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Early buildup of Communist nations must be taken into consideration in the granting of export licenses.

I believe it is very important for the House to recreate the Select Committee on Export Control for the 88th Congress. The Congress must keep a close watch on this program and I would urge the membership of the House to support resolutions other Members of the House and I have introduced providing for a Select Committee on Export Control. There is no time to waste.

CUBA—COSTA RICAN CONFERENCE AVOIDS SUBJECT IF UNITED STATES HAS ITS WAY—U.S. ACTIVE LEADERSHIP IS FIRM—LONG-RANGE ANTI-CASTRO COMMUNISM POLICY NEEDED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CRAMER] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, on a number of occasions I have taken the floor of this House feeling deep concern with regard to the administration's policy concerning Cuba, recognizing the threat it offers now and has offered for some time, not only the threat of Communist subversion emanating from Cuba to other Latin American countries but as a matter of fact as late as last Thursday as it relates to Communist subversion through Cuba by way of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, even in the United States.

OPEN DOOR OF SUBVERSION TO CUBA THROUGH MEXICO UNDERATED

I brought out in the RECORD last Thursday the fact that some 73 American citizens, citizens of the United States, had used the open door subversive route through Mexico City, the Cuban Embassy therein to gain admission to Cuba to conduct—some of them at least—subversive activities and who knows, perhaps, to attend even subversive training schools. I put this information in the RECORD and it was interesting to me that Mr. McCone when he appeared before the Selden subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs did not see fit to bring out these facts that this subversive activity that many have evidenced concern about, at which time Mr. McCone said about 1,000 to 1,500 "Latin American citizens" had visited Cuba and had received subversive training during the period of 1962.

Mr. McCone failed to include in his discussion with the committee, apparently, the list of or number of Americans, U.S. citizens as well as Latins, who had gone to Cuba during 1962, including the 4-month period in 1962, which I discussed in the RECORD of Friday. As a matter of fact, on a very cursory examination of the list which I turned over to the House Un-American Activities Committee, it was found that at least two of them had Communist backgrounds, established through the records of the House Un-American Activities Committee; and, as a matter of fact, one of them went to Cuba for the purpose of attend-

ing the Congress of Women of America, a Communist meeting in Cuba in July of 1962.

I learned subsequently that three additional U.S. citizens visited Cuba during a similar period in 1962, and one in late 1961, all of whom likewise had a Communist background and this likewise was properly established.

So we see a rather interesting and startling situation, and I imagine a situation that is questioned by other nations of Latin America when we insist upon those nations trying to close this open door, whereas in the United States similar visitations are taking place.

I call this to the attention of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The names after being properly checked, should be submitted to the Justice Department for proper prosecution.

I put in the RECORD the statute involved, title 8 of the United States Code, which is also title 215 of the Walter-McCarran Immigration and Naturalization Acts, which makes the visitation by a U.S. citizens to Cuba at this time, this being an international emergency situation, so declared in the Korean war and still carrying over, and the State Department having advised as of January 1961 that any visitation was against the law and subject to prosecution resulting in a \$5,000 fine or 5 years in jail, or both. Why have none of these persons been prosecuted?

As a matter of fact, some of these are very blatant in their activities of going to and coming from Cuba through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. This, of course, results from the fact that Mexico is one of five Latin American countries that continue to recognize the Castro regime. The other countries are Bolivia, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. As a matter of fact, Brazil continues to carry on active trade with Moscow and with Russia itself; and, as a further matter of fact, it is well known that the present negotiations for a very substantial loan through AID is for the purpose of building the economy of Brazil so that it can increase its trade with Communist Russia. This I intend to discuss in just a few minutes.

The fact of the matter is that because Mexico continues to recognize the Castro Red regime in Cuba this door remains open for the flow of subversives even from the United States as well as from other places. As a matter of fact a list that has been submitted to me, that I believe to be authoritative and that I have checked and rechecked many times, indicates that there is a more substantial flow of Latin Americans for subversive purposes than even Mr. McCone indicated going to Cuba through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. This is the list I have in hand. I do not intend to include the names in the RECORD. This is the list that was submitted to the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House for its investigation.

There was during this same 4-month period in 1962 a total of 2,840 passages to and from Cuba, and understand this is only a 4-month period in 1962. Certainly a visitation by any or all of these people would give them at least the opportunity to participate in subversive activities if they saw fit to do so and if

an equal number gained passage during the other 8 months this would bring the figure of passages to over 8,500 and the opportunity for subversive activities to relate to far more than the 1,000-1,500 figure cited by Mr. McCone before the Selden subcommittee.

Through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico there are included 235 passages from Russia and its satellite nations.

This list by countries follows:

From:	
Argentina.....	149
Brazil.....	79
Bolivia.....	32
Colombia.....	21
Costa Rica.....	52
Cuba.....	565
Canada.....	49
Chile.....	173
Ecuador.....	49
El Salvador.....	66
United States.....	77
Guatemala.....	64
Honduras.....	110
Mexico.....	362
Nicaragua.....	10
Panama.....	29
Paraguay.....	14
Peru.....	46
Dominican Republic.....	2
Uruguay.....	78
Russia and satellites.....	235
From undetermined nationality.....	381
Other countries outside this hemisphere.....	161
Total.....	2,840

This raises the question of whether or not this influx of trainees and those engaged in subversive activities in 1962 is not far greater than the 1,000 to 1,500 as was suggested by the distinguished Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. McCone. I put this in the RECORD because I feel in doing so it is a public service, and it is my duty and responsibility to do so.

CONCERN OVER CUBA CONTINUES—SUBJECT NEEDS OPEN DISCUSSION

I am one who is concerned about the constant, at least recently, lambasting of anyone in public office who has anything to say about Cuba at the present time in relation to policies concerning Cuba. So far as I am concerned, an American citizen, let alone a public official, has a duty so long as Castro and communism remains in Cuba to do what he can to see that the administration establishes and carries out a long-range and firm policy of getting rid of Castro and communism in Cuba; and, in addition, making sure that there is not an infiltration of communism or subversion from Cuba, and that major military personnel and weapons are imported further—as well as "offensive" weapons—not returned to Cuba in place of those which may or may not have been taken from Cuba as result of the too hastily lifted quarantine last October.

I think it is and has been the duty of every Member of Congress to do all in his power in helping to firm up a firm anti-Communist Cuban policy, not only this year but in previous years.

I quote Winston Churchill in answer to the Democratic big guns trying to stifle all discussion of the Cuban mess and the need for firm action—

Still, if you will not fight for the right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will

be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all the odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival.

There may even be a worse case. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than live as slaves.

I could point to the RECORD, when I took the floor of the House and made remarks on the subject of Cuba, calling for action concerning Cuba, and calling for a peaceful blockade, which is exactly what the administration put into effect in October, making that request long before the blockade took place.

I call the attention of the Members of the House to the RECORD of October 10, 1962, page 2782. I had previously addressed to the administration a number of recommendations. As a matter of fact, a letter to me from Fred G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary of State, in answer to a number of recommendations made by me February 3, 1962, was dated March 10, 1962, in reply to my letter asking for consideration of those recommendations made on a constructive basis as the result of information of military buildup that had not only come to my attention but to the attention of other Members of the House as well.

In those recommendations I suggested that the United States Government consider—this is February 3, 1962—such things as recognition and support of a free non-Communist Cuban government in exile.

What was the answer of the administration? Of course I make that proposal again today. My objective today is to set out proposals that deserve continuous consideration and putting into effect by the administration of a free non-Communist government in exile. That is one of the recommendations.

What did the administration reply to that request? I am speaking as of their letter of March 10, 1962, in reply to mine of February 3, 1962:

The recognition of a government in Cuba in exile at this time is not in the national interest of the Government of the United States, because neither the Government of Switzerland nor any other government could then represent the U.S. interests before the Castro regime.

I thought we had withdrawn recognition of the Cuban Castro government. Now, continuing:

Were a government-in-exile formed, and should the United States recognize such a government, the United States would have to look to that government and not to the Castro government for the fulfillment of Cuban obligations.

What obligations? We had withdrawn recognition. And I cited in the RECORD of October 10, 1962, and prior thereto this as evidence of the fuzzy thinking of the State Department as it relates to dealing with the Communist Castro threat in Cuba.

I further recommended—and this is February 3, 1962—the prevention of further shipping of heavy war materiel by the Sino-Soviet bloc to Cuba. This was October 10, 1962. And, in reply the State Department said:

Underlying an announcement, such as you suggest, that the United States will not per-

mit the shipment of war materiel to Cuba by the Sino-Soviet bloc is, of course, the intention to insure that the terms of the announcement are fulfilled.

Using the same old kernel that is now being repeated again, that blockade means war, and nobody is proposing a blockade, nobody is proposing war, but I was proposing that which finally resulted; that is, a quarantine or peaceful blockade.

I brought out that there was a some 4.5 to 5 million U.S. dollar leakage through the payrolls at the Guantanamo base to Castro, and I see one of those Members of this House that recently visited Guantanamo made the same statement just a few weeks ago and wondered why this door of American dollars could not be closed. I asked that question, too—on February 3, 1962.

I also suggested that aid to Latin American countries under the Alliance for Progress program be cut off if assistance was given to Castro. Here was the reply, and I repeat it now:

To withhold our assistance would in many instances further weaken the very nations that for the above-mentioned reasons find that it is politically unfeasible at this time to undertake steps such as sanctions, against the Communist Cuban Government.

So, this was March 10, 1962. The State Department policy was not to withdraw aid or, as a matter of fact, not to take effective steps to discourage other Latin American countries from doing business with Castro-Communist Cuba. These were recommendations I made many months ago, and I could point to other places in the RECORD where I, for one, was calling for action relating to Cuba.

CUBAN ISSUE DOWNGRADED AT COSTA RICAN CONFERENCE

Today I want to discuss a couple of other matters relating to this overall question. No. 1 is the present Costa Rican Conference, and it is rather disturbing to me that the Cuban question is being downgraded by the United States. I have just read on the UPI wire service the President's remarks as he landed in San Jose at the airport, and I noticed a lack of reference with respect to Cuba and the Communist menace in this hemisphere, which again substantiates the statement emanating out of the State Department previously that Cuba and Communist subversion was not to be the top subject of discussion in Costa Rica at this conference of Central American States. It is also interesting to me that Mexico is left out of the Central American Conference. Mexico is where one of our principal problems exists, being one of the nations that continues to recognize Cuba and through which this flow of subversives continues through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. What happens is that a person who goes to Mexico, be it from the United States or any Latin American country, goes to the Cuban Embassy, and if they pass the standards set down, they get a separate visa unattached to their passport to enter Cuba and come back to Mexico and then to go back to their home country without the evidence of their Cuban visit on their home document. In that way this visa

does not appear as a permanent record on the passport or visa papers of the person involved, the traveler.

Therefore, when that person, be he a citizen of the United States, comes back to the United States, it does not appear on the face of his transport papers—his visa or passport—that he had been to Cuba. This, incidentally, as I understand it, is a violation of international custom if not international law let alone U.S. law.

Mr. Speaker, I call the attention of the Members of the House to the fact that going to Cuba at all at this time by a U.S. citizen without the permission of the U.S. Government is a crime.

I am particularly disturbed that the Cuban situation and the long-range answers to it, some of which could easily be carved out at the Costa Rican conference, is being played down rather than played up purposely by the United States—in a forum where firm action could easily emanate—because, after all, most of these small countries were actually invaded by Castro bands early in 1961 and their concern is natural.

SUBJECTS ON COMBATING CUBA'S COMMUNISM THAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT COSTA RICA

Mr. Speaker, in my opinion such matters as these should properly and of necessity be discussed at the Central American-Costa Rican conference: For instance, first, how the large uninhabited coastal regions of Central America—and I have had the privilege of visiting many of them—can be protected against weapon drops and subversive activities by Cuban communism.

Second, how all Central American nations can act in concert if any one is threatened by overthrow by force by the Communists.

Third, how the flow of subversion to and from Cuba can be stopped at their borders as well as through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

Fourth, how these nations can encourage other nations to withdraw recognition and impose an economic quarantine in Cuba.

Fifth, what programs should be followed on Alliance for Progress funds for nations that do not join in this effort. And, of course, it is my opinion that such funds should be withheld.

Sixth, give an assurance to these nations that U.S. military assistance to fight threatening communism is available to those nations on the call of the free government of those nations.

In my opinion all of these subjects should not only be discussed, but they should have top priority and should be resolved upon at the Costa Rican conference. A failure to come to grips or to make plans for these actions will foredoom the Costa Rican conference to utter failure in meeting the clear and present dangers of communism, which is the most serious challenge of this decade in this hemisphere.

FURTHER STEPS TO COMBAT COMMUNISM IN THIS HEMISPHERE

Mr. Speaker, another subject upon which I wanted to touch briefly, relating also to Cuba, is this report recently issued by the Selden Committee in which some very interesting, factual findings are made, and in which there are some

rather obvious omissions. Let me outline some additional steps—in addition to those which I have already suggested—which I feel the administration should seriously consider in meeting this Communist challenge emanating from Cuba.

The report itself says that certain economic and diplomatic quarantines should be put into effect by all Latin American countries in this hemisphere.

Of course, the report does not indicate how they should be implemented. I have suggested that economic aid should be withheld from countries which do not show an inclination to so implement them. That, obviously, brings up the question with respect to this open-door policy and the quickest way to close that open door of subversion is for Mexico to withdraw recognition of Cuba and thus close the Cuban Embassy and also stop doing business with Cuba. Withdrawal of recognition of Cuba by Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile should be demanded as a condition for Alliance for Progress funds.

Then, we get specifically to Brazil and how it can contribute to putting an end to subversion within its own country. There have been some very interesting disclosures concerning that of recent date. The secretary sent to this country to negotiate on behalf of Brazil, the Brazilian Minister of Finance, San Thiago Dantes, made a number of statements before he left Brazil concerning what his intentions were as they relate to the Brazilian loan that he was attempting to negotiate in this country, and these are not small loans. He is asking for an addition of some \$84 million to the \$553 million in U.S. aid which was given Brazil since 1951 and, according to the best information available, to obtain a postponement of the \$450 million Brazil has to date to pay to the United States this year on its debts. When the minister left Rio de Janeiro on February 20 of this year, this is what was reported by the United Press International:

RIO DE JANEIRO.—Brazil is about to sign a long-term \$160 million a year trade agreement with the Russians as part of a 3-year plan the United States will be asked to help finance, it was reported today.

Government sources said they do not expect the United States to press for curbs on Iron Curtain trade which will be approximately doubled by the new agreement and may increase to as much as \$300 million a year by 1965.

I read that sentence again:

Government sources said they do not expect the United States to press for curbs on Iron Curtain trade which will be approximately doubled by the new agreement and may increase to as much as \$300 million a year by 1965.

A mission headed by Finance Minister San Thiago Dantas is to leave soon for Washington to seek liberalized terms on existing loans and \$1.5 billion in new U.S. loans and investments over the 3-year period.

Likewise, in the Evening Star of March 11, as a result of an interview with Finance Minister Dantas this was reported:

Brazil's Finance Minister said today that part of the financial help he is seeking here

would be used to develop trade with all countries—including Russia.

Francisco San Thiago Dantas made that statement to newsmen after conferring at the White House with President Kennedy.

Mr. Dantas, a former Foreign Minister for his government who voted against the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States, said of his talk with Mr. Kennedy:

"I think it was a very interesting conversation and I hope that my visit will be helpful for the mutual understanding between our countries. We had a general picture of the situation and before I leave for Brazil we will have a new talk."

A reporter asked whether "some of this loan you are seeking from the United States" would be used to help develop trade with Russia. No, Mr. Dantas replied, "with all the countries."

"Including Russia?" he was asked.

"Including Russia," he replied.

Mr. Dantas is reported to be hoping to persuade the United States to add some \$84 million to the \$553 million in U.S. aid given Brazil since 1951, and to obtain a postponement of the \$450 million Brazil is due to pay to the United States this year on its debts.

He said that in his talk with Mr. Kennedy there was mention of a visit to Brazil. No date has been fixed he said, but Mr. Kennedy confirmed that it would be this year.

I made a specific request through Mr. Moscoso's office as late as last Saturday that I be informed concerning the requests that had been made by Brazil as to loans and aid and also what was being discussed with regard to trade with Russia—that is between Russia and Brazil; and it is going on now, there is no question about it. I was denied any information other than that negotiations are underway with Brazil. There is no question that the improvement of the economy of Brazil through these loans would have the effect of putting Brazil in a better position to have greater trade with the Soviet Union. I called the attention of the Department of State through Mr. Moscoso's office that according to reports Brazil has earmarked \$1½ million for developing trade, including trade with Soviet Russia, and that a large portion of this sum will come from U.S. aid if the request of Goulart's nearly bankrupt administration is fulfilled.

Although the facts surrounding Brazil's request for U.S. aid, as well as how this money will be spent, can be read in the Rio press, the State Department has refused to release this same information to the people who are going to foot the bill—the American taxpayers.

I personally spoke on Saturday with a Mr. Romano in the State Department office of Teodoro Moscoso, regional assistant administrator for Latin America. Although he informed me active negotiations for a loan to Brazil are under way in Washington, he refused to give me information concerning the total amount under consideration and how it will be spent.

In light of the State Department's charges of Communist infiltration in the Government of Brazil, I am asking that no further U.S. loans be made to Senor Goulart's government until the Communists are cleaned out of it, until we receive assurances that our aid dollar will

not be used to finance Brazilian trade with Russia and until Brazil follows the lead of the majority of the Latin American nations and withdraws recognition of Castro's Cuba.

I am also asking the State Department to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding this loan so that the American people will be as informed as the Brazilian people are concerning how our tax dollars will be spent.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAMER. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HARSHA. Can the gentleman advise whether or not the State Department has lifted the veil of secrecy around this loan?

Mr. CRAMER. I will say to my distinguished friend from Ohio that it has not, except to the extent that I read again on the UPI wires this morning that despite protests, a loan for \$4 million has been announced to Brazil to be used in the State of Guanabara, through a local Brazilian development bank, through the aid loan program, to develop small and medium businesses in the State of Guanabara, and is to be repaid in 15 years.

That is the only answer I have gotten, to the effect that they do not think that securing any assurances from Brazil that would aid in fighting Castro communism in this hemisphere economically and politically, as well as the withdrawal of doing business and stopping them from handling business with Soviet Russia, should be a requirement for this or any other loan.

Mr. HARSHA. I have been trying for about 2 weeks to ferret out this information from the State Department, concerning this so-called negotiation with Brazil. On March 4 of this year I wrote the Secretary of State asking him who was responsible for the State Department's position in this, wanting to know why the State Department would even entertain any negotiations with a country, Brazil or any country, for that matter, to use the money of the American taxpayers to finance an expansion of Communist trade with that country. I have asked for the names of those people responsible for any such policy and as yet have not received an answer of any kind from that Department, although I have written them on a number of occasions subsequent to that letter and have received replies to my letters. Apparently we are not to be advised of the conditions of this loan or the terms or under what circumstances it is to be made. Apparently there are going to be no strings attached to it, and it will be used to finance Red trade. I do not think the American taxpayer wants his money used for any such purpose.

Mr. CRAMER. I agree with the gentleman wholeheartedly. I appreciate the contribution the gentleman from Ohio has made relating to the trade of Brazil with Soviet Russia, and his effort to get the State Department to make information available. I have joined in that effort.

Of course, the State Department recently, as is contained in the Seldon

committee report, specifically accepted responsibility for the assertion that Communist infiltration in Brazil exists, and the extent of that infiltration, which is quite substantial. It seems to me now that the Selden subcommittee report is now being made public this should give all the more reason to the State Department as justification for demanding that anti-Communist and anti-Castro anti-communistic action be taken economically and politically by Brazil.

In further substantiation of this fact, that there is a substantial buildup of communism in Brazil, interestingly enough *The Worker*, the Communist newspaper in this country, on Sunday March 17, reports on this.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include this and other articles in the Record at this point.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The articles referred to are as follows:

[From the Worker, Mar. 17, 1963]

BRAZIL'S COMMUNIST PARTY'S STRENGTH DOUBLES IN 2 YEARS, SAYS CARLOS PRESTES
(By Art Shields)

Moscow.—Big changes are coming in Brazil, and the Brazilian Communist Party is much in this changing picture. Its strength has doubled since 1960, says Luis Carlos Prestes, the party's general secretary.

The membership of the progressive peasant unions has expanded from 50,000, 2 years ago, to 800,000 today. The movement for peace, which is the party's central issue, has made great advances.

I met Prestes when he talked to a group of correspondents during a short visit to Moscow.

Prestes gave us many details of the rising strength of the people's forces. Thus the Communist Party's ties with the militant working class of Brazil have grown much stronger since the late 1950's.

The student movement is rapidly growing. It is led by Communists in alliance with members of the Catholic youth.

"The influence of the Communist Party and other democratic groups is rising in the ranks of the Brazilian Army," said Prestes who used to be an army Colonel himself.

But socialism, he said, cannot be prevented. He proudly declared, "We Brazilians are fighting to become the second people in Latin America to open the door to socialism."

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, further in the Red Continental Congress is being held in Rio March 28 as reported in the press; including prominent Brazilians who are to participate such as Luis Carlos Prestes, Secretary General of the outlawed Brazilian Communist Party; Gen. Luiz Gonzaga de Oliveira Leite, president of the Brazilian Association of Reserve Officers; Francisco Juliao, a federal deputy and founder-president of the Castroist Peasants League; Dante Pelicani, president of the National Federation of Industrial Workers; Almino Afonso, Minister of Labor in President Goulart's cabinet and leader of Goulart's Brazilian Labor Party in the federal chamber; Clodsmith Riani, a Labor Ministry functionary and chief of labor's general strike command; Mario Shemberg, a well-known Sao Paulo physicist; and Roberto Morena, a political commissar with the

Communist forces in the Spanish civil war.

The complete article follows:

SECRECY SHROUDS AIM OF RIO RED CONGRESS
(By Julian Hartt)

RIO DE JANEIRO.—The second Communist-inspired Continental Congress of Solidarity with Cuba is scheduled to be convened here March 28.

The first such Congress, 2 years ago in Mexico City, is widely regarded as having brought about violent efforts to subvert the Governments of Venezuela and Peru, and with organizing leftists agitation in Panama and Puerto Rico.

Just what the delegates hope to accomplish in the 3-day meeting this year has become the subject of broad speculation among security officials and political observers in Rio.

Most of the experts are keeping their guesses to themselves, however, chiefly because the current Sino-Soviet ideological schism makes it difficult to forecast events in the Communist world.

A possible reflection of this rift is the fact that leaders of the Rio Congress have drawn up two lists of purported sponsors.

Carlos Lacerda, the anti-Communist Governor of Guanabara state, of which this convention city is the capital. He hopes the Congress will embarrass the administration of President Joao Goulart.

It was Lacerda's State department of public security that came into possession of the two sponsor lists, which were made available to this reporter.

These lists were taken from the luggage of Luis Carlos Prestes, secretary general of the outlawed Brazilian Communist Party, as he departed recently on a trip to Havana, Prague, and Moscow. (While the party is barred from taking an active role in Brazilian politics, membership in the party is not a crime.)

The lists show some duplication, but the principal name on both appears to be that of Gen. Luiz Gonzaga de Oliveira Leite, president of the Brazilian Association of Reserve Officers. His name appears first on one list and second on what appears to be the original invitation, after that of Francisco Juliao, a Federal deputy and founder-president of the Castroist Peasants League in the economically depressed northeast.

Both Juliao and the Communist functionary Prestes have been issuing radical statements from Havana recently. Juliao, following the line laid down in Peiping, has insisted that violence and armed struggle against democratic governments must be the Communist course. Prestes, however, has spoken out for the Moscow line of coexistence.

The so-called Juliao list of sponsors, according to Governor Lacerda's department of public security, includes the names of Dante Pelicani, president of the National Federation of Industrial Workers, and Almino Afonso, Minister of Labor in President Goulart's Cabinet and leader of Goulart's Brazilian Labor Party in the Federal chamber.

The second, or General Leite list, carries the names of Clodsmith Riani, a Labor Ministry functionary and chief of labor's general strike command; Mario Shemberg, a well-known Sao Paulo physicist, and Roberto Morena, who, according to Lacerda, served as a political commissar with Communist forces in the Spanish Civil War.

Speculation on the Congress' goals has centered mainly on documents accompanying the two lists of sponsors.

The Juliao list was accompanied by a letter that thunders: "Once more Cuba is threatened with armed invasion." Papers taken along with the other list are much milder in tone, proposing a program covering:

1. Self-determination and nonintervention.

2. Solidarity with the Cuban people.
3. National sovereignty and emancipation.
4. Imperialism's policy of world domination.

These documents promised participation in the Congress by labor unions, women's groups, cultural, youth and political organizations, but held out no promise of funds for delegates' travel, food or lodging.

Some observers hopefully expect a violent split between the Peiping-oriented and Moscow-oriented factions.

Mr. Speaker, I think this, together with State Department remarks, clearly establishes the Communist buildup in Brazil.

It further leads to the obvious conclusion that any additional foreign aid money going to Brazil should be conditioned upon withdrawal of recognition of Cuba by Brazil and affirmative efforts to rid the country of the Communists influence.

ACTIONS TO COMBAT COMMUNISM IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Thus, to summarize these remarks, and in making constructive suggestions as to how to combat the Castro and Communist menace in this hemisphere short of war on a constructive basis, I recommend that the U.S. Government consider the following actions:

First. That Cuba and the methods of combating communism in this hemisphere be made a primary topic of discussion at the Costa Rican Conference, including discussions of first, how the relatively uninhabited coastal regions of Central America can be protected against weapon drops and subversion activities from Cuba; second, how all Central American nations can act in concert if anyone is threatened by the overthrow by force by Communists; third, how the flow of subversives to and from Cuba can be stopped at their borders, as well as through Mexico; fourth, how these nations can encourage other nations to withdraw recognition and impose an economic quarantine on Cuba; fifth, how these nations can encourage and join in the withholding of Alliance for Progress funds for nations that do not become a part of this effort to rid the hemisphere of Castro and communism; and sixth, to provide adequate assurance to these nations that U.S. military assistance to fight communism will be made available to the free governments of these nations.

Second. That the U.S. policy should be to require withdrawal of recognition of and doing business with Castro and the Communists on the part of all Latin American recipients of Alliance for Progress funds, including the five countries that still recognize and do business with the Communists; namely, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay.

Third. The forming and implementation of strong national policies on the part of all Latin American nations to control and eliminate the flow of Communist traffic and arms from Cuba or other Communist countries to Latin America.

Fourth. The establishment of an effective trade ban by the United States, banning the use of U.S. ports by any company doing business with Cuba or by any government that has jurisdiction

over those ships doing business with Cuba. The present piecemeal ban is full of loopholes restricting only individual ships from using U.S. ports that also do business with Cuba.

Fifth. The recognition of a free non-Communist government in exile to strengthen all the refugee efforts so that these efforts can have optimum effects, both externally and internally, in up-setting Castro and communism.

Sixth. Advising the Communist nations that this country does not intend to permit the continued shipment of heavy war materiel or personnel to Cuba or the transshipment of Communist subversion and/or arms to other Latin American nations, or to permit Cuba to remain as a Communist threat and that the continuation of these efforts will obviously result in a reinstatement of a quarantine.

Seventh. Volunteering military support to any Latin American country that is threatened with Communist overthrow.

Eighth. That an immediate protest to Mexico should be made by the United States against the use of Mexican territory by the Cuban Embassy for the assignment of visas and for the actual passage of United States and Latin American citizens to Cuba for subversion activities, demanding that this open door to subversion be closed;

Ninth. Securing the support of the Organization of American States for this long-range planned program, short of war, to rid the hemisphere of Castro and communism; and

Tenth. The United States should firmly state that no funds will be contributed to any fund or program of the United Nations by the United States if any of those funds are used to give aid and assistance to the Castro regime.

Many of these constructive suggestions were made months ago by me. I repeat them and add to them today, hoping that this constructive approach, providing for a sound long-range planned program to rid this hemisphere of communism, will receive serious consideration and will be put into effect.

I refuse to accept any coexistence with Castro and communism in this hemisphere doctrine as a replacement of the Monroe Doctrine. Our ultimate objective as expressed in my resolution, House Joint Resolution 277, should be to rid the hemisphere of communism in Cuba and elsewhere as our basic policy and the steps to accomplish this will of necessity follow.

AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY

(Mr. HARSHA asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, in light of recent developments concerning Brazil's efforts to secure additional U.S. loans and grants, I feel it imperative to put the facts in their proper perspective and to again call my colleagues' attention to this situation.

Mr. Speaker, as early as February 20, 1963, an announcement, presumably from the Brazilian Government, was is-

sued from Rio de Janeiro stating that Brazil was about to sign a long-term \$160-million-a-year trade agreement with the Russians as part of a 3-year plan the United States would be asked to help finance. The announcement further stated:

Government sources said they do not expect the United States to press for curbs on Iron Curtain trade which will be approximately doubled by the new agreement and may increase to as much as \$300 a million a year by 1965.

A Brazilian delegation, headed by Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas, was scheduled to visit with U.S. officials on March 4, 1963, for the purpose of negotiating these long-term loans. This meeting, for some unexplained reason, was postponed.

The reports vary as to just how much money Brazil is requesting, however, the Brazilian Government owes the United States some \$630 million in short-term obligations which Dr. Dantas is attempting to defer payment on until some future date. In addition, he is asking for approximately \$400 million in additional loans this year and another \$400 million for next year. This adds up to the tidy little sum of nearly \$1.5 billion. Over the years, we have sent the Brazilian Government more than \$2¼ billion in the form of loans and grants, so you see, Mr. Speaker, we have not exactly been stingy with our Latin American friends.

Mr. Speaker, on March 4, I wrote to Secretary of State Rusk and asked him for an explanation as to why this Government would entertain the thought of loaning any sum to Brazil, or any other country for that matter, to develop trade with Russia. As yet, I have not been provided with any answer of any kind, although I have subsequently written the State Department on other matters and have received replies. Apparently, the State Department feels we are not entitled to know the answer to this question. Efforts have been made to determine just how much this loan will amount to, for what purposes, what repayment methods and other pertinent information that we all should know, but as of this date, we have been kept in the dark or rather denied this information.

On March 11, Mr. Dantas did visit with U.S. officials and he visited with the President, himself. It was after this visit with President Kennedy, that Mr. Dantas, in response to a question by a reporter, admitted that part of this U.S. loan would be used to help finance trade with Russia. Now, the Brazilian Embassy, in a release on March 16, stated that none of the money being sought by Mr. Dantas would be used to develop trade with the Soviet Union. In that same release, it stated that apparently Mr. Dantas misunderstood the question when he said that part of the money would be used to help develop trade with Russia. It was explained by associates of Mr. Dantas that he apparently thought that the reporter was asking him if Brazil would do business with the Soviet Union and it was to this purported question that Dantas said, "Yes."

But, Mr. Speaker, let me restate the exact conversation so that my colleagues

can draw their own conclusions. In my humble opinion, the question is very clear and one would have extreme difficulty in misunderstanding it. The question and conversation were as follows: A reporter asked, "whether some of this loan you are seeking from the United States would be used to help develop trade with Russia?"

"The money will be used to promote trade with many countries," Dantas said.

"Including Russia?" he was asked.

"Yes, Russia," he replied.

This conversation was reported in the Columbus Dispatch, March 12, 1963. It was heard by some 11 or 12 other reporters and reported in other leading newspapers throughout the country. Mrs. Jessie Buscher, a leading Washington reporter for the Columbus Dispatch asked the question. Mrs. Buscher is a highly respected newspaper lady and of unquestioned integrity.

Now, this question does not leave much room for misunderstanding. Add to this, some other pertinent facts and one cannot help but arrive at the same conclusion that I did. That is, that this loan will be used in part at least to develop Red trade unless we can put some strings on it. Here are these additional facts:

A news article appearing in the Baltimore Sun, March 8, reported that Brazil would soon begin trade talks with four other members of the Red bloc—Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. In fact, the Hungarian mission has already been in Brazil and it hopes to increase its trade from \$7 million per year to \$40 million and Poland, at the last report, is scheduled to arrive in Brazil tomorrow.

Mr. Dantas met in an off-the-record session with a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and admitted again that Brazil would expand its trade with the Communist bloc. Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, the Brazilian Bulletin of March 1, 1963, a publication issued by the Brazilian Government Trade Bureau states unequivocally that Brazil hopes to expand her trade with the Soviet bloc countries.

From the many news releases issued by both this Government and the Brazilian Government that Brazil is practically bankrupt, has spiraling inflation and must have this money to put her financial house in order, one draws the obvious conclusion that at least part of these U.S. tax dollars will be used to enhance Communist trade. To say that this money would not find its way into Red trade, is like saying you are going to pour a glass of cream off the top of a bottle of homogenized milk. It cannot be done.

To help Brazil or any other country expand or enhance Communist trade is beyond my comprehension, it is ridiculous and blatantly points out the futility of our foreign policy. During these days when we are so concerned with Communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere, when the administration is calling for \$11 billion of the taxpayers' money to help Latin America stave off communism, why would the State Department even consider any such nego-

tiation? We are spending and have spent billions of dollars to help other nations combat communism, we are sacrificing American lives in Vietnam to combat communism, we just passed a \$15.8 billion military construction bill designed to protect this Nation from communism, our State Department officials have just publicly announced that this Government stands ready to give military help to any Latin American government threatened with a Communist takeover. Why then, in the name of commonsense, would we enter into any agreement that would enhance Red trade?

The expansion of Red trade is a very effective cold war weapon, it not only aids the economic structure of the Red governments, but helps expand their military posture and makes these other countries dependent upon the Russians for much of their economic existence. It completely nullifies the advantage, if any, of making these vast U.S. expenditures to combat communism. Expansion of Red trade will be eventually reflected in the loss of U.S. markets and aggravation of our own balance-of-payments problem and will certainly add to our unemployment dilemma. This muddled thinking by persons in the State Department, this desire to support both sides of any issue at the same time, has led to the chaos and confusion that swirls about our foreign policy. It is time to call a halt to this exercise in futility. Whether the loan to Brazil is for \$1.5 billion, \$400 million or \$1, makes no difference. The American taxpayer does not want his money spent with the right hand to combat communism and with the left hand to enhance communism and Communist trade.

The Russians have already established some 84 so-called friendship stations throughout Latin America. They have completed their takeover of Cuba and are now in the process of taking over Haiti; this is being started by sending a trade mission into Haiti. On March 13, a Czechoslovakian commercial mission arrived in Haiti to start negotiating with Haiti. Thirty-year credits to build up industry are being offered by the Reds. Here again, the same old pattern is being followed as was followed in Cuba—trade missions are sent in, then technicians and advisers and next, soldiers.

Yes, Mr. Speaker, to finance the expansion of Red trade with any country is foolhardy and only builds up the economic and military posture of the Reds, enabling them to expand the growth of communism throughout the world.

It is time to call a halt to this idiotic practice.

Now, Mr. Speaker, as if the foregoing were not enough to call a halt to this nonsense, look at these facts.

Mr. Dantas, the gentleman trying to negotiate this loan, was the same gentleman who advocated a soft policy toward Cuba at the Punta del Este meeting last year and voted against ousting Cuba from the inter-American States system.

Brazil still officially recognizes Castro's Cuba and is today carrying on trade with Castro.

The State Department has revealed that the Communists have infiltrated the Brazilian Government, the Brazilian labor unions, and Brazilian youth movements.

The Brazilian Government has not as yet made settlements with all the U.S. firms it has expropriated property from, although the foreign aid bill unequivocally states that no aid shall be given any country until such settlements are made.

Furthermore, other American firms are being harassed by the Brazilian Government and Francisco Juliao, leftist leader in Brazil declared on March 10, that, "if the United States invades Cuba, we will sabotage North American properties in Brazil."

It is reliably reported that Brazil will host the second Communist-inspired Continental Congress of Solidarity with Cuba on March 28. The first such congress, 2 years ago in Mexico City, is widely regarded as having brought about violent efforts to subvert the Governments of Venezuela and Peru and with organizing leftist agitation in Panama and Puerto Rico.

Under all these circumstances, Mr. Speaker, it would seem little enough to ask that American tax dollars not be granted or loaned to Brazil until she has removed the Communists at least from the ranks of government, that all U.S. citizens be reimbursed for property expropriated by Brazil, and that infallible assurances be given the United States that none of our money will be used to enhance Communist trade.

TARIFF RELIEF A HOAX

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. DENT] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time in the House to discuss that part of the Tariff Expansion Act dealing with assistance for displaced workers. Recently the U.S. Department of Labor issued the following memorandum contained in an official booklet. I quote from the booklet:

ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS UNDER THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962

(Note.—This pamphlet discusses the eligibility of totally unemployed workers, but you may apply for a readjustment allowance or training if you are working only part time for your company because of an increase in imports, provided that increase was the result of a trade concession.)

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provides adjustment assistance to workers who are laid off or working only part time because of increased imports resulting from trade concessions.

This pamphlet explains how workers may apply for assistance and the kind of assistance they may receive.

Your company has laid off a number of its workers, including you. The layoff is caused by an increase in imported products like those made by your company. If this increase was the result of a trade concession, you may apply for a readjustment allowance, training, job relocation assistance, all of the above.

Before you may receive assistance, the U.S. Tariff Commission must find that your

unemployment is due to increased imports resulting from a trade concession but immediately following your layoff, inform your local employment security office that you wish to apply for adjustment assistance under the Trade Expansion Act.

This is important so that your right to apply for assistance is protected.

You satisfy all of the following:

Your layoff, the result of a trade concession, began after the Trade Expansion Act became law, October 11, 1962;

You worked for any employer or employers for 18 months out of the 3 years preceding your layoff;

You worked for any employer or employers adversely affected by imports for 6 months out of the year preceding your layoff;

You are available for work (or enrolled in an approved training program);

You are not disqualified under your State unemployment insurance law.

DETERMINATIONS BY THE U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION

A group of workers adversely affected by imports may petition the U.S. Tariff Commission for a determination covering (I) their individual company (or a subdivision of their company), or (II) their entire industry.

I. YOUR COMPANY (OR SUBDIVISION)

To determine whether you are eligible to apply for trade adjustment assistance, your union representatives, or anyone you authorize to represent you, must petition the U.S. Tariff Commission on your behalf. The Commission will determine whether the layoff at your company resulted from an increase in imports caused by a trade concession and will report its findings to the President.

The President may then certify that the unemployed workers of your company are eligible to apply for adjustment assistance. His certification will specify the date that import-affected unemployment began.

Note.—If you continued working at the time a group of your fellow workers petitioned the Tariff Commission, but you were laid off at a later date, apply for assistance immediately. It will not be necessary for your representative to petition the Tariff Commission a second time within 2 years.

II. YOUR INDUSTRY

A recognized union, firm, trade association, or other representative of an industry may petition the Tariff Commission for tariff adjustment. In this case the Commission will determine whether increased imports resulting from a trade concession are adversely affecting your entire industry. Its findings will be reported to the President.

The President may then authorize groups of unemployed workers in your industry to request the Secretary of Labor for a determination of eligibility so they may apply for trade adjustment assistance.

When the Secretary receives a group's petition, he will determine whether their unemployment was caused by increased imports which the Tariff Commission found to be adversely affecting their industry.

If the Secretary finds that the group's unemployment results from increased imports, he will certify that these workers are eligible to apply for trade adjustment assistance. His certification will specify the date their import-affected unemployment began.

Note.—If you continued working at the time a group of workers in your industry requested the Secretary of Labor for assistance, but you were laid off at a later date, apply for assistance immediately. It will not be necessary for your representative to ask the Secretary for another determination within 2 years.)

myriad programs. My purpose here— and I can guarantee this House that it will be a continuing purpose—is to see that the American taxpayers have the straight truth upon which to base their decision.

Until the U.N. develops more built-in checks and audits upon itself, it is up to the American Congress to audit U.N. actions and U.N. facts for the American people. Perhaps we should turn the General Accounting Office loose for a complete audit of the United Nations' aid projects. The U.N. has hundreds of projects going on all over the world. I certainly hope they have better information about the others than they do about the aid project for the United States.

Let me briefly illustrate the confusion found surrounding just this one U.N. aid project.

I have been told by the United Nations Information Center here in Washington that this rice-fish project was conducted in Kansas—a startling revelation since Kansas has no rice paddies.

Also, I have been told by way of the New York office of the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization that this project was not in Kansas but in Arkansas.

Then, I read for myself in "World Without Want," a book written recently by Mr. Paul Hoffman who is manager of the U.N. Special Fund, that this project is not in Kansas and not in Arkansas but in Louisiana.

Later the information center here advised me that the Kansas-Arkansas mixup was caused by the pronunciation of a Swedish secretary on a long-distance telephone call.

Still later, in response to a letter from me, Mr. Hoffman, a dedicated and talented American who is now an international civil servant, wrote to me that his book contained a "regrettable mistake." But he neglected to correct that mistake and to locate the project in any State.

And we still do not know where it is, or was, or how much we paid for the U.N. aid.

Since American taxpayers apparently contributed the expert's salary for this lost, strayed, or stolen project, I thought we at least ought to know what State of our Union benefited. So, last Friday, I issued through the press an appeal for help from the amateur sleuths and detectives of the great American midlands.

I asked for their help in solving "the case of the fish in the rice paddies," an international intrigue that now has defied solution by the massive bureaucracies of the United States and the United Nations. The best hope, if we are to confirm the veracity of the United Nations is a quick response to this challenge by the many and able American mystery fans.

I have appealed to them to apply their magnifying glasses in the vicinity of Topeka, Little Rock, Baton Rouge, Schenectady—who can tell where this piscatorial-paddy will turn up next?

I have asked these sleuths to look for fish even though the spring bass season is not yet open in their area; to look for a mysterious Chinese expert, perhaps wearing a light-blue U.N. helmet; to be

alert for white jeeps loaded down with goldfish bowls.

I am anxiously awaiting word from the Secretary of the Interior, from the United Nations, or from any of the amateur fish-hunters. And, I will report promptly to the House just as soon as the slippery evidence of the U.N.'s unique aid to the United States has been hooked and landed.

CASTRO COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(Mr. SELDEN (at the request of Mr. ROGERS of Florida) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include a subcommittee report.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs has completed its report resulting from recent hearings into Castro Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere.

As chairman of the subcommittee, I believe the hearings and this report will prove of great value in focusing the attention of the American people and other friends of the inter-American system on the Communist subversive threat to the Americas.

This report contains subcommittee findings and recommendations growing out of testimony given by members of the executive branch and by other authorities in Latin American affairs. The members of the subcommittee, Democrat and Republican alike, have conscientiously worked toward keeping the hearings on the high level of national interest. I believe this contribution is reflected in the responsible, objective nature of the report.

It is to be hoped that the subcommittee's efforts will serve to aid our Government and our friends and allies throughout the hemisphere in the continuing fight to eliminate the threat of communism to the inter-American system.

The report follows:

CASTRO COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

On February 13, 1963, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs began exploratory hearings intended to (1) probe the nature and extent of the Communist subversive threat to the hemisphere in the light of recent developments in Cuba and throughout Latin America; (2) inform the American people of the danger of this threat to our national and hemispheric security; and (3) explore possible legislative or other means to spur U.S. action toward curbing and ultimately eliminating Communist subversion in the Americas.

In the weeks following, the subcommittee heard testimony from officials of the executive branch, as well as other witnesses having knowledge of conditions prevailing in Latin America. Mindful of national security interests, the subcommittee heard pertinent testimony from some witnesses in closed session. Release of portions of such closed session testimony was made through the subcommittee by the witnesses themselves, only after their examination of transcripts for security purposes.

The subcommittee's special interest in Communist activity in the hemisphere is of long standing. History, geography, and traditional bonds of friendship are ample reason for the concern of the American people, and their elected representatives, in the plight of the Cuban people. These hearings, how-

ever, were specifically aimed at gathering information concerning Communist use of Cuba as an island base for subversive aggression in the Americas. The urgency of this threat to our hemispheric security was spelled out in detail in testimony before the subcommittee.

As a result, the subcommittee is more than ever convinced of the need to inform and alert the American people to the nature of Communist designs and operations in Latin America.

THE GROWTH OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA

As noted at the outset of the subcommittee's hearings, these designs and operations antedate the coming to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Latin America has been a target for Communist conquest since the early 1920's, when the Third Communist International (Comintern) initiated a program to organize and coordinate Communist political and organizational activities in Central and South American nations. Comintern agents, operating under orders from Moscow, were active during this early period in recruiting and training Latin American party leaders. The Confederación Sindical, a Moscow-controlled labor organization, was another instrument of Communist efforts to create a Soviet Latin America. By 1929, the First Conference of the Latin American Communist Parties was held in Buenos Aires, drawing delegates from 14 of the 20 Latin American nations.

From this nucleus, the Communist movement in Latin America grew rapidly in the 1930's and 1940's. The global depression spurred Communist organizational efforts among workers. Communist-controlled labor unions and hemisphere-wide labor associations served as the center of expanding party operations throughout the area. Moscow's control over party activities throughout Latin America was complete and thorough, acting through centralized command posts in Uruguay, Mexico, and Cuba. Montevideo served as command headquarters for South America, Mexico City for Central America, and Havana for the Caribbean area.

By the end of World War II, the Latin American Communist movement was flourishing and its party organizations operated openly in virtually every country in the hemisphere. The Communists were represented in nine national congresses, had at least three members in the Chilean Cabinet, and were influential on lower levels of government in several other nations.

The first Communist government established in the Americas came to power through the election of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1951. The Communists dominated the Arbenz government, establishing effective control over the country's labor and peasant organizations. However, the Guatemalan regular military establishment's resistance to Communist subversion resulted in the overthrow of the Arbenz regime by anti-Communist liberation forces in 1954.

In the late 1950's a number of Latin American nations which had broken diplomatic ties with Russia and Soviet bloc countries renewed them. Although Communist Party membership in Central and South America was relatively small, the party's influence could be discerned in the activities of many other political, labor, and student groups. Anti-U.S. propaganda remained the consistent theme of Communist and Communist-line groups throughout Latin America.

With the coming to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba, in 1959, the existence of an operational base in the heart of the Americas brought a grave new dimension to the Communist threat to the inter-American system.

From its inception the Castro regime has sought to export revolution to other countries of the hemisphere. Direct military efforts, in the form of small rebel force landings in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican

Republic, and Haiti, failed in 1959. Cuba rapidly became a base for subversion and guerrilla training, as well as propaganda campaigns aimed at the overthrow of existing Latin American governments.

By 1980, Soviet and outside Communist influence and control over the Castro revolutionary apparatus had become obvious, thus clearly violating the Monroe Doctrine and all inter-American agreements affecting the security of the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. In December 1961, when the Cuban dictator proclaimed his allegiance to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, his appeal to indigenous non-Communist elements in Latin America diminished, but the campaign to export revolution by subversive aggression was intensified.

This campaign continues to be carried out by three basic means: (1) the exploitation of nationalist and ultraleftist groups; (2) the dissemination of propaganda; and (3) intensive ideological indoctrination and the development of indigenous forces through guerrilla training.

EXPLOITATION OF NATIONALIST AND ULTRA-LEFTIST GROUPS

Castro has stepped up his campaign to exploit indigenous nationalist and ultra-leftist movements in behalf of his own subversive aims in Latin America. Infiltration of political, social, and economic movements remains a primary Communist tactic in carrying out subversive activities in the various nations of the hemisphere. The Arbenz regime's failure to successfully infiltrate and subvert the Guatemalan regular military establishment led to its downfall. Evidence submitted to the subcommittee indicates that Communist strategy now recognizes the need to undermine and infiltrate the military of target nations wherever possible.

DISSEMINATION OF PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is an important arm of the Communist subversive apparatus in Latin America. Tons of Communist literature, featuring antigovernment and "hate America" themes, are shipped to entry points throughout the region. Such material, along with funds for subversive operations, is often transmitted through Cuban Embassies in countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Havana. In countries where Cuba has no diplomatic relations, dissemination is effected by Castroite or Communist groups. Much of this material is aimed at students, from the university to grade school levels.

The principal direct and mass audience medium in Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America is shortwave radio. The Castro regime inaugurated an international broadcasting service, Radio Havana, on May 1, 1961, which has increased its broadcast time to a total of 266½ hours a week. The total Communist effort, including the Cuban, Soviet, European satellite, and Chinese shortwave broadcasts, is 415 hours per week. The Cuban broadcasts concentrate for the most part on the Latin American scene, making great claims about Cuba's progress and denouncing the United States. Time is regularly allotted on Radio Havana to groups of foreign nationals residing in Cuba such as the so-called Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Movement, the Honduran Liberation Movement, the Guatemalan Information Committee, and the Dominican Liberation Movement. All of these broadcasts incite their listeners to revolt against their present governments. In the aftermath of the missile crisis, the Cuban broadcasts have grown increasingly explicit in their attempts to incite violence.

INTENSIVE IDEOLOGICAL INDOCTRINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIGOVERNMENT FORCES THROUGH GUERRILLA TRAINING

Testimony given the subcommittee by top intelligence officials of the United States

established that from 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans traveled to Cuba last year for ideological and paramilitary training. The number of trainees is increasing in 1963. Some graduates of such Cuban training return to their homelands to foment disorder and chaos aimed at the ultimate overthrow of legitimate democratic governments. Others remain behind to receive more intensive training and to form the nucleus of military units which can be returned to their respective homelands at the appropriate time to lead a "liberation army." Operating under a facade of nationalism, these trainees represent a Communist revolutionary cadre for the establishment of other Castro-type regimes in the hemisphere.

In effect, this Cuban-based program for revolution constitutes more than subversive activities as that term is generally defined. The program is so extensive in concept and execution as to be branded subversive "aggression," a modern totalitarian form of warfare against the nations of the free world.

CURRENT U.S. POLICY

Current U.S. policy regarding efforts to meet this threat was enunciated by Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin in testimony before the subcommittee. Said Mr. Martin: "Without being complacent, we in the United States can derive certain satisfaction that as a result of actions of the United States and other American governments, working individually and collectively, some headway is being made to reduce the influence and capabilities of Cuba and the bloc and in controlling local subversive activities of all kinds in each country. Current U.S. actions may be summarized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of the Cuban regime, spreading knowledge of what a Castro Communist regime does for a people's freedom and well-being, providing equipment and training to Latin American military and police forces to deal with riots and guerrilla actions, working through the OAS to stimulate individual and collective action on the problem, and through the Alliance for Progress helping our partners attack the basic discontent on which subversion feeds."

While the value of this policy must be judged by future events, the subcommittee makes the following findings and recommendations regarding the current status of Communist subversive aggression in the Western Hemisphere:

FINDINGS

I

Although the inter-American collective security system is prepared to meet the possibility of open military aggression by Communist forces against nations of the hemisphere, no plan for collective action against Communist subversive aggression has been put into effect.

Since the Korean conflict, subversive aggression rather than traditional military aggression has been the primary instrument of Communist expansionist strategy in the cold war. Subversive aggression against Latin American nations follows the pattern of Communist aggression in other parts of the world.

The traditional concept that "subversion remains primarily the task of each government to handle in accordance with its own laws and resources" hampers collective action in meeting the primary Communist threat to hemispheric security. Moreover, "the security machinery of the inter-American system was originally conceived to deal primarily with forms of direct aggression," and the nations of the hemisphere have been slow to devise new collective security

arrangements to meet subtle forms of aggression.

Castro Communist subversive aggression in Latin America is an integral part of Communist global strategy. In January 1963, Fidel Castro acknowledged the international nature of this subversive offensive as follows: "The liberating movement is fighting in Angola, in Vietnam, in Latin America, and this fight needs all the united forces of the Socialist camp."

II

Communist potential for aggression cannot be measured solely in terms of regular military forces or offensive capabilities. The fact that Castro Communist forces in Cuba are incapable without outside assistance of mounting successfully a traditional military offensive blow in the hemisphere does not minimize the Communist threat to inter-American security.

Strategic concepts and traditional diplomatic and military definitions of terms such as "aggression" and "offensive" are misleading standards by which to assess the threat of subversion. Emphasis on such words and definitions and on Castro Communist conventional military capabilities tend to blur policy and public understanding of the seriousness of subversive aggression.

Since 1959, Communists have stepped up "the tactics of infiltration, popular front action and insurgency . . . with a marked shift toward more violence" in Latin America. The threat such tactics pose to hemispheric security cannot be measured only in terms of conventional military capabilities.

III

Since the primary thrust of the Communist offensive in Latin America is paramilitary, relying on force and violence, economic aid alone cannot cope with immediate threats of subversive aggression. In fact, the success of the Alliance for Progress or any other long-range economic aid program for the region is dependent on reducing and finally eliminating the threat of subversive aggression to the hemisphere.

As Assistant Secretary Martin testified, "The Alliance was not undertaken as a response to Castro," and it cannot be considered as an adequate response to the immediate threat of Castro Communist subversion.

So long as Castro Communists conduct subversive operations in the hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress will be "a constant object of their scorn and attacks."

Success of the Alliance and hemispheric plans for the economic and social development of Latin America will be endangered by continuing Castro Communist efforts to increase the political tensions and dangers of the region. Hence, long-range economic and political plans must be complemented by immediate steps to meet the threat of subversive aggression.

IV

In the absence of a clear and unified hemispheric policy dealing with the threat of Castro Communist subversion, some member nations of the Organization of American States have not devised effective internal methods of controlling subversive traffic in and through their territories. Whether due to failure to recognize the danger posed by Castro communism, or for other reasons, this situation endangers the security of all nations of the hemisphere.

Although ample provision for hemispheric cooperation in dealing with subversion exists through inter-American agreements, no clear

* Fidel Castro quoted, the Washington Star, Jan. 16, 1963.

* Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, hearings, p. 5.

* Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, hearings, p. 23.

collective plans have emerged to implement the words of Bogotá, Rio, Caracas, and Punta del Este with decisive action.

Internal methods of dealing with the Castro Communist threat vary from country to country. The difficulties of controlling clandestine subversive operations and traffic are great "even for governments with the most elaborate security machinery."

These difficulties are further complicated by the failure of some member nations of the Organization of American States to deal with subversive traffic. For example, Mexico remains a "neutral ground," to all intents and purposes, for Castro Communist traffic and travel in the Americas. Internal policies permitting such subversive traffic weaken inter-American, treaty obligations and endanger the security of the hemisphere.

Communist Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is complete. The Castro Communist movement, although claiming to represent indigenous Latin American interest and aspirations, is in fact controlled and operated by trained professional agents from the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union must be held accountable for such subversive aggression in the Americas.

The Castro regime is a wholly dependent Soviet satellite and Castro communism is the instrument of Soviet aspirations for the Americas. Thus, subversive aggression emanating from Cuba is Soviet-directed and represents a "far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly" effort than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids conducted by Castroites during the early months of the regime.

International Soviet agents, experts in the field of revolutionary propaganda, terrorist tactics, and guerrilla warfare, are operating schools for violence in Cuba, training and indoctrinating Latin American subversives. The Soviet Union as well as its Cuban puppet regime must bear the responsibility and consequences for subversive attacks on nations of the Western Hemisphere.

VI

Training of guerrillas and terrorists at Cuban camps is on the increase. At these camps, experts in subversive warfare are organizing the cadre for an "alliance for violence" that will send agents trained in sabotage, espionage, and revolutionary techniques throughout Latin America. At present, Castro Communist assistance to these cadres takes the form of funds, guidance, and technical assistance.

"In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it will flourish."

Undisputed evidence exists that "Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America."

Toward this end, from 1,000 to 1,500 persons from other Latin American countries made the pilgrimage to Cuba during 1962 to receive ideological indoctrination and guerrilla training. Additional thousands are traveling the route to Havana this year. To date, training emphasis has been on acquiring weaponry from "the enemy," i.e., government arsenals, but Castro arms shipments to other Latin American countries can be expected to increase if needed to further revolution.

Castro Cuba has furnished financing for subversive operations throughout the hemisphere, and tons of Communist propaganda material are shipped from Cuba for dissemination throughout Latin America. Some of this material is detected and destroyed by customs officials of target nations, but substantial amounts get through to the people.

VII

Venezuela is the primary target for Cuban based Communist subversive aggression.

Castro Cuba has provided training in subversive warfare to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. An estimated 200-plus Venezuelans received such training in Cuba during 1962. Although "the Communists have not demonstrated the ability to stand up to the armed forces, or seize and hold government buildings," increased terrorist activity in Venezuela poses one of the most immediate Communist threats to any country in the hemisphere.

Creation in 1962 of the so-called Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) is the result of a unification of command to coordinate Castro Communist subversive activities in Venezuela.

VIII

Purported differences between Soviet and Chinese branches of international communism have had no discernible effect on the increased intensity or course of Communist subversive aggression in the hemisphere. Violent overthrow of existing governments remains the unified aim of Communist forces in Latin America.

"To date the Latin American Communist Parties seem to have been reluctant either to admit the existence of basic differences between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China or to take sides even when the differences are admitted."

There is no reason to believe that purported ideological differences in the Communist camp have affected or altered Cuba's role as communism's spearhead in the Americas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I

In accord with the joint resolution of Congress, October 3, 1962, section (a), immediate steps should be taken by the United States to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the hemisphere.

The joint resolution of Congress, October 3, 1962, declared U.S. determination to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the extension of Castro communism to other parts of the hemisphere by aggressive or subversive activities.

The distinction between aggressive and subversive activities is without significance. Subversive activities, as conducted by Communist forces in the world today, represent as certain a form of aggression as direct military aggression.

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy responded to the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba in accord with section (b) of the congressional determination of October 3. Section (b) declared U.S. determination to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States * * *

It is recommended that the threat posed by the aggressive capability of Castro Communist subversion be dealt with by what-

* Statement of Hon. John A. McCone, Director, CIA, p. 64.

¹⁰ Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, hearings, p. 9.

ever means may be necessary in the security interests of the United States and all the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

II

The United States should be prepared to act with military force, if needed, in response to the request for help and assistance of any nation of the hemisphere in danger of being overthrown by Castro Communist subversive aggression. This recommendation is in no way to be considered as a substitute for or a bar to unilateral action by the United States in defense of its own security.

The United States must be prepared to do in our own hemisphere what we are willing to do in other parts of the world in defense of freedom. Certainly the sacrifices of Korea and Vietnam would be futile if Communist tyranny were to be allowed to extend its power by force and violence over nations of the Americas.

In compliance with solemn treaty obligations, the United States, along with other nations of the hemisphere, must make clear our intention to act not only in our own defense but in the interests of collective security and for the defense of the nations of the inter-American system.

III

Every effort must be made by the United States to assure collective action by the Organization of American States, and by OAS member states individually, toward the curbing of Castro Communist subversive activities and traffic in the hemisphere.

Failure of any nation of the hemisphere to curb subversive activities and traffic within its borders endangers all the nations of the inter-American system. The chain of hemispheric security is only as strong as its weakest link.

The United States, as leader of the hemisphere's defense, must seek early implementation of strict national policies to control and eliminate the flow of Communist traffic between Cuba and other countries of the hemisphere.

IV

The United States should seek the complete diplomatic and economic quarantine of Communist Cuba by other nations of the hemisphere.

Recognizing the aggressive nature of Cuban-based subversion, the United States should exert efforts to quarantine the aggressor by means of diplomatic and economic sanctions applied by nations of the hemisphere. The Declaration of Punta del Este furnishes ample legal basis for the complete ostracism of the Castro regime from diplomatic and economic contacts with other American states. Recent months have established even more clearly that the Castro regime is not the legitimate representative of the people of Cuba, but is a mere instrument of international communism.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN

I believe no reference to the situation in Latin America can be made without calling attention to the fact that U.S. aid must be based upon long-range economic and political reforms dealing with the rampant economic and social underdevelopment, which will lead to freedom of the individual and representative governments.

LEONARD FARBSTEIN.

NEW YORK.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADAIR-HICKENLOOPER AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indi-

* Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, hearings, p. 22.

⁷ Statement of Hon. John A. McCone, Director, CIA, p. 65.

⁸ Statement of Hon. John A. McCone, Director, CIA, p. 63.

ADAIR [Mr. ADAIR] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, in the last session of the Congress this body amended the Foreign Assistance Act to provide that aid be suspended to those countries that expropriated American-owned property without prompt and adequate compensation. My purpose today is to advise the House on the effectiveness of the so-called Adair-Hickenlooper amendment since its enactment and approval on August 1, 1962.

HISTORY OF AMENDMENT

As you know, there was, in the early part of 1962, an expropriation of International Telephone & Telegraph holdings by the Brazilian State, Rio Grande do Sul. Although these holdings had been recently valued at over \$7 million, the State Governor offered only \$400,000 as full and just compensation. As a matter of further importance, we recall that nearly 3 years earlier this same State had taken over properties belonging to the American & Foreign Power Corp. No compensation had been received by the company and expropriation proceedings had been stalled for a year and a half.

During April, May, and June, 1962, just at the time we were considering in committee the foreign aid bill, Ceylon took over 83 gasoline stations and other properties belonging to 2 American oil companies, Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., and Caltex Ceylon, Ltd.

In view of these expropriations, coupled with the increasing tendency toward nationalization of public utilities and other industries by many of the countries receiving U.S. aid, I felt that some protection should be afforded American citizens and businesses in countries throughout the world. Therefore, I proposed in the Committee on Foreign Affairs amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act to cut off aid to those countries that took over property of U.S. citizens and failed to provide adequate compensation promptly. Some action was taken in the committee, but I felt that we had not given adequate protection. Hence, when this section was further considered on the floor on July 11, 1962, I offered additional amendments that were adopted by the House and which changed the section in three principal respects:

First. A retroactive feature was added which made the requirements applicable to expropriations on or after January 1, 1962.

Second. The authority of the President to allow aid to continue to countries that had expropriated U.S.-owned properties when he found it in the national interest was deleted.

Third. Provision was added that the requirements of the section could not be waived by the use of any other authority available under the act.

The Senate bill (S. 2996) also included a provision prepared by Senator Hickenlooper against expropriation of American-owned property similar in requirements though not in language to section 620(e) as it passed the House. In conference the Senate agreed to the House language with two minor amend-

ments. The first specified that appropriate steps to be taken "may include arbitration"; the second qualified "obligations" of the expropriating country toward the U.S. citizens or entities as obligations "under international law."

The language as it now appears in the act reads:

(e) The President shall suspend assistance to the government of any country to which assistance is provided under this Act when the government of such country or any governmental agency or subdivision within such country on or after January 1, 1962—

(1) has nationalized or expropriated or seized ownership or control of property owned by any United States citizen or by any corporation, partnership, or association not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or

(2) has imposed or enforced discriminatory taxes or other exactions, or restrictive maintenance or operational conditions, which have the effect of nationalizing, expropriating, or otherwise seizing ownership or control of property so owned,

and such country, government agency or government subdivision fails within a reasonable time (not more than six months after such action or after the date of enactment of this subsection, whichever is later) to take appropriate steps, which may include arbitration, to discharge its obligations under international law toward such citizen or entity, including equitable and speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, as required by international law, or fails to take steps designed to provide relief from such taxes, exactions, or conditions, as the case may be, and such suspension shall continue until he is satisfied that appropriate steps are being taken and no other provision of this Act shall be construed to authorize the President to waive the provisions of this subsection.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROVISION

Mr. Speaker, it is extremely difficult to assess accurately the effect that this amendment has had in the past few months toward encouraging settlement by Brazil or discouraging expropriation by others. However, I am certain that it has been powerful and salutary in the case of the expropriation of I.T. & T.'s properties. For example, a satisfactory agreement has been reached between the Government of Brazil and I.T. & T. Instead of the \$400,000 as initially proposed by the State of Rio Grande do Sul as full and just payment, I.T. & T. will receive \$7.3 million which is more closely related to the actual value of their holdings. One-half of the settlement was allowed to be repatriated in dollars and the remainder is to be reinvested locally by I.T. & T. in Standard Electrica S. A., its wholly owned Brazilian manufacturing subsidiary. I understand that this settlement is satisfactory to I.T. & T.

In the case of American and Foreign Power Corp.'s expropriation problem settlement has not been reached. I am informed, however, that the company and the Brazilian Government are moving toward agreement with respect to the company's Brazilian holdings and that the company considers progress to be satisfactory.

ASSISTANCE SUSPENDED

On February 8, 1963, the Department of State suspended development loans and technical assistance to Ceylon. From my study of the record, the determination made to suspend aid in this

case was entirely warranted by the facts. No mutually satisfactory negotiations were going on which might be considered appropriate steps under the law. The Ceylon Petroleum Act, authority for the expropriation, did not provide satisfactory procedures for arriving at a fair compensation, the means of payment or currency of payment. Ceylon's history on the expropriation issue generally, as well as their bargaining posture on this expropriation, in that no offer was made nor would they agree to arbitration, fully justified the suspension. The Department is to be commended for this forthright action. Food-for-peace programs are being continued, as well as training abroad for some 57 Ceylonese being financed from development grants under the Foreign Aid Act. The requirements of section 620(e) do not extend to food-for-peace assistance under Public Law 480. However, that section does apply to training assistance with development grants; therefore, the failure of the Government of Ceylon to act will require the speedy termination of these training programs.

In addition to those expropriations I have just enumerated, I am aware of several instances where countries enacting agrarian reform measures which were expropriatory in nature have been heavily influenced by the requirements of 620(e). When advised of the effect of this section as it would apply to them should they move under such agrarian reform law, either changes were made in the law or changes are being requested of the legislature.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I am satisfied that the enactment of these requirements by the Congress was a good thing. It furnishes a weapon with which the Department can protect American business interests, and, I believe, its effective implementation can very much serve the Department's interests. Amendments may be desirable, however, and they will be considered in connection with the foreign aid bill this year. We were told repeatedly that the Alliance for Progress and similar programs could not succeed without the flow of large amounts of private capital. This will be encouraged and made possible by the passage and application of the Adair-Hickenlooper amendment.

(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENSUS AND GOVERNMENT STATISTICS—COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT POINTS TO SAVINGS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS BY PURCHASING RATHER THAN LEASING ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROGERS of Florida). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Montana [Mr. OLSEN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss the possibility of saving the taxpayers and the Federal Government \$150