

to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness over and above any and all consideration of property and the priority of these right over any and all other rights, need to be reiterated and reaffirmed as valid for the entire hemisphere, and all limitations of these rights, even those represented by the vested interests of the United States, to be firmly condemned and repudiated.

This means that the United States must declare its acceptance of the right of all governments in the hemisphere to amend their laws in the pursuit of these aims, to do over their systems of land tenure, to overcome injustice, and give a fair chance to the destitute. It also means that the United States must realize that in the modern world, the role of the state in the task of equalization is fundamental and more important than any other single factor.

Second, a declaration along the lines laid down by Kenneth Galbraith in his recent article in Foreign Affairs, "A Positive Approach to Economic Assistance," in which he develops the idea (the same idea that Muñoz Marín and Tugwell and several other able and devoted people working together put into practice in Puerto Rico) that capital by itself is not enough to do the job; that machines by themselves are not enough; that these two elements alone cannot transform a society and that people are the indispensable factor in such transformations.

Efficient and progressive governments, without which peaceful social change is impossible, require a reservoir of trained and effective personnel, and such reservoirs cannot be created without education, without resourceful government intervention, without a sense of the obligations of public administration: in short, without planning, without a sense of the difference between objectives and ways, by which I mean methods and structures. This dimension of implementation is a higher form of what is so often called know-how. It does not involve merely the tricks of the trade, but also a sensitivity to carrying dreams out, to making them work in practice, to add the missing dimensions of reality to the hopes of man.

I am persuaded that the great chasm that is involved in all this, the one that so facilitates the growth of demagoguery and Peronism, the chasm between objectives and achievements, the difference between the dream world of what ought to be and the reality of what it takes to make dreams come true, is one of the greatest obstacles to hemispheric development. In 1940 a group of us had the dreams, the goals, the enthusiasms, the general support, but all these, important and indispensable as they were, were not enough. We needed also the courage to make the hard choices, the wisdom to discard inoperative formulae, the techniques, the resources, the kind of managerial leadership essential to bring objectives into fruition. This special talent required for operational action has often been deprecated in the Latin American world and has unjustly been equated to the organization men and the operators without faiths and spiritual strength to live by, of which the United States seem to produce so very many. Such operators or robots are a distorted representation of the pragmatic or hard-headed idealist of whom I am speaking. If such people do not exist in Latin America sufficient quantity, it is of the highest urgency to facilitate their recruitment and training. For otherwise, Latin Americans may find themselves at a loss to effect successfully their own impending revolutions. It is part of the task all of us face, Latin Americans, the United States, leaders of education in the Western World, to provide the leadership and assistance necessary for these cadres to come into existence, so that these in turn may create structures on which governments may rest in stability and justice.

Next to this task, capital and machinery is of minor importance.

Third, and last, the United States must be willing to state just how much it is willing to put up with. It must recognize that it cannot do the job for Latin America. Even if it wanted to, it could not do it by itself, for people are not saved, they save themselves. The United States must, therefore, be willing to tolerate many and different paths toward the goals to which the whole hemisphere can subscribe, and it must make plain beforehand that it is willing and even eager to see such diversity, that its interests lie in furthering these goals and not in imposing a single matrix on all forms of social, economic and political progress. Latin American elites must have the intellectual courage necessary to search out the difficult ways that lead to service and responsibility; they must find the will and magnanimity to tread these paths as the leaders of their own millions of ill-housed, ill-trained and ill-fed; ultimately, they will find this to be the benefit of all. This may be too much to expect of either the United States or Latin America, but certainly not too much to ask, at least for those of us committed to the uses of intelligence and of good will.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, turning to another matter, very quickly, and I should like to have the attention of the minority leader on this, so he can advise his side of the aisle. I want to make an announcement, with the complete approval of the majority leader. I cleared this matter earlier this morning with the majority leader at the time the Subcommittee on Education met. My Subcommittee on Education is going to proceed next Tuesday morning at 9:30 a.m. with our subcommittee mark-up of the national defense education bill. We will continue day by day in those mark-up sessions until we report the bill to the full committee.

It is my hope, and I risk the prediction, that we shall be able to report the bill to the full committee by Thursday noon of next week.

I wish to make this announcement because I do not want any Senator to feel that I or any member of the committee have in any way let him down or given him the run-around, because, as the minority leader well knows, it was our hope and expectation that we could finish the mark-up of the NDEA bill this week.

But we got into session this morning, and I listened to the representatives of members of the subcommittee on both sides of the table, Democrat and Republican alike. The physical facts are just these with regard to time: I am confronted with a situation in which many members of the subcommittee are already committed to other committee meetings for the rest of this week. The committees considering migratory labor, unemployment, and some other subjects have commitments from members of the Education Subcommittee, so that if I did my very best to continue the hearings tomorrow and Friday, I would have difficulty getting a quorum. Therefore, I knew the time had come to reach an agreement with my colleagues on the

committee. They had every reason to ask for a postponement of the mark-up hearings. Therefore, I cleared with the majority leader the plan to start the mark-up sessions next Tuesday. We would have started them Monday, but some members of the subcommittee could not be present Monday, but told me, as chairman of the subcommittee, they would agree, starting Tuesday at 9:30 a.m., to stay with the deliberations of the committee until work on the bill is completed.

I want the record to show that the majority leader has given me assurances that, as soon as the Labor and Public Welfare Committee reports the NDEA bill and it is put on the calendar, Senate action on that bill will be given priority, save and except for the housing bill if it is ready. If it is, we will proceed to the consideration of that bill, subject, of course, to any other calendar emergency which may arise on the floor of the Senate.

I want Senators to know that, as we promised, we are going to complete consideration of the NDEA bill as soon as possible by completing marking up the bill, and get it to the Senate calendar. I also want them to know that the majority leader has given us assurance that the bill will receive high priority on the calendar as soon as it is ready.

I wanted to make this statement because I do not want to be in a position where anyone can have any basis even for a suspicion that we are not keeping our promise. It is true we told certain Senators we would do our very best to get the bill marked up this week. I wish the RECORD to show that I cannot deliver on that promise. It does not mean we are walking out on the promise. It means it is a consinuing promise and we will get the bill out of the committee next week as soon as we can.

Mr. SYMINGTON obtained the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may yield for 1 minute.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to the minority leader.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am sure the Members of the Senate appreciate the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Oregon. I know how diligently the Senator has pursued the problem. What he says gives point to the difficulties which confront the Senate at the present time.

Insofar as I know, there must be 120 or more subcommittees and committees, and there is no coordination about their meetings. I am confronted, as other Senators are confronted, by days when four subcommittees or committees of which I am a member announce meetings at one and the same time. It becomes a physical impossibility to carry that kind of a workload and to do full justice to it.

This same urgency even, in some parts, conveys a sense of panic, which is unfortunate. The United States is a great power; the one thing that great powers cannot permit themselves is a sense of frenzy. Why, for instance, should the seat of the OAS be changed from Washington to Panama? Because its present location points to the fact that the United States is the outstanding Nation of the hemisphere? The United States does not need to apologize for its strength or weaken it. What it must do is to turn it to the best advantage of all. If the OAS is to become an important influence in the orientation of U.S. policies it had better remain in Washington.

Finally, there are in parts of the report, due to these very same factors I have mentioned, aspects of that same condescension that has always deeply disturbed Latin America, particularly when it becomes a question of what must be done. This pressure to get things done—and "done" here means, fundamentally, done for or to Latin America—ends up by giving an unfortunate impression that if only the United States could wake up and do its job in Latin America right, then the subcontinent might indeed turn out as the United States has, rich, educated, developed, democratic, and self-fulfilled.

The fact is that the United States' position, which for all the valuable suggestions of the report, its quick sympathy, its honesty, and its compressed command and understanding of enormously diverse situations, should be anything but that of writing a blueprint for the development of Latin America. Rather, it should be an invitation to these countries to write their own blueprints, or perhaps not even to go that far, but to think, in terms of their own aspirations, just what kind of societies it is that they want and aim to achieve.

It is terribly important that the impetus for change come from the Republics themselves; changing societies against their will can only be done through violence, and then for how long? And is it not possible—I pose this as a hypothetical question on which we might well reflect hard and long—that some people may prefer to remain what they are? Is it not possible that it is not in the interests of the United States to broaden its vision and seek to be for all what it would be for itself? The great cultural hegemonies of the past were not based—and this is an understatement—on any deep understanding of the problems, the cultures, the aspirations of the countries included in such groupings. The Roman Empire did not wax strong on an understanding of Carthage and Asia Minor; nor did the British import their institutions of parliamentary procedure, of equality under the law and respect for individual rights by sympathy toward the Indian border states or Tanganyika. True enough, these cultural hegemonies were created under an imperial system of master-and-slave relationships; but do we know the answers to the 20th-century version of these relationships? I am merely suggesting, with this very pertinent question, what I think is a major problem; that it may be that what we should all do is tend our own gardens, and provide one's services upon request, not merely when needed. Our neighbors may like to grow unsightly plants and we bloom roses, but until they express a desire for roses, who would take care of the roses once they were planted?

Within the framework of the autodeveloped plan for Latin America, the United States would be perfectly correct in establishing its own limits, its own requirements, and even in stating, quite candidly, its own aims. In fact, it is necessary that the United States make these limits plain in advance; the nature of the aid it is prepared to grant on request, the extent and kind of services

and personnel it is prepared to lend, and the things it would expect to get in return, just as any two partners in a development enterprise would have clear understanding before any project was begun. There are, beyond Latin America itself, many projects on which the partnership could embark together; there are areas in the world where the partnership could make a definite contribution, and some in which the process of learning could be shared.

It has been said by some, quite recently by Mr. Douglass Cater in the Reporter, that Puerto Rico is an answer to Castro, and indirectly, to Latin America's own development. Having been one of the persons responsible in part for this development, I am deeply appreciative of the compliment intended. Nevertheless, I think that the abstraction Puerto Rico-Latin American development contains some serious errors. To begin with, the situations are not entirely comparable. The links that bind us to the United States are many and mutually beneficial to an extent that is not true of any of the other Latin American republics. Then there is the fact that our development in Puerto Rico may not be the kind of development that a country in Latin America would choose to follow; I am not, as I suppose I have made amply plain, a believer in the interchangeability of solutions. Further, there is a widespread belief in Latin America that what has been achieved in Puerto Rico has been achieved more by the United States than by Puerto Rico itself. In this they are wrong, as we in the United States and in Puerto Rico are both wrong—one wonders if for the same reason—in not giving due credit to Rexford Guy Tugwell for his brilliant participation in the Pacific revolution led by Luis Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico.

It may be well to recall briefly a bit of recent, yet forgotten, Puerto Rican history. Until quite late in his period of office, Franklin D. Roosevelt made his appointments to the governorship of Puerto Rico in cavalier fashion: first an amiable newspaperman from Florida, whose only qualification for that office was a substantial contribution to the Democratic campaign; then, after the dismal failure of this first appointment, a retired Army general from Georgia whose noted tightlippedness was supposed to contrast with the bumbling loquacity of his predecessor, but who was obviously out of his depth. By the time he was withdrawn in 1938, and Admiral Leahy became his successor, the articulate groups in the opposition—all except the most conservative in the professional groups and the well-heeled lauded and commercial elites—had adopted a fundamentally independentist position. We saw no other viable solution for the development of Puerto Rico, no other way out of a futile colonial tutelage.

It was also in 1938 that first under the designation of Acción Social Independentista and a little later under its present name of Partido Popular Democrático, Luis Muñoz Marín created the social, economic, political movement destined to direct the Government of Puerto Rico from 1941 to the present. This movement was at first firmly committed to the twin aims of social justice and independence for Puerto Rico. It was not until Muñoz Marín encountered unyielding opposition from his potential clientele—namely, in the startling lack of support of the jibaró or peasant section as well as the laboring masses for the proposed independence of Puerto Rico—that he and his followers were forced to reexamine the assumptions of his program. It is to Muñoz Marín's everlasting credit that he had the courage and the wisdom to align himself with the needs and the exigencies of the democratic process and rated social justice first. Thus, after a bitter internal struggle which has taken different turns throughout the years, the

way to human progress and social dignity seems to be finally cleared in the complex political formulae of our present Commonwealth organization. It must be added that the success achieved has been in no small part due to the practical qualities, experience, and flexibility that the last non-Puerto Rican governor, Tugwell, brought to his post. But the formula of Commonwealth and social justice which has succeeded so well in Puerto Rico is not in the cards for the countries of Latin America. These are sovereign nations and must remain such; they must have both independence and social justice and this creates a totally different situation.

I am not suggesting, of course, that there are not elements in the Puerto Rican situation that would not be extremely beneficial, as examples, to many of the countries in Latin America. What I am saying, what I am insisting on, is that the United States only needs to make it possible for the Latin American republics to be able, if they so care, to undertake similar operations, or adaptations of the Puerto Rican experience. I am suggesting that Puerto Rico as a panacea is as dangerous a simplification as any of the others that I have been discussing.

This brings me to my conclusion. I have insisted throughout on three main points: (1) that the United States should divert its present extravagant interest in Fidel Castro towards an awareness of the realities facing it in dealing with Latin America; (2) that it should provide solid support for the creation of independently motivated social and economic changes in Latin America, and (3) that it should do so not as the all-powerful progenitor of such changes but as a financial and technical partner who participates in such programs on request, making clear beforehand his terms and anticipations and, at the same time, his own secondary role concerning the means taken, the timetable, the form, the personnel and so on, involved.

This may sound as though the United States should be merely a passive agent towards Latin America, a source of an abstract bounty, ideologically uncommitted.

Let me dispel that impression immediately, with what I consider must be the most important step the United States should take.

This involves a recognition of the fact that in the next decade a great upheaval, economic, social, and cultural will be taking place throughout Latin America, as it will in much of the world. It is my opinion that the United States must identify itself positively with these movements, that it must, in the French sense of the word "d'avancer," go ahead, of the great reform of the balance of the century. It must provide moral and intellectual endorsement and if need be assistance for these reforms. Instead of letting situations occur, as they have in Cuba, in distasteful forms, about which it can then do nothing, it should exercise all its moral suasion to seeing that these reforms occur within frameworks favorable to peace, progress, justice, and liberty. The United States should issue now, before once again it is too late, a declaration of principles as far-reaching as Wilson's 14 points or Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, and incorporate into this statement those elements which form part of the natural and just aspirations of the great masses in Latin America and throughout the world that yearn for social justice and reform.

What should such a document contain? What would be its fundamental points? I think they are three.

First, a statement of the principles of democratic life. These are expressed better and earlier, in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America than in any other document. The principles on which that declaration is based, of the fundamental equality of men, of equality before the law, and of the right of every man

in an economy that will already have been altered in its basic structure?

Surely this situation is one that the United States will have to view in a much larger context than that of Castro or of Cuba alone.

The Castro image and the kind of action, the purposes and methods, the aims and ideals associated with it, right or wrong, provide a collective vision, a version of the world in which many of the dispossessed, the oppressed and the disenfranchised peoples of the Caribbean, Latin America, and possibly, the whole world, see a role for themselves, a means to achieve their goals of participation in the life of their nations, a way of exercising the power that resides in masses and numbers. Such an image cannot be undone in a moment. The end of Castro would not be the end of the image, and there are times when a live demagog is infinitely preferable to a dead martyr, particularly when that potential martyr has proven himself (with the help of all concerned) one of the most salable saints in recent history.

Can the United States avoid being maneuvered into becoming the antagonist of such mass movements and such mass aspirations, which exist whether or not the Cuban revolution truly represents them?

The answer to this question is highly difficult and fraught with dangers. To see the situation clearly requires that the United States accept the facts of the problem. Stated briefly, these are that any rich and powerful nation faced with a skilled demagog who identifies himself with a popular cause and becomes its symbol, is subject to a basic internal ambivalence. If it is a generous and politically unselfish nation as the United States is, this ambivalence is even more painful. For, on the one hand, the nation will want to support the legitimate aspirations that gave rise to the demagog, and on the other, will feel a profound irritation at seeing such valid ideals, debased by mobbery, hatred and mass manipulation. Further, the nation facing this problem is made painfully aware that the very strength of that demagogue is fed by grievances with a genuine basis. What then if that nation feels an additional burden of guilt for having allowed those grievances to grow to the point of no return? As if this weren't bad enough, there is the painful truth that demagoguery flourishes by flaunting authority: the principle of psychological redress, of seeing the righteous and the mighty disturbed in their majesty, is one that has worked in favor of every law-breaking challenger since earliest human history. With Castro it has the additional advantage of involving the very small with the very large, thus adding a comic or tragic touch to the spectacle, depending upon on which side of the arena one happens to sit.

If these elements of the problem were not difficult enough, there are still two more of prime importance, both of which make it hard for the United States to see the question posed by the coming revolutionary changes in Latin America clearly and that are, instead, forcing the Castro image ever more powerfully to the fore.

The more important of these, clearly, is the way in which the present great power squeeze, with its faculty for making international mountains out of local molehills, for neglecting deeper issues in favor of combating local irritants, for taking the short view rather than the long, for adopting a defensive stand rather than the more solid posture becoming a great power sure of itself, has made of Castro a smokescreen through which the United States seems unable to see the true issues involved. Because of the power politics that form the constant background to the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, all reform movements, tinged with Castroism or

not, directly influenced by him or not, are lumped together under the generic name of Fidelista. This pernicious error crops up again and again in the mass media in much the way that during the worst years of the McCarthy insanity in the United States, the single word "Communist" was used as the bogymen with which to conjure everything from appropriations, to the exile of some of America's outstanding intellectuals to Princeton's Institute for Advanced Studies. Such is the form of propaganda that not only does the United States fall into this error, but by a process of natural compensation, in which many errors tend to cancel each other out, some legitimate and perfectly democratic reform movements in Latin America and elsewhere find themselves, willy-nilly adopted into the Castro movement. In short, the prevalent looseness of thought simply makes it easy for Castro and others like him to take advantage of such genuine movements and pervert them for their own ends, ultimately turning them against the United States. Blind opposition to or identification of diverse reform movements with Fidel merely breeds Castro's advantage.

All this confusion of Castro and Latin America, this lumping together of dissimilar problems, distinct interests, varying backgrounds, is, I have suggested, the United States worst enemy in seeing its hemispheric relations in a true and clear light.

There is a parallel simplification in reverse which is equally harmful and which affects adversely the rhetoric of all Latin American political movements, be they of the right, the left or the center. This is the attribution to the United States of all the responsibilities and blames for all failings and misdeeds south of the Rio Grande. Latin American elites have consistently neglected to examine their own shortcomings and limitations and have, instead, made the United States the scapegoat for their own missed opportunities, aggrandizing the hostile role of the great power, the United States, and thus freeing themselves of the responsibility for their own unstable governments, their dictatorships, their land tenure systems, their armies and their economic, social, and political underdevelopment. Justice to the strong requires a special kind of courage and sophistication that is uncommon among those who are both weak and proud. Yet without such courage, and without the wisdom that derives from it, understanding will remain obscured and accord impossible. Explanations which exempt any of the parties from the compulsion to better themselves serve nothing, and this is why, if additional reasons were needed, personal, intellectual confrontations of the highest caliber between North and Latin Americans are so urgently necessary.

Well? We have seen some of the difficulties that face the United States, and some of the reasons why these difficulties, far from conveniently disappearing, are in the process of growing into fixed and inflexible attitudes. What then does the United States do?

Experience shows us certain things it does not do. It does not, for instance, try to dragoon the other countries of the hemisphere, all of which have internal problems susceptible to the same sort of solution as Castro's into overt, coordinated action against the point of irritation. This is akin to asking men who are showing signs of a highly infectious disease to go to the source of the infection and take on all the risks involved. But negative approaches to the question are not fundamental. Positive approaches are urgent. The world situation does not give any country time to reflect truthfully on its mistakes. The greater the stress, the more urgent it is that a closer vision of policy for the future be motivated.

To get at this new policy, I wish to use as a point of departure the report entitled

"The Voice of Latin America and Its Significance in Today's World," submitted by William Benton and Adlai Stevenson on November 1, 1960, on their return from a 2-month visit to Latin America.

It is a very good report, well-documented and thought-provoking, and written with the skill and insight one might expect of its authors. Would that a similar document, as well meaning and generous were to be written about the United States by Latin Americans of corresponding authority and worth. The report is, at the same time, revealing in several ways that its authors did not intend. For example, the opening sentence declares: "Until the spring of 1960—the year both of us reached 60—neither Gov. Adlai Stevenson nor I had ever been in the great cities of South America." This statement carries its own tone of pathos. For Messrs. Stevenson and Benton, outstanding intellectual, cultural, and political leaders in their own rights, are representative figures of the highest quality in the United States or anywhere in the world. Their lack of direct contact has been typical of the elites of the United States. Until very recently, leading figures have had neither first-hand knowledge, nor even (and this has been galling to Latin Americans) much serious interest in South America. The same could not be said in reverse. Almost every leader in Central or South America has been to the United States; many have studied there; most are fluently conversant in English.

How to account for this basic disparity in reciprocal knowledge of each other's countries, institutions, languages and cultures? Mr. Benton, in his report, suggests that it is due to a profound conviction prevailing in the United States that there is nothing really worthwhile south of Rio Grande; that traffic with Latin America would be one-way traffic, with help, knowledge, protection and development flowing southward and little more than local color and appreciation infiltrating back. I believe that many difficulties in inter-American relations result from this conviction. I further believe that this conviction is erroneous in point of fact and that the unfortunate difficulties ensuing therefrom are compounded both by the U.S. ignorance vis-a-vis Latin America and Latin American insecurity vis-a-vis the United States. Such basic failure in communication need not be everlasting, and the fact that pedagogy, language instruction and Latin American studies have been the most neglected areas in American education over the past 50 years need not prevail forever. Yet the present unhappy state of affairs, which Messrs. Benton and Stevenson were honest and chagrined enough to admit, demonstrates that the sins of the fathers are indeed visited upon their children, and that the ills that educators do, live on after them.

Several other observations could be made on the basis of this report. Its accent on the amount of travel, organization and work represented by the trip, the speed and urgency of it all, the breathlessness of its appeal, is in itself revealing. Is it possible that all the work, work, work and help, help, help the United States intends for Latin America is due to fear? To fear that it is too late, that some international battle is being lost? Surely Latin America has some thoughts of its own on the subject; surely it has its own contributions to make; surely any help extended must be help out of a profound belief in the value of the things that the two cultures share, out of belief in a deeper and fuller life for both. Yet the report reveals too much the puritanical sense of guilt, the urgency of doing; it lacks its own breathing space, its sense, if one may use such a word today, of poetry, of enjoyment of life rather than activity.

ership in the Congress, does have a responsibility to provide aggressive leadership in working for the adoption of an orderly program of increased domestic sugar production, because it will be beneficial to all.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry be permitted to sit during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, yesterday I served notice that it would be necessary, as of today, to object to all requests for committee meetings. If I make an exception in one case, then I should make an exception in all cases; but, since important legislation is before us, I think Senators ought to be available for floor duty, and I am constrained to object.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is objection.

Cuba file

THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND LATIN AMERICA

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, one of the most outstanding scholars in all Latin America is the president and head of the University of Puerto Rico, Jaime Benitez. He made a speech recently at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, entitled "The United States, Cuba, and Latin America."

It is one of the most penetrating analyses of the Cuban problem that I have had an opportunity to read for some time. I take only a moment to read a short paragraph or two:

Surely this situation is one that the United States will have to view in a much larger context than that of Castro or of Cuba alone.

The Castro image and the kind of action, the purposes and methods, the aims and ideals associated with it, right or wrong, provide a collective vision, a version of the world in which many of the dispossessed, the oppressed, and the disenfranchised peoples of the Caribbean, Latin America, and, possibly, the whole world, see a role for themselves, a means to achieve their goals of participation in the life of their nations, a way of exercising the power that resides in masses and numbers. Such an image cannot be undone in a moment. The end of Castro would not be the end of the image, and there are times when a live demagogue is infinitely preferable to a dead martyr, particularly when that potential martyr has proven himself (with the help of all concerned) one of the most saleable saints in recent history.

Can the United States avoid being maneuvered into becoming the antagonist of such mass movements and such mass aspirations, which exist whether or not the Cuban revolution truly represents them?

The president of the University of Puerto Rico goes on in his analysis to make what I think are some very constructive suggestions in regard to needed changes in American foreign policy in Latin America. I think not only are they worthy of the careful considera-

tion of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of Members of the Senate, and of the entire Congress, but I recommend the speech of the president of the University of Puerto Rico to this administration, to the end that it weigh the suggestions and, on the basis of their merit, take those suggestions which might be helpful in a reexamination and reappraisal of American foreign policy in all Latin America.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the speech be incorporated in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND LATIN AMERICA (By Jaime Benitez)

Mutual trust and understanding between the Americas would be greatly helped if the United States found it possible to distinguish between its genuine long-term interest in Latin America and its present irritable obsession with Fidel Castro. More attention to the realities of the situation in the hemisphere and less attention to the more extreme antics of the Cuban Premier would help achieve the same goal.

For, if left to his own devices, Castro will succeed in undoing or, at least, isolating himself and his "revolution" sooner and more completely than if the United States undertakes to direct the process. That Castro can do this for himself is evidenced by his unnecessary aggressiveness against friends and potential friends both in Cuba and throughout Latin America and his consequential alienation of what was once widespread support at home and abroad. That U.S. initiative can harm rather than help democratic developments in Cuba is evidenced by the ineffectiveness of its efforts to line up a Latin American front against Castro.

The priority accorded the present situation in Cuba, at least, in the public mind, has been a hindrance to the development of the "new deal" for Latin America promised by the new administration in the United States. In many ways, it may have seriously delayed the eventual substitution of the present dictatorship by a free and democratic government in Cuba.

Regrettably, the chances of the United States separating these two distinct problems one from the other seem unlikely in the present state of tension and the present scramble for a "solution" to the Cuban "problem." Too much is against it, and it is worthwhile to reflect on why this should be so.

Friends of the United States in Latin America and friends of Latin America in the United States have jointly suffered through a long period, painful and unnecessary, of being systematically ignored: ignored by academic, journalistic, political, intellectual and other opinion-molding centers of authority. It is thus felt—with what degree of validity no one can say—that the present sympathetic receptivity to matters Latin American is due to the awakening caused in these circles by the Castro revolution, in much the same way as scientific research and intelligence in general, and even primary and secondary schooling, have received a big boost from the success of the Soviet Union's first sputnik. Certainly this dramatic reversal from apathy to fascination ensuing on Castro's erupting into print has both its origin and its nourishment in the Cuban drama. This is reflected in a thousand ways, ranging from the random identification of similar revolutionary movements throughout the world

with the Castro trademark to last year's Latin American joke that Mr. Eisenhower's offer of \$500 million in aid should be called the Fondo Fidel.

This natural pleasure at being suddenly recognized, the objects of a jealous affection, akin to any convert's zeal, is aided and abetted by the particular way in which United States foreign policy is subject to the pressures and influence of the mass media: newspapers and their headlines, commentators and their alarmist reports, the weekly magazines with their red-ringed covers, the newsreels, films and television, all the mighty who shape and fashion American public opinion, and through that public opinion, American policy, are committed to the maintenance of what is newsworthy. Castro, who has managed to thrill, shock and infuriate public opinion, is considered, and given the nature of the situation has become, more "newsworthy" than all the rest of Latin America put together.

This factor has collateral effects that are just as dangerous as the monopolizing of the Latin American image by the Cuban situation. Certain elements of the revolution in Cuba, for instance, have been exaggerated out of all proportion, so that public understanding of this phenomenon so close to the U.S. borders has been seriously misled. What is going on in Cuba is not confined to beads and fatigues, public assemblies, military scores, 10-year-old traffic policemen and so on. The whole social fabric of Cuba is being affected, disrupted, reoriented. To what extent and in what varying proportions of chaos, demagogery, and progress this is so, we are now unfortunately in no position to assess impartially. Construction, agricultural reform, new economic policies, new international alignments, reeducation, governmental austerity, the decimation of élites, and many other developments typical of traditional revolutionary situations deserve closer attention than they are getting; certainly, they cannot be ignored out of hand because the political manifestations that accompany them are distasteful.

If Castro continues to be, for the average American, what Latin America is all about; if he dominates North American understanding of the peasant movement in northeast Brazil, the survival of Peronism in Argentina, the rise of substantial opposition parties in Chile, the Peace Congress recently held in Mexico, there is serious error: error compounded by the fact that the playback of this image that the mass media are creating is, in Latin America, that picture of the little giant from the South locked in mortal combat with the colossus of the North that has so long bedevilled traditional and reciprocal misconceptions about the roles of both parts of the hemisphere.

Second, the clear and present danger that many aspects of the present situation in Cuba represent for the United States and its policy of inter-American cooperation, may well be a danger that the United States is going to have to put up with. There can be little room for argument that Castro has set back the development of democratic institutions in Cuba for some time; but we have to be aware of the fact that before Castro they never existed fully and they might not have blossomed forth even had he not taken power. Furthermore, it may well be that many elements of Castro's revolution—good and bad—are by now thoroughly irreversible. It is hard to imagine, for instance, how the great majority of the expropriated property could be returned to its former owners, and the longer the present regime stays in power, the harder such restitution would become. The most that could be hoped for from a successor government would be some form of compensation; and how would that compensation be paid for