Castro's air force could be over the beachhead and the invaders' ships in a matter of minutes. Hence the absolute necessity of knocking out Castro's air power, or at least reducing it to impotence, by the time the ground battle was joined.

This, in general terms, was the plan the Chiefs reviewed for Kennedy. They judged the tactical elements sound, and indeed they accorded the operation a high probability of success. But some of Kennedy's closest advisers were assailed by sinking second thoughts. What bothered them was the immorality of masked aggression. They recoiled from having the U.S. employ subterfuge in striking down even as dangerous an adversary as Castro, and they were unanimously opposed to having the United States do the job in the open.

THE CHANGES

The immorality of the intervention found its most eloquent voice before the President during a meeting in the State Department on April 4, only 13 days before the date set for the invasion. The occasion was Bissell's final review of the operation, and practically everybody connected with high strategy was on hand—Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lemnitzer, CIA Chief Allen Dulles, as well as McGeorge Bundy, Paul Nitze, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann and three Kennedy specialists in Latin American matters—Adolf Berle, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Richard Goodwin. There was also one outsider, Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whose support Kennedy wanted. After Bissell had completed his briefing and Dulles had summed up risks and prospects, FULBRIGHT denounced the proposition out of hand: it was the wrong thing for the United States to get involved in.

Rusk said he was for it, in answer to the President's direct question, but as would presently be manifest, he privately had no heart for it. Two other men among the President's senior foreign policy advisers, not present at the meeting, shared FULBRIGHT's feelings: Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. In deference to these views, Kennedy made two separate rulings which were to contribute to the fatal dismemberment of the whole plan. First, U.S. airpower would not be on call at any time. Second, the B–26's flown by our Cubans could be used in only two strikes before the invasion—first on D minus 2 days and again on the morning of the landing.

Dawn of April 15, by the timetable, the B–26's, having flown undetected through the night from their Central American staging base, appeared over Cuba and bombed the three fields on which Castro's ready air was deployed. The attack was, on the whole, highly successful. Half of Castro's B–26's and Sea Furies and four of his T–33 jets were blown up or damaged.

REQUEST FOR "BOXER"

Sunday evening, only some 8 hours after Kennedy had given the final go-ahead, the expedition in the first dark was creeping toward the Cuban shore. In Bissell's office, there was a call on the White House line. It was Bundy, being even crisper than usual: The B–26's were to stand down, there was to be no air strike in the morning, this was a Presidential order. Rusk was now acting for the President in the situation. Bissell was stunned. He and CIA Deputy Director General Charles Cabell, an experienced airman, went together to the State Department to urge Rusk to reconsider. Cabell was greatly worried about the vulnerability to air attack of the ships and then of the troops on the beach. Rusk was not impressed. The ships, he suggested, could unload and retire to the open sea before daylight; as for the troops ashore being unduly inconvenienced by Castro's air, it had been his experience as a colonel in the Burma theater that air attack could be more of a nuisance than a danger. One fact he made absolutely clear: military considerations had overruled the political when the D-minus-two strike had been laid on; now political considerations were taking over.

Past midnight Bissell and Cabell restudied the battle plan while signals of consternation welled up from their men far to the south. At 4 o'clock, less than an hour before first light on the Cuban shore, Cabell went back to Rusk with another proposal. It was manifestly impossible for the Cuban brigade's small force of B–26's (only 16 were operational) to provide effective air cover for the ships from their distant base. Cabell now asked whether, if the ships were to pull back to international water, the U.S.S. *Boxer*, a carrier on station about 50 miles from the Bay of Pigs, could be instructed to provide cover. Rusk said no. The President was awakened. Cabell registered his concern. The answer still was no.

THE END

The invasion force had little chance. They were without the ranging firepower which the B–26's with their bombs and machine guns had been expected to apply against Castro's tanks and artillery. Castro's forces came up fast. He still had four jets left, and they were armed with powerful rockets. He used them well. Before the morning was done he had sunk two transports and driven off two others.

Now Kennedy and his strategists became alarmed. About noon on Monday, Bissell was told that the B–26's could attack Castro's airfields at will. But the orders came too late. Most of the pilots had been in the air for upward of 18 hours in an unavailing effort to keep Castro's planes off the troops and the remaining ship. That night a small force was scratched together. It was over Cuba at dawn, only to find the fields hidden by low, impenetrable fog.

Tuesday was the turning point. The men ashore had fought bravely and gained their planned objectives. They had even seized and bulldozed the airfield. But they were desperately short of ammunition and food, and under the pressure of Castro's superior firepower and number they were being forced back across the beach. There remained one last chance to make the thing go. *Boxer* was still on station. The release of a few of its jets simply for air cover should see two landing crafts with ammunition and rations safely to the shore.

At a White House meeting that night, Bissell made it plain that unless U.S. air power was brought forward, the men on the beach were doomed. He asked that *Boxer's* planes be brought into the battle. Rusk still would not have this. Several others were also opposed, including the President's personal staffers. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke vouched for the worth of Bissell's proposition. The outcome of the meeting was a singular compromise. Jets from *Boxer* would provide cover next morning for exactly 1 hour, long enough for the ships to run into the shore and start unloading and for the remaining B–26's to get in a hard blow.

Next morning, through an incredible mischance, the B–26's were over Cuba half an hour ahead of schedule. *Boxer's* jets were still on the flight deck. But Castro's jets were ready. Two of the B–26's were shot down; others were hit and forced to abort. That was the melancholy end.

The House Vote on the Conference Committee Report Containing the So-Called Hanford Compromise Is Scheduled for Wednesday, September 13, 1961

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES E. VAN ZANDT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 7, 1961

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call attention to the House schedule for next week, which includes consideration of the conference committee report on the Atomic Energy Commission authorization bill. It is important that every Member of the House who voted to instruct conferees to delete the Hanford electric power provision from that bill, and all other Members in sympathy with this position, be present when this legislation comes to the floor.

I am certain that some of my colleagues are discouraged at the long delay incident to the handling of this legislation. The growing resentment at the way in which it has been batted about is quite understandable.

After having deleted the Hanford powerplant provision from the Joint Committee bill, the House found it necessary to take the unusual step of instructing its delegates following the Senate's reinsertion of the provision. If you will recall, the motion to instruct conferees to delete the project carried by 235 to 164, a majority which one might assume would be adequate to notify our friends in the Senate that we are unqualifiedly opposed to the project.

If proponents of this measure are of the opinion that Hanford will become more palatable as this session nears to a close, it is my opinion that they are in for a big surprise. There is not going to be any flexibility on a matter of such importance to the national welfare.

Actually, by dragging out final action, proponents may very well be building up greater opposition to their project. While the bill is collied across the Capitol, tension mounts in Berlin. Anyone who might have had a tendency to be apathetic about the international crisis heretofore is now getting his daily jolts from newspaper headlines. As the gravity of the situation comes into focus, appeals for junk projects that would deprive the defense structure of necessary funds have far less chance of reaching sympathetic ears. The Hanford generating station has no place in the defense program. There is absolutely no room for it in the national budget.

Just to keep the record straight, I want to notify my colleagues that, while this legislative breakdown has been persisting, the case against the Hanford powerplant has been building up among those who suffer most from it. I refer to representatives of the coal industry and residents of mining communities as well

America today. It is drama that began nearly 400 years ago on this hallowed ground when intrepid souls set out from the mother country, England, in their tiny vessels, to found the dynamic civilization in freedom, which we now enjoy but, perhaps do not always appreciate.

This week marks the end of the 1961 season for the presentation of "The Lost Colony" pageant performed by its able and dedicated cast of actors, musicians, dancers, and choristers.

I must open my remarks with special recognition of the genius of Paul Green who felt the deeper meaning of the American dream—the American goal—by creating this tremendous outdoor symphony on this site some 25 years ago. Each year there has been some change—for he has sought to perfect this phase of his presentation of the meaning of the American heritage.

America's greatness has grown from its variety, and Paul Green has extended his vast talents to other historical phases of our national growth with such successes as "The Common Glory," now in its 15th season at Williamsburg, Va.; "Faith of Our Fathers," in the National Capital; "Wilderness Road," at Berea, Ky.; "The Founders," at Jamestown Island, Va.; and "The Confederacy," at Virginia Beach, Va.

In the light of all that, my friends, you must know that this is a night to remember, to feel deeply, and to cherish.

When I was asked not so long ago if I, as Congressman from this First District of North Carolina, would participate briefly in this seasonal closing of our State's historic drama, the news in Washington, D.C., was exceedingly grim. The world seemed beset by cold fire—interspersed here and there with brutal bursts of passion that did not—do not—make sense in a civilized world. The intervening weeks do not look any better.

Korea, though some 10 years behind, has left scars which may still pain many who are here tonight. The Suez crisis of 1955 and 1956 made a deep impact on the nations of the world as the Arab States went through pangs of extreme nationalism and flirtations with the untiring Communist powers, China and India reached serious crises over boundary matters. A President of the United States was advised not to visit one country because of the possibility of disorders which might threaten his safety. And later, he and the United tates were outrageously affronted by the Premier of the Soviet Union at a meeting in Paris of top officials of the great world powers—the United States, Soviet Russia, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of France.

Today, we have one crisis on top of another. The West Germany/West Berlin situation is boiling and dangerous in light of the extreme measures which have been taken to seal off the unhappy East Germans from access to the West. The problems of the French in Algeria and between the French and the Tunisians, gravely, though indirectly, affect these shores. The turn of our near and formerly friendly neighbor, Cuba, to communism and Soviet domination is frightening. Recent developments in Brazil are mystifying. Africa is in a tremendous ferment. And who knows what has really happened in Laos and Vietnam?

These things are of great concern to us in Washington, D.C., at the seat of our Government.

I know they are to all of you.

National divisions, realinements, and inconsistencies seem to plague the world. We have a North Korea and a South Korea; we have a North and a South Vietnam, there is an East and West Germany—complicated by the city or cities of East and West Berlin located 110 miles within the World War II boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Union of South Africa we see the concept of apartheid, or white supremacy, carried to greater extremes than it has ever been in this country. In other parts of Africa the concept of black supremacy seems to be on the rise.

These are the things of today and of recent years. But let's go back to the times portrayed by Paul Green's pageant, the time when the English-speaking peoples asserted themselves on this continent.

Things were no different then than they are today. Not really.

History books have to cover time by recording the main events. They cannot give us the infinite details which we learn from our daily newspapers, radios, and television.

But those books do tell us that power struggles in Europe were then, as now, shaking the structure of the entire civilized world at the time our brave Roanoke Island colonists came to these shores.

We know that Spain had been in control of the seas for a hundred years or more. That the Portuguese were competitors. We know that the English were, through their ruling classes, in violent diplomatic and religious conflict with the rest of Europe. We know that the Dutch were straining to compete in the colonization of the unsettled areas of the world.

In the official souvenir program for tonight's entertainment—the one that costs 50 cents per copy—there appears a chronology of Pre-Colonial America, it tells about Columbus in 1492. It shows that England wasn't going to wait very long, and John Cabot discovered North America for England in 1497. It shows that an Italian explored the present North Carolina coast for France in 1524. And it shows the vigorous efforts of the English under the direction of Sir Walter Raleigh to establish a colony in the New World, at Roanoke Island—where we now stand.

The Colony was lost. Its fate is intriguing, and historians have been interested for more than 370 years in finding the answer to the disappearance of the sturdy, well-balanced and well-provisioned group of colonists. They brought families and produced English children. They had brought Christianity. They had established law and order in the wilderness. They had taken the first steps to move the Western World into the modern era.

In this great drama—Paul Green suggests an answer to the fate of the first brave groups to begin the history that becomes the cornerstone to English, then Anglo-American and then American heritage. His story of the lost colony is self-sufficient.

But I want to say in conclusion that as we look backward we must look forward. "The past is prologue."

There was a cold war then—between England and Spain. There was no declared war—but the Spanish Armada sailed against England—and was defeated. From that date English seapower was supreme all over the world—upholding the freedom of the seas for all nations who would use them for peaceful purposes. From those perilous times to the present perilous times man's indomitable spirit has pushed the frontiers of civilization and knowledge incredibly far.

Think of this analogy and feel a surge of hope for the future that lies ahead. Our faith in God and country may be summed up in the final beautiful lines of this great pageant:

"Let the wilderness drive us forth as wanderers across the earth, scatter our broken bones upon these sands * * * it shall not kill the purpose that brought us here. * * * The dream still lives. It lives * * * and shall not die."

How the Cuban Invasion Failed

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES E. GOODELL
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, September 7, 1961

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following article which appeared in the September 1, 1961, issue of Time magazine:

HOW THE CUBAN INVASION FAILED

Last April's U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs will be long remembered and angrily debated. In the September issue of Fortune, the magazine's Washington Correspondent Charles J. V. Murphy tells in behind-the-scenes detail the incredible story of how that invasion failed. Excerpts:

The idea for the invasion had taken root during the early summer of 1960. By then, thousands of defectors from Castro's Cuba were in the United States. Many of them were soldiers. The job of organizing and training them was given to the Central Intelligence Agency. It became the specific responsibility of one of the CIA's top deputies, Richard M. Bissell, a former economist who is also a highly practical executive.

During the summer and fall of 1960, President Eisenhower from time to time personally reviewed the scheme. In late November, the last time it came up for his comprehensive review, an operational plan had not yet crystallized. It was taken for granted that a landing in force could not possibly be brought off unless the expedition was shepherded to the beach by the U.S. Navy (either openly or in disguise) and covered by airpower in whatever amount might be necessary. Eisenhower, the commander of Normandy, understood this well enough.

After his election, Kennedy had been briefed fairly frequently on the Cuban situation. He discussed Cuba at length in both his preinaugural talks with Eisenhower. On taking office, Kennedy decided that he had to have from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a technical opinion of the feasibility of the project.

HOW IT WAS PLANNED

The plan still assumed that U.S. military help would be on call during the landing. Castro's air force consisted of not quite two-score planes—a dozen or so obsolete B–26's, plus about the same number of obsolete British Sea Furies. But in addition, there were seven or eight T–33 jet trainers, the remnants of an earlier U.S. transaction with the Batista government, so the force was not the pushover it appeared at first glance. Armed with rockets, these jets would be more than a match in a battle for the exiles' B–26's.

It stood to reason that, considering how small the landing party was, the success of the operation would hinge on the B–26's controlling the air over the beachhead. And the margins that the planners accepted were narrow to begin with. The B–26's were to operate from a staging base in a Central American country more than 500 miles from Cuba. The round trip would take better than 6 hours, and that would leave the planes with fuel for only 45 minutes of action over Cuba. In contrast,