afghanistan commercially to the bloc, such as the agreement to construct a steel mill in Central India (see Chapter I of the Sixth Battle Act Report), preceded the visit of the two Soviet officials.

The economic highlight of the two-phase Indian tour was the joint communiqué issued on December 13, announcing the conclusion of a trade agreement calling for the purchase by India of 1 million tons of Soviet steel and various types of oil drilling, mining, and other equipment over a three-year period beginning in 1956. In return, the U. S. S. R. agreed to buy raw materials and manufactured goods in amounts equal in value to India's purchases in the Soviet Union. To provide for the expected shipments, steamship lines, using Soviet and Indian vessels, would be established between the ports of both countries. India and the U. S. S. R. agreed to exchange delegations at the earliest possible date to discuss terms and conditions and to enter into economic agreements to guarantee that the volume of trade between them would be increased to maximum levels. It was expected that the actual implementation of the trade agreement would coincide with the beginning of India's second five-year plan in April, 1956.

The "B & K" visit was the climax of Soviet efforts to cultivate India, and it yielded the U. S. S. R. considerable propaganda returns. Other developments that gained support for the Soviet Union were: the Soviet offer to share experiences in the peaceful uses of atomic power and in the construction of industrial enterprises; the arrival of shipments of equipment for the steel mill, and teams of experts; the offer of assistance in every branch of oil exploration, production, and refining; and the arrival of equipment for a 30,000-acre state farm which had been promised to Prime Minister Nehru on his visit to Moscow in June.

Total trade turnover between the Sino-Soviet bloc and South Asia and the Far East increased by about \$120 million in 1955. India's trade with the bloc increased by over \$18 million. By the end of the

year, India had eight trade agreements with the bloc, but this trade accounted for only 1.7 percent of India's imports and 2.1 percent of its exports. The bloc's trade with Indonesia, which had seven agreements, increased by about \$50 million in 1955. Ceylon's trade, however, declined by \$36 million.

Rice as a Weapon

Rice is the main crop and staple food in almost all the countries of Asia. In seeking to influence Burma, the principal Communist weapon is the purchase of rice, a commodity which Burma has in substantial surplus and has to export in quantity to remain economically stable. The rice trade accounts for 70 to 80 percent of Burma's export earnings, and government revenue depends heavily on this trade. With Burma experiencing difficulty in disposing of its rice in its traditional markets, the increasing rice purchases by the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 became the entering wedge by which the bloc countries could make the Burmese economy more dependent on them.

In 1955, Burma's trade with the bloc rose by over \$23 million (preliminary), exports to the bloc constituting 12 percent of Burma's total exports as compared with less than 1 percent during the period 1950-54. Burma in 1955 concluded five new trade agreements with bloc countries and renewed a 1954 agreement with Communist China. Rice, minerals, rubber, timber, and cotton were exchanged for industrial products and some consumer goods, under these agreements signed with the U. S. S. R., Czechoslovakia, Communist China, Communist East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The most important item was rice. Burmese rice exports increased from 1.5 million tons in 1954 to 1.7 million in 1955, of which the bloc took 23 percent. The bloc importers used the rice not only for their own consumption but also for Northern Vietnam and North Korea, and resold some to free world countries.

When Premier U Nu visited Moscow late in October, he praised the U. S. S. R. for having saved his country from economic crisis by purchasing its surplus rice, and expressed a desire to exchange rice for Soviet factories, machinery, and technicians. He had announced on February 22, 1955, that the Soviet Union would soon buy 200,000 tons of Burmese rice and would supply Burma with industrial equipment in return.

On December 7, "B & K" advanced in their "rice offensive" when they concluded an economic agreement with Burma, providing for Soviet assistance in Burma's agricultural development, major irrigation works, and the establishment of industrial plants. The U. S. S. R. also promised construction and equipment of a technological institute in Rangoon as a gift to the Burmese people. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union would be paid in Burmese rice for the agricultural

and industrial aid or accept deferred payment if there was not sufficient rice.

Rattling the Ruble

Soviet "technical aid" activities in Afghanistan have followed and have been related to the drive for expanded trade. The trade offensive would appear to be stimulated by long-range strategic interests of the U. S. S. R. rather than in any immediate advantage to be derived from imports from Afghanistan.

By mid-November, 1955, Moscow's economic wooing of Afghanistan had produced 500 Soviet technicians who were working there helping to erect oil storage tanks, grain elevators, and other capital projects, according to press reports. "Spectacular successes" were reported by news correspondents. Vigorous trade promotion efforts had pushed the bloc's share in 1955 to probably half of Afghanistan's total foreign trade. Soviet activities in the country are buttressed and supplemented by the satellites, especially Czechoslovakia, which is building a cement factory. In November there were press reports that Afghanistan was expected to accept a Czechoslovak offer of arms, following an announcement by the Afghan radio station that Afghanistan had accepted an invitation to send a military mission to Czechoslovakia to inspect the latest types of military equipment.

Premier Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev ended their tour of South Asia with a visit to Kabul, the Afghan capital. The capstone of the visit was the announcement on December 18 that the U. S. S. R. would extend to Afghanistan a \$100 million long-term credit to be used for the development of agriculture, the construction of hydroelectric stations, irrigation projects, motor repair workshops, and the reconstruction of the Kabul airport. The two countries also agreed to expand friendly political and cultural relations. During the visit the Soviet leaders presented a 100-bed hospital as a gift to Afghanistan and 15 buses to the city of Kabul. The large-scale aid was interpreted as part of a Soviet design to reinforce its position in Afghanistan and insure continued Afghan neutrality, thereby counterbalancing United States friendship with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

Ruble Rhythms in Latin America

Only three Latin American Republics—Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico—maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, although several other countries maintain relations with various of the other Soviet bloc nations. Latin American trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc in 1955 represented, as was noted on pp. 7–8, only 2 percent of that area's trade with the world. Since 1953, however, the efforts of the bloc to increase its trade with Latin America have met with some success. United States traders and businessmen do not dis-

count the significance of the bloc's commercial infiltration, with its prospects of keener economic competition as well as its usefulness to Communist parties in the area.

As the "peace offensive" developed during 1954 and 1955, Latin America felt the Soviet pressures for coexistence and for closer economic and cultural relations. No direct offers of technical assistance were extended, however.

Diligent efforts were made by the bloc in 1955 to increase the number of bilateral trade agreements with Latin American countries and to broaden their scope. At the meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) held in Bogota in August, Polish and Czechoslovak observers appealed for larger trade between Latin America and the Iron Curtain countries, and stressed the possibilities of new and stable markets for Latin America's exports.

As of December 31, 1955, there were 18 trade agreements in effect between Latin American Republics and European Soviet bloc countries. The U. S. S. R. followed in the wake of its satellites in establishing its own network of direct agreements. The 18 trade pacts, which contain liberal credit clauses, call for an exchange of approximately \$500 million worth of goods annually, an impressive figure compared with the \$200 million trade volume in 1954 and the \$70 million in 1953. In general, the Latin American exports under these agreements are restricted to a relatively few commodities: Argentina, linseed oil, hides, and meat; Brazil, coffee, cotton, cacao, and wool; Uruguay, frozen meats and wool; and Mexico, coffee. The bloc countries supply, in exchange, agricultural machinery, industrial equipment, oil, raw materials, rails, cement, and plate glass. As mentioned on p. 7, larger bloc purchases of sugar and coffee in 1955 served to increase Latin American exports to the bloc by 20 percent.

There were reports in the autumn of 1955 that the Soviet bloc countries were not fulfilling completely their trade commitments with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico, and other countries, and as a result substantial credit balances had accumulated for the Latin American countries. Unofficial estimates revealed that the gap between the promise and performance of Argentina's trade agreements with the Soviet bloc in 1954 was about 54 percent, while that of Brazil was 42 percent. Although both parties to these pacts failed to deliver according to expectations, fulfillment by the Latin American countries was generally better than that by the bloc nations. Deliveries to Argentina not only fell far short of assurances, but the quality of finished machine tools and similar products was inferior to and out of date by 5 to 15 years compared with United States goods, according to complaints.

Argentina and Uruguay were the prime targets of the bloc in its
1955 economic drive. At the end of the year, during which its trade with the bloc increased sharply, Argentina was a party to six trade agreements with the Communist countries. The most important one in effect was that signed with the U. S. S. R. on August 5, 1953, which originally provided for \$150 million in trade, plus a Soviet credit of \$30 million for the purchase of capital equipment. Under a 1955 trade protocol, the \$30 million credit was reduced to \$4 million, none of which was utilized by Argentina.

Late in 1955, the new Argentine Ambassador to Moscow declared that his country's relations with the Soviet Union would help to stabilize Argentina's trade so long as Argentina could find outlets in the vast U. S. S. R. market. He said Argentina, in turn, planned to purchase Soviet manufactured products for its industry.

In July there were unconfirmed reports that the U. S. S. R. had made tempting trade proposals to Brazil, whose finances were in a shaky condition. The offer reportedly included an initial purchase of 1,000 tons of coffee and 20,000 tons of sugar. The amount of coffee involved was negligible, amounting to one-tenth of 1 percent of Brazil's average crop. Sugar sales would be more important, however, because Brazil's high prices for sugar were pricing it out of world markets.

During the Brazilian presidential campaign in the late summer and fall of 1955, the three principal candidates stated their intentions of establishing at least commercial relations with all countries. The increasing agitation for trade and diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R. and its satellites was motivated by economic rather than political factors, with Brazil seeking new markets and satisfactory prices for its products, especially coffee.

In December, the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico visited Ecuador where he was received by the President and Foreign Minister at an official luncheon. Since the visit the Ecuadorian Government has denied published rumors that a technical aid agreement and an offer to provide Ecuador with arms were discussed.

At the close of 1955 there was growing interest throughout Latin America in widening trade with the bloc, but Communist blandishments were still viewed with cautious skepticism.

Challenge and Reaction

On January 1, 1956, Western statesmen could look back on a period during which the Sino-Soviet bloc had intensified its economic and political offensive in the uncommitted and less developed areas of the world. A new phase of the cold war had emerged, with the bloc appearing to rely not so much on military threats, political subversion, and propaganda invective as on "peaceful competitive coexistence" embracing "economic and technical aid" to the less developed nations. Free world officials had watched the evolution of Soviet policy from

the time it gave only vague impressions of support for the economic welfare of the newly developing countries, without any actual contribution toward their development, to the adoption of foreign trade as an "organic part of the Socialist economic system" and an "integral element of the Soviet foreign policy."⁸ An item in the Soviet press in July, 1955, reporting for the first time a Main Administration for Economic Relations, an autonomous organization which operates directly under the U. S. S. R. Council of Ministers and which apparently has responsibility for overall coordination and direction of Soviet economic and technical assistance policies, did not go unnoticed. The setting up of this administration may reflect the new importance the Soviet Government attaches to economic aid programs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared in a communiqué issued on December 16 after its annual meeting in Paris, that the Soviet Union's tactics in the Near East and its growing military strength offered "a new challenge to the free world." The mutual security programs of the United States are meeting this challenge by improving the economic growth and military security of our partners in the free world. The Ninth Semiannual Report on the Mutual Security Program, covering operations from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1955, said:

"Building on past progress, the United States continued to help free people throughout the world strengthen their individual and collective efforts to safeguard their independence and at the same time move ahead with effective measures for economic self-improvement. * * * Mutual security programs for joining our efforts with the efforts for economic improvement being undertaken by newly developing countries also went forward during the six-month period."⁴

³ These quotations from a Soviet foreign trade publication are published in *Soviet Technical Assistance*, op. cit., p. 4.

^{*} Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program, for the six months ended December 31, 1955, p. 1.

APPENDIX A

Text of Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act)

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APPENDIX A

Text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 [H. R. 4550], Public Law 213, 82d Congress, 65 Stat. 644, Approved October 26, 1951

AN ACT To provide for the control by the United States and cooperating foreign nations of exports to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951."

TITLE I-WAR MATERIALS

SEC. 101. The Congress of the United States, recognizing that in a world threatened by aggression the United States can best preserve and maintain peace by developing maximum national strength and by utilizing all of its resources in cooperation with other free nations, hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to apply an embargo on the shipment of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary stragetic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, in order to (1) increase the national strength of the United States and of the cooperating nations; (2) impede the ability of nations threatening the security of the United States to conduct military operations; and (3) to assist the people of the nations under the domination of foreign aggressors to reestablish their freedom.

It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that no military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an embargo on such shipments to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United

States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

This Act shall be administered in such a way as to bring about the fullest support for any resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, supported by the United States, to prevent the shipment of certain commodities to areas under the control of governments engaged in hostilities in defiance of the United Nations.

SEC. 102. Responsibility for giving effect to the purposes of this Act shall be vested in the person occupying the senior position authorized by subsection (e) of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, or in any person who may hereafter be charged with principal responsibility for the administration of the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Such person is hereinafter referred to as the "Administrator."

SEC. 103. (a) The Administrator is hereby authorized and directed to determine within thirty days after enactment of this Act after full and complete consideration of the views of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce; the Economic Cooperation Administration; and any other appropriate agencies, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, which items are, for the purpose of this Act, arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and those items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war which should be embargoed to effectuate the purposes of this Act: *Provided*, That such determinations shall be continuously adjusted to current conditions on the basis of investigation and consultation, and that all nations receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance shall be kept informed of such determinations.

(b) All military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation shall, upon the recommendation of the Administrator, be terminated forthwith if such nation after sixty days from the date of a determination under section 103 (a) knowingly permits the shipment to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, of any such item which he has determined under section 103 (a) after a full and complete investigation to be included in any of the following categories: Arms, ammunition, and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war: *Provided*, That the President after receiving the advice of the Administrator and after taking into account the contribution of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet

bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance, may direct the continuance of such assistance to a country which permits shipments of items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States: Provided further, That the President shall immediately report any determination made pursuant to the first proviso of this section with reasons therefor to the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the President shall at least once each quarter review all determinations made previously and shall report his conclusions to the foregoing committees of the House and Senate, which reports shall contain an analysis of the trade with the Soviet bloc of countries for which determinations have been made.

SEC. 104. Whenever military, economic, or financial assistance has been terminated as provided in this Act, such assistance can be resumed only upon determination by the President that adequate measures have been taken by the nation concerned to assure full compliance with the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 105. For the purposes of this Act the term "assistance" does not include activities carried on for the purpose of facilitating the procurement of materials in which the United States is deficient.

TITLE II—OTHER MATERIALS

SEC. 201. The Congress of the United States further declares it to be the policy of the United States to regulate the export of commodities other than those specified in Title I of this Act to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination, in order to strengthen the United States and other cooperating nations of the free world and to oppose and offset by nonmilitary action acts which threaten the security of the United States and the peace of the world.

SEC. 202. The United States shall negotiate with any country receiving military, economic, or financial assistance arrangements for the recipient country to undertake a program for controlling exports of items not subject to embargo under Title I of this Act, but which in the judgment of the Administrator should be controlled to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

SEC. 203. All military, economic, and financial assistance shall be terminated when the President determines that the recipient country

(1) is not effectively cooperating with the United States pursuant to this title, or (2) is failing to furnish to the United States information sufficient for the President to determine that the recipient country is effectively cooperating with the United States.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. All other nations (those not receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance) shall be invited by the President to cooperate jointly in a group or groups or on an individual basis in controlling the export of the commodities referred to in Title I and Title II of this Act to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

SEC. 302. The Administrator with regard to all titles of this Act shall—

(a) coordinate those activities of the various United States departments and agencies which are concerned with security controls over exports from other countries;

(b) make a continuing study of the administration of export control measures undertaken by foreign governments in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and shall report to the Congress from time to time but not less than once every six months recommending action where appropriate; and

(c) make available technical advice and assistance on export control procedures to any nation desiring such cooperation.

SEC. 303. The provisions of subsection (a) of section 403, of section 404, and of subsection (c) and (d) of section 406 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress) as amended, insofar as they are consistent with this Act, shall be applicable to this Act. Funds made available for the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, shall be available for carrying out this Act in such amounts as the President shall direct.

SEC. 304. In every recipient country where local currency is made available for local currency expenses of the United States in connection with assistance furnished by the United States, the local currency administrative and operating expenses incurred in the administration of this Act shall be charged to such local currency funds to the extent available.

SEC. 305. Subsection (d) of section 117 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Public Law 472, Eightieth Congress), as amended, and subsection (a) of section 1302 of the Third Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951 (Public Law 45, Eighty-second Congress), are repealed.

APPENDIX B

Trade Controls of Free World Countries

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Trade Controls of Free World Countries

This appendix summarizes the national trade control measures of the countries cooperating with one another in the multilateral control system. Descriptions of the trade controls of other friendly countries have been contained in similar appendices to previous MDAC reports, and, since their control procedures have in most cases not undergone substantial revision, they are not repeated in this appendix.

As indicated in previous reports, much of the detailed information on security trade controls has a security classification. Thus these descriptions must, in a public report, be presented in somewhat general terms. The descriptions are concerned primarily with the basic export license and customs control procedures originally established for directing foreign trade to particular currency areas, for conserving goods in short supply, and for other economic or financial reasons. Security trade controls have been generally exercised through these basic procedures, supplemented, to increase their effectiveness, by import certificate-delivery verification (IC/DV) procedures, shipping controls, transit trade controls, and transaction or financial controls. The descriptions which follow describe the main features of these national control systems as they stood June 30, 1956. The countries are arranged in alphabetical order.

BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG

License Requirements

The basic legislation from which the present import-export control system in Belgium has developed was a law of June 30, 1931, modified by the law of July 30, 1934, which authorized in broad general terms the regulation of Belgium's foreign commerce to promote the general economic well-being of the country. The convention with the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on May 23, 1935, amending the economic union convention of 1922, established also a combined Belgo-Luxembourg Administrative Commission (the Commission Administrative Mixte Belgo-Luxembourgeoise) and in this way provided a central agency for coordinating the import and export licensing procedures of Belgium and Luxembourg. Pursuant to the 1935 convention, when the appropriate agency of either government desires to modify or expand regulations pertaining to import and export controls, the recommendation is discussed with the approriate agencies of the other government; their agreement having been reached, the new policies are communicated to the Mixed Commission which then trans-

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mits identical instructions to the Belgian Central Office of Licenses and Quotas and the Luxembourg Office of Licenses. This procedure insures close coordination of the import and export licensing operations of the two governments in order that the general economic welfare of both may best be served.

A royal decree dated January 17, 1955, provides that the import and export of all merchandise is subject to licensing control. However, the Ministers can, within the limits of their authority, suspend this measure as to certain merchandise designated by them. They can also limit this suspension to merchandise coming from or destined to countries which they determine.

The control over exports effected by the requirement of export licenses is reinforced by special controls applied at the time of the actual export of the licensed merchandise. Submission to these special controls is required as a previous condition to the obtaining of certain licenses, these special additional controls being applied by reason of the special nature of the merchandise to be exported or to assure the direct delivery of the merchandise to its foreign destination.

Applicants for export licenses must make a declaration that they are familiar with the conditions upon which licenses are issued and the regulations relative to exchange controls, and that they accept these conditions and regulations without reserve. The applicant also acknowledges that the licenses are not transferable and that any irregularity in his application or utilization of the license subjects him to possible refusals of any new export license applications and may expose him to prosecution for a criminal offense. Exporters of products whose final destination is controlled must sign an undertaking that their exports are not to be reexported. In such cases, the exporter renounces his right to obtain any subsequent export licenses in all cases for which nonreexport declarations are required, if the present undertaking is evaded.

Transit Controls

The royal decree of January 17, 1955, referred to above, authorizes the Minister of Economic Affairs to impose a transit licensing requirement for certain items coming from or going to countries he may designate. A second decree of the same date by the Minister of Economic Affairs requires the production of a Belgian transit license, or a transit authorization certificate (TAC) issued by certain countries, for the shipment through Belgium in transit of items named in the decree coming from the countries participating in the TAC scheme and destined for any of the Soviet bloc countries. Luxembourg issued similar decrees January 20 and February 1, 1955.

Financial Controls

Prior authorization is required for all buying and selling transactions abroad by Belgian and Luxembourg residents. The exchange control is carried out by the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute.

Shipping Controls

Belgium has taken action to prevent the carrying of strategic goods in Belgian ships to Communist Chinese and North Korean destinations.

CANADA

Authority for the control of exports in Canada is derived from the Export and Import Permits Act, an act of Parliament, which came into effect on June 1, 1954.

Permit Requirements

The Canadian approach to export control is based on two lists: (i) The Export Control List of strategic commodities for which export permits are required for practically all commercial exports to any destination, except the United States,

and (ii) the Area Control List of countries, the shipment to which of any goods requires an export permit. The Area Control List comprises all Communist countries plus Hong Kong, Macao, and Indochina. General export permits are in effect which enable shipments of a list of nonstrategic items to Hong Kong; shipments of casual gift parcels of trivial value to Communist countries; shipments to Canadian diplomatic missions; etc.

Transaction Controls

Under the act, Canada has also enacted a form of transaction control whereby it becomes an offense for a resident of Canada to knowingly cause or assist any shipment of strategic goods to be made from Canada or any other place, to Communist countries.

Transit Controls

New regulations were made effective January 16, 1955, respecting transit shipments. These regulations stipulate that no person shall transship or cause or assist in the transshipment of or accept for transshipment to a country included in the Area Control List any goods included in the Export Control List, unless a transit authorization certificate covering such goods and issued by the exporting country, or by the country of residence of the exporter, has been presented to and endorsed by a Canadian collector of customs or, in the absence of such certificate, approval for the transshipment has been given by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, or by a person authorized by him to do so.

An export permit is required for all goods originating outside Canada when tendered for export in the same condition as when imported, without further processing or manufacture in Canada. Goods in transit in bond on a through journey on a billing originating outside of Canada, clearly indicating the ultimate destination of the goods to a third country, do not require a Canadian export permit. Foreign goods passing through Canada to a third country without a through bill of lading require a Canadian export permit. (If such goods represent United States shipments of controlled goods passing through Canada to third countries, they must be covered by a United States export permit.) All Canadian goods having an undeclared ultimate destination require export permits. Shipments of United States goods through Canada must be accompanied by a copy of the United States export declaration form.

Export controls are administered by the Export and Import Permits Section of the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce.

DENMARK

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for all commodities, except certain agricultural products, if the goods are exported to or intended for end use in countries which are not members of the European Payments Union or are within the dollar area. For the goods enumerated in the below-mentioned Commodity Lists A and B,

export licenses are required, irrespective of the country of destination.

List A of the Danish export regulations consists of items of strategic significance. For most of these items the licensing authority is the Board of Supply, but the Ministry of Justice controls exports of arms, munitions, military equipment, and machinery for the production thereof. For the exportation of ships, the Board of Supply must obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation.

List B consists of nonstrategic goods. Export licenses for these are issued by the Board of Supply, the Board of Health, the Ministry of Public Works, or the National Bank of Denmark according to the nature of the commodity concerned.

Denmark applies import certificate-delivery verification procedures.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 Exchange Controls

The National Bank of Denmark exercises strict controls over all transactions in foreign exchange. Earnings in foreign currencies must be repatriated and sold to the bank unless special exceptions are made.

Transit Controls

The export controls apply to merchandise exported from the Copenhagen free port, including exports from transit or bonded warehouses and goods from free port or private warehouses. They also apply to goods in transit through Denmark, unless these are transiting on a through bill of lading and there is no change in ultimate destination. In addition, Denmark has adopted the TAC scheme. These control measures thus prevent unauthorized diversion of embargo goods in transit through Denmark.

All transit transactions financed by Denmark are subject to control by the national bank, regardless of whether the goods in question actually pass through Denmark or are forwarded directly between the countries of origin and destination. In its administration of these provisions the bank observes the same rules as the export control authorities with which the bank cooperates closely in this field.

Shipping Controls

An arrangement has been made by the Danish Government with Danish shipping companies to prevent the carrying in Danish vessels of strategic goods to Communist China and North Korea. This arrangement is implemented through a licensing system operated under a voluntary agreement with Danish shipowners.

FRANCE

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for over one-half the commodities identified in the French tariff nomenclature. Governmental authority for this control is contained in various decrees, the latest dated November 30, 1944. These decrees also permit addition to or removal from the list of controlled commodities merely by publication of a notice in the *Journal Officiel*.

Applications for license to export, as submitted by French exporters, are examined by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, by the Office des Changes (where monetary and financial factors are given consideration), and on occasion by appropriate technical committee and personnel in other agencies. At the time the application for export license is submitted, the exporter may be instructed by the Ministry of Industry and Energy to submit a sample, photograph, blueprint, drawing, or other detailed description of the commodity in question. These data are used in determining the advisability of issuing the export license requested. At the port of exit, random samples of actual exports are extracted by customs officials and these are compared by competent technicians with the original data submitted with the license application. This procedure is designed to assure in as many instances as practical that the commodity exported is identical with the commodity for which the export license is issued.

In the event fraudulent action on the part of the exporter is found and can be legally established, the exporter is subject to confiscation of the goods in question and fines ranging upward to four times the value of the shipment plus penal servitude. The control system in operation in France makes it possible to block or encourage exports to any destination of commodities requiring export licenses.

Transit Controls

On December 30, 1954, and January 12, 1955, the French Government published new regulations effective respectively on the 1st and 15th of January, 1955, con-

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cerning the regulation of imports, exports, and reexports of a certain number of products which enter France under transit status. In essence, these regulations state that the products affected cannot be diverted to certain specified countries (which comprise the Soviet bloc) if their exportation begins in countries participating in the transit authorization certificate scheme unless the country of export so authorizes the change in destination.

Financial Controls

All transactions in foreign exchange engaged in by French residents, particularly those in which a French resident takes title to foreign merchandise, require the prior authorization of the French Government.

An "exchange commitment" (guaranteeing the return to the government of the exchange proceeds of a transaction) is required for all exports and reexports of merchandise to which a French resident holds title. Where the products concerned are subject to export license, the export license suffices for the exchange commitment.

Shipping Controls

In order to avoid the transport on French vessels of strategic commodities to Communist China, the French Government has reached agreement with the only French shipping firm operating on the China run that the latter will not transport commodities of any description to Communist China unless these are covered by export license or permit indicating Communist China as the destination and issued by the French Government or a friendly foreign government maintaining the same level of controls as concerns strategic items to China as is maintained in France.

The French Government has also instituted controls to deny bunkering facilities to vessels transporting strategic commodities to Communist China.

GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) AND WESTERN BERLIN

License Requirements

No commodity can be exported from the Federal Republic of Germany or West Berlin unless it is covered by an export declaration (Ausfuhrerklaerung) which is issued by the interior customs authorities. However, certain types of exports require a special export declaration (Sonder-Ausfuhrerklaerung) which is granted by the same customs authorities only after a certificate of approval (Lieferungsgenehmigung) has been obtained, as appropriate, from the Bundesamt fuer gewerbliche Wirtschaft (Federal Office for Industrial Economy) or the Zentrale Genehmigungstelle (Central Licensing Agency) of the West Berlin Senate. A certificate of approval is required for the following:

(a) Exports to all countries in the free world of all commodities on the German "restricted list" in excess of DM1,000 (ball and roller bearings are excluded from this procedure and therefore require a certificate of approval regardless of the value of the shipment).

(b) All exports to the European Soviet bloc except certain nonstrategic commodity groups, i. c., foodstuffs, certain types of textiles and consumer goods and "Small Value Shipments" (DM1,000 or less) of commodities of minor strategic importance.

(c) All exports to Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Macao except certain non-strategic commodity groups (See b).

The German "restricted list," which is similar to but smaller than the United States "positive list," comprises commodities under control for security and short-supply reasons and includes all items covered by Title I and Title II of the MDAC Act.

Exports to numerous Western countries, including peripheral countries, are subject to one form or another of end-use checks. Import certificate-delivery verification procedures have been in operation since July, 1951.

In conjunction with the issuance of either the export control document or the special export control document, the interior customs authorities observe a definite procedure for physical inspection of commodities being exported. Additional control over commodities being exported from the Federal Republic is exercised by the border customs authorities.

Financial Controls

All triangular transactions between residents of Western Germany and West Berlin and residents of other areas are subject to either a general or a specific transit trade permit (Allgemeine or Einzel Transit Handels Genehmigung) issued by the foreign trade banks. A specific transit trade permit is needed for all transactions where the final destination of the goods is in a Soviet bloc country. Before the granting of a transit trade permit, the transaction in question is not only screened with respect to the currency problems but also in regard to the strategic nature of the goods. The latter screening is done by export control officials who have the power to prevent the transaction.

Transit Controls

Certain items are prohibited for intransit shipments on the grounds of health and sanitation, but the number of items so prohibited is very small and the prohibited list has not been changed since 1939. German customs officials may inspect transit shipments at the border and remove any items prohibited under German law. They then seal the containers of all other goods and such goods are permitted to proceed, in accordance with international agreement on transit traffic, without further inspection or restriction, except to insure at the exit border that the original customs seals remained unbroken.

Effective January 15, 1955, the Federal Government implemented the transit authorization certificate scheme (TAC). Under this procedure, transit shipments of listed strategic commodities originating in a COCOM country which are unloaded in the Federal Republic and destined for the Soviet bloc, but are not accompanied by a transit authorization certificate, will be detained pending proper clearance by the exporting country. The same procedure will be followed for strategic transit shipments which originated in a non-participating country, but where the principal of the transaction is a resident of a COCOM country.

On January 1, 1956, the TAC scheme was extended to include also exports from certain non-COCOM countries.

Intransit shipments arriving in the free port of Hamburg are subject to a customs documentary and physical check before being allowed to enter the free port. When in the free port, such shipments are under the control of the free port authorities, and may be loaded, unloaded, or reloaded only with their approval. The destination of intransit shipments arriving in the free port of Hamburg traveling under a "through bill of lading" can only be changed upon instructions of the original shipper, while the destination of intransit goods traveling under an "ordinary bill of lading" can be determined by the responsible local forwarding agent.

Intransit shipments consigned to West German firms and remaining in the free port of Hamburg for shipment to a consignee outside Western Germany, require an intransit trade permit (Transit Handelsgenchmigung), except when the goods are returned to country of origin. Such intransit trade permits are issued by the State Central Banks after careful scrutiny of the West German firm and in accordance with the same regulations applying to shipments of West German origin, and approval by the West German Central Export Control Office

West German firms must be listed in the official trade register in order to qualify for an intransit trade permit.

A similar procedure is enforced in the free ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, with the exception that the functions within the free port are carried out by federal customs authorities rather than free port authorities. This procedure also applies to Cuxhaven, Emden, and Kiel, which are free ports of very minor importance.

GREECE

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for all strategic commodities and for certain nonstrategic commodities for which export quotas have been established. For nonstrategic shipments, licenses are issued by the Bank of Greece in accordance with directives from the Greek Foreign Trade Administration, Ministry of Commerce. For strategic shipments, including those to the Soviet bloc countries, licenses must be obtained from the Foreign Trade Administration. In the case of countries with which Greece has bilateral trade agreements (which includes the Soviet bloc countries), such licenses are limited to the quantities specified in the respective agreements.

Transit Controls

Transit shipments of strategic commodities must be licensed by the Foreign Trade Administration prior to being reexported.

Financial Controls

Foreign exchange proceeds must be surrendered to the Bank of Greece.

Shipping Controls

Effective March 17, 1953, the Greek Government prohibited Greek-flag vessels from calling at Communist ports in China and North Korea. This was accomplished by the Greek Council of Ministers Act No. 204 of March 17, which was enacted into law by the Greek Parliament on May 7. Violators are punishable under the provisions of law No. 2317 of 1953, published in Greek Government Gazette No. 61 dated March 17.

The Greek foreign investment law (No. 2687 of 1953) provides that foreign vessels transferred to the Greek flag may only be resold to countries named in the instrument of approval executed at the time of the transfer of the vessel to Greek registry. So far, such instruments have not included Soviet bloc countries. With only minor exceptions, the sale to other countries of Greek-flag ships not covered by an instrument under law 2687 requires the prior approval of the Greek Government.

Ship repairs are subject to export licensing under the procedures covering transit shipments.

Current bunkering controls require licensing by the Bank of Greece with respect to payment in foreign exchange for the value of fuel and by customs authorities for removal from customs precincts.

ITALY

License Requirements

All commodities listed in the new *Tabella Esport* (the Italian export list) dated March 29, 1956, require an export license to all destinations, except Somaliland, which is issued by the Ministry of Forcign Trade. All items internationally accepted for embargo or quantitative control are included in the *Tabella Esport*.

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Goods not listed in the *Tabella* are exempt from license, but must be exported in conformity with exchange regulations, which vary according to the country of destination and clearing or other financial agreements.

All exports to Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany require an export license, while licensing of exports for other Soviet bloc countries is covered by special regulations for each country. Export and import licenses for trade with Communist China and Eastern Germany are presently granted only to SPEI, a special entity under the Government agency ARAR, appointed to administer this and which acts as agent for firms wishing to trade with these countries.

Exports to the Soviet bloc also require bank validations, as virtually all trade with the Soviet bloc is conducted under bilateral agreements which specify the commodities that may be traded and the methods by which payment is to be made. Normally, shipments to the East comprise only those commodities specified in a trade agreement with an eastern country. In order to facilitate checking of eastbound shipments, trade with the Soviet bloc is funnelled through selected frontier customs points.

The formulation of export control policy and the administration of the export licensing system are the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This Ministry is advised by a special interministerial committee.

Italy is employing import certificate-delivery verification procedures and carries out end-use checks for shipments to destinations outside the Soviet bloc, particularly for questionable transactions involving goods of a strategic nature. The country of origin is notified if an attempt is made to divert a shipment.

Financial Controls

Financial control over all export transactions is maintained through the licensing system and through implementation of existing exchange control regulations.

Strict bilateral trade agreements with almost all members of the Soviet bloc have constituted, in effect, a financial ceiling on exports to Eastern Europe. Trade with Communist China under a unilateral compensation arrangement is conducted in sterling or Swiss france. Italian exchange control regulations would not normally permit payment for imports from the Soviet bloc in hard currencies, although sterling is occasionally used in payment for the few items not included in the trade agreements. In certain instances ship charters are completed for sterling when circumstances warrant or it is considered convenient.

Transit Controls

In order to implement the international TAC agreement on transit controls, instructions were issued to Italian customs offices on January 2, 1955, to the effect that foreign commodities in transit through Italy, in order to be considered in direct transit, must be covered by commercial or freight documents showing ultimate destination of the commodities to a specific foreign country, which destination should be clearly noted in the origin of the shipment. For embargo items directed to the Soviet bloc, this requirement may be met by the presentation of a transit authorization certificate. If a shipment of this kind arrives at an exit customs point without the proper documentation to establish that it is in direct transit, customs is required to hold the commodities in storage until its status can be clarified. These regulations should, in conformity with COCOM agreements, effectively close the loophole previously caused by the lack of control over shipments in direct transit.

In the case of indirect transit shipments, a check is also made on the regularity of the transaction from the foreign currency standpoint. Operators contemplating indirect transit operations must submit an application to the appropriate

agency (Bank of Italy, directly or through authorized bank; or Ministry of Foreign Trade, General Directorate for Currencies) when any item listed in part A of the *Tabella Esport* (which includes all strategic items except International List III) is purchased abroad. To allow a certain flexibility, a transit operator may purchase the goods abroad and have them shipped to Italy before making application to the Ministry of Foreign Trade; however, in this case he must submit to the bank which holds his currency account a written commitment that the goods will be sent directly to Italy and not diverted. He must also obtain the clearance of the General Directorate for Currencies before the goods can be onforwarded through Italy to another country.

The routing of both direct and indirect transit shipments is kept under surveillance to ascertain that it is natural and normal and to avoid routing that may facilitate diversion.

Shipping Controls

The Ministry of Merchant Marine has drafted a bill which, when enacted into law, will give the Italian Government the power to exercise control over shipping traffic with countries of the Soviet bloe. The bill contemplates quite severe penalties to be imposed upon owners and masters of ships failing to comply with regulations established by the Ministry of Merchant Marine. Consideration of this bill by Parliament has been delayed for more than two years, however, and there seems to be no immediate prospect that it will be enacted into law.

Penalties

Penalties that may be imposed under Italian law for violations of exportcontrol regulations include (1) imprisonment up to 3 months, (2) fines up to 40,000 lire, and (3) confiscation of the merchandise involved. These penalties have on occasion been supplemented by fines as high as 50 million lire (\$80,000) for crimes committed in connection with false customs declarations or currency violations in export transactions. Persons and firms under investigation for illegal export transactions are denied foreign trading privileges.

Irregularities under the customs law may be punished by fines from 2,000 to 20,000 lire, while other infractions may incur the penalties contemplated by the penal code.

JAPAN

License Requirements

Licenses from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry are required for exports of any commodity on the Japanese export control list. No exports to North Korea have been permitted since the outbreak of the Korean War. Exports to Communist China are limited to nonstrategic items. Exports of strategic items to any other Communist bloc country are strictly controlled.

End-use checks are made also on suspicious exports of strategic items, and the import certificate-delivery verification procedure has been utilized since April 1, 1953.

Transit Controls

Intransit cargo is offloaded under customs supervision and is normally kept in a bonded warchouse or other area under the complete control of customs officials.

Japan applies transit authorization certificate procedures to certain offloaded intransit cargo destined for the Soviet bloc exported from any country cooperating in the TAC scheme, or which was exported from any country if the principal in the transaction is a resident of a COCOM country.

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Financial Controls

For balance-of-payments reasons, Japan closely controls its receipts and expenditures of foreign exchange. These controls are not related to security measures except indirectly in connection with trade with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Trade with these areas is largely confined to barter transactions.

Shipping and Bunkering Controls

Japanese shipowners have been notified that Japanese vessels are not authorized to carry strategic goods to Communist China from Japan or from any other country unless shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country.

Administrative measures also have been adopted to prevent foreigners from chartering or using Japanese vessels to carry contraband goods to Communist China or North Korea. The Ministry of Transportation has announced that applications for approval of a bareboat or time charter of a Japanese vessel to a foreigner must show that the charterer has guaranteed that during the period of the charter the vessel will not enter any port in Communist China or North Korea with strategic goods on board the vessel unless the shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry furthermore has instructed Japanese oil companies not to furnish fuel bunkers to any vessel carrying strategic goods to Communist China or North Korea unless the shipment has been licensed by a COCOM country.

THE NETHERLANDS

License Requirements

All exports from the Netherlands are subject to export controls.

However, general licenses are granted for transactions involving most industrial products and for transactions of less than \$250 (U. S.) involving items appearing on the international control lists, provided these transactions are with either OEEC or dollar area countries. Under these general licenses, an exporter completes and submits a declaration to the customs, which can then approve the transaction without prior reference to the licensing authorities.

Individual licenses are required for all other export transactions. Export licenses for industrial products are issued by the "Centrale Dienst voor Inen Vitvoer" (Central Import and Export Office) in The Hague. With respect to the approval of applications for export licenses in cases involving strategic goods, the IC/DV system is applied extensively. In cases involving the export of strategic goods to countries not participating in the IC/DV system, the final destination is often checked before the export license is granted. Furthermore, the exporter is, in most cases, afterwards obliged to prove that the goods exported by him have been imported into the country mentioned in the export license as the country of final destination. Finally, when a shipment leaves the country, the customs authorities have the right to satisfy themselves that the goods to be exported are identical with the description given in the export license, and that the direction in which the shipment is being sent is not incompatible with the final destination mentioned in the license.

Financial Controls

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All financial transactions by Netherlands residents involving payments to or received from a party abroad are subject to foreign exchange licenses. Through the means of these licenses, it is possible to control triangular transactions in which a Netherlands resident is involved as a middle man. Within the framework of these controls, the IC/DV system is also applied.

Shipping Controls

Voyage controls have been instituted which are aimed at preventing the carriage of certain strategic commodities by Netherlands ships to the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam except pursuant to special permission.

Transit Controls

Pursuant to royal decree regarding the transit control of strategic commodities, strategic goods sent from specifically mentioned countries or shipped on the behalf of resident of some of these countries, which after unloading pass in transit through the Netherlands, are subject to control over their destination.

NORWAY

License Requirements

All commodities to be exported to any destination require export licenses. The licensing authorities using existing powers can prevent the export of any item for security reasons.

Norway applies import certificate-delivery verification procedures.

Transit Controls

Goods which are to pass through the territory of Norway may be reexported without license only if it is clearly stated by their conveying documents that the goods are going straight to the foreign destination. If the reexport does not take place within 90 days, a Norwegian export license must be secured. The destination listed on the original documents must remain the same, and the goods may not be transformed in any way during their stay in the country. The customs authority applies a control to that effect. An export license is required for all commodities in transit to a Soviet bloc country even though the reexport takes place within 90 days. There are no free port areas in Norway.

Financial Controls

Strict exchange controls are maintained by the government through the Bank of Norway. The granting of an export license carries with it the obligation on the part of the exporter to relinquish the foreign exchange to the Bank of Norway as soon as received from the foreign buyer; a maximum of 60 days is allowed between export and remittance, although under certain circumstances the government may grant the exporter an extension of time. Transfers of capital from Norway require the prior approval of the Bank of Norway.

Shipping Controls

The Norwegian Foreign Office announced publicly in April, 1953, that the Norwegian war risk insurance group had refused to insure Norwegian vessels delivering strategic articles to Communist Chinese and North Korean ports. The Foreign Office also announced that Norwegian ships had not violated the United Nations Resolution of May 18, 1951, prohibiting the shipment of strategic material to Communist China and North Korea. Several allegations that they had done so had been investigated and found to be unjustified.

PORTUGAL

License Requirements

Exports to all foreign destinations are subject to individual export licensing. Exports to the Portuguese overseas provinces are free of licensing except in the case of a few items. Licenses for strategic materials are granted only after assurance has been obtained as to the effective destination of the merchandise. Licenses are not approved for exports of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

Import and export licensing activities are exercised by the Division of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Economy and by delegated other agencies. The financial aspects of trade control are coordinated with the Ministry of Finance through the Bank of Portugal. In recent years, Portuguese exports to the Soviet bloc as a whole, consisting almost entirely of cork and its products, have substantially exceeded imports, resulting in a net exchange balance to Portugal.

The Portuguese overseas provinces exercise varying degrees of trade and exchange control.

Transit Controls

Portuguese controls over goods in transit have been under study for some time and are expected to be amended to establish additional safeguards against undesirable diversions of strategic commodities.

Shipping Controls

Portugal does not exercise voyage licensing, but Portuguese vessels plying between Europe and Macao have been instructed not to accept cargo for Macao unless it is covered by a Macao import certificate. There have been no Portuguese flag shipping services to Soviet bloc ports in recent years.

TURKEY

License Requirements

Export licenses are required for most of the important export commodities, including all goods considered to be of a strategic nature. The goods which are subject to export licenses appear on List II attached to the Turkish foreign trade regulations issued in September, 1953. For the goods appearing on that list, export licenses are required for shipments to all destinations; the licenses are issued by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, with the exception of some agricultural commodities for which authority to grant export licenses has been delegated to other organizations. Goods not appearing on List II may be exported upon the presentation of a customs exit declaration which is based on the exporter's application. All exports are subject to strict foreign exchange regulations.

Turkey applies import certificate-delivery verification procedures with respect to the shipment of strategic commodities.

Transit Controls

Goods which are to pass through the territory of Turkey may be reexported without license only if all shipping documents (including bill of lading and ship's manifest) and outer containers carry the name of the Turkish port of transit, the phrase "in transit to" and the name of the city and country of destination. Goods entered in transit may be reexported without further control; however, the government reserves the right to inspect transit shipments in cases of suspicion of irregularity. The reexport of goods covered by "in transit" bills of lading, without an export license, is contingent on proof that the goods were not purchased with foreign exchange made available by Turkish authorities.

The reexportation of all foreign goods cleared through Turkish customs is subject to the authorization of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.

The Turkish Government is authorized by law to establish free zones in Turkish ports, but thus far no such free zone has been established.

Turkey has established transit authorization certificate procedures.

Financial Controls

Strict exchange controls are maintained by the government through the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. Turkish exporters are required to sell

to a bank in Turkey the foreign exchange proceeds of exports within 3 months from the date of exportation and within 15 days of the date of receipt of the foreign exchange by the exporters. Foreign exchange may be sold to persons and firms in Turkey only by banks, against permits issued by the Ministry of Finance. All payments in foreign exchange, from funds available abroad to persons and firms in Turkey, are subject to the authorization of the Ministry of Finance. Other capital transactions involving foreign exchange, by persons and firms in Turkey, are also subject to the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.

UNITED KINGDOM

License Requirements

The export control system in the United Kingdom is similar to but not identical with that of the United States. It is administered by the Board of Trade. Although the present system grew out of measures originally promulgated at the start of World War II, its primary purpose now is the safeguarding of the country's requirements of strategic and short-supply goods, and the restriction of the flow of such items to undesirable destinations. The United Kingdom security trade control program was instituted in 1947.

The United Kingdom export control mechanism operates in the following manner:

Export control orders which detail the items subject to control are published documents, and revisions are issued in the *Board of Trade Journal* (an official weekly). The current orders provide that (1) all goods are controlled to China, Macao, North Vietnam, Tibet, and North Korea, (2) certain specified goods are controlled to all destinations, and (3) certain other specified goods are controlled to all destinations other than the British Commonwealth, the Irish Republic, and the United States of America.

The extent of the restriction on individual items is reflected in the administration of the control. Strict control is maintained over items which are prohibited exportation to certain areas, as, for instance, aircraft, firearms, ammunition, atomic materials. The exportation of a wide range of goods of strategic importance, including rubber, to Communist China is prohibited, as is the exportation to the Soviet bloc in Europe of a somewhat narrower range of commodities. The export to the Soviet bloc of many other items is subject to limitations as to quantities permitted to be shipped. In addition, there is the great bulk of items on which control is achieved through case-by-case scrutiny of individual license applications.

The United Kingdom has effectively implemented import certificate-delivery verification procedures.

Transit Controls

The United Kingdom has had in effect since November, 1951, a system whereby certain items arriving from other countries are subject to transshipment control. Individual licenses are required for all of the items on the licensing list before any of the goods, after being landed in the United Kingdom, can be transshipped to any destination other than the British Commonwealth, Ireland, and the United States. The present control is operated over all goods embargoed to the Soviet bloc. In administering the control, the British authorities normally grant licenses when they are satisfied that the goods will not be diverted to the Soviet bloc, China, etc., contrary to the wishes of the exporting country.

The United Kingdom also cooperates fully in the implementation of the TAC scheme.

Transaction Controls

As one of the reinforcement measures to strengthen security controls agreed when the Soviet bloc embargo list was reviewed in 1954, the United Kingdom introduced a control on merchanting transactions operative from January 7, 1955. This control prohibits the disposal by persons in, or ordinarily resident in, the United Kingdom of specified strategic goods which are situated outside the United Kingdom to any authority of, or person in, the Soviet bloc, China, Tibet, North Vietnam, or North Korea, or to any other person if the person disposing of the goods has reasonable cause to believe that the goods will be imported directly or indirectly into the Soviet bloc, China, Tibet, North Vietnam, or North Korea. The goods covered by the control are those which are subject to embargo for Soviet bloc countries.

Shipping Controls

In order to restrict further the flow of strategic goods to China and as an additional measure of control, a statutory order (titled the Control of Trade by Sea (China and North Korea) Order, 1953) was made on March 13, 1953, pursuant to which the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation is empowered to control all shipping to China and North Korea. In essence, the order applies to all British ships having a gross tonnage of 500 tons, limits the type of trade in which the ships may engage and the voyages which may be undertaken, affects the class of cargo or passengers which may be carried, and imposes certain conditions on the hiring of ships. Approximately 100 items are listed in a schedule which is an integral part of the license issued under the order in question. These items are banned from carriage to China in British-flag vessels.

While formal shipping controls were not adopted until March 17, 1953, British shipping circles were kept under fairly close scrutiny by the government ever since the adoption on May 18, 1951, by the Additional Measures Committee of the United Nations, of the resolution to apply economic sanctions against China as a result of her aggressive intervention in Korea.

Complementary controls over the bunkering of vessels carrying strategic cargo (as defined in the Shipping Control Order) to China were adopted at the same time that the order affecting shipping became operative. These controls are administered by the Ministry of Fuel and Power on an informal basis, in cooperation with British oil companies which deny bunkers to ships carrying strategic cargo to China.

UNITED STATES

Export Controls in General

The Department of Commerce is responsible for controls over nearly all commercial exportations from the United States under the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended.

The Department of State is responsible for control over the exportation of arms, ammunition, and implements of war; the Atomic Energy Commission administers controls over the export of major atomic energy items; and the Department of Treasury administers controls over the exportation of gold and narcotics.

Administration of Export Controls by Commerce Department

The export control regulations administered by the Department of Commerce are contained in the Comprehensive Export Schedule published annually by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce (BFC) of the Department of Commerce. Changes in these regulations are published once or twice a month in Current Export Bulletins by BFC. These publications must be consulted to determine the ap-

plicable requirements for an exportation of any given commodity to a specific destination.

In accordance with the export control regulations, all commercial exports from the United States, except to Canada, are controlled by the Department of Commerce either through the issuance of a validated export license or the establishment of a general license permitting such shipments.

A validated export license is a formal document issued to an exporter by the Department of Commerce which authorizes exportation within specific limitations. Validated licenses are required for shipments of commodities identified in the Positive List of Controlled Commodities to virtually all destinations. This list is maintained on a current basis in the Comprehensive Export Schedule.

A general license is a broad authorization issued by the Department of Commerce which permits exportation under certain circumstances without the requirement of a formal export control document. The authority to export and the conditions under which each general license may be used are specified in the Comprehensive Export Schedule.

In addition to the validated license requirements for commodities on the Positive List, a validated export license is required for the shipment of any commodity to the following destinations:

(1) Communist China, North Korea, Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam and of Laos, and the maritime provinces of the U. S. S. R.;

(2) Macao;

(3) Hong Kong, except certain specified commodities which may be shipped under General License GHK; and

(4) The European Soviet bloc, with the exception of certain specified commodities which, since April 26, 1956, may be shipped to these areas under General License GLSA.

Export controls as administered by the Department of Commerce are, in accordance with the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended, maintained (a) for short supply or (b) for security reasons. Both export control policies reflect appropriately established United States foreign policy and international responsibilities. Major policy changes and activities of the Department of Commerce in carrying out its export control activities are reported in Quarterly Reports under the Export Control Act made by the Secretary of Commerce to the President and the Congress.

The objective of security controls is to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national security. The controls were designed to deny or restrict the exportation of strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc in order to impede the buildup and maintenance of the Soviet war potential. Shipments of all commodities to Communist China and North Korea are embargoed while shipments to other Soviet bloc destinations are either denied or restricted. In addition, all proposed shipments of strategic commodities to all destinations, except Canada, are carefully scrutinized to assure that the goods will not be transshipped or diverted to unfriendly hands. The Commerce Department has developed procedures to prevent the frustration of our own export controls which would result from shipping a strategic item to a country which (1) ships identical or closely similar items to the Soviet bloc, or (2) would use the American item directly in the manufacture of strategic items for the Soviet bloc.

In order to prevent the transshipment abroad of United States commodities, the Department of Commerce also has regulations covering the unauthorized movement of United States commodities after they leave United States shores. These regulations, generally referred to as the "destination control" provisions, are designed to prohibit the reexportation from the country of ultimate destination except upon written authorization from BFC. These regulations also restrict

ships, planes or other carriers from delivering United States origin goods to other than the destination specified on the export control documents. In addition, the United States participates in the international IC/DV (import certificate/ delivery verification) system.

In addition to United States export controls for security reasons, it is necessary to administer export controls for short supply reasons in order to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal demand. Such controls are usually exercised by means of export programs or quotas fixed by the Secretary of Commerce. The easing of supply programs has led to the lifting of nearly all domestic controls over materials; such actions have generally been followed by the relaxation of related export controls for short supply reasons. Thus, export controls for short supply reasons do not play as important a part as before in comparison with security controls.

Transit Controls

A validated export license is required for the exportation from any scaport, land frontier, airport, or forcign trade zone in the United States of certain strategic goods in transit through the United States which originate in and are destined to a foreign country. The commodities so controlled are the ones which are identified on the United States Department of Commerce Positive List by the letter "C". In addition, any commodities in transit through the United States for Soviet bloc destinations require a validated export license. These procedures are used to implement United States participation in the TAC scheme.

Shipping Controls

Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-1 denies any United Statesregistered vessel or aircraft authority to carry items listed on the Positive List, or arms, ammunition, and implements of war, or fissionable material, to any Soviet bloc destination, Hong Kong, or Macao without a validated license issued by BFC or other appropriate licensing agencies or the express permission of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation. This order includes shipments from foreign ports as well as from the United States.

Department of Commerce Transportation Order T-2 prohibits the transportation of any commodities directly or indirectly to Communist China, North Korea or areas under their control, by United States-registered vessels or aircraft. It also prohibits American ships and aircraft from calling at any port or place in Communist China.

A validated license is required for delivery in United States ports of specified types of petroleum and petroleum products to foreign vessels, if the foreign carrier has called at any point under Far Eastern Communist control or at Macao during the 180 days preceding the date on which such commodities are to be laden aboard the vessel, or will carry commodities of any origin from the United States destined directly or indirectly for any such point within a period of 120 days in the case of a vessel, or 30 days in the case of any aircraft. This regulation also requires that if a carrier is registered in or under charter to a Soviet bloc country or is under charter to a national of a Soviet bloc country it will be necessary to apply to BFC for a validated license.

American petroleum companies at certain foreign ports are prohibited without a Treasury Department authorization from bunkering any vessel bound for a Communist Far East port or Macao or which is carrying goods destined for Communist China or North Korea. Similar restrictions apply to the bunkering of these companies of vessels returning from Communist Far East ports or Macao.

Financial and Transaction Controls

The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, administered by the Treasury Department, block the assets here of Communist China, North Korea and their national and prohibit unlicensed dealings involving property in which Communist China, or North Korea, or their nationals, have any interest. The regulations prevent the use of United States financial facilities by those countries and their nationals. These regulations also prohibit the unlicensed importation of goods of Chinese Communist or North Korean origin.

Treasury regulations also prohibit Americans, including foreign subsidiaries of United States firms, from participating in the purchase or sale of certain important commodities for ultimate shipment from any country outside the United States to the countries of the Soviet bloc. Attempts to do the prohibited acts are also covered. These transactions controls, which are complementary to the United States export control laws, are administered by the Treasury Department under Foreign Assets Control Regulations.

APPENDIX C

Presidential Determinations Made During 1955

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APPENDIX C

Presidential Determinations Made During 1955

On April 1, 1955, the following letter was sent to the six Congressional Committees named in the Battle Act. At the same time, public notification of this determination was made through press release 344.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., April 1, 1955.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President on March 31, 1955, determined, pursuant to Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 that United States aid be continued to France, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom because the cessation of such aid would be clearly detrimental to the security interests of the United States. The President, in his letter to me directing that aid be continued, has also directed that, in compliance with the reporting requirement of Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, I inform you of his determination, to which purpose this letter, with attachments, is sent.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. STASSEN, Director of Foreign Operations.

The following letter dated March 29, 1955, which recommended to the President the continuance of aid to France, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was attached to the above transmittal.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., March 29, 1955.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is my duty to report herewith certain additional shipments of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc from countries receiving United States assistance, and to recommend that you continue this assistance to the countries involved since in each case the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States.

The countries involved are France, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. On the advice of Vice Admiral Walter S. DeLany, my Deputy Director for Mutual Defense Assistance Control; concurred in by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury; I recommend that you make a Determination to continue aid to these countries pursuant to Section 103 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act).

Section 103 (b) forbids all military, economic, and financial assistance to a country that knowingly permits the shipment of items listed for embargo under the Act, except that the President "may direct the continuance of such assistance to a country which permits shipments of items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States."

All of the shipments reported in this letter were "prior commitments"—made prior to January 25, 1952, the effective date of the Battle Act embargo provisions. The prior commitment problem has been fully discussed in communications to the Congress on a number of occasions. Most of the original prior commitments have been removed from the books, either by deliveries or by cancellation of certain shipments. The remaining amount is still scheduled for shipment. Although the Battle Act list revisions of August 25, 1954, have resulted in the removal of some of these items from the control lists, the addition of new items to the lists may also result in the creation of new "prior commitments" with respect to certain previously uncontrolled items.

As a result of the recent reappraisal of commodities within the U. S. Government and by the 15 governments, including the U. S., which cooperate in security trade controls, some of the items in this letter have been determined no longer to require embargo treatment, but since they were still on the Battle Act embargo list at the time of the shipments, they must be dealt with here along with items whose embargo status was unaffected by the August 25 revisions.

My recommendation that aid be continued in the present cases does not grow out of the recent revisions of the security trade control program. The circumstances of these cases are very similar to previous cases wherein a determination that aid be continued was made. All of the shipments reported herein went to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. None of them was arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials. Following is a summary of the shipments which were permitted and which have not been covered by any previous Presidential Determination with respect to these four countries.

FRANCE

The following Battle Act embargo items have been shipped from France to Poland: boring, drilling, and milling machines valued at \$494,878; stainless steel tanks valued at \$91,786; and \$254 worth of nickel products. All of these shipments were part of the French backlog of prior commitments.

ITALY

Prior-commitment items worth \$43,419 have been shipped from Italy as follows: To Poland: \$26,649 worth of rolling mill parts.

To Czechoslovakia: \$16,770 worth of bearings of types and sizes listed as embargo items under the Battle Act.

THE NETHERLANDS

Molybdenum wire, tungsten wire and tungsten wire filaments, of a total value of \$81,981, have been shipped from The Netherlands to Poland.

These shipments were made under a 1947 agreement between a Dutch firm and the Polish Government, with the approval of The Netherlands Government, providing for the Dutch firm to deliver certain electrical products intended to be used as component parts for light bulbs and radio tubes.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 THE UNITED KINGDOM

Additional United Kingdom prior-commitment items valued at \$1,686,247 have been shipped to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria as follows:

To Poland: \$654,438 worth of metal-working machinery and electrical and electronic equipment; \$1,008,873 worth of locomotive equipment and spare parts; and 59 gallons of lubricating oils valued at \$41.

To Czechoslovakia: \$16,407 worth of radio relay equipment, electronic valves and wire.

To Hungary: \$5,334 worth of locomotive equipment and spare parts.

To Bulgaria: \$1,154 worth of locomotive equipment and spare parts.

The above-mentioned locomotive equipment and spare parts shipments were made during a period of thirteen months. This equipment, though previously included on the Battle Act Title I List, Category B, is now covered by the Title II List.

These countries have for almost five years cooperated closely in controlling strategic shipments to the Soviet bloc. The fact that each country makes an important contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the fact that U. S. aid to these countries is largely military aid, enabling these countries to meet their NATO obligations and enhancing the security of the free world, including the U. S., leads to the conclusion that the U. S., in its own security interest, should not terminate aid.

Respectfully yours,

HAROLD E. STASSEN, Director of Foreign Operations.

On June 30, 1955, the following letter was sent to the six Congressional Committees named in the Battle Act. At the same time, public notification of this determination was made through press release 397.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., June 30, 1955.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President on June 28, 1955, determined, pursuant to Section 103 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 that United States aid be continued to France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom because the cessation of such aid would be clearly detrimental to the security interests of the United States. The President, in his letter to me directing that aid be continued, has also directed that, in compliance with the reporting requirement of Section 103 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, I inform you of his determination, to which purpose this letter, with attachments, is sent.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. STASSEN, Director of Foreign Operations.

The following letter, dated June 28, 1955, which recommended to the President the continuance of aid to France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, was attached to the above transmittal.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., June 28, 1955.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is my duty to report herewith certain additional shipments of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc from countries receiving United States assistance, and to recommend that you continue this assistance to the countries involved since in each case the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States.

The countries involved are France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. On the advice of Vice Admiral Walter S. DeLany, my Deputy Director for Mutual Defense Assistance Control, concurred in by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Treasury, I recommend that you make a Determination to continue aid to these countries pursuant to Section 103 (b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act).

Section 103 (b) forbids all military, economic, and financial assistance to a country that knowingly permits the shipment of items listed for embargo under the Act, except that the President "may direct the continuance of such assistance to a country which permits shipments of items other than arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States."

With the exception of a small quantity of items to service certain non-strategic equipment previously shipped to a bloc country, all of the shipments reported in this letter were "prior commitments"—made prior to either January 25, 1952, the effective date of the Battle Act embargo provisions or August 25, 1954, the date of revision of the lists. The prior commitment problem has been fully discussed in communications to the Congress on a number of occasions. Most of the original prior commitments have been removed from the books, either by deliveries or by cancellation of certain shipments. The remaining amount is still scheduled for shipment. The August list revision resulted in the removal from the control lists of some of these items which fall outside of certain specifications. The addition of new items to the lists have resulted in the creation of new "prior commitments" with respect to certain previously uncontrolled items.

My recommendation that aid be continued in the present cases does not grow out of the recent revisions of the security trade control program. The circumstances of these cases are very similar to previous cases wherein a determination that aid be continued was made. None of the cases involved shipments of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials. Following is a summary of the shipments which were permitted and which have not been covered by any previous Presidential Determination with respect to these four countries:

FRANCE

Prior-commitment items worth \$180,087 have been shipped by France as follows:

To Poland: \$179,680 worth of boring machines, gas liquifying and petroleum equipment, automotive parts, and tires.

To Czechoslovakia: \$407 worth of tires.

ITALY

Italy shipped to Poland, as a prior commitment, \$124,000 worth of mercury.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Federal Republic shipped to Poland as a prior commitment, one measuring instrument valued at \$400.

UNITED KINGDOM

Prior commitment items worth \$298,325 were shipped by the United Kingdom as follows:

To Poland: \$227,556 worth of mercury and vacuum pump equipment.

To Hungary: \$66,759 worth of magnets.

To the USSR: \$4,010 worth of scientific equipment.

In addition to the prior commitments reported above, the United Kingdom shipped \$443 worth of bearings, lubricants and valves to Communist China for the servicing of non-embargo equipment previously supplied. These shipments were made by the United Kingdom after prior consultation in CHINCOM, the international committee for the control of strategic trade with Communist China, in which the U. S. participates.

These countries have for over five years cooperated closely in controlling strategic shipments to the Soviet bloc. The fact that each country makes an important contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the fact that U. S. aid to these countries is largely military aid, enabling these countries to meet their NATO obligations and enhancing the security of the free world, including the U. S., leads to the conclusion that the U. S., in its own security interest, should not terminate aid.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

HAROLD E. STABSEN, Director of Foreign Operations.

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APPENDIX D

Trade and/or Payments Agreements in Effect Between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World During 1955

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APPENDIX D

Trade and/or Payments Agreements in Effect Between the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World During 1955

I. USSR

Austria	Outshaw 17, 1055, Outshaw 10, 1000
	October 17, 1955–October 16, 1960
Belgium	February 18, 1948—Indefinite
Denmark	July 1, 1946–June 30, 1948 (Annual tacit
•	renewal)
Finland	January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955
France	1. July 1, 1954–December 31, 1955
	2. (September 1955) Supplement
Greece	July 28, 1955–December 31, 1956
Iceland	July 1, 1954–December 31, 1955
Italy	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Netherlands	July 2, 1948—Indefinite
Norway	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Sweden	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Switzerland	April 1, 1948Indefinite
Yugoslavia	1. January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
	2. (July 30, 1955) Supplement
	3. (October 1955) Supplement
Argentina	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Uruguay	*July 28, 1954–July 27, 1956
Afghanistan	July 1, 1955-June 30, 1956
Burma	July 1, 1955–June 30, 1958
$\operatorname{Egypt}_{$	March 27, 1955-March 26, 1956
India	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Iran	April 1, 1955–March 31, 1956
Israel	February 18, 1954-Indefinite (Pay-
	ments)
Lebanon	September 11, 1955–September 10, 1956
II. ALBANIA	
Italy	October 1, 1955–September 30, 1956
Yugoslavia	May 17, 1955–December 31, 1955
III. BULGARIA	
Austria	November 1, 1955–October 31, 1956
Belgium	(April 21, 1947)-April 20, 1948 (Annual
	tacit renewal)
	course a child to way

Data underlined indicate first postwar agreement,

Data in parentheses indicate date of signature.

Data not in parentheses indicate period during which agreement is in force.

Data preceded by (*) indicate that agreement is not government-to-government.

III. BULGARIA—Continued

III, BULGARIA—Continued	
Denmark	January 28, 1948–January 27, 1949 (Annual tacit renewal)
Finland	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
France	July 28, 1955–July 27, 1956
W. Germany	April 1, 1955–March 31, 1956
Greece	January 1, 1954–December 31, 1954
T . 1	(Annual tacit renewal)
Italy	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Netherlands	June 15, 1947-May 31, 1948 (Annual
	tacit renewal)
Norway	(December 2, 1955)-May 31, 1957
Sweden	April 1, 1955-March 31, 1956
Switzerland	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Turkey	March 10, 1955-March 10, 1956
United Kingdom	(September 23, 1955)-December 31, 1957
Yugoslavia	April 1, 1955–March 31, 1956
$\mathbf{Egypt}_{$	April 6, 1950–April 6, 1951 (Annual tacit
1	renewal)
India	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Indonesia	(December 14, 1954)—one year
Israel	December 20, 1954–December 31, 1955
IV. CZECHOSLOVAKIA	
Austria	January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955
Belgium	April 1, 1955–March 31, 1956
Denmark	June 1 1055 Mar 21 1056
Finland	June 1, 1955–May 31, 1956
	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
France	July 1, 1955-June 30, 1956
W. Germany	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Greece	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Iceland	September 1, 1955–August 31, 1956
Italy	July 2, 1947–December 31, 1947 (Annual tacit renewal)
Netherlands	February 1, 1955–January 31, 1956
Norway	January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955
Sweden	August 1, 1955–October 31, 1956
Switzerland	April 21, 1955–December 31, 1956
Turkey	July 1, 1949–June 30, 1950 (Annual tacit
	renewal)
United Kingdom	August 19, 1949-August 18, 1953; ex- tended to August 18, 1956 (Payments)
Yugoslavia	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Argentina	February 11, 1955–February 10, 1956
Brazil	May 17, 1955-May 16, 1956
Mexico	November 9, 1949-December 31, 1954;
	extended to December 31, 1955 (Annual tacit renewal)
Paraguay	* <u>November 15, 1953-November 14, 1954</u> (Annual tacit renewal)
Uruguay	
Afghanistan	(September 12, 1955)—three years
Burma	(August 22, 1954)—one year
	1. February 14, 1955–January 31, 1958
Ceylon	2. (May 26, 1955) Supplement (December 16, 1955) - one year (Trade)
····	(December 16, 1955)—one year (Trade)

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IV, CZECHOSLOVAKIA-Continued

South and the state of the stat	
Egypt	July 19, 1955–July 31, 1956 🔹 🔹
India	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
Indonesia	July 15, 1955–July 14, 1956
Iran	1955
Lebanon	November 20, 1954–November 19, 1955
Sudan	May 20, 1955—Indefinite (Payments)
Syria	March 27, 1953-March 26, 1954 (Annual
	tacit renewal)

*January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 *February 1, 1955–January 31, 1956

V. EAST GERMANY

ST GERMANY
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
W. Germany
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Netherlands
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Norway
Sweden
Turkey
Yugoslavia
Argentina
Colombia
Uruguay
Burma
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Lebanon
Sudan

VI. HUNGARY

HU	NGARY	
	Austria	September 1, 1955–August 31, 1956
	Belgium	February 1, 1955–January 31, 1956
	Denmark	March 1, 1955–February 29, 1956
	Finland 1.	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
	2.	(July 18, 1955) Supplement
	France	June 1, 1954-May 31, 1955; extended to
		December 31, 1955
	W. Germany	July 1, 1955–June 30, 1956 (Trade)
		January 1, 1954–December 31, 1954;
		extended to January 31, 1956 (Payments)
	Greece	June 5, 1954–June 4, 1955
	Iceland	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
	Italy	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
	Netherlands	January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955
	Norway	February 1, 1955–April 30, 1956
	Sweden	October 1, 1955–September 30, 1956
	Switzerland	October 1, 1955–September 30, 1956
	Turkey	June 1, 1949-May 31, 1950 (Annual tacit
		renewal)
	United Kingdom	September 1, 1954–August 31, 1955

January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 *March 1, 1955-February 29, 1956 . *January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 *January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 *(September 8, 1954)-December 31, 1955 *January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 *July 1, 1954-June 30, 1955; extended to December 31, 1955 *January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 *January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 *May 1, 1955-June 30, 1956 (August 25, 1954)-June 30, 1955 *January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 *February 14, 1955-March 31, 1956 *June 29, 1954-June 28, 1955 February 27, 1955-January 31, 1958 November 10, 1955-December 31, 1956 October 16, 1954-October 15, 1955 *June 9, 1954-December 31, 1955 (November 12, 1955)—Five years June 10, 1955-December 31, 1956 (Payments)

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 VI. HUNGARY-Continued January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 • Yugoslavia Argentina September 8, 1953-September 7, 1956 Brazil April 26, 1954-April 25, 1955 Paraguay_____ November 1, 1953-October 31, 1954 (Annual tacit renewal) Burma · February 21, 1955–February 20, 1956 India...... 1. June 17, 1954-December 31, 1955 2. March 10, 1955-December 31, 1955 (Supplement) Indonesia_____ July 1, 1955-June 30, 1956 Iran_____ (June 4, 1955)-One year Israel February 26, 1955-February 25, 1956 Sudan_____ May 20, 1955-May 19, 1956 (Payments) VII. POLAND Austria April 1, 1955-March 31, 1956 Belgium_____ January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 Denmark January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 Finland January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 France..... 1. December 1, 1954-November 30, 1955 (Trade) 2. January 1, 1955-Indefinite (Payments) W. Germany January 1, 1955-June 30, 1956 Greece_____ January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 Iceland..... January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 Italy_____ July 1, 1950-Indefinite Netherlands_____ August 1, 1955-July 31, 1956 Norway_____ May 1, 1955-April 30, 1956 Sweden_____ May 1, 1955-April 30, 1956 Switzerland_____ July 1, 1949–June 30, 1954 (Annual tacit renewal) July 1, 1948-June 30, 1949 (Annual tacit Turkey_____ renewal) United Kingdom (November 11, 1954)—three years Yugoslavia January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 Argentina January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 April 1, 1955-April 1, 1956 Brazil_____ Paraguay_____ *(November 23, 1955)—One year Uruguay_____ *April 24, 1953-April 23, 1954 (Annual tacit renewal) November 1, 1955-October 31, 1958 Burma Egypt April 1, 1955-March 31, 1956 India January 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 Indonesia_____ May 1, 1955-April 30, 1956 Israel.... July 1, 1954-June 30, 1955 Sudan May 20, 1955-May 19, 1956 (Payments) VIII. RUMANIA Austria April 1, 1955-March 31, 1956 Belgium_____ September 3, 1948-September 2, 1949 (Annual tacit renewal) Denmark_____ April 1, 1954-March 31, 1956 Finland..... January 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 January 1, 1955-December 31, 1957 France_____

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VIII. RUMANIA-Continued

VIII. RUMANIA—Continued	
W. Germany	*January
Greece	July 1,
Iceland	April 13
. Italy	January
Norway	June 1,
Sweden	April 1,
Switzerland	August
DWIGZCHIMA	tacit
Turkey	April 18
Yugoslavia	April 1,
	July 2
Argentina	tacit
Egypt	January
	nual
India	\mathbf{March}
	nual
Indonesia	July 1,
Israel	Septem
IX. COMMUNIST CHINA	
Burma	Deceml
Ceylon	Januar
Egypt	(Augus
India	Octobe
Indonesia	August
	(Noven
Syria	May 1
Finland	intay 1
X. NORTH VIETNAM	(Octob
France	

y 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 1955–June 30, 1955 3, 1954–December 31, 1955 y 1, 1955–December 31, 1955 1955-May 31, 1956 1955-March 31, 1956 1, 1953-July 31, 1954 (Annual renewal) 5, 1955–April 14, 1956 , 1955–March 31, 1956 25, 1951-July 24, 1952 (Annual renewal) y 18, 1954-January 17, 1955 (Antacit renewal) 23, 1954-December 31, 1954 (Antacit Renewal) 1955–June 30, 1956 nber 9, 1954–December 31, 1955 ber 29, 1955-December 28, 1956 y 1, 1955-December 31, 1955 st 22, 1955)-Three years er 14, 1954-October 13, 1956 t 1, 1955-July 31, 1956 mber 30, 1955)—One year I, 1955–April 30, 1956

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(October 14, 1955)-One year

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APPENDIX E

Statistical Tables

APPENDIX E

Statistical Tables

- TABLE 1. Trade of free world with the Sino-Soviet bloc, annually1947-55 and semiannually, 1952-55.
- TABLE 2. Trade of free world and COCOM countries with the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1947-55.
- TABLE 3A. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1938.
 - B. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1938.
 - c. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1948.
 - D. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1948.
 - E. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1952.
 - F. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1952.
 - G. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1953.
 - н. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1953.
 - I. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1954.
 - J. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1954.
 - K. Exports of principal free world countries to the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1955.
 - L. Imports of principal free world countries from the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1955.
- TABLE 4A. United States trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc, 1938, 1948, 1952, 1954 and 1955.
 - B. United States exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc, by principal commodities, 1948, 1952, 1954 and 1955.
 - c. United States imports from the Sino-Soviet bloc, by principal commodities, 1948, 1952, 1954 and 1955.
- TABLE 5.A Free world exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc, by principal commodity groups, 1952-54.
 - B. Free world imports from the Sino-Soviet bloc, by principal commodity groups, 1952-54.

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GENERAL NOTE.—Unless otherwise noted, the Sino-Soviet bloc comprises the following: Soviet European satellites, which include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Zone of Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania; U. S. S. R. including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; Outer Mongolia; North Korea, beginning 1951; and China for which data since 1949 refer (as far as possible) to mainland China, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet. No data are available on trade with North Vietnam.

SOURCE FOR ALL TABLES: International Economic Analysis Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce

TABLE 1.--TRADE OF FREE WORLD WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, ANNUALLY 1947-55 AND SEMIANNUALLY 1952-55

[In millions of United States dollars]

Period covered	Total Sino-So- viet bloc		Euro- pean satellites	U.S.S.R.	Commu- nist China
		Fre	e world exp	ports	·
Year 1947	- 1,968.5 - 1,666.7 - 1,544.8 - 1,688.5 - 1,438.2 - 1,388.8 - 1,764.2 2,032.7	$\begin{array}{c} 1, 333.5\\ 1, 434.2\\ 1, 342.6\\ 1, 092.7\\ 1, 242.3\\ 1, 165.7\\ 1, 101.4\\ 1, 470.2\\ 1, 719.6\\ \end{array}$	856, 5 900, 7 914, 2 791, 6 854, 8 682, 4 677, 9 896, 7 1, 148, 9	$\begin{array}{r} 477.\ 0\\ 533.\ 5\\ 428.\ 4\\ 301.\ 1\\ 387.\ 5\\ 483.\ 3\\ 423.\ 5\\ 573.\ 5\\ 570.\ 7\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 672.\ 2\\ 534.\ 3\\ 324.\ 1\\ 452.\ 1\\ 446.\ 2\\ 272.\ 5\\ 287.\ 4\\ 294.\ 0\\ 313.\ 1\end{array}$
Second half	707.7	611.0 554.7	344. 2 338. 2	266. 8 216. 5	119.5 153.0
First half Second half	747.8	472.8 628.6	314, 8 363, 1	158.0 265.5	168, 2 119, 2
First half Second half 1955:	872.7	754, 1 716, 1	417.4 479.3	336. 7 236. 8	1 37. 4 156. 6
First half Second half (preliminary)	938, 0 1, 094, 7	791. 8 927. 8	549.3 599.6	242.5 328.2	146. 2 166. 9
		Free	world imp	orts	
Year 1947 Year 1948 Year 1949 Year 1950 Year 1951 Year 1952 Year 1953 Year 1954 Year 1954 Year 1954 Second half 1953: First half Second half	1, 796. 8 1, 727. 0 1, 883. 0 1, 633. 9 1, 631. 1 1, 835. 6 2, 428. 7 1845. 9 1788. 0 1756. 0	$\begin{array}{c} 1,006,8\\ 1,519,7\\ 1,370,6\\ 1,192,3\\ 1,358,1\\ 1,262,9\\ 1,189,7\\ 1,453,2\\ 1,926,4\\ 672,4\\ 590,5\\ 525,8\\ 663,0\end{array}$	732.9 1,026.0 1,089.9 940.0 967.5 794.6 807.9 952.7 1,282.6 399.9 394.7 380.2	273.9 493.7 280.7 252.3 390.6 468.3 381.8 500.5 643.8 272.5 195.8 145.6	417.9 488.3 426.2 534.7 524.7 367.9 432.7 375.4 492.7 172.9 195.0 226.3
First half	¹ 875, 1 1 806, 3	663.9 627.0	427.7 433.7	236, 2 193, 3	206, 4
Second nalf 1955: First half	1 1, 029. 3	826.2	519.0	307.2	175.4 200.0
Second half (preliminary)	¹ 1, 095. 2 ¹ 1, 333. 5	851.2 1, 075.2	595.7 686.9	255, 5 388, 3	240. 4 252. 3

¹ Outer Mongolia and North Korea are included in total Soviet bloc, but not in geographic areas. Values for the years 1951-55, in millions of dollars, are: 0.2, 3.1, 8.7, 7.0 and 9.6.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 2.—TRADE OF FREE WORLD AND COCOM COUNTRIES WITH THE SINO-Soviet Bloc, 1947-55

[In millions of United States dollars]

		Expo	rts to b	loc		-	Import	s from	bloc	
Trade by year with	Free world	All CO count	COM tries	Euro COC cour	pean OM atries	Free world	All CO count		Europ COC(count	эм
Trace by your most	Total value	Value	Per- cent of total value	Value	Per- cent of total value	Total value	Value	Per- cent of total value	Value	Per- cent of total value
SINO-SOVIET BLOC										
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1951 1952 1953 1953 1954 1955 (preliminary)	$\begin{array}{c} 2,005.7\\ 1,968.5\\ 1,666.7\\ 1,544.8\\ 1,688.5\\ 1,438.2\\ 1,388.8\\ 1,764.2\\ 2,032.7 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{1, 268. 5} \\ \textbf{940. 8} \\ \textbf{772. 2} \\ \textbf{636. 2} \\ \textbf{543. 0} \\ \textbf{545. 5} \\ \textbf{613. 2} \\ \textbf{835. 4} \\ \textbf{984. 7} \end{array}$	63. 2 47. 8 46. 3 41. 2 32. 2 37. 9 44. 2 47. 4 48. 4	494. 2 487. 8 597. 9 537. 2 533. 5 543. 0 606. 4 799. 2 926. 3	43.7	1, 424. 7 2, 008. 0 1, 796. 8 1, 727. 0 1, 883. 0 1, 633. 9 1, 631. 1 1, 835. 6 12, 428. 7	686. 4 1, 014. 5 959. 6 997. 9 1 965. 0 1 785. 7 1 832. 8 1 957. 2 1 1, 294. 4	48.2 50.5 53.4 57.8 51.2 47.9 50.5 51.8 63.2	448. 3 744. 0 736. 7 716. 8 822. 5 691. 8 743. 3 1 853. 7 1 1, 132. 1	81.5 87.1 41.0 43.7 42.3 45.6 46.5 46.6
EUROPEAN SOVIET										80 0
BLOC 1947 1948 1949 1949 1950 1950 1952 1953 1954 1954 1954 1955 (preliminary)	1, 333. 5 1, 434. 2 1, 342. 6 1, 092. 7 1, 242. 3 1, 165. 7 1, 101. 4 1, 470. 2 1, 719. 6	785.8 576.1 644.8 533.4 511.9 519.8 542.5 758.5 883.8	58.9 40.2 48.0 48.8 41.2 44.6 49.3 51.6 51.4	410. 2 429. 7 569. 9 502. 4 508. 5 517. 9 540. 2 741. 5 855. 0	\$0.8 \$0.0 42.4 46.0 40.9 44.4 49.0 50.4 49.7	1,006.8 1,519.7 1,370.6 1,192.3 1,358.1 1,262.9 1,189.7 1,453.2 1,926.4	504. 4 809. 8 790. 6 732. 0 752. 1 695. 1 684. 0 823. 4 1, 092. 0	50.1 53.3 57.7 61.4 55.4 55.0 57.5 56.7 56.7	$\begin{array}{c} 390.\ 3\\ 688.\ 3\\ 700.\ 1\\ 641.\ 6\\ 679.\ 7\\ 645.\ 1\\ 634.\ 6\\ 769.\ 6\\ 1,\ 023.\ 3\end{array}$	88.8 45.3 51.1 53.8 50.0 51.1 53.3 53.0 53.1
EUROPEAN SATEL- LITES										
1947	914. 2 791. 6 854. 8 682. 4 677. 9	538. 2 447. 8 506. 5 437. 5 382. 9 335. 5 383. 4 531. 6 643. 1	62.8 49.7 55.2 55.3 44.8 49.2 56.6 59.3 56.0	$\begin{array}{c} 316.7\\ 333.9\\ 445.7\\ 407.9\\ 379.6\\ 333.8\\ 381.1\\ 519.8\\ 619.3 \end{array}$	\$7.0 \$7.0 48.8 51.5 44.4 48.9 56.2 58.0 53.9	732. 9 1, 026. 0 1, 089. 9 940. 0 967. 5 794. 6 807. 9 952. 7 1, 282. 6	$\begin{array}{c} 338.\ 4\\ 484.\ 5\\ 610.\ 7\\ 546.\ 4\\ 468.\ 8\\ 396.\ 2\\ 443.\ 1\\ 520.\ 7\\ 691.\ 9\end{array}$	46. 2 47. 2 56. 0 58. 1 48. 5 49. 9 54. 8 54. 7 53. 9	$\begin{array}{c} 303.6\\ 452.5\\ 562.2\\ 495.1\\ 424.4\\ 365.9\\ 407.5\\ 481.6\\ 643.8\end{array}$	41. 4 44. 1 51. 6 52. 7 43. 9 46. 0 50. 4 50. 5 50. 8
U. S. S. R. 1947	533.5 428.4 301.1 387.5 483.3 423.5	247.6 128.3 138.3 95.9 129.0 184.3 159.1 226.9 240.7	51.9 24.0 32.3 31.8 33.5 38.1 57.6 59.6 42.2	$\begin{array}{c} 93.5\\ 95.8\\ 124.2\\ 94.5\\ 128.9\\ 184.1\\ 159.1\\ 221.7\\ 235.7\end{array}$	19.6 18.0 29.0 81.4 33.8 88.1 37.6 38.7 41.3	273.9 493.7 280.7 252.3 390.6 468.3 381.8 500.5 643.8	$\begin{array}{c} 166.\ 0\\ 325.\ 3\\ 179.\ 9\\ 185.\ 6\\ 283.\ 3\\ 298.\ 9\\ 240.\ 9\\ 302.\ 7\\ 400.\ 1\end{array}$	60.6 65.9 64.1 73.6 72.5 63.8 63.1 60.5 62.1	86. 7 235. 8 137. 9 146. 5 255. 3 279. 2 227. 1 287. 9 379. 5	\$1.7 47.8 49.1 58.1 65.4 59.6 59.5 57.5 58.9
COMMUNIST CHINA										100
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1953 1954 1954 1955 (preliminary)	- 534.3 - 324.1 - 452.1 - 452.1 - 272.5 - 287.4 - 294.0	127.4 102.8 31.1 25.7 70.7 76.9	71.8 68.3 39.3 22.7 7.0 9.4 24.6 26.2 32.2	66.2	10.9 8.6 7.7 5.6 9.2 23.0 19.6	367.9 432.7 375.4	$\begin{array}{c} 182.0\\ 204.7\\ 169.0\\ 265.9\\ 212.7\\ 87.5\\ 140.1\\ 126.8\\ 192.8\end{array}$	43.6 41.9 39.7 49.7 40.5 23.8 32.4 33.8 39.0	58.0 55.7 36.6 75.2 142.8 46.7 108.7 84.1 108.7	13.9 11.4 8.6 14.1 27.2 12.7 25.1 22.4 22.0

Nore.-COCOM countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and United States.

¹ See footnote 1, table 1.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 3A.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1938

[NOTE.—These data are not comparable with those for later years for many reasons. Most important are the lack of information about trade with that part of Germany known today as the Soviet Zone and lack of uniform definitions for "China." No adjustments have been made in original data except as indi-cated below. Dollar values are unadjusted for price changes.] [In millions of United States dollars]

	[III III].		ited States	donars			
Exports to	World		no-Seviet loc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.1	China
Exporting country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of exports to world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	3, 094. 4 837. 5	186.3 9.0	6.0 1.1	134.6 6.2	61.3 4.2	73. 3 2. 0	² 51. 7 2. 8
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	9, 287. 4	836.9	9.0	749.6	524.9	224.7	87.3
Austria. Belgium Luxembourg. Penmark. France. Germany 4. Greece. Iceland. Ireland. Italy and Trieste. Netherlands. Norway Portugal. Switzerland. Turkey. United Kingdom. OTHER EUROPE Finland.	(*) 732.4 333.9 874.8 2,256.6 90.1 12.9 118.5 552.4 550.5 192.3 50.7 463.3 301.1 115.0 2,602.8	(³) 46. 1 9. 6 47. 8 369. 7 9. 1 .1 .1 .38. 1 33. 5 9. 1 .1 .38. 1 34. 2 13. 8 192. 7 5. 1	(⁸) <i>8.9</i> <i>5.5</i> <i>16.4</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>0.1</i> <i>0.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.2</i> <i>8.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.2</i> <i>8.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.2</i> <i>8.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.2</i> <i>8.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.9</i> <i>5.7</i> <i>4.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>10.1</i> <i>11.4</i> <i>11.0</i> <i>11.4</i> <i>12.0</i> <i>7.4</i> <i>8.8</i> <i>8.8</i> <i>8.8</i>	(1) 38.7 7.8 42.3 327.7 9.1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .37.2 32.9 8.4 1.1 20.9 8.4 1.1 20.9 28.0 13.8 172.5 4.6	(³) 21.3 6.4 34.8 278.5 8.7 .1 .1 .1 36.2 17.0 5.5 .7 20.9 22.8 9.6 62.3 1.6	$\begin{array}{c} (3)\\ 17.4\\ 1.4\\ 7.5\\ 49.2\\ (5)\\ (5)\\ (5)\\ (5)\\ 2.9\\ .4\\ 9.0\\ 5.2\\ 4.2\\ 110.2\\ 3.0\\ \end{array}$	(3) 7.4 1.8 5.5 42.0 (9) (6) (7 (3) 2.0 2.0 20.2 20.2 20.2 5
Yugoslavia	116.2	17.9	15.4	17.9	17.9	(8)	(5)
Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iran Sudan Union of South Africa	151. 0 43. 2 51. 7 153. 0 29. 9 158. 0	14.6 .7 .4 15.1 .2 2.2	9.7 1.6 .8 9.9 .7 1.4	$13.6 \\ .7 \\ .4 \\ 14.9 \\ .2 \\ 2.2$	13.0 .7 .4 .2 .2 2.2	.6 (⁵) 14.7 (⁶) (⁶)	(5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5)
FAR EAST Ceylon Hong Kong India • Indonesia Japan Malaya Pakistan Taiwan	103. 7 154. 8 616. 7 81. 3 379. 0 1, 113. 0 329. 9 (⁸) (⁵)	.9 69.7 17.9 2.2 9.8 323.4 3.0 (⁸) (⁸)	.9 45.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 50.0 .9 (8) (8)	.9 (⁵) 9.0 .1 4.4 1.8 1.2 (⁸) (⁵)	(*) 7.7 1 2.0 .4 1.2 (*) (*)	(⁵) (⁵) (¹) 2.4 1.4 (⁵) (⁸) (⁵)	(⁵) 69.7 8.9 2.1 5.4 7 331.6 1.8 (⁵)
OCEANIA Australia New Zealand LATIN AMERICA	613, 9 229, 5	16, 3 1, 0	2. 7 -4	13.9 .9	9.4 .9	4.5 (⁸)	2.4 .1
Argentina Brazil	409, 2 289, 2 61, 8	12. 4 5. 8 3. 7	5.0 2.0 5.8	12. 3 4. 4 3. 7	11. 3 4. 3 3. 6	1.0 .1 .1	(⁵)

NOTE.—Exports include receptors for the following countries: Australia, Ceylon, Gold Coast, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Japan (beginning in 1950), Malaya, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sudan, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Includes exports to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
 Includes exports to Kwantung.
 Included with Germany.
 Includes Austria.

⁸ Not reported in source.
⁶ Includes Pakistan.
⁷ Includes exports to Kwantung and Manchuria.
⁸ Included with India.

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TABLE 3B.—Imports of Principal Free World Countries From the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1938

[Note.—These data are not comparable with those for later years for many reasons. Most important are the lack of information about trade with that part of Germany known today as the Soviet Zone and lack of uniform definitions for "China," No adjustments have been made in original data except as indi-cated below. Dollar values are unadjusted for price changes.]

Imports from	World		no-Soviet .oc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R. ^j	China
Importing country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	1, 960. 4 677. 3	123.5 5.6	6. <i>3</i> 0.8	74.7 3.2	48.0 3.0	26.7 .2	² 48. 8 2. 4
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	12, 520. 9	1, 114. 8	8.9	1, 013. 8	703.7	310.1	101.0
AustriaBelgium-LuxembourgBelgium-Luxembourg Permany 4 Germany 4 Greece Iceland Ireland Ireland Italy and Trieste Notherlands Norway Portugal Switzerland Turkey Turkey	(3) 779.7 353.6 1,317.4 2,430.3 131.0 111.1 202.5 593.3 802.2 291.6 102.2 523.3 867.5 118.9 4,406.3		(*) 6.8 5.5 4.5 17.2 17.9 1.8 2.5 7.1 6.6 2.1 9.4 10.9 18.0 10.9 18.0 6.4		(3) 22.1 10.0 31.4 316.9 20.3 62.2 33.2 12.8 1.9 35.4 31.7 9.66 113.7	(3) 29.9 6.0 21.1 59.5 3.2 (8) 2.2 .8 21.1 5.3 (6) 6.1 7.5 4.7 7 142.7	(³) 1.2 3.0 7.2 42.8 (⁶) (⁴) 1.1 1.4 3.0 1.4 .2 7.8 1.6 (⁴) 31.3
United Kingdom	4, 490. 3						
Finland Yugoslavia	184. 6 114. 5	15, 6 20, 2	8.5 17.6	$15.5 \\ 20.2$	10. 7 20. 2	4.8 (⁶)	(⁵) , 1
NEAE EAST AND AFBICA Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iran Iraq Sudan Union of South Africa	185.262.450.757.945.731.5466.0	18.0 6.4 .8 21.1 1.4 (⁵) 10.0	9.7 10.3 1.6 36.4 3.1 (*) 2.1	17.3 3.1 .8 21.1 1.4 (⁰) 9.2	14.9 2.9 .8 1.3 (⁵) 7.6	2.4 .2 (*) 18.8 .1 (*) 1.6	(5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5)
FAR EAST Ceylon Hong Kong India ⁶ Indochina Indonesia Japan Malaya Pakistan Taiwan	86. 0 187. 0 566. 5 267. 3 1, 072. 1 315. 9 (⁸) (⁶)	. 6 70, 4 13, 8 4, 2 8, 5 162, 4 15, 3 (⁶) (⁶)	.7 57.6 2.4 7.6 5.2 15.1 4.8 (8) (9)	(*) 7.5 24.0 1.9 1.7 (*) (*)	(*) 6.3 3.7 1.7 1.7 (*) (*)	(*) 1.2 (*) 3 .2 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)	.2 70.4 6.3 4.0 4.5 7 160.5 13.6 (⁸) (⁵)
OCEANIA Australia New Zealand	557.3 217.9	7.6 1.4	1.4 .6	4.7 1.0	4.0 .9	.7 .1	2.9 .4
LATIN AMERICA Argentina Brazil. Uruguay	416. 0 294. 8 48. 0	13, 7 5, 2 1, 6	3.3 1.8 3.3	13.5 5.2 1.6	13.1 5.2 1.6	(ð) (ð)	(š) (š)
¹ Includes imports from Es: Lithuania. ² Includes imports from Kwant ³ Includes with Germany. ⁴ Includes Austria.		via and	⁶ Includ 7 Includ	ported in so es Pakistan es imports f ed with Inc	ı. rom Kwan	tung and M	anchuria.

[In millions of United States dollars]

TABLE 3C.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1948

[In millions of United States dollars] Total Sino-Soviet European bloc satellites Exports to _____ World bloc U.S.S.R. China As per-centage of exports to Exporting country Total value Total value Total value Total value Total value Total value world United States 12, 653. 1 3, 075. 4 396, 6 47, 9 \$.1 1.6 123. 2 18. 8 95.2 18.7 28.0 273. 4 29. 1 Canada .1 OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL ... 16, 824, 0 698.1 617.6 496.4 80.5 4.2 121.2 .1 20.2 18.6 .2 (*) (¹) 1.(29.241.327.631.77.88.46.2Austria. Belglum-Luxembourg. Denmark France. 198.4 1,691.4 569.1 30.0 70.7 46.6 29.3 61.5 .7 9.2 15.1 4.2 8.2 61. 5 46. 2 31. 9 7. 8 8. 4 7. 2 . 3 .4 3.6 .9 France. Germany, Bizone. Greece. Iceland. Italy and Trieste. Notherlands. Portugal. Sweden. 1.8 1.5 9.0 1, 997. 5 592. 0 35.5 8.7 8.4 7.2 48.9 46.6 46.9 1.9 102.3 70.2 18.6 155.1 $592.0 \\ 94.0 \\ 61.0 \\ 198.8 \\ 1,086.3 \\ 1,010.0 \\ 415.3 \\ 171.8 \\ 1,107.0 \\ 799.2 \\ 196.8 \\ 6,635.4$ $\binom{2}{(1)}$ (*) (*) 4.2 11.8 4.6 4.6 11.3 1.1 9.2 8.8 9.5 2.5 .3 40.6 41.8 24.5 $\begin{array}{r} .3\\ 43.6\\ 46.0\\ 44.0\\ 1.8\\ 93.0\\ 58.0\\ 18.6\\ 120.0 \end{array}$ 5.3 Ř 19.5 2.9 1.0 17.0 7.7 8 .1 9.3 Switzerland .8 76.0 50.3 18.4 91.5 12.2 Turk United Kingdom..... . 2 28. 5 OTHER EUROPE (*)^{1.6} Finland_____ Yugoslavia_____ 501.6 303.5 ³ 160.0 154.0 31.9 50.7 158.4 154.0 8 146.9 45.5 11.5 108.5 NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 12.1 .8 5.7 1.2 (4) (5) 1.6 1.0 71.5 1.5 12.9 4.0 (¹) (⁵) 1.5 4.9 21. 7 1. 5 2. 8 ⁽¹⁾ ^(*) ^(*) 1. 5 4. 9 Egypt French Morocco 591.4179.2 224.4 $71.5 \\ 1.5 \\ 12.9 \\ 1$ 49.8 (¹) 10.1) 10. 1 4. 0 (*) (5) (*) (*) (*) Gold Coast (1) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) 491.0 Iran____ 1.9 34.9 (⁵) 98.7 Iraq_____ Israel (¹) Sudan Union of South Africa .1 .4 529.8 FAR EAST 305. 6 398. 7 1, 310. 4 91. 8 393. 9 258. 3 810. 7 7 304. 9 17. 2 Ceylon_____ Hong Kong_____ India_____ (1) 70.7 21.9 1.9 1.6 . 5 .2 18.7 3.4 2.1 . 3 .5 74.4 44.8 1.9 3.0 8.5 62.3 29.1 (⁵) .3 (²) 11, 4 (*) 1.4 (*) 8.3 5.8 (⁵) .5 3.7 22.9 (²) 1.4 4.4 55.7 19.2 (⁶) .2 3.7 11.5 (*) 4.4 47.4 13.4 (*) India.... Indochina.... Indonesia.... 1. 2.1 .8 3.3 7.7 9.5 (8) Japan Malaya Pakistan 6 Taiwan 4.1 6.6 9.9 17.2 (5) OCEANIA Australia______ New Zealand 1, 649. 9 495. 1 49.8 9.8 26.0 8.5 3.0 2.0 42.6 9.7 $16.6 \\ 1.2$ 7.2 .1 LATIN AMERICA (*) (*) (1) Argentina Brazil Uruguay 1, 650. 3 1, 172. 7 **3**.0 2.0 1.6 49. 2 20. 3 2. 9 49.5 23.2 47.5 . 3 20.3 2.9 178.9 2, 9 **(**1)

¹ Less than \$50,000. ² Not reported in source. ³ Includes reparations delivered to U. S. S. R. val-ued at \$34,894,000 in 1948. ⁴ Less than 0.05 percent

Not available.
 Data relate to fiscal year ending March 31, 1949.
 Excludes land trade.

TABLE 3D.—IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE SINO-Soviet Bloc, 1948

	[In millio	ons of Unit	ed States	dollarsj			
Imports from	World	Total Sin blo	o-Soviet oc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Importing country	Tota l value	Total value	As per- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	7, 123. 8 2, 636. 9	233.5 8.9	3.3 .3	113. 2 5. 0	26. 4 4. 9	86.8 .1	120. 3 3. 9
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	24, 636. 3	1, 035. 5	4.2	966. 0	712.4	253.6	69.5
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Denmark France Germany, Bizone Iceland Ireland Ireland Italy and Trieste Norway Portugal Switzerland Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom OTHER EUROPE Finland Yugoslavla	390.0 1,997.2 713.5 3,448.3 1,314.2 364.5 549.4 1,576.9 1,859.5 749.8 414.0 1,375.7 1,163.2 275.0 8,374.5 488.0 314.2	56,6 85,8 84,3 75,4 225,5 7,6 6,9 3,1 49,9 79,5 67,8 1,5 153,3 72,4 24,0 242,8 92,8 92,8	14.5 4.3 11.8 8.8 8.6 6.6 8.8 4.3 9.0 .4 11.1 11.1 11.1 1.1 6.2 8.7 8.7 8.9 9.0 19.0 45.6			$(1) \\ 50.2 \\ 28.8 \\ 11.1 \\ 1.5 \\ (2) \\ 11.1 \\ 1.5 \\ 27.3 \\ (3) \\ 12.6 \\ 12.6 \\ 12.6 \\ 12.6 \\ 109.3 \\ 109.3 \\ 109.3 \\ 109.3 \\ 109.4 \\$.2 2.0 1.0 7.8 3.4 (*) (*) 4 1.9 2.5 2.7 .2 5 2.7 .2 3.7 9.6 1.1 33.0 33.0 (*)
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt French Morocco Iran Iran Israel Sudan Union of South Africa	183.5 96.2 91.6	63.9 10.7 2.8 5.9 10.0 6.0 1.4 8.0	8.9 8.7 1.6 3.5 5.4 6.2 1.6 .6	$ \begin{array}{c} 1.5\\ 2.8\\ 5.4\\ 4.8\\ 6.0\\ .5\end{array} $	1.2 2.8 3.6 4.7 5.9	(*) 1.8 .1 (¹)	(1) (1) 5 5.2 (1) .9 1.1
FAR EAST Caylon Hong Kong India Indochina Japan Yapan Pakistan ² Taiwan	188,1	$ \begin{array}{c} 1,2\\ 108.8\\ 22.0\\ 9.0\\ 15.7\\ 28.2\\ 56.1\\ 24.5\\ (^{\flat}) \end{array} $	1.6 4.8 3.4 4.1 6.7	16.9 14.0 3.4 6.0	$ \begin{array}{c} (-) \\ (-) $	(*) $(*)$ $(*)$ $(*)$ (1)	.9 108.5 5.1 8.9 11.7 24.8 50.1 20.8 (*)
OCEANIA Australia New Zealand	1, 232. 0 436. 0	21, 3 2, 5	1.7				8.2
LATIN AMERICA Argentina Brazil Uruguay	1, 134, 2	12.1	1.	1 11.	9 11.1	9 (*)	(1) .9 .2

[In millions of United States dollars]

Less than \$50,000.
 Not reported in source.
 Data relate to fiscal year ending March 31, 1949.

Excludes land trade.
Not available.
None.

TABLE 3E.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO Soviet Bloc, 1952

÷.

[In millions of United States dollars]

Exports to	World		no-Soviet loc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Exporting country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of exports to world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	15, 200. 7 4, 396. 4	1.1	(1) (1)	1.1 .6	1.1 .6	(2) (2)	(*)
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	27, 185. 5	788.8	2.9	744.8	513.4	231.4	44.0
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg. Denmark France. Gerece. Iceland. Ireland. Italy and Trieste. Netherlands. Norway. Portugal Sweden. Switzerland. Turkey United Kingdom.	$\begin{array}{c} 506.9\\ 2,451.0\\ 849.1\\ 3,889.4\\ 4,077.0\\ 119.9\\ 39.4\\ 284.1\\ 1,386.5\\ 2,113.4\\ 284.5\\ 2,113.4\\ 236.9\\ 1,571.4\\ 1,100.1\\ 100.1\\ 9\\ 7,632.2\end{array}$	64.5 60.1 35.2 42.0 92.9 .4 2.8 (1) 59.4 36.4 29.9 7.2 118.2 60.4 20.3 159.1	12.7 2.5 4.2 1.1.3 7.1 1.3 7.1 3.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 2.1	64. 2 59. 5 35. 0 38. 8 90. 1 4 2. 8 (³) 55. 7 36. 4 28. 2 7. 2 7. 2 117. 6 42. 4 20. 2 146. 3	63. 9 44. 6 21. 2 32. 3 89. 9 .4 2. 8 (2) 35. 3 31. 5 17. 9 1. 3 73. 1 40. 0 17. 8 41. 4	$\begin{array}{c} & .3 \\ 14.9 \\ 13.8 \\ 6.5 \\ .2 \\ (^2) \\ (^*) \\ (^*) \\ (^*) \\ 20.4 \\ 4.9 \\ 10.3 \\ 5.9 \\ 44.5 \\ 2.4 \\ 2.4 \\ 2.4 \\ 104.9 \end{array}$	3.3 6.2 2.8 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
OTHER EUROPE				=		**********	
Finland Yugoslavia	$717.\ 6 \\ 246.\ 5$	³ 183. 8 (*)	25.6 (*)	177. 2 (*)	21.9 (*)	⁸ 155. 3 (*)	(*) ^{6.6}
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA							
Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iran Iraq Israel Sudan Union of South Africa	$\begin{array}{c} 416.8\\ 273.8\\ 241.6\\ 151.1\\ 55.9\\ 42.6\\ 122.8\\ 922.5 \end{array}$	73.0 1.5 12.0 24.3 .1 2.6 .8 2.1	17.5 5.0 16.1 .2 6.1 .6 .2	$\begin{array}{c} 64.1\\ 1.5\\ 12.0\\ 24.3\\ .1\\ 2.6\\ .8\\ 2.1\end{array}$	35.3 1.5 (*) 1.0 (2) 1.4 .8 2.1	28.8 (*) 12.0 23.3 .1 1.2 (*) (*)	(2) (*) (*) (*) (*) (2) (2) (2) (4)
FAR EAST			1				
Ceylon	$\begin{array}{c} 315.5\\ 507.3\\ 1,303.3\\ 116.7\\ 907.5\\ 1,272.9\\ 1,239.7\\ 532.5\\ 116.5\\ \end{array}$	28. 9 91. 0 16. 4 . 1 9. 8 . 8 30. 3 119. 6 (4)	9.2 17.9 1.3 .1 1.1 .1 2.4 22.5 (4)	$\begin{array}{c} 2.9\\ (4)\\ 6.2\\ (4)\\ 9.8\\ .2\\ 30.3\\ 35.7\\ (4)\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 2.4 \\ (4) \\ 2.0 \\ (4) \\ 9.8 \\ (2) \\ 20.9 \\ 20.3 \\ (4) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} .5 \\ (*) \\ 4.2 \\ (4) \\ (4) \\ (4) \\ .2 \\ 9.4 \\ 15.4 \\ (4) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 26.0\\ 91.0\\ 10.2\\ .1\\ (^2)\\ (^2)\\ 83.9\\ (^4)\end{array}$
OCEANIA							
Australia New Zealand	1, 716. 2 673. 6	8.9 10.0	.5 1.5	8.3 10.0	8.3 10.0	(2) (*)	(*) .6
LATIN AMERICA	700 5	10.0					
Argentina Brazil Uruguay	709.5 1,408.8 208.9	12, 9 6, 5 1, 3	1.8 .5 .6	$\begin{array}{c} 12.9 \\ 6.5 \\ 1.3 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 12,9\\ 6,5\\ 1,3 \end{array}$	(2) (4) (*)	(2) (2) (*)

¹ Less than 0.05 percent. ² Less than \$50,000. ³ Includes reparations delivered to U. S. S. R. valued at \$35,719,000 from January to September 1952 when reparations deliveries were terminated. ⁴ Not reported in source. ^{*}None.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 3F.—IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1952

[In millions of United States dollars]

Imports from	ports from World Total Sino-Soviet bloc			European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Importing country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	10, 716. 8 4, 120. 3	¹ 67, 3 8, 7	0.6 .2	39.6 7.4	22.8 5.0	16.8 2.4	24.6 1.3
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	32, 322. 1	925.4	2.9	867.7	565.4	302.3	57.7
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Penmark France Germany, Fedoral Republic Greece reland Ireland Italy and Triesto Notway Portugal Sweden Switzerland Turkoy United Kingdom	$\begin{array}{c} 653.\ 6\\ 2,\ 460.\ 5\\ 9062.\ 2\\ 4,\ 432.\ 1\\ 3,\ 884.\ 8\\ 3,\ 884.\ 8\\ 3,\ 884.\ 8\\ 2,\ 55.\ 9\\ 482.\ 2\\ 2,\ 335.\ 6\\ 2,\ 257.\ 2\\ 873.\ 5\\ 347.\ 4\\ 1,\ 728.\ 6\\ 1,\ 205.\ 1\\ 555.\ 9\\ 9,\ 741.\ 3\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 73.6\\ 37.4\\ 39.2\\ 63.0\\ 105.5\\ .6\\ 3.7\\ 2.3\\ 86.8\\ 59.3\\ 35.5\\ .8\\ 108.4\\ 45.4\\ 420.6\\ 243.3 \end{array}$	11. 3 1.5 4.1 1.4 2.7 5.7 2.6 4.1 1.4 2.8 5.7 2.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 2.5	$\begin{array}{c} 73.\ 6\\ 32.\ 7\\ 39.\ 2\\ 57.\ 4\\ 87.\ 9\\ & .6\\ 3.\ 7\\ 2.\ 0\\ 84.\ 6\\ 54.\ 4\\ 32.\ 3\\ & .7\\ 107.\ 6\\ 35.\ 6\\ 20.\ 6\\ 234.\ 9\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 73.5\\ 21.1\\ 28.1\\ 38.7\\ 83.9\\ .6\\ 3.7\\ 1.8\\ 50.5\\ 28.8\\ 20.9\\ .7\\ 87.6\\ 32.7\\ 20.6\\ 72.2\end{array}$.1 11.6 11.1 18.7 4.0 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (4) (2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4	(2) (2) 5.6 17.6 (2) (*) 3.2 2.2 4.9 3.2 .1 .8 9.9 (2) 8.4
OTHER EUROPE							
Finland Yugoslavia	791.7 373.0	153, 5 (*)	19.4 (*)	153. 2 (*)	71.6 (*)	81.6 (*)	.3 (*)
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA							-
Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iran Iraq Israel Sudan Union of South Africa	$165.2 \\ 173.2 \\ 321.1 \\ 177.2$	$\begin{array}{r} 46.3\\ 8.6\\ 1.6\\ 27.4\\ 4.0\\ 5.0\\ 5.5\\ 4.7\end{array}$	7.4 1.7 .9 16.6 2.3 1.6 3.1 .4	$\begin{array}{c} 45.\ 6\\ 3.\ 1\\ 1.\ 6\\ 27.\ 3\\ 4.\ 0\\ 4.\ 9\\ 5.\ 4\\ 4.\ 6\end{array}$	$14.5 \\ 3.1 \\ 1.6 \\ 3.4 \\ 4.0 \\ 4.9 \\ 5.3 \\ 4.5$	$\begin{vmatrix} 31.1 \\ (^2) \\ 23.9 \\ (^2) \\ (^2) \\ (^2) \\ (^2) \\ .1 \\ .1 \end{vmatrix}$	(2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1
FAR EAST							
Ceylon Hong Kong India Indochina. Indonesia. Japan Malaya. Pakistan. Talwan.	924.0 2,028.8 1,256.9 609.7	8.0 146.6 40.4 8.2 5.3 17.9 42.5 8.6 9.7	2.2 22.2 2.4 1.8 .6 .9 5.4 1.4 5.2	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$.8 1.0 4.6 .8 3.4 2.5 3.0 5.6 (²)	$ \begin{array}{c} 3 \\ 1.8 \\ (3) \\ (3) \\ (3) \\ (5) \\ (2) \\ (4) \\ (*) \\ $	$\begin{array}{c} 6.9\\ 145.3\\ 34.0\\ 7.4\\ 1.9\\ 14.9\\ 39.5\\ 2.6\\ 49.7\end{array}$
OCEANIA							9 5
Australia New Zealand	1, 734. 8 644. 2	14.0 2,3	.8 .4	10.5 1.6	9.4 1.4	1.1	3.5 .7
LATIN AMÉRICA				10.0	10.0	(*)	.3
Argentina Brazil Uruguay	2,009.5	17.1 5,9 1,1	1.5 .3 .4	5.9	16.8 5.9 1.1		(2) (*)

¹ Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of \$3,100,000. ² Less than \$50,000. ³ Not reported in source. 4 Represents goods of Communist Chinese origin imported from Попд Kong. *None.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 3G.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1953

<u></u>	1						1
Exports to	World		no-Soviet loc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R .	Com- munist China
Exporting country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of exports to world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	15, 766. 8 4, 184. 8	1.8		1.8 .5	1.8 .5	(2) (2) '	(*)
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL.	27, 602. 6	804, 4	2.9	709.0	518.2	190.8	95.4
Austria	$\begin{array}{c} 537.\ 6\\ 2,\ 259.\ 3\\ 893.\ 9\\ 893.\ 9\\ 483.\ 2\\ 132.\ 0\\ 43.\ 3\\ 319.\ 2\\ 1,\ 488.\ 2\\ 132.\ 0\\ 508.\ 6\\ 218.\ 5\\ 1,\ 477.\ 0\\ 1,\ 204.\ 4\\ 396.\ 0\\ 7,\ 524.\ 7\end{array}$	58, 5 66, 1 44, 3 63, 3 140, 3 8, 3 8, 6 .4 62, 7 60, 9 5, 6 69, 7 60, 8 29, 3 92, 7	10.9 2.9 5.0 1.6 8.1 6.3 19.8 .1 4.2 2.9 6.5 2.6 4.7 5.0 7.4	58. 5 64. 7 44. 0 50. 9 115. 3 8. 3 8. 6 58. 0 56. 9 32. 0 56. 9 32. 0 6. 6 67. 0 34. 3 29. 3 75. 2	$\begin{array}{c} 57.\ 0\\ 48.\ 2\\ 23.\ 1\\ 34.\ 9\\ 113.\ 6\\ 5.\ 3.\ 1\\ .4\\ 4\\ 34.\ 9\\ 34.\ 2\\ 16.\ 9\\ 34.\ 2\\ 16.\ 9\\ 1.\ 0\\ 45.\ 2\\ 31.\ 4\\ 26.\ 9\\ 40.\ 9\end{array}$	$1.5 \\ 16.5 \\ 20.9 \\ 16.0 \\ 1.7 \\ 1.8 \\ 5.5 \\ (*) \\ 23.1 \\ 22.7 \\ 15.1 \\ 4.8 \\ 2.9 \\ 2.4 \\ 34.3 \\ 34.3 \\ $	$(2) \\ (1, 4) \\ (3, 25, 0) \\ (4) \\ (2) \\ (2) \\ (2) \\ (3) \\ (4, 7) \\ (4, 7) \\ (4, 7) \\ (4, 7) \\ (4, 7) \\ (4, 7) \\ (5, 7) \\ (5, 7) \\ (7, 7)$
OTHER EUROPE							
Finland Yugoslavia	572.0 186.0	179.3 (*)	\$1.4 (*)	173, 9 (*)	28. 4 (*)	145. 5 (*)	(*) ^{5.4}
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iran Iraq Israel Sudan Union of South Africa	394. 5 269. 4 251. 4 89. 6 55. 5 57. 5 127. 5 920. 7	48, 2 1, 9 10, 1 11, 2 1, 4 2, 0 , 1 2, 0	12.2 .7 4.0 12.5 2.5 3.4 .1 .2	37.8 1.9 10.1 11.2 1.4 2.0 (2) 1.9	25. 9 1. 9 (1) 2. 3 1. 3 . 9 (2) 1. 9	(*) 10.1 8.9 .1 1.1 (*) (3)	10. 4 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
FAR EAST Ceylon Hong Kong India Indonesia Japan Malaya Pakistan Taiwan	$\begin{array}{r} 329.\ 3\\ 478.\ 4\\ 1,\ 114.\ 3\\ 95.\ 4\\ 819.\ 6\\ 1,\ 274.\ 8\\ 951.\ 2\\ 438.\ 9\\ 127.\ 6\end{array}$	51. 5 94. 6 14. 6 (⁸) 4. 5 4. 6 15. 5 19. 8 (³)	15.6 19.8 1.3 .5 .4 1.6 4.5	. 6 (*) 7. 3 (³) 4. 5 . 1 13. 6 12. 5 (³)	.6 (*) 6.5 (³) 4.5 .1 13.6 5.1 (³)	(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)	50. 9 94. 6 7. 3 (³) (²) 4. 5 1. 9 7. 3 (³)
OCEANIA Australia New Zealand LATIN AMERICA	2, 021. 5 659. 7	62, 2 11, 1	5 .1 1.7	56.9 11.1	23. 8 11. 1	33, 1 (*)	(*) ^{5.3}
Argentina Brazil Uruguay	1, 147. 8 1, 539. 3 269. 8	24.4 11.3 1.2	8. 1 .7 .4	24. 4 10. 4 1. 2	13.1 10.4 .9	11.3 (³⁾ .3	(²) (³) .9

[In millions of United States dollars]

Less than 0.05 percent.
 Less than \$50,000.
 Not reported in source.
 None.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 3H.-IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1953

[In millions of United States dollars]

Imports from	World	Total Sir ble		European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Importing country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	10, 873. 8 4, 449. 4	1 45.7 6.0	0.4 .1	36.4 4.9	25.6 4.0	10.8 .9	0.6 1.1
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	31, 379. 2	924, 1	2.9	795.9	552.0	243.9	128.2
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Denmark France Germany, Federal Republic Greece Ireland Ireland Ireland Italy and Trieste Notway Portugal Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom	$\begin{array}{c} 545.7\\ 2,422.6\\ 1,000.3\\ 4,006.7\\ 3,877.8\\ 294.3\\ 67.8\\ 513.6\\ 2,395.1\\ 2,354.3\\ 912.0\\ 330.9\\ 1,577.0\\ 1,182.8\\ 532.6\\ 9,365.7 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 60, 1\\ 47, 4\\ 40, 6\\ 51, 4\\ 167, 9\\ 3, 8\\ 5, 8\\ 5, 8\\ 68, 6\\ 43, 9\\ 61, 4\\ 50, 7\\ 29, 5\\ 235, 6\end{array}$	11.0 2.0 4.1 1.3 4.3 1.3 8.6 5.2 2.2 2.9 4.8 5.9 4.3 5.5 2.5	$59.1 \\ 40.1 \\ 38.5 \\ 40.4 \\ 134.7 \\ 3.8 \\ 5.8 \\ 1.9 \\ 46.4 \\ 53.5 \\ 40.3 \\ .7 \\ 59.8 \\ 34.6 \\ 29.5 \\ 206.8 \\$	$\begin{array}{c} 59.0\\ 23.4\\ 30.1\\ 23.5\\ 119.1\\ 3.6\\ 4.2\\ 1.0\\ 37.1\\ 22.2\\ 23.3\\ .7\\ 49.7\\ 30.5\\ 29.5\\ 95.1 \end{array}$.1 16.7 8.4 16.9 15.6 .9 9.3 31.3 17.0 (³) 10.1 (⁴) 111.7	1.0 7.3 2.1 11.0 33.2 (²) ([*]) (
OTHER EUROPE Finland Yugoslavia	529, 8 395, 3	182.3 (*)	\$4.4 (*)	180.7 (*)	91.1 (*)	89.6 (*)	(*) ^{1.6}
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt	503.2 488.9 200.8 168.2 192.3 286.9 145.5 1,191.0	38, 6 13, 2 2, 1 16, 4 3, 0 2, 4 3, 6 4, 9	7.7 2.7 1.1 9.7 1.6 .8 2.4 .4	2.4	2.4 3.2	(2)	(3) (3) (4) (5) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5)
FAR EAST	ļ						
Ceylon Hong Kong India Indochina Japan Malaya Pakistan Taiwan		45.5 150.0 7,9 6.0 7,0 37,8 40.3 4.2 5.8	13.5 22.1 .7 1.5 .9 1.6 3.8 1.2 3.0	(³) (³) 4.9 8.1 5.9 1.2	(³) 3, 5 (³) 4, 8 6, 0 5, 9	(2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)	43.9 150.0 3.5 6.0 2.1 29.7 34.4 3.0 4 5.8
OCEANIA						1	
Australia New Zealand	1,289.3 457.8	10.7 1.9					4.2
LATIN AMERICA							
Argentina Brazil Uruguay	1,319.9	15.3 9.9 .8	1.8	9.9	9.9	(8)	(2) (8) (3) (3)

¹ Includes imports from Outer Mongolia of \$8,700,000. ² Less than \$50,000. ³ Not reported in source. ⁴ Represents goods of Communist Chinese origin imported from Hong Kong. *None.

Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180118-8 TABLE 31.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1954

Exports to	World	Total Si	no-Soviet	European		Í	
		b.	Total Sino-Soviet bloc		satellites		Com- munist China
Exporting country	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of exports to world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	15, 076. 8 3, 982. 5	6.0 6.1	(1) 0. 2	6. 0 6. 0	5.8 1.0	0. 2 5. 0	⁽²⁾ 0.
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	29, 847. 7	997, 7	<i>3.3</i>	914.8	657.3	257.5	82,
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Denmark. France. Germany, Foderal Republic Iceland. Ireland. Italy and Trieste. Notwerlands. Norway. Portugal Sweden. Switzerland. Turkey United Kingdom	$\begin{array}{c} 609.6\\ 2, 303.5\\ 948.3\\ 4, 320.7\\ 5, 354.1\\ 151.9\\ 322.3\\ 1, 636.0\\ 2, 393.0\\ 582.8\\ 253.5\\ 1, 587.6\\ 1, 229.8\\ 334.9\\ 7, 767.8 \end{array}$	58,8 66,8 61,9 82,8 206,8 10,8 12,9 .3 62,8 85,8 45,1 6,1 6,1 55,1 115,2	9.6 2.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 7.1 2 4.9 5.8 5.9 7.1 2 4.9 5.8 5.7 4.8 5.7 4.8 5.4 4.8 5.1 5.7 4.8 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7	$\begin{array}{c} 57.5\\ 66.3\\ 61.5\\ 74.1\\ 185.3\\ 10.8\\ 12.9\\ .3\\ 56.6\\ 84.8\\ 45.1\\ 6.1\\ 6.7\\ 35.9\\ 55.1\\ 95.8\end{array}$	56. 0 42. 0 43. 2 172. 7 7. 1 5. 0 . 3 31. 3 52. 0 20. 8 1. 3 43. 9 32. 3 49. 9 56. 3	$\begin{array}{c} 1.5\\ 24.3\\ 18.3\\ 30.9\\ 12.6\\ 3.7\\ 7.9\\ (*)\\ 25.3\\ 32.8\\ 24.3\\ 4.8\\ 22.8\\ 3.6\\ 5.2\\ 39.5 \end{array}$	(*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
OTHER EUROPE	681.0						
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA	240. 4	190, 1 6, 2	27.9 2.6	183. 5 6. 2	37.1 4.7	146.4 1.5	(³) ^{6. 6}
Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iraq Israel Sudan Union of South Africa	399. 4 285. 4 322. 1 111. 0 53. 5 85. 0 116. 2 890. 2	56, 3 3, 0 20, 4 20, 3 , 1 4, 4 , 9 7, 4	14.1 1.0 6.3 18.3 .2 5.2 .8 .8 .8	44.9 3.0 20.4 20.3 .1 4.4 .7 6.7	39.5 2.3 (4) 1.7 (4) 1.3 .7 1.8	5. 4 .7 20. 4 18. 6 .1 3. 1 (⁸) 4. 9	11. 4 (4) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) . 2 . 7
FAR EAST Hong Kong ndia	$\begin{array}{c} 380.\ 0\\ 423.\ 0\\ 1,\ 180.\ 0\\ 96.\ 5\\ 856.\ 1\\ 1,\ 629.\ 3\\ 975.\ 4\\ 358.\ 9\\ 93.\ 3\end{array}$	46, 9 68, 4 19, 3 .2 9, 1 24, 1 16, 7 33, 6 (³)	12.3 16.2 1.6 .2 1.1 1.5 1.7 9.4	.4 (*) 10.7 (³) 6.8 5.0 10.3 7.5 (³)	(*) 5.4 (³) 6.4 5.0 10.3 3.9 (³)	(*) 5.3 (³).4 (⁴) ⁽⁴⁾ ⁽⁴⁾ ⁽³⁾ .6	46.5 68.4 8.6 .2 2.3 19.1 6.4 26.1 (⁸)
OCEANIA ustralia Iew Zealand	1, 688. 1 684. 4	57.4 15.8	3.4 2.3	54. 2 15. 8	21. 9 7. 6	32. 3 8. 2	(1) 3.2
	1, 073, 1 1, 561, 8 249, 0	84. 1 24. 0 23. 7	7.8 1.5	84, 1 21, 4	47. 7 21. 4	36. 4 (*) 20. 0	⁽³⁾ 2.6

[In millions of United States dollars]

Less than 0.05 percent.
\$6,000 only, representing shipments for the use of a diplomatic mission of a friendly foreign country.
Not reported in source.
Less than \$50,000.
January-October data only.
*None.

TABLE 3J.—Imports of Principal Free World Countries From the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1954

[In millions of United States dollars]

				-			
Imports from	World	Total Sir ble	10-Soviet oc	European bloc	European satellites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Importing country	Total value	Total value	As por- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	10, 206. 7 4, 221. 4	1 49.3 5.6	0.5 .1	42.3 3.9	30. 5 3. 2	11.8 .7	² 0. 2 1. 7
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL	33, 823. 5	1, 050, 3	3 . 1	952.6	622.1	330. 5	97.7
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Pernace Germany, Federal Republic Greece Iceland Iteland Italy and Tricste Netherlands Norway Portugal Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom	$\begin{array}{c} 653.3\\ 2,549.9\\ 1,161.9\\ 4,215.3\\ 4,708.8\\ 330.0\\ 69.4\\ 503.8\\ 2,401.0\\ 2,840.3\\ 1,018.6\\ 350.4\\ 1,777.0\\ 1,304.5\\ 4,78.3\\ 9,461.0\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 60.3\\ 51.3\\ 44.6\\ 76.2\\ 226.4\\ 9.3\\ 12.7\\ 2.1\\ 65.1\\ 44.2\\ 1.0\\ 72.0\\ 45.3\\ 45.0\\ 231.7\end{array}$	9.2 9.0 5.8 4.8 2.8 2.1 4.5 .47 2.1 4.5 .3 4.1 5.8 9.4 2.4	$\begin{array}{c} 59.5\\ 49.1\\ 44.3\\ 66.8\\ 190.3\\ 9.3\\ 12.7\\ 1.9\\ 63.0\\ 52.9\\ 41.8\\ 8\\ 70.4\\ 38.3\\ 45.0\\ 206.5\end{array}$	$58.1 \\ 21.1 \\ 28.6 \\ 26.6 \\ 168.1 \\ 7.8 \\ 4.6 \\ 1.3 \\ 39.3 \\ 29.9 \\ 28.5 \\ -3.5 \\ 43.4 \\ 32.8 \\ 41.6 \\ 89.6 \\ 1.6 \\ 1.3 \\ 29.9 \\ 28.5 \\ -3.5$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.4\\ 28.0\\ 15.7\\ 40.2\\ 22.2\\ 1.5\\ 8.1\\ -6\\ 23.7\\ 23.0\\ 13.3\\ (^8)\\ 27.0\\ 5.5\\ 3.4\\ 116.9\end{array}$.8 2.2 3 9.4 36.1 (*) (*) (*) 2.1 6.2 2.4 4.2 1.6 11.0 (8) 25.2
OTHER EUROPE							
Finland Yugoslavia	656. 5 339. 4	185.0 4.0	28. 2 1. 2	182. 2 4. 0	98. 8 2.9	83.4 1.1	(*) ^{2.8}
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt French Morocco Gold Coast Iraq Israql Sudan Union of South Africa	200. 6 223. 0 207. 6 289. 7	26. 9 14, 1 2, 9 21. 2 3. 7 11, 8 11, 2 6, 1	5.9 2.9 1.5 9.5 1.8 4.1 8.0 .5	$ \begin{array}{c} 2.9\\ 21.2\\ 3.7\\ 11.8\\ 11.1 \end{array} $	10.9	$ \begin{array}{c} .3\\.1\\13.5\\(^3)\\6.5\\.2\end{array} $.8 11.1 (³) (*) (⁴) (⁸) .9
FAR EAST Ceylon Hong Kong India Indoehina Indonesia Japan Malaya Pakistan ¹ Taiwan	1,025.6 324.7	$\begin{array}{c} 33.1\\ 121.1\\ 11.2\\ 9.3\\ 15.3\\ 48.4\\ 32.7\\ 6.5\\ 3.4\end{array}$	11.5 20.1 .9 2.6 2.4 2.0 3.2 2.0 1.6	(3) 6.4 11.8 7.6 4.2 2.8	(*) 4.0 .4 11.2 5.3 4.2	(3) (3) (3) (3)	32.0 121.1 4.8 8.9 3.8 40.8 28.7 3.7 6 3.4
OCEANIA Australia New Zealand	1, 692. 3 597. 2	13. 0 2, 3	.8	9.0 1.7	7.5	1.5	4.
LATIN AMERICA Argentina Brazil Uruguay	1, 081. 8 1, 633. 5 274. 5	76, 7 18, 8 2, 6	7. 1 1. 1 . 8	18.8	18.8	3. (4)	(*) (*)

Imports from Outer Mongolia of \$6,839,000 included in total value but not in geographic areas.
Imports from China were \$179,000 in January-December 1954.
Less than \$50,000.
Not reported in source.
Includes Government account imports.
Represents goods of Communist Chinese origin imported from Hong Kong.
*None.

TABLE 3K.—EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1955

	World			Euro- pean bloc	Euro- pean satel- lites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
January through—	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of exports to world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
December	15, 518. 1 4, 322. 8	7.3 11.7	(¹) 0.3	7.3 10.7	7.0 8.0	0.3 2.7	(²) 1.0
	33, 387. 0	1, 139, 1		1, 040. 5	770.6	269. 9	98.6
December December December December	698.8 2,779.2 1,041.6 4,800.7	71, 2 70, 5 35, 7 133, 6	10. 2 3. 1 3. 4 2. 8	69. 4 63. 5 35. 6 126. 4	63.8 46.6 25.7 90.4	5.6 16.9 9.9 36.0	1.8 7.0 .1 7.2
December December December December December December December December December	6, 243. 9 182. 8 52. 1 308. 7 1, 857. 1 2, 687. 5 634. 0 283. 2 1, 728. 2 1, 308. 3 313. 3	275.0 8.5 14.4 .1 64.0 62.2 37.1 6.7 62.8 64.3 68.6	4.4 4.6 27.8 (¹) 3.4 2.3 5.9 2.4 3.6 4.9 21.8	248. 8 8. 5 14. 4 .1 58. 3 59. 3 37. 1 6. 7 61. 0 40. 6 68. 6	222. 1 6. 3 4. 8 1 42. 3 43. 7 22. 5 3. 5 46. 4 363. 4	26. 7 2.2 9. 6 (*) 16. 0 15. 6 14. 6 3. 2 14. 6 4. 3 2	26. 2 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
December	8, 467. 6	164.4	1.9	142.2	52.7	89.5	22. 2
December	788. 1 256. 6	203, 0 35, 5	25. 8 13. 8	190. 5 35. 5	52.7 17.6	137. 8 17. 9	12.5 (*)
December December December September December October November	397. 4 312. 1 270. 2 136. 2 375. 5 88. 2 122. 5 928. 1	106, 1 9, 6 11, 5 20, 7 , 2 3, 4 3, 7 7, 3	26.73.14.215.2(')3.83.0	81.6 9.6 11.5 20.7 .1 3.4 2.9	61. 4 7. 9 (³) 3. 6 . 1 1. 7 2. 9	20. 2 1. 7 11. 5 17. 1 (*) 1. 7 (*)	24.5 (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) .8 1.0
						*. (1.0
December	931.4	25.8 31.8 26.6 33.9 39.5 16.1 37.0 (⁴)	6.3 7.2 2.1 3.6 2.0 1.2 9.2	.3 (*) 8.6 27.7 11.0 11.9 5.3 (4) (4)	.3 (*) 3.4 27.7 8.9 11.5 5.3 (4) (4)	$(*) \\ (*) \\ 5.2 \\ (4) \\ 2.1 \\4 \\ (3) \\ (4) $	25. 5 31. 8 18. 0 6. 2 28. 5 4. 2 31. 7 (⁴)
							••
December	1, 797. 0 724. 8	38, 5 18, 7	2. 1 2. 6	32. 2 18. 3	31. 9 12. 2	. 3 6. 1	6.3 .4
August December December	673. 9 1, 423. 2 183. 7	49.6 46.6 10.5	7.4 3.3 5.7	48. 4 42. 0 10. 5	34. 9 41. 3 5. 9	13. 5 . 7 4. 6	1.2 4.6 (*)
	January through— December	January through Total value December 15, 518.1 December 4, 522.8 January 698.8 December 2, 779.2 December 2, 779.2 December 2, 779.2 December 1, 44.6 December 1, 44.6 December 1, 44.6 December 1, 480.7 December 1, 857.1 December 2, 687.5 December 1, 857.1 December 1, 38.3 December 1, 38.3 December 1, 38.3 December 1, 38.3 December 2, 76.6 December 2, 70.2 December 307.4 December 36.2 October 376.5 Sa.2 270.2 December 928.1 December 928.1 December 928.1 December 2, 610.6 December 928.1	January through Total value Total value December	January through Total value Total value As per- contage of exports to world December	WorldTotal Sino-Soviet blocpean blocJanuary throughTotal valueTotal valueAs per- centage of exports to worldTotal valueDecember mechanization15, 518, 1 4, 322, 8T, 3 11, 7(1) 0, 37, 3 10, 7December mechanization4, 322, 8 4, 333, 387, 01, 139, 1 1, 139, 13, 4 1, 040, 51, 040, 5 608, 8 10, 2December mechanization608, 8 1, 2, 271, 2 10, 210, 2 60, 4 3, 1 63, 766, 4 3, 1 63, 766, 4 3, 1 63, 7December mechanization1, 041, 6 1, 041, 6 1, 05, 771, 2 10, 2 10, 210, 2 60, 4 3, 1 64, 428, 8 10, 2 8, 5December mechanization6, 243, 9 2, 67, 5 2, 1 1, 44, 4 27, 8 1, 44, 4 27, 8 1, 44, 4 27, 8 1, 10 1, 26, 7 1, 10 1, 26, 7 1, 36, 7 1, 1, 26, 4 2, 2, 3 2, 3, 1, 1, 5, 9 3, 7, 1 1, 36, 3 1, 1, 5, 9 3, 7, 1 1, 36, 3 1, 1, 5, 9 3, 7, 1 1, 36, 3 1, 1, 5, 9 3, 7, 1 1, 36, 6 35, 5 13, 8 1, 36, 6 35, 5 13, 8 1, 36, 6 35, 5 13, 8 1, 10, 142, 2December mechanization 2, 36, 6 1, 36, 2 2, 6 1, 36, 2 2, 7 1, 36, 2 2, 7 1, 36, 2 2, 7 1, 36, 2 2, 7 1, 5, 2 3, 7 3, 8 3, 4 3, 6, 6 3, 7 3, 7 3, 8 6, 6 3, 6, 6 3, 7 3, 7 3, 8 6, 6 3, 6, 6 3, 7 3, 7 3, 8 6, 6 3, 7 3, 7 3, 8December 1, 260, 4 26, 6 2, 00, 6 26, 7 39, 7 30, 7 30, 8 30, 7 30, 8 30, 7 30, 7 30, 8 30, 7 30, 7 30, 9 3	WorldTotal sinc-Soviet blocpean blocsatel- ittesJanuary throughTotal valueTotal valueAs per- contage of exports to worldTotal valueTotal valueDecember15, 518.1 4, 322.87.3 11.7(1) 0.37.3 10.77.0 8.0December2, 732.8 4, 322.871.2 11.710.2 0.369.4 4, 63.563.5 46.6 25.7December December2, 779.2 2, 779.2 2, 779.270.5 70.5 3.1 6, 7 3.4 4, 800.733.6 4, 435.622.8 25.7December December 1, 041.6 December 4, 800.7275.0 133.6 4, 4 4, 80.74.4 4, 248.8 4, 6, 8, 5 6, 6, 3 4, 6, 8, 5 6, 6, 3 4, 4 4, 88, 222.1 1, 14, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4	January throughTotal valueTotal

[In millions of United States dollars]

Less than 0.05 percent.
\$3,000 only, representing shipments for the use of a diplomatic mission of a friendly foreign country.
Less than \$50,000.
Not reported in source.
(*) None.

TABLE 31.---IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL FREE WORLD COUNTRIES FROM THE SINO-Soviet Bloc, 1955

[In millions of United States dollars

Imports from		World	Total Si b	no-Soviet loc	Euro- pean bloc	Euro- pean satel- lites	U.S.S.R.	Com- munist China
Importing country	January through-	Total value	Total value	As per- centage of imports from world	Total value	Total value	Total value	Total value
United States Canada	December December	11, 382. 1 4, 773. 7	1 65.2 8.0	0.6 .2	55.6 4.8	38.7 4.2	16.9 .6	0.2 3.2
OEEC COUNTRIES, TOTAL		38, 849. 5	\$ 1,388.7	3.6	1, 260. 4	825.1	435.3	128.2
Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Denmark France	December December December December	885.1 2,844.1 1,173.0 4,688.1	84.6 54.4 43.8 95.7	9.6 1.9 3.7 2.0	83. 4 52. 5 43. 6 83. 9	79.3 23.1 35.2 35.0	4.1 29.4 8.4 48.9	1.2 1.9 .2 11.8
Germany, Foderal Re- public	December December December December December December December December December December December	$\begin{array}{c} 5, 966, 4\\ 382, 2\\ 77, 6\\ 572, 1\\ 2, 705, 9\\ 3, 208, 1\\ 1, 089, 5\\ 398, 1\\ 1, 991, 0\\ 1, 489, 6\\ 497, 6\\ 10, 881, 1\\ \end{array}$	2 312.0 13.2 17.3 4.9 71.1 78.9 41.0 1.6 87.5 62.2 91.3 329.2	5.2 3.5 22.2 8 2.6 2.5 3.8 4.4 4.4 4.2 18.3 2.9	$\begin{array}{c} 266.\ 0\\ 13.\ 1\\ 17.\ 3\\ 4.\ 7\\ 67.\ 0\\ 70.\ 8\\ 39.\ 1\\ 1.\ 5\\ 85.\ 2\\ 46.\ 4\\ 91.\ 3\\ 294.\ 6\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 230.2\\ 11.2\\ 6.7\\ 3.9\\ 43.9\\ 40.6\\ 21.5\\ 1.4\\ 53.3\\ 38.0\\ 83.0\\ 118.8 \end{array}$	35.8 1.9 10.6 .8 23.1 30.2 17.6 .1 31.9 8.4 8.3 175.8	45.9 .1 (³) .2 4.1 8.1 1.9 .1 2.3 15.8 ([*]) 34.6
OTHER EUROPE Finland	December		208.1 33.0	27.0 7.5	204.0 33.0	117.0 18.6	87.0 14.4	4.1 (3)
Y ugoslavia NEAR EAST AND AFRICA Egypt	December December December September December	523.5 469.6 246.0 272.9 188.3 324.4 115.2	35.8 22.9 5.1 25.8 5.2 4 9.2 3.6 6.4	6.8 4.9 2.1 9.4 2.8 2.8 3.1	34. 9 3. 9 5. 0 25. 8 3. 7 4 9. 2	28.3 3.7 5.0 5.5 3.6 4 5.7 3.4 5.6	6.6 22.3 20.3 1 43.5 .1 (³)	.9 19.0 .1 (*) 1.5 (³) .1 .8
FAR EAST Ceylon Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Malaya Pakistan 6 Vietnam Talwan	December December December December December December November	650.8 41,353.2 604.2 2,471.4 1,248.6 289.6 236.9	3.4	$\begin{array}{c} 24.2 \\ 1.7 \\ 6.6 \\ 3.6 \\ 3.4 \\ 1.2 \\ 3.6 \end{array}$.5 15.1 30.5 8.3 4.1 3.0 (⁶)	1.5 (*) 9.1 30.3 5.2 4.1 2.9 (*) (*)	.5 6.0 .2 3.1 (3)	9.9 80.8 37.8
OCEANIA	December	1, 937. 9	14.1	7	9.6		2.1	
Australia New Zealand				i .a	1.3	1.2	.1	.8
LATIN AMERICA Argentina Brazil Uruguay	December	770.9 1,306.8 226.0	38.	1 2.1) 38.1	38.3 38.1 2.4	(1)	(*)

¹ Imports from Outer Mongolia of \$9,439,000 included in total value, but not in geographic areas.
² Imports from Outer Mongolia of \$134,000 included in total value, but not in geographic areas.
³ Less than \$50,000.
⁴ Incomplete.
⁵ Not reported in source.
⁵ Includes Government account imports.
⁷ Represents goods of Communist Chinese origin imported from Hong Kong.

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TABLE 4A.—UNITED STATES TRADE WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, 1938, 1948, 1952, 1954, AND 1955

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[In thousands of dollars]

Country	Exp	orts, ind	cluding	reexp	orts		Gene	ral imp	orts	
	1938 1	1948	1952	1954	1955	1938	1948	1952	1954	1955
Total Sino-Soviet Bloc U. S. S. R	186, 331 69, 691	396, 641 27, 879		6, 126 216		123, 546 24, 034	233, 483 86, 825		49, 425 11, 928	65, 160 16, 875
European satellites	64, 916	95, 362	1,077	5, 904	6, 996	50, 697	26, 313	22, 768	30, 480	38, 657
Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Estonia Germany, Soviet Zone Hungary Latvia Lithuania. Poland and Danzig Rumania	$\begin{array}{c} 275\\760\\26,526\\1,573\\(^3)\\2,731\\1,342\\669\\24,695\\6,315\end{array}$	2, 086 21, 563 7 (3) 8, 029 1 115 55, 675 7, 542	(*) 622 69 (*) (*) 286 (*) (*)	(*) 1,005 (*) 765 2,476 (*) (*) (*) 1,588 66	(*) 407 788 (*) (*) 3, 307 191	26, 174 1, 244 (3) 3, 544 558 922 13, 417 2, 474	831 22, 125 (²) (³) 1, 613 6 10 1, 249	1, 477 (*) 7, 118 2, 913 (*) 1	311 3, 074 (*) 3, 794 1, 339 (*) 1 21, 570	3, 819 (*) 5, 439 2, 017 (*)
Bloc in Asia	51, 724	273, 400	_(*)	46	53	48, 815	120, 345	27, 725	7,017	9, 634
China (including Manchuria) Outer Mongolia ⁶ North Korea	{51, 724 (³)	273, 400 (³)	(*) (*)	{	* 3 (*) (*)	{48, 815 (³)	120, 345 (³)	{24,605 3,120 (*)	168 6, 849 (*)	195 9, 439 (*)

NOTE.-Columns may not add exactly due to rounding.

¹ Data represent direct shipments only which in prewar years greatly understated the trade with Centra 1 European countries.
² Less than \$500.
³ Not shown separately.
⁴ Represents a shipment for the use of a diplomatic mission of a friendly foreign country.
⁶ Represents shipment of printed matter under general export license.
⁶ United States does not consider Outer Mongolia as a part of Communist China; although traditionally, for statistical purposes, Outer Mongolia has been conditionally included with China: Separate figures for this area have been complied by the Bureau of the Census only since January 1953. The 1952 breakdown *None.

Commodity		U. S. S.	S. R.			European satellites	satellites 1		China an	China and Outer Mongolia 2	ongolia
	1948	1952	1954	1955	1948	1952	1954	1955	1948	1954	1955
Total, including reexports. Total, domestic.	27, 879 27, 506	72 12	216 216	252 245	95, 362 94, 117	1,077 1,017	5, 904 5, 794	6, 996 6, 856	273,400 273,029	26 26	
Cattle for breaching Animal oils and fats, edible Darliew, mediale, wet. Calf and kip skins, wet. Calf and kip skins, wet. Calf and kip skins, wet. Tallow, medible. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Barley. Tobeco and preparations. Pertolement and oils. Cooking and sald oils. Tobeco and manufactures. Pertolement and products. Wool rags. Wool	6 H338 3 2 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6							• •	 ● 第二、1000000000000000000000000000000000000	22222222222 [®] 2222222222222222222222222	

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nnet	golia	1955	<u> </u>		bond
AND I	Outer Mongolia	1954	6, 849 7, 385	00000000000000000000000000000000000000	n or mer rehouse pon arri ed into
1954, .	Out	1952 3	3, 120 3, 283		Imports for consumption repre- tito consumption or merchandis- led customs warehouses; "Gen- immediately upon arrival into chandise entered into bonded
1952,	<u> </u>	1955	195 235	ee ⁼ e=eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee	Import into com aded cus immedi rchandis
, 1948,	13.2	1954	266 266	ະສະບັດຊີອອດເຊັ່ງ ແລະ ເພື່ອເຊື່ອເຊື່ອເ	mption. n arrival from bon entered plus me
DITIES	China	1952 3	24, 605 25, 749	$ \overset{(1)}{\overset{(2)}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}$	or consu tely upo hdrawn chandise hannels
Commodifies, 1948, 1952, 1954, and		1948 3	120, 345 117, 366	$ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \end{array}\\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array}\\ $	imports 1 immedia ndise wit scent mee
PRINCIPAL	1	1955	38, 657 37, 904	19 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30	4 Commodity data are imports for consumption. Imports for consumption repre- sent merchandiss entered inmediately upon arrival into consumption or merchandis- ing channels plus merchandise withdrawn from bonded customs warchouses: "Gen- eral Imports" data represent merchandise entered immediately upon arrival into consumption or merchandising channels plus merchandise entered into bonded outsoms warehouses."
	European satellites ¹	1954	30, 480 30, 975	$\overset{1,7}{\overset{6,7}{\overset{6,7}{\overset{6,7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset{7}{\overset$	4 Commodity data sent merchandise enti- ing channels plus enti- eral Imports" data consumption or me ustons warehouses 5 Tess than \$500
SINO-SOVIET BLOC, BY [In thousands of dollars]	uropean	1952	22, 768 22, 460	7, 28 54 54 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55	4 Commodit sent merchance ing channels I eral Imports" consumption s I acc them
VIET B ousands	E	1948	26, 313 29, 168	**	여러대 8
NO-SO		1955	16, 875 16, 828		tion in 1948 have con- ed in 1951 countries
THE SI	S. R.	1954	11, 928 11, 794	ZOSS STORMAN SC SS	for inclus thandise ere issue ina from
	U.S.	1952	16, 818 16, 808	305°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°	s. available esse merc censes w side Chi
IMPORTS FROM		1948	86, 825 86, 186	$\overset{913}{\overset{923}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}$	rounding parately a of Chin mport li ased out as 1950.
LABLE 4CUNITED STATES IMI	Commodity		General imports. Imports for consumption 4	Neats and sursage easings Fish products including shelifish. Other foodstuffs. Fishes an audiactures including shelifish. Fishes an audiactures Feathers, crude. Feathers, crude. Feathers, crude. Food of the second manufactured Hops Cutton waste Raw ootion and linters. Wool, unmanufactured Hair and manufactured Cutton waste Star waste Star waste Star and glass products. Other textiles and manufactures of and manufactures for the textiles and manufactures of the textiles and manufactures for the textiles and manufactures of the textiles and manufactures for the textiles and manufactures of the textiles and manufactures of the textiles and manufactures for the textiles and the textiles and plated ware for the textiles and the textiles and the textiles for the textiles and the textiles and the textiles for the textiles and the textiles of beads. Vessels returned for the textiles of the textiles and the textiles and the textiles and the timports.	NorzColumns may not add exactly due to rounding. ¹ Imports from the Soviet Zone of Germany not separately available for inclusion in 1948. ² Since December 1950, United States imports of Chinese merchandise have con- sisted cluefty of strategie meterals, for which import liceness were issued in 1951 and early 1952, and of Chinese before Specimber 1990.

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TABLE 5A.-FREE WORLD EXPORTS TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS, 1952-54

は 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	23, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25, 25	nd 1955, 5 nd 19	11,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,25,	1052, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16	69.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1	66.4 12.4 12.4 12.7 12.4 12.7 12.4 12.7 12.7 12.7 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 17.6 17	88.7 88.7 88.7 88.7 88.7 84.5 84.5 80.0 140.1 140.4 14	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	Outer and unspecified food, beverages, and tobacoo 73 3 3 Outer and unspecified food, beverages, and tobacoo 55.8 8 3 16 Outeeds 3.8 16 3 4 6 8 5
80022200 80022200 80022200	20 m - 5 6 6 0 0 20 m - 5 6 6 0 0	91. 402% 2040402%	27.5 57.5 26.7 26.5 117.3	44.54.4.8 80.000 80.000	103.20 144.1 15.0 16.0 103.9	87.4 87.4 87.4 87.4 173.7 173.7	140 2003 241 2003 241 2003 241 2003	148.9 149.9	ar and unspecified nonmetallic minerals and manufactures . metals, ores, and manufactures 4
6.230 6.234 1 234	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	17.1	152.6 60.3 62.3 62.3 62.3	14 4 6 7 8 6 7 8 6 7 8 6 7 8 6 8 7 8 8 7 8 8 8 8	181.5 15.8 44.1	179.7 116.5	20.5 20.4 20.5 20.4 20.5	199.6 25.7 25.2 25.7	and related friels. oleum and products. # and unspecified normetallic minerals and manufactures metals, ores, and manufactures 4.
29.6 5.6	88 943 1024	30.0 2.0 4.0	13.9 31.2	30.0 30.0 30.0	14.4 31.6	- 84.5 88.3 8.3	1 40. 1 62, 5 37. 2	36.2	r and unspecified incifible crude materials and manufactures. Litzers, crude and manufactures. and reals freak
46 2.2 2.2	11.0 14.1 14.0	12.9	26.5 ¢	28.1	245- 149-5-	81.7	40.05 20.05	35.94	na and manufactures r and unspecified textile fibers and manufactures. Kins and manufactures
74.6	.85 4 4 6	12,22	16.2	46 12.9 12.9	38.0 15.5	148.7 38.9 25.0	105.9 27.4 131.3	73.3 32.8 11.6	u auto iumuer, uumaanuaenred. 1 and unspecified, wood, paper, and manufactures. 1 and manufactures.
55 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 5	ล่อ	2. 2. 2. 2.	10.5 4.9 6.9	0 2 4 4 2 0 1	2,4,4 - 70 6	27 4 4 21 6 4 4	68.3 47.1	22.0 43.5 34.6	eds.
1.1	16.7		17.6 38.7	14.1 29.9	16.1 49.0	57.3	65.3 49.3	69.7 73.1	Sugar and preparations Other and unspecified food. beverses, and tobaroo
	1.1 (3) 119.3	246.4	66.4 14.3 51.8	69.2 21.5 59.0	49.8 26.1 57.2	96.2 42.1 168.0	92.0 51.9 229.0	74.9 44.7 346.0	Lute antimats and meat. Duity products. Cereals and preparations
500.5 367.9	381.8	468.3	952.7	807.9	794.6	21, 835. 6			Imports, total
1954	1953	1952	1954	1953	1952	1954	1953	1952	•
	. S. S. R.	Ď	llites	pean sate	Euro	riet bloc	m Sino-Sov	Total from	Commodity or commodify group
ROUPS,	ITT G	доммор	UPAL C		dollars]	VIET DI	ons of Uni	M THE A [In milli	NULTINITY MAN MANY MANY MANY
	路0UPS, 2001年1135年1135年1135年1135年1135年1135年1135年1	TTT GROUPS, 11TT GROUPS, 1953 1954 1953 1954 1953 111 1	OMMODITY GROUPS, U.S. S. R. U.S. S. R. U.S. S. R. U.S. S. R. U.S. S. R. 1952 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 1953 1954 1953 266.4 110.3 21.7 256.4 113.3 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 22.8 31.7 21.7 22.8 33.0 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1 33.1	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS, pean satellites U. S. S. R. 1953 1954 1952 1953 1953 1954 1952 1953 1953 1954 1952 1953 807:9 952.7 468.3 381.8 500.5 60.2 66.4 1952 1954 10.3 20.3 151.8 266.4 10.3 32.8 46.1 26.5 14.1 19.7 11.1 10.3 20.3 16.2 10.3 21.4 7.4.6 3.2.8 46.1 7.4.6 53.1 10.3 3.2.8 3.2 46.1 7.4.6 53.1 10.3 3.2 3.2 46.1 7.4.6 53.1 7.4 53.3 3.2 21.6 1.7 3.3 2.2 8.4 7.4 12.9 16.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 8.4 1.3 21.5 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.4 7.4 8	OC, BT FRINCIPAL COMMODITT GROUPS, Galars] European satellites U. S. S. R. European satellites U. S. S. R. I952 1953 1954 1952 1953 Fuencean satellites U. S. S. R. U. S. S. R. Fuencean satellites U. S. S. R. 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 1953 1954 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 734.6 807.9 952.7 468.3 381.8 500.5 57.1 11.1 21.6 21.7 22.3 22.8 32.9 4.1 9.1 10.5 11.6 3.2 11.1 3.3 3.2 2.5 1.4 3.6 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 1.7 3.8 5.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1.5 1.4 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2	TIET BLOC, BT FINNCIPAL COMMODITT GROUPS, GROUPS, ied States dollars] ret bloc European satellites U. S. S. R. 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1954 1952 1953 1954 1955 181 241 16.3 28.0.5 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.1 25.2 22.8 25.3 35.1 10.5 21.7 22.3 22.8 25.3 4.1 7.4 10.5 23.4 74.6 25.3 14.1 7.4 3.2 3.2 56.6 21.2 24.1 25.3 24.4 49.2 74.6 25	DINO-SOVIET BLOC, BT PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS, 1952–54 Outs of United States dollars] U.S. S. R. Commun Data of United States dollars] European satellites U.S. S. R. Commun 14 European satellites U.S. S. R. Commun 1500-Soviet bloc European satellites U.S. S. R. Commun 1653 1954 1952 1953 1954 1952 1953 155 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 1953 1954 1953 1954 1952 1955 1953 1954 1952 1953 1954 1955 10	Soviet bloc BY Jnited States dollars] Soviet bloc Europ Soviet bloc Europ 1954 1952 Soviet bloc Europ 1953 1952 Soviet bloc Europ 1954 1952 Soviet bloc Europ 1952 1952 Soviet bloc 1121,5 249,6 49,0 Soviet bloc 125,4 49,0 155,1 Soviet bloc 22,4 49,1 155,1 Soviet bloc 135,7 242,4 44,1 Soviet bloc 135,7 24,4 14,4 Soviet bloc 135,7 14,4 14,4 <

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