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Special Support Assistant, DD/S

3 July 1956

Chief, Policy and Planning Staff, OC

Semi-annual Report on Wartime Preparation

REF: DD/S letter dated 8 June 1956, same subject

1. This status report relates to requirements relevant to the reference and known to this Office on 25 June 1956.
2. Our wartime preparation program embraces planning for the following:
 - a. The emergency relocation center
 - b. Domestic emergency circuitry.
 - c. Intra-Agency emergency communications
 - d. Support of CIA wartime circuit requirements by the Department of Defense.
 - e. Development of new equipment and techniques for wartime use.
 - f. Communications support of the military unconventional warfare effort.
 - g. Staybehind planning--unilateral, bi-and polypartite.
 - h. Radio base planning including
 - i. Stockpiles.
 - j. Communications annexes to CIA Theater War Plans.
 - k. The Office of Communications Civilian Reserve Program.
3. The following have been accomplished:
 - 2.a. The Alternate Signal Center at is complete and functioning.
 - 2.d. This requirement was accepted by the Department of Defense 30 March 1954 (DCEM 821, Top Secret).

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2.h. To the extent that base radio stations will be built in peacetime in support of CIA wartime projects, this program is complete. Bases for this purpose exist in [redacted]

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[redacted] the United States. All of these may not exist or be used, however, subsequent to D-Day.

4. These are in process:

2.b. This includes emergency reroutings in the Washington area resulting from the Government Relocation Plan. It is nearing 90 percent completion.

2.c. This includes [redacted], Room 2, the Security Office and Mobile Nets, etc. Anticipated completion date, 20 July 1956.

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2.e. A continuing and changing undertaking. Certain systems have been tested and will be installed in our base radio stations upon receipt from the manufacturer. Even so, the search for greater reliability in communications will be continued. A percentage estimate is not possible. Agent sets RS-1 and RS-6 are in stock in quantities sufficient for D plus one year. New equipment is being developed as rapidly as possible.

2.g. In this field planning for the European Area (WE, EE and SE) is 60 percent complete; in the Middle East (MEA) 50 percent; in South East Asia (SEA) 30 percent. In the Central and North Far East (FE) planning for this type of activity has not been brought to a point where percentage figures are applicable. Incidentally, attrition of many parts will prevent achievement of 100 percent.

2.h. Radio base planning in terms of locations nears completion with the exception of [redacted] 85 percent would be a reasonable estimate.

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2.i. Communications stockpiles of varying sizes are located at our active bases in [redacted] and the United States. Additional communications material and mobile equipments are stored at [redacted] Thus, we have something at all of the locations presently included in our plans since a revision of quantities is in progress, a statement of completeness of the program is not applicable.

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2.j. Communications annexes to the CIA Theater War Plans have been approved for CIA/Pacific. [redacted] A concept annex has been submitted for the [redacted] area. The Agency Global War Plan includes a statement of Office of Communications-approved policy. This represents about 100 percent of what we have been asked to contribute.

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* as regards enemy counter action.

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5. There are three major items outstanding about which we can do very little until extra-Office of Communications action is taken.

2.k. An important matter, this is now being handled by the Office of Personnel with this Office assisting. Since it is actually an Agency-wide problem, its solution will undoubtedly be correspondingly sweeping.

2.h. A decision must be made between [redacted] before we can complete our communications planning for [redacted]. The entire matter is being thrashed out by elements of DD/P.

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2.f. This remains an enigma to us. Many discussions have taken place, but no formal requirement has been levied on the Agency. Until the Department of Defense does this we can not recommend the nature, type or extent of communications support we will be able to provide.

6. The answer to paragraph 2. of the reference must be done in two parts:

a. Assuming that our clandestine communications assets now in place can be brought to bear in a wartime situation, I believe that the Agency's performance in this field will be commensurate with the task. In those areas where requirements will be war-born, the planning already done, together with the depth of experience provided by Office of Communications personnel both in Headquarters and the field, will permit the Agency to do its job in the clandestine communications field to an extent which will be limited mainly by the completeness of its wartime Communications Table of Organization.

b. In terms of our wartime staff communications capability, the Agency must anticipate a crashing failure unless the current shortage of code clerks and radio operators is eliminated and augmented by an effective Civilian Reserve Program per paragraph 2.k. [redacted] came within a few bodies of swamping the Office of Communications. Senior staff officers stood extended watches at radio stations and code rooms. Excessive overtime has become normal for radio stations and signal centers here and in the field. The health of our personnel is frequently directly affected. The slightest flap delays routine staff communications operations even further. Thus, until we reach a level in personnel strength where routine Agency business can be handled by us without overworking, I believe we must expect a degree of chaos on D-Day which will prevent effective handling of all but the highest precedence traffic.

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