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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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unknown seas of physics, Marconi and Fermi. No men charted a more profound map of the universe of esthetics than Toscanini, Verdi, and so many other Italian musicians, including Puccini, who found in our Golden West the inspiration that turned the dreams and hopes of so many of his countrymen westward, to America.

All of these men made great discoveries. But in a democratic society it is not enough to mark the works of the great. We must never forget that the most important discoveries were made individually: by each of the many millions who discovered in America full scope for the development of their splendid potential.

Countless Americans of Italian birth or extraction have made lasting contributions to the American way of life. Some of them may not be as known as Christopher Columbus, John and Sebastian Cabot, and Amerigo Vespucci. One of these discovered America. The other two were sailors who discovered Greenland, Newfoundland, Labrador, and the east coast of North America, while the third succeeded in having the entire continent named after him.

I would like to add a few words on behalf of a few others who were not as well known even though their contributions were most significant.

Let me mention Giovanni Verrazano, a Florentine navigator who discovered the harbor of New York and the mouth of the Hudson River about 100 years before Henry Hudson. Then Philip Mazzei, who settled in Virginia in the period of the Thirteen Colonies, and although many people knew that he introduced the culture of grapes in America, few know that he was an intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson. How many know that the third Governor of Maryland was a man by the name of William Paca? This American of Italian heritage was a Member of the First and Second Continental Congresses and was one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence.

A Venetian musician and composed by the name of Philip Tragetta was a friend of Presidents James Madison and James Monroe. It was Tragetta who established the American Conservatory in Philadelphia.

The very first collegiate institution on the Pacific coast, the College of Santa Clara, was founded by Father Gregoria Mengarini, a Roman missionary and educator.

A man by the name of Peter Caesar Alberti was officially known as Peter Caesar, the Italian. Alberti established the first tobacco plantation in Brooklyn, and to the greater glory of our Nation raised a large family.

The roots of Americans of Italian extraction go back not to the turn of the century but to the very founding of our country. They sustained her in time of need and offered their labors and ingenuity and their talents to help make it the land of the free and a glorious nation in the family of nations.

The greatness of our country stems from the parts played in the contributions of so many peoples—peoples of all

racess, creeds, and national origins—who helped make this the greatest Nation in the world. No one has a monopoly on Americanism. Americanism does not imply race, color, creed, or national origin. Americanism means an equality of opportunity, respect for your fellow-man, adherence to the Golden Rule.

Perhaps the greatest single exhibition of the enrichment of this land by the sons of Italy is seen in the history of our wars. Americans of Italian descent were among the first to go over the top in Flanders and among the last to yield to overwhelming force in Corregidor.

The graves of Italo-Americans grace the soil of a thousand battlefields, where they fell fighting for America and for the same love of freedom that motivated Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour.

In conclusion, we should all be thankful for the many millions of Americans of Italian birth and descent who continue to prove that they are first in the arts of peace as they are foremost among those who defended America during time of war.

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A POWERFUL ANTIDOTE TO SPREADING EUPHORIA: A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CAPTIVE NATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKI] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, in the wake of our signing the nuclear test ban treaty countless Americans are being steadily engulfed by a spreading euphoria in the cold war. Many have already jumped to the groundless conclusion that this event has signaled the beginning of the end of the cold war. Responsible officials in the administration and numerous private analysts are becoming increasingly concerned about this untoward development. They rightly fear its psychopolitical consequences upon our general cold war posture.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CONGRESS

We in Congress have an excellent opportunity—indeed a duty—to provide a powerful antidote to this spreading, contagious euphoria. We can and should establish in this session a Special Committee on the Captive Nations. With this euphoria giving rise to much unthinking talk about a nonaggression pact the Warsaw Pact regimes, the time has arrived for positive action on our part to check what may develop into a major diplomatic disaster for us and the free world. We can furnish such a check by concentrating our efforts on the captive nations and people in Eastern Europe and Asia.

MAJORITY IN RULES SUPPORT A SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Mr. Speaker, one of the most mystifying aspects of this legislative action for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations is that despite the expressed support by a majority of our members in the Rules Committee, not one step has been taken in this session to consider the measure. There are 40 resolutions before the Rules Committee, call-

ing for the creation of this special committee.

REPEATABLE QUESTIONS DESERVING ANSWERS

On this whole issue there are certain repeatable questions deserving specific and honest answers. Why in the light of these facts and more has action been blocked in the Rules Committee? When in view of the preponderant interest by our members in such a committee will fair consideration be given to the 40 resolutions? Who, indeed, is opposed to this measure so strongly that even the opportunity is denied our members in Rules to vote on it? How do we explain all this to our respective constituents who for 2 years have persistently urged the passage of this measure?

Yes, Mr. Speaker, these are questions worthy of repetition and deserving of specific and honest answers. The supporters of this measure shall keep repeating these basic questions until we receive specific and honest answers to them. Naturally all of them can be quickly resolved by a fair and immediate decision on this measure in the Rules Committee.

THE DOBRIANSKY ARTICLE IN NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS

How important and vital the captive nations are to our security and to world freedom is shown in a recent article published in the August-September issue of NATO's Fifteen Nations, written by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, professor at Georgetown University and president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the article is entitled "Soviet Russian Imperio-Colonialism and the Free World." A careful reading of this article by our Members will convince them of the necessity of a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations.

I insert it in the RECORD as part of my remarks:

SOVIET RUSSIAN IMPERIO-COLONIALISM AND THE FREE WORLD

(By Lev E. Dobriansky)

No matter how one views it, Moscow knows best the true character of communism. After all, it has successfully manipulated the ideologic deception for over 40 years. Like the czars, who with their more limited ideologic smoke screens of religious orthodoxy and racist Pan-Slavism were also quite adept in the art of conquest, the present Russian empire builders have managed to keep their intended victims in a state of doubt and confusion as to the real threat facing them.

The Russian totalitarians bank heavily on the permanence of this state of doubt and confusion. In fact, it is a necessary condition for the success of their cold war efforts. As they doubtlessly see it, those who are divided in thought and conception are prime candidates for divided action; and such action in the context of the total struggle is tantamount to inaction, indecision, and slow defeat in the cold war. Centuries of continuous Russian cold-war activity substantiate this fundamental truth. It is not the product of any Communist innovation.

So long as millions in the free world interpret the struggle as a conflict between social systems—between communism and capitalism—Moscow's expansionist interests are well served. This misconception, fanned by Moscow's own propaganda machine, has lent philosophical dignity to Soviet Russian totalitarianism, has bred countless recruits for its subversive work in all quarters of the globe, and, above all, has blinded the tar-

geted victim as to both the nature of the enemy and the opportunities to defeat him in the cold war. In earlier stages of Russian imperial history, the supposed conflict was between religious systems, then later between races; in this century of phenomenal economic growth and a materialist interest affecting all parts of the world, it is painted in terms of social systems.

The center of so-called world communism has been exceptionally adroit and skillful in this prime task. Seizing upon opportunities with courage and fixed determination, it has built an empire that far surpasses the wildest dreams of the past czars. What Alexander I had failed to accomplish in the Western Hemisphere, Khrushchev achieved in captive Cuba; and the end of Russian entrenchment in Latin America is certainly not in sight. In Asia and Africa the same task is being methodically performed with indubitable long-term consequences. Massive weapons, counterinsurgency operations, and economic aid designed to contain Soviet Russian aggression will not stop Moscow's primary form of aggression—its planned assault of half-truths, false conceptions, and a projected image upon minds the world over.

We in the free world have yet a long way to go before a complete understanding of this traditional Russian cold-war strategy is realized. Most of us, including those in the highest official quarters, have never bothered to investigate the long history of the Russian Empire; and if some have, the chances are that their exclusive dependence on Russian sources has precluded patient inquiries into the histories of Russia's victims. How the empire in its present form came to be what it is serves as the basic clue to this indispensable understanding, but general conceptions about the Soviet Russian empire first being formed in the 1940's show how little we have developed this clue. This repeated failure has always benefited imperio-colonial Moscow. It thrives on protracted intellectual neglect.

In a recent address at American University in Washington, D.C., President Kennedy called upon Americans to reexamine their attitude toward the Soviet Union. Actually, this summons applies to all peoples in the free world. By all means, let's reexamine our attitudes, but with facts, not fiction. In the short run, the likelihood of an intelligent reappraisal leading to a redoubtable free-world strategy for victory in the cold war is dim, indeed. And there is no better proof for this prediction than the untold development of our encounter with Moscow over the captive nations since July 1959. The highlights of this unique development readily underscore all of the above observations.

THE 1959 RUSSIAN ERUPTION

Few of us will forget the explosion that occurred in Moscow immediately after the U.S. Congress had legislated the Captive Nations Week Resolution in July 1959. Never before did a Russian chief of state react so violently and for so long against an official document as has Khrushchev against this resolution. The question that continues to puzzle many diplomats and analysts is "Why this vehement reaction to a congressional resolution?" "For," they would add, "It wasn't the first resolution of its kind against communism and for the captive nations."

Before answering this, let's view some aspects of this initial phase. Significantly, in his first tirade against the resolution, Khrushchev kicked back with a centuries-old but spurious Russian retort. Speaking to a Soviet-Polish friendship rally in Moscow just moments before the airport arrival of Vice President Nixon, he denounced the resolution as "a direct interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs."¹ This must be borne in mind to appreciate the resolution's novel features.

¹ UPI, Moscow, July 23, 1959.

Of course, the argument on interference in "internal affairs" has consistently been applied by Moscow to other parts of its empire. For example, in the U.N. General Assembly meeting in Paris in 1951, Vishinsky used it tirelessly with reference to Hungary during the extensive debate on the Kersten provision in the U.S. Mutual Security Act. That provision aimed to attract defectors from behind the Iron Curtain. Last year Khrushchev used it with regard to Cuba. In short, what becomes part of Moscow's empire, including the vast non-Russian territories in the U.S.S.R., becomes an "internal affair."

In the course of Nixon's tour in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev let it be known that the resolution pierced the false image of the Soviet Union as the leader of world communism. As Nixon himself puts it in his book "Six Crises," the resolution was "the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour." Khrushchev staged a whole series of antics, shaking his finger at Nixon, shouting, pounding, dubbing the resolution and then, in Nixon's words "he spelled out what he meant in some earthy four-letter words."² On the Moskva river the Russian leader conducted "fine river rallies," to use Mikoyan's phrase, in order to convince Nixon that there are no captives in the Soviet Union.

All this evidence and more points to the essential meaning of the resolution. Moscow quickly grasped its meaning, if much of the free world didn't. For the first time an official act by a free world government identified the nature of the cold war enemy as Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. The act penetrated the veneer of communism and laid bare the last remaining, major, imperialist power in the world. It placed the Soviet Union in its true light, an empire within an empire, made up of more captive non-Russian nations than exist in Central Europe. Briefly, the resolution seriously threatened the image projected by Moscow in every quarter of the globe and opened up possibilities for cold war operations that in time would destroy the impact of Soviet Russian propaganda.

How little this was understood in the United States can be gleaned from these examples. One report stated, "U.S. officials are somewhat puzzled and slightly annoyed, but also amused, by Soviet irritation over President Eisenhower's proclamation of Captive Nations Week."³ The resolution predicates the presidential proclamation. Another report was captioned, "That 'Captive Nations Week' Has Many Diplomats Puzzled."⁴ What truly puzzled this writer were the numerous queries received from various parts of the country on the whereabouts of Idel-Ural, Turkestan and Cossackia in the U.S.S.R. Only a relative few seemed to know about these captive non-Russian areas mentioned in the resolution. Yet, these important states are located in the front yard of the cold war enemy.

THE RESOLUTION HAUNTS K'S VISIT

If Khrushchev was merely irritated by the resolution or, as it is now called, Public Law 86-90, then one is extremely had put to explain subsequent events. Considering the unprecedented character of Moscow's first reaction and the innovative features of the law itself, the effect was unquestionably much deeper than this. The Russian leader, who has gained a reputation for his ebullient confidence, his boasts and threats, is found ranting "This resolution stinks." He was so preoccupied with it that it continued to haunt him. And, in cold war terms, for good reasons.

² Nixon, Richard, "Six Crises," New York 1962, pp. 252.

³ AP release, July 23, 1959.

⁴ The Sunday Star, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1959.

A month before his visit to the United States, Khrushchev had an article published in an advance issue of Foreign Affairs, a periodical of a group in New York. Once again he attacks the resolution. He also uses the familiar Russian rhetoric paralleling the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. In an attempt to mislead the reader he writes, "It would be interesting to see, incidentally, how would Americans have reacted if the Parliament of Mexico, for instance, had passed a resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona, and California be liberated from American slavery."⁵

This point did not go unchallenged. When the Russian Premier arrived in Washington in September 1959, and was received in several governmental circles, I prepared a set of questions for Senator DIRKSEN, of Illinois, to elicit Khrushchev's answers at a tea given by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On this point the Senator asked him: "In your article in Foreign Affairs you mistakenly compare Texas, Arizona, and California with certain non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Would you be willing to stage, under U.N. auspices and control, free voting conditions to determine whether the nations of Lithuania, Ukraine, and the Caucasus want to remain in the U.S.S.R. or be independent and whether the residents of comparable Arizona, Texas, and California want to remain in the United States of America or be completely independent States? Let's compete in ideas and action." Following the closed meeting, Senator DIRKSEN informed the press that on this and other concrete questions "Khrushchev took a fifth amendment stand."⁶

During his entire stay in the United States, the Russian boss posed as a dauntless competitor in ideas and coexisting action. However, when he was pressed on these vital issues, he cringed. Early in the visit the White House passed the word that the guest was not to be confronted by "embarrassing questions"—in effect, the great advocate of competitive coexistence was to have a clear field for his propaganda effort. And on matters of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, the tremendous strength of the U.S.S.R., and the horrors of nuclear war, he did his work well.

Nevertheless, from start to finish, from Washington to Camp David, the big competitor was haunted by the resolution. Just last year the present Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, the Honorable William W. Scranton, testified on this as follows: "I think anybody who was connected with this visit in any way will tell you that this particular resolution made more of an impression on Chairman Khrushchev and he inveighed against it at a greater rate almost daily while he was here than any other single thing that America was doing in the cold war."⁷ The Governor, attached to the Department of State then, accompanied Khrushchev on the tour and was at Camp David.

In the following months, both in 1959 and 1960, Moscow continued its barrage against Public Law 86-90. For example, Khrushchev himself railed into it again on October 31 in the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, slurring it as an "appeal for interference in other peoples' affairs." Moscow even found it necessary to order the publication out of London of a new series of pamphlets titled "The Fifteen Soviet Republics, Today and Tomorrow." These have been distributed in massive volume throughout the free world to exhibit the paradise of coexisting nations in

⁵ Khrushchev, Nikita S., "On Peaceful Coexistence," Foreign Affairs, October 1959.

⁶ "The Ukrainian Bulletin," New York, Oct. 1-5, 1959.

⁷ "Hearings on the Captive Nations," Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 1962, p. 195.

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the U.S.S.R. But Khrushchev wasn't through yet; he chose a new course of tactical diversion in the United Nations—which almost seriously backfired.

K'S 1960 TACTIC IN THE U.N.

One of the chief motives behind Khrushchev's dramatic appearance—and antics—in the U.N. General Assembly in September 1960, was to divert free world attention from the reality of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, particularly in the U.S.S.R. itself. With finger, shoe, and tongue he hammered away at the theme of Western imperialism and colonialism, while his puppets decried the resolution. As to be expected in this unfolding pattern of events, he seized the offensive while, on the whole, Western delegates played the typical defensive.

However, the Prime Minister of Canada, John G. Diefenbaker, deviated, and in his address raised the simple questions, "What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of freedom-loving Ukrainians and other eastern European peoples?"⁹ By merely raising these pointed questions the Canadian Prime Minister threw the Soviet and puppet representatives into a state of pandemonium and confusion. They believed this was the opening shot of a counteroffensive designed to lay bare before the world the brutal facts of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism within the U.S.S.R. itself. Khrushchev was so shaken by this that on October 4 he even permitted his Ukrainian puppet, Nicholas V. Podgorny, to address the U.N. for the first time in the Ukrainian language.

Apparently the only organ that captured the full meaning of these events and what suddenly transpired in Ukraine itself was the Swiss daily, the *Neue Zurichier Zeitung*. In its November 20, 1960 issue a detailed report, titled "Colonialism in the Soviet Empire," covers the unusual campaign staged for several days in Ukraine against the Diefenbaker statement. Protest rallies in all cities, continuous Radio Kiev broadcasts, declamations by officials, writers, academicians and others proclaiming their "freedom and independence"—even Communist Party opposition in Canada—marked the frenzied campaign. "The whole event," states the report, "merits also full attention because for a short time the Soviets (Russians) themselves certified in a striking manner on what weak feet stands their federal system and how highly vulnerable, from the viewpoint of foreign relations, they are on this point."

ONLY A LOST OPPORTUNITY

Upon his return to Kiev, Podgorny gloated that the Wetsern maneuver was "choked in the germ stage." Actually, no plan existed to have warranted the expectation of subsequent stages. Few understood Khrushchev's maneuver against the background of the resolution and the successive events it precipitated. The complete pattern of these significant events was scarcely noticed. Too late, too little, and too piecemeal was President Kennedy's United Nations challenge in September, 1961: "Let us debate colonialism in full—and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every part of the globe." In effect, another opportunity was lost to advance the interests of the free world in the cold war.

But the battle over the resolution has not ceased, and additional opportunities will be in store as further understanding of its contents is realized. At the Communist Party Congress in October 1961, Khrushchev again assailed the resolution. Yet, even at this late date, fact and fiction were mixed in Western commentaries. For example,

Stewart Alsop wrote: "When I was in Moscow during the October Party Congress, Khrushchev once again violently denounced the innocuous Captive Nations Week Resolution which Congress passes every year to attract minority votes."¹⁰

This comment is a gem of fact, illogic, and fiction. The obvious fact is Khrushchev's violent denunciation; the illogic is the supposed innocuousness of the resolution; and the fiction concerns Congress passing it every year to attract votes. The resolution is explicitly self-renewing. Also, passed in an off-election year, it has had nothing to do with minority votes.

What will in time produce this full understanding is the annual observance of Captive Nations Week by the American people. Each year since 1959 the week has been viciously attacked by Moscow and its puppets, and the unknowing naturally ask "Why?" In July 1962, for instance, *Izvestia* ran a lengthy editorial condemning the week as "unbridled anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slander."¹⁰ In the same year we witnessed the scandalous publication by UNESCO of the book "Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the U.S.S.R.," a mass of half-truths and bald fabrications. To answer the "whys" of such events Congress and Americans across the country discuss the captive nations within the framework developed here, as a strategic free world instrument in the cold war. Inevitably, the real enemy will be better understood, the resolution will be intelligently implemented, and genuine progress toward victory in the cold war will be achieved.

Mr. Speaker, I must reemphasize the fact that the establishment of a special House Committee on the Captive Nations is of such importance that regardless of the known State Department roadblock to our consideration, a resolution should be approved so that the House could work its will.

May I remind the Members of the dedicated efforts of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood], on behalf of this cause. Certainly, responsible Members of the House serving on this committee would accomplish much that would be of practical benefit not only to the enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain but also to all people of the free world earnestly striving for a world of true peace and freedom.

Incidentally, Mr. Speaker, there is a moral question that we must reemphasize in maintaining an interest in the captive nations. Soviet colonial exploitation of these lands, unfortunately, is hardly recognized. I am especially pleased, however, that the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, in an editorial of Monday, September 30, saw fit to direct editorial attention to the Soviet exploitation of Eastern Europe, and I insert this editorial into the *Record* at this point as part of my remarks.

LAX CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND

Once more the U.N. has been subjected to Soviet pontification and a Russian demand for an end to all colonialism by 1965.

Mr. Webster has defined colonialism as "the system in which a country maintains foreign colonies for their economic exploitation." How does our erstwhile champion of

⁹ Alsop, Stewart, "The Berlin Crisis: Khrushchev's Weakness," *Saturday Evening Post*, Dec. 16, 1961.

¹⁰ *Izvestia*, July 17, 1962.

anticolonialism score on this point? Last spring it was embarrassingly plain and equally poor.

The Rumanians had openly balked. They no longer wanted to play the role assigned to them by the planners of COMECON, the Soviet-organized, Soviet-run, involuntary economic corporation set up by Moscow as the opposite of the Common Market.

According to the big plan, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union were to provide heavy industry, while the other states were to concentrate on agriculture with Rumania something of a bloc bread basket.

But being the "banana republic" of the Balkans held little appeal for the proud and pragmatic nationalist Gheorghe Gheorgiu-Dej, who is Rumania's party boss.

His intransigence at the time of the China split won him minor concessions, but he took pains not to push the mother country too far.

Even Fidel, who has made a career excoriating monopolists and exploiters, has been forced to trek to Moscow for his 5-year plans. This summer he returned to Cuba, slowed the island's industrialization and, under Khrushchev's orders, put his nation back along the road to the sugar economy.

But the exploitation can come in simpler forms. In the 6 years after 1955, the Soviets swindled their colonies in Europe of some \$6 billion by merely forcing them to pay premium prices for Russian goods and paying the satellites less than value for what they produced. Attila would have marveled at the bloodless methods of modern plunder.

The U.N. states have never censured the Russians for this heinous exploitation. Yet these same hypocritical U.N. states can be counted on—once again this session—to wax hot and indignant at Portugal and taunt that tiny nation with raucous insults for clinging to Angola.

This is one reason why we can never seem to share the enthusiasm and optimism of those hermits from reality who insist that the glass building off 42d Street houses the "conscience of mankind."

Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, there is sufficient evidence that our foreign policy defects which have marked conferences with the Russians since the Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam period, and in other so-called summit meetings, are based on a lack of sufficient knowledge of true conditions in the Communist area, as well as the true aspects of the captives of communism.

As evidence of original lack of knowledge but a growing awareness of the true facts, I submit the public reappraisal of former Vice President Nixon. A recent article by Columnist David Lawrence discusses Mr. Nixon's latest views on the subject of Eastern Europe, which I insert here as part of my remarks:

[From the *New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune*, Oct. 7, 1963]

EASTERN EUROPE'S FEARS LINKED TO U.S. DIPLOMACY

(By David Lawrence)

WASHINGTON.—America's foreign policy is going through a critical stage. There is a growing feeling that, in order to reduce tensions, secret diplomacy has taken over, and that important concessions have been or will be made to the Soviets.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are reported to be most apprehensive about an American tendency to grant such concessions—as, for example, on the sale of wheat—without achieving anything in return.

⁸ U.N. General Assembly, New York, Sept. 26, 1960.

Thus, former Vice President Nixon, in an article in this week's issue of the Saturday Evening Post, says flatly that, while the signing of the test ban treaty may have decreased the danger of war, "the danger of defeat without war has been substantially increased."

Mr. Nixon writes that "a great new Communist offensive is being launched against the free world, an offensive without resort to war, an offensive all the more dangerous because it is so difficult to recognize and to meet effectively." He adds:

"I believe that we are now entering a period of the greatest danger of Communist expansion in the free world since immediately after World War II."

Mr. Nixon, who has just returned from a trip to Europe, says that an American foreign-policy adviser there said to him: "If the Kennedy administration had not watered down the captive nations resolution as it did this year Khrushchev might never have agreed to the test ban."

Mr. Nixon doesn't believe that such an assumption is correct, but he asks, "was the test ban worth the price we paid? Did we sell out freedom for expediency?"

The former Vice President is well aware that during the Eisenhower administration, the people of Hungary revolted against Soviet rule and did not get the support they had hoped to receive from the United States. He admits that mistakes were made in 1956, when the Budapest revolution erupted. Conceding that it is easy to second-guess, he now believes that more should have been done than was done. He blames in part the fact that the British and French chose this very same time to use armed force in the Suez situation, while America felt that on principle it had to protest and rely on the United Nations. But he ruefully remarks that "Khrushchev did what he always does—uses the UN when it helps him and ignores it when it hurts him." And "We ended up with a debate in the UN; the Hungarian freedom fighters ended up without a country." Mr. Nixon now outlines a policy that he thinks should have been followed:

"First, we should have recognized the anti-Communist Nagy government promptly. This would have deprived Khrushchev of the legal argument that the Communist Kadar government had 'invited' the Soviet forces to come in.

"Second, when Khrushchev refused to withdraw his troops from Budapest, we should have broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

"Third, we should have permitted the organization of 'volunteers' in free countries to help the freedom fighters. This is the action the Kremlin has taken in corresponding situations.

"Fourth, when the puppet Kadar government was set up in place of the free government, we should have recognized a government-in-exile. Such a government-in-exile by itself could not have changed the situation. But it would have been a symbolic rallying point not only for Hungarians, but for people throughout Eastern Europe who admired their courage and shared their ideals of freedom."

Mr. Nixon does not reveal how much of the foregoing program he advocated in the inner councils at the time. He says about the current situation, however, that it would be "shockingly immoral for the United States to do anything directly or indirectly which would give the impression that we accept Khrushchev's price—namely, that in return for 'peaceful coexistence' we would draw a line down the middle of Europe and accept as permanent the Communist enslavement of 97 million Eastern Europeans."

A good deal of uneasiness prevails on Capitol Hill concerning the possible changes in American foreign policy. There have been hints right along that some kind of "deals"

were being made behind the scenes. When Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba, for instance, there were rumors about side agreements. This was repeatedly denied by the administration.

Now the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty has been followed by discussion in the press of proposals for the sale of wheat by America to Communist-bloc countries, without any corresponding concessions to the United States in the cold war.

The issue is hardly partisan. Though there are many Republicans who have criticized the trend of the Kennedy administration policy, there are lots of Democrats who have done the same. The fear seems to be that the Russians will persuade the State Department to agree to a nonaggression treaty as between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries. The idea advanced is that a kind of status quo could then be attained. But, at the same time, those who are familiar with Eastern European affairs say it could be just a starting point for the complete abandonment by this country of the peoples in Eastern Europe who have depended so much on the moral support of the United States in their crusade for freedom.

I believe it is fair to say that if Mr. Nixon had as much knowledge of the propaganda situation behind the Iron Curtain at the time of the Hungarian revolt, the course of history would most certainly have been changed.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all the Members of the House to join the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood] and myself in asking for favorable consideration by the Rules Committee of a special Committee on the Captive Nations.

THE DEBATE ON FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, President Kennedy has called the proposed Revenue Act of 1963 the most significant piece of legislation to come before the Congress in 15 years.

This is an understatement if it is the intention of the President to change our basic Federal fiscal policy deliberately to incur further deficits through cutting revenues without cutting expenditures on the theory that this will produce increased economic growth from whence additional Federal revenues will be derived to make up for the planned deficits and alleviate unemployment.

However, the President recently has in effect stated that he is not advocating such a novel fiscal policy; he has stated that he intends to exercise even tighter control over expenditures. Furthermore, the President has accepted the amendment placed in the tax bill stating that it is the sense of Congress that rigid expenditure control be imposed.

The issue in the debate on the tax bill before the House of Representatives boiled itself down, not to a difference of opinion over a novel fiscal policy, but to a question of how expenditure control, which everyone agreed was necessary to make the tax cut meaningful, was to be brought about. In light of this development it is now clear that the proposed Revenue Act of 1963 is by no means the

most significant piece of legislation to face the Congress in the past 15 years. Indeed, it has already been relegated with the tacit approval of the President to at least second place, if not lower, in significance in one session of a single Congress, the 1st session of the 88th Congress. The civil rights bill has been given priority.

Mr. Speaker, I was pleased with the caliber of the debate in the House of Representatives on the tax bill. Overall it was on a very high plane and much good came from it. However, the debate off the floor of the House has in many instances taken a very low level. I called to the House's attention by remarks on the floor appearing on pages 16439-16440 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 18, 1963, a despicable editorial appearing in one of our great newspapers just before the debate began. Regrettably, this was not an isolated example of the low tactics being employed by some overzealous advocates of what they deemed to be President Kennedy's tax and fiscal policy proposals.

On October 9, 1963, another example of this low-level-type debate was called to my attention. This time it was in the nature of a letter to the editor appearing in the Washington Post signed by, of all persons, a full professor in one of our most respected institutions of learning, Harvard University. It is certainly a sad day for public debate in America when the ethics of "gutter" politics is employed by distinguished professors of political science and deemed sufficiently meritorious by one of America's leading newspapers to print it in prominent display.

I wish I could say that these are isolated examples of the caliber of public debate being carried on in America today outside the Congress by those in prominent and powerful public positions. Regrettably it is becoming so commonplace that people just shrug it off. Many people wonder why I still get excited about it and continue to protest.

A few weeks ago I said in one of my speeches of protests on the floor of the House that I felt that the root of this trouble lay in the school of neo-Machiavellian political scientists which seems to be so dominant in our universities and colleges today. I pointed to Dr. David B. Truman, of Columbia University, whose text books on political science are so widely used throughout our colleges and universities as a symbol or leader of this modern school of political thought which I think is so degrading, and, in its cynical attempt to be realistic, so unrealistic. Seymour Harris, professor of political science, at Harvard, has established himself as a neo-Machiavellian. However, he seems not content to just teach this questionable doctrine, but he seeks to practice it.

I am setting out in the RECORD a copy of the letter of Seymour Harris which appeared in the October 9 Washington Post. I am also including the reply I sent to the Washington Post. I trust the editors of the Washington Post will print my reply even though it is now set out in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. After all, the readership of the CONGRES-