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Had an extended talk with Mr. Farley of the NSC Secretariat respecting intelligence support for NSC activities. Farley indicated to me the tentative plan of collecting a reference book for use by the President and we discussed informally the sources that might be called upon to furnish material for such a book. I explained to Farley the importance of the intelligence arrangements that had been made under the National Security Act of 1947 and had been implemented through the IAC. I emphasized the value of having national intelligence prepared upon a coordinated basis. Accordingly I felt it important to insure that any information within the competence of the IAC be obtained from the DCI, who acts as intelligence adviser to the President. We discussed briefly whether or not information respecting forces of Allies, such as the Nato countries, should be furnished by the DCI or by Defense. I indicated that I desired to discuss this question with the DCI and, indeed, that I desired to obtain his views upon the whole plan of activity upon which the Secretariat was engaged. I also indicated briefly to Farley the fact that I desired to strengthen and make somewhat more responsive to emergency requests the intelligence support that was presently being afforded NSC, particularly in the formulation of NSC papers in the NSC Senior Staff. With respect to this, I commented that at present there seemed to be a gap in that intelligence requirements for such NSC papers were not spelled out in enough detail to enable the intelligence mechanism to devote itself to the specific questions of fact with which the NSC Staff was concerned. Mr. Farley was extremely interested in this view and we both recognized the obvious connection between this matter and the problem of periodic reporting by the NSC Senior Staff which had earlier been raised by Mr. Farley in a discussion with Mr. Dulles and myself. At the conclusion of this meeting, I undertook to (1) have a talk with the DCI and advise Mr. Farley of his views on the several questions raised, and (2) ultimately give Mr. Farley an outline of how I thought the NSC papers could be coordinated with National Intelligence Estimates. I shall have to have to have an extended discussion with the DCI on the points raised at this meeting, probably in the evening. 16 January, 14

Respecting intelligence support for NSC, the Director indicated that he was willing to send a memorandum to Jimmy Lay expressing the view that intelligence support for NSC papers should be in the form of a coordinated intelligence estimate and requesting assistance in defining the terms of reference for such answers as early as possible. 22 January, 13 c

Another thing that concerned me was the lack of exact correlation between the policy decisions being made by the National Security Council and the intelligence prepared as a basis for such decisions. This was an extremely complicated question, but I had already initiated steps to see that the Intelligence Units were better informed as to what was likely to come before the Council and also to clarify the nature of the intelligence questions that would be asked, at the earliest possible moment. To some extent this would have to be done on an "eyes only" basis with the ADs, but I felt certain that they would be able to see that their working people had sufficient guidance. 28 January, 7. 2. b

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4 Had a meeting with Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge to explore the possibility of a joint planners/IAC operation to estimate the situation in China, with specific reference to certain of [redacted] recent cables. Both Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge read over the [redacted] cables. After they had done so, I explained my reason for approaching them as follows: The possibility of liaison between planners and intelligence had long been under consideration. The Director had recently suggested to Gen. Bradley that some liaison be exchanged, but nothing had as yet resulted. It was my own feeling that when this suggestion was considered in the abstract, many fears and objections would be raised, but many of these would likely disappear in working upon a particular project. Under the circumstances, the China project (which was now entitled SIC 3) seemed to afford an excellent chance to try out a joint operation. Gen. Cabell commented briefly on the desirability of hitting this problem at its root. He believed that war-gaming should be left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he fully appreciated that it would be most desirable to give "relativity" to estimates at the earliest possible stage so that they would be directed to the real questions that were under consideration by the planners and ultimately by the policy-makers. After some discussion, it was agreed that if SIC 3 were not in too advanced a state, CIA would have the terms of reference reviewed by the Joint Chiefs' planners (the channel to the planners being Gen. Partridge). During this review, the planners could indicate any additional questions they desired to have explored or might suggest certain assumptions which should be stated in the estimate. The mechanics and details were not as important as trying to bring the estimate more into line with the realities of the situation. I explained to Gen. Cabell that this procedure was almost exactly parallel to the one that had already been developed in dealing with the NSC Senior Staff Steering Group and that I felt certain that it would have a good prospect of success. 4 March, 2

5 Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge hand-carried to the Director the decision of the JCS making arrangements for liaison with the planners. Following our meeting with Gen. Smith, I met briefly with Gen. Cabell and Gen. Partridge and explained what I had in mind in organizing an IRC. Gen. Cabell, particularly, was in favor of such a development. 7 March, 14

Attended a meeting between the NSC Steering Group and the Board of National Estimates. The following points were brought out:

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- a. Mr. Bohlen indicated that it would be most helpful to have estimates on the table during the discussion of the various policy papers and I undertook to have this done.
  - b. Mr. Noyes of Defense indicated that some indication of what had previously been covered would be most helpful. Dr. Kent stated that O/NE had prepared a card index of the substance matter of the National and Special Estimates which should be of value in this respect. Such index will be distributed to Steering Group members.

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(Cont'd.)
- c. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that estimates tended to cover short-term periods, while policy papers were intended for a longer term. It would be most helpful if some of the estimates could cover longer terms so as to be parallel to the policy papers. We undertook to look into this question.
  - d. Various members of the Staff expressed interest in having more estimates covering the implications of various contemplated courses of action. It was pointed out that we would have to receive notice of what courses of action were contemplated in order to prepare such papers, but would be glad to do so if given adequate notice.
  - e. I emphasized the desirability of the Staff members themselves reviewing terms of reference and Mr. Bohlen emphasized the value to the Senior Staff of having drafts of estimates, prior to the final product, while they were considering a policy paper. We undertook to have such drafts distributed to them.
  - f. Various members of the Staff indicated the desirability, particularly on long-term papers, of alternate views and dissents by various IAC members, if that would tend to sharpen up the conclusions of the papers.
  - g. There was also a discussion as to the value of factual tabs, and it was agreed that such tabs would be extremely helpful on some, although not all, of the papers. It was felt that such tabs should not be distributed to certain consumers, but it would be of value to the Staff members to have them attached to the estimate.
  - h. Dr. Kent raised the question of the estimative language that had been worked out in some detail by O/NE and the reaction was mixed, although it was felt that the papers were considerably cleaner from the point of language than they had been. Mr. Lay seriously questioned whether or not the ultimate consumers could ever be educated as to the meaning of the estimative terms.
  - i. As respects the use of graphs and maps, the Staff members were unanimous as to their value.
  - j. Mr. Livermore, ODM, indicated that it would be of value sometimes, when an estimate was based on a round-up of evidence made some time prior to the actual issuance of the estimate, to include a statement to the effect "This paper based upon data available to \_\_\_\_\_."

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Following the meeting I spoke to [ ] and requested him to insure that copies of all papers sent to Senior Staff members be sent simultaneously both to Mr. Dulles and myself, since we should at all times be advised as to what the various Senior Staff people were receiving. 10 April, 10

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7 Informed Mr. Armstrong that the Director would probably wish to comment on NSC 104/2 when it came before the NSC. Mr. Armstrong suggested that if a severe attack were made upon this progress report, an effort would probably be made to document its criticism of intelligence support. I explained that we fully appreciated this and later informed Mr. Amory that we might well have to write what in effect amounted to a reply brief on this subject. 7 May, 5

8 Mr. Gleason of the NSC Secretariat phoned and stated that after reading over our paper respecting intelligence support for economic activities, he obtained the impression that the policy agencies were seeking to use intelligence as a whipping post for failures of policy. I informed him that an express statement to that effect had been deleted from the original comment. Mr. Gleason indicated some concern at the coordination of economic warfare activities. I informed him that both Mr. Dulles and Mr. Wisner were well aware of this and were making representations to that effect, but there was a limit to which CIA could inject itself into the making and enforcement of policy. He said that he understood the point and indicated that he would press his suggestions with State. 5 June, 7

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