Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

It is a privilege to appear before you. This Subcommittee and its predecessor have contributed a great deal to the fund of information on which we in universities depend for the enlightenment of those we teach. If I can be of use to you today, please take it with my thanks as a return for benefits received.

You have asked me to comment on basic issues in national security staffing and operations. This is a vast field and a very complex one, where troubles are hard to track down and "solutions" come harder still. The field is full of genuine dilemmas, many of them quite new to our governmental system but all of them quite likely to endure as far ahead as one can see. Durability is a common characteristic. So is difficulty.

Perhaps the chief of these dilemmas is the one placed first in the Subcommittee's recent, cogent staff report on "Basic Issues." To quote from that report:

"The needs of a President and the needs of the departments and agencies are not identical ...
"What does a President need to do his job?
"Essentially ... to keep control ... to get early warning of items for his agenda before his options are foreclosed, to pick his issues and lift these out of normal channels, to obtain priority attention from key officials on the issues he pulls to his desk, to get prompt support for his initiatives, and to keep other matters on a smooth course, with his lines of information open, so that he can intervene if need arises...."
"What do the officials of our vast departments and agencies need to do their jobs? 
"Essentially ... orderly, deliberate, familiar procedures -- accustomed forums in which to air their interests, a top-level umpire to blow the whistle ... written records of the decisions by which they should be governed.
"... middle-level yearnings for some equivalent of the OCB [originates] in the desire to have one's views heard through some set, certain, reliable procedure which binds the highest levels as well as other agencies."

A President needs flexibility, freedom to improvise, in dealing with those below. Officialdom needs stability, assurance of regularity, in dealing with those above. To a degree these needs are incompatible; hence the dilemma. As your staff report notes:

"It is not surprising that the departments often find a President's way of doing business unsettling -- or that Presidents sometimes view the departments almost as adversaries."

In considering the problems now before you, I find it the beginning of wisdom to face this dilemma candidly. That is what I hope to do today.

The President versus Officialdom

So much of our literature and every-day discussion treats the Executive Branch as though it were an entity that effort is required to visualize the President apart from the departments, in effect a separate "Branch," with needs and interests differing from those of "his" officialdom. Yet constitutional prescription, political tradition, governmental practice, and democratic theory all unite to make this so. In all these terms the separateness of presidential need and interest are inevitable -- and legitimate.

The man in the White House is constitutional commander of our military forces, conductor of foreign relations, selector of departments heads, custodian of the "take care clause" and of the veto power. No other person in our system has so massive a responsibility for national security. At the same time he is the one Executive official holding office on popular election, and save for the Vice President he is our only public officer accountable directly to a national
electorate. He is, besides, a relative short-timer in our government. Members of Congress and career officials often hold high places for a generation. He, at most, holds his for just eight years. The first year is a learning-time, the last year usually a stalemate. Whatever personal imprint he can hope to make is usually reserved to the short span between. Yet his name becomes the label for an "era" in the history books; his accountability widens as time goes on. School children yet unborn may hold him personally responsible for everything that happens to the country in "his" years.

The constitutional responsibility, the political accountability, the time-perspective, the judgment of history: all these adhere to the President himself, not as an "institution" but as a human being. In this combination his situation is unique. No one else in the Executive Branch -- or for that matter in the government -- shares equally in his responsibility or feels an equal heat from his electorate and history. It is no wonder that his needs can be distinguished from, and actually are different from, the needs of most officials in Executive departments.

Cold War and nuclear weapons make the difference greater. A new dimension of risk has come upon American decision-making. Its effect has been to magnify the President's responsibility, and to intensify his needs for flexibility, for information, for control. This new dimension first began to manifest itself in President Eisenhower's second term. Mr. Kennedy is the first President to live with it from the outset of his Administration.

The President as Risk-Taker

What a President now lives with is the consequence of a substantial nuclear delivery capability acquired by the Soviet Union as well as the United States. It is the mutual capability which pushes our decision-making -- and theirs too, of course -- into a new dimension of risk. In an article included in your Applied Geopolitics, 23, 69/71, p. 26-33.
"irreversibility:" the risk that either bureaucratic momentum in a large scale undertaking or mutual miscalculation by atomic adversaries, or both combined, may make it infeasible to call back, or play over, or revise, an action taken in our foreign relations, at least within the range of the Cold War. But the term "irreversibility," standing alone, does not really suffice to convey what is new in this dimension. Bureaucratic momentum and multiple miscalculations made a German Emperor's snap reaction after Sarajevo "irreversible" as long ago as July, 1914. Therefore, to amend the term: what is new since the Soviets acquired their ICBMs is the risk of irreversibility become irremediable. Unlike the problems facing Kaiser Wilhelm fifty years ago -- or those of President Roosevelt in World War II, or even those of President Truman in Korea -- a possible result of present action is that nothing one does later can ward off, reduce, repair, or compensate for costs to one's society.

The consequences for the Presidency are profound.

One consequence is that the sitting President lives daily with the knowledge that at any time he, personally, may have to make a human judgment (or may fail to control someone else's judgment) which puts half the world in jeopardy and cannot be called back. You and I will recognize his burden intellectually; he actually experiences it emotionally. It cannot help but set him -- and his needs -- sharply apart from all the rest of us, not least from the officials who have only to advise him. As Mr. Kennedy remarked in his December television interview:

"The President bears the burden of the responsibility....the advisors may move on to new advice."

A second related consequence is that now more than ever before his mind becomes the only source available from which to draw politically legitimated judgments on what, broadly speaking, can be termed the political feasibilities of contemplated action vis-a-vis our world antagonists: judgments on where history is tending, what opponents can stand, what friends will take, what
officials will enforce, what men-in-the-street will tolerate; judgments on the balance of support, opposition, indifference at home and abroad. Our Constitution contemplated that such judgments should emanate from President and Congress, from a combination of the men who owed their places to electorates, who had themselves experienced the hazards of nomination and election. The democratic element in our system consists, essentially, of reserving these judgments to men with that experience. But when it comes to action risking war, technology has modified the Constitution: the President, perforce, becomes the only such man in the system capable of exercising judgment under the extraordinary limits now imposed by secrecy, complexity, and time.

Therefore as a matter not alone of securing his own peace-of-mind, but also of preserving the essentials in our democratic order, a President, these days, is virtually compelled to reach for information and to seek control over details of operation deep inside Executive departments. For it is at the level of detail, of concrete plans, of actual performance, on "small" operations to say nothing of large ones, that there often is a fleeting chance -- sometimes the only chance -- to interject effective judgment. And it is at this level that risks of the gravest sort are often run. "Irreversibility become irremediable" is not to be considered something separate from details of operation. If, as reported, Mr. Kennedy kept track of every movement of blockading warships during the Cuban crisis of October 1962, this is but a natural and necessary corollary of the new dimension of risk shadowing us all, but most of all a President.

The net effect is to restrict, if not repeal, a hallowed aspect of American military doctrine, the autonomy of field commanders, which as recently as Mr. Truman's time was thought to set sharp limits upon White House intervention in details of operation. The conduct of diplomacy is comparably
affected. So, I presume, is the conduct of intelligence. Also, we now rediscover that age-old problem for the rulers of States: timely and secure communications. The complications here are mind-stretching.

The only persons qualified to give you a full appreciation of the President's felt needs in such a situation are Mr. Eisenhower, keeping his last years in view, and Mr. Kennedy (Mr. Khrushchev might now be equipped to offer some contributory evidence). The situation is so new and so unprecedented that outside the narrow circle of these men and their immediate associates one cannot look with confidence for understanding of their prospects or requirements as these appear to them. I do not advance this caution out of modesty -- though my competence suffers along with the rest -- but to suggest that there remains, at least for the time being, a further source of differences between the President and most Executive officials: the former cannot fail for long to see what he is up against; the latter have not seen enough of men so placed to have much sympathy or a sure sense for how it feels these days, in these conditions, to be President. What they see with assurance is what they in their jobs want of him in his, a very different matter. Such differing perceptions of the presidential task are bound to widen differences of perceived need between the White House where responsibility is focussed and officialdom where it is not.

The same phenomenon of differing perceptions seems to play a part in other presidential relationships. No doubt it has some bearing on the current difficulties of relationship between the White House and its counterparts in certain allied capitals where political leaders, in their own capacities, have not experienced the risk to which our President is heir because they lack the power which produced it. Presumably some of the sore spots in congressional relations have a comparable source. Certainly this is the case with some of the complaints voiced against Messrs. Eisenhower and Kennedy, in turn, by private groups intent upon particular action-programs.
The lack of common outlook increases the Presidency's isolation and thus reinforces the dictates of common prudence for a man who bears the burden of that office in our time: namely to stretch his personal control, his human judgment, as wide and deep as he can make them reach. Your staff report is quite right in its catalog of presidential needs.

Officialdom versus the President

The Cold War, however, and the pace of technology have not affected only presidential needs. They also have affected departmental needs, and in a very different way.

Well before the Soviets achieved ICBMs the pace of change in our own weaponry combined with our wide-ranging economic and political endeavors overseas were mixing up the jurisdictions of all agencies with roles to play, or claim, in national security: mingling operations along programmatic lines, cutting across vertical lines of authority, breaching the neat boxes on organizational charts. Defense, State, CIA, AID, Treasury, together with the President's Executive Office staffs, now form a single complex -- a national security complex, if you will -- tied together by an intricate network of program and staff interrelationships in Washington and in the field. AEC, ACDA, USIA are also in the complex; others lurk nearby, tied in to a degree, as for example Commerce.

As early as the National Security Act of 1947 we formally acknowledged the close ties of foreign, military, economic policy; these ties had been rendered very plain by World War II experience. But in the pre-Korean years when ECA was on its own, when CIA was new, when MAAG's were hardly heard of, while atom bombs were ours alone and military budgets stood at under $35 billion, a Secretary of Defense could forbid contacts between Pentagon and State at any level lower than his own, and within limits could enforce his ban. That happened only fourteen years ago. In bureaucratic terms it is as remote as the Stone Age.

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While operations now have been entangled inextricably, our formal organizations and their statutory powers and the jurisdictions of congressional committees remain much as ever: distinct, disparate, dispersed. Our personnel systems are equally dispersed. In the national security complex alone, I count at least seven separate professional career systems (military included), along with the general civil service which to most intents and purposes is departmentalized.

These days few staffs in any agency can do their work alone without active support or at least passive acquiescence from staffs "outside," in other agencies (often many others). Yet no one agency, no personnel system is the effective "boss" of any other; no one staff owes effective loyalty to the others. By and large the stakes which move men's loyalties -- whether purpose, prestige, power, or promotion -- run to one's own program, one's own career system, along agency lines not across them.

These developments place premiums on inter-staff negotiation, compromise, agreement in the course of everybody's action. This Subcommittee has deplored the horrors of committee-work; the wastes of time, the ear-strain -- and the eye-strain -- the "papering over" of differences, the search for lowest common-denominators of agreement. I deplore these horrors too and freely advocate "committee-killing," periodically, to keep them within bounds. But given the realities of programming and operations, interagency negotiation cannot be avoided. To "kill" committees is, at most, to drive them underground. Officials have to find at least an informal equivalent. What else are they to do?

One other thing they can do is push their pet issues up for argument and settlement at higher levels. Once started on this course, there is no very satisfactory place to stop short of the White House. In logic and in law only the Presidency stands somewhat above all agencies, all personnel systems, all
staffs. Here one can hope to gain decisions as definitive as our system permits; congressional committees may be able to supplant them, special-pleaders may be able to reverse them, foot-draggers may be able to subvert them -- even so, they are the surest thing obtainable.

Accordingly, officials urged to show initiative, to quit logrolling in committee, to be vigorous in advocacy, firm in execution turn toward the White House seeking from it regular, reliable, consistent service as a fixed and constant Court of Arbitration for the national security complex. This means, of course, a Court which knows how courts behave and does not enter cases "prematurely." Your staff report rightly describes the sort of service wanted; in the circumstances of officials they do well to want it.

Their need for such a service is unquestionable, and legitimate. To flounder through the mush of "iffy" answers, or evasions; to struggle through the murk of many voices, few directives; to fight without assurance of a referee; to face the Hill without assurance of a buffer; or on the other hand, to clean up after eager "amateurs," to repair damage done by ex-parte proceedings; to cope with "happy thoughts" in highest places -- these are what officialdom complains of, and with reason. For the work of large-scale enterprises tends to be disrupted by such breaches of "good order" and routine. Not bureaucrats alone but also Presidents have stakes in the effectiveness of the Executive bureaucracy. From any point of view, officials surely are entitled to want White House service in support of their performance.

But if a President should give this service to their satisfaction, what becomes of him? While he sits as the judge of issues brought by others -- keeping order, following procedure, filing decisions, clearing dockets -- what happens to his personal initiative, his search for information, his reach for control, his mastery of detail? What happens to his own concerns outside the sphere of national security? In short, where is his flexibility? The answers
I think are plain. Thus the dilemma with which I began: to a degree -- a large degree -- his needs and theirs are incompatible.

Help from the Secretary of State?

It is tempting to assert that this dilemma could be resolved at a stroke by the appointment of a "Czar," a presidential Deputy, to serve as court-of-first-resort for all disputes within the national security complex except the ones the President preempted out of interest to himself or to the nation. The "solution" is tempting but I find it quite unreal. I do not see how this role can be built into our system. I share the reservations put on record by the reports of your predecessor Subcommittee.

Setting aside grandiose "solutions," what might be done to ease the tension between Presidential and official needs, to keep the pains of this dilemma within bounds? The answer I believe -- insofar as one exists -- lies in careful and selective augmentation of the Presidency's staff resources. A President may not need Deputies, writ large, to keep decisions from him but he certainly needs ready and responsive staff work in the preparatory phases of decision-making and follow-up. The better he is served thereby, the better will officialdom be served as well. In this their needs run parallel: effective staff work for him cannot help but put some firm procedure under foot for them; such staff work promises that bases will be touched, standpoints explored (with rocks turned over and the worms revealed), positions traced, appeals arranged, compromises tested. When this prospect is seen ahead official hearts are glad.

In the nature of the case, a President's assistants at the White House cannot do that sort of staff work by themselves except -- they hope and so does he -- on issues having top priority for him in his own mind and schedule, day-to-day. Preparatory work on issues not yet in that class and follow-up on issues which have left it must be done, if done at all, at one-remove through staff facilities less dominated by the President's immediate requirements.
Hence the distinction introduced a quarter-century ago between personal staff at the White House and "institutional" staff, mainly career staff, in the Executive Offices across the street, of which the longest-lived example is the Bureau of the Budget.

But in the sphere of national security there is no Budget Bureau. Its nearest counterpart remains the Office of the Secretary of State. This is the traditional source of "institutional" assistance for a President in what was once the peacetime sum of "foreign relations:" diplomacy. And while the Office has not kept pace with the meaning of that term, no full-scale substitute has been built in its stead. I hope none will be. I hope, rather, that the Secretary's Office can be rebuilt on a scale commensurate with the contemporary reach of "foreign relations."

Reliance on the Secretary's Office as an "institutional" staff resource seems to have been envisaged at the start of Mr. Kennedy's Administration. On the White House side Mr. Bundy was named to the necessary personal assistantship, filling a post established in the previous Administration: "Special Assistant for National Security Affairs." But formalized committee structures and secretariats built up around his post during the Nineteen-fifties were scaled down or disestablished by the new Administration. This was done with the expressed intent of improving staff performance by transferring staff functions to the Office of the Secretary of State. OCB is a case in point.

As Mr. Bundy wrote your Chairman on September 4, 1961:

"It was and is our belief that there is much to be done that the OCB could not do, and that the things it did do can be done as well or better in other ways.
"The most important of these other ways is an increased reliance on the leadership of the Department of State...the President has made it very clear that he does not want a large separate organization between him and his Secretary of State. Neither does he wish any question to arise as to the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in his own Department, and not only in such large-scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination in all our major policies toward other nations."
For a variety of reasons, some of them beyond my range of observation, this staffing pattern has not been set firmly up to now: the White House side, the "personal" side, seems firm enough but not the other side, the "institutional" side. So far as I can judge, the State Department has not yet found means to take the proffered role and play it vigorously across-the-board of national security affairs. The difficulties here may be endemic; the role may ask too much of one department among others. But I think it is decidedly too soon to tell. State, I conceive, should have the benefit of every doubt and more time for experiment.

This seems to be the view of the Administration. It is striking that in all these months the White House staff has set up no procedures or "machinery" which would interfere in any way with building up the Secretary's Office as a presidential "agent of coordination." It is striking also that the Secretary has moved toward enhancement of his Office by equipping it with a strong number-three position in the person of Mr. Harriman, who preceded me at your hearings. The burdens of advice-giving and of negotiation weigh heavily these days not only on the Secretary but also on the Undersecretary: this position thus comes into play as in effect their common deputyship. Mr. Harriman, I take it, with his new authority as second Undersecretary has more opportunity than they to be a source of guidance and of stiffening -- and interference-running -- for careerists in the State Department, as they deal with one another and with staffs outside. If he actually can do this, if he too is not weighed down by other duties, then the ground may be prepared now for substantial further movement toward development of central staff work in the national security sphere.

Until now, I gather, no one has had time to make himself consistently an energizer, catalyst, connective for the several sorts of planners, secretariats, "task forces," and action officers now scattered through the upper floors of our
vast New State Building. The Secretary may sit at the center of this vastness, but his Office has almost no staff which he can call his own. To weld together such a staff out of these scattered pieces, to imbue it with cohesion and a government-wide outlook, to implant it as a presidential agent of coordination for the sweep of national security affairs: all this is far from done. I need not tell you why I think the doing will take time.

The Secretary versus the Others

But I must not mislead you. What I offer here is "conventional wisdom," my hopes are conventional hopes. To call for augmentation of the Presidency's staff resources is to echo what has been prescribed for almost every governmental ailment these past thirty years. To fasten on the Secretary's Office as the means is to follow the footsteps of innumerable study-groups intent upon improving something-in-particular within the range of foreign operations. The Herter Committee very recently, concerned for personnel in foreign service, charged the Secretary's Office with coordination of civilian career systems. Now I come along to charge the Office with coordinative staff work in the realm of policy. Such unanimity is dangerous.

The danger is that as we try to make the Secretary's Office serve the needs of personnel directors, or of action-officers, or White House aids, or Presidents, we may forget the Secretary's needs. The danger is that as we try to make him a strong instrument for other people's purposes we may forget that he will have some purpose of his own. The modern Secretaryship of State is not merely a presidential staff resource -- or a personnel agency for that matter -- nor can it be used simply to bridge differences between the President and officialdom. This Office has its own compelling and divergent needs apart from theirs; it has its own dilemma differing from theirs. To seek the best of both worlds from the Secretary's Office, to intend effective staff work for both President and Secretary, is to present as delicate a task of institution-building
as the Executive has faced in modern times. Because it is so delicate the outcome is uncertain. The danger is that in our advocacy we forget the delicacy, the uncertainty, or both.

Consider for a moment the responsibilities of any modern Secretary of State. Always in form, usually in fact, the man becomes a very senior personal adviser to the President, a source of brainpower and judgment for him both as one man to another and at working sessions of his chosen "inner circle" (currently the "Executive Committee" of the National Security Council). Perhaps this was not Mr. Bryan's role -- to reach far back -- or Mr. Hull's, but certainly it was the role of Messrs. Marshall, Acheson, and Dulles, among others. Under conditions of cold war, this role is sharpened, rendered more intense by emergence of the Secretary of Defense, an officer with roughly equal claim but necessarily different focus, as a source of judgment in the foreign relations sphere. Balance of advice becomes important on each issue every day.

The Secretary of State is much more than a personal adviser. He also is our ranking Diplomat-at-Large for sensitive negotiations just short of the "Summit." Furthermore, he serves as an Administration "voice" to Congress, to the country, and abroad whose public word is weighty in proportion to his rank. At the same time he is actively in charge of a complex administrative entity. He is "Mr. State Department" -- and "Mr. Foreign Service" -- leader of officials, spokesman for their causes, guardian of their interests, judge of their disputes, superintendent of their work, master of their careers.

The Secretary of State has a dilemma all his own. These roles are mutually reinforcing: his advice gains weight because he represents the whole department; his public statements and internal orders gain in potency because he is so often at the White House. But these roles are also mutually antagonistic: fronting for officials strains his credit as an adviser; advising keeps his mind off management; negotiating preempts energy and time.
No modern Secretary has performed the miracle of playing all these roles at once so skillfully and carefully that he obtains the benefits of all and pays no penalties. Presumably there is no way to do it.

A Secretary cannot wriggle out of this dilemma by ditching his department and retreating to the White House, although at least one Secretary may have wished he could. His job cannot be done from there, nor is he needed there. Another man can serve, and does, as White House aide for national security affairs; like others of his kind the aide stays close at hand to deal with action-issues on the President's agenda when and how the President's own mind, interests, and work habits require as he meets his own time-pressures and priorities. No doubt this personal assistantship includes a role as personal adviser. The Secretary also is a personal adviser. But this coincidence does not make them the same, nor would it help the President to have two such assistants and no Secretary.

The Secretary's usefulness as an adviser lies precisely in the fact that he is more than just another aide whose work is tied entirely to the President's. The Secretary has work of his own, resources of his own, vistas of his own. He is in business under his own name and in his name powers are exercised, decisions taken. Therefore he can press his personal authority, his own opinion, his adviser's role, wherever he sees fit across the whole contemporary reach of "foreign relations," never mind the organization charts. He cannot hope to win all arguments in such a sphere, nor is he in position to contest them indiscriminately. But his status and the tasks of his department give him every right to raise his voice where, when and as he chooses. To abandon his department in an effort to escape its burdens and distractions is to cloud his title as adviser.

Yet to concentrate on running his department -- combatting weaknesses, asserting jurisdictions, adjudicating feuds -- is no better solution for a Secretary's problem. With the President absorbed, as Presidents must be, in
foreign operations, in diplomacy, defense, no Secretary worth his salt would spend much time on management while others drafted cables in the Cabinet Room. And if he did he would not long remain effective as a personal adviser.

The modern Secretary of State, whoever he may be, deserves more sympathy than most receive. He lives with his dilemma but he cannot take the comfort which officials, facing theirs, draw from longevity: "this too shall pass." Nor can he take the comfort which a President derives from being, for a fixed term, "Number One." The Secretary's only consolation is to share with Gilbert's Gondoliers "the satisfying feeling that our duty has been done." But "duty" is exceedingly ambiguous for him. What about the duties he has slighted?

Two Notes of Caution

Under these circumstances it would add insult to injury if this man were asked to serve in any simple sense as the Director of a presidential staff facility on the model of the Bureau of the Budget. For self-protection he would have to shirk the task if it were his. Otherwise he would be kept so busy checking on the work of his resentful Cabinet colleagues that every present role might suffer more than it does now. What is the gain from that? But if we simply move the upper reaches of the State Department out from under him and tie them to the Presidency apart from him, where does he get his staff work done, who bulwarks his initiatives, supports his roles? Yet if we leave his departmental aides to serve him only and turn elsewhere for the Presidency's service -- if, as some have urged, we simply set up a new "Office of National Security Affairs" in the Executive Offices beside the Budget Bureau -- what happens to the Secretary's status and utility in doing what he now does for our government?
I pose these questions to be cautious, not equivocal. I hope that through the Secretary's Office we can build an institution serving both the Presidency and the Secretary himself. I hope thereby that we can ease the tension between President and officialdom, and at the same time ease the Secretary's own dilemma. In my opinion we should try to realize these hopes. But I would not pretend to you that such a course is either safe or certain. And assuredly it is not simple.

In closing let me add a second caution: even with time, even with good use of it, even if we master complex institution-building, we can expect no miracles from policy. Even if the Secretary's Office should become a partner with the White House in the Presidency's business while the Secretary's business is protected and enhanced, even then both sorts of business would be botched on numerous occasions. For methods and procedures at their best cannot abolish the deep difficulties of perception, of analysis, of judgment, of persuasion which confront our policy-makers now and in the future. Organizational arrangements at their most ingenious cannot rub out the underlying differences of duty, interest, role, perspective, separating Presidency from officialdom -- and separating both from Congress, for that matter.

These difficulties, differences lie at the root of most "botched business" we have witnessed in the past and will experience in future. Machinery may confine the damage, or enlarge it, but to see the source of damage as the vehicle in use is to ignore the driver, and his passengers, and road-conditions and the other drivers. To claim that it could be made "damage-proof" by re-design is to divert attention from the human condition. I would make no such claim. Machinery is important; our President and our Executive officials need the most effective mechanisms they can get. Still, this remains emphatically a government of men who face in national security affairs unprecedented problems mostly not of their own making.
They dare not hope for too much from machinery, nor should we. To do so is to court unnecessary disappointment. As the world goes these days I see no need for that. There seems to be quite enough necessary disappointment.