

1964

Federal highway projects are financed out of the highway trust fund, and are not involved in the difficulties being experienced by the general fund of the Treasury. Therefore they are excluded from this discussion.

Exclusive of highways and projects related to military functions, new direct Federal civil public works alone proposed in the 1965 budget would cost \$2 billion to complete (budget document, p. 386). Funds for these projects in 1965 are in numerous accounts throughout the budget.

The budget proposals for new appropriations and other spending authority totaling \$103.8 billion could and should be reduced by upward of a billion dollars through postponing starts on new public works projects which are not urgent.

In addition, for economy and efficiency, and elimination of waste and extravagance, the \$10.2 billion reduction in appropriations and other spending authority generally includes a 10 percent cut in new money for Federal civilian construction projects already underway.

There is no doubt about the fact that the \$103.8 billion in requests for new appropriations and other obligational authority could and should be reduced by at least \$2.7 billion in the interest of efficiency, and economy, and the elimination of waste and extravagance (along with nonessential and postponable programs, projects, construction, etc.).

EXPENDITURES

The basic reason for Federal taxes is to meet Federal expenditures. And Federal expenditures, under the Constitution, are made pursuant to appropriations enacted by law. Federal taxes are too high, but Federal appropriations and expenditures are higher.

Federal expenditures have exceeded the revenue in 28 of the last 34 years. Over this period the Federal debt has been increased from \$16.2 billion to \$310 billion; and interest on the debt has risen from \$659 million to \$11 billion a year.

The danger of inflation always lurks in Federal deficit financing. It is there now. The purchasing power of the dollar has

dropped in every year since 1955. There will be another deficit next year unless expenditures are held to the level of revenue.

Since deficits are determined by the excess of expenditures over revenue, and expenditures are made pursuant to appropriations, obviously the first thing to do is reduce new appropriations and other spending authority. But with \$90.4 billion of balances in prior appropriations and other spending authority already available before the first dollar of new spending authority is enacted, something more than cutting new appropriations and other spending authority needs to be done. Recission of some of the balances is a place to start.

Cutting appropriations will directly reduce annual expenditures in accounts where there are no balances, and where annual appropriations do not exceed annual expenditures. But cutting appropriations does not necessarily reduce annual expenditures from accounts where any other situation exists.

But effective reduction of annual expenditures from accounts where balances exist, and in instances where appropriations exceed expenditures is largely a matter of administrative control in the executive branch.

The urgent need for the administration and the Congress to join in a concerted and effective effort to reduce Federal expenditures to meet revenue estimates for the coming year is clear.

My own examination and evaluation of the spending objectives represented in the some 800 budget accounts leads to the conclusion that Federal expenditures in fiscal year 1965, beginning July 1, could and should be reduced by at least \$6.5 billion, from \$97.9 billion estimated in the January budget to \$91.4 billion.

With combined and sympathetic effort by both the legislative and executive branches, I have no doubt that reductions in this amount could and should be made without impairment of any essential Federal function.

I suggest minimum reductions in expenditures which may be categorically summarized as follows:

[In billions]

Foreign aid (including payroll costs) --	\$1.3
Federal civilian payroll costs (excluding foreign aid) -----	.9
Proposed new programs and projects --	1.9
Waste, extravagance and inefficiency (along with nonessential and postponable programs, projects, construction, etc.) -----	2.4
Total expenditure reduction ----	6.5

Reasons and justifications for these suggested expenditure reductions follow generally the same pattern already described with respect to suggested reductions in the new appropriations and other authority to obligate public money.

The fact is that—exclusive of 70-odd accounts in military functions—the budget shows some 400 nonmilitary expenditure items increased in the coming year as compared with the current year level, against some 275 reduced. About 50 items are in approximately the same amounts.

Some of the so-called reductions, such as those anticipating the sale of certificates of participation in pools of loans and mortgages held by Export-Import Bank, Federal National Mortgage Associations, and Veterans' Administration, are questionable. They represent no actual expenditure reduction or restraint. And these are not the only questionable so-called reductions.

As a matter of fact, 1965 budget expenditure estimates show categorical increases over 1964, as follows:

[In millions]

Space research and technology up --	\$590
Natural resources up -----	105
Health, labor and welfare up -----	299
Education up -----	343
Interest up -----	400
Allowances for "attack on poverty," civilian pay raise and contingencies up -----	844
Total -----	2,581

The suggested expenditure reductions, as applied to Federal departments and principal agencies, are shown in table 1 as follows:

TABLE 1.—Suggested expenditure reductions, by departments and agencies

[In thousands of dollars]

Departments and agencies	Fiscal year 1963 actual	Fiscal year 1964 estimate	Fiscal year 1965, January estimate	Suggested reduction	Fiscal year 1965, after reduction
Executive Office of the President	23,113	24,677	27,581	9,215	18,366
Funds appropriated to President (except foreign aid)	40,482	532,530	231,443	24,707	206,736
Foreign aid	1,720,755	1,400,000	1,200,000	360,000	840,000
Military assistance, Department of Defense					
Economic assistance:					
Funds appropriated to the President:					
Grants and loans	2,043,100	2,100,000	2,150,000	862,620	1,287,380
International financial institutions	121,656	111,656	61,656		61,656
Peace Corps	42,269	73,000	90,000	37,959	52,041
Export-Import Bank	-391,560	-650,281	-855,914	632	-856,546
Other programs: Agriculture, Commerce, and State	225,834	262,260	259,547	1,600	258,047
Department of Agriculture	7,519,667	6,731,691	5,571,018	126,949	5,444,969
Department of Commerce	672,689	780,650	826,450	150,442	676,008
Department of Defense—military functions	48,252,421	50,900,000	50,000,000	1,240,100	49,759,900
Department of Defense—civil functions	1,128,066	1,141,295	1,192,339	108,447	1,083,892
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	4,909,340	5,530,278	5,855,482	908,982	4,944,500
Department of Interior	1,028,800	1,113,900	1,148,150	107,496	1,040,654
Department of Justice	317,035	329,990	343,100	28,085	315,015
Department of Labor	257,279	415,374	666,812	366,693	300,219
Post Office Department	770,335	546,015	474,700		474,700
Department of State	401,213	374,000	373,000	56,129	12,276,371
Department of the Treasury	11,027,931	11,873,984	12,335,187	59,816	2,457,800
Atomic Energy Commission	2,757,876	2,800,000	2,735,000	277,200	790,046
Federal Aviation Agency	726,311	790,000	829,000	38,954	498,097
General Services Administration	464,382	554,975	577,706	79,609	-70,707
Housing and Home Finance Agency	410,330	212,339	349,650	219,157	4,405,000
National Aeronautics and Space Administration	2,552,347	4,400,000	4,900,000	585,000	4,982,783
Veterans' Administration	5,172,823	5,348,818	5,065,340	83,557	647,867
Other, executive branch	760,437	1,159,090	1,953,640	1,305,773	250,497
Legislative and judicial branches	210,265	233,093	230,497		
Total	93,155,196	99,089,384	98,490,784	6,512,722	91,987,062
Deduct interfund transactions	-513,397	-684,565	-599,519		-599,519
Grand total	89,441,799	98,404,819	97,900,265	6,512,722	91,387,543

Reductions suggested only for civil defense, and proposed legislation for military personnel pay raise and uniform rations.

TABLE 2.—Suggested appropriation reductions by departments and agencies
(In thousands of dollars)

Table with 6 columns: Departments and agencies, Fiscal year 1963 actual, Fiscal year 1964 estimated, Fiscal year 1965 January request, Suggested reduction, Fiscal year 1965 after reduction. Rows include Executive Office of the President, Military assistance, Economic assistance, and various departments like Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health, Education, and Welfare.

1 Reductions suggested only for civil defense, and proposed legislation for military personnel pay raises and uniform rations

TABLE 3.—Federal expenditures, fiscal years 1954-65, showing military functions; and nonmilitary functions broken categorically
(In millions of dollars)

Table with 13 columns: Year (1954-1965) and two main categories: Actual and Estimate. Rows include Military functions, Nonmilitary functions (National security related, Foreign aid), Domestic-civilian (Space research, Agriculture, Natural resources, etc.), and Total.

McNAMARA'S WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, on May 23, the Portland Oregonian published another one of its many editorials paying its disrespects to me. This mouth-piece of yellow journalism, owned by the Newhouse eastern chain, which continues to represent itself as an Oregon news-newspaper but is one only in location, is one of the...

reverse, that I have in the State of Oregon.

Ever since 1952, when I resigned from the Republican Party, this yellow sheet has periodically and with consistency and persistency stooped to the type of editorial which it wrote on May 23, 1964. The editorial is entitled "Oregon's Demagog." I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record.

[From the Oregonian, May 23, 1964] OREGON'S DEMAGOG

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE, of Oregon, is sounding the depths of demagoguery in his daily diatribes demanding U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

In seeking election as an Oregon delegate to the Democratic National Convention, Senator Morse used the ballot slogan: "All the Way With President Johnson."

Now, he says on the Senate floor that President Johnson's budget request for an additional \$125 million pay for U.S. military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese

in their fight against Communist conquest is "a proposal by the President of the United States to kill more American boys."

In the isolationist view of WAYNE MORSE, "McNamara's war" now has become "Johnson's war", the President is ordering American boys "to their death"; pursuit of Communists back across the borders to their sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, says Morse, "will be outright [U.S.] aggression."

The virulence of Senator Morse's attack on the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department for carrying out what is essentially a bipartisan policy in southeast Asia is almost beyond belief. One hopes the Nation understands that Senator Morse does not speak for the people of Oregon in this poisonous campaign to undercut U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, some of my friends in the Senate "josh" me, now and then, because I am the only Senator who puts in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD editorials and articles against himself. They raise the query as to why I do it, because they wonder if I do not know that the newspapers always have the last word. My reply always is that if they do, that is the fault of the politician, because I am perfectly willing to get this kind of support, in reverse, from this yellow sheet, but I always set the record straight.

Yesterday, I sent the following telegram to the editor of the Oregonian, because the editorial reached my attention only yesterday.

I stated:

Your editorial Saturday, May 23, entitled "Oregon's Demagog" has just reached my attention. It is in keeping with your yellow journalism. I stand on my ballot slogan "All the Way With President Johnson" in seeking election as Oregon delegate to Democratic National Convention. I shall support President Johnson's nomination enthusiastically and work hard for his election. However, every voter knows that my ballot slogan was not synonymous with pledging to be "a rubber stamp for President Johnson." Frequently the best service a Senator can render in supporting the President of his party is to disagree with him when he thinks some Presidential policy is wrong. U.S. foreign policy in South Vietnam is wrong and it cannot be reconciled with our obligations under international law. If you think it can, start writing editorials trying to justify McNamara's war in South Vietnam. If you think that the Oregonian speaks for the people of Oregon on U.S. policy in South Vietnam, you couldn't be more wrong.

WAYNE MORSE.

Mr. President, that is a fitting introduction for my speech today dealing with McNamara's war in South Vietnam, although the name of the war should be enlarged a bit to include all the members of the war council that met in Honolulu a few days ago.

Today, however, I wish to make comments upon the position taken by the President of the United States yesterday in respect to McNamara's war in South Vietnam.

The President's news conference statements yesterday about our policy in Asia were in reality a sad admission that the 10-year-old policy of unilateral American intervention in Indochina has been a failure.

President Johnson's reliance upon a 10-year-old letter from

however to Premie Diem bespeaks nothing but the bankruptcy of the policy which that letter sets forth. That letter was not a treaty. That letter did not legally bind the American people or the American Congress. It was only the statement of one President's intentions toward another President. The conditions which existed then do not exist today.

The commitment President Johnson spoke about yesterday was the alleged commitment in the Eisenhower letter of 1954. However, I say most respectfully to my President that that was no commitment of the United States to South Vietnam.

It was the expression of the then President of the United States as to what he proposed to do. However, a President of the United States cannot commit this Republic in respect to conducting a war. Let us never forget that.

I repeat today what I have said many times on the floor of the Senate, in speaking against the U.S. unconstitutional war in South Vietnam, that that unconstitutional war cannot be reconciled with a single principle of international law; that the United States is at war in South Vietnam illegally; and that any reference by the President of the United States to a so-called commitment contained in the Eisenhower letter of 1954 never was and is not now binding upon the people of the United States.

I repeat that the foreign policy of the United States does not belong to the President of the United States, but to the American people. I also say most respectfully that in my judgment the President of the United States ought to bring the foreign policy, as far as his administration is concerned, in line with the views of the people of the United States. If the President of the United States thinks that the illegal war of the United States in South Vietnam has the support of the American people, let him take it to the country.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I believe the Senator's position is that at the present time, since there has not been a declaration of war, we are not properly in a state of war.

Mr. MORSE. My position is that no President of the United States has the constitutional authority or power or right to send American boys to a battlefield in the absence of a treaty obligation or a declaration of war.

Article I, section 8, of the Constitution vests the power to declare war in Congress, not in the President. This President as any President before him, before he sends any more boys to the battlefield in South Vietnam to be killed—and they will be killed in increasing numbers—ought to ask for a declaration of war. He should not attempt, as this President is attempting, indirectly to get an appropriation of \$125 million to support an illegal U.S. intervention in South Vietnam, an intervention which has violated the Geneva accords ever since 1954. The aid which President Eisenhower subsequently sent to South Vietnam violated

neutral council found South Vietnam guilty of violating the Geneva accords. It also found North Vietnam guilty. It based a part of its charge establishing the guilt of South Vietnam on the fact that the United States, contrary to the Geneva accords, was sending kinds and amounts of military aid to South Vietnam, in violation of the Geneva accords. When President Eisenhower sent that aid and put the United States in the position of violating the Geneva accords, charges ought to have been filed before the United Nations to have this matter thrashed out within the United Nations.

That is where it ought to be now, instead of having Adlai Stevenson read a speech, which obviously had been prepared for him, setting forth the unsound position of the U.S. State Department before the Security Council a few days ago. He ought to have resigned as Ambassador to the United Nations rather than to lend his lips to reading such a shocking speech. That speech cannot be reconciled with the international law obligations of this Republic.

Having Adlai Stevenson, in effect, beat his breast before the world and say that we were going to do what we thought was necessary to be done in South Vietnam, was a serious blow against the United Nations Charter itself, of which, as our Ambassador, he is supposed to be one of the trustees.

I do not yield to Adlai Stevenson or anyone else in this country in my dedicated support of the United Nations. I represented this Government in 1960 as one of its delegates to the United Nations. I am convinced as much today as I have always been that the United Nations offers mankind's only hope of establishing permanent peace in this world.

The sad thing is that today, the United States, probably more than any other nation in the world, is undercutting the United Nations Charter. The great danger is that if we do not stop the program of the United States vis-a-vis the United Nations we may well see the liquidation of the United Nations as mankind's best hope to preserve peace in the world.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. Let it be understood at the beginning of my speech today, as I have said time and time again, I am not only criticizing the foreign policy of the United States; I am also offering a substitute. In my 20 years in the Senate I have never criticized American foreign policy without at the same time offering what I considered to be an affirmative, constructive substitute for the policy that I was criticizing.

I say to my President again today, as I said yesterday, on the floor of the Senate: "When are you going to lay the whole southeast Asia crisis before the United Nations under the procedures and in keeping with the procedures of the United Nations Charter for the settlement or attempted settlement of that threat to the peace not only of Asia but also the peace of the world?"

When we signed the United Nations Charter, we pledged ourselves to seek to

military might. The United States of America, in South Vietnam today, is seeking to substitute the rule of American military might for right.

In all the history of the world any country that has attempted to do that has finally fallen. If the United States follows the rule of the jungle, the United States, in due course of time, will fall.

The world will not long tolerate a nation that takes the position which Adlai Stevenson took before the Security Council of the United Nations, when, in effect, he announced to the world that we intended to do exactly what we choose to do in South Vietnam, and that the rest of the world could like it or not. Not even the United States, in the course of history, can get away with that threat to the peace of the world.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I commend the Senator from Oregon on his position. It is entirely right from a constitutional standpoint for us to stay out and to have this matter left in the hands of the United Nations. If we go in there, without submitting the matter to the United Nations, we are really, in a way, tearing down the United Nations, and we say to the nations of the rest of the world, "You have the right to do likewise." That being so, there is no need for the United Nations to be in the field.

Mr. MORSE. We have already greatly damaged the United Nations. I pray that we have not irreparably damaged it, because the opportunity is still available to the President to take this case to the United Nations, to ask the United Nations to take jurisdiction of it, just as we support the United Nations in three other trouble spots of the world where the peace is threatened: the Middle-East, where there is a United Nations peacekeeping corps that we support; in Cyprus, where there is a United Nations peacekeeping corps that we support; and in the Congo, where there is a United Nations peacekeeping corps that we support. Why not in South Vietnam? Could it be for the ugly reason that we think we are too powerful to be challenged?

I yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. Again I wish to express my complete accord with the magnificent stand that the senior Senator from Oregon has taken for many weeks on the subject of our illegal involvement in the civil war in southeast Asia. I commend him for his constructive proposal to take the problem to the United Nations. I invite attention to the fact that only this morning, when I spoke on this subject, I urged that the United Nations ask for an immediate cease-fire. I assure the Senator from Oregon—and I feel certain he will agree with me—that such a request by the President of the United States would meet with the loudest cheer from the American people that he could possibly hear.

My mail continues to run at the rate of 100 to 1 in favor of the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. There is no excuse whatever for the con-

tinued killing of our own boys and the killing of Vietnamese on the sole pretense or pretext or argument, which has been advanced by the Washington Post and the New York Times, that in order to negotiate, we must be much stronger; consequently, we must sacrifice more American lives and more Vietnamese lives in order to arrive at the conclusion which we ought to know by now is inevitable, namely, peace by negotiation.

Mr. MORSE. I completely endorse the proposal of the Senator from Alaska that the President call upon the United Nations to ask for a cease-fire in Asia—in Laos, in South Vietnam, or wherever the fighting is going on.

The Senator from Alaska is very kind to make reference to the position I have taken these many weeks on the floor of the Senate in opposition to what I consider to be the illegal, unconstitutional U.S. war in South Vietnam. But no Member of the Senate has been more courageous, more farseeing, more statesmanlike in opposition to American policy in South Vietnam than the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. It has been an honor that I shall always appreciate, an honor that I shall be proud to have my descendants read about, that I stood shoulder to shoulder with the Senator from Alaska during this period of time when so many Members of Congress were noncommittal, when so many apparently hoped that the trouble would blow away; that in some way, somehow, it would vanish. But it will not vanish. Affirmative action will be necessary on the part of this country.

During that period of time we have listened to brilliant speeches by the distinguished Senator from Alaska, and they have been supported by the distinguished Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] and the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], who commented on the subject on the floor of the Senate a few moments ago.

During these weeks the American people have not had an accounting from the kept press of the country in regard to the position that has been taken on the floor of the Senate in opposition to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. The gentlemen who sit in the gallery above the clock, and who represent the major newspapers of the country, are not to be blamed, for frequently they submit such articles. Some of them have shown me copies of their articles. However, there is a deliberate design on the part of the kept press of America to conceal from the American people the facts about South Vietnam and America's unconscionable, inexcusable, illegal course of action in South Vietnam.

It is quite interesting to observe that the American people are beginning to realize that only through radio and television newscasts can they begin to get at least some conception of the other side of the South Vietnam issue, a side that disagrees with the policy of the U.S. Government.

Yesterday I placed in the Record at the close of my speech some of the hundreds of letters that I have received on this subject. I would have preferred not to

put them in the Record, for I am really more modest than those letters might seem to indicate as a result of my insertion of them. But I placed them in the Record, just as the Senator from Alaska also placed a similar number of letters in the Record some days ago, because it is important, from the standpoint of history, that we record at the time of this historic debate on South Vietnam that there is a large body of American public opinion that is against the policy of our Government. That body of opinion will become larger and larger as more and more people begin to understand the facts about U.S. policy in South Vietnam. I am proud of the letters I placed in the Record yesterday.

The Senator from Alaska said that his mail, for many weeks, has been running at the rate of about 100 to 1 against U.S. policy. I have said that mine is running at least 9 to 1 against it. I know it is much larger, so 9 to 1 is a gross understatement. However, I have placed in the Record letters from such great historians as Professor Commager, one of the greatest living historians in this country. All those letters constitute a cross section of American public opinion.

I say to my President that latent at the grassroots of America is aghastness at the policy of the United States in making war and killing American boys in South Vietnam. I have heard the Senator from Alaska say on the floor of the Senate, time and time again, that South Vietnam is not worth the life of a single American boy. And it is not. We cannot justify the killing of a single American boy in South Vietnam.

In one of my earlier speeches I said—and I repeat it today—that I am waiting for the long list of honorary pallbearers that I assume my administration will appoint, consisting of the top echelon of officials of the United States, to be ready to meet the ships laden with flag-draped coffins of fallen American boys returning from South Vietnam, if we do not stop the killing. There can be no possible end result but an increasing slaughter of American boys. Not only are American boys being killed. Our course of action is resulting in the killing of thousands of other human beings. That is why I spoke a few days ago about the spiritual values and the moral obligations involved in this situation, for all those people are the children of God.

When I think of all the pratings of my Government, when I think of the speeches of Adlai Stevenson from 1952 until his unfortunate speech of the other day, and the hope that is to be found in the symbolism and procedures of the United Nations, I, too, am aghast at what has happened to my country. Instead of making peace, we are making war. Instead of stopping bloodshed, we are spilling blood. Reconcile that with the church pews we occupy on Sunday; for as a religious person I would have my fellow Americans remember that basic in this foreign policy crisis are great questions of morality.

Of course I do not accept the attempted rationalization, "We are in it, and there is no way for us to get out. So we are going to go on with it, to save face."

1964

Mr. President, whose face? Until we got into this situation, I never knew that face saving—which some call “prestige”—was ever more important than to do right, for there is no substitute for following what we know is the honest and the right thing to do.

So those who talk about “face saving” impliedly admit that they do not attempt to sustain the program on its merits.

I repeat the suggestion I made the other day to the “face-savers”: I have heard of “throwing out the baby with the bath water,” but never before have I heard it suggested that we should blow off heads to save face. Yet we are blowing off heads in South Vietnam, and some attempt to justify it on the ground of “saving face.”

I respectfully submit, Mr. President, that the statesmanlike course of action is to lay the problem before the United Nations, and thus put Russia on the spot, for I believe that in the Security Council, Russia would veto it; but under the United Nations Charter there is another course, which is to have an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations called, and there lay the problem before all the members of the United Nations. Let them take up the problem of this crisis, which in my judgment is fast threatening the peace of the world and is rapidly destroying the effectiveness and the hopefulness of the United Nations itself.

I return to my discussion of the Eisenhower letter of 1954, because, as I have said, the statements made yesterday by the President of the United States, at his news conference, have given me the impression that he must be laboring under the delusion that the Eisenhower letter of 1954 in some way, somehow, creates a binding commitment on the part of the Government of the United States; but there is no basis in fact for such a conclusion.

In 1954, President Eisenhower wrote of the Geneva Conference; in the 10 subsequent years the United States and South Vietnam have violated with increasing impunity the Geneva accords.

Ten years ago, President Eisenhower spoke of the long exhausting war through which the people of South Vietnam had lived; in the next 10 years, the United States helped as much as any party to step up that war, and today we are promising the same people the same war conditions “forever,” to use the word of our Secretary of Defense.

In 1954, President Eisenhower spoke of the need of South Vietnam for aid; in the 10 years to follow, the United States would spend around \$5 billion to aid South Vietnam, and in 1964 would find itself committed to an ever-rising level of such aid.

When our Government began pouring its military aid into South Vietnam, it violated the Geneva accords of 1954, for that is prohibited under the Geneva accords. The neutral council, composed of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, found South Vietnam to be in violation of the Geneva accords, and cited, as one of the

violation of the Geneva accords, the acceptance from the United States of large supplies of military aid. The council also found North Vietnam to be in violation of the Geneva accords. Furthermore, I believe that both Laos and Red China have been violating the Geneva accords; and very possibly Cambodia has been violating them, too. I believe that situation should also be examined.

The proper procedure for the United States to follow is to file a complaint with the United Nations. The United States had no business setting up itself as a unilateral enforcer of the Geneva accords. After all, the United States did not even sign them.

In 1954, President Eisenhower wrote of the need to stabilize the Government of South Vietnam. That is the letter from which President Johnson quoted yesterday.

Ten years later, despite the huge amount of money we have put into the stabilization effort and despite the large American military force on the scene, the Government of South Vietnam is a tottering instrument, held up only by the United States itself. It is less capable of resisting “the attempted subversion or aggression through military means” of which President Eisenhower spoke than ever before.

I cannot understand how any American, not to mention the President of the United States, can read that letter today and not appreciate that it sets forth a futile, dead end course for the United States. To quote it again, President Eisenhower wrote to Diem:

The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

The government to which that Eisenhower letter was addressed collapsed in an aura, not of reform and respectability, but of terror and corruption. It delivered nothing that was expected of it by President Eisenhower 10 years ago. It is dead and gone, and unmourned, both at home and abroad. Its successors have been no more “enlightened in purpose and effective in performance” than was the Diem government.

The successive governments of South Vietnam have failed to hold up their end of the bargain President Eisenhower entered into 10 years ago. Today the United States is upholding both ends—our own and that of South Vietnam.

As I have said before of the Eisenhower letter, unless the policy it began is quickly changed, American Presidents will be reading it 30 and 50 years from now to explain why we are spending billions of dollars and thousands of American military personnel to maintain what is nothing but an American puppet in

South Vietnam. One of the inexcusable arguments advanced by some is that we are there because we were asked to go there by Diem; but the fact is that we set up the puppet Diem, and also two other puppet dictators there. We have no more right to argue that our forces belong there because our own puppet asked us to send them there than Khrushchev has a right to argue that his forces are in East Germany because his puppet dictator in East Germany invited him to send them there.

Mr. President, we ought to wash our hands of puppetism in South Vietnam. We ought to ask the United Nations to come in and maintain peace and order. We ought to get out. I have said before, and I repeat now, that I am not an over-nighter. Our SEATO allies ought to come in and help to try to maintain the peace until the United Nations can move in. The United States should stay there with a peacekeeping mission for a period of time until the issue could be debated and passed upon in the United Nations. But our SEATO allies—Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Great Britain, and France—ought to be in there with us. If they come in, it might help us to stop the killing. But obviously they have an allergy against involving themselves in a situation that might kill any of their boys.

Great Britain is perfectly willing to urge us to continue our operations in Asia. Great Britain applauds publicly the flying of American planes over Laos, which is obviously in violation of the Geneva accords. But we do not see any British planes there. The British are very clever in persuading others to do their dirty work for them.

Mr. President, I am not interested in sacrificing the lives of American boys in South Vietnam because that might strengthen the colonialism of Great Britain in Malaysia. I say to the American people, “Do not forget that that is back of this picture, too.” What is behind the scenes is very ugly; and so far as I am concerned, not only should the problem of South Vietnam be made a question of United Nations jurisdiction, but if Malaysia becomes a threat to the peace of the world, I am for taking that issue to the United Nations as well—unless we wish to tear up the charter—for we cannot read the charter, as I shall show before I finish my speech, without realizing that that was the commitment of the signatories thereto.

Mr. President, the President’s statement of American objectives in Asia is not borne out by the facts. President Johnson said, “First, America keeps her word.”

What word? Does he mean that the letter of President Eisenhower, which was never sanctioned by the Congress of the United States, becomes America’s word, binding upon succeeding Presidents? He could not be more wrong. The question is not what President Eisenhower said 10 years ago in a letter that he sent to Premier Diem, the American puppet in South Vietnam. The question is, How sound is the policy that was negotiated in that letter? If the policy is

not in our national self-interest, that policy should be repudiated and no longer followed.

So when the President said, "America keeps her word," I ask, "What about South Vietnam's word?"

The Government of South Vietnam has not fulfilled the 1954 conditions for aid laid down by President Eisenhower. The United States has kept her word to South Vietnam far beyond any reasonable expectation, even to the extent of violating the Geneva agreement. What we are doing now is furnishing South Vietnam with a type and amount of military aid that was barred by the Geneva accord. To throw billions of dollars and the lives of American soldiers into the unilateral fulfillment of an Executive agreement under these conditions is not a mark of honor but of folly.

President Johnson continued:

Second, the issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.

I respectfully ask: "Since when is the future of southeast Asia something for an American President to decide all by himself? Mr. President, the future of southeast Asia is not the exclusive property of the Presidency and not even the exclusive property of the United States. The people most concerned with the future of southeast Asia are the people who live there, and that excludes the United States altogether."

If the President thinks the future of southeast Asia is at stake, then he has no alternative but to confer with the governments of southeast Asia, not only with South Vietnam, but with North Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma, Laos, Thailand, and the neighbors who also have a more direct interest than does the United States—India and China.

For President Johnson to create the impression that the United States intends to determine the future for millions of people 7,000 miles away is not even a thinly disguised kind of imperialism. It is stark, ugly imperialism.

Third—

Said the President—
our purpose is peace.

But Mr. President, why do we help make war when you say our purpose is peace? The one agency of mankind designed and created to maintain peace in the world is the United Nations. If we sincerely wish to bring peace to southeast Asia, why has the American Government shunned United Nations jurisdiction of the whole conflict in southeast Asia? Why, too, do American military planners discuss the use of nuclear weapons to defoliate trees, the selection of targets for air and sea bombardment of North Vietnam and Laos, and possibly China? What kind of doubletalk is it to say that we seek peace when our Secretaries of State and Defense openly threaten other nations with hints of these contingent war plans to expand the war?

Mr. President, our purpose in southeast Asia will not truly be peaceful until we bring the United Nations in. Until the American Government does that, words of our peaceful purpose are a shameful hypocrisy.

Fourth—

Said President Johnson yesterday—
this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

Freedom for whom? The people of South Vietnam? I have not heard anyone make the case in private conversation that the United States is bringing any kind of freedom to the people of South Vietnam. We are not bringing communism, as is the Vietcong, but we are not bringing freedom, either.

We are supporting a military dictatorship. We are supporting a police state. We are supporting a tyrant under whom there is no freedom for the people of South Vietnam. That is one reason why that country is in great turmoil.

Mr. President, I wish to see freedom in South Vietnam. I desire to see freedom everywhere where police state regimes rule. That is why I have always been counted on the side of those who wish to take to the troubled spots of the world economic freedom, because without it, political freedom for the people cannot take root and grow. But bring it into the United Nations, and then the senior Senator from Oregon will be among those who will urge that we do everything possible to bring economic freedom to the rank and file of the people of South Vietnam which, when once established, will make it possible for political freedom to develop.

The fallaciousness and unsoundness of the 1954 Eisenhower letter were spelled out clearly in today's New York Times by C. L. Sulzberger, writing from Paris. He states:

When Foster Dulles fathered SEATO a decade ago he admitted its principal purpose was to provide our President legal authority to intervene in Indochina.

That was also the reason why Foster Dulles put the backing of the American Government behind Diem, and prevailed on Diem not to put South Vietnam's signature to the Geneva accords.

Dulles wanted to keep South Vietnam as an American protectorate. He wanted an American "handle" in Asia, and Diem was it. But he at least recognized at the beginning the limitations the Geneva accords put upon the American protectorate. He told Sulzberger on February 22, 1955:

The French have a substantial military force in South Vietnam. That is France's principal role. The Geneva (1954 partition) accord bars the importation into Indochina of new military aid. The United States can't increase the number of its military advisers. That places a strong dependence on France.

In my speech of a few weeks ago, in which I discussed at length the international law principles that are involved in this case—all of which are against the position of the United States—I recounted for the Senate that sad chapter in American history when John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, went to London and to Paris, and in London tried to persuade Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill to pledge themselves to join the United States and France in maintaining in Indochina, British, and American troops, along with

that if we could get that agreement between the British Government and the French Government, he, speaking for the United States, then would announce it to the Congress.

Who protected the United States at that sad international diplomatic conference? Winston Churchill. For Winston Churchill, said, in effect, that that would be a deception of the Congress of the United States, and he turned Dulles down. Dulles was not successful in keeping the French involved, for they had already lost 240,000 of the flower of French youth in the Indochina war. They had had enough.

If this country follows the course of action it is now following in South Vietnam, if the mess does not lead to a third world war conflagration, it will not be many years before history will record the tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of American boys that will be sacrificed in the same area of the world in which the French sacrificed 240,000 in total casualties.

When France declined to play the role Dulles had laid out for her, we began to violate the Geneva accords by sending in the very military aid and advisers that Dulles admitted were prohibited under the Geneva accords.

That is the kind of deceitful program that President Johnson seems to think he is required to carry out 10 years later. The Diem government has dissolved. Yet the American President is embarked on an open-ended task of propping up his tyrannical successors. That is not a matter of keeping an ex-president's word; it is a national stupidity.

As Sulzberger makes clear, we are not acting today in Asia in our capacity of a SEATO member. SEATO is defunct. SEATO has specifically declined to act or to intervene in South Vietnam. SEATO as an organization wants no part of the South Vietnamese war.

The United States is going it alone. And we are going alone down the path to war.

Next time President Johnson reads the Eisenhower letter aloud, I would hope he will also read aloud certain articles of the United Nations Charter, to wit:

Article 2, section 3: All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

Section 4: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 33, section 1: The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Article 37, section 1: Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

If the Cambodian border problem is the subject for United Nations action, then the whole conflict that gave rise to the

Cambodian border problem is even more appropriate for United Nations jurisdiction. It is time for President Johnson to lay the whole Vietnamese problem before the United Nations, lest he engulf the United States in a worse disaster than the one we are already in in southeast Asia.

Finally, although most American newspapers have studiously avoided any real presentation of the criticisms and alternatives many of us have been offering to present policy in Asia, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch is not one of them.

I ask unanimous consent that three of its recent editorials on this subject be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks, and that they be followed by today's column by C. L. Sulzberger from the New York Times. I do not share what seems to be Mr. Sulzberger's conclusion that having embarked on a fatal foreign policy, we have to follow it to the bitter end. But just how fatal a policy it is, is clear from Mr. Sulzberger's excellent account. On June 1, Mr. Sulzberger also wrote a perceptive column, and I ask that it, too, be printed at the conclusion of these remarks. I call attention to his conclusion:

One of the U.N.'s purposes is to be a dumping ground for insoluble questions and a face-saver for lost causes. Now would be the best time to involve U.N.—before Pelping and its satellites are members.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McGovern in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am also impressed with the editorials being written by John Knight of the Knight newspapers. One of them was placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD yesterday by the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS]. As Mr. Knight put it:

As we look with reverence upon the graves of our hero dead and contemplate their sacrifices, what an appalling thought it is that more of our youth may soon be joining them in eternal rest.

And—one may ask—why and for what?

Mr. President, I close my speech with that question on my lips to the President of the United States: "Why and for what? Mr. President, why do you persist in following a course of action that was set out in the Eisenhower letter of 10 years ago, which has proven to be so wrong and so much against the national interest of this Republic? Why do you persist in following a course of action that constitutes a failure on the part of this Republic to live up to its solemn obligations under the charter of the United Nations?"

Mr. President, I shall continue to pray that my country will change its course of action from warmaking to asking the United Nations to take over jurisdiction of the threat to the peace of the world in southeast Asia, and seek to use the rule of law as the best instrumentality which has been devised by man to maintain peace and to prevent war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, May 18, 1964]

HOPE AMID CYNICISM

There is something cynical and at the same time faintly hopeful in the statement

of American policy on southeast Asia presented to the U.N. Security Council by Ambassador Stevenson. He indicated that all the United States wants is to restore the Geneva agreement of 1954. He said our Government has "faithfully supported" that political solution, and the reason for our military intervention will be removed once the Communist forces stop violating it. The fighting can be ended overnight and American military "advisers" can go home, he suggested, if the peoples of the Indochina Peninsula are just left to themselves; the United States "has no, repeat no, national military objective anywhere in southeast Asia."

We say this is a cynical statement because, as Ambassador Stevenson well knows, the United States participated in negotiation of the Geneva agreement of 1954 but refused to sign it (as did our client Government of South Vietnam) and has violated it repeatedly. The agreement has also been violated by China, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong. And it has been violated by South Vietnam, acting on American advice.

Ambassador Stevenson neglected to mention that the Geneva agreement called for elections to be held in 1956 for a unified government that would bring together North and South Vietnam. The elections were never held because South Vietnam, acting on American advice, declined to permit them.

Mr. Stevenson omitted mentioning that the 1954 accord contemplated the military neutralization of the whole peninsula, including both Vietnams, Cambodia, and Laos. Both the North and the South, by that agreement, were barred from receiving any arms reinforcements, from establishing any new military bases under foreign control, from adhering to any military alliance. This part of the agreement has been thoroughly violated on both sides. Certainly the enormous American aid program has violated it; only hypocrisy can pretend otherwise.

The simple truth is that after the Communist Vietminh drove the French out of Indochina, the United States undertook to keep a military foothold there by building up a military satellite in South Vietnam, and China undertook to capture that satellite by civil war. The truth is that after 10 years we have been unable to establish a firm government with solid roots among the people of South Vietnam. Our policy of military intervention is at dead end. We need a new policy.

One new policy would be to support the objectives of the Geneva agreement of 1954; namely, military neutralization of the whole peninsula, with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia left free to determine their own political future. The slightly hopeful element in Mr. Stevenson's speech is that if our Government means what it says about restoring the Geneva agreement, then a way may be open for an ultimate solution. Our officials still, however, talk against the idea of neutralization, and against a new Geneva conference, as suggested by France, to explore that possibility. Just what do they mean?

The Laos crisis has reinforced the need for a new American policy. We accept neutralization for Laos and Cambodia; why not for Indochina as a whole? We accept a reconvened Geneva conference for Laos; why not for Indochina as a whole? We accept a U.N. presence for the Cambodian border; why not for Indochina as a whole? We accept the aims of the 1954 Geneva accord, says Ambassador Stevenson; why not then support them, as we have not done up to now?

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, May 18-24, 1964]

NEEDED: A REAL VIETNAM POLICY

No recent event has underlined quite so firmly the lack of a viable U.S. policy in southeast Asia as President Johnson's request for an additional \$125 million in economic and military aid for the Saigon

government. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is mainly a gesture intended to assure potential election-year critics of the administration that everything possible is being done to hold back communism in southeast Asia.

Mr. Johnson told Congress the Communist Vietcong guerrillas "have intensified terrorist actions" against the South, and that "this increased terrorism requires increased response." But is more money the answer? Within a limited framework, the answer is increased confidence of the South Vietnamese people in their Government and an increased will to fight. That has not been evident, and we do not see how more money will bring it into being.

U.S. aid has been running at the rate of \$500 million a year. About 2 months ago it was announced this would be increased by 10 percent to enable Premier Nguyen Khanh to enlarge and strengthen his armed forces. Mr. Johnson's request—\$55 million for military uses and \$70 million for economic aid—represents an increase of 25 percent. Yet General Khanh said several weeks ago he was satisfied with the aid he was getting.

The administration is undoubtedly sensitive to criticism stemming from the American casualty lists in Vietnam, where some 16,000 U.S. troops are acting as advisers. Mr. Johnson acknowledged as much when he observed that, "Duty requires, and the American people demand, that we give them the fullest measure of support." This is fair enough, and yet it conveys the notion our troops are regarded as something more than advisers. This is a guerrilla war, and only the Vietnamese can, or should, fight it.

Even if the increased aid increased the efficiency of the South Vietnamese effort, what could be accomplished? The news from Laos is an obvious warning that success in South Vietnam would mean increased Communist pressure in Laos, where there is a shaky neutral coalition, or in Cambodia, where the neutral Sihanouk government has been edging toward Red China. Which suggests that a solution must be found collectively for the three states of the old Indochina, as French President De Gaulle has noted with his proposal for neutralizing the whole area.

It is increasingly clear that no solution can be developed in the absence of some sort of United States-Red China accommodation. This idea is implicit in the U.S. request to several friendly governments to use their influence with Red China to save the Laotian coalition. It is quite likely that Red China is in a more commanding position now than it was 2 years ago, when the Laos coalition was established. It will be recalled that the coalition was possible because President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev agreed in Vienna on a neutral and independent Laos. Since then Russian influence in Asia has diminished.

If Red China is calling the tune it is Red China with which we must deal. If our policy, and our increased aid, were somehow directed toward that end, it would be understandable. But our policy amounts to just more of the same, with no attainable goal proclaimed except a nebulous "successful campaign against the Communists."

No doubt the administration believes that any move toward neutralization, or any suggestion of agreement with mainland China, would be dangerous in an election year. If this is a motive, it is unworthy. It may not even be good politics. We believe a majority of the American people would welcome a way to withdraw honorably from Vietnam.

The 14-nation Geneva Conference that opened just 3 years ago to discuss the Laotian coalition included both the United States and Communist China. Why would it not be possible to convene another such conference? Why not the United Nations, perhaps at the Geneva Conference's request, he brought into the picture? Why should the United States

think it necessary to direct and finance virtually alone a Western operation in Vietnam? The feeling of our allies may be discovered in the profound silence that so far has greeted Secretary Rusk's proposal to bring 25 other nations in at our side.

It is time that a positive, rational program, leading toward a permanent political solution, be established for Indochina. The United States need not take overt moves in this direction, if it fears to destroy the vestiges of Vietnamese morale. The proposals can be made by others. But we should work actively to see that they are made, discussed, and acted upon.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, June 1, 1964]

GOAL FOR HONOLULU

The important meeting of U.S. military men and diplomats at Honolulu is an effective way of impressing the world with this country's concern over the deteriorating Western position in Indochina. But it should be something more than that. It should set a course leading to a political solution in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

As Walter Lippmann pointed out the other day, "there never has been a time when a military victory, or anything like a military victory, has been possible." It is not possible now. The best that increased military activity can accomplish is to hold the line and thus prevent a decrease in the Western bargaining position at some future conference table. Even this risky course may not be possible.

What is possible, and necessary, is that the United States recognize the mistake it made when it tried after 1954 to replace French power and create a Western bastion on the borders of Communist China, and that it formulate a policy that contains the hope of honorable withdrawal. The time is late and this will not be easy, but it were better done now than later.

Would the withdrawal of the United States from Indochina bring about the communication of that area? Eventually perhaps it would, but that does not mean that the strategic interests of the United States (which keeps the 7th Fleet in Asian waters and maintains a huge air base at Okinawa) would be seriously affected.

It might be affected if communism were a monolithic world movement, but it is not. The Chinese-Russian quarrel, the independence of Yugoslavia, the slowly growing independence of the Eastern European satellites, demonstrate that national interests always in the end take precedence over ideological similarities.

Too many Americans equate communism, which they quite naturally abhor, with the national interests of countries with which the United States must deal. Though both China and Russia are Communist countries their national interests are not identical. In time the United States and Communist Russia may be allied against Communist China, for example; indeed, Chinese propaganda criticizes the Russians for that very tendency.

What this means is that while Indochina might eventually go Communist it would not necessarily go Chinese Communist. The Vietnamese, the Cambodians, and the Laotians have differences among themselves, but all dislike the Chinese. There are responsible experts who hold that had the United States backed the North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh a decade ago, rather than the late President Diem, Indochina would now have a stable independent Communist government, like Tito's Yugoslavia.

It should not be forgotten that during the war the United States did back Ho Chi Minh as the most effective leader of the resistance against the occupying Japanese. Communist or not, he is still universally admired through-

out Indochina as the man who broke French power there. Although Ho originally sided with Moscow, it is believed that the pressure of Red China on his border has forced him to compromise.

But there is a strong surge for independence in North Vietnam, more so, perhaps, than in the south, and the United States should aim at creating conditions which will enable that spirit to prevail. An Indochina neutrality guaranteed by the United States, Russia, Red China, Britain, and France, with provisions for the free elections that were promised for 1956 but blocked by the United States, might bring stability to the area.

Perhaps that is not the best of all possible ends to the U.S. investment of men and money in Indochina, but there does not appear to be any other answer. So the Americans meeting in Honolulu should agree to confer, perhaps at a lower level at first, and eventually at a major conference to effect a permanent settlement.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, June 3, 1964]

ALONE WITH OUR ASIAN CRISIS

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS.—Whatever the U.S. Government decides to do about Indochina need not be too carefully strained through the fabric of our SEATO alliance. For, if SEATO ever truly existed as a coherent pact, it certainly doesn't exist today.

When Foster Dulles fathered SEATO a decade ago he admitted its principal purpose was to provide our President legal authority to intervene in Indochina. But Dulles had strange visions concerning the pact's other implications.

He thought it would assure us active allies in a vital area. He called SEATO was one of three connected Oriental bastions, directly linked to South Korean and Formosan strongpoints. Our allies never accepted this tidy assumption.

Dulles also had misconceptions concerning French and United States commitments in Indochina, over which SEATO unilaterally extended its protection. On February 22, 1955, the late Secretary of State told me in Bangkok, on the eve of a SEATO conference: "The French have a substantial military force in South Vietnam. That is France's principal role. The Geneva [1954 partition] accord bars the importation into Indochina of new military aid. The U.S.A. can't increase the number of its military advisers. That places a strong dependence on France."

On February 25, when SEATO's meeting had ended, Dulles added: "We are operating on a basis where more and more we treat atomic weapons as conventional. It doesn't make sense to use 100 shots or bombs to do exactly the same job as one atomic weapon and it is much more expensive. Throughout history there has been a steady development of more powerful explosives."

WHERE DULLES ERRED

Dulles was wrong in all his SEATO observations save the congressional blank check given the President. He was wrong in linking SEATO with South Korea and Formosa, which the other allies wouldn't accept. He was wrong about the position of France. He was wrong about the freeze on U.S. "military advisers" and nuclear deterrence.

SEATO never checked Communist subversion and it never produced an alliance community or forces structure. France is militarily out of the area; France and Pakistan are diplomatically disengaged. Laos has been removed from SEATO protection and neutralized in theory; in fact it is being devoured by Communist forces. Cambodia professes to consider SEATO a greater danger than the Chinese and U.S. military intervention moved into South Vietnam 3 years ago and has been growing ever since.

If we are going to try to save southeast Asia from Communist control we are going to have to do so virtually alone. France won't help; Britain will only go along to the degree that we back its Malaysian experiment against Indonesia. Pakistan considers India, which we arm, more menacing than China.

SEATO was a classic example of closing the barn door on a missing horse. In this case the horse was the Anglo-French empire. SEATO was written on the assumption of British and French armed strength that didn't exist.

France and Britain, increasingly excluded from Asia as military powers, feel diminishing interest in the area. They admit Asia is strategically important, but less vital to the West than the Atlantic world. The SEATO allies have no passion for the kind of holy war the United States wishes to carry on against China.

These are the uncomfortable facts concerning our southeast Asian crisis. We got into South Vietnam to save that rump state despite both the spirit and the letter of the 1954 Geneva accord that created it. And we based on commitment on the assumption of continued French and British military strength that was then already disappearing.

During the pactomania phase of American policymaking, we allowed ourselves to be deceived by shadowy illusions. We believed such organizations as SEATO and CENTO were realities, but they weren't.

We must therefore face the problem of salvaging our Indochina crisis on the basis of what we consider right. There is no point allowing ourselves to be bound, for example, by Paris' insistence that while France will fight for Berlin, it won't fight for Saigon. In southeast Asia we must honor our commitments and respect our interests. Confusion cannot be coordinated.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, June 1, 1964]

NO EASY EXIT FROM THE JUNGLE

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS.—In Indochina we have persistently violated the four cardinal maxims of foreign policy which are: (1) always keep the initiative; (2) always exploit the inevitable; (3) always stay in with the outs, and (4) never stand between a dog and a lamppost. Above all we have lost the initiative and the inevitable is exploiting us.

Our present function seems to be that of popular whipping boy and guerrilla pin-cushion in South Vietnam. To escape this embarrassment, two alternative formulas have been proposed: (A) that we cease playing the war game according to Communist rules and attack guerrilla arsenals, communications, and safe havens abroad; or (B) that we negotiate the neutralization of South Vietnam and then abandon it. Washington seems to oppose formula A as unacceptable to the Saigon regime and the American people.

Formula B, generally associated with De Gaulle, assumes the United States cannot impose a military solution in Vietnam and therefore must seek the least bad terms for political surrender. This is, of course, an unpalatable suggestion to an American administration facing reelection.

The French proposal is often inaccurately described. It is said France proposes neutralization of all Indochina and that it is clearly impossible at this juncture to negotiate neutralization of North Vietnam. Furthermore, Washington claims a political solution cannot be attempted by negotiation until military stalemate has first been achieved.

In fact, the French approach deals only with South—not North—Vietnam and eschews all thought of a battlefield standoff. The French wish to save what is left of their

own Indochina investment, extensive economic interests in South Vietnam and Cambodia. And they are convinced that if we pursue present policy, the entire area will inevitably be communized. They also think if we attempt formula A, we will merely accelerate the process by insuring Chinese occupation of North Vietnam.

THE FRENCH APPROACH

Paris doesn't pretend that neutralizing South Vietnam is agreeable or that it would automatically facilitate neutralization of North Vietnam. It does claim, however, that its formula accords with the 1954 Geneva agreement to partition Vietnam and that it is preferable either to enlarging the Indochina war or continuing the present dead end policy.

France sees no reason why military stalemate must precede negotiation. France began secret parleys with the Algerian rebels while it dominated the battlefield. Although militarily it seemed to be winning the war, France saw it was doomed to lose the peace. And in Indochina we aren't even winning the war.

On the basis of its own grim experience Paris believes we should now encourage our South Vietnam clients to seek contacts with their enemies and start to parley while fighting. The French feel this would offer the least terrible way out of a hopeless morass and maybe save something in the wreckage.

Obviously, this is not a happy solution for Washington or Saigon. But it should at least be considered and, if neutralization of South Vietnam is inevitable, we had better face the fact now while we have a measure of control and might influence its form.

In 1954 Washington feared Vietnamese partition was but a first step to its communization. What was true then is still probably true. And, in merely delaying this trend, we have committed immense power and prestige. Our entire world posture would suffer if we now abandoned an area into which we probably never should have intruded.

This space reluctantly concludes that we have foolishly forced ourselves into a position where we must attempt formula A. But if we are unready to do so, and are unwilling to accept formula B, we must still replace our present unsuccessful policy. Not even the most misconstrued Pentagon spokesmen pretend any longer that it is succeeding.

There is only one other possibility and that is to try and dump the problem on U.N. This would be extremely difficult to arrange and the Organization is already short on manpower and money. Nevertheless, one of U.N.'s purposes is to be a dumping ground for insoluble questions and a face saver for lost causes. Now would be the best time to involve U.N.—before Peiping and its satellites are members.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7152) to enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on January 20, 1961, in the course of one of the most stirring inaugural addresses ever

made by an American President, the late John F. Kennedy accepted for all Americans the responsibilities of leadership in a time of troubles. He said:

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from the responsibility—I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation.

Although he could not at that time have foreseen the precise nature of this current civil rights controversy, John Kennedy's words are fully applicable today. To the Members of the U.S. Senate has come the responsibility and the rare opportunity to act decisively for the common good in a time of crisis. Let there be no mistake about it, Mr. President, this bill can be, and will be, a major outpost in our defense of freedom in this, a time of maximum danger.

There is—in every corner of America, on every continent in the world—a seething restlessness. It is the impatience of those who for years—even centuries—have suffered unfairly under the crushing yoke of poverty, discrimination, and exclusion. That restlessness, that impatience will not be dissipated by words of promise and counsels of yet more patience. It will disappear only when firm action is taken; action which will tear up and cast aside forever the roots from which have sprung this blight on the face and conscience of America.

Mr. President, I find it hard to believe that there is a single American who really believes, deep down in his heart and soul, that another American citizen should not have the right to vote just because he is a Negro; or that he should not have the right to eat in a public place just because he is a Negro; or that he should not have the right to equal job opportunities just because he is a Negro. All the torrent of words, all the legalistic arguments, all the appeals to the Constitution cannot obscure this basic, simple truth: Every American citizen has the right to equal treatment—not favored treatment, not complete individual equality—just equal treatment.

This bill has been described by some of its opponents as a mad grab for dictatorial power by the Executive. I have heard it called "Fabian socialism, a hand reached out to grasp the hand of communism." Some have protested that it would "give the President and the Attorney General almost unlimited personal power over the details of our everyday lives," or that it will "take away the personal and property rights of nearly every individual in the United States."

Dictatorship, socialism, total Federal control—the slogans are catchy, but they do not describe this bill.

The thrust of the opposition to this bill is grounded upon the belief that this bill wantonly extends the power of the Federal Government into every aspect of our lives in an effort to give favored treatment to a small minority.

A careful examination of this bill demonstrates clearly that this is simply not true. No favoritism is asked for the Negro. No Federal police will be sent to violate any American's privacy. No massive Federal force will coerce and regiment

every American's life. This bill seeks, in a responsible and moderate way, to assure to all Americans the rights which most of us simply take for granted.

Title I of the bill seeks only to insure to each American, regardless of the color of his skin, that most precious of rights—the right to vote. We all know that countless thousands of qualified American citizens are denied that right because they happen to be Negroes. The evidence is clear, substantial and persuasive beyond doubt that in many States qualified Negroes are not permitted to vote. This fact has not been seriously disputed even by the opponents of this bill. In fact, it cannot be disputed. For we know that in the State of Mississippi, only 7 percent of the eligible Negroes are registered to vote. We know that in 100 counties across the South, a little over 8 percent of the eligible Negroes are registered. And so the statistics go, in county after county, State after State.

The pertinent question which we face as we consider the merits of title I is this: Should a qualified American citizen be denied the right to vote just because he is a Negro?

Title II would prohibit discrimination in certain places of public accommodation.

As President Kennedy pointed out in his original message to the Congress proposing this legislation:

Negro citizens are being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and accommodations which are otherwise open to the general public. This is a daily insult which has no place in a country proud of its heritage—the heritage of the melting pot, of equal rights, of one nation and one people.

Mr. President, I suggest to each Member of the Senate to try to place himself in the position of the Negro, daily facing incident after incident of humiliation and insult: Uncertain as to whether or not he should try to get a room in this or that motel or hotel; wondering which restaurant will admit him and which will not. Again we must ask ourselves: Should an American citizen be denied access to an establishment which holds itself out as dealing with the public, simply because he is a Negro?

Title III would hasten the elimination of segregation in certain truly public facilities—hospitals, libraries, museums, parks, playgrounds—owned or operated by a State, city or other governmental unit. Surely no form of segregation is less defensible than that which excludes Negroes from public facilities built, operated and maintained in part with their tax dollars. Should an American citizen be refused admittance to a public hospital, be unable to take a walk in a public park, not be able to go swimming at a public beach, just because he happens to be a Negro?

Title IV of this bill provides for technical and financial assistance to public school officials in preparing and carrying out desegregation plans, and also authorizes the Attorney General to bring desegregation suits in certain cases.

The story: In 11 Southern States, less than 1 percent of all Negro children attend inte-

12190

grated schools. Below college level, in Mississippi, not a single Negro child attends school with white children; in South Carolina, 10; in Alabama, 11. This, 10 years after the U.S. Supreme Court held segregated schools to be unconstitutional.

Should a child be barred from a public school simply because he or she is a Negro?

Title VI would prohibit discrimination in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. Billions of Federal dollars, collected without regard to the color of the taxpayers skin, are each year channelled into each of the 50 States in the form of Federal grants-in-aid. In many States, much of this money is diverted into segregated activities. For example, between 1946 and 1962, over \$36 million in Federal grants were made to 89 racially segregated medical facilities under the Hill-Burton program. Should the U.S. Government aid and abet racial discrimination by permitting the use of Federal funds to perpetuate discriminatory practices already outlawed by Congress and the courts?

Title VII would prohibit employers, labor unions, and employment agencies whose activities affect interstate commerce from discriminating in employment policies and practices. The foundation upon which other necessary freedoms for the Negro must be built is economic freedom. The chance to hope; the chance to dream of a fair chance at a good job, to have the things so many Americans now take for granted.

Again, the facts are shocking. Here are but a few:

First. The unemployment rate among nonwhites is double the rate among whites.

Second. 47 percent of all white workers hold white-collar jobs; for nonwhites the figure is 17 percent.

Third. 20 percent of all Negro women who graduate from high school can find only domestic work. For whites the figure is 2 percent;

Fourth. Finally, the average Negro with 4 years of college will earn less in his lifetime than a white man who quit school after the eighth grade.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I am happy to yield.

Mr. ERVIN. Did I correctly understand my friend from Maine to say that the unemployment rate among Negroes is twice that among white people?

Mr. MUSKIE. The unemployment rate among nonwhites is double the rate among whites.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator upon what information he bases that statement?

Mr. MUSKIE. It is based on information which has been supplied to me by the Department of Justice.

Mr. ERVIN. I say to the Senator that it is contrary to the information which was supplied to me by the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor informed me a few weeks ago that, on the basis of the figures for February of this year, the number of unemployed Negroes was 895,000, and the number of employed white was 3,629,000. Instead

of being 2 to 1, that is a little more than 4 to 1, I should say.

Mr. MUSKIE. I am talking about the unemployment rate among Negroes related to the Negro population, as compared with the rate of unemployment of whites compared with the white population.

Mr. ERVIN. The figures I cited show that slightly more than four white people are out of jobs for every Negro who is out of a job.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator gives me the figure of 895,000 unemployed Negroes and 3,629,000 unemployed whites. I submit to the Senator that, related to the population figures of whites and nonwhites, my figures, supplied me by the Department of Justice, are not erroneous.

Mr. ERVIN. I should say, so far as numbers are concerned, that slightly more than four white persons are out of employment, as of February, for every nonwhite person.

Mr. MUSKIE. As I understand—and the Senator will correct me if I am in error—there are approximately 20 million Negroes in this country. The Senator has said that 895,000 Negroes are unemployed. He gives me a figure of 3,629,000 as the number of white unemployed. The white population is 160-odd million. I arrive at that figure by subtracting the 20 million Negroes. The figures which the Senator has supplied me give an even more startling result than the ones I have suggested.

Mr. ERVIN. My point is that there are more than four white people out of employment for every Negro that is out of employment. That is according to the figures given me by the Department of Labor. Will not the Senator from Maine concede that there is no basis for the claim that the 3,629,000 white people who were out of employment in February were out of employment because of discrimination?

Mr. MUSKIE. The point I undertook to make was that the unemployment rate among Negroes was related to the total number of Negroes in the country, and the unemployment rate among the whites was related to the total number of whites in the country. I said that the unemployment rate among nonwhites is double the rate among whites.

That suggests two things. First, it suggests that the Negroes are unemployed in many cases because of discriminatory practices; second, perhaps because of lesser opportunities from an educational and training standpoint, they are less qualified for some job opportunities that may be available.

Mr. ERVIN. Does the Senator from Maine contend that any of the 3,629,000 whites who were out of employment in February were out of employment because of discrimination?

Mr. MUSKIE. I have made no such contention.

Mr. ERVIN. Would not the Senator from Maine concede that a great many of the whites who were out of employment in February were out of employment because of automation?

Mr. MUSKIE. That might be true.

Also concede that many of the whites

who were out of employment were out of employment because of economic conditions in the localities in which they live?

Mr. MUSKIE. That may be true.

Mr. ERVIN. Would not the Senator from Maine also concede that a great many of the whites, of the 3,629,000 that were unemployed, were out of employment because they lacked necessary skills and necessary training?

Mr. MUSKIE. That is undoubtedly so.

Mr. ERVIN. Would not the Senator also concede that a great many of those observations apply to a substantial number of the 895,000 Negroes who were out of employment at the same time?

Mr. MUSKIE. No doubt.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator from Maine concede that in all probability, on the average, whites possess skills superior to those possessed by Negroes, because of their previous training?

Mr. MUSKIE. That may or may not be true in particular cases. I agree that Negroes have had lesser opportunity, educationally and vocationally and trainingwise, to equip themselves for better jobs.

Mr. ERVIN. Is not the Senator led to conclude that many of the Negroes who were out of employment in February were out of employment for the same reason that white people were out of employment?

Mr. MUSKIE. I agree with the Senator that Negroes and whites are subject to the same economic factors that dictate the unemployment picture in any section of the country; but I also emphasize and invite the Senator's attention to a point which he conveniently disregards: that in the face of these economic factors which bear upon unemployment, the rate among Negroes is still double that among whites, indicating that, in addition to the economic factors which may produce unemployment, the Negro must face the factor of discrimination, which reduces his possibility for getting unemployment opportunities.

Mr. ERVIN. Has the Senator studied the figures which show that there is less unemployment among nonwhites in States which have no FEPC laws than in States which have such laws?

Mr. MUSKIE. I had the pleasure and the privilege, not too long ago, of listening to the Senator from North Carolina discuss those figures. All they proved to me was that discrimination of this kind exists in almost every State of the Union.

Mr. ERVIN. Did they not also prove to the Senator from Maine that the lack of employment was greater, percentage-wise, in the Northern States which had FEPC laws?

Mr. MUSKIE. No; I did not draw that conclusion.

Mr. ERVIN. Did not those figures show, for example, that in North Carolina the unemployment among Negroes was 7.4 percent, and that among Negroes in New Jersey it was 9.5 percent?

Mr. MUSKIE. I would not dispute those figures if the Senator from North Carolina says they are correct.