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


IDEA 0904  
Copy 5 of 5

3 October 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Deputy Assistant Director, OSA  
**SUBJECT:** IDEALIST Concept of Operations

1. Due to recent events which have overtaken the IDEALIST program it is necessary to reevaluate that program's concepts of operation as it appears presently and during the near future. The principal events, their effects and a recommended course of action will be discussed in this paper.

2. 

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Three main points arise as a result of this unfortunate loss:

a. Our already low inventory of operational U-2C aircraft becomes critical.

b. This incident, along with the recent revelation of the presence of SAM sites and MIG 21 aircraft in Cuba, dictates a more cautious approach in the employment of U-2 aircraft. The net effect is that it will probably require more operational sorties to achieve less coverage.

c. North Viet Nam reconnaissance coverage 

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The above mentioned considerations are discussed in some detail in following paragraphs.

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3. OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

a. The IDEALIST concept of operations requires a total of seven U-ZC aircraft. This figure allows for two aircraft at Detachment H, two aircraft on TDY or other permanent overseas location, two aircraft in ZI at Detachment G and one rotating through periodic IRAN and/or other maintenance. Experience has proven that on the average more than one vehicle is not available due to the demands for test beds, modifications, IRAN, updating, etc. In fact, during the last 12 months an average of over two operational aircraft have been unavailable due to the above activities. These shortages have resulted in a serious loss of pilot proficiency training, excessive overtime in performing routine maintenance and in some cases, our inability to support secondary mission requirements and accomplish badly needed new tactical doctrine testing and evaluation.

b. \*Operational aircraft availability through April 1962:

<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>
343	343	343	358	358	358	358
342(-)	355	355	355	355	355	355
359(29th)	359	359	359	359	359	359
		358(10th)	342(21st)	342	342	342
			343(-)	352(?)	352	352
					343	343
					367(11th)	367

Non-Available Aircraft and Reason

	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
Test Bed	352	352	352	352	352(?)	
Conversion	359(-)	367	367	367	367	367(-)
IRAN	342(29th)	342	342	(342 (21st)		
		358	358(-)	343(-)		
Movements	358					
	355					

NOTE: Approved For Release 2003/01/24 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600100105-9  
Attended to reflect adjustments made at meeting in the Control Center, 4 Oct 62. Attended jointly by LAC, Project Hqs.

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**4. RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. U-2A, 367, should be obtained from SAC and programmed into conversion at LAC at the earliest possible date. This action will increase our inventory to the minimum required to support the operational concept and offers some badly needed pad against either further operational losses and/or unforeseen special testing which will in all probability occur.

25X1A b. That further negotiations be conducted regarding the use of [ ] for future OXCART testing with the objective of obtaining article 352 for operational and IDEALIST project test uses that require a J-75 engine configuration. It can be anticipated that at least one U-2C will be required for special testing of new defensive equipments, further NORAD test, 25X1A [ ] engine research, etc. These project support requirements have not been considered in the current aircraft inventory and flow schedules. An alternative which is acceptable and in some ways preferable to Operations is to use the SAC J-57 engine (350) aircraft for INS testing. This offers the advantage of having a test bed for other camera, film, special equipment, etc., testing which seems to be a perpetual requirement without the [ ] 25X1A 25X1A [ ] expense.

**5. INCREASED DEFENSIVE POSITION OF SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES:**

Due to the relative invulnerability of the U-2C to know defensive capabilities of Communist countries over which we have been operating recently, it has been possible to program photographic coverage of many miles of denied territory and/or many specific target areas. For practical purposes, fuel and/or film supplies were the only limiting factors when favorable weather conditions existed. Now, in the light of recent discovery of SAM sites and high performance aircraft, in Cuba, plus some evidence of an increase defensive capability of the ChiComs, long sorties over some denied areas can no longer be considered acceptable.

Assuming that photographic reconnaissance will continue to be required and that the U-2 will for some time be the best vehicle from which to collect this intelligence it is mandatory that every reasonable effort be taken to reduce the risk attendant to any overflight. Improved and additional defensive equipment for the U-2 is presently being obtained on a rush basis.

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**6. TACKLE/LOW NOTE OPERATIONS:**

Since an operations paper has been presented reflecting our recommendations (IDEA 0903) regarding TACKLE only North Viet Nam operations are discussed here.

It is my opinion that Southeast Asia reconnaissance coverage as we presently know them cannot be satisfactorily accomplished on a TDY rotation basis from Detachment G. However, if the requirements can be satisfied by partial coverage once every 4 to 6 months a modified operational concept similar to [redacted] etc., could be worked out. The two largest problems, i. e., suitable weather conditions only 2-4 days per month or less and the ferrying of aircraft across the Pacific, precludes any practical plans for monthly coverage without either using TACKLE facilities as before, or establishing a somewhat permanent detachment at [redacted]

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**a. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVES:**

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(1) [redacted] using TACKLE facilities with [redacted] for LOW NOTE sorties. This is the concept recommended by Operations. Several modifications of previous procedures could be made which should minimize some of the principal objections. For example, our

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[redacted]

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(2) Another plan would stage the aircraft and a staging team from [redacted] during an anticipated good weather period. Admittedly this concept would require some personnel augmentations at Detachment H, but would undoubtedly be a more economical operation than any other concept excluding (1) above.

(3) A third concept, the feasibility of which is dependent on the extent of Cuba requirements in the future, would deploy a staging team from Detachment G to [redacted] and use TACKLE aircraft on "loan" from [redacted]

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
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The inherent disadvantages of this plan are; (1) the long lead time (minimum 5-7 days) would preclude keying the operation to forecast weather conditions, (2) frequent airlift halfway around the world and return (3) and, of course, the loss of manpower and equipment while traveling and waiting for operational conditions. [redacted] and [redacted] would be operationally crippled during the period of this operation.

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Chief, Operations Division, OSA

cc: AD/OSA

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OSA/OD [redacted] (3 Oct 62)

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