

# SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TRAVEL AND ENTRY TECHNIQUES



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
John Edgar Hoover, Director

~~SECURITY INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**April, 1953**

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PREFACE

A key to the detection of Soviet secret intelligence agents in foreign countries is the discovery of the plans for travel and entry that the Soviet Intelligence services have adapted somewhat successfully to their requirements. A knowledge of the modus operandi of Soviet Intelligence agents has proved to be beneficial to the governments harried by Russian interlopers and their followers. Therefore, a study of Soviet travel and entry techniques may provide basis and direction for the opposing operations required of our counterintelligence and internal security forces.

Trained Soviet agents sent out from Moscow to organize an underground apparatus for long-time operation in a foreign country enter, exit and travel about quite freely because they are protected by falsifications and cover occupations which make them appear above the suspicion of the target country's protecting authorities. Ways have also been devised for securing the entrance of an agent on a single mission and of other persons who will be called upon to cooperate at some distant date.

This paper provides a review of the travel and entry techniques that have been used by the Soviet Intelligence services. Awareness of past

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successful Soviet techniques may assist in preventing possibilities from becoming eventualities.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Government has taken a number of steps to control the travel and entry of subversive elements. We impose visa restrictions on all people from Iron Curtain countries. We have a program for screening at points of entry those foreigners regarding whom we have adverse information. We have curtailed the travel privileges of Russia's official representatives -- excepting Soviet nationals with the United Nations or other international organizations -- preventing secret trips in and out, and about the country. We deny passports for extended stay abroad to admitted Communists and to anyone who is found to have given consistent and prolonged adherence to the Communist Party line. But the Soviets, in their planning, anticipated rebuffs and set up measures for facilitating clandestine travel and entrance to foreign countries where they wish to collect military, economic or political information.

In the past, Soviet Intelligence operations in Europe, Asia and America show that travel and entry plans for foreign agents have been worked out in Moscow. Whatever plans proved successful have been developed into a pattern for agent activity, and those methods have been incorporated into the training program for preparing future agents to be sent abroad.

The direct attention that the Soviet Intelligence headquarters devotes to travel and entry techniques is illustrated by "Task No. 3 of 1. 8. 45 " \* assigned to Sam Carr, a member of a Soviet Military Intelligence network operating in Canada. Among the nine items to be reviewed and reported to the "Director" in Moscow are:

\* 1. 8. 45 is August 1, 1945, not January 8, 1945.

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"4. More expedient methods to slip into the country.

"5. Conditions of entry into the country and of moving about in the country." \*

An earlier Soviet operator said he was ordered to make a full report to his superior on the methods by which naturalization papers and passports are obtained in the United States. He found there was a dearth of information concerning these procedures and he gradually came to be considered an expert on the subject. Agents coming to this country were directed in Moscow to contact him for instructions.

Walter Krivitsky, former Soviet Intelligence agent, said that about 1928-29 the Russians discovered that American and Canadian passports could be obtained relatively easily, and they came into frequent use both for Fourth Department, or Soviet Military Intelligence, and for OGPU\*\* agents. With a bit of adroit, illegal maneuvering entrance to Europe and Asia was also possible. Krivitsky said that although the Fourth Department in Moscow was able to produce perfectly forged passports of any country,

\* The Report of the Royal Commission, June 27, 1946, p. 553.

\*\* The Secret Political Police of the Soviet Union, formerly the Cheka and the GPU.



it was much preferred that espionage agents should travel on genuine passports, procured, if necessary, by means of forged documents of identity. Up to 1928 or 1929, he said, Soviet agents usually traveled on Austrian, German or Danish passports.

An agent who was active during the 1930's said that for the protection of cover stories there was, in the OGPU offices in Moscow during his time, a passport department for the preparation of any necessary documents. He stated that he gathered this from conversations as well as from his original dealings with George Miller, a photographer employed in the passport office.

It is the present policy of the Soviet Government to keep its officials engaged in foreign travel aloof from foreigners, so that undesirable ideas will not alter their political convictions. Political reliability is a more important qualification than technical ability or general suitability for any particular foreign appointment. This policy results in very few Soviet citizens being allowed to travel and very few foreigners being allowed to visit the USSR. The result, as pointed out by a 1948 report of a foreign intelligence agency, is that all Russians abroad are official representatives of the Soviet Union and no Soviet citizen would be granted a passport for a "private" visit; even a scientist who has been sent abroad to attend an international conference is attached to the local Soviet Embassy or trade delegation to which he has to report on arrival.

Security and counterintelligence investigations have revealed that the Soviets take advantage of both legal and illegal cover for maneuvering the travel and entry of their foreign agents. Consequently, cover occupations, and falsifications supporting them, are the framework for this study.

I. COVER UTILIZED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE  
FOR TRAVEL AND ENTRY

From a Soviet Intelligence defector who has furnished reliable information, we have learned that all Soviet citizens living abroad are considered by the MGB\* for assignment to a specific espionage task outside their own duties. All have a bona fide reason for employment abroad, the general task of observing everything which may be of interest to the various intelligence services in the USSR and in certain cases special espionage tasks for which they are already fully briefed before leaving Moscow.

Soviet agents operate in a foreign country under two types of cover -- official and private. Official cover gives them a legal right to enter abroad in spite of the way they use or abuse the privilege. Official cover ranges from embassy appointments to commercial ventures. Some of the latter are infiltrated; others are devised for a particular agent's cover, and savor of the illegal because of the founding purpose.

Aware that its legal residents in a foreign country are under suspicion, Soviet Russia, therefore, has provided for its secret agents to travel to and enter a country by illegal means, attempting to cover

\* Ministry of State Security, formerly the Cheka, the GPU, the OGPU, the NKVD and the NKGB.

all technical illegalities of identification, transportation and occupation by falsifications that appear to be legitimate explanations. An agent may enter the country intending to carry out his assigned covert duties independent of official cover, but under private cover -- outwardly engaged in some innocent, legitimate and perhaps worth-while employment. In this connection, experience has taught our security agencies to suspect all Soviets who enter our country. Although there are thousands of anti-Soviet Russians in the United States, some of our espionage cases prove that the Russian Intelligence Service urges former Russians to cooperate. A Soviet defector who traveled back and forth from Russia to the United States between 1936 and 1940 has warned us regarding his countrymen.

Before observing in detail these covers for travel and entry, it should probably be mentioned that Soviet Intelligence seeks to utilize the cooperation of the Communist Party abroad. It appears that the utilization of the Party varies in scope and degree, and under changing circumstances. The Party is often called upon to furnish couriers, photographers, informers, mail drops, safe meeting places, etc. When service endangering the Party is required, the worker may drop out of the Party and join the espionage network, wholly responsible to domination and direction of intelligence headquarters in Moscow.

For several years prior to 1937, according to Krivitsky's information, it was arranged personally by General Berzin, head of the Fourth Department, and Piatnitsky, head of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Comintern, for each chief Fourth Department agent to receive a special introduction to a senior official of the Communist Party of the country in which he was to work. Krivitsky added that the "OGPU embassy agent has probably only a man earmarked [in the Communist Party] whom he can use when necessary." The first concern for conducting Soviet Intelligence operations is to get key operators strategically located in the country where they are to work. Aid from the Communist Party can be invoked according to the varying needs of the operators.

A. Official

Since, as was observed above, legal entrance of Soviet Intelligence agents under official cover is the least complicated scheme, these favored official covers, operated exhaustively by the Russians, should be examined for their past success.

1. The United Nations

Russian membership in the United Nations organization offers one official gateway for the Russians to enter the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, employees of and delegates to the United Nations are entitled to certain privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded to international organizations in the United States. The United Nations organization, having the USSR as a member nation, offers a legal opportunity for the Soviets to introduce their agents into the United States, unhampered by restrictions limiting the area of their travels. The activity of Valentin Gubitchev showed that he had been placed in the United Nations for the purpose of contacting and receiving information from one or more informants like Judith Coplon.

A case of more recent date was reported by a Russian in the United States on a Nansen passport as the dependent of a United Nations employee. This Russian said he was contacted by a Soviet representative in the United Nations Secretariat who endeavored to recruit him and to develop him as a source of information. Moreover, this representative, he said, placed him in contact with still another United Nations representative who also requested his service.

## 2. Diplomatic and Consular Services

Russia, like any other large country, designates people to represent the nation abroad. Protected by diplomatic passport and immunity from arrest, search or seizure, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, his staff and, through him, all assistants accredited to perform regular tasks for the embassy have a fairly secure local base from which to direct

intelligence activities. The success of this blind for protecting the coming and going of Soviet Intelligence agents in the guise of embassy personnel is indicated by its broad use. It appears that were it not comparatively successful, intelligence assignments would be handled more exclusively by other legal covers or by illegal agents.

Between January, 1942, and August, 1944, Vassili M. Zubilin served in the United States as Third Secretary, then as Second Secretary, of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. ; but it is alleged that he actually at the same time engaged in intelligence operations in the United States and Mexico. Meantime, his wife allegedly operated a network of agents in the United States Government agencies. Anatoli B. Gromov, exposed by Elizabeth Bentley, was First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. , prior to his departure for Russia in 1945. On January 15, 1953, Yuri Novikov, a Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. , was declared persona non grata by the United States Department of State after a Washington grand jury indictment named him coconspirator in espionage against the United States. In the early 1940's Leonid Tarasov, attached to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as First Secretary, and Vitali Pavlov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, were suspected of engaging in intelligence work.

Besides the Secretaries of the Soviet Embassy in Canada, the report of the Royal Commission regarding Soviet Intelligence operations in Canada lists fifteen other Soviet Embassy staff members who gave themselves

over to espionage operations sometime or another after the embassy was established in 1942.

Not only the Soviet Embassy but also other embassies may harbor a Soviet agent. In 1939, Richard Sorge, operating for Soviet Intelligence in Japan, was able through his former friendship with the German Ambassador to obtain a semiofficial status at the German Embassy in Tokyo. There he gathered information for Russia from the English and French Embassies as well as from the German.

Soviet interest in the confidential activities of its dominated satellite nations is not unknown, neither is penetration of such areas when considered necessary to Soviet designs.

The office of the Soviet Military Attache offers an opening used especially by Soviet Military Intelligence for getting its agents into a country. For example, it was Colonel Nikolai Zabolin, Soviet Military Attache, who headed the Soviet Armed Forces Intelligence Department operations in Canada. His assistants, Lieutenant Colonel Petr Motinov and Lieutenant Colonel Vassili Rogov were also particularly active in this connection.

A clerk-accountant in the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, D. C., from February 5, 1948, to December 10, 1950, was reliably reported to have been engaged in espionage, collecting data pertaining to the national defense.



Teachers at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages have been said to speak openly of attaches as "legalized spies."

Besides embassies, the Soviets also utilize consulates in foreign countries as bases for espionage operations. Pavel Klarin, Soviet Vice Consul in New York City in 1943 and 1944, was, according to the statements of his contacts, engaged in the operation to release Frank Jacson, Leon Trotsky's murderer. Pavel Mikhailov, as acting Soviet Consul General at the New York Consulate, was the official Soviet contact of several persons identified or strongly suspected as espionage agents and, according to Igor Gouzenko's testimony, assisted in setting up the Soviet Military Intelligence organization in Canada in 1942 and 1943. Anatoli A. Yakovlev entered the United States on February 8, 1941, as a clerk at the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He operated Harry Gold who obtained data from Klaus Fuchs. The Soviet consulates in San Francisco and Los Angeles have also in the past proved to be staffed with employees active in espionage tasks and also in operating Soviet agents within governmental agencies.

By means of the various consulates in Japan, Richard Sorge was able to contact and make friends among informed employees who unwittingly furnished information valuable to his widespread efforts in behalf of the Soviets.

Igor Gouzenko, whose defection to Canadian authorities resulted in exposing much of the workings of the Soviet Intelligence organizations, stated among other things, that the Soviet Consul at Halifax had been employed by the Soviet Military Intelligence Office.

The direction of overt tasks as well as of particular assignments is almost certainly the responsibility of officers of the MGB and of the GRU\* using the cover of normal diplomatic and consular departments for security protection.

According to a 1944 estimate, there were 2,500 Soviet nationals in the United States on either diplomatic or official visas. It may be seen that Soviet foreign services provided cover for the entrance of numerous possible agents. However, by February 1, 1953, the number had been reduced to 285.

### 3. Diplomatic Courier Service

Official Soviet couriers also enjoy the liberties of legal travel and entry, for they carry diplomatic passports. They normally travel in teams of two and are usually single, middle-aged men although there has been evidence in India of the employment of women. Diplomatic couriers are trained by and are under the supervision of the MGB; therefore, a stay

\*Soviet Military Intelligence Organization.

for an abnormally long period should be suspected. Mikhail Milsky and Gregori Kossarev, top-ranking Soviet Intelligence officers in the capacity of diplomatic couriers, engaged in 1944 in an inspection tour of Soviet espionage facilities in the United States, Mexico and Canada. Subsequently, activity of Kossarev with another courier companion in 1945-46 indicates further Soviet Intelligence operation. They spent long hours at the Soviet Consulate in New York City working late in the evenings; and, as was the case in 1944, several Soviet agents, possibly suspected of laxity, were recalled to Russia after the tours of these couriers.

Between January and April, 1947, approximately fifty official Soviet couriers entered and departed from the New York area.

#### 4. Trade Delegations and Purchasing Commissions

A legal opportunity for travel and entrance to a foreign country is open also to Soviet Government Purchasing Commissions and to trade organizations such as Amtorg. But the privilege of operating such organizations has been abused by the Soviets. Amtorg has been a cover for Soviet Intelligence ever since its founding in 1924, as was Arcos in England. The Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, although originally set up in the United States to handle lend-lease shipments, was simultaneously and subsequently used as a cover for bringing espionage agents into the country.

Victor Kravchenko, formerly an inspector for the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, cited the case of Semen Vassilenko, an employee of the Commission, who flew from Washington to Moscow in February, 1944, with six pouches of material dealing with new and extremely secret developments in war industry in the United States.

Gaik Ovakimian, once a leading Soviet agent in the United States, entered this country on August 15, 1933, on passage paid by the Russian Government. He was en route to Amtorg. In 1936, he traveled to Russia, returning on a temporary visitor's visa the same year. Subsequently, he obtained thirteen extensions of permits to stay in the United States, all of them requested by Amtorg. The last such extension, which expired June 1, 1941, was requested in November, 1940, and indicated that Ovakimian was still conducting research in United States chemicals production for the Soviet Government.

Major Sokolov came to Canada in 1942 ostensibly as a Soviet inspector of work in Canadian factories in connection with the Canadian Mutual Aid Program to the USSR. Meantime, he was a member of an espionage network controlled by key agents in the United States.

After the opening of diplomatic offices in Canada, Sokolov was turned over to Zabotin's network. Confusing to the Canadian authorities was the fact that Sokolov wore a uniform although not officially on the staff of the Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy, but on that of the Commercial Counsellor.

The Soviet Commercial Attache in Berlin and the Attache at the Commercial Legation in Vichy functioned for the Rote Kapelle, \* collecting information from the various networks and even organizing nets.

From 1923 to 1925, visiting commissions were chosen exclusively by the Soviet Intelligence service, according to Krivitsky. Later some difficulty was experienced in explaining the numbers composing such commissions. As a result, agents had to be chosen from among the delegation or commission already appointed.

\* "Rote Kapelle" was the cover name for a secret operation started by German counterintelligence in August, 1941, and conducted against a wireless station of the Russian Intelligence Service which had been detected in Brussels. Subsequently, the operation extended into France, Holland, Germany and Switzerland, where at least seven major Russian networks were penetrated. Literally Rote Kapelle means Red Orchestra.

### 5. News-gathering Agencies

Another légal passageway to a foreign country is as a representative for a news-gathering agency such as Tass, which Richard Sorge pointed out as a cover for collecting information. Such representatives also have legitimate cover for asking detailed questions and for roving about from place to place.

Ismail Akhmedov, former chief in the intelligence department of the Red Army General Staff said that in 1941 he was sent to Germany as the first vice-president of Tass, Berlin, and that a real purpose of "my activity in Germany was the organization and direction of the intelligence work. "

Nikolai I. Zhivaynov, a Tass representative in Ottawa, formerly stationed in New York, was a member of the Soviet military espionage system, using the cover name "Martin. "

An illustrative instance can be cited of an espionage agent sent to the United States by Soviet Military Intelligence. Prior to the agent's departing from Moscow, Furmanov, the director, discoursed with him concerning the possibility of associating himself with some newspaper or magazine and writing petroleum articles, since the agent was a specialist in the petroleum field. In the absence of such employment, it was Furmanov's suggestion that the agent should find himself some type of occupation and do something to establish himself as a normal everyday citizen.

Richard Sorge, who headed the Shanghai conspiracy, was correspondent for German newspapers -- the Frankfurter Zeitung, and the Amsterdam Handelsblatt. The vast amount of travel and research he engaged in for the success of the papers and magazines he represented was, he insisted, the key to his successful Soviet espionage activity in the Far East. Sorge said he covered all his spy activity by his correspondent duties.

Within the Rote Kapelle, Ilse Stoebe kept up successful liaison between an agent in Warsaw and one in Germany, traveling about as correspondent for German and Swiss newspapers.

The journalist or press correspondent coverage presents an ideal shelter for the travels of an espionage agent. The "professional curiosity" which everyone expects to find in a journalist is undoubtedly excellent coverage for agent activity.

#### 6. Red Cross

Alexander Foote, a British soldier with the International Brigade in Spain, said that for some reason the Party decided he was a suitable person to run a Red Cross truck which was to go to Spain from England at regular intervals, carrying medical supplies, etc. However, his real job was to be a courier between King Street (headquarters of the

British Communist Party) and the Communist command of the British Battalion of the brigade. He was also to act as passeur for unauthorized persons who wished to enter Spain. \*

G. Bessedovsky, the former Charge d' Affaires and First Counsellor of the USSR in Paris, following his break with the USSR in 1929, made the statement that consideration was being given to sending to the United States an official of the OGPU, Dr. Scheftel, who would be presented as a representative of the Soviet Red Cross.

Louis Budenz, in a notarized affidavit dated November 11, 1950, and submitted to the House Committee on Un-American Activities, wrote:

"... I now know that this man Roberts was in reality Dr. Gregory Rabinowitz, or Rabinowitch, head of the Russian Red Cross in the United States....

"It is significant that the Soviet dictatorship has been so unscrupulous in its dealings with the American nation that it would use the International Red Cross (with which the Russian Red Cross was then connected) to advance espionage activities of various sorts in the United States. It is ironical that the Kremlin would use, or misuse, an organization devoted to the saving of lives for the purpose of destroying the lives of its enemies by assassination."

\* Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1949), p. 15.



## 7. Commercial Coverage

"Every member of the Soviet espionage organizations must have a reasonable job," declared Klausen, Sorge's assistant in Japan. The official posts which the Russian Intelligence services adapted to their travel and entry requirements show a remarkable variety. Besides diplomatic, humanitarian and journalistic coverages, the crafts and commercial professions were found suitable.

Commercial coverages sometimes have individual character and sometimes collective character, for some conceal the individual agent while others conceal a network.

### a. Individual Character

In Japan, Max Klausen, chief radio operator of the Sorge network, with his own money, went into the manufacture of fluorescent plates to conceal his activity as an agent.

Moische Stern who conducted extensive Soviet Intelligence operations in the United States during the 1930's tells how he obtained a contract in this country as European representative to sell infrared ray equipment on a commission basis. This connection gave him an entree to European industrialists, military engineers, etc. The equipment was manufactured at Delft, Holland.

Several illegal resident agents have operated in England as American businessmen. One experienced agent came to the United States as an English businessman but when in London posed as an American businessman.

Whittaker Chambers, confessed courier for a Soviet Military Intelligence apparatus in the United States, has told of his preparations to head a London branch of Maxim Lieber's New York publishing business. Lieber had been desiring this branch office. Now the Soviet apparatus would finance one for him. Chambers would do a regular job of seeing authors and preparing manuscripts received from the British, among whom Lieber already had some contacts. At the same time, Chambers would assist "Bill," his Soviet Intelligence superior, in setting up an apparatus in England. To use the United States as a base for establishing Soviet apparatuses in other countries was then a common practice.

Whittaker Chambers tells of another instance when the Soviets used a similar device. John Sherman, one of Chambers' superiors, had been ordered to go to Tokyo, Japan, and there set up a Soviet espionage apparatus. For this purpose he said that he needed a cover as a representative of a legitimate American business. He said that he also needed an assistant

and the latter would have to be an American-born Japanese with connections in high Japanese circles. It was Sherman's idea that they should set up an organization to be known as the American Feature Writers Syndicate. The purpose of the organization would be to place correspondents around the world. Plans were accordingly put under way.

It has been reported that leading business concerns in Shanghai, as well as the service of American military organizations there, were infiltrated by an NKVD "Shanghai Unit" of fifty capable Russian agents with a monthly subsidy.

William Hoffman (Willie Brandes), known for his military espionage activity in the British Woolwich Arsenal Case, posed as a commercial representative for the Phantom Red Cosmetic Company and for the Charak Furniture Company--both of New York City.

By contract dated March 21, 1941, the United States Service and Shipping Corporation in New York was designated as exclusive agent and representative in the United States, Canada and Mexico for Intourist, the official Russian travel agency. Elizabeth Bentley declared it was set up with Communist Party, USA, money or Soviet funds and was a cover firm for Soviet espionage in the same category with World Tourists, Incorporated. Regarding World Tourists, Louis Budenz stated before a United

States Congressional subcommittee that Jacob Golos, while head of the Control Commission of the Communist Party (time not stated), was directing espionage through that organization.

In Amsterdam, the OGPU created the firm of Gada which provided the necessary business cover for Theodore Maly, alias Paul Hardt, the chief OGPU illegal resident for the United Kingdom during 1936 and 1937. To create this firm, the resident OGPU agent in the Soviet Embassy in London had an uncle in Poland who understood the Polish import trade in rags and waste paper. The uncle, therefore, was sent by OGPU to Amsterdam to found the firm of Gada, which would appoint representatives to work in London in connection with the export of rags to Poland. The sole purpose of this maneuver was to provide a genuine business cover for an OGPU agent in London.

b. Collective Character

An example of a collective commercial cover is one set up by the Rote Kapelle network after the Germans invaded the Low Countries. The Excellent Raincoat Company headed by Leon Grossvogel, a Communist in Belgium, was to be expanded to branch companies in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden upon the advice and with financial aid from Leopold

Trepper, director of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe from 1936 to 1942. Having failed as a businessman in Brussels, Grossvogel then set up Simex in Paris and linked the Belgian company Simexco with it. The company was designed to enter into business relations with the Quartermaster General's Office of the Todt organization and of the Wehrmacht to collect intelligence information.

A collective commercial cover was the aim for creating the highly important firm called Wostwag, opened by the Fourth Department in Berlin in 1922. It provided a genuine cover for a large number of Fourth Department agents. The principal business of the firm was the sale of Russian produce in Germany. Two brothers, junior staff officers of the Fourth Department, were put in charge of the organization and espionage side of the firm. They were naturalized Austrians of Polish origin. The business side of Wostwag (and later its various branches) was in the hands of an old Bolshevik--a Latvian.

About 1925 or 1926, the Fourth Department suspected that the activities of the firm had become known to the German police. They decided to withdraw the two brothers and other members of the Russian General Staff and let the firm continue purely commercial activities. After their recall from Berlin, the brothers worked for a time in the Fourth Department,

managing accounts. Later, one brother was sent to Tientsin, China, where he founded and built up a very important branch of Wostwag -- The Far Eastern Trading Company. The other brother was sent to Urga, the Soviet colony in Outer Mongolia. In 1935, the latter was recalled to Moscow with the idea that he should go to America. The plan fell through and it was decided to send him to London where an affiliated company of Wostwag, the Fur Trading Company, was properly registered and carrying on legitimate business, with certain members of the staff, however, devoting part time to intelligence business.

According to a former Soviet Government representative, so-called closed organizations were set up in foreign countries several years ago by Soviet Intelligence. These organizations, he said, are headed by an experienced agent who handles important espionage work and in the meantime has no contact whatsoever with any official Soviet Government representative. The agent who is the head of a closed organization is, the informant said, ordinarily not a Soviet citizen, but has assumed another identity based upon a false foreign passport.

#### 8. Study Groups

In 1946, a group of ten Russian engineers made a six-month tour of major United States cities including New York City, Washington, D. C., Detroit and San Francisco.

Although there have been no direct allegations that any of these engineers were undercover agents of the Soviet Intelligence organizations, known Soviet practices regarding their citizens who chance to travel abroad in any capacity certainly placed these ten engineers in positions to acquire information that would be invaluable to the Soviet Government in the case of hostilities with the United States.

Screened and perhaps briefed by Soviet Intelligence before leaving Russia, this study group was conducted through our cities according to a plan presented by the chairman of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C. Few evening functions were attended by the group during their stay, for their evenings were occupied by the extensive reports required by the Soviet Government, pertinent parts of which would be available to Intelligence headquarters.

Consequently, under cover of official sanction, the Soviet study group, whether secret agents or legitimate engineers, gained detailed information on gas works, electric utility installations, water filtration and supply, sewage disposal systems, roads, etc. They obtained numerous blueprints, photographs and diagrams of specific facilities. All of this information can serve Russia immeasurably in planning targets for military action or sabotage in the United States.

B. Private (Nonofficial)

In order to take advantage of every opportunity to cover entrance abroad and freedom of movement upon arrival, the Soviets have occasionally used persons who had acceptable personal, private or individual reasons for going abroad. Secondly, then, these persons would be assigned intelligence duties.

1. Specialists

Ozaki, who worked for Sorge in the Orient, set out during his trial by the Japanese the "Commandments" of the perfect Soviet spy, wherein he mentioned: "It is always good to be specialized in something. In regard to me I am a specialist in Chinese affairs and because of this I was solicited everywhere." Among specialists admitted abroad as legitimate, worthy visitors are such as Dr. Alan Nunn May, the British nuclear physicist sent to Canada and the United States with a group of physicists. Soviet Military Intelligence urged him to undertake espionage in connection with his scientific studies.

A former Soviet Intelligence agent in the United States said that a Russian specialist would be sent out of the country on a special mission, but before he departed or after he arrived at his destination that specialist



would be asked to perform a special task for Russian Intelligence. The specialist, he said, would be "hounded" until he completed the job.

Engineers, technicians or others designated to visit a country to buy military or naval equipment were handed over to the intelligence departments for a short course of instructions on the particular secret mission to be carried out during their visit. They were also instructed to find contacts in factories they entered through whom the Soviets could continue to obtain information.

## 2. Students Sent Abroad

A former Soviet agent, whose name cannot be mentioned for security reasons, speaking about USSR students who are sent abroad for higher education, stated that all individuals who are allowed to leave the USSR must have a specific reason such as industrial espionage or preparation for future assignments either in the country to which they are sent or to some other country at a later period. He advised that students come within this category.

Stanislaus Shumovsky came to the United States in September, 1931, as an exchange student. In June, 1936, he received his Master's degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. According to the statements

of his classmate, Ben Smilg, his paid tutor, Shumovsky was frequently away on trips to the West Coast or Texas with no explanation except that arrangements had been made at Amtorg. Subsequent assignments and contacts support the belief that Shumovsky was an active agent of the Soviet Government.

Semen M. Semenov entered the United States as a student on January 18, 1938. He attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. During the next few years, Semenov was reported to be operating a network of agents while he moved from one appropriate cover to another.

3. Foreign Nationals Trained and Returned  
to Operate in Their Native Land

In 1939, an agent and his wife were sent from Russia to Bulgaria to establish a network and wireless communication with Moscow. The salient angle of this event is that the couple was Bulgarian born and had gone to Russia as visitors in 1935 with no strong political background. In Russia they were picked up by Russian Intelligence, given espionage training, equipped with money, a transmitter, aliases, and addresses of Russian Intelligence contacts in Bulgaria.

One of Elizabeth Bentley's supervisors, Anatoli B. Gromov, who had formerly served as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. , once became concerned about her activity being

discovered, he told her it might be well for her to go to Moscow and receive special training. Thereafter, he said, she might be sent to Latin America, Canada, or she might be returned to the United States under another name.

There are numerous known instances of the Russians using other nationalities for their espionage service. Often they send them back to serve in their own country, where for them problems of travel and entry as well as many others will be nullified.

Another more recent example is that of a Spanish Communist who went to Russia voluntarily to join the Red Army but instead was given a training course in radio and associated espionage operation, and then sent back to Spain to set up and operate a secret radio station.

#### 4. Naturalized Citizens

An example of another type of legal entrance of an individual espionage agent is that of Simon A. Rosenberg. He was born in Poland but naturalized in the United States and employed by the Amtorg Trading Corporation. In 1931 he went to the Soviet Union as an engineer and was, he said, compelled to work for the OGPU, or his sister in Kiev would be killed. He signed a pledge and returned to the United States in 1932 where he contacted numerous Soviet agents and fulfilled assignments.

### 5. Foreign-born Spouses

Even matrimony has on occasion offered assistance to the operation of Soviet Intelligence. Marriage of one who is foreign born to a United States citizen aids the foreigner in his desires to be accepted abroad in the country of his spouse.

Hede Massing was born in Austria. It was her marriage to Julian Gumperz, an American, that was influential in securing for her an American passport which in turn made her a valuable courier for Soviet Intelligence. Her next step was to become a naturalized citizen of the United States. As a consequence, she retained her citizenship and passport privileges although her next husband was a foreigner.

Ursula Hamburger, a German woman working for Soviet Intelligence in Switzerland in 1940, divorced her German husband and married the Englishman, Leon Beurton, thus incidentally acquiring British nationality. It is possible that Soviet Military Intelligence intended to use Ursula Beurton in England.

### 6. Refugees

Victor Kravchenko testified before a United States Congressional committee that in the early war years there was a great mass of refugees

who entered countries of the Western Hemisphere and that among these refugees were numerous agents of the NKVD.

A German-born couple acquired German passports and fled to Leningrad in 1932 to escape the rising Hitler regime. The situation in Russia for foreign workers becoming constantly more uncomfortable, the couple accepted recruitment into the Russian espionage system in order to get out of Russia and to avoid being sent back to Germany.

The Soviets arranged travel papers and visas, and allowed the couple to go to Stockholm, Sweden, to work against Germany for the Russians. Before departing, they procured on their own initiative an extension or a renewal of their German passport privileges.

In Stockholm from 1936 to 1939 and having received no particular assignments and no more than \$500 for the information they had furnished the Russians, the man wrote his Russian principal that they intended going to the United States since the Russians had left them "high and dry." Immediately following the writing of the letter, the couple went to the German Consulate and obtained another extension of their German passports. With no assistance from the Russians they applied for visas and obtained them in the fall of 1939. They then took a train to Oslo,

Norway, and left by boat for the United States. On March 18, 1951 -- free from Russian espionage contacts for fourteen years -- a stranger appeared at their home in the United States to revive their agent activity for the Soviets.

#### 7. Growing Up Agents from the Inside

The plan which Krivitsky referred to as "growing up agents from the inside" should be mentioned here. It is not a scheme to facilitate travel and entry, but rather a technique to avoid the problem of travel and entry. This method has the disadvantage of delayed maturity, but Krivitsky said it had been regularly used by the Soviets. It is understood that Soviet Military Intelligence using this plan is prepared in some instances to wait for ten or fifteen years for results, and in some cases has paid the expenses of a university education for promising young men in the hope that they might eventually obtain diplomatic posts or other key positions in the service of the country in which they are nationals.

Similarly, to circumvent the American passport problem, Paul Crouch, an acknowledged former Communist, testified that Russian secret police in 1928 worked on a plan to have members of the Young Communist League employed with the State Department. Through them,

the Soviet Government would then supposedly have access to blank American passports. \*

The patience required in Soviet espionage activity is illustrated in an instance referred to by Julius Rosenberg, according to an informant. Rosenberg is reported to have said he advanced money to a young couple to open a business in the West. For years, according to the report, this couple operated a business to build up a front. During difficult times, Rosenberg supplied money to keep the business going. But during Rosenberg's later operations this man acted as a go-between, "for example, for men who had microfilm to send to me for further conveyance." This man in the western city served as a secret drop for the East-to-West connections.

Closely allied to this technique is an instance referred to during an interview with a former Soviet agent. Mention was made of a Russian couple who came to the United States September 11, 1936, and left April 28, 1937. The agent said the indication was that the couple had probably been sent to this country for one special assignment or else "to establish" themselves or obtain a background so that they could be used in other countries.

\*'Government's Proposed Findings of Fact submitted to the Subversive Activities Control Board," July 28, 1952.

In regard to growing up Russian agents from the inside, both Ismail Akhmedov and Igor Gouzenko were cognizant of a plan to send a group of young intelligence-trained Soviets to the United States for university educations. Thus, this group, to which Ahkmedov referred as the "seven brothers," would be admitted to the country and would be appropriately stationed for future tasks.

C. Summary

The Soviets have found that the most secure and the most efficient coverage for entering their intelligence agents abroad is to appoint them to administer some sort of official business in the country where they wish them to operate.

Traveling as a lawfully appointed representative of the Soviet Government, of a commercial establishment, as a specialist, a student, a refugee; or being a citizen of another country but secretly in the employ of the Soviets, the Soviet Intelligence worker enters a foreign country and attempts to remain undiscovered as an enemy, while he goes about organizing his network of informants and funneling information back to Moscow. Obvious, in the light of these travel and entry techniques, is the advantage a counterintelligence agency has when it is able to learn of these foreign intelligence agents before they enter and to provide measures for coping effectively with their hostile operations.



**II. FALSE IDENTITY TO AID TRAVEL AND ENTRY  
OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

Confronted with the need for placing intelligence agents in foreign countries and finding official and legal occupations covering travel and entry incommensurable with the supply of agents, the Soviets do not hesitate to use fraudulent, illegal means. Should diplomatic relations between Russia and so-called friendly countries be broken there would be cause for added emphasis on these clandestine means of placing intelligence agents in enemy countries.

This study has brought to light no startlingly ingenious schemes used in the illegal travel and entrance of Soviet agents, only the devices that anyone facing defeat and reaching for extremities might grasp.

An interview with a former Soviet agent has revealed that another agent entered the United States from Canada simply by being smuggled across the river in a rowboat at night. A former Comintern agent who operated periodically in the United States from 1929-1938 said that smuggling people into the United States was a highly secret business of the Party nuclei aboard the vessels of the United States Lines and, to a certain extent, the Norddeutscher Lloyd and the former Red Star Line.

Some have tried to take advantage of holiday crowds crossing to and from Canada and Mexico, reasoning that officials may be lax in checking on the occupants of the streaming vehicles. Others, in wartime, have parachuted behind enemy lines. It has been a common practice for agents to camouflage their illegal entrances with cover stories, or legends, which correspond to the false names and false documents assigned them. Protected in that manner they are enabled to travel openly by plane, train or boat to a country where they operate under a cover occupation perhaps devised for their particular assignment.

The Canadian espionage case and the Rote Kapelle operations are replete with instances of Soviet espionage leaders and their assistants being assigned false names. In the Canadian case, secret meetings and documents regarding them protected the agents involved by the use of cover names, although these agents were already protected by their legal cover occupation. Soviet agents identified during the Rote Kapelle operations were known under one false name in one country and under another false name in another assignment in another country. These constant changes in identity give the agent strong security. They confuse the international liaison of the different national counterintelligence services.

Leon Helfand, a former Russian ambassador to Rome, stated that important espionage work is handled by experienced agents who enter the country illegally disclaiming Soviet citizenship and remaining under an assumed identity based upon a false passport.

Some of these illegal schemes for travel and entry are illustrated by instances which follow. Variations to correspond with the time and the country to be entered have been noted, but for the most part illegal travel follows a pattern. Viewing the pattern and noting instances of application might assist an investigator in his problems of trying to figure out what activity may have preceded a step he discovers, and what further steps the foreign agent might undertake unless prevented.

A. De-Russianizing

Concerning the selection of personnel to be utilized by the Russians in their intelligence work abroad, Elizabeth Bentley recalled that her superior had emphasized the need for "de-Russianizing" their agents as much as possible. This de-Russianizing used to be a study of the Foreign Department in Moscow from which agents are dispatched. Furthermore, the process may be continued under the tutelage of a native Communist assigned to aid the newly arrived agent in managing dress, language, and customs, so he can move about unnoticed.

Language is one of the high hurdles for illegal Soviet agents. It is not unusual for a foreign agent to prepare himself with several languages. Elizabeth Bentley said that her superior, whom she called "Jack," was studying Spanish and familiarizing himself with Latin American affairs in general. He never indicated to her, though, whether the Russians were going to send him to Latin America or whether he himself intended to go.

Hede Massing believed that she was invited to participate in espionage because of her "ability to get along with people and to move in varied circles without difficulty." Then too, she explained, she had married an American citizen and accordingly possessed a legitimate American passport -- the best protection for any European traveler at that time.

#### B. False Legends

For the sake of assuming a safe identification, an illegal resident agent needs a completely new legend to cover his life from birth to the present. Supplying the basis for these legends by securing legally registered birth certificates became a valued source of income for Communists in Canada and the United States in the 1930's and 1940's.

To smooth entry into Panama from the United States for the purpose of developing an intelligence contact, a Soviet agent sailed from New York with letters of introduction to various clubs in Panama signed by one Levy, who had been in Panama before. As a pretext for going to Panama, the agent was prepared to say that from his friend, Malcolm Whitaker, he had received a letter of recommendation to Major General Preston Brown, the Military Governor of the Canal Zone. This letter stated that the agent was on a pleasure trip and was going to visit the Browns.

C. False Documents

1. Birth Certificates

Originally, the principal requirement for obtaining a birth certificate was a witness to certify the identity of the applicant at a local office for vital statistics. Consequently, the Soviets had not been reduced to moving their secret agents as false hockey players or under any other disguises. They simply entered Canada or the United States illegally and within a short time received citizenship and passport papers -- both false.

One informant has stated that outside of Russia in the actual operation of the intelligence unit there is always one person who handles documents and obtains related information. According to his standing,

that person has the title of Inspector and is usually an assistant to the agent in charge of the intelligence operations in that country. According to the anonymous letter mailed to the FBI on August 7, 1943, Vassili Zubilin, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., was revealed to be personally engaged in the illegal moving of agents into and out of the United States and in preparing counterfeit documents.

When Hede Massing was working for the Russians in 1935, she said she was told to get hold of some birth certificates. The only way she was able to comply was to contact an important official of the Communist Party, USA, a tactic which her Soviet superior considered a regrettable necessity. She met him six or eight times in two or three months and eventually received the birth certificates in a sealed envelope, for which she paid him cash.

A Hungarian Communist, Alexander Goldberger, who was known to his espionage contacts in the United States as J. Peters and as Stevens, had developed a system for trafficking in essential birth certificates, naturalization papers and other identifying documents for his contacts. One of them -- Whittaker Chambers -- told about Peters having several young Communists working in the Genealogical Division of the New York Public

Library. Some of these individuals would look up births of children who were born in the early part of the century; others would search for deaths which occurred during the same period. The lists of births and deaths were then compared. For example, Chambers said, a John Smith was found to have been born in 1900 and died several years later. An application then would be made for a copy of the birth certificate of John Smith. Communist Party members, using the names of parents listed on either the birth or death certificates, would write for photostat copies of these birth certificates to be mailed to a cover address from which they were turned over to Peters. It was Chambers' impression that Peters received hundreds of these birth certificates which were used as the basis for securing legal passports, not all of which were to be used by espionage workers but some for Communist Party underground activity.

John Loomis Sherman, Whittaker Chambers' superior in a United States espionage apparatus, was designated to go to Tokyo, Japan, to set up an apparatus. He ordered Chambers to get him the needed papers. Peters obliged Chambers by securing a birth certificate in the name of Charles Chase on which Sherman procured a passport enabling him to travel to Japan and back to the United States. For a subsequent journey

Sherman did not make use of the same birth certificate but required Chambers through Peters to procure another. The one provided on this occasion was in an Irish name. It is to be noted that, although Sherman was American born, he falsified his identity.

Between late 1935 and early 1937, Mr. and Mrs. Edward Joseph Herbert rented a furnished New York apartment from which they made three trips to Europe. The front sheet of the passport application of Mrs. Herbert contains a handwritten notation that a photostatic copy of the birth certificate of Sarah Graff was presented at the passport office. Mrs. Herbert directed that the passport be mailed to her New York address. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the real Edward Joseph Herbert and the real Sarah Graff had died as infants during the first year of their lives and that the couple traveling as Mr. and Mrs. Herbert were actually Mr. and Mrs. Vassili Zubilin, both Soviet Intelligence personnel.

Zubilin later, in 1942, became a member of the Russian Embassy staff in Washington, D. C.

Alfred Tilton directed Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States (1927-1930) from New York City under the name of Joseph Paquett. He supported this false identity with fraudulent Canadian papers obtained



with the assistance of Tim Buck, Secretary of the Canadian Communist Party. Later, by means of more fraudulent documents, Tilton became "Alfred Martin."

Communists placed in offices that could assist Soviet operations were an important part of the scheme for securing identification papers. When Whittaker Chambers was scheduled to go to England to help his superior, "Bill," set up a Soviet apparatus, Chambers' family, consisting of wife and daughter, were to accompany him. Not only must he have papers for himself and his wife, but also for his infant daughter. J. Peters again obliged, securing birth certificates for Chambers and his wife in the name of David Breen. Then to perform the rest of his duty, Peters visited the City Hall at Atlantic City where he contacted the "right" individual (Chambers presumed he was a Communist), and for a fee, had the name of Ursula Breen written into the birth records and a regular birth certificate issued in that name.

Peters was assisted also in getting hold of petitions of persons seeking naturalization, who included on their petition the names of minor children. He used these petitions to secure passports in the names of the children listed thereon.

A former Comintern agent who operated periodically in the United States explained that birth certificates of dead Party members or other people who were considered "safe" were sent to the National Office from the district organizers of the Party.

2. Affidavits of Faked Relatives

This spurious method of getting into and out of a country by using "safe" birth certificates was only one of several illegal methods used by the Soviet Intelligence services. Another method was to claim relationship with someone who could assist in gaining the required foundations for openly acquiring the needed legal papers.

To assist him in his problems of "explaining" his way around, a Soviet operator leaving Moscow was frequently given the status of a "phoney" relative of a citizen he would contact abroad and from whom he had been separated a number of years. Here again a legend would be required: the agent would be given a complete background which he would be requested to memorize prior to making any contact in the country he would enter.

When "Mark Jonas," Soviet agent destined to operate in Poland, entered the United States to organize his group, he was sponsored by a Benjamin Taishoff. When interviewed, Taishoff denied any wrongdoing,

stating that he had received a letter from the man using the name "Haas." Appropriately recalling that they were cousins, "Haas" asked Taishoff to furnish him an affidavit. Taishoff complied.

### 3. Naturalization Certificates

Sources have made it clear that Russia told its agents to be on the lookout for naturalization certificates. One agent said he contacted an undertaker in Chicago to obtain naturalization certificates from unclaimed bodies. These certificates he said were subsequently utilized for illegal Soviet activities.

Alfred Tilton, who once directed Soviet Military Intelligence in the United States, arranged with an undertaker in Brooklyn to purchase the naturalization papers of a deceased American soldier, Frank Kleges. Afterward, a Soviet agent assumed that identity, set about acquiring an American background and then went to Paris on a fraudulent American passport.

To obtain naturalization papers, #23606, Series E, in Montreal on March 19, 1937, "Mark Jonas" posed as a relative of Aaron Marcovitch, whose father-in-law's name was Samuel Jonas.

One "Charles Peter Atkin," a member of the Jonas group, posed as the son of a shoemaker, Sam Atkin, in Montreal. According to Sam Atkin, Jr., Aaron Marcovitch came to Sam Atkin, Sr., and told of having a refugee cousin whom he desired to bring into Canada to be naturalized. Marcovitch talked the shoemaker into letting him use the entry record of Sam Atkin, Jr., as a basis for establishing a naturalization identity for "Charles Peter Atkin." Marcovitch collected the old Atkin papers and in three days was back with \$100 and new papers for the shoemaker and his son. It is noted that the papers of the Atkins and "Charles Peter Atkin" bear consecutive numbers -- #23623, #23624, #23625. The passports issued to Mark Jonas, his wife, and Charles Peter Atkin bear the consecutive numbers -- #37628, #37629, and #37630.

Aaron Marcovitch and Adolph Stark, also of Montreal, were apparently instrumental in procuring false Canadian papers for various Russian agents who desired to establish Canadian identities in order to facilitate their going to European countries to engage in espionage. Investigation proved that an illegal passport bureau was maintained at Montreal, Quebec, for the purpose of fabricating information upon which Canadian naturalization papers and passports were obtained for persons obviously connected with Russian OGPU activities. For an agent to go to Montreal "to change his feathers" (meaning to obtain the basis for new identity) was not unusual.

When arrested by Canadian authorities for internment, Stark and Marcovitch had between 150 and 200 applications for Canadian citizenship and other documents in their possession. These two men had been directed, at least to some extent, by a Mr. Stern of the United States who engineered such fraudulent activities in both Canada and the United States and who appeared to be an OGPU official.

Aaron Marcovitch had even approached the Canadian Postmaster General Ernest Bertrand to get him to sign a letter recommending for citizenship one Willie Brandes who later proved to be a Russian espionage agent. Mr. Bertrand fully trusted Marcovitch, who "worked in my committee all through the elections under the supervision of my campaign manager." Nevertheless, the deception worked out by Marcovitch went so far as to include a false father for Brandes and also a false marriage which the rabbi, listed as officiating, denied performing.

#### 4. Passports

The fraudulent passport system is without doubt the illegal scheme that has been worked out and used scientifically by both Soviet State Security and Military Intelligence organizations. Forged passports are mentioned by Richard Sorge as an operational objective.

One of Ovakimian's agents stated that some passports were obtained on the basis of naturalization papers which had been either legally or illegally obtained and some were obtained on various birth certificates,

since, during the period of his operations, no independent investigation was made of the applicant for the passport.

Jacob Golos, president of World Tourists Incorporated and Elizabeth Bentley's superior, was instrumental in finding "safe" people who would go to the Federal Agencies with the pictures of those to whom passports were to be issued in order to fill out the questionnaires and swear to the correctness of all answers given. The same people received the passports when they were delivered and handed them over to Golos.

High OGPU officials had American passports and arrangements were regularly made to have these passports renewed in the United States by some other individual in order that the passports might be kept current for any necessary use by the individuals in possession of them.

The Robinson-Rubens passport fraud case makes clear that during the 1930's illegally obtained passports were procured through the New York County Clerk's Office. Falsified applications were passed to the County Clerk through a chain of Government employees, making final certification a favor for a friend. In other instances \$500 or \$1,000 was paid per passport.

Intelligence training courses are offered in Russia to carefully sifted foreign Communists, European and American, and to certain qualified Russians. Defectors have mentioned secret schools that teach, among other operations for espionage, passport forgery although it is noted that agents on missions neither manufacture nor falsify the documents they carry. That work is done by someone else.

The illegal agent first of all must conceal his connection with Russia. Consequently, if he begins his journey on his Russian passport, he exchanges it in the next country he enters for a false one of some other country and picks up his Russian passport again on his return journey, for in Russia every citizen over fifteen years of age, with the exception of collective farmers, must possess a passport as one of his identifying documents.

At the end of a tour of duty, agents are sometimes summoned back to Moscow either for discussions or to take a course in some specialized subject. In such cases, the individual travels to some other country -- usually one with a common frontier with the USSR -- and there at a prearranged rendezvous, he meets an agent from the Center\* who hands him a new passport, sometimes a Russian one, containing the necessary visas, of course, bearing a false name. In return, the recalled agent hands over to the Center's agent a sealed envelope containing his original passport and necessary documentation which he receives back on his return from Russia.

Following an espionage mission Nicholas Dozenberg returned from China to Moscow in 1937. He stopped en route at the Soviet Consulate in Paris for a Soviet visa. Within three days, the visa was issued on a separate slip. Dozenberg stated that visas of this nature were commonly used and surrendered at the Soviet border in order that one's passport would not disclose that particular trip into the USSR.

\* Intelligence headquarters in Moscow.

The necessity of concealing relationship to Russia explains two features of travel techniques: 1. An agent seldom proceeds directly from Russia to the country where he is to operate and back again, but follows a devious route. 2. The Soviets coax into Russia and train for foreign espionage people of other nationalities who have passports from their own countries and who will operate secretly for Soviet interests.

Sorge went to the Soviet Union from Japan in 1935, but by way of the United States. A Communist Party contact in New York gave him a forged American passport which he said he destroyed in Holland after leaving Moscow to begin his next assignment. The use of the forged passport was to prevent his real passport showing he had been in Russia. Sorge pointed out that he did not forge passports, that they were given him by contact men.

Walter Krivitsky said it was not unusual for the Comintern representative or the OGPU agents in America to send American passports to Moscow where a staff was employed in "fixing" such documents according to the needs. Hede Massing referred to the "cobbling" of "captive" passports.

In 1924, the Berlin police raided Comintern headquarters and seized a number of German passports, together with files listing the names of their original owners, the true names of the agents to whom they were issued and the false names under which the agents were traveling.



Max Klausen, Richard Sorge's assistant in Japan, told Japanese interrogators that at the Moscow General Headquarters there are hundreds of passports of different countries. All are authentic, for the Soviet Government took them from their rightful owners. Only the names and photographs are false.

Austrian passports were among those used by the Soviets before they discovered the availability of Canadian and United States passports. To obtain the issue of the legal Austrian passport a certificate of domicile was more important than a birth certificate. At one time the Fourth Department had as its agent the head of the local council of a small town in Austria. This man issued false certificates of domicile whenever required, and a confederate in a nearby town issued false birth certificates if these were necessary. However, sometime in 1934, both these men were arrested and the department was obliged to use Moscow-made Austrian passports for the time being.

When Henri Robinson, operating in the Swiss network, wanted a passport, he turned over to a colleague, Anna Muller, the civil status information, the description and the photographs of Soviet agents whom he wished to furnish with the identifying documents. She transmitted the information to one Habijanac, an officer of the Swiss Cantonal Police, who searched the index file of the population in the city of Basle to find a person whose description corresponded with the one which he had received.

The passport request was then made through a willing colleague of Habijanac and the passport signed without difficulty by the head of the office.

For many years, and continuing as far as Krivitsky knew, there was a special section of the Fourth Department in Moscow that issued false documents. Two Lazowski brothers, expert forgers, were in charge and they had a number of experts under them. This staff prepared all kinds of falsifications, such as passports, credentials, signatures, and in fact any forgery required by the Fourth Department. However, the Department preferred to falsify an identity with which to secure a genuine passport, rather than to forge the passport.

Russians have had much experience in forging documents. Pre-Revolution conditions in Czarist Russia gave them exceptional training in the art. The elaborate passport regulations which became prevalent in most European countries after 1918 found the Bolsheviks well prepared. Experts in the offices of Soviet Intelligence forge consular signatures and government seals wholly indistinguishable from the genuine articles, according to Krivitsky.

Krivitsky stated further that the O. M. S. (International Liaison Section of the Comintern), unlike the OGPU and Military Intelligence, did not actually manufacture passports. Instead they procured genuine passports and "doctored" them according to requirements. To obtain genuine passports, the O. M. S. drew up the fanatical zeal of Communist members and sympathizers. For example, if the O. M. S. representative in the

United States required two American passports for agents in China, he communicated with his contact in the American Communist Party, who in turn obtained the passports from Party members or sympathizers. When the O. M. S. staff of approximately ten members received the passports, it removed the photographs, substituted others and made other necessary changes. Benjamin Gitlow stated that two passport factories operated for the Comintern and OGPU, one in Berlin, Germany, and one in Moscow.

Blunders in all this falsifying are bound to occur. Following are a few that have been noted:

1. An old date passport that appears to be new.
2. Entries made with the same ink and the same handwriting although they have reference to different places of issue or places of entry.
3. An exchanged photograph on the passport instead of bearing a genuine stamped impression carries a copy in indelible pencil.
4. A subsequent entry of alleged residence in a different type of writing.
5. Pages replaced by other pages recently inserted.
6. Particular figures on the upper edges of passport pages cut off to conceal certain data.

An agent who makes numerous trips into a given country in order to strengthen liaisons there makes use of passports having different names so as to avoid being noticed. Rudolph Hamburger of the Swiss network of the Rote Kapelle traveled sometimes with a German passport, sometimes with a Honduran passport. In order to effect his liaisons with Switzerland, Henri Robinson made use of three passports under different names. He presented one of them to the Swiss Inspection Office, and presented another made out in a different name to the French Inspection Office.

The absence of the exit stamp should have caused the frontier services to detect the fraud.

Klausen, upon leaving Moscow for Tokyo, was furnished three passports -- Canadian, Russian, German -- each made up under a different name. Swiss police unearthed the information that during a period of two years, Ignatz Reiss, who operated Hede Massing's early activity in Soviet Service, used seven or eight different names and traveled on forged passports furnished by Soviet officials in the different European countries.

A Soviet defector describes his own experiences as follows: After it was decided that he would be sent to the United States, he had to see a person in "a little office in a building on Lubianka Square." The person in charge he found had already been notified and greeted him with: "I'll give you an American passport. Do you want to be an American citizen?" This person then referred him to a laboratory technician who asked him if he should like to be a Dane. The technician then brought in an old Danish telephone book and out of the classified section entitled "Pharmacists" selected a name in which the fraudulent passport was to be made up. But when actually made up, the passport described a merchant. For the American passport the name of a naturalized American doctor of Yugoslav origin was used. The agent was instructed to travel via Vienna on the American passport where he should meet a contact and exchange it for the Danish passport which was to be sent to Vienna by diplomatic pouch.

On his return trip to Russia this agent said he was issued a Canadian passport in his own name and in Paris picked up his original Danish passport already stamped to take him through Switzerland, Austria, and Poland.

On his next trip to the United States he was given another Canadian passport with a different identity and he traveled by an entirely different route.

Another example of using multiple passports and identities and making the exchange en route to the assignment is found in the account of a defector who operated widely for Soviet Intelligence. He said he left Moscow in January, 1930, on a Swiss passport in an unknown name and proceeded to Berlin where through a contact man who operated a cigar shop he met one Wilhelm, a Comintern agent. In a cafe Wilhelm exchanged passports with him so that he could proceed to the Balkans to organize the nucleus of military espionage networks in Rumania and Bulgaria. The second was a fraudulent German passport made out to a mining engineer with a German sounding name. With a corresponding legend, the agent had familiarized himself before leaving Moscow.

The same Soviet agent tells of traveling from Moscow to Brazil in 1934-35. Arriving in Copenhagen he exchanged the passport with which he left Moscow for an Austrian passport in the name of an Austrian merchant avowedly on a holiday. On the Austrian passport he proceeded

via Paris to Genoa, Italy, where he boarded a French liner for Rio de Janeiro. There a contact man met him at the boat and took him to a hotel in the Flamingo district where he met the organizer of the Brazilian Communist Party.

The Rote Kapelle groups, active from 1936-1942 throughout Europe, depended frequently upon false passports. Leopold Trepper, perhaps the most important member of the venture, made several trips between Paris and Moscow in 1937 and 1938 each time with false papers in a different name. Leon Grossvogel used Uruguayan passports issued under Spanish or Mexican sounding names on his trips to the Scandinavian countries from Belgium under commercial cover.

Another key operator in the Rote Kapelle, who was actually a Red Army captain and an expert in chemical warfare, went to Brussels as a student of chemistry traveling on a Finnish passport made out in an appropriately assumed name, Erland Jernstraem. Names and nationalities to agree with the falsified passports appeared throughout that undertaking. Although many operators in the networks were discovered, it is believed that a number were able to escape and may be active in present operations.

A notable opportunity for procuring coveted Canadian and United States passports came during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). According to Walter Krivitsky, all volunteers' passports were taken up when they arrived in Spain, and very rarely was a passport returned.

Even when a man was discharged he was told that his passport had been lost. From the United States alone hundreds of volunteers went over. Krivitsky further reported that nearly every diplomatic pouch from Spain arriving at the Lubianka\* contained a batch of passports from members of the International Brigade. He said that one day in the spring of 1937, a batch of about a hundred passports arrived; half of them were American. They had belonged to dead soldiers and after some weeks of inquiry into family histories of their original owners could easily be adapted to a Soviet espionage agent.

Sometime around December, 1940, according to Elizabeth Bentley's statement, her superior, Jacob Golos, under investigation by the Dies Committee, \*\* opened a package and started to burn the contents, among which she specifically recalled were approximately thirty or forty American passports. Golos explained that these passports were left with him by people who had gone to fight in Spain.

Fraudulent passport techniques of the Soviet Intelligence services are demonstrated by the Witczak case. Message #11436 dated August 14, 1945, from Moscow to "Grant" (code name for Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, Canadian Military Attache) was among the Russian documents Igor Gouzenko placed before the Royal Commission after he decided to break away from the Soviet Union. The message contains instructions regarding the obtaining of a new fraudulent Canadian passport for Witczak, whom Gouzenko identified

\* A prison in Moscow. *2 11 1 Ex-insurance co building. Now offices of MBB-MVD. (Prison 570 checked)*

\*\* A special committee of the United States House of Representatives under the chairmanship of Representative Martin Dies of Texas set up in 1938 for investigation of un-American activities. Dies retired from the House in 1944, but the committee was put on a permanent basis and called the Committee on Un-American Activities in January, 1945.

as a person assigned by the Soviet Union to the United States to build up an independent espionage network to be used in event diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are broken off.

Zabotin, working through Sam Carr, Organizing Secretary of the Communist Party for all of Canada, had been endeavoring for approximately a half year to date of the telegram to secure a passport for Witzcak biding his time as a student at a Los Angeles, California, university and engaging in some obvious recruiting for espionage.

Back in 1930, a bachelor, Ignacy Witzcak, journeyed from Kurowo, Poland, to the Ontario district of Canada where he became a farm laborer and received naturalization papers in 1935. In 1937, he secured a passport and went to Spain with the MacKenzie-Papineau Battalion of the International Brigade. At the military base of Abacete he and some others were relieved of their passports by an officer who stated that such documents should not be taken into the front line as they might be destroyed. When Witzcak applied for his passport at the end of his term of service, he was told at brigade headquarters that the trucks which had carried the passports had been bombed, "probably" destroying the passports. Upon his return to Canada he did not apply for a new passport but did receive new naturalization papers, the original ones, he said, he lost while swimming a river in Spain. In 1945, Moscow assured Sam Carr that the real Witzcak had died in the Spanish Civil War.



United States immigration records show that "Ignacy and Bunia Witzzak," Canadians, landed in New York from Boulogne September 13, 1938. In 1940, one Ignacy Samuel Witzzak registered in Los Angeles as an alien "merchant," "last arrived in the United States at Detroit, Michigan, on September 25, 1938. I came in by railroad unknown." He stated he was born at Kurowo, Poland. Such was the legend of the California Witzzak, the fictitious Witzzak.

According to the files of notes Gouzenko displayed to the Royal Commission, Sam Carr had been instructed to obtain a new passport as well as a new identity for the Soviet Witzzak but was having trouble arranging the transfer of identification from the real Witzzak to the spurious one. Problems of naturalization and marriage were uppermost. It developed that the original Witzzak's passport dated March 12, 1937, was used by Sam Carr and his aides to secure a renewal for the California Witzzak. Questionnaires were provided, signatures forged, photographs supplied, and an office employee bribed to substitute a manufactured 1937 application form in the files for the original 1937 application, in order to furnish the basis for the issue of a new 1945 passport to the spurious Witzzak.

Anticipating that it might be necessary to surrender the old passport or, at least, to produce it for inspection at the Passport Office, Sam Carr suggested that burning it and leaving nothing except the number with which to compare the 1937 application would appear authentic. Carr's fee

for the whole transaction was set first at \$5,000, but Moscow termed it "fantastic," so he reduced it to \$3,000.

The passport was secured, but investigators have since brought to light the stealthy maneuvering that now plainly reveals the forgery. Shortly after Gouzenko defected, the fictitious Witczak mysteriously disappeared.

The case of Arthur Adams is a record of a number of journeys between the United States and Russia. On December 8, 1937, Samuel Novick, treasurer of the Wholesale Radio Service Company, Inc., New York City, wrote to the United States Consul at Toronto, Canada, asking permission to import his Canadian representative, Arthur Adams, as a skilled laborer. However, Adams was denied admission as there was no shortage in the labor field for which he was to be imported. Therefore, on March 31, 1938, Adams himself wrote the Immigration and Naturalization Service, advising that he did not desire to enter the United States as a skilled contract laborer as he was now an independent specialist, and that besides doing work for Wholesale Radio he planned to perfect a cream-whipping machine. He further explained that he planned to establish a laboratory of his own under the name of Technological Laboratories, Inc.

On May 16, 1938, Adams again executed a "Preliminary Questionnaire for Immigration Visa," stating, "I am in business for myself." Under that section devoted to showing his purpose in coming to the United States, he stated: "I have organized in New York a Technological

Laboratory for the development of mechanical and electrical devices.

The business is incorporated in the State of New York... I am the President..."

On the basis of the above cover, a fraudulent Canadian birth certificate and statements made by friends, Adams entered the United States on May 17, 1938, with permission to stay four months. Ignoring the four-months limitation, he took up residence in the United States.

According to a former headquarters official of Soviet Military Intelligence, Adams had been called to Russia in 1932 or 1933 and recruited into the Soviet Military Intelligence Service upon the recommendation of the Comintern. This informant also stated that in 1937 Adams was dispatched to the United States to serve as a "legal resident" to operate for Soviet Military Intelligence and later was assigned tasks of obtaining top-secret blueprints and other American military secrets.

Prior to 1938, Adams had entered the United States. On two of these occasions -- November 1, 1928, and again on December 5, 1932 -- he came in as a Soviet Government representative making inquiry concerning plans and equipment for factories and a contract for the use of the Wright Whirlwind Motor.

It is conjectured that, on each of the above trips to the United States, Adams was engaged in Soviet espionage.

Another case that emphasizes the use of falsified passports concerns the journey of a Soviet agent who said he was given very little advice about travel and entry techniques. He was sent from Moscow to New York in 1934 under private cover. He proceeded as follows:

1. Removed labels from his clothing.
2. Limited amount of wearing apparel carried with him.
3. Dropped the Russian language.
4. Left Moscow by train traveling on a false American passport to Vienna.
5. Spoke English en route.
6. Met Vienna contact as directed and exchanged his American for a false Danish passport. (He said the official in the photography shop in the OGPU office where he secured his passports may have given him some background about Scandinavia.)
7. Spoke German to Vienna contact.
8. Hesitated about going to the United States Consulate at Vienna or American Express to handle visa matters.
9. Thought of saying he was going to see the Chicago World's Fair.
10. Pondered the possibility of entering the United States through Cuba or Mexico.
11. Secured a six-month travel visa for a "vacation in Mexico."
12. Approached a tourist agency and explained he wished to travel to Mexico via Italy.
13. Sent a note back to his director at Moscow from Genoa.
14. Boarded a passenger freighter.
15. Went to United States Consulate in Tampico, Mexico, to obtain a transit visa to go to New York "for travel to Europe." Had to present a ticket for European travel.
16. Chatted casually with the Immigration Officer at International Bridge, Laredo, Texas.
17. Showed officer his transit visa.
18. Registered under Danish name at hotel.
19. Traveled to New York by train.
20. Contacted Amtorg.
21. Boarded the Normandy for return to Russia on a Canadian passport in his true name. Ovakimian gave him a written background.

22. In Paris picked up his Danish passport already stamped to take him through Switzerland, Austria and Poland.
23. To return to the United States, was given papers of a naturalized Canadian citizen of Finnish descent.
24. Returned to New York via Latvia; Paris; Port Arthur, Canada.

Under certain circumstances, Soviet espionage agents use a special type of travel document, similar in appearance to a genuine passport. The document is known as a "Sojourn Permit" or "Vid Na Zhitelstvo." Another United States intelligence agency has investigated the origin and use of this document and reports that it is not a valid passport although some countries will affix their visas. It is issued only by the Soviet embassies and consulates outside the USSR to persons being granted Soviet citizenship under the program of naturalizing White Russians, persons originating in areas annexed by the USSR but living outside the USSR, and persons who have lost their Soviet citizenship for any reason. This citizenship so acquired may be kept secret and its possessor forced to retain his former status abroad as cover for carrying on agent activity.

### III. USE OF PARACHUTES FOR ILLEGAL ENTRY

The Soviets train some of their agents to enter forbidden territory in wartime by means of parachute. Rote Kapelle agents with wireless transmitters were parachuted into the Low Countries and into Germany.

Women as well as men were trained as wireless operators to be parachuted behind enemy lines. One of the girls so trained said that at the close of her radio course the espionage school she was attending moved to the outskirts of Moscow to practice encoding and decoding for two months. Then, on August 27, 1943, she and her male agent companion were flown from an airfield south of Moscow to a partisan transfer point for groups of partisans going in and out of Finland. In another plane, they were flown across the front lines and jumped into Finland at night. They wore civilian clothes, carried knapsacks containing their transmitters and receivers, and were provided also with food, pistols, maps, compasses and ration cards. The object of entering enemy territory was to contact and report to Moscow via clandestine wireless.

Parachutists, as was the case in Poland, are trained to climax decomposition work. In Poland everything possible had been done before the outbreak of the war to prepare organized assistance from within for an invading Russian Army. Both the Fourth Department and OGPU had agents working in key positions in Government departments,

and over a period of years the Polish Army had been infiltrated by Polish Communists. It was the duty of the Fourth Department to organize groups of these Communists to act under the orders of specially trained Russian Army parachutists who, in the event of war, would be dropped behind the enemy lines to act in accordance with a prearranged plan.

VI. ESCAPE DEVICES USED BY SOVIET AGENTS

Besides emphasizing the methods for facilitating travel on fraudulent passports, the instructions which Julius Rosenberg gave to David Greenglass also reveal a pattern of travel action for a compromised agent.

About February, 1950, when Klaus Fuchs was arrested, Rosenberg advised Greenglass to leave the country before his activity might be disclosed. Greenglass explained:

"I was to go to Mexico City by train with my family. There I was to rent a house and write a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In the letter I was to mention something about the United Nations. I was to wait three days at which time I would go to the Plaza de la (something or other) and stand in front of the statue of Christopher Columbus at 5 p. m. with my thumb in the Mexico City street guide. A man would come to me. . . . The man would give me passports and money for a trip to either Stockholm, Sweden, or Berne, Switzerland, where I was to repeat the same procedure and if I were to go to Stockholm I would stand in front of a statue of Linnaeus, at which time I would receive the necessary papers to continue my trip to Czechoslovakia where I was to write to the Soviet Ambassador to merely state, 'I am here.' "

According to Rosenberg, Mexico City is the springboard and from there his friends obtain passage to a predecided destination.

Elizabeth Bentley was told that if she were able to get to Mexico or Canada, the passport and visa problem could be handled in those countries. When a Mr. Tamer was accused of removing documents from



files of the Crucible Steel Co., Harrison, New Jersey, he went into hiding and later left for the Soviet Union.

Two of Ignatz Reiss's assassins escaped to Mexico, another to Spain.

It is understood to have been the practice of OGPU to give travel advice to their prospective foreign agents who have not had the benefits of a training course. One agent stated that he could recall conversations at various times about major blunders, or agents being disclosed. Talk among the group was about how the agent should have listened to the instructions given to him concerning his method of travel.

Six days after David Greenglass was arrested, Morton Sobell and his family took flight from New York by American Airlines for Mexico City. After his arrival there, he hid out in the rooming house section of that city under the name of N. Walter until the date of his location through Bureau investigation and his arrest by the Mexican Security Police. Rosenberg is said to have described Sobell's flight as foolhardy, stating that if he had consulted him, he (Rosenberg) could have arranged for Sobell's escape to Mexico through his contacts.

Investigations have brought out the evidence that Party leaders have been instructed to establish secret hide-outs for use in emergencies. Leading officials in the United States have been told to avoid being arrested and to make every effort to reach Mexico if the Communist Party is forced to go underground. Directions have been given for contacting the Communist Party in Mexico upon arrival.

There are known instances of "safe" houses and mail drops being used by couriers in secret journeys across Europe and America.

The Communist Parties in the various countries assist agents in their travels. It has already been noted that it is through the Communist Party and sympathizers that needed documents are often supplied. It is also the Communist Party that provides the "safe" houses. The Swiss police detected activity from a clandestine radio, revealing to them the approximate location of a Rote Kapelle operator. Before the police could apprehend the agent, the Swiss Communist Party took him to a safe place where they lodged and fed him for several months. Then he was taken to Communist sympathizers in Geneva. The Swiss Communist Party organized the secret departure of two agents and their passage into France where they were lodged first at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, then by a member of the French Communist Party. An agent en route from one country to another sometimes takes refuge at the Soviet Embassy where he stays until suitable cover and documents are provided.

Leopold Trepper, the Soviet's chief resident agent in France for Rote Kapelle operations, fled from his German captors and probably hid someplace in France until the end of the war; then he left under an assumed name.

An emergency means of escape recommended is to board a Russian or a Russian-chartered boat in port and notify the captain to contact the Embassy.

An avenue of escape in wartime is found in the advice to seek an assignment in counterintelligence close to the front, contact the partisans, desert with them and with their help return to the USSR.

Agents who have lost favor with Moscow are sometimes "called home." Paul and Hede Massing were successful in escaping from Russia after complying with their summons. At first they met difficulties in regard to their requests to the Soviets to return their travel documents and to issue exit visas. Her passport and his certificate of identity were genuinely American and they insisted upon using them although the Soviet agents urging them to return to Russia had insisted that they use false passports. Finally Mrs. Massing threatened to go to the American Embassy for help and hinted that she had left in the United States the story of their activities and departure for Moscow, and if she and her husband did not return to the United States this story might be made public. Within three hours, the papers were in her hands.

The Rubenses, of the mysterious Robinson-Rubens passport case, were not as successful in freeing themselves after their trip "home." "Richard," identified by Whittaker Chambers as Rubens, was the Soviet agent whom J. Peters contacted regarding documents for identification. The chief of "Richard's" apparatus, General Berzin, had been liquidated. When "Richard" was summoned, he knew his turn had come. Therefore, skilled in passport falsification matters, it seems he made use of his knowledge to plant clues in order that Soviet action against him and his wife would be discovered by United States authorities.

For himself and his American wife, he secured two sets of passports on the same day by filing applications with conspirators at the New York County Clerk's office where three contacts of J. Peters' underground apparatus were employed. The first set was taken out in the name of an unknown young man and woman named Robinson; the other set in the name of Rubens. Upon receiving the Robinson passports, Richard replaced the pictures with those of himself and his wife, but the application filed with the State Department still carried the Robinson pictures. The preparation came to light when Mrs. Rubens in Moscow sought help from the American Embassy there in locating her husband who "had disappeared."

Chambers concludes:

"... From the first, I had been puzzled as to why an underground worker of Richard's experience would make two passport applications in one day, in an unusual way in an unusual place. I also wondered why he would take his American wife to Moscow during the Purge. I decided presently that he had taken her on purpose so that she might intercede for him if necessary. And he had left that curiously open trail (there were other easily followed clues also) so that it would be discovered. How desperate he must have been! And, in returning to Moscow, what a razor's edge he elected to walk on." \*

\* Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, Inc., 1952), pp. 400-401.

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V. CONCLUSION

Placing their secret agents abroad to collect whatever information will be of use to the Soviets has resulted in the employment of certain travel and entry techniques which have been mentioned briefly in this paper.

We have seen how the Soviet Intelligence Service uses official assignments as cover for key espionage agents. We have also observed that added opportunities have been secured by the use of nonofficial or private cover and concealed illegal entries.

We have noted how agents unprotected by official cover make use of carefully prepared false identities and false documents.

We have seen the numerous techniques and something of the scope and variations used in the past by Soviet Intelligence. In the absence of information regarding future operations, we must assume that Soviet agents may continue to use these techniques for travel and entry. We may also assume that entirely new plans adapted to currently changing needs and policies will be put into practice. It will be important for our security officers and counterintelligence agents to recognize the old techniques and be alert to the use of new ones.

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