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CHAPTER IX

ARMY, DOS, JCS and USAF review(s)
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ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1950-1953

Chapter IX: PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

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Chapter IX

PRODUCTION AND COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Status of CIA's Estimating Program and Procedure in 1950

By August 1950, when General Smith was appointed as Director, CIA had had some $4\frac{1}{2}$ years of experience, under three successive Directors, with the Government's experiment of producing intelligence estimates on a cooperative, interdepartmental basis. Historically there was probably nothing older or more basic in intelligence work than the ultimate task of estimating a foreign power's capabilities, weaknesses, and intentions. Only in recent years, however, had the Government attempted a continuing, organized effort at comprehensive estimating, in which the Nation's total intelligence resources and talents, traditionally decentralized among several departments and agencies, might somehow be regularly brought to bear, in a single integrated and objective evaluation, on a given foreign policy issue or international situation. Such a concerted approach had been informally attempted during World War II by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which had been continued after the war, even though responsibility for coordinated, interdepartmental estimating was officially assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence.

The years 1946-50 were experimental with respect to this problem and marked by a measure of accomplishment with, perhaps, a larger measure of problems and difficulties. Responsibility to

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produce intelligence estimates on foreign problems of "national" significance, in "coordination" with all the departments and agencies concerned with national security, was vested in the NSCI, successively by Presidential order, Congressional statute, and National Security Council directive.¹ Under these directives the established intelligence branches of the operating and planning departments and agencies were expected to contribute to CIA-produced estimates, and to participate in the deliberations leading to the final estimative conclusions. At the same time, however, the existing prerogatives of those agencies to produce independent "departmental" estimates were left undisturbed; and in practice their cooperation and attention to the centrally sponsored program of coordinated estimating was not undivided. Frequently their cooperation was only passive.

Within NSCI and CIA, the new estimates program was managed, from 1946 to 1950, by a central production staff which was known successively as the Central Reports Staff (CRS), February - July 1946, the Office of Research and Evaluations (ORE), July 1946 - January 1947, and the Office of Reports and Estimates, February

¹ See especially (1) President Truman's letter of Jan. 22, 1946 (unclassified), ordering the establishment of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG); (2) NIA Directive No. 1, Feb. 1946; (3) the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, effective in Sept. 1947, which (among other things) renamed CIG the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and gave statutory recognition to the NSCI's responsibility "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security"; and (4) National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 3, Dec. 1947, which implemented that statute in relation to CIA's estimating responsibilities. (Copies in NSCI/NS files.)

1947 - November 1950. Even within this staff, however, attention to estimates was divided, because ORE also had responsibilities for other types of production such as periodic summaries, regional surveys, informal memoranda, and oral briefings.

In the fall of 1949, several changes had been made in the organization of the Office of Reports and Estimates. The most important of them involved the creation of an "Estimates Production Board" consisting of the chiefs of all producing divisions and of the two principal staffs under the chairmanship of the Assistant Director. Subordinate to this change was the formation of an "Estimates Branch" within each of the producing divisions. The intention of the reorganization was to make the estimates branches responsible for adequacy and accuracy of estimative material prepared by their divisions, while the Estimates Production Board was to act as a reviewing authority for all ORE estimative material. In point of fact, however, this system was never fully utilized during the year when it was technically in operation.

In July 1950, shortly after the beginning of hostilities in Korea, the Assistant Director appointed a "Special Staff" to assist him in the review of current intelligence and estimative material concerning the Korean situation.¹ This move was undoubtedly prompted by the urgency of demands for intelligence on Korea after June 25

¹ ORE Operating Procedure Order No. 15, July 3, 1950 (Secret), in O/DCI/BS files. See also two further orders: Instruction No. 27, July 12; and Order No. 18, Aug. 3, 1950. (Ibid.)

when delays in production that had formerly been commonplace had begun to seem inadmissible. The Assistant Director's thought seems to have been that if he himself, assisted by a staff of intelligence estimators, gave authoritative consideration to all material on Korea, time otherwise spent in unresolved disagreement might be saved.

The "Special Staff" was not, however, the equivalent of the "small estimating group" recommended so frequently in 1949-1950. For one thing, this Staff did not supersede the "Estimates Production Board", nor did it in any way disturb the general organization of ORE as determined in 1949. It was emphasized, on the other hand, that the Special Staff was a temporary device, concerned only with material arising out of the Korean war.

Inasmuch as virtually all material being prepared by ORE in the summer of 1950 was related directly to the war in Korea, however, the Special Staff's responsibilities, as long as it was in existence, were relatively comprehensive. It was evident that the Staff could easily be transformed into a permanent estimating group such as ONE was to become. On October 26, however, the Special Staff was abolished on grounds that the Korean emergency no longer required it.¹

Parallel with the problem of internal organization was the problem of departmental participation in the CIA-sponsored estimating program. By 1950, CIA had experimented with a variety of procedures and practices, including committee systems, formal correspondence, and direct contact and liaison, to the end of promoting and improving

¹ ONE Operating Procedure Order No. 21, Oct. 26, 1950.

departmental cooperation in the national estimating process, and obtaining a workable consensus on controversial issues.

During the period 1946-1950, CIA had been heavily dependent on other intelligence organizations for all types of material to be used in estimates, because its own collection services had not had time to develop. This material, however, came to CIA, in part, through regular channels primarily designed to serve CIA's current-intelligence needs. Because ORE had developed since 1947 as a research organization, it was able to arrive at some conclusions primarily on the basis of this material as stored in its own files, supplemented through direct consultation with analysts in other agencies. Formal Agency contributions to estimates also figured in the process when they were provided. ORE's practice of depending on its own research, however, led to criticism (including that to be found in the Dulles Report) to the effect that CIA ignored other agencies in the preparation of estimates rather than leading them in a cooperative effort.

On the other hand, however, there could be little question that CIA attempted to take all relevant agencies into account in framing final drafts of estimates. After experimenting for two years with written circulation of drafts "for concurrence, dissent, or comment", ORE by 1950 adopted the method of discussing all prepared drafts with ad hoc committees made up of representatives assigned from all participating agencies, under the chairmanship of a disinterested CIA representative who had had no part in

preparing the estimate under discussion. These committees--made up essentially of experts--continued to meet on the estimate at issue until substantial agreement had been reached by those participating. After the final meeting a new draft was prepared by ORE based on the consensus reached, circulated for final comment, and then sent officially to the IAC members themselves for concurrence or dissent. This was made particularly necessary by virtue of the fact that members of the ad hoc committees frequently were not permitted to speak officially for their agencies. For this reason, there was, of course, no guarantee that agreements reached at inter-agency meetings would be final. Frequently, in fact, departmental intelligence chiefs, on studying drafts agreeable to their subordinates, raised unforeseen objections. The ensuing effort to reach agreement, however (which was frequently of long duration), did not normally take place at the level of the departmental chiefs but rather was handled indirectly through subordinates in the form of correspondence, telephone calls, or further meetings of the ad hoc committees. At the conclusion of these negotiations a satisfactory draft would be produced or a dissent would become unavoidable. CIA/ORE was normally in a difficult position in these negotiations because it could never be sure that concessions it made to dissenting opinion on the part of one department might not render a previously agreed draft unacceptable to one of the others. In no case observed in the course of this study did the IAC itself meet to settle any of these disputes. This was, of course, a cardinal difference between coordination procedures before and after October 1950.

For reasons as indicated above, it can be seen that no single, unvarying method could be made to apply to the preparation and coordination of all estimates during the 1946-1950 period. In very general terms, however, the procedure in use by October 1950 was as follows.

A given estimate project was scheduled in ORE on the basis of a request from the NSC or one of the operating departments, or on the initiative of CIA. Next, an outline of the "terms of reference" was prepared by ORE, circulated to the departmental member agencies of the IAC, along with a request for contributions to the forthcoming estimate. On occasion, ad hoc committees discussed terms of reference and the allocation of contributions before they were circulated. Each department was expected to prepare a contribution according to its special field of interest. The principal contributions came from the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments; rarely from the other intelligence agencies in the Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These contributions were used by ORE in the formation of a draft estimate. This draft was then circulated to the departmental intelligence agencies by ORE. ORE then called informal meetings with IAC "working-level representatives" at which conflicting views were aired, further research invited if appropriate, and a consensus sought. After whatever revision was indicated at this meeting, a final draft was formally sent to each departmental intelligence chief, for the written concurrence of that agency, or its comment or dissent.

Finally, the finished estimate was printed and disseminated.¹

By August 1950, a hundred ~~some~~ estimates had been produced, under CIA/ORE sponsorship, according to variations of this general formula that had been followed since 1946. More recently, during the eight months since January 1950, some 21 such estimates had been completed.² Most of these dealt with Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled areas, or trouble spots on the Soviet periphery

[redacted] included, for example, was a series of estimates early in June 1950 warning of the coming war in Korea. Other estimates disseminated in 1950 dealt with areas of the Free world, [redacted]

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In addition the following ORE estimating projects were under way in August 1950, at various stages of completion:

"Prospects for the Defense of Indochina against a Chinese Communist Invasion" (ORE 50-50), and "Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina during 1950" (ORE 50-50 Supplement); requested by State Department, August 1950; completed and disseminated on September 7, 1950.

"Probable Developments in Eastern Germany by the end of 1951" (ORE 34-50); initiated by CIA/ORE, May 1950; completed and disseminated September 29, 1950.

¹ The system described here was highly variable. In many cases, the "terms of reference" and "contribution" steps were omitted. Each individual estimate usually brought its own problems which required adaptations of the system.

² Copies of these estimates, together with working papers and correspondence, are in O/DCI/HS files.



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"Consequences to the U. S. of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia" (ORE 29-50); requested by State Department, April 1950; completed and disseminated October 13, 1950, with dissents by State, Army, and Air Force.



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"South African Politics and U. S. Security" (ORE 27-50); begun April 1950, requester unknown; completed and disseminated November 17, 1950.



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"Neutrality and Third-Force Tendencies in Western Europe" (ORE 36-50); initiated by CIA/ORE, May 1950; completed and disseminated December 19, 1950.

"Repercussions on the Netherlands of Indonesian Independence" (ORE 6-50); initiated by CIA/ORE, December 1949; completed and disseminated December 19, 1950.

"Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Korea" (ORE 45-50); requested by NSC, July 1950; draft sent to NSC in September 1950; and subsequently cancelled as a formal estimate.

"Probable Attitudes of Non-Soviet Countries toward a U. S. Decision to Initiate War against the USSR" (ORE 51-50); initiated by CIA/ORE, about July 1950; draft completed about September 20, 1950; and subsequently cancelled as a formal estimate.

Pending Proposals and Initial Decisions for Continuity and Change

When General Smith became Director, this CIA experiment in cooperative, interdepartmental estimating had been the subject of criticism and controversy for almost four years. Proposals for administrative changes had come both from within and outside the agency, particularly in 1949 and 1950. By the summer of 1950, some changes had been made, while others had been shelved or were pending. In September 1950, the outgoing Director, on the occasion of CIA's annual request for funds to the President and the Bureau of the Budget, had singled out the management of national estimating and the need for "improving" the estimating process as the number-one management problem of the Agency.¹

Three major types of continuing administrative problems appear to have been involved. First, how could the estimates be made more responsive to the needs of the White House, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the several operating departments and agencies concerned with the national security? Next, how could departmental intelligence resources and talents be better marshalled for national estimating? Finally, how could CIA's own staff for estimating be better organized and staffed to serve the complicated purposes for which it was intended?

¹ "Introduction" to CIA Budget Estimate for Fiscal Year 1952, dated Sept. 1, 1950, Secret, p. 10; copy attached to CIA Comptroller's "Historical Notes . . .", 1945-52, [redacted] in O/DI/NS files.

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Three sets of recommendations calling for changes in the national intelligence system, confronted the outgoing and incoming Directors in September 1950, all three of them having been submitted by outside parties, on the basis of surveys and investigations of CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies made in 1948, 1949, and 1950. The first was a report of the Hoover Commission's subcommittee or task force on national security, headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, prepared late in 1948 and submitted to Congress by the Hoover Commission in February 1949.¹ The second was a report of the Dulles Survey Group to the National Security Council, submitted in January 1949 and endorsed in principle by the NSC in July 1949.² The third was a plan for a "national intelligence group", contained in a staff study prepared in May 1950, chiefly by General John Magruder of the Defense Department and W. Park Armstrong of the State Department. This last plan was submitted to CIA in July 1950,

X1 ¹ The Eberstadt Task Force on about Nov. 15, 1948, submitted a [redacted] report to the Hoover Commission entitled "The Central Intelligence Agency, National and Service Intelligence", which comprised Chapter II (pp. 25-60) of a longer report (some 250 pp.) on the "National Security Organization" as a whole. (A copy of Chapter II, undated, is on file in O/DGI/ER.) This report, which in turn was transmitted to Congress by Mr. Hoover on Jan. 13, 1949, remained unpublished, and should not be confused with a briefer, unclassified report, also entitled "National Security Organization" (121 pp., 1949), published by the Hoover Commission as "Appendix 3" of its reports, nor with the Hoover Commission's own report to Congress, also entitled "The National Security Organization" (30 pp.). Copies of these two published reports are in the CIA Library.

² Dulles Survey Group, Report..., Jan. 1, 1949, [redacted] copy in O/DGI/HS files. 25X

and subsequently revised in collaboration with CIA officials, in August and September 1950.¹

While the three survey groups were far from unanimous in many of their recommendations, they expressed a common concern for improving the inter-departmental estimating process rather than scrapping it and reverting to a decentralized system of departmental estimates. The Eberstadt committee, for example, had found the traditional system of departmental estimating to be deficient. It had criticized the military intelligence services for the wide divergence in their individual departmental estimates of potential enemy strength, and attributed this divergence partly to their "natural service interests" and partly to the "inter-service budgetary competition" among them.² The Eberstadt committee had found, furthermore, that such inter-service estimates as were being coordinated within the Defense Department by the Joint Intelligence Committee "contained so many inconsistencies within a single paper that it was considered valueless for planning purposes."³ The Dulles Group had questioned the objectivity of estimates made by the Joint Intelligence Committee and by the individual

¹ The plan, dated May 1, 1950, was sent to the DCI on July 7, 1950, by UnderSecretary of State Webb; copy in O/DCI/HS files. Later versions were revisions made in collaboration with CIA officials in Aug.-Sept. 1950. Copies of these later drafts, mostly undated, together with related correspondence, are in O/DCI/ER.

² Eberstadt Task Force report , p. 40, previously cited.

³ Ibid., p. 40.

military services, and had asserted that within the State Department, "the policy makers are, for the most part, their own intelligence advisors."¹

Far from abandoning the experiment of CIA-supervised estimating, the Eberstadt committee had emphatically urged that CIA "must . . . fulfill its responsibility for central evaluation of intelligence free from departmental prejudice, control, or bias, whether real or imagined."² In the same vein, the Dulles Group had urged that the national intelligence estimate become "an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners."³ CIA had the "mandate" in existing legislative and executive directives, the Dulles Group concluded, to insure that the U. S. Government did have "adequate central machinery" for "the examination and interpretation of intelligence so that national security will not be jeopardized by failure to coordinate the best intelligence opinion in the country, based on all available information."⁴

The Magruder-Armstrong plan of July 1950, had gone farther than either the Eberstadt or Dulles plans in proposing that the scope of "national" estimates be enlarged to include "strictly

¹ Dulles Survey Group report, previously cited, p. 69.

² Eberstadt Task Force report , p. 44.

³ Dulles Survey Group report, previously cited, pp. 68-69.

⁴ Ibid., p. 65.

political" and "strictly military" estimates, whenever such subjects were of national policy interest. In spite of existing directives specifying that these were within the "exclusive competence" of the State and Defense Departments,¹ the Magruder-Armstrong plan proposed that they be processed as "national" estimates.

With respect to the problem of CIA's "customer relations" with the policy echelons to which national estimates were addressed, the Eberstadt and Dulles plans both had criticisms to offer and some improvements to suggest. The Eberstadt committee had concluded that CIA was not enjoying "the full confidence" of the National Security Council, and had "not as yet, with certain encouraging exceptions, played an important role in [its] determinations".² More specifically, the committee criticized the CIA estimating staff in ORE for not having developed close enough working relations, either with the NSC Staff, whose meetings ORE attended only "when invited", or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which CIA had only a tenuous contact.³

The committee also criticized the policy and operating agencies for withholding background information on the Government's own operational activities and decisions.⁴ The Eberstadt committee concluded

¹ Draft of "national intelligence group" plan, previously cited.

² Eberstadt Task Force report previously cited, pp. 37-38.

³ Ibid., p. 33

⁴ Ibid., pp. 33, 37-38, 52.

that ". . . effective intelligence is possible only when it is closely linked with planning and policy making." Furthermore, "if CIA was to perform its job adequately, it "must be aware of, and participate in, the thinking at all these [policy and planning] levels."¹

The Dulles report, similarly, had found a lack of confidence in CIA's estimates, but attributed it primarily to CIA's tendency to take the initiative in launching estimates independently of the departmental intelligence agencies, and to "select [its] own subjects and establish [its] own priorities".² Like the Aberstadt committee, the Dulles Group criticized policy staffs for withholding background operational information from CIA, and warned against the dangerous tendency of the policy staffs to ignore estimates.³

The Dulles Group had little to recommend, however, on how to meet the needs of the policy staffs, except that CIA should rely more heavily on greater participation by the departmental intelligence agencies, including their participation in the planning of estimating projects and the setting of priorities.⁴

The Magruder-Armstrong plan for a "national intelligence group" had relatively little to say on this subject, except to propose that the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Committee be

¹ Ibid., p. 52.

² Dulles Survey Group report, previously cited, pp. 69, 70, 72, 74.

³ Ibid., pp. 79, 80.

⁴ Ibid., p. 73.

brought into the planning of estimating projects, and into the reviewing of any projects that might be "initiated" by CIA.¹

Greater participation by the departmental intelligence agencies at all stages of the estimating process was, meanwhile, the major theme in all three sets of proposals. The Eberstadt committee had recommended that the contacts between the CIA estimating staff and the IAC agencies be strengthened, and that the Intelligence Advisory Committee itself be convened more frequently by the DDI on substantive issues in specific estimates.² As to departmental research contributions to estimates, the Eberstadt committee observed that both the departments and CIA/ORE frequently "examined the same basic material", but concluded that to "some degree" such duplication was "inevitable and even desirable".³ Rather than curtail CIA research, the Eberstadt committee suggested that CIA's analysts be placed "in the message centers and secretariats of the departments and [military] services, to sift out really important material for routing to CIA".⁴ On the controversial issue of "political" intelligence work, shared by CIA and the State Department, the Eberstadt committee recommended that "a large part"

¹ Plan for "national intelligence group", including both original version of May 1950 and revised version of Aug.-Sept. 1950, previously cited above.

² Eberstadt Task Force report ([redacted] previously cited), p. 53.

³ Ibid., pp. 49-50.

⁴ Ibid., p. 50.

of State's intelligence research branch, which during the war had been a part of OSS, be transferred to CIA.¹

The Dulles Group had come to somewhat different conclusions on how to improve departmental cooperation in CIA's estimating program. Not only should the departments "fully participate" at all stages of the program, but all of them should assume collective responsibility for the finished estimates.² ORE's practice of relying heavily on its own research was categorically condemned, and its procedure of circulating drafts of estimates and inviting "a formal notation of dissent or concurrence" did "not substantially mitigate" CIA's "failure" to achieve full cooperation.³ ORE's "initiative" in selecting estimates projects and setting priorities on them without departmental consultation was deplored.⁴ While the Dulles Group did not translate these indictments into a full positive statement of revised procedures, it did, in general, urge fuller participation by the IAC and its departmental members at all stages in the estimating process.

Somewhat in the same direction, but with proposals in fuller detail, was the Magruder-Armastrong plan, which called for greater participation by the departments, individually and through the IAC,

¹ Ibid., p. 50.

² Dulles Survey Group report (previously cited), pp. 5, 77, 69, 81.

³ Ibid., pp. 6, 72, 74-75.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 69, 70, 72, 74.

in CIA's estimating program. Thus, the IAC was expected to "advise" the DCI on estimating projects being initiated by CIA, as well as on Government plans "which should be based . . . on estimates".¹ The actual drafting of estimates would continue to be handled within CIA, but should be based as fully as possible on "departmental contributions, oral and written, and [on] departmental views . . . considered at all stages of production".² On the other hand, "departmental . . . resources [should] be subjected to adequate safeguards against bias", and CIA's existing intelligence resources should "continue" to be employed.³ The individual departments must have an opportunity to review an estimate in draft stage, while the IAC would subject the final draft to "formal review". In addition, the IAC should review research and collection inadequacies revealed in a given estimating project, and "advise" the DCI on collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies for the production of "combined" estimates.⁴

Finally, as to CIA's internal organization for estimating, all three survey groups had recommendations to offer. The Eberstadt committee, unlike the others, did not criticize ORR's basic organization, with its several regional branches, its several branches

¹ Draft of plan for "national intelligence group", May and Aug.-Sept. 1950 versions, previously cited.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

specializing in particular topical fields, and its planning, reviewing, and editorial staffs.¹ At the same time, however, it proposed that CIA establish an "intelligence evaluation board" at "a high level", presumably in ORE if not in the Director's immediate office, where "a small group of highly capable people, freed from administrative detail", would be assigned to "concentrate upon intelligence evaluation" and be "set to thinking about intelligence only".²

The Dulles Group, on the other hand, regarded ORE as the bête noire of the Government's entire estimating system, which should be thoroughly reorganized. It charged ORE generally with CIA's "failure" in estimating, "with one or two exceptions, whose occurrence was largely fortuitous", and accused ORE of having been "diverted" from national estimates to "the production of miscellaneous reports and summaries which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates".³ The solution, according to the Dulles Group, was to divorce estimating completely from other types of intelligence production, and re-establish it in a new, separate Estimates Division. That Division would consist of "a small group of highly selected individuals" who would "review" the products of the departmental intelligence agencies, draft the estimates from

¹ Oberstact Task Force [redacted] version, previously cited), p. 30.

² Ibid., p. 49.

³ Dulles Survey Group report (previously cited), pp. 5, 6, 70, 77.

them, and at various stages subject the drafts to review by the departments and the IAC.¹

Still another approach to reorganization was offered by Magruder and Armstrong, in their plan for a new "national intelligence group", previously mentioned. Like the others, this plan called for the end of ORE and for a separate estimating staff,^{but} it also called for a companion staff to be concerned with current intelligence. In this plan, both the "national estimates staff" and the "current intelligence staff" would work in close cooperation as two complementary parts of a larger "national intelligence group". Both staffs would be concerned with evaluating foreign capabilities and intentions, and each staff in turn would work in close collaboration with the departmental intelligence agencies: one staff from the immediate viewpoint of current indications; and the other from the more detached "long-range" viewpoint of "well-confirmed" estimates.

Thus General Smith was confronted, between August and October 1950, with three sets of similar but somewhat divergent proposals affecting the future course of CIA's estimating program and procedure. Taken together, these proposals comprised a considerable body of informed opinion on the problem as a whole, and each report carried a particular weight of authority with it.

¹ Ibid., pp. 6-7, 77, 81, 83.

The Eberstadt report, for example, had gone to Congress the year before, with the endorsement of the Hoover Commission, and with it, the implication, at least, that CIA would eventually be accountable to Congress on the recommendations that the Hoover Commission had made.

The Dulles report had been endorsed by the National Security Council, at least in principle, in July 1949; and now (in August-October 1950) the report had taken on a special persuasiveness, in the sense that two of the three principal signers of the report (Allen W. Dulles and William H. Jackson) were in the process of being appointed by the President as Deputy Directors on General Smith's staff. Jackson, in particular, is known to have urged the Dulles report on Smith, and recalled later that he had accepted the position of Deputy (to which he was appointed by the President in August 1950)¹ only on the condition that General Smith "read and approve" the Dulles report.²

The Magruder-Armstrong plan had at first been rejected by Admiral Millenkoetter (July 1950), but it had been subsequently

¹ On Aug. 22, 1950, while General Smith's nomination as DCI was before the Senate, the Washington Post asserted categorically that Jackson had been appointed as Deputy Director of CIA. About the same time, Arthur Krock reported, in the New York Times, that "Everell Harriman (a member of President Truman's white House staff), "had a hand" in Jackson's appointment. (See scrapbook of press clippings entitled "CIA in the News", 1950 volume, in the CIA Library.)

² Historical Staff interview with William H. Jackson, Feb. 16, 1955, in O/DCI/IS files.

revised by the General Counsel and other CIA officials in collaboration with State and Defense officials, and by mid-September 1950 Millenkoetter was ready to accept it. On October 3, 1950, W. H. Jackson read and commenced the plan as a "sound" one, and had endorsed it for General Smith's consideration.¹

Four days later, Jackson had asked ORE for its views, particularly on a separate estimating staff in CIA, and on October 10, had received from ORE a "rough plan" for a separate "Office of Estimates", over the signature of its chief, Theodore Babbitt, and his two senior assistants for estimating, Ludwell L. Montague and [redacted].² Like the Dulles report of 1949 and the "national intelligence group" plan of 1950 (which were cited), ORE's plan called for establishing the estimates function as a separate component in CIA. On the matter of inter-agency participation in estimates, the IAC was to provide final review, while the detailed, continuing, day-to-day job of inter-agency liaison and consultation was to be achieved, not by formal committees, but through a Coordination and Liaison Staff in the new Estimates Office. This coordination staff would be composed of full-time representatives from the other

¹ Memorandum by Jackson to Smith, Oct. 3, 1950, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "NSCID-1950". Jackson and Smith had been on duty in CIA since Oct. 1, but were not sworn in until Oct. 7, 1950.

² Memorandum by Babbitt, Montague, and [redacted] to Deputy Director (William H. Jackson), Oct. 10, 1950, [redacted] entitled "Plan for a CIA Office of Estimates"; copy in O/DCI/ER.

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intelligence-producing agencies, and of Estimates representatives who would be stationed at the major intelligence-using agencies, notably at the National Security Council staff, the Joint Intelligence Group (of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ORX's plan also included a current intelligence division, accountable to, and a responsible component of, the new Estimates Office. Apart from organizational particulars, ORX specified three conditions which had to be met to insure greater success in cooperative estimating: (1) the recruitment of additional, qualified senior personnel for estimates work, but not from among personnel "now in CIA"; (2) more adequate research contributions from the State and Defense Departments, "a condition [which] cannot be met at present;" and (3) "a cooperative attitude" among those departments and the other intelligence agencies, especially with respect to the process of coordination of the drafts of estimates.¹

Now importantly each of the four sets of proposals just outlined figured in General Smith's planning during his first weeks in office, is not entirely clear from the records seen in this study; and whether he was influenced by still other sources of opinion is not known. The Dulles report was apparently foremost in his mind, and central in Jackson's thinking as well. Thus, on October 12, Smith expressed his adherence to that report, at his first appearance at the meetings of the National Security Council; and again on October 20 he declared (this time at a meeting of the Intelligence

¹ Ibid.

Advisory Committee) that the NSC's previous endorsement of the Dulles report, in 1949, constituted the governing directive on him. At the same time, he announced that he had "terminated" further consideration of the State-Defense plan for a "national intelligence group", with the agreement of those departments.¹

The Hoover Commission recommendations were not cited at all at the meeting of October 20,² nor was OAS's reorganization plan of October 10. It appears, nevertheless, from Smith's decisions in October and November, and in later modifications in 1951 and 1952, that elements in CIA's new organization were derived from all four plans.

In any case, two major steps were taken immediately that stemmed directly from the Dulles report. One was to reactivate the Intelligence Advisory Committee (beginning on October 12, 1950) as the focal point for departmental participation in estimating,

¹ Minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, in two versions ("rough notes" and final copy as circulated), both in O/DCI/HS. At this meeting General Smith summarized what he had said at the NSC meeting on October 12.

² Ibid. Although the minutes of October 20 indicate that General Smith made no reference at that meeting to the Hoover Commission's survey of CIA in 1948 (the Aberstadt Task Force), he nevertheless knew of the survey and had read the report. Thus, two months before, at the Senate hearing on his nomination in August, he had singled out the Hoover Commission's report as the one item of "homework" he had read so far, along with the directives and statutes covering CIA.

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especially for interdepartmental deliberation on the final draft of the estimate. The other was to establish a new Office of National Estimates (on November 13, 1950) as the focal point within CIA for the drafting of estimates and the planning and supervision of the estimates program generally.

The Intelligence Advisory Committee, made up of the departmental intelligence chiefs and presided over by the DCI, was not, of course, a new inter-agency committee in the Government's intelligence organization, but its participation in the estimating process was a new departure in October 1950. Initially General Smith first convened the IAC for coordination of estimates, on October 12, 1950, in particular, to discuss and approve the final drafts of several the estimates on/Var Eastern situation, which had been prepared by ORR (under its established procedures) for use by the President at his forthcoming Wake Island conference with General MacArthur.¹ Thus was inaugurated under the IAC, a method for harmonizing and reconciling conflicting views, for increasing the area of agreement, and for increasing the sense of departmental participation and inter-departmental cooperation.

¹ General Smith convened the IAC, for the first time in his administration, for the "precise" purpose of working out Var East estimates for President Truman to take along to Wake Island, and this meeting led to the "first real coordination of national estimates in the history of U. S. intelligence", it was said later. (See memorandum by L. B. Kirkpatrick, "CIA's Role . . . in . . . Coordination", undated, about Nov. 1951, [redacted] p. 4; copy in O/DCI/NS, filed under "CIA".) See also O/DCI/NS study concerning estimates of Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War dated Oct. 1955.

At the next IAC meeting, on October 20, Jackson presented a restatement of his theory of national estimating, and General Smith followed with an outline of procedure calling henceforth for formal IAC action at additional stages in the estimating process. Henceforth the IAC would be invited to participate in the planning of estimating projects, to the extent of reviewing and adopting a project list and setting priorities in it. Each department was asked to submit project proposals by the next meeting, to be added to the list that was meanwhile to be prepared by ORS. Likewise, on the planning of terms of reference for individual projects, General Smith announced that the IAC henceforth would discuss and pass on the "frame of reference and . . . assumptions on which the estimate is based."¹ (This step was revised in subsequent weeks, however, to provide, instead, that CIA's estimating staff would first discuss each set of terms of reference informally with the working-level representatives of the departments, and refer to the IAC only those drafts of terms of reference on which agreement could not be reached.)²

¹ Minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, [redacted] in O/DCI/HS.

² On Oct. 26, the IAC considered and approved terms of reference for estimates on Indo-China and Germany, and went on to agree on the general principle that terms of reference should not, however, be inflexible, that "the experts should be allowed some latitude in working out necessary changes." (Minutes of IAC meeting, in IAC secretariat files, in ORS.) Early in December, ONE proposed to OIC that draft terms of reference "need not be cleared in the IAC unless issues arise at the working level", and this procedure (endorsed by OIC on Dec. 6) was approved by the IAC on Dec. 7. (See memorandum by OIC to DDCI, Dec. 6, [redacted] and IAC minutes, Dec. 7, IAC-4-10, both in O/CI/ER.)

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In other aspects, the procedure outlined on October 20 was not unlike existing ORE practice: CIA would assign contributions to the IAC member departments, and set deadlines in "consultation" with them. Upon the completion of the first draft of the estimate, CIA would send it to the departments for review, comment, and "further discussion, if required." The "second, or later drafts if required," would be submitted to the IAC itself for "final discussion, resolution of differences, and approval," in accordance with the precedent set on October 12.¹

If any remaining differences could not be resolved there, the estimate would be issued with "notation of substantial dissent and reasons therefore." For "crash" estimates, such as the Far Eastern reports completed on October 12 for the President, a special meeting of the IAC would be convened by the DCI, whereupon agency representatives (that is, from CIA and the departments) would be "assigned at once" to produce a draft, and the IAC would receive it for "discussion, revision, and approval."²

The establishment of a separate estimating staff within CIA's organization was General Smith's second major decision, announced first on October 20, 1950, at the IAC meeting with the departmental intelligence chiefs, and again on November 13, to the staff of CIA. Whether this reorganization was to consist simply of a re-naming of the Special Staff, which had been established within ORE in July 1950

¹ Minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, [redacted] in O/DCI/RS files.

² Ibid.

to supervise the estimating program, or whether there was to be a liquidation of ORG and a complete divorce of estimating from ORG's other production functions, was not immediately clear, however, from two versions of the minutes of the meeting of October 20 which have survived.

According to one which was reported by one of the Army observers present,¹ General Smith called ORG "the heart and soul of OIC and of the national intelligence machinery," which he proposed simply to divide into two divisions--a "Division of Estimates", which would handle the estimates program, and a "Division of Basic Intelligence,"² which would "confine" its activities to producing reports on "subjects assigned specifically by law to CIA." "Within the new Estimates Division of ORG", General Smith went on, according to this version, there would be established "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" of the new estimates organization. Smith had been "looking hard for a retired General or Admiral" to head the division, so the Army's minutes reported, and he had attempted to recruit Admiral Leslie Stevens, recent Naval Attache at Moscow. While Smith was continuing his efforts to "persuade" Stevens to come to CIA, he was also "anxious to get General

¹ "rough draft" of minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, signed by Col. H. M. Howze, G-2; in O/DCI/HS files.

² Whether the phrase "Basic Intelligence Division" was used advisedly, in its technical sense, to cover only the National Intelligence Surveys (see Chapter VII, above), or whether it simply denoted a general research division in OIC, is not clear from the minutes cited above.

[Clarence R.] Huebner to be a member of the panel, and possibly to head the division."¹

In a later edited version of minutes of the meeting on October 20, as circulated about November 1,² the new estimates staff was labelled as an entirely separate office--the "Office of National Estimates," rather than a new division of ORA; and the research components of ORA, which General Smith had proposed to call the "Basic Intelligence Division" of ORA, were now also called a separate office--the Office of Research and Reports. Presumably, General Smith was more certain by November 1 that ORA should be liquidated and replaced by two new offices. No mention was made in the revised minutes, however, of any board or panel of estimators within ORA's new estimating organization. Nor was the search for an Assistant Director of ORA mentioned,³ presumably because, by November 1, General Smith had settled on the appointment of William H. Langer.

Neither version of these decisions of October 20 indicated whether General Smith expected to keep a current intelligence staff

¹ "rough draft" of minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, [redacted] previously cited.

² Revised draft of minutes, labelled "IAC-M-1", in O/ICI/RS files. This typescript, with longhand changes and carrying the original date October 20, apparently was the final draft from which a "stencil was cut" and mimeographed copies printed for circulation, probably about Nov. 1. A copy of the printed minutes is in IAC Secretariat files in ONE.

³ ibid.

in CIA, and if so, how it was to be related to the estimating function. A few days later, however, on November 7 and 8, a "current division" appeared as a component of the new Office of National Estimates, on two successive drafts of^a proposed organization chart of CIA's production offices;¹ and a few weeks later, shortly after ONE was officially established, such a current staff was actually installed in ONE, by the transfer of some 30 former members of ORE's current intelligence group.² Thus the issue of current intelligence appeared to be settled, at least for the time being, much along the lines of ORE's recommendations of October 10, rather than according to the Dulles report (which had questioned CIA's need for that activity) or the State-Defense plan of September 1950 (which had called for a current intelligence staff in CIA but one that would be co-equal with the estimating staff).

One other item in the planning being done in the fall of 1950 might bear mention with reference to the later development of DD/I. A preliminary version of the Agency's new organization chart, which had appeared on November 7 and 8, 1950, showed a "Deputy Director for National Estimates", as superintending not only ONE but the other production offices as well, together with the Office of Operations

¹ See proposed charts for (1) CIA as a whole, Nov. 7, 1950, and (2) CIA's intelligence offices, grouped under a proposed "Deputy Director for National Estimates". Copies of these charts are in DD/S "OUMS" file, and in Annex B, below.

² See below, p. 35.

and the Office of Collection and Dissemination.¹ While this chart was never adopted, it probably reflected something of the importance attached by the Director to his estimating responsibility during those critical weeks. Furthermore, with the establishment of a Deputy Director of Intelligence some fourteen months later (in January 1952), something resembling the 1950 proposal was actually installed. Meanwhile, the Deputy Director, William H. Jackson, probably gave more than a proportionate share of his attention from October 1950 to August 1951 to the affairs of the new Office of National Estimates, thus achieving somewhat the same purpose.

In spite of the establishment of a new estimating Office, there was a substantial thread of continuity with the past experience of the Agency with this problem. While ONE was formally liquidated, with the announcement of November 13, 1950, its job and resources were not abandoned. Its experienced estimators were to become the nucleus of the new ONE; some of its procedures and methods for eliciting interdepartmental cooperation were continued and others revised. A few, at least, of its pending estimates were continued by ONE and were completed in the weeks and months ahead, and disseminated under the new format of "national intelligence estimates." It was also apparent that many of the substantive and administrative problems confronting ONE in the next two years were not unlike those that had faced ONE before it.

¹ See proposed CIA organization charts dated Nov. 7 and 8, 1950, cited above.

Organizing and Staffing the New Estimates Office

Heading the Office of National Estimates as Assistant Director, beginning on November 13, 1950,¹ was Mr. William L. Langer, who came to CIA from Harvard University and who brought with him both a distinguished academic record in history and international relations, and the intelligence experience of having headed the wartime Research and Analysis Branch of OSS and (for some months after the war) the State Department's intelligence research branch. A few days later² he was joined by Mr. Sherman Kent, professor of history on leave from Yale University, former instructor at the National War College, and, like Langer, a key officer of the wartime intelligence production group in OSS. During his first weeks in ONE, Kent was designated as a "consultant" in ONE;³ about December 1950 he was named its Deputy Assistant Director; and some thirteen months later (in January 1952) he was appointed Assistant Director, upon Langer's return to Harvard.⁴

ONE's table of organization was evolved during the first weeks of the reorganization, in November and December 1950. It was described

¹ Langer's appointment was announced in General Order No. 37, Nov. 13, 1950, [redacted] in CIA Records Center.

² Kent came to CIA in Nov. 1950, according to a New York Times article about him published Jan. 22, 1952. (See press-clipping scrapbook, "CIA in the News", in CI Library.)

³ Kent's title "consultant" was used in various ONE memoranda during his first weeks on duty, for example, on Dec. 15, 1950. (See ONE "chrono file", in ONE.)

⁴ Kent's appointment as Assistant Director was announced by the White House on Jan. 21, 1952. (New York Times, Jan. 22, 1952, in press-clipping scrapbook cited above.) The DCI's formal Notice to the CIA staff has not been found.

by Langer as an "incredibly simple" internal organization; in size, "one of the smallest [components] in CIA," and "chicken feed by usual Government standards."¹

while the size of ONE's staff was larger than the preceding estimating group in OTR (the "Special Staff"), it was considerably smaller than any of the other production offices in the Agency in General Smith's time.

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
¹ Extemporaneous remarks by Langer at OTR's Agency Orientation Conference, Feb. 13, 1951, [redacted] on disc recording, in OTR files.

² "Table of Organization for the Office of National Estimates", Jan. 17, 1951, 3pp., [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

³ Memorandum by Administrative Officer, ONE, to Mr. [redacted] "Table of Organization Office of National Estimates", March 22, 1951, 4 pp., [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

⁴ "Personnel Report, Office of National Estimates, as of 17 Feb. 1952," 4 pp., [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

⁵ Memorandum by Deputy Assistant Director of ONE for Administration [redacted] to Special Assistant for Administration, Office of [redacted] ME/I, Jan. 29, 1953, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file."



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Selected members of the former estimating staff and certain other intelligence officers of the now-liquidated ONS constituted the nucleus of the staff that was initially recruited for ONS, between November 1950 and January 1951.

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¹ ONS's T/O for Jan. 1951, cited above. In Dec. 1950, the DCI had asked the Secretary of Defense for [redacted] "officers" for estimates work. (See letter from DCI to Secretary of Defense, Dec. 26, 1950, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "Department of Defense, Cover Support.")

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
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


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² See ONS tables of organization, March 1951 and Jan. 1953, cited above.

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By March 1951, [redacted] principal estimating personnel on full-time duty in ONE had come from this original ONE group, and among them was represented, as Kent put it later, a "considerable experience in writing estimates."⁴ During the next two years, almost half of these ONE-trained men, together

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
¹ The DCI's decision to place the current intelligence function in ONE was not announced in his General Order of Nov. 13, but it was probably already settled by that date. Thus, two days later, ONE asked the CIA Executive to transfer [redacted] to ONE, specifically to head that function, and on Nov. 22 it submitted a list of [redacted] former ONE employees [redacted] "to constitute a Current Intelligence Staff" in ONE. (See memoranda by Assistant Director of ONE to CIA Executive, Nov. 15 and Nov. 22, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file"; see also Chapter VIII, above.)

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⁴ Mr. Kent later recalled to the OI/I, in Aug. 1952, that the "entire staff" of ONE, when it was first organized, was recruited from within CIA, thus carrying forward "considerable experience in writing estimates". (See his memo to OI/I, Aug. 1, 1952, in ONE "chrono file.")

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with a good number of clerical and administrative personnel who had also been obtained from ONE late in 1950, remained with the new Estimates Office. The others were meanwhile released for overseas duty, for duty with other headquarters officers, or for what Kent called reasons of "incompatibility."¹

The other full-time personnel, who made up the staff of ONE in 1951 and 1952, were for the most part new to CIA.² In addition to Langer and Kent, those appointed to senior positions during the first year were [redacted] from Duke University;³

[redacted] from the University of California;⁴

[redacted] Boston lawyer;⁵ and [redacted]

[redacted]

The internal organization of ONE, as it developed in 1951 and 1952, seemed to follow partly the experience of ONE, partly the

¹ Ibid.

² These men were brought into CIA "systematically," partly as "new blood" and partly because of the difficulty of getting "releases" for existing CIA personnel from other offices, and the net result was "an optimum balance between 'old hands' and 'new blood,'" so Kent observed in Aug. 1952. (Ibid.)

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³ [redacted] came in Dec. 1950 and served until about May 1951, and thereafter was shifted to a part-time consultant basis because of illness.

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⁴ [redacted] came in Jan. 1951 and a year later became the Deputy Assistant Director, when Kent moved up to become Assistant Director.

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⁵ [redacted] served from about March to June 1951, and then became a part-time consultant.

⁶ These men came later in 1951.

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Dulles and Herstadt recommendations of 1949, and partly the ideas of Langer and his immediate advisers. The general outline of ONE's organization was apparent shortly after its establishment in November 1950, and provided for four principal components concerned with the estimating program, together with a fifth component, the current intelligence staff, which remained attached to [redacted] until early January 1951. Of the four components for estimating, three were fixed in ONE's table of organization on January 17, 1951, as follows: the Board of National Estimates; the Estimates Staff (divided into a General Group, a Specialist Group, and a Military Group); and a Support Staff (with three branches for editorial and reproduction services, reading room services, and information control).¹

The fourth component, consisting of a panel of part-time consultants [redacted] [redacted] did not appear in the table of organization, but it had been announced by General Smith on December 18, 1950,² and

¹ "Table of Organization for the Office of National Estimates", Jan. 17, 1951, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file."

² General Smith announced to the Assistant Directors on Dec. 18, 1950, the formation of what he called a "consulting board", to meet periodically [redacted], on estimating problems, and that [redacted] "and others" had been or were being appointed to that board. (Minutes of DCI's staff conference SC-M-1, [redacted] in O/DCI/HR.) Early in 1951, [redacted] withdrew from the [redacted] (See memorandum by ONE to Controller, March 7, 1951, and memorandum to DDGI, Nov. 29, 1950, both [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".)

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and by May 1951 it, too, was in operation as a recognized element in ONE's organization and procedure.¹ With minor changes this was in general the outline of ONE's organization during its first two and one half years, to February 1953.

Of the four components of ONE, the new Board of National Estimates became, in effect, the senior staff in ONE, with the final responsibility for reviewing, revising, and approving all drafts of estimates written in CIA before they were submitted for formal inter-departmental review and approval in the IAC and released by the Director for dissemination. General Smith apparently had had such a senior staff in mind when he spoke of the need for what he called "a panel of five or six individuals constituting the top brains" in the estimating program, in his reorganization plans outlined to the IAC on October 20, 1950.²



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² See minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, in O/DCI/RS. While this concept of an internal board or panel was not specifically mentioned in the Dulles report in 1949, it was singled out for special recommendation in the Eberstadt committee's recommendations, previously cited above. However, in the preliminary organization chart for ONE, early in Nov. 1950 and a week before the new office was launched, no such top panel or board was mentioned, although the chart did show a "senior staff". (See proposed CIA organization chart, Nov. 8, 1950, in Annex B, below.) By Dec. 18, 1950, the idea was revived, when General Smith announced to his immediate staff that a "high level board" was being established within ONE. (See minutes of DCI's staff conference, SC-4-1, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.)

In its procedure, the new Board of National Estimates operated largely by collective deliberation in much of its work in the next two years. In membership and organizational status because it was not a typical board in the usual governmental meaning of the word; that is, it was not a committee whose members were representatives of different agencies or representative of various established points of view. Nor was it comparable to ONI's earlier experiment of an estimates production board, which had been made up principally of chiefs of CIA's research divisions and branches who had tended to represent the particular regional or topical fields of research specialization for which they had individual responsibility. Instead, the new board, presided over by the Assistant Director himself, was made up entirely of senior staff members of ONI, most of them serving under full-time CIA appointments, who were expected to have a "general" and "mature" point of view toward the international problem at hand. Langer described them as intelligence officers with long experience, academic men with extensive knowledge of international relations, and former military officers with "global" judgment.¹

Perhaps the name "board" was originally attached to this group in order to give CIA's estimating procedure an additional measure of prestige, to match the formal committee review by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Advisory Committee. Thus, Langer, at one point early in January 1951, seemed to regard the internal board and the external

¹ Extemporaneous remarks by William L. Langer, AD/NE, Feb. 13, 1951, at ONI's Agency Orientation Conference; on disc recording, in ONI files.

committee as somewhat competitive, when he expressed some skepticism at "the ability of the IAC . . . to keep pace with such a high level group" as his own "high powered estimates board."¹

In any case, the membership of the Board, like that of the other components of ONE, was made up, from the beginning, of "old hands and new blood," as Kent later characterized ONE's entire staff.²

In General Smith's announcement on December 16, 1950, he listed Dr. Langer (the new Assistant Director), Dr. Kent (about to be appointed his Deputy), [redacted]

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[redacted] as the initial members of the Board.³ Also included, virtually from the beginning, were the two senior estimators from the now-liquidated ONE--Ludwell L. Montague [redacted]

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[redacted] who almost immediately became the Board's executive Secretary.⁴ All three of these ONE "alumni" served continuously on the Board during the next two years of the present study, as well as during the period following. All original members, however,

¹ Minutes of ONE staff conferences, Jan. 1951, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

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² See memorandum by Kent to DD/I, Aug. 1, 1952, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

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³ Minutes of ONE's staff conference, Dec. 16, 1950, SS-M-1, in O/DCI/ER.

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⁴ [redacted] position during ONE's first weeks was "Special Assistant"; beginning Dec. 29, 1950, he was called Executive Secretary of the Board of National Estimates. (See various memoranda, Dec. 1950, in ONE "chrono file".) On Jan. 4, 1952, [redacted] was re-designated Deputy Assistant Director for Administration. (Notice 5-52, Jan. 4, 1952, [redacted] in CIA Records Center.)


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except Kent, departed eventually in 1951 and 1952, but continued to serve ONE subsequently on an advisory, part-time basis, through ONE's "panel of consultants," described below.

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At first, the National Estimates Board's single, dominant function was to review, discuss, and revise drafts of estimates written by the Estimates Staff, and this remained its continuing responsibility in 1951 and 1952. In this task the Board's procedure was somewhat akin to the academic seminar, in that the one or more members of the Estimates Staff who had worked on the draft were usually also present, during the Board's deliberations, to defend their conclusions and their evaluation of the evidence on which the estimate was built.

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The Board also adopted a second type of meeting to which, on a given draft estimate, it invited "working-level" representatives of the contributing groups in the IAC agencies and the OIR research offices. In this second phase of deliberation, the Board carefully adhered to the theory (in its progress reports and formal correspondence) that it was simply inviting "consideration" of the estimate by the departmental representatives, and not asking them for their "approval".¹ Yet this additional step of informal consultation was a vital step in the preliminary coordination of a given estimate, and was regarded as a psychologically important factor in promoting a spirit of inter-agency cooperation.²

The Board also soon entered the review phase of other stages in the estimating process, especially at the significant first step of estimate making, when the terms of reference were being formulated. This function of formulating the proper frame of reference and assumptions in an estimate--"asking the right questions"--was at first, in October 1950, yielded by General Smith almost completely to the IAC, as a step to be taken in formal committee; but on November 2, he re-assigned the job, dividing it between CIA, which would

¹ See IAC-PR's (progress reports) and ONS correspondence with IAC agencies, in ONS files.

² The Board of National Estimates also occasionally invited to its meetings Government officials from outside the intelligence organization, e.g., Foreign Service officers from the State Department, in Sept. and Oct. 1952. (See ONS "chrono file.") [redacted]

henceforth draft the terms of reference, and IAC, which would review them.¹

With the establishment of ONE later in November 1950, this procedure was further re-defined, so that the job was left almost entirely to CIA/ONE, except that the IAC would review any essential differences of opinion between CIA and the departmental representatives.² After mid-December 1950, the function of reviewing terms of reference belonged to the Board of National Estimates, and the drafting of terms to the Estimates Staff. Here again, as with the drafts of the estimates themselves, the Board normally invited in to the discussion the representatives of the IAC departments to whom contributions were to be assigned,³ and only rarely, in 1951 and 1952, were the terms of reference appealed to the IAC.⁴

The Board eventually served as an advisory staff to the Assistant Director on other aspects of ONE's work. Individually, the Board members were given special tasks on occasion, such as the assignments to [redacted] at different times in 1951 and 1952, on the continuing problem of liaison with the operational planning groups in the Defense Department, discussed more fully later in this chapter. Collectively, the Board deliberated

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¹ Minutes of IAC meetings, Oct. 20, Oct. 26, and Nov. 2, 1950, in IAC Secretariat files, in ONE.

² Minutes of IAC meeting, Dec. 7, 1950, IAC-X-10, [redacted] in C/DCI/ER.

³ See ONE correspondence with IAC agencies, 1951-52, passim, in ONE "chrono files".

⁴ See IAC minutes, 1951-52, passim, in C/DCI/ER.

on the lists of pending estimates projects, including the annual programs of estimates beginning early in 1952. They also received new requests for estimates; though these required final IAC approval.

The Board also served as a forum for staff discussions with the Estimates Staff and the Assistant Director on a wide range of other problems that were incidental to the estimating job, such as the quality of research contributions, collection overtones and deficiencies, dissemination policy, ONE's relations with the contributing and operating agencies, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Board was also responsible for reviewing and approving for release, types of intelligence evaluations other than formal estimates, which were produced from time to time by the Estimates Staff, such as the many intelligence memoranda written for the Director's use independently of formal inter-departmental coordination, and the various types of prepared comments on NSC planning papers that were referred to the DCI for intelligence appraisal.¹

The Estimates Staff became the second echelon in ONE. It was in this Staff that the estimates were actually drafted; contributions from the departments and CIA's research offices assigned, received, and studied; and the day-to-day consultation with the contributors carried on. The Estimates Staff was headed by Ray S. Cline from about December 1950 to about May 1951, [REDACTED]

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¹See files of intelligence memoranda (other than estimates), prepared by Estimates Staff for the Board of National Estimates, [REDACTED] in ONE files.

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[redacted] Cline was succeeded first by Abbot S. Smith, then by William F. [redacted], and again, by Smith.

The Estimates Staff was organized at first, late in 1950, simply as a small group of senior estimates writers, leaving to a separate group of analysts in ONE's Support Branch the job of undertaking whatever necessary supplementary research and analysis was required in the course of constructing an estimate. In January 1951, however, the Estimates Staff was reorganized into three groups: a General Group, consisting of the "generalists", who remained responsible for drafting the conclusions and the discussion section of the estimate; a Specialist Group, consisting essentially of research men (formerly in the Support Staff) expert on particular areas or topics; and a Military Group, which was to comprise the working level representatives from the Army, Navy, and Air Force who (it was originally planned) would be permanently stationed in ONE.¹

Of the three groups in the Estimates Staff, the Military Group had the shortest history. Originally (in December 1950), it had been planned that [redacted] officers would be assigned full-time to ONE,² in order to "give counsel on military, naval, and air

¹ "Table of Organization for the Office of National Estimates", Jan. 17, 1951, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

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matters and critically review the contributions of the defense agencies" submitted to ONE.¹ In practice, however, ONE did not use them as extensively or as regularly as planned, "because of ONE dependence on the [Service] representatives sent by the DOD agencies to our [Board] meetings to present the viewpoint of their respective agencies."² Accordingly, the [] officers involved were assigned to regular staff positions in the Specialist Group of the Estimates Staff, where they performed a variety of useful tasks, but tasks that were not one of "representing" their home departments.³ Aside from the personal capabilities and qualifications of the individual officers thus assigned full time to ONE, there was a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with their position in ONE. In October 1951, General Smith questioned whether ONE was using them "to the full extent of their capabilities," and he asked Langer and Kent "to examine the present method of using Service personnel in staff

¹ Memorandum by [] to Chief, Military Personnel Division, April 30, 1951, [] in ONE "chrono file".

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. For example, [] who was assigned to ONE from the Air Force, was assisting on Far Eastern estimates in April 1951. Similarly, [] from the Navy, was assigned in July 1951 to the job of attempting to improve ONE's contact and liaison with the intelligence and planning echelons of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (described more fully later, in this chapter); and the next month, when [] was detached from ONE at the end of his tour of duty, [] took over this particular problem. (See memorandum by [] to Chief of Military Personnel, Sept. 11, 1951, [] and other correspondence in ONE "chrono file", July, Aug. 1951.)

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X1 assignments."¹ In subsequent months, ONE reiterated its need for
[] military positions on its table of organization, []
X1 []² but apparently did not find it necessary to
change its practice of assigning them to the Specialist Group. In
any case, ONE did not restore a separate "Military Group".

With the abandonment of a separate Military Group, the Estimates Staff developed, early in 1951, in two parts, a General Group and a Specialist Group, and this arrangement persisted unchanged from about March 1951 until after February 1953. This internal organization was largely one of administrative convenience, however, which in practice was frequently ignored. As a practical matter, these two groups, rather than being separated, were brought together intimately in the course of a given estimates project.

Actual preparation of estimates was by small special committees (called "Task Teams") made up of one of the "general" group as chairman, with assistance from several "specialists" assigned for the particular project involved. The chairman was given general responsibility for seeing that, first "terms of reference" and then a draft estimate would be brought before the Board and afterwards before the Board's meeting with the departmental representatives. This task, in point of fact (once departmental assignments had been agreed upon and

X1 ¹ Minutes of ONE's staff conference, Oct. 22, 1951, SO-M-29
[] in O/DCI/ER.

X1 ² Memorandum by ONE to Chief, Military Personnel Division, May 26, 1952, [] in ONE "chrono file".

departmental contributions had been received by ONE), was largely one of synthesizing four separate studies into a single brief statement of the case at hand, representing an estimate that might be agreeable to the Board, the departmental representatives, and finally, the IAC. This synthesis was usually undertaken by the "Task Team" chairman who, however, could not hope to produce a fully valid statement without reference to his "teammates" who specialized in area and functional knowledge and the immediate sources thereof.

After the first several months of ONE's experience, there seemed to be no longer any debate on the old question whether CIA's estimating staff needed a complete research organization. The Dulles Group had severely criticized ONE for having "confused" estimating with research, although the ONE proposals of October 10, 1950, had stressed the need for "research support." General Smith and Mr. Jackson, in their plan of October 20, had gone back to the Dulles report in calling for a clear-cut divorce of estimating from research. Along the same lines, Langer, in his first weeks in ONE, announced that ONE intended to do no "substantive research" on "regional" or "topical" matters, and he expressed impatience, at one point early in 1951, with the need of supervising any additional staff in ONE.¹

¹ Extemporaneous remarks by William L. Langer, Feb. 13, 1951, at OTR's Agency Orientation Conference, on disc recording, [redacted] in OTR files.

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The October 20 plan was subsequently modified, however, to the extent first of providing an "Analysis Group" in ONE's new Support Staff and then, about mid-January 1951, re-naming these ONE analysts a "Specialist Group" and shifting them to the Estimates Staff.¹ ONE thus had a small group of specialists immediately at hand, for the purpose of analyzing departmental research on which ONE primarily depended. As indicated later in this chapter, ONE relied ever more heavily, in 1951 and 1952, on both the research offices in CIA, especially OSI, OPR, and OCI, for supplementary research bearing on particular questions arising in pending estimates.

The third and last full-time component in ONE's table of organization in 1951 and 1952 was the Support Staff. In ONE's original table of organization,² three branches were to make up the Support Staff: an Analysis Branch, consisting of research assistants for the Estimates Staff, mentioned above; a Publications Branch, which was made responsible for arranging for the reproduction of finished estimates by the Agency's printing plant; and an Information Control Branch, which was to log in and out of ONE all

¹ Memorandum by William L. Langer, AD/NE, to SD/A, Jan. 17, 1951, subject "Table of Organization for O/NE," [redacted] in ONE "chrono file."

² ONE Table of Organization of Dec. 21, 1950, mentioned in ibid.

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departmental contributions to estimates, and to maintain a reference file of selected intelligence materials for consultation by the Estimates Staff and the Board.

In subsequent revisions of ONE's table of organization, the Support Staff underwent some changes. In January 1951 the Analysis Branch, as indicated above, was shifted to the Estimates Staff, where it became a Specialist Group of research assistants.¹ The Information Control Branch was divided, also in January 1951, to include a Reading Room Branch containing intelligence reference materials borrowed from the Agency's central library and elsewhere, for the convenience of the members of the Estimates Staff and the Board.² Finally, some changes were made in the Publications Branch, which arranged for the reproduction of the finished estimate by the Agency's printing plant and provided the necessary typing, proof-reading, and editorial services incidental to publication.³

During its first year, the Publications Branch was staffed both with clerical personnel and intelligence officers, suggesting that ONE may have planned on a kind of editorial work on estimates that would be more than stylistic, and somewhat comparable to ONE's

¹ Memorandum by Langer to SA/A, Jan. 17, 1951, [redacted] ibid.

² Ibid. See also report of ONE "Ad Hoc Committee on Reading Room", Feb. 27, 1953, [redacted], attached to ONE Staff Memorandum No. 333, March 11, 1953, in ONE files.

³ Memorandum by Langer to SA/A, Jan. 17, 1951, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

practice previously. But by 1952 the personnel of that Branch had been converted entirely to a clerical basis.¹ Presumably the Publications Branch was not expected to participate in the estimating process until the estimate was ready for the printer.

These three service branches of ONS, although formally and collectively called the Support Staff, were never headed by a separate Chief serving full-time. Instead, they were at first supervised by a member of the Estimates Staff as part of his other duties, and later, by early 1953, seem to have been regarded informally as a group of administrative services attached to the immediate office of the Assistant Director.²

The fourth component of ONS's organization for estimating was its panel of Consultants, first announced by General Smith on December 16, 1950.³ The idea of having attached to ONS an advisory panel of part-time consultants, made up of distinguished and experienced men from outside the Government's intelligence enterprise, was, of all the developments in ONS's organization, the one entirely new departure in CIA's estimating program. No such panel had been part of ONS's normal estimating procedure during the years 1946-1950, nor

¹ See ONS tables of organization and personnel rosters, Jan. 1951, March 1951, Feb. 1952, March 1952, previously cited.

² Memorandum by [redacted] LAD/NE/Admin, to Special Assistant for Administration, O/DIA, Jan. 29, 1953, [redacted] in ONS "chrono file".

³ Minutes of DCI's staff conference, Dec. 16, 1950, SC-M-1, [redacted] in O/CI/NS.

had one been recommended in any of the several sets of reorganization proposals confronting General Smith in October 1950.¹

The first appointments to the Panel of Consultants included

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[Redacted]

and expert on the Soviet Union;

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and

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² r.

[Large Redacted Block]

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in 1951.⁴ Meanwhile, other appointments were made, early in 1951,

¹ See Dulles report, the Herstadt report, the State-Defense plan for a "national intelligence group," and ORE's plan for the new Estimates Office submitted on Oct. 10, 1950; previously discussed, above.

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² Minutes of ORE's staff conference, Dec. 18, 1950, SC-1-1, [Redacted] in C/DCI/CR.

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³ Ibid. [Redacted] had been recommended to ONE by the Consultants Panel itself, at its first "organizational meeting" late in November 1950. Langer regarded his appointment as an "extremely important" one, in the interest of improving CIA's relations with those agencies concerned with scientific intelligence; and urged General Smith to convey the invitation to [Redacted] personally. (Memorandum by Langer to DCI, Nov. 29, 1950, [Redacted] in ONE "chrono file".)

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⁴ ONE told the Comptroller, on March 7, 1951 (by memorandum, ibid.), that [Redacted] had declined to serve [Redacted], but that he would presumably consult, gratis, with ONE, OSI, and other Agency components, "in other ways".

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[REDACTED]

ONE's Panel of Consultants was first convened in May 1951,¹ to discuss the pending revision of the general estimate of the capabilities and intentions of the USSR (WFF-25).

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

During the next two years they met on the average of once a month. They usually met, not by themselves, but with one or more ONE Board and Estimates Staff members.

The agenda of ONE's Consultants usually consisted of the drafts of one or more pending estimates nearing completion, on which the Panel's function was to provide additional independent, critical review. The Panel's deliberations did not, however, constitute a formal step in CIA's review procedure. Only rarely were its meetings noted in ONE's periodic progress reports circulated to the IAC members;² and apparently the Panel was never expected to share CIA's responsibility for the finished estimates.

The membership of ONE's Consultants Panel expanded somewhat in 1952, and by early 1953 it totalled twelve men.³ Among the new

¹ The Panel's first meeting to consider a specific estimate was in May 1951, but it had had one preliminary meeting, late in November 1950. (See correspondence, previously cited, above.)

² See IAC-PR's (progress reports), 1951-52, passim, in ONE files.

³ See ONE lists of consultants dated May 21, 1951, Dec. 5, 1952, and Feb. 2, 1953, in ONE "chrono file".

appointments in 1952 were

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The practice of adding such distinguished academicians and men of public affairs to ONE's roster of part-time consultants was regarded not only as a practical way to solicit their advice when it was actually needed, but also a device, so NE later theorized, for recruiting and training new men for possible full-time work on the Board of National Estimates.

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[Redacted] for example, did "graduate" later (in 1953) from the Panel to the Board.

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On the other hand, still other new part-time appointments to the [Redacted] were CIA "alumni" who had retired from full-time work with the estimates program and who took on what might be called a "reserve" status. Among these appointees in 1952 were William L. Langer, the retiring Assistant Director of ONE, former Ambassador

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[Redacted] till other new panel members in 1952 were [Redacted]

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[Redacted] who all had previously served on full-time basis in other intelligence capacities closely related to estimating.

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[Redacted] part-time consultants were also retained by ONE from time to time for a variety of special

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purposes. For example, three of its Board members [redacted] and [redacted] were placed on a part-time basis in 1951 and 1952.¹ On occasion, certain specialists were temporarily attached to the Board for consultation on a specific estimate. Such was the case on an estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities (NIE-60, pt. I), for which ONE retained three scientists [redacted]

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[redacted] to help resolve a conflict of opinion between the Air Force, on the one hand, and CIA and the Navy, on the other hand.²

On another occasion in 1952, ONE retained [redacted] a former Board member, as a "consultant in connection with a study of estimative language used in NIE's".³ Other special consultants were two Yale University men, [redacted] who late in 1952 were appointed to supervise CIA's external research project for an estimative study, to be based entirely on unclassified materials, of the USSR's intentions toward the United States.⁴

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¹ See ONE "chrono files", passim.

² Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Oct. 28, 1952 [redacted] in ONE "chrono file"; and ONE production record, 1950-53, in Annex below.

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³ Memoranda by AD/NE to DCI, March 21, March 27, 1952, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

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⁴ See memoranda by AD/NE to DCI, Nov. 24, Dec. 19, 1952 [redacted] [redacted] in ONE "chrono file"), recommending [redacted] as "intermittent consultants". In June 1951 a related external-research project had been assigned to [redacted] for analyzing unclassified press and Government publications on "The Kremlin's estimate of the capabilities and intentions of the US". (See correspondence, June 1951, in ONE "chrono file".)

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From the above outline of ONE's staffing problems during its first two years, it appears that ONE relied heavily at first, in 1950 and 1951, on men with extensive prior technical experience in producing intelligence evaluations, and later on men from outside the Government's intelligence organization who nevertheless had extensive academic knowledge or broad practical experience, or both, in international affairs which could be applied to the daily problem of evaluating intelligence evidence and speculating on the meaning of the evidence in the continuing international conflict.

Conversely, ONE did not depend to any great extent on formal training programs for either its original staff or its later recruits. The "recruiting of trained personnel" rather than the "training of recruited personnel" seemed to be ONE's basic staffing policy in ONE in 1951 and 1952. While its new personnel were normally enrolled in CIA's general, introductory training courses, as required, there was no special formal course for estimators as such, nor did ONE favor the establishment of a "super-intelligence school . . . at the National Intelligence level" at which the processes of estimating might be formally taught.¹ Thus, for example, [redacted] who served in ONE both as Board secretary and as Deputy Assistant Director for Administration, commented at some length in August 1951 on the plans for a CIA Career Corps. He questioned the need for "training schools

¹ Memorandum by [redacted] on behalf of the AD/NE, to the Director of Training, Aug. 31, 1951, [redacted] commenting on "A Proposal for the Establishment of a Career Corps in CIA", in ONE "chrono file".

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in the upper brackets," criticized training programs which placed "too much emphasis on over-elaborate testing techniques, schools, etc.", and concluded that, in ONE's experience, "a year of on-the-job training would be much more valuable than a year spent in a super-intelligence school."¹

On-the-job training was provided by the Estimates Staff, especially to the new intelligence officers recruited later from the universities and from other components of CIA. Similarly, the Panel of Consultants provided, to a more limited extent, an on-the-job period of orientation for outside experts from non-governmental institutions who might later be considered for appointment to the Board of National Estimates. In addition, ONE also conducted a few activities which were entirely in the name of training. For example, guest lecturers were invited to speak from time to time to the Board and the Estimates Staff, and were paid from a special fund allotted to ONE. Included among these lecturers were "certain professors of leading universities who are particularly qualified in fields of concern to . . . this Office, as well as other experts presently in non-governmental capacities."² On the governmental side, too, ONE also took advantage of the courses at the National War College, where CIA was given a small quota of students in 1951, as well as briefings at other Government agencies.³

¹ Ibid.

² See ONE correspondence with Project Review Committee, 1951, passim, in ONE "chrono file".

³ For example, Tanager, Kent, [redacted] attended the AFSPW course at Sandia in Nov.-Dec. 1951. (See ONE "chrono file".)

Like other components of the Agency, ONS also took advantage of the training value of having a few of its men assigned on temporary duty at other offices of the Agency and at overseas stations, under the rotation program or under other arrangements. In addition, ONS established a separate overseas travel program in the summer and fall of 1951, under which selected Board and staff members were sent abroad for several weeks of "re-familiarization . . . with overseas areas."¹ By this means, the estimators were expected not to undertake specific collection assignments, but "to gain through unofficial observation a fresh sense of the intangible elements in the situation abroad, which is . . . essential . . . in the process of intelligence estimation."² In 1952 this plan was expanded to permit ONS personnel, when on such a travel status, to visit with selected key policy officials in certain U. S. missions abroad who might express "informal comment" on ONS's that "would be worth many times that which is formally transmitted in writing."³

¹ Memorandum by AD/NS to DECI, Sept. 19, 1951, [redacted] in ONS "chrono file". See also ONS memoranda to AD/Personnel, Sept. 18, Oct. 26, 1951 [redacted] and to AD/P, Oct. 15, Oct. 19, 1951 [redacted] in *ibid.* [redacted] had spoken on the need for such overseas training for Board personnel, at the DCI's staff conference on July 9, 1951, and the DCI agreed that Board members "should get to the field more often". (Minutes, July 9, 1951, SS-N-23, in O/DCI/IR.)

² ONS memorandum of Sept. 19, 1951, cited above.

³ ONS staff study, Nov. 25, 1952 [redacted] on "program for re-familiarization of O/NS personnel with overseas areas; in ONS "chrono file".

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Clientele and Scope of "National" Estimates

In contrast to the extensive internal organizational changes in CIA's estimating procedures, described above, there were no revisions, between October 1950 and February 1953, in the formal definitions which outlined the subject-matter scope of "national" intelligence estimates and which specified the "national security" agencies of the Government and the kinds of needs which were to be served by such estimates. In particular, the CIA organic act of July 1947 and the NSC directive of January 1948, in which these matters were outlined, were left unchanged during the period of General Smith's directorship. In practice, however, the relationship of national estimates to foreign and defense policy formulation was clarified further, less by statements of estimating doctrine, expressed from time to time, than by the force of precedent in the expanding program of estimates that were actually requested and produced for various echelons of the Government's national security organization.

The directives in force in October 1950 had defined estimates only in barest outline. The act of 1947¹, for example, had simply asserted that the Director of Central Intelligence shall evaluate intelligence "relating to the national security", and in subsequent directives of the National Security Council such intelligence was called "national intelligence". The directives had not, however,

¹ National Security Act of July 26, 1947.

differentiated national intelligence from departmental intelligence, and had left in doubt the further question whether departmental intelligence, too, was not, after all, obviously addressed to problems of "national security". A further NSC directive, in January 1948¹, had attempted to clarify this relationship by stating that "national intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, or transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency or the National Military Establishment". Neither of these directives specified who or what agencies in the Government were to use CIA's estimates, which of them might demand estimates, what types of subjects were to be emphasized or excluded, and whether CIA could initiate estimates independently or only on the basis of a specific request. The implication, however, was that the National Security Council would be the principal customer for "national" estimates.

The Dulles Survey Group, in its recommendations for changing the estimating program in January 1949, in effect had endorsed this NSC-approved concept of national estimates as appreciations on "broad" policy problems, and had not attempted a more precise definition of their scope, nor had outlined more exactly what using agencies (from the White House on down) were to be exclusively served or

¹ NSC Intelligence Directive No. 3, Jan. 13, 1948.

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or specifically excluded. The national estimate, the Survey Group reiterated, should deal with "broad aspects of national policy and national security", it should "transcend in breadth and scope the interest and competence of any single intelligence agency", and it should be "an authoritative interpretation and appraisal that will serve as a firm guide to policy-makers and planners".¹

The Government's critical need of such "broad" estimates had, indeed, been "the moving factor" in the very establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Survey Group asserted.² As if to emphasize its concern for estimates of "broad" scope, the Survey Group had, conversely, criticized CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates for having become "diverted" to the production of what it called "miscellaneous reports and summaries", including "summaries of current developments, political reports, background studies on countries and areas, economic reports, etc.", which "by no stretch of the imagination could be considered national estimates".³

Up to October 1950 these jurisdictional questions of definitions and customer relations had been met pragmatically by CIA and its Office of Reports and Estimates. ORE's four years of experience had

¹ Dulles Survey Group, Report . . . , Jan. 1, 1949 [redacted] pp. 5, 68-69.

² Ibid., p. 5.

³ Ibid., pp. 6, 70.

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revealed both variety in subject matter and flexibility in serving any and all echelons of the Government's national security organization that expressed a legitimate need. Requests for estimates had been accepted not only from the National Security Council and its immediate staff, but also from the departmental members on that Council. Requests came not only from the policy planning and operational echelons of the departments but also from the intelligence agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. A good number of CIA's estimates, finally, were initiated by CIA without waiting for a request from an outside agency. In any case, whatever the origin of a particular estimate, the finished reports were all customarily distributed, broadly and in quantity, to the entire group of departments and agencies represented on the NSC and on the IAC, and occasionally to non-IAC agencies as well.

Between October and December 1950, during the first weeks of General Smith's administration when the estimating work of the Office of Reports and Estimates was being reorganized into the new Office of National Estimates, a number of further interpretive statements of administrative policy were attempted, in the direction of clarifying the subject-matter scope of "national" estimates and the end-purpose of such estimates in relation to the using agencies. The short-lived Magruder-Armstrong plan for a "national intelligence group" (on which CIA and departmental officials had agreed in September 1950 and which the new Deputy Director, William H. Jackson, had endorsed on October 3) reiterated the NSC-approved concepts of January 1948, but went on

to add that "strictly political or strictly military intelligence estimates" (that is, those normally in the jurisdiction of the State and Defense Department intelligence agencies, respectively), "should also be regarded as national intelligence when used in formulating policy at the national level".¹ Although this definition failed of formal adoption, when the plan as a whole was shelved by General Smith later that month, the concept nevertheless represented at least a degree of informal inter-agency agreement for an expanding concept of "national" estimates that was to be followed, in effect, during the next two years. Frequently, in fact, the title of an ONS-sponsored estimate was essentially military, political, or otherwise limited to particular "topical" or "functional" subject of interest to a particular department, but rarely was there any evidence of a controversy as to whether such an estimate was truly "national" in scope, and one for CIA legitimately to handle.

The problem of reconciling topical estimates of intra-departmental concern and those of broader significance at the "national level" also was implicit in a statement by Jackson, made in October 1950,² which

¹ Undated draft of "NSC Directive" for a "National Intelligence Group", 11 pp., undated (about Sept. 1950), [redacted] together with covering memorandum by W. H. Jackson to Gen. W. B. Smith, Oct. 3, 1950, [redacted] both in O/DCI/ER, filed under "NSCID-1950".

² Paper by Jackson entitled "A Discussion of the Functions and Responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency", pp. 10-13, undated, [redacted] in O/DCI/RS files. This paper was apparently prepared about October 1950, originally for press-relations purposes apparently for Walter Lippmann in particular (see RS/S file, "O & M 5"); and the substance of it was also delivered by Jackson at the IAC meeting of Oct. 20, 1950 (see IAC minutes, in O/DCI/RS files).

departed somewhat from the earlier views of the Dulles Group report of which he was a co-author. The scope of a national estimate was limited only, he said, in the sense that it would deal with foreign situations, "not domestic or internal security" matters. Beyond that limitation, however, the estimate "should deal with topics of a wide scope relevant to the determination of basic policy, such as the assessment of a country's war potential, its preparedness for war, its strategic capabilities and intentions, its vulnerability to various forms of direct attack or indirect pressure". Here again, while some of the topics he cited might plausibly have been interpreted as exclusively departmental intelligence problems, they were all to become acceptable subjects of national estimates, in the actual production program of ONE during the following two years.

In still another analysis of the concept of national estimates, presented by the Office of Reports and Estimates¹ soon after General Smith and Mr. Jackson took office, ORS reminded Jackson that, while some estimates would, indeed, deal with a single country, others would cut across particular areas and regions of the world. Furthermore, some estimates might be heavily scientific, economic, or geographic in content, but normally they would cut across such "functional" factors and represent a balanced "appreciation of the effect of all factors in combination". Finally, ORS expected that an estimate would not be confined to "long-term" trends alone, but deal also with "current

¹ "Plan for a CIA Office of Estimates", by Messrs. Babbitt, Montague, [redacted] ORS, Oct. 10, 1950, [redacted] in O/CI/RS files.

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developments", and hence it had urged that CIA's current-intelligence work be supervised by the new Estimates Office.

These several views, similar in some details and divergent in others, were crystallized further by General Smith, at his first several meetings with the IAC between October and December 1950.¹ He outlined no theoretical, pre-determined subject-matter boundaries within which national estimates must be confined, but stressed instead the practical importance of seeking to make intelligence appraisals on the day-to-day foreign problems, whatever they might be, that were faced by the policy-planning officials of the Government. National estimates, he said, "should endeavor to answer specific questions related to policy determination rather than be generalized country studies".² He recognized, however, that some of these problems might, indeed, be "specific or general, regional or functional",³ and that in any case the estimates must be "timely".⁴ The policy officers, he added, "must have the intelligence they need when they are faced with their decisions rather than after the decisions are taken".⁵ Finally, he emphasized that the end-product of the estimating process should

¹ Minutes of IAC meetings, Oct. 20, 26, Nov. 30, Dec. 21, 1950, IAC-M-1, 2, 8, and 11, [redacted] in O/DCI/EP and HS files.

² Minutes for Nov. 30, 1950, cited above.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Minutes for Dec. 21, 1950, cited above; and Minutes of DCI's staff conference, Dec. 18, 1950, [redacted] in O/DCI/EP.

⁵ Minutes for Nov. 30, 1950, cited above.

be a brief, undocumented evaluation, confined to the conclusions and to "a summary of the deductions drawn from the data supporting the estimate".¹

With this pragmatic view of national estimates, General Smith's early decisions also suggest that CIA's circle of customer agencies, which under his predecessor had customarily included both the NSC Staff and the departmental policy offices, would not be narrowed to any one echelon of the Government. For example, the very first estimate that was launched after his arrival, early in October 1950, was for the President's personal use at the forthcoming Wake Island conference with General MacArthur, and dealt with the Korean war and the prospects for Chinese Communist intervention.² Several other estimates were scheduled, almost immediately, at the request of the NSC Staff, on problems relating to Iran, Greece, and Turkey.³ Following them, General Smith next solicited estimating problems from the departmental policy offices, through the departmental intelligence chiefs sitting on the IAC; and their needs, which included both new items as well as others already under way for some time in OIA, seem to have actually outnumbered those requested by the NSC, in CIA's initial survey of

¹ Ibid.

² See Historical Staff study, "Study of CIA Reporting on Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War", September-December 1950", Oct. 1955, [redacted]

³ Minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 26, 1950, IAC-M-2, [redacted] in O/DCI/R.

the requirements for estimates completed on October 26, 1950.¹

One major procedural departure by General Smith, in the continuing task of planning estimates and determining priorities on them, was to give a greater voice to the Intelligence Advisory Committee over the authorization of new projects undertaken by CIA. Initially, on October 26, General Smith invited the IAC members to solicit the needs of their respective departments for estimates, and he indicated then that if there was a priority conflict between the departments and the NSC, he himself would be the final arbiter.² In a subsequent meeting, however, he began the practice of subjecting the entire list of projects to IAC review and approval, and thereafter he regularly submitted all new proposals to IAC authorization, item by item. In practice, during the next two years, very few of the many requests for estimates were rejected either by the IAC or the Office of National Estimates, and in no case recorded in the minutes did the IAC actually overrule a prior CIA decision or recommendation to accept, reject, or defer a given requested project.³ On the other hand, in a few cases the IAC did change relative priorities⁴, and there may have

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ See IAC minutes, Nov. 1950 - Jan. 1953, *passim*, in O/ICI/EN. In one case, upheld by the IAC, ONE rejected a request from the Joint Intelligence Committee for an estimate on the effects of a possible "Holy War" in the Middle East, as being "largely hypothetical". (IAC minutes, Aug. 23, 1951, in O/ICI/ER.)

⁴ See "Historical Record of National Estimates Projects Undertaken...", Annex K, below.

been other cases, not revealed in the minutes, where the mere prospect of IAC review and consensus might have had an indirect influence on OAS's scheduling of a given request.

The initial schedule of estimates assembled under these new policies was handled by the OAS Special Staff and approved by the IAC on October 26, 1950,¹ some two weeks before the Office of National Estimates was established. It listed eleven proposed estimates, divided about evenly between NSC requests, departmental requests, and CIA-initiated projects. On November 1 and 15, the list was expanded twice, first by OAS and then by ONS, respectively, to a total of some twenty projects.² Each of these early priority lists was essentially generalized a/country-by-country breakdown of critical areas in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, headed by two continuing priority projects on the Soviet Union, including one on its "strengths and weaknesses" and the other on its "intentions to resort to general war". In future revisions, however, beginning in January 1951 and occurring annually thereafter, projects on more specific problems were added. Some of them were comprehensive multi-national appraisals actually broader than so-called general country studies on a particular nation, while others were addressed to particular political, military, economic, or scientific factors in a given foreign situation.

¹ Listed in IAC minutes for Oct. 26, 1950, cited above.

² IAC-P-1, Nov. 1, 1950, [redacted] in O/DI/ER files; and IAC-PR-2, Nov. 15, 1950, [redacted] in ONS files.

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It was quickly evident, late in 1950, that no list of pre-determined projects could anticipate all policy problems on which intelligence appraisals might be useful. During ONE's first six weeks (that is, by the end of December 1950) no less than eight additional studies were requested of CIA, chiefly by the NSC and the State Department, on subjects as diverse as the following. On the Korean War, a third review of the probabilities of Chinese Communist intervention was requested (NIE 2/1), together with one on the consequences of Chinese Nationalist participation (NIE-12), one on Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchuria (NIE 2/2), and (after Chinese intervention had actually occurred), one on the international implications of maintaining a beachhead in South Korea (NIE-16).

Others dealt with the Soviet Union, and all were on specific issues rather than on her intentions to launch "general war." One dealt with her intentions to "exploit the current situation" (NIE-15); another with her reactions if remilitarization of West Germany were undertaken (NIE-17); and still another with her plans to use bacteriological and chemical warfare on the U. S. if attacked (NIE-18).

From the beginning ONE was faced with the need of accommodating both a continuing, scheduled program of estimates and a program of ad hoc requests, some of them with comfortable deadlines but others needed on a crash priority basis.¹ By 1951 ONE was dividing its

¹ In March 1951, ONE established five relative degrees of priority for handling estimates: crash, urgent, high, routine, and deferred. See IAC progress report, March 21, 1951, IAC-PR-9, [] in ONE files.

manpower resources about equally between these parallel approaches, and this ratio continued into 1953.¹

The emergence of these parallel programs of estimates also was reflected somewhat in the changing format of ONE's end product--the finished estimate itself. Initially, on November 1, 1950, some two weeks before ONE formally replaced the Office of Reports and Estimates as the Agency's estimating group, a single series of "National Intelligence Estimates" (NIE's) had been launched, in which (it was planned) all of CIA's estimates would be numbered serially in one sequence and disseminated broadly; and with this new series, the several labels previously used by ORE, including the numerical "ORE's" and the "Special Estimates" series, were discontinued. In January 1951, after about two months of experimentation with the NIE format, a second series, called "Special Estimates" (SE's), was established by ONE, patterned somewhat after the old SE series of ORE. The new SE format, although its purpose was not officially described,² was evidently expected to accommodate those estimates which were outside the regular scheduled program of estimates, especially those that might be disseminated to a limited clientele or deal with subjects more restricted than those in the general estimates. During the next two years about 35 such SE's were produced and disseminated,

¹ IAC minutes, Jan. 15, 1953, IAC-M-94, [] in O/DCI/ER.

² The new SE series was first mentioned, but without explanation, in the IAC minutes for Jan. 18, 1951; see IAC-M-15, in O/DCI/ER.

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as compared to about 70 NIE's in the main series.¹ In addition to these two principal products, a third, called "Special Intelligence Estimates" (SIE's) was started later in 1951, as a means of disseminating estimates that were based on specially sensitive materials that required special handling.² In all, about 135 estimates were issued in the three series, during the entire period November 1950-February 1953.

Aside from these formal estimates, each one normally prepared with departmental cooperation and coordinated in the IAC before dissemination,³ numerous informal uncoordinated estimates were also prepared and released to customer agencies by the Office of National Estimates from time to time during this period. For example, advance drafts of formal estimates were circulated informally by ONE, in advance of formal IAC coordination, frequently to the NSC Staff,⁴ and occasionally to the State, Defense, and other policy offices as well,⁵

¹ See "Historical Record of National Estimates Projects Undertaken..., October 1950-February 1953," Annex K below.

² The SIE series was first mentioned on March 21, 1951; see IAC progress report IAC-PR-9, [] in ONE files.

³ Departmental participation is discussed below, in section on "Departmental and CIA Contributors...", pp. 94-118.

⁴ Similarly, ONE had on occasion sent advance, uncoordinated drafts of estimates to the NSC Staff (for example, one on the Philippines in June 1950) and to the State Dept. (one on Indo-China, in August 1950). See ONE case files on projects ONE 56-50 and ONE 50-50, in O/OCI/HS custody.

⁵ Included, for example, was an advance draft of NIE-18 sent to the National Security Resources Board in Dec. 1950; see progress report IAC-PR-4, in ONE files.

in order to meet a particularly urgent demand on which an intelligence opinion was needed.¹ In addition, informal memoranda were prepared as intelligence comments on specific NSC planning documents referred to the Director by the NSC or the NSC Staff. Finally, intelligence appraisals were written in the form of "Memoranda for the Director," some by ONE's Board of National Estimates and others by its Estimates Staff. Frequently these intelligence memoranda were prepared in advance of any formal request for an opinion, and they were intended to serve a variety of purposes, such as oral briefings made by the Director to the NSC, informal disseminations by him to particular policy agencies of the Government,² or alerts circulated as preliminary

¹ CIA did not conceal these informal disseminations from the IAC members, regularly noting them in the IAC meetings, and carefully stating in each case that the draft was "only a preliminary, uncoordinated draft by CIA, and. . . so represented to the Senior NSC Staff [or other customer agency involved]." (See, for example, memorandum by ONE to IAC working-level representatives, Jan. 11, 1951, [redacted] in ONE files.) Not until June 1952 were any departmental objections to this informal practice raised in the IAC meetings. On June 5, 1952, the State member (Mr. Armstrong) warned that advance drafts sent to policy officers might so "impress" them that the "final approved version might not be read, and earlier impressions changed," and he cited the Berlin estimate (SE-30) as a case in point. This practice, furthermore, might also "freeze" the views of the ONE Board, he cautioned. General Smith defended the practice by explaining that he had been "disturbed" that the NSC Senior Staff, lacking a finished estimate, "had on occasion written its own intelligence into policy papers." The IAC agreed that estimates, in order to be "more useful," must be "available earlier in the preparation of a policy paper." (IAC minutes, June 5, 1952, in O/CI/ER.)

² In August 1951 the DCI ordered that copies of all ONE "intelligence memoranda," after approval by himself, be sent in the future to General Eisenhower in SHAPE; and in January 1952, to the Naval Aide to President Truman. See ONE memorandum to DCI, Aug. 7, 1951, [redacted] in ONE chrono files; and OD/I memorandum to ONE, Jan. 30, 1952, [redacted] in O/CI/ER, filed under "ONE."

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hypotheses and speculations to the several departmental intelligence agencies on problems that might require further, concerted analysis. These several types of informal memoranda¹ actually outnumbered the formal estimates, during the two years ending January 1953, although in total page length, and in the manpower resources involved in them, they were outweighed by the lengthier, formal estimates that were produced by ONI.

The National Security Council's Staff, or the Senior Staff as it was later called, remained the principal customer from which requests for estimates were received, in 1951 and 1952. On the other hand, requests from the several departmental policy offices, when combined, actually exceeded NSC requests, and a substantial number of estimates (about 1/3 of the total) remained to be initiated by CIA. Of a sample 100 estimates whose origins can be verified from the records,² the largest number (25) stemmed from requests from the NSC Staff. The State Department accounted for some 19 other estimates, while the Defense Department called for 18, with the latter's requests divided among the Army (6), the Navy (2), the Air Force (3), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (4), the Office of Secretary

¹ Copies of these memoranda, variously entitled DSI Memoranda, Staff Memoranda, and Board of National Estimates Memoranda, are in ONI's files.

² See "Historical Record of National Estimates Projects Undertaken . . .," cited above. About 100 of the 135 estimates are identified by requester.

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of Defense (2), and the Munitions Board (1). No requests at all were recorded for the other two agencies represented on the IAC (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission), but there were requests from two agencies outside the IAC complex, one from the National Security Resources Board and the other from the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.¹ The rest of the estimates, 34 in all (or about 1/3 of the total of 100), were initiated by CIA: 4 at the request of the Director; 3 at the request of the clandestine operations group; and the remaining 27 on the initiative of the Office of National Estimates.² In any case, the

¹ The request from this Congressional Committee, in January 1951 (see NIE-30, *ibid.*), was for an estimate on certain Soviet defenses against atomic attack, and was ultimately cancelled, not because of IAC or CIA objections but because it was to be based partly on certain U. S. operational planning information which the Secretary of Defense declined to reveal to the Congress. The Congress figured in at least one other estimate during this period: NIE-7, on Yugoslavia (*ibid.*). In this case the State Dept. had "urgently" requested the estimate, in November 1950, for use "in connection with its request before Congress for Yugoslavia aid." The IAC concluded that it was "a proper intelligence function", in this case, to tell the Government's policy officers that "the current situation may provide opportunities for creating a situation more favorably disposed toward the western Powers and leading to a weakening of Tito." (See IAC minutes, Nov. 11, 16, 1950, IAC-M-5, -6, in O/DCI/ER.)

² "Historical Record of National Estimates Projects Undertaken . . . ," cited earlier.

finished estimates were regularly distributed to some 20 policy offices and officials, as well as to the participating intelligence agencies.¹

The geographic coverage of the 135 or more formal estimates produced by February 1953 proved to be as diverse as OMB's initial program in the fall of 1950.² First of all, the Soviet Union continued to dominate OMB's work, to the extent of some 45 estimates. A few of them were addressed to Soviet capabilities and intentions, generally and in relation to a "general war," while most of them dealt with its control over Communist countries elsewhere, and with its specific threats, maneuvers, and motives toward the uncommitted countries and toward the West generally. Estimates were also made, however, on many of the countries outside the Soviet Bloc, including Western European, Middle Eastern, African, Asian, and Latin American nations. Here, again, the estimates dealt variously with capabilities,

¹ The dissemination schedule for NIE's followed by OGD as of April 1951 included, besides the LAC agencies, the following policy and operational officials and agencies: President Truman; his security-affairs assistant, Averell Harriman; the Executive Secretary of the NSC, the Coordinator of the NSC Staff, and the NSC Staff itself; the Secretary of State and his Policy Planning Staff; the Secretary of Defense and the three departmental Service secretaries; the Chairman and the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with their Joint Strategic Plans Group and their Joint Subsidiary Plans Division; the Munitions Board; the Research and Development Board; the National War College; the Armed Forces Staff College; the National Security Resources Board; the Atomic Energy Commission; and the Office of Defense Mobilization. (See OGD memorandum to L. B. Kirkpatrick, C/DCI, April 17, 1951, [redacted] in C/DCI/RR, filed under "OMB.") Senior diplomatic officers and military commanders in the Far East and Europe, as well as General Eisenhower in [redacted], were also customarily sent estimates, through their departmental headquarters in Washington. [redacted]

² Ibid.


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weaknesses, and reactions toward internal and external pressures, including Soviet pressures and proposed changes in U. S. policy.



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The United States itself also figured directly or indirectly in each estimate, at least to the extent that every estimate, since it was ultimately addressed (directly or indirectly) to an intelligence appreciation of an existing or changing U. S. policy, required the estimators to have at hand (or to guess at) certain assumptions regarding U. S. capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions in a given developing foreign situation. Only rarely, however, was one able to attempt an estimate that frankly went beyond a "raw" estimate of a foreign country in the direction of a "net" estimate of its capabilities specifically in relation to U. S. counter-capabilities.²



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² This problem is discussed later in this chapter, under "Intelligence Estimating in Relation to Operational Planning"; see pp. 161-182 below.

Whatever the areas covered, all of the estimates were, of course, intended to be essentially speculative or predictive about the future, rather than descriptive or historical about the present and past, and therefore all of them contained some measure of forecasting on a particular development or carried a warning, express or implied, about the future. Only rarely, in contrast, was a completed estimate essentially a descriptive survey, as in the case of a Venezuelan estimate (NIE-67) in 1952.¹ Many of the estimates, nevertheless, were not only predictive but also historical, in the sense that they inevitably discussed past trends as one basis for perceiving trends into the future. The projected time span, furthermore, varied from one estimate to another. A few took a very long-range view into the future, such as the 10-year forecast of Soviet intentions (NIE-78).

¹ ONE told the DCI, on July 23, 1952 (memorandum in ONE "chrono files") that the Venezuelan estimate, requested by State, contained more "descriptive (as distinguished from estimative) matter than is usual or generally desirable in NIE's." The "estimate turned out to be negative--no radical change in the situation is expected--leaving the paper little function save to describe the situation" (ibid.). Earlier, in December 1950, ONE had rejected a draft of an ONE estimate on the Far East (ONE 10-50), saying that while it was "an excellent and comprehensive survey of developments in the Far East," it "does not meet the requirements of an NIE as presently defined." (ONE memorandum to DCI, Dec. 6, 1950, [redacted] in ONE "chrono files".) Similarly, in accepting the task of revising the estimate on Soviet intentions, previously handled by the JIC, ONE's head had commented that the JIC's estimate "is more related to National Intelligence Survey material" and that such "survey" aspects should be handled elsewhere than in ONE (IAC minutes, Jan. 18, 1951, IAC-M-16, [redacted] in O/INT/ER files). While there was no obvious "competition" between NIE's and NIS's, there was some priority conflict between them, in some of the departments, which suggests that some of the same research analysts worked on both types of reports. (See IAC minutes, Aug. 16, 1951, IAC-M-41, [redacted] in O/INT/ER.)

Many others were of a more intermediate range, such as the estimate on the Soviet war potential over the next four years (SI-65), or a particular foreign situation generally over the next year or two (SI-13, SI-14, and others). Still others dealt with threats and crises likely to arise in the immediate weeks and months ahead. Indeed, the very titles of some estimates, such as "Soviet Intentions in the Current Situation" (SI-11) and "Current Developments in Iran" (SI-6), suggested that it was not always practicable to adhere to a pre-determined, theoretical boundary between speculative estimates about the future and current-intelligence evaluations of the immediate situation. Some of ONS's informal estimates, in particular, did involve jurisdictional issues and problems of coordination with the Office of Current Intelligence.¹

Many of the 135 estimates produced dealt comprehensively with the whole range of political, military, economic, scientific, psychological, and other factors in a given power situation.² Yet the very editorial arrangement of many such estimates, subdivided as they were into topical paragraphs corresponding to such factors, suggested a certain practical departure from the theory of so-called "integrated" estimates, and a degree of segregation of those factors

¹ See Chapter VIII, above, on Office of Current Intelligence, especially pp. 37-43. By December 1952, OCI-ONS relations were called "an armed truce", by OIC. See OIC Planning Book.

² See "Historical Record of National Estimates Projects Undertaken", Annex K.

for which the several contributing departments and agencies each had primary jurisdiction. Other estimates, furthermore, were individually confined to particular functional or topical factors in many cases.¹ Among such examples were Soviet military and civil-defense capabilities against atomic attack (NIE-30, NIE-40), the psychological impact of an air offensive against the USSR (NIE-39, SR-15), the importance of Middle East oil (NIE-14), the threat of Soviet economic imperialism (NIE-40, NIE-56),² the possibilities of economic warfare (NIE-22), the East-West trade problem (NIE-59), specific political maneuvers by the Soviet Union, the parliamentary elections in Italy [redacted] 25X
[redacted] 25X6, Soviet biological and chemical warfare 25X6 plans (NIE-18), Soviet clandestine-warfare capabilities (NIE-31), and Soviet electro-magnetic warfare capabilities. While coordinated

¹Ibid. Initially, ONE had avoided what it regarded as strictly political estimates which, it felt, the State Department would wish to reserve for itself. Thus, for example, the new AD of ONE, Mr. Langer, in cancelling one of ORE's pending ORE projects (one on Argentina, ORE 30-50), on Dec. 12, 1950, commented that, while the draft was "entirely satisfactory," he wanted to avoid challenging the State Department. He wrote: "In view of the present policy of leaving the field of political reporting to the State Department, and in view of the close working relations that have been developed with the Department, it would seem that any gain from the publication of the attached study would outweigh the disadvantages of creating an issue of principle at this time." His views were concurred in by the DDCI, Mr. Jackson, on Dec. 15. (Correspondence in ORE case folder on ORE 30-50, in O/DCI/HS files.) It is notable, as an indication of a changing climate among the intelligence agencies, that some 15 months later the State Department itself requested an estimate on Argentina, on subject matter that was heavily political. (See IAC progress report, IAC-PR-23, April 21, 1952, [redacted] in ONE files.)

²Both of these projects were eventually cancelled, presumably in favor of the Economic Intelligence Committee.

economic and scientific intelligence estimates were prepared in greater numbers by ORR and OSI, through the interdepartmental Economic and Scientific Intelligence Committee,¹ respectively, a substantial number of topical estimates in these fields were issued as NIE's and SE's.

With respect to most of these and other specifically topical estimates, each of them was theoretically within the primary cognizance of one of the contributing agencies (outside CIA or in ORR and OSI), but there seems to have been a notable absence of jurisdictional controversy on the part of the departmental intelligence agencies affected. Rarely, in fact, were any of these specific non-integrated projects challenged as inappropriate for a CIA-sponsored estimate, at least as far as the deliberations in the IAC meetings were concerned.² While there was some doctrinal contention on the length of estimates, on their timeliness, and on the jurisdiction between an intelligence estimate and an operational plan (described later, below), there was

¹ These EIC and SIC projects were actually listed (in the IAC progress reports) as "estimates" rather than as reports. (See IAC-PR-25, July 15, 1952, and later issues, in ONE files.)

² In one case, involving an estimate on India (NIE-23), General Smith questioned whether it was proper to include a warning of possible "losses in terms of strategic raw materials," but the IAC expressed "general agreement" that to make such economic predictions "was a proper mission of intelligence." (IAC minutes, Aug. 30, 1951, IAC-M-43, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.) In another case, CIA rejected a request from the JCS for a "psychological warfare intelligence estimate," and referred the requester to the State Dept. (Letter by William H. Jackson to Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Jan. 29, 1951, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "State Dept.")

no persistent debate on the propriety of CIA's sponsoring an essentially military, political, economic, or scientific appraisal when one was requested by one of the policy agencies.

In summary, the estimates requested of CIA by the policy agencies between October 1950 and February 1953 revealed a diversity of subject matter, a widening circle of customers, and a flexibility of product handled by ONE's several series of formal, coordinated estimates and informal intelligence memoranda. All of these factors help to explain the development of CIA's ability to meet the changing needs of the NSC and the departmental policy echelons.

The progress during this period was summarized by General Smith on two occasions, one near the beginning and the other near the end of his administration. In December 1950 he told a staff conference¹ that

"Policy makers in the other departments are turning more and more to CIA for advice and assistance, and . . . the Agency is receiving greater responsibility all the time. The Agency has not really missed any timely estimates, with one possible exception"

In a similar vein, two years later,² General Smith praised CIA's progress in meeting the policy needs especially of the NSC. He regretted that "the demand for . . . estimates exceeds our ability

¹ Minutes of DCI's staff conference, Dec. 18, 1950, SC-M-1, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

² Remarks at the Agency Orientation Conference, Nov. 21, 1952, reproduced in OTR Training Bulletin No. 1, Feb. 11, 1953, [redacted] in CIA Records Center.

to supply them," but he expressed the assurance that estimates "have become, or at least they should become, what in military parlance is called the -2 annex on which operational plans are based." "More and more," he added, they are "being used in that way." The continuing problem, he found, was that

"We are having a little difficulty getting estimates in in a timely way so that the staff officers who do the work for the Security Council will have them well in advance of their own job, which is the preparation of draft policy papers. In some cases, we have been a little behind the policy papers, but more and more we are keeping up to date and a little bit ahead of the parade."¹

Throughout this period it is evident that CIA's position as the Government's central estimating authority was certainly strengthened, and that the prestige of its estimates was enhanced by closer contact with the policy users and by improved inter-departmental exchange and consultative arrangements with the intelligence contributors. On the other hand, CIA did not achieve exclusive jurisdiction over the production of all estimates needed by the policy officials. The departmental intelligence agencies, including State's Office of Intelligence Research and the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence agencies in the Defense Department, each continued to produce estimates for intra-departmental consumption, including reports intended for their departmental members on the NSC and the NSC Senior Staff. So also did the Joint Intelligence Committee,

¹ Ibid.

under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continue to produce appraisals, except that the JCS yielded to CIA the jurisdiction over the basic, periodic estimate of Soviet capabilities and intentions, beginning in November 1950.¹ Finally, when domestic security policies were at issue, jurisdiction over intelligence estimates was normally taken not by the JCS and the IAC but by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) headed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The combined efforts of all these intelligence estimating groups represented a comprehensive, significant, and growing body of intelligence opinion and advice, available continuously and on demand to the policy echelons of the Government. While there was general agreement that the estimates were useful and germane to policy formulation, it is not as clear, from the historical records available, whether (and how) the estimates were actually used by the policy officers. One critic, who had access to the views and records of the policy echelons themselves during this period, questioned whether intelligence estimates were a major ingredient in policy formulation.² He suggested that the policy officers were

¹ See IAC progress report, Nov. 2, 1950, IAC-PR-1, in ONE files.

² Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Free Press, 1956); based in part on interviews, apparently during the period 1950-52, with various U. S. intelligence and policy officials.

characteristically influenced, instead, by a cacophony of competing opinions on foreign developments supplied by a variety of non-intelligence sources, such as "personal friends, lobbyists, party bosses, ward heelers, senators, congressmen, cabinet members, union leaders, newspapermen, and even pollsters and social psychologists."¹

No such sweeping generalizations can be supported by the evidence used in the present study. Except for isolated cases, notably the public controversy in 1951 which revealed mixed reactions by various policy officials to the intelligence estimates on Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950,² no conclusive evidence has been found of any general indifference to intelligence estimates on the part of the policy echelons of the Government. General Smith, for his part, seemed convinced, both at the beginning and the end of his administration, that CIA-produced estimates were, in fact, becoming increasingly influential. His own membership in the NSC,³ together with the assignment of key ONI officers to work directly with the

¹ Ibid., p. 148.

² For varying, publicly expressed reactions to intelligence estimates by the President, cabinet members, and the Far East commander (General MacArthur), see Historical Staff study, "Study of CIA Reporting on Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean War, September-December 1950", Oct. 1955, [redacted] especially exhibit S.

³ Oral briefings were made by the Director at NSC meetings early in his administration, and the practice continued during his next two years. (See IAC unnumbered minutes, Dec. 11, 1950, and later, in O/OCI/52 files.)

NSC Senior Staff,¹ probably gave CIA a further, more direct voice in the policy councils of the Government, to insure that objectively produced intelligence appraisals were ever more closely addressed to the needs of those who were responsible for the conduct of the Nation's foreign policies and operational programs.²

¹ In December 1950, the DCI expected to personally keep ONE informed, primarily through his attendance at NSC meetings, of "action taken or contemplated by the NSC". (See minutes of DCI staff conference, Dec. 18, 1950, S-4-1, in O/DCI/ER.) Later, in April 1951, he directed the AD of ONE (Mr. Langer) to attend regular bi-weekly meetings of the NSC Staff. Mr. Langer apparently objected to attending personally, with "my time very fully taken up" (see his memo to the DCI, April 19, 1951, in O/DCI/ER); and later this liaison task was assigned to specific ONE staff members. In 1952, this task was re-assigned to staff assistants of the DD/I.

² While ONE participated increasingly in NSC Staff committee meetings, only rarely did the policy officers (conversely) participate in ONE Board meetings, when the crucial matter of "terms of reference" was decided on a given request. There were exceptions, of course; in April 1951, for example, the ONE Board met for that purpose with representatives of State's Policy Planning Staff. (See IAC progress report IAC-PR-10, April 10, 1951, [] in ONE files.)

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Changing Needs for Supporting Documentation

ONE continued the practice, followed by ORE in previous years, of providing the user of the finished estimate not only with the actual estimative conclusions themselves, in a page or two of text at the front of the report, but also with an accompanying "discussion" section, and sometimes with an appendix in addition, in which the evidence bearing on the conclusions was summarized and evaluated, briefly or in more extended detail.

Although ONE's practice seemed to represent no essential change from preceding years, it was subjected to critical review from time to time. Various issues were raised on occasion: how detailed an estimate should be; whether supporting documentation of any kind was needed at all by the policy officials to whom the estimative conclusions were addressed; and whether it was appropriate to reveal, outside the intelligence organization, the nature, extent, and reliability of the factual evidence on which the speculative conclusions were built.

In November 1950, General Smith had aired the case for a bare minimum of factual detail, at one of his first meetings with the IAC, apparently on behalf of Dr. Langer.¹ In order for national estimates to meet "the requirements of the policy makers," General Smith proposed that the finished report "would have to be brief, that the argument attached thereto should be a summary of the deductions

¹ Minutes of IAC meeting, Nov. 30, 1950, IAC-M-8
in O/CGI/AR.

drawn from the data supporting the estimate, and, finally, that all readers would have to understand that for an examination of the voluminous detail, reference would have to be made to the experts." As a statement of administrative principles these views prevailed, with the unanimous agreement of the departmental intelligence chiefs assembled at that meeting.¹

In actual practice, in 1951 and 1952, however, it was apparently impossible to exclude supporting documentation completely from the finished report. It is doubtful, on the other hand, whether in practice the policy readers availed themselves with any regularity of the opportunity for a first-hand "examination of the voluminous detail" from which the estimates were written, in cases where they might wish to challenge the conclusions submitted to them or pursue the underlying ramifications in detail. In any case, not a single transmittal of any such material to any of them has been found in OMB's many outgoing letters for this period.

The "discussion" section of the finished estimate, in 1951-52 as before, typically included not only several pages of what General Smith had called the argumentation, but also some summarization, at least, describing and evaluating the intelligence documentation from which the opinions were drawn. In addition, a substantial number of estimates contained appendixes as well, in which further factual

¹ ibid.

detail was presented. Thus, in ONE's first weeks, in November-December 1950, appendixes appeared in two estimates,¹ and in 1951 they were included in eleven of them.²

The need for supporting documentation was questioned and defended a number of times in 1951 and 1952, both within and outside CIA. Occasionally a final draft of an estimate was criticized by an IAC member agency as being simply "overly lengthy".³ In March 1952, for example, the Army intelligence chief urged that CIA's estimates in general should be shorter.⁴ General Smith apparently continued to take a skeptical attitude toward supporting detail of any kind. On several occasions Smith was quoted as saying that the opening "conclusions" in an estimate were, after all, "the only part that the top policy maker, especially the President, is likely to read."⁵

Evidently his Deputy, William H. Jackson, shared these views, at least in his first months in CIA, which seemed to conform to his own theories about national estimating, as expressed in the Bulles

¹ NIE-3 and NIE-7.

² NIE-18, NIE-21, NIE-27, NIE-19, SE-5, SE-9, NIE-35, NIE-41, NIE-33, and SE-20. See ONE production record, 1950-53, in Annex K below.

³ Comment by General Bolling, G-2, March 27, 1952. See minutes of IAC meeting, March 27, 1952, IAC-M-66 [redacted] in O/DCI/SR.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Quoted by Sherman Kent, AD/NE, in his memorandum to the DD/I, April 10, 1952, commenting on the problem "Authentication of Facts" [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

Group report and in later statements,¹ in which he had distinguished sharply between estimates, as statements of "opinion", and other intelligence products as "factual" reports. By 1951, however, Jackson was insisting, with respect to some of the estimates which came to him for review, that they be more strongly supported "by facts and reasoning from facts."² His successor, Loftus H. Becker, expressed the same criticism after January 1952.³

In April 1952, ONE formally sought out the views of the National Security Council Senior Staff members, on their preferences for supporting detail. At a meeting with them on April 10, which Sherman Kent regarded as "certainly the best consumer guidance we have received," he found that that group of readers "would on occasion like more detail than is now supplied."⁴ Similarly, on subsequent occasions in 1952 and 1953, the NSC representatives asked again for "a fuller array of facts upon which the conclusions were based."⁵ The State Department and the Psychological Strategy Board

¹ For example, at the IAC meeting on October 20, 1950, Mr. Jackson made the distinction between "estimates and simple reports of fact" (IAC Minutes, in O/DCI/HS files).

² Comment by Mr. Jackson, recalled by Mr. Kent, in memorandum to DI/I, Jan. 1952, in ONE "chrono file".

³ Ibid.

⁴ Memorandum by AI/NE to DI/I, April 10, 1952, "Authentication of Facts", [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".

⁵ Memorandum by AI/NE to DCI, Sept. 23, 1953, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "ONE".

agreed. It seemed evident that a discriminating and critical reader of an intelligence appraisal would have the keenest interest in going behind the tightly measured words of a page or two of conclusions, not only to check for himself the logic that led to those conclusions, but also to satisfy himself about the extent, authenticity, and reliability of the evidence on which the conclusions were based.

In April 1952, apparently at the request of the new DD/I, ONE explored comprehensively the problem of improving the supporting documentation, not only in the finished estimate but also in the departmental and intra-CIA contributions on which it was expected to be based. In a staff study on "authentication of facts," Sherman Kent discussed the relative merits of several alternatives that might be employed.¹ He mentioned, first, the time-honored academic practice, common to all fields of critical scholarship and not uncommon to current intelligence reporting and to some other types of intelligence production, of footnoting the "discussion" section of an estimate with accurately evaluated references to the specific documentary evidence involved. He dismissed footnotes summarily, however, as being "presumably anathema" to the reader. Similarly he discarded the comparable practice of systematically summarizing the documentary references in the text by means of such typical documentary phrases as "on the basis of P/W reports" and "on the basis of agent reports." He questioned whether such documentation "would add to the judgment of a consumer not trained in

¹Memorandum by AD/NE to DD/I, April 10, 1952, [redacted]
[redacted] in ONE "chrono file."

intelligence," and he wondered whether such a practice would not also present problems of "bulk" and "occasionally, of security."¹

Other alternatives Kent considered more favorably, in cases where there was a demonstrated need for more documentation. The practice of oral "briefings" could be extended, he thought, except that more briefings might take undue time for ONE staff members. A greater use of "tabs" or appendixes would also appeal to the consumers, he said. Next, he suggested a greater use of "graphic methods of presentation."² While all these alternatives were primarily methods of presenting facts and figures, rather than devices for revealing the reliability of the evidence presented, they were all used increasingly by ONE for extending and improving the supporting detail in the finished report.

Appendixes, in particular, continued to appear with some regularity, but not without a formal re-examination of the problem by the IAC in September 1952. All the recipients of ONE material in 1952 had responded favorably to appendixes, so ONE reported, but some of the producing agencies, especially the military intelligence services, had raised objections to supporting detail in general, and to certain kinds of appendixes in particular. While the military agencies no longer objected, so ONE had found, to such appendixes as "maps, . . . tables of estimated military strengths, . . . tables of military end items, or . . . rough inventories of

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

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the strategic resources of another state," which were all primarily within the fields of their special competence, those agencies had been "as a rule, . . . either lukewarm or definitely opposed to Tabs which were of a general political, social, or economic nature."¹

On September 4, 1952, the IAC took a formal position against appendixes as an integral, coordinated part of the finished estimate, and left the problem to CIA as to whether a given appendix might be issued along with an estimate merely as "background information."² In the future, so the IAC ruled, if an appendix would be proposed, the DI/I would determine, after consultation with the departmental intelligence agencies, whether it should be issued as "background information." Furthermore, however, while the IAC would not formally review the substance of an appendix, the appendixes "should be 'screened' by the [intelligence] agencies and any serious disagreement taken into account," before it was circulated with the estimate as unofficial background information.³

Between September 1952 and February 1953 the number of appendixes declined. Only three estimates appeared with them during that period.⁴ Those that survived did, however, carry the formal

¹ Memoranda by ONE, July-Aug. 1952, in ONE "chronic file".

² Minutes of IAC meeting, Sept. 4, 1952, IAC-M-81, [] in O/OCI/AR.

³ Ibid.

⁴ NIE-58, NIE-64 (part I), and NIE-21/1; see ONE production record below, Annex K.

concurrence of the IAC, in spite of the categorical position it had taken in September 1952. The issue was raised again the next year, when the principle of fully coordinated appendixes was once again restored.¹

In summary, the presence of adequate supporting documentation, in sufficient relevant detail and in readable and understandable form, seemed to be one of the factors contributing to increasing "customer acceptance" and "consumer confidence" in CIA's estimates in 1951 and 1952. Among the intelligence producers, documentation was variously regarded either as a strictly editorial problem of form and presentation or as a substantive problem affecting the very integrity of the final evaluation. In any case, supporting documentation was a production problem which, aside from formal administrative rulings, had to be re-appraised from time to time, and seemed to be inherent in the very nature of orderly and responsible estimating.

¹ Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Sept. 23, 1953, on "IAC Policy on Approval of Appendixes to NIE's," [redacted] approved by DCI, Oct. 1, 1953; in G/DCI/ER, filed under "ONE."

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Departmental and Agency Research Participation
in Estimates Production

Parallel with the problems of customer relations, described above, were CIA's problems of maintaining working relationships with the several intelligence research and production agencies and offices, both among the departments and within CIA, which had varying intelligence resources and points of view to contribute in the construction of the finished estimate. The need for better departmental contributions and for fuller participation by the IAC member agencies in the estimating process had been commonly urged by all of the several surveys that had investigated CIA's estimates programs before October 1950, even though they had not agreed in all details as to what changes might bring about the desired result. Furthermore, with the internal reorganization of CIA and the emergence of four separate production offices by January 1951, there was also a corresponding need, unforeseen by the several surveys of the old Office of Reports and Estimates, for redefining the relationships between the new Office of National Estimates and the research and analysis divisions in the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Research and Reports, and the Office of Current Intelligence.

Between October 1950 and January 1951, after a period of experimentation first by the Office of Reports and Estimates and then (after November 13) by the new Office of National Estimates,

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the procedures for inter-agency participation were revised, in the direction of giving the participating agencies and offices a more direct and continuing voice at various stages of the estimating process, and at the same time making their participation a more regularized and responsible one. There was no broad reorganization of the intelligence production organization outside CIA, which remained decentralized essentially in the State and Defense Departments. Nor was there any change in the essential steps of the estimating process, which included (as before) the formulation of the terms of reference, the assignment and production of research contributions, the drafting of the estimate, and the review, revision, and final approval of the finished estimate. In all of these essential steps, however, new procedures were attempted toward the aim of fuller and better participation by the departmental intelligence agencies, and a widening circle of participating agencies and offices/^{to be}consulted during the research and deliberative stages.

The procedural changes, while not dramatic or revolutionary, were both definite and flexible. Thus, the terms of reference for a given estimate, instead of being sent/^{peremptorily}to the contributing agencies, were first discussed in advance with their representatives, thus providing an opportunity for a consensus in which the research and evaluative questions involved could be more clearly defined or understood and in which the assignment of research contributions

would be more acceptable. The pattern of contributing agencies remained basically the same as before 1950, but there was a degree of flexibility with an occasional smaller circle of contributors (if the subject matter was limited) or one that was wider (if more ramifying subject matter was involved).

The drafting itself was usually reserved as a function for the ONR Estimates Staff itself, but again the procedure was flexible enough to yield this task to one or another departmental agency (particularly when the subject was in a department's primary jurisdiction) or to an ad hoc committee of CIA and departmental representatives (on subjects that were more speculative than factual). Finally, the review of the draft was divided into two steps: in the first instance, within CIA, by ONR's Board and Estimates Staff; and second, by CIA and the departments jointly, in the subsequent discussions. While this second step corresponded to ONR's former practice of discussing a draft with IAC representatives, an additional, third step was added, calling for a further review and a final concurrence by the departmental intelligence chiefs themselves, assembled in the full IAC committee. In not a single case, among the 135-some estimates published between October 1950 and February 1953, was an estimate formally disseminated until the IAC had had an opportunity to consider and concur in the final draft.

The inter-departmental character that permeated much of the work of estimating followed a pattern of flexibility and regularity during the period October 1950-February 1953. All seven departmental

intelligence agencies were regularly represented, along with CIA, in the Intelligence Advisory Committee, when the final review of an estimate was being undertaken, but only the four principal production agencies (those in the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively) participated with any regularity in the earlier research and deliberative stages of the estimative process. In those earlier, sometimes time-consuming stages, the other three agencies (the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Joint Intelligence Committee) participated only to a limited extent, chiefly in relation to specific problems. The AEC, for example, itself preoccupied with a separate series of atomic-energy estimates (outside the ONE program but nevertheless ultimately cleared through the IAC), served chiefly (along with the Office of Scientific Intelligence) in advising ONE on atomic-energy factors that figured in a larger national estimate. Similarly, the FBI, which also had its own estimating program in the field of domestic-security intelligence, participated in ONE's most part program for the/only when domestic matters were involved.¹ Finally, the JIC, which as an agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff was

¹ The FBI objected to ONE's standard credit line (in the NIE's), that "all" IAC members "concurred in this estimate," commenting that it regarded its responsibility to "coordinating foreign and domestic intelligence and related matters." (Memorandum by [redacted] ONE, to DD/I, July 29, 1952, [redacted] in ONE "chrono files.")

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itself an inter-departmental estimating group (for military intelligence in particular), rarely submitted military contributions to CIA's estimate program, and only rarely undertook to coordinate Army, Navy, and Air Force military information needed by ONE, leaving that task either to one of the three Service departments, or to ONE itself. Instead, JIC's chief function in the CIA/ONE estimates program was to serve as an intermediary between the intelligence estimators in CIA and the operational planners in the JCS, in relation to problems of "net" estimates, discussed further later.¹

The remaining four departmental intelligence agencies meanwhile participated not only in the final IAC meetings but also in a series of regular meetings of department-appointed working-level representatives (called IAC representatives). These meetings, typically, were scheduled by the ONE Board of National Estimates, first to consider the terms of reference and next to consider the successive drafts of the estimate itself. The ONE Board meetings with the IAC representatives consisted usually of a single meeting on a given set of terms of reference, but the meetings on the drafts averaged between two and three meetings per estimate, and occasionally the record indicated that "several long and protracted meetings" were involved on a draft that was particularly controversial or in which the speculative features outweighed the factual evidence that was available.²

¹ See below, pp. 161 ff.

² See "Historical Record of Estimates Projects Undertaken. . ." Annex K, below, passim.

In addition, the departmental representatives and their home agencies performed other functions, on occasion, which departed somewhat from the typical procedure worked out in the fall of 1950. The State Department's intelligence agency, for example, occasionally was asked to draft the terms of reference, as in the case of Burma (NIE-36), in April 1951. Similarly, the State Department also occasionally did the initial drafting of an estimate, as in the case of the Soviet Union's current intentions, in November 1950 (NIE-11), Soviet tactics in a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, in January 1951 (NIE-28), Soviet vulnerability to economic warfare, in January 1951 (NIE-22), the San Francisco treaty conference, in August 1951 (SE-11), and the political situation in Panama in January 1952 (SE-21). Furthermore, beginning early in 1951, ONE made special requests on the State Department for special background studies on particular political problems, such as Mainland Chinese attitudes toward Chiang Kai-Shek (March 1951), French politics (March 1951), Indonesian and Thailand politics (June-September 1951), and further political studies on France and China (in February and June 1952).¹

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The three military departments, similarly, occasionally provided special services to the CIA estimates program which went beyond their normal research contributions and their normal participation in ONE meetings to deliberate on the terms of reference and on the drafts. While most of the military contributions were

¹Ibid.

separately submitted to OMB by the individual departments, they were occasionally subjected to inter-Service coordination, usually by the particular department that had the dominating interest in the military subject matter of the estimate project. The Army, for example, was responsible for "coordinated" contributions on Southeast Asia (NIE-20, January 1951), Korea (NIE-32, February 1951), and the European Satellites (NIE-33, April 1951). The Navy, similarly, assembled a single Defense Department contribution on the Chinese Nationalists (NIE-27, March 1951). So also did the Air Force, on a USSR psychological warfare estimate (SE-15, July 1951). Like the State Department, the Army occasionally was asked to do the drafting of the estimate itself, in lieu of OMB, as in the case of a Yugoslavian estimate in April 1951 (NIE-29/1), but there is no record that Navy and Air Force participated in the initial-drafting stage, except in a few cases where they and other IAC representatives were temporarily constituted as an ad hoc drafting committee. Such drafting committees were used in the case of the estimate on Soviet biological and chemical warfare (NIE-18, December 1950), one on Soviet defense against atomic attack (NIE-30, February 1951), and the first of the special-intelligence estimates (SIE-1, March 1951).¹

There were still other departures from the typical pattern of IAC participation. In May 1951, for example, an estimate on the probabilities of a new Soviet blockade of Berlin was delegated by

¹ Drafting committees were also used for some of the "net" USSR-US capabilities estimates; see pp. 161 ff.

the IAC to the several U. S. intelligence representatives in Germany.¹ In another case, the following year a project on Indo-China led to a special request to the U. S. Embassies at Saigon and Paris, asking them to prepare a consolidated and coordinated contribution of the views, "including minority views," of all the U. S. intelligence agencies in those two areas.²

In addition to the four principal IAC members, a number of non-IAC agencies also participated in the research and deliberative stages of estimating from time to time. In one of ONE's very first estimates projects, dealing with the Middle East petroleum situation (NE-10), the research and drafting was done by an ad hoc committee that included representatives of the Treasury and Commerce Departments, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Petroleum Committee of the Munitions Board.³ In another case, in July 1951, a draft estimate on Soviet clandestine-warfare capabilities (NE-31) was revised on the basis of discussions with a variety of agencies having particular technical competences, including (besides the FBI and the AEC), the Agriculture Department's Bureau of Animal Industry and of Entomology, the Treasury Department's Customs Bureau and Coast Guard, the Army's Chemical Corps, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, and the Public

¹ IAC Minutes, May 3, 1951, IAC-M-29, [redacted] in O/DCI/AR. 25X
² IAC Minutes, Jan. 24, 1952, IAC-M-57, [redacted] in ibid. 25X
³ IAC Progress report, Nov. 15, 1950, IAC-PR-2, [redacted] in ONE files. 25X

Health Service.¹ Indirectly, too, and more typically, these and other Federal agencies also participated in the estimates program through their assistance to the departmental intelligence agencies in connection with the normal research and collection programs of the latter agencies.

The contributions of CIA's own research offices meanwhile became an increasingly regular feature in a substantial number of estimates projects, beginning early in 1951. Although CIA had been criticized, before 1950, for conducting research on estimative problems independently of IAC member agencies, the practice was resumed in modified form, early in 1951, partly (it appears) in order to retain an independent review of the reliability of evidence supplied in the departmental contributions, and partly to take advantage of special research and collection resources being strengthened in CIA after ^{October} 1950.

Among the participating offices of CIA, the Office of Scientific Intelligence continued (as before October 1950) to prepare contributions when a particular estimate dealt with scientific subjects or the economic aspects of new weapons. In addition, beginning early in 1951, OSI was occasionally given the further responsibility of drafting a major section of the estimate. Two such cases were the estimates on Western European Defense (NIE-13) in January 1951, and Civil Defense in the USSR (NIE-60, part II) in February 1952. With the

¹IAC Progress report, Aug. 1, 1951, IAC-PR-16, in ibid.

reorganization of OSI and the establishment of the Inter-agency Scientific Estimates Committee later in 1952, both OSI's research contributions and its drafts of sections of the estimate were increasingly subjected to advance, inter-departmental coordination, and were accordingly submitted to OMB in the form of "Scientific Estimates Committee" contributions.¹

Similarly, the new Office of Research and Reports soon became a major contributor to those estimates projects that were heavily economic in subject matter. Initially (late in 1950 and early in 1951) economic-intelligence contributions had been supplied by the State Department, but beginning in February 1951, this work was gradually taken over by ORR. The first case was a general estimate on Soviet capabilities and intentions (NIE-25), in which the economic sections were divided three ways between the State Department, ORR, and OSI, as follows: (1) State, the USSR's "total economic potential relative to the United States and Western Europe"; (2) ORR, the USSR's industrial conversion to war production, its capabilities to meet essential civilian and military needs, and stockpiling; and (3) OSI, the USSR's production capacity in the fields of the newer "weapons of mass destruction".²

¹ For example, a "SEC" contribution was prepared, in Jan.-Feb. 1953, for NIE-65, on Soviet War Potential, Mid-1953 to Mid-1957. (See IAC progress Report, March 13, 1953, IAC-PR-31, [redacted] in OMB files.) As early as April 1951, there had been occasional inter-agency coordination of scientific contributions by OSI, as in the case of SF-4, on "Intelligence Implications of a Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments."

² Memo by [redacted] OMB Board Secretary, to IAC representatives, Feb. 10, 1951 (Top [redacted] in OMB Chrono Files.)

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In subsequent estimates, however, the economic contributions were more definitely centralized in OHR (except that OHR continued to handle the economic aspects of new weapons). Furthermore, as OHR itself became a coordinating agency on economic intelligence, confirmed with the establishment of the inter-departmental Economic Intelligence Committee in June 1951, the economic contributions to OHR-sponsored estimates became (like OSI's scientific contributions, mentioned earlier), a form of "pre-coordinated" material upon its delivery to OHR.¹

The Office of Current Intelligence was still another source of research and evaluation for ONE. By June 1951 OCI was making occasional "informal" contributions, as in the case of an estimate on Spain (NIE-3h), and in October 1951 ONE was asking OCI to participate in the terms-of-reference meeting on an estimate on Sino-Soviet relations (NIE-58). In a number of cases OCI's work on indications and warnings, conducted in collaboration with the IAC Watch Committee, also figured in the estimates, as in the case of an estimate on Communist intentions in Japan, in August 1951 (NIE-11), and one on Soviet air-defense capabilities, in November 1951 (NIE-60).² In 1952 ONE experimented with the practice of regularly

¹ Among the estimates containing OHR/ETC contributions were NIE-56, NIE-58, NIE-59, and NIE-65. (See "Historical Record of Estimates Projects Undertaken . . ." Annex K, below.) In addition, OHR and OIC also produced separate series of reports, entirely economic in scope, which in the IAC progress reports (IAC-PR's) were identified as "estimates".

² See "Historical Record of Estimates Projects Undertaken . . ." Annex K, below. For other aspects of ONE-OCI relations, see Chapter VIII, above.

subjecting departmental contributions to "factual" review by OGI regional specialists, in the interest of overcoming "shortcomings or possible errors" and improving the departmental contributions. But ONE found that because of "the pressure of other commitments in OGI," this review "almost never results in major comment," except for OGI's Far Eastern Division, and except for OGI's Support Staff, which "has also contributed substantially to the factual side of some estimates of Soviet intentions."¹

Meanwhile, CIA's operational groups also were used on occasion in the estimates program. While their normal relationship to ONE was that of a customer, they also served occasionally as an intelligence contributor. The several established series of secretly collected reports of OSO, for example, were of course regularly available (in sanitized form) to ONE as they were to all of the production offices in and out of CIA. In addition, moreover, ONE occasionally sought the specific and direct collection assistance of OSO on special problems,


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¹ Memorandum by Sherman Kent, AD/NS, "Authentication of Facts." Top Secret (TS #75300), p. 16; in ONE "chrono files."

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informational basis than is available in Washington."¹ Another approach was to invite OSO (as well as OPC) to brief the ONE Board on particular areas, as was done in March and April 1951 on China and Eastern Europe.² Formal contributions were occasionally requested of those operational offices,



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
By the beginning of ONE's second year, ONE was also drawing directly on the Office of Operations,

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for special psychological studies to supplement the analyses normally made of the

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
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
The pattern of contributing agencies and offices outlined above ranged from the standardized formula of four IAC member agencies, on which ONE depended in the great majority of projects,

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to a highly flexible procedure that permitted ONE independently to draw on the additional assistance of a variety of specialized offices (within CIA and among the non-IAC agencies), in order to meet research needs in specific estimative problems. Normally the contributions were in written form, but usually not supported by documentation.¹ In other cases, furthermore, contributions were received orally by ONE. Oral briefings by the IAC representatives figured in two projects, conducted experimentally in November and December 1952: one on Albania (SE-34) and the other on "Free World Attitudes . . ." (NIE-45).² The results were regarded by ONE as "sufficiently successful to warrant repetition in similar cases" in the future.³

¹ Whether departmental contributions were long or short, they were generally not footnoted or otherwise referenced to specific documentary evidence, Sherman Kent (AD/NE) said in a survey in April, 1952. While contributions "generally give the subsidiary facts or line of reasoning in support of statements," they "do not under present practice go into questions of intelligence methodology," he said, because the contributors might object to the additional workload and would regard a request for documentation "as a serious reflection on their competence." To require documentation "might easily impair good relations," he concluded. (See Kent's study, "Authentication of Facts," April 10, 1952, pp. 13, 16, 31, [redacted] in ONE "chrono files.") For customer (as against contributor) interest in supporting documentation, see above, pp. 86-93.

² Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Dec. 17, 1952, [redacted] and IAC progress report, Dec. 12, 1952, IAC-FR-29, [redacted] both in ONE files.

³ Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Dec. 17, 1952, ibid.

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At the other procedural extreme, ONE also had occasion to draft an estimate without any formal departmental contributions whatsoever. At least three estimates projects, all of them in 1952, were handled in this way. Among them was an estimate on Guatemala (NIE-62), one on Berlin (SE-30), and one on Italy (NIE-71). The drafts written by ONE were subjected, of course, to normal review and revision by the IAC representatives meeting with the ONE Board, but they were based entirely on initial research and evaluation conducted within ONE. Nor was ONE's work on the many other, more normal inter-agency projects confined to that of a middleman for contributions. From the beginning ONE had had a Support Staff for handling ad hoc research problems that figured in estimating projects.¹ Furthermore, both the supporting analysts and the estimators themselves generally had direct access to a variety of "raw intelligence" reports and other materials, including certain special series of departmental cable and radio messages, from which to draw evidence at first hand.² The key personnel in ONE had additional clearances for using directly certain categories of material, specially those in the custody of OSI and OCI, which had a research value for estimates.³

¹ See above, pp. 48-50.

² Memorandum by William L. Langer, AD/NE, to ONE Staff, Dec. 9, 1950, [redacted] in ONE "chrono files"; and memorandum by ONE to OGD/LS, June 18, 1951, [redacted] (regarding ECA "Daily Cable Summary"), in ibid.

³ Atomic-energy " " clearances and special-intelligence clearances were promptly requested and obtained by ONE between Nov. 1950 and March 1951; see memoranda in ONE "chrono files."

Regardless of an abundance or a minimum of contributions, ONE characteristically added an "infusion of [its] own sources of information" in the initial drafting of an estimate, the Assistant Director (Sherman Kent) said in 1952.¹

Whatever the degree of departmental and agency participation in research contributions, the evaluative problem confronting ONE was to come to intelligence conclusions and make them both intelligent and intelligible. This task was sometimes called, figuratively, the job of piecing together a "jig saw puzzle" of the enemy's intentions, or of managing an "assembly line" to which the separate producers of components made contributions.² Both of these figures of speech, apt as they were, implied erroneously that the boundaries of each of the several elements of an intelligence estimate and each of the contributions could be exactly drawn, and that pre-fabricated reports on each element, once they were prepared, needed only to be joined together editorially. Nor was the drafting task in ONE a function of "a mere editorial

¹ Report by Sherman Kent, AD/NE, "Authentication of Facts", April 10, 1952, p. 17, previously cited.

² The assembly-line and jig-saw puzzle figures were frequently used (among others) by William H. Jackson, the DCI, in 1951, and also appeared in the DCI's progress report to the NSC, in 1952. (Disc recordings, [redacted] of Jackson's remarks at OTR Orientation Conferences, April 11, 1951, in OTR files; his letter to General Omar Bradley, JCS, Jan. 10, 1952, unclassified, in O/DCI/ER, filed under "JCS," and DCI progress report, April 23, 1952, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.) Jackson also regarded the entire U. S. intelligence organization as, figuratively, a "Sears, Roebuck Enterprise."

secretariat," Kent said. Rather it was a critical analysis and synthesis of formal contributions and of supplementary material. In this process, ONE "does not lightly depart from the contributions," but it "does deliberately amplify, modify, and on occasion contradict contributions, on the theory that such departures should be ironed out, in the main, in the coordination process."¹

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This inter-agency coordination process, handled by person-to-person discussion in the ONE Board's many meetings with the IAC representatives, was probably more akin, figuratively, to an academic seminar, than to an assembly-line or a jig-saw puzzle, insofar as the meetings were concerned with such matters as establishing the reliability of evidence, reconciling conflicting evidence, and arriving objectively at generalizations and conclusions. The Assistant Director of ONE described these meetings, in 1952, as a period of "constant scrutiny" and "cross-examination" which usually result in "a very searching appraisal of the essential factual points."² On the other hand, such cross-examinations were sometimes "a discouraging business," he said, especially when they involve military representatives who are "not the working-level people and are not accompanied by these people," who have "some tendency...to take a fixed view and to decline to argue it, on the ground that it is solely within their particular agency's competence."³ In any case,

¹ Report by Sherman Kent, "Authentication of Facts," p. 17, previously cited.

² Report by Sherman Kent, "Authentication of Facts," April 10, 1952, pp. 19-20, previously cited.

³ Ibid., p. 19.

however, "at the very least we make an overdramatic or uninformed agency representative (or ONI staff member) fairly uncomfortable," Kent said, and he concluded that by 1952 the meetings had become "far franker . . . than in the early months of ONS's existence."¹ His hope was that, "with the passage of time" the Board's proceedings would develop to the point where "group spirit, plus a little genial criticism, will permit factual and intelligence weaknesses to be discussed with complete frankness."² A year later he was able to report further progress toward improving the factual content of estimative contributions. Both military-strength and scientific-capabilities studies on the Soviet Union, which "two or three years ago . . . may have been in large part uncritical 'boiler-plate,' are 'emphatically not' in that category today, he wrote in 1953.³ The committee deliberations were going "to great lengths to squeeze out all inflation possibilities" in such contributions, he said.⁴

The inter-agency coordination meetings conducted by the Board, together with the final meetings of the IAC, revealed not only differences over the evaluation of factual evidence, but also differences of opinion and judgment on the conclusions and

¹ Ibid., p. 20

² Ibid., p. 20

³ "Draft" memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Sept. 28, 1953, on "possible topics for discussion with Admiral Radford [JCS]," in O/DCI/ER, filed under "Memos for DCI."

⁴ Ibid.

speculations rendered. There were relatively few cases of formal dissents, and no cases where an estimate was cancelled for lack of conclusions, among the 135-some estimates produced between October 1950 and February 1953. The records suggest, however, that controversy was characteristic of many of the deliberative sessions in the Board and IAC meetings.

In one early case, the Air Force member of the IAC objected vigorously to a draft estimate on Communist China (NIE-10) in January 1951, because:

The effect of the . . . paper would be to point out to the policy makers advantages of taking positive steps with respect to China, and he stated frankly that his own inclinations were in the opposite direction.¹

In another estimate, on Communist intentions in Japan (SE-11), in August 1951, the Navy and the ONE Board were in a minority on certain of the conclusions, while the majority views (held by the State, Army, and Air Force Departments and the Joint Intelligence Committee) were in the end upheld by the DCI.² In still another case, in January 1952, the State Department and ONE had divergent views on the likelihood of authoritarian rule in Iran (NIE-16).³ No one department or agency was consistently in a minority position. In June 1952, the Office of Scientific Intelligence and the

¹ IAC Minutes, Jan. 15, 1951, IAC-M-15, in O/DCI/ER.

² IAC Minutes, Aug. 13, 1951, in O/DCI/ER.

³ See "Historical Record of Estimates Projects Undertaken . . ." Annex K, below.

Air Force contended on Soviet capabilities to jam Western communications (in WIE-30);¹ in October it was OPI and the Navy, versus the Air Force, with respect to certain aspects of Soviet air defenses (SIE-5);² and in December 1952, it was State and Army dissenting on how the USSR was appraising U. S. reactions to Soviet measures against Berlin (in WIE-64, part II.)³

Rarely was an initial draft of an estimate not revised, first by the Board in deliberation with the Estimates Staff members involved, next in Board meetings with IAC working level representatives, and finally in the IAC itself. The 135-some estimates projects averaged between two and three Board meetings on a project, preceded by at least one meeting on the terms of reference, and occasionally there were "several long and protracted meetings" on a draft.⁴ Almost no revised drafts were given final concurrence in the IAC without at least minor modifications, so the IAC minutes reveal.⁵ While a case analysis of the actual deliberations in these estimates projects is outside the scope of this study, an examination of the records available (such as IAC minutes and

¹ Minutes of DCI's staff conference, June 2, 1952, SC-M-37, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

² Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Oct. 28, 1952, [redacted] [redacted] in ONE "chrono files." 25X

³ Minutes of IAC meeting, Dec. 1, 1952, IAC-M-89, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER. 25X

⁴ "Historical Record of Estimates Projects Undertaken . . .," Annex K, below, passim.

⁵ IAC minutes, Oct. 1950-Feb. 1953, passim, in O/DCI/ER.

inter-agency correspondence of ONE) suggests that the differences of opinion were occasionally intra-CEA and more often inter-agency in scope, and that they stemmed from a variety of factors, such as a lack of conclusive intelligence evidence, a collection or research deficiency, or a departmental or policy bias among the participants in the deliberations.

The degree of controversy seemed to be greater as the quantity of reliable intelligence evidence was lower. For example, the estimate on Sino-Soviet relations (NIE-58), late in September 1952, was described as follows by ONE:¹

There is not much to be said for NIE-58 except that it does establish a small area of agreement...concerning a subject on which there is little knowledge and much feeling. ...Large areas of the subject are inadequately treated. But we do now have...a few significant generalizations, and we may hope to extend this agreement in subsequent estimates.

While unanimity was achieved in most of the finished estimates, there were dissents in some cases, and in a few, the divergence of opinion was so unreconcilable that it was found to be preferable to submit the divergent conclusions to the NSC and other policy agencies rather than to give them a misleading impression of apparent unanimity. In one early estimate on Soviet intentions, in November 1950 (NIE-11), the IAC accepted an

¹ Memorandum by AD/NE to DCI, Sept. 3, 1952, in ONE "chrono files." The IAC approved the estimate, with a "reservation" by the State Department, on the conclusions that related to "the vulnerability of Sino-Soviet solidarity to western pressures." (IAC Minutes, Sept. 4, 1952, IAC-M-81, in O/DCI/ER.)

additional paragraph explaining to the NSC and the President that "there is a serious difference of view . . . of the firmness of the Soviet position, and that it is thought desirable to make these views available to the policy makers."¹ There is no one "correct" position, the IAC agreed, "on the basis of available intelligence."² In another estimate, a year later (SE-9, on Korea), the consensus in the IAC was, similarly, "not to reconcile" the remaining differences of opinion but "simply indicate the several points of view where they are at variance."³ This practice became less frequent in ONE's second year, but reflected a continuing problem. In February 1953, for example, when an unreconcilable aspect of an estimate on East-West trade (NIE-59) confronted the estimators, one of the ONE Panel of Consultants [redacted] suggested, again, that the estimate simply "summarize arguments of both sides," and let the NSC "choose the horn of the dilemma which it prefers."⁴ Among the objections to this practice was one by William L. Langer (former Assistant Director of ONE and now a Panel member), who said that "the NSC cannot make a decision if the professionals cannot agree."⁵

¹ IAC minutes, Nov. 30, 1950, IAC-M-8, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

² Ibid.

³ IAC minutes, Aug. 2, 1951, IAC-M-38, [redacted] in ibid.

⁴ Memorandum on ONE meeting with its Panel of Consultants ("the [redacted] Feb. 6, 1953, filed in ONE developmental file on project NIE-45 (sic).

⁵ Ibid.

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More characteristically, however, the overwhelming majority of the finished estimates were presented as a unanimous report. This achievement was doubtless a credit to the increasing effectiveness of the deliberative machinery of the ONE Board and the IAC, in narrowing down the areas of disagreement on factual and speculative points. The many committee deliberations and personal conferences involved in a project frequently resulted in some degree of compromise, reflected in the carefully measured language in which the agreed conclusions were couched. "Always," in fact, "the final estimates . . . reflect a certain amount of compromise," ONE concluded near the end of its first year of experience.¹ Commenting on certain critical views received after the dissemination of an estimate on Chinese Communist vulnerabilities (SE-5), ONE acknowledged that these views "were, in general, shared by the Board of National Estimates," and went on to explain that:

A number of other intelligence agencies were unwilling to go along with flat statements on this subject, and that since the final estimates always reflect a certain amount of compromise, the [Chinese] Nationalists' capabilities were perhaps somewhat generously defined.²

The dangers and hazards of seeking unanimity at any cost remained a problem of continuing concern in 1951 and 1952. The ONE Panel, for example, expressed "some concern," in January 1952, "over what they thought a tendency to blur situations and the

¹ Memorandum by AD/ST to AD/SG, Sept. 14, 1951, commenting on comments received [redacted]

[redacted] in ONE "chrono files."

² Ibid.

probable consequences of courses of action in order to secure unanimity."¹ The new Assistant Director, Sherman Kent, likewise warned repeatedly that while an estimate must be "the product of deliberation and argument and deduction and expert guessing," the finished product must not be "a watered-down common denominator."² If necessary, he added, one or more dissents were preferable "so that the policy makers, who after all are not so well informed in regard to detail, should have every aspect of the complex issue before them."³

¹ Memorandum report of Panel meeting by [redacted] OAD/NE, to DCI, Jan. 22, 1952, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "ONE."

² Historical Staff interviews with Kent, March 25, Oct. 7, 1952, in O/DCI/NE files.

³ Ibid.

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Intelligence Estimating in Relation to Operational Planning, 1950-53

Parallel with the problem of improving the intelligence content of estimates was the continuing problem confronting General Smith and ONE as it had their predecessors, of insuring that the intelligence on a given foreign power situation was realistically examined and stated in relation to the U. S. Government's own operational capabilities, counter-measures, and plans. Up to October 1950, such planning data had usually been withheld, both from CIA and from the departmental intelligence agencies, by the planning groups in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the agencies in charge of the Government's foreign and domestic security programs. The problem was also partly one of reconciling jurisdictional differences between the intelligence and policy elements of the national security organization--between those who were expected to estimate a foreign situation from the intelligence point of view and those who were evaluating it from the U. S. operational point of view.

Both the Dulles Survey Group and the Eberstadt Task Force had criticized CIA's estimating, in 1949, for being inadequately based on current U. S. operational information, and both had deplored the departmental practice of withholding relevant operational information from CIA.¹ The Eberstadt committee, in addition, had

¹ Dulles Survey Group report, Jan. 1949 [redacted] pp. 77-81, and Eberstadt Task Force report, Dec. 1948 [redacted] p. 52, previously cited.

concluded that estimating was "impossible" without the benefit of such information, and urged that CIA not only be given proper access to the planning and policy-making levels of the national security organization, but be responsible for participating, as well, "in the thinking at all those levels."¹

The problem of what was commonly called "withheld operational information" was emphasized in the briefings given to General Smith, in August 1950,² and it was raised by his Deputy, William H. Jackson, at their first general meeting with the IAC, on October 20.³ In the general prospectus of estimating presented at that meeting by Jackson, is the statement that CIA estimates "should be prepared with the full knowledge of our own plans and in the light of our own policy requirements."⁴

At some policy levels ONE apparently enjoyed a measure of success from the outset, while at others there were serious difficulties from the beginning. With the National Security Council Senior Staff, for example, ONE established direct contact early in its new program, and from it regularly received a measure of operational guidance, especially on those estimates specifically requested by the NSC. Similarly, ONE kept in regular and informal

¹ Aberstadt Task Force report, cited above, p. 52.

² Historical Staff interview with L. R. Houston, General Counsel, in O/ACI/HS files.

³ Minutes of IAC meeting, Oct. 20, 1950, [redacted] in O/ACI/HS.

⁴ Ibid. Jackson re-iterated these views in later negotiations with the Defense Dept. (see below), as well as at CIA staff conferences. (See, for example, his extemporaneous remarks at OTR's Agency Orientation Conference, June 13, 1951; on disc recording, [redacted] in OTR files.)

contact with the clandestine operations group in CIA (CSO, etc., and the Area Divisions under the LD/P), receiving occasional briefings "on aspects of this work bearing on estimates."¹

As to the State Department, ONE at first was especially interested in certain special categories of policy messages of the State Department, which Mr. Langer sought to have routed regularly to ONE as a device for keeping abreast of the current viewpoints of the policy officials in that Department.² In addition, ONE staff members regularly sought background policy information from the State Department on specific estimates under way, either through State's intelligence office or by direct contact with State policy officers who would ultimately use the finished estimate. As of April 1952 the DCI regarded CIA's liaison arrangements with State policy officers as "reasonably satisfactory, although there is room for betterment."³ ONE reported later in 1952, however, that it was

¹ This arrangement was confirmed by Charles V. Mulick, O/DIR, in a memorandum to AD/NE, Feb. 6, 1952, concurring in a memorandum by ONE, Feb. 1 (both [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "ONE"). On various occasions, Mulick agreed, "it has been important for ONE to know to what extent operations within CIA control affected developments and trends which ONE had to identify and whose significance ONE had to appraise." (Ibid.) As a compromise arrangement in the interest of operational security, ONE will "continue the practice of furnishing draft terms of reference and estimates for review" (by the LD/P Area Divisions), so that ONE "may be advised of information which [they] possess which by the content of the paper it is clear is not in the possession of ONE." (Ibid.)

² Minutes of DCI's staff conferences, Dec. 1950, Jan. 1951, [redacted] in O/DCI/SK.

³ DCI progress report to NSC, on NSC-50, April 23, 1952 [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

not always effective to seek out policy information on an "ad hoc" basis, and recommended to the DD/I that "a policy-level understanding between the DCI and the Secretary of State . . ." be developed, followed by the necessary directives from the Secretary to his personnel.¹

CIA had less success with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Early in December 1950, Mr. Langer urged the Deputy Director to seek a direct information channel, for ONE, from key policy offices in the Defense Department, including the Secretary of Defense and "possibly" the three Service Secretaries as well, in order to enable ONE to "receive cables . . . which are not normally regarded as intelligence materials." In particular, he specified such items as General MacArthur's reports from the UN command headquarters in Tokyo, Admiral Struble's reports from the U. S. Seventh Fleet, and "similar high-level traffic moving to and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff."²

Evidently ONE had no immediate success in getting access to JCS operational messages, since three weeks later General Smith wrote formally to Secretary of Defense Marshall, urging on his CIA's need to "be kept fully informed of operational decisions and plans" of the JCS.³ It was not until April 1951 that General Marshall

¹ Memorandum by AD/NS to DD/I, July 18, 1952, [] in ONE "chrono file." 25X

² Memorandum by AD/NS to DCI, Dec. 7, 1950, [] in O/CI/ER. 25X

³ Letter by DCI to Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, Dec. 26, 1950, [] in O/CI/NS, filed under "Department of Defense".

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acknowledged CIA's request.¹ While he concurred in principle, he simply referred CIA to a standing policy statement issued by the JCS in September 1950, which prescribed the Department's various restrictions governing the dissemination of operational planning information.²

Meanwhile, since late October 1950, CIA had also been attempting to solve the JCS operational-guidance problem on the basis of specific project needs. Thus, in the current estimate of Soviet moves with respect to Germany (NIE-4), launched by ONI in October and completed by OMS in January 1951, the JCS representative on the IAC, Brig. Gen. Vernon E. Megee, agreed to supply the necessary U. S. operational planning information, in the form of a contribution to the estimate. But work on the contribution for CIA was at first delayed and then stopped, and the estimate was ultimately issued without an operational evaluation.³

Similarly, late in December 1950, with respect to a pending estimate on the Korean War (SI-1), CIA had sought to check the validity of certain operational assumptions on U.S. capabilities and plans. This time ONI apparently had a measure of success in obtaining the pertinent information, not now from the JCS but

¹ Reply by General Marshall to DCI, April 13, 1951, in ibid.

² General Marshall cited (ibid.) the JCS paper JIC-M-1205, Sept. 1950, for restrictions on dissemination of JCS operational planning data. The text of this paper has not been located.

³ See ONI production record, 1950-53, Annex K below.

directly from two of the Service departments (Army and Air Force),
through the good offices of one of ONI's new board members,

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[redacted] After the IAC representatives had
concluded in ONI's final draft, however, the JCS representative
entered a "strong objection" (during an IAC meeting) to the estimate
as a whole, because it contained "elements . . . which transcend
intelligence, encroaching upon the fields of planning and policy
making." He announced, furthermore, that his agency "will want to
file similar objections in the future."¹

The same issue arose later in January 1951, in this instance
with a pending estimate on the "prospects for the creation of an
Adequate Western European Defense" (WED-13), which had been
requested by the State Department, apparently on behalf of the
President. In this case, after the intelligence contributions were
under way, ONI sent out a supplementary questionnaire to the several
Service intelligence agencies, asking for operational information
on "NATO Capabilities in Western Europe." Again there were objections
in the Defense Department because U. S. operational plans and planning
information were involved.²

Instead of insisting on this supplementary operational con-
tribution, General Smith proposed at the next IAC meeting (January 22)

¹ See ONI production record, 1950-53, *ibid.*; IAC minutes, Jan. 6,
1951, IAC-M-14, [redacted] IAC-PR-5 (progress report), Jan. 2, 1951,
[redacted] and minutes of DCI's staff conference, Feb. 28, 1951, SC-M-10,
in C/DCI/ER.

² ONI production record, 1950-53, Annex K below.

that the estimate be "approached jointly by the intelligence and the planning officers of the Government." The IAC members, evidently including the JCS representative present, agreed to this new approach. Shortly thereafter, General Smith discussed his proposal with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar N. Bradley, and reported to the IAC that he had Bradley's assurance of cooperation, not only for the completion of the European defense estimate but also for working out "a standard operating procedure for coordination with the JCS planners in future similar cases."¹

General Smith, the departmental intelligence chiefs, and now the chairman of the JCS thus all appeared to concur that the method of a joint intelligence-operational evaluation was a workable compromise, in order to overcome the objections of the military planners and at the same time successfully meet the needs of the President and the policy officers in the other agencies. Acknowledging what he called the "marginal area between policy and intelligence," General Smith explained "that the questions asked by the President and others do not always fall clearly on one side or the other," and noted "that there are many factors involved in assessing the adequacy of European defense which are beyond intelligence." He concluded, with the concurrence of the IAC, that in such cases there was a clear need for "a combined intelligence-operations estimate."²

¹ Minutes of IAC meetings, Jan. 22, Jan. 25, 1951, IAC-M-17, -18, in S/CI/R.

² Ibid.

The cooperation of the planners having been authorized by the Chairman of the JCS, the JCS representative on the IAC (General [redacted]) undertook late in January to solicit an "informal" operational evaluation from the JCS planners, for the use of ONI. ONI meanwhile proceeded to complete its draft of the estimate, simply "as an intelligence paper," that is, without the benefit of background operational information, and with the understanding that the draft would be "checked . . . against the Joint Staff contribution when it has been received."¹ By the end of January, ONI's draft was completed, but the JCS paper was still not forthcoming, and General [redacted] now reported that he had been "unable to convince the planning officials in JCS that they should participate on an informal basis."² He added, however, that they would do so "if instructed as a result of a formal request to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the JCS."³ Instead of waiting for the information, however, the DCI announced on February 8, 1951, that he intended to submit the intelligence draft "formally" to JCS, and to the Atomic Energy Commission as well, for their comments.⁴

¹ IAC-PR-7, Jan. 31, 1951, [redacted] in ONI files; and IAC minutes, Feb. 8, 1951, IAC-M-19, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

² Minutes of IAC meeting, Feb. 8, 1951, IAC-M-19, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

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ONE's draft of the European Defense estimate never reached JCS. It was first submitted to informal discussion with the IAC representatives on February 18, and to the formal review of the IAC on February 23.¹ The IAC would not accept it, however. Its objections were those of the JCS representative if not also of the Service intelligence chiefs, that "the estimate goes beyond the province of intelligence in undertaking to assess the adequacy of approved U. S. plans."² The estimate was referred back to ONE for the deletion of the "objectionable portions". ONE attempted to revise it, and discussed the revision in turn with the IAC representatives, early in March. Meanwhile, however, it appeared that JCS cooperation, still hoped for, would not be forthcoming. The project was reduced to "deferred" priority,³ and late in April ONE reported that "no further efforts would be made to secure operational information for . . . this paper."⁴ Shortly thereafter, the State Department, which had originally requested the estimate, withdrew its request.

By April 1951 ONE had suffered set-backs on several additional estimates, for lack of adequate background operational information,

¹ ONE letter of transmittal (for 4th draft of MIE-13) to IAC representatives, Feb. 14, 1951, [redacted] in ONE "chronic file"; and minutes of IAC meeting, Feb. 23, 1951, IAC-M-21, [redacted] in O/DCI/SR.

² Minutes, Feb. 23, 1951, ibid.

³ IAC-R-10, April 10, 1951, [redacted] in ONE files.

⁴ IAC minutes, April 23, 1951, IAC-M-27, [redacted] in O/DCI/SR.

but had had some success in at least one case. This was a project for evaluating Communist China in relation to Taiwan,¹ in which Nationalist China's counter-capabilities were obviously dependent on the disposition of U. S. forces in the area. In this case, ONE was able to obtain statements of U. S. operational assumptions "approximating the real facts" (so ONE phrased it later), not by direct cooperation from the JCS but through considerable negotiation with the Service intelligence chiefs.² In the same month, however, another estimate was cancelled for lack of operational guidance from JCS. In this new case, which involved a phase of Soviet defense against atomic-warfare attacks (WIA-31), and in which the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy was the requester, ONE had been led to believe, in the course of negotiations with the Defense Department extending over two months, that guidance on U. S. operational factors would be forthcoming. The JCS ultimately declined to cooperate, however, with the further objection, cited in its final decision and concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, that the JCS would not release data on war plans for an estimate that was to go to a Congressional committee.³

¹ The estimate in question was WIA-27; see ONE production record, below, Annex K.

² Memorandum by William P. Bundy, ONE Estimates Staff, subject, "The 'Net Estimates' Problem", prepared Aug. 25, 1954, for use of Clark Committee; copy in O/DCI/H3 files.

³ IAC-W-9, [redacted] March 21, 1951, in ONE files; minutes of IAC meeting, April 23, 1951, IAC-W-27, [redacted] in O/DCI/ER; and letter by Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, to DCI, April 17, 1951 [redacted] in ONE "developmental file" on WIA-30.

Late in April 1951, the issue of operational information was re-studied for the Deputy Director, now by OIC rather than by ONE, as a problem of necessary collaboration between the estimators and the operational and planning people. OIC observed that to venture an intelligence appreciation of enemy capabilities "without taking into account the capabilities and intentions of the opposing friendly forces (including U. S.)" was a "vacuous" exercise, but for ONE and the IAC contributors to get into "the business of war-gaming" would be "opposed by the JCS and would, in fact, not be proper and useful." What was needed was "some midway point between these two extremes," OIC concluded, and it pointed hopefully to [redacted] continuing negotiations with the JCS representative on the IAC (General Megee), with the aim of fixing responsibility on the Joint Staff for "guiding the intelligence estimators in such a way as to provide the operational and planning information essential to making their estimates useful."¹

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Although OIC suggested in its study of April 1951 that the necessary arrangements for Joint Staff assistance to ONE were already

¹ Memorandum by ONE to DDCI, April 25, 1951, [redacted] in O/DCI/WR, filed under "OIC". Various CIA officials undertook to negotiate the problem. Mr. Jackson, the DDCI, for example, talked with the Chairman of the JCS, Gen. Omar N. Bradley, sometime in Aug. 1951, and found him "willing" to "attempt to work out some sort of liaison arrangements between the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically its Office of National Estimates, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Recalling this conversation to Bradley later (in Jan. 1952), Jackson said: "As I told you [in Aug. 1951], I personally would not under any circumstances accept General Smith's statutory responsibilities without access to such [operational planning] information." (Letter by Jackson to Bradley, Jan. 10, 1952, unclassified; copy in O/DCI/WR, filed under "JCS".)

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X1 "established" through [redacted] efforts, the course of still another estimating project during the next month indicated that the problem remained unresolved. [redacted] had embarked on a project on the probabilities of a Soviet invasion of Japan (NIS-37), and proposed, through an outline of terms of reference submitted to the IAC representatives on May 22, to include in it the pertinent U. S. operational-support factors affecting Japanese resistance, in order to make the estimate a more realistic one. In a counter-proposal by the Air Force, concurred in by the other Service intelligence agencies, U. S. operational factors were excluded, however; and on May 25 the two alternative approaches were discussed by the ONE Board with the working-level representatives from the IAC agencies. Although the military agencies had already concurred in the more limited approach, their working-level representatives at the ONE meeting of May 25 apparently joined the other IAC representatives in expressing "considerable sympathy" with the broader approach proposed by ONE. In fact, the JCS representative agreed to "attempt" to get the operational questions answered.¹

Again, however, operational guidance was not forthcoming from the JCS, and eventually the Japanese estimate also was cancelled. Captain W. G. McCool, the JCS representative, reported to ONE, on

¹ The progress and difficulties with NIS-37 are described at some length in a memorandum by Mr. Langer, AD/NE, to the DCI, June 1, 1951, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file". See also IAC progress reports, IAC-PR-13 (May 22, 1951) and IAC-PR-14 (June 12, 1951), [redacted] in ONE files.

May 29, that he was "unable" to get the necessary operational information, but went on to suggest, on behalf of the Service Intelligence agencies, that the problem be referred by the DCI to the IAC.¹ ONE thereupon undertook to prepare a statement for the DCI for the next IAC meeting, urging the views of the ONE Board that it was "futile" to evaluate Soviet intentions "without determining what opposition the Soviets would expect to meet." To limit the estimate, as the military departments had proposed, by "carefully deleting anything that could be remotely described as operational," would be to "reduce" the evaluation of the Soviet Union "pretty much to a statement of [its] raw capabilities,"² the ONE Board contended. The expected discussion in the IAC did not take place, however, for reasons not explained in the records, and the project was ultimately cancelled.³

By early 1952 there appeared some prospect that cooperation from the JCC planners might be forthcoming. On March 4 the new Deputy Director for Intelligence, Mr. Becker, conferred with the recently appointed senior officers in the Joint Staff, Maj. Gen. C. F. Cabell and Maj. Gen. Richard G. Partridge,⁴ and found that (while they reserved "war gaming" for their operational planners) they

¹ Memorandum by Langer, June 1, 1951, cited above.

² Ibid.

³ Minutes of IAC meeting, July 19, 1951, IAC-M-35, in O/DCI/HR.

⁴ Cabell, new Director of the Joint Staff, had previously been the IAC member for the Air Force, and Partridge before July 1951 had been in Army G-2 and a frequent participant in IAC meetings.

conceded the need for operational "relativity" in CIA/NSC estimates.¹ Three days later General Smith had another personal discussion with General Bradley (chairman of the JCS) on the establishment of "effective liaison" between ONE and the planners.² Bradley, in turn, "directed" the new head of his Joint Staff, General Cabell, to "establish such liaison", and Cabell designated his recently-appointed deputy director for intelligence (General Partridge) as "the point of contact" to receive CIA requirements for planning information and operational guidance.³

ONE promptly submitted drafts of two estimates on Communist China to the JCS, in March 1952, along with questions bearing on assumptions as to U. S. operational plans and capabilities in the Far East. The JCS planners replied on the same day, in one case, and in little more than a week, in the other. Sherman Kent, the new head of ONE, commended the JCS for its cooperation, finding its replies "direct, to the point, and extremely helpful, in short, . . . all we hoped they would be."⁴ It appeared as if the presence of new leadership in the Joint Staff may have been a major factor in improving

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¹ Memorandum by [redacted] O/DII, listing pending projects of concern to [redacted], Nov. 1952, in "OIC Planning in O/ICL/DA/PC files." [redacted]

² The recent Smith-Bradley conversations were recalled on March 7, 1952, by Maj. Gen. C. W. Cabell, then Director of the Joint Staff, JCS, in a memorandum to the DII; copy of memorandum [redacted] [redacted] in O/ICL/DA, filed under "JCS".

³ Ibid.

⁴ Memorandum by [redacted] commenting on replies received from Joint Staff on March 19 and March 21, 1952; in O/ICL/DA, filed under "JCS".

CIA-JCS relations. The assistance of the JCS planners was limited, however, to comments on specific questions raised by CIA estimators, and did not provide for any continuing transmittal of material to CIA, nor any committee procedure or other system for regular and direct consultation by the estimators with the planners.¹

There was one project, however, which had meanwhile been under way since June 1951, calling for a formal system of cooperation between estimators and planners, and carrying the blessing of the National Security Council. This project was frankly addressed to an overall "net" estimate of Soviet capabilities to attack the U. S., specifically in relation to U. S. counter-capabilities and counter-plans. Some eighteen months elapsed between June 1951, when the NSC Executive Secretary first wrote the DDI about the need for such an estimate, and November 1952, when the final evaluation was delivered by CIA. While the project was marked by delays and difficulties, the end result was an evaluation that was actually produced and delivered, and one that represented at least a minimum of procedural success in interdepartmental estimating in collaboration with the planners. Participating at various stages were all the

¹ In April 1952 General Smith went on record, at the NSC, on CIA's need for operational guidance and on the close "interrelationship between intelligence and operational planning." He warned that "if CIA's product is to be timely," his estimator "must have adequate advance information at least of the general nature and objectives of any plans toward which he can make an intelligence contribution, as well as of such national or international policies and agreements as precede them." While contacts with the State Dept.'s policy officials were "reasonably satisfactory", those with the Defense Dept. and the military Services were "still somewhat less than satisfactory." (DDI progress report to NSC on NSC-50, April 23, 1952, [redacted])

[redacted] (C/DI/ER.)

major intelligence agencies and all the principal planning agencies, including not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other agencies having operational responsibilities for the Nation's domestic security programs.

In CIA's initial reaction to the NSC's project proposal, in June 1951,¹ the DCI concurred at once in the need for such a net estimate, and agreed to accept responsibility for providing the leadership to see it through to completion. In his comment, however, the DCI reminded the NSC that such a net appraisal would be "necessarily much broader in scope than the usual National Intelligence Estimate," and would involve "the integration of intelligence on the USSR with various types of information on the U. S." It was essential, therefore, the DCI continued, that the NSC's directive to the participating intelligence and planning agencies be worded strongly enough to insure that all types of necessary information, both intelligence and operational, would be forthcoming. He questioned "certain qualifying phrases" about interdepartmental cooperation in the draft of the directive, and urged that the directive be worded so that it would "not be interpreted in such a way as to limit the scope or otherwise prevent the accomplishment of the project." In addition, the DCI proposed that CIA be loaned the services of the necessary planning and other personnel from the other agencies, on a full-time or temporary basis, to assist at various stages of the evaluation process.²

¹ Reply by DCI to Executive Secretary, NSC, June 14, 1951, drafted by GME (Dr. Langer) and OSI [redacted], in GME "chrono file".

² Ibid.

Pending the arrival of the formal request from the NSC, General Smith announced the proposed "net estimate" project to the IAC, on July 19, 1951, describing the scope of the project as "a joint effort between the intelligence agencies and the planners or operators." He invited the DDC agencies to participate initially to the extent of assisting ONE in producing first "a pure intelligence estimate" on Soviet capabilities, as a point of departure, and directed ONE to launch that phase of the evaluation immediately, without waiting for the NSC directive.¹

Later in July, the request came officially to CIA, now in the name of the President, and with it a request from NSC, that CIA draft the necessary administrative directive for the NSC to issue to the intelligence and operational departments, agencies, and committees involved. That directive was accordingly drafted, by OIC rather than ONE, and was issued on August 30 to the several agencies concerned.²

Four participating groups were assigned to prepare the major contributions, two for intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities, and two for evaluations of U. S. counter-capabilities to repel a Soviet attack; and the DCI was to be responsible for integrating the contributions into a final "net" evaluation, in collaboration with

¹ minutes of IAC meeting, July 19, 1951, IAC-M-35, [] in O/DCI/ER.

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² See progress report on this estimate, in memorandum by [] OIC/NE, to DCI, June 23, 1952, [] copy in O/DCI/ER, filed under "ONE".

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the chairmen of the contributing groups. The assignments, in summary, were as follows:¹

1. An estimate of Soviet capabilities for military attack against the U. S., excluding Soviet clandestine capabilities, to be prepared by ONS/ONE in collaboration with the IAC member agencies;

2. An estimate of Soviet capabilities for clandestine attack and subversive action against the U. S., to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC);

3. An evaluation of U. S. capabilities to repel Soviet attack (excluding counter-measures for clandestine attack), to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

4. An evaluation of U. S. capabilities to resist Soviet clandestine and subversive attack, to be prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS); and

5. A "final evaluation of the net capabilities of the enemy," to be prepared from the foregoing estimates by the DII with the collaboration of the above four contributing groups.

ONE's "pure intelligence" contribution to the net evaluation was completed almost immediately, in collaboration with the IAC agencies, and was issued separately in October 1951 in the form of a regular estimate (as SE-14).² Similarly, the companion estimate on the clandestine aspects of Soviet capabilities, prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other agencies that made up the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, was also ready in October, except for a supplementary contribution requested later

¹ Ibid.; and minutes of IAC meeting, Aug. 2, 1951, IAC-M-38, [redacted] O/DCI/BR.

² See ONS production record, 1950-53, Annex K below.

by ONE from CIA/OSO, dealing with USSR clandestine capabilities against U. S. territories outside the continental limits, which was ready early in January 1952. The two operational evaluations, however, were not completed until mid-1952. The JCS evaluation of U. S. counter-capabilities was ready in June 1952; while the corresponding evaluation of U. S. resistance to Soviet clandestine attack, prepared by the FBI and the other agencies on the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, was ready in May 1952.¹

The final "net" evaluation was drafted in July 1952 by an interagency "working group" consisting of Dr. [redacted] of ONE, chairman, [redacted] (also of ONE), a representative from the IAC (Maj. Gen. John A. Sanford of the Air Force), and one from the JCS (General Walsh).² Their work was done principally in the Pentagon, apparently because the JCS declined to release its own evaluation outside its premises; and insisted instead on making its findings available to the drafters on an oral basis.³

On substantive issues, the working group found themselves in eventual agreement on all but one issue, so [redacted] reported to the DCI on August 1, 1952. That issue was on the "USSR atomic bomb

¹ Progress report to DCI by [redacted], ONE, on "net estimate" on USSR, June 23, 1952, cited above; and minutes of IAC meeting, June 26, 1952, IAC-M-75, [redacted] in O/DCI/HR.

² Ibid.; and memorandum by [redacted] ONE (Chairman of the "working group" on net estimate), to DCI, Aug. 1, 1952, [redacted] in ONE file "Memos for DCI, 1952".

³ Memorandum by Hoover to DCI, Aug. 1, 1952, cited above.

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attack capability," in which [] objected to the "admittedly unrealistic assumption of 100% delivery" made by the JCS planners. The JCS representatives defended this formula as "safe planning," and [] argued that while in planning it is "better to overestimate than to underestimate," such wide "safety margins. . . should not be attempted in an evaluated intelligence report."¹

The draft of the "net estimate" underwent further revision, first in the hands of the working group and then in the "Ad Hoc Evaluation Committee," on which the four contributing intelligence and planning groups were represented and over which the DCI presided, in accordance with the NSC directive of the year before. On October 21, 1952, the report was delivered to the NSC, and late in November it was followed by a revised version.²

The National Security Council, which reviewed this final "net" evaluation on November 25, 1952, found the end result somewhat less than satisfactory. It noted that the report was "characterized by a number of limitations and inadequacies, including the fact that developments since the evaluation was prepared have rendered it in part out of date."³ The experiment was not abandoned,

¹ Ibid.

² The estimate entitled "Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the Continental U. S.," was sent to the NSC on Oct. 21, 1952, and an amended estimate on Nov. 25, 1952. (See memorandum by J. S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of NSC, to DCI, Nov. 28, 1952, [] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "NSC.")

³ Memorandum by Lay to DCI, Nov. 28, 1952, cited above.

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however. The NSC instructed the DCI to prepare a new set of terms of reference (in collaboration with officials of the JCS, IIC, ICIS, and other Government agencies "as required"), for a "more adequate" evaluation of the "USSR's net capabilities to inflict direct injury on the U. S."¹

In January 1953, the NSC established another "Special Evaluation Subcommittee," this time giving it the position of a subcommittee of the NSC. Representatives of CIA, JCS, IIC, and ICIS were to make up the committee, with a chairman who was to be acceptable to all of them. [redacted] of the ONE Board was nominated by the DCI as the CIA member; and Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards became chairman of the committee, on the nomination by JCS and with the concurrence of CIA and the other groups.²

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Thus General Smith's administration came to a close, with the experiment of joint intelligence-operational evaluation still continuing, in the direction of preparing what were now being called "commander's estimates." Whether this new type of committee at the NSC level was to be more successful than the experiment in 1951-52 remained to be seen. In any case, the problem of adequate operational

¹ Ibid.

² Memoranda by DCI to Executive Secretary, NSC, Jan. 14 and Jan. 22, 1953, both [redacted] in O/DCI/ER, filed under "NSC."

guidance to normal intelligence estimating remained.¹ Shortly before his retirement, General Smith summarized the situation during his two years in CIA, and concluded that CIA-produced estimates had been "steadily increasing in quality and [have] . . . now attained a standard of excellence which justifies acceptance as the basis for national planning." On the other hand, he pointed to what he regarded as CIA's one major remaining problem, "the impossibility of making certain estimates in the absence of military assumptions." Without realistic guidance on U. S. counter-capabilities, CIA and its IAC contributors could only "prepare a sort of bill of materials of Soviet assets and let it go at that," he stated. He expressed doubt whether the problem would be resolved "until we set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2 and G-3 estimates"; but "whether that's possible or not, I don't know," he concluded.²

¹ Late in 1952 the scope of two pending estimates on the USSR was revised to avoid operational matters. On NIE-64 (part I), for example, ONE reported to the DCI that in accordance with instructions from the IAC on Oct. 23, 1952, "we have excluded all war-gaming paragraphs and limited ourselves to estimates of raw capabilities." (Memorandum by AD/NS to DCI, Oct. 29, 1952, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file".) Another estimate (NIE-40) was recommended for cancellation by the ONE Board, on Nov. 25, because its scope (to equate the "strategic value" of Western Europe to the Soviet Union against "US and NATO forces and plans") "goes beyond IAC responsibility." (Memorandum by Board of National Estimates to IAC representatives, Nov. 25, 1952, in ONE "developmental file" on NIE-40.) Meanwhile, the ONE Panel of Consultants had an extended discussion, on Oct. 16, "on the risks attendant on attempts to introduce war-gaming into intelligence estimates"; and at least one member of the Panel [redacted] subsequently 25X1A objected to ONE using the term "communist capabilities", "without reference to opposition on the part of UN/US forces." (Memorandum by Dr. [redacted] AD/NS, to Maj. Gen. R. C. Partridge, then G-2, Oct. 16, 1952, [redacted] in ONE "chrono file"; and summary of Consultants meeting of March 19, 1953, in ONE Staff Memorandum No. 340, [redacted] in ONE "Staff Memos" file.) 25X1A

² Extempore remarks by DCI at OTR's Agency Orientation Conference, Nov. 21, 1952, printed in OTR Training Bulletin No. 1, Feb. 11, 1953, [redacted] copy in CIA Records Center. 25X1A

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