

the course of this statement, Wilson made a very cogent comment concerning the advantages of trial by jury:

I think I am not now to learn the advantages of a trial by jury. It has excellences that entitle it to a superiority over any other mode, in cases to which it is applicable.

Where jurors can be acquainted with the characters of the parties and the witnesses—where the whole cause can be brought within their knowledge and their view—I know no mode of investigation equal to that by a jury; they hear everything that is alleged; they not only hear the words, but they see and mark the features of the countenance; they can judge of weight due to such testimony; and moreover, it is a cheap and expeditious manner of distributing justice. There is another advantage annexed to the trial by jury; the jurors may indeed return a mistaken or ill-founded verdict, but their errors cannot be systematical. *Id.* at 516.

Whatever may be said against juries, James Wilson says, "Their errors cannot be systematical." Whenever the general government can be a party against a citizen, there is the need for the intervention of some agency whose "errors cannot be systematical."

Edmund Randolph spoke on the subject in the following manner to the ratifying convention in Virginia:

The trial by jury in criminal cases is secured—in civil cases it is not so expressly secured, as I could wish it; but it does not follow, that Congress has the power of taking away this privilege which is secured by the constitution of each State, and not given away by this Constitution—I have no fear on this subject—Congress must regulate it so as to suit every State. I will risk my property on the certainty, that they will institute the trial by jury in such manner as shall accommodate the conveniences of the inhabitants in every State; the difficulty of ascertaining this accommodation, was the principal cause of its not being provided for. Volume 3, Farrand page 309.

THE FIRST CONGRESS

One of the most authoritative sources of information on the meaning of the Constitution is to be found in the proceedings of the First Congress, which met in 1789, since so many of the Members of this body had also served as delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

This First Congress proposed to the States the amendments which have come to be known as the Bill of Rights.

On June 8, 1789, Mr. Madison, of Virginia, laid before the House of Representatives his proposals for amendments to the Constitution. Among these was the following:

Seventhly. That in article 3d, section 2, the third clause be struck out, and in its place be inserted the clauses following, to wit:

The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service, in time of war or public danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisites of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment, or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by

law be authorized in some other county of the same State, as near as may be to the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate. 1 Annals 435.

After some debate, the House referred Madison's proposed amendments to the Committee of the Whole. Subsequent action by the House and Senate can be traced in the journals of the two bodies: Volume 1, Annals pages 660, 665, 672, 755-60, 779, 71, 74, 77, 903, 905, 913, 88.

The final text of the amendment proposed to the States, and which became the sixth amendment, was as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses of his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The debates on these amendments proposed to the States in 1789 do not contain so much as a word suggesting that contempts not committed in the presence of a Federal court could be prosecuted other than by a jury trial.

COURT DECISIONS

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has often spoken in dicta about the defendant having no right to trial by jury in contempt proceedings, it appears that the Court has never actually sanctioned a denial of trial by jury to a defendant subject to criminal sanctions in a proceeding brought by the United States as an interested party, representing the public—until the decision of last week in the case from Mississippi, involving, among others, Governor Barnett, who had demanded a jury trial but had been denied that right.

A strong minority on the Court would grant the defendant a right to trial by jury in all proceedings for criminal contempt.

The word "contempt" covers a multitude of ideas. Many of the decisions dealing with the subject involve points not presented by the pending bill, H.R. 7152. The question is not whether a violation of an injunction obtained by the Attorney General should be called civil or criminal contempt, direct, or indirect or constructive contempt, or by any other particular label. The narrow and explicit question is whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to authorize the Attorney General to bring proceedings in the Federal courts in the name of the United States, in which proceedings the defendants may be fined and imprisoned, without according to the defendants a right to trial by jury, for acts committed outside the actual or constructive presence of the Federal courts.

The question of the inherent power of a court to punish contempt by some type

of proceeding, whether by jury trial or summary proceeding, as discussed in *United States v. Hudson v. Goodwin* (7 Cranch. 32 (1812)), and *Anderson v. Dunn* (6 Wheat. 204 (1821)), is not involved.

The question of the power of State courts to punish contempt summarily without violating the 14th amendment as presented in *Fisher v. Pace* (336 U.S. 155 (1949)), and *Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County* (134 U.S. 31 (1890)), is not involved.

The question of the power of a Federal court to punish summarily for a contempt committed in open court and in the presence of the judge, as in *Ex parte Terry* (128 U.S. 289 (1888)), is not involved.

The question of the right of appeal in the Federal judiciary from a contempt conviction, as presented in *Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co.* (194 U.S. 324 (1904)), is not involved.

The question of the inherent power of a court established by the Constitution to punish for contempt is not involved. This was the question presented by many of the State court decisions, sometimes cited as supporting legislation of the type embodied in the bill, H.R. 7152. *Watson v. Williams* (36 Miss. 331 (1858)); *Carter's case* (96 Va. 791, 32 S.E. 780 (1899)); *Bradley v. State* (111 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630 (1900)); *Ex parte McCown* (139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. (1905)).

The Supreme Court in *Ex parte Robinson* (19 Wall. 505 (1873)), recognized the power of Congress to regulate the exercise of contempt powers by the Federal courts, with the possible exception of the Supreme Court, including contempts in causes or hearings before the courts. The Court said:

The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice.

The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. But the power has been limited and defined by the act of Congress of March 2, 1831. The act, in terms applies to all courts; whether it can be held to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which derives its existence and powers from the Constitution, may perhaps be a matter of doubt. But that it applies to the circuit and district courts there can be no question. These courts were created by act of Congress.

Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The act of 1831 is, therefore, to them the law specifying the cases in which summary punishment for contempts may be inflicted. It limits the power of these courts in this respect to three classes of cases: First, where there has been misbehavior of a person in the presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; second, where there has been misbehavior of any officers of the courts in his official transactions; and, third, where there has been disobedience or resistance by any officer, party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or com-

mand of the courts. As thus seen the power of these courts in the punishment of contempts can only be exercised to insure order and decorum in their presence, to secure faithfulness on the part of their officers in their official transactions, and to enforce obedience to their lawful orders, judgments, and processes.

The law happily prescribes the punishment which the court can impose for contempts. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of 1787 declares that the court shall have power to punish contempts of their authority in any cause or hearing before them, by fine or imprisonment, at their discretion. The enactment is a limitation upon the manner in which the power shall be exercised, and must be held to be a negation of all other modes of punishment. The judgment of the court disbarring the petitioner, treated as a punishment for a contempt, was, therefore, unauthorized and void. (Id. at 510-12.)

The fact that the United States, as a disinterested party, may constitutionally exercise particular powers in order to secure justice in litigation between private parties, does not provide a precedent for granting the United States, as an interested party, precisely the same powers.

McNAMARA'S WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia yield, with the understanding that in doing so he will not lose his right to the floor, with the further understanding that this interruption will not count as a second speech when he resumes?

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to yield to the Senator from Oregon, under those conditions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NELSON in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, last night on a national television network, Mr. Walter Lippmann explored some of the changes that have overtaken the world and America's position in it since the end of World War II.

With respect to our present involvement in South Vietnam, Mr. Lippmann pointed out that it has long been a principle of American policy not to become involved in a land war on the continent of Asia.

I agree with Mr. Lippmann that this is a sound guide for us to follow; but I would also say it is a guide we should be following now with respect to South Vietnam.

To say that because this sound principle has been ignored to the extent that we have put 15,000 troops in South Vietnam does not mean we should maintain our position there no matter what the cost. Mr. Lippmann declares that for us to change our policy now in South Vietnam would mean a great loss of prestige for this country. But, the longer we must fight, and the more troops we must put in just to stay in the same place, the more prestige we are bound to lose.

France's prestige was never lower than while she was fighting to maintain herself in Indochina and Algeria. Since she

has extricated herself from those impossible endeavors, her prestige has gone steadily upward.

More important, as the costly status quo continues in South Vietnam, the American people will lose confidence in their Government. I am far more concerned about the prestige of the U.S. Government with its own people than I am about its standing in Asia.

Whatever prestige the United States stands to lose abroad by terminating its unilateral intervention in South Vietnam, the American people are not going to support an indefinite and expanding intervention there.

I invite the attention of the Senate to the statement reported in today's New York Times that the Secretary General of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization denies there is any military aggression in South Vietnam. I have been pointing that out for weeks in speeches on the floor of the Senate in opposition to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I have stated over and over again that this is a civil war. I have pointed out the undeniable fact to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense that not one single witness for the administration on the record, and not one single spokesman for the administration off the record, ever denied that this is a South Vietnamese conflict with South Vietnamese supporting the government and with South Vietnamese supporting what has become known as the Vietcong. There has never been any evidence submitted that there are any foreign soldiers in South Vietnam engaged in this civil war, except U.S. soldiers—no North Vietnamese soldiers, no Red Chinese soldiers, and no Russian soldiers. This is a South Vietnamese operation.

All that the administration witnesses have been able to disclose is that equipment used by the Vietcons is, for the most part—except for American equipment which they have captured from South Vietnam—either Red Chinese equipment or equipment that is manufactured in North Vietnam, or Russian equipment. We have furnished vast quantities of equipment to South Vietnam. The situation in that regard is almost as bad as when Chiang Kai-shek was in China and the Communists captured American equipment from him or, in a very interesting oriental operation, in some way, or some how, got it into their possession before it was even uncrated.

Whose equipment are the South Vietnamese using? It is 100-percent American equipment. We had better not start throwing stones on that issue. One of the replies that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense make in justifying McNamara's war in South Vietnam is to tell us that the South Vietnam Government invited us in. Senators know what we think about the excuse of Russia, when it tries to rationalize its presence in East Germany. It is that the East Germans invited the Russians in there.

Puppets have a way of doing that. That is one of the purposes of creating a puppet government. South Vietnam is a puppet government of the United

States. The United States is more responsible for the creation of the so-called South Vietnam Government than any other factor.

I continue to ask the question: What are we doing there? Why are we there? By what international law or right are we there? I am still waiting for the State Department to tell me, or for the Defense Department to tell me. In my judgment, the Defense Department has taken over State Department policy in South Vietnam. I do not believe the Defense Department should determine American policy in Asia. I think it is wrong. It ought to be changed.

It is very interesting that we now hear the Secretary General of SEATO deny that there is any military action in South Vietnam. The SEATO Secretary General is reported to have said in Manila, on Monday, that the struggle in South Vietnam is only an internal quarrel between two factions. Those who have been criticizing American foreign policy in South Vietnam have said "Just that."

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I did not understand who made that statement.

Mr. MORSE. The Secretary General of SEATO. The Secretary General of SEATO is from Thailand. Thailand borders on South Vietnam. It is a next-door neighbor. There is not one Thai soldier in South Vietnam. There is not one Thai dollar in there, either. One would think that if the civil war in South Vietnam were of such importance, as U.S. officials try to make out—and they are fooling the American people about it—Thailand would be concerned.

One would think that Australia would be concerned, as would New Zealand, Pakistan, and the Philippines. They are all in that area. They are doing nothing about it. For them the policy is hands-off. Let me repeat—and it is necessary to repeat this over and over again, until finally the American people will begin to understand the facts—that we are in there because of the SEATO treaty. That is the reed on which we are leaning. What part of the SEATO treaty are we leaning on? It is on the protocol agreement, attached to the SEATO treaty. The signatories to SEATO—New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Great Britain, France, and the United States—state in the protocol agreement that this is an area of mutual concern. South Vietnam, however, is not a signatory to SEATO. It is not a member of SEATO.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is any member of SEATO participating in this conflict in any way whatever, financially or militarily?

Mr. MORSE. None but the United States. This is a U.S. unilateral intervention in a civil war in southeast Asia. Our administration is trying to convince the American people that if we do not stay in there, and kill more American boys, communism will take over. That is so much "hogwash."

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Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is not the Senator from Oregon somewhat encouraged by the recent reports of the Secretary of Defense on the progress we are making and what we hope to do in the future?

Mr. MORSE. I was never so depressed. I was never so depressed as I was the other day when I listened to the Secretary of Defense. I appreciate his inviting me to the National Security Council meeting. I do not know why I was invited. I listened to the report by the Secretary of Defense. As I listened I kept saying to myself, "If all these things are true, what in the world are we doing in there?"

He made the greatest statement in support of our getting out of South Vietnam, and ended by urging that we go into a greater extent. That is the kind of mental gymnastics that I do not understand. But that is our position.

Senators have heard me say before that I do not criticize a policy unless I am willing to offer what I believe to be a substitute. I have offered the substitute over and over again. I cannot find any takers for it in the administration, but I cannot get any answers, either. I offer it again this evening on the floor of the Senate. The SEATO Ministers are meeting in Manila. I am waiting, wondering whether they will pass a resolution saying, "We are coming. We are coming in with you. We will put in our battalions."

I do not believe that the battalion approach is the way to settle the controversy. But if we are to take the military approach—and I do not believe we should—why do not our allies offer to do some of the dying?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. A battalion from any one of those countries would be a token contribution, would it not?

Mr. MORSE. Even one soldier would be a token contribution. I shall come in a moment to a discussion of whether the military approach is the approach to make. However, I point out that if we are to make the military approach—and that is the approach we are making—the SEATO nations in southeast Asia are not sufficiently interested in dying. If they are not interested in doing any of the dying, the situation is not of the serious import on the basis of which the Secretary of Defense is trying to sell it to the American people, as his rationalization of McNamara's war.

But my alternative is that the SEATO countries, the signatories to the SEATO treaty who entered into the protocol agreement at Manila—now assembled there—offer to have the SEATO organization take over the trouble spot in South Vietnam. That would give De Gaulle an opportunity to put up or shut up.

Do not forget the play that De Gaulle made a few short weeks ago. We did not have any blueprint. But with one diplomatic brush stroke, he put the United States in a very difficult spot. Senators

will remember that he announced that he thought South Vietnam ought to be neutralized. I do not know what he means. Who does? I want to find out.

I should like to know what De Gaulle's program is in South Vietnam. France's signature is on that treaty. That is why I offer this as the first alternative: "All right, SEATO. Come on in. Say that SEATO is going to carry out whatever obligations it has under the protocol agreement and offer to take over the administration and handling of the operation in South Vietnam."

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. There is no contention on the part of any of the SEATO countries that South Vietnam is an aggressor, is there?

Mr. MORSE. Oh, no. There is no aggression in Vietnam. It is only a family fight—fathers on one side, sons on another; brothers on one side, brothers on another; uncles on one side, nephews on another.

Mr. McCLELLAN. There is no claim that there is any danger to the area by reason of the nature of the activities or plans of aggression in South Vietnam?

Mr. MORSE. I could not say that there is no claim.

That is a part of this fabulous—

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am talking about a claim by the SEATO countries.

Mr. MORSE. Their silence is golden. They are waiting for our gold, however. They are not engaged in any discussion. They do not want to talk about this affair. But they want more aid.

Mr. McCLELLAN. SEATO countries?

Mr. MORSE. SEATO countries—Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines. They want our money. They want our gold. But they are maintaining a golden silence with respect to this affair. The talk by the Secretary General is the first mention of it in some time except De Gaulle's talk a few weeks ago when he talked about neutralization. I want to know what he means by "neutralization."

The Senator from Arkansas knows that one cannot understand my position about foreign policy unless he understands my deep conviction that in a situation such as this we ought to try to exhaust all the possibilities of reaching accord and a settlement without killing, through the application of what we claim to be our basic foreign policy in the trouble spots of the world; namely, the substitution of the rule of law for the jungle law of force.

That is what I am pleading for. Of course, I was trained in that concept by a great Republican—I think one of the greatest we have had in my 20 years in the Senate. He was my leader on foreign policy. He became one of the great internationalists in the Senate, after being one of the leading isolationists for many years. I speak of the late Arthur Vandenberg, of Michigan.

The other day I told the story about his changing from isolationism to internationalism when he became convinced that the atomic bomb would become a reality. He used to tell us that he real-

ized there was no longer any place for an isolationist in the Senate. He left us this unanswerable ideal criticism. It is an ideal criticism because it is not supposed to be practical. And because it is an ideal, it is a great practicality. It cannot be a practicality except in terms of an ideal put to work.

I want to apply it to South Vietnam. What a great opportunity we have to keep faith with all our prating. We ought to try, at least, to settle international disputes.

Senator Vandenberg used to say there would be no hope for permanent peace in the world until all the nations of the world were willing to establish a system of international justice through law, to the procedures of which they were willing to submit each and every issue that threatened the peace of the world for final and binding decision to be enforced by some international organization such as the United Nations.

I do not believe we can leave a heritage of freedom to our grandchildren unless we do a better job of trying to implement that great ideal. There is no better time to start than now. I receive much abuse and castigation because I favor making greater use of the international law procedures of the United Nations than the United States has been willing to advocate. I do not know whether those procedures will work or not; but we shall never know until we try. Trying does not mean that we will weaken our security.

I have voted in the Senate, and shall continue to vote in the Senate, for huge appropriations to keep my country strong, so that Russia and Red China will understand that they have everything to lose and nothing to gain by resorting to aggression against the United States. But I also know that if that should become our foreign policy, we should be sunk. If that should become the basic foreign policy of the United States, we should not have a chance of survival, in terms of trying, in the years not too far distant. If that should become our foreign policy, we should be headed straight to war. We would not survive a nuclear war; nor would our potential enemies. But that is not much consolation to the advocates of freedom.

So I favor remaining strong, so that no nation will dare to attack us. But I am against aggression on the part of the United States, too. I am against killing on the part of the United States in South Vietnam or anywhere else in the world. Our country must be able to demonstrate for the record of history that we can always be counted upon to resort to the peaceful procedures of international law for the settlement of international disputes.

So I continue to repeat what I have said many times. How many times? I do not know—a dozen or more times in the Senate in recent weeks. I shall repeat again that we ought to say to the SEATO nations: "Come in, sit down in conference, and try to arrive at a program for the handling of the trouble spot in the world known as South Vietnam."

If they do not want to cooperate; if De Gaulle, for example, does not want to put up or shut up; if Thailand, as I judge from the statement of the Secretary General of SEATO, which I have quoted, is not interested; if Pakistan is interested only in getting more military aid and economic aid to the tune of hundreds of millions more dollars; and if the Philippines want to take the same position; let us wash our hands of South Vietnam. Let us move out, and save the lives of American boys.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. What does the Senator from Oregon think would be the consequences if we withdrew our troops from South Vietnam?

Mr. MORSE. The Vietnamese would settle their differences. Those people are not militant. They do not want to fight. The people of southeast Asia are the most peaceable, lovable, happy-go-lucky, cheerful, live-by-the-day people in the world. But, of course, when we are giving them material benefits they never before dreamed of, what do we expect?

Mr. President, consider the amounts of money we have been pouring into South Vietnam, and also the amounts we have provided for the pay their soldiers have been receiving. It is sad to have any of them die; but is it not remarkable how long the fighting there has continued, with a relatively small number of casualties?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Do I correctly understand the Senators' statement to mean that the presence of our personnel over there is sustaining and prolonging the conflict?

Mr. MORSE. I so charge; and history will so record—to the shocking disgrace of the United States of America.

Mr. President, do Senators think I like to say that about a program of my country? Certainly I do not like to say it. But I have a responsibility as a Member of the U.S. Senate, and including my responsibility as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to express my honest views on the basis of the facts, as I see them; and I believe that our country could not sustain its record in South Vietnam before any impartial, international jury established to evaluate it. Furthermore, there will be such an impartial, international jury after all of us have left the scene. That jury will be composed of the historians who will write the record of the United States in South Vietnam; and it will be a record against the United States, not for our country.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I wish the Senator from Oregon to understand that I am not asking these questions for the purpose of being frivolous or in any sense to challenge the position of the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I understand.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Heretofore, I have heard him speak on the floor of the Senate on this subject. He serves on the Foreign Relations Committee; and therefore there is available to him, I am sure, information not available to me. So I am very much interested in his point of view and his opinions and recommendations.

In my opinion, all of us believe some change is needed in the situation in South Vietnam—whether to remove our personnel from South Vietnam or to really wage a war there and get it over with, I do not know. But so far as I can determine, the situation there does not give much satisfaction either to those who want our personnel to leave South Vietnam or to those who want our country to wage and win a war there. Instead, we are merely doing enough to keep the situation in the stage of conflict, but we are not willing to devote enough to it to be able to win it; neither do we seem to be willing to leave it. I am not criticizing the administration, but I should like to have a better understanding of that situation.

Mr. MORSE. I am trying to ascertain any reason the administration could give which would rebut the information I am placing in the Record.

We called representatives of the administration before our committee. Those gentlemen did not have any information which would answer the points which I and the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Gruening] and other Senators have been making on the floor of the Senate.

Before I conclude, I shall read some letters from American military personnel in South Vietnam. I wish to read them for the benefit of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara; I want him to have available all the information I can make available to him in regard to this situation.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield for another question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. A few days ago, I heard the Senator from Oregon—or perhaps it was the Senator from Alaska—state on the floor the amount of money the presence of our personnel in South Vietnam is costing, daily. What is the daily cost?

Mr. MORSE. The daily cost is \$1,500,000; and if McNamara is allowed to pay for the additional draft costs, that will increase the daily cost.

When we consider the amount of money we made available to France—\$1,500 million to France, at the time when she was losing the Indochina war; nevertheless, we provided all that money, to help France—we find that we have spent in this part of Asia, during the French debacle and since then, \$5,500 million. But France was thrown out; and a little prince in Cambodia kicked out the U.S. personnel.

In my judgment, we can never win in South Vietnam. In the situation which exists there, we cannot win. The internal situation there must be settled by

the South Vietnamese, among themselves.

The question asked by the Senator from Arkansas prompts me to make an additional comment about a point which I think we must keep in mind; namely, the nature of the operations in South Vietnam.

At our committee meeting, one of the witnesses was Mr. Gaud. The other day, when I went to the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, I had no intention of voting against approval of the nomination of Mr. Gaud, the Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development—at least, not until I heard him. Mr. Gaud had been Assistant Administrator for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in the State Department.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken] asked him a few questions. As I listened to the mental gymnastic, trapeze performance by Mr. Gaud, I said to myself, "Why are we considering this nomination?"

So I asked Mr. Gaud a few questions, one of which was:

What are we doing in South Vietnam?

He replied:

We were invited in.

When I raised the question of the puppet relationship, it became perfectly obvious to me that I was dealing with a witness who was not coming clean. Whenever I find a witness is not coming clean, I will vote against approval of his nomination. So in the committee, I voted against approval of his nomination.

He said we were invited in by the Republic of South Vietnam. Mr. President, I know something of the semantics used by the State Department; so I asked him whether he would discuss with the committee what he meant by his use of the word "Republic." I asked:

Do you mean that we are dealing with a country that is democratic or is based on freedom?

Of course he knew he could not say that.

That causes me to state that in South Vietnam we are dealing with a tyrannical military dictator; in South Vietnam we are trying to strengthen a tyranny. Do Senators think there are any human rights under the control there by that general-dictator?

The other day that dictator called me a traitor. Imagine that, Mr. President—that little tinhorn tyrant—military dictator in South Vietnam is supported by the Government of the United States. How come? He proceeded to call an elected Member of the United States Senate, one of the representatives of a free people, a traitor. I wonder whether he thought I was going to send him a bunch of roses.

I hear the whip say, "Portland roses."

I say to the Senator from Arkansas that one would think that if we were going to get ourselves into a controversy abroad, we would be supporting freedom and human rights and democratic processes. Has the Senator from Arkansas been surprised, when he has picked up

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the daily newspapers during the past several years, to discover that that little tinhorn tyrant in South Vietnam has had to do some recouping and some maneuvering and juggling because he has some trouble with his Cabinet?

I wonder if our Ambassador is helping him. The Ambassador should be called home to make a report. I do not believe he is doing a good job. I think it is a lousy job. The situation is growing worse under him.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the Senator from Oregon talking about the candidate for President?

Mr. MORSE. The Senator means the candidate of the other party?

Mr. McCLELLAN. Yes.

Mr. MORSE. I do not know who their candidates for President are. It makes no difference who they are. They do not have a prayer, and they know it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator has suggested that the Ambassador be called home.

Mr. MORSE. He ought to be called home for a report. He should never have been sent over there.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Other distinguished public officials also feel that the Ambassador should be called home.

Mr. MORSE. I understand. Some of our good friends running for the Republican nomination also believe he should come home and report.

I shall get on with my alternative.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I asked the Senator about the cost of the operation or war in South Vietnam. The Senator replied. I recall that a few days ago the Senator made some reference to the number of casualties in South Vietnam. He said that at that time he had not been able to procure information as to the number of casualties that we have suffered in that operation. Has the Senator been able to obtain such information?

Mr. MORSE. Not yet. We have asked for it. We know that more than 200 American boys have been killed in South Vietnam—in my judgment, needlessly and unjustifiably. In my judgment, not a one of them who gave his life in South Vietnam gave it for a good cause.

The Senator ought to read the editorials that have come into my office and read the editorials by which editorial writers, by "sticking their pens in my blood," thought they were going to bleed me.

I have said, and repeat again tonight—and I have been saying it on the platforms of America away from the floor of the Senate—that South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. I repeat that statement. More than 200 of them have been killed. If we escalate the war, there will be more casualties.

I say, "Watch out. Watch out." The trial balloon is up. We may escalate the war into North Vietnam before we

are through; but if we escalate the war to North Vietnam, we shall not do it alone with conventional American ground forces. We must do it with nuclear weapons. I believe that after the first nuclear bomb that we drop in connection with the South Vietnam McNamara war, we shall have few, if any, friends left among the free nations of the world. If we cannot even interest SEATO in coming in and trying to reach an accommodation in keeping with the processes of law for the settlement of that international dispute, where do we think we shall have any friends in Europe?

The second phase of my program for settling the South Vietnam situation in keeping with our professed dedication, at least, to the peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes which threaten the peace of the world is to take it to the United Nations. What in the world is wrong with that procedure? Sometimes in the Senate I gain the impression that if we have a simple program that is right, it is unacceptable because it is not complicated enough to confuse.

Sometimes it seems that the only foreign policy the United States can have is a complicated gobbledook program for which we need a half dozen interpreters to try to figure out its semantic meaning. It is designed to conceal simple principles that usually describe what is right.

What is wrong with taking the South Vietnam controversy to the United Nations? Will Senators tell me? We might be surprised. We might be able to reach an agreement in the United Nations by which a United Nations trusteeship could be set up for 10 or 30 years, until we could train a civil service, until we could do the educational training that would be necessary to develop an ability on the part of people to govern themselves. We could strengthen the seedbeds of economic freedom in South Vietnam so that the flower of political freedom could blossom. There cannot be political freedom in South Vietnam, in Latin America, or in any other underdeveloped area of the world until the people first enjoy economic freedom of choice for the individual. It is a truism. I have made that statement almost ad infinitum on the floor of the Senate, but Senators will hear it again and again and again, for there is no answer to it.

American foreign policy, so far as aid to underdeveloped areas of the world is concerned, must be based upon economic freedom, and helping those areas develop their economic freedom. We cannot develop economic freedom with bullets. We cannot develop economic freedom with Sherman tanks. We cannot develop economic freedom with fire bombs.

A little of the news got in the newspapers, but a remarkable coverup job has been done in America in recent days. We were caught flatfooted. We were caught with an American light plane inside of Cambodia, with American military personnel as well as South Vietnam personnel, dropping a fire bomb which destroyed a village and killed 16

people. We rushed for cover with apologies. We said, "It will not happen again."

Do Senators think that the apologies would have been forthcoming if we had not been caught? The Cambodians were able to shoot down our plane. That is how we were caught. But suppose that had been a successful flight, engineered with so-called American military advisers, who are really combat soldiers. I do not think we have any right to put our boys in that position. Suppose we had not been caught. Those same 16 Cambodians would have died. The same Cambodian village would have burned from that fire bomb. We were caught. Our Government was quick to announce, "No more fire bombs."

Mr. President, we shall witness one incident after another in South Vietnam until we get out.

I am greatly disturbed about the danger that we may escalate the war. I am greatly disturbed lest this country will continue to follow a unilateral course of action in South Vietnam that will lead to worsened conditions, and that finally some shocking catastrophe may happen and many American boys may be killed. Then the superpatriots will demand some kind of first-scale operation, and the holocaust will be on.

Hypothetical? Perhaps. But I think it is a very real possibility.

Now is the time to think about it. Now is the time to try to do something about it. Now is the time for those of us who feel as deeply as the senior Senator from Oregon feels about it to dare to stand up on the floor of the Senate and say so. Popularity contests are not won that way, in or out of the Senate, but one goes to bed at night satisfied that he did what he thought was his duty. I sleep much more comfortably knowing that I have raised my voice again in a plea for taking the problem to the United Nations. That is where we should take it. I do not know what we are waiting for.

If we are waiting for the trouble in South Vietnam to vanish, we shall wait a long time, so long as we stay in South Vietnam and continue to stir it up with mercenary pay and military pay. I would like to get the military aid out of there. For want of a better descriptive term, I would like to get some form of international trusteeship established. I would like to see my country stop supporting military tyrants. Under a military Fascist rule, there is no more freedom for the individual South Vietnamese than there is under Communist rule. They are equally bad and intolerable.

Yesterday's and today's newspapers indicate that the military tyrant in South Vietnam is having more trouble. This is an old pattern. Stop and reflect on the number of times there has been a juggling of military and government personnel in South Vietnam. The juggling continues. A group here and there will start organizing, conspiring, and contriving. We pick up a paper some morning and read either of a successful or unsuccessful coup.

Mr. President, they live on that. There is much dissent in many of the

hamlets in the so-called delta area. We ought to go down to some of those hamlets and take their arms away, although they got their arms in the first place because it was thought they would be loyal to the South Vietnamese Government and the U.S. Government.

We discovered, of course, that they were working in concert with the Vietcong. Among the Vietcong were some of their relatives, in some instances members of their families.

We cannot proceed under those conditions. There will continue to be a juggling and shuffling for new positions. We are supporting this sort of thing on a unilateral basis, making more and more enemies for ourselves around the world, losing more and more face.

I am somewhat amused by the suggestion which has been made that if the suggestion of the Senator from Alaska and the Senator from Oregon is followed, American prestige will suffer. We are losing more support and more face by supporting the little tyrant by McNamara's war in South Vietnam than we will ever lose by being honest with ourselves, by saying we are ready to resort to the peaceful procedures provided for in the charter to which our Government's signature is attached.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the able Senator from Oregon yield to me?

Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator knows the great respect I have for him, so I ask the Senator why he calls it "McNamara's war." It seems to me in peacetime and in normal times the Secretary of State handles foreign policy, with the advice and approval of the National Security Council. As the Senator knows, I have great respect for him, but I also have respect for the Secretary of Defense. I wonder sometimes, having read it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, why the Senator from Oregon constantly calls it "McNamara's war." Knowing of the justice and fairness of the Senator from Oregon, which I also observed when I testified before him when I was in the executive branch, I trust he understands the spirit in which I ask the question.

Mr. MORSE. I call it McNamara's war because, before the Senator from Missouri came to the Chamber, in the early part of my speech I said that in my opinion McNamara is the Secretary of State in southeast Asia. I believe Rusk has abdicated. Rusk merely follows McNamara. It is McNamara who is calling the shots in South Vietnam. It is McNamara's policies that are being followed. The four objectives that have been outlined as U.S. policy in South Vietnam did not come from Rusk. They came from McNamara.

I always believe both in giving a man credit and placing on his shoulders the responsibility when he is to blame. The South Vietnamese program is McNamara's program. I am not interested in Rusk's "me-too-isms" in regard to it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have respect both for the Secretary of State and for the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I would not want to enter into a discussion as to the relative merits of either; but based on my knowledge of the executive branch, no Secretary of Defense could operate without full consent of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council. I disagree with my friend. I believe McNamara is not the architect, although, because he is the operator, he has to be the bulldozer.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator heard him. He heard the testimony. The Senator heard him outline the program. The Senator heard the Secretary of State in effect say "Me, too," or, if the Senator likes a more polite phrase, "I second the motion."

That is exactly what has happened in regard to the South Vietnamese program. The South Vietnamese program is being called by the Pentagon and the rest of the administration is following it. I am trying to change that course of action, so I am pressing my honest convictions as to who is responsible to see if I cannot secure a change. I never give up hope.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator from Oregon yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I am delighted to yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. No Member of this body has more consistently fought for civilian control over the military than has the Senator from Oregon. I therefore suggest to the Senator that there may be some dichotomy of thought on his part, because of all the Secretaries of Defense who have worked for civilian control, I am confident he will agree with me that none has tried harder than the current Secretary of Defense.

Mr. MORSE. I did not mean to intimate that the Secretary of Defense is not in the saddle. There is no general in the saddle in the Pentagon. What I am saying is that the Secretary of Defense is surely in the saddle. He is galloping ahead with saber drawn, leading McNamara's war in South Vietnam. That is my position.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I trust he will give consideration to my observations, because he is a fair man.

Mr. MORSE. I always give consideration to the observations of the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my good friend, the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I am always hopeful that sooner or later I may persuade the good Senator from Missouri to my view. I am always hopeful. I never give up hope.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator often does persuade me; but in this particular case I would hope to persuade him.

Mr. MORSE. Please do not bar the doors of the wonderful intellect of the Senator from Missouri. Please keep them ajar until I can get through to him. I am perfectly willing to wait for that final discussion. Please do not bar those doors to me yet. Give me an opportunity.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator knows I would never try to close my mind to anything he had to say.

Mr. MORSE. I point out that I have outlined my program for a peaceful approach, and not a bullet approach, to South Vietnam, for an international law approach rather than a law of the jungle approach to South Vietnam, seeking to make it through SEATO, and if that fails, through the United Nations.

To continue with my argument on this problem, I have pointed out that the Secretary General under the SEATO treaty—who is a Thai—states that there is only an internal quarrel between two factions in South Vietnam.

His reported statement is indicative of the reluctance of the Asiatic nations to involve themselves in someone else's behalf in warfare, which might involve Red China.

According to reports of foreign aid spending for fiscal year 1963, the United States has spent \$280.8 million on regional aid in this part of the world. That was for military aid only. Approximately \$4 million or more was spent for economic aid. The footnote on the aid summary shows that the \$280.8 million figure included aid to Australia and New Zealand, furnished on a regional basis. The grand total of our military aid in that area, on a regional basis, since 1946, comes to \$1,510 million. Do not forget, that is grant money. That is giveaway money.

As I stated in my reply to the Ambassador to India, my good friend Chester Bowles, when he made his speech before the Press Club the other day, when he said that in connection with the AID program we had better stop playing God, I also suggested that he remember that we should stop playing Santa Claus as well. This is Santa Claus aid which the United States has been pouring into that part of the world. The only regional organization in that part of the world is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, known as SEATO. Besides the regional aid we have furnished, we are also furnishing hundreds of millions of dollars each year in military aid to certain individual members—namely, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. That is separate and distinct in what they receive.

Of course, we know what Pakistan will do with her aid. She is building up a vast military force for a potential war with India over Kashmir. If anyone believes she is building it up for a war against Red China, he could not be more wrong. Pakistan is opening her doors to Red China, entering into trade agreements and entering into airport landing agreements.

Although India is not a member of SEATO, we are pouring millions of dollars of military aid into India. What will it be used for? It will be used to fight Pakistan over Kashmir, if it is deemed necessary.

What a paradox—what irony. The United States is supplying 100 percent of the military equipment for Pakistan and India—building it up.

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The only possible use to which the aid will be put will be in fighting each other.

Perhaps some Senator can justify that procedure on moral grounds. I cannot do so. I have been heard to say before that if we cannot justify a policy on moral grounds, we cannot justify it at all. If we cannot justify a policy on the basis of its morality, we had better dump it. We cannot justify a policy of building up the military strength of Pakistan and India and placing them in a position in which they can kill large segments of their population over Kashmir, when the issue of Kashmir should be taken to the United Nations.

Here is another dispute that threatens the peace of the world, which should be subjected to the procedures of determination by international law.

What is wrong with that? I ask that question again.

It makes so much commonsense. It is morally unanswerable that we should be supporting it, not undercutting it.

In my judgment, the military aid we are giving to India and Pakistan is morally unjustifiable.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. Why did I lead the fight, along with two or three other Senators in the previous session, against the foreign aid bill? Not because I was against foreign aid, but because I am against that kind of foreign aid.

I am glad to yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. HILL. How much aid are we giving to India and Kashmir at the present time?

Mr. MORSE. I have not that information before me, but I will get it and place it in the RECORD. I believe we have given each country billions of dollars in aid since 1946. We have poured out more than \$100 billion of the taxpayers' money since 1946 in foreign aid, military and economic—but mostly military. Military aid is almost always an overwhelming percentage of grant money.

Does anyone believe that has stabilized the world? Does anyone believe that has tilled the seedbeds of economic freedom?

I am the chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin America. Does anyone believe that we have tilled the seedbeds of economic freedom in Latin America?

We flirted with one coup after another. We let a military junta overthrow a constitutional government in the Dominican Republic and after a certain period of time, when most people had forgotten about the Dominican Republic and it went off the headlines, we recognized it.

We let a military coup overturn the constitutional Government of Honduras a few days before an election was to be held, because the leading candidate on a democratic ticket—with a small "d"—believed in the American principle that the military should be brought under constitutional control with the President of the country as its Commander in Chief. That is a pretty good American doctrine, is it not? The Honduran military did not think so. Knowing that if he won the sound principle of constitutionalism would be established in Hon-

duras, they overthrew the Government. However, a little while later we recognized them.

At that time we had an Assistant Secretary of State by the name of Martin. He tried to distinguish between dictators as "good guys" and "bad guys." I never saw a good military dictator in my life, and no one else has, either. A military dictatorship means the end of civil liberties. It means the end of self-government. It means the end of economic and political freedom. It means that the citizens have become but pawns of the state.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. HILL. There is no separation of powers, no check and balance, is there?

Mr. MORSE. There is only one power.

Mr. HILL. No separation; only one power.

Mr. MORSE. Yes; and that is the dictatorship.

Mr. HILL. That is the dictatorship.

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Of course, Senators know what would happen to the Senator from Oregon if he were in Vietnam now. He would be liquidated. I said at the White House:

Do you know what would happen to the senator from Oregon if he were in South Vietnam? He would be liquidated.

That would happen, because they do not tolerate any criticism of the Government over there.

Let me say to the Senator from Missouri, before he leaves the Chamber, that McNamara, in conducting McNamara's war, is perfectly willing to support that kind of dictatorship. He is supporting that kind of dictatorship and he is now advocating that we pick up the check and pay for the military draft that is supposed to be put in effect over there. Does the fact that Rusk supports it too make the Senator from Missouri feel any better?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I should like to discuss the matter further with the Senator from Oregon. Unfortunately, I must leave the Chamber. It is always a privilege to discuss a subject with the Senator from Oregon. At another time, I look forward to discussing the problem with the Senator from Oregon, and perhaps our discussion will lead into an argument. I would look forward to it.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. MORSE. The only regional organization in that part of the world is the Southeast Asia Treat Organization. Besides this regional aid we have furnished under it, we are also furnishing hundreds of millions of dollars each year in military aid to certain of its individual members; namely, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan.

This is why I said here some days ago that SEATO is little more than a mechanism for extracting aid from the United States.

Mr. President, if they could not get

aid from us under SEATO, SEATO would be finished overnight. It is one of Dulles' gimmicks for extracting a great deal of money from the United States for the benefit of those countries. SEATO was a great mistake when Dulles proposed it. His "domino" theory was also a fallacy. There was never anything to it. Little Cambodia proved it. Even before Cambodia, it was proved by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and North Vietnam. They all proved it.

It is interesting to listen to the State Department officials talking about the Geneva accord of 1954. All the Geneva accord did was to quarter Indochina, to create South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Then there was the great Dulles brain-storm of the "domino theory." It was said we must go in there, we must pour the largess of the American taxpayers, because those countries are like a row of dominoes. The theory is that if one of these countries falls, they all go down. Bunkum. Pure bunkum. Events have proved how much bunkum it was.

Connected with the Dulles "domino theory" was Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. They have not gone over to communism. I do not say that they have gone over to democracy, either. They have not. Does anyone believe there is any democracy in Thailand? It is another monarchy, whose king sits on the throne at the sufferance of the military. We support the military.

Do American taxpayers know that we support the military in Thailand 100 percent? We pay the full cost of the Thia military organization. As I said the other day, I observed a great Thai military maneuver. It was held to show the result of our military aid to Thailand. I do not exaggerate very much when I say that I could have taken 10 American Boy Scout troops over there and whipped the whole Thai Army. If a film of that maneuver were shown in an American theater, it would be the subject of high comedy. Does anyone think they would be of help to American forces if our forces were engaged with them in fight against an enemy? The great problem would be for the American soldiers to get out of the way of the Thai troops before they were trampled to death as the Thai retreated.

We pour money into all those countries. We are not pouring it into armies that are willing to die for a cause.

It is a shocking waste. It ought to be stopped.

I want to help the Thai. I want to help the Pakistanis. I want to help India. However, I want to help them sow the seedbeds of economic freedom. I want to bring the economic freedom of choice to the masses of people, because I know that, according to history, will be the result. Every society in the history of mankind which has developed economic freedom of choice for the individual has become a free society.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I commend the Senator for the views he is expressing. I have shared those views for a long

time. As evidence of it, in the past 9 years I voted against all foreign aid. I voted against it not because I was against all foreign aid, but because of the kind of aid the Senator refers to.

I ask the Senator if he agrees with me that when we give aid some condition ought to be laid down that these countries must live up to; otherwise it is a complete giveaway, irrevocably and irretrievably.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Arkansas has been 100 percent right. I greatly appreciate the great support he gave me in the previous session of Congress as we tried to modify the foreign aid bill. The administration has now made a good start. It is not enough. We hope it will go further in this session.

The Senator is correct. I offered an amendment to end all foreign aid—stop it—wipe the slate clean—at the end of fiscal year 1965; and then start all over again on two major premises: First, that those who want foreign aid will come and apply for it. We have rammed down the economic gulleets and the military gulleets of some foreign countries, since 1946, foreign aid that they did not want, that they did not ask for, because of the human frailty that characterizes the human animal, and they could not turn it down. My amendment provided that we end it and start all over with two principles or guideposts. We would require that first they must apply for it on terms and conditions which we proscribe in order to qualify them as applicants; and, second, that we limit the aid to not more than 50 countries. Does the Senator know how many countries we are aiding now? One hundred and seven.

Mr. McCLELLAN. How many more are soon to be born that we will assist?

Mr. MORSE. That we do not know. We shall be economic midwives to them, if we do not watch out. There are only eight countries outside the Iron Curtain, down whose gulleets we have not rammed foreign aid.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Only eight?

Mr. MORSE. Only eight. If some of us had not made the fight—including the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN]—which we have been making, the State Department would have seen to it that those countries would be getting the taxpayers' dollars.

I would drastically cut military aid, and I would reorient foreign aid so as to follow the program which I suggested, and require a demonstration of economic feasibility on a project-to-project basis. I would have most of it based on loan money, not grant money.

What does the Senator from Arkansas have to do and what do I have to do when we want to get a reclamation project, or when we want to get a dam, or when we want to get a public works project?

He and I must present evidence that shows a cost-benefit ratio favorable to the project. I do not quarrel with that. We ought to be required to do it. Does the Senator think we do that in our foreign aid program? We build dams when any careful study of the project would show that the prospect of ever getting enough water behind the dam to warrant

its construction would be nil. We build roads which go nowhere. This is not the senior Senator from Oregon speaking. This is the Comptroller General of the United States.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. We must do much more than merely ask for a project. We must justify it by the best available expert testimony and show that it is economically justifiable.

Mr. MORSE. Of course.

Mr. McCLELLAN. In the countries where we are spending the money, no such requirement is made. I recall that some 7 or 8 years ago, the Committee on Government Operations and the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee investigated a project in Bolivia. An irrigation project was constructed where there was no water.

Mr. MORSE. There was no water at all.

Mr. McCLELLAN. That is correct.

Mr. MORSE. Do not be surprised at that. The Comptroller General is our watchdog. He is our agent. He is an officer of Congress. He has been trying to warn us for years as to what is going on in foreign aid. He has given us a pile of reports. And he does not mark them top secret. But they are marked "Top secret."

Does the Senator remember when I used the reports in a debate during the previous session? There was an 18-inch-high pile of reports showing the shocking waste in foreign aid, the failure to carry out the professed objectives of a given program, and also the existence of great corruption among governments in underdeveloped areas of the world. I announced in the Senate Chamber that the reports were available for Senators to read.

In my judgment, one of the main reasons there are the votes which occur on some amendments is that Senators accepted my invitation and read some of those reports. Senators came to me and said, "WAYNE, I had no idea this was going on. I have listened to you. I know your position. But I had no idea this was your backstop evidence."

I remember that I once said—because of what the Senator from Arkansas has said, perhaps I ought to say it again—that one of the reports from the Comptroller General showed that more than 200 hay balers were shipped into a desert country, where it would not be possible to grow a ton of hay in a hundred square miles. Yet there they were, rusting away, some of them not even uncrated, and absolutely no good to anybody. Somebody lined some pockets. I do not charge that American officials did, because I will say to the everlasting credit of American officials that I know of no evidence of any corruption on their part. There was bad judgment. But much corruption is created in other countries because of the exercise of bad judgment on the part of U.S. AID officials.

It is important that we now hear that the Secretary General of SEATO, a Thai, finds that the war in South Vietnam is

only an internal struggle between two factions. I do not disagree with him. I believe he is quite correct. But I also agree with General Khanh, the military tyrant of South Vietnam, when he calls SEATO a "paper tiger." He does not like it. He is not a booster for SEATO. He knows very well that if SEATO came in, he would go out.

He knows very well that an international jury, which the foreign ministers of the SEATO countries ought to be, because the signatures of their countries are attached to that treaty, could not very well support that tyrant's policies.

Probably in this instance both the Secretary General of SEATO and the military tyrant of South Vietnam are correct: SEATO has become a paper tiger. I wish it were not, if it could do any good. I should like to give SEATO a chance to prove whether it is a paper tiger. That is why I am urging my Government to try to make a resort to the SEATO organization in an attempt, at least, to end the killing in South Vietnam and restore some kind of order through a SEATO command, a SEATO trusteeship, or whatever can be agreed to by way of a SEATO pact for South Vietnam. We have no business getting into the middle of a civil war in South Vietnam. We have no business being a "sugar daddy" to a group of nations in southeast Asia that are strong for American intervention in Vietnam, but who want no part of the activity for themselves.

Unless the meeting of SEATO in Manila embarks on a joint SEATO policy toward South Vietnam and begins to deal with this threat to the peace in the one and only area it was created to deal with, the United States should get out of SEATO. At the very least, we should cancel our military and economic aid to it.

The only thing about SEATO that seems to work is its mimeograph machines. I receive an ample supply of publicity releases about its joint exercises with all-American equipment. Apparently that is all that the military establishments of these countries will ever do under SEATO—that is, to exercise their American equipment.

If there is a threat to peace in South Vietnam, SEATO should be dealing with it. That is its only reason for existence. The United States should not be dealing with it on a unilateral basis. If there is not a threat, but only an internal struggle between two factions, the United States has no business in South Vietnam, and should get out. Our present policy is only bleeding the United States financially and militarily.

Some days ago, on the floor of the Senate, I discussed a statement made in Manila by the President of the Philippines. He said that, by all means, the United States should stay in South Vietnam. There was no question about it. I was a little disturbed because that statement by the President of the Philippines did not continue and say that because the Philippines Government signed the SEATO Treaty, the Philippines would come in and help. He did not add that. So I respectfully—if none too politely—

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suggested, on the floor of the Senate, that I was not very much moved by that statement by the President of the Philippines; and I said I thought it would be more fitting if Filipino forces were in South Vietnam, doing a little of the dying and a little of the supporting. The President of the Philippines did not like that statement; and he had a few unkind words to say about the senior Senator from Oregon—which convinced me that I was right.

I received a letter from Jose F. Imperial, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Embassy of the Philippines. The letter reads as follows:

EMBASSY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Washington, D.C., March 31, 1964.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate of the United States,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I read with much interest your remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Senate, of March 26, 1964, titled "Answer to the Secretary of Defense."

On page 6258 of the RECORD is the following statement: "Your country's signature is on the SEATO Treaty. You have walked out, Mr. President of the Philippines; you have not lived up to your signature."

I am not aware, Mr. Senator, that the President of the Philippines has either "walked out" or that he has "not lived up" to the signature on the SEATO Treaty. South Vietnam is one of the protocol states. I am certain, Mr. Senator, you are also familiar with the fact that without the specific request of a protocol state, SEATO is powerless to intervene in the internal affairs of that country. Since SEATO is not involved in South Vietnam, and American assistance there is a unilateral action on the part of the United States, your strong remarks against the President of the Philippines is both unfair and unjustified.

Without counting the cost, Filipino boys fought side by side and died side by side with American boys in two World Wars and in Korea for the cause of freedom and human dignity. In the event that SEATO action should become necessary in South Vietnam please rest assured, Mr. Senator, that the Philippines will be there to the full limit of her treaty obligations.

Sincerely yours,

JOSE F. IMPERIAL,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from Oregon yield?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF). Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If there is no such obligation on the part of the SEATO countries—apparently that is what he was trying to state in his letter—and nothing which has developed in South Vietnam calls for the SEATO members to act to fulfill their signatures to the SEATO agreement, why is the United States called on to intervene unilaterally in South Vietnam?

Mr. MORSE. I point out that there is a "gimmick" in that gentleman's letter—namely, his statement that the Government of the Philippines never was asked to go into South Vietnam, whereas the United States was asked to go in.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Who asked the United States to go in? As I understand

the statement the Senator from Oregon is making, only the South Vietnamese Government asked the United States to go in there.

Mr. MORSE. We were asked to do that by a tyrant we put into power there in 1954—a man by the name of Diem. Let us remember that after France set up a puppet there, and after France was kicked out, we set up a puppet there—the late dictator Diem. And of course it was not difficult for us to get him to ask us to go in there—just as it was not difficult for the East Germans to ask the Russians to go into East Germany.

However, let me say, as a former professor of logic, that the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of the Philippines who wrote the letter to me would have flunked my course, if he wrote an examination paper which was as full of false assumptions, non sequiturs, and misstatements as the large number we find in the letter he sent to me. It will be noted that in his letter he admitted that South Vietnam is one of the protocol states; but he failed to state that SEATO had much to do in connection with that protocol state arrangement, because every nation which was signatory to the SEATO Treaty joined in the statement in the treaty that the signatories thereto recognized South Vietnam as an area of mutual concern and interest. Of course they pledged themselves, at that very time, to take an interest in South Vietnam—along with the United States. We have kept our pledge—although I think we have carried it out very poorly and unfortunately. But the point is that the Philippine Government and every other government which signed the SEATO Treaty should have been in South Vietnam with us, trying to work out there, with us, under the protocol agreement they joined in placing in the SEATO Treaty, an agreement involving South Vietnam—a peaceful handling of the controversy which has arisen, in South Vietnam.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Then, if I correctly understand, whatever obligation the United States may have had to be in South Vietnam stemmed from the fact that the United States was a party to the SEATO Treaty; is that correct?

Mr. MORSE. Yes, that is the only international-law need we have to lean on; and the same obligation exists with respect to every other nation signatory to that treaty.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Is it true that there is no other obligation, in that connection, that has been incurred by the United States, other than through our signature of the SEATO Treaty?

Mr. MORSE. That is correct.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If I correctly understand, every signatory to that treaty is under as much obligation to be in South Vietnam tonight as the American troops are. Is that correct?

Mr. MORSE. That is my position; and the escape hatch that McNamara and the State Department are trying to use—mainly, that Diem asked us to come in—is, in my judgment, an arrangement of convenience.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Were we under any obligation to go in there?

Mr. MORSE. Only as a member of SEATO.

Mr. McCLELLAN. If we had an obligation to respond to that invitation, it seems to me that all the other signatories to the SEATO Treaty had the same obligation.

Mr. MORSE. Certainly they did. Not only that, but when we did respond to that invitation, every other signatory to the SEATO Treaty should have asked us, "What are you up to? What do you propose to do? What are you doing in there?"

In this matter we bound ourselves in regard to mutual concern. In that case, what happened to Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, France, and the other countries? I do not know; I never have been able to find out. But I believe we can take judicial notice of the fact that they merely took the position that if Uncle Sam was willing to spend his money and blood there, let him do it.

Of course that happens all around the world; as long as the United States is willing to "pick up the checks" and the responsibilities, the other countries will let us do it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. They will say, "Let you and him fight."

Mr. MORSE. Of course, as the Senator from Arkansas has said, they will reply, "Let you and him fight."

We poured out over \$100 million.

In response to the letter I received from that Filipino diplomat, I dispatched the following letter:

APRIL 6, 1964.

HON. JOSE F. IMPERIAL,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Philippines, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your letter of March 31.

I completely disagree with the rationalizations set forth in the letter. The fact remains that the Government of the Philippines signed the SEATO Treaty. It, like the other signatories of the treaty, has exercised no leadership in trying to resolve the civil war in South Vietnam short of military action. Until your President exercises such leadership, I shall continue to point out that he, along with the other signatories of the treaty, have walked out on their clear responsibilities to seek a peaceful solution to issues that threaten the peace in South Vietnam.

I recognize and have paid tribute to the fact that Filipino boys have fought along beside American boys in past wars, but there are no Filipino boys in Filipino uniforms dying in South Vietnam these days.

I am enclosing tear sheets from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, containing the references I have made to the President of your country and to the policies of your country. I assure you that I stand on every word I have spoken in criticism of your President and your country.

Yours respectfully,

WAYNE MORSE.

Mr. President, I now repeat, all the criticism that I have heretofore made of the failure of the Philippine Government to live up to what I consider to be their clear obligations under the SEATO Treaty, and I now incorporate in that criticism, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, Great Britain, and

France. The only one, I believe, who has made a gesture on the question is De Gaulle. The trouble is that we do not know what he means, and I wish to give him an opportunity to clarify his position. I wish to give him an opportunity to expound, amplify, and define. I do not believe we can do so except through SEATO.

There was a little criticism of my position on South Vietnam from an American Legion Post, Southeast Post No. 146, American Legion, Department of Oregon, signed by Don E. Johnson, Americanism Chairman, District 8, Post No. 146, American Legion, Field Box 7013, Portland, Oreg., 97219.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter, including the listing of the officers of the post, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOUTHEAST POST No. 146,
AMERICAN LEGION,
DEPARTMENT OF OREGON,
Portland, Oreg., March 30, 1964.

Subject: Your picture—Peoples' World.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SENATOR MORSE: Do you think that the patriotic, well-informed citizens of the State of Oregon appreciate your smiling picture on the front page of the Peoples' World, dated Saturday, March 28, 1964?

Yours very truly,

DON E. JOHNSON,
Americanism Chairman, District 8, and
Post 146, American Legion, Portland,
Oreg.

OFFICERS 1963-64

Dan E. Mosee, commander.
Alfred G. Rouse, first vice commander.
Roy L. Axt, second vice commander.
John E. Shapland, adjutant.
Don E. Johnson, assistant adjutant.
Willard G. Hoard, finance officer.
Clarence D. Griffiths, junior past commander.
George F. Payne, chaplain.
Earl F. Olson, historian.
William J. Kirkland, service officer.
Charles R. Crisp, sergeant at arms.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

A. A. Esau, Ervin R. Johnson, Herb Smith,
Norman LePoideuin, Bernard Anderson, Harold
Widman, Jr., and Jack Stewart.

PAST COMMANDERS

Herbert A. Peterson, 1946-47.
Gordon O. Auburn, 1947-48.
Ronald E. Callbeck, 1948-49.
Albert H. Boss, 1949-50.
Donald M. Lehman, 1950-51.
Ralph W. Kaufman, 1951-52.
Willard G. Hoard, 1952-53.
George O. Nelson, 1953-54.
Irvin R. Johnson, 1954-55.
Orville W. Reynolds, 1955-56.
William J. Kirkland, 1956-57.
Robert C. Jones, 1957-58.
Clinton H. Fromm, 1958-59.
William F. Bower, 1959-60.
Peter B. Lang, 1960-61.
Irvin R. Johnson, 1961-62.
Clarence D. Griffiths, 1962-63.
Dan E. Mosee, 1963-64.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to complete my discussion of the letter I received from the chairman of the Committee on Americanism of Southeast Post No. 146 of the American Legion in Portland, Oreg. The letter reads:

Subject: Your picture—Peoples' World.
HON. SENATOR MORSE: Do you think that the patriotic, well-informed citizens of the State of Oregon appreciate your smiling picture on the front page of the Peoples' World, dated Saturday, March 28, 1964?

Yours very truly,

DON E. JOHNSON.

I responded to the chairman of the Americanism Committee of the Southeast Post No. 146 of the American Legion of Portland, Oreg., as follows:

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: I have received your letter of March 30.

I would be interested in knowing what in the world you think I had to do with my picture being on the front page of the Peoples' World. Do you mean to tell me that you have duped yourself with the guilt by association philosophy? What nonsense.

Yours truly,

One cannot take my position on South Vietnam and not receive mail of that type, because the people who write such mail are not interested in the facts. Seldom do they give evidence that they resort to thinking of great abstract principles of government that keep us free.

When a Senator fights in the Senate to have his Government keep faith with the great ideal that this country should resort to the rule of law—which we say we do—instead of the jungle law of force for the settlement of disputes, and then says it should be applied to South Vietnam, and says, quite frankly and undeniably, that this country is not doing it there, one expects people to write letters such as this. But it is a part of the liabilities that go with the position one holds in this body, and I do not intend to be deterred by mail of that type. I intend to continue to press my administration for some answers to the questions I have been raising.

I have another letter I wish to read. It is similar to the 200 or more letters I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a few days ago, from every State in the Union, and from officers, privates, and sergeants of our Military Establishment in South Vietnam, in support of the position I am taking on South Vietnam. I said before that those letters would have to be published without disclosing their signatures. I said the letters were available for Senators to read, and I said the letters were available to the White House to read, if the White House wanted to read them. But, knowing the military as I do, I know what would probably happen to any officer in South Vietnam who wrote a letter of encouragement and support to the senior Senator from Oregon in regard to his position toward American foreign policy in South Vietnam. So the Official Reporter will please eliminate the name or any identification mark, and return the letter to my office uncut.

The letter reads as follows:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I thought you might note the enclosed article clipped from today's Saigon Post. Also enclosed is the Vietnamese press version of Ambassador Lodge's and Mr. McNamara's statements. It seems that policies as usual are still undecided.

The small article on the L-19 crash, of which the lieutenant has died, shows what some of our military aid in southeast Asia has done for us. As you will note he was

shot down by Cambodian T-28 fighters. This is a case of some of our foreign aid coming back to us in the form of death to our own troops. This is just one of many instances.

I trust you will find these articles of interest.

Yours truly,

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the articles that the member of our Military Establishment in Saigon sent to me also be incorporated at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 1964]

U.S. AIR FORCE L-19 MISSING WITH TWO ABOARD—KHMER-DOWNED U.S. PILOT DIES

A U.S. Air Force L-19 observation plane has been reported missing in Quang Tri Province since Wednesday with two American pilots aboard according to American military sources.

The plane took off from Khe Sanh at 2:15 p.m. for a 2-hour reconnaissance flight. It carried enough gas for approximately 3 hours and 40 minutes of flight.

When the aircraft did not return to Khe Sanh as scheduled, a ground communications check failed to reveal any information on its status. Darkness and bad weather in the area prevented any immediate airborne search.

No emergency messages or position reports were received from the aircraft after it took off. The general area of the L-19's proposed flight plan was searched Thursday by 18 fixed-wing aircraft.

Due to bad weather in the area, the search could not be started until 11:10 a.m.

Two H-34 helicopters are on standby for medical evacuation purposes and 12 other H-34's are on alert to fly troops in to secure the area when the missing plane is located.

The pilot is assigned to the U.S. Air Force and the observer is a U.S. Army officer.

The sources also reported that the U.S. Air Force first lieutenant who piloted the Vietnam Air Force L-19 observation plane shot down by Cambodian fighter planes March 19 died Wednesday at the Clark Air Base hospital in the Philippines.

The pilot was evacuated to Clark on Tuesday; at that time he was still in critical condition with multiple injuries.

The L-19 crashed in Kien Tuong Province about 2.5 miles this side of the Cambodian border after being fired on by two Cambodian T-28 fighters painted gray with red tails.

[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 1964]

U.S. PULLOUT DISASTROUS; VICTORY SURE, LODGE SAYS—LOSS OF VIETNAM WOULD ENDANGER FREEDOM OF 240 MILLION PEOPLE

U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said Thursday that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam would be disastrous and that neutralization of the country at this time would be "the complete equivalent of Communist victory."

The Ambassador also said, in prepared answers to questions put by Associated Press that persistent execution of existing civil-political and military plans under Gen. Nguyen Khanh will bring victory—provided the hostile influences stay within bounds.

The loss of South Vietnam to the Communists would be a clear success for Communist China, which wants to turn Vietnam into a satellite, and would endanger a vast area of Asia in which 240 million people live, he said.

This is the reason why the freedom of South Vietnam is so important to the United States, the Ambassador pointed out.

"South Vietnam is the hub of an area which is bounded on the northeast and east by Formosa and the Philippines, on the south

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

by Indonesia and on the west by Borneo. Communist seizure of South Vietnam would put the Communist squarely into the middle of southeast Asia, whence they could radiate all over," he said.

The loss of South Vietnam would have an incalculable effect on Cambodia and Laos, with strong repercussions further west in Thailand and Burma, he added. It would shake Malaysia to the south, it would surely threaten Indonesia. If Indonesia were unable or unwilling to resist, the Chinese Communists would be on the front doorstep of Australia.

Eastward, the repercussions for the Philippines and for Formosa would be severe, he said. Therefore, when we speak of southeast Asia, we are not talking of some small neck of the woods, but of an area about 2,300 miles long from north to south and 3,000 miles wide from east to west with about 240 million people.

"If the Communist Chinese, using North Vietnam as a catspaw, were able to take over South Vietnam, it would be interpreted as a vindication of the fanatic Chinese methods over that of the Soviets. It would also be regarded in the free world as reflecting a general lack of ability, a lack of willpower by the United States to prevent Communist aggression," he said.

The Ambassador dismissed current criticism about the war being in a stalemate with little gain by either side. He said that under General Khanh a new and much stronger situation is being created which means that in the Army bravery is being rewarded. "I believe that persistent execution of the existing civil-political and military plans will bring victory—provided the hostile external influences stay within bounds," he added.

Commenting on suggestions that the U.S. troops withdraw immediately, the Ambassador said that some U.S. troops which are performing specific missions can be withdrawn as soon as their missions are completed. "But a general withdrawal of the United States at this time would be disastrous," he reasoned. "We and the Vietnamese have built a strong position here."

He said that the cost to the United States in dollars per year is less than it cost to build one airplane carrier. "For us to throw away this joint investment, for which brave men have laid down their lives, would be imprudent," he emphasized.

The Ambassador scored the idea of neutralism as proposed by France, as the complete equivalent to Communist victory under present circumstances.

"In fact," he said, "the Communists in describing their idea of victory always use the word 'neutralism'. But they apply it exclusively to South Vietnam and not to the North."

He said that before discussing any kind of new relationship between North and South Vietnam, the North should stop aggression against the South.

No conversations with North Vietnam are even conceivable while this interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs is going on. "They must withdraw immediately," he pointed out.

The minute they do so, there will be peace he concluded.

[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 28, 1964]

**MORE MEN, GUNS, PLANES FOR VIETNAM—
McNAMARA: HIT-HANOI PLAN NOT SHELVED**

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara Thursday night said that the United States will help the Republic of Vietnam expand its land and air forces to press its war against the Communist Vietcong. At the same time, he did not specifically rule out the possibility of direct South Vietnamese military action against North Vietnam.

Speaking at the annual James Forrestal memorial dinner in Washington, named in honor of America's World War II Secretary

of War, McNamara said that President Johnson approved 12 recommendations which he and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, following their 5-day visit here early this month.

The Secretary did not spell out in complete detail what the 12 recommendations were, but mentioned the following:

He again reaffirmed U.S. support for the Government of South Vietnam in carrying out its anti-insurgency plan. Under the plan, he said, Prime Minister Gen. Nguyen Khanh intends to supplement a national mobilization plan program to mobilize all national resources in the struggle.

The Secretary said that the quality of the "new life" hamlets will be improved, and will be built systematically outward from secure areas and over-extension will be corrected.

The security forces will be increased by at least 50,000 men. The present strength of all regular and paramilitary forces is now about 400,000. The armed forces will be consolidated and their effectiveness and conditions of service will be improved, he announced. "We will provide required additional material," he said. "This will include strengthening the Vietnamese Air Force with better aircraft and improving the mobility of the ground forces."

McNamara made the rural problem the focal point of his speech. He said that a broad national program is to be carried out, giving priority to rural needs. He announced the imminent establishment of an administrative corps which will include teachers, health technicians, agriculture workers and other technicians. The initial goal during the year 1964 will be at least 7,500 additional persons, he disclosed, with the ultimate goal being at least 40,000 technicians for the more than 8,000 hamlets in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces.

The Secretary touched on the topic of carrying the war to North Vietnam. He said it was one of the options before President Johnson in the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.

He said: "This course of action—its implications and ways of carrying it out—has been carefully studied. Whatever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Vietnam's own borders."

McNamara ruled out two other options for dealing with the Vietnamese problem. He totally rejected the notion that the United States withdraw its help, and he said the proposal for the neutralization of Vietnam would, in reality, be an interim device to permit Communist consolidation and eventual takeover.

McNamara noted that both North Vietnam and Communist China regard their battle for South Vietnam as a test case for the new Communist strategy. But he noted that they have different objectives. Hanoi's objective is limited to a mere conquest of the south, he said, while Peiping would regard Hanoi's victory as a first step toward eventual hegemony over the two, Vietnam and southeast Asia.

America's goal, McNamara said, is peace and stability, both in Vietnam and southeast Asia. "When the day comes when we can safely withdraw, we can expect to leave an independent and stable Vietnam, rich with resources and bright with prospects for contributing to the peace and prosperity of southeast Asia and the world," he concluded.

ONE-STAR RANK CREATED IN VIETNAM ARMY

A new rank, a one-star general has been created within the Vietnamese Army, it was authoritatively reported yesterday.

The source said the officers getting this new rank will be between a full colonel and the present brigadier general. Just why the move has been made is not known.

In Vietnamese, according to the source, the rank is "chuan tuong."

English translation of the rank is a problem since the Vietnamese brigadier general or "thieu tuong" has two stars, the major general, three, and the lieutenant general, four. So what can this new rank be called in English?

What about "junior general" for Vietnam's future one-star officers?

[From the Saigon Post, Mar. 30, 1964]

**NO BIG POWER BACKDROP FOR KHMER TALKS—
P.M.—U.S. SENATOR INVITED FOR LOOK-SEE**

Prime Minister Gen. Nguyen Khanh on Saturday apparently tried to dissuade Cambodia from demanding a Geneva conference to guarantee its neutrality as a prerequisite for resumption of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border talks postponed early last week.

The Prime Minister said Cambodia and Vietnam are independent countries having complete sovereignty and when it comes to matters only concerning our two countries, we should settle them between ourselves without having recourse to the patronage of any outside country or seek any guarantee other than the sincerity and friendship of two fraternal people.

After pledging "strict respect for all agreements" the two governments may sign "in full freedom of action," he said the Vietnamese people "are ready to welcome" a Cambodian delegation which Prince Sihanouk recently said he might send to Saigon.

General Khanh said he and his government understood Cambodian indignation over the Chantrea bombing, and we have shown to the world that we know how to accept our responsibilities.

"If Vietnam and Cambodia now self-reliantly solve the common problems between the two nations, they will directly and effectively contribute to the maintenance of peace in southeast Asia and at the same time win the esteem of the whole world for the Cambodian and Vietnamese people," he added.

General Khanh made this statement at a 45-minute planeside press conference after presiding over the end of a course for observation pilots at Nha Trang Air Base.

Before inviting newsmen to ask questions, General Khanh made known the press conference had to be held in Nha Trang because he had to fly to Central Vietnam on an inspection trip immediately after.

Asked to comment on Prince Sihanouk's most recent attitude in the light of his "guarantee Cambodian neutrality first" statement, the Prime Minister said:

"On the basis of that statement, I asked myself why our two nations can't get together directly to settle their common problems without always relying on some great powers standing beside them? On my honor I can guarantee that Vietnam will respect all the agreements it may sign with Cambodia."

"At this point I also want to answer a rumor in the press that in the Cambodian incident, the Vietnamese Government acted on the recommendation of the United States. I want to make clear that the Government and myself made the decision ourselves without any advice from outside."

"On the other hand, one paper said to make concessions to Cambodia was a shame to our nation. They said that because they didn't understand the matter. Actually as far as force goes we are stronger than Cambodia and precisely because of this strength we must show modesty and peaceful intentions. On the contrary, we cannot have the same attitude towards a country stronger than us, as France for example."

For these reasons I want to repeat that the Vietnamese Government is striving to re-establish normal relations with Cambodia on an equal basis.

In reply to another question, he said he knew nothing of Cambodia's intention to exhibit the Chantrea victims' bodies but admitted that damage done to the Cambodian border village was heavy.

"Just imagine that a 1-ton bomb makes a crater 35 feet wide and you'd realize," he drifted off in a visibly moved mood.

Asked to comment on a recent statement by U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara that extension of the war to North Vietnam is not entirely ruled out, the Prime Minister said that was "a question of grand strategy, and the enemy always would like to know what's in our minds."

"All I can say as a general is that to be on the defensive is to lose and to be on the offensive is to win.

"However, military actions above the 17th parallel have important international implications and I can't answer you in detail. I can only let you know that we can repay Communist aggression, and there are many ways we can do that, not only with flags flying and drums beating."

KNOW BETTER

In answer to a newsmen's question about his reaction to a recent statement by a U.S. Senator (WAYNE MORSE of Oregon) to the effect that all South Vietnam "isn't worth the blood of one American soldier," General Khanh said:

"If I were an American citizen, I would never vote for such a Congressman. Because the Americans in Vietnam are fighting for a just cause—freedom—to oppose the international Communists' invasion of a small nation.

"I am ready to invite that Congressman to come and live here with the Americans in the field. Then he will know better."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, how right he is about some of that military aid coming back to us. I referred previously to the incident when a small military plane was caught dropping a fire bomb inside Cambodia, which course of conduct could not possibly be justified on humane grounds.

Mr. President, I have another letter. Tomorrow, or next day, or the day after, or in the near future, I shall have another collection of letters to put in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, many of them from South Vietnam. News has reached there that some of us in the Senate dare to speak out in opposition to this policy. So I am hearing from them.

The next letter, Mr. President, is dated April 1, and reads as follows:

DEAR SIR: Today I read an article about you in the Pacific Stars and Stripes. I'd like to congratulate you and say I'm behind you 100 percent. Many others here share your viewpoints.

You "hit the nail on the head" about the statement aimed at the Philippine President. We are the only ones here sitting as targets for the Communists. Believe me, the Reds are hitting those targets too. And then they say we're not actually "in" the cold(?) war.

I also believe in the fact that the Commander in Chief should speak up. He's evaded the situation long enough. I believe this whole thing is a political scandal which is a 100-percent flop. It's all a political battle in the U.S. offices.

As for the flag flying at half mast; it'd be at half mast for many, many days.

I also believe McNamara should've spent some of his time here talking to the American GI's while he toured the field. No, he spent it all with the Vietnamese and the big U.S. officials who probably "snowed" him. If he actually knew the situation, maybe he'd change his viewpoints.

The administration should stop and think of all of our supplies that are being shot right back at us.

Sir, I appreciated your article very much. It helped many of us that read it. We're glad to know someone sees things right. Nine out of ten of the GI's go along with my feelings.

Again I say "Thank you" for the support. Keep up the fight. The righteous wins.

P.S.—I'd appreciate acknowledgement if possible.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled, "Saigon Criticizes Position of SEATO," written by Jacques Nevard, and published in the New York Times for April 9, 1964.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SAIGON CRITICIZES POSITION OF SEATO—SAYS BAN ON MEETING COVERT AGGRESSION HAMMERS IT

(By Jacques Nevard)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, April 8.—South Vietnam said today that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was running the risk of becoming a "paper tiger," because it considered its role limited to prevention of open aggression by Communists.

A statement issued by the government of Premier Nguyen Khanh said that the subversive struggle being waged by the Chinese Communists "does not require frontal attack, uniformed soldiers, or even a battlefront."

The criticism of SEATO was a result of reports here that Konthi Suphamongkhon, Secretary General of the eight-nation pact, said Monday in Manila that there was no military aggression in South Vietnam and that the struggle there was only an internal quarrel between two factions.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET

The Secretary General, a Thai citizen, was interviewed on his arrival in the Philippines for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the SEATO nations—Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States.

A protocol to the 1954 treaty that established the alliance provided an umbrella of protection for South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although they are not members.

In a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry, South Vietnam said that never in the nearly 10 years since the beginning of the alliance had the Chinese Communists committed open aggression, "except perhaps in the case of the Indian frontier."

The statement said that "instead of armed struggle," the Communists "preferred by far an intensive propaganda campaign in extremist groups in newly independent countries, thus creating unyielding infiltrators more dangerous in the long run for seizing power than a battalion of soldiers."

CLASSIC IDEAS OBSOLETE

The Foreign Ministry said: "In another order of ideas, the classic concept of aggressive war, or rather traditional terminology in military matters, risks being obsolete. International law, which governs our treaties, conceives of aggressive war in the form of a frontal attack launched by a uniformed army. But the subversive struggle invented by the Communists, designed for wars of liberation, does not require a frontal attack, uniformed soldiers, or even a battlefront. How, in such cases, can one talk about war and aggression, much less about intervention and armistice?"

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have other material here, but the Senator from Nevada [Mr. BIBLE] has arrived in the Chamber. I understand that we

are to take up another subject matter tonight—I am not too sure whether there has been a change in the plan, but this is my speech on McNamara's war in South Vietnam for today. There will probably be another one tomorrow and the day after, so long as the administration continues to follow a course of action which I believe is as unsound as America's unilateral action in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I had intended to discuss the pending bill some time today, but circumstances have intervened. Other Senators have been recognized by the Chair and have occupied the time until this late hour. I understand, too, that some agreement or arrangement was made whereby it was understood that there would not be another quorum call tonight. I believe that arrangement was made to accommodate a number of Senators who are now absent and who desire to be absent.

Under the conditions which prevail, it would hardly be expected that I would make a lengthy address this evening on this important proposed legislation with the Chamber completely empty except for two Senators of the majority party who are now present, besides the occupant of the chair, and with the membership of the minority party, except one, absent attending some repast, some enjoyable dinner. I hope that when I speak on the measure I shall have the presence of some of our distinguished friends across the aisle as well as some of my own colleagues.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. BENNETT. I wish to make the observation that even Republicans must eat, though the fare is sometimes a little bit scanty.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am in favor of that, and I think we ought to recess immediately so that we can all eat. I do not believe it is fair to permit only the Republicans to eat with the understanding that there will be no quorum call. While they dine, some of us must carry on. As soon as the distinguished Senator from Oregon returns and finishes his remarks, it would be very fitting and very becoming to the dignity of this body for the Senate then to recess under the previous order until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning—so I look forward to that moment that I think would be appropriate under the conditions that now prevail.

Mr. President, I spoke on the motion to consider the bill on the 12th day of March. One day from now that will be a calendar month ago. I have been prepared to speak on the bill each day subsequent to that day. The reason I have not is that I have had very little opportunity to do so. I have been crowded off the stage. The supporters of the measure have taken up a great deal of the available time—and rightly so. But to date I have been almost a little peeved at times because I could not get to speak routinely as the day arrived