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11 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Intelligence Research  
Department of State  
Chief, Office of Research and Intelligence  
United States Information Agency  
Acting Chief, RQM/OIS  
Chief, Special Projects Staff  
Operations Coordinating Board  
Lt. Cmdr. A. Christopher  
Office of Naval Intelligence  
Major Thomas B. Johnson  
Department of the Air Force  
Mr. Yaro Skalnik  
Department of the Army, G-2

25X1C

SUBJECT: Intelligence Materials on [REDACTED]  
RE: USIA Survey

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1. In April, 1954, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of USIA agreed to a survey by CIA personnel of the intelligence needs [REDACTED] of USIA and agencies with related programs. The IAC agencies and OCB participated in the survey. The report of the survey and its recommendations were approved (see IAC-D-82 series).

2. One of the major findings of the survey was that a consolidated Statement of Need for the "types of intelligence and intelligence information required to meet USIA's essential needs" should be approved. This statement of need was approved by all interested agencies. It <sup>indicated</sup> provided that additional detail would, of course, be necessary to support CIA operations and, against military personnel <sup>targets</sup>, armed forces operations. This

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statement of need has served as a base to define the specific basic intelligence requirements for NIS which in turn have been approved by agencies in the NIS Committee.

3. During the survey the statement of need was tested in the cases of two countries -- <sup>25X1C</sup> [redacted] In the case of <sup>25X1C</sup> [redacted] a psychological offensive program had already been approved. Based on this program an intelligence annex listing questions which should be answered by intelligence was agreed to by persons participating in the survey. <sup>by priority of course,</sup> The answers <sup>such</sup> to intelligence questions should, ~~of course,~~ be provided in advance of or at least concurrent <sup>by</sup> with the <sup>evaluation</sup> establishment of a program <sup>if</sup> in order that programming decisions <sup>are to</sup> would be based on all available information. The second country, <sup>25X1C</sup> [redacted] was chosen for various reasons, and a list of intelligence questions to serve as an annex to a [redacted] country plan was agreed upon. Time did not permit answering the <sup>25X1A</sup> [redacted] intelligence questions while the survey was in progress.

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4. Since the survey and at the suggestion of the undersigned, the Department of State has assembled in one volume (copy attached) available intelligence in answer to the <sup>25X1C</sup> [redacted] intelligence questions. The intelligence assembled appears to cover most of the intelligence questions asked but requires tailoring and editing to be more useful. Some additional information would necessarily be required from the field and of a current nature.

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The amount of additional intelligence required would become less and less in quantity as the NIS basic intelligence program produces more basic intelligence in keeping with the revised outline referred to in para. 2 above.

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5. Perhaps the first point which [redacted] volume makes clear is that the intelligence production program of OIR in State already provides an enormous amount of intelligence materials which bear upon intelligence needs for one particular USIA country program. While this will vary from country to country the case is in general typical.

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6. It is doubted that the assembly of pertinent finished intelligence materials in the form used in [redacted] case is the practical way to go about answering the questions bearing upon other country programs, a general outline for which is attached. It is suggested instead that:

a. IRI personnel should be responsible for preparing from such materials intelligence annexes to country plans <sup>(except "Stage I")</sup> -- this is a case of tailoring to meet an agency's peculiar needs and

b. Where necessary, consulting with OIR specialists and OCI specialists where refinements or more current facts and interpretations are required.

*c. OIR should contribute to such intelligence annexes the part labelled Stage I, since it requires current and strategic interpretations.*  
Naturally this should not become a mechanical process and the questions set forth in the model may need to be refined and indeed some of them might well not be pertinent to the programming needs.

*could be found in current basic material*

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7. In addition, modifications of the model questions for an intelligence annex might be useful for DDP/PP programs or for OCPW planning (though somewhat less applicable in the latter case in view of the fact that OCPW is conducting no current operations and its major requirement is for the stock-piling of information). As in the USIA case normally DDP and OCPW should expect to perform the tailoring required to meet ~~Their~~ own needs <sup>instead of</sup> rather than imposing this task on OIR.

8. It would be appreciated if we could have a note from you indicating your reactions to the foregoing ideas. *It might then be useful for me to circulate these notes to all concerned as the basis for a group discussion of the matter.*

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