Soviet Capabilities
in Guided Missiles
(IAC-D-81, 10 March 1954;
Memorandum for DCI from
Assistant Secretary of
Defense (R&D) dated 26 March,
circulated to members 29 March)

- Estimate on the status and future course of Soviet guided missile

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 and members were unabled to normalize succh advances

 by scientific advisors. The estimate's scope will include points

 raised by both FCDA and will initially be open-ended

 as to time covered, and will be completed at a date judged realistic

 on the basis of further consideration by the Board of National Estimates.
 - 4. <u>Discussion</u>: The Acting DCI felt that this subject was so important and embraced so many aspects of intelligence production that it should be treated on a broad rather than a narrower basis.

 It was recognized that the subject matter had major military implications and that the instant case would establish no precedent.
 - 5. There was the suggestion that an <u>ad hoc</u> group, comparable to the JAEIC, make the desired estimate for IAC review, but this was rejected on the grounds that the existing NIE machinery was entirely adequate. It any event, the IAC felt that it was premature to conclude that there is a requirement for a JAEIC-type mechanism in the guided missile field.

- 6. Tentative plans to enlist the assistance of a few cleared scientists privy to U.S. missile research and development were discussed. It was recognized that such assistance to the Board would aid in satisfying consumers that the best possible work had been done and in checking the intelligence methodology employed. The members were invited to nominate scientific advisors.
- 7. Tentative plans to create task teams for the scientific-technical, political, economic and strategic aspects of the estimate were outlined. In reply to Mr. Armstrong's question as to the role of the SEC (established by DCID 3/4 to integrate intelligence opinion for the purposes of national intelligence), it was suggested that the scientific-technical task team could perform this function.