

Dec 8th, 1947

DIRECTOR: In starting out this afternoon I wish you would bear up with me while I make a little bit of a speech. There is nothing personal, everybody understand that please. I think if we take our hair down and say what we think - the people will be the same when they leave as they were when they came in. We may differ in opinion, but this is the best way to get anything done. I think we here this afternoon are of two schools of thought, two philosophies. Which one is the right one, I frankly don't know. I am backing up one side for what I think is a good reason. Some of the Advisory members are backing the other side for a good reason. I have felt since I came here in May - I was assigned for it, I did not hunt for it - whether the reasons are good or bad. I have to get an answer and I will adopt it. It will be answered by the Security Council and regardless of which side wins or loses, we will carry out what they want.

Mr. Forrestal received a letter from Dr. Vannevar Bush about CIA. Who he talked to I don't know. I don't know whether Dr. Bush consulted with any of you or not. He gave Mr. Forrestal his opinion about CIA. He is talking about the general scientific intelligence:

"Now I fear that CIA is not yet in a good position to meet this call. They have been studying the situation of directives, and particularly their relationships with the Atomic Energy Commission. In this connection, they have an intelligence advisory committee which meets next Monday, but it seems to be quite divided. As to the question of whether CIA should be a small coordinating body or should be itself operating widely, I attach two memoranda from my staff which indicate to me that there is a considerable amount of confusion present as things now stand.

"The CIA takes its instructions from the National Security Council. In view of what occurred this morning and the imminence of vigorous inquiry..."

I don't know what that was because he just sent these letters over. He goes on to say:

"I think that the Security Council ought soon to pass on some of the policy questions involved."

And then he says:

"The Intelligence Advisory Committee mentioned in Mr. Beckler's memorandum is, of course, not provided for by law, but in the original draft directives prepared by CIA it was proposed to have the Director of Central Intelligence reconstitute it as an advisory committee to the Director of CIA. The committee proposed by the present IAC would be an Executive Order almost in the form of a governing

committee for CIA. An Executive Order would be required as it is contended that the Security Council has no authority to establish such boards or committees. The Intelligence Advisory Committee proposed by the heads of the operating agencies would possess a great deal of power to influence the actions of the Director of CIA.

"Someone at the highest level should define the objective of CIA in relation to the production of strategic intelligence in support of the activities of the Security Council and delineate relationships between CIA and the operating agencies in such manner that the work of producing information, detailed intelligence, and integrated strategic intelligence can proceed."

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That was Dr. Bush's report to the Secretary of Defense and I think there is a lot in it, and which is correct I don't know. I am taking the side of CIA that we should not be governed by the IAC, but advised by it on intelligence. As you all know, since May, since I have been here, through no fault of any particular person, we have been arguing about details and the only time we have talked about intelligence was after the last meeting when General Chamberlin, General McDonald, Admiral Inglis and I went to my office and we talked for about 15 minutes on intelligence. I would like to see that happen much more frequently, for intelligence and not procedures. How this is going to come out I do not know. We are ~~going to~~ taking the point of view which is a contestable point of view and that is why I want your statements of non-concurrence, because I think there will be a lot of statements of non-concurrence to present to the Security Council. They are going to meet, as far as they know, next Friday.. We will present ours and I think the Intelligence Advisory Committee should present theirs. We are not trying to be the boss of everybody, but now we have a lot of responsibility and unless these things are cleared, we have no authority. This morning Senator Hickenlooper wanted to know something about Atomic Energy. Just as an example to show that in his mind we are responsible for things like that. Whether we are ^{or} not, we are in the mind of Congress and public opinion. And yet we have to be and get things by arrangement with the concept that we do not have the authority. All I'm hunting for in this next meeting is have the Security Council say you work under the IAC, then we know whether the authority is, or if they say you don't, we don't.

These directives now coming up - and my personal opinion is it wouldn't do much good to change it; we have taken our position and we are going to go up and get a directive, and whatever the directive may be, we will carry it out. Whatever the Security Council says. I am sure everybody else will have something to bring up on this.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would like to ask as a matter of procedure in this meeting whether the Chairman contemplates discussing the drafts that he circulated, and the points that are -

DIRECTOR: Very definitely.

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MR. ARMSTRONG: in disagreement with the ad hoc committee. If we are to discuss them. I am willing to take them paragraph by paragraph. Otherwise the State Department would have to dissent from Directive No. 1.

DIRECTOR: We must get an answer on the dissents. I think as far as the CIA is concerned on the ad hoc committee report, it puts us as having a lot of responsibility with no authority to enforce it. That is the idea and a very sincere idea. And the ad hoc committee had just as sincere an idea. Therefore, we need a big boy to decide it for us.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The question in my mind is a matter of procedure to go through the directives. Taking up the points that are in disagreement, or a blanket disagreement?

DIRECTOR: We would like to get everybody to agree.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We cannot agree to Directive No. 1 in its present form.

DIRECTOR: Let's go through paragraph by paragraph and get the disagreements.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We take particular exception to paragraphs 2, 4, 7, 8, and 9. 8 and 9 because they are under a procedure set up under No. 8.

DIRECTOR: What would you recommend for 2?

MR. ARMSTRONG: ^{In}the ad hoc committee draft reinstate the deleted clause.

DIRECTOR: I think the majority will be against us, but I will have to dissent from that for CIA.

ADM. INGLIS: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a general statement before we get into details. I think there is perhaps a difference of opinion as to the fundamental philosophy and concept of this job. I always think a great many of these differences are not irreconcilable. I think - at least I hope - that we can come to an agreement, perhaps a compromise under a good many of these. I think there are only one or two things that are fundamental which is necessary to give dissenting views.. I want to make this one other point that the ad hoc committee draft itself is a compromise. There was a sincere effort on the part of the ad hoc committee to reconcile the differences as far as possible. Any further ground-giving on the part of the agencies, other than CIA, would be an extension of that compromise.

We have already given considerable ground and I think with the extension of very few specific issues. That with sort of a free discussion and very friendly frame of mind, boil it down to a small number of differences which need be referred to the National Security Council. And I would like to make a plea for that frame of mind attitude before we get into the details, to avoid as far as possible the acrimony, any closing of the mind to further compromise before we get into it.

DIRECTOR: I agree with you fully.

ADM. INGLIS: That is all I have to say in general.

MR. ARMSTRONG: And may I endorse what Admiral Inglis said.

DIRECTOR: I think that anything is said - we are smiling at one o'clock, I don't see why we can't at 5. They are very honest differences of opinion and if we get them settled once and for all that which has grown up and wasting so damn much time and trying to get these things in which we should be doing.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: One general comment I would like to make on one thing you read. I was not conscious that there was any question about whether the IAB was to be a controlling body or an advisory body. I don't think my people have worked from that standpoint. I frankly admit it is (an advisory body), maybe others have a different opinion. The only thought that we had in phraseology of this thing was a procedure which it could be created would be less objectionable if ~~expanded~~ whereby a lot of the minutiae could be cut out in the advisory body rather than have it perhaps break on the surfaces without any warning. In other words, I feel when I sit here I have authority to commit my own Department on certain things. If it is decided here, everybody seems to be agreeable we will carry it out loyally without any command to do so. On the other hand, if the Advisory Committee is not to be advisory, then each thing will have to be either by command from some area or sent up to the National Security Council. Now that is our viewpoint - that the Advisory Committee could cut out a lot of that, but still it is an advisory committee.

DIRECTOR: I don't know. I do have that feeling, that thing I read was from Dr. Bush. Where he got it I don't know. He didn't come here.

I think he has a lot of sound things in his statement there to the Secretary of Defense. He says:

"The original and revised directives embody totally different philosophies. Under one, CIA would be almost completely self-sufficient. Under the other, CIA would be a small coordinating body surrounded by strong Departmental Intelligence Agencies."

Now what is the answer? I don't know. I will take any answer the boys suggest, but I don't think you can solve the question by saying we are all in agreement, because we are not - to speak about it very frankly. We can get it off our chests and there is no personal acrimony. We will let the boss give the decision and whatever he makes we will carry it out.

ADM. INGLIS: I think there is a middle ground in that respect. I think as far as CIA ~~is~~ ^{as} an integrated operating agency is concerned that the functions of the Advisory Committee or Advisory Board is purely advisory, and absolutely nothing more. And in fact, I think the Advisory Committee should interfere as little as possible with the operations of CIA. But when it comes to the relationship between CIA and the departmental intelligence agencies, I think the IAC goes a little beyond a purely advisory capacity. Because there is as General Chamberlin points out, we have a responsibility which must be accompanied by authority with respect to our own agencies. And it is in that threshold, the field between the strictly integrated operations of CIA and its relationship with other agencies where we ~~combine~~ begin to get into trouble. And there I think the advisory committee goes a little beyond the advisory capacity and has something to do with liaison, coordination and implementation. That is my philosophy for whatever it is worth.

GEN. CABEL: I think Dr. Bush has a little overemphasized when he pointed out that there are two alternatives. I am convinced there is a middle ground between those alternatives and as our discussion progresses there is considerable agreement that that is such the case. I feel like you that the work of the subcommittee has not been necessarily to present stands of the respective agencies, but has been directed toward an attempt to draft a basis for discussion for this meeting this afternoon and the stands will be taken by the representatives themselves here this afternoon. I would suggest, therefore, we go right through this paragraph by paragraph and bring out the points of difference that remain in each detail.

DIRECTOR: I would like to do that very much. You go ahead. ~~Now~~ Does anyone have anything on this first paragraph?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I am perfectly agreeable to the deletion on the ground the functions and responsibilities of the IAC are spelled out in subsequent paragraphs.

GEN. CABEL: On this paragraph I'm perfectly willing to accept the deletion and have a suggestion. I believe there is one reservation that it is a I would like to introduce. I believe/perfectly reasonable one and that is that with respect to the advice that the Director of Central Intelligence may be giving to the National Security Council; it is reasonable that that advice as it is offered or before it is offered is laid before the agency concerned - activities of a ~~certain~~ ^{particular} agency and that that agency, therefore, has an opportunity to look at that advice and comment on it. I see no ground for requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to be bound by the comments or restricted by the comments made upon that advice. With that thought in mind, I suggest the introduction in a more appropriate paragraph, that would be paragraph 3c to this effect. Make this a new c (hands out copies to other members).

MR. TRUEHEART: This is recommendations.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is the reason we were persuaded there is no substantive change because my man recommends and advises it is synonymous with paragraph 3 which covers recommendations. Do you feel that way Admiral?

DIRECTOR: Absolutely.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: We made a non-concurrence on the basis there was some difference between recommendations and advice, but if there isn't you can erase my remarks because paragraph 3 adequately covers the elimination here providing that recommendations and advice mean the same thing.

MR. ARMSTRONG: They are both in the Act.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I'm willing to go further than that, I'm willing to go to the point that only recommendation and advice that refer to the agencies not the CIA. What the CIA does themselves, I'm not concerned about. I'm interested, of course, but I don't consider it my business, Only when they begin to get in the coordination where you have indicated, where the action and the opinions of its own agency. That is the basis of this in

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part. I have no feeling whatever that I want to get into the CIA's business.
That is the reason the Admiral is up here, but when they get into my business
I want to know something.

ADM. INGLIS: I am not going quite as far as you are, General, because
I think the inception of CIA was an agency in which all the departments
participated from which they gain certain profit and advantage and, because
of that interest, I think that purely in an advisory capacity, the IAC
should have a part, but it is purely advisory until it gets an opinion on
the departmental agencies goes beyond the field of advice.

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GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I ~~don't~~ think one thing could be said on what Admiral
Inglis said, I don't know whether it occurred but frequently does. When an
action is called for by the National Security of the Central Intelligence
Agency, my Secretary often asks me what I think about it. They often do
and then if we haven't found out we are apt to go counter to what ~~he~~ ~~what~~
a round table discussion might say was the thing to do. So I have no
objection.

DIRECTOR: Have you all seen and read this thing of General Cabal's?
We will accept that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I claim if advice is the same, it is not necessary.

ADM. INGLIS: Insert in a "The Director of Central Intelligence shall
in making recommendations, or in giving advice" - would that cover it?

GEN. CABEL: That would cover me.

DIRECTOR: Which one is this?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: 3a.

ADM. INGLIS: It would save a few words.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: "each recommendation."

DIRECTOR: We will take that.

ADM. INGLIS: "In transmitting recommendations or advice to the National
Security Council" - how would that be?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: "Transmit therewith and making recommendations" -
that or "transmitting advice."

DIRECTOR: "3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall in making
recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council" and then
go on and "The Director of Central Intelligence transmits therewith a

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: You can cross off my non-concurrence on paragraph 1.

GEN. WRIGHT: Can I make a little suggestion to follow out Cabel's idea. Could it read "The Director of Central Intelligence shall in transmitting recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council which have to do with the intelligence activities of the various departments" and so on.

GEN. CABEL: It is agreeable ^{to} ~~with~~ me.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: To me. I don't think Admiral Inglis will from what he said.


ADM. INGLIS: Your proposition to make it read how General Wright - "The Director of Central Intelligence for giving advice" concerns -

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think that is desirable. I am not speaking about this. I think it is, and the principle of the thing will expedite business we can do here and don't have to shoot them up at all.

DIRECTOR: Any more questions on paragraph one?

MR. TRUEHEART: Does this addition go in? It is perfectly all right, but I would like to add "agencies" after "departments."

DIRECTOR: All right, fine.

ADM. INGLIS: I have a reservation on paragraph one. We will find  as we go on in this paper that the members of the IAC are required to interchange information freely with CIA. And as far as I am concerned, it is perfectly all right, but all the present members, but I am not so sure about the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are certain papers and certain intelligence concerning those papers that the Joint Chiefs, I believe, do not want to have them over here to CIA and I think it would be preferable to have the representative of the JIC be an observer rather than a member to avoid that complication we are going to get into later. So I suggest we delete the membership by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but include ~~and~~ a representative of it as an observer. I think that is in line with General Gruenther's view too.

GEN. TODD: I thought so, Admiral, but I discussed it at great length with him today and I find he feels that that probably is not the solution of the status of the representative. If there is a little relationship,

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for example, paragraph 8 of the first, the access to files. A little relationship between that and the status of the Joint Staff representative I think not much consideration and what the status of the Joint Staff representative is, but under - when we came to 8 I was going to make a statement in reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their files. *

ADM. INGLIS: In other words, you would rather not change the membership, but change paragraph 8 to exclude JCS. They are quite sensitive about that. Well, that would satisfy my point, my position, except that I just want to remind you that it occurs not only in paragraph 8, but it is going to crop up again and again and involve a lot of exceptions in a lot of different places. Not only as we consider them here today, but in future meetings. If that is the way you and General Gruenther want it, it is o.k. with me. If that was not a clear understanding I would have to refer it back to my superior, because there is some question on it.

GEN. TODD: We had a discussion that we recognized the fact at times on the IAC the representatives from the three departments of the armed forces may differ with each other and in those cases I would appreciate it if the Chairman would let me abstain from discussion as well as voice under those circumstances.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Why couldn't that be written in the record? I should think the CIA should omit such record, omit it in the record and don't press the point hereafter.

GEN. TODD: The Secretary of Defense - they are being referred to him before they are referred to the National Security Council is parallel.

ADM. INGLIS: I'm not disturbed about that whether you vote in interdepartmental controversies, but in reference to the papers you and I know.

GEN. TODD: General Gruenther asked me to make that and make a record.

GEN. WRIGHT: That paragraph 8 you say is going - if wherever under security regulations if that reads every place "pertaining to the Department concerned" wouldn't that obviate the question?

ADM. INGLIS: Might if it is so interpreted.

GEN. WRIGHT: If it is written in, what is to be interpreted?

GEN. CABEL: That comes in very definitely in paragraph 5b and it

would be very appropriate to insert that.

ADM. INGLIS: I think you are going to have more reluctance on the part of the JCS and they seem to be in a special case by themselves.

DIRECTOR: Any other comments on paragraph 1?

ADM. INGLIS: I don't quite understand why you want to delete that portion shown exed out, because you don't agree or it is covered?

DIRECTOR: It is covered in paragraph 5a and c.

ADM. INGLIS: You are in agreement with the sentiment?

DIRECTOR: With the sentiment, but not in agreement that every recommendation I take up to the Security Council should go through the Advisory Committee first. The ones referring to that, yes - but the way you can read this we send a recommendation to the Security Council and it has to go through the Advisory Committee first - it might be about money, or directly relating to it. And to avoid anything like that, I would like to see that cut out.

ADM. INGLIS: Is there anything relating to the paragraphs (d) and (e) that shouldn't be referred to the IAC?

DIRECTOR: No, I think your normal case would be on that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I believe there is an answer to your question. I know if I was conducting a secret intelligence agency I wouldn't want to consult anybody.

ADM. INGLIS: I wouldn't either. Not in anything pertaining to their routine operations.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Almost anything. The matter of the policy should not have a - say to establish [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] that is Admiral Hillenkoetter's business.

ADM. INGLIS: I agree with you.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It seems to me matters of concern to our Departments, when we are concerned, we are adequately concerned, we have to leave it to his good judgment whether ~~we~~ ~~are~~ we are really concerned.

ADM. INGLIS: Whether or not you are going to establish a net in Turkey, I would agree with you one hundred per cent. But if you are going to let this wording stand, it would be referred to the IAC.

DIRECTOR: I think it would and this is limiting it. If you don't refer everything according to this you are in bad faith.

GEN. CABEL: All recommendations seems to me to cover a lot of territory.

ADM. INGLIS: Why should that be referred to the National Security Council? Before you refer anything to the National Security ~~Council~~ Act which may be referred to the National Security Council, this first should be referred to the IAB. I don't see why you would refer to the National Security Council whether you wanted to

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DIRECTOR: We are working under them.

ADM. INGLIS: But you wouldn't refer it to them then? I think this body should review it first so our Department heads serving on the National Security Council would be properly advised so they know what to do about it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: You can argue both ways. I have been trained to stay out of everybody else's business.

DIRECTOR: There is a limitation there.

ADM. INGLIS: If your Secretary, Secretary Royall, is going to take a position with any intelligent knowledge of what he is required to pass on, he is entitled to your advice before he is required to take that position, and it seems this group is the proper agency to advise the Secretaries as to what their positions should be after a full hearing of issues involved.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is probably correct, Admiral, but I am trying to look - I am trying to look at the broad phase. I don't believe we can ever write a directive that will do anything other than to have the Director of Central Intelligence to exercise his own judgment. If he thinks it has the remotest affect on our activities or he thinks we should know about it, I think he will without any question refer it to us. If he thinks it is one of those things we couldn't possibly have any interest in it we should -

ADMIRAL INGLIS: Anything that is worth referring to the National Security Council is worth referring to us so we can advise our superiors on what their position should be on it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I wouldn't want all the financial arrangements sent in.

ADM. INGLIS: And the National Security Council will come back and ask you what they should do.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I don't know what kind of things he is going to have thrust upon him. He hasn't been given any directive yet.

ADM. INGLIS: If you accept that theory, that he is going to take things to the National Security Council before first having them referred to you, the thing you deplored at the last meeting - in other words, a wedge is going to be driven between you and your superiors by CIA.

DIRECTOR: I don't agree with you on that, Tommy. The additional things the Security Council may bring up and say do this -

ADM. INGLIS: That is outside of the provisions of this paragraph. What you are going to take up with them, not what they are going to take up with you.

DIRECTOR: So I think you should take this up before the Security Council.

ADM. INGLIS: If he says he thinks you should, I think it should be referred to the IAC.

DIRECTOR: I want that deleted myself. It is all too inclusive.

GEN. CABEL: That final protection in that the Secretaries before taking action on such a recommendation or advice, if it is not clear to them that ^{which} ^{in some} has been passed upon/~~xx~~ shape or form knowledge to their own particular intelligence advisor, we can hold things up whether they are referred to them.

ADM. INGLIS: They are reluctant to take a position unless it has been thrashed out. Who is responsible for that particular process. Therefore, I think every possible effort should be made to reach a unanimity before they have to worry about it at all. You have fine examples in the dominant interest which is held up and held up. And a charter for this IAC which is held up because it wasn't thrashed out.

DIRECTOR: If you can't get an agreement here, ~~there~~ it will still be held up.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: ^{Shove it up}
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ADM. INGLIS: Shoved up with the issue clearly brought out. They don't have to go into all the background and do a lot of research themselves.

GEN. WRIGHT: As far as the Law is concerned, what the Director of Central Intelligence can do is contained in paragraphs (d) and (e) which we are talking about now. If you make a restriction on everything to the Intelligence Advisory Committee which pertain - he takes everything to the Intelligence Advisory Committee - all of his operations - all important functions are in those two paragraphs.

ADM. INGLIS: Those things he feels he must refer to the National Security Council, if it is that important, the National Security Council is entitled to the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. They are responsible as heads of their respective departmental intelligence agencies and that should be given after a discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Committee or Board and the Secretary should not be required to take it before it has been discussed by the Board.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Admiral Inglis, if we changed or added to paragraph 3a so as to make it apply only to recommendations or advice pertaining to - I'd be willing to drop this clause in paragraph 1.

ADM. INGLIS: I am at the mercy of your semantics. If the intent, if the meaning is transposed into paragraph 3a, all I'm interested in is getting the meaning and intent, and my philosophy again is that the National Security Council should have the advice of the IAC on any matter which is brought up to them by the Director of Central Intelligence before they have to decide on it. Before rather than after. I don't care ~~whether~~ where you put it so long as that meaning is there.

DIRECTOR: I will hold out for the deletion of that because simply the fact the Law says to advise the National Security Council concerning such interdepartmental - doesn't mean advise the National Security Council in agreement with the IAC. We will do as we have in the past. We will not try to bypass the IAC. The Law says one thing and I don't see how we can write up a change that will make something different.

ADM. INGLIS: I want to make myself clear. I don't insist there will be an agreement, but I think they should have the benefit of the views of the IAC.

DIRECTOR: I would rather have the agreement going up, but I don't think you should be limited to the fact you don't.

ADM. INGLIS: Nor do I think the Law requires it to submit something to the National Security Council without the advice of the IAC, if the Security Council wants the advice of the IAC.

DIRECTOR: That is up to the Security Council to decide that.

ADM. INGLIS: I do too and I think it should be written into the ground rules that they will get that advice.

DIRECTOR: I think to avoid - to save some time, will you make a non-concurrence on it?

ADM. INGLIS: I will if it is not going to be written into some other paragraph.

DIRECTOR: We will see as we go along. Any more on paragraph 1? Paragraph 2?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Our feeling on paragraph 2 is that the deletion of that clause has the affect of narrowing it. The Director without consultation and without reference to their workload or convenience or capabilities make surveys and inspections which are not defined in this paper or in the other directives. And that in the case of some Departments that might be in the future broadly construed so as to bring within the surveys and inspections powers of the Director activities of the Departments that are not necessarily or truly characterized as intelligence activities. We feel that the deleted clause should remain so that the intelligence chief in each of the Departments would be consulted prior to the inauguration of any surveys or inspections.

DIRECTOR: ~~There~~ again it comes - do you accept the compromise with the Secretary of the Department concerned.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I don't see the need for that when he has a subordinate official that is far more informed than he.

DIRECTOR: If you can't get an arrangement, you are licked.

ADM. INGLIS: Not according to the National Security Council. If you are not getting cooperation -

CEN. CABEL: I wonder if the Director would function exactly the same way whether or not this clause was written in the directive as

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standard operating procedure to call or write the agency concerned and say I would like to make certain surveys, certain inspections, when would it be convenient for me to do that. Whether or not that is written, that is the way he would do it.

DIRECTOR: We would not pop into somebody's office.

GEN. CABEL: The Director - if he insists on deleting it, I think he would comply with it anyway.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I agree in so far as the present Director is concerned, but we are writing a directive that may stand for all time and empowering an outside agency to go in and inspect each Department on his own discretion on the basis of which is not clearly defined.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I must say, Admiral, as far as I am concerned this is the most objectionable. I would like to ask one question. Is this a matter of right or privilege that you are asking for?

DIRECTOR: Well, I don't know. I would hate to say.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is a very important point because the right to inspect is inquisitorial.

DIRECTOR: That is right.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: And it will without question violate the responsibility of everybody inspected.

DIRECTOR: It will indeed, and if you don't inspect and something comes up like the case of our friend recently who gets hit for it - we do to the extent recommended by the Security Council.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Intelligence.

DIRECTOR: Intelligence of the Departments and Agencies.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It obviously means intelligence and activities and operations. If you substitute the word "material" for the "activity" I have no objection to the paragraph. They gave you the right to inspect intelligence. Congress did, but not the activities of the War Department or the Navy Department.

DIRECTOR: I have no idea of doing that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Just to come down to see our intelligence.

DIRECTOR: I think that is what they meant. We wouldn't come down and say Colonel Bill Smith is in that desk and he should be in another.

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GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is what each one fears. I couldn't possibly give approval to this without going to the Secretary of War, because I have not the right myself to say that an external agency can come in and inspect, but I can say the intelligence is present for their inspection any day they want to, but all the wording - what does this mean? I'm satisfied Congress meant intelligence not the activities or operations.

DIRECTOR: There is no idea of coming over and saying you have four guys working -

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Maybe if you take out the word "activities" you have the solution.

DIRECTOR: That is one the committee passed. I never meant the idea we would advise desks and offices.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The word "activity" of course is operations and the case of the State Department which has the command responsibility for the foreign service - this could be applied to any foreign service diplomatic establishment, that is an agency activity. Every post is a collecting and operating unit of our collection system. I would be willing to leave "activities" in if the other clause remains. By arrangement with the Department might be a good thing for CIA to inspect the foreign service operations, but to empower it on its own volition without consultation is going well beyond the intent of Congress.

GEN. WRIGHT: Maybe it would be better if it read: "The Director of Central Intelligence, or his representative, by arrangement with the Secretary of the Department concerned." Because then if General Chamberlin was having his activities inspected, it would be inspected by the order of the Secretary of the Army.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think it is better not to put it in a document of this kind. Admiral Inglis has the feeling you come down and get ~~an~~ that specific authority for that specific inspection and as general application.

GEN. WRIGHT: But he has the duty by Law to make inspections of intelligence activities.

GEN. CABEL: I don't think we should set up a system to bypass the intelligence chief concerned. I don't think that is a way out of this

particular problem.

GEN. WRIGHT: That is the reason for "by arrangement with the Department Head" thereby there would be no question of anybody being by-passed.

ADM. INGLIS: Over the head of the intelligence chief.

GEN. CAREL: I don't see any necessity for that.

GEN. WRIGHT: The Director works within the Security Council. His command channel is to the Department chiefs and not an intelligence activity through the chief of intelligence.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't entirely agree with you on that.

GEN. WRIGHT: If the Law said an Intelligence Advisory Committee, that would be a different thing.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is merely as a way to expedite business rather than go into the top formation. When you deal with me in the Intelligence Division, I certainly assume the responsibility of the Secretary of War. If I'm wrong, he is going to kick me out. He ought to.

MR. BOOTH: May I raise the point as to how this got in here in the first place? I think we are responsible for it. The Law says the Director of Central Intelligence shall have the right to inspect intelligence material was not sufficient to carry on the necessary inspection for the coordination of intelligence activities so we inserted, as you see, "by arrangement" to broaden it so the Director of Central Intelligence "by arrangement" through the agency, not only inspect the intelligence materials, but activities necessary to carry out his responsibility. But we never expected that the "by arrangement" part would be eliminated. This is a recommendation to the NSC as far as we are concerned. It is not carried through on the strength of the Law, but limit it to materials.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Of course, I went one step further. I think the Law intended to do that in the Presidential Directive establishing an NIA, intelligence operations were included. When this last Law was passed for some reason, I was not aware of ~~the exchange~~ the fact that they changed it to the word of "intelligence". We are shying away of clothing the Director of Central Intelligence to go down and inspect the activities only. The intelligence of the agency they were authorized to inspect

ADM. INGLIS: They even went further and spelled it out that the CIA was not to interfere with the interdepartmental agencies or have any authority over them.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I would like to see the whole paragraph eliminated. And then it doesn't give Admiral Hillenkoetter ways to inspect my agency, but I hate to see it in writing. However, I might not be as high as Admiral Hillenkoetter, but what I am having to say is I may have to take this up with them.

DIRECTOR: The reason we cut out "by arrangement" was because it said here "you will do it" and if at any time, I don't think ^{with} this immediate personnel, where I couldn't make an arrangement with the chief of intelligence because he would be busy, and particularly if things needed inspection.

GEN. CABEL: In those circumstances you have recourse to the Security Council, in giving you a directive or going to the Secretary concerned and say "I have done my best to gain my access through normal civil methods and I have failed and I need some help."

ADM. INGLIS: Just put it - I concur with you. Sort of reduce this to the absurd - if I wanted to conceal my office from your inspection and was willing to go to the length you just ~~mentioned~~ apparently indicated, I could still circumvent it and tell my people to throw your rascals out. What could you do? You would do the same if this phrase was left in. You would go to the National Security Council and say "I went over and tried to inspect and they wouldn't let me inside the door." It all boils down for the necessity of a little cooperation. It should not be a surprise inspection. We all have any one of these solutions. It would be all right to put it back in or change "activities" to "matters."

DIRECTOR: Would this be acceptable? It is a compromise and would effect everybody. Put "formally by arrangement with the chief of intelligence." That does leave you an out in it.

MR. TRUEHEART: May I make a suggestion? Have it read "The Director of Central Intelligence, or his representative, shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence agencies, by arrangement with the intelligence chiefs of the intelligence activities of the various

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Departments. In other words make the arrangement only on the activities
and not the intelligence materials.

DIRECTOR: We will take that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I can't give a concurrence on that because - I mean
the second part of it.

MR. TRUEHEART: Even by arrangement to inspect?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: No, I can't. I recognize the fact he can do that
any time he wants to anyway with arrangement without any written authority
and I would hate to give that without consultation with the chief of staff
and the Secretary of War. If it only means a non-concurrence and I have
to get the non-concurrence, I don't want to hold up the meeting. If every-
body is agreeable to writing it that way, it is agreeable to me.

ADM. INGLIS: Go back and ask for the changing of "activities" to
"material." Leave this deletion as given here, leave it deleted, but make
it restricted to material and say nothing about activities.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Stricter conformance with the Law.

DIRECTOR: I'm willing.

GEN. WRIGHT: The last few days we got a definition of material which
may change the attitude of you a little and I don't ~~think~~ believe that is
the meaning of everybody when they are talking about intelligence material.

CAPT. DAVIS: There is no definition of material in the Joint dictionary
of intelligence terms.

DIRECTOR: The term defined by the Security Advisory - any document
produced in which information may be recorded or embodied.

ADM. INGLIS: That is not what we wanted to say.

DIRECTOR: That was SANACC.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is authority given him by statute.

DIRECTOR: We will change "activities" to "material."

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That eradicates a lot of my objection.

DIRECTOR: The singular or the plural? You will all have to tell us
that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: And I want to say in accepting this I would welcome
an arrangement any time Admiral Hillenkoetter wants to inspect the intelli-
gence Division.

DIRECTOR: Nobody is going to say, we haven't done it before and have no intention of doing it now.

ADM. INGLIS: Outside of this paragraph, I would welcome an inspection of my shop with special reference to any overlapping of my activities with anybody else's activities.

DIRECTOR: If we once get this settled, the CIA can do a lot of good without any inspections.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: One other suggestion I have in connection with this - I don't know exactly what the word means - several Federal Departments and Agencies. Is that all inclusive? I would have difficulty to explain to an Army Commander to have an inspector of Central Intelligence inspecting his files on intelligence. We have a problem here that the ~~other~~ rest of you haven't got. And I think that should be narrowed to the Departments in Washington and I think that is what you mean.

DIRECTOR: That is what the Law says "Federal Departments and Agencies."

MR. TRUEHEART: By arrangement made - is it possible to stop the thing before it got to the Army Commander?

DIRECTOR: I'm not going to send anybody down to see an Army Commander.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I know it would simplify it in my case because if a Central Intelligence inspector shows up at a regimental post, he might get put out.

DIRECTOR: An Army post is not a Federal agency.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It is a Federal agency. I think it is separate from a State agency.

DIRECTOR: I don't think it means to that extent. An agency in the sense - I would certainly read in this the Federal Department - that is very clear now and agency is the AEC, the JCS not an Army post out in Leavenworth or a Navy ship.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I mean like the Commander in Tokyo. I'm afraid you would get in trouble over there.

DIRECTOR: Not Tokyo or Frankfurt.

GEN. WRIGHT: I think if you would change those to capital letters, they would agree to Department and Agencies in Washington.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: We have our intelligence somewhat decentralized, even in the War Department. We have a little piece in the Ordnance, the Medico, the Chemical Warfare, some with the Transportation Corp. I have no objection, but I would hate to have you go down there without telling me about it.

DIRECTOR: I think -

GEN. WRIGHT: Make it capital D and A. I don't think you should put Washington. You may have something in Philadelphia.

DIRECTOR: ~~Capital~~ Capital "D" and capital "A".

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It is all right as long as it is written in the record. My understanding is that this means the Department and the activity. They directly are included in a Federal Department, not the Agencies of a Federal Department out in the field.

ADM. INGLIS: One thing that disturbed us was "or his representatives." We were afraid some day after you have been relieved and someone that we haven't the same confidence in, maybe a fellow on a fairly low level and in an officious manner produce this man and say I am the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence.

DIRECTOR: We are willing to change that.

ADM. INGLIS: And if he does, he is going to find the door closed.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Why not make it "designated representatives"?

ADM. INGLIS: Or "representatives designated by him."

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Make it singular.

ADM. INGLIS: Designated by whom? "Or his representatives designated by him."

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: "Representative designated by him."

MR. TRUEHEART: I suppose it is clearly understood what intelligence materials are?

ADM. INGLIS: I have a recommendation for that.

DIRECTOR: Let's take 3.

GEN. TODD: Admiral, how about the word "activities" appearing in that? Can you change that to "material"?

DIRECTOR: Yes.

GEN. WRIGHT: May I make a suggestion? The Law says he must do this. You can't change that.

GEN. WRIGHT: Could I make another recommendation on paragraph 2?
"Such intelligence" - the word "such" could come out in view of the change made before. That still complies with the Law and with the change made previously.

ADM. INGLIS: In other words, he inspects material in order to coordinate activities? Is that right?

DIRECTOR: Now in paragraph 3. Anything on the opening thing there? That wording was changed simply because it makes it clearer this way. It has the same idea. It was changed more grammatically than anything.

ADM. INGLIS: ONI accepts CIA's change.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: You were going to make a non-concurrence on that.

ADM. INGLIS: Not on the opening sentence.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The opening sentence we thought the original language contained a meaning that is eliminated by the change and that it tied together the coordination with support and the recognition of the direct service, and those have been separated now. We would prefer the original language, but do not feel too strongly about it.

GEN. CABEL: Air Force can accept the change.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We will go along with the consensus of the group.

DIRECTOR: 3a then.

ADM. INGLIS: As far as 3a I would like specifically to know whether that change has been accepted by everyone except me - and I reserve it.

DIRECTOR: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council which pertain to the various Departments and Agencies."

ADM. INGLIS: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall, in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council."

DIRECTOR: "Which pertain to the various Departments and Agencies."

MR. TRUEHEART: It would be grammatically better to say "pertaining."

DIRECTOR: "Pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and Agencies, transmit therewith."

ADM. INGLIS: "In giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to the intelligence activities of the various Departments and

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Agencies." Capitalize. "Transmit therewith a statement, In order to save
time, Xf I am the only one who has any reservation about that, it is best
to go on and I'll try and relate that to what has been agreed to in
paragraph 1 and make an ONI lateral dissent. I would like to canvass the
members of the Board and ask/^{if}any other member of the Board has the same
view. I think anything worth taking up to the National Security Council
is worth referring first to the IAC.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: As far as I am concerned it is all right either way,
but if the Admiral has any strong objections to it -

GEN. CABEL: I think it is good operating procedure, but not absolutely
binding to that extent.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I feel it is the principle, that will be adhered to,
but this procedure doesn't mean -

MR. TRUEHEART: O.K.

ADM. INGLIS: All right, I suggest we go on.

DIRECTOR: We added "before presenting it to the National Security
Council." Before presenting it, it looked like you gave it to the Secretary
of Defense. Paragraph b.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: No change in that one.

DIRECTOR: Paragraph 3c. If the Air Force member's alternative is
agreeable to everybody, we are agreeable.

GEN. CABEL: That is wrong, that was back there in -

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: This is the present c.

DIRECTOR: Yes, the present c.

ADM. INGLIS: I have a reservation on the deleted portion.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I am going to accept the deletion. The action called
for otherwise -

DIRECTOR: It is not necessary. You said what you were going to do.
Those words were unnecessary in that.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't think that it is necessary for the Director
of Central Intelligence to act through the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
I do think it is necessary for him to act through the respective and
appropriate head of the appropriate departmental head concerned.

DIRECTOR: That is what it says in the rest of the paragraph there.

You go through the same procedure. Where there is unanimous agreement, it doesn't have to go back to the National Security Council. That is why the Intelligence Advisory Committee is unnecessary on that one.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would like to point out - is the change in paragraph 1 a similar matter to ^{make it} ~~get~~ an NSC Directive, not a DCI Directive? In other words, you only have to get concurrence from the Departments and Agencies if it pertains to them. ~~In case of the NSC~~ in case of a DCI, listed in c, you have to get the concurrence from everybody every time it intends to make a ^{dir?} ~~recommendation~~. *The NSC is the result rather than the DCI*
~~the NSC? The result is rather not the DCI rule~~

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: There may be a simple ^{ex} inclusion. Are any of the DCI Directives written for the purpose of internal administration of your own shop, or ^{is it} ~~in~~ the interest of ^{the} coordination of the various shops?

MR. CHILDS: Within the shops.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: All for the coordination of other departmental agencies?

MR. TRUEHEART: It does not apply to the ~~NSC~~ ^{NSC directives} which might be issued for the internal operations? I withdraw that.

DIRECTOR: How about 4?

MR. ARMSTRONG: We were very sorry to see the ~~definition~~ definition of National Intelligence disappear and the new phrase, or rather the language of the Act inserted without the definition.

ADM. INGLIS: I agree with Mr. Armstrong.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We feel the definition was a very useful one and should be included either in this or one of the subsequent directives.

DIRECTOR: That was included in the Directive of staff intelligence.

MR. ARMSTRONG: This is the only place it occurred and the omission leaves National Intelligence in No. 3 without a definition.

DIRECTOR: I think it should be included in No. 3.

MR. ARMSTRONG: You are agreeable to put - to inserting it in No. 3?

DIRECTOR: In No. 3 where you have basic and staff intelligence and all that. We will put National Intelligence in.

GEN. CABEL: I have a suggestion. Instead of defining the

departmental intelligence suppose you substitute this expression "produced by the several departments or agencies."

DIRECTOR: Let's get that in. "In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and, shall utilize intelligence produced by the several departments or agencies for such production purposes."

MR. TRUEHEART: Eliminate a?

GEN. CABEL: Eliminate the word "departmental" and justify the deletion of the definition of "national intelligence." And also of "departmental intelligence."

ADM. INGLIS: It is not here, but we want to define it later on.

GEN. CABEL: Not here, but maybe later when it comes up?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It would be simpler to leave it in here as it is.

DIRECTOR: We have a lot of definitions in No. 3 and there again we put these words in. The Act doesn't say you will produce national intelligence, but intelligence relating to the national security.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It all means the same to me.

DIRECTOR: They don't to me, if you put a separate definition right ~~after the word~~ afterward.

ADM. INGLIS: Intelligence relating to the national security covers the water front and gets over into departmental intelligence.

DIRECTOR: But we can cut it down.

ADM. INGLIS: It also says you shall not interfere with departmental intelligence.

DIRECTOR: You have put a definition in the definition group.

ADM. INGLIS: I think in the definition of national and departmental intelligence we have to include -

DIRECTOR: "Shall produce intelligence relating to the national security. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and, shall utilize intelligence produced by the several departments and ~~agencies for such~~ agencies for such production purposes."

DIRECTOR: Cancel a and cancel b.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is all right with me.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

CAPT. DAVIS: Except it is a compromise. I question whether the Act really authorizes the production of national intelligence because the preface says for the purpose of coordinating you shall do so and so. It doesn't say you shall produce national intelligence, even for the purpose of coordinating intelligence.

ADM. INGLIS: Does the Act say you shall produce?

DIRECTOR: First, "you shall advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security; (2) make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; (3) correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government."

CAPT. DAVIS: For the purpose of coordinating.

DIRECTOR: "To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security."

CAPT. DAVIS: For the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities.

ADM. INGLIS: The only thing which is germane is the opening sentence. To correlate and produce the intelligence produced by the other departments.

DIRECTOR: That is where we differ. There should be a non-concurrence on that. Getting back to Vannevar Bush's ~~later~~ idea and that is the one we ought to get settled.

ADM. INGLIS: What is your conception of the intended functions of CIA in that respect?

DIRECTOR: That we should produce intelligence too. It is more than a small coordinating staff. Maybe that is the wrong thing.

ADM. INGLIS: I agree with you so far, but when you get over into the field of departmental intelligence -

DIRECTOR: We hope not to get over there.

ADM. INGLIS: That departmental intelligence does relate to the national security.

DIRECTOR: Everything relates to the national security.

ADM. INGLIS: That broadens the scope way beyond what we have defined as national intelligence. When we get to that it is that intelligence which transcends any one department and includes that of interest to more than one department. See the difference? And we feel, therefore, that national intelligence, as later defined, is a better word to describe your functions. Not intelligence relating to the national security.

DIRECTOR: I don't agree to that. We would have to go back and change the Act.

ADM. INGLIS: What you do have to do further - we need still another definition to define ~~by~~ what you mean by intelligence relating to the national security. It is not defined anywhere. We think you can define your functions by calling it national intelligence.

DIRECTOR: Let's take that in the definitions.

ADM. INGLIS: If we can come back to this after we get our definition.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Before we leave this section, I want to ask, Admiral, whether this definition is acceptable if it is going to be included in the definitions?

DIRECTOR: I think that is a very good definition of national intelligence, but you are not limited. The only thing we find it doesn't, we can't touch it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The limitation to practicability of duplication will apply there whether it is practicable to do so without duplicating.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is more a question of that than definition. What is practicable and what isn't, rather than what we defined in the second sentence. It is more important than the first.

COL. SHERMAN: Could I bring out, the point you make is adequately protected in paragraph 4 which says "he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities, but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities." That limits him to a duplication of efforts and I think would meet your objection.

GEN. TODD: Could you ~~inject~~^{it} indirectly define/here and then say "hereafter referred to as national intelligence."

ADM. INGLIS: That would button it up completely as far as I am concerned.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Admiral, ~~English~~^{he} has quite a point there.

DIRECTOR: I know it. Can you make a definition on that? I don't think you can.

CAPT. DAVIS: For the purpose of coordinating. If you coordinate them all together to produce national intelligence, that would be right under the Act. All of your activities are headed by that one purpose - the purpose of coordinating the several Departments and Agencies. If you tie that definition down here to that type of national intelligence, that is the type you are going to produce, clarify the whole field - your position in relation to the Departments.

MR. BOOTH: The Act always says as determined by the National Security Council. And this is our recommendation to the National Security Council as to how they should determine that particular point.

GEN. CABEL: It looks like we cannot define the fact that such intelligence as he may produce or make use of is certainly intelligence relating to the national security and then we proceed later on to narrow that field and explain what is meant by that. At his present point, it would be perfectly all right to use the expression Admiral Hillenkoetter has used and then see what principles are used in applying that in proceeding in this document and in the production paper.

ADM. INGLIS: I like that suggestion "intelligence relating to the national security hereinafter referred to as national intelligence."

MR. ARMSTRONG: That would clarify it and bring this focus to the certain definition.

ADM. INGLIS: You come over to the definition of national intelligence and that gives you as broad a field as you want. Integrated departmental intelligence - that covers the broad aspect of national policy. Anything that has to do with broader aspects of national policy and something that is of more concern to one department or agency - that is a broad implication. Is of concern to more than one Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single Department or Agency or the Military

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Establishment. That gives you plenty of room for your purposes.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: You might interpolate one word there. I don't know whether I'm getting over national policy or national security.

ADM. INGLIS: I would say national security or national policy.

DIRECTOR: Let's change that national security hereinafter -

ADM. INGLIS: I would include both national security and national policy hereinafter referred to and define as national intelligence.

COL. SHERMAN: Do you need the phrase "he will not duplicate the activities"? If you use that definition for that it automatically provides for that inclusion.

DIRECTOR: I don't think it hurts on that.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is the definition we are talking about.

ADM. INGLIS: To get this down, I make this formal motion that paragraph 4, first sentence to read as follows: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security and national policy, hereinafter referred to as and defined as national intelligence."

MR. HOUSTON: The words "national security" be added to the definition.

DIRECTOR: Yes.

ADM. INGLIS: You mean when we get over to define national intelligence?

DIRECTOR: We will have to add it there.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think it would be wrong. My general feeling in this is that I hope it is going to come true that Admiral Hillenkoetter can have a bunch of people and not be bothered by the administrative restrictions. We are poring over this stuff and coming up with something that will be beneficial to the national policy and national security. We are all embroiled ~~employed~~ in a hell of a lot of administration. We don't have much time to get the sense of that intelligence up to the upper crust. At least it is like that in my office. I^{would} like to see some people put it all together and see what it means.

DIRECTOR: Those definitions go in NSCID 3.

ADM. INGLIS: I am indifferent, I don't care.

MR. BOOTH: There is only one objection. As that is the first paper and it is going to be a long time before we know what it is going to be.

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DIRECTOR: Make an a and b.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: And national security after -

CAPT. DAVIS: There is one defect in this departmental intelligence.
It left out the meat of the definition that was included in JCS definition.

ADM. INGLIS: We are talking about the definition of the national security.

DIRECTOR: a and b are going to be left in.

GEN. CABEL: Do we have to use the term "intelligence produced by the several agencies or departments"?

ADM. INGLIS: That is all right. If you want to put this over in another paper, that is just mechanical.

CAPT. DAVIS: Departmental intelligence is already defined in a JCS paper. Part of the definition is left out here.

ADM. INGLIS: We can go back to the original wording. I don't think it makes any difference.

GEN. CABEL: I am trying to get away from an extra term and an extra definition.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: If we are going to accept it, make it right here.

ADM. INGLIS: Restore the original wording of 4 and cross out "produced by the several departments and agencies." If that is the case, I have a suggestion for a change in the definition of departmental intelligence.

MR. TRUEHEART: We have settled on national intelligence?

ADM. INGLIS: Restore the 4. I suggest that we insert after "departmental intelligence" the phrase including basic, current, and staff intelligence needed by a Department of Agency" - any kind of agency in the Government.

That erases
MR. ARMSTRONG: ~~Erases~~ the problem of having to define them here.

ADM. INGLIS: I thought it would be better to put them in 3.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Is that the only change? I don't think that is important.

ADM. INGLIS: Not if in a later paper we are going to put it in 3, not under departmental. I want to be sure.

MR. CHILDS: We have departmental here.

CAPT. DAVIS: Basic and departmental is written in the JCS and was

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approved by the departmental intelligence agencies includes basic, current

ADM. INGLIS: If you are willing to insert interdepartmental intelligence when you redefine it in another paper.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It is better there because everything is defined.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't want to put departmental intelligence here with those words left out. If this is a restatement of the departmental intelligence, then leave these words out here.

GEN. CABEL: If we are going to define it both places, we have to define it the same. It covers practically the same thing. That is the thing I want.

ADM. INGLIS: Including current, basic, and staff intelligence in this definition in this NSCID No. 1 and when we come to No. 3 define basic, current, and staff intelligence.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: There is one other way if you want to simplify ~~the paper~~ it. Say "For definition see NSCID No. 3" and put all your definitions in one paper.

MR. CHILDS: Isn't it better to have them in one paper?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Put a foot note here and will be considered by the National Security Council at one time.

ADM. INGLIS: The same thing with national intelligence - put after national intelligence "for definition see NSCID No. 3."

MR. CHILDS: Put that in at the bottom of page 5.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Part of paragraph 4.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Put it at the end of the paragraph, or a footnote.

MR. CHILDS: Leave in departmental intelligence and not include "as produced by the different departments and agencies."

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: "For definition see NSCID No. 3".

MR. CHILDS: Then "The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce intelligence relating to the national security and national policy, hereafter referred to as national intelligence. In so far as practicable, he shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various Departments and Agencies (capitalize D and A) but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes. For definitions see NSCID No. 3."

MR. ARMSTRONG: Delete a and b.

MR. CHILDS: Which will be used later.

DIRECTOR: Are we ready to go on to paragraph 5 then?

ADM. INGLIS: To make it consistent, I say disseminate such national intelligence because now we have said what that means: that intelligence relating to the national security.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is already defined.

DIRECTOR: It is carrying out the words of the Act here.

ADM. INGLIS: There was a grammatical error which should be changed to "as."

MR. HOUSTON: It is better with the "such" out and leave the "which" in.

ADM. INGLIS: That would be all right.

DIRECTOR: "Shall dissemination intelligence which."

MR. TRUEHEART: "National intelligence as ~~hereafter~~ hereinafter provided." Leaving out the "which" and "as," in view of the change.

DIRECTOR: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate national intelligence as hereinafter provided."

ADM. INGLIS: That is a big improvement. It centralizes the dissemination and functions in Central Intelligence for anything pertaining to the national security.

DIRECTOR: The crossed out words in a referred back and was unnecessarily in there.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That doesn't mean - there is a point there that we can't pick it up and read it.

ADM. INGLIS: Not in your own Department.

GEN. CABEL: I have a suggestion there. You might take that last sentence of sub-paragraph a and lift that into the continuation of the heading of paragraph 5.

MR. CHILDS: Doesn't that have to go to other Departments and Agencies?

MR. TRUEHEART: Some of that would be ~~xxx~~ just intelligence information.

MR. CHILDS: Or only to the President and the members of the Security Council, Intelligence Chiefs, and so on.

DIRECTOR: Leave it as it is and go on to b. There is not much

difference one way or the other.

ADM. INGLIS: Disseminate to the President.

CAPT. DAVIS: Cross out and start "To the President, etc."

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: In other words make one paragraph. Start the sentence "To the President of the United States."

DIRECTOR: That is all right.

MR. CHILDS: We have "to members of the National Security Council, to the intelligence chiefs, and to such departments or agencies, etc."

ADM. INGLIS: As long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are member agencies we don't have to make any mention of them. I have no objection to the wording of this, but to clear this up I would like to make this observation - I hope when the Central Intelligence Agency seeks concurrence by the other Departments that the Departments will establish machinery for rapid concurrence or non-concurrence and that it will not be necessary for you to hold the thing up for a day or a week getting it screened through a dozen different people to get the concurrence. If you run into a road-block we want to get you a quick answer. We want to get this up to the President with what comment we want to make.

25X6 MR. TRUEHEART: Is it possible to concur or non-concur or express no opinion? For instance, the Atomic Energy Commission would not want to comment on a statement like that.

ADM. INGLIS: "Shall include the concurrences, if any."

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't know whether anything would come up that you wouldn't want to comment on.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't want to get over in the State Department.

DIRECTOR: I think that is working out. The thing is you don't have to start changing words - all you have to do is send it back and say "no comment."

ADM. INGLIS: No objection. Noted.

DIRECTOR: Yes.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Are we considering b now? It seems ambiguous to me. Who's security regulations?

DIRECTOR: Security regulations of the producing agency.

GEN. TODD: I have a suggestion to clarify the point that Mr. Armstrong brought up. Maybe that will do it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would go so far as the security relugation of the originating agency other~~than~~ than the CIA.

DIRECTOR: If our's won't permit it we are not going to give it to it. I would rather see the originating agency.

ADM. INGLIS: Does that mean in case I get something from []

25X6

25X6

[] which they give me in confidence with the understanding I shall not pass it on, does this permit me to act in good faith with that reservation and not pass it on? Sometimes I do. I think we all get some that we say will not be passed on. Normally, we can by paraphrasing, by concealing the source, but if we don't have that understanding what they are going to get, are going to be passed to the CIA and our sources will be ^{choked} ~~checked~~ off.

DIRECTOR: Outside the CIA.

ADM. INGLIS: In another paragraph you have it, and interchange, and surveys and inspections, and get everything we have tied up. It might put us in an awkward place.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: But this is purely dissemination.

25X6

ADM. INGLIS: But [] might give me something with the understanding I would not disseminate it to other agencies.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: This is taken care of by this amended paragraph.

ADM. INGLIS: If the security regulation may include any dicker with any other agency.

DIRECTOR: They are your security regulations.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: If you are authorized to make a security regulation, you can make it or break it.

ADM. INGLIS: What worries me about the security regulations is does it include an agreement made by some source?

DIRECTOR: It is your security regulations and we can't go back of it.

ADM. INGLIS: I'm all happy.

DIRECTOR: When security regulations of the originating agency permit.

MR. CHILDS: Cross out "The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate" because we are using that phrase in the first.

DIRECTOR: Cross out the next phrase. "When the security regulations of the originating agency permit, the Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate to the other Departments or Agencies intelligence", etc.

CAPT. DAVIS: It still doesn't make very good grammar. Disseminate intelligence relating to the national security as hereinafter provided, and then we get intelligence and intelligence information involved in this second b.

MR. TRUEHEART: You can't read from the beginning of 5 right through.

ADM. INGLIS: Make b read "to other Departments or Agencies."

CAPT. DAVIS: There is a draft of those - and independent paragraph.

ADM. INGLIS: In order to save time, ^{let it stay as} we have ^{it} ~~the~~ it and let the staff polich it upx the grammar.

DIRECTOR: How about 6 then? We are changing the words to agree with the Act. We are simply repeating the Act there.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: No objection.

MR. TRUEHEART: O.K.

MR. ARMSTRONG: All right with us.

DIRECTOR: How about 7?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: No objection.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I do feel there has been a fairly important change here because the old introduction to old 7 provides for the end to be accomplished in 7, 8, and 9 by arrangement and under the rewritten form that is completely eliminated.

DIRECTOR: I think 7 under the old form, if you want to see something in the War Department or Inglis wants to see something with you, I will assure it is done. If he comes to you and says you, General Chamberlin, you don't come to me to see that it is done. Make a flat statement, the files are open to the other agencies.

ADM. INGLIS: Captain Davis raises a point, maybe a little on the legalistic side. His point is this purports to be a directive from the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence. The National Security Council is telling the Director of Central Intelligence that the intelligence organizations in the sever~~al~~ departments shall maintain. He questions whether that is the proper channel for the National Security

DIRECTOR: Maybe we -

MR. CHILDS: Isn't the Council composed of the heads of these departments?

ADM. INGLIS: They could transport their orders to the Director rather than through the departments. It is kind of a legalistic point.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: He has the authority to give an order. Right in your first paragraph pertains to section of the National Security Act for the purpose enunciated. The National Security Council hereby, the National Security Council with the approval of the President hereby authorizes and directs that.

DIRECTOR: He is boss of it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: You remember the National Security Council is recommending only. If you have this approved by the President, you have an established procedure for the thing thereafter.

DIRECTOR: The National Security Council with the approval of the President.

CAPT. DAVIS: This reads as a directive.

DIRECTOR: That is what we have been arguing about. It is a directive to the agencies too.

CAPT. DAVIS: That isn't what it means. All NSCID Directives are to the Director of Central Intelligence.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That has been revamped. The ad hoc committee, I understand, changed the direction of that.

MR. BOOTH: No, sir, I don't believe so. The ad hoc committee - ~~that~~ they are only directives to the Director of Central Intelligence. This change would be a very important one and swing it back. The draft still adheres to the principle that the Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence. He makes arrangements with the various agencies to carry out the various directives.

CAPT. DAVIS: That was our intention.

MR. TRUEHEART: Except on the first paragraph.

CAPT. DAVIS: We sidetracked that by saying "shall be established."

ADM. INGLIS: That first paragraph was deliberately done to evade this very debatable issue.

DIRECTOR: I don't see anything wrong in 7. I think that is a statement of the Security Council and I see nothing wrong with it.

CAPT. DAVIS: Until you issue it.

DIRECTOR: The Security Council, as we can see it, will issue it. See paragraph 7. I think you are quibbling on words. There is no objection on the meaning of the thing?

CAPT. DAVIS: Your original directive - the directives should be directives to you.

MR. BOOTH: I don't think - there is the departure from all Government principles and now maybe we are recommending ^{that} the National Security adopt a procedure to issue directives that are rather new.

DIRECTOR: The members are making an agreement - our organizations are open to each other. I don't see anything wrong with the getting down into -

CAPT. DAVIS: For policy purposes.

DIRECTOR: For policy purposes, our things are open.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't think that is it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Just as soon as the respective members of the Security Council sign it.

DIRECTOR: We know what they mean.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Those are two unusual procedures, but you can go against each other. First it is unusual for setting up an individual who can give directives to a department and body issuing directives. The lesser of the two evils, let the National Security Council issue the directives.

MR. BOOTH: That is very good if they want to do that. You must recognize this is quite precedent. If they do it for intelligence, they will do it for everything. You will have your Security Council by a majority vote tell the sections involved what they are going to do.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Set up an individual in the Government to give directives to the department head.

MR. BOOTH: We avoided that with "by arrangement."

GEN. CABEL: This whole thing is an arrangement.

DIRECTOR: I think we are getting way off and it is getting late. This is a statement of policy by the National Security Council.

DIRECTOR: We all agree it is a good thing to do.

MR. BOOTH: We may run into some difficulty. It certainly is a consolidation we have never had in the Government before. An advisory group being able to control the sections which are part of it toward centralization, but they should be cognizant of it before they pass on it.

DIRECTOR: The President is chairman and he makes recommendations to himself to do something. That sounds foolish too.

ADM. INGLIS: It sounds foolish and maybe it is. You have the same with the War Council. He makes recommendations which is more ridiculous because he has the power of decision. If they all recommend something he doesn't like, he overrides them.

DIRECTOR: If it is agreeable, I am perfectly willing to let that go.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I will have to take reservation until later. Our legal people say although the duty of making available relating to national security imposed on departmental intelligence organizations, a directive from the DCI requiring such procedure as now drafted is so unique as to introduce an entirely new concept.

MR. TRUEHEART: The DCI or the NSC?

MR. ARMSTRONG: The DCI.

MR. TRUEHEART: This would be an NSC Directive.

MR. ARMSTRONG: A directive to the DCI. He says from, but he means reissuing by the DCI.

MR. TRUEHEART: If we leave this as it is, it won't be directed just to the DCI, but to everybody. There is nothing in the lead paragraph that refers to it.

ADM. INGLIS: Dodge this and get the sense of it the way you want and not introduce any legal doubts. Is there any way out of that? Skirt around it. We are all in a -

MR. HOUSTON: Who is going to raise the legal technicality.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think that is the point. Are we deceiving the National Security Council? I don't know whether we are or not. I am ~~perfectly willing~~ perfectly willing to give the National Security Council that authority. Where are we going? Somebody has to decide.

MR. BOOTH: They should know what they are doingx when they pass it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Somebody has to be responsible in this pyrmided Government and I think that is the place to put it. The President can counter-act it if he wants to if he doesn't like it. This legal opinion is trying to get this pyrmided up to make it complicated. I think we should try and relieve the complication. That is the reason I suggested this one dodge. If he will approve this one picture, all the National Security Council papers on this subject falls into the same place and this is the only one that has to go to him because this established the procedures.

DIRECTOR: If the National Security Council approves it, the President approves it.

MR. TRUEHEART: He sees the dissents.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: These lawyers say the National Security Council have no authority to issue a directive.

ADM. INGLIS: I am inclined to believe they have no legal authority. We know in our own hearts, of course, they have the authority to issue directives. If they haven't got the authority, who in the hell has got it? We have to find a simple way of getting around that doubtful legality.

MR. BOOTH: You are in the exact position we had with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They all agreed, but no Joint Chief directed the other fellow to do it.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think that is a great weakness.

MR. BOOTH: That is the system.

ADM. INGLIS: There is no place on record where the Joint Chiefs agreed and were not implemented. They carried out their directives.

MR. BOOTH: No, the Chief of Staff of the Army put his out to the troops.

ADM. INGLIS: The Joint Chiefs of Staff put out what is a directive.

MR. BOOTH: To its own subunits.

ADM. INGLIS: A JCS directive.

MR. BOOTH: To its own staff, but not to the Army.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: They had one other dodge. They always appointed a mouthpiece somewhere to control this activity. For instance, if it were to an Army Commander, a Chief of Staffx was the mouthpiece. If a Naval

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Command, the Chief of Naval Operations was the mouthpiece. And they got that authority to deliver that order in no uncertain terms. That was a dodge. We are trying to find a different one here. I think it can be simple.

ADM. INGLIS: It is a broader thing as originating by the Joint Chiefs of Staff itself. I can cite one of them right now. It was a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur which said you are in charge in Japan. That was from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And then it went on to say the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him as the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to implement all the details. They assumed, at least, the considerable authority.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: They had authority as a group to issue an order to a field commander. We receive many such.

GEN. TODD: Each agency had an implementing agency in the case of both the Army and Navy. They sent copies to the implementing agency of action taken which was a cross-check on the action taken.

ADM. INGLIS: There is rather a close parallel between the JCS. We have General ~~Gruenther~~ Gruenther who is quite comparable to Admiral Hillenkoetter's position under the National Security Council as far as I am concerned.

DIRECTOR: Let them in and let the Security Council say we don't have the authority to do this. Let them throw it out.

ADM. INGLIS: I feel a certain responsibility to being as helpful to the Security Council as possible.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I think they should be aware of the significance of this No. 7 so they know what they are doing.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I think the President can empower the National Security Council to do this.

DIRECTOR: No, I don't think so.

GEN. CABEL: In the event any Secretary does not desire to go along, it will be he can contest it on the legal ground and then/decided in the Security Council as far as our purposes are concerned. If we are agreed and this is an aid - why not?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: There is another way I think it ought to be binding

on the Departments as well as the Director of ^{the} Central Intelligence Agency.

DIRECTOR: I think the Security Council signs it. It is binding, they are the boss.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is to put an additional paragraph on this first directive. "The respective members acting for the Security Council accepts this as their directive in their own Departments, accept this and all other approved action of the National Security Council directives to their Departments." If you are bothered about the legality, I am not, I freely acknowledge to bring it down to it.

GEN. CABEL: I think the National Security Council will have other occasions where they will have the same principle involved, so I should think that could be dealt with under their establishment of their own rule of procedures. This is only one little facet of it.

MR. TRUEHEART: If Admiral Souers thinks they should.

ADM. INGLIS: I wish we had Admiral Souers here now to give him the view of what the National Security Council is.

MR. CHILDS: He looked them over and he ~~from~~ telephoned me this afternoon. They raised one point only back in paragraph 2 "arranged with the Secretaries concerned" and I asked them if there were any other points and they didn't mention them. So whether he realized the change in 7, 8, and 9 - I don't know.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: The declaration of principle and letting it go at that which personally I feel obligated to confirm.

DIRECTOR: They will sign them over there. I would think that would be -

MR. ARMSTRONG: I'm interested in getting along, perfectly willing to let this go up this way on the assurance it be called to the attention of the Executive Secretary or appropriate persons in the Security Council. There is an issue and I will see that my Secretary is advised upon it.

ADM. INGLIS: Put that in the forwarding letter.

MR. CHILDS: It pertains to 7, 8, and 9.

ADM. INGLIS: About the propriety of having the National Security Council issue directives in this manner, that the IAC is in agreement as to the substance, but desire to call the attention of the National

DIRECTOR: Now we are on 10. In 8 we crossed out ~~and~~ "freely". ~~We~~
~~what that understood~~ "Also" is also crossed out. In 9 "In addition thereto"
is crossed out. Any objections to 10?

ADM. INGLIS: Yes, I have a suggestion. Do you want to hear mine?
I think my position in this principle that was involved in the last part
of paragraph 10 has been misunderstood. I have no idea that any of my
people over here should not be under the administrative operational control
of the Director of Central Intelligence. There should be no reservation in
my mind on that score. So it isn't a question in my mind of deciding whether
they shall be under the administrative control or serve as a representative
of my department. My point is they should do both - be under the operational
and administrative control and also in addition serve as liaison officer to
reflect the views of the departments which they represent, from which they
are drafted. So to clear up that point I suggest in place of what has been
x-ed out we substitute this: "Such departmental personnel will be wholly
under the operational and administrative control of the Director of Central
Intelligence, but in addition shall act as liaison between the Central
Intelligence Agency and their respective department in order to present the
departmental viewpoint into the appropriate activities in the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in which they participate." That was composed hastily and
the grammar and choice of words may not be so good, but that is the idea.

DIRECTOR: That would mean only certain particular personnel. For
example, you wouldn't put [] as under that status, or []

ADM. INGLIS: [] the ICAPS
and the research and evaluation groups. I would put in that category
not
particularly/the operations, Special Operations.

DIRECTOR: [] And now [] is collection and dissemination,
[] is research and evaluation.

ADM. INGLIS: I would put [] Going back to paragraph 5a:
"Intelligence so disseminated shall be officially concurred in by the
intelligence agencies" ~~xxxxshallxxxx~~ [] would
be the liaison agents to obtain concurrence. Use them in that way. That
is what they are doing right now.

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DIRECTOR: They don't get concurrence.

ADM. INGLIS: They get it from us. They get our views.

DIRECTOR: Read that thing.

MR. CHILDS: The other purposes wouldn't cover it.

MR. HOUSTON: Need that be spelled out in the directive? Arrangements or other purposes?

ADM. INGLIS: I think it should. That is one of the purposes. It is too not, to my mind, ~~so~~ important to be thrown into a catch-all.

GEN. CABEL: Is there any possibility of these people who are assigned over here and operating under Admiral Hillenkoetter being denied access to their parent departments or agencies whenever they wish to. I would say if there is any hint of a prohibition, spell it out. If just a problem of good operating practice, it shouldn't be spelled out.

ADM. INGLIS: They are not doing it, especially in the ICAPS group. It is like pulling a tooth and it must be their indoctrination over here because the people we have had over here, the minute they are attached over here I never see any more of them. I say why don't you come over and talk things over? He sort of nods in a dead-pan way and we never see him again.

GEN. CABEL: Intimate contact with the department of agency from which they originate.

ADM. INGLIS: I don't think ~~a~~ ^{the} National Security Council shall use that ~~language~~ language. They are encouraged to do it. I would like to see a definite job written into the directive. That is one of their jobs.

MR. HOUSTON: Not all cases.

ADM. INGLIS: Special Operations and Collection and Dissemination perhaps not. We have no views.

DIRECTOR: We have no objections.

ADM. INGLIS: If we have any views, we think that it is the channel. Maybe it would be advisable for Special Operations to get our view on the priority of targets.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I would like to cite you - now we have a General divorce Staff organization. One of the greatest difficulties is to ~~divorce~~ General Staff officers from the narrow ~~view~~ viewpoint of their own service and I

believe when an officer comes over here to CIA he belongs to ~~the~~ body and soul and should be free to express his will or his ideas based on his naval service or his army service, but completely free from any string that may be attached to him to pull him back in his views, to the partial viewpoint of his own service. Any control over this man here, over a man you sent to the CIA may have been very apt - with all the unscrupulous personnel, we all have it, where people can't justly size up an officer's service, it is liable to be reflected in his efficiency report $\frac{1}{2}$ very few. I would like as far as I am concerned, I don't want to influence you on the subject, but as far as I am concerned when an Army officer comes over here he belongs body and soul and if he doesn't perform his mission in accordance with his viewpoint of the whole intelligence picture, I would say he would fail if he allowed himself to be influenced by the narrow view of his own service.

ADM. INCLIS: I don't agree with you, General, entirely. I think as far as the General Staff, and that is very sound, but on the other hand in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the JIC and the JIS we have people like Captain Murphy who belongs body and soul. His fitness report and promotion record depends on what General Gruenther says, but on the other hand one of his jobs is probably as important as any other job is to come over to ONI and find out what ONI's viewpoint on a particular estimate is and go back and present that view to the JIS. Now it doesn't necessarily follow that he is going to agree with ONI when they get around the table and he hears the views of the other people - the Air Force, and the Army - he may be persuaded that the ONI viewpoint is all wrong and his instructions are to go along with the others and not ONI. He gets the ONI point of view and transmits that on to the JIS. That goes into the hopper and comes out with that thought at least considered. Then again it comes back to me as a member of the JIC and may differ with the group, including Murphy, but at least that hadn't been overlooked - the ONI slant. I feel the same philosophy should apply in the work of CIA in so far as ~~ix~~ the representatives of the services are concerned, and it is a very ~~xxx~~ small group. The big bulk of the CIA are not in that category. It is a very small group of people and it seems to me if it doesn't reflect the views of

the department. Too, what is the good of having a Navy officer/allows a wall to be built up between him and his Naval Department?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is not quite true. They go through years of training. That must have given them something. They unconsciously carry that into their views up here. To be put in a position to be influenced is what I am speaking about.

ADM. INGLIS: What is the object to having him consciously instead of unconsciously reported. His fitness report is made out by Admiral Hillenkoetter.

GEN. CABEL: I like to think we have confidence in the best judgment and in the years of training and I would like to have it felt he is not a representative of the Air Force. I am the Air Force representative and if they want, they come to me for that Air Force, but when they want that individual's best talents and best judgment he is supposed, expected to give it without being told to tell them, unless he chooses to accept what they told him.

ADM. INGLIS: Have you followed that with the JIS?

GEN. CABEL: I would like to.

ADM. INGLIS: Not with the Navy and I don't think the Navy is much more satisfied with JIS than it has been.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The present form of paragraph 10 provides for both methods.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: The JIS heretofore had been a creature of the JIC. Straight departmental representation. There is no question about it. It is an integrated staff of a Command. Admiral Hillenkoetter has a Command. He has an integrated staff, he wants people to think of his problem and not the problem of everyone else. I had this case come up while I was in the Southwest Pacific and [] wanted to put people on my staff, and I brought them into my office and said "you are my staff, you are prohibited from divulging any information [] unless I release it personally, my office releases it." Because that is the confidence a commander must have from his staff. He is loyal only to his one commander. When they come up here, they are loyal only to him. He is the boss. His loyalty is to nobody else, except their conscience.

ADM. INGLIS: That wasn't the original concept of CIA. It wasn't

supposed to work out that way. They were supposed to contribute and participate. In other words, we had the procedure and principles of JIS when this was organized. Now if that is evolved into a different conception we have to accept the evolution, but -

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It is only my idea.

ADM. INGLIS: Evidently it is the idea of everybody else here, except me. What I think to save time, everybody seems to be quite firm and positive, we had better go home and think about this.

DIRECTOR: Let's take NSCID No. 2.

GEN. CABEL: I have a suggestion. I think what your intention here was to indicate this is either of two alternatives.

DIRECTOR: Yes.

GEN. CABEL: It is an undecided question.

DIRECTOR: I want to point out that was brought up before the NIA was dissolved, and either way as far as a general opinion, it is of the IAC.

ADM. INGLIS: As far as collection is concerned, I would like to suggest in the second Intelligence Directive - instead ~~of~~ have "Jointly each in accordance with its respective needs."

DIRECTOR: That is one they have to decide on.

ADM. INGLIS: This same point has been raised before and it is now before the Secretary of Defense for decision.

MR. CHILDS: Cross out Jointly.

DIRECTOR: In accordance with its respective needs. Any other comments on this one? We have had this over before and it is the same paper.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I move that we accept ~~it~~ the Intelligence Directive No. 2, with the exception of this one thing.

DIRECTOR: It is the same as before. Now No. 3. I think that goes all the same except we must add in there ~~before~~ after basic intelligence put: current intelligence, staff intelligence, departmental intelligence, and national intelligence. Change subparagraph d to departmental intelligence; and subparagraph e to national intelligence.

CAPT. DAVIS: National Intelligence is now d?

is d. The others stay a, b, and c.

MR. TRUEHEART: Then you pull the definition ~~from the~~ for national and departmental intelligence from the first?

DIRECTOR: Including basic, current, and staff.

ADM. INGLIS: Does everyone agree on that?

DIRECTOR: On page 7 you have the air intelligence. You want to change that to: "In accordance with their respective needs."

GEN. CABEL: I request an asterisk there after the disputed part to refer to this note: "It will be noted that the IAC unanimously approved this phraseology, with only the Department of the Air Force remaining. The Navy Department has subsequently dissented therefrom and it is now before the National Security Council."

ADM. INGLIS: Before the Secretary of Defense.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: That is a lot of words.

MR. BOOTH: Add technological to scientific and economic.

GEN. CABEL: Admiral, have you considered adding national intelligence and charging that to the Central Intelligence Agency?

ADM. INGLIS: We have agreed to define it.

GEN. CABEL: This sort of buttons up the responsibility for certain types of intelligence, you complete that by giving dominant interest:

MR. ARMSTRONG: National intelligence is a different level.

ADM. INGLIS: I would like to copy down what you have for your asterisk there.

GEN. CABEL: It is not true in respect to the first one, just the second one.

MR. CHILDS: At the end of page 7. "It will be noted that the IAC unanimously approved -"

DIRECTOR: Now No. 4. That is the same as the ad hoc committee draft except paragraph 2 that we scratched out.

ADM. INGLIS: I want to go back to No. 3. In the case of most of these definitions and what not you not only define what you mean by that form of intelligence, but you have a paragraph about who is responsible and so on. Don't we want to do it the same for departmental intelligence, adding:

"Since departmental intelligence is comprised of the categories of basic, current, and staff intelligence, production and dissemination are fully covered in a, b, and c." No further explanation to departmental intelligence is required. That would be as subparagraph under the heading of departmental intelligence. The first subparagraph would define departmental intelligence, then the second would dismiss it by says it is handled by each department.

MR. TRUEHEART: That sort of goes without saying.

ADM. INGLIS: It buttons the thing up like you do for all the others. It says what it is and who is in charge of it.

DIRECTOR: That is all right.

ADM. INGLIS: You may have to change the paragraph number.

DIRECTOR: Any objections on No. 4?

ADM. INGLIS: O. K. as far as I am concerned.

DIRECTOR: No. 5?

ADM. INGLIS: I have one small change that doesn't change the sense of it. I have two small changes. One is very minor. In the first sentence change "perform" to "conduct."

DIRECTOR: We will take that.

GEN. CABEL: All right.

ADM. INGLIS: Down in paragraph 2 we think that should be broadened to include casual personnel of all departments, not restricted to the Military Establishment.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That has a specific meaning in the military service that it doesn't have in the civilian departments so far as I know and I would be at a loss to know who in our particular department would be called a casual personnel.

CAPT. DAVIS: Should be casual agents.

ADM. INGLIS: My proposed change requires when casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by an IAC and others not in an overt capacity, their activity, covert activity, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence. The present directive restricts it to the Central Intelligence, the operation of coordinating covert work abroad, but it permits certain casual covert agents of other departments to

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engage in that work as long as it is not an organized network. Some

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coordination between those departmental casual agents and the organization of covert activities is required. And that is all that this says, all it is intended to mean.

MR. ARMSTRONG: The thing I want to raise bears on that insert in it. In paragraph 2, strike out the period and add an insert: "Agreed activities departments by other ~~activities~~ and agencies." The reason for that is, as you know, the Department of State and Foreign Service have Security Officers abroad who do a certain amount of counter-intelligence in connection with visas and passport work. That might be considered casual agent contacts that come to us. It should be provided for in an agreement with the Director of Central Intelligence. It will read: "The Director of Central Intelligence . . . not to preclude counter-intelligence activities by military ~~commands~~ ^{certain} commands abroad" ~~and~~ "and agreed activities by other departments and agencies."

CAPT. DAVIS: That provides for them, but does -

DIRECTOR: I think you can put that in "certain agreed activities by other departments and agencies."

MR. TRUEHEART: Agreed intelligence activities.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: It occurred to us as we read this in the Intelligence Division that the effort to avoid this bugaboo of the National Security Council being able to control the destinies of other agencies, it has gotten themselves into kind of a backward wording of this thing and we felt a complete revision of this one was desirable. I sent it over this morning, probably no one has had an opportunity to read it. There is no important change in it. I don't know whether you would want to change it. Here is what we had. I had a limited time to get over it myself. It doesn't mean anything different than yours. (Reads ID's non-concurrence)

ADM. INGLIS: How about broadening that out beyond the military establishments?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I have no objection to that amendment. I think the inference of the wording of "activities by military commands abroad" probably had had the same inference on the rewrite of the first one, but I think as far as I am concerned it can be broadened out because it applies to us, whether or not it applies to the State Department. Was I right?

Did I state this right?

COL. TREACY: It was written from the positive point of view. The old one gave the responsibility for all counter-intelligence and espionage, such espionage for his own activities.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: He ought to protect his own, wherever he may be.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Paragraph 3 is limited to collection activities, for coordination.

COL. TREACY: There is a reason for that. Our personnel were very much concerned with the broad term "covert activities." It will be construed to include the covert and deception activities and they thought that should be a subject of a separate paper.

MR. ARMSTRONG: That is agreeable to me.

MR. BOOTH: The way this is written now, can we trust an outside coordination of covert activities?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: What is the point there?

MR. BOOTH: We have a little broader word, but practically the same. The responsibility of all the coordination, thinking that was covert, to get into other intelligence agencies we could rely on the Director of Central Intelligence. I was wondering whether the word "collection" in here would limit that.

DIRECTOR: I think that is all right.

ADM. INGLIS: As one of the agreed activities outside of the scope of this directive. Do you recognize communications intelligence? This is not a blanket which is covert?

DIRECTOR: No.

ADM. INGLIS: You think you should coordinate communications intelligence?

MR. ARMSTRONG: Not within the meaning of this directive.

DIRECTOR: What do you mean by coordination? I don't mean the running of the things but we frankly - I would like to lay off it. We want to know, we get it completely, or we don't have it. We don't want any collecting of it.

ADM. INGLIS: This directive will not be construed to preclude counter-intelligence activities by Military Commands abroad and certain

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agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies. The collection
of communications intelligence?

DIRECTOR: When they have to know, we don't have it.

ADM. INGLIS: You think you should get the end product, but the collection of it we don't think you should.

DIRECTOR: We don't want it. Let's put it in.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: This is Federal espionage.

ADM. INGLIS: So we would define communications as being covert?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Maybe that word "covert" should be -

MR. TRUEHEART: As long as you are on the point - it is not something I feel strongly about, but if you have a directive approved by the Security Council and referred to the Act of Congress, you have some very nasty words - "organized federal espionage".

ADM. INGLIS: Organized intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

MR. TRUEHEART: Collection other than ~~this~~ - this word might cause trouble if it became known. I realize it is top secret.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I don't think you could ever coin a word that would mean the same.

DIRECTOR: Congress knows about it.

MR. TRUEHEART: If it could be softened.

DIRECTOR: Let's get this ~~phar~~ phrase. We might put that in No. 1.

MR. ARMSTRONG: ~~E~~ We accept "certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies."

DIRECTOR: In connection with the national security, except for a certain agreed activities by other departments and agencies. That will take it in, won't it?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I don't know whether that 3 is bothering anybody or not, my judgment is that the communications intelligence is not included.

ADM. INGLIS: Do you think that should be spelled out in so many words?

DIRECTOR: We don't want to work on it.

MR. TRUEHEART: You use the phrase "covert collection activities."

DIRECTOR: "All organized Federal counter-espionage operations."

ADM. INGLIS: We have had a lot of criticism for not doing espionage.

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DIRECTOR: Can we accept this No.5?

ADM. INGLIS: I still want to raise this "casual personnel" to the Military Establishment and to the other departments.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: Use the old tried and true phrase "departments and agencies."

DIRECTOR: "abroad of casual personnel engaged in other than overt capacities." "Casual agents engaged in other - engaged in the collection of intelligence other than overt.

ADM. INGLIS: "Coordinate the activities abroad when casual agents are employed or otherwise utilized by and IAC Department or Agency in other than an overt capacity." Their activities and the organized covert activities shall be coordinated by the DCI.

MR.HOUSTON: How about coordination between casual?

ADM. INGLIS: We don't want him to coordinate one casual with another, but the casual with the organized Federal espionage and counterespionage.

DIRECTOR: Is that agreeable?

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: To me there is one thing, is that a direct ~~re~~ coordination or through the agency employing them. It is not necessary to spell out, but I judge the coordination would be ~~be~~ through the department rather than the agent directly.

DIRECTOR: Just to key personnel.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: If my man is crossing up your personnel, you do like you did the other day, tell him to get out.

ADM. INGLIS: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall" and you will have it consistent.

DIRECTOR: Now we can turn to No. 6 and the last. This is the ad hoc committee without any changes in there at all.

GEN. CHAMBERLIN: I quit before I got to this one. No objection.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would like to make one statement for the record:

"The correct interpretation and successful implementation of the directives which have been worked out by the Intelligence Advisory Committee depend in large measure on a good understanding on the part of each participating agency of the intelligence requirements and ~~xxxx~~ capabilities of the other agencies. These matters are, generally speaking, well known in the case of the other agencies represented on this Committee, but probably are not so well understood in the case

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of the Atomic Energy Commission, which has been in existence for only
a short time and which has begun to set up an intelligence unit only
in the last sixty days.

"I should like, therefore, to make it a matter of record that the Atomic Energy Commission is setting up its intelligence organization in accordance with its memorandum of July 7, 1947, to the National Intelligence Authority, in which the N.I.A. concurred on July 25, 1947. The Commission's memorandum and inclosure, which are available to the other representatives, explain in some detail the Commission's requirements for information and intelligence, the facilities for evaluation which it might be able to offer to other agencies, and the type of organization which it considers necessary to accomplish the above ends, in collaboration with the other Government intelligence agencies. The Commission's intelligence organization expects to operate in general conformity with that memorandum, which appears to be in accord with the proposed N.S.C. directives submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence."

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