

TOP SECRET

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REQUIREMENTS FOR COVERAGE IN THE USSR

1. The most accurate intelligence obtainable on the Soviet ability and readiness to launch an attack against the United States will provide the basis for fixing the speed and effort of preparations to protect the United States against such attack.

2. For the most part, this involves how accurately we estimate Soviet development and capability with reference to three matters:

- a. Guided missiles.
- b. Nuclear weapons.
- c. Long range bombers.

3. We must admit that our estimates on these matters are based upon fragmentary evidence. We cannot with authority today provide the information which will enable one to judge whether missile development in the USSR surpasses that of the West. We cannot say whether the USSR is placing greater emphasis on guided missiles or on long range aircraft. Our nuclear weapons stockpile estimates admit to a significant margin of error and could be failing to detect a large scale Soviet expansion in this field.

4. In addition to discussing hereafter targets bearing clearly on guided missiles, nuclear weapons and long range bombers, a section is provided dealing with four miscellaneous targets believed to be of great importance but whose function is still obscure.