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Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP66B00560R000100080084-5

25X1A

ADM-5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief/Special Security Center

FROM 25X1A [REDACTED]

SUBJECT 25X1A : Staff Study: Proposed Consolidation of
[REDACTED] Clearances

In accordance with your instructions to study the possibilities of combining closely related clearances within the [REDACTED], the 25X1A following Staff Study is submitted. This Study deals only with the Security aspects of the various programs and in no way concerns their technical management.

I. PROBLEM

25X1A There are a number of closely related clearances operating within the [REDACTED]. The number is not fixed and may be expected to increase on a continuing basis as satellite reconnaissance systems become more sophisticated. The problem therefore, is whether it is feasible to consolidate these clearances along functional and administrative lines at this time.

II. ASSUMPTIONS

A. In view of the extreme importance of satellite photography to the National Security it is evident that there will be an on-going program in this field with a continuing addition of new programs and projects.

B. Many of the new programs and projects will represent refinements and improvements of existing systems.

C. To continue to add a new compartmented clearance for each new program, project, or refinement will result in a clearance structure which tends to become more and more cumbersome and time consuming in its administration.

D. The present system of closely compartmented and fragmented clearances is best for Industry in order to hold down the knowledge of

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our degree of success and to protect the Industrial component's specific proprietary interests.

III. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM

A. The basic security policy for the NRO, as well as Recommendation 14 of the USIB Security Committee favors a procedure wherein the information on the same general subject, which is maintained within one or more systems of compartmentation, should be combined with similar information into one system whenever possible.

B. Basic reasons that satellite covert photography of the USSR is considered extremely sensitive include:

1. Political and foreign policy considerations of the U.S. Government require it. Participation in covert satellite photography has not been admitted because of adverse implications which could be drawn by the Soviet Bloc based on their interpretation of International Law and the United Nation's Charter.

2. The degree of success of our satellite photography program, as well as our sources and methods of obtaining this vital intelligence information, must be protected in accordance with existing Executive Orders and statutory laws.

C. The proposed consolidations are intended for clearances of Government employees only. Clearances for industrial personnel would continue under close compartmentation as is in effect at present.

D. At the present time the four operational programs concerning satellite photography, namely CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD, and [REDACTED] employ similar techniques, hence they could be consolidated into one composite clearance. Such a clearance could be called [REDACTED] 25X1A

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1. With respect to the proposed [REDACTED] 25X1A clearance:

- a. The basic difference between the four existing operational, or near operational

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25X1A [redacted]

projects, lies primarily in technical sophistication.

b. It is questionable that the variations in the state of the art between the four programs is now sufficiently sensitive to preclude consolidation of all the operational satellite photographic projects into one project clearance.

c. Consolidation of the four operational clearances will facilitate cross-fertilization of technical information, will promote ease in admitting a person to any of the four programs after "must know" is established, and will reduce the volume of records keeping.

d. A consolidation of CORONA and ARGON, each numbering approximately [redacted] clearances in the U.S. Government has been agreed upon within [redacted] 25X1A

E. The four separate clearances for access to satellite photography research and development studies, namely [redacted] 25X1A and [redacted] are similar in that they are not operational, or near operational, and may not develop beyond the study phase; hence they could be consolidated into one composite clearance. Such a clearance could be called [redacted] 25X1A

1. With respect to the proposed [redacted] 25X1A clearance:

a. When a project study consolidated into the proposed [redacted] 25X1A clearance achieves operational capability it would be transferred from [redacted] 25X1A to [redacted] 25X1A

b. A clearance for [redacted] 25X1A indicates the individuals clearability, without further investigation or evaluation, for all research and developmental clearances within the [redacted] 25X1A upon the establishment of the specific "must know".

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[REDACTED]

25X1A F. The two separate clearances which have been in existence for access to the processing facilities of satellite photography projects, namely [REDACTED] could be consolidated into one composite clearance. Such a clearance could be called [REDACTED] 25X1A
25X1A

1. With respect to the proposed [REDACTED] clearance:

a. The consolidation of these two photographic processing clearances would result in a significant reduction of the existing administrative compartmentation.

25X1A G. The responsibility for determining the "must know" for the proposed [REDACTED] clearances and their component projects would remain as set forth in previous issuances. (1)

IV. DISCUSSION

It has been established that satellite photography is necessary for the National Defense. It follows, therefore, that satellite photography programs will become more productive and more sophisticated. As a result an increased number of clearances for research and developmental activities and for operational activities should be expected.

It is believed that the proposed consolidations of closely related clearances will result in distinct advantages to the National Reconnaissance Program. Inasmuch as the proposed [REDACTED] clearances 25X1A will be utilized for U.S. Government employees only, all persons holding these clearances will have met the standards for access to TOP SECRET information, based upon a uniform criteria. Therefore, these persons will be clearable for any of the related project clearances upon the determination of "must know".

(1) 23 July 1962 Agreement, [REDACTED] 25X1A
NRP Security Policy No. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

There has been some confusion regarding the nature and status of many of the existing clearances under the [REDACTED]. The proposed consolidation would combine all research and developmental studies under a [REDACTED] clearance. Controlled cross-fertilization is of paramount importance to the components working on related, although separate, projects. A [REDACTED] clearance will make it possible for a person to be granted immediate access to related information in the [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Programs upon the establishment of "must know", which must precede briefing on any individual study.

Some of the research and developmental studies will mature into the production planning stage, necessitating a further increase in the number of required clearances. At that time, under the proposed consolidation of closely related clearances, the project would be transferred to the [REDACTED] category.

At the present time a consolidation of CORONA and ARGON has been agreed upon within [REDACTED]. The relative technological similarity of CORONA, ARGON, [REDACTED], and LANYARD is apparent. It is believed that the consolidations of these four closely related clearances into a [REDACTED] clearance will be a logical development with advantages to each component.

The proposed consolidations would not in any way abrogate the "must know" policy established for the National Reconnaissance Program.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. The review and analysis of the satellite photography programs and clearance structure, on which this Staff Study is based, has developed no security objections to the implementing of the proposed consolidations at this time.

B. The overall advantages of the proposed consolidations are believed to far outweigh any unique or primarily administrative disadvantages.

C. Utilizing three basic clearances, i.e., [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] within the [REDACTED] instead of ten will, in itself, result in a significant savings in administrative processing.

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D. A person holding a [redacted] clearance will be automatically eligible for access to any of the separate projects under the specific basic clearance, after "must know" has been established. This should reduce processing time delays and improve efficiency.

E. Program and Project Directors will find it easier to exchange technical information as necessary and as may be deemed to be of mutual benefit.

F. The proposed consolidations, coupled with the emphasis on the strict application of the "must know" principle, will implement Recommendation 14 of the USIB Security Committee regarding a review of existing compartmentation to ensure that essential security safeguards do not result in vital information being withheld from officials and organizations with urgent National Security responsibilities.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. It is recommended that as the initial step in consolidating closely related clearances:

1. The four separate clearances for access to non-industry satellite photographic operational information, namely CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD, and [redacted] be consolidated into a single 25X1A clearance called [redacted] 25X1A

25X1A 2. The four separate clearances for access to satellite photographic research and development studies, namely [redacted] 25X1A [redacted] be consolidated into a single clearance called [redacted] and 25X1A

25X1A 3. The two separate clearances for access to the processing facilities of satellite photographic projects, namely [redacted] be consolidated into a single clearance called [redacted] 25X1A

25X1A B. It is recommended that an individual approved for a [redacted] 25X1A [redacted] clearance be considered eligible for access to information regarding any of its component projects under the following conditions:

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1. The individual's "must know" has been established.

a. With respect to the [REDACTED] clearance, 25X1A
a Program Director may brief an individual on any
of the component projects whether under his control
or under the control of another Program Director. In the
latter case he will exercise discretion in determining
the "must know" and will advise the other Program
Director of his action as soon as possible.

b. With respect to the [REDACTED] clearance, 25X1A
Program Directors will maintain the responsibility
for the "must know" determination on all studies and
projects under their administration.

25X1A [REDACTED] c. With respect to the [REDACTED] clearance, 25X1A
[REDACTED] will maintain the responsibility
for the "must know" determination.

2. The individual's briefing on the component projects would
be only to the extent necessary for the effective performance of
his assigned duties.

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