

**SURVEY
OF
COMMUNIST BLOC
BROADCASTS**

(25 JULY - 7 AUGUST 1963)

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CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

C O N T E N T S

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Bitter Moscow-Peking Recriminations Focused on Test Ban Treaty . . . 1

 Moscow Claims Soviet Initiative on Test Ban
 CPR Says Agreement to Test Ban "Betrays" Soviet People
 USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"
 Moscow Says Nonaggression Pact Next Logical Step

Hiroshima Conference Scene of Violent Sino-Soviet Debate 8

Pyongyang, Hanoi Endorse CPR Stand on Test Ban Treaty 11

LATIN AMERICA

Castro Renews Call to Revolution in Latin America 13

 Havana Poses as Sino-Soviet Neutral

THE FAR EAST

CPR Continues Routine Attacks on Indian "Aggressiveness" 16

 Peking Denies Reports of Troop Concentrations
 CPR Foreign Ministry Notes Carry Standard Charges
 Peking Remains Cautious on Pakistani-Indian Differences
 CPR, Soviet Reactions to Air Exercises and VOA Agreements
 Peking Vents Bitterness Over Soviet Aid to India

(continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

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W
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A
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F
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I
R
S

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

BLOC RELATIONS

Moscow Presses "Trotskyism" Charge Against Peking 22

KOMMUNIST Assails CCP Leaders' "Deviation"
Moscow Defends Record on "National Liberation Movement"

CEMA Meeting: Autonomy Agitates Soviet Bloc Propaganda 25

Conference Communique Skirts Autonomy Issue
Soviet Bloc Responds to CPR's Anti-CEMA Sallies

THE USSR

Supreme Economic Council Meeting Underlines Chemical Priorities . . . 28

Additional Investment Resources Sought From Construction
Ustinov Position Remains Ambiguous

COMMUNIST CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY Cracks Down on Historian's Views of Confucius 31

Liberal Line on Study of Confucius Tightens
Historian's Theory on Confucius Linked to Modern Revisionism

THE FAR EAST SATELLITES

DRV Regime Reacts Sharply to Novel's "Sour Criticism" 34

C
O
M
M
U
N
I
S
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I
N
T
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R
N
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A
F
F
A
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R
S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 1 -

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

BITTER MOSCOW-PEKING RECRIMINATIONS FOCUSED ON TEST BAN TREATY

The conclusion of the partial test ban treaty evokes an outpouring of acrimonious propaganda, with Moscow citing the treaty as concrete proof of the correctness of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and Peking characterizing it as a nuclear fraud perpetrated with the imperialists to maintain the nuclear monopoly. The increasingly vitriolic exchange is climaxed by the 31 July CPR Government statement which charges the USSR with betrayal of the Soviet and other socialist people, and the 3 August Soviet response which characterizes the CPR statement as "impudent" and again accuses the Chinese of transferring ideological differences to the realm of state relations.

This bitter propaganda exchange is followed by a direct and violent confrontation at the Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference. The Chinese delegate, according to NCNA, went so far as to charge that the USSR cannot be trusted to live up to the 1950 treaty of mutual alliance. This charge is the more brazen coming after the Soviet Government statement had pointedly asserted that its nuclear shield insures the security of the socialist countries "including the CPR."

Moscow points up the "isolation" of the Chinese opponents to the treaty by stressing the overwhelming worldwide approval it has received, and Khrushchev at the 5 August signing ceremonies in Moscow said that many states, "including those in Asia and Africa," have expressed readiness to sign the accord. Propagandists claim that in addition to the Chinese, the treaty is opposed only by some "wild men" in the United States and by Bonn and Paris. All of the pro-Soviet satellites promptly expressed their intent to sign the treaty. However, Hanoi has joined Pyongyang and Tirana in echoing the Chinese argument that a partial ban is militarily advantageous to the west.

Moscow Claims Soviet Initiative on Test Ban

In line with the attempt to portray the test ban agreement as a result of Soviet "initiative," Khrushchev in his 26 July PRAVDA-IZVESTIYA interview speaks of the "many years" the USSR has been striving for a ban. At the same time, he states that U.S. and British negotiators should be given

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 2 -

their "due," a graceful gesture which he repeats at the 5 August signing ceremony, and leaves it to his propagandists to document in detail that it has been the Soviet Union which has led the way in test ban proposals.*

Consistent with this claim of "initiative," Moscow, of course, obscures the similarity of the present treaty with the U.S.-British proposal of last August. And predicatably the account of the President's 26 July TV speech omits his recollection that Washington and London had proposed limited test ban treaties in 1959, 1961 and 1962, as well as his reference to U.S. attempts to control nuclear weapons dating back to the Baruch plan. Peking, of course, highlights the similarity between the treaty signed in Moscow and proposals advanced by the West to support its charge of Soviet capitulation. And to further document the Soviet reversal, Peking media published textually past Soviet statements, including those by Khrushchev himself, criticizing a limited test ban.

In keeping with Moscow's cautious optimism about a further relaxation of tensions and agreement on at least partial measures, propagandists indicate that it is only isolated circles in the United States which oppose a detente. Noting that some "wild men" in the United States are opposing the test ban treaty, commentators refer to the "Pentagon" and single out for special criticism Teller, and Senators Goldwater, Jackson, Dirksen and Thurmond.

In keeping with the circumspect treatment of the President, the substantial TASS account of his 26 July TV speech omitted passages bearing directly on the cold war such as his reference to the United States' having stood on the verge of direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union in Laos, Berlin and Cuba. TASS also omitted his statement that Western policies have sought to persuade the Soviet Union to forego direct or indirect aggression;** a home service commentator, however, did say that his words about improving relations are incompatible with his "slander and attacks" directed at the Soviet Union, and specifically his statement that the USSR and other socialist countries should "repudiate their aggressive plans." But commentators for the most part

* Soviet audiences do not hear detailed accounts of past efforts for disarmament and a test ban. But a 28 July commentary to Germany says it was not the "notorious" Baruch plan but the 1956 Soviet proposal which was the first initiative. And a broadcast to Britain the day before goes on from the 1956 proposal to list the May 1957 Supreme Soviet appeal, the 1 March 1958 Soviet unilateral moratorium, and the Soviet "initiative" on a test ban in November 1961.

** The NCNA account of the speech, which was interlarded with editorial comment calculated to point up Khrushchev's "capitulation," included this passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 3 -

played up his expression of hope that the test ban agreement would be followed by progress on other disputes.

CPR Says USSR Agreement to Test Ban "Betrayed" Soviet People

While Moscow stresses Soviet initiative in achieving the test ban agreement and says that it is proof of the correctness of its coexistence policy, Peking's attack on the Soviet role in perpetrating the nuclear fraud becomes steadily more acrimonious and voluminous. Thus, the 31 July CPR Government statement--which continued to be rebroadcast through 6 August--goes beyond past indictments of the USSR to charge that it has betrayed the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union, of the peoples of the socialist camp, including China, and of all the peace-loving people of the world. The statement blatantly goes on to characterize Soviet policy as one of

allying with the forces of war to oppose the forces of peace, allying with imperialism to oppose socialism, allying with the United States to oppose China, and allying with the reactionaries of all countries to oppose the people of the world.

Making explicit earlier clear implications that Peking would not be deterred from developing a nuclear capability, the Chinese statement says of the treaty that "it is unthinkable for the Chinese Government to be a party to this dirty fraud." However, there has been no echo of Kuo Mo-jo's 26 July statement that "it will not be long" before the nuclear monopoly is broken.* Consistent with propaganda since the 19 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, the CPR statement points up the Soviet's about-face in agreeing to a partial test ban. Thus, it again quotes Kuznetsov's 29 August 1962 Geneva statement that the U.S.-British partial test ban proposal would give them a one-sided military advantage, since it "legalized" underground tests by which the United States could continue improving its nuclear weapons. The Chinese statement also recalled Khrushchev's similar remarks of 9 September 1961--after the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing.

* A Prague broadcast in Serbo-Croat sees a discrepancy between this statement and the CPR proposal for destruction of all nuclear weapons. Prague adds that "it is even stranger when we take into account the Sino-Indian conflict and Chinese maps of Asia with large territories of neighboring countries indicated as parts of China." Peking has lashed out at Soviet-oriented parties for their attacks on the CPR, and the press and NCNA have carried detailed reports of statements by the French, Italian, Czech, Bulgarian and GDR parties.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 4 -

The charges against the USSR voiced in the CPR statement are echoed in the 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial--blatantly entitled "This Is a Betrayal of the Soviet People"--which says that by its 180-degree turn, Moscow has betrayed not only "their own correct stand and the interests of the Soviet people, but also all those who had supported them." The editorial in addition to repeating past public Soviet statements opposing a partial test ban, claims that this appeared to be the Soviet position "even up to early June this year." PEOPLE'S DAILY says that after the agreement to hold the tripartite Moscow test-ban talks, the Soviet Government had "formally" notified the CPR that the Western countries' position "could not serve as a basis for reaching an agreement" on a test ban. The editorial goes beyond the CPR statement in its frontal attack on Khrushchev. After saying that it is obvious that the treaty is aimed at tying China's hands, PEOPLE'S DAILY says

Recently, while fraternizing with U.S. imperialism on the most intimate terms, the Soviet leaders and the Soviet press have gnashed their teeth in their bitter hatred toward socialist China. They use the same language as U.S. imperialism to abuse China. This is a U.S.-Soviet alliance against China pure and simple.

Since the beginning of the talks, Peking has made sure that its audience is informed about the warm friendly atmosphere in Moscow. Thus, the 17 July NCNA dispatch on the opening of the negotiations quotes Western press reports at length on Khrushchev's good humor and conviviality. The NCNA press review for 29 July pointedly notes that PEOPLE'S DAILY publishes a picture of Khrushchev embracing Harriman. NCNA on 6 August cites REUTERS for the report that during the signing ceremony Khrushchev was "bubbling over with good spirits," and that he "went into a comic routine, pretending that his view of the signing was blocked by the six foot aide of Lord Home." And a 7 August NCNA report that Secretary Rusk had accepted an invitation from Khrushchev to join him at a Black Sea resort says according to Moscow reports, Rusk was gratified by the warm reception he received in Moscow. NCNA concludes with the information that "when Rusk and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home entered a Kremlin reception with Khrushchev on 5 August, the band broke into 'Love Walked In,' by American composer George Gershwin."

CPR Proposes World Disarmament Conference: Peking's concern over the world wide approval which would greet a test ban and China's isolation in opposing it is pointed up by the call, in the CPR statement, for a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. As specific documentation of the claim of a consistent struggle for peace and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 5 -

disarmament, the statement says that "as is known to the whole world," the CPR long ago proposed the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the Asian and Pacific regions. NCNA on 1 August carries Senior General Lo Jui-ching's statement of PLA support for the world conference proposal, and on 4 August Peking releases Chou En-lai's letter to the heads of all states formally advancing the proposal.

The only major propaganda followup comes in the 2 August editorial ostensibly directed against the United States for saying that the Chinese proposal is so "sweeping and unrealistic" that it stood little chance of being considered seriously. PEOPLE'S DAILY says that all those who are sincere in defending world peace will welcome the proposal, and "only U.S. imperialism and its collaborators fear it." Earlier, the editorial says that U.S. dismissal of the proposal shows U.S. intent to use, export, manufacture, test and stockpile nuclear weapons. And it adds that "the very words prohibition of nuclear weapons are not found in the much vaunted treaty." The Soviet Government statement's dismissal of the proposal as "propaganda" has so far occasioned no direct reply from Peking.

USSR Calls Chinese Charge of Betrayal "Impudent"

Moscow did not acknowledge the CPR Government statement until it released its scathing response on 3 August which characterized as "impudent" the charge that Moscow has "betrayed" the interests of the Soviet people. The statement is published in all Moscow papers and PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA carry the text of the Chinese statement as well, with the prefatory note that the "shameful" document is unworthy of space in the Soviet press but is being carried so that the Soviet people may see "how far the Chinese leaders have gone."

The Soviet statement says the Chinese have provided one more bit of evidence that they have transferred ideological differences to state relations, and that the USSR and "other socialist countries" regard the CPR attack as an unprecedented, most regrettable act. As though to point up the "correct" Soviet behavior, the statement in two separate passages notes that the Soviet nuclear shield has insured and will insure the security of the CPR as well as other socialist countries. The statement reveals some sensitivity, however, to Peking's charges of the reversal in the Soviet position on a test ban when it says that the CPR "in artificially selecting quotations...forgets that science and technology are developing tempestuously, and what was unacceptable only yesterday might prove most useful today." Moscow says sarcastically that the test ban treaty can only be objected to by people who "cover up with flashy phrases about the most radical disarmament measures their lack of desire or readiness to achieve disarmament."

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 6 -

The Chinese position on the test ban treaty was scored in a Yuriy Zhukov article published in PRAVDA on 29 July which expressed "astonishment" at "responsible" Chinese leaders acting in concert with the French to defend nuclear testing. After the Zhukov article, a steadily increasing volume of radio and press commentary attacked the Chinese position.

Moscow Says Nonaggression Pact Next Logical Step

Moscow's elite and routine propaganda continues to give wide play to the notion that the test ban agreement should be followed by a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression agreement. Thus, Khrushchev in his 26 July interview places it in "first place" and--putting his own interpretation on the 25 July communique--says agreement was reached in Moscow that after both sides had consulted with their allies, discussion should be continued with a view to reaching an accord.* This interpretation was repeated in a 28 July home service broadcast, and in the 29 July PRAVDA editorial. In his remarks, at the signing ceremony on 5 August, Khrushchev describes the nonaggression pact as the "next step," and the 3 August Soviet Government statement speaks of it as a "primary" task.

While Khrushchev (and the 3 August statement) expresses concern for settlement of the German problem, he as well as lesser propagandists remain vague on the relationship between the nonaggression pact and this issue "on which the liquidation of international tension most depends." Reporting President Kennedy's 1 August press conference, TASS includes his remark that "we must...discuss the nonaggression pact with our allies, review their interests and our interests, review them from the point of view of one problem--Berlin--and then set out once more for the Soviet Union and explain what the situation is." The account omits, however, the President's assertion that one of his interests in a nonaggression pact would be greater security for Berlin.

Aside from singling out the nonaggression pact for priority consideration, propagandists generally fail to indicate an order of preference for the partial measures listed by Khrushchev in his 19 July speech--for control posts to guard against surprise attack, a reduction or freezing of military budgets, and reduction of troops and exchange of military missions in Germany--or the forum in which they should be

* The communique said in fact that the allies would be consulted about continuing discussions.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 7 -

discussed. Khrushchev in his interview with PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA merely lists these measures (without specifying that the measures to prevent surprise attack include the establishment of ground control posts) and in his 5 August remarks he alludes only to "specific problems" which he has mentioned recently "more than once." According to the TASS account of the 30 July plenary session in Geneva, Tsarapkin listed all of Khrushchev's partial measures with the exception of that for surprise attack. And the account of the 1 August session notes the Bulgarian representative's suggestion that the Geneva negotiators discuss a nonaggression pact, the proposal for the reducing of military budgets, and the creation of nuclear-free zones--which scattered commentaries continue to press as a desirable measure.

Although proposals for a nonproliferation agreement are not pressed in current comment, Moscow has acknowledged various suggestions to this effect. The TASS account of the President's 26 July speech includes his reference to the desirability of a further limitation on the dissemination of nuclear weapons. And TASS on 30 July says that Lord Home indicated that along with surprise attack measures, "the next logical step" would be a nondissemination agreement. Moscow also reports a similar statement by Macmillan.

Although Khrushchev failed to mention underground tests in his 26 July interview, other propaganda including the 8 August PRAVDA editorial lists such a ban among problems that remain to be settled. In his 3 August message to the Hiroshima conference Khrushchev perfunctorily spoke of the need to ban "all" tests. Reportage on the Geneva talks includes expressions of interest by various delegates in banning underground tests.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 8 -

HIROSHIMA CONFERENCE SCENE OF VIOLENT SINO-SOVIET DEBATE

The 5 August Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference was witness to the most severe public vituperation of the Soviet Union by China to date. In unprecedentedly frank and detailed reports, both Peking and Moscow media have described a climactic verbal bout between their respective delegates in which the Chinese representative all but rejected the CPR's alliance with the Soviet Union and accused the Soviets of helping another country to attack them.

At the same time, the Hiroshima conference revealed the disintegration of the "peace movement" in the wake of the heightened Sino-Soviet dispute. The conference was divided at its inception by a break in the tenuous alliance of the Japanese "left", as the socialist and Sohyo delegates withdrew, in protest of communist manipulations, to form a separate conference. Likewise in a dilemma over the widening Peking-Moscow rift, the Chinese-oriented Japanese Communist party showed signs of confusion over its own stand on the test-ban treaty.

In view of the Moscow-Peking propaganda exchange over the test ban treaty, a debate at the Hiroshima conference was to be expected; however, the degree of bitterness of the exchange, acknowledged in broadcasts from both sides, is unprecedented. Apparently Soviet delegate Yuri Zhukov replied to a Chinese attack on the test ban treaty by using the Cuban and Taiwan crises as examples of how the Soviet Union's nuclear might has protected the security of the "socialist camp"; he claimed that "more than once" we have "saved" the CPR from "attempts at aggression by Taiwan," and he recalled that "we said bluntly that we would use atomic weapons to defend China."

In response, Chu Tzu-chi is reported by NCNA to have asserted, in part, the following points:

- + that the Chinese won their revolution "mainly by their own efforts," and have "relied on their own strength" to "discourage U.S. imperialism from attacking their country."
- + that "Zhukov's claim that the Soviet Union managed to protect China with its nuclear weapons was an insult to the Chinese people."
- + that Korea was strictly a Chinese victory and that the Soviets committed both the errors of "adventurism" and "capitulationism" in Cuba.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 9 -

+ that the Soviets not only do not help China but that they "and U.S. imperialism have been helping a third country with arms to attack socialist China."

+ that China cannot trust the alleged protection of Soviet nuclear power because the Soviets have "violated Lenin's teachings and the interests of the Chinese people, the socialist camp, and the people of the world," and have "betrayed the interests of the Soviet people."

+ that, by voting in favor of the dispatch of U.N. troops to the Congo, the Soviets "helped...in the murder of Patrice Lumumba."

+ that while the Chinese "can list 100 cases of your capitulation to imperialism," the Soviets will never be able to give a single case of Chinese capitulation.

+ and, that the Soviets "show far less courage, if any, than the Japanese religious circles."

Moscow, Peking Pre-Conference Maneuvers: In the 19 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial Peking had revealed its concern that the conclusion of a partial test-ban treaty could cause the CPR to be estranged from the peace movement. The editorial noted that "some kind-hearted people" may view even a partial test ban as a "step forward"; but that the imperialists must not be allowed to exploit the people's desire for an end to tests. Peking's resolution to attempt to use the conference to garner opposition to the treaty was evident from the fact that Chinese speakers at the 1 August Peking rally supporting the Hiroshima conference concentrated on attacking the test ban treaty.

The Soviet delegation seemed initially to be willing to try to avoid a direct battle with Peking. However, after failing in an apparent attempt, through the efforts of the representatives of the World Peace Council, to give all overseas delegates the status of observers, rather than delegates, the Soviet delegation countered the Chinese offensive by urging the conference to endorse the test ban treaty.

Each side claims to have succeeded in its aim--Peking media emphasize the anti-imperialist content of the final conference report (which makes no mention of the test ban treaty); and Moscow claims, in a 7 August commentary on the conference, that the majority of the authentic representatives of the world's people supported the treaty and that the Chinese delegates "looked particularly out of place."

The Position of the Japanese Communists: The Japanese CP has professed to be neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict but has in fact backed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 10 -

Peking's stand on important issues. On the question of the merits of the test ban treaty, a particularly sensitive issue in Japan, the JCP has been inconsistent and seems to be attempting to avoid a direct rejection of the treaty. Reflecting the dilemma, a 24 July JCP AKAHATA editorial implies some credit for the expected test ban agreement is due the 1962 anti-nuclear weapons conference whose declarations and recommendations "have made great contributions to the suppression of imperialism." And a 29 July AKAHATA editorial declares that "the nuclear test ban agreement will have positive significance if it is the first step toward a world ban on nuclear weapons."

The 3 August JCP statement on the Hiroshima conference presents a position differing in emphasis significantly from the previous modicum of optimism by declaring that the view that "the treaty represents a 'first step toward a reduction of the threat of nuclear war and toward world peace with a total ban on nuclear weapons'" does not "accord with world reality in Japan." The JCP acknowledged its political problem when it proposed in this same statement that the conference "should not be forced" to pass a resolution supporting or opposing the treaty, "for the sake of preserving unity." The JCP's basic desire to maintain the unity of the Japanese groups in the anti-nuclear weapons movement was also given by the statement as the reason why the conference should similarly avoid a position on the question of opposing nuclear tests by "any" country--the issue which split last year's meeting.

Having been unsuccessful in its attempt to prevent the polemics at the conference and to avoid the disintegration of the Japanese "peace movement," the JCP has publicly ignored the conference chaos. Thus, the JCP statement on the "successful opening" of the conference passes briefly over the socialist-Sohyo walk-out of the first day, appealing to both to safeguard unity; and, AKAHATA has made no mention to date of the bitter Sino-Soviet exchanges.

Peking has reproduced in its press JCP statements, editorials and leaders' remarks on the conference and the test-ban to give the impression that the JCP favors the CCP's views. The Chinese and JCP positions while close, are not identical. Peking obviously would have preferred the conference to have opposed the treaty--Chu Tzu-chi declared that the treaty was a "crime" and that the conference should "repudiate and oppose it resolutely." Moreover, Peking did not echo the JCP concern over the socialist-Sohyo departure from the conference--CPR media, in fact, welcomed the absence of the "trouble makers."

Moscow, while at odds with the JCP on most issues, has attempted to obscure the differences. A 1 August PRAVDA article implied that the JCP

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 11 -

should agree with the test ban treaty. The article declared:

The position of the Soviet Government on the question of the banning of nuclear tests is wholly in accordance with the demands of the previous international forums of peace partisans, and also the demands put forward by peace partisans of various countries in the course of preparation for the Ninth World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons.... As confirmation of this we can cite the program of the Japanese peace partisans expounded recently in AKAHATA, the organ of the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party.

Generally, Moscow media seem to avoid as much as possible any comment on the internal difficulties of the Japanese "peace movement" and JCP policy.

Prague in a rare attack upon a party for allying itself with Peking, on 7 August lauded the Japanese Council Against Atomic Weapons--which, it said had been "practically destroyed" by the Chinese and JCP--and condemned the JCP for trying to "force" its opinions on others "at all costs." The Czech radio commentary openly declared the JCP to be "one of the the very few communist parties supporting the views of the Peking leaders."

The Czech broadcast is particularly remarkable when compared with a Prague CTK commentary on the previous day which blamed the conference difficulties on the "wrecking activities of the rightwing leaders of the Japanese Socialists Party" and attacked the socialists for attempting "to force their views on the conference." Thus the Czechs appear to have made a complete reversal in picturing the JCP as the villain of the Hiroshima conference.

PYONGYANG, HANOI ENDORSE CPR STAND ON TEST BAN TREATY

Peking's opposition to the test ban treaty is seconded by North Korea and the DRV, as well as by the Indonesian Communist Party. Characteristically, Pyongyang provides the most outspoken support, although Hanoi joins it in echoing Chinese assertions that the separation of the test issue from nuclear disarmament strengthens the imperialists while nonproliferation provisions are aimed at weakening the bloc.

After initial Pyongyang propaganda which characterized the treaty as a "sinister machination of U.S. imperialists," leading DPRK dailies published the text of the 31 July CPR statement (Pyongyang has apparently ignored the 3 August USSR statement). This was followed on 4 August by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 12 -

a NODONG SINMUN editorial (rebroadcast by Peking in Russian) which charged that the treaty provides the United States with "favorable conditions for attaining nuclear supremacy," and cites Harriman for the comment that the treaty could enable the United States and USSR to "work together to prevent China from getting nuclear capability." Echoing proposals of the CPR statement, the editorial calls for destruction of all nuclear weapons and their removal from overseas bases. Indirectly endorsing Peking's call for a world conference, the editorial asserts that matters of nuclear disarmament "cannot be discussed and solved only by a few countries."

Hanoi Reaction: After reporting the initailing of the treaty, Hanoi on 31 July broadcast to the home audience a series of news reports obviously tailored to underline the advantages of the treaty to the United States, and to point up U.S. intentions of increasing its nuclear strength. However, Hanoi's first independent comment came in a 6 August NHAN DAN editorial (carried in the Peking press on 8 August) describing the partial test ban as enabling imperialists to perfect "such nuclear weapons as they deemed necessary for their war plans."

Attacking the nonproliferation provisions, the editorial asserts that in the absence of disarmament, attention should be paid to strengthening conventional and nuclear defenses of the socialist camp. In its sharpest slap at Soviet participation in the treaty, the editorial declares that the United States "cannot deceive the whole of the socialist camp and the whole of the communist and workers movement; it cannot deceive all the peace-loving people of the world."

The editorial, ostensibly pegged to the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, managed to avoid any specific reference to the treaty itself--aside from a brief allusion to the Moscow talks. While NHAN DAN echoes the CPR call for a complete nuclear weapons ban and other of the proposals advanced in the CPR statement, it does not mention the call for a world nuclear disarmament conference.

The Hanoi press and home service broadcasts on 7 August carried the text of the treaty together with excerpts of about equal length from the CPR and USSR statements. Hanoi's fairly full version of the Chinese statement is notable for its omission of the most blatant attacks on the Soviet Government for making an "about-face" on the test issue, for "selling out" the interests of Soviet and world peoples, and for allying with the United States and reactionaries to oppose China and the "people of the world." Detailed information on Hanoi's version of the Soviet statement is not yet available; however, apparently it does contain the charge of CPR aggressiveness.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 13 -

LATIN AMERICA

CASTRO RENEWS CALL TO REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

With newly restored confidence in the protective deterrence-cover of Soviet military prowess following his USSR visit, Castro on 26 July delivered his most militant call to revolt in Latin America since January. In two speeches in January he had revived from the Second Declaration of Havana the maxim that the duty of a revolutionary is not to sit passively in his doorway and "watch the corpse of imperialism go by," but to actively make revolution. In his July anniversary speech, he now enlarges repeatedly on the notion that it is the "duty" of the revolutionary to act, and he adjures Latin American revolutionaries "not to wait for a change in the correlation of forces to produce the miracle of social revolution."

Asserting that "a revolution is inevitable" in Latin America, Castro ticks off a list of 10 hemisphere nations--"and any other countries I may have forgotten"--as ripe for revolt, exempting the five that still recognize his regime. He singles out Venezuela and Guatemala for special attention, offering a "greeting of solidarity and co-fraternity to the heroic Venezuelan revolutionaries" as well as to the "heroic guerillas of Guatemala." He claims that revolutionaries "do not need anyone to send money from abroad when they are fighting, nor do they need anyone to send them weapons." And he mocks "imperialist" concern that Cuba "exports its revolution": "We only expose our ideas," he says; "We share our ideas with revolutionaries from anywhere in the world."

While Castro lambasts President Kennedy in sharper language than usual in the course of a diatribe against "U.S. imperialism" (Cuban commentator Gomez Wanguemert says Castro's "harsh language" in referring to the President "shocked" U.S. news agencies), he reiterates Cuba's readiness to hold discussions with the United States provided the latter puts an end to its "aggressive schemes." He had been more frank in remarks to the Middle East News Agency (MENA) in an interview on 25 July. Practically admitting that it was at Soviet insistence that he had recently adopted a more conciliatory position toward the United States, Castro recalled "contacts for the improvements of Washington-Havana relations" before his departure for Moscow and declared that "this visit was a turning point in those contacts." However, he said, "miserable America" maintained its hostile attitude and "thus hindered these contacts." He added: "We are happy about America's hostile policy, since it has enabled us to proceed on our path and do whatever we wish."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 14 -

Moscow's Handling of Castro Speech: Moscow acknowledged Castro's 26 July speech in a 450-word TASS account on 27 July which disposed of Castro's inflammatory calls to arms in the bland statement that he "dwelt at length on the significance of the heroic attack on the Moncada Barracks for the development of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Cuba and all Latin America." TASS noted Castro's comment on Soviet power as a deterrent to the United States, on Soviet economic aid to Cuba, and on the certainty that "the USSR and the socialist camp" will support "any people doing what the people of Cuba have done."

PRAVDA on the same day published an account of the speech similar to the TASS release. It received no further publicity for four days, when PRAVDA's issue of the 31st gave "almost two full pages to Fidel Castro's speech" in "abridged" form, according to the TASS press review. Coincident with the PRAVDA publication, versions of the speech were broadcast some 50 times in various languages. PRAVDA's abridgment made no effort to suppress Castro's call to arms in Latin America, giving in full his remarks concerning revolutionary "duties" and the inevitability of revolution in Latin America. Passages concerning Cuban grievances against the United States were muted, and PRAVDA softened the attacks on Venezuela and Guatemala through omission or condensation of Castro's remarks.

While the text of Castro's glowing 4 June report on his USSR visit had been broadcast in Mandarin and Korean, in installments, with lengthy excerpts provided for the Albanians from 17 through 22 June, no such special treatment is given to the 26 July speech in these three language services. (The 4 June speech had also been promptly published in full in PRAVDA and given as prompt broadcast dissemination in summary form.)

Peking's Treatment of Castro: Peking, which conveyed its reaction to Castro's 4 June trip report by ignoring it, recounts this speech promptly and at length in the domestic service as well as via NCNA. Peking's account concentrates on Castro's outline of the duty of revolutionaries in a hemisphere ready for revolt, and picks up his comment on the Moncada Barracks attack as showing how "people" can defeat a modern army. Singling out his remark that "revolutionaries should not make the path of Yankee imperialism easier" (omitted in PRAVDA's abridgment), Peking rephrases it with pointed applicability to the Sino-Soviet dispute in reporting that he said revolutionaries "should not facilitate the tactics used by U.S. imperialism."

But the Chinese have clearly not forgiven Castro for his USSR visit. He is not once mentioned in remarks by Chen I and Kuo Mo-jo (as reported by NCNA) at a Cuban embassy reception, or in PEOPLE'S DAILY and TA KUNG PAO editorials on the 26 July anniversary. (PRAVDA referred editorially on the occasion to "national hero and leader Fidel Castro,"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 15 -

and published articles by Dorticos, Raul Roa, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.) And where the CPR leaders' greetings message on 26 July 1962 had applauded Castro's "correct leadership," this year's message mentioned him only once, noting that "Comrade Fidel Castro" led the attack on the Moncada Barracks 10 years ago and crediting everything since then to "the Cuban people." (In direct contrast, where last year's Khrushchev-Brezhnev message referred only to "Comrade Fidel Castro" leading the Cubans at Moncada, this year's calls Castro an "outstanding revolutionary.") The 1962 CPR message (from Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai) extended "warm fraternal greetings" from the Chinese people, government, "and on our own behalf" to Dorticos and Castro personally, "the Cuban people, and the Government of the Republic of Cuba"; the present message (from Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai) sends "warm greetings" on behalf of the Chinese people, the CCP, and the Chinese Government to the "heroic Cuban people, the United Party of the Socialist Revolution of Cuba, and the Cuban Revolutionary Government," omitting the personal salutations.

Havana Poses as Sino-Soviet Neutral

Still striving to maintain a carefully neutral attitude in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Havana media balanced publicity for the activities of the CPR and Soviet delegations to the anniversary reception. Broadcasts prior to the anniversary reported that pictures of Khrushchev were displayed in Cuba alongside those of Castro, Marx and Lenin. On the other hand, PRENSA LATINA on 1 August distributed a summary of a speech by Gen. Liu Ya-lou, leader of a CPR military delegation, in which he described as an "immutable truth" the claim that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers." And PRENSA LATINA announced on 4 August that the Cuban ideological magazine CUBA SOCIALISTA in its August edition carried texts of both the CCP 14 June letter and the CPSU's 14 July reply, while Che Guevara, addressing U.S. students visiting Cuba, said he found "the attitude of Cuban students correct when they do not comment on Sino-Soviet ideological differences, which are also among the most important matters for us as well."

That overtones of the polemic were nevertheless present at the celebration is indicated in an article by Soviet editors Adzhubey, Pavel Satyukov, and Dmitri Coryunov of the Soviet delegation, who accused their "Chinese comrades" of "grossly and deliberately distorting the truth" in regard to the Caribbean crisis. They noted that "when Fidel Castro said that in their revolutionary struggle the people of Latin America will find a loyal comrade and friend in the great country of Lenin," this promise was roundly applauded by the Havana audience, "but the Chinese delegates would not even remove their hands from their pockets."

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 16 -

THE FAR EAST

CPR CONTINUES ROUTINE ATTACKS ON INDIAN "AGGRESSIVENESS"

Contemptuous of Indian "stories" of Chinese troop concentrations on the border, the CPR continues to focus on charges of Indian aggressive intent. Peking's propaganda, routine in tone and moderate in volume, does not threaten retaliation, nor appear to be building a case as a pretext for counteraction. Last fall, a month before large-scale fighting broke out, Peking was charging India not only with border intrusions but also with armed clashes, and NCNA gave plain warning that India's "nibbling" at Chinese territory created a "dangerous situation in which armed conflict may be touched off at any time."

While Moscow shows concern at the effect on Indian neutrality of the air defense agreement with the West and the VOA agreement, Peking sees the former as a "grave step" endangering peace in Asia, and routinely charges that the agreements are further evidence of Indian alignment with the West. The CPR, in increasingly bitter tones, castigates Soviet aid to India.

Peking Denies Reports of Troop Concentrations

Ridiculing the recent spate of Indian "wild stories" of massive Chinese troop concentrations on the border, NCNA on 3 August quotes foreign press reports attributing the rumors to an attempt to distract Indian public attention from the government's political difficulties and to obtain more aid from the West and the USSR. On 27 July NCNA specifically attributes the reports to an attempt to make the "military collusion" of the U.S.-U.K.-Indian air defense agreement appear necessary.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial the following day claims that Indian ground and air intrusions have increased simultaneously with India's "rumormongering" about a CPR buildup, and NCNA on 30 July says that Indian newspapers have "proved" that it is India which is "intensifying military activities" on the border. Again, on 6 August, NCNA reports that India is "busy making war preparations" on the border by preparing for the joint air exercises, by mountain road-building, by enlarging the army, by reorganizing border defenses and so forth. However, Peking does not portray these military preparations as constituting an imminent threat to the CPR, nor as requiring Chinese defensive countermeasures, but rather as

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 17 -

evidence of India's generally "aggressive" nature and "alignment" with the West.

CPR Foreign Ministry Notes Carry Standard Charges

Of the five notes to India publicized by Peking since 12 July, three are concerned with border incidents. A 31 July note denies an Indian charge (in a 5 July note) of a Chinese intrusion in June across Natu La into Sikkim; Peking's note claims that no CPR forces have ever crossed into Sikkim, and implies a difference between India's and Sikkim's foreign relations by saying that "China and Sikkim have always lived together in peace" and by charging that Indian military structures around Natu La have interrupted normal traffic between Sikkim and Tibet. Another CPR note on 31 July, also concerning the Natu La area, reiterates an earlier charge (denied in a 15 June Indian note) concerning Indian military structures on, and troop occupation of "Chinese" territory beyond the watershed defining the Sino-Sikkim boundary. This note demands a joint Sino-Indian investigation of the military structures to clarify their location and to show "who is confusing world public opinion." A 30 July CPR note accuses Indian troops of two intrusions in July into Hsialinkung terrance (in the eastern sector of the border) north of the 7 November 1959 line of actual control (which India does not recognize) for reconnaissance of a CPR civilian checkpoint and for the erection of military structures on "Chinese" territory. The note goes on to accuse India of "deliberately creating tension" by its alleged repeated intrusions in the western sector of the border and recently extended intrusions in the eastern sector, in violation of the pledge not to take any action impeding the unilateral CPR ceasefire and withdrawal. The note demands an end to the "intrusions" but does not threaten retaliation--nor do the other protest notes.

Two other CPR notes concern the long-standing allegations of Indian-Taiwan collusion and India's persecution of its overseas Chinese population. A 27 July note protests the reception of a Buddhist delegation from Taiwan by Nehru and other government officials, and charges that the Indian government "has completely gone back on its oft-repeated pledge to the Chinese government that it recognizes only the People's Republic of China and is opposed to 'two Chinas.'" A 31 July note announces that Peking will send a ship for the fourth time to repatriate more interned and otherwise "persecuted" Chinese nationals, despite India's claim that all who desired repatriation have already left.

Peking Remains Cautious on Pakistani-Indian Differences

CPR propaganda consistently plays up Sino-Pakistani amity and liberally quotes from Pakistani sources on the alleged threat of Indian aggression. However, there is no evidence in available Peking propaganda to confirm

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 18 -

Indian rumors of a secret Sino-Pakistani defense pact and plot to divide Kashmir. Indeed, Peking circumspectly avoids the Kashmir issue.* And Peking does not directly acknowledge Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto's warning on 17 July in the National Assembly that "any attack on Pakistan will no longer concern only the security and territorial integrity of this country but will involve the largest state in Asia" (as reported in Karachi radio's domestic service), and that "China would come to Pakistan's aid if it were attacked by India" (as reported by REUTERS' correspondent in Rawalpindi, who added that Bhutto declined to say whether Pakistan had a secret pact with the CPR).

In what is apparently a diluted paraphrase of the 17 July Bhutto statement, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial of 28 July says that Bhutto "pointed out recently that a heavily armed India would always be a threat, not only to Pakistan but to the whole continent." According to NCNA on 26 July, Bhutto declared on 24 July that Pakistan had received an assurance from "our friend" (not identified by NCNA, but identified by Karachi radio as the Western powers) and from "other countries" that they would "help Pakistan in the event of aggression." Thus while Peking is apparently not averse to rumors of a defense agreement with Pakistan, it is careful to remain noncommittal.

CPR, Soviet Reactions to Joint Air Exercises and VOA Agreements

The 28 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial assails the air defense agreement as a "grave step taken...to menace the peace of Asia," and claims that the agreement constitutes a political and military alliance with the United States and an attempt to revive tension on the border. It is thus "new proof," the paper says, of India's "rejection of a peaceful settlement" and should be brought to the attention of the Colombo conference nations. Should India "take rash actions...and create new conflicts," concludes the editorial, "it must bear responsibility for all consequences."

The Soviet reaction to the air exercises plan evinces serious concern about the consequences for Indian neutrality: In a Moscow broadcast on 24 July, Polyakov calls the agreement "part of a Western plan to

* The Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, signed 2 March 1963, is carefully worded so as not to commit the CPR to an endorsement of Pakistan's claims: It demarcates the boundary "between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan," and specifies that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the CPR will reopen boundary negotiations with the "sovereign authority concerned."

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 19 -

hinder Soviet-Indian cooperation" because the "imperialists" are well aware of "how important Soviet-Indian friendship is to consolidation of the independence of young states and the strengthening of peace." Western military aid to India, supplied under the "pretense of defending India from aggression," is designed to force India to relinquish its sovereignty and is thus "causing anxiety among India's friends."

TASS on 7 August quotes Nehru as saying that the Voice of America transmitter agreement "runs counter to the policy of nonalignment" and was signed "without being preliminarily studied by the government," and that therefore talks are in progress to amend the terms of the agreement. Moscow has strongly attacked the agreement: The Polyakov commentary called it "not only an unprecedented concession to the imperialists but a step toward political and ideological cooperation with them." It stopped just short of calling it an unfriendly gesture by India toward the USSR:

The aims pursued by the Voice of America are well known. Its subversion against the national liberation movement, peace supporters, and the USSR are well known. Making the domestic service of the Indian radio available for VOA broadcasts can be considered an unfriendly gesture toward the countries of Southeast Asia and the Far East, which are defending their independence, and of course a blow to Indian sovereignty. It can in no way be associated with the policy of nonalignment which Prime Minister Nehru has mentioned so often and so clearly.

Peking treats the VOA agreement as merely additional evidence of U.S.-Indian alignment. NCNA on 18 July says sarcastically that the Indian press is worried that the agreement will explode India's "nonalignment myth," and quotes one Indian paper as saying that the VOA broadcasts must be confined to "anti-China propaganda" so that "not even the slightest mention" will be made of the USSR. A few days later, NCNA, while citing Indian press attacks on the agreement, also quotes an INDIAN EXPRESS argument that there should be no Soviet objection to it since Radio Moscow, the Voice of America, and All-India Radio are all engaged in attacking Peking.

Peking Vents Bitterness Over Soviet Aid to India

After a long period in which CPR media only implied Peking's displeasure over Soviet-Indian relations, and in which Moscow propaganda discreetly played down the Soviet position, both sides in July made their opposing views more explicit. Thus Moscow put on an unusual display of friendliness for India, with Khrushchev personally opening the Indian exhibition in Moscow and with the welcoming of a number of official Indian visitors, including a delegation seeking expanded Soviet military aid.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 20 -

Peking's more direct attacks on Soviet-Indian relations date from the polemical 16 July PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer article which proclaimed that Nehru has "not without success" pursued the strategy of "poisoning Sino-Soviet relations."* PEOPLE'S DAILY also quoted Nehru as saying that "Soviet neutrality in the India-China conflict is of greater help to India than all the military aid received from the West" at the time of the fighting. And it warned that while the "nonalignment signboard... can still hoodwink some people," Soviet aid cannot change India's status as a U.S. "protege"--for "can the investment of one dollar outweigh that of 10 dollars?"

Since the Observer article, Peking has continued its attacks on Soviet-Indian relations, using the device of quotations from the Indian press:

† NCNA 31 July: "Had Russia not befriended India and were the combined might of the communist bloc directed against India, no amount of military aid from the United States would have been of any avail."

† NCNA 4 August: The Indian Government is very grateful for Soviet arms aid because it came despite Soviet misgivings about the air exercises and VOA agreements, and despite "open Chinese diatribes against Moscow as aiding and abetting India in its armed encounter with China," and because the arms aid list "covers weapons which are conventionally called offensive."

† NCNA 7 August: Moscow's cooperating with India is "no longer inhibited," a fact which "explains the reported large measure of success of the Boothalingam arms mission to Moscow." However, "more important than these material gains are recent Khrushchevian gestures in public of continued affection and sympathy for the Indian Prime Minister."

NCNA says on 6 August that according to an AFP report, Indian Foreign Secretary R.K. Nehru, asked at a Moscow press conference "whether his government was as sure of receiving material aid from the USSR as from the United States in case of hostilities with China," replied that he was certain the Soviet Government would help India. Peking has not to date picked up a report from "reliable sources" in New Delhi, carried by Delhi radio on 6 August, that Moscow assured R.K. Nehru that the USSR and East Europe are not supplying military equipment to China.

* The Chinese delegate at the Hiroshima conference, in the most vitriolic anti-Soviet charges on record, accused the USSR, along with "U.S. imperialism," of aiding a "third country" with arms to attack China. For a discussion of the Sino-Soviet confrontation at Hiroshima, see page of this SURVEY.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 21 -

On 3 August NCNA reports a Cambodian paper's commentary on the "shocking" news of the Soviet Union's "agreement to supply India with guided missiles, radar installations, and transport planes without restrictions on their use." It quotes the paper as asking: "Does the Soviet Union intend to allow India to use the weapons it supplied to invade China, which cherishes peace and has concluded a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union?"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 22 -

BLOC RELATIONS

MOSCOW PRESSES "TROTSKIYISM" CHARGE AGAINST PEKING

While Moscow and Peking are currently absorbed in hostile exchanges on the test-ban treaty, the charge of "Trotskyism" against Peking is pressed more and more openly in the CPSU's continuing campaign against the positions of the "Chinese leaders." The charge, which was first bruited in the propaganda as long ago as 1960, was renewed by Khrushchev last December, without, however, an explicit naming of the Chinese, and again in the 14 July CPSU open letter which accused the Chinese of consorting with Trotskyites in Ceylon. Now the charge is leveled directly at Peking in articles commemorating the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Bolsheviks under Lenin (30 July), and is further documented in press accounts of Chinese collusion with Trotskyites in various countries.

The charge--among the gravest in the lexicon of communist heresies--is well suited to the current Soviet strategy against Peking. The labeling of the Chinese as Trotskyites--advocates of world "revolutionary war" in the official terminology--serves both the prime Soviet effort to portray the Chinese as the warhawks of world communism, and the attempt to build the case against them as representatives of a classic communist "deviation" deserving of exclusion from the ranks of orthodoxy. While the emergence of the Trotskyite theme provides but one more sign of the deepening of the conflict since the break-off of the Sino-Soviet talks last month, Moscow continues to refrain from the logical next step of demanding formal expulsion of the Chinese from the communist movement and persists in the anachronism of referring to the Chinese as "comrades."

"Old Bolsheviks" Letter: Moscow uses the 60th anniversary of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which marked the formation of the Bolsheviks under Lenin, to denounce the Chinese as Trotskyites. PRAVDA on 30 July publishes a letter signed by a group of more than one hundred "Old Bolsheviks" who say they "knew" Lenin. They declare that it is "sacrilege" to argue that Lenin would have condoned the Chinese neo-Trotskyite line on "revolutionary war." Expressing the hope that the Chinese will publish their letter, they accuse Peking of resurrecting old heresies they helped Lenin suppress, and declare that many of the "theses" of the 14 June CCP letter to the Soviet party "simply repeat the A-B-C" of Trotskyism. According to the "Old Bolsheviks,"

The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party advocate a revolutionary war, but 45 years ago, during the party's struggle for the Brest peace, the necessity of such a war was being propagated by Trotsky,

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 23 -

Bukharin, and left communists. Why don't you, comrades of the Chinese Communist Party, say how Lenin branded them and others as archrevolutionary leftists?

The "Old Bolsheviks"--retired party figures whom the Soviet regime often calls upon to give the stamp of orthodoxy to its policies--combine appeals to the "Chinese comrades" to see the error of their ways with merciless criticisms of the Chinese positions along the lines of the CPSU's 14 July open letter.

Pospelov Article: Along with the Old Bolsheviks' letter, PRAVDA carries a Bolshevik anniversary article signed by Pospelov reinforcing the Trotskiyite charge. Pospelov asserts that the Chinese have exposed their Trotskiyite colors by complaining that the Soviet party "forgets" revolution. Pospelov, who has previously issued warnings to the Chinese in the form of historical accounts of how Lenin purged leftist factions from the Bolshevik fold, warns that the Chinese leaders--"whether they want to or not"--are colluding with the "ideologists of extreme reaction." Thus he says:

In the past few months the Chinese comrades have slanderously accused the CPSU of burying revolution in oblivion. There is nothing original, however, in this slander: the Trotskiyites, too, said this and wrote in this fashion. Today they repeat this slander in anti-Soviet books published in West Germany by fascist revanchist publishers.

In other propaganda, Moscow provides cases in point to document the Trotskiyite charge. Among the numerous reports in the Soviet media describing CCP divisive activities in various countries are references to Peking's commerce with Trotskiyites. Thus Moscow has publicized the Canadian party's complaint about Chinese links with Trotskiyites in Canada, and most recently a TASS report of the Hiroshima anti-nuclear weapons conference pictures the Chinese delegates along with "Trotskiyites" and "rightwingers" as among the disrupters of the meeting.

KOMMUNIST Assails CCP Leaders' "Deviation"

The CPSU's principal journal KOMMUNIST (No. 11) develops the theme that the Chinese party has become a full-fledged "deviationist" faction within the world communist movement. Thus KOMMUNIST's lead editorial, according to a 6 August TASS review, assails the "deviation of the CCP leadership" in seeking to force a "revision" of the entire course of world communism. While repeating in detail the charges that have now become standard in the propaganda since the release of the CPSU open letter, the journal conveys to Soviet readers a notion of the massive effort being undertaken by the Chinese to produce an all-encompassing ideological and political literature

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 24 -

designed to counter the standard Soviet texts. According to KOMMUNIST, the Chinese comrades are completely revising from left opportunist and nationalistic positions the policy declarations of the world communist movement on all main questions, namely, the nature of the present era and its principal contradictions, the role of the world socialist system, war and peace, the development of the revolutionary process and forms of transition to socialism, the national liberation movement, international experience in socialist construction, principles governing relations among communist parties, the struggle against the cult of the personality, and other problems.

To date most of the voluminous Chinese tracts countering Soviet positions have been withheld from Soviet readers--though Peking has assiduously reprinted the Soviet materials and has dared Moscow to follow suit. Conceivably, KOMMUNIST may now be preparing Soviet readers for eventual release of some of the major Chinese documents in the USSR.

The specific charges KOMMUNIST lodges against the Chinese leadership are blunt and scathing. The "Chinese leaders" are accused of pursuing their present line to distract the Chinese masses from the "actual causes" of domestic setbacks which, according to KOMMUNIST, are the direct result of the implementation of the "erroneous preconceptions" of the CCP. The Chinese communists are depicted as having lost confidence in their own capacities and, in desperation, resorted to stimulation of Chinese nationalism and racialism. And once more the Chinese are accused of a deliberate internal campaign to arouse anti-Soviet sentiments and hostility toward other bloc countries and parties in the capitalist countries.

Moscow Defends Record on "National Liberation Movement"

While Moscow presses its offensive against the Chinese on the war and peace issue, the current propaganda betrays Soviet defensiveness in the face of the Chinese charges that the Soviets have forsaken the national liberation movement. Moscow thus stresses the theme that the USSR has been and remains the "bulwark" of the national liberation movement and argues in the KOMMUNIST editorial that the CCP's theories stressing the revolutionary primacy of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are really aimed at reducing and denigrating the USSR's role in these areas. And a large part of the 7 August PRAVDA, for example, is devoted to a defense of the Soviet record and an indictment of the "Chinese leaders" for taking a "monstrous" and "unthinkable" stand on the issue. The paper's editorial and editorial article elaborate the charge that the Chinese are seeking to draw the national liberation movement away from the Soviet bloc, and numerous items are published to demonstrate the extent of the USSR's support--"including open military support"--for "anticolonial" and "anti-imperialist" movements.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 25 -

CEMA MEETING: AUTONOMY ISSUE AGITATES SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDISTS

The top-level CEMA meetings in Moscow (24-26 July) attended by bloc leaders and convoked in the wake of the break-off of the Sino-Soviet talks implicitly underscored Communist China's economic, as well as political, isolation from the Soviet orbit. However, the communique on the meetings failed to register any impressive gains for Moscow in its effort to accelerate the integration of the individual economies of the CEMA countries. In addition, the Soviet bloc propaganda connected with the occasion conveyed the impression that the issue of national autonomy within the CEMA framework--raised most openly by the Rumanians of late--remains very much alive and that Peking's exploitation of the issue against Moscow has had effect among some of the satellites.

Conference Communique Skirts Autonomy

The CEMA meetings attended by bloc party and state leaders--announced on the same day (20 July) as the break-off of the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow--produced a communique which hailed in general terms CEMA's progress in coordinating and specializing bloc economies since the organization adopted resolutions on these matters in June 1962.* However, the specific areas of progress to which the communique refers are only in the field of bilateral economic projects, not in multilateral coordination, where most of CEMA's unfinished business lies. The goal of CEMA's future multilateral efforts, according to the document, is the coordination of the economic plans of all member countries in the 1966-1970 period. But along with the communique's rededication of CEMA to multilateralism, it also places conspicuous stress on the "bilateral" concept and says that "bilateral consultations" among member countries "create the best possible basis for the multilateral coordination of plans." Beyond these statements, the communique does not broach the question of the extent of economic and planning autonomy retained by the individual CEMA countries.

While the Soviet bloc propaganda has also generally skirted discussion of the autonomy issue, the Rumanians, a 23 July Yugoslav dispatch from Bucharest asserted, approached the conference with the viewpoint that within CEMA "decisive competence in working out details of plans" should remain in the "corresponding executive institutions of each of these countries." Although Bucharest's SCINTEIA editorial of 31 July spoke of Rumania's "wholehearted approval" of the CEMA meeting's decisions,

* On 30 July Tirana lodged the complaint that Albania, "a full member of both CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, was neither informed nor invited to participate in" the Moscow meetings of these bodies. Tirana issued a similar statement last year regarding its absence from the June 1962 meetings.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 26 -

the contents of the CEMA meeting communique do not necessarily conflict with the Yugoslav description of the Rumanian position prior to the meeting. The communique had spoken only of a generalized agreement on "terms of coordinaiton of plans" made at the Moscow meeting.

However, the only recent clear reference to Rumania's independent stance in CEMA from satellite sources appeared in a Bratislava PRAVDA editorial article shortly before the Moscow meeting. The article, pegged to the anniversary of a Czech-Rumanian mutual aid pact, unmistakably aimed a barb at Rumania when it said that "isolation...autarkic national economies... and neglect of duties resulting from proletarian internationalism are equally harmful for Rumania and Czechoslovakia."

Soviet Bloc Responds to CPR's Anti-CEMA Sallies

Following the conclusion of the CEMA meeting in Moscow, Soviet and satellite propaganda sought to counter Peking's recent charges that CEMA is a Soviet scheme for exploiting and dominating its neighbors.

On 31 July both TRUD and PRAVDA responded to the Chinese sallies. TRUD denied the allegation contained in the CCP's 14 June letter that the USSR uses the "international socialist division of labor"--specialization--to impose its will on and exploit other socialist countries. PRAVDA in its turn asserted that the application of the Chinese economic theories to socialist countries is nothing but "an attempt to undermine the unity of the socialist comity." Like the TRUD article, PRAVDA replied to Chinese charges in kind, claiming that it is the Chinese who are trying to force their economic tenets on other countries. Extending its attack on the Chinese position, PRAVDA added that China's preaching of the doctrine of self-containment among the newly "liberated" countries only leads to wasted labor, slowed growth rates, and "splitting the peoples in the face of the united front of imperialist forces."

Various satellite organs also joined Moscow in striking back at Peking's criticisms.* The 1 August TRYBUNA LUDU, for example, in an article on the 60th anniversary of RSDWP congress, denounced the CCP's "hostile and groundless attacks" on the CPSU and declared that

we cannot agree to the principles of relying mainly on one's own resources in economic building. This principle is shortsighted,

* Tirana, largely ignored in the polemical exchanges between the CEMA countries and the CPR, as usual stridently resonates Peking's charges. Thus on the eve of the CEMA meeting, ZERI I POPULLIT charged that the USSR under Khrushchev's leadership is "exploiting the international division of labor...in order to impose his will on the other countries...tie their hands and feet, violate their sovereignty...and reap the biggest possible profits."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 27 -

it contradicts the interests of every socialist country and the entire socialist community; it is autarchic and separatist in its character.

And on 6 August, Sofia's TRUD carried an article denouncing the Chinese leaders for their concept of "relying on one's own forces." It added that prospects for development of the world socialist system "cannot be found along the road of mechanically piecing together different national economies."

Signs of Concern over Domestic Impact of Peking's Charges: Prior to the opening of the Moscow CEMA meetings, the East Germans and Czechs, in particular, betrayed their concern over the impact of Peking's charges on domestic opinion. Thus, shortly after Moscow's release of the CCP's 14 June letter which charged Moscow with economic exploitation through CEMA, the GDR's JUNGE WELT bristled at a reader who, while saying that the Chinese leaders "exaggerate" when they say the USSR takes unfair advantage, asked if tis was not in fact the case in regard to the GDR's abandonment of the aircraft industry. The editors fired back that the Chinese charge was a "lie," not an "exaggeration," and that the GDR alone and in its own interest gave up aircraft production. And Czech Deputy Premier Simunek, in his press conference in Prague on 23 July, denounced similar allegations, attributed to "Western" sources but implicit in the Chinese attacks, that "our credit policy" of extending large sums of credit to other bloc countries "is one of the causes of our present difficulties."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 28 -

THE USSR

MEETING IN SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL UNDERLINES CHEMICAL PRIORITIES

The announcement by PRAVDA on 3 August of a two-day conference "In the Supreme National Economic Council of the USSR, of the USSR Council of Ministers," provides further evidence of Khrushchev's drive to consolidate revisions of the seven-year plan aimed at releasing greater investment funds for the chemical, agricultural, and consumer goods industries. The 1-2 August meeting, which discussed questions on drafting the national economic plan and drawing up capital construction lists for 1964-65, follows a meeting on the same questions which had been reported in PRAVDA on 4 June. The shift in economic priorities apparently registered by these meetings was attended by a political mystery--the present status of D. Ustinov, the titular head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. In neither of these important meetings dealing with subjects which fall fully within the administrative purview of the supreme economic organ was there any indication of Ustinov's participation or attendance.

Additional Investment Resources Sought From Construction

At the 1-2 August meeting, which included members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, heads of the USSR planning organs, and other high party-state leaders, Khrushchev spoke on "definite tasks for the fundamental improvement of the planning of capital construction," introducing proposals aimed at speeding activation of production capacities and a more effective utilization of capital investments. Other speakers included planning chiefs Lomako, Dymshits, Novikov, and Rudnev; Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Rudakov, and Shelepin were reported as participants. The meeting, which published no formal directives or decrees, was presumably a followup of the meeting in the Council of Ministers reported by PRAVDA on 4 June and chaired by Khrushchev.

At the earlier meeting, a number of "guidelines" were issued, based on Khrushchev's proposals, calling for a preferential development of the chemical industry and specifying the fertilizer and consumer goods industries as principal beneficiaries of the shift in emphasis. Proposals were also made to delimit a large proportion of capital

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 29 -

investments to the technical reequipping and reconstruction of existing enterprises, with the aim, presumably, of freeing additional investment funds for the commissioning of what Khrushchev described as "progressive" enterprises.

Gostroy Chairman I. Novikov, in an article which appeared in PRAVDA the following day, 5 June, added specifics to Khrushchev's proposals by stating that 1,000 construction projects had been excluded from the 1963 title lists, and by pointing out that these "freed" investment funds would be allocated to "key and holdover construction sites."

Ustinov Position Remains Ambiguous

Curiously, the name of D. Ustinov, the head of the Supreme Economic Council, is again, as on 4 June, omitted from the list of speakers or participants at the August meeting--an omission adding to a growing list of indicators that Ustinov's position has become a political issue in the Soviet leadership. Elsewhere in the 3 August issue of PRAVDA, Ustinov is again--as in a series of PRAVDA references in July--incorrectly identified as "deputy chairman" rather than "first deputy chairman" of the Council of Ministers--although in this case his name is placed first, out of alphabetical order, before deputy chairmen Lomako and Rudnev.

Indications that Ustinov's position is somehow related to a political issue in the Soviet leadership were first noted on 30 April, more than a month after his promotion to first deputy premier and chairman of the Supreme Economic Council and two weeks after the incapacitation of Kozlov. At that time, PRAVDA incorrectly identified Ustinov as a deputy chairman in noting attendance at a luncheon for Castro. In succeeding weeks, however, Ustinov was accorded preferential treatment in the press: he was reported in attendance with top leaders at a dinner for the Uruguayan CP delegation on 11 May, and he was reported as accompanying Khrushchev on a tour of Moscow building sites on 14 May--events which gave rise to speculation that Ustinov would be promoted to the Presidium at the June plenum.

In the weeks following the plenum, however, a series of press indicators suggested that Ustinov's position had again become a focal point of contention. Thus, on 20, 21, and 23 July, PRAVDA "erred" in identifying Ustinov in protocol listings as a "deputy chairman" of the Council of Ministers. On 23 July, SOVIET RUSSIA, in reporting the arrival of the Mongolian CEMA delegation, incorrectly identified USSR Sovnarkhoz chairman Dymshits as chairman of Ustinov's Supreme Economic Council, although PRAVDA, on the same day, carried the correct identification. On 24 and 27 July, PRAVDA again accorded Ustinov his

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 30 -

correct title of "first deputy chairman." On 29 July, Ustinov appeared without title at the end of a listing of Presidium and Secretariat members. But on 3 and 5 August Ustinov was again incorrectly identified by PRAVDA as a mere "deputy chairman."

One possible explanation for the Ustinov mystery might be found in the changes which have taken place in Soviet policy since his agency, the Supreme Economic Council, was established in March of this year. The indications were strong at that time that the new agency was being established to preside over a "hard" orientation of Soviet economic policy and that the arrangement was being imposed upon Khrushchev rather than being engineered by him. That the new agency was invested with powers which seemed to undercut the rationale of much of the administrative reforms carried out since the November plenum, and that Ustinov himself was, by background and association, a representative of heavy industry interests, were only two of a number of indicators that could be cited to support this interpretation. In brief, Ustinov and his Supreme Economic Council could be regarded as the political offspring--and instruments--of a particular policy orientation inimical to Khrushchev's interests.

Against this background, the current tergiversations around the name of Ustinov could be interpreted as mirroring the fallen fortunes of the policy that he symbolizes. The only indications that are available regarding Khrushchev's attitude toward Ustinov are compatible with this interpretation. In his 24 April speech, Khrushchev referred to Ustinov in demeaning terms, ridiculing Western rumors that Ustinov's promotion signified a major reallocation of resources in favor of defense. Cautioning Ustinov's successor, Smirnov, Khrushchev warned: "We shall be able to shake him just as hard as we used to shake Comrade Ustinov when he was responsible for the development of the defense industry."

There are some loose ends in this interpretation. One is the fact that the strongest indications of Ustinov's political favor came in May when Khrushchev's authority was well on the mend. The other is that it does not account for the curious announcement which appeared in the first Sunday edition of IZVESTIYA on 20 April, under the caption "In the Supreme National Economic Council of the USSR," that an additional 1 billion rubles had been allocated to consumer goods. But there are indications that this item was itself a reflection of political infighting: it was not carried in the regular second edition of IZVESTIYA on that day, and although the report ostensibly dealt with a decision of the Supreme Economic Council, another organization and another man, the USSR Sovnarkhoz and its head, Dymshits, were much more prominently displayed in the article.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 31 -

COMMUNIST CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY CRACKS DOWN ON HISTORIAN'S VIEWS OF CONFUCIUS

A long article in PEOPLE'S DAILY of 18 June strikes out at an obscure history professor's views on Confucius in a manner which seems to portend the inauguration of a tougher line by the party toward the seemingly harmless pursuits of its intellectuals. For quite some time classical scholars--with the party's encouragement--have "bloomed and contended" over such issues as the "class stand" of Confucius, the progressive or reactionary character of his teachings, and so forth. Now, however, PEOPLE'S DAILY clearly indicates that professor Liu Chieh overstepped the bounds by stubbornly denying the relevance of Marx and the concept of class struggle to the study of China's classical history.

History, the article warns, plays strange tricks on people who lose themselves in ancient papers; it leads them from one closet to another. In espousing the "nonclass" character of Confucius, the historian has put himself in the same closet with all the modern revisionists who preach class harmony and peaceful co-existence, and who betray communism. The paper leaves little doubt that it regards Liu Chieh as a witting agent of modern revisionism.

Liberal Line on Study of Confucius Tightens

The first hint that the hard line on class struggle--introduced by the party plenum last September--augured ill for the relatively more liberal line which had encouraged diverse interpretations on the historical role of Confucius, appeared in the journal NEW CONSTRUCTION in January. The journal's editorial department complained that "unhealthy tendencies" among some scholars caused them to praise Confucius, and worse still, to give him credit for scientific epistemology, for the unity of theory and practice, and for dialectical materialism--some 2,300 years before Marx. The editors warned that this method of interpreting the CPR's historical legacy would cause people to look backward to "feudal and bourgeois ideologies," and to revere the ancients blindly. Another unhealthy tendency, said the editors, was to ascribe a supraclass character to the teachings of Confucius, making it a philosophy suited to all classes indiscriminately. While declaring all these tendencies to be wrong, the journal was quick to add that its criticism was open to discussion and those with contrary views were entitled to stick by them. The journal

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 32 -

said that its views were in no way meant to hinder the "contention of 100 schools of thought"; in academic research, it said, not even scholars of Marxism can declare their views to be absolutely right and suppress the views of others.

But the more authoritative and far more caustic personal attack on Liu Chieh in PEOPLE'S DAILY in June makes no pretense of preserving a facade of academic freedom. Purporting to review a recent essay by Liu--"How History Should Be Studied in Order to Make it Serve Current Politics"--PEOPLE'S DAILY critic Chang Yu-lou actually calls all of Liu's recent work to account, and sarcastically observes that it "bears distinctive colors" and "deserves attention from the public."

What provokes Chang the most is what he describes as the fearless obstinacy and cunning in Liu's work. The critic notes that Liu exultantly "refutes" Marxism, that his theory is in "unequivocal opposition" to the use of class struggle for historical research, and that Liu says that to ascribe class character to all facets of history is a method which is dogmatic, mechanical, and "too anemic" for good historiography. Chang also charges that Liu poses as a self-styled expert who says that Marxism is applicable to foreign history but not to Chinese history, to economic history but not to ideological history, to modern history but not to ancient history.

Chang seeks to refute the thesis that Confucian laws of benevolence and propriety are humanist, abstract concepts of man's nature common to all classes at all times, by adducing the standard Marxist refrain that there is no love, no truth, and no justice that transcends class interest; all such concepts are "merely the terse political slogans inscribed on the banners of every class for use in the class struggle." To the historian's query--if Confucius was but a tool of the ruling classes, why was he persecuted by them and why did he counsel them to promote the interests of the whole people?--Chang retorts that in all societies based on private ownership there is wrangling among the rulers themselves, and that Confucius' so-called regard for the people was only the Machiavellian ruse known to all traditional ruling classes--to feign benevolence in order to preserve their rule.

Historian's Theory on Confucius Linked to Modern Revisionism

Chang charges that Liu is deliberately vague as to the application of his theories on classical history to modern politics. According to Chang, Liu implies that the notion of class struggle is as irrelevant to the present era as it is to history. If, for example, Liu says a "proper" study of ancient history can shed a great deal of light on present politics--and his proper study of the past excludes class struggle--, can we not see, asks Chang rhetorically, "what sort of current politics Mr. Liu Chieh wants to serve in his historical research?"

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 33 -

In praising Confucius, Liu appears to advocate the universal application of the Confucian version of the golden rule: "Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you." Such ideas have no application to the modern period, Chang avers; in dealing with our enemy

we think that we should do to him what we do not wish to be done to ourselves, that is, we should overthrow him, destroy him, and give him a dose of his own medicine.

Worse still, according to Chang, Liu has craftily sought to propagate the modern revisionist line under the pretext of studying the historical legacy of Confucius. In the broader context of what the consequences will be for those who abandon the concept of class struggle, Chang makes the unusual observation that "if struggle is eliminated and completely suppressed, then some sort of slave system will be permanently preserved, no advance will be made in history, and mankind will never be liberated." Past Chinese attacks on what they have called the Soviet abandonment of the principle of class struggle have invoked the specter of "capitalist restoration," but never permanent slavery--an image which seems wholly inconsistent with every communist assumption about the dynamics of history.

* * * * *

The rationale for Peking's tougher line on the intellectuals is not hard to find. A characterization of Marxist ideology as "foreign" at a time when Peking is locked in ideological struggle with the Soviet Union could give rise to confusion in the academic community. The historian's appeal to the universal, humanist elements in traditional Confucianism could encourage sentiments incompatible with the militant mood which the regime evidently wishes to encourage. Stubborn individualists like Liu Chieh often carry more influence among the generally cowed intellectuals in Communist China than their positions in the political substratum would seem to warrant. Regime propaganda often testifies to this phenomenon: The relentless hounding of the venerable rector of Peking University, Ma Yin-chu, for his forthright opposition to the economic rationale of the leap forward, was one case in point. The current attack on Liu Chieh is probably calculated to cast a chill of conformity over all the wayward Confucians in the academic community.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 34 -

THE FAR EAST SATELLITES

REGIME REACTS SHARPLY TO NOVEL'S "SOUR CRITICISM"

Hanoi has instituted a bitter counterattack against North Vietnamese writers who have strayed from the party line in literature, pegging the assault to a recently published novel by Ha Minh Tuan, "Her First Job."

The novel tells the story of Miss Sen, a schoolgirl, who apparently bolts from a "forced and commercial" wedding and runs away to Hanoi. There she finds work at a factory construction site in order to live "a more significant life," and at the novel's end she becomes a good worker, even a production-line militant. The story line, NHAN DAN notes, is acceptable: It could "instill in a reader even more confidence in our regime and socialist construction." But what is objectionable is the satirical, and sometimes bitter, criticism of life in the DRV, its revolutionary achievements, various government organs, and the party itself.

According to a letter to the editor of NHAN DAN on 13 July, the novel is filled with confused, negative, disgraceful, and frightening scenes. It not only shows a lack of sincerity and respect for the great successes of the revolution, the letter says, but it fails to eulogize the regime or contribute to the safeguarding of the regime. Quite the contrary, it continues: the novel attacks each step of the revolution, distorts the truth, besmirches the regime, and arouses the remaining backward elements to resentment against the regime.

The novel apparently advances in a graphic manner "sour criticisms of the many daily shortages, worries, and grudges" occasioned by life in Hanoi. The excesses of the sacrosanct revolutionary achievement of land reform are blasted by the author by means of the character Hien, who had been a good soldier in the "war of resistance" against the French, but whose father was unjustly judged in the subsequent land reform and hanged himself. Hien loses his "revolutionary character" and falls into "bad thoughts and actions," forever plagued by the memory of seeing his father "with his tongue hanging out."

Various government organs are also criticized. NHAN DAN on 29 June charges that the novel gives rise to "a whole heap of antipathy and prejudice" against leading cadres, a number of important institutions--such as in-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 35 -

dustrial branches, the state trade organ, the press, and propaganda organs-- and important organs of "our people's democratic dictatorship," including the security service.

Even the heinous crime of criticizing party leadership is ascribed to the novelist. Although his alleged target is "bureaucracy," notes the letter published in NHAN DAN, the author "attacked the party leadership under the form of an 'antibureaucratic struggle.'" NHAN DAN comments that, even when convenient opportunity was lacking, the author still voiced his "deep-rooted antipathy against the leadership."

Hanoi is clearly apprehensive of the effect that the book may have, and plainly intends to totally suppress the novel. NHAN DAN asks: "After reading 'Her First Job,' what does a reader retain in his mind as the most striking impression?" And it answers:

Embarking on the road of life consists purely of catastrophes and sophisticated tragedies in which one's personal happiness is broken. There is still room for the free development of dishonesty and debauchery in our society--and in places where order and security should be insured, particularly in cities and factories. The living standard of the people and workers is still poor and miserable; here and there the masses sporadically voice grudges and sarcasm. Leadership everywhere is bureaucratic; the leaders have no concern for the life of the people--all they know is empty politics, one-way propaganda, and persuasion.

There has not been a literary protest of such magnitude in the DRV since the "Nhan Van-Ghai Pham" incident in 1958.* Although Ha Minh Tuan is the only writer now being criticized, NHAN DAN indicates that this intellectual questioning may not constitute an isolated case. Labeling his whole approach as "bourgeois individualism," the paper says that the author

has expressed this current of thought in his work. This current, under circumstances easier for it to soar than before, has become vehement and brazen and has conspicuously appeared in the resentful and angry view and attitude of the author in his novel.

Another manifestation of this "current" may be the fact that the novel was even allowed to be published. A writer in NHAN DAN asks: "How could such a bad, hostile, and seriously harmful book slip through the net and reach the hands of readers?" NHAN DAN asks if the officials of the Van Hoc Publishing House have "now seen all their responsibilities toward the

* Hanoi's suppression of literary dissenters at that time is discussed in the BLOC SURVEYS of 17 July 1958 and 28 January 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

BLOC SURVEY
8 AUGUST 1963

- 36 -

party, people, and art." Six days later, the journal VAN NGHE publishes the "self-criticism" of "the former Van Hoc Publishing House editorial board." Upon rereading the book, the editorial board states, it discovered serious shortcomings in the board's past work: "Opinions voiced by readers and the press have pointed out to us our weakness. This is a precious experience for us, from which we can learn so as to improve our editorial work still further."

The campaign against the book rages in the DRV press only; it has not been reflected in any VNA transmissions or radio broadcasts from Hanoi.

CONFIDENTIAL

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