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HONORARY DEGREES

General LeMay's distinguished record of service has been recognized by many schools. He has honorary degrees from John Carroll, Kenyon College, University of Southern California, Creighton, University of Akron, Tufts, Ohio State, University of Virginia, and Case Institute of Technology.

He has many awards and decorations from the U.S. Government and from foreign governments. These include the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross with 2 clusters, the Air Medal with 3 clusters, the Medal for Humane Action, the National Defense Service Medal and many other American awards.

His foreign decorations include the British Distinguished Flying Cross, the French Legion of Honor, degree of commander; and awards from Brazil, Russia, Belgium, Morocco, Chile, Argentina, Sweden, Ecuador, and Uruguay.

General LeMay entered the armed services as a flying cadet in 1928. He received a regular commission in January 1930. The General of the Air Force participated in the first mass flight of B-17 flying fortresses to South America in 1938. Prior to our entering World War II, he pioneered air routes over the South Atlantic to Africa and over the North Atlantic to England.

General LeMay organized and trained the 305th Bombardment Group in 1942 and led that organization to combat in the European theater. Formation procedures and bombing techniques developed by General LeMay were later adapted to the B-29 superfortresses which fought the war to its conclusion in the Pacific.

REGENSBURG SHUTTLE RAID

As commanding general of the 3d Bombardment Division (England), he led the famed Regensburg raid, a B-17 shuttle mission that originated in England, struck deep into Germany, and terminated in Africa.

In July 1944 he was transferred to the Pacific to direct B-29 heavy bombardment activities of the 20th Bomber Command in the China-Burma-India theater.

Still later he became Chief of Staff of the Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific.

At the conclusion of World War II, he returned to the United States piloting a B-29 superfortress, on a nonstop, recordbreaking flight from Hokkaido, Japan, to Chicago.

After the war General LeMay was transferred to the Pentagon at Washington to be the first Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development.

BERLIN AIRLIFT

In October 1947 General LeMay was selected to command the U.S. Air Forces in Europe with headquarters at Wiesbaden, Germany. He organized air operations for the famous "Berlin airlift."

A year later he returned to the United States and assumed command of the newly formed Strategic Air Command, establishing its headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebr. This central location became the nerve center of a worldwide bomber-missile force.

SAC COMMANDER

Commanding SAC for nearly 10 years, he built, from the remnants of World War II, an all-jet bomber force, manned and supported by profession airmen dedicated to the preservation of peace.

Under his leadership and supervision, plans were laid for the development and integration of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability.

In July 1957 General LeMay was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the USAF and served

in the capacity until July 1961, at which time he was appointed Air Force Chief of Staff, the post he now holds.

WYOMING EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

Cheyenne, May 8, 1964.

It is with pleasure that we invite your participation in Wyoming's second "Space Age Conference and Exposition" at Riverton June 3-7.

Gen. Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, will keynote the conference on Thursday, June 4. General LeMay is one of America's great military leaders, a national figure who I am sure will be well worth hearing.

Theme of the afternoon space age conference on Thursday is "The Technological Revolution." A group of leading national figures will be present to discuss this theme with us. They will present valuable data and information designed to help open the door for Wyoming participation in the space science fields.

A leading industry speaker will complement the appearance of General LeMay and both the Air Force and industry will provide a technical industrial exposition which should prove of great interest.

It is expected that several different Air Force jets will be on display to add to the exposition.

Last year's Wyoming Space Week Exposition at Riverton attracted about 25,000 people. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration cooperated in the program, and James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, was he keynote speaker. The conference and exposition provided Wyoming with a fine orientation in the space science field.

We are hopeful that this year's conference will show us the way into active participation of Wyoming in the space sciences.

Mark June 4 on your calendar.

We hope you can join with the others from Wyoming on that day to help in the planning of our State's future participation in the space age.

Sincerely yours,

CLIFFORD P. HANSEN,
Governor.

HERE'S NEWS

(By MILWARD SIMPSON, U.S. Senator,
Republican, of Wyoming)

LEMay AT WYOMING SPACE CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.—U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis LeMay will speak at the Wyoming Space Age Conference and Exposition to be held in Riverton, Wyo., June 4 through 7, U.S. Senator MILWARD L. SIMPSON announced today.

"The presence of General LeMay, one of America's greatest military leaders, will come as a highlight of the space age conference," Senator SIMPSON said. "His active participation will form the nucleus of what promises to be an exhibition to equal or top last year's monumental show."

Wyoming Gov. Clifford Hansen proclaimed the conference and exposition in an announcement today. Last year's exposition, featuring speakers and exhibits from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ran for 8 days. It drew National attention and some 25,000 people. This year's theme is the "Role of the U.S. Air Force in Space."

Senator SIMPSON said General LeMay is looking forward to the Wyoming exposition "with keen anticipation" and is making preparations with his staff for the participation of the Air Force "in what is destined to become one of the outstanding annual events in the Equality State."

"Gen. Curtis LeMay is a military leader of unquestionable stature and integrity. His

leadership and vision have helped mold an Air Force second to none in the world. His concern for our national security, plus his lifetime of experience serving his country in war and peace, make him preeminently qualified to speak to Wyomingites on the space age to which America's future is so inextricably bound," Senator SIMPSON said.

EXHIBIT 2

WYOMING SPACE AGE CONFERENCE, WYOMING DAY, JUNE 4

From 9 a.m.: Exposition open to the public, National Guard Armory, Riverton.

From 10 a.m.: Dedication of exposition, Governor Hansen, Senator Simpson, General LeMay, and other dignitaries.

From 10:30 a.m.: Informal tour of the exposition by the official group.

From 11 a.m.: Flyover by Wyoming Air National Guard planes and possible Air Force planes.

From 12 noon: Keynote banquet, Gen. Curtis LeMay, keynote address; introduced by Senator Simpson, Governor Hansen, opening remarks.

From 2 p.m.: Space age conference, theme "The Technological Revolution." Conference speakers: "Wyoming Research and National Goals," Dr. John Bellamy, director, NRRI, University of Wyoming; "Impact of Symbolic Control in Industry," Albert K. Hawkes, director of Computer Services Division IIT Research Institute; "Numerically Controlled Machine Tools," Mr. L. C. Penny, Sundstrand Aviation, Denver; "Bionics—Living Growing Science," Air Force representative, Capt. Leslie Knapp; "Summary and Review," Wyoming Natural Resource Board and Industry.

From 6:30 p.m.: Industry banquet: E. B. Fitzgerald, president, Cutler-Hammer, Inc.; Wyoming industrial achievement awards.

SENSIBLE TALK ABOUT CUBA

Mr. BARTLETT, Madam President, "Let's Talk Sense About Cuba" is the title of an article by the able and truly perceptive junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Certain it is that sense is needed when we talk of Cuba and of Latin America as a whole.

I am afraid that too often in the past we have tended to think of the problems, the dangers, and the opportunities of the whole hemisphere in terms of Cuba. Too often our efforts to encourage a peaceful but profound social revolution across Latin America have been viewed solely as countermeasures made necessary by the threat of Castro's exported subversion. The basic principles of the Alliance for Progress are important in themselves, and not because a Cuban dictator is making threats on the peace of a continent. The deep unrest and injustice which it is designed to meet would be there whether or not there had ever been a Castro. In his article, the Senator well says:

If Castro and his henchmen were to disappear tomorrow, much of Latin America would still be stirred by demands for radical social change.

Castro is a grave threat, it is true, but only because he answers these demands for radical social change. This threat, for us, should be more of a challenge. We must show the people of the hemisphere that orderly change and demo-

cratic processes can produce a more effective revolution than does Castroism. We have a job to do in Latin America and we should not let hysteria about the man with the beard keep us from it.

I ask unanimous consent that the Senator's excellent article from the May 16 issue of the Saturday Evening Post may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LET'S TALK SENSE ABOUT CUBA

(By Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT)

(NOTE.—Democrat from Arkansas Senator FULBRIGHT is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was a Rhodes Scholar and at 34 was president of the University of Arkansas. He served one term in the House before his election to the Senate in 1944. One of the most distinguished Members of the upper House, Senator FULBRIGHT shook Washington recently with a speech attacking the myths that underlie U.S. foreign policy. Here he defends himself against his critics and tells in fuller detail what he thinks should be done about Castro's Cuba.)

For a long time it has seemed to me that American attitudes toward the world tend to be rigid and slow to adjust to new situations. Thus, for example, we tend to resist change in policies which were developed to deal with a monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc despite the facts that the Chinese and Soviets are now deeply, perhaps irrevocably, split, and that there is growing trend to diversity in Eastern Europe. There are people who cry for a blockade or other stern measures against Cuba, making no distinction between the problems posed by a Cuba with Soviet medium-range missiles and by a Cuba with Communist workers riding to the cane fields in new British buses.

It was in an effort to point out some of the areas in which change has outrun policy that I spoke in the Senate on March 25. "We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation," I said, "and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities." I stated, for instance, that Castro "is not likely to be overthrown by any policies which we are now pursuing or can reasonably undertake." I suggested that our efforts to persuade free-world countries to maintain a boycott on trade with Cuba have been largely unsuccessful and that for this reason the boycott policy has been a failure.

My purpose was, and remains, to stimulate a general discussion, a rethinking, and a re-evaluation of our foreign policies in the light of changing circumstances. Such criticisms as were contained in my speech were directed at inflexibility in public and congressional thinking about foreign policy, and not at specific policies of the present and preceding administrations, except as these policies have been thwarted or unduly influenced by popular prejudices.

There is nothing more difficult, and nothing more important, than the adjustment of our thoughts and of our policies to changing realities. As Eric Hoffer has written: "It is my impression that no one really likes the new. We are afraid of it. . . . Even in slight things the experience of the new is rarely without some stirring or foreboding."

If there was something "new" about my speech of March 25, it was not what was said but the fact that it was said, and said publicly. In any case, reactions of fear and foreboding were largely confined to the Congress. The reaction of the press and of over 10,000 private citizens who wrote letters to me in the first 3 weeks after the speech was very substantially favorable to the views which I expressed. What is more important, the reaction showed a very substantial in-

terest in a public exploration of the issues which I raised. The voluminous public response indicates to me that the American people are eager for a public discussion and may be receptive to changes in policies.

I welcome the opportunity to examine some of the questions raised in the various comments and criticisms of my speech. I have no objection to being held responsible for anything I said. I do object, however, to being held responsible for things I did not say. I did not say, for example, that American policy is guided solely by myths, or that our policies were inappropriate at the time they were framed. I did not say that we should ourselves enter into friendly relations with the Castro regime in Cuba or terminate our own economic boycott. I said only that our effort to organize a concerted international boycott which eventually will bring down the Communist regime is a failure, which it demonstrably is.

I did say that we should face the probability that the Castro regime will continue to exist. We are, of course, already doing so, and this particular suggestion, therefore, is not the adoption of a new policy so much as the acknowledgment, to ourselves, of an existing fact.

There has been considerable inaccuracy on another point. I did not say that the Castro regime is not a "grave threat" to the hemisphere. I said that it is not a "grave threat" directly to the United States. I did say that it is a "grave threat" to the Latin American countries, but one which should and can be dealt with through the procedures of the Organization of American States.

One criticism which has been directed at the speech is that I neglected to state more explicitly what I believe our policy toward Cuba should be. On reflection, I think this criticism may be well taken, because Cuba now appears to have greater importance in the public mind than I had thought.

I believe that the United States under present conditions should maintain its own political and economic boycott of the Castro regime. It would be desirable if all the other countries of the free world would join in such a boycott, but experience has amply proved that major industrialized countries of Europe, and Japan as well, are unwilling to do so and that we are incapable of either forcing or persuading them to do so. We look silly when we cut off a pittance of military aid to Great Britain and France because they trade with Cuba, when at the same time we find an excuse to continue substantial aid to Spain despite its trade with Cuba. What makes the case even sillier is that the aid we were giving to Britain and France was not aid at all. It was called aid because it came from military-assistance appropriations, but in fact it paid for a sales-promotion campaign to persuade high-ranking British and French officers to buy American military equipment.

There is an important distinction to be made between Cuba and Western Europe on the one hand and Cuba and Latin America on the other. Cuba is not a grave threat to Western Europe, any more than it is a serious threat directly to the United States. But Cuba is a grave threat to Latin America. It is logical, therefore, to expect the Latin American reaction to Cuba to be different from the European reaction, and this has indeed been the case. The Organization of American States has found the Castro regime to be incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system, and Cuba has been excluded from the inter-American organization. Fourteen of the Latin American States have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has been increasing inter-American cooperation in the exchange of intelligence and in the application of countersubversive measures. Latin American trade with Cuba, over all, is insignificant.

Nonetheless, Cuban intervention in the affairs of Latin American States has contin-

ued, the most flagrant example being the shipment of arms to Venezuela, a shipment which was fully confirmed and documented by a committee of the OAS.

The OAS is the deliberately chosen instrument of the American states to deal with these problems. It has available to it adequate procedures and powers, based on the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the Organization of American States. I believe the United States should fully meet its obligations under these treaties to participate in multilateral action to protect the hemisphere from Soviet-Cuban aggression and subversion. But this is primarily a Latin American problem. We cannot protect people who are not interested in protecting themselves.

The real problems of this hemisphere are going to be solved by boycotting Cuba but by making the Alliance for Progress a success. Our exaggerated preoccupation with Cuba has distorted our judgment of the revolutionary movements in several Latin-American countries. If Castro and his henchmen were to disappear tomorrow, much of Latin America would still be stirred by demands for radical social change.

This change need not be brought about through totalitarian methods and controls. In fact, the example of Castro's Cuba has perhaps done more to turn Latin Americans away from communism than all our preaching about its evils. Latin Americans have been shocked by Castro's brutality as well as by an inefficiency that has made a shambles of the Cuban economy.

Despite the importance of these considerations, it was not my major purpose in my statement of March 25 to stimulate a debate on Cuba but rather to place this issue in a reasonable perspective. The problems of the Caribbean are difficult; but unless they are made the focus of a clash of interests between the great powers, as in the missile confrontation of 1962, they are not in themselves the issues which are likely to precipitate a third world war or to determine the shape of world politics in the decades to come.

The problems which are much more likely to be decisive stem from our relations with the two great powers of the Communist world and our relations with our free world allies. It was with respect to these problems—the supreme issues of our time—that I sought to provoke discussion, and to suggest that, when placed in perspective, such issues as Cuba have engaged our attention to a degree out of all proportion to their real importance. For example, I spoke of the "myth . . . that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and a relentless enemy of the free world," and I pointed to "the reality . . . that some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none, and that if we will recognize these distinctions, we ourselves will be able to influence events in the Communist bloc in a way favorable to the security of the free world."

One of the criticisms of my speech is that I did not explore the problems of the Western Alliance and particularly the increasing differences of opinion between General de Gaulle and the other members of the Western community.

My basic belief is that the best hope for the North Atlantic democracies lies in the development, by gradual stages, of a close political, military and economic partnership. If the Western community of nations is to survive and prosper, its prospects for doing so depend heavily on its overcoming its ancient rivalries and animosities and uniting its member nations in a close working partnership.

Impressive progress toward the development of such a partnership was made from the end of World War II until quite recently—through the Marshall plan, the NATO alliance, the formation of the European

Economic Community and of a variety of international financial institutions, and other steps. In the last few years France, under General de Gaulle, has pursued policies which are apparently aimed at quite different objectives, although it is not yet clear what these objectives are. The tendency of current French policy, if I gage it correctly, is away from partnership with other nations, particularly Great Britain and the United States, and back toward the kind of nationalism that has divided the West against itself in centuries past. In many ways French policy is being skillfully, even brilliantly, executed, and many highly informed observers have come to the conclusion that the Gaullist concept of a European community of sovereign nations, vaguely and loosely bound to each other and separated from Great Britain and the United States, represents the "wave of the future."

Perhaps it does. Efforts to assess the realism and the prospects of General de Gaulle's program, however, are handicapped by the fact that it is extremely difficult to grasp the true meaning of the general's statements. We have been told that the post-war era is at an end and that the Gaullist design is built on that reality; that the Atlantic-partnership idea is only a disguise for American hegemony in Europe; that this hegemony, which is equated with Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is intolerable and must soon end; that France and Europe (the terms seems to be used interchangeably) have a destiny and "personality" of their own which must not be diluted by "Anglo-Saxon" admixtures; and that Europe must aspire to be "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

In its present state of definition Gaullism seems more a mystique than a program. It may be that President de Gaulle, in his own good time, will give content to his vision of Europe and of the world. It may be that he will go beyond elegant disquisitions on the pride and personality of nations and proceed to suggest the kind of continuing institutions that will bind together the European nations, firmly or loosely, and the kind of political and economic relations he feels Europe should have with the United States and the British Commonwealth.

It may be, as the general has suggested, that the NATO alliance has served its purpose and is obsolete. I do not think so, nor do I think that NATO is a disguise for American hegemony in Europe. In any case, whether or not NATO survives in its present form, it is essential that provision be made for close and continuing cooperation among the nations of the West, lest they revert to the uncontrolled nationalism that all but destroyed Europe in two World Wars. There are two constructive proposals for long-range cooperation that can be implemented with little delay: the seaborne multilateral force and the proposed consultative Atlantic Assembly. If these are unacceptable to France, perhaps General de Gaulle will propose a better approach.

It is inconceivable that France should be anything less than a leading participant in an Atlantic community. France's partners are in need of her wisdom and her vision—the same wisdom which enabled President de Gaulle to end the Algerian war and to make France the guarantor of order and economic growth in large areas of Africa and, indeed, in proportion to her resources, the leading nation of the free world in extending economic aid to underdeveloped countries. Many Frenchmen have feared that France cannot be herself as a participant in a larger community. They would do well to consider that the free world of which France is an integral part, can have little chance of realizing the full measure of its hopes and opportunities without the participation of France.

The foregoing are some, although certainly not all, of the questions raised by the criticisms of my speech of March 25. I hope that these exchanges are only the beginning of a national rethinking of foreign policy and of a new receptiveness on the part of our people and their policymakers to new ideas and fresh approaches. In a free debate in which no proposal is barred because of its unfamiliarity or its incompatibility with prevailing prejudices, there is certain to be a good deal of error as well as insight. But this need not trouble us. As Thomas Jefferson said, "Error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it."

CONSERVATION AND POLITICS

Mr. CHURCH. Madam President, we are all aware of the growing importance of conservation and resource issues in our national life. And we are also aware of the natural divisions which have occurred in the conservation community itself.

It has remained for Assistant Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver to put some of these problems in their proper perspective in a recent address before the Conservation Week banquet at Utah State University, Logan, Utah.

I ask unanimous consent to have his address printed at this point in the RECORD, and recommend it to the attention of my colleagues.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONSERVATION AND POLITICS

A week ago today I spent a day on a university campus in Massachusetts, before a graduate seminar on our territorial programs and policies. I've savored the opportunities I've had over the past 3 years, at Lansing and Ann Arbor, Milwaukee and Chicago, at Princeton and Riverside and Boston, to discuss government in the university community.

I'm particularly proud to have been asked to be with you tonight. Your Conservation Week has become justly renowned, and the standards set by my predecessors are demanding indeed. I recall that you heard a most significant speech a year ago. Although your scheduled speaker, Chairman WAYNE ASPINALL, was unable to be here, you were able to hear his talk, and in it the main features of his bill for a Public Land Law Review Commission, and of associated legislative items. In the intervening year, his bills on the subjects discussed here have been introduced, hearings held, and they have passed the House of Representatives.

My subject, "Conservation and Politics," can be opened by amplifying the reference to the Public Land Law Review Commission. Here was a measure which at the House hearings received virtually unanimous support from the broadest possible spectrum of the public interested in the public lands, whether commercially, as with the timber, forage, and mining industries, or noncommercially, as with the wildlife organizations and recreationists, and public interest and governmental units, State, county, and local.

This measure passed the House 339 to 29. The bill was sponsored from both sides of the aisle, among others by a member of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission with unimpeachable conservation credentials, JOHN KYL, of Iowa.

The purpose of the Commission bill is clearly stated in it: It is to study the statutes, review the policies and practices of the Federal agencies, compile data on demands for the public lands, present and future, and to recommend legislation to the Congress.

Yet last week a newspaper columnist, with

a radio program also, referred to this as a bill to turn the public lands over to the cattle and mining interests.

Such a charge is erroneous, irresponsible, and a calumny on the Congress. Yet, it is of such stuff that conservation politics is made.

This is the good guys against bad guys method of policy formulation. In the international field we're all aware of the attempt to manipulate public attitudes with reference to some other country's policy—what they want, we oppose, and vice versa. In the resources field, it works the same way. If the lumber or cattle or mining people want a public land law review commission, then to some groups it must be bad; if the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society or some other public group agrees, however reluctantly, to a modified version of the wilderness bill, then those who had demanded the modifications are likely to take a second look.

A related, or refined version of this, is the epithet method of manipulating policy formulation.

Even experienced and sophisticated veterans of public resource management react in a conditioned way to verbal stimuli which are a part of our political tradition. Take the word "exploit" in reference to economic development needs. This is ordinarily a bad word in the conservation lexicon—not for any etymological or philological reason, for words are neutral. But this one exudes the colorful symbolism of our political environment. "Exploit" means "spoil"; "conserve" means "save." In this context, one doesn't even need to write down the moral propositions that create the differences. Generations of holy crusade have produced the glandular reaction—"exploiter," evil; "conservationist," virtuous.

This Pavlovian reference illustrates how deeply conservation issues have cut into national thinking. Some will say: "Isn't this good? Shouldn't people react righteously without having to ponder? Let's not equivocate with evil." This begs the question, for it assumes that the labels and catch phrases, the campaign slogans, have been correctly assigned; that there is some divine guidance, some intuitive gift, that permits ready identification of an infidel or heathen cause. For the purist, there are no gradations of virtue—no compromises between ideal and reality.

A few days ago an experienced and seemingly sophisticated Government servant said to me, "Why doesn't the Department create a special board for the sole purpose of identifying the public interest?"

A good question. Yet in the 3 years and almost a half I've been in the Department, I can't recall any one of the innumerable controversies where each side of the issue wasn't framed plausibly in terms of the public interest. I've known no decision made by Secretary Udall which hasn't been made in the public interest. Yet the controversies have been deep and vigorous, and many have reverberated in the Halls of Congress or the columns of the press long after they were made. In all of them both sides of the controversy are stated in terms of the public interest, and in most of them both sides are in the public interest. But choices have to be made and the job of making choices cannot be delegated by the Secretary to a board.

Let's look at a couple of specific cases. The development plan for the Potomac presents one controversy now active: the development of the Colorado another. Those who would build dams (in one case the dam builders are in another Department, in the other case in our own), and those who oppose in favor of the existing values, such as parks or private improvements each states a public interest case.

Electric energy for a rapidly growing population and burgeoning economy must be planned for. Both sides agree, but opponents of the dam assert that account has

not been taken of alternatives like nuclear power.

Recreation opportunities are laudable side benefits of dams—but does this kind of recreation outweigh the damage to natural features?

Listen to the language of the two sides:

From the dam builders:

"Water-based outdoor recreation is one of the most popular leisure-time activities in the Pacific Southwest region. The capacity of many existing recreation facilities is already strained. Coincident with the anticipated population growth of the region will be an increased demand for water-oriented outdoor recreation uses. Thus, new basic facilities are included in the plan of development wherever appropriate.

"The basic facilities that would be provided at the reservoirs include access roads, parking areas, beaches, boat launching ramps, picnic and campground areas, public utilities, comfort stations, and related items. The new reservoirs would create new large water areas for boating, fishing, swimming, and water skiing and, additionally, would provide new access to some of the most spectacular scenery in the Nation."

From the opponents:

"The construction of a reservoir in this reach of the canyon (at Bridge) would inevitably result in the loss of park values of national significance.

"The river, with its ever changing currents, pools and rapids, would be blotted out by the slack water of the reservoir.

"The existing natural streambank ecology would be drastically changed throughout the extent of the reservoir. The existing plant and animal habitats would be drowned out, and colonization by exotic species would be expected. In the uppermost regions of the reservoir, silt deposition and debris accumulation would be inevitable.

"The most obvious change in the recreational use would be the limitation of the traditional and exhilarating experience of wild river boating."

Controversies like these are incapable of resolution by the application of rhetoric or slogan—something far more fundamental is expected of Government than that.

And something far more fundamental ought to be expected of the public.

Conservation issues are public issues. Success in the task of conservation requires mastery of the workings of politics, both internal and external. Conservation presents elemental conflicts of values.

If the politics of conservation are to be worthy, if it is to be recognized that resource managers must communicate to the public and to the legislatures a sense of ethical urgency rooted in a felt philosophy, then history must be studied, our society comprehended, our governmental system mastered.

Slogans are not substitutes for celebration; and the field of conservation isn't open to be staked as the exclusive domain of any group, however well intentioned.

Many in this room will participate in making the social decisions that must be made to meet the demands of 300 million people for living space, food and fiber, and all of the other resource requirements of an almost unimaginable technology. Conservation and resources promise to become the most critical domestic political issue as we approach that social milestone. Any attempt to answer the challenge with clichés must fail—and with it our basic values, quite possibly our whole political system and our existence as a democratic society.

Professional resource managers have their own sophisticated phrases. The appeal of "sustained yield" has been sufficient to turn many a tide. And "multiple use" comes close to being the universal solution to all demands, even though it provides no effective

assistance in adjudicating incompatible demands. The mere suggestion of "give-away" is enough to stop any resource transaction in its tracks—at least temporarily. Such slogans are high-powered weapons of the political arsenal.

It helps to recognize that these are the current manifestations of a long tradition. Resource issues have been political issues since the earliest days of the Republic. Jefferson and Hamilton's ideological struggle had as one of its ingredients the policies which should govern in settling western lands.

The Mississippi bubble was the major political issue of its decade. John Wesley Powell made the settlement of arid lands a bloody battleground long before those lands had any real value. In the last decade, Al Sarena held center stage while the pressures for more open space, better recreation facilities, more and purer water piled up. This accumulation is our political inheritance, the unfinished agenda of our generation.

The techniques of achieving political goals for conservation were never more effectively exhibited than they were at the hands of the first Roosevelt and his chief lieutenant, Gifford Pinchot. Roosevelt made his name synonymous with conservation, as he met both the interests and their legislative spokesmen head on.

By a pen's stroke, he set aside public lands for forest purposes while enrolled enactments of Congress prohibiting such executive action sat out the constitutional waiting period on his desk. Forestry, reclamation and wildlife protection became main functions of the Federal Government under his tutelage.

Teddy Roosevelt took the conservation movement out of the polite conversation of drawing rooms and off the platforms of the lecture circuit. An ideal, clothed with Victorian respectability, became an objective of public policy—of Government activity. Conservation was made an object of political contest—where it has been ever since, not only at the Federal level but in the States as well.

Pinchot presents an even more interesting case study in the development of political conservation and conservation politics, which is equally significant. Pinchot is something of a rarity among all public figures: a pioneer in an emerging profession and respected for that in itself; masterful politician, good enough to quarterback many of Roosevelt's most daring forays, and to be elected Governor of Pennsylvania twice; but above all, superlative bureaucrat. With a singleness of purpose that would have been disastrous in one of lesser ideals, Pinchot used a small and ineffectual office in the Department of Agriculture as the nucleus for concentrating most of the Federal forestry activities into one of the largest and most powerful of all Federal bureaus—one that could dominate Cabinet officers and challenge a President of the United States.

Pinchot's zeal to become the dictator of conservation values and morals led, of course, to his split with Taft and his accusations against Secretary of the Interior Richard K. Ballinger, whom Taft appointed to replace Pinchot's friend and collaborator, James Garfield. The congressional hearings on these accusations marked one of the bitterest episodes in the history of conservation politics. The stakes were high—the office of the President becoming eventually involved. Ballinger was eventually exonerated of any intentional wrong-doing, but it was found that certain of the evidence submitted in his behalf had been misrepresented as to time of preparation. Press and public alike remembered only this tarnishing fact—Ballinger was publicly guilty, though innocent.

This incident in one man's bureaucratic war on those who opposed him did lasting harm to a major conservation department of the Government. Pinchot—although out of

office—never lost an opportunity to remind the country of Interior's faults, as if Ballinger had been found guilty. Not until Harold Ickes took over a quarter century later did the Department retrieve the public respect so necessary to discharge its conservation mission.

The politics of the conservation movement itself, including both the internal manipulation of organizations and the interplay of powerful forces among those who have a rightful claim to be called conservationists, took shape in Roosevelt's time, too.

Theodore Roosevelt's task in establishing the conservation ideal ran across the grain of traditional thinking. He had to first establish waste as something close to immoral—and then work on the public conscience to see that it reacted accordingly. The substantive issues of his day were, however, relatively uncomplicated. Techniques of forest protection were direct, elementary and easily comprehended; power generation and transmission had potential for the future, but comparatively little current relevance; demands upon land and water resources were confined to single uses, uncomplicated by competing needs incompatible with each other.

Now our population has almost doubled and its mobility multiplied fivefold or tenfold. A disturbing percentage of our land area must be devoted to concrete ribbons strung with the beads of metropolis, suburb, and town. Technology has made possible and created forms of land use which were impossible a half century or even a decade ago. The protective barriers to the wilderness have been breached.

Hetch Hetchy was the early warning of what is today a truism—that one conservationist's ideal could be another's desecration, that the recriminations among friends under stress match those that draw blood from sworn enemies.

The cities of central California and the bay area were outstripping readily available supplies of water; a similar situation in power could be foreseen due to their great distance from conventional energy sources. To those who were thoroughly steeped in Theodore Roosevelt's premise that "conservation is the great fundamental basis for national efficiency," it was elemental that the rivers of the Sierras should be harnessed to provide the water and power requirements for a growing prosperity. From almost every standpoint of economy, efficiency, and engineering convenience, the ideal site for dam construction was in the Hetch Hetchy Valley of the Tuolumne River. Heated opposition immediately developed from two quarters; from private utility interests, because the project was to be constructed and operated by the city of San Francisco, and from an important segment of the conservation movement itself, because the site was deep in the Yosemite National Park, consecrated in the eyes of parks purists.

Hetch Hetchy became a national issue primarily because of its public power aspects, but the contention between conservation values was also very much in the public eye. Labels became mixed and the identity of friend and foe became complicated. If you can conceive of it, John Muir was actually cast in the role of advocate for Pacific Gas & Electric Co., was called a mouthpiece of "the interests." To those who recount this story from the public power viewpoint, the term "conservationist" is reserved for Hetch Hetchy's proponents—all others fall in the category of "nature lovers" or "power interests." In this, the first clear instance of conflict among national conservation objectives, the charge was also made by one element of the conservation front that their erstwhile friends were being exploited by those having diametrically opposite social values. "Save Yosemite From Destruction"